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**A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to explore an  
Alternative Unification Theory: The case of the Horn of Africa**

By

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## DECLARATION

I, *Seife Tadelle Kidane* hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree at any other university.

Signed: .....

Date: .....

Place: .....

## DEDICATION

To my daughter *Nafkot Seife*, my son *Yegerm Seife*; my late mother *Keba Tabino Hieso*, and My late father, *Tadelle Kidane Welde/Selassie*.

My greatest devotion is to my "beloved Africa, the Motherland." I want to encourage and strengthen bonds of solidarity among all indigenous Africans people, and Africans in the diaspora, in order to harness the abundant human vibrancy and natural wealth for a prosperous, dignified, and united Africa. My special dedication and thoughts go out to those who have fought and fall for African people's liberty and dignity. The United Peoples' of Africa is not a desire but a reality for her current and future generations.

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**ይህን ጥናት እንዲደርግ ለረዳኝን ሁሉን ቻይ ለሆነው አምላክ ክብር ይሁን...!!!**

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**አፍሪካ በልጆቻ ታፍራ እና ተከብራ ትኖራለች**  
**ሰይፈ ታደሰ ኪዳኔ (አፍሪካኛ)**

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism APRM
ARIA	Assessment of Regional Reintegration in Africa
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CAAU	Constitutive Act of Africa Union
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFW	Conceptual framework
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
DCWA	Debo of Central West Africa
DEA	Debo of East Africa
DHA	Debo of the Horn of Africa
DIA	Debo of Island Africa
DNA	Debo of the North Africa
DNEA	Debo of North East Africa
DNWA	Debo of North West Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSA	Debo of Southern Africa
DSEA	Debo of South East Africa
DSWA	Debo of South West African States
DWA	Debo of West Africa
DWSA	Debo of West South Africa
EAC	East African Community
EAS	East Africa States
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FAL	Final Act of Lagos FAL
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HoA	Horn of Africa
IAS	Island African States
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IOC	Indian Ocean Community
LAS	League of Arab States
LGA	Liptako–Gourma Authority
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MIP	Minimum Reintegration Program
MRU	Mano River Union
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NWAS	North West African States
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RII	Regional Reintegration Institutions



SADC Southern African Development Community  
UPA United Peoples of Africa

**Abstract:**

The integration process associated with postcolonial African unification resulted in the establishment of several Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and two continental organisations, ranging from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union. This thesis begins with the premise that the integration approach has thus far been unsuccessful, encountering structural impediments in every facet of its political, economic, and sociocultural framework. Similarly, the structure of regional economic communities (RECs) has made little difference in terms of empowering African peoples, developing intra-African trade, or accelerating the unification project to its desired heights. Additionally, it appears as though the RECs are not structured or mandated to address the socioeconomic challenges confronting populations, to restore African identity, or to promote economic interdependence among member countries. As a result, many aspects of the original vision of free movement, free trade, open borders, and Africa-wide integration remain a pipe dream. This thesis argues that a narrow focus, as well as a lack of a common philosophy and model compatible with African socioeconomic and political aspirations in an African context, is at the heart of the continent's failed unification project. Despite numerous efforts since 1963, postcolonial Africa continues to suffer from balkanisation as a result of arbitrary borders, a phenomenon that has resulted in numerous, frequently protracted intra-national conflicts, economic stagnation, and governance challenges. In essence, the majority of African regional integration scholarship focuses exclusively on economic integration, omitting critical variables such as the political, sociocultural, and philosophical contexts for regional unification. Subsequently, there is a dearth of literature focusing on the restoration of African unity through a holistic approach. As evidenced by the research, I contend that focusing solely on the integration model underpinned by economic integration will not result in Africa's full unification. Additionally, this thesis responds to calls for contemplation of what an indigenous alternative architecture might look like in order to forge a common bond and responsibility based on shared consanguinity in order to reverse colonial architecture and reintroduce the African value system. The study employs a qualitative research approach to examine the challenges to Africa's unity. The purpose of this study is to examine the possibility of an alternative African unification theory based on indigenous knowledge systems, using the Horn of Africa as a case study.

**Keywords:** AU, Alternative Unification Theory, Economic Integration, Indigenous knowledge Systems, RECs, Interdependency, Reintegration, and Restoration.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## Overview of the Study and Research Background

### 1.1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH BACKGROUND

African economic integration among nation-states has been a major focus of African sub-regional and regional organisations for decades (Hartzenberg, 2011:3). Economic integration in Africa implemented through the REC arrangements has not resulted in the anticipated unification and shared prosperity among peoples. Numerous variables have been implicated in this failure. Following the economic integration model's collapse, no attempt has been made to present an alternative unification model capable of restoring African prosperity, development, and collective aspirations. The debates over regional integration/unification go beyond traditional economic integration. Based on a review of existing literature, different integration approaches in other parts of the world have been proposed, including political, physical, market, and developmental integration. However, Africa is neither interested in navigating the best strategy for advancing its collective developmental interests nor in a position to ameliorate the current model (Adogamhe, 2008:11).

Kwame Nkrumah correctly foresaw many years ago that as Africans;

*"We can go on to multiply the advantages of a continental union. Frontier problems will disappear in a continental union. Irritating customs, and other formalities, cease to be barriers separating brother from brother; we can think of the great economic advantage of a common currency and a common market" (Kwame Nkrumah as cited in Obeng, 1997, p.49).*

The study anticipates, delineates, and focuses on broader African unification to answer two questions: "why" is the current model incongruous with African unification aspirations, and "how" this might be addressed by the use of theoretically distinct methodologies. The regional economic integration intricacies are studied and discussed extensively among the political elite and widely published by African scholars (Dinka and Kennes, 2007). However, the current literature does not sufficiently examine the 'why' aspect of the question, as well as its economic relevance to the

political project of African unification of ground realities in Africa. In addition, the question of 'how' the socioeconomic infrastructure, macro, and microeconomic relevance benefit the populations from existing political structures has not been exhausted. My thesis also focuses on how to develop an alternative theory that addresses the existing structural impediments to African unification. As a result, this thesis necessitated a thorough critical engagement insight into the potential outcomes of unification. The three fundamental premises on which I base my arguments are as follows: first, that current economic integration is ineffective. The reasons for this are that the African economy remains predominantly backward, with limited agricultural production, a lack of industrialization, a reliance on aid, and a low level of intra-African trade. All of this adds to the challenges confronting African economies (Park, 2019:300). Second, following independence, African states adopted and imposed a unification model based on Western theoretical frameworks on the African agenda of economic integration (Draper 2012:68). This borrowed model could not speak to the African economic realities of Africa. Because the African economy is at the periphery of the global economy, the anticipated positive results will not emerge unless the central issue of how to rethink, reshape and reconfigure the African unification model is seriously considered (Amin, 2002:45). The cumulative challenges are the impetus for developing an alternative unification theory that is developmental by its nature has a transformational view of indigenous African knowledge systems, and is based on pragmatic remedies. The objective is to bridge people-to-people relationships beyond artificial border partitions. Thirdly, demonstrating the new alternative architecture or unification theory necessary for African reformation will result in more viable, sound economic, political, and sociocultural synchronisation on a broad scale. Modifying the legacy parameters of colonialism has the effect of expediting the political and economic conditions in contemporary Africa.

The study proposes a holistic unification approach that considers an indigenous alternative approach based on key focus areas: how to deconstruct the previous African economic integration projects; exploring theoretical frameworks that shift the telos from dependency to interdependence; the use of the proposed indigenous knowledge systems to restore distinct African identities; and finally, to introduce an alternative African political unification theory. It is shown that the goal of intra-nation building should not be to impose collective identities, but rather to organise states so that individuals may coexist despite their differences in order to achieve shared economic progress and greater well-being. Ottaway's (2002:18) argument is that the

colonial legacy in Africa created many African countries with the simple reason to fostering dependence, formulated on economic viability or in conformity with imagining future historical self-rule. During the colonial and postcolonial eras, African leaders recognised the importance of the unification agenda. For the leaders, the discourse of African unity became the only means of destroying the imperial plan of perpetual exploitation of independent Africa. African unification appears to be the best mechanism for rescuing failed, weak, and fragile nations' whose amalgamation was founded on collaboration among nation-states (Fritz & Menocal 2007:532; Shidona, 2018:27; Mamdani 2007; Scott 2007:13). The ideological, social, intellectual, and political fragmentation of African nation-states is also cited as a major impediment to unification. This lack of shared political cultures based on cohesive lived experiences, exacerbated by foreign influences, significantly undermines the unity journey.

This current study examines the aforementioned critical challenges and then proposes an alternative and comprehensive approach that takes a more holistic approach to African realities than is currently in place. The proposition based on the indigenous Afrocentric unification model that takes into account local knowledge allows for functional unity that embraces diversity. The study's foundation was the continent's historical, philosophical, psychological, sociocultural, and political context. The thesis examines incremental governance and institutional structures, and the critique of artificial boundaries. This proposition outlines the approach of this study while also providing a rationale and justification for it. The term "unification" refers to a holistic approach to integration that considers political, economic, sociocultural, and philosophical factors based on shared African citizenship and identity. Under the African unification model, unbounded African citizenship that promotes shared sovereignty is preferred to bound citizenship that is territorial in nature and survives on the precipice of a spurious narrow ideology of non-interference in a nation's governance of its citizens.

## **1.2: FRAMING OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM**

The failure of Africa's economic integration model is widely acknowledged due to poor economic performance, welfare, political inconsistency, and stagnant living standards among African citizens. Dinka, and Kennes, (2007:14); Adogamhe, (2008:6) The fundamental problem is the

absence of people-centred policy plans, grand visions and nuanced understanding of the societal structures in the continent. As a result, an adaptable unification model that speaks to societal needs is required. The problem caused by the related absence, and sometimes lack, of appropriate mandate and representation in all African Union systems remains to be solved (Adogamhe, 2008:2). The key areas that are critically evaluated are disconnections and disengagements with beneficiaries of the African unification model, and the AU lack of a political framework, its RECs, that cascade down to national governments. The postcolonial African economic integration theory is derived from the European model. Because of poor performance on many fronts, the pursuit of sustainable development and unification through regional economic communities is far from successful (Jiboku, 2015:6). Comparatively, the current arrangement of Africa's RECs contributes a great deal to the imposition of the wrong model. Furthermore, a multiplicity of membership in each RECs fractures the energies that might have been concentrated on refining the unification model, and this consequently poses as a structural impediment and an obstacle to socio-political unification in the continent (Dinka and Kennes, 2007:16). As previously stated, one aspect of the challenge is the importation of the regional integration model from the European Union (EU), whose history is very different from that of Africa, with the latter having dominated while the former was a dominant power for much of the twentieth century (Monnet and Schuman 2006:15). The concept of European economic integration arose from the need to respond to regional conflict, economic damage, and the Cold War rivalry between the East and West blocs. The initiative to industrialise the Eurozone received unwavering support from the United States, making the integration process go more smoothly (ibid 2006). Following the success storey, many continents, including Africa, adopted the EU-inspired integration model without taking into account the economic and political realities of each region (Draper 2012:68). The fundamental difference between the European model and other continents' economic integration is that the European model was built on three ideological foundations: democracy or 'republican liberalism,' commerce and trade or 'commercial liberalism,' and institutions or 'regulatory liberalism' (ibid: 69).'

African regionalism and unification aspirations and its objectives are profoundly different than European ambition on the ground realities. Africa's unification ambitions are also distinct including a desire for economic, political, and security interdependence and the development of a cultural identity impaired by colonial past (Fawcett & Gandois 2010:3). Adapting the Eurocentric model

contradicts Pan African beliefs and undermines Africans' ability to produce initiatives that are grounded in the realities (Gibb, 2009:702). Freedom from colonial rule was the underlying foundation of the Pan-Africanism struggle, as was mobilising and empowering African peoples against oppression and exploitation, and standing united for a better Africa (Adogamhe, 2008:7). The Africa unification model aimed to replace the colonial legacy with a collective African identity and citizenship rights capable of supporting intra-African cooperation (Hopkins, 2013:30). The thesis contends, however, that African leaders have failed to offer an alternative integration model that emancipates and transforms the continent into a united and prosperous force.

In contrast to African experiences, European elites created an optimal economic integration model with a shared commitment that ensures long-term multilayer cooperation among European citizens (Katzenstein, and Checkel, 2009:5; Monnet and Schuman 2006:17). The failure of Africa's economic integration model is due to factors other than the Euro-centric model. It seems, Africa's institutional performance combined with a lack of political coherence to also stall progress. From the outset, the idea of installing an economic integration model in the absence of an excellently or moderately performing economy among members was impractical. The best analogy that can explain the scenario is "planning hydropower without flowing river." The political elite's outward-looking perspective has significantly harmed and undermined local realities, as well as the African people's inherent strengths and potential. The other challenge that postcolonial African leaders face is that adapting the European economic and governance model will be wishful thinking without democracy and transparency in national structures. African leaders' regime solidarity even when it is apparent that some of the leaders are violating the human rights of the very ordinary African people in whose names the leaders claim to rule (Adogamhe, 2008:16). All of these issues have not been adequately analysed and discussed in the literature with the view to discuss alternatives and solutions to Africa's unification quagmire.

In the absence of work on an alternative model of unification, which is a major silence in the literature of African integration, this current thesis attempts to explore an African alternative governance and institutional model. Fundamentally, the unification architecture and sub-regional arrangements must be rethought. According to the study, the unification architecture (regional economic and political integration) should be redesigned to align with the indigenous reintegration model. The indigenous model formulated on the six pillars of historical, philosophical,

psychological, political, economic, and sociocultural context of the African continent should take precedence over narrow projects of economic integration (Kidane 2018:35). The current sub-regional arrangement (regional economic communities) ought to be reconfigured and reformulated in accordance with indigenous governance and institutional framework. Since this thesis deals with the sub-regional agreements, horizontal and vertical relationships; I will briefly discuss the relevance, compatibility, and uniformity of literature that deals with these topics. To build an administrative bloc, three fundamental premises must be met: the regional bloc's political, economic, and historical context. The Horn of Africa is used as an archetype in this analysis, as well as to investigate an alternative model of African unification.

The Horn of Africa, like the rest of Africa, has a political geography defined by colonial-era nation-states (McBride, 1981:43). Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan make up the Horn of Africa. The region is home to over seventy ethnic groups, each with its own set of languages, dialects, and cultural value systems (Mengisteab, 2011:13). Ethiopia's central role in shaping state borders dominates the Horn of Africa. At the same time, whether Ethiopia is perceived as an expansionist state by its neighbours is debatable and beyond the scope of this study. The Horn of Africa is a complex and dynamic African subregion (Kornprobst, 2002:370). The importance of the Horn of Africa geopolitics drew Western powers to have a large presence and compete to influence and control sub-regional politics, including the Middle East (McBride, 1981:42). The volatility of the region and its weak sub-regional formations are among the important subjects that will make the study appealing for proposing an archetype of regional building bloc formations as a result of the presence of all of the major superpowers. Frehiwot cited a news report where "President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika appealed...for African unity and said boundaries in Africa were ethnological and geographical nonsense" (Evening News, (1963:9) cited by Frehiwot, 2015:314).

This thesis' proposal for an alternative unification model is expected to make a scholarly contribution by introducing a new paradigm of indigenous alternative formation as a unique approach to the African unification project. This formation is designed in a unique way by reengineering the past and reinvigorating the current stalemate. Four pillars support the fundamental principle: restoration, reconfiguration, harmonisation, and realisation. The interdependence of the significant pillars as discussed in chapter five presents to speak to each

other about the importance of restoring African value systems by introducing common African affiliations and the abilities embedded in self-governing models. From a different angle, African knowledge contributed to the larger world by laying the groundwork for governance, institution building, history, anthropology, ethics, political philosophy, and language (Mudimbe, 2020:32; Hountondji 2009:128; and Igboin 2016:157). This indigenous model recognises that the African value system embraced the concept of humanity and life, and the importance of corporate bonding. Reconfiguring the administrative boundaries that have been impediments for six decades is a start-off point in responding to twenty centuries of societal demand by reconstructing the administrative classification based on Afrocentric rationales. The inherent weaknesses of postcolonial African states, and boundary configurations, should shift upwards rather than downwards when interstate unions are considered (Hughes 2004:834; Ajala 1983:178). This proposition selectively appropriates and exhibits the innovative creation of African administrative boundaries conceived in a precolonial state-of-mind.

### **1.3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

In this study, the research questions were designed as a particular instrument to explore the process and to realise the expected outcome. These questions influence the research through a literature survey and interviews for exploration, description, and explanation. This study will be guided by the critical research questions.

#### **1.3.1: Primary Research Question**

Why have postcolonial African unification models failed to bring the vision of African nations and peoples achieving unity and prosperity to fruition, and what alternative models might be applicable to Africa?

#### **1.3.2: Secondary Research Questions**

The following sub questions were asked in respect of the primary research question.

- What are current models of integration and unifications and what of thinking shape them?

- What kind of impediments and successes have the current unification model confronted and how has this affected the Horn of Africa?
- Why have African states been unsuccessful in constructing a unification model that is suitable to the African economic, political, and sociocultural context?
- What alternative unification theory needs to be explored, going forward, and how can that be employed?

#### **1.4: RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES**

The research aim of this study is important to understand the current regional economic integration model impediments and to formulate an alternative unification model based on the objectives and the research questions. It is accordingly essential to explain the objectives of the study and evaluate how they are applied to the research.

##### **The research objectives are to:**

- Describe the current state of the unification model including its historical evolution to the present;
- Analyse the challenges of the unification agenda in Africa; and
- Identify alternative models for Africa's unification.

The research questions are meant to elicit an answered inquiry into a specific aspect of the study objectives and to define the outcomes expected. Besides, it exhibits the historical evolution of Africa's regional economic integration to the present challenges and why the alternative model is essential.

#### **1.5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**



### **1.5.1: A Qualitative Research Approach and Design**

A research design is defined as a strategy for gathering and analysing evidence to answer the research questions of a study (Baskarada, 2014:3). The qualitative research design is an attempt to highlight the meanings people make and the actions they take, and to provide interpretations of phenomena (Creswell, and Poth, 2016:288). A qualitative research design allows for a systematic investigation into the meanings that emerge from the participants' experiences, with the goal of presenting events as they occur in a natural setting (Corbin & Strauss, 2014:3; Creswell and Poth, 2016:18). Qualitative researchers attempt to comprehend phenomena through the interpretations provided by participants (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba, and 2011:177). The essential characteristics of qualitative research demonstrate how ontological and epistemological principles are relevant to the study's foundations, such as research aims and questions (Beck, and Perkins 2014:7; Creswell, 2016:17). I will begin by examining the ontological and epistemological considerations that underpin the constructivist research method and then provide my justification for adopting this paradigm and the rationale behind the methods I selected.

A qualitative research approach based on inductive analysis does not begin with a preconceived premise; rather, qualitative data analysis is critical to determining and interpreting reality based on the research context (Bowen, 2006:13). Since the study aims are to evaluate the existing unification method in Africa towards exploring an alternative unification archetype a well organised research design is imperative. A constructivist grounded theory approach allows us to search for various points of view and critical inquiry methods designed to theorise action (Charmaz, 2017:37). Furthermore, constructivist grounded theory allows an opportunity for the researcher to investigate multidimensional themes to induce concepts and to provide a theoretical foundation (Mills, Bonner, and Francis, 2006:26). Adopting a grounded theory approach with an inductive approach will aid in the methodical development of a model from the collected data. Furthermore, the qualitative research approach is preferred for capturing participants' thoughts and experiences regarding regional unification. A qualitative research approach is appropriate for an analysis that will rely on qualitative data in the form of documents and a limited number of semi-structured interviews.

## **1.5.2: Data Collection Methods**

The data for the study came in two forms: primary data and secondary data. Primary data is information gathered by the investigator for the specific problem being investigated. Secondary data, on the other hand, is research data that has already been gathered and is available in a variety of formats (Hox and Boeije 2005:596). Semi-structured interviews were used as the primary data collection method for this study, and the data was analysed using the thematic content analysis technique. Regional unification experts, a government official in charge of political affairs, and African academics are among the key informants. Participants in the interview were selected purposively, in terms of their ability to provide adequate answers to research problems and research questions. I used individual semi-structured interviews with experts, academics, and politicians were used to analyse and contextualise findings. The thesis used the regional unification and related academic literature as secondary sources that are available in the libraries and Internet databases to supplement primary data sources. Multiple data gathering methods, including interviews with a variety of sources, at a variety of times and locations, and document examination, facilitated in the formation of practical patterns and knowledge development (McKendrick 1999:41).

### **1.5.1.1: Individual interviews**

Individual interviews with key informants and community members have the advantage of providing the investigator with insights and ideas during the interview, allowing the investigator to manage queries in an examinable format (Kumar, 1989:7). The key informants are regional unification experts from intergovernmental organisations, responsible for political affairs from Embassies and regional unification researchers from the higher education institution. According to Barriball and While (1994:330), Houghton, Murphy, Shaw, and Casey (2015:6), the flexible nature of a semi-structured interview data collection method allows for better descriptions and responses from respondents when examining complex issues. The study has two research locations. The first location was in Addis Ababa, home to the African Union headquarters and an

IGAD branch office. The other location is in Gauteng, South Africa, where the Embassies of the Horn of Africa and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) offices are located.

Interviews were conducted with twenty individuals. The representatives of intergovernmental organisations intending to participate in this study are from the AU, IGAD, and NEPAD. The interview involves regional unification experts, two participants, each from the AU and NEPAD, and IGAD with a total of six participants. The interview sample includes five Embassy officials, each one responsible for the political affairs at Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan who are based in South Africa, Gauteng. Two academics from Addis Ababa University, one from the political science department and one from the school of economics were also used. It was critical to include ten community members in this research, in addition to academics, government, and intergovernmental organisations.

Purposive sampling was used for these interviews, which was tailored to the research sites and participants chosen for this study. Purposive sampling entails selecting research sites and participants based on specific characteristics that make them appropriate for a given study (Creswell and Poth 2016:119; Nieuwenhuis, 2014:76). In the same vein, purposive sampling enables the researcher to collect data from multiple sources from which comparisons can be made to determine the best practise from the sampling data (Silverman, 2013:103). There are various types of purposive sampling, but I used a maximum variation method for this study. Maximum variation Purposive sampling is used by researchers when they want to understand how different people in different settings experience a phenomenon (Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim, 2016:2). All of the information gathered during the semi-structured interviews was recorded in English.

#### **1.5.1.2: Documentary research**

Documentary research, which analyses documents for authenticity, meaning, credibility, and representation, is an important method of data collection (Ahmed, 2010:6). The documents to be used are public domain and take the form of books and journal articles. These documents include

policy documents such as the Horn of Africa countries' foreign affairs policies and IGAD's regional integration policies. The African Union Constitutive Act and Agenda 2063 are the blueprints for transforming Africa, and they will be scrutinised for insights into the current state of unification and potential future alternatives.

### **1.5.3: Data analysis**

An inductive ontology research methodology is instrumental in developing a proposition to build bridges between different social structures (Ding, and Foo, 2002:129). Inductive reasoning is a bottom-up approach that enables the researcher to build from specific observations to a more general conceptualisation, enabling the researcher to make sound judgments and reach more persuasive conclusions (Hayes, 2007:32). The inductive approach helps in the identification of patterns that can be used to construct a theory; yet, the researcher needs to formulate the research question to be investigated using an existing method (Carlile, and Christensen, 2005:5). The induction method is used to validate ideas by examining the proposition, following appropriate patterns, and instilling observations that support or challenge theoretical assumptions (Bendassolli, 2013:6). The approach is, therefore, appropriate for exploring the transitional propositions from a Eurocentric idea to Afro-optimism in considering things will change in favour of the African unification project.

### **1.5.4: Quality criteria**

I ensured that the findings of this study are credible, reliable, and authentic and that their applicability is transferable to other contexts. In qualitative research, credibility implies that the findings are trustworthy and believable and that they reflect the participants' lived experiences with a phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 2014:2). Furthermore, in accordance with Creswell and Poth (2016:115), data will be collected from various sources for cross-validation to ensure the credibility of this study's findings. In agreement with Willig (2008:3), I record my reactions and feelings during data collection to reduce bias and increase credibility. The process assisted me in identifying my biases and assumptions and mitigating their impact on the data's subsequent findings.

Throughout the research process, I made certain that I did not allow my own experiences and thoughts about African unification to influence the participants' responses. In agreement with Berger (2015:230), I requested an interview to follow up on questions in order to improve the rigour of this investigation. I made certain that any biases and interference with the participants or the interpretations of phenomena were not imposed on the data in any way. I kept a reflective journal, as Willig (2008:8) advised, to capture biases as they emerged during the research process. A triangulation approach was used in the data analysis, which included conducting interviews and reviewing relevant policy documents to determine the divergence and convergence of member states' policies on regional unification (Jonsen & Jehn 2009:125).

### **1.5.5: Ethical Considerations**

I endeavoured to adhere to all the norms and rules of research and to uphold high standards of ethical consideration such as confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy of the informants. I followed the rules and regulations laid down in the University of Pretoria's Code of Ethics for Research during the research period. The key informants will be treated ethically, and their consent attained before the interviews. I applied the principles of anonymity. Confidentiality of the informants was guaranteed throughout the research process by implementing the rules and regulations of the University of Pretoria. When permission was required, all the necessary ethical procedures were followed to obtain ethical clearance and communicate the organisations accordingly. The study adhered to the research ethics policy of the University of Pretoria.

### **1.6: The Core Concepts Guiding the Study**

In this study, the conceptual framework (CFW) that guides this study is this and that based on the grounded theory to critique the current unification approach and explore an alternative unification model. I agree with Jabareen (2009:52) who argues for the development of a theory that demands a concrete concept supported by literature, data, and given conceptual descriptions to have intended output. The study's primary goal was to present the findings in a structured philosophical

approach, and how to conduct the research thoroughly and with a specific focus. Qualitative research effectively critiqued existing theories and applied them to new contexts through case study research, motivating the impediments of current approaches and constructing a new model (Haunschild and Eikhof, 2009:108). The novel paradigm is expected to demonstrate its applicability and phases of implementation. A conceptual framework is more than just a set of vital factors, constructs, or variables; it assumes that each concept plays an important role in the formulation of a model (Miles and Huberman, 1994:109).

The CFW of this study attempted to apply unification theory to the innermost of African indigenous institutional, governance, political, economic, and sociocultural epistemic value systems. The concept does not work in isolation; Africa's knowledge outskirts must be re-centred and customised to serve the interests of the African peoples. Essentially, the idea is to deconstruct the current state of weakened economic integration while also advancing the concept of interdependence among African countries and proposing an alternative indigenous unification theory. The European regional integration model has had a significant impact on African regional economic communities (McCarthy, 2010). It is also implied that if African countries fail to achieve successful and meaningful integration, they will end up with unsound, small, and fragmented economies, which will become a major impediment. The European economic integration model was imposed in order to make it easier to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and other trade-enabling factors (Draper, 2012:68).

The following key concepts served as the cornerstone for the proposed research work. The three interconnected concepts deconstruct the current model, shifting from dependency to interdependence by establishing a new unification theory.

### **1.6.1: Critiquing the African Economic Integration Project**

Critiquing the current African economic integration was advantageous for observing and comprehending the model's critical challenges from a political, economic, and sociocultural perspective. Existing integration model quandaries take many forms, ranging from theoretical

assumptions to implementation. However, the major impediments revolve primarily around governance and institutional issues, which include a lack of political will, an overemphasis on absolute sovereignty, the multiplicity of REC membership, and a lack of mandate and representation. The utmost challenge involved the structuring the sub-regional building blocs and the relationship with member states and supranational entities. Also, Africa's construction refers to the existing relationship between ethnic groups, languages, and artificial boundaries in Africa. According to Miguel (2004:39), supranational entities' political aspirations must balance indigenous cultures and language configurations so that the relationship between ethnic identities is not jeopardised. A broader matrix of regional blocs is required for African supranational institutions. Beyond language and religion, there should be a consideration of shared challenges, such as economic competitiveness, equal voice, political participation, ecological problems, and forming a bulwark against exclusion and marginalisation as essential considerations (Appiah, 1993:43).

From a conceptual perspective, the purpose is to deconstruct and reduce a phenomenon to its constituent parts to comprehend, analyse, and reinterpret the construct. In this case, the current African unification approach as our research phenomenon can best be understood, interpreted, and reinterpreted by disassembling it into its constituent parts for deep understanding. The segmented and fragmented African identity crumpled through an imaginary line (boundary) drawn by colonialists, becoming naturally assimilated over time (Mkandawire, 2004:3). In the African context, identity takes many forms: cultural, ethnic, political, linguistic, and religious. The inclusion of the Horn of Africa as a component of this project is intended to provide a thorough examination of the larger African unification project. The critique is formulated on reality, its challenges, and its successes have been extrapolated to answer the questions posed by this study. The greatest challenge is the construct of states in Africa and the existing relationship between ethnic groupings, language, and artificial boundaries.

### **1.6.2: The Path to Interdependence**

The concept of interdependence has distinct advantages in enabling a transition from an insignificant economy to more robust opportunities. Interdependence among member states

entails complementing one another in specific specialisation ways for the collective good (Moravcsik 1991, 1997). Moving from dependency to interdependence in Africa will lay a solid foundation on political, economic, and sociocultural frontiers. Due to poor infrastructure and the lack of an inward strategy in relation to Asia and the European region, intra-African trade is currently minimal or non-existent (Mattli, 1999). Unless African countries consolidate economic opportunities, they will remain on the periphery of the global economy (Torres & Anderson, 2004:10). The interdependence of African countries is critical in rationalising the issue of identity and shared sovereignty. And African identity, citizenship, and shared philosophy are critical in defining the unification of Africa and Africans, respectively. The arrival of the colonial powers in Africa altered the identity dynamics. Africans merely adopted the new territorial definition of identity through colonial languages and affiliations. More recently, colonial association and assimilation have become part of the African identity. African identity is a cumulative and diverse cultural, political, and social construct (AU, 2004).

The concept of interdependence has distinct characteristics that have the potential to transform an unsuitable economy into a more meaningful economy and political possibilities. Opportunities include not only economic benefits, but also political, social, and cultural exchanges. The concept of unity manifests itself in various ways through interdependence in political and economic systems that converge for development, not through competition rather a corporation. Africa can take experience from postcolonial unification failures and plan a turnaround strategy to secure political and economic space based on mutual trust and benefits. The most heinous manifestation of a colonial legacy is the proliferation of territorial jurisdictions of states shaped by economic viability and development assurance (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:17). Interdependence between countries entails increasing collaboration with one another in a broader context to the effect of transnational relations interest for the collective good.

### **1.6.3: Alternative Unification Theory**

The African indigenous alternative unification theory emerged to provide a practical solution to disrupt with the status quo. A single regional economic integration approach can neither bring economic advancement nor help to forge political and economic unity in Africa. The indigenous



solution, designed governance, and institutional framework in this study are motivated by the desire without the box. The study is considered a holistic approach because it included all necessary variables to ensure its unification and development. The alternative model addressed the main critical challenges of postcolonial African unification: the integration model, the current institutional framework, and governance systems. Alternative methods acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of Africa's economic structures as a result of market fragmentation and limited opportunities. The economic integration model adapted for the last forty years has not demonstrated the model-based geographic arrangements that enhance economic advantages. Exploring an alternative African unification model allows one to identify significant structural problems and perplexities in Africa's institutional formation. The alternative theoretical approach comprised the methodology, conceptual framework, modus operandi, structural foundation, and future steps; and the full description of the alternation unification theory definitions found in chapter five.

### **1.7: STUDY DELIMITATION**

This study did not exhaustively analyse the historical impact of the current weak position of integration as this fell outside the approved purview of the study. This study focuses on establishing that led to the failure of economic integration in Africa and particularly the Horn of Africa, in a very limited fashion. The approach is not completely orthodox as understood within Eurocentric in that there is a significant emphasis on exploring an alternative to the “normal” approaches to integration studies based on endogenous paradigms, in response to current calls to decolonize how we think about African subjects. Some elements in Eurocentric approaches to research and presentation of findings may be unusual, if not uncommon, to the readers. However, efforts are being made to find alternative methods of cultivating knowledge in this field of study.

### **1.8: LIMITATIONS**

The limitations are various, but the critical one is first: not utilising first-hand data and lack of adequate literature availability. Second, there is limited knowledge about the benefit of unification

among the bureaucratic circle. Thirdly, the fear of the unknown among communities wrongly magnifies the socio-cultural, ethnic, and language differences between member countries. Proposing an alternative unification theory is a broad and complex subject that necessitates new theoretical tools outside of the scope of International Relations (IR) as a discipline. The scope ranges from basic economics to infrastructure engineering, from political expertise to legal definitions, and from historical perspectives to geographical landscapes. However, for the study's assertions, a critical literature review and extensive interview approach were used.

## **1.9: CHAPTERS OUTLINE**

**Chapter One:** introduced the study and provided its rationale and its objectives. The chapter outlined the research problem and briefly mentioned the methodology that the study has utilised. The chapter presented a definition of the concept's guidance and situates the review within the existing literature and outlined the study's aims and objectives as a justification for its relevance of the subject to be investigated. The next chapters are thus structured:

**Chapter Two:** Critically reviewed the literature on African integration from the historical, political, economic, and sociocultural context in the pursuit of postcolonial unification agenda. The critical literature that was discussed during the theme analysis debates was expanded on in the second chapter. Discuss the gaps and shortcomings of the literature in resolving the obstacles to Africa's unification mission. The literature survey was divided into five sections and fifteen subsections in chronological order in reviewing different literature and contextualising the study objectives. The literature began with a brief introduction of scopes and objectives of the historical evolution of Africa nation-building, fragmentation, and postcolonial pursuit, including the current integration model rationale, impediments, and reasons for failure. It also included the methodological approach and feasibility. The literature review assisted in interrogating prior scholarship and addressing the study's overarching question, elucidating the failure of postcolonial African unification and examining failed models, and proposing an alternative theory applicable to Africa.

**Chapter Three:** Provided a substantive background analysis of the historical evolution of regional integration that is continental unification based on nation building from precolonial to postcolonial periods. The second part of this context will consist of theoretical perspectives on integration/unification and conceptual outlines. The chapter has revealed a functional background analysis in the form of precolonial governance's historical context, philosophy in Africa, colonial Africa's governance knowledge system, and the postcolonial economic integration project. Additionally, it unveiled indigenous governance, as well as indigenous institutional theory, that are embedded in African systems. Theoretical perspectives on integration/unification, and conceptual outlines, were also discussed. The theoretical methods are defined methodically as a foundation for developing indigenous unification theory. The findings and results of data analysis, followed by broad frames of the unification impediments discussed in chapter four and the outline in chapter five that follows.

**Chapter four:** discussed thoroughly to understand the current state of the unification process, the factors that have inhibited and enabled integration in Africa on a continental and regional scale, as well as those that have undermined the current integration model, were examined and presented. It primarily investigates African historical unification instigation and its impediments from the Pan Africanism movement, as well as why postcolonial African unification models have failed to realise the vision of African nations and peoples' unity and prosperity. The chapter is divided into four sections: first, the impetus for African historical unification and its obstacles; second, institutional impediments in the postcolonial African unification project; third, governance impediments at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels; and fourth, a lack of ideological clarity as a barrier to Africa's unification process. Furthermore, this absence of institutional, governance, and ideological leadership also meant that there was no feasible ideological framework in place, which left the project to fragment. Similarly, the chapter addressed institutional, structural, and operational challenges at national, sub-regional, and regional levels. Furthermore, the chapter draws on available data findings as well as insights from the published literature to answer the study's research questions. The fifth chapter presents data analysis and findings in semi-structured formats.

**Chapter Five:** The chapter presentation includes data analyses and findings, as well as in-depth insights from experts on regional integration, academia, and ordinary African citizens. The chapter discusses the interpretation of data from semi-structured individual interviews with key informants on regional unification experts, such as government officials, academics, and private citizens. Individual interviews were designed by dividing the challenges, opportunities, and alternatives for African unification into three parts. The economic integration model thus far, how progress has been made, and what challenges have been encountered. The chapter is divided into six parts. The feedback of experts and citizens: first, the current governance and institutional system; impediments and successes of the current unification model; knowledge about African unification; the reasons for the current unification model's ineffectiveness; the suitability of the current regional economic integration model; the alternative unification proposition and recommendations. The chapter presented its findings in a specific pattern in order to incorporate feedback from experts and ordinary citizens into the overall findings. In a similar vein, Chapter Six presents a comprehensive alternative unification theory.

**Chapter Six:** Outlined the broad frameworks of an alternative unification theory in general and presented the Horn of Africa in particular as a case study by demonstrating how it would work, including its institutional and normative frameworks. The fifth chapter provided a substantive background of a comprehensive theoretical framework that can be used as an alternative unification theory. Furthermore, the model was built on the foundations of the indigenous governance model. The rationality of the theoretical proposition was provided in the chapter. It explained how the current governance model's impediments are related to structural and sovereignty versus collective identity; one of the sections discussed the theoretical structure's hierarchy of the three layers, which are Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa. The three layers of continental hierarchy present a logical pattern and briefly explain the three branches of authority: the people's representative, the executive, the judicial, and the representation matrix. The alternative employment theory and the current model's stage of substitution are discussed. Finally, the chapter explained how twelve building blocs (Debo) were formed as a result of an alternative indigenous governance paradigm.

**Chapter Seven:** The study was summarised, as were its broad recommendations for future research. The chapter highlighted how the study made a significant contribution by proposing an indigenous unification theory. The chapter introduced a novel approach to effecting change away from the current practise of government-led intergovernmentalism and toward citizen-oriented supranational structures. The chapter discussed the governance methodology design that allows for direct representation as well as the mandate, accountability, and responsibilities of representatives. The chapter demonstrated distinct and pragmatic methods based on deconstructing the past and negating the current stalemate. Four pillars support the core principle: restoration, reconfiguration, harmonisation, and realisation. The chapter suggested that research findings be disseminated beyond academia and research institutions in order to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. The findings of this study can be used to spark a broad discussion at national, sub-regional, and regional institutions about adopting better practises. Finally, the chapter summarised the study's objectives and contribution to knowledge creation in relation to supranational governance, power devolution, and representations in the African context.

#### **1.10: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The chapter introduced the study and discussed the framing of the research problem, as well as the research questions, goals, and objectives that guided the investigation. The research methodology used specific techniques to identify, select, process, and analyse study data. Furthermore, the conceptual framework illustrates what to expect and discover during the research process. It defines the variables that are relevant. In general, this chapter summarised the most important studies conducted thus far in chronological order, including the core ideas, scopes, delimitations, and limitations of the studies.

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## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **The Current State of Unification of Africa: A Literature Review**

#### **2.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides an overview of literature discussions on Africa's current state of unification. The milestones of African regional integration, as well as the global trend and historical context, are briefly reviewed. The literature on the definitions of economic, political, and sociocultural integration, and how these definitions have evolved in the African perspective, was investigated. The description of various initiatives aimed at African unification is given consideration. Key debates on regional integration, regionalism, nationalism, and state formation are brought to the forefront, laying the groundwork for this thesis' argument and recommendation of an alternative model. I also conduct critical reviews of OAU/AU treaties, conventions, protocols, and charters related to continental unification. Following an explanation of various African unification initiatives, a review of the literature on the interpretations of historical and philosophical approaches to regionalism, and how these deconstructions have improved over time in the African context, is presented. This review also looks at what the literature says about various integration models relevant to this study, and its counter-arguments. The literature review went on to discuss topics such as economic and political integration, nation-building in relation to state formations, and the effects on postcolonial African regional integration. Examining a variety of sources was critical for comprehending the current configuration of RECs and their associated challenges, as well as the raging debates over the viability of the current African economic integration model. Similarly, the review included other methods, such as intrastate formations, to consider alternative unification models, which is critical when considering indigenous governance framework. The purpose of a critical review of the current economic integration approach is to better understand the structural impediments to political integration in the contemporary African perspective.

The chapter conducted a critically review of the literature on the need for an alternative political, economic and sociocultural unification theory for Africa. This leads to the discussion about the

importance of researching an alternative regional approach to African unification which underpins this study. This includes a different alternative theoretical framework that can be translated into a tailored plan for intrastate and interstate formation from an African perspective.

## **2.2: The Historical Evolution of Africa's Nation Building: Fragmentation and Independence**

Africa has gone through three historical phases of nation building: precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. There is empirical evidence that African countries experienced nationhood prior to conquest, which disrupted the nation-building process (Rodney, 1968:283). Scholars generally agree that various parts of precolonial Africa revealed elements of indigenous nation-building (Englebert, 2000:20). Statehood was at an introductory stage until the arrival of foreign forces on Africa's shores (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013:3). The disruption and imperious fragmentation of the continent into fifty-three small nations weakened existing structures of nationhood. The anticolonial struggles were to liberate African countries from colonizers and set at liberty Africans' consciousness, to reverse the spirit, moral, intellectual, and cultural decay that the alien rulers inflicted on African people (Ocheni and Nwankwo's 2012). The anti-colonial liberation struggles had two frontiers: on one hand, the struggles were meant to secure African independence, and on the other hand, they sought to assume control over the mode of production by replacing the colonial economic architectures (Houser, 1987:24; Toure, and Sloan 1972:3).

The colonial era damaged the economic, political, and psychological well-being of African citizens and negatively contributed to the contemporary political and economic development of the continent (Ocheni and Nwankwo's 2012:51). Undisputedly, the imperial forces disrupted the African nation state-building processes destroyed/ undermined the local knowledge systems with far reaching consequences in both the short and long period (Ocheni and Nwankwo's 2012). In precolonial Africa, the concept of nationhood was pragmatic, deriving from and connected to a supposed shared history, descent, and cultural sense of solidarity that defined homeland (Green, 2010:16). According to Ziltener and Künzler's (2013:291) analysis, the colonial interruption of political, economic, and social formations was intensely felt in the destruction of indigenous institutions, the expropriation of wealth, and installing of artificial borders that awkwardly exist till to date.

The colonial distortion of Africa's rich precolonial history, as well as the ensuing mental oppression, caused enormous psychological trauma in colonial Africa, which has had a negative impact on the continent's development and unity (Fanon 1963:444-52). Similarly, the arbitrary configuration of hard borderlines divided families and communities, resulting in fragmented communities, undermining efforts at unified national development (Deng, 1993:33; Ramutsindela, 2010:14). Deng and Ramutsindela also mention the importance of re-examining Africa's borders outside of colonial contexts; sovereignty and collective responsibility are important factors in achieving African restoration in a variety of ways. Typical examples are that the Somalis are divided among Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia; the Masai also are divided between Kenya and Tanzania; the Hausa are divided between Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon (Wa Muiu, 2010:1318). The argument here is that the postcolonial independent African nation was unable to correct the disruption of political, economic, and social injustice caused by the colonial era. The logic, method, and dynamics of Africa's current borders and borderlands approaches must be reconsidered in order to achieve better functional unity in Africa (Moyo, 2018).

According to Ogude (1997:91), the postcolonial institutions' inheritance and reproduction of slightly altered colonial institutions is reminiscent of new relations that are not transformed or reflective of the majority's interests. The colonial legacy on economic, political, and social consequences undoubtedly left the colonial experience intact, in part because African precolonial systems persisted in some cases to preserve their sociocultural heritage. Postcolonial Africa experienced continued systematic dominance from former colonizers in economic, politics of the African societies (Ayittey, 2016:59; Ndulo, 2003:333; Cornell, 1981:4; Kenyatta, 2015:724). The importance of examining the three patterns of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial Africa is enormous in understanding the continent's current political, social, and economic development. Discussing and diagnosing the paths in a systematic manner allows for research on the current structural challenges confronting African states.

### **2.2.1 Precolonial Nation Building in Africa**



Some, such as Menski (2006), claim that precolonial Africa lacked any form of governance system prior to the arrival of European conquerors, but that colonisers are the ones who brought governance to Africa. According to this viewpoint, colonialism is responsible for the establishment of basic regimes of governance, economic development, and social settlement. African indigenous peoples have control over agricultural production through wages paid to local labour and organised marketing strategies, as well as taxation systems used to monetise the economy (Alexopoulou, and Juif, 2017:220). It considers the development of fiscal governance as a key component of state formation to have occurred between the 1850s and the 1950s (Frankema, and Booth, 2019). In this context, colonialism is described as a strategy that was designed to help colonies accumulate wealth (Gann, Duignan, and Turner, 1969).

In contrast, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that precolonial Africa's governance was based on indigenous economic and governance models (Green and Bandyopadhyay 2013:3; Robinson 2002:513). Logan (2013:354) describes the precolonial period nation-building process as being guided by customary law, which allowed community leaders to carry out their responsibilities through ceremonial roles. According to Herbst (2014), precolonial Africa demonstrated that community leaders were an enduring institutional symbol and played an important role in governance execution. Robinson (2002:513) emphasises that precolonial Africa had long-standing nation-building traditions, well-defined boundaries based on African customary laws, and representation by consent that occurred at the community structure.

The primary reason for evaluating precolonial African nationhood structures is to gain a fundamental understanding of the governance system that existed during Africa's self-rule prior to the Berlin Conference of 1885, at which European colonial empires formally Balkanized the African continent. As documented in many parts of the continent, Precolonial Africa governance models are centralized administration systems primarily belonging to ethnic groups loyal to a central authority (Gennaioli and Rainer 2006:7). The governance structures may not be the same across the continent, as they are in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America. However, in some cases, poor border management or its porous nature in the absence of a central controlling mechanism made colonial force more appealing (Gennaioli and Rainer 2006). Some studies show that one of Africa's vulnerabilities originates from the absence of political centralization in the

precolonial period, when scattered settlements caused underdevelopment (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2013:9). The entire continent cannot be characterised as having existed in the same set of circumstances at any time, as there were different levels of centralisation and decentralisation in different parts of Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007:188 and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011:6). There is general consensus that generally the fragmentation of settlements was not conducive for economic, security, and political development. Fragmentation did not enable transatlantic enslavers to wreak havoc on African governance and economic systems, but also made it easier for colonial empires to occupy parts of Africa with speed (Obikili 2016:3; Kusimba, Kusimba, and Agbaje-Williams, 2006:148).

The cultural values practised by the nobility, monarchy, and clergy in precolonial African customary governance systems differed from western political and governance models (Claxton 2007: 597; Elias 1956:72). Although the command structures of precolonial African governance differ, there are parallels with the Roman and Greek Empires in Europe. The monarchical regimes of “Mansa Musa of Mali, Sundiyata Keita and Sonni Ali of the Shonghai Empire claimed divine right to kingship just like some of their European counterparts” to a large extent (Sesay 2014:7; Evans-Pritchard, 2014). As has been the case with a variety of other monarchical traditions throughout Africa and the rest of the world, African governance systems appear to have an inclusive and welcoming character (Akong'a, 2012:218). It is said that this is one of the reasons why foreign powers were able to penetrate and control the African territories (Robinson, 2002:512). The fact is that human interaction, value systems and structural governance differ between African and European nations; Nation-state's territorial integrity, citizenship, national identities, and financial systems were not present in precolonial Africa (Robinson, 2002:512).

In precolonial Africa, a well-established structural formation provided the command chain, vertically or hierarchically, in various parts of the continent (Ramutsindela, 2010:23). According to Igboin (2016:143), the precolonial African system of governance developed systems of governance accountable to the people. For a long time, the traditional hierarchical leadership's accountability and controlling systems were the norm, with especial supervision of local chiefdoms and kingdoms. Englebort (2000:13-22), precolonial governance systems attributed knowledge accumulation to the modern state's architecture. In precolonial Africa, unity and cooperation within

African nations were marked by what Cheik anta Diop refers to as a relatively stable equilibrium of precolonial African societies, which was misinterpreted by outsiders as stagnation (Diop, and Salemon, 2012). Precolonial African border management, collaboration, and conflict resolution were implemented as a buffer between kingdoms rather than hard mechanisms for permanent fragmentation (Ajala 1983:178).

With all the disruptions of colonial policies, African people kept in existence the monarchical governance system up until now, in countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Part of this has to do with the fact that some colonial empires preserved precolonial governance systems in order to use them for indirect colonial rule (Ranger, 1997). These contemporary African states appeared to continue to exercise their political cultures of their precolonial roots in a modern context. Moreover, precolonial Africa did not have had a demarcated borderline with state structures between nationalities and ethnic groups such as the Buganda of Uganda and Lunda of Congo ex-Zaire (ibid).

The discussion in this review, precolonial Africa developed different governance systems until they were disrupted by colonial powers. Precolonial African governance contributes to the configuration and discovery of solutions for Africa's political, economic, and sociocultural development.

### **2.2.2 The Colonial Period and the Fragmentation of African Governance**

The arrival of European colonizers in Africa marked a period of the reconfiguration of states and networks of nations that pre-existed for centuries (Touval, 1966:291). Mulich (2018:23) outlines how the colonisers made political experimentation by redrawing borders and adding new layers of sovereignty and territory that beneficated the new imperial powers (Mazrui, 2010). The border configuration has remained an enormous burden in postcolonial Africa. The colonial strategy of imposition new value system through political, social, and economical reconfiguration, conquest and destruction disrupted the precolonial sense of statehood (Mamdani cited in Zoppi 2013:43).

This was a powerful means of rewriting history in favour of the colonial project. The balkanization of Africa can be described as forced separation of nations, and kingdoms for the political and economic interests of foreign powers (Ramutsindela, 2010). Davis, (1973:385) sees it as the act of invasion orchestrated inhumanly with impunity to help Europeans to accumulate wealth and develop their own societies using African resources. The colonial appearance in Africa harmed two frontiers: precolonial cultural heritage and wealth, as well as the establishment of a unique governance system with narrow boundaries (Deng, 1993). According to Oni and Segun's (2014:10) analysis, the most oppressive act of colonial practice was altering the moral value system that had been in existence for many generations to make governable and to change behaviour of Africans, aligning these values to suit for the interests of colonial administration. As a result, the African continent suffered and still is suffering from the causal effects of its citizens' economic and political deprivation as a result of blocked boundaries and small market opportunities (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015:3).

The colonisation was driven by a massive appetite for raw materials such as gold, diamonds, palm oil, and accelerated Europe's industrialisation process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015:25). This led to ending the African control of the African mode of production and its replacement with colonial capitalism (*ibid*). Colonisers were not interested in exploiting humans only but also maximising profit through the ownership of land, use of cheap or free labour, production of manufactured goods by force or through the creation broader markets in which African participation was very limited if not excluded totally (Ramantswana 2015:823). As a result, divided Africa was not a problem for the colonisers as far as this served the interest of the colonial forces. However, the legacy of colonialism could not be sustained after the settlers left the African continent. The fragmentation process of the African continent continues to haunt the African market, resource, and geopolitics.

Some scholars argue that beyond material benefits for colonisers, Africa also benefited from colonial education and the introduction of modern administration during European colonisation. Bolt and Bezemer (2009:33) stated that colonisation promoted development through education, developed economies, and established colonial administrations as modern forms of government, all of which benefited Africa's people. Without a doubt, the colonial powers and European settlers developed a western education system that benefited the elites. According to Ocheni and

Nwankwo's (2012:52) explanation, if anything, development in the colonial era aimed to benefit the colonisers. Additionally, critics asserted that colonisation damaged indigenous educational and economic patterns, as well as the indigenously created governing paradigm (Mapara, 2009:141). The scramble for Africa by European colonialists created a decisive break with the African past by destroying self-administration and shared cultural value systems (Davis 1973:389). The colonial encounter modified Africa's approach to economic contact with the rest of the world through dynamic trade based on equal partnership (Fenske, 2014:3). Colonialism turned Africa into a mere supplier of cheap raw material and labour.

This fragmentation, underdevelopment, and distortion led to independent African states pursuing the path of unity, integration and shared prosperity on the basis of fractured legacies. Udombana (2002:8) who analysed the historical mistakes and unfortunate developments during the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) charter shows that modern African states retained the colonial boundaries to earn legitimacy but to the detriment of genuine integration. The OAU could have taken a number of different approaches to correcting colonial borders, including establishing a border commission to study further how to systematically dismantle colonial outposts. Colonial borders have continued created conflicts among African nations and are a hindrance to the development of Africa (Okumu, 2009:95). The colonial history of Africa is a complex reorientation of the personhood, nationhood and networking of nations in Africa in so many ways. For this study, the most critical ways related to governance, institutional framework and intrastate relationships that the study will discuss in some detail.

### **2.2.3 Postcolonial Pursuit of African Unity**

Postcolonial Africa sought to end the European divide and rule legacies as well as to reclaim and rethink the unity of African people (Young, 2004:24). Postcolonial Africa has achieved a lot from establishing the Organisation of African Union (OAU) to liberate African countries from the remaining colonial clutches and the apartheid system in South Africa (Okumu, 2009:97). African nations that emerged postcolonial inherited inadequate infrastructure, inexperienced leadership, and a fragmented political and historical conscience (Dinka & Kennels 2007:6). The colonial past conflicted with endogenous wisdom, experience, and the knowledge that has been for centuries

(Igue 2010:10). Postcolonial Africa encountered additional challenges in two frontiers: the first one is the colonizers' psychological destruction. The second one is loyalty to colonial boundaries through the OAU charter without considering the bigger picture of continental unity. These factors make Africa less competent in the world and less developed to support her citizens (Gibb 2009:703-5).

Africa inherited complicated twists and turns and conflict-ridden borderlines as a result of colonial divide and rule, dividing the same ethnic group into two or more communities. According to Menski (2006), colonisers are the ones who introduced a modern governance system to Africa. However, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that precolonial Africa's governance was based on indigenous economic and governance models (Green and Bandyopadhyay 2013:3; Robinson 2002:513). Logan (2013:354) supports this assertion by defining the precolonial period's nation-building process as governed by customary law, which permitted village chiefs to fulfil their tasks through ceremonial roles. According to Herbst (2014), colonial powers used precolonial Africans' wisdom for community settlement, and these facts demonstrated that community leaders were an enduring institutional symbol and played an important role in executing the governance task. Robinson (2002:513) adds to this argument by emphasising that precolonial Africa had long-standing nation-building traditions, a well-defined governance structure based on African customary laws and participation, and representation by consent that took place at the community level.

Clapham (2001:11) explained that arbitrarily imposed colonial boundaries are critical in undermining the point of convergence for state affairs in postcolonial Africa that hindered African agency in international affairs. The colonial territorial states and borders that define the identity of the ownership and marketing space of colonial masters remain the same way. Postcolonial African leaders were unable to change the colonial border architecture, despite the fact that it was critical to do so because it was a major impediment to development and unity. This was well known in the 1960s, when the age of independence began (Touval, 1966:286). Since postcolonial independence in the late 1950s onwards, two conflicting predispositions influenced the unification efforts, namely: an emphasis on the sovereignty of inherited nation-states, and the focus on sub-regional cooperation over continental unification (Okumu, 2009:95). One postcolonial unification

challenge was a disparity of ideas among leaders about what was required to advance African liberation and the way forward in the context of enduring effects of indirect rule, interventions by former colonisers, and the absence of reinventing the state structure to meet Africans' demands (Young 2004:41; Karikari 2013:44; Mizuno and Okazawa 2009:406). The primary challenge is the continued adherence to and insistence on colonial borders, despite the harm they cause to African states' economic, political, and social viability. Additionally, neglecting other important variables (such as political, cultural, epistemic, and spiritual variables, to name just a few), while putting an excessive focus on economic integration, as well as refusing to give serious consideration to alternative ways of unification.

The study argues that in postcolonial Africa, there was no clearly defined unification theory that African countries rallied behind. Also, here was import substitution industrialisation and inter-African economic cooperation grand plans such as [Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the subsequent passage of the "Final Act of Lagos (1980)" and the "Abuja Treaty (1991)] (Adaawen 2017:2). By default, these plans are substituted or considered as economic integration model in the absence of competitive theory or an alternative argument. So far, there is no clear political structural theory or economic philosophy that drives the African unification agenda. The African state and operation structures are different from those of Europe, and Africa lacks robust civil societies and businesses better to develop a model that speaks to African need (Gibb 2009:715). Considering these factors, the formation of regional unification appears not sustainable only on bases of economic terms and trading blocs alone without political, sociocultural drivers. In considering the unification project of Africa suffers from a lack of political will and ineffectiveness of intergovernmental structures (Adedeji (1970) as cited in Adaawen 2017:1). Furthermore, Adedeji (1970) stated that African institutional structures require adequate restructuring and strong leadership from both government and non-government actors. The brief discussion of the postcolonial pursuit aids us in understanding the difficulties and current realities.

### **2.3: Regional Unification Model, Patterns and the Outcomes in Africa**

The current Africa integration model draws on regional economic integration that established Regional Economic Communities (RECs) serving as its building blocs (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Anyanwu, and Conceição, 2014:2). The section provided a literature review on this.

The first point to note is that this pursuit of regional integration is informed by the emergence of economic integration theory designed as a roadmap to promote the European integration project that intended to appreciate economic units between different national states (Bolaños, 2016:24 cited Balassa, 1961a). The strength in Balassa's argument was to introduce economic revitalisation among the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Germany). These countries began with a customs union and then expanded to form an economic union (Balassa, 1994). Afterwards, the regional economic integration theory had sufficient impetus to be exported from Europe to Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The theory behind this and the practical work at integrating Europe would then influence the integration studies as a whole (Mattli, 1999).

In Africa, from the beginning, there was no distinct demarcation between regional economic integration, political integration, regionalism, regional cooperation, and regional governance model (Adetula, 2004:4; Jiboku, 2015:7; Lindberg, 1970:650). Fundamentally, the economic integration model is a path to facilitate trade among countries with or without border proximity (Djoumessi and Bala 2017:11). The underlining factor of economic integration is trade facilitation decision-making process among sovereign states based on market interest, and economic beneficiation to promote shared objectives (Hartzenberg, 2011:8). According to Brenton and Isik (2012:12), the broad consensus for economic integration envisioned economic transformation through expanded markets, investment, and employment creation with a practical policy framework and effective implementation.

The European Union established a distinct governance model for regionalism, which was gradually phased in over decades (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005:256) and was based on an integration conceptual framework that included functionalism, neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and federalism (Schimmelfennig, 2018: 3; Börzel, and Risse 2019:1234;



Holzinger, and Schimmelfennig 2012: 297; Börzel, and Riss. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was designed to replace the old governance regulatory system, which was based on a top-down approach. The new European governance model is procedural, heterarchical, and flexible (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002:2; Jordan 2001:199; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004:139; Bauer and Börzel 2010:6). The new governance system aids in the smooth operation and negotiation of government apparatuses at the national and regional levels.

Hooghe and Marks (2019) describe how the emergence of theories of neo-functionalism, post-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism have played a fundamental role in shaping European regional integration. Neo-functionalism emphasises on two primary principles which are the role of non-state actors and spillover effects to be a determinant factor in assuring the decline of nationalism (Schmitter, 2004; Caporaso, 1998:8; Haas, 1975; Lefkofridi, and Schmitter, 2015). Moravcsik, (2005:351-67) explained that neo-functionalism created unintended economic and political spillovers that weaken unexpected pressures on member states. The neo-functionalist argues that the ownership of the integration belongs to non-state actors; while the intergovernmentalism underlines that the state should be on the driver's seat. The Intergovernmental approach presented by Hoffmann (1966) searches for mutually benefits between states to manage the speed of integration in a way that promotes cooperation and competition.

Africa's economic integration that demonstrated collaboration among member countries rather than competition, considering the continent's historical background, was a good start (Nye, 1965:876). But Börzel (2016) critique the rationalist functionalist approaches to integration in Africa, for failure to ensure cooperation and integration between states that is inclusive of citizens and for regional cooperation, integration, and institution building that purely state-led rather than whole-of- society driven (Börzel, 2016:18).

Africa's regional economic integration has been the pursuit of common nationhood and bondage of ethnic and cultural homogeneity that remained based on a framework delineated by Europe's colonial powers (McCarthy, Cronjé, Denner, Fundira, Mwanza and Bursvik 2010). According to Gibb (2009), regional integration in Africa is conducted by a Euro-centric, market-led economic

regionalism. Moreover, the Eurocentric economic model exposes Africa to a wide-ranging unattended consequence, considering the reality of the economy and polity of Africa, and in particular with the nature of the African state (ibid; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:36). Part of the reasons is that Africa represents a small, relatively peripheral, and shrinking market of the world economy. Moreover, the intra-African trade and market-led integration are far from being a reality in the absence of a fundamental shift in the economic structure of ownership, and independency (Arrighi 1970; Hopkins 2014; Cooper 1981). Hence, African integration modalities should speak to the realities on the ground by projecting a turnaround model that supersedes market competition but assuring development in the continent (Oyejide, 2000:16).

### **2.3.1: What Are the Current Regional Economic Integration Model and Rational**

A critical examination of the current regional economic integration is desirable to comprehend the current model. The core value of economic integration is removing trade limitations and the restrictions that affect the movements of labour and capital and goods (Hailu, 2014:300). Economic integration is not adding one economy to another but opening and sharing market opportunities for a common interest (ibid). Following the removal of restrictions, several policies and legal frameworks require to be synchronised to facilitate the integration process. In the absence of common development of the infrastructure, industrialisation, tourism, energy, trade, and civil registration strategy and policy, the economic integration would not work to the fullest potential. Raúl Prebisch describes regional integration as a strategy to narrow down the discrepancy between trade balance, industrialisation, and development dichotomy between core and periphery (Puntigliano and Appelqvist, 2011:50).

Africa is at the periphery of the world and encounters complicated problems like border management, capital flow, extreme poverty, unemployment, and entrepreneurial skill development that need equal attention to integration. According to Golit and Adamu (2014:113), as cited (McCarthy, 2010)

*“Africa remains the most deprived continent in the world with fragmented parts, small domestic markets and declining shares of world trade. The combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 19 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries stood at less than US\$5 billion*

*below the US\$281.8 billion recorded by the smallest European Union (EU) member country (the Republic of Ireland) in 2008. The GDP of the largest African economy (South Africa) was said to have fallen below the smallest EU economy. What is more, the combined GDP of all SSA countries, excluding South Africa, fell short of the total recorded by the Netherlands over the same period.”*

Mainstream economic integration theory assumes the achievement of a level of economic and trade conditions and diversion between member countries that incentivises economic integration (Marinov, 2014:165). This means that the classic approach explains the possible benefits of economic integration and dynamics, often referred to as changing economic conditions and trade environments. Some of these approaches seek inclusion of trade creation, diversion, market structure, competition, and economic integration (Hosny, 2013:319; Ogbuabor, Anthony-Orji, Ogbonna, and Orji, 2019:124-128). Most African countries export a similar commodity that contributes to low volume of intra-Africa trade, and regional integration is meant to resolve this by creating dynamic value chains and market system (Njinkeu, and Fosso, 2006:4). The theoretical explanation may not sound useful until African countries reimagine regional integration to diversify and benefit goods and re-skill citizens by building human capacities and opening the market place (Ogbuabor, Anthony-Orji, Ogbonna, and Orji, 2019:124-128). These concepts involve the participation of private sector, non-state actors and attract foreign direct investment into the continent (Reinold, 2019:8).

Although African economic integration is critical, most African countries have low per capita growth, small and fragmented markets, and small populations that cannot support large-scale economies (Hartzenberg, 2011:3). The primary reason for Africa's market's small size is that continental trade appears to be on the periphery of the global economy, owing to fewer raw material producers and fewer end-product consumers. Such unfortunate circumstance makes Africa an insignificant player in the worldwide market place (Bond, 2006:24; Wallerstein, 1973:9). Nonetheless, economic indicators show that Africa is the world's second-fastest-growing region, after Asia (Zamfir, 2016:22). The introduction of trade diversification and the growing sophistication of the economy have been major contributors in Africa over the last fifteen years (ADB 2018:16; Zamfir, 2016:27). In this regard, African countries are expected to significantly diversify agriculture, industrial production, and trading opportunities, as well as improve standards to meet global market expectations.

In summary, Africa's unification rationale ought to be imagined as going beyond economic cooperation and harness the young and growing population. To a greater extent, the upward middle class, who are educated and have significant purchasing power, pave the way for urbanisation. The fortunes are based on the assumption that African countries' improvements in economic governance and the democratisation process will be inclusive and vibrant. However, the continent's economic potential must evolve from small and fragmented markets to poor infrastructure, trade diversification to boost development, and regional unification for Africa. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the impetus for African regional integration has enormous potential to generate a decent living for all of its citizens.

### **2.3.2: What Are the Current Unification Model Impediments and Successes**

What kind of impediments and successes have the current unification models confronted in Africa? And what are the indicators of economic integration challenges in particular, in the Horn of Africa? Where did the continent go wrong in applying a flexible regional unification model to move forward? According to Asante (1995: 575), the integration process in Africa up to the present time does not provide adequate attention to institutional support and autonomy that is comprehensive enough to reconstruct the African regionalism. Asante advocates for these three unification-related projects, which include a rigorous assessment and critical comprehension of potential unification strategies such as strong institutions, knowledge, and autonomy. Africa's precarious situation in the quest of economic integration theory arises from the absence of institutional architecture of the regional blocs aimed to create one economic community (Hailu, 2014:319).

There are shallow institutional frameworks of RECs and the Africa Union's deficiency of authorisation for the missions they have to convey (Ravenhill, 2016:6). Most African leaders recognised the importance of regional economic integration in Africa, though they did not always differentiate between economic integration and political unity (Adedeji, 1970:213). The main challenges for the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Regional Economic Communities

(RECs) stem from the organisation's structure and unclear mandates (Jiboku, 2015:9). Despite widespread acceptance of regionalisation, little progress has been made in terms of economic and political integration (Cheru, 1989). Cheru went on to say that Africa's economic cooperation was hampered by dysfunctional infrastructure, underdeveloped monetary and banking systems, and a lack of human capital. Besides, the primary conditions for functional regional unification do not exist due to a compatible theoretical framework and a favourable environment. The regional and sub-regional structures, the AU and RECs mandate come from the member countries' government authority instead of citizens' direct representation (Hartzenberg, 2011:19). According to the analysis, the only parties with mandates in the current scenario are the heads of state and the ministry of foreign affairs, who participate in every discussion of regional integration. The way the integration process is going indicates that it is being carried out in an elitist manner, and there are no places where citizens can influence or meaningfully contribute to numerous decision-making processes.

Asante (2000:9), the African integration process is hampered by a lack of citizen participation. The critic continues, government officials and heads of state make the majority of decisions, with little to no follow-up and little to no consultation with the private sector and non-state actors. The AUC plans and implements regional unification and other people-centred programmes without the participation of citizens at all levels. Regional integration necessitates all parties' assurance to create a sense of ownership over the processes of integration, which imparts a sense of belonging. Furthermore, inclusive participation has the potential to increase transparency, accountability, and the enshrinement of democratic governance processes (Landsberg, 2006:47). According to Okumu (2009:94), the fusion of the people's voice into the AU agenda lacks an organisational framework and programme. As a result, one can conclude that African supranational organisations are more of a direct reflection of African governments than citizens' voices, putting supranational organisations' autonomy in shaping integration processes in jeopardy. African governments appear to be unwilling to share sovereignty.

The postcolonial Africa integration agenda primarily shifted from a holistic unification approach to one direction by introducing blueprints for African economic integration, as outlined in the [Lagos Plan of Action (LAP), the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) 1980, and the Abuja Treaty of 1991]. These

documents and treaties, known as regional economic communities (RECs), are intended to decolonise the continent while also providing socioeconomic restructuring to promote development (Adedeji, 1970:213; Ross-Larson, 2006). LAP and the Final Act of Lagos documents is a raise out with a political declaration, a development strategy, a set of priorities, sectoral programmes of action and a blueprint for regional and sub-regional integration (Adedeji, 1984:10). The LPA characterised as the first comprehensive, unified approach to economic development and a radical departure from previous outward-looking African development strategies to be genuinely inward-looking, self-sufficient, and self-sustaining (Ikome, 2006:85). Ikome also stated that LAP would be a turnover strategy through the implementation of NEPAD; for a continent devastated by the historical legacies of slavery, colonialism, and various neo-colonial agreements such as the Lomé and Yaoundé Conventions with the European Economic Community (EEC).

The LPA promotes African socioeconomic integration and intra- and extra-African trade objectives, an exhortation to governments on the vital economic sectors' strategic priorities, such as agriculture and industrialization (Mkandawire, 1982:168). The LPA's main challenges in resource development included a lack of adequate capital; also, dysfunctional transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, underdeveloped monetary systems, the inadequacy of human capital in natural resources, and excessive foreign dependence. Ravenhill (1986:86) LPA is a viable indigenous alternative to the World Bank's description, structural adjustment programme, and development strategy flagship. However, LPA is vulnerable in achieving its long-term objectives; a failure to specify a practical self-reliance strategy and ownership, mainly how it would be financed, and a lack of political commitment for implementation. Shaw (1983:332) the Lagos action plan can express a shared fear of decline and chaos, both nationalist and internationalist, in addition to existing notions of hierarchy north-south and a theory dependency. Cheru (1989) rejects and defines the Afro-initiated LPA as a blueprint for Africa's recolonization, which has no significant advantage for ordinary Africans, rather than its indirectly imposed worst manifestations development program.

One of the essential milestones in the integration process by the AU is the establishment of APRM. APRM aims to promote good governance and make African leaders accountable to their citizens (Okumu 2009:100). The effort is more of organising a platform for non-state actors to

have a say in the political and development process. Through peer review mechanisms, the APRM integrated four areas of evaluation into African regional development: democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance, and socioeconomic development (Kanbur, 2004:3). In addition, ECOSOCC at the AU as civil society representation is an achievement, though its role is limited to being only an advisory body to the AUC. The ECOSOCC is a critical instrument for "non-state actors" participation in creating a platform for inclusive development; however, currently, ECOSOCC does not have authority over policy formation and execution (Stefiszyn 2005:369; Reinold, 2019:3). The extent to which ECOSOCC has become a platform for popular participation in African integration efforts is debatable. The civil society destiny and operations under the scrutiny of governments it would best in the interest of democratisation of Africa themselves, to manage the process (Sturman, and Cilliers, 2003:79). Further, the future of ECOSOCC, similar to UN Economic and Social Council, and EU Economic and Social Committee. For meaningful regional economic and political integration to take place in Africa, civil society participation is critical beyond the current superficial engagement ECOSOCC and the African Union (Adejumobi, 2009).

The African Heads of States in Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2002, was a significant milestone besides transformations from the OAU to the AU, historical Constitutive Act, a commitment to transform itself into a people-centred organ (Muchie, Habib, and Padayachee, 2006:2). While in African politics, political business is reserved for the political elite. The participation of non-state actors favouring Pan-African interaction and solidarity is critical, knowing that the vast majority of African citizens across the continent do not know the existence of the AU (Murithi, 2012:667). According to others, "inclusion of civil society will deepen integrative power integration, thereby extending the scope of Africa's political and economic union." Yet, some have pointed to the ambiguous AU Constitutive Act for reasons why there has been inadequate enabling of citizen partnership in the new drive by the AU to accelerate African integration. While the AU has opened the space for civil society to help shape the AU so that it does not respond to people-centred AU, partnerships and power relations: precisely what is the nature of civil society's participation? Is this full involvement or remodelling? How important is the participation envisaged? What kind of civil society is going to be involved? Will the AU promote a new relationship between civil society and the state? (Padayachee 2006:3, Muchie, Habib).

One of the AU's accomplishments is the AU's intervention in a member state during a crisis situation, as well as the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, which states that the PSC fostered and created a peace and security programme (Murithi, 2008:74). Its instruments seem to be working well, as seen in its power to impose sanctions on errant regimes, and carry out peacekeeping operations (Joshua and Olanrewaju 2017:5). Peace, stability, and development are the critical elements through developing oneness, optimism and consciousness of belonging to Africa (Francis, 2006:4). The aspirations for positive transformation can be realised with the creation of a robust African bloc that can play a critical role in defending the interests of its citizens in the international political arena (Kifle, Olukoshi, and Wohlgemuth 1997:135). The African trans-state unification can be a path for weaker and small countries to the benefit from a more robust, vibrant, and collective approach that benefits from international networks (Bach 1999:16).

### **2.3.3: Reasons for the Failure of Africa Economic Integration Model**

There are numerous reasons for this, but this literature review will focus on why the economic integration process in Africa has failed to result in common citizenship, shared development, and unity of purpose. The reasons for this are debated. The causes of failure are many, and they are mainly perilous economic conditions, inward-looking, distrust on supranationalism, over-dependence, operationalisation gap, and weak international bargaining capacity, among others (Murithi, 2008:21; Naldi, and Magliveras, 1998:620). Besides the failure of RECs and other integration, institutional initiatives are unable to deliver the desired result as a result of a weak institutional framework (Ross-Larson 2006:41). The unification efforts require effective mobilisation and deployment funds to avoid tension or straining among the AU member states and other organs working for the same objectives.

There is overwhelming agreement that inherited AU's failure from the inception of the OAU functional theory is limited to the facilitation mandate for the Head of States without having execution power (Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard 2005:507). Intergovernmental institutions without policy formulation, execution, follow-up and full mandate can undermine the success rate for two reasons. Scholars' arguments are primarily suggested for trust and ownership among the



different stakeholders. Second, the AU should evaluate its mission, vision and purpose, based on accountability, purpose, and accomplishment. In the case of the AUC, the execution and advisory organ to the AU has a limited mandate over member states because its legitimacy comes from the head of state, not representatives of citizens. According to Okumu (2009:104), the AU and Executive Council are the supreme organs and highest decision-making body with limited scrutiny and follow-ups. Further indicated that the AUC as an implementation organ is facing overlapping unclear authority, incompetent professionalism, and lack a Pan Africanist vision, according to the AU audit report.

Postcolonial African countries tried to break from the continuation of underdevelopment by introducing several alternative development approaches without transforming institutions into the inherited colonial geopolitical configuration (Yansane, 1977:77). Regional cooperation and unity without decolonising the past's institutional framework will resurface and compromise national interest versus the bigger picture of regional unity. The major challenge facing African integration is the lack of political will and member states' refusal to relinquish their sovereignty, which is an obstacle to move forward (Olaosebikan 2011:226). The integration process requires a theoretical framework of governance, institutional mechanisms, and harmonised structure to be operational. Söderbaum, (2013:5) analysis, African integration suffers because functional instruments are in the hand of state-led formation the structures, guided by Eurocentric theory, far from reality. Additionally, in relation to the transfer of sovereignty to supranational structures, the aforementioned structure process is not yet in place.

Draper (2012:68) argues that among many reasons for African integration failure is mainly because the model has strong European roots and is far detached from Africa's realities in all aspects. More specifically, most African states do not have the government machinery and institutional framework to run similar lines of the EU countries (ibid). The point argument is acceptable, and the comparison between Europe and Africa should be seen not only from human knowledge capacity; instead, historical injustice made Africa cripple in all aspects. Postcolonial Africa inherited an institution designed and built to serve the colonial interest (Young, 2004:36). Postcolonial African leaders were running either a failed state or the institution's model that was not established to benefit African people's interest. Killick (1992:34) points out that the failure to

maintain the economy and institutional capacity built by colonial empires lies behind the failure of integration beyond economics. The sub-regional grouping mainly demonstrates the deficits of fundamental organisational theory, interdependency, and accountability in the highest organisation. According to Golit and Adamu (2014:114), the failing of African regionalism is mainly structural and systemic and needs a comprehensive approach to address. The manifestations are a lack of correspondence between national sub-regional and regional interlink collaboration. As a result, planning and implementation are immensely affected, and the credibility gap is widening. More than eight sub-regional RECs that are recognised by the AU and some unrecognised RECs.

The reasons for RECs' multiplicity are unnecessary competition and lack of central leadership (Khadiagala 2008:3). The categorisation of spaghetti bowl comes from as a result of RECs mushroomed in every corner of the continent. Some RECs died before the maturity period; some were designed to fail; some exist only by name; others manifest regionalism failure in Africa (Asche and Brücher 2009:171). Besides, the alternative to the economic integration needs to be shaped based on the different theoretical approaches, political and economic methodology, and a form of governance. Mattli (1999:10) has revealed that intergovernmentalism is might be an alternate solution versus neo-functionalism by demonstrating its pros and cons for the European integration agenda.

The economic integration's institution building in Africa is neither vibrant nor consistent because of limited political support (Mistry 2000:561). Partly the reason member states they could not project the ultimate advantage in resolving national development problems, including poverty alleviation, creating jobs, and better livelihood for citizens to the minimum.

Similar to this fact, the African unification project needs a different approach with a strong and convincing argument that suits African reality. Nevertheless, literature is silent on an alternative model that is compatible with African facts, so this research is conducting to look at different departure for African unification. The brief literature review in this section on the reasons for failure

serves as a foundation for developing the indigenous alternative unification model's theoretical framework.

## **2.4: Researching Alternatives**

Identifying theoretical gaps, discrepancies, and challenges within the existing unification model help to provide a comprehensive solution based on African economic, political, and sociocultural realities (Jiboku, 2015:9). Researching alternative philosophy aims to discuss contending arguments and systematically examine the current integration model to identify the bases for alternatives. African heterogeneity, including language, ethnicities, religions, races, and cultures with five different time zones, needs analysis for an alternate unification model alongside socioeconomic and political parameters (Alesina, and Ferrara, 2005:779; Kirk, Stein, and Fisher 2018:12). The following section discusses the three concepts as a guiding framework for discussing alternatives. The research approach in this section examines the historical path, structural and leadership role in the integration process.

### **2.4.1: Deconstruct the African Unification Project**

Research for alternative fundamentally requires a critique of the current African economic integration projects from historical, structural, and leadership impediments in postcolonial Africa. According to Boje (2001:2), this approach helps to understand the complex process from the structural context and conduct point of view. Evaluating the African economic integration plan is a complex subject. Kilduff, (1993:14); Zald (1996:254); Kilduff and Kelemen (2001:57) deconstructing the core encounters of structural and organisational practice, structuralism, dependencies help to identify limitations. Ultimately, the critical assessment of structural challenges helps analyse what holds Africa back from achieving unification, intending to compete in the global marketplace, secure global political space, and betterment its citizens' livelihood. In this context, critiquing the African unification journey from historical, ideological, philosophical, structural, and leadership is essential.

The historical journey of the postcolonial unification movement started with high optimism in the early 60th critical; however, there was a division among African leaders between those who favoured a unitary model and those who preferred a more gradual federal approach (Olaosebikan 2011:224). Also, division triggered over ideological, colonial, philosophical, colonial and procedural issues (Kidane 2018). The challenge has reappeared unity versus sovereignty among immediate union promoters and gradual unification advocates (Ramutsindela, 2009). Welch (1991:536) argues that two historical junctures made sovereignty in Africa a critical debate related to contemporary international politics. [The OAU guarantee in its preamble referred to Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter, which required member nations to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.] Yet, another huge stumbling block.

The main challenge facing the African unity until now is because of the OAU, overemphasis on sovereignty. The question of surrendering sovereignty to a supranational body of the independent African state was still a difficult one; consequently, sovereignty and territorial integrity were left only for member states to decide, by the charter, and the OAU has no mandate to enforce, defend or monitor (Farmer 2012:94; Cragg 2008:55; Che-Mponda 1987:58; Olaosebikan 2011:221). The African unity agenda has suffered from narrow nationalist sovereignty principles influenced by the ideological framework that has divided the continent against its best interest (Adogamhe, 2008:4). The postcolonial leaders of Africa leaders failed to provide a comprehensive solution for the complicated nature of African boundaries; instead, they focused on self-determination and new statehood (Herbst, 1989:685).

The destruction of precolonial nationhood and the installation of a colonial structure of governance is a deep-rooted cause of contemporary Africa's failure to integrate (Christopher 1997:92). Mistry (2000:558) explains that African integration's failure is member states' lack of commitment in embedding regionalism into national policy, legislation, rule, and regulation. This resulted in a shaky relationship between the AU, RECs, and member states (Uzodike, 2009). Member states do not translate or mainstream the unification agenda in the national plan alongside expressing assurance for the unification by ceding national sovereignty in favour of the collective benefit (Vanheukelom, Byiers, and Woolfrey, 2016). Notably, African states do not make unification a

national political priority, and so they do not provide adequate institutional support to regional levels (Olaosebikan 2011:219).

The facts, African regional structures are at the infant stage of organisational development, are not equipped with the necessary human and financial capacity to accomplish the mission, a vision they stand for (Wachira, 2007:144). The absence of proper coordination systems between AU, RECs, and national governments is a source of discrepancy that causes administration, finance, and policy harmonisation impediment (Jiboku 2015; Kidane 2018). This leads to ineffective coordination, duplication of regional programs, and unnecessary competition (Agubuzu 2004:202; Jiboku and Okeke Uzodike 2016: 35-37). Besides, RECs are in limbo, marked by a lack of accountability and coordinating mechanisms either by the national government or the AU (Sako, 2006:17). In Africa, institutional systems have failed in part due to a lack of non-state actors and the private sector participation in policy formulation and implementation (Bach 2011:31). The challenge is most African regional institutions are not open for private citizens to contribute or to participate widely, and they are secretive and more bureaucratic than typical African governmental establishments. On the other hand, Haas (1975:185) advises that regional cooperation and organisations need to have a program that trickle-down effect in a holistic approach to society to deepen integration.

Nye (1965:881) points to divisions among ethnic groups and elitism as a critical challenge. Weiner argues that the African leaders' challenges in postcolonial Africa manage a deeply divided tribal structure at sub-national levels. These conditions impede development within the nation. Further, the collapse of civilian government and the replacement of military regimes in most African countries complicated these longstanding problems (Weiner 1965: 62). Leadership has a significant role in implementing the programme of unification. African leaders had a daunting triple task from promoting pan Africanism, struggling colonialism and apartheid and postcolonial nation-building. The African leaders were successful in every standard consolidating unity without division in struggling colonialism. Contrarily, postcolonial Africa leaders have challenges in the execution of plans and initiatives, and they could not achieve unification in a significant way.

## 2.4.2: From Dependence to Interdependence for African Unification

The idea of transforming from dependence to interdependence is an essential concept to be promoted as Africa's holistic unification agenda. Namkoong (1999:124) defined dependency as a reliance on an economy of particular countries or a country to rely on another economy. Moreover, the condition accompanied the exploitation of resources and reliance on economic, political, and security support of external powers (McGowan and Smith 1978:180). The interdependence of African countries through economic, social, political, cultural, climate change, labor, technology, industry, and the expected market place for unity was not pursued (John, 2014:27). The progression from dependence to interdependence to achieve unification is the harnessing of historical, philosophical, and shared destiny (Moravcsik 1991).

Interdependence between states implies complementing one another in the broader perspective to build transnational relations in the interest of collective good (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998:656; Moravcsik 1997:520). Interdependence has exceptional promise in moving from an insignificant economy to more significant opportunities derived from harnessing linkages between otherwise enclosed economies (Nye, 1968:861). Regarding Africa's particularity Brown and Harman (2013:3) underline that individual approach to negotiate and compete in international political and economic agenda; the agency is weaker unless a collective stand is considered. Tollison and Willett (1973:255) explain that interdependence can establish ways that ensure unification between inter-and intra-state collaboration for a common interest.

To achieve comprehensive economic development in African states, expected to develop a global information communication technology ladder with appropriate structural change (Bienefeld 1988:77). Africa can take a lesson from postcolonial unification failures and plan a turnaround strategy to secure political and economic space. The transformation creates the ability to build an economic and political bloc and facilitate human resource, technological capabilities within the continent for joint development (ibid). The colonial legacy of African states has inherited the existing territorial jurisdiction established by Europeans with international legitimacy, which is questionable in terms of economic viability and development (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:16). The greatest challenge of African unification is adjusting political independence into sustainable

cooperation between states to create a synergy of interdependence. Povolny (1966:304) suggests that the idea is to foster a reciprocal relationship between states, to ensure they complement one another, and to elevate the institutionalisation of interdependence.

Thus far, the concept of unification through interdependence and inter and intra nation-state building is not interrogated adequately in the studies. Green (1965:12) argues that at the core of African economic and political interdependence, an agreement is critical in assuring national economic growth and development considering the ability to attain fundamental socio-political goals. This pursuit of interdependency must deliver Africa from institutional dependency on the western world (Edo and Olanrewaju 2012:59; Martin 1982:228; Chirisa, Mumba, and Dirwai 2014:4). Nzewi (2009:5) argues for a robust engagement to strengthen political leadership at all level, open the platform for the private sector, non-state actors, women and youth participation.

#### **2.4.3: Restoration African Identity and Unity with Local Knowledge**

African identity is a capacious, imprecise distorted and emulsified idea. What is best for the community is what is best for the individual (Wright, 2002:13). African identity, citizenship, and shared philosophy is a critical ingredient in defining the unification of Africa as a nation and Africans as a citizen, predominantly. Adams and Van De Vijver (2017:118) explain that multiple African allegiances created personal, social, and rational identity cleavages that still exist. The deep-rooted division and language and ethnic lines undermine the pursuit of African development and unity (Akinwale, 2011:82). Canovan (2000:415) suggested that in this light, patriotism is critical for national unity and integrity. In his justification, patriotism was associated with political devotion for shared citizenship, with national ties and collective identity, while nationalism is loyalty to ethnicity or tribal root.

The arrival of the colonial powers in Africa disrupted the African identity dynamics; the legacy of colonial rule is now evident in the new territorial definition of identity through colonial languages and affiliations (Zezeza, 2006:22). The segmented and fragmented African identity formed through an imaginary line (boundary) drawn by colonialists, becoming naturally assimilated over time

(Mkandawire, 2004:3). Identity has many faces in the African context; cultural, ethnic, political, language, and religion. More recently, colonial association and assimilation have become part of the African identity. African identity is a cumulative and diverse cultural, political, and social construct (Idang 2015:102). Shared lifestyles in social, cultural, economic, and religious exercises, African communities have similar backgrounds if not identical. Despite how diverse Africans, there are resemblances among different ethnic groups and clans, which provide a moral support system, social network, and originality to them (Wane 2005:40). Postcolonial Africa inherited ethnocentric conflicts intra and interstates across the continent for unequivocal power politics and colonial boundary claims (Amadife and Warhola 1993:541). The most affected countries with civil war and internal conflicts are Sudan, DRC (Zaire), Nigeria, or Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, and Cameroon.

The ethnic divisions and artificial borders continue to fuel conflicts (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016:7). The division between the Hausa ethnic group in Nigeria and Niger weakens this ethnic group and harms transnational cooperation (Miles and Rochefort 1991). Africa's ethnic and national identities are a source of major conflict, whilst other African states coexist peacefully and strive for a single national flag (Zeleza, 2006:14; Fearon, 1999). Huddy and Khatib (2007:65), building national requires mobilising citizens despite ethnic, racial, and political affiliation to develop a sense of belonging. Africa is far from such a reality; while the development of African citizenship and identity is so profoundly damaged, a way to develop collective membership should be provided. Obiakor (2004:416) argues that building African patriotic needs leadership paradigms to consider education as the best tool to bring about positive change to the identity.

Wright (2002:2) says African identity is less salient than ethnic or national identity, and this has served to create a division among Africans not to unite for a common cause. Beyond national and ethnic identity, Africans are the classified Afro Africans, Cushitic, Bantu, Semitic, Hamitic Afro Arab, Afro Asiatic, Caucasian or European African, and other minority groups. The colonial language demarcation also fuels the fragmentation of Africans into Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone (Oguejiofor and Ezenwa-Ohaeto 2015:15). The pan Africanist orientation is the opposite of fragmentation that significantly damages the Africa unification project and helps only the imperial project succeed (Muchie, 2004:143). The restoration of African identity will take a



greater length in assuring economic development and political unity to reconstruct societal convergence.

Afrocentric thinking is a philosophical approach that appeals for appropriate African-centred and African agency in global political space (Asante 1991:171; Chawane 2016:82; Asante 2010:121). Afrocentric is a contract of identity, an embodiment of principles beyond narrow nationalism and tribal identity for a shared value system. In order to validate that Africanity is a state of mind, we must examine the diversity of African identity. George and Dei (1994:4-22) says that Afrocentricity as collective solidarity that promotes African identity, cultural heritage, and community bonding creates more robust networks and self-reliance among black people, in particular Africans. The centrality of African Identity manifested in political efforts to mobilise and consciousness Africans for pan Africanism and the African renaissance. Africa is portrayed in the world as a place of war, hunger, diseases, and extreme poverty. This makes it necessary for pan-Africanists like Mbeki to proclaim, 'I am an African' and to insist on Africanity (Bongmba 2004:294).

Obijekwu, Onebunne, and Muomah (2019:2) reject the disingenuous viewpoint about Africans as people without culture, philosophy, wisdom, and civilization as another form of identity destruction construct of colonial thinking. Africa lacks promoting these treasures and missing the documentation in the absence of proper care; however, several anthropological pieces of evidence reviles (Wiredu, Abraham, Irele, and Ifeanyi 2004:62).

Identity has a direct relationship to knowledge construction and perception. Africa portrayed as underdevelopment and its local knowledge inferior as compare to “developed countries.” Oyedola (2016:18) questions the idea that Africa is not developing. The argument is how development is defined epistemologically, whose development is the benchmark without analysing the philosophical quest for spiritual and cultural development in Africa. Zera Yacob instructs, “Humans are all equal in the eyes of God.” Human equality revealed that “God created all humans with intelligence.” Again, because humans are fated to die, they are equal. Death does not discriminate. It is the ultimate equalizer. (Merawi 2018:5, Abera 2016:432, Kiros 2005:184).

## **2.5: Modalities for an African Alternative Unification of Model**

The search for alternate unification models is to challenge the present state of affairs in Africa and address the integration formation that lacks the fundamentals to deliver the aspired result. Povolny (1966:316) argues that Africa needs the hierarchical arrangement and the quantifiable way to evaluate the process transparently to revitalise the unification process. The difference between the efficiency of the model and the reality should converge thereafter. The current model for Africa integration is faceless and amorphous to evaluate and identify the problem scientifically. Mukisa and Thompson (1995:71) suggested that unification to work there are factors beyond economics, and political setup requires an institutional capacity that coordinate and lead in acquiring realistic result. The recommendations are essential, yet; institutional and initialisation demand the participating parties' political will and financial and human resources to perform up to standards. The political unification paradigm needs to have a pre-defined scope, determination for take-off, and a more unambiguous sequence of a process that is determinate the success or the failure of the project (Etzioni 1962:48-49). Thus, all variables are equally political, economic, sociocultural, governance, and institutional frameworks that influence interdependence to conduct unification between states. The other theoretical perspective variables are structuration, fundamental rationales, representation and mandate that influence interdependence between states to perform unification seamlessly.

### **2.5.1: Political and Economic Unification Context**

The political context review includes the profound importance of restructuring the colonial Balkanisation and neo-colonial attempts to stop Africa from becoming a global player in the political and economic frontier (Young 2010:46; and Nye 1965:878). The political and economic context is the most critical element that discusses the structural impediment of the past and transformation to a new dispensation methodically towards unification. Clapham (1970:3) makes a similar argument concerning the political context, stating that there is a need for a broader understanding that encompasses political actuality, idea, and ideological orientation in order to build a favourable atmosphere for unionisation. The rationale for unification in Africa's context is to create a better livelihood for citizens, competitiveness in the world, minimise inequality between African states, and revert dependence on developed countries. Muchie (2004:146) argues that

the rationale of the unification rationale is to create one voice in political fora and merge the fragmented economic system to shape political and economic power. Economic constraints, such as a small financial market and trade share in the globe, a lack of soft and hard infrastructure, and market fragmentation, need economic unification (Ewing 1967:61; Tuluy, 2016:338). Such unflinching testimonials from academics need to be backed by political commitment, and translate into economic growth, with development strategy, and pertinent institutional framework.

Koné (2012:387) explained the rationality of economic union and constructive instruments in cutback trade impediments, increased economic development through investments and financial capitals, converging into the global market. Instead of promoting intra-African trade and economic development, the mismatch between existing RECs and the new initiative African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) exacerbates the problem. Berahab and Dadush (2018:5) examine the fundamental challenge of AfCFTA, which is the diversification and competitiveness of African countries in reforming domestic and export markets. The Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) initiative represents a significant opportunity for African countries, but it must address the challenge posed by existing regional economic communities (RECs) operating under similar arrangements, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Aside from planning, the lack of a well-established intra- and inter-taxation scheme is critical. Currently, intra African trade is minimal or non-existent due to poor infrastructure and the absence of an inward strategy vis-à-vis Asia and the European region (Yang and Gupta 2007:406). African countries will remain at the periphery of the world economy unless they consolidated the economic opportunities within their reach and formed a political economy model. Tuluy (2016: 341) highlighted that the cardinal architecture of regional integration in Africa has many political oriented limitations; besides, a lack of physical and organisational infrastructure makes it unsound. The African unification model needs a practical transformation reengineering process through political reform to make it viable and relevant.

Robson (2012:21) raises critical questions about the benefits of African political and economic integration. How was economic union achieved in the absence of political unity? Robson also inquires as to what modalities can be used to accomplish the aspired goal, which must be addressed methodologically. Mukisa and Thompson (1995:64-66) analysis cannot obtain unification Independently without seeking political, economic, social, and cultural context together

within the modalities of free movement of people, goods, capital, and common citizenship. African unification agenda requires detailed work in a modest way, among which the thesis highlights how to enrich Agenda 2063 about the unification project. Including how regional security, legal and institutional framework, citizenship, common market, and monetary policy are part of the unification plan. African Union Commission (2015:44-46) agenda 2063 clarifies the need for an inclusive strategic framework for political unity under pan Africanism ideals, good governance, democracy, and the Rule of Law. Along with this, the strategy enables Africa to speak with one voice in global affairs and ensure economic growth and sustainable development.

The counter-argument of scholars like Addaney and Njie, while they appreciate the determination and comprehensiveness of the strategic document, the question is Agenda 2063 clarity and ability to deliver. The critical challenge of this blueprint for Africa unity and development is the strategies and means of how to achieve these megaprojects. Addaney (2018:182); and Njie (2019:24) further articulated that significant challenges such as lack of sufficient resources, including its effective and efficient execution method, are not comprehensively discussed in the document. Additionally, the agenda promotes a diametrically opposed ideological approach known as market capitalism and incorporates divergent Pan-Africanism ideals, which are vying for acceptance as theories. Gibb (2009:711) analyses the existing failed institutional framework as neither reliable nor attainable to achieve a market integration approach. The idea subscribes that any theoretical framework without institutional reengineering is “Like ‘new wine into old wineskins’ a parable of Jesus.”

Draper (2010:14) described the main challenge in African unification as an unrealistic ambition that is not backed by institutional autonomy and capacity. Draper argument underlines that the African unification mission has so many unique variables that differentiate it from other continents. Fagbayibo strengthens the argument that the integration failure lacks a robust transformational program of unification plan, the coordination process crowded with several agencies without appropriate mandate and commitment to supranational objectives (Fagbayibo 2013:52). Partly, the problem emanated from the colonial past, and neo-colonial distraction caused division among the political elite, and ethnic identities triggered continuous conflicts within a state and among countries (Langford 1999:63). Besides, a low level of trade, investment, and technology exchange

among African countries and weak institutional capacity is the most hindering factor on the ground.

According to Gibb (2009:705), profoundly the unification project failure related to abstract landscape inherent structural features centred on Western ideals and the benefit not promoted with all stakeholders as it should be. The alternative economic corporation focuses on creating an opportunity among member countries to remove trade barriers through labour and goods movement (Balassa, 2013:8). Africa's alternative plan needs to strategies inward-looking in developing trade and technology transfer among African countries with step-by-step development based on local capacity and available resources. The literature survey considers the political commitment and relationship between RECs and the African Union as crucial. Similarly, economic viability and competitiveness are the dominant factors in the proposition of unification, including examining economic and political feasibility. Concerning the failure to construct an African-based unification initiative that speaks with the economic, political, and sociocultural context of the continent is both a daunting and possibly provoking task.

### **2.5.2: Sociocultural Unification Context**

The question about African philosophy, culture, morality has been distorted or damaged throughout the colonial era; thus, to achieve African unification, cultivating and revising the sociocultural system is critical. Culture as an essential variable is indispensable in conveying unification among different communities as a prerequisite to comprehending customs, traditions, and belief systems. According to Dosenrode (2008:2), the elaboration of culture's importance in the unification process brings together different communities and worldviews that incorporate values, rules, and norms to share commonality for the common good. Adesuyi underlines that the relevance of examining the sociocultural value system of Africans critically to understand the governance and philosophical aspiration in society (Adesuyi 2014:86). The development of culture, politics and economic transformation make African society more enhanced, functional, and integrated.

The holistic approach to unification requires broader sociocultural undertakings. The promotion of regional integration in Africa through culture, tradition, art, and music is essential for promoting common ground and mutual understanding in different parts of Africa (Mbaye, 2015:20). The Abuja Treaty emphasised the importance of social and cultural values as the essential tools for the reintegration process. Mukisa and Thompson (1995:2) argue that culture is a unifying instrument more than the economic and political interest.

### **2.5.3: Governance and Institutional Structures for Alternative Model**

Jiboku's (2015:6-9) says institution building requires a clear vision, mission, and practical implementation mandate. The literature revises diverse governance, institutionalisation, and structuration research papers in the public domain. Okumu (2009:100); Fritz and Menocal (2007:39) analyses show that in Africa, regional organisations leaders are implementing a top-down approach, which is designed to control all forms and source of power. In the broadest sense, governance comprises the way states exercise power to regulate citizens through the laws, norms, in an organised way society to pursue collective goals and interests (Fritz and Menocal 2007:49). Contemplating this fact having an appropriate governance structure is the best instrument to shape the interoperability of interstate and intrastate relationships at all levels.

Bekele, Kjosavik, and Shanmugaratnam (2016:3) analysis structural clarity attribute is the access of power between multiple parties, such as state, communities, and stakeholders, to negotiate and outline their particular roles through structured, hierarchical, and decision-making processes. Mbiba and Huchzermeyer (2002:125) evaluate that most African institutions are ill-equipped due to the challenge to apply a unification process between states and stakeholders for power dissemination in a structured manner. The missing factor in Africa is the structuration model that can apply its task without giving primacy to either party. Therefore, using structuration to define the power relations between different actors that share similar/ different resources is that they bring together structure and agency that allows the possibility of structural transformation (Whittington, 2010:145). A consolidated system of government organs in place helps the

relationship between state and citizen; the representation modalities resource allocation and power-sharing process applied within a power structure formula. Structuring a system that allows for the distribution of competencies, authority, and resources among states extraordinarily critical, and the aggregate result is acceptable by all stakeholders (Keohane and Nye 1973:18). However, as maintained by Feng and Genna's (2003:283) argument, the contributing factor between structure, integration processes, and domestic institution harmony has not directly tested, and there is research that demonstrates the relationship.

In summary, introducing the concepts of structuration in the unification process provides a paramount significance to practice this study. The literature survey emphasises the correlation between institutional consistency in all three tiers of upward and downward unification procedures, political, economic, and sociocultural. The idea of interdependence, both structural and theoretical, needs to read each other for robust institutional formations. The distinctive advantage of a holistic approach is to enable the current impasse of unification to move vibrant prospects in the context of structured and well-researched output. Analogously, evaluating the existing structure and proposing institutional framework through the structuration theoretical framework is an essential instrument to recommend for Africa's future to develop solid institutionalisation. The study's objective is to employ the concept of an alternative unification model in order to envision holistic, comprehensive, and reflective African realities that are transformed through enhanced providence. Parallel top-down and bottom-up approaches were used in this section, with the primary objective of highlighting alternate institutional and government modelling and how to create the theoretical framework.

## **2.6: Case Study: The Horn of Africa for Alternative Unification Proposition**

The Horn of Africa (HoA) is the case study in this thesis that demonstrates both impediments to unification in Africa and exploring a unification theory as an archetype versus mainstream approaches. It focuses on two prime areas: the absence of a solid regional economic community; and the complicated geopolitics situation of the region. Secondly, what type of governance method is best suited for the people's interests and the collective good of unification at a sub-

regional and continental level. The Horn of Africa consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and South Sudan. However, the broader Horn of Africa includes Sudan and Kenya. The literature review in this section aims to examine the historical background of HoA historical impediment, success stories and propose the indigenous alternative theory. The case study examines data in a specific context of a sub-regional bloc. As attested by Zainal (2007:2), case studies are often applied to explore contextual analysis in exploratory research as an essential way of validating theory to adapt to the local situation.

### **2.6.1: The Horn of Africa Historical background on Unity and Diversity**

The Horn of Africa countries have interlinked cultures, religion, ethnic origin, and geopolitics throughout their long history. The region consists of ancient states with complex political, socioeconomics, and development arrangement need to be analysed prudently. The archaeological evidence indicated that the ancient civilisation and centralised government commenced in the 1st millennium BC and 1st millennium AD in the kingdom of Aksum (Fattovich, 2010:160). Additionally, Fattovich noted that the sociocultural advancement and synthesis that resulted from the Aksumite polity, civilisation, and interaction between the Kushite, Neolithic, and Nubian kingdoms are indicative of intricate patterns of societal development. The region has immense indigenous knowledge that can also use to contribute to the broader world knowledge systems significantly in architecture, literature, philosophy, astronomy, medicine, and scripts. The region is one of rich literature, unique writing script, and advanced astronomy in ancient times that endured thousands of years with anthropological evidence (Houston, 1926:54-59).

The HoA is a fragmentation caused by colonial powers of Italy, Britain, and France that destroyed community bonds by imposing a national border regime without proper consideration (Crummey, 2003:123). According to Gesheker (1985:4-5), Ethiopia has started suffering extensive impacts of colonial practices in how various nationalities in Ethiopia push for independence, including Ogden in the east and Eritrea in the north. The secessionist tendencies were orchestrated to weaken the Ethiopian empire. The defeat of Italian fascists sparked an African cry for political freedom, including in the Caribbean islands. The HoA has an immense contribution to African



knowledge production, since its pioneering of trade with the rest of the world, and conquest of the European colonialist.

The Horn of Africa is the home of Christian, Islam, and Judaism for centuries; consequently, religion contributed to societal consciousness; nonetheless, rivalry among religious communities created division followed by distraction. According to Novati (2009:236) analyses the colonial administration in the HoA persistently exploited ethnic identity, religion, and Kinship. One of the dividing mechanisms was religion among countries, portraying Ethiopia as island Christianity and a more significant threat that surrounded Islamic populations in the region and vice versa. Similarly, religion and ethnic identity were essential to leverage colonizers to extend occupation by creating ethnic and religious discord. Issa-Salwe, (2016:21); Englebert, (2000:9); Taddia, (1990:161) arguments the quest of ethnic groups for self-determination, fragmentation one ethnic group into different states, again irreducible ethnic and political identity is a contentious issue in all HoA countries. Equally, the border dispute is inherited, and immense bi-lateral relations political cooperation demanded among the HoA countries. The inherited colonial border legacy in the HoA states has caused ethnic groups partition into different territories, border disputes, and war, and still poorly demarcated borders are permanent threats (El-Affendi 2009:7; Englebert, 2000:20; Novati, 2009:235; Issa-Salwe, 2016:5). The colonial administration in HoA permanently exploited issues of ethnic identity, religion, language, and cultural differences to legitimize their existence.

Taddia (1990:168), postcolonial HoA nationalism that struggled for unity has changed rapidly and swamped into ethnic focused politics as a class structure without analysed the ultimate failure and cultural resemblance. One of the healing strategies from these domino effects ought to be developing common security, economic, and political unity in the HoA. Building an inclusive political identity with an impartial and peaceful social contract led to cooperative elevating relationships among HoA states (Assefa, 1996:47). The region has a rich, diverse culture, ethnicity, and language; further common consanguinity shared history, opportunity, and threats that demand a collective perspective through interdependence for unification (Gaas, 2019:12). The long misery of colonial effect in Africa and the emergence of postcolonial nationalism have caused a devastating impact on sub-regional unity. The HoA suffers from poor governance, natural disaster, military destabilisation, and external interventions are the explosive elements of

the region (ibid). The historical contestation supremacy becomes an established reality in assuring ever-increasing economic and political challenges in the HoA Africa. Besides, the absence of liberated minds of political organisations, leaders and conscientious citizens has failed to disentangle the narrow nationalistic notion.

Noticeably, the Horn of Africa's unification efforts were relatively weaker than other parts of postcolonial Africa (Gebru, 2016:12), partly because the region is situated in intricate geopolitics setting that hatched foreign powers intervention, widespread insecurity, instability within and among countries. The region has daunting and multifaceted challenges in managing its diversity of ethnicity, culture, and religion; likewise, an extraordinary opportunity that undoubtedly harnesses the geographical position, diversity, and natural resources (ibid). The agency of colonial legacy and subsequent destruction of postcolonial, HoA the engagement redirected in managing its internal conflict and natural catastrophe. For illustrative purposes, in 1986, the formation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was to mitigate severe droughts and natural disasters in the region (Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo, 2016:29; El-Affendi:7). IGADD's objective was disaster prevention; however, it was replaced in 1996 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an economic unification agenda and comprised Eastern Africa countries Kenya and Uganda (ibid). The thesis examines the impediments to and success of the Horn of Africa's current organisational structure.

In the HoA, intrastate conflict, religious extremism, ethnic politics, overlap in membership and a tenacious approach to sovereignty are significant obstacles to regional unification. IGAD regional unification coordinator shares similar challenges with other RECs, including weak institutional capacity, lack of proper organisation structure, high dependency on foreign funding, and lack of economic diversity in the region (Gebru, 2016:28-30). As Adetula, Bereketeab, and Jaiyebo (2016:33-35) argue, IGAD lacks a comprehensive peace and security policy framework to adequately address the region's security challenges and impaired in its peace mediation efforts in South Sudan. The demonstration explains that IGAD lacks institutional strength to resolve conflicts within and among member states; this is partly the nature of the organisation and political disparity between members. The Horn of Africa is affected by political, ethnic, religious, and border conflicts. These are, fought over territorial and border disputes despondent political,

economic, and social relations that became stumbling blocs to move forward (Dias, 2013; Mengisteab, 2011; Zitelmann, 2008:6). The Horn of Africa has encountered a number of impediments, including external intervention, ethnic politicisation, ideological mismatch, and historical, colonial, and governance impediments, all of which have hampered state-to-state connectivity (Gaas, 2019:12; Rondos, 2016:154; Crummey, 2003:118-26). Though the internal ethnic conflict and border conflict among HoA states were severe, the cultural bonds and boundedness they share were much greater than the damage.

The Horn of Africa's unification effort, besides the weak institutional capacity of IGAD, suffers from multiple memberships of different RECs, which created duplication of effort, waste of human and financial resources, and unnecessary commitments (Hailu, 2014:329). For instance, two IGAD members, Kenya and Uganda, are also members of the EAC, and all IGAD members except Somalia are members of the COMESA. Five out of seven IGAD members, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan, are members of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Gebbru, 2016:29). Besides, the above challenges are structural and internal political division among member states and external intervention are serious problems. According to Kendie (1994:44) Gaas (2019:13) analysis, the region is highly susceptible to external interference because of its strategic position and proximity to the Middle East. Similarly, IGAD is exposed to manoeuvring by foreign funders and are subjected to subservient by Ethiopia's political interest in the region; besides, there is an absolute absence of structural accountability for all member states (Bereketeab, 2012:178; Byers, 2017:6; Møller, 2005:41). One of IGAD's most serious concerns is a lack of effective organisational structure; engagement of all stakeholders and building trust among member states are vital.

The imperative is to develop indigenous governance and institutional system that works for Africa and the Horn of Africa (Zewde 2002:18; Gennaioli and Rainer 2006:7). The perplexities are far more profound than institutional formation, but a high sense of empiricism can influence the realm of Africa. An indigenous alternative unification comprises three layers of governance and institutional framework; is Mojo-Oda, Debo and, Umoja-Jamaa (Mutere, 2012:157; Jalata, 2010; Green, 2010:24; Gerba's 2016:122; Ikeke, 2013:346; Abera, 2017:62; Twala, 2004:184; Jenco, Idris, and Thomas, 2019:273; Zegeye and Vambe, 2006: 349). The indigenous theoretical

approach comprises the methodology, conceptual framework, modus operandi, structural foundation, and steps as the study advance. Rethinking present integration theories is critical because the theory lacks consensus; the conceptualisation focuses on specific discipline rather than accommodating a comprehensive conceptual framework; instead, multidisciplinary reconceptualisation is vital (Dirar, 2014:128). A transformative institution like the African Union is expected to have overarching autonomy and designation to perform their duties and bring necessary change. Udombana (2002:14) analysis, the AU is an artificial entity that does not have 'hands, legs, eyes, a brain', and the legal personality of the organisation relies only and only on member states, including the various organs which are under the AU supervision.

The indigenous alternative theory assumes that the economic integration model, the current institutional framework, and governance will address the primary critical challenges of postcolonial African unification. The postcolonial Africa integration theory imagined without discriminating the political, cultural, and socioeconomic of imperial institutions, and also, the OAU/AU enshrines the sanctity of colonial boundaries (Rukundwa, and Van Aarde, 2007:1174; Udombana, 2002:8). In the African unification blueprint, the disparity between system and structure is vivid. Africa, regionalism adapting Eurocentric integration model in economic terms alone is not recommendable while waiting for social and economic transformation (Gibb, 2009:702). With a similar note Udombana, (2002:66) observation the transformation from the OAU to AU not balance between the ideal and the reality on the ground; instead, it inherited most structural glitches that have dragged the executions. Hence, what are the alternative unification models need to correct the missteps and explore going forward and how feasibly can be employed.

Besides, the alternative unification theory requires deconstructing the current economic integration model with epistemological and methodological assertions to standardise alternative concepts alongside considering polity, policy, and politics. The concept recognises the agency of social actors in building the structure and appreciating the practical application in satisfying the material visions (Sewell 1992:3). The modus operandi considers comprehensive political, economic, sociocultural, and governance as a means of unorthodox methodology. Povolny (1966:311) says Africa has experimented with different cooperation model, the failure related to a single strategy necessitate to pursue willpower for political socialisation is indispensable, to begin with, interstate integration. Evaluating the African unification impetus is a complex subject

that requires exhaustive knowledge, resources, and institutional support. The alternative unification models need to be explored to fill the knowledge gap of theoretical framework structural and institutional formulas. Among which how the indigenous alternative unification theory can be employed are critical. The proposal considers three layers of institutional fundamental and different steps of implementations.

The study employs an alternative unification theory with an inductive approach that intent to help examine appropriate pattern, empiricism, bottom-up and top-down mixed practice meticulously to develop a concept. Schmitter (1970:257) demonstrates how the inductive process enables alternative strategies to be analysed and justified phenotypically in order to construct a model. The indigenous alternative method of unification on the border State county, interstate, and intrastate intergovernmental structures are all examples of intergovernmental structures. In conjunction, the four steps desired for moving onward, such as preparing the foundation for reintegration, structuration, harmonisation, and unification. Since the thesis considers the Horn of Africa as a sub-regional structure, the study will not discuss an in-depth intrastate governance structure. The variables included in the proposed theory are equivalent in terms of their political, economic, sociocultural, governance, and institutional frameworks and influence the interdependence of states in order to conduct unification seamlessly.

## **2.7: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The literature review is divided into five sections and fifteen subsections in chronological order in reviewing different literature and contextualise concerning study objectives. The review begins with a short overview of the scope and objectives. The first section examined research papers and books on the historical development and the postcolonial quest of Africa's national fragmentation. The second section reviewed numerous pieces of literature about justifications, barriers, and causes for the existing integration model's failure. The third section attempts to provide how the alternative unification idea considerations, including the methodological approach and feasibility. Besides deconstructing the current integration model logjam, the transformation from dependence to interdependence in political, economic, and sociocultural revival is central for African restoration. The fourth section discussed the modalities or how to go about the future unification model from political, economic, sociocultural, governance, and

institutional structure perspectives. The final part presented the case study of the Horn of Africa, the current unification efforts, and what needs to be done. In order to identify the knowledge gap, the researchers have reviewed various books and journal articles on regional integration in Africa. The literature review helps to interrogate previous scholarship, answer the study's overarching question, and explain the failure of postcolonial African unification, and exploring models failed and alternative models that might apply to Africa.

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## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Theoretical Framework of Intra-Nation-State-Building in Africa**

#### **3.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Chapter three provides an analysis of the precolonial pattern of the African egalitarian power structure and the historical evolution of nation-building, with a particular focus on the Horn of Africa. Examining the precolonial nation building is crucial for comprehending an alternative philosophical and psychological paradigm. Progressively, analysing Africa's disintegration and its negative impact helps to work out to propose a re-emergence. The chapter argues that unified power structures in precolonial time were replaced by fragmented colonial conquest, thus distorting the basis for postcolonial integration since independence. As I have already stated, the postcolonial quest of integration involving newly independent nation-states was thus constructed to serve colonial interests and neo-colonial aspirations for Africa. The inability to frame a reintegration theory remains a significant impediment to undoing the fragmentation of Africa. The central argument for this chapter is to appreciate and consider as new governance of the architecture of African unity the historical context for the precolonial period governance and command chain. Therefore, I argue in this chapter for the need to look back at indigenous African governance as a basis on which to explore an indigenous alternative unification theory.

#### **3.2: Precolonial Governance in Africa and Beyond**

The precolonial internal political organisation is characterised by two distinct governance structures: chiefs have a decentralised pyramidal system of government, while kingdoms have a centralised monarchical system of government (Palagashvili, 2018:283). It also explained that, although the kingdom is the supreme governing structure, both have similar features in recognition of the local administration's autonomy. The monarch system, which provides authorised Community leaders, is an overly consolidated political power; chiefs have limited authority within a tribe as a political structure. Ayittey's (2006:185) analysis shows that African kingdoms self-governing lineages characterised primarily as heads of the nation and 'divine

kingships,' with the presumption that the king is the authentic epitome of a spiritual union between different Chieftainships. The role of chiefdoms and kingdoms in Africa nation-building was critical by consolidating power and governing other regions. This had at its centre culture, the rule of law, and institutional dynamics in a centralised administration system with a central authority (Gennaioli and Rainer 2006:7).

Zewde (2002:18) says that the primary reason for the Africa failure of governance in Africa is the deviation from the indigenous knowledge system of the precolonial era. The 'Yajoka Qicha, Gordanna' in Gurage, the Baytona of Tigray, Gada system of Oromo and 'Sera' in Sidama, southern part of Ethiopia, have indigenous governance, legislative and judiciary rules governing their communities, respectively (Zewde 2002). The importance of the indigenous governance system is also in the administrative rules and regulations that are critical in improving African institutional mechanisms. In Africa, there are several refined traditional local administration rules and regulations that are recognised.

African indigenous knowledge systems are concerned with a broad range of social, cultural, economic, and political issues. They provide an explanation for indigenous African governance, collective leadership, and voluntarism, which all contribute to Africa's progress and unification. It also contains concepts that can be a sound basis for alternative indigenous theory to guide the unification in Africa. For instance, 'Mojo-Oda', 'Debo' 'Umoja-Jamaa' reinstate indigenous philosophical paradigms for governance, unity, diversity, and mutual collaboration between different parties from a small scale towards massive engagement. Mojo-Oda or Oda represents a nation-state's first layer, a mystical relationship between nature and human beings. Ikeke (2013:346) reminds us that Africa's worldview is intertwined with nature and human life, including trees, oceans, plants, and rocks as interrelated web, a manifestation of the creator God. In central and southern Ethiopia, Oda is considered a sacred tree under which people sit and discuss social, cultural, legal, and political issues pertinent to the community. According to Birbirso and Gerba's (2016:122), the governance Gada system is a symbol of spiritual power transfer into local administration systems.



Mojo-Oda is a unique expression of the relationship between nature and humanity as well as the convergence of these two words in a manner that engenders interdependence among African states, cultures and governance systems. Mojo is a Swahili word meaning the art of meditation mind-body-spirit the isolating dualities between the 'good/evil,' 'spirit/flesh,' 'sacred/secular' representing divisions thinking African and non-African philosophy (Mutere, 2012:157). Oda "Odaa" is a sacred tree meeting ground for social, political, cultural and religious observance in Ethiopia (Hineu, 2012:81). The combination of the two philosophies - Mojo and Oda - establishes a fundamental element of economic, political, and sociocultural convergence in local governance from an African perspective.

Oda widely used Borana Oromo the relationship between man and nature, including the Oromo traditional Gada government system in order for society to be assembled around political, economic, social, cultural, and religious institutions (Jalata, 2010). On the one hand, the nexus between governance and social justice is a synergy between governing and governed people. On the other hand, the abuse of power is an indicator of incoherence, causing separation from society. Ikeke (2013:348) suggests that the African tradition and relationship with nature believed the sacred trees represent ancestral guardian spirits, which helped preserve nature and interconnect it with human beings. The onslaught of colonialism has wreaked havoc on African society's well-being by separating it from its creed.

Debo is an established local African knowledge system that has been employed for cooperation, voluntary contribution, and surrendering between different actors for the common good. As a governance philosophy, Debo selects among the community who has the best skill and looks into when for what purpose should be applied. Introducing Debo as governance and institutional philosophy into intra nation-states formations is essential; establishing Debo as governance and institutional philosophy into intra nation-states formations is critical. According to Abera (2017:62); Twala (2004:184); Jenco, Idris, and Thomas (2019:273); Zegeye and Vambe (2006: 349), Debo in Oromifa and Gurage languages in Ethiopia share meaning with Obra Ye nnoba in the Akan language of Ghana, 'letsema' in Setswana in Southern Africa (Abera, 2017:62; Twala, 2004:184; Jenco, Idris, and Thomas, 2019:273; Zegeye and Vambe, 2006: 349). The words have a broader

sense in the governance and structural arrangement of African contexts, such as cooperation, volunteerism, a better life for all, and collective responsibility.

Debo is used in this context to refer to collaboration amongst various segments of society for the purpose of economic growth and capacity building among nation members. I choose to use Debo because its focus includes “common consanguinity”; “working together for collective attainment”; and also “helping one another” as a meaning of “development and economical building orientation” (DEBO) between nations (Abera, 2017:62). Indigenous knowledge systems like Debo embedded in lived ‘empiricism’ and numerous perspectives, norms, and institutional framework are imperative for transformation while looking back at the African value system (Teffo, 2019:247-9). Such a viable institutional model is critical in providing a novel approach for building a democratic and sustainable governance system within the local context and knowledge (ibid: 2019). The local knowledge interrelationship with epistemological validity has an immense impact on Debo to implement on governance, jurisprudence, socioeconomic and political factors.

The African indigenous is knowledge systems contribution belongs to all Africans, not to a specific society, ethnic or sub-region is highly problematic. African people have survived for centuries and prevailed as a society with all odds throughout history constructed on philosophy and way of living. The African unification process needs to shape a broader African philosophy and worldview to resonate on the ground conditions. ‘Umoja Jamaa Africa’ is a Swahili text meaning United Nations/people of Africa. As a theoretical foundation, it is a governance and transformational concept, which helps when shifting the paradigm of African unification. Nafukho (2006:409) and Fattah (1987:40) describe Umoja as an expression of oneness, unity, extended family that resonate with African culture that pursues consensus, reconciliation, equal opportunity and team solidarity based on cultural values and diversity. Jamaa as a religious, social, state structures and institutions system was since 1804 AD a catalyst for political, economic, diplomatic transformations in influential empires, kingdoms comprising Benin, Borno, Ghana, Hausa states, Mali, Oyo, and Songhai (Okene, and Ahmad 2011:86). Jamaa is a teaching and learning doctrine and a compelling social movement with ontological, moral, and social standards advanced in Katanga Congo (Fabian, 1969:168-72). Umoja-Jamaa in shortest form is Ujamaa that means, “‘extended family,’ ‘familyhood,’ ‘brotherhood’ text exerts that a person becomes a person through the people or community” (Green, 2010:24).

A deeper understanding of African societies, indigenous governance, institutional administration, and political organisation from the village to a higher structure is essential in order to outline the features of future governance and institution systems. Martin (2012:12) explains that the African governance notion of authority is about being the custodian of the people. This bond is secular and sacred, where the leader acts as an intermediary between the people and their ancestors. A virtuous system goes beyond leadership acting as a proxy to really aid in the promotion of order by providing spiritual and material necessities. Indigenous governance and institutional administration have a high potential as a source of alternative governance modalities for political culture, transforming social consciousness, and achieving development plans (Green, 2010:20). The complexity and hierarchical structures of precolonial indigenous institutional creation can be methodically linked to modern regional development to yield outcomes that are superior to those now observed. Scholars agree that precolonial Africa had indigenous institutional formation, nation-building, and statehood that were well-shaped and consolidated worth revisiting today (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013:4). The challenge of the precolonial institution was its inability to transform and vulnerability for successfully resist the destruction and manipulation of external colonial actors.

### **3.2.1: Precolonial African Nation-Building**

Precolonial African nation-building has so much untapped wisdom, which is vital in shaping the current state and the future of Africa's institutional governance towards a unified framework. The advantage of looking back to the precolonial governance, institutional and people to people relations helps us rethink the current political and socioeconomic modelling of integration. In terms of government and statehood, Africans have demonstrated that they are capable of doing so. While repudiating disapproval stemming from the colonial legacy does not delve into the past's systems of knowledge. The analysis of past and present African nation-building thus has a great deal of importance for developing future ideologies and theories. Zewde's (2002:17) argues that the secret of existence in precolonial African societies is grasping people's adherence to the political process guidelines and procedures that conform to societal willpower. The heritage of precolonial governance and the institutional framework in the same part of Africa has not

disappeared; the rest of the social contract is alive and preserved by the public. The internal political organisation has two major systems of structural governance: decentralised pyramidal governments and centralised monarchies (Palagashvili, 2018:283).

According to Martin (2012:63), precolonial nation-building and state formation followed discernible demographic patterns, socio-cultural similarities, and political alliances, cultural homogeneity, and economic sustainability. The political unification of Africa was perhaps unique in any form and shape from the usual nation formations. Governance's unique approach does not aim to control production mode and control equal opportunities as a unified authority and create positive development. The argument is understandable that even - if not considered utopian - precolonial Africa governance has intact governance and institutional frameworks. Precolonial state formation was uniquely conducive for development, economic, and cultural harmonisation using the political structure constructed multi-ethnic inclusivity until the colonial boundaries introduced (Christopher, 1997:92). There is ample evidence through research by anthropologists and historians that the precolonial governments in African domains are based on more and less centralised precolonial political architecture (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2006:3; Christopher, 1997:98).

The precolonial governance accommodated diverse languages, ethnic and religious plurality, representation and inclusivity. Logan (2013:355) argues that the authority and institutional legitimacy of precolonial traditional leaders stemmed from communities' direct representation and the symbolic function of communal identity, unity, and stability. The earliest state formations and nation-building in Africa are believed to have been experimented with in Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Asante (Ghana), and Mali (Martin 2012:5). There is evidence that ancient African nations experienced political interdependence, decentralisation, and institutional consolidation; that shaped particular types of modernisation before they were dismantled by foreign powers (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013:3-6; Gennaioli, and Rainer, 2006:5-7). We now realise that precolonial governance systems incorporated three distinct indigenous governance conceptions that influenced nation-building standards: centralised government with decentralised administrations and the separation of religion and government. Even though the decentralisation empowered the communities, it created vulnerability from foreign power penetration; yet, this variable exposed the continent to balkanisation. Gennaioli and Rainer (2006:5) observes that in East Africa, particularly Uganda, the British administration has recognised and adapted

indigenous devolution justice and government system that was highly effective and maintained until the colonial power got complete control.

In precolonial governance, the critical asset was the separation of government and religion, along with ethnicity and nationhood. These were implemented before the introduction of western philosophy. Diop (1988:65) analyses that sociocultural identities and artefacts are an essential instrument in transforming present Africa in the precolonial political consciousness. Africa had identified demarcations in secular and religious influences for many years, and the distinction between ethnicity and nationhood was considered significant. Green (2010:24) explains that the precolonial African nationhood as an institution encompasses different tribes and kinship living in harmony as a state structure; nonetheless, after the arrival of foreign powers, the system was distorted and categorised as ethnicity.

Green (2010) found evidence that the Buganda nation that has been existed for ages in central East Africa was demoted from a nation to an ethnic group using the language variable of Buganda speaking people. But in Buganda, beyond the language, different factors make a nation Buganda. Such arbitrary categorisation and misconceptions have negatively affected the nation-building and state formation logic underpinning state-based regional integration in Africa. The type of nationhood that had a prominent role in the African context and eventually remained as ethnic groups are of Buganda, Hadiya, and Kaffa of East Africa, the Ashanti, Ife, Shongai and Igala in West Africa, as well as Zulu and the Swazi in Southern Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013:6). Dishonouring authentic kingdoms and nationhood by foreign powers on an imperial mission created enormous political vacuums and clashes between various indigenous governance systems in repositioning their original positions.

In the precolonial African government establishment, the fundamental markers are a sense of solidarity, common historical, cultural, territorial, and language resemblance. According to Green (2010:23), precolonial Africa conducted nation-building through assimilation, such as Ashanti territories where there was a sizable cultural difference between inhabitants. Yet, progressively Ashanti nationhood emerged as a distinct nation. Similarly, there is ample evidence that the Zulu

kingdom surrounding peoples such as the Tonga and Lala assimilated without completely adjusting previous identities (Green 2010:22). Precolonial African nation-building demonstrated that assimilation strategy was an indigenous political agency that operated through an institutional framework. Customary laws, tax collection, permanent military and participation, and consent-based representation all assisted in nation-building traditions. The border protection system made Africa vulnerable (Robinson 2002:523). Additionally, precolonial African states remain poorly portrayed as a form of local political agency battled foreign powers dynamics (Monroe, 2013:19). This thesis includes the critical issues to be taken by contemporary Africa, the quality of their government, the system for representation, accountability and political and economic unification.

### **3.2.2: Lessons in Nation-Building and State-Formation Conceptions beyond Africa**

Precolonial, nation-state formation, institution, and governance systems have a significant impact on contemporary Africa. Monroe (2013:28-29) illustrates how Africa conducted diverse experiments in nation-state formations up to continental unification efforts without considering indigenous political knowledge and political configuration shaped by peoples' will. Nevertheless, learning an eclectic approach to governance and adapting to an indigenous knowledge system is essential for developing an integrated governance concept without contradicting the local contexts. Considering the fragmentation has costed Africa to lag in social, economic, political, and holistic development from the rest of the world. The focus of this section is to underline what can be learned on governance functionality and the corresponding relationship among member states from precolonial experiences of nation-building and governance. According to Von Bogdandy, Häußler, Hanschmann, and Utz (2005:585), the nation's failure transpires when the fundamental of nation pillars is ruined, and the contract between people and state is no longer valued. It is not necessary but also essential collective psychology to sustain peace with itself and common consensus about the culture, identity, allegiance, symbols, rituals, and historical experience.

Africa need a robust, accommodative, and realistic alternative unification theory that is distinct from the continent's current social, economic, and political impasse. However, learning from others of a similar scale provides the capability to reflect on the whole issue and adapt to the context of Africa is functional. The unique nature of these countries' institution formation, nation

building, nation branding has immense lesson Africa should attain. Respectively, briefly discuss each country and the union with one particular subject that can add value in exploring the unification model. Rath (1978:582) and Phillimore (2013:229) argue that what makes the USA nation-building concept firm and consistent is the designation of responsibilities and political interdependence between federal and state governments. Further, they explained that the central pillar of the systems is a division of political power or autonomy of state governments and one supra sovereignty which represents the nation to the outside world.

In parallel with the institutional structure, it is crucial how Africa develops a sense of belonging. European Union, USA, Canada, and China have improved how the supreme nation identity is more important than local identity. Anholt (2010:118) argues that branding Europe goes hand in hand with building a common purpose, citizenship, and identity as a community. Apart from providing "education, health care, housing, social security, and social welfare," African governments are critical in promoting a universal value system through music, art, and cultural exchange (Kidane 2018:22). The EU branding project bounded the EU as one economic community through festivals, different competition, EU logo in the car plates, and flag and brand member countries (Anholt, 2010:118). Traditionally, Africans have promoted a shared identity much earlier than Europeans, who for a while resisted shared identity (Fioramonti and Mattheis, 2015:685). However, as Europeans began to institutionalise the concept of "Europeanization," Africans were far behind in the process of transforming the shared identity into a formalised institution of their own.

Nation-building is at the centre of advancing collective identity formation, aspiration, equal opportunity, and social welfare. To achieve a nation-building project, it is indispensable that indigenous knowledge takes its course in a meaningful way because of the 21st-century human advancement and demand on an existing cultural, political, economic, and institutional framework (Von Bogdandy, Häußler, Hanschmann, and Utz 2005:586). An effective nation-building process produces a shared value proposition that legitimises shared responsibility and authority. In complying with the primary government responsibility, there are different approaches implemented in pursuing the character of nation framers, including diversity, equality, liberty, unity, and nationalism. Africa and China share nearly similar population size; the societal structure and governance systems are distinctive fifty-five independent states and one centralised

administration. Africa can study what is best from the Chinese that is beneficial to Africa governance and institution formation. According to Phillimore (2013:229), with the Communist Party's administrative government ideology, China has a central, provincial, and county, bottom-up strategy that comprises city and prefecture levels of five tiers, making the central government more powerful. The origins of socio-political processes in the different part of the world are complex to understand, but it speaks that particular community how the governance models are shaped.

Nation-state-building has been for centuries in the entire world at different times, formats, and strategies like the USA, China, and Russia. The Russian nation-building and state structures are comparatively different from western nations. The unique nature of Russian systems of governance is an advantage that enables the only expert Russia in the area to avoid foreign interference. The Russian legislative Duma and state structures were a crucial part of this. Russian nation-building dilemma and success are a good lesson for Africa. The predicament is an ethno-federal structure, which complicates defining who is Russian under the flag of “rossiiskaya”, the ethnic Russian nation (Shevel, 2011:185).

While institutionalisation and legalisation are some of the daunting tasks in the unification process, defining “who is an African” without an ethnic matrix is essential. Similarly, the lessons learned through the Soviet Union's integration and disintegration have included lessons about ideological failure, ethnic justifications, boundaries, sovereignty, and unresolved contradictions. Snyder (2015:707) suggests that the integration and disintegration of Russia took place through revolution and wars and at the very least a wise acquisition, at a certain distance from the Alternative Reality of Europe and the Soviet Union. Based on the Balkans model, the European nation-state succeeded in breaking up territorial empires but failed as a means of reintegration.

### **3.3: Fragmentation of Africa and the Colonial Period**

The balkanisation of Africa has left it in a fragmented, weak, and vulnerable economic and political position in the world. The arbitrary drawing of African political and economic boundaries



negatively impacted postcolonial Africa (Davis 1973:389 and Ijeoma, 2007:181). The colonial partitioning of Africa against the will of the African people continues unabated and becomes an impediment to shared development and identity. Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012:52); Udombana, (2002:39), the significant negative impact of balkanisation is the unacceptably high levels of underdevelopment and the destruction of African indigenous cultural-educational, economic and political patterns. (Seife, 2020:3), the progressive deterioration of a multicultural African value system and the entrance of a western education system that disregards African roots and indigenous knowledge systems have resulted in the African value system becoming multicultural and on the verge of extinction.

The advent of colonial dominance into Africa marked a period of dismantling the African governance system and replaced it with a new reconfiguration of nation-states structure, which is foreign to Africans. The disintegration ruined the pre-existing, cultural, institutional, and economic systems and replaced them with fifty-five strange countries. According to Obikili (2016:3) and Davis (1973:390), the fragmentation process took Africa into uncharted territory as foreign political powers took over the political institutions. Further, they indicated that the African disintegration period not only operated by external power but also the emergence of a new class of Africans that promoted westernisation of the education systems and economic bridge by native Africans.

Christopher (1997:92) explained that precolonial African nations were uniquely conducive for development, economic, and cultural harmonisation using the political structure. During the colonial period, Africa's enormous political and economic power fragmentation transformed itself into a distortion of local knowledge systems and economic underdevelopment, leading to its dependence on the developed world. One of the critical distractions of the colonial period is the creation of the internal isolation and separation of the rest of the world between African political leaders and traditional leaders. *Things Fall Apart* (1957) explains that Chinua Achebe's novel explains that a functioning and viable African community fragments in the face of white missionary and administrative intrusion (Davis 1973:389). The anti-colonial liberation fight sought to establish moral and intellectual liberty, to combat cultural decadence, and to secure African independence by controlling the mode of production (Houser,1987:21-22).

Fohtung (2015:2) analysis, the arbitrary artificial boundaries are not the only impediment for economic development but also political unification of postcolonial Africa, which lacks superior logic. The colonial project has disrupted the social, cultural, economic, and political pattern in Africa. Whether or not the "precolonial or colonial" era was the central discussion of African history was the most important way to shape independent Africa to manage its crunch (Cooper 1981; Clarke, 1988; Davis 1973; Rodney, 1968; Ocheni, and Nwankwo). Clearly, colonisation interrupted every spectrum of development in Africa, but the solution is to look more closely into how this is solved. Africa's fragmentation into fifty-three weak nations, which subsequently became fifty-five countries due to separatist agendas, has significantly harmed the natural evolution of nationhood (Settles, 1996:3).

### **3.3.1: The Colonial Impact in Disintegration Africa political Economy**

The systematic disintegration and disarticulation created massive damage in the indigenous economy, traditional, social, and cultural structures (Bayeh, 2015:90). Alarming, the economic policies of colonisers were deliberately designed to disempower the local habitats by exploiting cheap labour force and low price for agriculture and mining products (Settles 1996:8). The colonial era paralysed the systemic economic power base that made Africa primary goods or cash crop production provider and restricted the production of finished goods within Africa (Austin, 2010:16; Kelsall, 2011:632). Above and beyond, making African economies' growth control in the hands of colonial administrations was one of the main sabotages and not allowing indigenous people to have autonomy.

Colonialism aimed to control African mode of production to favour European industry raw material input that translates into economic enrichment. Africa received negligible revenue for its product and labour. Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012:47) suggest that the driving force of colonisers' presence in Africa was to satisfy the high demand of industry input socio-economic transformation; otherwise, Africa undoubtedly has much better economic position today. The economic, political, and psychological damage by colonial power negatively contributed to the impoverishment of African nations. Hook (2004:122) argues that colonial interest goes beyond African raw material,

imposing western culture, values, and norms on African societies to exploit human and natural resources permanently.

Colonialism has sponsored despotic forms of government to serve long-established, postcolonial Africa Imperial interests (Lange and Dawson, 2009:786). Ziltener and Künzler (2013:297) say that the colonial legacy even after colonialism fostered a tyranny that led to a “rent-seeking culture” and also elite politics in the governance system. The colonial involvement in postcolonial Africa is realised through indirect control that negatively impacts the development agenda and supports highly corrupted and autocratic leadership (Bayeh, 2015:90). Colonisers installed institution that serves the interest of colonial authority carefully against the interest of the people.

During the colonial rule, an attempt was made to amalgamate various colonial states. The examination of the efforts at unification during the colonial period is essential in order to check how and why the projects were designed and failed. During colonial periods, there were limited efforts favouring unification in countries under British Protectorates and French colonies, initiated by various actors' merger. Three major unification attempts have been made in this regard, which is relevant to our subject matter. The Rhodesian federation was composed in 1953 from Northern Rhodesia "current Zambia" and in 1953, from the Southern Rhodesia "currently Zimbabwe" and in the Nyasaland "currently Malawi" (Rosberg, 1956:98). The local people have taken little account of the federation as they have learned a further colonial expansion of human and natural resources. Senegal and Gambia established the Confederation of Senegambia in 1982 was the second step in unification (Hughes & Lewis, 1995:228). The third effort to unify nations is the result of the federation of Italy's Ethio-Eritrea colony formed by a UN resolution mechanism (Tiruneh, 1980:99; Haile, 1987:10).

The thesis would like to draw a lesson on why, without consultation, the colonial empire tries to unify various states with citizens. In this regard, the thesis briefly assesses the three major attempts the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Senegambia Confederation, and the Ethio-Eritrea federation. The amalgamation arrangement was not intended to facilitate political and economic programmes for citizens. Baxter and Hodgens (1957:450-5) argue that the

federation seeks to promote and smooth internal borders to enable the colonial authority to provide broader market opportunities and controls. Three African nations formed the Central African Federation between 1953 and 1963 on the historical record. The lesson from this failed process is people's voice and participation; any imposition of an idea is disrupted in some way. The rise and fall of intra-state fusion were one of the historical attempts of the African colonial era. The federal agreement between Rhodesia and Nyasaland does not have equal status or is not a sovereign high office of the Commonwealth (Rosberg, 1956:98; Mason, 1962:19). However, while forming the federation, the local population and traditional leaders took little consideration. Colonialist convinced it was necessary to change and control the internal dynamics and people's aspirations to be independent in an administrative arrangement. And yet, until Africans realise that they will be their federation, the British government plans to maintain this authority together (ibid).

On 1 January 1982, after a long negotiation between independent Senegal and the independent Gambia, the confederation of Senegambia is recognised (Hughes & Lewis, 1995:229). It then stated that English-speaking Gambia and French-speaking Senegal are exemplary unions, regarded as a political union by independent African countries. The two countries' binding Constitutional Act facilitated the emergence of Senegambia's 19th-century political unit. This union has unfortunately been dissolved or reduced to a customs union (ibid). There might be many reasons for failure, but from the beginning, the confederation did not involve citizens and did not develop a collective strategy; rather, it emerged from threats of vulnerability. From the outset, the approach was a simplified solution that only focuses on current problems without considering the future relationship between the two countries (Coppa, 1986:52). Two countries remain autonomous in their political system through the Senegambia Confederation (ibid). The failure to address the security threat and political instability experiences of the Senegambia Confederation was intended to address instead of introducing a holistic development ambition. It was a problem. The formation of the Senegambia confederation provided an impetus to see other similar unity between countries as a model and to develop a multi-layered continental unification. Nevertheless, for the future unifying process, a short-lived confederation can be a good lesson.

Another colonial mystery in the face of Africa is the unity and designation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea is the creation of the colonial legacy, which has posed substantial difficulties in reconciling the Ethiopian values with Eritrea's values (Negash, 1997:13). Eritrea has spent three distinct periods, the Italian colonial rule, the UK government under the umbrella of the United Nations, and the United Nations federated with Ethiopia. The UN adopted resolution 390A (V) on 2 December 1950, which states "Eritrea became an autonomous unit federated under the sovereignty of Ethiopia" (Haile, 1987:13-16; Negash, 1997:10). The UN Commission conducted a feverish investigation to determine Eritreans' future by attempting to determine whether or not both parties, people's unity and independence, could coexist. Accordingly, by examining different options, the commission concludes that the shared history with Ethiopia has the UN resolution to recommend establishing a federation with Ethiopia (Tiruneh, 1980:112). Yet, after a few years, an inescapable political crisis emerged due to Ethiopia disregarding the UN arranged federation agreement. The federation overturns caused the political elite to be angered and turned into a political movement against the federal collapse (Haile, 1987:14). There was an understanding of national identity among Eritreans for national building; the secessionist campaign ended with the emergence of Eritrea in 1991. I argue that the aim was to extend the imperial presence and the involvement or participation of citizens, notwithstanding the failure of the attempts at unity in Africa during the colonial period. In addition, elite politicians near the system with colonial masters leave the population behind. Consequently, the unity agreements have no foundation that will benefit the majority of the society, and a question arises intermittently about the ownership about the validity of the arrangements.

### **3.3.2: Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa**

The Horn of Africa disintegration needs to be discussed within a perspective that demonstrates how the colonial powers create division among the same people who have similar psychological makeup and identity. Similar psychological makeup and identity refer to cultural, functional intelligence, religious, and ethnic patterns; identity configuration frequently necessitates a similar environment and consistency; however, this does not imply that they are identical in every way (Schachter, 2004:23; Cole, John-Steiner, Scribner, and Souberman, 1978:9). The artificial border demarcations created in the Horn of Africa not merely an imaginary administration line but also a new identity according to a colonial pattern. The people of Somalia have four identities that are

apportioned within the Horn and East Africa. The current national identity undermines the historical context of the African nation-building journey; following colonialists' artificial boundaries between African countries and being absorbed naturally over time (Ijeoma, 2007:181). The identity dynamics were not created in the image of African history.

The colonial history of the Horn of Africa is not different from the rest of the continent; perhaps the devastation is more profound due to a mix of geopolitics and dual religious interest by the colonisers (Selassie, 2003:146; Crummey, 2003:121). What makes the fragmentation more complicated the region proximity and surrounded diverging religious creed, such as 'Christianity, Judaism and Islam', is the centre of attraction for conflicting interests (ibid). The diverse colonial powers' interest in the region tried to manipulate the religion as an entry point and battling ground to the extent that the nation-state formation has attached to religious dynamics. According to Awad (1994), the colonisation was changing from time to time based on the higher bidder and the intensity of power, including British, France, Portugal, Italy, and Turks are among the leading contenders. The link between colonial legacy and the interruption of the local knowledge system attributed to conflict and governance is a two-way street in the region. The depiction of life in the Horn of Africa has become synonymous with internal and intra border conflict since the arrival of colonial power in the region.

Among critical historical hurdles introduced by colonial powers was creating division among citizens into political, ethnic, religious institutions in the Horn of Africa that immensely troubled the societal structures. The consequence of such intrusion triggered conflicts in different forms, which became stumbling blocks to unanimity. Mengisteab (2011:9) says that the colonial legacy enabled the protracted fragmentation that formed unaccountable governance and the ethnocentric and self-serving leadership in the region. Inescapably, the Horn of Africa has 'often been cited as a metaphor for disaster' and inter and intra conflicts that have caused over half a century that doomed human lives and aspiration of development among the citizens (Selassie, 2003:148). The major conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia include the Border War of 1964; the Ogaden War of 1977–1978; and the 1982; as well as the Eritrean–Ethiopian War of 1998–2000 (Taddia, 1990:165; Crummey, 2003:123). "The wars over the Ogaden, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1960-91) and the Southern Sudanese war (1956–72; 1983–2005) cannot be explained without reference

to their contextual roots, which go back to the precolonial empires and the colonial state” (Mengisteab, 2011:9).

The region that has lingered behind in consolidating the unification process is partly historical grievance among member states, and still, there is a suspicious relationship among different parties. Religious extremism, ethnic politics, membership overlap, foreign powers interventions, and obstinate sovereignty approach are among barriers to integration (Gebru, 2016:27). Protracted internal conflicts, natural disaster, and border wars among member states negatively affect forming a sub-regional organisation and accelerate the regional unification process in the HoA. The fragility of the Horn of Africa emanates from the heavy presence of foreign powers, including the Arab League, Iran, Turkey, and Israel, which makes regional politics more difficult (Kendie 1994:44). The IGAD's institutional weakness is a result of external powers' intervention and internal instability. The sub-regional coordinator IGAD suffers from multiple memberships, deprived human and financial resources. The unification plan requires understanding the current problem, identifying weaknesses, acknowledging the limitation, and reflecting on the alternative. The regional unification depended on providing an institutional mechanism, improve fiscal and non-fiscal barriers, including external intervention, ethnic politicisation, Ideological mismatch, and dealing decisively with a historical grievance (Yitay and Thobejane 2017:78). Consequently, it is helpful to critique the current approaches and for suggesting alternative paths to sub-regional unification.

### **3.4: Postcolonial Pursuit of African Unity**

Postcolonial Africa has two appearances. On one side, a new beginning of hopes among Africans to determine the continent's fate in the hands' native people, aspiration of development, and equal status in the world fora. As noted above, however, the presence of fear and uncertainty, due to the lack of mode of production control, inadequate financial and technological resources, and unfinished business of colonial force, are likely the result of remote-control mechanisms interfering with the status quo. According to Dinka & Kennes (2007:6), the new hopes divided into two waves of independence and the beginning of further cooperation among self-governing African countries: "the first wave from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and the second during

the first half of the 1990s". The first wave of postcolonial action was about policymakers' efforts towards integration; the second wave was to strengthen the power of the existing regional institutions (ibid). Postcolonial Africa has to encounter challenges in two frontlines by former coloniser legacy psychological warfare, socio-political crises, economic subjugate, and method of governance, without which the democratic process (Igue 2010:11; Demissie, 2007:162).

Postcolonial governance challenges arose as a result of external actors interfering via local agents, while the state formation process was still in its infancy, in an attempt to manage various types of colonial oppression. African political elites are more determined to deter and establish collective destiny by reinvigorating the continental organisation. Dinka and Kennes (2007:5) state that the vision that resulted in the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) establishment in 1963. The OAU's creation is regarded as a watershed moment achieved by visionary African leaders soon following colonial devastation. The transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) was a demonstration of the Pan-African political and economic union that exhibited the steadfastness of African leaders with all challenges (Edo and Olanrewaju, 2012:57; Yihun, 2013:11). The leaders of Postcolonial Africa face two main challenges: to break the national development agenda and develop an international stance that divided bipolar world powers of political, economic, military and cultural influence, which shaped the international community. Post-independence African leaders have played an essential role in dealing with former colonial powers. The Cold War superpowers political manoeuvring and shapes the domestic unification agenda with all shortcomings (Cragg, 2008:23). The postcolonial Africa States, more than cold war rivalry and unification agenda internal socio-political and economic crises including structural adjustment program under the Bretton Woods Institutions.

Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the early 1980s conducted a program aimed to privatise strategic state-owned industries to the private sector for "better efficiency and investment." At the same time, African economies were small, excessively open for elites, dependent and primary product, and poorly organised supply management system designed to a colonial system unable to swallow SAP prescription. The prescription of SAP increasingly demanded global independence, and privatisation exacerbated poverty in Africa and undermined local capacity development. Accordingly, in opposition to SAP program implementation, the OAU adopted the



Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) that recommended by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (Adebajo, 2013:25; Ndulo, 2003:332; Thisen 1991:116). The Lagos Plan of Action was an alternative mechanism to assure African development through food and agriculture; industry; natural resources; human resources; transport and communications; trade and finance; and energy (Adebajo, 2013:24). Nevertheless, LPA was designed to respond to SAP's privatisation push replacing homegrown economic development. Tabulation was a total disregard for the developing world, in particular, the African continent. Thisen (1991:153) analysis states that Africa needs to rediscover its potential with a sense of self-reliance, indigenous capital, and psychological independence accompanied by social justice, equity, and unity.

*If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa's rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full exploitation of our material and human means, in the full interests of all our peoples. "To go it alone" will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations, and threaten our liberty.*

— Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, xvii

Postcolonial Africa has attained a lot by conducting the unification strategies by reclaiming and rethinking African people's history and agency. Legum (1975:209) says the OAU precondition to qualify practical unity under one sovereign entity failed because of strong disagreement on the type of union; the second option was establishing an association of governments. The most qualified is the association of governments and a sub-regional community that offers alternative economic integration policies. Since it was founded in 1963, the OAU has been concerned with mobilising solidarity in favour of unliberated African countries and resolving conflicts following a colonial disruption. However, the organisation's main objective is to create political unification between the Member States. The ground realities were not conducive, and the resistance was immense both within and from foreign powers.

De Melo and Tsikata (2015:4) argue that since the foundation of the OAU unification project, they have not made significant progress in planning substantial steps towards political integration, while there is deep unification desire. The unification model has no clear direction of principle on which path the continent embarks on, achieving a holistic approach such as economic, political, or sociocultural context. Young (2010:46) and Muzee and Enaifoghe (2019:55) argue the current economic integration scheme that is ambitious and idealistic timeframes towards deeper integration with a single approach. The paradox encapsulates two contradictions inherent in

adopting Western neoliberal economic methods while maintaining a fragile and dependent economy (ibid). Africa's unification endeavour requires an assessment and identification of its quality through the use of a holistic approach rather than a single model.

The regional economic communities (RECs) emerged slowly from the early 1970th onward through different initiatives. According to Adebajo (2013:20) and Cragg (2008:79), the primary motivations for the RECs programme were to respond to SAPs; to transition from national restructuring to sub-regional consolidation while achieving short-term gains; and to increase economic integration in response to long-term benefits. Additionally, Adebayo Adedeji initiated the concept of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and made it a reality in 1975. The second initiative was the "Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) in 1981 (Adebajo, 2013:21).

Postcolonial Africa inherited poor infrastructure, a fragmented economy (De Melo and Tsikata 2015:4). In the absence of a united political will and harmonised economy, neither free movement of people, goods, and services nor a common representation in the international fora was possible. There was a mismatch between theoretical aspirations towards economic integration and practical reality based on ground realities (Jiboku, 2015:23). Beyond theory, the unification effort necessitates an appropriate political framework as well as a complete understanding of the practicalities and capacity of member nations. The basic unification challenges confronting Africa, such as fragmented markets, intricate government systems, peace and security, the rule of law, political instability, and a lack of seaport access, must be addressed holistically (Muzee and Enaifoghe 2019:58). Importantly, beyond financial, political and human resources challenges, having authorised and directly elected people to decide on regional unification process give provision of belongingness and impact versus appointed people.

The Horn of Africa is the most troubled zone in postcolonial Africa, border conflict, civil war, and severe drought. Besides, the region in the last thirty years has got two newborn countries out of the secessionist movement. El-Affendi (2009:5) analysis, the region challenges are multiple that trigger disputes within intrastate such as underdevelopment, slow growth, and uneven resource

distribution due to bad governance. The new, invented national character created by the colonial leaders has suffered in postcolonial Africa, which has aggravated the demand for independence and self-administration (Crummey, 2003:129). The structure problem stems from inherited colonisers, arbitrary border demarcations, and an ethnic and political identity that contributed to the disintegration of the HoA people's social compact (Assefa, 1996:46, Crummey, 2003:119; Selassie, 2003:142). The manifestations of historical colonial legacies that brought division of the same people with arbitrary border demarcation have caused a severe outcome from security, governance development, and people to people relationship at stake.

#### **3.4.1: Postcolonial State Formation and Governance Impact in Africa unification**

According to Young (2004:26), the postcolonial Africa state formation is primarily detached from precolonial African experience but is adapted from colonial structures and European imperial domains. In the beginning, there were fundamentally three options that can be implemented as state running philosophies. On the one hand, applying the western governance model, which is a highly acceptable structure for state formation; on the other hand, implementing an indigenous political culture; and finally, a hybrid of western and indigenous systems. Stark (1986:344) says that there is no profound distinction between ideology, idealism and individualism in postcolonial state formation or ideological conception. The only difference is personality and vision, the lack of collective leadership against the charisma of individuals that greatly sacrifice the continent.

The primary drawback of having weak state formations at an individual nation level is that this translates into weak continental institutions. The OAU, the AU, is predominantly a mirror image of the majority of its members portrayed as poorly governed, susceptible, vulnerable, and heavily dependent on external aid (Asante, 2000:7; Okumu, 2009:97). What makes it worst is most of these states, after independence, still receive a significant portion of technical and financial help from former colonisers (ibid). The disorder at the AU reflects member countries and can expect poor performance unless either party takes a leading role in changing the reality conclusively. It has been suggested that what is needed is a holistic approach to state formation through institution-building, the transition from individual leadership to inclusive governance, and functional ideology attached to local realities (Stark, 1986:347). While it is obvious that the

continental political arrangements formed in the aftermath of colonialism resulted in weak, unsuccessful, and poorly administered member states. After sixty years of independence, constantly blaming foreign powers for failure is not appropriate. By now, Africans have the well-defined state-building capacity and institutionalised the continental organisation that can create a robust and cohesive economic and political tie among member states.

Examining crucial factors that made the African Union unproductive in an approximate manner is essential; why it did not achieve its mission, vision, and motto. Among many reasons, the core challenge that handicaps the AU is the inheritance of the OAU principles of sovereignty and non-interference, an organisational culture of incompetency, and financial dependency on foreign powers (Asante 2000:9; Draper 2012:68; Okumu, 2009:95; Muzee and Enaifoghe 2019:58; Muchie, 2004:151). Additionally, there is a lack of political will, decision-making processes, authority, and accountability on the part of AUC leaders, statements are poorly or never implemented, working relationships with RECs are strained, and Eurocentric unification theory is prevalent (ibid). The AU, institutional mandate limitation and inability can be demonstrated in many ways, including planned activities and objectivist versus accomplishment, besides the realisations of the core mission unification. For the last sixty decades, the OAU/AU has made little or no progress toward political and economic integration among member states. According to Okumu (2009:104) analysis, the AU is producing several declarations for implementation; nonetheless, less than ten per cent go through the execution phase due to lack of monitoring mechanism and related weakness.

The critical observation concerning the mandate difference between the African Union Assembly of the Head of States and the African Union Commission (AUC), the execution organ, is vital. Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004:141); Landsberg (2012:61) critique the AUC as a toothless organ that does not have a full mandate to plan and execute its vision; instead, it is a mere secretariat of the AU and Executive Council, which comprises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The significant challenge related to an institutional framework that crippled the AUC operationalization is that the political leaders of AUC are appointees of the AU Assembly, the highest organ comprised of the head of states. The AUC leadership does not carry any authority and responsibility from citizens

of Africa; instead, the responsibility emanates from the head states to execute a decision reached by the General Assembly.

The AU emulates institutional structures of the European Council and European Union in that they are not unacceptable or beneficial to African people. The organisation structure at the AU and RECs is a shallow institutional structure without a broad-based citizens' involvement and representation to formulate based on local as an alternative structure. Jiboku (2015:23); Landsberg (2006:47); Okumu (2009:94) analysis that to realise a Pan African unification which aims for Africans wellbeing, development, and democratisation citizens' participation at all level is essential. The current AU/AUC structures do not allow people's participation in the decision-making process. For Bischoff (2008:181), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOCC) and PAP close to social structures to promote unification agendas, political education for democracy, or organise for democratic participation in the continent. African civil society organisations remain at the periphery as the result of the mistrust by states. In the state formation, civil society's role is critical in mobilising citizen participation in the community decision-making process together with the right of voting, freedom of assembly, and speech.

#### **3.4.2: Postcolonial State Formation and Governance Impact on the Horn of Africa Unity**

What makes the Horn Africa state formation in postcolonial Africa unique is the birth of new states unprecedentedly through secessionist tendencies driven by non-African powers. Such a wave of disintegration includes Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia, South Sudan's independence from Sudan, the breakdown of Somalia in Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu led central government. Colonial heritage, geopolitics, the formation of a new colonial identity, and the absence of an indigenous political framework all contribute to fragmentation. The fundamental challenges that postcolonial leaders faced were a continuation of the colonial mode of rule. According to Bereketeab (2012:9), Somaliland was a product of British colonial legacy, unlike South Sudan, which was not an integrated part of colonial artefacts. The justification of separation claims by Somaliland as British protectorate developed a Somaliland identity, which they claim different status from Somalia Mogadishu, Puntland region. Somaliland is officially separated after the central government collapsed in 1991, even if there is no international recognition secured to

be considered a nation-state (Gaas, 2019:12). Contrasting Somalia central government relatively peaceful and a strong sense of national identity has emerged with the functional political structure and trading system.

Italian colonisation over Eritrea sowed the seeds for entitlement independence. The seed that built self-identity over time, which rejected Ethiopian unity, offered the status quo of the precolonial era by avoiding animosity among ethnic and political problems (Kendie 1994:45; Bereketeab 2012:10). Eritrea, apart from the colonial past, the other pushing factor was the geopolitics that aimed to make Ethiopia a weak state and seaport less country to avoid a nation with a massive population vulnerable. Kendie (1994:50) states that Arab countries were the dominant supporting group for the Eritrea people liberation movement, considering creating an Islamic country and controlling strategic the longest Red Sea. The complex nature of the political past has produced two new nations at the same time presently; there is nationhood appeal to the international community. The future of HoA needs to assess the state failure in Somalia, South Sudan and the absolute isolation of Eritrea from the international community, often categorised as a lack of governance and unfinished state formation process (Gebru, 2016:29). Moreover, the region characterised by recurrent drought, grinding poverty and the presence of weak state institutions and tribal conflict that needs to address.

The Horn of Africa region has two divergent dilemmas: external force occupation and internal rivalry for control over more territories. Due to the Abyssinians' (Ethiopia's) historical opposition to European colonialism, which fostered hatred both within and beyond, Ethiopian Empires were characterised as expansionists in the region (Crummey, 2003:121; Mengisteab, 2011:19). Aside from the distraction of colonial authority, the political and socioeconomic structure, postcolonial leaders are responsible for resolving internal divisions, political governance, and nationhood. As indicated by Abdallah (2008:270), Djibouti, as a state, created French colonial rule that comprises two ethnic groups, the Afar and Issa. The Djibouti colonial and postcolonial leadership shaped its survival and the current state of governance. Precolonial Djibouti does not have a sufficient imprint that has significance outside of the Horn context. Djibouti has been strangely stable compared to its neighbours, particularly Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Bereketeab 2012:14). While Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia has been suffering internal civil war and intra border and political conflicts with

neighbouring countries for the last thirty years. Djibouti is relatively the most stable and steady governance system (Seife, 2020:5). For four decades, the HoA countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan were consumed by internal strife and border disputes (Mulugeta, 2010:24-26). Ethiopia and Somalia fought over the Ogden piece of territory from 1963 and 1978, while Ethiopia and Eritrea fought over the Badme piece of land between 1998 and 2000.

Ethiopia plays a vital role in the intra-state formation and the coordination of the region's economies in the contemporary political arena with a comparative geographical advantage. Besides, economically, it can play a crucial role with vast arable land, sizable hydropower potential, and a substantial trained workforce. Additionally, the reunification of Ethiopia and Eritrea, where cultural affinities, religious bonds, historical ties under a single Kingdom, and the flag all play a role in the restoration of economic and political links, has greater significance (Kendie 1994:28). Ethiopia and Somalia share close cultural, geographic, historical, religious, economic, and security interdependence as essential assets in the region if they compromise not to pull each other in opposite directions (Gaas, 2019:14).

Similarly, cooperation between Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia would strengthen regional bloc immensely and bargain on lofty sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the region, the new states that emerged through secessionist movement that caused devastating war "such as Eritrea and South Sudan" at honeymoon stage sovereignty remain extremely valued and resentfully safeguarded (Gebbru, 2016:29). Besides, most political solutions involve military confrontation within and with neighbouring countries equally; economic nationalism strong national identity stronger than older nations in the region that might cause resistance in the formation of regional bloc. The postcolonial unification challenge was a disparity of ideas between leadership and the indirect rule of former colonisers. The preponderances of analysing the three patterns of postcolonial Africa have immense importance: political, social, and economic development. diagnosing the paths in systematic approach governance of the present-day African state structural challenges, including the intergovernmental sub-regional and regional formations.

### **3.5: Towards: An Alternatives Unification Philosophy**

The alternative theory of unification is an academic exercise in philosophising of the integration model of the past and the present; it describes a strategy for governance that speaks for the future. The concept of the alternative unification model signifies that looking beyond a single solution. The approach needs to be designed in a holistic technique vertical and horizontal dimension of multi-layer governance archetypal. The alternative considered indigenous knowledge as a premise that made Afrocentric proposition which is a novel paradigm shift.' The African unification process necessitates being design based on African philosophy and worldview more to resonate on the ground conditions. The idea is not a comparison between economic integration vis-à-vis political or otherwise. The methodology based on the theoretical framework designed that employs different layers of organisational outlines, and the conceptual definition provides different pillars that illuminate the reasoning.

The motivation behind the alternative strategy is the 'failure' of regional unification for the last six decades. The failure of unification has internal and external factors, including ill-advised, economic policies, deficiencies in an institutional and administrative capacity, political instability, and disparities in urban and rural development (Naldi, and Magliveras, 1998:601; Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard, 2005:501). Besides, the external factors hostile terms of trade, high debt and debt-servicing commitments, intervention on African internal affairs, and indirect control of the mode of production are among the few (ibid). Predominantly, from the time of OAU up to the AU, the fundamental challenge is lack of creating institutional capacity that plan, execute, and evaluate. The institutional mandate directly emanated from citizens, not from designated officials [Head of States], which undermines the intergovernmental organisation and appreciate indigenous solutions as a preferable institutional framework. According to Börzel's (2016:10-18) research, one of the reasons for African unification's failure is a lack of a rationalist approach to developing interconnectedness in political, economic, and sociocultural domains that cement institution-building at sub-regional and regional levels.

The compelling factor in developing an indigenous alternative unification theory is identifying critical structural challenges and providing solutions for the continental unification project. The



alternative approaches are expected to acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the dominant approaches in the past and present and explore a technically feasible and practically implementable solution. Debunking the current unification model and its significant challenges, and responding 'why the alternative unification is indispensable to achieve continental unification. The current unification model could not resolve duplication of effort institutional framework, governance deficits, underdevelopment and artificial borders, poor design of RECs formation, and overlapping memberships (Jiboku, 2015:9; Kidane 2018:26; Golit, and Adamu, 2014:111). Reduplication of efforts must be avoided in order for an institutional framework to function properly. The core demand of the unification project is building an institutional structure with vertical and horizontal organisation capability with transparency, adequacy, appropriate mandate, and robust imperative strategies for implementation. Additionally, having human agencies and institutional structures that enable them to create synergy with political conduct to shape the political context is vital.

### **3.5.1: Theoretical Perspectives for Alternative Unification Theory**

The indigenous alternative unification is a theoretical framework pattern based on the indigenous ontological and epistemological foundation to reach a broader conclusion. Charmaz (2017:6), constructivist grounded theory helps broaden theoretical sampling and explanations for critical review, which nurtures the exploration of alternative propositions both from the researcher and participants. Besides, conducting constructivist grounded theory benefits the researcher to use an indigenous knowledge system that illuminates the communal, traditional, and academic studies. The foundation of theoretical perspectives is the comparison and contrast of distinct researcher worldviews, experiences, and profound empiricism. Beck and Perkins (2014:13); Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (2011:176), constructivist and participatory inquiry influence the outcome by determining a researcher in developing a theoretical construct by exploring shared knowledge within a community, peculiar experience, and empiricism through data collection and analysis. The alternative unification model foundations are based that the current model is unable to achieve due to structural impediments. As a result, to investigate alternative unification, the researcher established model validity through thorough analyses that covered the unification pillars, such as governance, equality, political, economic, and sociocultural contexts.

The induction reasoning method introduces broader conceptualisation and constructs a system by examining the proposition, following appropriate patterns in reaching more persuasive conclusions (Male, 2016:8; Mousa, 2017:40). An inductive approach is relevant to exploring an alternative theory through data collection, practical observation, and developing a critical conceptual model (Saunders, Gray, Tosey, and Sadler-Smith, 2015:9). Based on problem gaps established in this chapter and identified indigenous governance and institutional systems, applying as an alternative theory through inductive reasoning is imperative. Hence, constructivist grounded theory and inductive, indeterminate, and open-ended facilitate in defining and developing emergent critical inquiries intended to theorising unfold, and knowledge accrues (Charmaz, 2017:4). Furthermore, the theoretical, methodological, or substantive contributions offer a broader opportunity for the researcher to investigate multidimensional premises to persuade ideas and provide a theoretical underpinning.

The theoretical approach designed adequately to respond, research questions, problem statements, current integration, structural impediment, and unification failure at all layers. The regional economic integration investigated methodically. Jiboku (2015:9); Draper (2012:68); and Söderbaum (2013:7) to develop integration model robust empirical analysis, concepts development, and policy examinations required; besides, evaluating economic, political, sociocultural, and identity essential. The proposition aims to discuss the hypothetical viewpoint from the theoretical consideration, concepts, applications, insight, and approach to defining the alternative unification theory methodically.

### **3.5.1.1: Theoretical Consideration; Layers of Governance Structures**

The indigenous alternative unification theory aspiration introduces a homegrown governance system based on African philosophy, enabling the development and unification of a reality. The premise of the indigenous alternative unification model is that it harmonises with the contemporary governance and institutional framework that allows comprehensive social, cultural, economic, and political affairs. The assumption of introducing the African indigenous governance system is to bring back African collective leadership wisdom in conjunction with responsibility and accountability to make at the centre organisation culture. Zewde (2002:18) describes that the

precolonial era African governance system was formulated on African governance philosophy that guides the political process and procedures that obtained conformity of societal willpower.

Africa might learn from the past five decades mistakes and produce a concrete plan that is a measurable, valid, and comprehensive homegrown governance system that enables development and unification. The African unification method requires re-engineering innovative schemes that do not repeat the failure of RECs and other integration, institutional initiatives that are unable to deliver the desired result (Ross-Larson 2006:41). The proposition should be adaptable and improved through time the unification in the context of Africa. The alternative proposition considers a holistic approach to governance systems horizontal and vertical relationships and theory explanation, standardisation, modalities, and transformation mechanisms. Among these three layers of the interdependent organisational and governance system is one of the pillars that originate from theoretical consideration. The governance structure is based on homegrown African philosophy that considers reintegration, structuration, harmonisation, and unification through Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja Jamaa.

**Table, 3.1:** illustration of the three indigenous governance and institutional structures.

<p><b>Mojo-Oda</b> (State County)</p>	<p>Mojo-Oda is the national governance structure that operates with full autonomy: The focus of local authority is planning and implementation with the close collaboration of sub-regional building bloc 'Debo.' The primary focus is on administration and service delivery.</p> <p>⇒ Mojo-Oda: Considering many factors, the local administration Mojo-Oda can introduce a two- or three-layers governance structure based on population and landmass for administration purposes.</p> <p>⇒ Mojo-Oda will have equal representation in the Debo. However, considering the population size, an additional</p>
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	<p>representative will be added based on the formula that is going to be set in chapter five.</p>
<b>Debo (Interstates)</b>	<p>Debo is a building bloc of member states (Interstates) comprises of a minimum of three and a maximum of six states. The principal task is policy development, implementation, and monitoring as a collective with greater autonomy of local states.</p> <p>⇒ The local states designate their sovereign autonomy to Debo to represent on behalf of member states.</p> <p>The Debo as philosophy it formulates the representation based on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What do you contribute?</li> <li>• What is your expertise?</li> <li>• How we can lead as a collectively?</li> <li>• Who is best among us?</li> <li>• What resource is available?</li> <li>• Who has better experienced?</li> </ul> <p>⇒ Debo is multiple legal entities comprising twelve DEOBs that deal with strategic policy formulation as a collective of member states.</p> <p>⇒ All African Union member states are a member one and only one Debo bloc.</p> <p>Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa are extraction of African local knowledge systems that are unrelated to Western philosophy and language patterns. The more Africa utilises indigenous knowledge systems, the less vulnerable it becomes, and intervening in internal affairs becomes increasingly difficult.</p>
<b>Umoja-Jamaa (Intrastate)</b>	<p>Umoja-Jamaa is the highest body of regional affairs, which emanates its authority from Mojo-Oda and Debo. Umoja-Jamaa the highest sovereign authority in the land.</p>

	<p>⇒ Umoja-Jamaa is a representation of DEBOs. Each Debo will designate its members into Umoja-Jamaa with an equal number.</p> <p>⇒ The Umoja-Jamaa designation is assumed to control inland security, common defence, land management, and foreign affairs.</p> <p>⇒ Umoja-Jamaa is a single legal entity that represents the African people with one umbrella.</p> <p>⇒ The theoretical concept is to construct Umoja-Jamaa is to form "the United Peoples of Africa" (UPA).</p>
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**Source:** Own Construction

\*The above governance structure is established on indigenous African philosophy that explains the structural mandate, representation, and three governance frameworks. The detailed structuration, harmonisation, and unification of Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa will be presented in chapter six.

### **3.5.1.2: The Essential Variables for Alternative Unification Theory**

The systematic analysis consists of evaluating dependent, independent, and interdependent variables to make a critical examination. The examination assesses African unification projects' political, economic, sociocultural, governance, and institutional structures. African commitment to unification should be supported by a model that allows a functional relationship between African states by identifying essential variables to be employed in the pursuit of an effective organisation (Povolny, 1966:298). Further, he argues that in order to strengthen the governance system at all

levels, there are variables that need reconfiguration in a hierarchical and quantifiable order to transform the governance system into a systematic decision process.

The other essential variable is leadership that can lead the transformation towards the desired objective to validate and find solutions based on the designed paradigm with adequate mandate and representation (Villoria and Iglesias 2011:176). Essential variables: Thus, the variables are, that is, political, economic, sociocultural, governance and institutional framework influence interdependence to conduct unification between states. The other theoretical variables include structuration, perspective, underlying rationales, representation, and mandate, all of which have an effect on states' dependency and hence on their seamless unification.

- **Indigenous system:** Home grown governance, institutional, and normative frameworks is one of the premises of the theoretical perspective that include three layers of governance model; that is Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja Jamaa;
- **Structuration:** structural foundation that represent organisational structure such as multi-layer governance, institutional and normative frameworks;
- **Perspective:** the following modalities should be considered to outline government organisational structures: political, economic, and sociocultural modalities;
- **Fundamental rationales:** Interstate formation grounded on common consanguinity, language resemblance; cultural similitude; historical connection; market accessibility, administration facility, similar psychological makeup, and, most importantly, seaport access;
- **Representation and mandate:** At interstate and intrastate, the political representation and mandate are central planning, execution, and monitoring activities. The legitimacy of individual elected officials' authority emanates from granted by each constituency that

mandated representatives on behalf of citizens for public office in charge of the policy-making position.

### **3.5.1.3: Theoretical Application or Modus Operandi**

The theoretical application related to institution formulation and establishing governance system needs modus operandi to make operational, that comprises political, economic, sociocultural, and governance. Formulating African unification theory and envisaging the model is a complex subject that requires interdisciplinary involvement and institutional support. The multidisciplinary approach incorporates, among other things, political, international relations, history, economic, and legal contexts. The African alternative unification theory needs to correspond to fill the knowledge gap of theoretical framework structural and institutional formulas based on the architecture of political, economic, sociocultural, and governance. Among which what kind of theory and how it can be employed are critical.

According to Povolny (1966:299), the Africa unification model should consider geographical contiguity, which consists of collective decisions among member states in forming interstate accord. The independence between the African states in economic, political, and sociocultural will create a new emerging community (ibid). The transformational processes that underpin the concept of the United Peoples of Africa must be scrutinised in light of African ideology, which relates to local reality. There is a need to correct the 'missing link' of Africa's unification essentials, including theoretical postulations and critical modalities (Jiboku, 2015:19). The alternative unification model proposition considers three layers of governance structure, heading different variables, patterns, organisation structure, and institutional system transformation to propose a comprehensive approach.

**Table, 3.2:** illustration of organisation structure and institutional system

<p><b>The political and economic context that needs to consider:</b></p>	<p>The political and economic contest is related to collective action to promote mutual interests of economic development security and foreign relations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ African political unification demands a broader and deepens political, legal, and indigenous institutional unity. The major political transformation that introduces seamless economic cooperation among African countries includes building collective internal security, defence, and international relations.</li> <li>⇒ Political and economic unification is the highest form of unity that requires African states to surrender their sovereignty to a proposed intergovernmental structure.</li> <li>⇒ The African alternative unification establishes through political systems, regulations, laws, and norms. Besides, the unification theory based on institutionalisation.</li> <li>⇒ Transform the inter-African trade from a low level of trade, investment to a satisfactory level by implementing free movement of goods and people to create interdependence.</li> <li>⇒ Enhance, invest, and exchange technology and innovation among African countries.</li> </ul>
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	<p>⇒ Implement business reengineering to transform weak institutional capacity that hindering commercial and industrial development on the ground.</p>
<p><b>The sociocultural context of African alternative unification key areas:</b></p>	<p>The sociocultural development framework is an essential pillar of African people's unification process, which allows Africans to know each other in a better way through social, cultural music, and art for shared development.</p> <p>⇒ The sociocultural framework is an essential context in assuring citizens to understand the broader objectives, participation, and awareness about the collective undertaking of unity.</p> <p>⇒ Prompting social and cultural development, through music, art, language, philosophy and indigenous education system among African people.</p> <p>⇒ Creating a platform cultural exchange and social cohesion.</p> <p>⇒ Restoration shared cultural identity, and African language.</p> <p>⇒ Persuasion common identity, citizenry an ideological and cultural way of solidarity.</p>
<p><b>The Governance and institutional system the need to follow:</b></p>	<p>The alternative unification theory, the core value addition, is restructuring the African governance and institutional scheme based on the indigenous knowledge system.</p> <p>⇒ To create authentic interdependent, transparent, and operative governance systems.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ Institute multi-layer governance system that is supported by appropriate representation and full mandate to operate effectively.</li> <li>⇒ A system that empowers society to pursue collective goals and interests in assuring democracy and human rights.</li> <li>⇒ The governance model that promotes the development and advancing the goals of African political, economic, sociocultural unification.</li> <li>⇒ To establish a people-centred system and encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector.</li> <li>⇒ A governance system that corrects institutional and leadership failures and allows accountability, monitoring, and evaluation continuously adjusts itself.</li> <li>⇒ Finally, introduce governance and institutional framework according to Africa indigenous system (Afrocentric).</li> </ul>
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**Source:** Own Construction

\* The characteristics listed above are critical for achieving the alternative unification theory proposition patterns to be operational without encountering numerous obstacles. The proposed model's comprehensive approach must be backed up by an organisational structure and institutional system capable of achieving the intended outcomes.

#### **3.5.1.4: Theoretical Approach of Institutional System Transformation**

A shift from the status quo, which includes the representation, mandate, and operational mechanisms, is fundamental to the institutional transformation of the new Alternative Unification Theory. Planning is the crucial part of transforming institutions, including accountability and delivery in the architectural development of the administration process. Alexander (2005:213) says institutional change is a complex undertaking involving new planning, the design of procedures and the development of old-fashioned systems. The pinnacle of an alternative theory of unification is the theoretical approach to institutional systems transformation. The institutional reform or restructuring proposal is necessary to ask why now and how to transform the institutional system. The AU considered as “a big elephant without a bone”, which describes the present structural impediment currently entangled. Similarly, the AU is symbolised as a "ship unable to anchor," implying a shortage of indigenous theoretical methods in favour of combining alien development and economic integration models. The manifestations are numerous, with research that indicated that the AU is facing severe structural and theoretical challenges (Jiboku, 2015:18; Asante, 2000:7; Okumu, 2009:97). The AUC is confronted with duplication of activities, narrow focus, lack of priority, inefficiency, and, most critically, the absence of an ownership unification strategy and coordination among the commission, RECs, and other organs.


Africa should gradually engage in a socio-economic and political transformation that can ensure that citizens take charge of their destinies through the functional change of African state architecture by establishing the united people of Africa. The welfare of ordinary folks must be prioritised as the underpinning of institutional system reform by making the African economy viable for sociocultural benefit (Muchie, Habib, and Padayachee 2006:13). The institutional transformation to be valid requires to make homegrown that belongs to citizens, and the representation system and the mandate need to establish transparently and efficiently. Institutional transformation is a driving force that shapes an economic dependency over time, broadening and deepening the continental unification (Michel, Zeggelenlaan, Chalmers, and Hosli, 2012:42). Multilayer institutional transformation helps the local authority to focus on services delivery. The sub-regional bloc in policy development, implementation, and monitoring at the regional level emphasises inland security, common defence, land management, and foreign affairs.

For my part, the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.

— Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution*, 186

Institutional transformation plan is unique method to transform from the current practice government-led intergovernmentalism to citizens'-oriented supranational structure. The proposed model aims to empower and assure the African people to play their role in establishing coherent system.

**Figure 3.1:** Institutional transformations focus areas and priorities.



**Source:** Own Construction

\* The preceding graphic demonstrates that prioritisation is essential; consequently, the theoretical framework's proposition considered the aforementioned core topics.

### 3.5.2: Conceptualisation and Operationalisation the Alternative Unification Model

A new paradigm for African unity necessitates conceptualization inside a different unification theory that changes thinking away from Eurocentric ideology and toward indigenous African

knowledge systems. In order to present the study with a structured philosophical approach, conceptualisation is primarily envisaged and research in full and with a particular focus. Operationalisation focuses on how and when the concept devolves in forming structural procedures, both top-down and bottom-up approach. The conceptual and theoretical framework aimed to develop an alternative unification model by introducing a comprehensive approach. The overall aim of the conceptual framework is to make research findings more meaningful, acceptable and respond to critical questions of the past and present. Conceptualisation is a careful analysis of general ideas into the intellectual process through substantive fundamental patterns that enable theory development to resolve problems with qualitative data examination (Glaser, 2002:26). Further argue that “conceptualisation is the medium of grounded theory for a simple reason: without the abstraction from time, place, and people, there can be no multivariate, integrated theory based on conceptual, hypothetical relationships” (ibid).

The conceptualisation and operationalisation mainly focused on institutionalising African identity by erecting a governance system that enables economic development and political unity to reconstruct societal convergence. Rosenkopf and McGrath (2011:1297) analyse institutional structure and governance transformation that need to be supported by theoretical examination to develop and implement alternative models through conceptualisation and operationalisation that help organisational assessment and reengineering. The African alternative unification theory requires the design to address the convergence that improves structural, ideological unity for socioeconomic interests and legitimises institutional framework renewal through a transformation based on peoples’ mandate. The conceptualisation and operationalisation enable the restructuring of basic building blocs’ in the unification process by constructing technical, social, multiple contexts and multiple mechanisms; in examining and obtaining tangible results (Rosenkopf and McGrath 2011:1303). Thus, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of three standard layers will be demonstrated below by demonstrating three categories; the convergence of standard governance layers, the power dynamics in the organisation structure, and governance structure classification.

### **Convergence Standard Layers Design**

**Table 3.3:** Illustration of a standard layer in local, sub-regional, and regional structures


Standards layers: harmony among local, national, regional, and continental authorities requires convergence at various multi-layer governance, and consociationalism to establish the United Peoples of Africa (UPA).	
Layer 1-1:	Peoples/citizenry
Layer 1-2:	Local authority, provincials
Layer 1-3:	National authority
Layer 2:	Debo: a building bloc authority
Layer 3:	Umoja-Jamaa: a higher-level unity authority

**Source:** Own Construction

\*The table above depicts the three standards levels of national, regional, and continental authorities, as well as the convergence at various multi-layer governance levels.

The Conceptualising Institutional transformation of the alternative African unification theory rationalises the idea of abstract research, which formulates a shared and meaningful value to develop a sound theory. The African alternative unification framework key concepts need to be articulated within the indigenous governance system. Continental governance is possible with the core concepts of adequate representation and mandate, which also provide broad economic, sociocultural, and social opportunities for Africans. Povolny (1966:308) states that conceptualisation is essential to achieve comprehensive goals that enable the Pan-African ideals of a combination of better security and well-being to be implemented in order to attain inter-state unification for Africa. Conception also helps validate a new theoretical and methodological approach and a changing philosophical paradigm in the chronological pattern of African unification.

**Figure 3.2:** Indigenous Model of Institutional and Governance Power Dynamics and Structure.



**Source:** Own Construction

\*The pyramid structure demonstrates that the power structure is bottom-up, implying that the people at the bottom have a greater mandate to contribute meaningfully to the alternative unification process's formation.

**Table 3.4:** Illustration of the pyramid governance and representation model in detail

Structural classification of three-layer governance model			
	First to third Layer	Second Layer	Third Layer

Definition	Mojo-Oda	Debo	Umoja-Jamaa Africa
Description	<p>A state under one sacred tree.</p> <p>A depiction of political power. It is also a centre of social and economic activities among indigenous people.</p>	<p>A common consanguinity and also “helping one another”</p> <p>Cooperation between a different segment of societies for economic development and political unity.</p>	<p>Assembly of Unity// united family (People) Africa.</p> <p>Strengthening Inter-cultural unity and diversity. The assembly of all African nationals from different background. Represented as united people and safeguard common defence.</p>
Corresponding meaning	National authority	Building blocs	Unity authority
Governance model	Single entity, which encompass different layers of local governance structure	Interstate: an assembly of national states.	Intrastate: (representation of different building blocs’).
Mandate	Local Administration	Policy development and implementation with collaboration of local authorities.	The system introducing African level foreign policy, in land security, and land management.



Representation	Local authority through local election	Direct representation from Mojo-Oda	Indirect representation from Debo
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\* The table above describes pyramid governance and representation, structural classification of the three-layer governance standard, and definitions of Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa.

**3.6: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter has presented a substantive background analysis in the form of the historical context of Nation-State-Building, from precolonial governance, philosophy in Africa, the lesson in colonial Africa and postcolonial. Besides, the chapter briefly discussed the impact of African balkanisation and arbitrarily disintegration, which has created weak and vulnerable African states in the world. Most importantly, the chapter extracted precolonial indigenous nation-building and governance formations; furthermore, laydown how the alternative unification theoretical framework and conceptualisation justified. The theoretical perspectives on integration/unification and conceptual outlines also have been discussed with theoretical consideration, insight, applications of concepts, and theoretical approaches have been systematically defined to suggest an alternative unification model. The results of data analysis and findings followed by broad frames the unification impediments will discuss in chapter four that follows.

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## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **Impediments to Current Integration Model: An Analysis**

#### **4.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Chapter four presents a substantive analysis of the factors that have inhibited and enabled integration in Africa, at sub-regional and regional levels. It primarily examines why postcolonial African unification models have failed to realise the vision of unity and prosperity for African nations and peoples. The chapter examines the structural impediments that undermine the current model of integration to understanding the newly envisaged current state of the unification process. The study evaluates the efficacy of the economic integration project of challenges African unity as informed by the Pan African ideologies of postcolonial leaders, their visions, missions, and value systems. The study raises a critical question of why African states have been unsuccessful in constructing a unification model for the last six decades that is suitable for the African economic, political, and sociocultural contexts. It is important to discuss the current restrictions on the economic integration model in order to identify the kinds of impediments and achievements faced by the existing unification model at the national, sub-regional and continental levels. The special focus is on the Horn of Africa. The chapter provides an overall analysis of institutional, governance, and ideological impediments to establish why the alternative unification theory is necessary.

#### **4.2: The African Background of Historical Unification and Impediments**

Kloman (1962:388) notes that the Pan-Africanism movement was the oldest organisation that promoted African unification during and after the colonial occupation of the entire continent. The movement envisioned the restoration of African identities and political reintegration of Africa as a broader goal to form "The United States of Africa", but today's Africa is still far from achieving the

unification agenda and is far less prepared politically, economically, and sociocultural to form a united state of Africa (ibid). While the Pan Africanist movement was indisputably altruistic and driven to unification, there remained a gap in the leadership's organisational approach to the grassroots. Additionally, the absence of synergy in the strategic, theoretical, and ideological contexts required to fulfil the objectives remains a point of contention.

The Pan Africanist movement was naturally limited in its capacity and understanding of the political realities of mainland Africa's colonial history when it came to supporting the African unification agenda. throughout the establishment's early years Pan Africanism lacked a link to the African people, as the majority of advocates or activists were based outside of Africa. African political personalities participated in the movement in a limited capacity during the early stages, and there was no discernible programme or commitment. Nantambu's (1998:563) shows that another of Pan Africanism's challenges was the close attachment of leaders to Pan-African nationalism rather than Pan-Africanism that had broader mobilisation of African people emancipation from slavery and continual exploitation. The indisputable fact that most active the early promoters were from African Diaspora and were "non-African citizens," the focus was too broad, and the impact was limited. Second, the disconnection with African local politics, The Pan Africanist leaders in Diaspora did not get an opportunity to play a crucial role in postcolonial Africa itself. Likewise, those who were active Pan Africanist postcolonial leaders who understood the world politics and the power dynamics of the Western ideological game plan were outnumbered among Africa's leaders. Consequently, mobilising the African mass against the neo-colonial propaganda machinery was not an easy task after the massive devastation of African well-being for decades, if not centuries.

There was a major conceptual division among African leaders between those who promoted gradual unification approaches and those for immediate African unity. As previously stated, this showed itself in the 1960s in the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs of leaders (Desta, 2013:9-123; Povolny, 1966:301; Kloman, 1962:389). This was a division driven by differences in ideology, colonial language, and cultural affiliation. Despite the disagreements, none of the activators had a blueprint on what and how to implement Africa's unification. Postcolonial new African leaders had no domestic and international politics convergence and divergence experience, thus easy to manipulate by international politically exposed entities. According to Kloman (1962:401), In

Brazzaville-Monrovia Bloc, Nkrumah undeniably played a crucial persuasive role in creating a crossing, compromising the Casablanca Bloc principle. The accord called for "less political and more functional, less continental and more regional, less precipitate and more gradual" approaches to the African unification model, as well as "less continental and more regional, less precipitate and more slow" approaches (ibid, 1962:402).

The third impediment in the history of Pan-Africanism was that the commitment to the Pan African movement encountered a contradiction between national interests versus continental ambitions among postcolonial leaders. Muchie (2004:143) and Povolny (1966:297) argue that the misapprehension between the Pan Africanist vision and local leadership was vivid and manifest in the absence of a shared idea of the way Africa needed to transform into a supranational entity. And the internal divisions among African leaders were not narrowed in articulating the way forward. Postcolonial African leaders have struggled to support the union proposition on the basis of two factors, which are: not to concede the honeymoon of new statesmanship and external intervention to remain in colonial status quo relationship. These problems are still alive and become an integral part of the project for unification.

A strong, united and prosperous Africa is not conducive to perpetual economic exploitation, therefore hampering some parties' process. The fourth impediment was the fragmentation of regional economies assisted by the activities of external actors. One fascinating but highly controversial question is whether regionalism or ideology has the most significant influence on the composition and character of an African group. (Kloman, 1962:389) inevitably the fragmented economy and political influence only benefited the powerful external authorities. Artificial borders and weak infrastructural growth resulted in economic fragmentation; consequently, Africa is faced with limited intra-African commerce, trade imbalances and barriers. Africa's economic fragmentation and stagnation are a combination of poor governance, poor state and institutions capacity, low level of civic and social capital (Englebert, 2000). Other areas, such as the expansion of poverty and community polarisation and social destruction, affect the fragmented economy. The fragmentation of economy is caused by a political divergence between the African countries, which make problematic to provide public goods and service; that mainly disadvantages for countries to depend upon primary commodity exports and concentrate solely on natural endowments (Collier and Venables, 2008:13). Thus, the African political disintegration

has a direct effect on discouraging the economic scale of countries to be limited on the small boundaries.

The fifth is that Those African leaders who understood Africa's volatility without organisation agreed to form a body with a minimal program to accommodate African countries under a broader roof. In this understanding, the envisaged role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was not to establish a complete political, economic and sociocultural union to ensure a relationship between the African countries. Michel, Zeggelenlaan, Chalmers, and Hosli (2012:14); Povolny (1966:310); Muchie (2004:144) point out that Pan Africanism remained a dream and a strategy in addressing African unity. As part of this, the OAU/AU failed to resolve the issues pertaining to collective African identities, colonial boundaries, free movement of people and goods, economic independence, and political stature; the organisation would serve as the political infrastructure to effect change from within

#### **4.2.1: The formation of the Organisation of African Unity; Objectives and Challenges**

The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is the paramount achievement for the pursuit of African unity to end centuries of political/economic and cultural fragmentation, exploitation, destruction, and dehumanisation by foreign powers. However, as it was founded, a number of African countries were still under colonial and apartheid rule. The organisational objectives geared mainly towards the design, implementation, and monitoring of the unification plan while promoting the development and asserting democratisation within its mandate. However, from the inception, the OAU faced several hurdles related to the colonial legacy, inexperienced leadership, absence of ideological coherence, and institutional effectiveness.

There were challenges even in the very constitution of the OAU. According to Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard (2005:507); and Elias (1965:248), the OAU Charter was silent on how to build a collective identity and cohesion among the people of Africa. The Charter enjoined member countries "to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence," but not how this would help unite the people of Africa; the Charter focused on preventing interference

in the sovereignty of member states at the expense of fashioning a collective identity for African people. From its inception, the conceptualisation and narrow interpretation of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the OAU charter made the organisation debilitated not to intervene in member states' internal affairs (Adogamhe, 2008:16). The intergovernmental nature of the Charter serves the interest of state actors and neglects the interests of the people of Africa.

Another challenge is that, as Adogamhe (2008:18) shows, there was no evident unanimity among African leaders on a singular strategic calculus to constitute an African approach to international affairs as well as African unification. The OAU became a consortium of African heads of State who dominated every decision process. The decision-making process suffered further during the 60s and 70s due to the undemocratic nature of many African political leaders and regimes. These leaders had the overall responsibility for the vision, strategy and plans of actions towards African unity (Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard, 2005:503). So, the OAU was challenged by a deficiency of leadership caused by the lack of clear ideological explanation and inability to produce a viable conceptual blueprint for continental unity and development (Adogamhe, 2008:6). This lack of shared vision amongst the leaders has had considerable costs and disadvantages to the people of Africa.

The OAU has been challenged by a deficiency of leadership caused by the lack of clear ideological explanation and inability to produce a viable conceptual blueprint for continental unity and development (Adogamhe, 2008:6). Alongside the absence of institutional framework and governance systems, the organisation was unable to resolve critical regional projects, mainly African intra-trade, free movement of people and goods, collective security, and development (Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard (2005:498), Adogamhe, 2008:26; Elias,1965:254). Consequently, the OAU was synonymous with duplication efforts, adapting to institutions, policies, and programs other regional institutes. The OAU leadership entangled since its inception several challenges, including a lack of pursuing strategies, notably, institution development, governance structure, and a shared philosophy. This lack of shared vision amongst the leaders has had considerable costs and disadvantages to the people of Africa.

The lack of structural framework incompetence or reticence to promote good governance within and between the member states was a fundamental problem of the OAU (Okhonmina, 2009:93). Further, the OAU was undermined by the absence of an effective institutional framework and governance system to enable the organisation to achieve critical regional projects such as African intra-trade, free movement of people and goods, collective security, and development (Schalk, Auriacombe, and Brynard (2005:498), Adogamhe, 2008:26; Elias, 1965:254). Yihdego, (2011:569). The OAU was an ineffective entity that failed to fully address the continent's critical issues of governance, development, and attendant conflicts; rather, it was criticised for being a club of authoritarian regimes. Regrettably, the African leaders have proven inadequate in proposing any such momentous economic and political unification theory that creates ideological consensus and transforms the continent into a sovereign republic (Adogamhe, 2008:21). The transformation should sufficiently address the historical injustice and balkanisation of African states using the analytical tools of a new theoretical and institutional framework that can reverse and advance the people of Africa

#### **4.2.2: Transition from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union**

The OAU's transformation into the African Union was intended to revitalise and expedite the anti-colonial struggle, as well as to establish continental unification through political coordination and economic development strategies. The transformation brought some positive changes, including broader participation of civil society through the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the introduction of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Likewise, the African Union Commission (AUC) was established as an executive organ with a division of labour in the AU system. The Specialized Technical Committees (STC) introduction, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), and the Court of Justice made it more functional than the OAU.

Edo and Olanrewaju's (2012:59) say that the transition implemented the Abuja Treaty that had recommended the urgency of establishing institutions like the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and the Pan-African Parliament. Besides, the Treaty also wanted the RECs to be the core pillars for the African unification process (ibid). However, an

institutional and governance challenge to implement the Abuja Treaty as human development and poverty reduction receives little attention within the AUC, organs, and sub-regional structures. Yet, the argument is that still, the AU inherited structural challenges that faced the OAU, impediments that would be stumbling blocks towards unity amongst African people.


The legacy of the OAU's organisational ethos has not changed significantly after the institutional transition. Some argue that the AU has no aim for the desired change in the structural organisation (Okumu, 2009:95). In his opening remarks to the African leaders, the outgoing OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, asked: "This summit must provide answers to the questions that occupy our people's minds, including the form and nature of the AU that we are establishing." According to Edo and Olanrewaju (2012:59), the African Union is simply the OAU in thinking with minimal modifications to the structure. The Salim Ahmed Salim question was not only aimed at making a cosmetic change from the OAU/AU but also at creating a process of people-driven formation. Part of this academic exercise is the way Salim Ahmed Salim thinks.

The idea of an African unification and renaissance has a historical dimension and natural question. The reintegration efforts arose not only as a response to the economic advantage but also to reverse the colonial disintegration that created 53 weak and vulnerable states. Regrettably, the African leaders have proven inadequate in proposing any such momentous economic and political unification theory that makes ideological consensus and transforms the continent into a sovereign republic (Adogamhe, 2008:21). The transformation should sufficiently address the historical injustice and balkanisation of African states using the analytical tools of a new theoretical and institutional framework that can reverse and advance the people of Africa.


The constitutive act's standing and acceptance of sovereignty matters, territorial integrity without amendments to the unsettled encounter during the OAU charter negotiation speaks louder; that the transformation was not a shakeup but a mere facelift reform. From the outcome, it is understandable that the constitutive act negotiation fundamentally failed to dislodge and restructure the colonial project; instead, it favoured a soft-landing to avoid a landmark change that could produce appropriate reformation. That means that the postcolonial leaders could not reach



a consensus in shifting to disrupt the colonial project and choosing to replace it with new principles over reality. In order to have an inclusive and holistic transformation in Africa, it should foreground not only the unification project but also the significant economic development as core pillars around which to rethink the issue of sovereignty and the concept of border. According to Udombana's (2002:8) analysis, "society is not static but dynamic as well as organic; it is made up of both structure and system." In contradiction, this universal logic is scorned after four decades of the OAU existence and transformation. The AU further entrenched the sanctity of colonial boundaries in the constitutive act.



**Table 4.1:** The OAU Charter's position on the boundaries and sovereignty of African states



**Source:** Own construction

**Table 4.2:** The AU Charter stand concerning African States boundaries and sovereignty.

Evaluating the African Union's Constitutive Act is critical to identifying the impediments to the unification agenda. Organisational success and failure can be discerned from the foundation document. Okumu (2009:94) indicated that the Constitutive Act recognises and makes

progressive changes; however, its key objectives (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act) remained the same as those of the OAU Charter defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states. It has confronted with sovereignty issues, including the concept of border, collective security, foreign relationship, citizenship, and identity. The critique is that the AU is unable to correct the issue of sovereignty and colonial border demarcation within the Pan African perspective and indigenous governance model.

The AU Constitutive Act's acceptance of narrow state sovereignty and territorial integrity suggests that the transition was a mere facelift reform. The transition favoured a soft-landing to avoid a landmark change that could produce appropriate transformation. This means that the postcolonial leaders could not reach a consensus to disrupt the colonial project by replacing it with new principles over reality. In this transition, African governments did not pursue inclusive and holistic transformation in Africa based on the unification project and economic development as core pillars around which to rethink the issue of sovereignty and the concept of borders. According to Udombana (2002:8), "society is neither static nor organic; it is composed of both structure and system." Taking this into account, the AU could have been more transformative in light of societal change. The AU's constitutive act enshrines the respect of colonial frontiers.

The Constitutive Act has not enabled the AU to overcome the fragmented nation formation and nurture common economic interests and shared political cultures. On the contrary, the constitutive act allowed fragmentation to continue (Michel, Zeggelenlaan, Chalmers, and Hosli's, (2012:39); Okumu (2009:95). Whereas the governments behind the OAU formation could be excused for the political uncertainty of the 1960s, and their lack of experience and exposure to international politics, after forty years in international politics, African countries behind the AU formation had enough expertise to engineer profound transformation in African governance, development and unity. But they did not. The AU could not transform the development and drive a critical continental consciousness necessary to transform Africa

In the constitutive act, there are fourteen objectives under article 3, some are contradictory, and some are the responsibility of member states. For instance, (Article-3) objectives a, b, and c are

listed in sequence; Article 3 (a) "encourage greater unity and solidarity among African countries and peoples." The statement is not meticulous; what is greater unity and solidarity? Is it to achieve one supranational union? By implication, this Article demonstrates that there should be a union government at a supranational level. However, the recognition of sovereignty in the same document is for the Member States only and is not indicated in the document to establish another supranational entity. Therefore, one concludes that the document is not brought a unique approach to the OAU charter, only changing words and more Articles. The constitutive act framers seem to have difficulties articulating in a more precise manner to construct a supranational union government that supersede the national government sovereignty. The second discrepancy is after stating in Article 3 (a) the objection to pursuing greater unity in Article 3 (b) the AU constitutive act defends "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its Member States". Right next, Article 3 (c) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. Two principal contradictions:

- The act is still not recognised the end result supranational union rather simplify as an alliance of the continent.
- Political unification cannot be achieved while over fifty-five sovereignty and territorial integrity tact.

Thus, the whole document can be examined more thoroughly than this exercise to show that the act is far from the unification goals and identify 'which one is which. The OAU/AU designed to act as a unifying organisation, not as an intergovernmental organisation that carries out its goal as a non-state actor on behalf of the Member State. The transformation from the OAU to the AU naturally means that the core challenges will change substantially. These are the sovereignty and colonial borders to find a solution to an emerging union. The AU nevertheless brought forward the principal challenges not solved during the founding of the OAU. The AU constitutive act could have missed considering core elements of the union, which is indicated in table 4.3. The observations and missing concepts are:

Missing concepts



- ⇒ Sovereignty belongs to the African supranational union, and member states are ordinarily appreciating an autonomous state to govern their locality.
- ⇒ Moving from hard sovereignty to soft sovereignty.
- ⇒ In the African supranational union, territorial integrity is the African boundary shores that need to be considered as an international border.
- ⇒ The member states' borders should be distinguished as an administrative line.
- ⇒ From state centric institution to citizen centre institutionalisation

**Source:** Own construction

**Table 4.3:** Concept proposition regarding the AU members' states boundaries and sovereignty

Fundamentally, the above table illustration shows that one of the core challenges for African unification is the failure to reach a consensus on transferring national sovereignty to a supranational authority. The constitutive act is expected to narrow down the contradictions between national interests and supranational union legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. The constitutive act is expected to avoid confrontation between governments and citizens in the decision-making process. Udombana (2002:12) shows that the Act in Article 31 limits the right to notify the Union on cessation of membership to state and thus denies the citizens the right to recommend such action as well. The greatest threat of the article is that the member states have the right to cessation or withdrew from the AU only by providing written notification without citizens' involvement or referendum. The inconsistency of the AU Act emanates from the fact that it is not based on African reality and the desire for more profound unity, identity and shared prosperity. According to Michel, Zeggelenlaan, Chalmers, and Hosli (2012:32); Udombana (2002:5), the AU unification model is virtually based on the EU integration theories. The AU was not even hesitant to copy even the name, but when it comes to functionality, that is a different story all the way. Udombana (2002:5) unique perspective enlightens the case "the work of craftsmen, not artists-craftsmen copy; artists create." I concur that 'The AU is an African organisation born out of the European mindset'. Adamu and Peter (2016:52) the similarities

between the AU and the EU, and some of the difficulties the AU faces in its ongoing journey towards pan-African integration aspiration

**Table 4.4: The table below compares the AU and the EU in terms of similarity.**

Function of Institution at the AU and EU	African Union	European Union
Provides overall strategy and political direction	The Assembly of Heads of State and Government	The European Council (of Heads of Government/State)
Coordination and formulation of policies	The Executive Council of the Ministries of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or other Ministers	The General Affairs Council, or the Council of the EU
The secretariat the cabinet and the bureaucracy	The Commission of the AU; headed by an appointed Chairman	The Commission of the EU; headed by an appointed President
Legislature	Pan – African Parliament (PAP); presently an advisory body	European Parliament (EP); power function of the legislative procedure being employed; assent power
Judicial Review	African Court of Justice (ACJ)	European Court of Justice (ECJ); apex court of EU
Ambassadors	Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) of members state to the AU	Committee of Representatives (COREPER II) of Members States to the EU
Expert Committee	Specialized Technical Committees (STCs)	COREPER I
Advisory Corporatist Structure	The Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)	Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)

**Source:** Adamu, and Peter (2016).

(Alexander, 2005:212), institutional transformation necessitates strategic planning that is divorced from the old school of thought and introduces new thinking that attributes maximum efficiency and achievement of its objectives. The similarities between the AEC and the AUC are not apparent due to separate legal bases and treaties; however, they have parallels and complement each other, as they share the same institutional framework (Yihdego, 2011:578). The AUC has

attempted to mimic every aspect of the institutional framework. Despite the fact that they arrived at their respective goals through different paths, their goals are similar. Given the overlap of practical and institutional issues, it remains to be seen what the difference is between self-sufficiency, diligence, and institutional and human competence.

### **4.3: Institutional Impediments to the African Unification Projects**

Impediments to postcolonial institutions must be evaluated in the context of African people in general and political leadership consciousness, particularly in terms of socioeconomic and political conditions. Given centuries of colonial eradication of indigenous knowledge and governance systems, an overnight institutional building miracle appears unlikely. As identified in this thesis, the AU core institutional challenges are structural and operational in nature, resulting from policy formation and becoming a systemic organisational problem. The structural and operational can be manifested through agency and social processes, knowledge and world-views ontological institutions, cultural norms, habits and decision-frameworks practices (Alexander, 2005:216; Weiss, 2000:811). In order to mitigate structural and operational obstacles in any institutional setup, essential areas for investigation must be identified in order to optimise a process's efficiency, productivity, and achievement of desired goals.

According to Walker and Schafer (2006:240-6), structural and operational challenges emerge in the absence of political leadership, adequate policy formations, and institutional configurations. In the absence of regulatory bodies at the AU capable of enforcing legislation, broad objectives include implementation, evaluation, and monitoring. As a result, institutional culture and norms deteriorate, limiting the organization's overall goal. The institutional framework gap and structural and operational constraints affect or divert the balance of power between different organs and the AU ability to perform; thus, an appropriate theoretical method must address such substandard precedent. Udombana (2002:16) says that the constitutive act is unable to articulate the standards on governance at all levels and defined the considering political, economic, and structural governance. The challenge of governance manifested in the incorrect configuration that does not align with geographical, historical, cultural, and language patterns on the ground.

**Table 4.5: Operational and structural challenges key points.**




Illustration of structural challenges key points




Illustration of operational challenges key points

**Source:** Own construction

As demonstrated in the above table, a combination of structural and operational challenges emanated from lack of organisational mandate and appropriate human recourse is among many. Decision-making processes require political mandate and responsibilities through citizen participation to resolve specific problems and achieve mission and vision; in the absence of an appropriate mandate, structural and operational challenges are imminent (Renn, Webler, Rakel, Dienel, and Johnson, 1993:197). In order to achieve a delicate balance between organisational and individual mandate, citizen participation in decision-making is an integral part of appointing responsible individuals for assigned tasks. There is no other way to replace it. The AU structural

and operational challenge necessitates reimagining the unification project through local knowledge and governance, with institutional philosophy as a top priority in order to replace the old regime. According to Jiboku (2015:6), there is a significant difference between institutions and creating institutionalism; a clear vision, political commitment, and practical implementation are required to achieve the desired results.

#### **4.3.1: The Critical Assessment of Institutional and Structural challenges**

The African Union is a convoluted web of institutional arrangements that have hampered and exacerbated inefficiencies over time. According to Frimpong Oppong (2010:7), the multifarious institutional frameworks and structures are incapable of meeting the regional unification agenda's concerns. The purpose of the discussion is not to conduct a thorough examination of the AU's entire institutional framework and activities but rather to highlight how they impede the unification process. However, some critical agencies have been chosen to conduct a brief examination of the institutional approach in conjunction with the unification project. The AU includes major organs and agencies that can have a significant impact, some of which are irrelevant to the cause of unification. (Salami, 2011:681) AU/AEC and RECs have faced significant legal and institutional challenges, resulting in their failure to achieve sub-regional and regional integration goals due to structural and planning issues. The evaluation will, nevertheless, aim to highlight the convergence and divergence of the AU's Constitutive Mandates' vision and practise in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of these institutions' converging institutional duties.

According to the AU 2003 website, the following organs show who run the activities of the union: the Assembly, Executive Council, Permanent Representative Committee; Peace and Security Council; Specialised Technical Committees; AU Commission; NEPAD/AU Development Agency; AU Foundation; Financial Institutions; Judicial, Human Rights and Legal Organs; Pan African Parliament; Economic, Social and Cultural Council; African Peer Review Mechanism; Regional Economic Communities; Specialised Agencies, and Institutions. Despite the fact that the AU claims that several organs are actively working toward the objectives, a closer examination is required to determine whether they are up to the task. It is critical to assess the institutional link between the AU, RECs, and other organs to ensure overall institutional alignment. The most



challenging aspect of this exercise is the lack of an independent monitoring evaluation institution with auditing commentary that compares objectives to goals. Unfortunately, the only source for some of the data presented here is the AU itself.

According to Sotarauta and Suvinen (2018:2), in order to investigate the core models of an organisation related to institutional agency, the main institutional strategies adopted by intentional actors, either independently or in collaboration, to boost institutional creation and renewal. The institutional challenge is frequently caused by a misalignment between the organisation's mission and its organisational structure. Udombana's (2002:65) observation is that though the primary motif of the AU constitutive Act is assuring political and economic unification, the institutional arrangements hinder the realisation of the main goal, leading to a situation of ultimately undermining of the said structures. In general, some of the projects overseen by the AU are unrelated to the organisation's primary goal or should have been undertaken by member states.

The AU Commission is one of the executing agencies of the AU. According to Nagar and Nganje (2016:30), the AUC structure is a source of disorganisation, impeding efficient synchronisation and synergy between departments. Institutional challenges are experienced as inadequate supervision and ineffective leadership and management systems (Union, 2000:14). While the AU main objective is the unification of Africa through political and economic, yet at the AUC, no section, department or commission is supposed to promote, implement and follow up the unification plan. The absence of distinct authority between the top two leaders, the chairperson and the deputy of the AUC, undermines the ability to perform its mandate as it engenders the division in leadership and creates low morale among staff (Nagar and Nganje (2016:30).

Idoamhe (2008:15) Okumu's (2009:94) analysis demonstrates that NEPAD and APRM's institutional competence is crucial for ensuring economic development and attracting foreign direct investment and assistance. However, for the APRM to perform up to its mandate and ensure democracy, anti-corruption requires a strong and capable institutional framework, and the mandate needs revision. The NEPAD Secretariat was initially designed to represent, implement and mobilise international partnerships for funding to support technically and financially mega

projects in Africa. Another role was to strengthen partnerships in the private-public sector in Africa to enhance capability of implementation and service delivery. Aspects of development that evolve, shifting from the individual to the collective, constitute a feature of NEPAD in Africa, which sums up the idea of development (Landsberg, 2012:55). Landsberg further alluded that NEPAD’s challenges include the duplication of programs, absence of civil society involvement due to top-down’ approach governance, and overstretched programs.

The APRM is an organ of the AU that conducts governance review of African states through their voluntary participation. Yet, the APRM assessment has no punitive mechanism to make the organisation induce “a carrot and sticks” effect. Furthermore, the pre-review lacks an independent judicial mechanism. Instead, the instrument empowers the perpetrators to act as investigators, judges, and appeal reviewers. Similarly, mainstreaming and inclusion are lacking in the NEPAD development plan. As a result, NEPAD currently has over thirty-six programmes, the impact of which cannot be felt at the national level.

**Table 4.6:** illustration of duplication NEPAD programs with national governments

No	NEPAD Programs	NEPAD Programs
1	African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE)	Africa Kaizen Initiative (AKI)
2	African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative (AFR100)	Africa Power Vision
3	African Institute for Mathematical Science (AIMS) – Next Einstein Initiative	Capacity Development
4	African Medicines Regulatory Harmonisation (AMRH)	Climate Change Fund
5	African Orphan Crop Consortium (AOCC)	Climate Smart Agriculture
6	African Science Technology and Innovation Indicators (ASTII)	Emerging Technologies
7	Agriculture and Food Insecurity Risk Management (AFIRM)	Fish Governance and Trade
8	Agriculture Technical Vocational Education and Training (ATVET)	Food and Nutrition Security

9	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)	Gender
10	Gender Climate Change Agriculture Support	Grow Africa
11	Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICl)	Move Africa
12	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)	Nursing and Midwifery
13	Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL)	Rural Futures
14	Skills Initiative for Africa	Terr Africa
In collaboration with other Organs		
15	The African Mining Vision (AMV)	
16	Science Technology Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024),	
17	Boosting Intra African Trade (BIAT)	
18	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA)	
10	Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016-2025 (CESA 16-25)	
20	African Health Strategy 2016–2030 (AHS)	
21	Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA)	
22	African Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025 (ARNS)	

**Source:** NEPAD 2019 <<https://www.nepad.org/programmes>>

APRM is just as essential for contributing to democratisation and enhancing accountability in member states. For this, APRM must oversee the investigation and procedure of such processes, which must be handled by independent entities (Adogamhe, 2008:15; Okumu's 2009:94). Besides, if the outcome of the reviews is negative, the APRM does not impose economic and political punitive action against those governments to make them comply with the AU standards. According to Sotarauta and Suvinen's (2018:3) analysis, the institutional agency is critical in

institutions such as the NEPAD and APRM in order to develop a mechanism and transform into institutionalisation towards the structure to have impact and continuity.

#### **4.3.2: Critical Assessment of Institutional and Operational Challenges**

Operational challenges reveal the impact of institutional structural impediment. Given this, the structure lacks the ability to implement a given strategy in the absence of a system that enables or develops operational ability. The operational challenges of the African Union system are a result of poor structural governance and institutional framework. Among which, lack of organisational philosophy, leadership style, absence of priority, and political clientelism. Institutional mandate and structural transformation are required to overcome operational challenges. According to Udombana's (2002:14) analysis, the African Union needs to fundamentally reshape its legal entity and hand it over to a supranational and autonomous body that can stand on its own. Extraordinary efforts are required to introduce the alignment of a developmental roadmap to revamp the organisational structure at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels.

The AU continues to face operational challenges due to mismanagement, institutional and structural impediments to the performance of various organs, specialised agencies, and RECs. With all of these challenges, the critical question is how the AU can advance meaningful political, economic, and sociocultural unification. The operational capability issues manifested differently to address peace, democracy, and development issues and move forward with meaningful unification. Povolny's (1966:135) analysis, what makes operational challenges more problematic is the absence of resolving problems strategically at a national level rather than dealing with macro-level hurdles with quick fixes "like a fire brigade." The same metaphor can be used to describe the AU. "Silencing the Guns and empower women" is not a slogan or a short-term solution; it requires in-depth analysis and community engagement to remove the impediment from African society. It requests a resolution on the following interrogations in order to assess the operational barriers of the unification programme in comparison to the rest of the world:

What is the nature of operational hindrances the unification?

- ⇒ What lessons have been learned thus far by the AU in overcoming such operational issues?
- ⇒ How can the AU assess its political and economic unification achievements thus far in comparison to similar programmes elsewhere in the world?
- ⇒ The method in which unification prospects can be restructured to meet operational difficulties

The 'Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)' was formed to make the AU inclusive and involve the citizens' participation in the decision-making process. Having an organ such as ECOSOCC is necessary for the continental governance system to be more pragmatic and for engaging the civil society, private sector, trade unions, and academics. The AU-ECOSOCC is a replica of 'EU-ECOSOC' and 'UN-ECOSOC' by name; however, the mandate and autonomy are diametrically different. The UN-ECOSOC has a broader operational mandate that includes civil society and all development activities, and it oversees all UN regional commissions. Similarly, EU-ECOSOC has a central role in the EU governance system (Walker, and Schafer, 2006:244). The AU-ECOSOCC weakness emanated from the mandate of these organisations; which has no impact on the process of changing the livelihood of Africans' and the unification scheme.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was established with a similar objective to the ECOSOCC, to ensure the full participation of African peoples (Udombana, 2002:29). It is critical to assess the impact of operational challenge versus objective, engagement, and achievements in order to provide a brief evaluation to the AU organs of AU-ECOSOCC and Pan African Parliament (PAP). The similarities between these two organs stem from the fact that they both represent citizens of member states. Udombana's (2002:29) analysis reveals that the Constitutive Act of the AU envisioned the broader participation of African people through PAP and ECOSOC; however, the mandate of these organs was reduced only to an advisory role. The mandate of PAP and ECOSOCC is thus rendered nonessential in policy formulation and decision-making process.

African leaders yearn to make the AU Assembly, the organ of the Heads of States and Government, so significant that the decision power remains in the hand of the Heads of States.

This reinforces the power of national state authorities to intervene in giving direction to the AU organs. As a result, the national governments have ultimate power in all structures. The encounters have an impact on the legitimacy of organs that do not operate fully autonomously. It is critical to discuss the AU-ECOSOCC membership process in order to substantiate this claim. The ECOSOCC Article 5 says, "The Commission shall adopt appropriate criteria for its selecting nominated members to the General Assembly, in consultation with the Member States;" (Africa Union, 2004:5-6). The paramount challenge of ECOSOCC is to claim its legitimacy by providing the advisory role and validate its ability to introduce practical remedies and alternatives to Africa's conundrums (Bekele, 2006:14).

Among the many obstacles that AU-ECOSOCC faces are the statutes' limitations on allowing broader participation, the recruitment procedure, operational space, the absence of equal partnership among organs, and the undermining of civil society contribution. According to Article 6, civil societies that receive funds more than 50% of the total income from donors are not permitted to participate in the process. The majority of these non-state actors with the ability to raise funds have the technical and financial capacity to contribute to the good of the AU-ECOSOCC; however, they are prohibited by Article 6 provision. However, only civil societies that rely solely on membership contributions, such as trade unions and smaller non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are eligible to join ECOSOCC.

Furthermore, member countries have the authority to veto AU-ECOSOCC decisions to expel them from the organisation. As a result, civil society members who are vocal about human rights violations and political prosecutions of AU member states are vulnerable and unfavourable to participating in the process. Besides Article 6, Eligibility Requirements for Membership states the following: "The basic resources of such an Organisation shall substantially, at least fifty per cent (50%), be derived from contributions of the members of the Organization. Where external voluntary contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed

in the membership application. Any financial or other support or contribution, direct or indirect, from a government to the Organization shall be declared and fully recorded in the financial records of the Organization". By implication, the AU-ECOSOCC is an accurate depiction of institutional impediment and reflection of the African political and civil society space limitation. The PAP is the one of the organs out the nine that is considered as a legislative body just like the other political organs of the AU Assembly and includes the followings.

**Table 4.7:** The AU organs

(a)	The Assembly of the Union;
(b)	The Executive Council;
(c)	The Pan-African Parliament;
(d)	The Court of Justice;
(e)	The Commission;
(f)	The Permanent Representatives Committee;
(g)	The Specialized Technical Committees;
(h)	The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
(i)	The Financial Institutions;

The organs of the Union shall be:

**Source:** Union, A., 2000. The Constitutive

\*The above table depicts all nine organs without variation in authority and accountability; however, as explained in this section, with the exception of the African Union Commission, other organs do not have comparable status and representation in the Union.

The establishment of PAP invigorated a vision for broader participation through direct election to a legislative body of African decision-making processes transformation from Head of States to citizens. The PAP vision became an empty promise as the body became only an advisory organ to the AUC. The PAP remains only a name without any impact. Demeke (2004:58) and Mngomezulu (2018:55) say PAP does not yet have executive and practical powers as a result. Such limitation poses a challenge in policy formulation and implementation powers. Besides,

there is no proper configuration of fair and balanced representation based on proportional geographical and population representation; PAP cannot fund its programs (Demeke, 2004:58; Mngomezulu, 2018:55). PAP should not carry out its work due to the limited mandate of legislative and budgetary powers of the organ, absence of a direct election to empower citizens. The PAP should make an effort to ensuring the fair representation and mechanisms of all member state voices, including the opposition parties.

#### **4.4: Governance Impediments at National, Sub-Regional Blocs and Regional**

Weiss (2000:795) governance is commonly associated with a system of national or intergovernmental administration; that manifests as an act, manner, office, or power of governing; government', 'state of being governed', or 'method of government or regulation.' Institutional governance is fundamental rules for the organisation of the public realm that involves stakeholders' individual, public, civil society, for steering social systems toward the same goals. Governance obstacle is inextricably linked to insufficient policy formulation or incompatibility, which presents itself in rent seeking, clientelism, nepotism, and pervasive corruption. Olaniyan (2005:164) defines governance impediments in Africa as the absence of peace and stability, the rule of law and human rights, institutional capacity, insufficient financial resources, and the challenge to transfer sovereignty to the supranational authority. Other significant governance challenges include institutional development, planning, policy formulation, and harmonisation. The issues of implementation, evaluation, and monitoring must be addressed.

Okumu (2009:100); Fritz and Menocal (2007:39) analyses show that leaders are implementing a top-down approach in Africa at national, sub-regional, and regional organisations. Because the current system lacks an appropriate mandate, it may be ineffective and lead to an organisational stalemate. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages; however, the question of which is more beneficial for the African unification agenda remained "top-down, bottom-up, or an interplay" of the two. Sotarauta and Suvinen (2018:6) argue that the 'top-down, bottom-up approach has been tested in different corporate and state structures; yet, what matters the most is an institutional agency changing the ground realities.



The study delineated that there is a significant institutional and governance deficit in the current systems. Among the identified considerable challenges are (a); absence of governance connexion both top-down or bottom-up; (b) divergent political and economic interests; (c) incompatible configuration of countries in groping sub-regional structures (d) deficiency of appropriate citizenship mandate at sub-regional and regional level (e) absence of a functional relationship between the AU and RECs and lack of functioning structural arrangements; (f) tension between sovereignty versus collective identity and lack of strategy to accommodate a diversity of economic, political, and cultural identities. Since the approach is unique and new in promoting indigenous governance and institution development, this will impact enormously on the academia to refocus African indigenous unification approach.

The general consideration is that the bottom-up approach primarily applies a continuous change through a participatory attitude to make institutional perfection rather than radical action (ibid). On the other hand, the top-down method is considered an efficient model in delivering a result; On the other hand, the bottom-up is appreciated people's participation and development. The study proposed three-layers governance approaches top-down, bottom-up, and a hybrid system to have checks and balances between governance and institutional mechanisms.

Governments are expected to design acceptable procedures to develop institutional interdependence capacity for interstate relations and influence patterns (Keohane and Nye 1973:5). In this regard, the postcolonial African leaders have failed in asserting a new pattern that enables collaborative development and unity. There is an understanding that the structural, operational, and developmental impediments are the derivatives of governance and institutional ambiguities at the continental leadership level.

The governance challenges confronting the AU must be addressed in detail in order to illuminate the divide between the various vertical and horizontal hierarchical organisational systems. While some of the AU's organisational interconnections, both upward and below, appear to exist; the organisation is unable to achieve its objective due to a vast vacuum. To define the indigenous proposition in this thesis, I argue favouring a counter-normative continental governance

framework influenced by multi-level governance. Understanding the critical disconnect and disinterment within the AU is critical for analysing and recommending significant input.

**Figure 4.1:** The demonstration of disconnect the AU organisational structure



**Source:** Own construction

\*The diagram above depicts the AU organisational frameworks disconnect between three layers, both vertical and horizontal. The governance structure intended to unite the continent is in disarray, and there is no mechanism in place to compel one country to join only one sub-regional community. Some countries are not REC members but are AU members. The eight AU-recognized RECs have multiple memberships; additionally, the RECs have no direct relationship with the AU. The African Union is viewed as a cloud, with no intermediary interconnection between member countries and the regional body. Not only are the RECs a shaky link, but they also lack a convincing link with member countries and the AU. The current model is a structurally disconnected and ineffective link between the AU, RECs, member countries, and citizens.

#### **4.4.1: The Disconnect Between the AU and Sub-Regional Structures (RECs)**

The missing factor from unification perspectives is related to the legal foundation, representation, mandate, structural formation, and accountability between the member states, RECs and the AU. The governance structure of the African Union and its associated organs must be critically examined. To ascertain why they have been unable to establish effective and direct representation is a question that the AU as an intergovernmental structure organisation has left unanswered. To some extent, several assumptions are made, including that the organisational structure of RECs is not uniform, and that the multiplicity of membership results in more significant collateral damage or unintended consequences for the AU itself. The RECs' have a poor record of not achieving their mission. They lack coordinated and brilliant unification mechanisms, which makes the RECs less attractive for regional contributions. As a result, underperformance is prevalent in all RECs arrangements (Jiboku 2015:6).

The current RECs structural arrangements lack appropriate governance methods that best suit African states' political, economic, and sociocultural contexts. Besides, a paradigm shift is required in order to promote effective and efficient service to deliver for the citizens. The absence of adequate coordination between AU, RECs, and national governments is a source of conflict of interest that causes maladministration, financial mismanagement, and insufficient policy harmonisation critical impediments. As indicated below, the governance problems are related to impulsive practices and lack of theoretical method and alien to African experiences and economic development challenges. Introducing an indigenous theory might be a solution that speaks to the local context and easy to implement in the African context.

Ravenhill, (2016:9) observes that

*"A half-century of regional economic collaboration has failed to realise the legitimate aspirations of African leaders for closer economic integration and accelerated economic growth. Various econometric studies have been unable to provide any evidence to suggest*

*that African regional economic collaboration has made a significant contribution to the continent's welfare".*

The formation of regional economic communities has a broader aim that seeks to stimulate sub-regional as sub-regional economic and sociocultural development. The economic unification purpose is to increase economic independence and promote intra Africa trade and harness Africa's human and natural resources to make progress, development, and economic unification at the continental level. However, this dream never materialised for the last fifty years.

Asche and Brücher's (2009:176) study of the rationale for REC formation and their contribution to the larger picture of unification reveals that it is difficult to achieve tangible outcomes because the purpose and objectives of RECs are distinct from one another. As an illustration, the formation of IGAD initially was for conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, CEN-SAD and COMESSA, similarly to the ambitions to create preferential trade areas. The divergence between the AU and RECs stems from the organization's inherent nature, which is not directed or projected toward the establishment of supranational institutions. Mainly, while the AU objective is unification the continent, the focus areas are fragmented and exceedingly many. Aside from structural considerations, another key issue is that most regional economic communities (RECs) are not founded with thorough assessment and greater engagement of residents, but rather on the basis of the willingness of heads of state. As a result, it lacks a totally independent power, in addition to the fact that it lacks acceptable governance and democratic due process, among other things.

**Table 4.8:** Factors on Disconnection between the AU, RECs and Member states

Disconnecting  
Factors

(a)	Absence of governance interrelation both top-down or bottom-up
(b)	Constitutional discrepancy in forming common institutional framework
(c)	Diverged political and economic interests
(d)	Lack of popular participation in the unification processes
(e)	Incompatible configuration of countries in groping sub-regional structure
(f)	Deficiency of appropriate citizenship mandate at sub-regional and regional level
(g)	Absence of operational relationship between the AU and RECs
(h)	Lack of functioning structural arrangements'
(i)	The AU and RECs have separate legal entities
(J)	The tension between sovereignty versus collective identity
(K)	Lack of strategy to accommodate diversity of economic, political and identity


**Source:** Own construction

The thin line connecting the African Union and RECs is referred to as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU mandates both entities, the AU and RECs, based on “the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act,” which is directed by the 2008 procedure on relationships between these bodies (African Union: 2003). The memorandum of understanding is limited to collaboration in the area of ‘peace and security between the AU, RECs.’ Kolbeck (2014:25-8), the AU and RECs obtain all together with a separate legal entity that does not have any legal obligation to one another. Nonetheless, a vertical relationship between the AU and AUC governance systems is impractical since the structure is loosely coupled hierarchy and supremacy, which originates with the authorities of the same AU Member states. The principal legal relationship between the AU and RECs was established in 1998, followed by the adoption of the AU-REC treaty in 2007. (Kolbeck, 2014:25).

The “Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty, and The AU Constitutive Act” did not specify or silent how the AU and RECs should be established hierarchically. Khadiagala (2008:3) explains that the RECs are distracted from the original mission and assignments aimed at economic unification.

The critic further elucidates that the different mandates that involve security and stability operations unavoidably watered down their primary concerns of economic priorities. The RECs remain suffering from inadequately defined objectives and engaged in duplicative activities, inconsistent strategies, unbalanced development and multiplicity of membership. The utmost difficult task is defining the RECs role and authority from the regional unification agenda since each RECs has a different vision and mission; beyond legal and political definition. The RECs sometimes emerge as an economic or political bloc, in the same instance, peace and security resolution hub, otherwise suited to development and governance agency. Beyond these facts in Africa, more than ten regional economic communities are not recognised by the African Union. Some RECs are non-existent such as the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), while in the recognised category, which validates the argument that there no monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in these multilateral relationships as well as clear requirement what makes recognised or otherwise.


**Table 4.9:** Recognised and unrecognised RECs by the AU



**Source:** Own construction

**Table 10.4:** depicts recognised and unrecognised RECs; the problem indicates that there is no explicit requirement from the AU as a legal requirement for how, when, and who communities should be recognised.

**Figure 4.2:** The multiplicity of RECs membership



**Source:** Kolbeck, (2014:7)

Figure 4.2 depicts a complex web that has resulted in a disorderly situation in both recognised and unrecognised regional economic communities. The RECs operate in the same environment to serve communities, with primarily similar goals and efforts. The disorganised arrangement ultimately obstructs the unification process rather than contributing positively.

Jiboku and Okeke Uzodike (2016:54) claim that ineffective political leadership, ineffective socioeconomic policies, and a lack of coordinated welfare weaken RECs for citizens, all of which have a detrimental effect on the unification process. Apart from that, the absence of good governance and consensus, as well as the impasse over absolute sovereignty, made it difficult for RECs to function efficiently. RECs could either own the unification strategy within their mandate by removing structural and institutional impediments, or they could remain silent. When these facts are considered, the unification challenge becomes more apparent: architectural,

institutional, governance, representation, and mandates are just a few examples. Among visible contradictions is a duplication of effort and overlapping memberships that signify African countries in different RECs with complex work environment for similar goals in a disorganised fashion, as shown in figure 4.2 above. The paradoxical argument between national interests versus regional interests causes serious concern.

#### **4.4.2: The Disconnect among the AU, RECs, and Member States**

The disengagement of political and operational level between the member states, RECs and the AU are apparent, and it impedes the unification advancement of the continent. The disengagement manifested by the absence of hierarchical division of labour among governance structures to implement development and the continental unification project. The Assembly of the Union and AUC, the respective unions, are equal in terms of function and role, each having been granted their power by their member states. Similarly, the mandate of the RECs originates from member states forming a structure to deal with sub-regional concerns without any formal ties to the continental organisation; this is one of the reasons why the AUC is fundamentally incompatible with the RECs. The AUC organisational framework has limited engagement with RECs and implementation agencies, in addition to the challenges associated with other multilateral governance institutions (Latib 2020:31; Nagar and Nganje 2016:10). Besides, there is no ideological, material, and emotional benefits that are attached to power and liberty in these governance and institutional structures.


Mistry (2000:561) regional institutions do not essentially result in unification, considering the absence of a political mandate to make a commitment, being the decision process confined to a narrow circle of political leaders. Such limitations transpire neither fully comprehended by African governments the importance of institutional independence and mandate nor the magnitudes of the problem sufficiently examined. Disengagement can be described in two ways, first unsynchronised institutional framework and second, disengagement and disconnect with the people who need to participate in the process. As an institution expected to bridge the gap between the AU and member states, the RECs have no mandate to bridge the gap or independently perform the organisational task.



Equally, it is crucial to discuss the disengagement between citizens and the national government as well as RECs. In order to achieve African unification, a strong political agreement among political leaders and population is critical for the realisation of genuine and inclusive unity. Bach's (2011:80) analysis shows that citizen participation and representation are necessary for political and public decision-making at local and regional structures to increase accountability in the bureaucratic system. The critical aspect of unification is the inclusivity of people implanted in the governance structure that speaks the local reality and translates into the economic, political and capacity-building program. Soori, Masereka, and Apedoe-Dzidza, (2007:19-22) analysis, African integration is all about the ruling political elite fantasy instead of 'ordinary' citizenry, networking; similarly, the disengagement between the national government and RECs emanated over "sovereignty has become a fetish and even a religion in some cases". African unification requires strong political will and institutions framework. To address these issues, institutions that enable discussions and political decision-making to shift away from the parochial interests of elite political leaders and toward people-centred policymaking and implementation are required.

The detachment of the institutional framework from the citizens is one of the missing factors in the African unification process. Unification requires creating allegiances and belongingness to develop distinct African political culture, collective identities beyond ethnicity, geography, religion, and language is essential. The AU has created a platform for citizens' participation, including PAP and ECOSOCC; however, as mentioned in this study, the role of these organs is limited to make a significant impact. These organs do not have a planning and execution mandate to transform African political and socioeconomic space. In this regard, both the OAU and AU somewhat failed to create direct peoples' representation and empowerment for the decision-making process, particularly in the African unification project. To appreciate and mainstream "Africa's common ideals," the theoretical assumptions have never been inextricably linked to the AU institutional architecture (Agwu, 2011:9).

**Figure 4.3: The Disconnect between the AU, RECs and national Governments**



**Source:** Own construction

The graphic serves as a visual representation of the AU, RECs, and national governments becoming disconnected and disengaged, as described previously. The encounter appears natural in the majority of African states, as it is difficult to develop and implement sub-regional and regional institutions without popular engagement.

The separation is not deliberate, but rather the result of a lack of capacity and institutional structures incapable of mainstreaming and integrating with national policy. While explaining why and how the separation happened and various possibilities is less important, it is critical to identify constraints and alternative approaches. Disconnect and disengagement is not totally intentional; rather, existing governance mechanisms preclude the development of a standardised and effective engagement framework. Mistry (2000:559) explains that African unification's failure is a lack of political commitment, and the unification ideas are being confined within narrow political elite leaders and senior technocrats. I cannot entirely agree with critics of African leaders' lack of political will; instead, they did not take decisive action in allowing an inclusive decision-making process alongside government structure. This means that the broader benefits and chances for unification are not effectively promoted, and a broad spectrum of public opinion is overlooked in

the absence of national policy, legislation, rule, and regulation. To foster a common conviction between government officials and the population regarding the African unity goal, all parties must participate in extensive and sustained dialogue.

#### **4.5: Absence of Ideological Clarity as an Impediments for Africa Unification Process**

The absence of ideology or less clarity in the objective, mission, and vision has direct undesirable implications in the institutional formation and implementation. The lack of ideology clarity is a political ideology with the suffix [ism] instead of creating a common ground and collective undertaking of an African ideology or ideologies. Asante's (2010:123) assessment of African unity is that prior to analysing a continental ideological reason for unity, there is a need for more in-depth examinations of the foundations that obstruct national institutions. Additionally, he emphasised that the primary impediments to continental unification are regionalism, ethnic chauvinism, and religious sectoral divisions, all of which must be seriously addressed. It is critical to build a broader shared interest based on ideological thought that is distinct from Eurocentric governance and institutional structure in order to turn the AU into, develop, and unite African nations for the common good. Adogamhe, (2008:9) analysis, Pan Africanism served as a liberation and unification instrument by assuring a collective cohesion, and the consciousness of belonging to Africa; African need for revitalisation an ideological framework to advance unification agenda.

Blake (2005:589) says formulating an African nationalist ideology is imperative to build and manage political, economic, sociocultural, and African unity in advancing motivating theory. Similarly, evaluating the absence of ideology/philosophy adverse effect is essential, building regional and sub-regional institutions' functional implications on governance structure. The rationality of African unity needs to be backed up with a philosophical framework to mobilise citizens around the ideology and fundamental ideals. Okhonmina's (2009:92) analysis says the absence of a functioning and tangible ideological structure incapacitate focusing, plan, and implement on political, socioeconomic challenges, cause policy failures, and invoke a gap in public-private partnerships. The AU's Constitutive Act was inspired by "the great ideas that propelled our continental organization's founding fathers and generations of Pan-Africanists in

their commitment to promote unity, solidarity, and cohesiveness among Africa's peoples" (Union, 2000:2).

Pan Africanism, Pan Europeanism, and Pan Arabism are considered continentalist movements that think beyond the national boundary. In early 1900 beyond African ideological Pan Africanism, there were many Pan oriented movements such as Pan-Germanism; Pan-Slavism; Pan-Angle; Pan-Latinism; Pan-Hispanism; Pan-Islamic; the Pan-Turanian; the Pan-Arab; and the Pan-Asiatic (Shepperson, 1962: 353). These complex webs of Pan African movement demonstrate a political activism approach from early 1900 to the 1970th. What distinguish Pan Africanism from other movements are the consistency, authenticity, and tenacity with which the anticolonial struggle can transform from Pan Africanism to Pan African nationalism. As Shepperson underscored, the Pan Africanism originated and was inspired by the values of Ethiopianism. Okhonmina, (2009:92) explains that Pan Africanism Nationalism has as "the primary goal the total liberation and unification of all Africans and people of African descent under African communalism."

The introduction of an ideological framework is to revitalise a new atmosphere in order to reach out the Africa society. One way to embrace this current generation of ideological and technological messages is to adopt the language and online formats associated with the new century. The current generation's challenges are far different from those experienced by the OAU fifty years back. The ideological configuration of Africa's civic commitment needs to be attached to promote African cultural value systems, defend, celebrate, and accept the diversity of culture and embrace African diaspora (Asante, 2010:128). The foundation of a continental ideology needs to be appreciated and based on indigenous knowledge systems. The Pro-African Union ideology is a vital sprite to enhance and advocate the unification agenda; if there is a consensus that Pan Africanism as philosophy fits into 21st challenges, it needs to be woven not only ideologically but also technologically. Petrović (2016:57) explains that the emergence of the EU ideology explicitly incorporates "antinationalism, social democracy, pacificism, and environmentalism." These are the pillars of the ideological manifestations embraced by pro-EU scholars, civil societies, citizens, and politicians as ideological maps rooted in European history and identity. Building and indoctrination are a dominant ideology that promotes African communities with an African identity that teaches ideas and values; through ideological domination that overcomes enforced European linguistic differences.

#### **4.6: The Absence of Indigenous Unification Theory as an Impediment to Unification**

The inherent dynamism and indicative nature of indigenous governance structure of belonging are linked to the closeness with native people. Indigenous governance systems can be shaped to accommodate the existing local community's needs by considering political, economic, and sociocultural contexts and embracing other governance methodologies. The absence of an indigenous governance system creates a disingenuous relationship between the governors and the governed to improve accountability and adequate service. The advantage of introducing the indigenous governance method in Africa is to break unnecessary patron and client links and build moral legitimacy that enables African people to be empowered. More importantly, transforming the governance and leadership that helps the unification process is crucial. Basheka (2015:467) observes that the African structural governance and leadership emanates as a result of separation with an informal and indigenous institution that are rooted for centuries and uprooted by alien culture and way of life.

Appreciating indigenous paradigms and weaving African institutions' agency towards local knowledge impact have demonstrated changes in the governance and development agendas. One of the governance arrangements that demonstrated outstanding architecture was the Ndebele polity, which the governance structure is shown below. Similarly, societies in precolonial Africa exhibited governance mechanism based on common societal beliefs like the Yoruba of Nigeria and Buganda from Uganda Indigenous economy and politics a well-organised system (Basheka, 2015:467). Any governance model cannot be seen separately; it has a connection with economic development, societal consciousness and state interoperability. Acceptability of governance and institutions are key strategies for building national, sub-regional and regional intrastate formation. African government systems, such as those illustrated in Table 4.10, differ and are more cohesive than those found in Europe, including federal and confederal governance structures.

**Table 4.10:** Demonstration of Indigenous power hierarchy in the Ndebele state:



**Source:** Sabelo (2008).

The indigenous governance system depicted above exemplifies how African governance systems were hierarchically organised in the early centuries. The figure indicates that the proposed idea of indigenous alternative unification in Africa and its continued applicability are conditional on the formation of an indigenous governing system. However, it does not mean that the precolonial administration narratives are relevant for twenty-first-century challenges as a whole, but some lessons can be drawn. The more Africa becomes dependent on resolving governance and development concerns with the imported theory, the limitations and dependency remain constant. Abrahamsen (2003:193) says that the history of Africa and the glories and opportunities attached with the arrival of the white man superseding the existence of indigenous cultures and practices. Mudimbe (2020:29) asserts that the genesis of indigenous societies' knowledge systems in Africa has been demonstrated and has had profound effects on the study of anthropology in the absence of a Western epistemological connection. He further alluded that long experience characterises knowledge can be determined through a different approach on the one hand with "ethnocentrism" and also "epistemological affiliation" towards a hegemony of ideological connection. These

experiences demonstrate that underdevelopment and governance failure emerged from an uncritical borrowing of organisational practices, including social ills such as corruption, state capture, and maladministration that can be healed through different approaches. Regardless of enormous economic potential, dependencies become inevitable due to self-rule structural capacity and autonomy (ibid, p.p:35). Employing the indigenous system has a more significant impact on shifting the power and knowledge practices and closing a chapter of patron and client relationships. Besides, it allows us to experiment with the theoretical and conceptual tools and infuse them into African institutions to assure development and unification to happen.

#### **4.7: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter has presented a background analysis of the institutional, governance, and ideological impediments to the current unification framework in Africa. The chapter has examined the historical achievements of the OAU as well as the primary blunders that created hindrances in moving forward the formation of African unity. The discussion showed that the OAU challenges and deficiencies are of a leadership nature because this postcolonial elite ruling class lacks clear ideological values to produce a viable blueprint for continental unity. The chapter also discussed the transformation from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union and underlined the early optimism amongst African citizens. The citizens hoped that the AU would create conditions conducive for political and economic transformation to achieve developmental goals that would enable broader participation of civil society, labour, academic, Diaspora, and the private sector. Correspondingly, the chapter discussed the institutional, structural and operational challenges at national sub-regional and regional structures.

Similarly, impediments and a separation between multiple echelons impede governance. The separation and disengagement of various actors, including the AU, national governments, and RECs, harmed the realisation of the agreed unity objective. Additionally, the lack of ideology and an innovative unification theory, the significant contributing factor of unification failure, was identified as one impediment. Following the arguments made in chapters three and four, highlighting the initial failure of the unification model, chapter five will present data analysis and findings of semi-structured individual interviews. This chapter identified critical impediments to

unification, such as institutional, governance, and a lack of ideological ambiguity. Furthermore, it demonstrated the failure of the current economic integration model and the importance of indigenous theory in achieving a better outcome in the unification project.

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## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Data Analysis**

#### **5.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

This chapter compiles an in-depth look at the topic's data interpretation through interviews with regional unification experts, government officials, academics, and private citizens. The study followed a specified pattern and evaluated the major point of the thesis by inviting representatives from various academic disciplines and informants to analyse and contextualise the ideas. Key organisations involved in regional integration implementation and research, including as the AU, IGAD, NEPAD, Addis Ababa University, and the Horn of Africa Embassies based in South Africa, participated in the interview to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the subject matter. I summarise the insights collected from important informants in this chapter; finally, I explore the study's ramifications and propose recommendations for further research.

#### **5.2: Discussion, Findings and Data Analysis**

A semi-structured individual interview was one of the data collection methods employed in this study, the findings of which are given in this section. The major informants were regional unification experts from intergovernmental organisations with responsibility for political affairs, embassies, and regional unification researchers from higher education institutions. The advantage of having individual interviews with the key informant and community members and guided conversations is to enable the investigator to manage queries in the examinable format (Houghton, Murphy, Shaw & Casey 2015; Kumar, 1989). The adaptability of a semi-structured interview data collection method enables the researcher to study difficult issues with more detailed descriptions and responses from respondents. Interviewees were carefully selected based on their capacity to contribute meaningful information to the study difficulties and research questions.

The research applied inductive content analysis, which is associated with cases where so many previous studies deal with the subject (Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas 2013:401). This study

is backed up by research, however that research is supported not only by literature but also by evidence taken from institutional and individual wisdom to help include the study into the body of research. Individual semi-structured interviews performed in the context of these realities gave essential intellectual input, validating both the theoretical concept and supporting literature and documents. The coding organised data into three categories to identify the discussion patterns. Throughout the data analysis and discussions with different informants, the researcher avoided similarities and differences in the data described in categories on various abstraction levels and classifications (Graneheim, Lindgren, and Lundman, 2017:30). The findings of the study presented in this chapter attempt to answer the overarching research question.

### 5.3: Data source classifications

The data sources, classification, and processes used to collect and analyse the data included semi-structured individual interviews drawn from a variety of data sources. To ensure consistency and practicality, the data collection and presentation processes incorporated a variety of data sources, requiring a broad spectrum of professional knowledge to make it more appealing and effective than a single data source. Most crucially, the overwhelming bulk of data came from government agencies, intergovernmental organisations, academic institutions, and private citizens.

Data source	Code
Government, and Intergovernmental organisation experts	AGI-001-AGI-007
Academia and experts	ACI-001-ACI-004
Private Citizens	ACI-101-ACI-106

**Table 4.12:** classifications of data source from key informants

## Summary of participants' characteristics

Participant code	Position and work experience	Qualification
AGI-001- AGI-007	Ambassadors', Directors, Diplomats and Experts	BA, MA, and Ph.D.
ACI-001-ACI-004	Professors	Ph.D.
ACI-101-ACI-106	Ordinary Citizens	BSc, BA, MA and High school graduates

**Table 4.13:** classifications participant characteristics in the research interview

### 5.4: The organisation of Data Analysis

The key informants were treated ethically, and the University of Pretoria's laws and regulations were observed, including the principles of informed consent and confidentiality throughout the research process. The study reviewed regional unification and related literature as secondary sources available at libraries and on the Internet to have various sources, which were then consolidated through interviews and document investigation to develop practical patterns and knowledge development (McKendrick 1999:146). The participants in the interview were selected carefully to scrutinise the research problems and research questions sufficiently. Individual semi-structured interviews with professionals, academics, and citizens were analysed and contextualised against the background of the literature and discussion findings. A constructivist grounded theory approach was used because it suggests the possibility of generating diverse viewpoints through interview and document investigation methods of critical inquiries intended to theorising action (Charmaz, 2017:37; McKendrick 1999:146). The data collected from different sources, at different times and places through interviews, helped to develop practical configurations and knowledge pattern development.

The data analysis is supported by inductive methods to endorse or challenge theoretical assumptions (Bendassolli, 2013:6; Carlile and Christensen, 2005:5). I ensured that participants were listened to throughout the research interview process and that my own experiences and ideas about Africa's unification did not influence their responses. Inductive reasoning enables the researcher to create worlds from specific observations to a more general conceptualisation, enabling the researcher to make more informed decisions and reach more persuasive findings in a bottom-up research strategy (Hayes, 2007:32). A research topic is classified into three categories: describing the existing model, identifying a type of hindrance, and identifying what should be explored as an alternative unifying theory in order to elicit sufficient thought from specialists, academia, and ordinary African residents.

The inductive research approach helps identify patterns to build a theory; in this context, the researcher needs to explore different techniques to explore the question to explore ideas and alternative mechanisms (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012). One of the verification methods that allow for appropriate responses to interview questions in a study is data collection and analysis (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013; Creswell, 2014). As a result, the research approach directs the investigation in order to develop an idea and investigate an innovative method. The researcher sought to examine various scenarios that allowed a shift from a Eurocentric to an Afrocentric philosophy in considering views/values in order to develop an African indigenous alternative unification theory. The interview text was systemised, allowing the breakdown of the interview segments based on chronological order formulated on relationships and as per correspondence in the sub-groups (Thomas, 2006:239). Regarding the preparation of raw interview data, I used established formats: for the interviewer, I used a bold opening line and regular fonts for the subsequent questions; for the respondent/informant, I used italics and indented text.

#### **5.4.1: Theme one: The Current Governance and Institutional system**

The first theme, which aims to provide a broad understanding of contemporary economic integration, including the existing approach of RECs, may contribute to the gradual advancement of regional programmes toward prosperity. It is critical to comprehend the impediments and triumphs encountered by Africa's current unification strategy. The questions categorised to

identify challenges on RECs, progress or success stories, factors of failure, and the role of state play. The first question was: How do you explain the current integration/unification model and the thinking that shapes the African Governance and Institutional system?

A follow up question encompassed:

- Share with me your opinion about the current regional economic communities' RECs, the role in promoting economic interdependence among member countries that leads to gradual unification?
  - What are the most frequently used turnaround tactics or arrangements that the AUC/IGAD/NEPAD have developed and implemented to date?
- **Respondent:** *By recognizing this reality, the initiatives should have been discussed with Africa from the African Union perspectives with the RECs before they are enrolled in practice. Why? I'm saying that is because African Union's agenda twenty-six three might be an overall objective. We all want to go there, but the unresolved question is how (AGI-001, Lines 16-21, p.1).*
- **Respondent:** *But each RECs are taking it step by step, given the realities, their own challenges. And we may bypass the set deadline and reassess. They need that. For example, even though we have a regional integration plan and regional integration strategy, we are taking it bit by bit. For example, the stages where we are now and regional integration are. Are transboundary free movements? We have developed a protocol that is subject for RECs signature first and then the legal proceedings of reintegration into local legal systems (AGI-001, Lines 16-21, p.1).*
- **Respondent:** *The AGI-002 responded that the IGAD infrastructure master plan for some programs or programs which is transport, including road and rail, it has energy, it has the audacity, and it has water practically financed by the African Development Bank. This is part of the infrastructure master plan, which we will be implementing for the next 30 years, based on the Malabo declaration, including ICT connectivity, high energy connectivity among member countries (AGI-002, Lines 10-18, p.10).*

- **Respondent:** *To begin, we Africans should eliminate borders between Kenya and Egypt, and between Egypt and South Africa, so accelerating the integration of individual consumer items and bringing me to the second stage, which is national integration and regional trade. It is necessary, but they must be able to provide the infrastructure that enabled me to address what they would do again and again, as this is the only way for NEPAD, the African institutions, to handle the issue of African policy integration. I'm not a big fan of the term integration because that's an area where I'm looking for the appropriate answer (AGI-003, Lines 6-13, p.26).*
  
- **Respondent:** *As you may be aware, the African Union has authorised eight regional communities in Africa; COMESA is one of the eight recognised RECs with economic aspirations. The remainder of the REC was conceived from a standpoint of political unification. It was more aligned; on the surface, it was about regional liberation and political rights, and the majority of them come from that background. However, it is critical to understand that immediately following their advancement, and when viewed now, they have all recognised and accepted economic integration aims. Apart from political unification, they have also earned, and some have even swapped, more economic integration reality. That concludes the first section. There are, of course, additional ways to facilitate cross-border negotiating. Thus, they have invested considerable effort in establishing alignment and harmonisation of policies, legislation, and some of the most effective instruments, such as trade, regulations, and tariff difficulties (AGI-004, Lines 7-18, and p.29).*
  
- **Respondent:** *We need encouragement to move like family unification and your peculiar concept of integration because the concept of unification is very highly ambitious. And it may be a sense of I prefers to talk about integration rather than unification if you allow me to do that but it's not a problem for me. It's a matter of wording. I mean, we all are, you know, an English speaker, but, yes, somebody told me that there is no distinct difference between integration and unification. OK, these days, there is a process, as you know, to help harmonize policies and programs have been abused by member states in terms of the structure of the race in the integration process; it varies very much across the*

*continent. If you look at, for instance, the EAC now has at least as you know doing well, you know, the commercial markets are a dimension, which is a very high integration arrangement when you think about the various regional economic communities in Africa. So, yes, a somewhat smaller body of countries because presently six countries, but actually South Sudan is not the same as the other members' states, a bit backward compared to Kenya, Uganda (AGI-005, Lines 8-19, p.35).*

**First part of discussion of Question1:** The question and answer elicited a range of responses from key informants evaluating the strength and weakness of regional building blocs, as it was an expected generic question. Concerning RECs, the majority of informants concurred that they are a gradual process and emphasised that economic integration can become a reality if governments allow cross-border migration. Despite the existence of policy, there are divergences amongst member countries. Numerous informants stress the critical nature of acknowledging our economic, cultural, and political biases. Most of the time, we wish to downplay these distinctions, but we are not alike; we are a highly diverse society, and that has been our greatest obstacle thus far in the process of African unification.

There are RECs that focus on infrastructure development among member states; however, RECs have plans but no say over those plans or policies. Therefore, there will not be impact out of these initiatives. They would rather create their own policies and clear them through their own member states if they are allowed to perform in such a way. Furthermore, with the exception of COMESA, the majority of RECs were founded with political aspirations, but several have evolved into economic integration agents over time, which is positive. The RECs' objectives should prioritise political alignments, economic policy harmonisation, and trade regulation in order to improve member countries' relationships. Prior to that sub-regional economic integration there was need to have a series of deep consultation in most African countries to work toward national economic integration. This is very important part of the process of national economic integration, because without having an integrated economy at national level one cannot build a robust economy at sub-regional structure. To be accurate, country politics and economy are the bedrock of any government; fostering more national unity is critical, yet in the majority of African countries, economic and political integration do not occur. There is a need for robust institutions to facilitate national economy integration, as our economies are now not integrated nationally.

#### 5.4.2: Theme two: Impediments and Successes the Current Unification Model

The second theme focused on the current unification model successes stories and the impediments that holdback not to achieve the desired goals. The discussion included the advantages of economic integration model, and the progress that are applicability to attain economic prosperity and political stability. Similarly, the benefits of considering shared history, psychological makeup, geographical setup, religion, and similar language affect the unification process as a significant factor. Besides, the interviewer and informant discussed the challenges of regional economic communities' roles and progress in particular. The first question was: What kind of impediments and successes have the current unification model confronted and how has this affected the unification process?

Follow up questions includes;

- What do you think about having unification models that are different from the usual economic and political models such as; sociocultural, development, market, and physical integration?
  - Do you think that shared history, psychological makeup, geographical setup, religion, and similar language affect the unification process?
- **Respondent:** *There is here one thing that most define specifically the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan; these are a place where the two major religions meet (ACI-001, Lines 8-9, p.47).*
- **Respondent:** *The ACI-001 responded that the regional unification related to a linguistic and cultural one, and culturally, leaving aside the well-known models of economic development and looking at the cultural base of the integration or economic advancement of the whole, one would have to see the traditional agriculture, which is pastoralists in the lowlands and also mixed farming in the highlands. And stifled lines and the ideology, the cultural point of view, emerge or emanate from these agricultural or economic models and practices, mainly as an agricultural region where subsistence farming is practiced in the highlands and the same highlands pastoralist agriculture perhaps in the lowlands and*



*lowland lowlanders. I mean, from North Kenya all the way up to the far of eastern Ethiopia or the horn in general (ACI-001, Lines 14-19, p.47).*

- **Respondent:** *The idea of African unification has evolved through three distinct periods throughout history. The first was how it was pronounced in the 1960s, during the development of the unity, during the rift that developed between African leaders, and eventually, with the formation of the Organization of African Unity; it was a sort of compromise decision. The goal is constantly present among African people and politicians, who believe that Pan Africanism is something that is popular throughout Africa, with possibly the least regional variances (ACI-002, Lines 9-15, p.57).*
  
- **Respondent:** *The idea of unification, well, the model used for a very long period was to bring the anticipated unification or more integration, I would instead prefer to use the idea of closer cooperation, closer integration instead of unification. The unification model was just promoted for a good part of these all years since the OAU establishment was bringing some form of cooperation from the top to bottom kind of approaches were pursued. Many conventions like the Lagos Plan of Action, many others, leaders at the continental level committing themselves to policies to conventions, treaties that were meant to bring closer cooperation among African countries. Numerous these exchanges lacked realism. Numerous leaders endorsed these conventions. Nonetheless, they lacked the political will and competence to pursue these types of pledges in order to foster closer collaboration among African states in the future. Regional economic communities are more bottom-up in nature, as top-down processes were implemented concurrently, resulting in regional African RECs or regional economic communities (ACI-002, Lines 16-27, p.57).*
  
- **Respondent:** *The ACI-003 responded that perhaps among all African RECs that work better is the East African model (EAC); they have similar economic setups and their educational system somehow similar as they learn from each other. They have integrated their systems better. It's not very difficult to go from one university to another, say, Makerere University Uganda to University Nairobi, Kenya, to University of Dar es Salaam.*

*Through the years, operating without barriers and more integration has been observed (ACI-003, Lines 2-8, p.76).*

- **Respondent:** *Africa is facing many divisions, and many problems continue and have not yet stopped, so the unification is in a difficult position. Must I say it's fragile? Real African unity did not come finally. African leaders meet in conferences, they create protocols, create statements, produce many documents, and they are very good at it and sometimes when you read the documents, but they don't practice them (ACI-004, Lines 12-15, p.83).*
  
- **Respondent:** *As we all know that president Gadhafi had enough gold to create what he called the Afro, like the Europeans had the euro. But, then, of course, what Europeans and USA they sent the NATO force Sarkozy from France also even Obama, they all floated around and got killed. And now, of course, Libya is happening. Libya is in a mess. It's like big trouble happened and all the gold that he accumulated for Africa was stolen. In fact, the African Union, they should really be really taking legal action to even bring all that wealth and also all the wrong that was done to countries like Libya because Libya leaders, whatever problem he has, he said he wanted to unite Africa and wanted to create unity. He didn't want Africa to depend on the go on the World Bank and IMF or anything. He wants to create the African United Bank. So, I think the unification project that you are thinking about on the political sphere, we have still big challenges. We haven't come out of all the conflicts and the conflict resolution challenge is very, very serious. Now, as you know, everyone, we have big problems, ethnic problems. Religion is a problem. Extremists are everywhere. And you have a language division and all kinds of divisions are happening in Africa almost in all the countries (ACI-004, Lines 4-16, p.84).*

**Discussion of the second part discussion:** The second part of the discussion has brought similar but distinct arguments relatable to RECs as the sometime the conflicting interest of RECs that is transnational character and multiplicity of memberships in regional international organizations such as EAC and SADC. Some are members of the IGAD also a member of EAC, and even conflicting interests the continent some countries, which are members of the Arab

League, which are also members of the African Union. Besides, two significant ideologies also intercept that extend to the West and East. Integrating any nature is bound to be difficult in light of this conflicting theologies, cultural, or political orientation. Similarly, there is a significant threat of religion extremists in all corners of Africa, including ethnic chauvinism, which is a challenge for regional unification.

#### **5.4.3: Theme Three: Knowledge about African Unification**

The focus of the third theme was the knowledge and the involvement of African citizens in the regional unification process; including the knowledge about the continental and sub-regional organisations. Besides, their concerns and what should be done involved the questions of the private Citizens. The main question from the interviewer was: To know about your knowledge of Africa unification the way you relate to yourself and society?

Follow up questions includes:

- When and how did you hear about African integration?
- Do you believe that African union is necessary? If you do, or if you do not, please explain.
- Kindly explain how the African continent's unity objective affects you directly or indirectly?
- Do you believe Africa is moving in the correct direction in terms of pursuing the unity agenda? If not, how can it be improved?

➤ **Respondent:** *It means the unification of African and what African unification means for me is probably on an African continent without boundaries where we can move to any part of Africa. Without having to go through Immigration without having to be looked at, as a foreigner or somebody who doesn't belong here. For me, unification means that at that level, and then it can also mean the capability to utilize our resources or allowing people to work freely in countries in regions in Africa. Besides, where we can get good services or live comfortably without so many restrictions and isolation like any other citizens (ACI-101, Lines 10-16, p.96).*

- **Respondent:** *the ACI-102 responded that the regional integration is more or less is something to do with economics, trade, and business. West Africa, ECOWAS, do it with the business model to see it even in Eastern African communities, socioeconomic development is in good shape. The problem comes when talking about political integration, but currently, as I see it, southern Africa the SADC part is a bit more advanced when it comes to socioeconomic integration, more or less open border, similar to Western Africa, and? East African communities (ACI-102, Lines 8-15, p.96).*
  
- **Respondent:** *I think it's always good to cooperate and any integration because most African countries are not economically viable; they are weak and vulnerable. Besides, unification or integration helps avoid conflicts and brings a peaceful solution for a society we hope to happen. Most especially, the Horn of African countries they need such kind of arrangement (ACI-103, Lines 1-3, p.108).*
  
- **Respondent:** *I know institutions like the ECOWAS participate in the development and managing or avoid conflict in the Western African states. Also, promoting economic integration by forming in attempting to create a single currency among the West African nations. I think a very, very good initiative in promoting economic integration among the Western African nations (ACI-104, Lines 15-17, p.112).*
  
- **Respondent:** *I have seen the regional integration that East African countries are in good shape and somewhat like Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda. I think those countries have implemented an excellent job. But in the Horn of Africa, integration is difficult to implement, especially countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan; they didn't have any integration signs despite the fact that they have similar cultures and the same people. But all of Africa and people didn't get any chance to see the fruit of the economic benefits of integration for the last fifty years. Integration or unification is an essential concept but difficult to implement; most probably, the EAC might be a model, and other African countries to follow (ACI-105, Lines 9-17, p.117).*

- **Respondent:** *As per my observation about regional integration and a regional institution like IGAD, I knew very well that I had never seen or heard any outcome or good result, satisfactory in development or peace initiatives (ACI-106, Lines 19-22, and p.122).*
  
- **Respondent:** *When it comes to integration among African sister countries or neighbouring countries, particularly addressing your internal vulnerabilities essential, a reconciliation of any differences in any African country. And then, as you stand together as a country, rectify all the mistakes and strengthen your potential. Then you can think of cooperation with African countries in collaboration rather than competition for the success of the future generation. There the regional integration model, I should say, is by far a critical engagement. As we understand, as the globe is becoming one village, being organized around yourself and behind your strengths and then working on those would be very vital. Otherwise, having a small community, small population, a small economy, a small economy, it doesn't make sense to be competitive enough at the global market (AGI-007, Lines 20-29, p.137).*
  
- **Respondent:** *I think the economic integration at the community level is a priority, should be supported with a different policy instrument because the communities in these border areas are very much integrated. Some policy instruments that should be designed to support this organic community integration were the dominant economy integration. I think that is encouraging the empirical finding that workable (ACI-106, Lines 11-18, p.123).*

**Discussion of Part/ Question three:** An excellent point raised in the respondents' answers is that Africa should not be complacent by blaming only the colonial past. Being honest about the failures should not be an excuse for Africa not to move forward. The Informant mentioned that there are no many discussions in many prominent African journalists, economists, and politicians, then feed us this victimhood rhetoric. Africans should avoid worrying or dwelling too much on the past instead of moving forward for a better future. Interestingly, unification beyond free movement and having one president somewhat improve Africans' livelihood and respect worldwide as a competent and able human. Besides, local knowledge of governance for economic development needs to be implemented critically and creatively.

#### 5.4.4: Theme four: The Reasons of ineffectiveness of the Current Unification Model

The fourth theme focused on the reasons for the failure of the current unification project, institutional and governance limitations, including the sub-regional formations like RECs. In this regard, the interviewer and interviewee tried to find the roles of government, political leaders, and society at large in the processes of unification thus far, including the roles main actors. Besides, the discussion focused on the political will of the member states and political leaders from determination perspectives. The debate further alluded that the current institutional and governance approach challenges of RECs that may contribute to slow progress towards regional unification schemes. The first question of the interviewer was: Why have African states been unsuccessful in constructing a unification model that is suitable to the African economic, political, and sociocultural context?

Follow up questions incorporated;

- How do you describe the roles of government and political leaders and society at large in the processes of unification thus far?
- In your opinion, have member states shown political will and capability to promote the unification process? If not, why?

➤ **Respondent:** *The role of RECs as an institution is limited to planning and implementing projects at a sub-regional and regional level in their policies and decisions made by the member states. The critical challenges begin in terms of the effectiveness; as you know, the biggest problem across the continent, which is sovereignty, has been imposed a significant encounter in moving forward. In some cases, Africa has got leaders of both sub-regional and continental levels who run RECs like personal organisation. While in Africa, there are many policy directions, and decisions have been taken, but there are no implementing mechanisms. And I think this has been the missing link I observed both at regional and continental levels. When it comes to implementing the African Union's mission, mission, and objectives, we face issues of harmonisation and implementation. However, a recurring issue is how to translate our decisions into actual plans and programmes. Is it the ongoing difficulty caused by these two overlapping memberships, in which member states are members of numerous regional economic communities' as a result of duplication, as well as the national body? (AGI-005, Lines 1-14, p.36).*

- **Respondent:** *When it comes to collective identity in Africa, I believe we are still a long way from there. Perhaps in the 1950s, throughout precolonial and early postcolonial periods, and particularly during Colonial periods, we were more Africans and more unified behind Africans. However, upon independence, Africans embraced nationalism and increased ethnic devotion. To be particular let us look north and horn of Africa such as Sudan they don't subscribe to Africa to subscribe more Arabism, maybe after the revolution they might change. Now, the Eritreans and Somalis to some degree are members of the Arab League and they would prioritise Arab League wishes, not strictly an African. Similarly, Egypt, priorities their own Arab interests more than the African interests that will show the weak role of whether it got African Union or any other African organization. When it comes to the Somali conflict, for example, or when it comes to the conflict between UAE and Djibouti over the ports or the conflict, as you may see in the case of Eritrea and how long was isolated? It is only the Arab neighbours from Asia who are able to come to the rescue of the trip. While the Eritrean challenge was originally challenged, it was just Ethiopia. Therefore, those challenges might have used the regional weight of God to bring sanctions to the UN, maybe they were able to influence the African Union, close down the Ethiopian embassy in Asmara and vice versa for the region in Addis Ababa, which limited the day they reach and voice in the country (AGI-001, Lines 4-17, p.3).*
- **Respondent:** *The AGI-007 responded that the African regional unification requires political leverage that is essential and equally important for economic reasons. In fact, in some African countries, including our member states, the culture that we take it to habitual cultures, the religious affiliations, and the norms, the practices are the same. However, under different governmental systems, and our people are under in other countries, they are by far linked through several retrials and religious practices. So that is the psychosocial makeup of Africans has always been the same and the same. I would argue that African regional mechanisms are very organic to say. Still, without practical steps, the unification process is not taking place there, so any aspiration should be interlinked with African people's reality. A mindset of a corporation, collaboration, and interdependence crucial. Some African countries have the strength just on one side, and others may have weaknesses on the other side; therefore, when you maximize those strengths, at the same*

*time, you address those weaknesses to emerge as a united force. Currently, African countries may confront whatsoever challenges, be it political, economic, and social, or even border issues of Africa will get a solution sooner or later (AGI-007, Lines 5-22, p.138).*

- **Respondent:** *When you talk about integration, we must appreciate that different countries have different challenges in terms of economy size, finance, and political will. Therefore, Africa needs a practical model that encourages countries willing to get into five stages of integration practiced in Europe. The reason why I am raising this question is what is the need for AfCFTA 55 member states sign that while we know, that's no African country implemented, the first step It would have been even more interesting if you had the kind, you know, ten or twenty countries implement that supplement the process. I think this was the foundation of the COMESA, EAC, and SADC Tripartite Agreement, which was signed in 2000 never implemented; again, it officially signed in 2010 because of member states' unique circumstances. I think it worth pursuing different citizen-oriented approach the majority, why should the government bureaucrats dominate the process but doing nothing. I'm contesting with you are referring to the European model, as you categorize as the Eurocentric model; I agree that we have a different psychological makeup than Europe, economic situation, consciousness, free movement, infrastructure, and so many things are in which doesn't go together. They have also experienced long experience as you know, I mean, last 60 or 70 years, they worked hard to implement a solid foundation (AGI-005, Lines 2-16, and p.43).*
  
- **Respondent:** *A narrative of Africa's historical trajectory or history of the continent before independence is essential. Africa is the origin of humankind, Panthers, and the source of civilisation. But during the scramble for Africa or partition of Africa at the end of the 19th century, at the meeting in Berlin in 1884 and in other engagements in Paris, London, and other capitals, Europeans bargain over the separate spheres of interest they intended to establish in Africa. Europeanists had known Africa more a coastal line than a continent when making out their new territories' boundaries. European negotiators resorted to drawing a straight line on the map, taking no account of the traditional monarchies, chiefdoms, and other African societies that existed on the ground with this phenomenon.*



*African societies were wrenched apart, but between French, Congo, Belgian, Congo, Portuguese, Spanish. For example, Somalia was between Britain, Italy, and France. In other cases, new colonial territories enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups with no shared history, culture, language, or religion. This is part of the legacy we inherited from colonial powers (AGI-005, Lines 13-21, p.127).*

- **Respondent:** *A proper critique of Africa's current approach to unification requires an extensive review on economic, political and social and economic, political and social reviews. It may be important to point out that the debate to attain African unification has already been settled at independence. It is worth recalling that this debate began soon after the colonial powers started granting independence to a number of African countries, beginning with Ghana in 1957 (AGI-006, Lines 2-17).*
  
- *It also raises preceded the formation of the Organization of African Unity. With the Casablanca group advocated for immediate union, while the Monrovia Group argued for a more gradual approach. The formation of the OAU In May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, loose intergovernmental organization seemed to have gained supremacy. However, with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002, it maintained that the Monrovia Group strategy of gradual integration. That the subsequent head of states debate on the union government of the Accra Summit, a summit of July 2007, seemed to have slowed down the possibility of adopting an alternative model to Africa's unification well, from this establishment in 1963 (AGI-006, Lines p.128).*

#### **Discussion of Question four:**

The informant indicated that the current regional economic community institutional arrangements solely depend on member states' decision-making process, particularly the head of states that involves the critical decision. Such prearrangement is a crucial challenge in terms of the effectiveness in implementing important projects that requires direction and approval from member states. As an institution, the RECs do not have the stature needed to challenge members' state decisions even if relevant policy matters. The biggest problem among member countries

may refuse to accept in response to 'sovereignty,' or political and economic interest that imposed a significant encounter in moving forward. Similarly, for some leaders of member states, in some cases, the institution of the public becomes a personal organisation. In most case, head of states have become passive. The African regional unification necessitates political influence and the driving factor, while socioeconomic and cultural context is equally important. The discussion mentioned the absence of citizens' participation in the regional unification process significant despondency in building a people-oriented approach.

The narrative of precolonial Africa's historical trajectory of the continent is essential to appreciate Africa as the origin of humankind and the source of civilisation. African civilisation's wellspring must be exploited for economic development and the development of indigenous systems. The partition of Africa at Berlin in 1884 followed the same logic, demonstrating that African leaders were incapable of resolving postcolonial Africa. Importing the European economic integration ideal and epitomising the Eurocentric model to African soil without customisation has one of the postcolonial leadership failures. Though African is a diverse continent with a different psychological makeup than Europe, economic conditions, political consciousness, the right to free movement, and the level of infrastructure are limited. Considering these facts, Africa has to develop a theoretical model that fits its environment. The gradual unification process is appreciated but a transformation from intergovernmental organization to people-oriented hegemony is much desirable. But, through time the AU have tried to correct some of the impediments of the OAU.

#### **5.4.5: Theme five: The Suitability of the Current Regional Economic Integration Model**

Theme five focused on questions that the current regional economic integration model suitability in consideration unity and diversity, collective interests versus collective identity and so on. Besides, the discussion further investigated the tension between sovereignty versus collective identity by emphasising the rigid nature of national sovereignty challenges in assuring regional unification. Additionally, the interview conducted to look into the slow progress of RECs as a critical challenge, including the intervention of external actors. The Interviewer first question: Why

have Africa states been unsuccessful in constructing a unification model that is suitable to the African economic, political, and sociocultural context?

Follow up questions:

- *What kind of impediments and successes have the current unification model confronted and how the impact affected the projects and activities?*
  - *What are the main challenges of the unification project in Africa in your view?*
  - *How do you understand the tension between sovereignty versus collective identity?*
- **Respondent:** *The AGI-001 responded that the challenges of collective identity are still questionable because what matters here is national sovereignty, and if national sovereignty matters, it should be a voluntary process and subscribe to the African identity. It should not be an emotional process to know or a decision. It should be a consultative process. The idea should emerge first like the European Union; they started with the few who subscribe to the same idea, and the rest started joining the initiative. Therefore, we should not just say we all Africans and all Africans are members of the African Union, should be members of integrated Africa at one go. That's why Africa is not making any headway; because it looks like an emotional decision following Gadhafi and Gadhafi left, and then things fell apart (AGI-001, Lines 22-32, and p.3).*
- **Respondent:** *Regarding external actors, I don't think Africans are immune from the Arab League's influence from French government; the Brits may not be as influential as they used to be because they are facing their challenges. But now we have a new phenomenon of the Americans. Africa's new scramble includes Russia and China, both of which have ambitions for the continent. The motivation for this is, of course, elites who have a stranglehold on their respective countries and are not accountable to their citizens. Therefore, they are pulled in a direction while the collective identity, even just geographic, not ethnic, not cultural, not linguistically, not even racial, because you have races that inhabit the northern part of Africa that are not African origin. For example, Egypt was I would not say colonize, but has been a land of foreign settlements for two thousand six hundred years. Therefore, we will bring you knew breeds of Egyptians that don't suspect Africa, and that's why when you go to Egypt today, people don't identify themselves as Africans. The massive public believes they can come close to Africa is to say. Also, this*

*issue of external actors is a matter to be investigated. Still, they play on this, whether prioritizing different identities than the collective identity or having influence towards pulling together, because united we stand and divided, we fall (AGI-001, Lines 5-16, p.4).*

- **Respondent:** *The AGI-006 responded that the main challenge of African integration and regional organisations is that we are not recognising our diversity that did not happen with African unity forces; we denied our diversity from the beginning. We are not seeking, but we are not working towards unity; somewhat, we are looking for a common platform to defend individual interests. As you may know, the formation of the USA is because of individual interests. When we look at the American unity's backbone that gave the United States number one position is the famous say that says, "We have agreed to disagree." During the foundation agreement made by the parliamentarian, the Congress, you have the judiciary, which is entirely independent. However, they are independent, and more importantly, every Confederate state will keep us when its independence. The fundamental premise is that governments should agree on only those actions that are in the collective interest. And they agree to cooperate on foreign policy, national defence, and a single currency. Let us bring the same story to the African context, and what is happening in Africa? None of these fundamentals actually what happened from the beginning African leaders took an ideological path instead of being practical and pragmatic move (AGI-003, Lines 15-21, p.22).*
  
- **Respondent:** *The fact that the African unification challenge starts with that very same element of sovereignty. Because sovereignty is also rooted in how colonisation happened and how we came out of that colonisation. The fundamental issues about colonization were the continent's fragmentation into those artificial sovereign entities, which does not have depth. And right now, is, in a way, many governments full of evident ambitions and intentions on the regional and continental integration, the constitutions that they have put in place from the independence time effectively forbid that kind of advancement (AGI-004, Lines 15-21, p.22).*

- **Respondent:** *The majority of African countries constitutions support sovereignty. And very few countries in Africa and a little bit up to the where we get closer to West Africa like Senegal, which has constitutions that respect regional integration and can talk and relinquish some of their sovereign rights to the regional structures. But in many African countries, they have to work on the constitution to allow some of the national systems' operations to respect regional integration objectives. So that is one challenge that exists. And this is a big issue that we're looking at the changing constitutions or revising constitutions to allow that to happen. Sometimes you also find that when they are pushed against the wall, they resolve to the point of sovereignty that this is sovereign interference. To address the critical challenges, again, is the fact that many of the countries, especially to these governments, do recognize the value of regional economic integration, mostly because it's apparent. There's a lot of analysis done by different scholars that no country can sustainably succeed economic growth without regional collaboration. Many of our countries have tiny economies, they're small markets, and they can't do without having to connect to cross border trading (AGI-004, Lines 1-17, p. 23).*
  
- **Respondent:** *The ACI-006 responded that the challenge is because of the mismatch between the different political leadership interests and ordinary citizens' aspirations of more significant opportunities and one Africa with all privilege and rights. Indeed, there is a lot of research on these political interests, including leaders' greed and ideology's imposition on African people. It becomes a challenge to create some vision for their citizens and the region at large. Additionally, the victim mentality is one of the political leaders' greatest obstacles to destroying this continent. They are using the colonial form of administration divide, and rule methods is an excuse to drain whatever societal degeneration to think war as a solution rather than unification as a solution of political, economic, or otherwise (ACI-106, Lines 15-24, p. 126).*
  
- **Respondent:** *The AGI-007 responded that the main challenge, I should say, is always the mindset issue. The mindset has been compromised for several reasons, and even related to our colonial eras of submission and implementing a colonial master wish. The cohesive way of thinking has always been manipulated by dividing people among themselves, within borders, ethnic, religion, to destroy cooperative and competitive*

*frameworks. As we come together today, we should argue and build an understanding that the concept of cooperation and competitiveness must be balanced. Collaboration at a higher level is critical if we are to achieve healthy, sustainable economic growth and prosperity. Also, understand that Africa cannot achieve any form of wealth and economic development in all frontiers without cooperation. Therefore, the African context's primary challenge is the absence of keeping a proper balance between collaboration and competition. The sub-regional RECs such as IGAD and EAC, as well as other regional arrangements, they have to understand this, required to balance of cooperation, not competition is very, critical and without those crucial ingredients, there is no way we can move anywhere else within that framework (AGI-007, Lines 25-34, p. 139).*

### **Discussion of Question five:**

The answers to the questions are related to economic, political, and sociocultural challenges and the apprehension between sovereignty versus collective identity. One of the critical views was to assess both failure and collective identity in Africa is not happening even the fundamental of unification. Instead, we are in the process of normalising our differences. Additionally, despite the policy, we are not comparable; we are incapable of appreciating and articulating what we desired from the union and how it could be practical. From the beginning denial of differences undermines the capacity to identity strength in diversity; Diversity is the biggest challenge that has made so far in African unity.

On the contrary, there were informants that described the Africa unification challenge as manageable, and the remedial is revitalising the unification process and engaging with citizens of Africa. Regarding the sovereignty issue, some they underline that the challenge is not on the economic front, because that did not come from an economic standpoint; it was my political perspective. When Africa moves faster on economic benefits and those economic benefits are going to compel countries to open up. Besides, states are willing more to facilitate the legislation and the policies that also then can be supported by the constitution to make regional integration happen.

#### 5.4.6: Theme six: The Alternative Unification Proposition and Recommendations

On theme six, the question and answer emphasised on how the indigenous alternative unification can be proposed and employed. In this study, the interviewer and interviewee attempted to understand the reasons why it is necessary looking inward to find homegrown solutions to achieve unification in Africa. The first part is suggestions about what kind of unification theory that helps enormously on sociocultural, development, market, and physical integration and what the modalities as an option. The study was looking at a practical suggestion about what should be done uniquely than the current model. Besides, how possible can citizens involve in the unification process to make it inclusive. Most importantly, how an indigenous alternative model of unification works better for Africa as a specific alternative to the current Eurocentric economic integration model. The Interviewer first question was: What alternative unification models need to be explored, going forward and how can they be employed?

Follow up questions including;

- What kind of approach do you think is best to achieve unification in Africa considering the colonial past and the current stalemate?
- Tell me about your practical suggestions about what should be done uniquely in the course of the African unification project?
- Would an indigenous alternative model of unification work better for Africa? And How? What do you think should be done better regarding introducing a new approach to unification (alternative model) in Africa?

➤ **Respondent:** *Regarding alternative unification theory or approaches to resolve broader African problems, I'm not sure if there are relevant indigenous approaches to unification. There are many African genius ways of approach to conflict resolution in many regions of Africa. One good practice from Somalia is all interest, the good or evil identification mechanism Somalia when they established the government first to cease hostilities positions, practiced by the elders. There are indigenous alternative approaches to manage, resources to manage conflict that can be adaptable. Maybe a more in-depth study of these kinds of methods might give us some ideas on how we can manage interstate or intrastate facilitate and cooperate. Africa has a rich art, music, and literature*

*about thousands and thousands of indigenous cultures in the west, central, east, and southern African regions. The genius approaches in Ethiopians proud cultural history of the GEDA, Baytona, Sera, and Debo tradition uniquely African indigenous governance institution (ACI-004, Lines 4-19, p.74).*

➤ **Respondent:** *The ACI-003 responded that the Ethiopian education system is thousands of years old and of an indigenous model that follows a different line and hijacked by the European knowledge system based on teaching and step by step development. The Ethiopian alphabet is perhaps the only one that works for education tenacity that is uniquely African language as indigenous thoughts are something that we have to think about seriously. If we look if we go back to our history, there are elements where people could inhabit coexist and a kind of mutual understanding; what we call it today in a modern way look like similar to decentralised systems. Therefore, as an academic member, I encourage the African indigenous system to be developed to assist the unification process. In my opinion, it requires a study. It's a field that's open on which we Africans need to work on; what model does our indigenous way of life; another potential collaboration is the primary question. How can this help unification, and how can this allow development and without also inhibiting collaboration? These are serious research questions that need to be answered through an in-depth look into its indigenous governance and institution building system (ACI-003, Lines 4-12, p.84).*

➤ **Respondent:** *On cultural issues, the informant is of the view that our cultural practices as reflections of our philosophies are based on our perception, understanding deductions from our natural environment. African interaction or interplay is between nature, the extent possible, and practice and our particular set of eyes on the economy or fishing or manufacturing. African philosophy varies across regions, across situations, across understandings, because the African knowledge of the tropical forest is not the same as understanding the norms upon black ice country or nature in Iraq. Therefore, the philosophy is human, but it reflects realisations and performance of practices in our respective area knowledge is available for us. At the moment, there is across regions, and that constitutes cultural differences. If you take our dietary practices in Africa, it varies across the regions, across climates, the closing practices, dietary practices, the marriage*



*practices, and child-rearing practices, they all emerged from our understanding of nature and the transformation of that which is our culture and the practice of that which is peculiar or a particular way of life across Africa or across the globe, one would say (ACI-001, Lines 4-15, p.53).*

- **Respondent:** *On the history of Africa, the informant asserts that African history as the whole language, innovations, astronomy, and calendar needs to study. Africans had excellent education systems, including the Alphabet's superior to the Latin alphabet. We do not value what we have; the African Enlightenment introduced by Zera Yacob was a seventeenth-century a great philosopher of Africa; it was 200 years before the European Enlightenment. We have challenges. We must overcome our inferiority complex and accept that what was created in the distant past on every sphere of knowledge from us should also be valued, and that all of these things should be valued. We have a challenge with all wealth of knowledge. The problems having will not be easy to still we are suffering from a localised identity; we could not expand our ideas beyond the colonial borders, which we adore. And this will fracture us, and collective identity needs to be learned so that all the young people from their moral, intellectual, and emotional education. Young Africans need to be united in a very systematic way to ensure Africans' collective identity is valued more than anything else. That has to be done step by step, and we need to challenge African leaders, and when we challenge them, as you know, they are fighting us rather than doing the right thing for Africa. (ACI-004, Lines 3-21, p.93).*

## **Final discussion**

Having discussed specific issues concerning the necessity for an alternative unification theory and what kind of approach the African continent should follow, the chapter Bedsides assessed the need for indigenous knowledge systems values in shaping the unification process. Additionally, the importance of economic, political, educational, agricultural, and land reform harmonisation was demonstrated. The following points are for further investigation; the relevance of time, experience, and promote action. The understanding would like to see how the African unification agenda versus its European counterpart might be considered in terms that take

account of the fact that all variables are not equal. One should have to understand to see learning as an opportunity to learn how Europeans established and structured the institutions that promote their economic integration plan without mimicking every aspect of the European process.

The current study observes that it took Europeans fifty years of preparedness to get to announce that they just decided on a single currency, and to announce the open boundaries and free movement. In order to do that, they focused internally, examine the structures of each member states to build consensus in standards on how to build roads that are equal in quality to the other infrastructure, promote access to power, electricity, and good education. Similarly, they invested in harnessing from the knowledge infrastructure that has been built and dedicated to European narratives for a century. The knowledge does not attribute to any specific race or region; however, the regional economic integration is envisaged and developed in Europe, most specifically in west Europe. The rest of the world, including Africa, has attempted to institutionalise the same theoretical framework but has never been as successful as Europe in overcoming all obstacles. There is no reason to criticise Europeans for exporting the products. The issue is with those who imported without adapting to their specific demands. As mentioned in the discussion, the other regions are trying to adapt different cooperation mechanisms to advance trade and political unity; the question is, how about Africa? The African continent will remain the status quo or change the gear.

## **5.5: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter has presented a background of data analysis, findings and presentation. The chapter presented six themes discussed individual interviews, also related to the research questions. The individual interviews designed by dividing into three-part the challenges, opportunity, and alternative for African unification. Thus far, the economic integration model has demonstrated how progress has been made and what obstacles have been encountered. Apart from the involvement of state actors in advancing the cause and the manner in which the difficulties arose. In the interviews process, the discussion included the factors of RECs challenges from political will perspectives. Individual interviews also included a discussion of African leadership issues both within and outside of African powers. Most significantly, the report explored citizen

participation and the possibility and viable choices for indigenous alternative unity, as well as particular alternative.

Theme one covered the interview discussed the current governance and institutional system approach of regional economic communities RECs in particular. Theme two focused on the current unification model successes stories and the impediments. The discussion included the advantages and constraints of the economic integration model and the progress that is an application to attain economic prosperity and political stability. Theme three covered the acquaintance and the participation of ordinary citizens in the regional unification, including the knowledge about the continental and sub-regional organisations. Theme four focused on the reasons for the failure of the current unification projects, including institutional and governance limitations. Besides, it discussed the political will of the member states and political leaders. Theme five focused on the economic integration model suitability to attain continental unity and diversity. Additionally, the tension between sovereignty and collective identity was discussed, including Africa and external actors. Theme six focused on discussing the possibility of framing indigenous alternative unification theory propositions and recommendations that help develop homegrown unification solutions. Chapter six presented indigenous alternative unification theoretical framework that proposed unification theory that the thesis seeks to advance.

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## **CHAPTER SIX:**

### **Developing Alternative Indigenous Unification Theory**

#### **6.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Chapter six makes a compelling case for supporting an indigenous government paradigm as the best path forward for Africa's unification. The theory explains how institutional and normative frameworks are shaped by the arrangement of governance structures at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels. This also focuses on how this applies to the Horn of Africa, which is depicted as a two-layer structure as a sub-regional bloc. The chapter explains the rationale of theoretical claims on key pillars of philosophical, historical, psychological, political, economic, and sociocultural contexts. The recommended theory is built, including the hierarchy of authority, representation, and the mandates in the governance structure and a border formula based on language resemblance, cultural similitude, historical connection, market accessibility, seaport access, trade facility, and similar psychological makeup. The proposed theory primarily applies the comprehensive indigenous unification theory encompass political, economic, sociocultural, and collective identity perspectives as an alternative to mainstream theories. The alternative model presented details a new border architecture that incorporates inside the potential and the interdependence between Mojo-Oda, Debo and Umoja-Jamaa.

#### **6.2: The Rationale of Methodological Approach**

I explain why a concept or a theoretical claim is necessary, its modalities, and who will be accountable in the justification or rationale for the theoretical claims. The indigenous alternative unification methodology employs the grounded theory with the inductive method to investigate the ontological and epistemological considerations that underpin the constructivist research approach (Mills, Bonner, and Francis, 2006:29). The proposed indigenous alternative unification model employed a constructivist grounded theory approach to investigate multifaceted themes.


The systematic analysis of data and literature enables us to reinforce that theoretical proposition by examining epistemological patterns. Inductive reasoning and analysis are applied in developing both the theory and the governance and institutional model presented in this chapter (Carlile, and Christensen, 2005; Corbin & Strauss, 2014:2; Ding and Foo, 2002; Hayes, 2007; and Charmaz, 2017). I explain below why and how the governance, institutional, representation, and mandating challenges are undertaken in the proposed theory. The proposed theory aims to resolve the current institutional and structural impediments.

### **6.2.1: The Rationale of Resolving the Current Governance Impediments**

The existing economic integration structure, which is based on the intergovernmental governance model, has encountered structural constraints, as detailed in Chapter four. The postcolonial African setback is the continent's inability to develop a unified identity capable of overcoming the impacts of limited state sovereignty. Theoretical approaches explain important issues and create a coherent plan for thoroughly and methodically addressing them. Another hindrance addressed previously is the top-down institutional structure that prevents the wide mass of society from participating. My objective was to develop a theoretical framework that solves these issues, accommodates diversity, promotes interconnection, and facilitates the interaction of top-down and bottom-up systems.

Additionally, it was critical to develop a strategy for intra- and inter-state interfaces that is compatible with African contexts, as well as a governance system that accommodates multiple layers and multiple stakeholders at the micro and macro levels by increasing African countries' interdependence. According to Rosenau (1984:256), 'cascading interdependence' promotes intra-state coherence by promoting a pattern that provides logical abilities to form building blocs with aggregation and policy harmonisation in a flawless manner. Given this, the alternative unification theory underpins how the theoretical framework can be translated into practical implementation in order to use 'cascading interdependence' as a rational solution.

**Figure 6.1: Mixed Solution Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approach Design**



**Source:** Own construction

\* The graphic above demonstrates that within a single governance system, there are two distinct structural arrangements: delegation and devolving processes. The first on the left illustrates how the people representation system works from the bottom up, beginning with Mojo-Oda, Debo and ending with Umoja Jamaa. The second figure on the left illustrates the devolution of the organisational mandate from supranational organ to building blocs and finally to the nation-states.

The suggested theory is based around the concept of a multilevel comprehensive governance structure with numerous layers of authority that employs a mix of top-down and bottom-up policymaking and implementation schemes. Additionally, a bottom-up strategy is included, as well as a representation that assists in increasing both inclusion and authority. Similarly, the top-down strategy entails stakeholders planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating procedures in order to achieve coordinated operationalisation for effective delivery. Yet, the apparent effectiveness of top-down formal institutions involving high-level societal participation is still dependent on these institutions having evolved from bottom-up representation (Easterly, 2008:96). To fully comprehend the complex economic, political, and sociocultural unification project, a mixed bottom-up and top-down multi-layer governance approach is thought to help

institutionalise the process. a method. Suvinen and Sotarauta's (2018:14) micro-level governance strategies necessitate both bottom-up and top-down institutional frameworks that enable diverse actors to participate in a check-and-balance manner. A detailed rationale and strategy for this are discussed in section 6.2.3.

It is necessary to establish a new structure for bloc formation in order to solve the AU's operational isolation from RECs until a new structural adjustment proposal arises. One of the key issues requiring systematic research response is the justification of discovering incoherence within the AU governance framework. The building blocs' governance approach is a philosophy that combines civil, public, and corporate governance with social, political, and economic enforcement structures in order to progress, react, and pressing societal challenges (Ruggie, 2014:8). The failure of the RECs' structural arrangement to create interlinks between nation-states and the AU stems from two major flaws: first, the RECs lack a structure based on representative and legitimate authority, mandate, and autonomy, allowing for a bi-directional link between member states and the AU. Second, the RECs' sole purpose is to accelerate economic integration among member states (statist logic). The governance arrangement lacks critical contemplative variables such as economic, political, and sociocultural context. Thus, the rationality of proposing building blocs' is considered in order to resolve the current RECs challenges; and propose a holistic approach, including one Mojo-Oda to be only in one Debo, as well as other proposed solutions in this thesis. Similarly, building blocs' must be designed in such a way that they allow one to exercise comprehensive sovereignty with varying governance structures that provide authority at all levels.

### **6.2.2: The Rationale of Resolving the Current Institutional Impediments**

Unless and until careful structural engineering is proposed, addressing the lack of functional structural arrangements and popular participation will continue to be a difficulty. As stated in Chapter four, the logic underpinning the statement that change is necessary. The major impediment to institutional arrangements is the absence of a regulatory authority capable of enforcing legislation and evaluating and monitoring the union's progress toward its objectives. Some AUC structures, according to Nagar and Nganje (2016:9), are not aligned with the

organization's mission, vision, and strategic goals. Additionally, the existing approach, which is excessively state-centric, does not reflect the more inclusive and people-centred vision of Pan-African unity. The institutional governance structure of the African Union must be established with strategic objectives in mind. At the same time, it should perform the remaining tasks through mainstreaming mechanisms with adequate monitoring and evaluation systems. The AU needs to consider the recommendation of giving membership to "a smaller grouping of African states in which conditions for entry involve sound economic and political performance" (ibid: 43). Also, the AU needs to establish a robust institutional link with sub-regional and national levels. The AUC's institutional mandate to implement the resolutions of various AU organs and provide strategic leadership concerning political and socio-economic unification in Africa must be strengthened. The AU organs, including the AUC, need to be led by directly elected officials.

The operational challenges are a hindrance to the AU system; these challenges emanate from poor structural governance and institutional framework, as argued in chapter four of this current study. The identified challenges have to do with a lack of organisational philosophy, leadership style, absence of priority, and political clientelism. Park (2019:300) says that the [African countries have no shortage of policy papers], then 'what is lacking', 'what is to be achieved' and 'what is the way forward. There is no shortage of policies in Africa; by implication, there is a solution to end the current unification and development challenges. The thesis has discussed the obstacles. Unlike Park, this thesis argues that if the policies are not translated successfully into practice, the policy may be incompatible with the situation or inapplicable to the problem on the ground. The critical analysis method is applied to the prescribed solution and is determined by how the problem identification process is comprehended. In other words, examining the logical application is critical because it is impossible to prescribe a solution unless the magnitude of the challenges is understood. Thus, the operational challenge can be ascribed to the mismatch between problem identification, solution proposition and implementation mechanisms.

Dambrin, Lambert, and Sponem (2007:7) argue that the institutional mechanisms are designed to respond to structural and operational challenges, and they benefit from a clear vision, political commitment, and practical implementation. Further, it is understood that institutionalisation is a process of building ideas or consolidating organisational mission that develops into discourses, management control systems, and then technique. Institutionalising the unification process



requires setting a priority, deploying the right human resources with adequate capacity building, financial support and proper performance monitoring and evaluation in place. According to Jiboku (2015:6), informing a common institutional framework of an institution transforms into institutionalism based on difference to formulate desirable results with appropriate and practical implementation.

### **6.2.3: The Rationale of Resolving, Absence of Representation and Mandate**

The absence of direct election of executives in the RECs and AU is one of the present unification project's obstacles. Clarity on representation and mandates in these institutions is critical for altering the African unity process. The justification for direct representation in all structures strengthens the mandate to lead the unification agenda, which stems from citizens' desire to develop a sense of belonging, commitment, and accountability. According to Brody, Godschalk, and Burby (2003:246), citizen participation and mandating of regional institutions is critical for producing quality results in the planning, management, development, and assessment processes to achieve the desired goal. This is also important for increasing the responsibility and accountability of all stakeholders. Representation and mandate are indispensable in resolving structural and operational impediments discussed in chapter four. Empowering citizens through the election process guarantees that each structure has a legitimate mandate. The elected representative will thus be duly mandated to discharge people's collective aspirations through planning, execution, and monitoring activities.

Transforming multi-layer institutions and governance systems assists in disengaging the unification effort from its current stalemate by synthesising suitable representation that gives an implementation mandate. The other essential step is leadership transformation by ensuring adequate mandate and representation in relation to the implementation of key projects (Villoria and Iglesias 2011:176). Institutional transformation must be people-centred in order to serve citizens' interests while also making the representation system more transparent and efficient. Bach (2011:80) argues that citizen involvement in mandating political leaders has a positive impact on policymaking and execution process in all structures and increases accountability in the bureaucratic system. The rationale of Debo indigenous philosophy formulates that the

representation is based on community contribution and proven expertise of individual merit-based, which allows making a collective and responsible leadership. Similarly, building institutional transformation based on indigenous philosophy is a motivating factor that shapes an economic, political and sociocultural interdependency overtime.

#### **6.2.4: A Novel Paradigm for an Alternative Unification**

The rationale for Africa's unification is to restore collective African identity and citizenship. It is to create an enhanced, dignified livelihood for citizens, competitiveness globally, minimise inequality between African states, and reduce dependence on developed countries. By this, I mean to engage people in the political process in order to establish a dynamic governing structure that addresses the specific African situation. It aims to reduce trade obstacles, facilitate global coordination, and put in place a new institutional framework following the African Pan-nationalist founders' original intent. Moreover, it provides a lasting break with Eurocentric economic integration models that have been tried and failed and a break with the narrow idea of national sovereignty that impedes the consolidation of a collective African identity. In order to attain African unification that benefits all citizens, Africans need to build up and methodically remove deep-seated narrow political and economic interests that are inimical to unification. Ewing (1967:61), Tuluy (2016:338), Muchie (2004:146) agree that unification is about building a collective voice in the international fora and a strategic position in the competitive global economic system to enable Africa to enhance its political and economic power. The indigenous alternative unification is designed to circumvent market fragmentation that imposes limitations on Africa's prosperity. The free movement of people and goods in Africa is an enabler to empower citizens through the proposed unification paradigm.

Consequently, the regional unification impetus in Africa has massive potential to generate a decent living. The goal will transpire only when an African governance and institution approach transforms from an imported economic integration method to a holistic approach in all frontiers. According to Koné (2012:387) and Yang and Gupta (2007:406), the logic of using economic, sociocultural, and political unification as a constructive instrument aids in avoiding isolation from

global economic development and competitiveness. Unless African countries strengthen economic coherence through unification, Africa will remain at the periphery of the world economy.

The rationale behind ushering in a new architectural indigenous alternative unification configuration is to ensure language resemblance, cultural similitude, historical connection, market accessibility, trade facility, seaport access, and similar physiological makeup, among other things. The arrangement is to be informed by the need to assure peace and sustainable development on the continent. The configuration aims to reduce external intervention and colonial attachments. The approach addresses different layers of unification, including geographical, cultural, historical, psychological similarities and other factors. The logic underlying the proposition of the United Peoples' of Africa is the assumption that the formation of such governance theory is a citizen-centric undertaking that forms the union rather than an assembly of states. The ultimate end proposed in this thesis is the creation of the United Peoples' of Africa (UPA) instead of the United States of Africa.

### **6.3: Structures of Authority, Representation, and Mandates**

The three-layered nature of the continental hierarchy follows a logical pattern designed to accommodate the three branches of authorities, namely: the peoples' representative, executive, and judicial branch. These are appointed through election and representation. These hierarchical arrangements will be embedded in broader classifications of societies in order to protect citizens' rights and promote African development and unification. These arrangements are formed to facilitate all forms of societal interactions, both horizontal and vertical, to assure a balanced and fair governance system for the benefit of the people. What makes these arrangements unique is that peoples' representatives are at the centre of the whole system, whereas in the current model, the state is at the centre, and the people are on the periphery. This enables the peoples' power in the decision-making process.

The peoples' representatives' assembly will be the highest body of authority that represents and delegates executive power to building blocs' to assure policy harmonisation and facilitate

unification and development in all parts of Africa. This is inspired by the theoretical foundations as stated in chapter three and chapter four, the indigenous alternative unification approach based on Africans' governance philosophy of the Buganda, Akan, Yoruba, Hadiya, Sidama, Hausa, Oromo, Ndebele, Xhosa people and others. Green (2010:15-17); Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013:4); and Zewde (2002:17) observe that precolonial African governance systems empowered citizens to decide their destiny and provided them with the right to political identity and autonomy in the absence of political centralisation and influence. Importantly, a "human population [shares] a historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass, public culture, institutionalise division of labour or economic unity and common legal rights and duties for all" Palagashvili (2018:283); Gennaioli, and Rainer (2006:3); Christopher (1997:98); Diop, (1988:65). Logan (2013:355) states that precolonial Africa had two major systems of structural governance formats: that are decentralised pyramidal governments and centralised monarchies profoundly shaped the quality of governments. The rationalisation of authority and institutional legitimacy originated from communities' direct representation and inclusive model as an essential symbolic role of community identity, unity, and dependability.


### **6.3.1: The Structures of Mojo-Oda**

Mojo-Oda is the Nation-State, or first layer of local administration. As defined in chapter three, the Mojo-Oda governance and institutional theoretical framework based on the African indigenous knowledge system provides the prerogative distinctiveness of an African governance philosophy. The system provides ample room for design and robust accommodation of development and unification goals. The system also includes the ability to precisely respond to the continent's sociocultural, economic, and political context. The rationale for instituting an African indigenous governance system is to restore Africans' value system, which includes people's empowerment, responsiveness, accountability, collective leadership, peace, development, and voluntarism. Believing that progressing toward unification can help African value systems become more entrenched in order to accomplish desired goals.

The three layers of the governance and institutional theoretical framework have Mojo-Oda (the nations) as key parts. The Mojo-Oda is a unique expression of the relationship between nature

and humanity that supports the convergence and interdependence among African states' political systems, socio-economy, culture, and governance (Mutere 2012:157; Ikeke 2013:348; Jalata 2010). Mojo-Oda is central to peoples' power representation linked to a mandate emanating from a supranational source. The peoples' self-rule and governance assure them of their right to development. This system shares its sovereignty with the upper structure DEBO and Umoja-Jamaa. The Mojo-Oda seeks to change the colonial border arrangement by introducing an alternative configuration based on administrative borderlines rather than sovereignty-based demarcation to help accelerate development. The layers of governance in this arrangement are meant to be in harmony with local, national, regional, and continental authorities and to promote convergence in multilayer governance in the process of building the 'United Peoples of Africa' (UPA).

**Table 6.1:** The Three Layers of Mojo-Oda Governance Structures.



**Source:** Own construction

\*The above table depicts the three levels of governance in the Mojo-Oda, also known as a "nation-state." The three levels of authority will have a bottom-up vertical relationship divided by district, provincial, and national. On the other hand, the lower layer is divided into a district and autonomous municipalities, which will have a horizontal relationship and will be accountable to the provincial administration. The separation of district and municipality is for the purpose of facilitating service delivery and administration due to the unique nature of metropolitan cities, towns, and population management that requires separate management autonomy.

African states are supposed to achieve specific criteria in order to operate a functional indigenous alternative unification system. The architecture will need harmonising the constitutional arrangements at the national level in relation to the terms of office of authorities, election procedures, labour laws, land ownership law, etc. The constitutional context needs to be Afrocentric, addressing the concerns of diverse ethnic groups fully through African knowledge systems and avoid Eurocentric governance inventions such as ethno-federalism, federalism, Confederalism. (Abebe 2012:174) contends that Africa requires a constitution and institutional mechanisms to best address the concerns of diverse ethnic groups through African knowledge systems. Ethiopia and Nigeria's experiences with this Eurocentric ethnic-based federalism are concerning, as they have failed to ensure ethnic cohesion.

The county state arrangements in a Mojo-Oda based governance system ensures market accessibility, addresses the effect of population size and geographical proximity. Mojo-Oda will have equal representation in the Debo's peoples' representative, executive, and judicial arrangements. The Mojo-Oda local government focuses on economic and infrastructure development, as well as service delivery on the ground. Beyond providing functional services at the local level, it is expected to collaborate with other member states on common issues that require a comprehensive approach, such as political, sociocultural, defence, security, and trade facilitation activities. Mojo-Oda will collaborate horizontally with other Mojo-Oda members of the same Debo, as each Mojo-Oda can only be a member of one Debo. The Mojo-Oda vertical administration link is only with Debo, and the representation to Umoja-Jamaa will be through Debo. The 'Debo' is sub-regional building bloc.'

### **6.3.2: The Debo, Authority, Representation, and Mandate**

Debo is a second layer sub-regional arrangement or building bloc formation comprised of Mojo-Oda membership. A Debo is a grouping of Mojo-Oda (nation-states) geographically close, with similar economic and market conditions, administration, trade potential, seaport access, and similar historical and physiological makeup. In the Debo governance architectural design, all

Mojo-Oda are considered to have seaport access with similar level facilities as those near the shore. The formation takes into account Mojo-Oda common consanguinity and economic interdependence for economic development, sociocultural assimilation, and political unity. The Debo governance structure is expected to include the general assembly (legislative), executive, and judicial bodies, which presides in its building bloc. The Debo assembly is formed through bottom-up representation and receives its mandate from Mojo-Oda; through direct election. Debo's function is to provide a collective leadership that aims to design economic development and cooperation as a building bloc, ensuring policy development and implementation with the collaboration of Mojo-Oda. Elections in all Mojo-Oda should be coordinated in a similar time frame to align with Debo's term of office. Debo's governance model is an interstate assembly with a full mandate to promote people's representation.

One of the distinctive arrangements of Debo is that it is designed to foster cross-border interdependence between member countries. This enables the development of broad economic opportunities across borders, political system convergence, widespread sociocultural interaction, and shared law enforcement mechanisms within the building bloc. Debo is a governance structure that connects Mojo-Oda and Umoja-Jamaa. Its critical role is to move states from dependence to interdependence in pursuit of an Africa-wide unification agenda. Debo's governance structure is intended to foster economic interdependence, sociocultural exchange, political convergence, environmental protection, technological transformation, and industrial expansion among African nation-states.

Furthermore, establishing a common marketplace through the Debo structure serves as a catalyst for unification as a comprehensive approach. Green (1965:12), Mistry (2000:561), and Povolny (1966:304) demonstrate that a reciprocal relationship between states leads to policy harmonisation and the institutionalisation of interdependence through a common platform to the benefit of all parties. To achieve fundamental socioeconomic and political goals, creating synergy between Mojo-Oda is critical within Debo fundamentals.

**Table 6.2:** Debo Philosophical Foundations

**Debo as a philosophical system is based on the following variables:**



a)	Who has better experience in the community: Multiplying or replicating the best practises
b)	What contribution do you make: What resources are available? How will we co-lead it?
c)	Who among us is the finest organiser or leader?
d)	What expertise does it need the job to be done
e)	Which place is the most vulnerable and need the most assistance?
f)	When is the best moment to implement our strategy?
g)	How can we avoid unethical behaviour?
h)	How might it be advantageous to distribute resources equitably?

**Source:** Own Construct

\*The table above summarises Debo's philosophical underpinning, which includes critical tools for constructing a governance structure at the building bloc level. The theoretical framework is adaptable to the economic, political, and sociocultural contexts of Africa.

Debo is a recognised African knowledge system of cooperatives among communities used for teamwork, voluntary participation, and surrendering between different communities for a common goal. Debo is a cooperative theory applied as an instrument for selecting the best community organisers based on previous performance among experts in the field. Debo is a concept of



voluntary cooperation and collective leadership that helps segments of societies advance economic development and capacity building. Debo has the fundamental principle that is required and is easily adaptable to any governance structure that adheres to the universal concept of accountability and efficacy. Bringing African indigenous theoretical knowledge into harmony with the overall creative process aids in the advancement of organisational and structural relationships with people and the illumination of societal development (Fanon, Sartre, and Farrington, 1963:143). As an African governance philosophy, Debo is undeniably compatible with the added value of filling institutional gaps in the African unification framework. Abera (2017:62); Jenco, Idris, and Thomas (2019:273), Zegeye and Vambe (2006: 349) opine Debo is related to and similar to Akan Ghana's *Obra Ye nnoba* and Setswana South Africa's '*letsema*,' both of which show that philosophy is commonly used in Africa and is not a new idea. The philosophy has a broader meaning in terms of conceptualising governance and structural arrangements by bestowing a better life for all and collective responsibilities.

Debo is an appropriate institutional and governance strategy that emphasises synergistic ingenuity to coordinate economic development as a whole (Abera, 2017:62). Debo is an African local knowledge framework that is epistemologically sound and can be used to shape governance, jurisprudence, social and political factors. Debo, which is imbued with lived pragmatism and a plethora of viewpoints, norms, and indigenous institutional frameworks, necessitates a transformation in order to elevate the African value system (Teffo, 2019:247-9). The philosophical robustness makes a novel solution preferable and consistent with the institutional system. Additionally, it aids in revitalising and providing a democratic and long-term governance framework within the local context and expertise.

Debo demonstrates that governance and institution building are part of Africa's long tradition. In this context, giving credit for information creation to any particular culture, race, or continent is a highly problematic concept. Throughout history, Africans have survived and thrived as a community based on philosophy and perseverance in the face of adversity. As a paradigm shift, the African unification process necessitates the development of a power system based on African theory and worldview that is more in tune with ground realities. According to the Debo theory and the aforementioned study, African countries are divided into twelve Debo (Building blocs), each

of which has a minimum of three and a maximum of five Mojo-Oda; however, DWA and DWSA are exceptions due to unique circumstances.


**Table 6.3:** Debo configurations

Debo Configuration	
1	Debo of North East Africa (DNEA): Egypt, Libya and Sudan
2	Debo of North Africa (DNA): Algeria Morocco, and Tunisia
3	Debo of North West Africa (DNWA): Mauritania, Mali and West Sahrawi Rep
4	Debo of West South Africa (DWSA): Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo
5	Debo of West Africa (DWA): Cape Verdi, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal & Sierra Leone
6	Debo of Central West Africa (DCWA): Chad, Central Africa Rep, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger
7	Debo of the Horn of Africa (DHA): Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan
8	Debo of East Africa (DEA): Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda
9	Debo of South East Africa (DSEA): Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe
10	Debo of Island Africa (DIA): Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Mayotte
11	Debo of South West Africa (DSWA): Angola, DRC Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rep. of the Congo, and Sao Tomé & Principe
12	Debo of Southern Africa (DSA): Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa

**Source:** Own Construction

\*The Debo configurations table shows the building blocs' with a minimum of three and a maximum of five Mojo-Oda, except for DWA and DWSA, which have six and seven Mojo-Oda, respectively. Each Debo is set up to create one Mojo-Oda that is a member of one Debo. Furthermore, Debo is formed with population size, economic status, seaport access, customs facility, trade accessibility as an economic zone, and administration facilities in mind. The Debo aimed to develop viable institutions that foster the interaction between Mojo-Oda.

**Figure 6.2:** Proposed Debo Building Blocs Administration Border Map.



**Source:** Own Construction

\* The map demonstrates that the novel paradigm of the African Debo border mapping how the twelve DEBOs building blocs' are constituted. The border background is meant to form and redefine the possibilities of various stakeholder groups in terms of what is socially, politically, and economically beneficial to them. The borderlines are administration lines, not sovereignty demarcation between DEBOs.

Debo is a theoretical application related to governance and institution formulation to correct the current unification structural and operational impediments discussed in chapters four and five. The critical assessment of the current economic integration challenges and opportunities is thoroughly assessed to introduce a new paradigm to achieve unification through step-by-step advance towards a holistic approach. The Debo conforms to African indigenous ideological, structural, and leadership systems. Debo's authority stems from its conformance to Mojo-Oda representation and it functions within the confines of its assigned mission. Similarly, Debo shares its jurisdiction with Umoja-Jamaa through the legal framework. All twelve Debo will have equal representation in the Umoja-Jamaa and form peoples' representative, executive, and judicial. The Debo framework created to allow for more Mojo-Oda participation as well as to play a critical role of the Debo's collective agency in Umoja-Jamaa.


### **6.3.3: The Structures of African Umoja-Jamaa, Authority, Representation, and Mandate**

Umoja-Jamaa is the highest and third level of the African unification structure, which is inter-state also; it has an assembly constituted by Debo representatives. As stated in 6.4.1, the Mojo-Oda does not have a direct relationship with Umoja-Jamaa during the first and second stages of formation. Umoja-Jamaa incorporates the people's representatives, an executive, and the judiciary mandated from below by the Debo, with each Debo electing an equal number of representatives to Umoja-Jamaa.

The primary purpose of 'Umoja-Jamaa' is to delegate key roles to elected and appointed officials who are responsible for overseeing and regulating the following key departments. The departments are Defence and Security Forces, Inland Affairs and Citizenship, Land Management, Education and Youth, Health, Women and Children Affairs, Agriculture and Food Security, Infrastructure and Rural Development, Science and Technology, Trade and Industry, Sport and Culture, and International Affairs. Umoja-Jamaa is a single legal entity representing the African people through designated power from Debo in constructing "the United Peoples of Africa" (UPA). The rationale behind the establishment of the UPA is that the assembly is not a

conglomeration of African states, but rather that unification is sought by and for the peoples of Africa.

**Table 6.4:** Umoja-Jamaa branches of governance



**Source:** Own Construction

\*The above table is a demonstration of three layers of Umoja-Jamaa branches of UPA.

Umoja-Jamaa is the highest assembly of African unity to promote African citizenship, security and foreign affairs. Umoja-Jamaa has a far-reaching significance as teaching and learning doctrine and a compelling social movement with ontological, moral, and social phenomenon standards advanced in Katanga Congo (Green, 2010:24; Fabian, 1969:168-72). With the proposed mechanisms, the deep-rooted division between borderlines, language, ethnicity approaching to get resolved, and African unity restore within institutional and governance instruments. The application considers the political, economic, socio-cultural, governance, and institutional structures aligned progressively. Umoja-Jamaa as an indigenous alternative unification model applies a transformational approach by considering Africa’s historical, philosophical, and local knowledge system to provide appropriate solutions.

Identity and belonging are cornerstones to be safeguarded by Umoja-Jamaa in developing Africa's patriotism towards a unified vision and destination. Jamaa is a religious, social, state organisations and institutions system since 1804 in influential empires, kingdoms comprising

Benin, Borno, Ghana, Hausa states, Mali, Oyo, and Songhai (Okene, and Ahmad 2011:86). 'Umoja Jamaa Africa' is a Swahili word meaning United Nations/people of Africa. It is proposed here as a theoretical foundation for the alternative unification model. Umoja is about cohesion and unity as if an extended family in a manner that resonates with African culture that promotes harmony, reconciliation, equal opportunity and solidarity as cultural values (Nafukho, 2006:409; Fattah, 1987:40).

**Figure 6.3:** Umoja-Jamaa international border and sovereignty map.



**Source:** Own Construction

\* The Umoja-Jamaa constituency is depicted in the diagram above. The Umoja-Jamaa is the sole sovereign entity that represents the African people in the construction of "the United Peoples of Africa" (UPA).

Umoja-Jamaa is a single sovereign entity representing the African people through designated power in constructing "the United Peoples of Africa" (UPA). It is the highest assembly of unity,

which implements the agreements by the people of Africa and strengthens inter-cultural unity and diversity. It is the assembly of all African ethnic, religion, language, and cultural backgrounds, representing united peoples of Africa and safeguarded common interest. The Mojo-Oda, Debo and Umoja-Jamaa together make up the United Peoples of Africa (UPA). The meaning of "UPA," which represents peoples at the heart of the unification, is not a merger of different identities and states, but rather aspirations for restoration and reintegration as Africans to their past in demystifying the colonial disintegration agenda and renewing with a new promise.

#### **6.4: Stages of Alternative Unification**

While developing a well-researched theory is a good place to start, the implementation and planning processes are as critical and are context-dependent. Institutional transformation planning necessitates an understanding of the actors, instruments, scale, and scope and the sensitivity with which governance dynamics shift from government to governance (Reimer, 2013:4658). A theoretical framework must be developed in order to incorporate and avoid superfluous inclinations, policy practises, and maladministration in implementation method designs. Without a doubt, the application of any brilliant theory needs the implementation of well-articulated methods that prevent the current project's flaws from being repeated.

New approaches should consider a change to ensure a safe departure and landing by well-planned agencies. Criticising the current method of economic integration and proposing alternative unification theories necessitates full-fledged standardisation. Furthermore, conceptual formulation needs to be supported by epistemological and methodological affirmations, alongside reflection on polity, policy, and political contexts. Sewell's (1992:2-3) analysis values the idea of the human agency of social actors in building the structure, which is essential in a practical application in satisfying material visions. Developing an alternative theory through criticism necessitates elaborative reformulation and reconstruction, as well as the creation of implementation instruments in a phased approach.

##### **6.4.1: The Steps of the Alternative Unification Process**

The alternative unification theory proposes five steps toward ultimate unity at the continental level. The preparation and implementation process is divided into five stages: 1) the first stage is called a foundation process that includes preparation at the national level; 2) the second phase is the "take-off" levels, where the political processes of negotiation of arrangements and their ratification happen.; 3) the third is a harmonisation of economic, political and socioeconomic systems and policies.; 4) the fourth phase is ameliorating stage is the testing and ascertaining the executive and judicial convergence in all three structures based upon the theoretical framework (after testing) of the executive and judicial convergence in all three structures.; 5) the final step is making fully operational the unification holistically and efficiently. These steps are a guiding principle from the conceptual and empirical point of view. The steps need to be applied on the basis of clear roles and will of the African political leaders and all other key stakeholders. According to DeLeon & DeLeon (2002:473), cause and effect are critical components of the planning, implementation, and evaluation processes. "Implementation should be examined as both a dependent and an independent variable." Political will, leadership, and human agency are critical factors in this equation, as are institutional and constitutional arrangements, policy alignment, representation, mandate, and holistic implementation. Some variables are predictable and can be identified beforehand; others need situation analysis and thorough investigation.

Planning the implementation process is crucial. Chapter IV identified the current integration challenges that need to be corrected, that the proposed concept should make sure not do not reappear. Based on this, the implementation stages are designed to make all stakeholders inclusive and participative at all phases. This inclusive process includes preparing strategic frameworks, creating a sense of mission, pitching action plans, ensuring monitoring and assessment, as well as updating. The implementation milestones are crafted to enhance harmonisation and organisation systems that encompass results-oriented coordination at Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa levels. The implementation process has five distinct steps that complement each other; these are a foundation, structuration, harmonisation, amelioration and operationalisation. The proposition is authentic thought of the researcher, which has evolved over thirty years of working at the national, regional, and global levels through long empiricism and experience.



- 1- Foundation:** the first steps of reintegration start with national unison or consensus about the need for unification. That requires vigorous debate among people and political leaders to reach an agreement on all details that matter, which will help create belongingness and ownership among citizens. The discussions are on a strategic document that elaborated further feasibility that compares and analyses the current model versus the alternative approach, including institutional structures representation and mandate, border demarcation, administration classification, democratisation, and other non-technical issues. An implementation strategy, as well as potential impediment management mechanisms, must be addressed. Transition strategies from the existing structure to the new architecture are also required, taking into account all challenges. Beyond extensive discussion, it's essential to disseminate information across academia, pressure groups, civil society, African think tanks institutes, African Diaspora, and eminent African personalities. In order to further consolidate the blueprint proposal and implementation plan, it is critical to involve multiple stakeholders and create a timeline for each phase. The process and the alternative unification strategy are essential to avoid misperception and to rally behind members' states positions.
  
- 2- Structuration:** The second step is regarded as a take-off for transforming alternative unification concepts into structural practicability, and it entails setting out political and decision-making mechanisms for negotiation. Negotiations will take place between the specialised organisation, the African Union, regional economic communities, and national governments. The assumption is that there is agreement on the structural relationship between society and the governance structure. The shaping of new political institutions and formations advancing interdependence and cascading arrangements between national, regional, and continental structures are also negotiated at this level. At this stage, the structural and operational modalities are identified, and the rules and resources are allocated to start the institutional framework. A pervasive structure is built based on the alternative unification strategy, including a network of institutions necessary to assure a vibrant institutional framework is in place. The critical task of the specialised agency must be supported by adequate practical expertise in organising a functional institutional structure capable of responding to the challenge in a meaningful manner.

- 3- Harmonisation:** Principally, the harmonisation methods need to be defined as a normative guideline formulated and elaborated within the framework treaty or constitution. A unification treaty allows member states to deliberate and ratify the critical legislation to implement the alternative unification model. This constitutional path requires every member state to rewrite and adapt their constitutional framework to the continental one.
  
- 4- Ameliorating:** at this stage, all three governance structures - the Mojo-Oda, the Debo, and the Umoja-Jamaa – are practically built from the bottom one right to the top one. The institutional framework chart up of national governance structures, through regional structures to continental institutions, is established.
  
- 5- Operational:** The final stage of African holistic unification is realised through the operationalisation of structures of peoples' representatives, executive, and the judiciary at Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa are fully operationalised. The use of a theoretical structure to introduce a political and economic union reduces subjectivity while increasing the reliability of African citizens' consent affirmation instruments. The existing economic integration model will be replaced, and the new unification architecture will be completely realised at the end of the process. Three pillars, namely polity, policy, and politics, should serve as a foundation for the envisaged five stages of unification.

Simultaneously, a number of initiatives must be carried out, including involving the African public and raising awareness of the UPA's operations, citizens' rights, and obligations. There is a need to put transitional arrangements such as: establishing joint security forces; preparing for a single currency, and dealing with the various monetary policies, including setting a central bank for currency dispensing and controlling as well as other tasks that designated to Umoja-Jamaa. Umoja-Jamaa represents Africa in the United Nations with a unified foreign policy and global representation. Furthermore, understanding and distinguishing the formation step and implementation mechanisms requires an examination of the theory creation process.

**Table 6.5:** The processes in developing indigenous alternative unification theory

<b>The aim of the theory</b>	<b>The approach</b>	<b>Steps forward</b>
Analysing the impasse	Critique the existing theory	Laying the Foundation
Thinking the best approach	Framing a theory	Political process negotiation
Restoration the African Unity	Standardising the concept	Harmonisation procedure
Affirmation how the system works	Bottom-up and Up-Bottom approach putting in place	Ameliorating and demonstrating stage
African Indigenous Alternative Unification Model	Developing Implementation plan and procedure	Implementing the proposed as pre unification method

**Source:** Own Construction

\*The table summarises the stages used to build the alternative governance theory, approach, and subsequent phases. Additionally, the indigenous governance and institutional frameworks of Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa are intended to address the following concerns.

- The need of the layers structure: to disassemble the colonial legacy, agreement and implementation
- The dissemblance is not only due to the forms are colonial but also it lacks the fundamentals of African nationhood formation common derivation that provide a full scale of nation and how to create a new African nationalism instead of fragment national interest.
- How to address the structural functionality, operation that is equipped with 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges and beyond?

- What is its unique advantage than the proposed unification model? How does it work, what is modus operandi? How people's empowerment can be assured and directly speak without government heave handiness?
- Upstream representational and mandate; downstream implementation approach

The study of governance and institutional formations revealed the interdependence of nation-state, sub-regional, and regional structures. Furthermore, the institutional processes, joint agencies, of responsibility, the role of the executive, judiciary, and people's representatives' approach both horizontal and vertical dimensions that are compatible with African renaissance objectives in both formal and informal dimensions.


#### **6.4.2: The Debo Arrangements and the Rational of New Border Configuration**

Africa's economic and political integration efforts have tended to adopt multiple sub-regional alignments among African countries without any coherent structure for the past sixty years. As a consequence, there have been several duplications of sub-regional blocs, causing confusion about which bloc is doing what. The magnitude of the ambiguity can be explained as follows: the African Union officially recognised six regions at the same time that eight RECs were recognised, which has no bearing on the regional bloc configuration. Furthermore, the systemic impediment severely hindered African countries' economic growth, trade, and political union. Among the major sub-regional blocs created by the Abuja treaty, initiated five building blocs' based on "the OAU resolution region as CM/Res.464 QCXVI) of the OAU Council of Ministers concerning the Division of Africa into six (6) regions, namely North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa" and the Diaspora (Union, 1991:4).

The second arrangement is for RECs that have signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU (recognised RECs), which are as follows: "UMA, COMESA, CEN-SAD, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWA, IGAD, SADC." There are also ten unrecognised RECs by the AU, namely "Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); Great Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), Mano River Union (MRU); International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); Indian Ocean

Commission (IOC); Senegal River Basin Development Authority (SRBDA); Southern African Customs Union (SACU); Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA); West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA/WAEMU); and West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)." Similarly, the UN has divided Africa into five regions, which are incompatible with the AU arrangement; the ECOWAS arrangement, in particular, is similar to the AU arrangement.

**Figure 6.4:** the illustration of African different building bloc or communities' arrangements.



Source: UNECA; Geda, and Seid, (2015:21).

\*The maps above indicate that the African continent is divided into sub-regions: the first on the left is the United Nations sub-region. The Africa Union recognised six officially recognised areas in the second row from the top right. The third bottom left the RECs of the African Union. The spaghetti bowl in the bottom left represents all regional economic communities recognised and unrecognised by the African Union. Africa has borne the brunt of regional bloc structures, including in terms of economic progress and unification at all levels.

The Debo singular building bloc arrangement is expected to resolve these complicated webs of regional communities' classifications. Distinctly, the logical pattern of Debo new building bloc configuration expedites the political, cultural, and socioeconomic unification. It limits inappropriate or counterproductive sub-regional blocs' arrangements automatically. What distinguishes and underpins the scheme is that each Mojo-Oda or member state may only subscribe to one Debo, with any other formation being either mainstreamed or outright prohibited from acting as an agent of the supranational organ. According to the study, the Mojo-Oda and Debo boundary lines are administrative borders, not sovereignty boundaries. However, the study recommends providing consistent regulations with the proposed building bloc structures for intrastate and interstate ties such as commerce, defence, and other technical management purposes. The Debo arrangement used a broadly agreed geographical description in addition to geographical proximity and other criteria that have already been discussed.

The new architectural configuration is justified primarily to promote economic growth and reinforce political solidarity in order to respond to citizens' self-sufficiency and well-being. Additionally, assures by providing appropriate leadership, making closer the government administration to the people. The Debo arrangement used a broadly agreed geographical description in addition to geographical proximity and other criteria that have already been discussed. Similarly, providing market access for the farmers and suppliers will boost the economy and job opportunities, including trade facilities and people and goods' free movement. Besides, the Debo arrangements allow all member states of one particular Debo to use the seaport access with equal access to those in the coastal line. Considering the Debo arrangements, East African Communities (EAC), Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) are a direct natural

fit with Debo proposed configuration. Following the introduction of unification stages, it is essential to introduce the new configuration DEBO that composed twelve building blocs' as the alternative unification theory formula as follows. The Debo building bloc arrangement is not an imposition, rather a proposition for when and how to begin the alternative unification process; it is open for a debate with stakeholders and academic appraisals.

### **6.5: The Debo's in North and North-Eastern Africa**

The North and north-east African countries comprise Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. North Africa's shared history, language, religion, and economic links are logically further divided into three cultural regions: The Maghreb in the northwest, Sahara to the south and the Nile valley in the east (Majerová, 2014:582). Egypt and what are now known as Sudan (northern Sudan) share a heritage derived from ancient Egypt's and the Nile Valley's histories. As a result, the geographical setting has created strong ties between these people and the region. According to Moore (1987:33), Egypt, Libya, and Sudan are known as the North-eastern triangle of the Nile Valley. Egypt may play a centripetal role in coordinating political, socioeconomic, and cultural influence in these matrices. The power dynamics of Egypt emanated from the size of pollution and the geopolitical importance in the region. The "periphery consists of Libya and the upper reaches of the Nile that escape the control of the Egyptian and Sudanese governments" (ibid 1987:29).

The typical Arab Maghreb countries - Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia - share core historical characteristics. The Arab Maghreb Union accommodates Libya and Mauritania at the periphery Majerová, (2014:583). The three countries share a French colonial history, with the inhabitants identifying as Arabs and Islamic. North Africa is one of the wealthiest regions of Africa due to its natural resources and access and proximity to European markets. There are states of different sizes, economic levels, other political systems, and religious issues. The Maghreb states of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have common cultural and socioeconomic opportunities domestically and contribute to the socio-political change at the continental level. The North and north-east African countries are divided into two DEBOs, as explained below.

### 6.5.1: Debo of North East Africa (DNEA)

Debo of North-East Africa (DNEA) consists of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. The arrangement is based on a shared identity, which is Afro-Arab culture, a common language, Arabic, and opportunities for mutual prosperity. These three countries share common borders, and most prominently, they have a similar type of population being majority Muslim with a minority Christian population. Historically, they share a very rich and ancient African civilization. They share numerous physiological characteristics, cultural characteristics, functional intelligence, religious beliefs, environmental consistency, identity formation, and historical, linguistic, and religious practises; however, they are not necessarily identical.

Among the Mojo-Oda members, Egypt and Sudan have favourable agricultural conditions along the Nile Valley and Nile Delta (Majerová, 2014:583). Most notably, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan are desert countries with limited arable land (Moore 1987:33). In addition, their early advancement has contributed to trade relationships with the rest of the world that has brought development. They enjoy a convenient geo-economic location close to Europe and Asia. So, factors that justify this are the shared history and consanguinity among the three; the practicality of economic interdependence can be achieved within a DNEA Debo. Besides, the DNEA has immense potential for the historical tourist industry, agricultural and industrial development. The natural resource in Libya, the vast arable land in Sudan as well over 150,375,531 Million populations gives the Debo an excellent potential for Africa development.

**Table 6.6:** Debo of North East Africa (DNEA) basic data

Countries		
Egypt	Libya	Sudan
Religion		



Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians.	Muslim (official; virtually all Sunni) 96.6%, Christian 2.7%, Buddhist 0.3%, Hindu <0.1, Jewish <0.1,	Sunni Muslim, small Christian minority
<b>Language</b>		
Arabic (official), Arabic, English, and French widely spoken	Arabic (official), Italian, English (all widely understood)	Arabic (official), English (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, Fur
<b>Population</b>		
104,124,440	6,890,535	45,561,556
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>		
\$12,700 (2017 est.)	\$9,600 (2017 est.)	\$4,300 (2017 est.)
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>		
71	141	177
<b>Agricultural Products</b>		
cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables; cattle, water buffalo, sheep, goats	wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus, vegetables, peanuts, soybeans; cattle	cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), sorghum, millet, wheat, gum Arabic, sugarcane, cassava
<b>Industrial Products</b>		
textiles, tourism, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, construction, cement, metals, light manufactures	petroleum, petrochemicals, aluminium, iron and steel, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement	oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, shoes, petroleum refining, armaments, automobile/light
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>		
Egyptian 99.7%, other 0.3%	Berber and Arab 97%, other 3%	Sudanese Arab (approximately 70%), Fur, Beja, Nuba, Fallata

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of North-East Africa (DNEA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size,

GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

### 6.5.2: Debo of the North Africa (DNA)

The Debo of North Africa (DNA) consists of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Maghreb countries' configuration is formulated on the basis of a shared Identity that is Afro-Berber-Arab Culture and a similar language, which is Arabic/ Berber or Tamazight. Messaoudi (1994:51); Majerová (2014:583) says, the original Arab Maghreb countries are Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, which share core historical association through the Arab Maghreb Union.

North Africa is one of Africa's wealthiest regions due to the possession of natural resources, industrial development, and proximity to European markets. The region is the home of many civilizations. Undeniably, the Berbers, the native population of these lands, contributed to the assimilation of Arab cultural inheritance (Messaoudi, 1994:51). The region faces internal and external challenges at the same time, and it has countless experiences in handling the potential to contribute to peace and stability within or across the region.

**Table 6.7:** Debo of the North African (DNA) basic data

Countries		
Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia
Religion		
Muslim (official; predominantly Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian and Jewish) <1%	Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, <0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i); note - Jewish about 6,000 (2010 est.)	Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1%

<b>Language</b>		
Arabic (official), French (lingua franca), Berber or Tamazight (official).	Arabic (official), Berber languages (Tamazight (official), Tachelhit, Tarifit), French (often the language of business, government, and diplomacy)	Arabic (official, one of the languages of commerce), French (commerce), Berber (Tamazight).
<b>Population</b>		
42,972,878 (July 2020 est.)	35,561,654 (July 2020 est.)	11,721,177 (July 2020 est.)
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>		
\$15,200 (2017 est.)	\$8,600 (2017 est.)	\$11,900 (2017 est.)
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>		
174	147	131
<b>Agricultural Products</b>		
wheat, barley, oats, grapes, olives, citrus, fruits; sheep, cattle	barley, wheat, citrus fruits, grapes, vegetables, olives; livestock; wine	olives, olive oil, grain, tomatoes, citrus fruit, sugar beets, dates, almonds; beef, dairy products
<b>Industrial Products</b>		
petroleum, natural gas, light industries, mining, electrical, petrochemical, food processing.	automotive parts, phosphate mining and processing, aerospace, food processing, leather goods, textiles, construction, energy, tourism	petroleum, mining (particularly phosphate, iron ore), tourism, textiles, footwear, agribusiness, beverages.
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>		
Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1%	Arab-Berber 99%, others 1%	Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish and others 1

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of the North African (DNA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition

are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

**Debo of North African (DNA):** Algeria shares a border with both Morocco and Tunisia, and the two countries speak the same language, practise the same religion, and have similar cultures. The dominant culture is Afro-Berber, with the majority of 99% being Muslim and less than <1% as Christian minorities. These countries differ in landmass sizes but are interconnected through Algeria. Somehow, the economic source is similar, and so are their political systems and religious issues. The Maghreb states of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco have common cultural and socioeconomic opportunities domestically and contribute to the continental level's socio-political advancement. Based on the above data, the Debo of DNA is one of the enormous attractions and holiday tourists' destinations.

In the DNA Debo agriculture and industry sector are well developed and still has a significant perspective. Education development in Tunisia has created a highly qualified information communication technology hub and skilled human resource. The vast land and massive oil production in Algeria, as well as over 90,255,709 Million populations, the Debo is feasible to constitute as a building bloc to provide and implement the proposed governance system and institutional framework with enormous potentials for African collective development.

#### **6.6: The East African Debo Configuration and Recommendations**

The East Africa configuration comprises only one building bloc, the Debo of East Africa (DEA). This encompasses Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, making it the most homogeneous community. The configuration fits with East African Community (EAC) naturally, except for a newly joined member of South Sudan. Tarrósy (2005:161) states that the common historical heritage and joint efforts in developing frameworks prove that the region is ready to create sociocultural cohesion and political unity.

The rationale of the DEA from a broader economic and political integration is to combine their strengths and operate as a convincing economic and political bloc in Africa. The five-member socio-economic and political orientation of somehow similar members, with shared cultural values, makes the union compatible with Pan African ideals (Tarrósy, 2005:167). The DEA building bloc has long experience in framing cooperation and collaboration, demonstrating the capability to become one of the thriving Debo. Concerning South Sudan, the country has a contested geographical position, cultural assimilation, and ethnic composition with East, Horn, and Central Africa (Jamie 2017:12). Similarly, Burundi and Tanzania affiliation to central and Southern African needs further analysis.

### 6.6.1: Debo of East Africa (DEA)

Debo of East African DEA: consists of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. The building bloc is the most homogeneous community; although this Debo has a common language, Kiswahili and English widely spoken in all member states, with some Francophone populations in Burundi and Rwanda. The majority of the population is Christian, with Muslims and African traditional religions making up the minority. Except for Burundi, the majority of these countries share borders. Landlocked countries in the union include Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Kenya and Tanzania were pivotal in the independence movement led by icons including Jomo Kenyatta and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who also made an early attempt to unite Africa.

**Table 6.8:** Debo of East African (DEA) Basic Data

Countries				
Burundi	Rwanda	Kenya,	Tanzania,	Uganda,
Religion				

Roman Catholic 62.1%, Protestant 23.9%	Protestant 49.5% (includes Adventist 11.8% and Protestant 37.7%), Roman Catholic 43.7%, Muslim 2%	Christian 83% (Protestant 47.7%, Catholic 23.4%, other Christian 11.9%), Muslim 11.2%,	Christian 61.4%, Muslim 35.2%, folk religion 1.8%, other 0.2%	Protestant 45.1% (Anglican 32.0%, Pentecostal 11.1%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.7%, Baptist .3%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, Muslim 13.7%,
<b>Language</b>				
Kirundi 29.7% (official), French(official); 9.1%, Swahili 0.3%	Kinyarwanda (official, universal Bantu vernacular) 93.2%, French (official)	English (official), Kiswahili (official)	Kiswahili (official), English (official) Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar)	English (official), Ganda or Luganda, Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan
<b>Population</b>				
11,865,821	12,712,431	53,527,936	58,552,845	43,252,966
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>				
\$700	\$2,100	\$3,500	\$3,200	\$2,400
<b>World Rank Per GDP Per Capital</b>				
227	208	187	193	200
<b>Agricultural Products</b>				
coffee, tea, sugar, cotton, hides	coffee, tea, hides, tin ore	tea, horticultural products, coffee, petroleum products, fish, cement, apparel	gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufactures, cotton	coffee, fish and fish products, tea, cotton, flowers, horticultural products; gold
<b>Industrial Products</b>				

light consumer goods (sugar, shoes, soap, beer); cement, assembly of imported components; public works construction; food processing (fruits)	cement, agricultural products, small-scale beverages, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles, cigarettes	small-scale consumer goods agricultural products, horticulture, oil refining; aluminium, steel, lead; cement, commercial ship repair, tourism, information technology	agricultural processing (sugar, beer, cigarettes, sisal twine); mining (diamonds, gold, and iron), salt, soda ash; cement, oil refining, shoes, apparel, wood products, fertilizer	sugar processing, brewing, tobacco, cotton textiles; cement, steel production
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>				
Hutu 85%, Tutsi 14%, Twa (Pygmy) 1%, Europeans	Hutu, Tutsi, Twa (Pygmy)	Kikuyu 21.6%, Luhya 15.3%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11.7%, Luo 11%, Kisii 5.8%, Meru 5.7%, Mijikenda/Swahili 5.3%, Somali 2.5%, Maasai 1.9%	African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu Zanzibar - Arab, African, mixed Arab and African	Baganda 16.5%, Banyankole 9.6%, Basoga 8.8%, Bakiga 7.1%, Iteso 7%, Langi 6.3%, Bagisu 4.9%, Acholi 4.4%, Lugbara 3.3%, other 32.1%

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of East African (DEA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The DEA has been the oldest sub-region building bloc with developed structure and operational mechanisms under the EAC organisation framework. One of the advantages is that the DEA has already been working for years with a similar governance structure at the advanced level and has a vibrant common customs Union as a block. Additionally, the building bloc is a dynamic region for trade and investment, an established tourism destination, and has massive agriculture and industry potential. EAC consists of over 179,911,999 Million populations with a vibrant civil service and trained workforce (UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018).

## **6.7: West African Debo Configuration and Recommendations**

The West African Debo configuration has four geographical classifications. West Africa Mojo-Oda divided into four Debo's, namely: North West, West Africa, Central West, and West Africa Debo. The rationale behind the proposed governance and institutional reconfiguration are to bring unification closer to the people. The three pillars are, above all, addressing the continent's recurring vicious chronic problems and developing a long-term, systematic, and robust solution in the areas of socioeconomic and political sustainability. The configuration should support the unification functions for the betterment of the citizens of Africa.

The current West African regional building bloc is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The region's vast scale, deep levels of poverty, security issues, and mismanagement are just a few of the challenges (Kidane, 2018:74). The absence of adequate programs to resolve citizens' problems in the region is partly because of the vastness of geographic coverage and lack of resources and accountability. The geographic spread was not logical, and other parameters were not considered scientifically. Other impediments are that ECOWAS is too complicated, lacks a common philosophy, the absence of a shared vision, and membership overlaps (Kidane, 2018:88). There are also marked geographical differences between member states. Another major issue within the region and continental frameworks is the unresolved governance and institutional mix. To overcome such significant obstructions, the theoretical framework of this thesis presents the following four DEBOs accordingly.

### **6.7.1: Debo of North West Africa (DNWA)**

The Debo of Northwest Africa, encompassing Mauritania, Mali, and the Western Sahara, share unique commonalities such as location in the Shale region. Mauritania shares a border with both countries. These three countries' languages resemble one another and are commonly Arabic and French-speaking. Mauritania in the middle can play a pivotal role in pulling together both Mali and the Western Sahara. These countries have cultural resemblance while the population is also dominantly followers of the Muslim religion. Therefore, considering the hostile political relationship between the Western Sahara and Morocco, the configuration with Mauritania and Mali avoids a



violent relationship in the continent through a political solution. The Debo will consist of a population of around 24,211,143 million.

**Table 6.9:** Debo of North West African (DNWA) basic data

<b>Countries</b>		
<b>Mauritania</b>	<b>Mali</b>	<b>SADR</b>
<b>Religion</b>		
Muslim (official) 100%	Muslim 94.8%, Christian 2.4%, Animist 2%, none 0.5%, unspecified 0.3%	Muslim 100%
<b>Language</b>		
Arabic (official and national), Pular, Soninke, Wolof (all national languages), French	French (official), Bambara 46.3%, and other covers 53 %	Standard Arabic, Hassaniya Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, Berber, Spanish, French
<b>Population</b>		
4,005,475	19,553,397	652,271
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>		
\$4,500	\$2,200	\$2,500
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>		
173	206	198
<b>Agricultural Products</b>		
iron ore, gypsum, copper, phosphate, diamonds, gold, oil, fish	cotton, gold, livestock	N/A

Industrial Product		
fish processing, oil production, mining (iron ore, gold, copper)	food processing; construction; phosphate and gold mining	phosphate mining, handicrafts
Ethnic Composition		
"black Moors (Haratines - Arab-speaking slaves, former slaves, and their descendants of African origin, enslaved by white Moors) 40%, white Moors (of Arab-Berber descent, known as Beydane) 30%, sub-Saharan Mauritians (non-Arabic speaking, largely resident in or originating from the Senegal River Valley, including Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, Wolof, and Bambara ethnic groups) 30%"	Bambara 34.1%, Fulani (Peul) 14.7%, Sarakole 10.8%, Senufo 10.5%, Dogon 8.9%, Malinke 8.7%, Bobo 2.9%, Songhai 1.6%, Tuareg 0.9%, other Malian 6.1%, from member of Economic Community of West African States 0.3%, other 0.4% (2012-13 est.)	Arab, Berber

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of North West Africa (DNWA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

According to World Fact Book 2018 (2018), Mauritania has extensive mineral resources, including iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock. Mali is landlocked, and one of the most impoverished countries in the world, and the economy is dependent on agricultural and mineral resources, notably gold exports. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid. Western Sahara has a small market-based economy whose primary industries are fishing, phosphate mining, tourism, and pastoral nomadism. The territory's arid desert climate makes sedentary agriculture difficult; thus, countries in the region are forced to import food. Nonetheless, this region is Timbuktu's

home, a testimony to an ancient African civilization and a massive potential for tourist attraction; with strategic minerals, this vast desert land.

### 6.7.2: Debo of West Africa (DWA)

The Debo of West Africa encompasses Cabo Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone: The primary requirement of amalgamation is geographical proximity. The building bloc incorporates very diverse states concerning language, religion, and other cultural assets. The region has prospects regarding alignment of religion, language, population, GDP, per-capita, primary agricultural products, industrial products, and ethnic compositions. According to UNSD (2020); World Fact Book (2018), it is a truism that Cabo Verde is one of Africa's most stable democratic governments with colossal economic potential. However, currently, Guinea is one of the world's poorest countries, although it has the world's largest reserves of bauxite and the most significant untapped high-grade iron ore reserves and gold and diamonds. Besides this, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and several West African rivers, including Senegal, Niger, and The Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous, and the country could be a significant exporter of electricity. Liberia is among the low-income countries in Africa and heavily dependent on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora; however, it has massive potential for development.

**Table 6.10:** Debo of West African (DWA) basic data

Countries						
Cabo Verde	Gambia	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Liberia	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Religion						
Roman Catholic 77.3%, Protestant	Muslim 95.7%, Christian 4.2%	Muslim 89.1%, Christian 6.8%, animist 1.6%	Muslim 45.1%, Christian 22.1%, animist 14.9%	Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%	Muslim 95.9%, Christian 4.1%	Muslim 78.6%, Christian 20.8%, other 0.3%

4.6% and others				Traditional 0.6%		
<b>Language</b>						
Portuguese (official), Crioulo	English (official), Mandinka, Wolof, Fula.	French (official), Pular, Maninka, Susu, other native languages	Crioulo (lingua franca), Portuguese (official)	English 20% (official), some 20 ethnic group languages	French (official), Wolof, Pular, Jola, Mandinka, Serer, Soninke	English (official) Mende, Temne, Krio
<b>Population</b>						
583,255	2,173,999	12,527,440	1,927,104	5,073,296	15,736,368	6,624,933
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>						
\$7,000	\$2,600	\$2,200	\$1,900	\$1,300	\$3,500	\$1,600
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>						
157	197	205	212	221	188	219
<b>Agricultural Products</b>						
fuel (re-exports), shoes, garments, fish, hides	peanut products, fish, cotton lint, palm kernels	bauxite, gold, diamonds, coffee, fish, agricultural products	fish, shrimp; cashews, peanuts, raw and sawn lumber	rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, coffee	fish, petroleum products, phosphates, cotton	iron ore, diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish
<b>Industrial Products</b>						
food and beverages, fish processing, shoes and garments, salt mining, ship repair	peanuts, fish, hides, tourism, beverages, agricultural machinery assembly, clothing	bauxite, gold, diamonds, iron ore; light manufacturing, agricultural processing	agricultural products processing, beer, soft drinks	mining (iron ore and gold), rubber processing, palm oil processing, diamonds	agricultural and fish processing, phosphate mining, fertilizer production, petroleum	diamond mining; iron ore, rutile and bauxite mining; small-scale manufacturing

Ethnic Composition						
Creole (mulatto) 71%, African 28%, European 1%	Mandinka/Jahanka 34%, Fulani/Tukulur/Lorobo 22.4%, Wolof 12.6%, Jola/Karoninka 10.7%, and other	Fulani (Peul) 32.1%, Malinke 29.8%, Susu 19.8%, and other	Fulani 28.5%, Balanta 22.5%, Mandinga 14.7%, Papel 9.1%, Manjaco 8.3%, other	Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6% other	Wolof 37.1%, Pular 26.2%, Serer 17%, Mandinka 5.6%, Jola 4.5%	Temne 35.5%, Mende 33.2%, Limba 6.4%, Kono 4.4%, Fullah 3.4%, Loko

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of West Africa (DWA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The Debo of West Africa has immense prospects with natural resources like rubber, timber, iron, and diamonds. Senegal can play a critical role in strengthening and leading this group because it has several experiences of a merger. The region has a long history in forming a union among countries in the region, and the most prominent one is Senegal with French Sudan and Senegambia confederation. According to Aka (2016:113), Senegal and French Sudan were merged in 1959 and granted independence in 1960 as the Mali Federation. The union broke up after only a few months. Senegal joined with the Gambia to form the nominal confederation of Senegambia in 1982 (ibid: 143). The envisaged integration of the two countries was never implemented, and the union dissolved in 1989. This formation can perform well in building the sub-regional bloc. The region has human and natural resources, with cultural resemblance and climate, agriculture, and language commonalities among these members.

### **6.7.3: Debo of Central West Africa (DCWA)**

The Debo of Central West African encompasses Chad, the Central Africa Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger. Out of five countries, three are landlocked, CAR, Chad, and Niger. Muslim believers dominate the religion with a minority of Christians and Africa traditional beliefs. Geographically, all are interconnected by Nigeria except the Central Africa Republic, and remarkably Chad shares borders with all the other members. According to UNSD (2020); World Fact Book (2018), Chad is a landlocked country, the transportation costs are high for imported goods from neighbouring countries and outside. Chad will have access to a seaport in this configuration from any nearest port through the formulation of a different offering in the group. The Central African Republic (CAR) has about 60% of the population living in outlying areas (ibid). The country is facing recurrent conflict, and as a result, agriculture is affected because of unreliable security. According to Lee and Schultz (2011:8), Cameroon, as the legacy of colonialism, is divided into two parts, French Cameroon and British Cameroon.

The colonial language division has created the central conflict sparking point for many years. The United Republic of Cameroon has a diversified economy with features like oil and gas, timber, aluminium, agriculture, mining, and the service sector. Nigeria is the most populous and the biggest economy in Africa. The country suffered political turmoil and military coup d' états for decades. Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria is shackled by the inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, a slow and ineffective judicial system, insecurity, and pervasive corruption (CIA/WFB 2018).

Niger's economy is based on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. The United Nations ranked Niger as the world's second least developed country in 2016 due to a variety of factors, including food insecurity, a lack of industry, rapid population growth, a weak educational sector, and few opportunities for work outside of subsistence farming and herding. However, if the proper structure is in place, there are numerous opportunities to meet citizens' aspirations.

**Table 6.11: Debo of Central West African (DCWA) basic data**

Countries				
Chad,	Central Africa Rep,	Cameroon,	Nigeria	Niger
Religion				
Muslim 52.1%, Protestant 23.9%, Roman Catholic 20%, animist 0.3%, other Christian 0.2%	indigenous beliefs 35%, Protestant 25%, Roman Catholic 25%, Muslim 15%	Roman Catholic 38.4%, Protestant 26.3%, other Christian 4.5%, Muslim 20.9%, animist 5.6%, other	Muslim 51.6%, Roman Catholic 11.2%, other Christian 35.7%, traditionalist .9%, unspecified .5%	Muslim 99.3%, Christian .3%, animist .2%, none .1%
Language				
French (official), Arabic (official), Sara (in south), Sara more than 120 different languages and dialects	French (official), Sangho, tribal languages	English (official), French (official)	English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional indigenous languages	French (official), Hausa, Djerna
Population				
16,877,357	5,990,855	27,744,989	214,028,302	22,772,361
GDP Per Capital				
\$2,300	\$700	\$3,700	\$5,900	\$1,200
World Rank GDP Per Capital				
202	228	182	166	224
Agricultural Products				
cotton, sorghum, millet, peanuts, sesame, corn, rice, potatoes, onions, cassava (manioc,	cotton, coffee, tobacco, cassava (manioc, tapioca), yams, millet, corn, bananas; timber	coffee, cocoa, cotton, rubber, bananas, oilseed, grains, cassava (manioc,	cocoa, peanuts, cotton, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava, yams,	cowpeas, cotton, peanuts, millet, sorghum, cassava (manioc, tapioca), rice; cattle, sheep, goats,

tapioca), cattle, sheep, goats, camels		tapioca); livestock; timber	rubber; cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; timber; fish	camels, donkeys, horses, poultry
<b>Industrial Products</b>				
oil, cotton textiles, brewing, natron (sodium carbonate), soap, cigarettes, construction materials.	gold and diamond mining, logging, brewing, sugar refining	petroleum production and refining, aluminum production, food processing, light consumer goods, textiles, lumber, ship repair.	crude oil, coal, tin, columbite; rubber products, wood; hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, ceramics, steel.	uranium mining, petroleum, cement, brick, soap, textiles, food processing, chemicals.
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>				
Sara 30.5%, Kanembu/Bornu/Buduma 9.8%, Arab 9.7%, Wadai/Maba/Masalit/Mimi 7%, Gorane 5.8%, Masa/Musseye/Musgum 4.9%,	Baya 33%, Banda 27%, Mandjia 13%, Sara 10%, Mboum 7%, M'Baka 4%, Yakoma 4%, other 2%	Cameroon Highlanders 31%, Bantu 19%, Kirdi 11%, Fulani 10%, North-western Bantu 8%, Eastern Nigrific 7%, other African 13%, non-African less than 1%	Hausa 27.4%, Igbo (Ibo) 14.1%, Yoruba 13.9%, Fulani 6.3%, Tiv 2.2%, Ibibio 2.2%, Ijaw/Izon 2%, Kanuri/Berberi 1.7%, Igala 1%, other 28.9%, unspecified .2%	Hausa 53.1%, Zarma/Songhai 21.2%, Tuareg 11%, Fulani (Peul) 6.5%, Kanuri 5.9%, Gurma 0.8%, Arab 0.4%, Tubu 0.4%

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of Central West Africa (DCWA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The Debo of Central West Africa is the largest population grouping in Africa, with 287,413,864 million people. DCWA has massive human and natural mineral resources, with a robust growth indicator in agriculture transformation with the human capital. Nigeria is one of the giant oils



producing countries in Africa. This configuration is diverse in natural resources with massive agricultural and strategic mineral potential.

#### 6.7.4: Debo of West South Africa (DWSA)

The Debo of West South Africa encompasses Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo: Except for Ghana, the rest are Francophone nations. They share a similar set of cultural values. The majority of the population is Muslim, except for the Ghana population, where a majority is Christian at 72% (CIA/WFB 2018). Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in Africa and is heavily dependent on agriculture as a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil.

**Table 6.12:** Debo of West South African (DWSA) basic data

Countries				
Burkina Faso	Benin	Cote d'Ivoire	Ghana	Togo
Religion				
Muslim 61.5%, Roman Catholic 23.3%, traditional/animist 7.8%, Protestant 6.5%	Muslim 27.7%, Roman Catholic 25.5%, Protestant 13.5%	Muslim 42.9%, Catholic 17.2%, Evangelical 11.8%, Methodist 1.7%, other Christian 3.2%, animist 3.6%, other religion 0.5%, none 19.1%	Christian 71.2% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 28.3%, Protestant 18.4%, Catholic 13.1%, other 11.4%), Muslim 17.6%, traditional 5.2%, other 0.8%, none 5.2% (2010 est.)	Christian 29%, Muslim 20%, indigenous beliefs 51%
Language				

French (official), French native African languages belonging to Sudanic family spoken by 90%	French (official), Fon and Yoruba	French (official), 60 native dialects of which Dioula is the most widely spoken	Asante 16%, Ewe 14%, Fante 11.6%, Boron (Brong) 4.9%, Dagomba 4.4%, Dangme 4.2%, Dagarte (Dagaba) 3.9%, Kokomba 3.5%, Akyem 3.2%, Ga 3.1%, other 31.2%	French (official, the language of commerce), Ewe and Mina (the two major African languages in the south), Kabye
<b>Population</b>				
20,835,401	12,864,634	27,481,086	29,340,248	8,608,444
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>				
\$1,900	\$2,300	\$3,900	\$4,700	\$1,700
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>				
211	201	179	172	215
<b>Agricultural Products</b>				
gold, cotton, livestock	cotton, cashews, shea butter, textiles, palm products, seafood	cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish	oil, gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, aluminium, manganese ore, diamonds, horticultural products	re-exports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa
<b>Industrial Products</b>				
cotton lint, beverages, agricultural processing, soap, cigarettes, textiles, gold	textiles, food processing, construction materials, cement	oil refining, gold mining, truck and bus assembly, textiles, fertilizer, building materials, electricity	mining, lumbering, light manufacturing, aluminum smelting, cement, small commercial ship building, petroleum	phosphate mining, agricultural processing, cement, handicrafts, textiles, beverages
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>				

Mossi 52%, Fulani 8.4%, Gurma 7%, Bobo 4.9%, Gurunsi 4.6%, Senufo 4.5%, Bissa 3.7%, Lobi 2.4%, Dagara 2.4%, Tuareg/Bella 1.9%, Dioula 0.8%	Fon and related 38.4%, Adja and related 15.1%, Yoruba and related 12%, Bariba and related 9.6%, Fulani and related 8.6%, Ottamari and related 6.1%, Yoa-Lokpa and related 4.3%, Dendi and related 2.9%,	Akan 28.8%, Voltaique or Gur 16.1%, Northern Mande 14.5%, Kru 8.5%, Southern Mande 6.9%, unspecified 0.9%, non-Ivoirian 42.3% (2014 est.)	Akan 47.5%, Mole-Dagbon 16.6%, Ewe 13.9%, Ga-Dangme 7.4%, Gurma 5.7%, Guan 3.7%, Grusi 2.5%, Mande 1.1%, other 1.4% (2010 est.)	African (37 tribes; largest and most important are Ewe, Mina, and Kabre) 99%, European and Syrian-Lebanese less than 1%
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**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of West South Africa (DWSA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The DWSA region has massive potential for economic development and political unity. The region has a natural endowment in strategic minerals and agricultural products like cocoa, cotton, palm oil, and abundant natural tropical forestry and the blue water economy. Most DWSA countries have natural resources like phosphates, limestone, cocoa, cotton, yams, millet, and sorghum. Yet, there are challenges in the area of infrastructure, youth unemployment, and low economic growth. The population size of this region is around 99,129 849 million people.

## 6.8: The Southern Africa Debo Configuration Recommendations

The Southern Africa Debo configuration has three geographical classifications: South West Africa, South-East Africa, and Southern Africa Debo's. In the southern African region, four RECs are currently operating: that is Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Out of four, COMESA and SADC have recognition by the AU,

the two -SACU and IOC do not have recognition by the AU. The critical challenges for SADC are different levels of economic development, political backgrounds, and the nature of resources that are all contributing factors (Dinka and Kennes, 2007:7-10).

SADC's challenges are not unique; in general, the significant problems that cut across African reintegration schemes are the same. These include the lack of grassroots support, excessive external dependency, institutional weakness, the duplication of membership, politics, and underdeveloped economies. According to Nyirabu (2004:23), the nature of SADC heterogeneity has provided an uneven economic environment, given that stronger economies, like South Africa, end up dictating the terms of reference and operation to weaker members of SADC. Additional membership duplication between SADC, COMESA, ECASA, EAC, and SACU complicates the whole process unification path.

#### **6.8.1: Debo of South East Africa (DSEA)**

The Debo of Southeast Africa (DESA) encompasses Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Except for Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) were once part of a Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also called the Central African Federation, a political unit formed in 1953 and ended in December 1963 (Nyirabu 2004:23). To reverse unequal economic development between DESA countries founding a building bloc is the best way forward. The four states (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) have different ideological inclinations yet, share similar culture and language and were only divided by international borders drawn during the colonial era (Chomba, 2017:179).

Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are landlocked; the only natural and closest option for seaport access is the Mozambique-Maputo corridor or the establishment of a new Mozambican seaport. The other rationale is these countries are at more or less similar development standard, ranking among the world's least developed countries. The World Rank GDP/Per capital is Malawi 223, Mozambique 222, Zambia 178, and Zimbabwe 203, respectively; this demonstrates similar

economic states among member countries compared to counterparts, Botswana 101, South Africa 118, and Namibia 135, respectively (CIA/WFB 2018). Policy inconsistency, macroeconomic volatility, weak infrastructure, rampant corruption, and insufficient health systems have all hampered these countries' economic success in the past, limiting labour productivity. However, there is enormous potential to turn the economy around as a whole.

**Table 6.13:** Debo of South East African (DSEA) basic data

<b>Countries</b>			
Malawi	Mozambique	Zambia	Zimbabwe
<b>Religion</b>			
Protestant 27.2%, Presbyterian 17.7%, Seventh Day Adventist/Baptist 6.9%, Anglican 2.6%, Catholic 18.4%, other Christian 41%, Muslim 12.1%,	Roman Catholic 30.3%, Muslim 19.2%, Protestant 19.2%, Zionist Christian 10.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 9.3% (includes Anglican), other 1.4%,	Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i)	Protestant 74.8% (includes Apostolic 37.5%, Pentecostal 21.8%, other 15.5%), Roman Catholic 7.3%,
<b>Language</b>			
English (official), Chichewa (common), Chinyanja, Chiyao,	Portuguese (official), 25.3% Emakhuwa, 10.7%, Xichangana 10.3%, Cisena 7.5%, Elomwe 7%, Echuwabo 5.1%	Bemba 33.4%, Nyanja 14.7%, Tonga 11.4%, Lozi 5.5%, Chewa 4.5%, Nsenga 2.9%, Tumbuka 2.5%,	Shona (official); Ndebele (official), English (official)
<b>Population</b>			
21,196,629	30,098,197	17,426,623	14,546,314
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>			
\$1,200	\$1,300	\$4,000	\$2,300
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>			

223	222	178	203
<b>Agricultural Products</b>			
tobacco, sugarcane, tea, corn, potatoes, sweet potatoes, cassava sorghum, pulses, cotton, groundnuts, nuts, coffee; cattle, goats	cotton, cashew nuts, sugarcane, tea, cassava (manioc, tapioca), corn, coconuts, sisal, potatoes, sunflowers; beef, poultry	corn, sorghum, rice, peanuts, flowers, tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, cassava (manioc, tapioca), coffee; cattle, goats, pigs, poultry, hides	Tobacco, corn, cotton, wheat, coffee, sugarcane, peanuts; sheep, goats, pigs.
<b>Industrial Products</b>			
tobacco, tea, sugar, sawmill products, cement, consumer goods	aluminium, petroleum products, chemicals (fertilizer, soap, paints), textiles, cement, glass, asbestos, tobacco, food, beverages	copper mining and processing, emerald mining, construction, foodstuffs, beverages, chemicals, textiles, fertilizer, horticulture	mining (coal, gold, platinum, copper, nickel, tin, diamonds, clay, numerous metallic and nonmetallic ores), steel; cement, chemicals, fertilizer
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>			
Chewa 35.1%, Lomwe 18.9%, Yao 13.1%, Ngoni 12%, Tumbuka 9.4%, Sena 3.5%, Mang'anja 2.5%, Tonga 1.8%, Nyanja 1%, Nkhonde 0.9%, other 1.8%	African 99.66% (Makhuwa, Tsonga, Lomwe, Sena, and others), Europeans 0.06%, Euro-Africans 0.2%, Indians 0.08%	Bemba 21%, Tonga 13.6%, Chewa 7.4%, Lozi 5.7%, Nsenga 5.3%, Tumbuka 4.4%, Ngoni 4%, Lala 3.1%, Kaonde 2.9%, Namwanga	African 99.4% (predominantly Shona; Ndebele.

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of South East African (DSEA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The Debo region of South-East Africa has enormous mineral resource potential, including copper, diamonds, and natural gas. The region has enormous tourism potential, including the Victoria Falls and long Mozambique seashores with both a blue economy and tourism attractions; the

area also includes vast agricultural land, natural timber forests, and enormous human resources. The region has a population of approximately 83,267,763 million people.

### 6.8.2: Debo of South West Africa (DSWA)

The Debo of South West Africa (DSWA) encompasses Angola, the DRC Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rep. of the Congo and Sao Tomé & Príncipe. In this configuration, the most prominent countries are Angola and DRC Congo regarding population landmass and economic significance. However, the richest in GDP/per capita income are Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, respectively. With a few exceptions, the majority of the population in DSWA is culturally, linguistically, and ethnically homogeneous.

DRC, Congo Republic and Gabon are Francophone, Angola and Sao Tomé & Príncipe are Lusophone and Equatorial Guinea is Hispanophone speaking countries. Most member countries are Christian and with minority Muslim and Africa traditional believes (CIA/WFB 2018). DRC the second largest in landmass and Angola is seventh in the rank. These countries have similarities in many ways in culture, history, ethnicity and psychological makeup.

**Table 6.14:** Debo of South West African States (DSWA) basic data

Countries					
Angola	DRC Congo	Equatorial Guinea	Gabon	Rep. of the Congo	Sao Tomé & Príncipe
Religion					
Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant	Roman Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%, Kimbanguist	Christian and predominantly	Roman Catholic 42.3%, Protestant 12.3%, other Christian 27.4%	Roman Catholic 33.1%, Awakening Churches/Christian Revival 22.3%	Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New

38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3%	10%, Muslim 10%, other	Roman Catholic, pagan practices	Muslim 9.8%, animist 0.6%, other	Protestant 19.9%, Salutiste 2.2%, Muslim 1.6%, Kimbanguiste 1.5%,	Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%
<b>Language</b>					
Portuguese 71.2% (official), Umbundu 23%, Kikongo 8.2%,	French (official), Lingala (a lingua franca trade language), Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili)	Spanish (official) 67.6%, other (includes French (official), Fang, Bubi) 32.4%	French (official), Fang, Myene, Nzebi, Bapounou/Eschira, Bandjabi	French (official), Lingala and Monokutuba	Portuguese 98.4% (official), Forro 36.2%, Cabo Verdian 8.5%, French 6.8%, Angolar 6.6%, English 4.9%,
<b>Population</b>					
32,522,339	101,780,263	836,178	2,230,908	5,293,070	211,122
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>					
\$6,800	\$800	\$37,400	\$18,100	\$6,800	\$3,200
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>					
160	226	52	97	161	191
<b>Agricultural Products</b>					
bananas, sugarcane, coffee, sisal, corn, cotton, cassava (manioc, tapioca), tobacco, vegetables, plantains; livestock; forest products; fish	coffee, sugar, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa, quinine, cassava (manioc, tapioca), peanuts, root crops, corn, fruits; wood products	coffee, cocoa, rice, yams, cassava (manioc, tapioca), bananas, palm oil nuts; livestock; timber	cocoa, coffee, sugar, palm oil, rubber; cattle; okoume (a tropical softwood); fish	cassava (manioc, tapioca), sugar, rice, corn, peanuts, vegetables, coffee, cocoa; forest products	cocoa, coconuts, palm kernels, copra, cinnamon, pepper, coffee, bananas, papayas, beans; poultry; fish
<b>Industrial Products</b>					



petroleum; diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, feldspar, bauxite, uranium, and gold; cement; basic metal products; fish processing; food processing, brewing, tobacco products, sugar; textiles; ship repair	mining (copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, coltan, zinc, tin, tungsten), mineral processing, consumer products (textiles, plastics, metal products, processed foods and beverages, timber, cement, commercial ship repair	petroleum, natural gas, sawmilling	petroleum extraction and refining; manganese, gold; chemicals, ship repair, food and beverages, textiles, lumbering and plywood, cement	petroleum extraction, cement, lumber, brewing, sugar, palm oil, soap, flour, cigarettes	light construction, textiles, soap, beer, fish processing, timber
<b>Ethnic Composition</b>					
Ovimbundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, mestico (mixed European and native African) 2%, European 1%, other 22%	Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) - make up about 45% of the population	Fang 85.7%, Bubi 6.5%, Mdowe 3.6%, Annobon 1.6%, Bujeba 1.1%, other 1.4%	Gabonese-born 80.1% (includes Fang 23.2%, Shira-Punu/Vili 18.9%, Nzabi-Duma 11.3%	Kongo 40.5%, Teke 16.9%, Mbochi 13.1%, foreigner 8.2%, Sangha 5.6%, Mbere/Mbeti/Kele 4.4%, Punu 4.3%, Pygmy 1.6%	Mestico, angolares (descendants of Angolan slaves), forros

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of South West Africa (DSWA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The DSWA building bloc is considered the lung of Africa and a symbol of the natural wealth of tropical forests. The sub-region has demonstrated a vast agricultural and mineral perspective, petroleum, coffee, sugar, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa, quinine, cassava (manioc, tapioca), bananas, plantains, peanuts, root crops, corn, fruits; wood products. The region has immense

potential for renewable energy that is Inga Dams, the largest waterfall in the world. The region has tremendous agricultural land resources as well as a population of over 142,873,880 million people.

### 6.8.3: Debo of Southern Africa (DSA)

The Debo of Southern African (DSA) encompasses Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia, Lesotho, and South Africa. These countries are currently members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). According to Dinka and Kennes (2007:10), SACU is the oldest customs union in the world, formed on June 29, 1910. The countries have similar languages, cultures, histories, social value systems, and philosophy. The anthropology research sheds light on the cultural origins, language history, and material evidence of kinship in southern Africa, including Nguni, Sotho-Tswana, Khoisan, and Venda (Guma, 2001:266; Huffman, 2004:81).

The African languages spoken across DSA have resemblance one another, and the languages are IsiNdebele, IsiXhosa, IsiZulu, Khoisan, Nama/Damara, Oshiwambo, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, SiSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga. The majority of the communities are English speaking, and most indigenous African languages have official language status. Geographically all member countries share borders with South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, and Eswatini are landlocked countries and dependent on South Africa for seaport access. The majority religion is Christian with a minority of Muslim and African traditional beliefs.

**Table 6.15: Debo of Southern African (DSA) basic data**

Countries				
Botswana	Namibia	Lesotho	Eswatini	South Africa
Religion				
Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4%	Christian 80% to 90% (at least 50% Lutheran),	Protestant 47.8% (Pentecostal 23.1%,	Christian 90% out of 40% Zionist – a blend of	Christian 86%, ancestral, tribal, animist,

(includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3%	indigenous beliefs 10% to 20%	Lesotho Evangelical 17.3%, Anglican 7.4%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, other Christian 9.1%, non-Christian 1.4%, none 2.3%	Christianity, 20%, Roman Catholic other 30%	or other traditional African religions 5.4%, Muslim 1.9%, other 1.5%, nothing in particular 5.2%
<b>Language</b>				
Setswana 77.3%, Sekalanga 7.4%, Shekgalagadi 3.4%, English (official) 2.8%, Zezuru/Shona 2%, Sesarwa 1.7%, Sembukushu 1.6%, Ndebele 1%, other 2.8%	Oshiwambo languages 49.7%, Nama/Damara 11%, Kavango languages 10.4%, Afrikaans 9.4%	English (official), Sesotho (official) (southern Sotho), Zulu, Xhosa	English (official, used for government business), siSwati (official)	isiZulu (official) 24.7%, isiXhosa (official) 15.6%, Afrikaans (official) 12.1%, Sepedi (official) 9.8%, Setswana (official) 8.9%, English (official) 8.4%, Sesotho (official) 8%, Xitsonga (official) 4%, siSwati (official) 2.6%, Tshivenda (official) 2.5%, isiNdebele (official) 1.6%, other (includes Khoi, Nama, and San languages) 1.9%
<b>Population</b>				
2,317,233	2,630,073	1,962,461	1,104,479	56,463,617
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>				
\$17,000	\$11,200	\$3,300	\$10,100	\$13,600
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>				
101	135	190	139	118
<b>Agriculture Products</b>				
livestock, sorghum, maize, millet, beans, sunflowers, groundnuts	millet, sorghum, peanuts, grapes; livestock; fish	corn, wheat, pulses, sorghum, barley; livestock	sugarcane, corn, cotton, citrus, pineapples, cattle, goats	corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruits, vegetables; beef, poultry, mutton, wool, dairy products

Industrial Products				
diamonds, copper, nickel, salt, soda ash, potash, coal, iron ore, silver; beef processing; textiles	meatpacking, fish processing, dairy products, pasta, beverages; mining (diamonds, lead, zinc, tin, silver, tungsten, uranium, copper)	food, beverages, textiles, apparel assembly, handicrafts, construction, tourism	soft drink concentrates, coal, forestry, sugar processing, textiles, and apparel	mining (world's largest producer of platinum, gold, chromium), automobile assembly, metalworking, machinery, textiles, iron and steel, chemicals, fertilizer, foodstuffs, commercial ship repair
Ethnic Composition				
Tswana (or Setswana) 79%, Kalanga 11%, Basarwa 3%, other, including Kgalagadi and white 7%	Ovambo 50 %, Kavangos 9 %, Herero 7%, Damara 7%, Nama 5%, Caprivian 4%, San 3%, Baster 2%, Tswana 0.5%	Sotho 99.7%, Europeans, Asians, and other 0.3%	African 97%, European 3%	black African 80.9%, coloured 8.8%, white 7.8%, Indian/Asian 2.5%

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of Southern African (DSA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The DSA configuration is justified by the fact that economic inequalities within member states are minimal; with the proper framework in place, the challenge of this building bloc can be managed. The region has massive mineral industry and agricultural potential. The relatively highly developed Infrastructure and financial capability can accelerate the trade facility among member countries of DSA. Shangase (2019:3) says, SACU member countries have a similar history with Lesotho and the Kingdom of Eswatini, and Botswana, the three are all former 'British Protectorates while Namibia was occupied by South Africa and became an extension of this polity up until 1990'. Further, he alluded that the economic divergence has two categories Botswana and South Africa are upper-middle-income countries, Eswatini and Namibia are lower-middle-

income countries. Lesotho is the least developed country among five-member countries. The DSA, with the South African leading role, the mineral, industrial, and service-based economy, can be the best African reintegration model. The region has massive mineral and agricultural potential, including mining platinum, gold, chromium, automobile assembly, metalworking, machinery, iron, and steel. DSA has a well-developed infrastructure, industry, and business sectors in comparison to the rest of Africa and sub-regional formations. The DSA population consists of over 64,477,863 Million People.

## **6.9: The Island African Debo Configuration and Recommendations**

The Debo of Island African countries encompasses Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles. However, the Indian Ocean Commission consists of Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Reunion. The five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources, and shared economic development opportunities, and similar risks. Kumar, (2014:3) states that, the Indian Ocean micro-states is linguistically homogenous except for Madagascar, the islands nations generally also more accessible to the rest of the world than African citizens.

### **6.9.1: Debo of Island Africa (DIA)**

The Debo of DIA's rationale is that these five islands face common problems and opportunities, such as climate change, security threats to the environment, political instability, and fragile economies. Island states find it extremely difficult to protect their territories on their own due to their small populations, limited economic resources, and vast areas of maritime jurisdiction; as a result, regional cooperation is critical in preserving current frameworks for island states (Bergin, Brewster, and Bachhawat, 2019:38). The people of the area, on the other hand, have similar historical migration and settlement trends, demographic relationships, natural resources, and development goals.

Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles have an immersive dynamism in which people's cultures and languages collide and evolve human life conditions, including seashore islands created by human migration trade (Geider, 2006:153). With the exception of French Réunion/Mayotte, the island states are currently African states, but they are not members of the African Union; however, the topic will not delve into why this is the case. The rise of the sea level is a common risk for African island states. Similarly, the countries share opportunities for growth in tourism, the blue economy, the fishing industry, and herbal medicine (CIA/WFB 2018). The region has Christian religion believers, as well as Hindu and a minority Muslim population.

**Table 6.16: Debo of Island Africa (DIA) basic data**

Countries			
Madagascar	Mauritius	Comoros	Seychelles
Religion			
Christian, indigenous religionist, Muslim	Hindu 48.5%, Roman Catholic 26.3%, Muslim 17.3%, other Christian 6.4%, other 0.6%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.1%	Sunni Muslim 98%, other (including Shia Muslim, Roman Catholic, Jehovah's Witness, Protestant) 2%	Roman Catholic 76.2%, Protestant 10.5% (Anglican 6.1%, Pentecostal Assembly 1.5%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.2%, other Protestant 1.7), other Christian 2.4%, Hindu 2.4%, Muslim 1.6%,
Language			
French (official), Malagasy (official), English	Creole 86.5%, Bhojpuri 5.3%, French 4.1%, two languages 1.4%, other 2.6% (includes English, the official language of the National Assembly, which is spoken by less than 1% of the population)	Arabic (official), French (official), Shikomoro (official; a blend of Swahili and Arabic) (Comorian)	Seychellois Creole (official) 89.1%, English (official) 5.1%, French (official) 0.7%, other 3.8%, unspecified 1.4%
Population			
26,955,737	1,379,365	846,281	95,981

GDP Per Capital			
\$1,600	\$22,300	\$1,600	\$29,300
World Rank GDP/PC			
218	86	216	70
Agriculture Products			
coffee, vanilla, sugarcane, cloves, cocoa, rice, cassava (manioc, tapioca), beans, bananas, peanuts; livestock products	sugarcane, tea, corn, potatoes, bananas, pulses; cattle, goats; fish	vanilla, cloves, ylang-ylang (perfume essence), coconuts, bananas, cassava (manioc)	coconuts, cinnamon, vanilla, sweet potatoes, cassava (manioc, tapioca), copra, bananas; tuna
Industrial Products			
meat processing, seafood, soap, beer, leather, sugar, textiles, glassware, cement, automobile assembly plant, paper, petroleum, tourism, mining	food processing (largely sugar milling), textiles, clothing, mining, chemicals, metal products, transport equipment, nonelectrical machinery, tourism	fishing, tourism, perfume distillation	fishing, tourism, beverages
Ethnic Composition			
Malayo-Indonesian (Merina and related Betsileo), Cotiers (mixed African, Malayo-Indonesian, and Arab ancestry - Betsimisaraka, Tsimihety, Antaisaka, Sakalava), French, Indian, Creole, Comoran	Indo-Mauritian (compose approximately two thirds of the total population), Creole, Sino-Mauritian, Franco-Mauritian	Antalote, Cafre, Makoa, Oimatsaha, Sakalava	predominantly black; mixed French, African, Indian, Chinese, and Arab

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of Island Africa (DIA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all

factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The Indian Ocean region is generally weaker or less organised than Debo. Agriculture, mining, fishing, clothing production, tourism, and knowledge-based economy are the DIA economy mainstays, along with meat processing, seafood, soap, leather, sugar, textiles, paper, petroleum, and tourism mining. The region is rich in unique biodiversity and enormous wealth in the area of conservation. It is believed that the world's forests in biological "hot spots" contain cures unknown to modern science preservation essentials (CIA/WFB 2018. DIA consists of over 29 277 364 Million People.

#### **6.10: The Horn of Africa Debo Configuration and Case Study**

Section 6.19 is a case study that discusses the convergence and divergence of Mojo-Oda and Debo, as well as representation and mandate formulation. The Horn of Africa Debo comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia. These countries' traditions, religions, ethnic origins, and geopolitics have been intertwined throughout their long history. Some manifestations include the linguistic intersperse between Somali in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia; the Nilotic, Omotic, racial, and cultural similitude in Southern Ethiopia and South Sudan; and the Tigrayan intersection between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In the precolonial period, the region, which included the ancient kingdoms of Aksum, Lalibela, and Gonder, was a complex political centre. Socioeconomics and development planning are crucial in order to become a building bloc. It is critical in Debo's formation to articulate the two-layer structure that is Mojo-Oda and Debo. The Mojo-Oda in the Horn of Africa consists of five countries with equal status in the formation of Debo. Before forming the Debo, numerous foundations need to be layout by member countries. Among expected task formulation, a treaty binds to adhere to fundamental principles, including harmonising the governance and institutional framework. These comprising uniformity of the democratic institution establish the representation and mandate proclamation. However, considering Mojo-Oda's unique nature can introduce a two- or three-layers governance structure based on population and landmass for administration purposes without deviating from the main



principle. In the formation of Debo, all Mojo-Oda will have equitable representation to form peoples' representatives

In order to establish a credible Debo in the Horn of Africa should reach a common consensus on the need and adhere to the fundamental principles. Fundamentally, the appreciation of interdependence among the Horn of Africa countries enables creating wider economic opportunities, political convergence, sociocultural interaction, and common law enforcement mechanisms expected. More significantly, to develop a constitutional framework that can be adapted and harmonised at the level of Mojo-Oda. All member states have to agree to set a minimum standard in the constitution. (1) In the constitution, except for human rights and country-specific articles, all need to adhere to the horizontal and vertical governance structure; Secondly, the representation and mandate of elected officials should be specified (3), the level of sovereignty between Mojo-Oda, Debo and Umoja-Jamaa needs to be established; (4) and all member states need to conduct the election with the same calendar year and date.

The Horn of Africa Debo must recognise the African knowledge system, which advocates vertical and horizontal hierarchy that aims to employ cooperation among member countries and voluntarily surrender sovereignty to the higher structure for common goods. Debo is a demonstration of voluntary association and collective leadership that helps African societies with economic development and capacity building. The Horn of Africa should have a more transparent membership strategy. IGAD is a platform to facilitate the Debo, but other Debo members such as Kenya and Uganda are a member of the East African Debo. Similarly, Sudan in the proposed Debo part of the North East Africa Debo should do rearrangement with a consultation. South Sudan's membership in the DEA and DHA must be discussed, as South Sudan is currently a member of the EAC and IGAD. Additionally, it necessitates in-depth evaluations of the areas that should benefit both South Sudan and the other member countries on both sides from a political and economic standpoint.

In the Horn of Africa, the Debo is essential to consider as the Debo formation obtains its mandate and representation from Mojo-Oda. The representation of HoA Debo comes from the bottom-up representation of each Mojo-Oda members, and the mandate emanated from the broad scope.

The Horn of Africa Debo's functions as required to adhere to a collective leadership that aims to design economic development and cooperation among member states. An election should be held in order to form a full-fledged Debo in the Horn of Africa based on constitutional harmonisation standards. As indicated in the study, the election of Debo and the national government (Mojo-Oda) happens simultaneously. The HAD Debo is an interstate assembly that has a full mandate to establish peoples' representatives. The executive and judicial designation is the Debo peoples' representative mandate through election and appointments. According to the matrix that sets the distribution of power, the peoples' representative of the Debo will include executives and judicial persons according to the matrix that specifies power distribution. However, in terms of people's representative representation, the population size will add additional representatives based on the incremental decrease numerical formula seated below.

**Table 6.17:** sample representation demonstration of the Horn of Africa Debo configuration.

Countries					Total
Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Somalia	South Sudan	
921,804	6,081,196	114,963,588	11,757,124	10,561,244	137,434,518
Given the population,2020, courtesy of united nations population division					
0.7%	2.4%	78.5%	10.8%	7.6%	100%
Country's share of representation based on population will be as follows					
0.7% + 5.9% = 6.6%	2.4% + 8.9% = 11.3%	49%	10.8% + 8.7% = 19.5%	7.6% + 6% = 13.6%	100%
Number of representatives per country					
20	34	149	59	42	304

**Source:** Own Creation

\*The table above is intended to indicate as sample representation in the Horn of Africa Debo. The sample illustrated in the Horn of Africa is as the case study the same configuration is applied to the entire Debo.

### Fundamental assumptions /principles

- Plurality is a necessary component of any democratic structure; as such, it should be a guiding principle when forming a body or "peoples' representatives." Diversification should be preserved and also reflected, whether in terms of language, religion, geography, topography, or gender.
- A single state should not have a representation share in the "peoples' Representatives or Assembly" that exceeds 50% of the total number of seats in the Assembly's House of Representatives.
- The people should directly elect members of the "peoples' representatives"; thus, a specific electoral zone/district/college should be formed representing a particular population. The election arrangement needs to consider in order maintaining diversity. It is absolutely essential to guarantee all sect of society has representatives in the assembly from the Mojo-Oda to the Debo. These presentations apply to all Debo's. The reason presented here is the Horn of Africa is a case study for this research.

Basic information about this Debo: Ethiopia is the most populous country in the Debo, accounting for 80 per cent of the Debo's population. The rest of HoF Mojo-Oda has a population of 29,321,368 people or around 20% of the total population. For example, Ethiopia's population is 120 times that of Djibouti, and the same holds true for other members due to their small populations. As a consequence, if the Debo adopts direct representation, the Debo will belong to Ethiopia, and the rest will be outvoted; thus, the amicable mathematical solution must be implemented. As a result, establishing a formula that ensures proportional representation is critical to the implementation process.

The representation is calculated to avoid the supermajority of an individual state. The representation matrix is done to balance power dynamics. For example, in the formation scenario, Ethiopia's representation share should decrease from 78.5% representatives of the total to 49% (the difference is 29.5%, and it should be allotted to the four nations equally). Additionally, Somalia

has a population of 15,893,222 people (50.3%) and South Sudan has a population of 11,193,725 people (35.4%). These nations account for 85.4% of the population of the HoA's five Mojo-Oda members. However, in order to maintain diversity and proportionate representation, their representation will be reduced to 50%. (29.5 % deducted share of Ethiopia).

**Scenario 1:** the comparative calculation between Somalia and South Sudan to get a percentage based on the population size. Somalia's population is 11,757,124 +South Sudan 10,561,244= 22 318 368. Based on this fact, Somalia's representation share will be 59%, and South Sudan's representation share will be 41%. Formulated on this fact out of 29.5% Somalia will get additional  $29.5\% \times 50\% \times 59\% = 8.7\%$  and South Sudan will get additional  $29.5\% \times 50\% \times 41\% = 6\%$ .

**Scenario 2:** Eritrea and Djibouti have a 14.4% share of the population, similar to Somalia and South Sudan. Eritrea and Djibouti will get 50% of the share that is deduced from Ethiopia will be allotted for four countries.

The formula used is Incremental decrease numeracies formula computational standard is applied to narrow the difference between, Eritrea 6,081,196 + Djibouti 921,804= 7,003,000. Based Eritrea's share = 78%; Djibouti's share =22%. But in order to maintain diversity Eritrea's share will decrease to 60%; And Djibouti's share will increase to 40%; So, from the 29.5% additional allocation of representatives. Eritrea will get additional  $29.5\% \times 50\% \times 60\% = 8.9\%$ . Djibouti will get additional  $29.5\% \times 50\% \times 40\% = 5.9\%$ . Totally  $8.7\% + 6\% + 8.9\% + 5.9\% = 29.5\%$ . The formula used is Incremental decrease numeracies formula computational standard is applied to narrow the difference.

**Scenario 3:** Considering Djibouti is the smallest nation in the region, close to a population of 1,000,000, the bottom-line representation is 20 representatives, per country which suggests there will be 20 election zones/districts which will have 50,000 potential voters. Based on this, Djibouti's share is 6.6%. The total seat should be  $100\%/6.6\% \times 20$  out of 304 peoples' representatives' members of the Debo. Ethiopia representation will be 49%, that is, 149 out of

304 peoples' representatives. Somalia representation will be 19.5%, that is, 59 peoples' representatives out of 304 members.

South Sudan will have 13.6%, that is, 42 representatives out of 304 assembly members. Eritrea population represent 11.3% that will be 34 representatives out of 304 members of peoples' representatives. These statistics demonstrate the sample population size calculation for Debo representation. The three scenarios presented above are an explanation of how to incorporate amicable representation between Debo members in the creation of building blocs'. The scenarios show that every Debo participant is fairly represented in the Debo assembly, executive, and judiciary portfolios, regardless of population size or economic muscle.

### 6.10.1: Debo of the Horn of Africa (DHA)

The Horn of Africa Debo has been known for decades as a war-torn region of Africa during the colonial and postcolonial periods. In this part of Africa, widely spoken languages are Amharic, Somali, Oromifa, and Tigrigna, and English, with minority French and Arabic. All member states share a border with Ethiopia. The religious majority of the population are Christian; however, equally, there are sizable Muslim populations. The HoA Debo's primary objective is to be politically and economically sound, as well as socioculturally integrated and to contribute to continental unity through the formation of a sub-regional building bloc. The second requirements are geographical proximity, common consanguinity, administration, and trade facility, market, and seaport accessibility are the priorities.

**Table 6.18: Debo of the Horn of Africa (DHA) basic data**

<b>Countries</b>				
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>South Sudan</b>
<b>Religion</b>				

Sunni Muslim 94% (nearly all Djiboutian), Christian 6% (mainly foreign-born residents)	Sunni Muslim, Coptic Christian, Roman Catholic, Protestant	Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional .6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)	Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)	animist, Christian, Muslim
<b>Language</b>				
French (official), Arabic (official), Somali, Afar	Tigrinya (official), Arabic (official), English (official), Tigre, Kunama, Afar, other Cushitic languages	Amharic (official national language) Oromo, Somali and Tigrigna	Somali (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter), Arabic (official)	English (official), Arabic regional languages include Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande, Shilluk
<b>Population</b>				
921,804	6,081,196	108,113,150	11,757,124	10,561,244
<b>GDP Per Capital</b>				
\$3,600	\$1,600	\$2,200	N/A	\$1,600
<b>World Rank GDP Per Capital</b>				
185	217	204	N/A	220
<b>Agriculture Products</b>				
fruits, vegetables; goats, sheep, camels, animal hides	sorghum, lentils, vegetables, corn, cotton, tobacco, sisal; livestock, goats; fish	cereals, coffee, oilseed, cotton, sugarcane, vegetables, khat, cut flowers; hides, cattle, sheep, goats; fish	bananas, sorghum, corn, coconuts, rice, sugarcane, mangoes, sesame seeds, beans; cattle, sheep, goats; fish	sorghum, maize, rice, millet, wheat, mangoes, papayas, bananas, sunflower seeds, beans, peanuts; cattle, sheep
<b>Industrial Products</b>				
construction, agricultural processing, shipping	food processing, beverages, clothing and textiles, light manufacturing, salt, cement	food processing, beverages, textiles, leather, garments, chemicals, metals processing, cement	light industries, including sugar refining, textiles, wireless communication	N/A

Ethnic Composition				
Somali 60%, Afar 35%, other 5% (mostly Yemeni Arab, also French, Ethiopian, and Italian)	Tigrinya 55%, Tigre 30%, Saho 4%, Kunama 2%, Rashaida 2%, Bilen 2%, other (Afar, Beni Amir, Nera) 5% (2010 est.)	Oromo 34.9%, Amhara (Amara) 27.9%, Tigray (Tigrinya) 7.3%, Sidama 4.1%, Welaita 3%, Gurage 2.8%, Somali (Somalie) 2.7%, Hadiya 2.2%, Afar (Affar) .6%, other 12.6% (2016 est.)	Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)	Dinka (Jieng) 35.8%, Nuer (Naath) 15.6%, Shilluk (Chollo), Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, Acholi, Baka, Fertit (2011 est.)

**Source:** UNSD 2020; World Fact Book 2018.

\*The purpose of this table is to show the Debo of the Horn of Africa (DHA) fundamental resemblance and diversity statistics of country composition. Religion, language, population size, GDP per capita, GDP pre-capital, key agricultural and industrial products, and ethnic composition are all factors to consider. The exercise aims to demonstrate Debo divergence and convergence, as well as its viability as a building bloc in a consolidated type of critical data.

The Debo Horn of Africa is known for its rich history and culture recognized in the Holy Bible and the Quran. The region has great potential to be an industrial hub, tourist attraction, both historical and natural route. The region has enormous agricultural, natural resources, including coffee, agroindustry, livestock, and other areas. The Debo consists of over 137,434 518 Million population.

## 6.11: CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Chapter five has discussed a comprehensive alternative unification theoretical framework and the indigenous governance model. The first section of the chapter presented theoretical propositions and explained current governance model impediments in terms of structural and sovereignty versus collective identity. It conceptually and practically described all three layers or structures

from national to regional to continental levels, including operational constraints, representation and mandate. It discussed the hierarchical structure of the Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa. It briefly explained the three branches of authorities that are peoples' representatives, executive, and judiciary.

The second part of the chapter explained how the concept of indigenous alternative configuration could be applied through five stages of the phased approach. The steps were guided by a conceptual framework and demonstrated through empirical foundations. The proposed architectural configuration was justified and briefly demonstrated the benefits of economic development and political unity, as well as how it is designed to make the leadership responsible and accountable. Similarly, granting market access, economic and job opportunities, trade facilitation, and free movement of people and goods across the continent are all important. The alternative unification theory implementation phases are discussed, including transition strategies from the current system to the new architecture. Finally, the chapter explained how twelve Debo's emerged based on the alternative indigenous governance theory. Chapter seven will provide a conclusion of the study and its contribution to the knowledge.

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## **CHAPTER SEVEN:**

### **Conclusion**

#### **7.1: CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

This research began by critiquing the current approach to economic integration and presenting an alternative unification theory. The proposed theory is formulated on Afrocentric indigenous knowledge systems. In chapter one, the thesis's principles and guidelines are extensively constructed and thoroughly addressed. Additionally, chapter two literature surveys covered comprehensively Africa's precolonial, colonial and postcolonial governance knowledge systems, historical, philosophical, economic, political and sociocultural context of the study. Based on a review of the literature, chapters three developed a theoretical framework of the unification theory derived from precolonial nation-state formation in Africa. In chapter four, I examined the current impediments at the African Union Commission, various organs and the RECs. Chapter five incorporates data analysis and interpretation from semi-structured individual interviews with participants on regional unification. Chapter six summarises the facts and comments from chapters two, three, four, and five in order to establish the output as an indigenous alternative unification theory. This chapter summarises the research findings as well as the methods employed to answer the purpose and primary research question. Finally, I discuss the implications of the study and further research recommendations.

#### **7.2: Reflecting on the Primary Research Question: Alternative Unification Model**

The thesis addresses the question of postcolonial African unification models' failure to realise the vision of unity and prosperity for African nations and peoples. The quest was also to recommend an Afrocentric solution by applying an indigenous alternative theory to Africa. So, the approach was divided into two parts; the primary task was to investigate other appropriate literature related to the African integration model, the past, present, and future propositions, i.e., the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial governance structures. In addition to conducting a literature review,

researcher empiricism gathered additional information from government leaders, intergovernmental experts, academicians, and ordinary citizens through interviews.

The literature survey is ordered into five categories sequentially to emphasise essential factors. The first part discussed Africa's historical evolution, including the fragmentation phenomena and the struggle for independence. The literature discussed the historic nations building evolutions and the value systems, particularly the intra-nations and ethnic relationships and administration structures that are precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras. The study discusses the factual evidence that is presented by historical and archaeological facts. The literature indicated several nationhood establishments in different parts of Africa until the arrival of colonialists, who disrupted the nation's building practices.

Precolonial governance institutions are crucial for studying and understanding contemporary Africa's economic, political, and sociocultural complexity. The study found that the precolonial African nation-building has so much unexploited knowledge, which is vital in shaping the current and the future of Africa's institutional governance that helps develop a unified framework. The study explored precolonial governance, institutional, and people-to-person relations to compare it with the current political and socioeconomic formation. Beyond that, the study analysed how the African indigenous knowledge system deals with wide-ranging social, cultural, economic, and political affairs. In the precolonial government formation, the essential prerequisites were a sense of solidarity, common historical, cultural, territorial, and language resemblance are among the significant factors. These include collective leadership and voluntarism essential for the contemporary unification model. The governance model *Mojo-Oda*, *Debo*, and *Umoja-Jamaa* are extracted from indigenous African governance theory.

The existing literature shows that the pursuit of postcolonial unification took the form of reclaiming and reorganising African unity and establishing the Organisation of African Union (OAU). These inherited poor infrastructures, a leadership that was unprepared to share unbounded sovereignty with the people, fragmented political and historical conscience that are discussed thoroughly. In addition, the study also pointed to the lack of clearly defined unification theory among African countries; and the failure of inter-African economic cooperation grand plans such as the Lagos

Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991). The literature reviewed also shows that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) emerged as building blocks towards African Unity inspired by the Lagos Plan of Action. The idea of RECs is also articulated in the Abuja Treaty a decade later. Yet both failed to economic integration for Africa.

The literature also stresses the need for critical examination of the current regional economic integration to comprehend its fundamentals. This is to understand why the economic integration initiative fails, to interpret political motivation and economic benefits associated with regional integration efforts in Africa. It is also to understand epistemological, theoretical and methodological debates on economic integration in Africa. Further, the literature surveyed the limitations in the current unification model. It underlined the need for interdependency for economic development, and political alliance for better negotiation balance of power with counterparts is an essential element. Further suggested that African countries have the collective negotiation power they will create immense power shifts and dynamics in the global community as well with stakeholders.

The literature also stresses the need for critical examination of the current regional economic integration to comprehend its fundamentals. This is to understand why the economic integration initiative fails, to interpret political motivation and economic benefits associated with regional integration efforts in Africa. It is also to understand epistemological, theoretical and methodological debates on economic integration in Africa. The literature agrees that the economic integration process has failed to produce common citizenship, shared development, unity of purpose in Africa because the reasons are many. The study found a lack of a theoretical framework that speaks to African realities, which the study attempts to address. The literature further alluded that the failure of Africa's economic integration model is not only because of the Euro-centric model but also due to poor performance of institutions, lack of political will, and absence of adequate infrastructure. Regardless, the tendency to adopt the liberal European integration experience to the African context was problematic. Postcolonial African leaders failed to correct colonial border arrangements unsound the sub-regional configurations. The leaders seem eager to follow the former colonisers' unsuitable model without considering African reality. The study confirmed that the postcolonial Africa economic integration theory is a direct replica of the European model. The literature showed that the postcolonial states' formation and

governance need an appraisal to respond to the needs of Africa. The issue was not only the impossibility of unification, but also the hindrance to economic progress caused by the absence or limitation of intra-African commerce through existing regional economic communities (RECs). On the other side, seeking a homegrown or indigenous governing system was not a preference, but the only alternative.

One of the research questions, according to the literature, is "why have African states failed to create a unification model appropriate to the African economic, political, and sociocultural context?" Historical, structural, and leadership impediments in postcolonial Africa were discussed in the literature. It also transforms from dependence to interdependence is an essential concept to promote an African holistic unification agenda. It examines African identity, unbounded citizenship, and shared philosophy as a critical ingredient in defining Africa's unification as a nation and Africans as a citizen, pre-eminently. The discussion tried to evaluate how African identity destroyed the extent to which Africans have seen one another as a foreign entity. The deep-rooted division between borderlines, language and ethnicity needs to be examined to propose how to restore African unity.

The purpose of the study analysis was to identify existing impediments related to why and how regional economic integration is failing? The study attempted to answer the research question regarding an alternative unification model that needs to be explored going forward. The question is addressed by examining theoretical methodology empiricism in systematically responding to the problem. The investigation of alternative theory focused on the constructivist research method's ontological and epistemological considerations, as well as the use of grounded theory and the inductive process. The foundation of alternative theory in this exercise aims to display opposing arguments and systematically analyse the existing integration paradigm. The need to reshape the current states led the unification agenda to peoples' oriented theoretical framework and proposition to construct belongingness, commitment, and accountability in all structures. In considering dignified livelihood for African citizens, competitiveness in the world, the study finds a need to minimise inequality between African states and revert dependence on developed countries.

To a limited extent, the literature has primarily focused on explaining how and why the African unity project failed, as well as made general recommendations. And understand the specifics and profundity of what should be done to construct a unification theory that speaks to African needs while adequately confronting the existing challenges. As a result, the literature focused on the modalities of African alternative unification theory, which include the political, economic, and sociocultural contexts as conceptual foundations. The essence of the unification concept necessitated a rigorous approach that took into account Africa's historical, conceptual, and indigenous information structure in order to provide practical solutions.

The literature on effective policy formulation practice looks at governance, institutionalisation, indigenous information systems, structuration, and publicly available research papers. Furthermore, the core focus literature survey aimed to identify flaws in the economic integration paradigm and explore options for indigenous alternative unification theories. With particular emphasis on postcolonial African nations' colonial boundaries, inherited poor infrastructure, unacquainted leadership, fragmentation, psychological destruction, lack of citizen participation, political and historical conscience. The identified challenges are a lack of political will and member states' refusal to relinquish their sovereignty, which is an impediment to progress. The mystifications are even more undermining to the institutional formation, but empiricism can provide a strong sense of agency in making a difference based on Africa's ground realism. The study attempted to produce advanced solutions using an alternative theoretical approach that included methodology, conceptual structure, modus operandi, systemic underpinning, and synchronisation.

### **7.3: Historical Overview of Africa Unification**

Unlike any other continent in the world, Africa has followed three distinct historical paths, including human resource exploitation through slavery and colonialism. To gain a better and more in-depth understanding, the researcher read journal articles and books on precolonial historical governance philosophy, colonial fragmentation, and the postcolonial quest for reintegration. Each epoch has its footprints positively and negatively shaping the continental policies, economy, and citizens' worldview. The study concisely examined the distraction of Africa's governance system,

as well as the impact of African Balkanisation and arbitrary disintegration, which has resulted in fragile and vulnerable African states around the world. Throughout colonial and postcolonial Africa, African political leaders were persuaded to pursue a unification project, but the ambitious goal failed due to a lack of clear deliverables. The unification encounters are many, but summarising them can be defined or categorised into three main elements: governance, institutional and ideological challenges. The governance challenges are intertwined with societal structure and how intrastate and interstate architecture the national, sub-regional, and regional administrations. These problems are inherited with colonial border configuration and postcolonial African leaders unable to correct the limitations in an amicable way to run business and administration facilities. The other chronic challenges that Africa encountered are the relationship between the colonial border and the issue of sovereignty.

The most contentious and challenging confrontation until now is postcolonial Africa leaders' indecisiveness and the Organisation of African Unity's lack of reassurance that the colonial border legacy remains an unresolved critical challenge. Besides inherited poor infrastructure, fragmented, psychological destruction, deficiency in citizens' participation, lack of political will, and member states' refusal to relinquish their sovereignty is an obstacle to move forward. Apart from breaking the current integration model's impasse, the research critically examines the shift from dependency to interdependence and African restoration in political, economic, and sociocultural revival.

The thesis attempted to deconstruct previous scholarship, address the study's overarching question, clarify the failure of postcolonial African unification, and investigate failed and alternative models that could be applied to Africa. Despite all of the challenges and African leaders' enthusiasm for promoting closer economic and political collaborations among African Union member states, little progress has been made. Some consider the unification encounter as an internal weakness of African leaders and lack of peace and security. Others externalise and associate the problem with the colonial structure and neo-colonial indirect divide and rule. Nonetheless, as the literature and study indicated in this thesis, the reasons for regional economic integration failures are a combination of many factors.

#### 7.4: Indigenous Governance Theory

The historical context of nation-state formation has been presented in the form of substantive background analysis, focusing on precolonial governance theory, and the concept of a nation-state has been highlighted in the African context. Examining precolonial nation-building was essential for understanding a new conceptual and psychological paradigm, particularly how to respond to modern governance theory and institutional structures. The research most notably revealed precolonial indigenous nation-building and governance structures, as well as how the alternative unification theoretical paradigm and conceptualization were justified. Theoretical perspectives on integration/unification and conceptual outlines have also been discussed with theoretical consideration, insight, concept applications, and theoretical approaches systematically defined to suggest an alternative unification model. Indigenous governance framework expected to enhance political transparency and economic interdependence.

The research design explored the impasse and influenced thought in order to restore African unity, growth, and prosperity using African indigenous alternative unification theory. As the time comes to include Africa's indigenous governance knowledge system in the global epistemic account, the theoretical analysis is entangled and followed by epistemological and methodological assertions. The proposed reintegration theory is a politically led unification that considers the historical, philosophical, and psychological contexts of each area and facilitates implementation in the following ways.

- The national (Mojo-Oda), sub-regional blocs' (Debo), and regional (Umoja-Jamaa) methodological approach is constructed on political, economic, social, and cultural contexts.
- The Debo configuration is based on topographical proximity, along with other variables. Interpretation and naming Debo are intended to rally African citizens in support of the supranational formation of Umoja-Jamaa. Furthermore, the Debo design aimed to bring sub-regional administration closer to the people.

The Indigenous governance theoretical structure is envisioned as a set of legal, policy, and governance principles, with concepts left open to further scrutiny and refinement.

### **7.5: Impediments to African Unification**

This study provided a context review of Africa's current unification framework's institutional, policy, and ideological impediments. The study has examined the historical achievements of the OAU/AU the primary blunders that created hindrances in moving forward the formation of African unity. The discussion demonstrated that the OAU challenges and shortcomings are of a leadership nature. The postcolonial elite ruling class lacks distinct ideological values to produce a viable blueprint for continental unity. The study also stated that the transition from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union was merely a name change that brought forward existing issues such as sovereignty, citizenship, and colonial borders without causing substantial change. The study findings on structural and operational institutional and governance barriers have demonstrated several obstacles that necessitate the introduction of a new process or methods. Institutional impediments include a lack of priority, organisational culture, and leadership quality, as well as conducting adequate monitoring, evaluation, and performance of the organisation for the deployment of the appropriate human resource, a lack of proper capacity building, and political clientelism.

The institutional challenge, as discussed in this study four, the current unification effort faces two challenges: structural and operational. These core challenges and systemic organisational problems originate from policy formation. The tension between sovereignty and collective identity, a lack of functioning structural arrangements, a constitutional discrepancy informing the common institutional framework, and a lack of appropriate citizenship mandates at the sub-regional and regional levels are among the identified critical structural and operational challenges. Furthermore, the lack of ideological clarity in the OAU/objective, AU's mission, and vision has had direct negative consequences in institutional formation and implementation over the last fifty years. Governance impediments, as well as organisational disconnection between different layers, are prevalent at sub-regional and regional organs. The disconnection and disengagement of the AU, national governments, and RECs hampered unification agendas.



## **7.6: Alternative Unification Theory**

The alternative unification theoretical framework, as well as indigenous governance theory, have been thoroughly explored and offered as theoretical propositions. It conceptually and practically described all three layers or structures from national to regional to continental levels, including operational constraints, representation and mandate. It discussed the hierarchical structure of the Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa. The study briefly explained the three branches of authorities are peoples' representatives, executive, and judiciary. The justification for the proposed alternative unification configuration was discussed, with a brief overview of the benefits of achieving economic development and political unity, as well as how it is intended to make the leadership responsible and accountable.

Similarly, granting market access, economic and job opportunities, trade facilitation, and free movement of people and goods across the continent are all critical. The alternative unification theory implementation phases are discussed, including transition strategies from the current system to the new architecture. The rationale for the proposed alternative unification is to improve citizens' livelihoods, increase global competitiveness, and reduce reliance on developed countries. Through the proposed alternative unification model, the empowerment of African people is to make them direct beneficiaries and decide their future by themselves. The indigenous alternative configuration concept is presented for implementation in a five-stage phased manner. The steps were guided by a conceptual framework and supported by empirical foundations. At this point in time, expecting utopia is unthinkable, and a perfect union is out of reach; however, the union improves over time and through generations to form a nearly perfect union. However, the fundamental questions were addressed within the framework proposed in this study: to lay the groundwork for African development and governance problems through African solutions and to progress over time. Given that the proposed institutional and governance framework promotes economic development and self-sufficiency in a wide range of areas, including peace and tranquillity. Through critical thought, the proposed theory of governance and institutional growth, Mojo-Oda, Debo, and Umoja-Jamaa, is expected to address the fundamental quest of building a united people of Africa. On the other hand, the mandate that influences interdependence between

Mojo-Oda and Nation States to carry out unification flawlessly should be enshrined in the structure and agency of those involved in international politics.

### **7.7: Contributions to Knowledge**

The study is the first in its approach, functioning to critique the existing African economic integration model and explore indigenous alternative unification theory. Thus, the study contributed to research by introducing and developing home-grown governance and institutional framework, which fills the knowledge gap in the regional unification/integration literature in Africa. As stated in chapters one up to three, this study established the significance of indigenous theory that speaks African society's needs and aspirations through the local knowledge system by amalgamating international best practice. The study further engrained and will help African researchers significantly explore local solutions for social, economic, political, and security challenges. Rather than focusing on Eurocentric governance systems such as federalism and Confederalism, this study uncovered a governance theory that can be further explored for the benefit of African people.

The study contributed to avoiding three significant vacuums. The first one moves from a single economic integration story to a holistic approach that considers political, historical, sociocultural, philosophical, and psychological contexts. Besides, the unification project is regarded as a novel paradigm border formula based on language resemblance, some cultural similitude, historical connections, market accessibility, seaport access, trade facility, and similar psychological makeup. Secondly, the proposed unification approaches implement people-based representation and mandates at national, building blocs', and supranational structures. Third, the study moves the African unification project from the government-led and top-down approach to a peoples-led mixed method that is simultaneously a bottom-up and top-down approach to provide a comprehensive solution. Furthermore, shifting from the Eurocentric economic integration model to homegrown unification theory is recommended in many ways. The indigenous governance concept proposes a transition away from federal and confederal ethnic and language-based formations; the study presented to move towards a homegrown and holistic approach.

## **7.8: Approach of the Study**

A specific method necessitates a complex approach; however, because economic and political integration is a widely studied subject, it is possible to replicate or research a particular integration aspect. On the other hand, deviating from the obvious necessitates considerable effort to explain, persuade, and compose the thesis. It is critical to describe the process; proposing an indigenous alternative unification theory was a daunting task from two perspectives. There is sufficient evidence to back up my claim. The second divergent and uniquely African or Afrocentric approach, as well as the untested theoretical concept, would have been unthinkable without the exceptional guidance and trust of those around me. Individual and institutional support is essential, but I was also advised to prepare and read relevant books, which helped me achieve my goal in the shortest amount of time possible.

The proposed indigenous alternative unification theory is a broad and complex subject that encompasses and extends beyond the discipline of "international relations," but for this study's assertions, a critical literature review and an extensive interview approach were used in developing sound output. The scope includes everything from political knowledge to legal definitions, historical perspectives to geographical landscapes, and basic economics to infrastructure engineering. The limitations are numerous, but the most significant is the lack of comparative literature in Africa and other continents. Furthermore, the advocacy for economic integration trumps the freedom to consider alternative options while the model is broken. Besides, there is apprehension about the unknown in communities, government, and academia. Another constraint is the refusal of governments' intergovernmental organisations to welcome the approach with open arms. Furthermore, member countries' socio-cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences hampered progress.

## **7.9: Recommendations for Future Action**

Based on the outcome of this study, there is a need for a paradigm shift in the governance and institutional structure to advance African interest, both economic and political progression. The

presented theoretical model of governance and institutional structural strategy is doable in cooperation with the AUC and national, sub-regional structures. The guidance can be provided by the AU assembly or initiated by members' states to take it further. Strengthening the proposed model from legal and geographical amalgamation might be needed. Therefore, it is recommended that the regional institutions stipulate a guidelines strategy that meets international best practice and principles. Recommendations are made in this section for future research regarding the regional unification approach, exercise, and research that can assist in reforming a building block and supranational organisations at the regional structure. Besides, the AU and its organs, building blocks, research institutions can benefit from further research and recommendation.

I, therefore, recommend having further and in-depth study from the legal, political, economic, and sociocultural perspectives in conjunction with establishing a border solution governance and institutional framework. Until and unless African countries opt for unbounded citizenship, the unification model might remain narrow and self-serving to individual African nations. It is critical to establish, standardise, and institutionalise the unification project. Institutionalisation helps to acclimatise divergence between institutions and make institutionalism a considerable difference to formulate desirable results, including a clear vision, political commitment, and practical implementation. Transitioning from a state-centric to a citizen-centric institution Institutionalisation enables the unification process to persist as a fundamental ideological pattern within a society and enables systemic challenges to be addressed through research and societal participation.

#### **7.10: Research Recommendations**

I can attest that my twenty-five years of experience serving in various capacities and travelling as a youth leader at the national, regional, and global levels greatly contributed to my studies. Serving in government, civil society, and the private sector has also influenced my research and understanding of how society interacts with governance, institutions, and daily lives. Working at the ECOSOCC of the African Union and the ECOSOC of the United Nations helped me understand the three-way relationship between government, non-state actors, and private citizens. As I travelled and interacted with people from all corners of Africa, practical empiricism helped my reflection in this study.

My extensive travel throughout Africa, which included visits to thirty-one of the continent's fifty-five countries, allowed me to gain first-hand knowledge and visualise the Debo configuration in the research. In addition, I have broadened my horizons by studying a variety of disciplines such as information and communication technology (ICT), management, development studies, and international relations. As a result, I recommend that researchers interested in regional unification/integration conduct preliminary research with local people in order to have better understand societal priorities. Additionally, studying African thought leadership, good governance, and African political economy at the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) equipped me to be a critical thinker and the person I am today. Experience is required to reflect on a specific area or community properly; literature, remote sensing, and desktop analysis alone cannot fully represent the current situation. As a consequence, I believe it is crucial for young researchers to have previous experience researching a particular discipline and spending time with a particular culture, or to have first-hand knowledge of the subject matter.

#### **7.11: CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

The chapter has summarised by addressing the research question and findings in this thesis, including the proposition of an indigenous unification model that aimed to serve as an alternative paradigm in establishing governance and institution mechanisms. The chapter reviewed the unique emphasis and approach to transform from the current practice of government-led intergovernmentalism to a citizens'-oriented supranational structure that was necessary. The proposed theory seeks to empower and reassure Africans about their role in establishing building blocks and supranational institutions to serve citizens' interests and ensure political unity and development. The methodology designed allows for direct representation and full mandate from both the people and their representatives in order to deliver their mission with accountability. The strategic approach is one-of-a-kind and pragmatic, and it is built on decolonising the past and overcoming the current impasse.

This study stipulated the insight into the key roles and functions that several stakeholders need to fulfil, such as civil society, private sectors, academia, national governments, the AU, RECs, the AUC, and other organs. The research outcomes need to be promoted beyond the academia and research centres to have comprehensive engagement with different stakeholders. This study's findings can serve as an agency to have a broad conversation at national, sub-regional, and regional institutions to adopt the better practice. The approach and results might help the African Union focus on its mission, deliberate by the amended constitutive act. Also, the AU may consider transforming the organisation in responding to twenty-first-century challenges and to belong to African people.

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### **Internet Source**

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**Appendix A: Sample Questions**  
**Semi-structured interviews with Intergovernmental organisation**  
**(AU/NEPAD/IGAD), Experts on regional unification.**

Date:

Time:

Interviewer:

Interviewee:

**1: How do you explain the current integration/unification model thinking that shapes the African Governance and Institutional system?**

- a. Share with me your opinion about the current regional economic communities' RECs, the role in promoting economic interdependence among member countries that leads to gradual unification?
- b. What are the common turnaround strategies or arrangements to date planned and implemented by the AU/NEPAD/IGAD?

**2: What kind of impediments and successes have the current unification model confronted and how the impact affected the AU/NEPAD/IGAD projects and activities?**

- a. What are the main challenges of the unification project in Africa in your view?
- b. How do you understand the tension between sovereignty versus collective identity?

**3: Why have Africa states been unsuccessful in constructing a unification model that is suitable to the African economic, political, and sociocultural context? What was the role of NEPAD in strategy in resolving the challenges?**

- a. How do you describe the roles of government and political leaders and society at large in the processes of unification thus far?
- b. In your opinion, have member states shown political will and capacity to promote the unification process? If not, why?

**4: What alternative unification models need to be explored going forward and how can they be employed? ever AU/NEPAD/IGAD proposed different approach?**

- a. What kind of approach do you think is best to achieve unification in Africa considering the colonial past and the current stalemate?
- b. Tell me about your practical suggestions about what should be done uniquely in the course of the African unification project?
- c. Would an indigenous alternative model of unification work better for Africa? And How?

**Appendix B:  
Semi-structured interview to the African Citizens**

Date.....

Time.....

Interviewer.....

Interviewee.....

1. Tell me about your knowledge about Africa unification the way you relate to yourself and society?
2. When and how did you hear about African integration?
3. Do you think African unification is essential? If so, or if you do not. why?
4. How can unification in Africa be practical in your opinion and also in the Horn of Africa?
5. Please tell me about the current approaches towards the application or implementation of the integration process?
6. Tell me how you heard about unification and regional economic integration?
7. Please tell me how does the unification agenda in Africa affects your life directly or indirectly?
8. Do you think Africa is on the right track implementing the unification agenda? If not, how can it be done better.



Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Political Sciences



Date

**Appendix C-1**  
**Sample Letter of Request for Permission for conducting Interview**

To \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Permission to conduct research at \_\_\_\_

Dear Sir/Madam

I, Seife Tadelle Kidane 15369944, am a registered Ph.D. student at the University of Pretoria in the Department of Political Science. I hereby request your organisation permission to conduct interviews with experts working at \_\_\_\_ on the research entitled: **"A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: the case of the Horn of Africa."**

The purpose of the study is to analyse the current approach to unification of Africa in order to develop an alternative unification model that can positively impact on unification of the Horn of Africa. I plan to interview officials and experts within the commission that have expertise on political and economic integration for about 45-60 minutes each. Therefore, I kindly request your esteemed office for permission to talk to the \_\_\_\_ experts willing to participate in the study.

For your information: the participants will be made aware of what kind of contribution they are making and their right to refuse to be recorded before they are recorded (see the informed consent attached); and the information will be stored at the University of Pretoria library archive. The participants may not benefit directly from the study. However, I envisage that the study will contribute its share in knowledge development related to regional unification. I plan to share the findings of my research with the academic and broader community by making it available in an open access repository. If there are any questions regarding this research project, you can contact me as well as my supervisor using the contact details provided below.

If there are any questions regarding this research project, you can contact me as well as my supervisor using the contact details provided below. Your favourable consideration and written feedback to this request will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Seife Tadelle Kidane  
PhD student  
Department of Political Science  
University of Pretoria  
Mobile: +27 (0) 76 542 3241  
Email: cdeofthemovement@gmail.com

Prof. Siphamandla Zondi      Signature.....  
Supervisor  
University of Pretoria  
Faculty of Humanity  
Department of Political Science  
Republic of South Africa  
Tel: +27 12 420 2688  
Email: siphamandla.zondi@up.ac.za



Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Political Sciences



Date \_\_\_\_\_

**Appendix D**  
**Sample Letter of Informed Consent**

Dear Participant,

I, Seife Tadle Kidane student no 15369944, am currently enrolled for a Ph.D., in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. I am conducting research titled: "***A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: Case of the Horn of Africa.***" As part of the Ph.D. requirement. For this study, I kindly request you to participate in the semi-structured interviews. Your first-hand knowledge in the field of regional unification and your contribution to this research will add value to knowledge production. The study will involve governments, inter-governmental organisations, and academics. The semi-structured interviews will form part of my primary data research as recorded confirmation and comply with the accepted standards within the discipline of Political Science. I hereby wish to obtain consent to interview you, which will take place at your convenient venue, preferably at your office for 45 minutes.

Your valuable contribution to this research will be acknowledged according to the system prescribed by the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria. If you want to remain anonymous, your request will be respected, and your name will not appear in the thesis. With your consent, the interview will be recorded in writing or via a recording device and will be stored in electronic format for 15 years in compliance with the University Faculty of Humanities policy. This material may also be used for other related research projects by the candidate. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you may choose to withdraw from the interview at any stage.

I would also like your consent to use this information for possible further research in the future.

Yours sincerely

I, \_\_\_\_\_ (the undersigned) agree to participate in the Ph.D. research project of Mr Seife Tadle Kidane (student number 15369944) at the University of Pretoria.

I have read his letter of introduction as well as informed consent above and agree that my information may be acknowledged according to the prescribed departmental footnote reference system.

<input type="checkbox"/>	I give permission for my name to be used in this research.
<input type="checkbox"/>	I wish to remain anonymous in this research.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



**Faculty of Humanities**  
Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe  
Lefapha la Bomotho



11 August 2020

Dear Mr ST Kidane

**Project Title:** A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: The case of the Horn of Africa  
**Researcher:** Mr ST Kidane  
**Supervisor(s):** Prof WS Zondi  
**Department:** Political Sciences  
**Reference number:** 15369944 (HUM042/1019)  
**Degree:** Doctoral

I have pleasure in informing you that the above application was **approved** by the Research Ethics Committee on 11 August 2020. Data collection may therefore commence.

Please note that this approval is based on the assumption that the research will be carried out along the lines laid out in the proposal. Should the actual research depart significantly from the proposed research, it will be necessary to apply for a new research approval and ethical clearance.

We wish you success with the project.

Sincerely,

**Prof Innocent Pikirayi**  
Deputy Dean: Postgraduate Studies and Research Ethics  
Faculty of Humanities  
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA  
e-mail: PGHumanities@up.ac.za

---

Fakulteit Geesteswetenskappe  
Lefapha la Bomotho

**Research Ethics Committee Members:** Prof I Pikirayi (Deputy Dean); Prof KL Harris; Mr A Bizos; Dr A-M de Beer; Dr A dos Santos; Ms KT Govinder; Andrew; Dr P Gutura; Dr E Johnson; Prof D Maree; Mr A Mohamed; Dr I Nocomè; Dr C Puttergill; Prof D Reyburn; Prof M Soer; Prof E Taliard; Prof V Thebe; Ms B Tsebe; Ms D Mokalapa



AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

P. O. Box 3243, Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA Tel.: Tel: +251-115- 517 700 Fax: +251-115- 517844 / 5182523  
Website: [www.au.int](http://www.au.int)

Ref: Eco/EIRC/43/301/2020  
Date: 09 July 2020

Ms Tracey Andrew  
Faculty of Humanities  
University of Pretoria  
Department of Political Sciences  
PRETORIA  
Republic of South Africa

Email: [tracey.andrew@up.ac.za](mailto:tracey.andrew@up.ac.za)

Dear Madame,

**PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH INTERVIEW AT THE AFRICAN UNION  
COMMISSION (DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)**

The Department of Economic Affairs at the African Union Commission has received a request to conduct a research interview for a PhD candidate – **Mr Seife Tadelle Kidane** on a research entitled **"A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: the case of the Horn of Africa"**.

The topic of research is relevant to the Continent considering that African leaders have, since the early years of independence, recognized the importance of creating a single African economic community which has been one of the most enduring priorities of many African leaders as well as a rallying call for Africans. It is in this vein that AU Agenda 2063, which absorbs the Abuja Treaty, is designed to be implemented within the framework of integration while enhancing and accelerating African integration efforts as evidenced by the Continental Flagship Projects.

In this regard and in support of this august research, I hereby inform you that **Mr Manasseh Ntaganda, Senior Policy Officer in the Department of Economic Affairs** has been designated to undertake the interview on behalf of the Department.

Please accept, the assurances of my highest consideration

**Mr Jean-Denis Gabikini**  
Ag. Director for Economic Affairs



cc: **Mr Manasseh Ntaganda, Senior Policy Officer in the Department of  
Economic Affairs**

---

**OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

Date: 11 August 2020  
Ref: AUDA/2020/0352/CA

**Ms Tracey Andrew**  
**Faculty of Humanities**  
**University of Pretoria**  
**Department of Political Sciences**  
**Private bag X20, Hatfield 0028**  
**Republic of South Africa**

Email: [tracey.andrew@up.ac.za](mailto:tracey.andrew@up.ac.za)

Dear Sir or Madam,

**RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH INTERVIEW**

The African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) have received a request to conduct a research interview in relation to a PhD candidate Mr Seife Tadelles Kidane on the research entitled: **“A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: The Case of the Horn of Africa.”**

The topic is timely and relevant to our region. Therefore, AUDA-NEPAD is more than willing to cooperate and provide two staff members who have related expertise and experience with our continental frameworks, strategies and our 50-year vision (Agenda 2063) towards the united ***Africa We Want***.

We hereby grant permission for further interviews expected from Programme/Project Managers and Directors.

**Sincerely Yours,**



**Dr Ibrahim Assane Mayaki**  
**Chief Executive Officer**

CC: Seife Tadelles Kidane (PhD Candidate)



## The Executive Secretary

ES10-402/402/20

02 August 2020

University of Pretoria,  
Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Political Sciences  
Private bag X20, Hatfield 0028  
Republic of South Africa

Dear Sir or Madam

**RE: Permission for Research Interview**

Greetings from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Djibouti. We have received a request to conduct a research interview from a Ph.D. candidate Seife Tadelle Kidane on the research entitled: **“A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: The Case of the Horn of Africa.”**

The research is relevant to our region, specifically for IGAD; hence, we consider it positively to provide two experts for interviews. Thus, we are delighted to host the candidate.

Sincerely Yours,

Workneh Gebeyehu  
Executive Secretary



CC: Seife Tadelle Kidane  
Ph.D. Candidate

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ዲን ጽ/ቤት



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
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Addis Ababa Ethiopia  
አዲስ አበባ ኢትዮጵያ


Date: July 24, 2020  
Ref.No:CSS/2012/2020/404

To: Mr.Seife Tadelle Kidane

Dear Mr.Seife,

Dear Mr.Seife Tadle Kidane your request to conduct an interview at our college is positively considered. We will further communicate about the details including issues of academic research ethics.

With regards,

  
Debebe Ero (PhD)  
Dean, College of Social Sciences  
Addis Ababa University  
E-mail: debebe.ero@aau.et

ሲታየልን ገኛን ደብዳቤ ቁጥርና ቀን ይጥቀሱ-Replying, please quote our reference



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ፕሪቶሪያ



Embassy of the  
Federal Democratic  
Republic of Ethiopia,  
Pretoria

Date 22/7/2020

Ref. No DO/SA/376/2020

University of Pretoria,  
Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Political Sciences  
Private bag X20, Hatfield 0028  
Republic of South Africa  
tracey.andrew@up.ac.za

Dear Sir or Madam


**RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH INTERVIEW**

Greetings from Ethiopian Embassy South Africa Pretoria. We have received a request to conduct a research interview in relation to Ph.D. candidate Seife Taddelle Kidane on the research entitled: **“A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: The Case of the Horn of Africa.”**

The title and the research are timely and relevant to our region; therefore, we are more than willing to cooperate and provide two experts who have related expertise and experience in the field. Thus, we are hereby granting permission for an interview.

Sincerely Yours,

Ambassador Dr. Shiferaw Teklemariam  
Head of Ethiopian Mission in the Republic of South Africa



CC: Seife Taddelle Kidane  
Ph.D. Candidate

Tel: +27 123 463 542  
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Fax: +27 123 463 867

E-mail: [pretoria.embassy@mfa.gov.et](mailto:pretoria.embassy@mfa.gov.et)  
Website: [www.pretoria.mfa.gov.et](http://www.pretoria.mfa.gov.et)

Address: 763 Justice Mahomed Street  
Bailey's Muckleneuk,  
P.O.Box11469, Hatfield 0028

Pretoria, SOUTH AFRICA



**EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF ERITREA,  
Pretoria, South Africa**

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Date: 05-08-2020

**TO:** Mr. Seife T. Kidane  
PhD Student at the  
University of Pretoria.

Acknowledge receipt of a letter date 10.07.2020. Moreover, in regards to our follow up discussion, I appreciate and welcome your research topic to share my experience on the critique of the current Approach to African Unification that could develop a positive alternative unification of the Horn.

Good Luck!

Salih Omar Abdu  
Ambassador

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Salih Omar Abdu'.



Embassy of Federal Republic of Somalia  
Pretoria – Republic of South Africa

29 July 2020

**SOMEMB/GL/79/2020**

Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Political Sciences  
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

Prof Siphamandla Zondi and Seife Tadle Kidane

**PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT THE EMBASSY**


Greetings from the Embassy of Somalia.

In response to your request that a research interview for a doctorate study about the African Unification in the Horn of Africa be conducted, the Embassy is pleased to inform that it has agreed to contribute to this study by nominating one of the diplomats to take part in such an interview.

The Embassy believes that the findings of the research may help to develop regional unification and that Somalia as a country, and all other countries in that region, may benefit from the outcome of the study.

As mentioned previously in our e-mail, we have to again remind you that most of our diplomats are currently not around, but believe that an appropriate candidate should be available towards the end of August/beginning of September.

Yours

  
pp Ambassador Mohamed Ali Mire  
Embassy of Somalia



831 Arcadia Street, Arcadia, Pretoria, 0083, Tel: 012-3440248/012-3433446, Fax: 0123437811,  
E-mail : info.sodmisa@gmail.com

University of South Africa  
Department of English Studies  
P O Box 392  
Unisa  
0003

06/10/2020

To Whom It May Concern

**Appendix M: Declaration of Language Editor**

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This letter serves to confirm that I, Professor Maurice Taonezvi Vambe, language-edited Mr Seife Tadelle Kidane doctoral thesis titled: **A Critique of the Current Approach to African Unification in order to Explore an Alternative Unification Model: The case of the Horn of Africa**, between August 2020 and October 2020. It is, of course, the prerogative of the writer to accept or reject my suggested changes. **I did not have sight of the final version of the thesis in its entirety and, therefore, cannot say whether new (unedited) text was added or whether/how Mr. Seife Tadelle Kidane responded to my changes/ queries/comments.**

Sincerely

Maurice Vambe (Professor in English Literature, UNISA.)



ENGLISH EDITOR: IMBIZO: International Journal of African Literary and Comparative Studies

Tel: +27 124298529: Cell: +27 (0790847386)



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