

# **Power and influence in post-secession South Sudan: A leadership perspective on nation-building**

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## **Abstract**

Following South Sudan's secession in 2011, the country faced significant political, social and economic challenges. The country emerged from a long and arduous nation-building journey, including almost 50 years of violent conflict, that would continue after declaring independence. This nation-building process would suffer a significant set-back in December 2013 when the most recent civil war broke out. This article provides a new perspective on South Sudan's nation-building trajectory that tends towards violence and complicates peace-building. It does so by utilising the leadership process approach from the Leadership Studies literature. While popular literature and commentary tends to fault the South Sudanese elite for the current crisis, there has not been a systematic effort to understand the leadership challenge and its role in conflict, peace and nation-building in South Sudan. In this article, South Sudan's nation-building process and its three primary components of (a) identity construction, (b) statehood and (c) collective will and responsibility, are analysed from a leadership perspective, focusing on issues of power and influence. The conclusion is reached that South Sudan's nation-building has been and will likely continue to trend towards a violent process due to a leadership process that lacks mutuality and is founded on insufficient sources of power.

KEYWORDS: [South Sudan](#); [leadership](#); [nation-building](#); [peace-building](#); [conflict](#)

## **Introduction**

On 9 July 2011, upon South Sudan's independence, President Salva Kiir made the following statement in his speech:

Let all the citizens of this new nation be equal before the law and have equal access to opportunities and equal responsibilities to serve the motherland. We are all South Sudanese. We may be Zande, Kakwa, Nuer, Toposa, Dinka, Lotuko, Anyuak, Bari and Shilluk, but remember you are South Sudanese first!<sup>1</sup>

Less than three years later, South Sudan would be plunged into a civil war and by the end of 2016 Adama Dieng, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, would release a report warning of potential genocide in the country.<sup>2</sup>

As a new country, founded on a nationalist struggle fuelled by perceptions and claims of identity difference, South Sudan was meant to indicate the birth of not just a new state, but a nation founded on decades of struggle. South Sudan's nation-building road, however, continues to be marred by violence and ever-deeper societal rifts. This, despite decades of war, secession and significant international investment in peace-building endeavours.<sup>3</sup> Much of the blame for the current situation in the country has been laid at the feet of an opportunistic or ineffective elite,<sup>4</sup> but there has been little effort to understand this leadership problem in a careful and systematic way.

This article seeks to explore South Sudan's nation-building and peace-building challenge from a leadership perspective, which sheds light on important issues of agency, particularly the role of multiple actors and their interaction with contextual and situational factors. It uses the leadership process approach to better understand the relationships in South Sudan that have resulted in a violent nation-building process rather than a peace-sustaining one. In particular, the article uses the concepts of power and mutuality, as understood in the leadership literature, to explain the rapid loss of national cohesion post-secession. The article argues that, once secession had been achieved, the common goals and interests of elites and society diverged in such a way that required national leaders to rely on coercive and reward power. As a result, the population sought out leadership founded on referent, legitimate and prototypical bases of power in more localised and diverse places.

## **Methodology**

This article stems from doctoral research<sup>5</sup> conducted between 2015 and 2018. The study conducted an extensive literature review of works on nationhood, leadership and South Sudan, to develop a conceptual framework of nationhood and a theoretical framework of leadership, used to analyse the case study of South Sudan from its early history until 2015. To support the existing literature, archival evidence was used from the Rift Valley Institute's Sudan Open Archive and a limited number of confirmatory interviews were conducted in Juba and Nairobi with key informants. The key conclusions and analysis have been drawn from this doctoral study and summarised here through a desktop study. This article utilises the conceptual framework of nationhood and theoretical framework of the leadership process to systematically analyse South Sudan's post-secession experience using existing literature. A case study approach is used to test the conceptual and theoretical framework, which both call for an in depth study of relationships and processes within a society.

As such, this article will first provide a summary of the proposed conceptual and theoretical frameworks, followed by an overview of South Sudan's context within the frame of these frameworks. This is then followed by a more detailed analysis of South Sudan's post-secession experience. The sections are divided according to the three elements of nationhood identified in the conceptual framework (identity construction, statehood, and collective will and responsibility), while the concepts of the leadership process are used in the analysis throughout. This is followed by a leadership analysis section which ties this all together. The article concludes with recommendations for further research.

## **On leaders, followers and nationhood<sup>6</sup>**

Nation-building processes can manifest violently or peacefully.<sup>7</sup> In the case of South Sudan, its nation-building trajectory has tended towards conflict and violence. Why is this the case? In order to understand this, it is important to first articulate what is understood by nationhood,

a highly contested concept, in this article. The nation, broadly, can refer to the sense of community a society holds.<sup>8</sup> More specifically, there are three indicators that can be used to understand the nation – national identity; statehood (including political organisation and territorial constraints); and collective will and responsibility. These elements of nationhood are derived from an extensive literature review on nation-building and nationalism literature.<sup>9</sup> National identity is understood to be socially constructed, dynamic and subjective.<sup>10</sup> Statehood, in this case, is used to refer to the nation's association with a specific territory,<sup>11</sup> as well as the ability to provide an effective form of government within the nation.<sup>12</sup> This conceptual framework does not prescribe a specific type of government for a nation to be considered either a nation or peaceful. Collective will and responsibility refers, respectively, to a community's ability to arrive at collective decisions and act accordingly, and to the loyalty, rights and responsibilities community members place on each other as part of the nation.<sup>13</sup>

The role of elites in nationalism, nation-building and identity-related conflict has been a question of debate for some time. Some view them as central drivers to the process, where identity is viewed as a mobilisation and instrumentalist tool, while others prefer to place more emphasis on the masses and the organic nature of identity.<sup>14</sup> These studies have tended to approach the issue from the entry point of the nation, with little systemic analysis into leadership processes. Instead, this article uses leadership as the entry point to better understand nation-building in South Sudan. Specifically, it uses the leadership process approach. The leadership process approach studies the relationship between leaders, followers and the situation.<sup>15</sup> Leadership is considered a process because of the focus on the relationships within leadership as a whole rather than on individual leaders, the positions they hold or the results they yield.<sup>16</sup> In this way, leadership is defined as a 'relational phenomenon' – it is a social process and not a label held by individual elites and power-wielders.<sup>17</sup> There have been several studies that explore these various relationships.

On the leader-follower relationship, scholars have explored how influence is exchanged between leaders and followers. Graen and Uhl-Bien for example, argue that a two-way influence is important between leaders and followers.<sup>18</sup> In other words, followers also influence leaders.<sup>19</sup> The nature of this exchange of influence is often determined by the degree of mutuality between leaders and followers. Mutuality refers to the presence of a common situation confronting both leaders and followers who therefore hold a common goal or purpose.<sup>20</sup> Another important determinant of how influence is exchanged is that of power. French and Raven identify five sources of power – referent power (followers follow because they identify with the leader or admire him/her); expert power (followers follow because the leader is competent in the field or situation at hand); legitimate power (followers follow because of 'internalised values' that legitimise a leader's right to rule); reward power (followers are enticed to comply and follow through a system of rewards); and coercive power (leaders use force and sanctions to gain followers compliance and loyalty).<sup>21</sup> Linked to this is Hogg's theory of prototypical leadership, which argues that group identification processes result in leaders that best represent the group 'prototype,' imbuing them with influence.<sup>22</sup> Such leaders have influence not because of the 'personal power' they wield but because they 'embody the norms of the group,' which gives them 'referent' and 'position' (or legitimate) power.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to this, the leadership process allows for a situational understanding of leadership. Leadership does not occur in a vacuum. Leaders are influenced by the situation they, and their followers, face.<sup>24</sup> Their response to this situation also creates a feedback loop which

alters or influences the situation.<sup>25</sup> As such, leadership is not dependent on individuals but rather on the situation, the ‘needs’ created by the situation and which ‘skills and abilities’ are most appropriate for that situation.<sup>26</sup> As Murphy states, ‘Leadership does not reside in a person. It is a function of the whole situation.’<sup>27</sup>

This understanding of leadership intersects with nation-building in several ways. In particular, the leader-follower relationship can be used to better understand in what ways elites are able to influence the nation-building process and under what circumstances followers accept or reject, and influence in turn, this exertion of leader power and influence. The situational understanding of leadership can be used to better understand the dynamism of nationhood and how it is influenced by changing contexts.

Using the leadership framework is novel and needed for a few key reasons. First, the Political Sciences discipline has failed to keep up with the advances in leadership studies in other fields, preferring to focus on institutions, despite the important role leadership plays in politics.<sup>28</sup> But in South Sudan, and many other countries, institutions have been or are increasingly removed from the real processes of power and influence in society. State-society relations are mitigated by a myriad of other processes, such as traditional governance, that need to be studied not as outliers of the political norm but as key determinants of social and political behaviour. The leadership process approach is not limited to the state and therefore allows for a study of such processes in a way that theories of state-building, factionalism, party politics, and patrimonialism and patronage would not allow. Conversely, as leadership does not privilege institutions or the state, it allows for the study of ‘informal’ processes as part of a whole society and its power relations, rather than as a process in opposition to the state.

The following sections will first provide a historical overview of South Sudan's nation-building process, with reference to the leadership process, followed by an analysis of South Sudan's post-secession experience and why peace-building failed.

## **Leadership and the nationhood question in South Sudan's history**

As the leadership process approach centres the situation in leadership analysis, it is necessary to provide an overview of the historical and contextual situation that has determined South Sudan's nation-building trajectory. South Sudanese secession marks a shift in the nation's situation and therefore the nation's needs. Yet, independence did not signify a ‘clean slate’ for South Sudan. Many of the challenges that contributed to the outbreak of two wars in Sudan in the twentieth century persisted after their conclusion, and new challenges emerged during these conflicts, resulting in a situation of severe economic deprivation, socio-economic inequality, societal rifts along identity lines, poor institutionalisation of governance structures and other traumas associated with a conflict-ridden society. It is as important to confront the situation that emerges as a result of war as it is to address the root causes of the conflict. In Sudan, these challenges include deepened societal rifts, a breakdown of governance institutions and a fragmentation of collective trust and responsibility.

### **Identity and conflict in Sudan**

In Sudan, social fragmentation and identity difference developed over a long period of conquest and colonisation, resulting in certain held ‘truths’ about social identity that are not necessarily supported by objective and factual inquiry. The most prominent example of this is

the Arab-African divide. Both conflictual and peaceful engagement between what is today northern and southern Sudan dates back several centuries.<sup>29</sup> Due to migratory processes and inter-marriage, the strictly bounded identity of 'Arab', as it is perceived today in Sudan, is not supported by objective physical attributes or historical evidence.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, a strong distinction emerged between Northerners and Southerners determined by their cultural and political orientation,<sup>31</sup> and a history of conflict and contestation.<sup>32</sup> Following Sudan's independence in 1956, when the South began to agitate in earnest for self-determination through violent rebellion and insurgency, the distinction between Northern and Southern identities would grow more embedded.<sup>33</sup>

However, the emphasis placed on identity difference and the specific attributes used to mobilise and frame the conflict, by leaders, the media and foreign actors, would shift throughout the two civil wars that would follow. Southern Sudan would suffer through two wars against Khartoum, the first from 1955 to 1972 when the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was signed, and the second from 1983 to 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. During the first conflict, there was a tension between framing the conflict as an Arab-African or political one.<sup>34</sup> The implementation of Shari'a law in 1983 shifted the framing of the conflict from a racial one to a religious one, though the two remained intertwined.<sup>35</sup> Following a split in the Southern liberation movement (the SPLM/A) in 1991, the conflict would again be re-framed by Southern leaders to include ethnic differences.<sup>36</sup> As a result of these changing contexts, identity has proven highly dynamic in Sudan as it has become reliant on the situation and the presence of a common enemy. This has created a 'negative' identity, founded in reaction to an 'other' and on what people are not, rather than a 'positive' identity, founded on a common history *and* future, common values, common attributes and common needs.

### **Statehood and nationhood in Sudan**

The case of Sudan demonstrates that how a state is built and made to reflect a perception of the nation is as important as what a state looks like (in terms of territory, institutions and ideology). Southern Sudan, in particular, has a history of contestation and tension with state formation. For most of its early history, people in Southern Sudan were outside the reach of the state.<sup>37</sup> It was with the growth of the Turco-Egyptian regime between 1821 and 1885 that southern Sudan began to face significant incursion by a centralised state entity, accompanied by an increase in the slave trade and economic exploitation.<sup>38</sup> This was followed by two regimes, both external to southern Sudan, the Mahdist regime from 1885 to 1898 and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1898 to 1956. Under British rule, a division between northern and southern Sudan was deepened with administrative policies that prohibited contact, cultural exchange and trading between the two regions,<sup>39</sup> and by directing more resources for socio-economic development to the North than the South.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, within southern Sudan the British policy of indirect rule (reliant on the identification and selection of local chiefs) centralised and crystallised previously fluid and dynamic ethnic identities based on colonial interpretations of ethnicity.<sup>41</sup> In general, southern Sudan resisted all these forms of external state rule and assimilation.<sup>42</sup>

The resistance to assimilation would only grow stronger after a Sudanese independence struggle and process that largely excluded the South and, in fact, Sudanese peoples in general.<sup>43</sup> This led to a rejection of the state by the South through open rebellion and civil war. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement promised, on paper, regional autonomy and temporarily halted Islamisation and Arabisation policies in the South by Khartoum.<sup>44</sup> The

Addis Ababa Agreement would fall apart when Sudanese President Nimeiri was forced to accommodate Islamist politicians for political reasons, eventually leading to the implementation of Shari'a law and the pursuit of an Islamist state.<sup>45</sup> The South's response was to immediately reject this state, which did not represent the Southern interpretation of the nation, once again leading to civil war. The second insurgency had as its goal a new democratic Sudan or self-determination for the South, which was interpreted by many Southerners as nothing short of secession.<sup>46</sup> During this period, Garang would promote the notion of a unified, democratic, secular Sudan, while the SPLM/A continued to pursue this goal of secession.<sup>47</sup> The issue of self-determination was a key sticking point in peace negotiations, but the CPA would include a provision for a referendum on secession.<sup>48</sup>

### **Collective will and responsibility in Sudan**

Similarly, due to limited, and at times no, mutuality between leaders and followers (both in Khartoum and in southern Sudan), collective will and responsibility was often fleeting and momentary, determined by situational factors and a temporary merging of interests rather than a long-term affinity of values and vision. A reading of Sudanese and South Sudanese history will demonstrate moments of collective will and periods of collective responsibility, at various levels (national, regional, sub-national etc.). However, these were often transient and subject to change when situations changed. The most evident example from early history is that of the Mahdi revolution against Turco-Egyptian rule. Southerners joined the Mahdi to overthrow this regime.<sup>49</sup> This alliance stemmed from a momentary convergence of interests, however, and not from a mutuality of needs, values and vision, as the subsequent oppression of Southerners by the Mahdist empire demonstrates.<sup>50</sup> A more recent example of collective will that crossed North–South divisions can be found in the second civil war where Garang pursued a broader vision which resulted in political and military allies from Northern Sudanese parties and militias.<sup>51</sup> Yet this alliance and solidarity appeared less important when southern Sudanese leaders were negotiating the CPA, which left many of these allies and their demands by the wayside.<sup>52</sup> Again, collective action was driven by a convergence of interests rather than values, which is not sustainable when situations change.

Within southern Sudan, collective will and responsibility has also proven brittle. A cause that has generally rallied Southerners behind a particular course of action is that of self-determination, in response to rule from the North. This is one of the key issues that drove the early development of Southern consciousness and political action,<sup>53</sup> and it was the most consistent demand and motivation in the two civil wars against Khartoum. Yet, in the Addis Ababa Agreement this demand was set aside by Southern leaders in what many Southerners viewed as an opportunistic move.<sup>54</sup> During the 1990s, a split within the leadership of the SPLM/A led to widespread violence within southern Sudan, which was framed along ethnic lines and by some accounts cost more lives than fighting with Khartoum.<sup>55</sup> Many viewed this as a 'war of the [...] educated elite',<sup>56</sup> where leaders lost sight of the self-determination goal and the struggle in pursuit of political gains.<sup>57</sup>

Throughout Sudan's history, when confronting the challenge of southern Sudan, there have been several contradictions in the nation-building process that have resulted in conflict and violence. The primary contradiction is the ways in which the state (in both its physical and institutional structure) clashed with other processes of identity construction. Perceptions of identity, in turn, varied in society and were not congruent with other perceptions of the state and its boundaries. As a result of this contradiction, collective responsibility, trust and loyalty was not determined by citizenship to a state or nation but rather other, much more fluid

identity formations, dependent on the situation. All this prevented the formation of a collective will for peace and development and instead gave rise to a multitude of motivations for conflict.

## **Leadership and nation-building in post-secession South Sudan**

After the CPA-prescribed six-year interim period, southern Sudanese voted to secede from Sudan in January 2011. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of this move, with 98.83 per cent voting for secession.<sup>58</sup> Despite enduring over fifty years of civil war in pursuit of this goal, South Sudanese leaders would prove ill-prepared for independence. Cohesion and unity would fragment as identity politics became the norm. Despite immense resources being dedicated to the momentous state-building task facing South Sudan, the state remains exceptionally weak and contradictions between statehood and nationhood continue to frustrate development and peacebuilding.<sup>59</sup> With the removal of the North as an imminent threat, attention could now be diverted to building the South Sudanese future, but collective will and responsibility proved brittle without this common enemy. The oppression felt by elites and the southern Sudanese populace alike, though in different forms, allowed for leaders to emerge and exercise influence on a prototypical basis and using referent and expert power. With the change in situation in 2011, the power bases that leaders had relied on previously shifted.

### **Identity in post-secession South Sudan**

In South Sudan, identity remains the dominant means through which loyalty, leaders, governance and resource distribution is determined. This is generated by and continues to generate a spiral of ‘othering’ that is detrimental to nation-building. As ‘othering’ is used to successfully raise support and mobilise followers and determine friend from foe, it embeds certain differences and encourages further ‘othering’ at lower levels due to its perceived efficacy. While this remains a tool for elites it has more significant consequences amongst the population. Yet it continues to be used due to the mutuality gap between leaders and followers, discussed below.

South Sudan's significant diversity (over sixty different ethnic groups) presents a nation-building challenge.<sup>60</sup> The foundations for a cohesive national identity could be found in a shared history of oppression and struggle, the dominant Christian religion and a shared, but resented, language of Arabic.<sup>61</sup> The mere existence of shared identity attributes, however, does not necessarily translate into a shared national identity.<sup>62</sup> The process by which shared attributes develop into a sense of nationhood is determined by contextual and historical factors, how attributes and shared experiences are framed, and the perceptions of identity driven by individual and communal experiences. Religion and language in this case are problematic attributes on which to found a nation (the first because of its exclusive nature and the second because of its association with former oppressors). This leaves the history of struggle against the North. Such a cornerstone for national identity, however, is fragile because it is a negative identity driven by a sense of difference from the North rather than affinity amongst South Sudanese.

In post-secession South Sudan, surveys indicated that people identified as ‘South Sudanese first’ and explained their identification by referring to the long and violent independence struggle.<sup>63</sup> The First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars and its associated processes created but did not embed a sense of nationhood. Political debate and collective responsibility and loyalty

continued to be determined largely by ethnicity.<sup>64</sup> In addition, much of social and political life is organised around ethnicity. Social networks, social capital, social safety nets and rural and urban land distribution are often driven by ethnic communities.<sup>65</sup>

As a result, the influence pathways in society are identity dependent. Hogg's theory of prototype leadership then becomes useful in explaining certain patterns. He argues that the effect of prototypical leadership increases with more salient groups and decreases with increased group diversity, which is context dependent.<sup>66</sup> So, with the changed context in South Sudan, a national leader that resembled the South Sudanese 'prototype' could not emerge as the salience of the South Sudanese identity suffered. This does not mean that a leader could not emerge at all, only that a prototype-based leadership was less likely and therefore required leadership founded on other bases of power that served the needs of society. For example, John Garang emerged as a national leader due to his referent, coercive, reward and expert power that responded to the needs of a society at war with an oppressor.

In post-secession South Sudan, people retreated to and gave influence to the leaders that served their post-conflict needs and resembled their community prototype. This tended to be ethnic and sub-ethnic communities. For example, in Nuer communities' key prophets such as Gatdeang, Nyachol and Dak Kueth Deng have, in differing ways, exercised significant influence in their communities by providing safe spaces (Gatdeang) or mobilising and blessing militant action in response to an insecure environment (Nyachol and Dak Kueth Deng).<sup>67</sup> Their influence, founded on prototypical norms and referent power, often rivalled that of the state and state leaders (whose power rested in official positions that only provide legitimate power if the position itself is considered legitimate<sup>68</sup>). Hutchinson and Pendle document two instances where this occurred with Gatdeang and Nyachol, in which President Kiir made a personal visit to Gatdeang following a Dinka cattle-raid and where Nyachol was able to avoid arrest due to fears of a violent response from her followers.<sup>69</sup>

This reliance on ethnic structures was cemented by a struggle narrative espousing Africanism, aimed at preserving African customs, to distinguish the South from the North.<sup>70</sup> South Sudanese returnees were forced to settle in their historical ethnic communities after secession, regardless of how much of this ethnic culture they retained.<sup>71</sup> The liberation struggle and the rhetoric of leaders such as Salva Kiir's above, was insufficient to challenge these embedded societal norms and institutions, reflecting a lack of influence on the president's part. Cross-ethnic trust similarly remained weak.<sup>72</sup> Also, with the advent of a new state, ethnic rhetoric was used to justify greater or lesser access to peace dividends, with particular emphasis being placed on the role of certain ethnic groups in the liberation struggle.<sup>73</sup> Such narratives are said to have resulted in notions of ethnic supremacy, especially among the Dinka and Nuer.<sup>74</sup> In this way, the logic of 'othering' and supremacy has allowed the same identity-based exclusion that occurred in Sudan to occur in South Sudan.<sup>75</sup>

This persistence of ethnic and sub-national identities above a national identity illustrates three things. First, while the struggle is a unifying narrative, it has been used in a divisive way. For example, those outside South Sudan during the struggle are seen as 'second-class citizens' who did not participate sufficiently in the liberation movement and are thought to have adopted external cultures from northern Sudan or East Africa.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, ethnic groups that dominated the liberation movement have been accused of claiming a right to greater benefits because of this role.<sup>77</sup> Secondly, the struggle narrative is often used by leaders for personal gain, rather than a nation-building purpose, discussed further in the next section. Third, the cause of the conflict was not a fundamental difference of identity as the struggle narrative



often espoused, but an endemic practice of ‘othering’ that sustains politics. In other words, a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was created between Northerners and Southerners in an effort to both make sense of political and economic conflicts and mobilise support in these conflicts. It was not the incompatibility of Northern and Southern identity that caused the civil war.

This practice of ‘othering’ is persistent in South Sudan because of the flawed leader-follower relationship which relies on identity rather than mutuality to build legitimacy and raise support for leaders. Hogg theorises that prototypical leadership can be effective because it reduces the need to exercise power, but it also runs the risk of ‘increasing status-based differentiation between leader and followers’ in the long run which counter-acts the influence provided by the shared identity.<sup>78</sup> This may lead to the ‘pitfalls’ of prototype leadership including the abuse of power in an effort to maintain leadership and the reliance on prototypicality rather than the needed skills and abilities needed for the situation in identifying leaders.<sup>79</sup> Both these trends have been seen in South Sudan. The SPLM/A elite have been driven to using reward and coercive power to maintain influence (see below) and reports indicate that despite a lack of interest in the political conflict, ordinary South Sudanese are being compelled to choose sides, often because of their ethnic identity.<sup>80</sup> The presence of an external threat may be useful in reducing these trends as it enhances the group identification processes that support prototypical leadership.<sup>81</sup> Since the external threat has diminished in South Sudan, it is indicative that the situation calls for a new process of leadership emergence that does not rely on prototypicality.

So, in independent South Sudan, without the racial and religious distinction from the politically dominant Northern communities, this ‘othering’ practice turned towards ethnic ‘othering’, due to its central role in socio-economic and political structures, as well as the remnants of inter-ethnic violence from the Second Sudanese Civil War. For example, competing ‘victim-liberator narratives’ between the two dominant groups of the Dinka and the Nuer emerged.<sup>82</sup> Also, the perceived domination of the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups has raised concerns of exclusion or extermination amongst other groups such as the Equatorians and the Murle.<sup>83</sup> In particular, Equatorian communities, with a history of “marginalisation and land dispossession” under the SPLM/A,<sup>84</sup> felt excluded from the benefits of an independent South Sudan.<sup>85</sup> In this way, dominant identity divisions keep shifting. In the end, the independence struggle remains the only narrative that transcends various identity groups in South Sudan but grows weaker as distance from the liberation struggle grows.

The consequences of this continued ‘othering’ would be disastrous. When a political dispute broke out into violence in December 2013, the conflict quickly spread across the country and spiralled into an ethnically framed conflict.<sup>86</sup> The lines drawn reflected those of the 1991 split, predominantly along Dinka (Kiir's ethnic group) and Nuer (former vice president Riek Machar's ethnic group) lines, and has resulted in significant ethnic and human rights abuses.<sup>87</sup>

### **Statehood and nationhood in post-secession South Sudan**

State-building efforts have largely failed. Despite the forty per cent of the budget being directed towards security institutions during the interim period insecurity persists and security institutions have primarily served the interests of elites.<sup>88</sup> At the same time, NGO's provide the majority of services (an estimated eighty per cent in rural areas) that are the responsibility of the state.<sup>89</sup> South Sudan's post-secession experience demonstrates that nation-building entails more than a redrawing of borders and building of institutions. Ensuring the state and nation are congruent requires a mutual understanding between followers and leaders on what

the nation is,<sup>90</sup> what the purpose of the state is, how the state will reflect the understood nation, and what the most important needs and values of the nation are. As this was not evident, the state became a commodity for elites and sub-national identity groups, furthering the cycle of fragmentation and contradiction between state and nation.

With the creation of the new South Sudanese state, a significant amount of attention was diverted to delineating and securing the internal and external borders of the state.<sup>91</sup> As the conflict (and the many sub-conflicts therein) was often framed in identity terms, this process of border drawing and making was driven by perceptions of identity. Identity, however, is not as easily delineated as territory, as the conflict surrounding Abyei illustrates. In focusing attention on the border disputes with Sudan, the new South Sudanese government was also able to maintain a sense of unity and nationalism by presenting Sudan as a continued threat, while internal challenges of underdevelopment and poor service delivery festered.<sup>92</sup> This focus on securing South Sudan's borders was an attempt to entrench the ruling party's legitimacy through solidifying a nation-state.<sup>93</sup> In this way, the purpose of the South Sudanese state was co-opted by the elites to serve their interests, rather than that of society.

This is further evidenced by the patronage system in state institutions. Access to the state and bureaucratic positions provide a leader and his followers (largely determined by kinship) access to state resources, particularly oil profits.<sup>94</sup> As a result, debates surrounding administrative borders spark conflict because of their impact on state access.<sup>95</sup> For example, a dispute between the Monyjooc and Ajak sections of two different Dinka sub-tribes, around ownership of the Maṅar settlement and boundary, was 'related not to competition over shared natural resources but to obtaining a place in a new administration,' and 'symbols of the state' such as letters, signs and flags were used to assert authority.<sup>96</sup> The state became a highly pursued commodity rather than an entity that exists to protect and serve the people it houses. In addition, the basis for prototype leadership (referent and legitimate power) became enmeshed with reward power. As a result, the norms that would foster the exchange of influence between leaders and followers, would have to compete with pathways of influence that relied on the provision of concrete rewards generated through state access.

At the societal level, after the interim period, administrative units increased significantly as part of a decentralisation strategy that was meant to increase rural development, urbanisation and service delivery.<sup>97</sup> These states, counties and payams usually ran parallel to ethnic groups, leading to an equation of ethnic and geographical boundaries.<sup>98</sup> But the simplification of complex identity groups, that instil a sense of belonging, generate norms and provide safety nets, into administrative territorial units is not straightforward, as Cormack explains regarding efforts to translate the Dinka wuot (cattle-camp) system into government administrations.<sup>99</sup> Ethnic identities have thus been validated by the creation of internal states and counties, hindering cross-ethnic nation-building.<sup>100</sup> As a result, instead of resolving the tension between nation and state, the creation of a new state enhanced competition over territory as smaller ethnic and regional groups sought to 'assert their claims to territory, status and recognition'.<sup>101</sup> The state thus became a source of destabilisation rather than the arbiter of societal relationships.

Competition for power at the centre was replicated at the local level due to the patronage networks that dominate South Sudanese politics.<sup>102</sup> Elites encouraged boundary disputes in their pursuit of state access and its associated resources.<sup>103</sup> Ensuring group access to land and other economic resources has been identified as a key driver of border conflicts amongst followers.<sup>104</sup> Following the trend in Sudanese history, where the South sought autonomy due

to its perceived primordial difference from the North, these divisions in South Sudanese society fuelled a debate of federalism. The idea of federalism was partly raised in response to the felt sense of domination by the Dinka.<sup>105</sup> The argument given was that federalism would allow groups to maintain their ethnic identity while promoting a national identity as well.<sup>106</sup> Some experts, however, contend that decentralisation is only likely to aggravate the issue by proliferating conflicts over ever smaller boundaries.<sup>107</sup>

The state should, in theory, provide leaders with legitimate power through their positions in political and administrative office. It is important, however, to qualify this with the foundations or preconditions of legitimate power identified by French and Raven, namely cultural values, an ‘acceptance of the social structure [...] as right,’ and/or appointment by another legitimate authority.<sup>108</sup> Legitimate power is dependent on the values of the followers, not on the personal power or abilities of the leader.<sup>109</sup> Many of these preconditions are absent in the South Sudanese state, and there are competing authorities with overlapping or greater authority. The greater legitimacy of prophets amongst the Nuer has already been commented on, but this can also be seen in land governance. For example, in Yei Town and its surroundings, traditional authorities such as the *monye menu* (land ‘custodians’) and *monye kuro* (clan-elders), the chiefs (which occupy a position in between traditional and state authority), and the *Payam* (administrative authority appointed by the state), compete for authority over land governance, with their influence being determined by differing groups’ perception of the legitimacy of the traditional or state structures (often guided by whether the community originated from the area or had migrated there during the war).<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, competition for state access remains high, not for the legitimate power it should embody but for the reward and coercive power it provides access to.

Another example of competing authorities can be found in local militant groups, which hold a complex relationship with state authority and local communities. The *titweng* (Dinka armed cattle-keepers) for example, have been at times incorporated into the state, at other times competed with the state, and yet other times been relied on by state officials for protection of their own cattle.<sup>111</sup> Their legitimacy and influence stems from legitimate and reward power through the cultural norms that place high value on *titweng* membership and their ability to protect their communities.<sup>112</sup> This, and examples of recruitment and leadership through established ‘historical practice’ in Equatorial militant groups during the recent civil war, have been used to demonstrate the blurred lines between state/formal uses of violence and community/informal uses of violence.<sup>113</sup> Contrary to the Weberian understanding of the state as the ‘monopol[y of] the legitimate use of force’,<sup>114</sup> the South Sudanese state appears to rely on the legitimacy afforded to communal uses of violence both to fulfil the role of protector of citizens and to defend against opposition.<sup>115</sup>

All this is not conducive to nation-building which requires a closing of the gap between the state and societal norms and notions of legitimacy. In the end, the state often served to unbalance inter-group power relations.<sup>116</sup> As the state is captured by the elite, converting administrative units into ‘tribal fiefdoms’ and promoting inter-ethnic conflict, the societal structures and norms that managed conflict in the past have been eroded.<sup>117</sup> As a result, state-building in the South Sudanese case actually led to an erosion of cross-ethnic ties and nation-building foundations, while further fragmenting society,<sup>118</sup> rather than promoting nation-building. The current conflict has emerged in part because of this commodification and ethnicisation of the state. The political conflict between Kiir and Machar threatened their respective ethnic groups’ perception of access to the state,<sup>119</sup> leading to violence.

## Collective will and responsibility in post-secession South Sudan

The 2011 referendum provided the illusion of collective will and therefore nationhood. This, however, was a moment of ‘spontaneous cohesion’.<sup>120</sup> The true test of collective will would come later, as insurgency would have to give way to peace-building. The collective will needed for peace-building requires a more nuanced understanding of the nation than the collective will that emerges during war in the presence of a common enemy. A collective enemy provides the impression of mutuality by simplifying collective needs to the elimination of the perceived threat. Peace and development, however, require a complex understanding of the situation, society and its varied needs in order to develop a collective vision that drives collective action. Limited mutuality makes this even more difficult as elites struggle to understand and respond to societal needs that may be divergent from their own. The bases of power also shift, as a national prototypical leadership is less feasible without the external threat. Persuading others towards a collective national goal would require influence, which the SPLM/A leadership struggled to maintain post-secession.

The elation that accompanied the referendum would quickly fade in response to continued economic strife, poor service delivery and insecurity.<sup>121</sup> Leaders were accused of using their power in an independent country to enhance personal wealth rather than pursue development.<sup>122</sup> At the same time, efforts at reconciliation were limited. Peace and stability were favoured over justice, leading to strategies of co-option of opposition and rebel leaders amongst the elite and largely ineffectual peace conferences amongst the populace.<sup>123</sup> This is indicative of an approach to peace-building and nation-building that lacks a broad ideology, clear strategy and unifying vision and instead relies on ad-hoc and short-term responses that are often driven by temporary elite interests rather than the long-term needs of society. Collective will, as a result, is often shifting and rarely indicative of a broader nation.

Instead, collective will in South Sudan appears to be driven by mobilisation tactics that rely on the invocation of a common enemy.<sup>124</sup> In fact, much of the sense of belonging to South Sudan and the geographical space it occupies was driven by the narrative of an oppressive North.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, at a sub-national level, narratives of ‘ethnic demotion’ have been a central means whereby politicians build a follower base.<sup>126</sup> This has the consequence of breaking down societal interests and associating them with specific identity markers while also demonstrating the limited mutuality between leaders and followers, who have little else in common with followers beyond common identity markers. However, the common enemy often shifts when contexts and situations change, making collective will and thus the nation, highly fluid. It is also dependent on a situation of crisis or conflict with a clear enemy, or risks manufacturing common enemies at ever smaller levels in order to manufacture mutuality between leaders and followers. It is therefore not conducive to peace-building. When leadership is founded on a deeper sense of mutuality, based on common needs and vision, it is likely to generate the collective will needed for peaceful nation-building as leaders are forced to respond to the actual challenges and situations facing a society.

Another challenge to the formation of collective will in post-secession South Sudan was the restrictions on societal dialogue and conversation. In order for influence to be exchanged between leaders and followers, which is needed to develop mutuality and a collective will that reflects both actors, channels of influence and dialogue must be available. Examples of this challenge can be seen in key discussions on South Sudan's future. Both the South Sudan Development Plan and the constitution-making process suffered from problems of limited public consultations and a significant gap between government, administrative units, civil

society<sup>127</sup> and the populace.<sup>128</sup> On a wider level, civil society has found itself under pressure by government since independence, as civil society's interests diverted from mobilising support for secession to issues of governance and service delivery.<sup>129</sup> This indicates once again that leader-follower mutuality, and consequently the South Sudanese nation and its associated collective will, was dependent on the independence struggle.

As a result of this spiral of 'othering' and state fragmentation, collective will and responsibility also splintered both between sub-national identity groups and between followers and leaders. As elite and follower interests began to diverge, due to different understandings of identity and the state, collective will for peace faltered. Elite alliances and rifts did not reflect follower needs and goals. Conflict and violence became a feasible tool for leaders and followers, but in pursuit of different needs and goals, complicating peace-building significantly. In short, the tenuous and manufactured mutuality that had sustained the South Sudanese 'nation' up until secession now began to fragment and disintegrate.

### **Nation-building in post-secession South Sudan: A leadership analysis**

As demonstrated in South Sudan's post-secession experience, identity continued to fluctuate based on situation and context. What is even more evident is how this is determined by elite interests. Perceptions of identity and their use appear more fluid amongst elites than amongst followers, amongst whom it has become ever more embedded and is an essential tool for governance, social safety nets and determining the distribution of resources. For elites, it appears to serve a far more instrumental purpose, as a mobilisation tool in pursuit of the state and its associated benefits. Herein lies one of the tensions between identity construction and statehood. In this situation, the state has failed to reflect and build a national identity as both the state and identity have become tools serving different actors (leaders and followers) in their differing needs, which grow ever wider as the mutuality gap persists. For elites, identity is a changeable tool to be used in pursuit of a state that serves elite interests. For followers, identity groups often fulfil crucial societal and institutional roles that traditionally fall within the remit of the state.

Leaders and followers continue to grow more independent of each other, as the power bases for state-appointed leaders to influence followers diminishes, and others emerge whose influence and power tend to be dependent on ever-narrower identity formations and norms. As a result, the contradictions between statehood and nationhood continue to grow and continue to divide rather than unify the nation. Further aggravated by and aggravating this, is the way in which collective will and responsibility are determined by sub-national identities as opposed to national or state loyalties. These contradictions between the various elements of nationhood can be explained through an analysis of the leadership process at work.

In independent South Sudan, due to the lack of mutuality between leader and follower, support and influence was often exchanged through coercive and reward power. Such power does little to stimulate collective will and responsibility as people are driven to act out of personal or communal interests rather than a fundamental agreement of the problem, solution and goals. It is also less sustainable as such power is dependent on the real and perceived ability of the leader to continue providing the rewards or sanctions.<sup>130</sup> Referent power, which is founded on an affinity with the leader,<sup>131</sup> is also superficial and has been used in South Sudan to further fragment society as leaders resorted to identity narratives to raise the needed popular support. Sub-national identity attributes were dramatised. The state became an increasingly ethnicised commodity. The collective will and responsibility of South Sudanese

disintegrated. Individual leaders are often blamed for this, but the systemic and cyclical nature of these issues indicate a problem in the leadership process.

South Sudanese leaders have been criticised and blamed for the current crisis.<sup>132</sup> The SPLM has been accused of retaining its military and un-democratic nature in its actions and organisation.<sup>133</sup> Corruption is prevalent, with oil rents being diverted to elites rather than development.<sup>134</sup> The claim to lead by this party and its members is almost wholly dependent on its role as the liberator, which is seen to include an entitlement to the associated economic benefits of power.<sup>135</sup> But leadership is situational, making this an insufficient basis on which to govern and lead a society. As a result, elites have largely lost their influence amongst the population. Currently, the government or the official opposition's legitimacy to speak on behalf of the people at the negotiating table is questioned.<sup>136</sup> While the SPLM/A may have been best suited to respond to a situation of oppression and conflict, this does not necessarily mean they are best suited to a peace-building situation. In addition, oppression and conflict permits leadership to be founded on the narrative of 'the other', as discussed above. This is not the ideal form of creating legitimacy and mutuality in a peace-building situation. In order to lead the country a change in this pattern is necessary.

The use of reward power is also particularly noteworthy in the South Sudanese case. The approach of co-opting opposition and rebel leaders resulted in a problem of first, overstretching the resources of the state in order to provide said 'rewards' and second, entrenching a pattern of leadership emergence not reliant on leader response to a situation or mutuality but rather through rebellion. The SPLM employed a 'Big Tent' strategy, which entailed amnesty for rebel leaders and warlords and their co-option into government and the military.<sup>137</sup> As a result, the role of security institutions shifted towards buying peace rather than ensuring security,<sup>138</sup> demonstrating again the lack of mutuality between and divergence of leader-follower interests. Similarly, Kiir addressed corruption and poor performance in government by prioritising stability rather than accountability (preferring not to act to prevent future rebellions).<sup>139</sup> Both these strategies have created a dangerous precedent where political and military office can realistically be achieved through insurgency.<sup>140</sup> This political culture, however, is extremely detrimental to not just peace-building but nation-building as well. As these leaders rely on ethnic mobilisation to build support, because of the ethnicised nature of social and political organisation, the cyclical use of rebellion to achieve leaders' personal ambitions continues to cement identity differences in society at large. Therefore, the use of reward and coercive power is detrimental to the development of a collective identity, collective will and collective loyalty.

Regarding the issue of borders and boundaries, Thomas points out that 'leaderships of smaller ethnic groups want smaller divisions'.<sup>141</sup> This leads to a situation of gerrymandering where the federalism debate, meant to protect the interests of minorities, has turned into a tool to protect elite interests. Thomas also indicates that the disputes over administrative borders lack dialogue and engagement with followers and are dominated by elites.<sup>142</sup> Institutional design, a key component of liberal peace-building, has been co-opted by elite interests that are not driven by a nation-building vision or mutuality with followers. In this way, South Sudan demonstrates the limits of institutional peace-building endeavours when leadership is not taken into account. A simplified analysis of the ongoing conflict, that does not take into account the multitude of relationships and power dynamics, runs the risk of continuing efforts to impose a state and institution-based solution that will fail to confront the actual situation facing South Sudanese.

In the absence of mutuality between leaders and followers to ensure the efficacy of institutions, other leaders must step into this role. Civil society should bridge the gap between state and society, bringing the needs of society to leaders and ensuring an exchange of influence between leaders and followers. As discussed above, while the SPLM has encouraged the participation of civil society in service delivery, it has been less welcoming of civil society participation that ‘foster[s] citizenry participation in policymaking and governance’.<sup>143</sup> In other words, leaders have accepted civil society as long as they have permitted leaders to escape their responsibility to serve the needs of their followers. When fostering influence between followers and leaders by holding leaders accountable, however, they are less accepting.

As a result, the mutuality gap persists while collective will suffers. How then do leaders engage with their followers? The way in which influence is exchanged is telling for a nation. In a unified nation, where collective will exists, followers across the nation should be able to influence leaders and vice versa. However, the channels for communication between leaders and followers is almost non-existent in South Sudan. Elites communicate with their rural constituents primarily through sub-national ethnic organisations and associations.<sup>144</sup> At the same time, ethnic organisations hold significant influence over leaders. The Jieng Council of Elders of the Dinka ethnic group, for example, is said to hold significant influence over the government.<sup>145</sup> This serves the dual purpose of continuing the ethnicisation of politics by limiting influence to one's ethnic group, and preventing the development of mutuality between leaders and broader society. Rather, mutuality is manufactured when it is in the interest of leaders to do so. Such a process creates a similar problem to that of the liberation struggle. While a mutual goal may be evident (e.g. independence, a new administrative boundary etc.), it is not founded on mutual interests and needs. As a result, when said goal is achieved leaders are not compelled to continue serving the interests of followers. Consequently, collective will becomes a volatile and elusive goal when mutuality is lacking.

## **Conclusion**

South Sudan's nation-building story is one of contradiction, contestation and violence. While cohesive states and nations have been formed from war and conflict, this did not occur in South Sudan. The South Sudanese nation remains obscure and fragmented and grows more so as the current civil war proceeds. The reasons for this nation-building challenge are manifold and multi-dimensional. A leadership analysis provides some insight into the multiple processes that contribute to this challenge, including processes of state-building and identity construction. In South Sudan, a leadership process that suffers from a flawed leader-follower relationship has resulted in a highly unstable and dynamic nation-building process. Identity and collective will and responsibility shift in response to situational factors, which complicates state-building efforts by not providing a sound foundation on which a state can be formed. As such, institutional and elite efforts at peace-building and state-building are likely to continue to fail in the face of a society that lacks the mutuality needed with its leaders to build a cohesive and peaceful nation.

Because of this lack of mutuality, the bases of power that determine the exchange of influence between followers and leaders is highly fluid and unreliable. So, when the secession dream was finally achieved, South Sudan fragmented not because of irreconcilable ethnic differences or a purely political dispute amongst elites, but because the leaders of the state had to shift their bases of power to an unsustainable system of reward and coercive power. In response and contenders for legitimate, referent, expert power emerged largely

through the processes of prototypical leadership. This, in turn, served to highlight rather than bridge the fragile divisions in society and forced the leaders at the top and centre to resort to violence to maintain their positions as the formal but not legitimate leaders of the state.

This study has shown that a shift in thinking towards leadership may be useful for a better understanding of nation-building and conflict dynamics. As such, further empirical research would be of use to test these ideas within different contexts, and to provide a more detailed understanding of the relationships within South Sudan. For example, a comprehensive study of how leaders emerge across different sectors and regions in South Sudan will provide clarity on other potential sources of influence and power that may tend towards more peaceful nation-building processes. These could then be capitalised on as the country searches for sources of sustainable peace. A better understanding of influence and the foundations of mutuality within South Sudanese society, could assist peacebuilders in identifying the peace sustaining relationships that will bridge the gap between leaders and followers, and strengthen the social contract between South Sudanese and those who govern them.

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### **Notes**

1 Gurtong, 2011, President Kiir's Independence Speech, para 13.

2 United Nations, 'Statement by Adama Dieng'.

3 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan', 2–4; UNMISS, 'UNMISS Facts and Figures'.

4 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan', 8; Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace', 1–4).

5 See Theron, *Understanding Nation-building*.

6 For a full discussion on these frameworks and the literature reviewed see: Theron, *Understanding Nation-Building*.

7 Dandeker, *Nationalism and Violence*, 3–4.

8 Holsti, *International Politics*, 58.

9 For examples of literature that has influenced this conceptualization see: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6–7; Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*; Deutsch, 'Nation-building and National Development,' 11–2; Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 7, 9–10; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 31; Hippler, *Nation-Building*; Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence*, 40; Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 27, 127; Norman, 'Thinking through Nationalism,' 5; Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 71, 75–6, 83, 196; Ting, 'Social Construction of Nation,' 457; Weber, 'The Nation,' 22; Weilenmann, 'The Interlocking of Nation,' 33, 43.

10 For examples of literature that supports this thesis see: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 4–6; Brubaker, 'Nationalism reframed,' 21; Deutsch, 'Nation-Building and National Development,' 11; Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 8–9; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5–7; Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 11–5; Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 67–92; Hroch, 'From National Movement,' 61–8; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Chapter 2; Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence*, 29–40; Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 28; Renan, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?,' 17; Ting, 'Social Construction of Nation'; Weber, 'The Nation,' 21–3

11 Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 127–129; Ting, ‘Social Construction of Nation,’ 457.

12 Deutsch, ‘Nation-Building and National Development,’ 12; Giddens quoted in Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 71.

13 Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 27; Weilenmann, ‘The Interlocking of Nation,’ 43; Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 196.

14 Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, 14–6; Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 12, 15; Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 20; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Hroch, ‘From National Movement,’ 63; Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*, 47–8; Stewart, ‘Horizontal Inequalities and conflict,’ 8.

15 Pierce and Newstrom, *Leaders and the Leadership Process*, 5–6.

16 Grint, *Leadership: A Very Short Introduction*; Murphy, ‘A Study of the Leadership Process,’ 674.

17 *Ibid.*, 11–4.

18 Graen and Uhl-Bien, ‘Relationship-based Approach to Leadership’, 223.

19 Oc and Bashshur, ‘Followership, Leadership and Social Influence,’ 919–20.

20 Bass, *Handbook of Leadership*, 21; Burns, *Leadership*, 10; Northouse, *Leadership: Theory & Practice*, 6.

21 French and Raven, ‘The Bases of Social Power,’ 136–41.

22 Hogg, ‘A Social Identity Theory of Leadership.’

23 *Ibid.*, 194.

24 Hollander and Julian, ‘Contemporary Trends,’ 15.

25 Pierce and Newstrom, *Leaders and the Leadership Process*, 5.

26 Murphy, ‘A Study of the Leadership Process,’ 674

27 *Ibid.*

28 Peele, ‘Leadership and Politics.’

29 Arnold and Le Riche, *From Revolution to Independence*, 7–10; Deng, *War of Visions*, 10; Iyob and Khadiagala, *Elusive Quest for Peace*, 22.

30 Gray, ‘Introduction’, 1; Sawant, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sudan’, 345.

31 *Ibid.*, 1.

- 32 Arnold and Le Riche, *From Revolution to Independence*, 7–10.
- 33 The Observer, ‘South Sudan massacres reported’; Oduho and Deng, *Problem of the Southern Sudan*, 17; Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur*, 41; Rolandsen, ‘A quick fix?’ 555.
- 34 This is evidenced in the rhetoric of key documents (e.g. Oduho and Deng, *Problem of the Southern Sudan*; SANU, ‘Call for African Unity’; South Sudan Resistance Movement, *The Anya-Nya Struggle*).
- 35 Deng, *War of Visions*, 12–3; Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology’, 36.
- 36 Hutchinson, ‘A Curse from God?’ 308; Jok and Hutchinson, ‘Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War,’ 126, 131; Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government: Political Changes*, 38.
- 37 Johnson, *Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 37–39.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 41.
- 39 Nasong’o and Murunga, ‘Lack of Consensus,’ 59.
- 40 Copnall, *A Poisonous Thorn*, 6–8; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, Introduction.
- 41 Idris, *Conflict and Politics of Identity*, 23; Poggo, *First Sudanese Civil War*, 22–3; Zambakari, ‘Sudan and South Sudan,’ 73–75.
- 42 Gray, Some aspects of Islam, 1; Arnold and Le Riche, *From Revolution to Independence*, 3.
- 43 Johnson, *Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, 69–70; Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan*, 46–7; Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology,’ 30; Poggo, *First Sudanese Civil War*, 32–3, 35–6.
- 44 Nasong’o and Murunga, ‘Lack of Consensus,’ 66; Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur*, 50.
- 45 *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, 54–5.
- 46 Deng, *War of Visions*, 20; Young, *John Garang's Legacy*, 539.
- 47 Garang, *Call for Democracy*, 26; Novicki ‘Interview: John Garang’; Deng, *War of Visions*, 20.
- 48 Johnson, *Waging Peace in Sudan*, 42–50; Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 3–8.
- 49 Collins, *The Southern Sudan*, 23, 29; Deng, *War of Visions*, 10–1.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 29–30; *Ibid.*

- 51 Deng, *Sudan: In Search of Itself*, 158; Nasong'o and Murunga, 'Lack of Consensus,' 67; Rolandsen, 'A quick fix?' 553.
- 52 Johnson, *Waging Peace in Sudan*, 177; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 156.
- 53 Poggo, *First Sudanese Civil War*, 37–8.
- 54 Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur*, 51.
- 55 Copnall, *A Poisonous Thorn*, 32; Hutchinson, 'A Curse from God?' 308; Jok and Hutchinson, 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War,' 126–7, 131; Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government: Political Changes*, 38.
- 56 Jok and Hutchinson, 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War,' 125.
- 57 Deng, *War of Visions*, 20–1; Jok and Hutchinson, 'Sudan's Prolonged Second Civil War,' 125, 128, 136; Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government: Political Changes*, 37.
- 58 Frahm, 'Making borders,' 253.
- 59 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 1–5.
- 60 Frahm, 'Making borders,' 253; Johnson, *The Untold Story*, Chapter 2.
- 61 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 62 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Chapter 1; Norman, 'Thinking through Nationalism,' 5; Weber, 'The Nation,' 22.
- 63 Frahm, 'Making borders,' 253.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 66 Hogg, 'A Social Identity Theory of Leadership', 189, 194.
- 67 Johnson, 'South Sudan: The Untold Story,' Chapter 4 & 6; Hutchinson and Pendle, 'Violence, legitimacy and prophecy.'
- 68 French and Raven, 'The Bases of Social Power,' 138–9.
- 69 Hutchinson and Pendle, 'Violence, legitimacy and prophecy.'
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Frahm, 'Making borders,' 261.
- 72 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 conflict,' 98.

- 73 Ibid, 85, 87; Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 74 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 conflict,' 87.
- 75 Ibid., 95.
- 76 Frahm, 'Making borders,' 254.
- 77 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 conflict,' 85, 87.
- 78 Hogg, 'A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,' 194.
- 79 Ibid., 195.
- 80 Pendle and Hutchinson, 'Violence, Legitimacy and Prophecy,' 427; De Vries and Schomerus, 'South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal,' 337.
- 81 Hogg, 'A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,' 194.
- 82 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict,' 96–7.
- 83 Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 260.
- 84 Medani, 'Strife and Secession in Sudan,' 143.
- 85 Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 260.
- 86 ICG, 'Merging Conflicts,' 10; Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict,' 96.
- 87 AUCISS, *Final Report*; Human Rights Council, Assessment Mission; ICG, 'Merging Conflicts,' 10–2; Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 6–7; UNMISS, A Report on Violations and Abuses.
- 88 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 3.
- 89 Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 3.
- 90 Mylonas defines nation-building as ensuring 'the boundaries of the state and nation coincide' (Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building*, xx).
- 91 Arnold and Le Riche, *From Revolution to Independence*, 125; Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 255.
- 92 Ibid., 265–7.
- 93 Arnold and Le Riche, *From Revolution to Independence*, 125; Frahm, 'Making borders,' 255.
- 94 Awolich, 'South Sudan's National Identity Challenge,' 4; Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict,' 98–9; Rolandsen, 'Another Civil War in South Sudan,' 165.

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- 96 Cormack, 'Borders are Galaxies,' 522.
- 97 AUCISS, *Final Report*, 44–52; Pendle, 'Interrupting the balance,' 236–237; Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 98 Pendle, 'Interrupting the balance,' 237; Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 99 Cormack, 'Borders are Galaxies,' 508.
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- 101 Ibid., 260–1.
- 102 Pendle, 'Interrupting the Balance,' 228.
- 103 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 104 Ibid., Pendle, 'Interrupting the Balance,' 238.
- 105 Bereketgab, *Redefining National Identity*, 312.
- 106 Frahm, 'Defining a Nation,' 31.
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- 109 Ibid.
- 110 Van Leeuwen, De Kerkhof and Van Leynseele, 'Transforming Land Governance'.
- 111 Pendle, 'They are Now Community Police.'
- 112 See Pendle, 'They are now Community Police,' for an explanation of the cultural norms that legitimize the *titweng* and their role as protectors.
- 113 Kindersley and Rolandsen, 'Civil War on a Shoestring'; Pendle 'They are now Community Police.'
- 114 Weber, 'Politics as Vocation', 8.
- 115 See Pendle, 'They are now Community Police,'; Kindersley and Rolandsen, 'Civil War on a Shoestring,' for examples of this occurring.
- 116 Pendle, 'Interrupting the Balance,' 227.
- 117 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict,' 97–8.

118 Ibid., 100.

119 Awolich, 'South Sudan's National Identity Challenge,' 4.

120 Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict, 100.

121 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 4; Gerenge, 'South Sudan's December 2013 Conflict,' 96.

122 Johnson, *The Untold Story*, Prologue, Chapter 2; Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 5.

123 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 3; Awolich, 'South Sudan's National Identity Challenge,' 9; Reeve, *Peace and Conflict Assessment*, 53, 56–8; Wilson, 'Local Peace Processes in Sudan,' 3, 5–7.

124 Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 254.

125 Schultz, 'There it Will be Better ... ', 314.

126 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.

127 For the purposes of this article civil society refers to 'institutions that are 'private' in that they are independent from government and organized by individuals in pursuit of their own end [...] [including] businesses, interest groups, clubs, families and so on. (Heywood, *Politics*, 8)

128 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 5; AUCISS, *Final Report*, 41–4.

129 Moro, 'CSOs/CBOs and Faith-Based Organizations,' 4–5.

130 French and Raven, 'The Bases of Social Power,' 137–8.

131 Bass, *Handbook of Leadership*, 270.

132 Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 3.

133 Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 259; Johnson, *The Untold Story*, Chapter 2; Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 4.

134 Ibid., 2, 5; Johnson, *The Untold Story*, Prologue, Chapter 2.

135 Johnson, *The Untold Story*, Chapter 2; Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 256.

136 De Vries and Schomerus, 'South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal.'

137 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 3; AUCISS, *Final Report*, 38; Awolich, 'South Sudan's National Identity Challenge,' 9; Frahm, 'Making Borders,' 260.

138 Ajak, 'State Formation etc. in South Sudan,' 3.

- 139 Kisiangani, 'Reviewing Options for Peace,' 3.
- 140 Awolich, 'South Sudan's National Identity Challenge,' 9.
- 141 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 142 Ibid.
- 143 Moro, 'CSOs/CBOs and Faith-Based Organizations,' 3.
- 144 Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, Chapter 5.
- 145 Fleischner, *Deadly Enterprise*, 11–2.

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