

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA: RESPONSES AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS

Samuel Kehinde Okunade^{1,*} and Olusola Ogunnubi²

¹Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa

²Centre for Gender and African Studies, University of the Free State, South Africa

*Correspondence

Samuel Kehinde Okunade, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.

Email: samuel_okunade@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Since 2009, the North-Eastern part of Nigeria has been engulfed with the scourge of Boko Haram attacks leading to a severe humanitarian crisis and food insecurity within the region. Studies have shown that in the various Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) camps, women and children are malnourished, depicting that there is a shortage of food. More importantly, upon the return of many of the local population into surrounding border communities, returning IDPs are met with ransacked houses, stolen food stuffs, and the decimation of their farmlands by members of the Boko Haram sect. This study investigates the various efforts of local and international actors towards addressing the humanitarian crisis within the region and the impact of these actions on women and children. Accordingly, the qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study approach. The findings from the study reveal the neglect of the inhabitants of border communities and the poor state of IDPs in the various camps as a direct result of the uncoordinated stakeholders' responses and the Nigerian government's inability to fulfil its role as the main actor responsible for providing relief support and coordinating the needed humanitarian solutions to the crisis. To address this problem, the paper identified corruption as a major bane which needs to be tackled so that the government agencies responsible for coordinating humanitarian responses can effectively carry out their function. Secondly, the UN agencies and NGOs stakeholders have a responsibility of putting away their differences and evolving a common approach for sustainable response and solutions.

Keywords: North-Eastern Nigeria, Border communities, IDPs, Humanitarian Responses, Boko Haram, Humanitarian Crisis

1. Introduction

In the wake of the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria, the region has experienced perpetual chaos and insecurity. Boko Haram's ongoing attacks have resulted in the loss of many lives and property, while many are forced to flee their homes and are relocated as either Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the various camps across the region or as refugees in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroun. The literature notes that the persistent violence witnessed in north-eastern Nigeria, especially in the border communities that were the first victims, has led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis (Salkida 2012; Chukwurah et al. 2015; Emmanuelar 2015; Abdulmalik et al. 2019). According to Salkida (2012), the quality of life in many communities in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, such as Kawuri, Gwoza, Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Shuwa, Konduga, Bama, Ajigin, Giwa, and Chibok is extremely poor. Awortu (2015) notes that community members, including both Muslim and Christian clerics have been targeted and killed. These communities live in constant fear for their lives (Awojobi 2014). The rule of law has broken down, resulting in human rights abuses, casualties, external and internal displacement of people, the loss of means of livelihood, and a lack of medical supplies and facilities as well as other basic amenities (OCHA 2018; Salleh et al. 2018; Kanu et al. 2019).

State and non-state actors have sought to address this crisis that unfolded after 2009 through both security and humanitarian strategies (Onuoha 2014; Oyewole 2015; Itumo and Nwefuru 2016; Brechenmacher 2019; CORE 2020). However, the situation in the region has degenerated further as various humanitarian agencies have limited access to the rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated (Salkida 2012; Itumo and Nwefuru 2016; NORTHEAST: Humanitarian Response 2017; CORE 2020). This article investigates the humanitarian responses of key stakeholders ranging from the Nigerian government through its agencies, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the newly created Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, to the governments of other nations as well as international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to render assistance to victims in the border communities and IDP camps in north-eastern Nigeria. It assesses the effectiveness and sustainability of these responses in securing the future of the communities impacted by Boko Haram.

2. Methodology

A qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study approach. A phenomenological approach aims to understand a phenomenon based on the everyday knowledge and perceptions of specific respondent subgroups (Lindgren and Kehoe, 1981 cited in Vaughn, Schumm, Jallard, Slusher, and Saumell 1986). It is not primarily concerned with exploring the causes of events, but seeks to describe how events are experienced by those that are directly involved (Denscombe 2004). Husserl (1970) notes that it thus commences from a standpoint that is free from hypotheses or preconceptions.

The target population was all inhabitants of border communities and the IDP camps in north-eastern Nigeria. Given the qualitative and phenomenological approaches adopted, purposive sampling was employed to select the participants, who were chosen based on their experience and knowledge. The researchers identified cross border communities¹ in three states of the region, namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe based on the fact that these states were the most affected by cross-border insurgency at the time.

The database for this study was drawn from a sample that was part of a larger study carried out by the researchers between November 2017 and January 2018. The sample consisted of 336 participants. Fifty-six participants were selected from two modestly populated border communities in each state, including Gamboru-Ngala and Baga townships in Borno State, Michika and Mubi communities in Adamawa State and Yusufari and Kanamma communities in Yobe State.

The primary data was gathered by means of interviews with the participants after informed consent had been secured. A local guide and interpreter was employed in each community to facilitate access and communication in either Hausa or Kanuri.² The secondary data included reports, articles and publications by various local and international organisations that provided relevant information on the activities of governments and other non-governmental agencies in the region.

¹ These Nigerian communities share boundaries with neighbouring states such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram carries out its activities.

² Due to stringent bureaucratic processes to obtain permission from the various agencies coupled with financial constraints, it was not possible to visit any of the IDP camps formally to conduct interviews with IDPs and camp officials who are civil servants or who represent international agencies.

The interviews were transcribed and coded and content analysis was used to analyse the data. The findings were compared with those on IDP camps presented in the literature.

3. **Theoretical Underpinning**

The state fragility theory stresses the fundamental failure of a state to perform the functions necessary to meet citizens' basic needs and expectations. It highlights a government's inability to ensure basic security, maintain the rule of law and uphold justice, or provide basic services and economic opportunities to its citizens. The theory thus rests on weak and ineffective central government with little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; and refugees and involuntary movement of populations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2014). According to the Department for International Development (DFID) (2005), state fragility suggests that the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The DFID adds that a fragile state is characterised by the insecurity of the ruling elite, which results in the victimization of some or all of a nation's citizens as experienced for instance, by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Ferreira (2015) notes that a state's lack of will or inability to fulfil its core functions, and frequent political violence pose significant challenges to the effectiveness of development assistance. Another standard for identifying fragile states is that they are often countries that are host to UN peace support operations or peace building. They are also countries that are far from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (OECD 2014; IEG 2014; World Bank 2013). The International Development Association (IDA) aims to assist such states as well as those that are conflict-ridden by offering financing packages based on performance as well as their special circumstances (World Bank 2014).

The fragility of north-eastern Nigeria and the border communities of the Lake Chad region is of serious concern. Boko Haram's activities have created a humanitarian crisis in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, leading to these states requesting international support for peace building. Guilbert (2017) notes the need for humanitarian assistance in the Lake Chad region, which is experiencing high levels of malnutrition and starvation, a breakdown of the social fabric, and human rights violations, etc. People in north-eastern Nigeria and the border communities are in dire need of access to food, water, protection from violent attacks, education, sanitation, shelter and healthcare.

They also lack the basic human rights of liberty, freedom of association and movement and the right to life.

4. Responses from Government actors

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is legally responsible for disaster response across Nigeria, while state and local governments have specialised agencies that manage affairs within their domain. Established by Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999 for disaster management in Nigeria, NEMA did not take action when Boko Haram’s activities commenced in north-eastern Nigeria in 2009, leaving many homeless and helpless. The agency, and indeed the Federal government’s conspicuous absence continued until 2015 when agitation began to emerge from different quarters. By this time, the humanitarian situation in the region had worsened making it impossible for these agencies to intervene (Chidume et al. 2018). As at 2018, the number of IDPs stood at 1.8 million (2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018). By 31 July 2019, the number had increased to 1,980,036 (UNHCR 2019) and stood at 1,900,000 in June 2020³. The table below shows the number of IDPs in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states.

Table 1 showing the Statistics of IDPs in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) States

STATE	2018	2019	2020
Adamawa	178,977	192,534	-
Borno	1,439,953	1,467,908	-
Yobe	136,662	133,003	-
Total	1,755,592	1,793,445	1,900,000

Source: DTM Nigeria, 2018 and 2019

According to the DTM Nigeria (2017), the Nigerian government through NEMA and SEMA has to some extent addressed the humanitarian needs of the affected people in north-eastern Nigeria especially with respect to food. Chidume et al. (2018) noted that NEMA provided several relief items and support services to affected areas, including visits by its officials to affected areas, bereaved individuals, community leaders and District Heads and IDP camps. The agency also organised several meetings and workshops to train corps members and secondary school students in selected schools

³ <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/nigeria>

on disaster management. These efforts were carried out in collaboration with relevant stakeholders such as SEMA, local governments, community leaders and NGOs.

However, the DTM Nigeria (2017) stated that the government's efforts to address the situation in the region were sorely lacking. It noted that when the Boko Haram crisis began, Nigeria was experiencing an economic boom. As such, it could have been expected that the government would take the lead through well-planned and carefully implemented policy initiatives and the allocation of sufficient funds, and by providing the disaster management experts required for a comprehensive humanitarian response. The interviews and focus group discussions conducted in the communities selected for the study revealed mixed opinions among the local population. While some believed that the government through NEMA and SEMA brought relief through provision of food, some, mostly young people, claimed that they received no support from these agencies. Community leaders acknowledged that NEMA and SEMA supplied food aid. According to a traditional leader in one community:

NEMA came from the federal government while SEMA was from the state government and they all helped in various ways. They brought help since when the people of Gwoza were here when we ran and came back, they still brought us some relief materials. The government came with their help around early 2015 from January to March because that was the time when people were coming back. The assistance provided by the government was also very impactful because people relied on it for their survival; this was due to the fact that the things left behind by those that fled were destroyed or stolen. When people came back there was nothing. The assistance from the government helped us to recover from this loss.

While women in some communities confirmed that they received food from the government, a group of women in Michika community asserted that food distribution was unfair and that many received nothing. This suggests partiality in the distribution of the limited relief. It resonates with the claim in an article in *Business Day* (2020), that groups of citizens in the rural areas and cities were given less than 10kg of rice and other relief items to share during the COVID-19 lockdown.

In the focus group discussions, many of the youth in the communities expressed strong views that the government (federal, state and local) has neglected them for too long. They asserted that the government did not have the security situation under control and noted that the lives of the local population remained under threat. They remarked that the performances of the Joint Task Force (JTF) had proven that Nigeria was incapable of fighting Boko Haram. A male community leader stated bluntly that government had done nothing as he had yet to see any tangible signs of government intervention. Another community leader remarked that, while he had heard news reports that support

was being rendered to the local population, he had not seen this happening. The representative of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in another community offered a somewhat different perspective. He averred that although the government offered support to the community, it was short-lived:

NEMA and SEMA helped us at first, but now maybe they are tired, they are not helping us like before. Getting to months now, we've not heard from government. People live on support they get from humanitarian organisations.

Furthermore, there were mixed opinions among local security formations known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) established by the Nigerian government in the border communities. While some groups of Vigilantes stated that their communities received support from the government, they claimed that it was not consistent. Other CJTFs and Vigilantes claimed that the government has not supported the communities in any meaningful way.

Aside from the financial constraints confronting NEMA, a scuffle for relevance between NEMA and SEMA impeded NEMA from effectively fulfilling its mandate. Murtala and Abubakar (2017) state that NEMA and SEMA's limited response in north-eastern Nigeria is due to poor communication and coordination between the federal and state governments. They add that governance in Nigeria is characterised by fragile and limited inter-governmental coordination. The state governments favoured a situation where the federal government through NEMA and the humanitarian organisations liaised with them through the SEMAs for a coordinated humanitarian response in the troubled areas. As a result of this, they rejected decisions reached at the federal level between NEMA and the humanitarian organisations, especially when their input was not considered.

While this power play between the two tiers of governments continued, the situation in the affected areas worsened. Murtala and Abubakar (2017) also noted state governments' unpreparedness to tackle the menace of Boko Haram in the region. SEMAs across the region had low capacity to respond immediately to the unfolding humanitarian crisis because they had no specific budget allocation and can only make requests as the occasion demands. However, the federal government insisted that the *status quo* remains because the state governments have often been accused of misappropriation of funds and lack of transparency and accountability. More specifically, the federal government noted that there have been reports of corruption, diversion of humanitarian aid, and misuse of power by state governments.

Moreover, as an office under the Ministry of Special Duties, SEMA staff members are drawn from states' civil services and do not have the necessary training and experience for engagement in humanitarian activities. This is reflected in their activities in the various camps. They do not know how to coordinate and manage an IDP camp, food distribution or protection monitoring, and are unfamiliar with the operating procedures of international humanitarian organisations (Nnadi, et al. 2020).

In summary, there is heavy reliance on assistance from state and non-state actors for humanitarian responses in the troubled region and in the various IDP camps. Through its agency, NEMA and the Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative (PCNI) the Nigerian government has intervened to some extent. According to Odufowokan (2016:7):

the PCNI redeemed 23 billion Naira from the sum of 55.92 billion Naira pledged by donor in 2014 for the safe School initiative. They also appropriated one billion Naira counterparts funding for the same purpose in the 2016 Appropriation Act. The sum of five billion was appropriated in the 2015 supplementary budget for the Northeast. Notwithstanding, the sum of 12 billion Naira was appropriated in the 2016 Appropriations Act as Federal Initiative for the Northeast region.

In November 2019, the newly established Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development organised a workshop for senior government officials and representatives of various aid agencies to improve civil-military cooperation in humanitarian intervention in north-eastern Nigeria. Unfortunately, this only resulted in strict procedures and control measures for aid agencies (HRW 2020).

5. Responses from International Actors and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Historically, international humanitarian NGOs have played a key role in conflict zones that suffer humanitarian crises. They are usually at the forefront in such zones and in saving lives at the expense of their own. International state actors, mainly developed countries also respond to humanitarian crises by sending relief materials and funds to alleviate suffering. Since the Boko Haram violence started in 2009, various international humanitarian organisations have been active in north-eastern Nigeria, particularly in the different IDP camps.

According to OCHA (2017: 4), “90 humanitarian organisations have provided aid to 4.5 million people, including nearly 2 million people who are reached monthly with food assistance and over 4

million people who received out-patient or medical health services”. Different countries, international organisations and concerned individuals have also made donations in the form of cash or kind.

The bulk of the funds available for humanitarian missions in the region are donations by international state actors, NGOs and concerned individuals that are targeted at dislodged communities and displaced persons. Odufowokan (2016) notes that the World Bank has donated 800 million US dollars, and Aliko Dangote and other concerned individuals donated 6.5 million naira, while the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) donated 248 million US dollars. Australia offered support to the tune of 9 million Naira, the United States government 200 million dollars, and 750 million naira was received from Saudi Arabia (Odufowokan 2016).

Food items donated included grains such as millet, maize, ground nut, sorghum, and cowpea, clothing such as dresses for women and children and shelter in the form of tents. Table 2 shows the support received from different countries and agencies for 2019.

Table 2 Donations from Countries and Organizations as at January 2019

<u>Source org.</u>	<u>Funding US\$</u> ▼	<u>% of response plan/appeal funding</u>	<u>Pledges US\$</u>
United Kingdom, Government of	5,193,523	48.0%	0
Germany, Government of	4,597,881	42.5%	0
Central Emergency Response Fund	688,130	6.4%	0
Spain, Government of	284,414	2.6%	0
International Organization for Migration	59,750	0.6%	0

Source: Nigeria 2019 (Humanitarian Response Plan).

The United Kingdom tops the list with a donation of \$US 5,193.523 million while the International Organization for Migration (IOM) gave the least at \$59,750 million. The total sum reveals the enormous support that the humanitarian crisis in the region has attracted from both international and local agencies.

In the selected border communities, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities create a hygienic environment to promote daily survival. The study participants noted that support was received from different NGOs at various times and that such assistance had helped them to survive. The relief has mainly been in the form of food items, medicine, and clothing.

A community scribe recounted his experience after a formal meeting organised by the United Nations High Commissioner in Adamawa:

we had a UN-Adamawa Peace Initiative in partnership with United Nations High Commissioner for refugees. They brought us food items such as rice, maize, and beans. Other organizations also gave assistance ... through the Red Cross and they were given to us. They sent items like blankets, mats, rice, maize, and milk which was given to women, clothes for little children, and drugs for pregnant women and the sick as well as the old people to relieve them of the hardship/pains they incurred while escaping for their lives.

According to the Chair of the Muslim Council in one of the communities in Adamawa state, some humanitarian organisations (names not mentioned) came from Abuja and recorded the losses suffered by local people, mainly their houses, market places and government structures. Fifty people, 25 Muslim and 25 Christian under the Muslim Council and CAN, respectively were provided with grinding machines and sewing machines. The youth also noted that different NGOs had come to their rescue in the past. According to some groups of youths and Vigilantes, material support was received from UNICEF, UNHCR, Save the Children, Action against Hunger and the Red Cross. They provided food and shelter, and sunk boreholes in some communities. A group of Vigilante said that NGOs demonstrated concern for their community by providing them with zinc for roofing and food.

6. Uncoordinated Responses and its Impact on Border Communities and IDP Camps in North-Eastern Nigeria

As noted in the introduction to this article, humanitarian crises attract the attention of humanitarian and aid organisations through medical responses and relief materials. However, the major actor plays the crucial role of collaborating and co-ordinating responses in the troubled zone. Through its agencies such as NEMA and SEMA and subsequently the North East Development Commission (NEDC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, the Nigerian government is responsible for co-ordinating the humanitarian responses of both international actors and NGOs in north-eastern Nigeria.

6.1 Lack of Coordination and Partnerships between the Government and Aid Agencies

Prior to the creation of the office of the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, NEMA and SEMA failed woefully in performing their roles of providing relief material, and co-ordinating the efforts of different stakeholders and distribution of relief in the border communities and IDP camps. Although many NGOs were willing to help, they were frustrated by the lack of a coordinated response from the Nigerian government. An NGO representative noted that it was a “perfect storm” for humanitarian agencies to access areas that needed support (CORE 2020). According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) (2014) many IDPs had to stay in unofficial shelters, unfinished sites and makeshift accommodation, as well as in unofficial camps. These shelters were not under the purview of the government but were made available by small local organisations.

6.2 A Lack of a Framework to Track and Monitor Displaced Persons

Due to the lack of a clear mechanism to track and monitor displaced people living with host communities and families, it was difficult to plan humanitarian assistance. Displaced people were thus found sheltering in mosques, churches, town halls, abandoned and incomplete buildings, and makeshift camps which are grossly insufficient and unsustainable as the population constantly increases (HNO 2014). This reveals the fragile state of the country as it was not able to perform its role even when support was made available by various concerned stakeholders such as governments and NGOs.

6.3 Constraints and Restrictions placed on Aid Agencies/ NGOs

According to CORE (2020), aside from its failure to acknowledge the humanitarian crisis and call for international assistance, the Nigerian government placed severe constraints on aid agencies/ NGOs. Movement of such NGOs is restricted even within the areas controlled by the government. As a result, their officials have often had to compromise their normal operating protocol of neutrality. Furthermore, humanitarian agencies have to apply to the military for permission to transport items and only the ‘3 Fs’ (food, fuel and fertilizers) can be taken into IDP camps and border communities.

6.4 Sanctions on Aid Agencies and NGOs

In 2019, two major NGOs, Action contre la Faim (ACF) and Mercy Corps were ordered to shut down their activities in north-east Nigeria after the government accused them of aiding and abetting terrorism by supplying food and medical supplies to Boko Haram (Wintour 2019). After high-level negotiations and external diplomatic support, they were allowed to resume operations. UNICEF was asked to shut down its operations at a certain point, which negatively affected the distribution of relief items to the displaced in various communities and IDP camps. In some cases, the authorities in

Adamawa, Borno and Yobe diverted relief materials, while in others, the collection points were too far away (CORE 2020).

6.5 Power Struggle between NEMA and SEMA

Again, rather than working together for a co-ordinated response, NEMA and SEMA engaged in a power tussle as both parties believed that they should be responsible for the implementation of the budget. While NEMA believes that it is the only statutory body for emergency response in the country, SEMA asserts that it is on the ground and has a better understanding of the terrain. The power struggle resulted in relief funds and material being misappropriated and diverted into private coffers (Familusi and Oshomoh, 2018; Nnadi et al. 2020). It is for this reason that the respondents noted that most of the relief came from NGOs rather than the Nigerian government. The assertion by DFID (2005) on state fragility rings true in this case as the Nigerian government is unable to perform its role in assisting its citizens who are distressed.

6.6 The Poor State of the Border Communities and IDP Camps

The establishment of the office of the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs offered an opportunity to revamp the system for a more co-ordinated response in north-eastern Nigeria. However, CORE (2020) noted that the process of fashioning a common approach has been fragmented and politicised and that a common platform for the humanitarian response in the region has not yet materialised (CORE 2020). This is evident in the poor state of the IDP camps and border communities. Due to the huge number of IDPs in the region, there is fierce competition for limited resources such as water, food and temporary shelter (Lenshie and Yenda 2016). The scarcity of these essential needs has led to what can be termed a secondary displacement of the IDPs in the region.

6.7 Human Right Abuses

There have been reports of violations of the human rights of women and children who constitute a significant proportion of IDPs. This is a violation of the Kampala Convention which commits states to the creation of improved living conditions for IDPs. There have also been reports of malnutrition in the IDP camps (Ojeme 2016) and of food items and other relief materials being diverted by camp officials for their personal use and that of elites (Faluyi et al. 2019). In Yobe State, two traditional rulers were sanctioned for diverting food items meant for IDPs (Joel 2016). Some government officials have been accused of repackaging and diverting grain donated for the IDP camps, especially rice (Haruna 2016) and it is alleged that a few NGOs sourced financial aid from international donors under

the pretence of providing humanitarian assistance to the IDPs (Salau 2016). Figure 1 shows children in tattered clothes with inadequate utensils queuing for food.



FIGURE 1. Internally displaced children queue to receive supplementary food in Banki internally displaced person camp, Borno state, North-Eastern Nigeria

It vividly illustrates the conditions to which children and their mothers are subjected in the IDP camps across the region.

7. Conclusion

This article examined the level of co-ordination and collaboration between the relevant state and non-governmental stakeholders involved in the delivery of a humanitarian response in north-eastern Nigeria. The analysis showed that domestic and global responses to the humanitarian crisis created by Boko Haram insurgency were at best incoherent and were bedevilled by the Nigerian government's inability to take greater responsibility in coordination of joint efforts. Consequently, the Federal government, through its relevant agencies lacked professional competence to mobilise a collective humanitarian response. The analysis revealed that most of the humanitarian assistance in this region has been provided by external actors, especially NGOs working on the ground to support the local population both in the communities and IDP camps. Allegations of corruption and misappropriation

of humanitarian assistance provided by outside agencies by government officials have also arisen during the COVID-19 pandemic, with relevant government agencies unable to account for the spending of donations made towards the country's emergency funds. Corruption is thus a major factor in explaining the failure of different humanitarian projects in Nigeria. It is also visible in the appointment of officials who are not qualified for their positions.

Addressing this dilemma must begin with the strengthening anti-corruption policies against public officials and ensuring that employment of staff for the government ministries are done with the highest level of professionalism and where meritocracy and excellence is rewarded in the civil service. Therefore, corruption must be addressed head long for any meaningful impact to be felt in the region. This would form a part of the restructuring process targeted at revamping the system for more performance and efficiency.

The effectiveness of national and sub-national agencies such as NEMA and SEMA and the NEDC that are charged with responsibility for humanitarian assistance will depend on how corruption and abuse of office are dealt with. In the absence of swift and decisive action, humanitarian aid merely creates another avenue to transfer government funds and donations from local and international donors to private pockets. It should be borne in mind that should this situation persist, it will further alienate a population that is already disenchanted with the system, not to mention the immense suffering caused to the most vulnerable, especially women and children.

Furthermore, UN agencies and NGOs need to craft a common approach rather than being engulfed in the political tussle that comes with the process. Speaking with one voice will hold more sway with relevant government agencies, especially the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.

References

- Abdulmalik, J. O., Dahiru, A. M. C., Jidda, M. S., Wakil, M. A., and Omigbodun, O. O. 2019. Boko Haram insurgency and Nigeria's mental health response. In *An International Perspective on Disasters and Children's Mental Health* (pp. 45-61). Springer, Cham.
- Awojobi, O. N. 2014. The socio-economic implications of Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east of Nigeria. *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research*, 11(1), 144-150.
- Awortu, B. E. 2015. Boko Haram insurgency and the underdevelopment of Nigeria. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 5(6), 213-220.

- Brechenmacher, S. 2019. *Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Business Day, 2020 April 19th. <https://businessday.ng/features/article/lamentation-still-trails-lagos-fgs-palliative-package-as-middlemen-hijack-programme/amp/>. Assessed 7th June 2020.
- Chidume, C. G., Nwosumba, V. C., and Osisioma, U. S. 2018. The Humanitarian Response to The Victims of Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State, Nigeria: A Case of The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) And United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 2014-2015. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)* Vol. 23(8), pp. 1-8.
- Chukwurah, D. C., Okechukwu, E., and Ogbeje, E. N. 2015. Implication of Boko Haram terrorism on northern Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 6(3), 371.
- CORE 2020. Humanitarian Access SCORE Report: Northeast Nigeria. Available at https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/score_ne_nigeria_01_2020.pdf. Assessed 7th June 2020
- Creswell, J.W. 2009. *Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approach*, USA, SAGE Publications, Inc.
- DTM Nigeria 2017. *DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX. Round XVI Report*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/displacement.-tracking-matrix-dtm-round-xvi-report-may-2017> Accessed 12/03/2018.
- DTM Nigeria 2018. *Displacement Tracking Matrix*. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria%20-%20Displacement%20Report%2023%20%28June%202018%29.pdf>. Assessed 7th June 2020.
- DTM Nigeria 2019. *Displacement Tracking Matrix*. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/nigeria_dtm_201905.pdf. Accessed 7th June 2020.
- Emmanuelar, I. 2015. Insurgency and humanitarian crises in Northern Nigeria: The case of Boko Haram. *Academic Journals: African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9(7), 284-296.
- Faluyi, O.T., Khan, S., and Akinola, O.A. 2019. *Boko Haram’s Terrorism and the Nigerian State Federalism, Politics and Policies*. Springer. Switzerland.
- Familusi, O. O., & Oshomoh, T. O. (2018). Socio-Economic Implications of Boko haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria. *KIU Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(2), 213-223.
- Ferreira, I. A. R. 2015. *Defining and Measuring State Fragility: A New Proposal*, The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, Berkeley, June 8-9.
- Guilbert, K. 2017. How to Tackle the Humanitarian Crisis in Boko Haram-hit Lake Chad Region: “Day-to-Day Survival Remains an Existential Struggle”, *Reliefweb*, March 9, 2017. Available at: <http://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/how-tackle-humanitarian-crisis-boko-haram-hit-lake-chad-region> (Accessed on 16/5/2015).
- Haruna, A. 2016. Boko Haram victims dying of starvation as Borno officials steal relief materials. Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/205489-boko-haram-victims-dying-starvation-borno-officials-steal-relief-materials.Html> Retrieved on 01/12/2018

- Human Right Watch, 2020. Nigeria: Army Restrictions Stifling Aid Efforts. *reliefweb*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-army-restrictions-stifling-aid-efforts>. Assessed 17/06/2020
- Humanitarian Needs Overview 2014. Available at <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/ROWCA/Coordination/HNOs/HNO%20Nigeria%20-%2015March2015.pdf>. Assessed 7th June 2020
- Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01022019_ocha_nigeria_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf. Accessed 7th June 2020.
- IEG 2014. *World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank Group, January 2014.
- Itumo, A., and Nwefuru, N. H. 2016. Nigerian state and responses to plights of persons internally displaced by Boko Haram insurgents: Implications for Socio-Economic and political development. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 6(15), 24-38.
- Joel, D. 2016. Yobe Suspends Traditional Rulers for Diverting IDPs Food. Available at: <http://thenationonlineng.net/yobe-suspends-traditional-rulers-diverting-idps-food/> Assessed on 27th July 2017
- Kanu, I. A., Bazza, M. B., and Omojola, I. O. 2019. Boko Haram and Forced Migration: A Focus on the Northeast and Lake Chad Basin. *Nnadiabube Journal of Education*, 4(2).
- Lenshie, N.E. and Yenda, H.B. 2016. Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307582949_Boko_Haram_Insurgency_Internally_Displaced_Persons_and_Humanitarian_Response_in_Northeast_Nigeria. Retrieved on 17/02/2019
- Lindgren, J. H. and Kehoe, W. J. 1981. Focus groups: Approaches, procedures and implications. *Journal of Retail Banking*, Vol. 3(4), pp. 16-22.
- Murtala, Z. and Abubakar, B. 2017. State governance and coordination of the humanitarian response in north-east Nigeria. Humanitarian Practice Network. Available at: <https://odihpn.org/magazine/state-governance-and-coordination-of-the-humanitarian-response-in-north-east-nigeria/>. Retrieved on 17/02/2019
- Nnadi, G. O., Ezeani, O. E., & Nnadi, H. C. (2020). The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Challenge of Effective Management of Internally Displaced Persons in North Eastern Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 25(5), 1-14.
- OCHA 2017. Nigeria: Northeast Humanitarian Overview. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/12092017_northeast_nigeria_humanitarian_overview.pdf Retrieved on 13/03/2019
- OCHA 2018. North-East Nigeria: Humanitarian Situation Update - Progress on key activities from the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/011102018_nga_ocha_humanitarian_situation_update.pdf Retrieved on 08/02/19

- Odufowokan, D. 2016. "IDPs: Where are the donor funds?" *The Nation*, Sunday, June 26, Vol. 10, No. 3624, p.7.
- OECD 2014. 2014 Fragile States: Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States.
- Ojeme, V. 2016. Buhari Furious over Deaths of Malnourished IDPs in Borno. Available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/06/buhari-furious-deaths-malnourished-idps-borno/> Accessed on 28th August 2017
- Onuoha, F. C. 2014. A danger not to Nigeria alone: Boko Haram's transnational reach and regional responses. Peace and Security Series. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
- Oyewole, S. 2015. Boko Haram: Insurgency and the war against terrorism in the Lake Chad region. *Strategic Analysis*, 39(4), 428-432.
- Salau, A. 2016. Shettima: NGOs Reaping from IDPs Woes. Available at: <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/shettima-ngos-reaping-from-idps-woes/152957.html> Assessed on 28th June 2017
- Salkida, A. 2012. Africa's Vanishing Lake Chad, *African Renewal*, April 2012. Available at: <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2012/africa%E2%80%99s-vanishing-lake-chad> (Accessed on 16/5/2017).
- Salleh, M. A., Ahmad, A. A., and Jamil, S. 2018. Forced Displacement and the Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria. *Humanities and Social Science Research*, 1(1), p46-p46.
- The World Bank 2013. Twenty Fragile States Make Progress on Millennium Development Goals, *The World Bank Press Release*, May 1
- UNHCR 2019. The Fact Sheet. North-East Nigeria. Available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71444>. Accessed 7th June 2020.
- United Kingdom, 2005. Department for International Development. "Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States." London: DFID.
- Wintour, P. 2019. Nigeria warned it risks humanitarian disaster by expelling charities. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/nigeria-warned-it-risks-humanitarian-disaster-by-expelling-charities?CM>. Assessed 7th June 2020