Namibia’s Regional and Local Authority Elections 2020: Democracy Beyond SWAPO

Henning Melber

Abstract

With the Regional and Local Authority Elections on 25 November 2020 Namibia’s political landscape has changed. Voters practiced their right to make political choices. The shifting grounds, for the first time visible in the National Assembly and Presidential Elections of November 2019, have triggered further seismic impacts on voting behaviour and patterns. Namibians are entering a new era, and it is not yet sure how this will play out in the years to come. As liberation movement in government since Independence in 1990, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was up for a rude awakening. This article offers a summary of the latest election results pointing into the direction of a new chapter in the country’s democratic political culture.

Introduction

After 30 years of by and large unchallenged political hegemonic rule the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO of Namibia) for the first time faced meaningful challenges in the National Assembly and Presidential Elections on 27 November 2019. The sobering results suggested that voters have started to abandon unconditional loyalty to the former liberation movement and its heroic narrative. While its dominance remained largely intact, cracks became visible. These suggested a gradual erosion of credibility and trust in the party, which for decades was associated with the slogan that “SWAPO is the nation and the nation is SWAPO”, coined during the days of the anticolonial liberation struggle.

During the first months of the new five-year legislative term, starting with Independence Day on 21 March 2020, the legitimacy of the governing party was further tested by

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3 SWAPO and Swapo as well as Swapo Party are usual references. Except otherwise quoted, this article refers to SWAPO as the original acronym.

continued self-aggrandisement of high-ranking political office bearers, combined with elements of an arrogance of power in stubborn defiance of meaningful political challenges. The dismissive tendencies were exacerbated by a tendency of denialism regarding financial scandals, embezzlement and a degree of illegal self-enrichment bordering to state capture. Public attention and opinions were most prominently focused since the first disclosures in mid-November 2019 on the country’s so far biggest known case of corruption, since then dubbed as #fishrot. Revelations have been nurturing suspicions also of the party’s involvement as a direct beneficiary.²

Early warning signs

While the size of the electoral avalanche was hardly anticipated, it came not entirely out of the blue. As SWAPO’s decline shows, ignoring or even dismissing criticism vested in factual evidence is not the best way to maintain legitimacy. The self-righteousness was displayed when president Geingob ahead of the November 2019 Presidential and National Assembly Elections at a townhall meeting in Gobabis responded to criticism by stubbornly declaring “elections are coming – go and defeat me there”.⁶

As the election results then suggested, the sands were shifting slowly. With 65% SWAPO lost its two-third majority (2014: 80%). Hage Geingob was re-elected with a humiliating 56% (2014: 87%). Scoring almost 30% of votes, the “independent” SWAPO candidate Panduleni Itula personified the dissatisfaction among party followers and the deep internal factional rifts. Expelled since then, he subsequently established the Independent Patriots for Change (IPC). The party’s official registration was certified by the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) in late September 2020. Well ahead of the forthcoming Regional and Local Authorities elections, this enabled the fielding of candidates.⁷

The People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), which had more than tripled its seats as official opposition in the National Assembly, and the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), which had then emerged as the third strongest party in Parliament, completed the field of significant competitors campaigning for votes at the end of November 2020.

Confronted with the loss of the two-third parliamentary majority (if only by one seat) and his own humiliation by losing a third of the votes obtained in 2014 to Itula, president

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² The case was disclosed initially by a consortium of investigative journalists also based in Iceland, since the biggest Icelandic fishing company Samherji was the main culprit bribing two Namibian ministers and several highest-ranking officials in state-owned enterprises to secure for years a preferential treatment in the allocation of fishing quota. A book initially published in Iceland at the end of 2019 with the full disclosure of Samherji’s fraudulent practices will in mid-2021 be made available in an English translation in Namibia: Helgi Seljan, Adalsteinn Kjartansson and Stefan Adalsteinn Drengsson, Nothing to hide. On Samherji’s path in Africa. Windhoek, 2021. Since the end of 2019, the two former ministers and several others have been under arrest awaiting trial, which is expected to start any time as from mid-2021 in the Windhoek High Court. See Maria Amakali, “The mother of all trials… stage set for Fishrot corruption case”, New Era, 21 April 2021, <https://neweralive.na/posts/the-mother-of-all-trials> [accessed 25 May, 2021].


⁷ Sakeus Iikela, “Itula’s Party officially registered”, The Namibian, 22 September 2020, <https://www.namibian.com.na/204740/archive-read/Itula&amp;ampamp39s-party-officially-registered> [accessed 25 May 2021]. As reported in the same article, at the same time the registration of the Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement as an organisation to contest in the Walvis Bay and Swakopmund municipal elections was confirmed. It had already been registered to contest in the local authority election in Windhoek.
Geingob originally responded with a certain degree of humbleness: “I have heard you”, he reassured the citizens after the official election results were announced. At the first Cabinet meeting after the elections he declared 2020 as the “Year of Introspection”. But expectations were frustrated.

Party leaders continued to brush aside the signs of dissatisfaction. Addressing soldiers in late August 2020, defence minister Peter Vilho accused whites being “obsessed with the idea of the black government failing”. He warned of regime change and lashed out at “misguided intellectuals” and “unpatriotic members of society”, who he blamed of seeking political mileage. In response to the wide range of criticism, he in an opinion article again linked the white minority as root cause to all governance failures. It bears some irony, that the same minister was a few months later forced to resign. It was disclosed that in violation of his obligations as minister he had failed to declare a unit trust account in Hong Kong. The amount of N$ 3.4 million (current value) were deposited there. This fueled suspicions of corruption during an arms trade deal with a Chinese company then, while he was a leading army commander.

In mid-October President Geingob commented on the growing number of whites (their total number estimated at less than 5% of the population) registering as voters for the forthcoming elections. Suspecting them to do so in order to support anything but SWAPO he warned: “I will not forget that. People are declaring war against SWAPO”. The anti-white slant was widely criticized. This included strong rebukes by other parties for being anti-democratic and promoting hate speech. The Legal Assistance Centre observed a violation of the racial discrimination prohibition act. The PDM launched an official complaint with the Ombudsman. In a ruling he dismissed the claim with the argument, that “the objectionable utterances had just the opposite effect of uniting people in their condemnation of the President”.

Testifying to the heated atmosphere, the former commander of the Namibian army Martin Shalli also achieved unifying responses by being carried away through remarks bordering to

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9 NBC, “President Geingob declares 2020 the ‘Year of Introspection’”, 4 February 2020, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGRB_r_VlxM] [accessed 25 May 2021].
10 The remarks were recorded by The Namibian and are visually documented at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwunrqKtWt8] [accessed 25 May 2021].
12 Kuzeeko Tjitemisa, “Vilho’s resignation opens can of worms… arms deal, ministerial code of conduct back in spotlight”, *New Era*, 8 April 2021, [https://neweralive.na/posts/vilhos‐resignation‐opens‐can‐of‐worms] [accessed 25 May 2021].
13 His statement was recorded and is available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHOOCU‐R4WY], [accessed 25 May 2021].
14 Kuzeeko Tjitemisa, “Swapo takes on Geingob detractors… ruling party reacts to ‘white’ comments fallout”, *New Era*, 21 October 2020 Tjitemisa, “Swapo takes on Geingob detractors… ruling party reacts to ‘white’ comments fallout”, *New Era*, 21 October 2020, [https://neweralive.na/posts/swapo‐takes‐on‐geingob‐detractors‐ruling‐party‐reacts‐to‐white‐comments‐fallout] [accessed 25 May 2021].
hate speech. At a rally he had encouraged those in attendance to slit the throats of party defectors.16 The public outrage forced him to apologise for “that cut-throat thing” on national TV.17 He had earlier joined those who were forced leaving office, after he was implicated in the same dubious arms deal with the Chinese company, over which then finally also Peter Vilho stumbled. As now became known, he had at the time made payments from his Hong Kong account to Shalli.18

The blend of arrogance and intimidating rhetoric throughout 2020 clearly lacked any visible signs of the initially declared “introspection”. The absence of any self-critical reflections but rather the display of an arrogance of power were during the build-up to the election possible ingredients adding to the frustration among the voters. Not least, going to the polls in late November had by far more alternative options among competing candidates than ever before, with IPC, LPM and AR as well as numerous independent individual candidates offering multiple choices.19 It speaks in favour of Namibians, that the preceding intimidation did not prevent them from voting for candidates and parties of their choice.

And the winner is...

The unexpected clear punishment of SWAPO was captured by the headings in the local newspapers. The state owned daily New Era titled “Swapo loses some ground”, which makes it a strong contender for the understatement of the year. With “Swapo holds on by fingernails” (Namibian Sun) and “Ruling party bleeds rural and urban votes” (The Namibian) the independent print media came closer to reality.

With 43.2% the voter turnout was higher than five years earlier (39.8%).20 For the 14 regional councils (with a total of 116 constituencies), SWAPO’s total votes dropped proportionally from 83% in 2015 to 57%. The party was in sole control of the National Council before (composed by three seats from each region) and held 40 of 42 seats. This dominance has now been reduced to 28 seats. A further decline was stopped mainly because the strongholds in the North remained to a large extent loyal. As a novum in Namibia’s political history, an independent candidate, elected in the newly created Rundu Rural Constituency (who earlier had left SWAPO, where he was the Youth League’s Secretary for Labour), was sworn in as a member of the National Council. Out of a total of 93 independent candidates three more (in the same north eastern Zambezi region) managed to be elected as regional councillors.21

Overall Regional Councils Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>IPC</th>
<th>PDM</th>
<th>LPM*</th>
<th>NUDO</th>
<th>Other**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>293,626</td>
<td>89,030</td>
<td>35,010</td>
<td>35,184</td>
<td>12,258</td>
<td>50,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>56.66%</td>
<td>17.49%</td>
<td>6.95%</td>
<td>6.87%</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
<td>9.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There is an inconsistency comparing the figures given with the official ranking and the percentage, compared with PDM. The overview is dated 01 April 2021 but seems to have not properly integrated the figures from the rerun elections for the Mariental Rural Constituency. The figures here are reproduced as given on the ECN website.

** Including nine parties and 90 independent candidates.


SWAPO remained the biggest party in 10 of the 14 regions. It continued to score high absolute majorities in its Northern strongholds of Omusati (over 80%), Ohangwena (over 80%), Oshikoto (over 70%), and Oshana (over 60%), with IPC securing for the first time a meaningful number of votes for any other party. Kavango West (over 80%) and Kavango East (over 60%) remained strongholds too, with the regionally All People’s Party (APP) as before the second strongest party. However, while remaining the biggest party, absolute majorities were lost in Zambezi (± 45%), Otjozondjupa (± 45%), Omaheke (over 40%) and Khomas (over 35%). The majority in the Kunene region went by a narrow margin to PDM (about 35%), to the IPC in the Erongo (over 35%), and the LPM in Hardap (over 45%) and //Kharas (close to 40%).

In the local authority elections SWAPO garnered just 40% (2015: 73%) overall votes. It maintained full control over 20 of the previously held 52 (out of 57) municipalities and town councils. The party’s Politburo decided to negotiate 12 possible governance alliances with two of the smaller regional-ethnic parties. These have both rejected the offer. The official election results announced by the ECN for the local elections had the following aggregated scores from all 57 local authorities:

Overall Local Authorities Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>IPC</th>
<th>LPM</th>
<th>PDM</th>
<th>AR</th>
<th>Other*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>76,680</td>
<td>40,723</td>
<td>27,380</td>
<td>15,266</td>
<td>8,501</td>
<td>23,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>39.84%</td>
<td>21.16%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
<td>7.93%</td>
<td>4.42%</td>
<td>14.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Including independent candidates. A total of 31 parties were campaigning in one or more of the local authority elections, including two separate AR branches for Walvis Bay and Swakopmund (votes counted separately and not included in the AR figure above).
Source: https://elections.na/LocalAssembly.aspx.

Most urban centres, including Walvis Bay and Swakopmund, were seized by other parties – either single-handedly or in planned coalitions. A disaster was the loss of the capital Windhoek. With previously 12 of the 15 seats in the municipality, SWAPO now holds five seats. The first-past-the-post election system prevented worse. Since in many constituencies several contenders competed, SWAPO candidates were elected at times with a mere one-third of votes (in one Windhoek district by a three votes majority): “The combined opposition vote beat Swapo in at least 16 constituencies where the Swapo candidate was declared the winner.”

Maybe the biggest symbolic humiliation as a result of the elections was the appointment of Job Amupanda from the AR as Windhoek’s mayor. After all, he was the leading figure in a SWAPO-internal revolt, when he and other leaders of the party’s Youth League embarked on a social movement grass root course regarding the occupation of urban land, while at the same time challenging for the first time the party’s gerontocratic structures. As a local analyst observed:

> If there was any good news for Swapo in these elections – it is that the opposition challenge remains fractured. The ability of the LPM to expand beyond its heartlands in the south remains in doubt. The IPC performed outstandingly in certain areas (the coast and Windhoek East for example) but overall did not maintain the momentum.

The future of Namibia’s democracy

As the election results re-confirmed, many of the country’s regions have remained spatial hubs for culturally and linguistically distinct groups. Local voting behaviour continued reproducing to some extent particularistic identities. The unwavering loyalty to SWAPO in the four Northern O-regions testifies to this, since the only other party receiving votes was the new IPC of the SWAPO dissident Itula with a background and network in these regions. Beyond the regional-ethnic patterns, until fairly recently, SWAPO was the only political party with significant support among almost all population groups, as well as in the urban ‘melting pots’. Notably, this now came to an end.

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31 Graham Hopwood, op. cit.
Celebrating SWAPO’s 55th birthday in 2015, Nangolo Mbumba as its Secretary General then, now the country’s Vice President, warned defectors that it is cold outside SWAPO.  Three years later, SWAPO has ended in the cold in many local settings, despite maintaining a clear control over the central government. Being in denial of the defeat will not help SWAPO, nor the future of democracy. The party’s spokesperson Hilma Nicanor clearly intoned the wrong tune, when accusing “outside forces” of trying to unseat the ruling party. In denial of a sober assessment, she claimed, the party was “victorious”. These elections have put Namibia’s political culture at a crossroad. While President Geingob was able to give credit to the election results, other frustrated members of the SWAPO establishment had already threatened during the election campaign that the party is as government in charge of the budget of the central state. It therefore, as the party’s Information Secretary warned, “controls the national cake”. The fiscus, as some suggested already earlier, might therefore withhold funds to financially starve towns and regions governed by other parties. Such threats were met with accusations that this would border to ethnic cleansing. This stresses the centrifugal tendencies emerging, fuelling regional if not tribal animosities. With the relative decline of SWAPO since the swearing in of the new Parliament in March 2020, the rhetoric in the political discourses has become more confrontational. Increasingly, pseudo-radical populism manifests in exchanges, which put degrading insults over substance. Notably, President Geingob despite occasional slips maintained in his initial response to the latest election results a statesman-like composure. He dismissed suggestions for financial starvation of regions now controlled by other political parties in no uncertain terms. As he declared, those elected into offices are supposed to serve all people and no funds will be withheld. Addressing the first cabinet meeting after the election, he stated: “Our citizens have spoken and made their democratic choice. As democrats, we have heard the voices of our people”. And he added: “Ultimately, democracy and the people of Namibia are the winners.” This is encouraging at a moment in time, when Namibia(ns) will enter new democratic turf. But it also requires to walk the talk. Geingob’s latest interpretation of the electoral performances pointed in another direction. At the opening of the party’s Central Committee meeting in late May 2021 he declared: “Swapo did not lose the elections. Yes, we suffered setbacks in some towns but overall Swapo achieved victory, albeit with a

It indeed requires some revolutionary optimism to wake up in the country’s capital with a mayor Job Amupanda of the AR and declare victory. The road to the country’s next National Assembly and Presidential Elections in November 2024 might be bumpy. Not only will SWAPO for the first time be during the campaign trail in the unusual role of an opposition on regional and local levels. The years ahead are also a first testing ground for opposition parties in coalition alliances and governance. This is for them as much new turf as it is for SWAPO. But democratic hiccups are part of a healthy pluralism, as long as the forms of exchange are not dominated by mere playing to the gallery and appealing to vested loyalties rather than guided by substance. As it looks, the crossroad in Namibian politics reached is not only a choice between competing parties, but also between forms and the nature of a political culture.

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