

The Exploitation of Refugees in Areas of Conflict: The Rohingya in Bangladesh

by

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to determine the extent to which exploitation compromises the human security of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. In so doing, the use of a vulnerability assessment and risk analysis are employed to quantify the impact of these risk in relation to the economic, food, health and personal security of the Rohingya. Consideration is given to the history of deep rooted tensions between minority Muslims and majority Buddhist nationalists in Myanmar, the conditions of the 2017 exodus of Rohingya into Bangladesh as well as their statelessness as key contextual elements in establishing the vulnerability of the Rohingya. Subsequently, this study determines the Rohingya's stay in overcrowded and under resourced Bangladeshi camps, Bangladesh's refusal to recognise the Rohingya as refugees and its isolationist policies towards this group, as central elements in the risk analysis. This study thereafter identified the successes and shortfalls in the role of the international community as it relates to providing aid to the Rohingya crisis relief and diplomatic support for the restoration of peace and security to Rakhine state. Furthermore, this paper identifies principal lessons learned and recommendations for moving forward in the crisis relief efforts, to better address and mitigate present and future risks to the human security of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Finally, this study arrives at the conclusion that while Bangladesh is the key player in addressing the crisis, the international community has a vital role to play in the restoration of peace and security in Rakhine State and upholding international human rights standards by holding Myanmar accountable for the atrocities it has committed.

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“The world is round and the place which may seem like the end may also be the beginning”

– Rebecca West.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARIFArakan Rohingya Islamic Front
ARSAThe Arakan Resistance Salvation Army
ASEANAssociation of South East Asian Nations
BTIBerte Ismann Stiftung
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organisations Of The Treadway Commission
ICCInternational Criminal Court
ICMPDInternational Centre For Migration Policy Development
IGOInter-Governmental Organisation
ILOInternational Labour Organisation
IOMInternational Organisation For Migration
IRMSAInstituted For Risk Management South Africa
ISILIslamic State Of Iraq And The Levant
NGONon-Governmental Organisation
OHCHROffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
P5UN Security Council Permanent 5 Members
UNUnited Nations
UNCTADUnited Nations Conference On Trade And Development
UNDPUnited Nations Development Programme
UNHCRUnited Nations High Commissioner For Refugees
UNICEFUnited Nations Children’s Fund
UNODCUnited Nations Office On Drugs And Crime
WHOWorld Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Theme and Problem

This research will focus on the vulnerability of refugees to exploitation in areas of conflict.

This study will explore why Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are more vulnerable than the average refugee due to their statelessness and how this contributes to their heightened risk of being exploited. Furthermore, this study will explore the fact that refugees are not citizens of the country within which they find refuge and consider the implication that refugees cannot be guaranteed the basic rights and security that citizens are entitled to under their own state. This problem will be analysed in the context of the 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis, in which almost 700 000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh seeking refuge, a country already struggling to address its own socioeconomic and developmental issues (United Nations 2018 (A)).

The first element that will be considered is the refugee and/or stateless person classifications of Rohingya, who have fled from violence in Myanmar to Bangladesh, and the implications that come with them. Stateless persons struggle to find asylum as they do not have a claim to citizenship in any country and as refugees they also do not have citizenship in the destination state. As a result, without citizenship documentation such as identity documents and birth certificates, registering as asylum seekers becomes even more difficult, threatening their personal security as their destination state may refuse these refugees sanctuary and repatriate them (United Nations 2018 (B)). Additionally, the implications for Bangladesh in receiving the Rohingya refugees at this scale in a short period of time means that further pressures are put on Bangladesh's capacity and resources to secure the basic needs of the Rohingya with regards to their food and health security. Such strain often becomes a national security concern, particularly for economically weaker receiving states (European Union 2017). As a result, the inability of Bangladesh to ensure that the personal, food, health and economic security of the Rohingya means that the Rohingya are left more vulnerable to exploitation due to their desperation to survive and to pursue opportunities that may better their quality of life.

Furthermore, The Rohingya's human security cannot be ensured by Bangladesh as it cannot be held accountable in this regard in that it is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention. There are several factors that hinder the enforcement of international law such as sovereignty and corruption, which results in state complicity in transnational organised crime and/or lack of capacity to meet the standards they have agreed to. As a result, international law is generally seen as, "a monument to successful laws, without much enforcement" (O'Connell 1995: 47-48).

As a result of the above, the Rohingya face increased insecurity and vulnerability, therefore, putting them at further risk of being exploited in Bangladesh. The problem of this study requires that particular focus is given to unpacking the following key concepts; refugees, human security, vulnerability and exploitation.

1.2 Objectives of the Research Study

As global interconnectivity grows, issues in one state often spill over into neighbouring states, predominantly in the form of large influxes of refugees. Subsequently, as the number of stateless people grows globally, the greater the need for their rights and human security to be ensured so as to mitigate factors that contribute to their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation.

This research will look at the vulnerability of refugees and stateless people and consider how this serves as the catalyst for their exploitation. There are several causal factors that contribute to their vulnerability. Within the context of the Rohingya refugees, situated in the human security paradigm, these main factors fall under food, health, economic and personal insecurity. As a result of their increased vulnerability, the Rohingya are more inclined to pursue opportunities out of desperation to alleviate their aforementioned insecurities. Albeit that Rohingya are pursuing opportunities with good intentions, they often unwittingly position themselves in such a way that makes them more susceptible to various forms of exploitation.

With this in mind, the main objective of this study is to explore why the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are vulnerable to exploitation. In order to answer this, the following sub questions will be answered:

- How does statelessness and refugee circumstances contribute to the vulnerability of individuals and groups?
- To what extent does Bangladesh adhere to international standards with regards to their policy on refugees?
- What is the nature of the vulnerabilities facing the Rohingya ?
- As a consequence of the aforementioned, to what extent does exploitation compromise the human security of the Rohingya?

1.3 Literature review

In the age of increasing migration and large refugee flows, the number of unprotected and vulnerable groups have increased. Often a crime of opportunity, exploitation - operating under the umbrella of human trafficking- thrives particularly off of women and children in vulnerable situations. The most common vulnerable individuals are those who are fleeing armed conflict and war. There are various forms of exploitation that generate billions of dollars albeit that much comes from labour and sexual exploitation (Ochab 2017). It is important to note that of the over 700 000 Rohingya who joined 200,000 previously fled Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, in 2017 it was estimated that 60% were children, the most vulnerable group to abuse (United Nations Children's Fund 2017 (B)).

Claire Healey (2016), research officer and author on migration for the ICMPD, states that under the circumstances of displacement, violence, crossing borders and the desperation to survive in foreign countries, many opportunities arise from the vulnerability of these groups to be capitalised on by exploiters. With this in mind, the Rohingya have fled state sponsored violence that in a recent UN fact finding mission on the atrocities committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar, it was found that the Myanmar military had committed crimes against humanity. Furthermore, this report called for senior Myanmar officials to be investigated and prosecuted to determine whether they are guilty of committing genocide (United Nations 2018 (C)).

In addition to the above, a further factor contributing to their vulnerability is that the Rohingya reportedly live under conditions where over 30% of Bangladeshi refugee camps do not have access to clean water and over half of their population do not have access to basic health care, in addition to high malnutrition amongst women and children due to food rationing (United Nations Children's Fund 2017 (B)). With this in mind, it is clear that they fall within the bracket of vulnerable groups who are highly susceptible to exploitation.

Healey (2016) also touches on some common misconceptions contributing to the susceptibility of vulnerable people to exploitation, the first being that human trafficking, mostly through sexual exploitation and forced labour are being carried out by highly organised and high level international crime bosses. However, Hailey disputes this and argues that what is being found is that low level trafficking and exploitation is actually more common and is often carried out within the same country by individuals close to victim of exploitation, such as family friends or relatives and other people who also find themselves in positions of desperation. While the UNHCR and Save the Children (2002:4-7) speak to the contrary, emphasising the role of security forces, peacekeepers and aid workers as the main culprits of exploitation, they also recognise the contribution to this industry by family members, teachers, refugees community leaders and friends of the victims.

The second assumption is that vulnerable individuals who are being exploited could go to law enforcement agencies for help. The issue here is that because of the nature under which they fled and their statelessness, these groups often do not have official documentation pertaining to their identity issued by their country of origin, therefore their claim for asylum often cannot be proven. In many instances, their exploiters take away what documents these individuals do have as a means of controlling their victims. As a result, there is the fear of and very real reality that the victim's involvement with the police will lead to their own arrest on the grounds of illegal immigration rather than to the arrest of their exploiters (Zenko 2017). It is also recognised in a UNHCR and Save the Children (2002: 18) report that the legal support measures for refugees needs to be improved to ensure that refugees have access to legal advice and indicates that governments need to strengthen civil laws to protect

refugees, particularly child refugees, from exploitation. While this is often the case, other factors such as the corruption of government officials and humanitarian aid workers on the ground also contributes to the fear of exploited refugees in coming forward, which prevent them from seeking help and legal protection (Government of the United States of America 2017: 81).

The third common misconception identified by Anastasia Moloney (2017), is that those who fall victim to the human trafficking and exploitation industry are physically forced or kidnapped, this however, is often not the case. Rather, refugees who are desperate for sanctuary, security and work fall victim to false promises of work and other opportunities to pursue a better quality of life. From there, victims are forced or coerced into various positions of exploitation. In particular, Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, willingly engage in prostitution for income but once trust is established between employer and employee, the employer takes away the refugee's documentation so that they cannot leave, they are then paid little to nothing and are trapped into debt bondage (Moloney 2017).

With this in mind, the recent Rohingya refugee crisis spilling over into Bangladesh has become a greenhouse within which the abovementioned circumstances are thriving. The Rohingya are not only refugees but are also stateless persons who have been stripped of their citizenship in Myanmar over several decades. In addition to the aforementioned, the fact that Bangladesh has weak anti-human trafficking legislation, poor socioeconomic development and corruption amongst government officials (Government of the United States 2016: 80), leaves Rohingya refugees at extremely high risk of being exploited. Investigative journalism and joint UN missions have identified that, as a result of the high level of desperation amongst Rohingya refugees, the fact that most are women and girls indicates that sexual exploitation is the most common form of human trafficking they may fall victim to. However, it is noted that labour exploitation remains the most widespread amongst this group encompassing men, women and children (International Organisation on Migration 2017).

There is much literature by scholars such as Mohajan, detailing the history of Rakhine State and the origin of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, as well as Edroos, who delves into the possibility of Rohingya freedom fighters being classified as terrorists and their

role in triggering the 2017 Mass exodus, scholars such as these speak to the plight of the Rohingya's economic and political oppression and their history of seeking new life in Bangladesh. Additionally, there is much literature of human trafficking as it relates to sexual and labour exploitation as a security issue explored by NGO's and State Institutions such as Amnesty International, Stop The Traffik and The Unites States of America's annual Trafficking in Persons Report. While there remains little data that quantifies the scale of sexual exploitation both within Bangladesh and globally due to the reluctance of victims to come forward, many interviews conducted by investigative journalists will be employed to paint a clearer picture of its presence in the lives of the Rohingya.

Additionally, IGOs such as the International Labour Organisation and the International Organisation for Migration are able to better provide scalable information on the presence of labour exploitation. While there generally exists estimations on the presence of labour and sexual exploitation globally, there are gaps in the literature on the flight of the Rohingya to Bangladesh in 2017. Furthermore, gaps in the information relating to the vulnerabilities the Rohingya face as stateless persons and refugees and the direct connection this has to their vulnerability to labour and sexual exploitation is sparse. It is for the aforementioned reasons that this study, with the aim of exploring how the Rohingya are more vulnerable to exploitation, is of value.

1.4 Methodology

This study will be employing the Human Security paradigm, as it relates to Critical Security Studies, as the grounding theory of this paper. Thereafter, a vulnerably assessment will be used as the foundational element in what will essentially be a risk analysis to quantify the impact that exploitative work has on the human security of the Rohingya.

With this in mind, Critical Security Studies (CSS) will serve as the grounding theory, which requires security research to consider the individual as the referent object, to assess the general assumptions of political life within the security dimension and to acknowledge the wide variety of experiences of security issues from numerous actors

(Peoples and Vaughn-Williams 2015: 33-37). In this study, the referent object pertains to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The other actor, considered to play a significant role in ensuring their human security, is the Bangladeshi government, which is driven by its own state interest to ensure its national and international security.

After employing an extended, systematic literature review, this paper will analyse the threats faced by the Rohingya using the identified areas of securitisation through the Human Security paradigm to determine the insecurities contributing to the vulnerability of the Rohingya. The identified areas of security that can be compromised and need to be secured are as follows; food security, personal security, health security and economic security, community security, environmental security and political security (United Nations 2009: 7). Thereafter, the vulnerabilities coming to the fore as a result of the presence of insecurities with particular focus on personal, health, food and economic insecurity will be argued to make the Rohingya more susceptible to exploitation, which in itself compromises the human security of the Rohingya. Additionally, the focus of this study will be narrowed by adopting a case study design within which the plight of the Rohingya refugee crisis from 2017 will be analysed in the context of their human security in relation to exploitation.

Furthermore, the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya will be identified and assessed by drawing on the 2016 United Nations Human Security Handbook, which provides a process of vulnerability mapping in the human security context. This map will be adapted to fit the context of the research question. Once the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya are mapped, it will serve as the foundation for determining the likelihood of a Rohingya falling victim to exploitation and to what extent this compromises their human security. That being said, vulnerability in the context of risk assessment plays a vital role in allowing an entity (State, NGO or IGO) to “gauge how well they’re managing risk” (COSO 20 : 6). In light of little information, throughout this study, in identifying trends that speak to the likelihood of vulnerability and human security threats, examples of other vulnerable groups and scenarios of exploitation from various parts of the world will be employed in this study’s vulnerability and risk assessments.

In chapter 4, the vulnerability map is used to analyse the current insecurities faced by a community against the capacities available to meet the needs of the community so as to alleviate those insecurities. By mapping out the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya, the following become clearer according to the UN Human Security Handbook (2016: 21-22):

- A. The identification of and the link between the insecurities and vulnerabilities faced by the Rohingya become clearer.
- B. The resources and capacities available to the community become clearer.
- C. The gap in existing strategies in terms of prioritisation, empowerment and protection becomes clearer.
- D. Strategies to tackle the aforementioned come to the fore.

In chapter 5, a risk assessment will be employed using the 2016 United Nations Human Security Handbook's *Manifestation of a Threat on Human Security* map, which will be edited and amalgamated with both the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations Of The Treadway Commission (COSO) 2012 impact and likelihood scale, and Tracy's (with ETQ) risk matrix. The use of a risk matrix will allow for a method of determining the risk rating in relation to what extent exploitation impacts human security of a Rohingya refugee. Therefore, it is important to understand what Risk Management is so as to understand the basis and logic for employing a risk assessment (Tracy 2016).

With this in mind, Risk Management is a business practice developed to address uncertainty by identifying "problems" in one's business and their possible impacts, which may derail the objectives of the organisation. It is noted by the Institute For Risk Management South Africa (IRMSA) (2014:11) that in identifying these problems early on, measures can be put in place to mitigate these risks and/or lessen their negative impacts on the company, thus allowing for the business to continue moving towards achieving its objectives. A risk assessment aids in mapping out the outcomes of particular events and helps determine the severity of the risk impact. This not only helps determine whether a risk is acceptable or not but it also contributes to determining the order of prioritisation in many instances (Tracy 2016).

Prioritisation plays a key role in operations to ensure that resources are allocated in such a way as to make the most positive impact to a situation and thus the most progress towards the achievement of the end goal (United Nation 2013: 4). In this case, the Rohingya refugee crisis is so large and unfolded rapidly beyond Bangladesh's expectation that the resources and capacities available to address many of the risks faced by the Rohingya are mostly provided for by NGO's and IGO's that rely heavily on donor support. By assessing the risks to human security that various forms of exploitation pose to a Rohingya, areas of prioritisation for resources and capacity distribution can be made so as to ensure maximum impact towards reducing the insecurities faced by the Rohingya.

Using Tracy's (2016) explanation, a risk matrix works as follows:

1. The likelihood of the risk occurring is multiplied by the impact of the risk.
2. Both likelihood and impact are assigned numerical values, which are determined by a wide variety of factors depending on the purpose of the risk assessment. In most cases, monetary values are given to the impact and the likelihood remains in generic percentages. In some cases, such as this, a scale from 1-5 can be used, particularly when doing a qualitative assessment.
3. Once these variables have been assigned values and are defined, and once they have been multiplied, their final value can be plotted on a risk matrix to get a risk rating.
4. The risk ratings can be defined in many ways, for the purpose of this research it will be defined in three zones; the red zone is high risk and considered to be an unacceptable risk and thus of high priority in terms of mitigation and resource allocation. The yellow zone is considered to be medium risk and depending on the kind of risk this poses to the objective, it can be acceptable or not acceptable, putting it at either high priority or medium priority. Lastly, the green zone is considered to be low risk and therefore of low priority for resource distribution.

With all of this in mind, it is also important for the variables that will be employed in this risk assessment to be defined. The first variable is likelihood which is defined by (COSO 2012: 5) as an element of risk assessment which represents the possibility of

an event occurring. The second key variable is impact which can also be referred to as the consequence of a risk and refers to “the extent to which the risk might affect the enterprise” (COSO 2012: 3). In this study the definition used for impact will be as above, with the exception of the word “enterprise” which will be replaced with the word “objective” where the objective pertains to ensuring that the referent object is free from fear and want. Therefore impact will be understood as the extent to which the risk might affect the objective.

Next is risk, for which there are numerous definitions identified by the IRMSA ranging from “the possibility of loss danger or injury” to “the possibility that the future may be worse than the what was expected” (IRMSA 2014: 11). In the IRMSA guidelines, risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives”. While this definition is simple and clear it does not quite capture the purpose of this risk assessment, which is to establish the risk to human security categories faced by the individual under exploitative conditions. Therefore, in this paper, risk is defined as “an uncertain event or condition which, if it occurs, will have a negative effect on the achievement of objectives” (IRMSA 2014: 11).

Finally, this brings us to the identification of the objective. In this study, the objective is to secure the individual in relation to the Millennium Development Goals. These goals, set out in the 1994 UN Development Report acknowledge that Human Security is a vital paradigm and key element in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, as they work towards the attainment of freedom from fear and want through people-centred development. In so doing, it is stated that “the ultimate objective of enriching human-lives” can be achieved (United Nations Development Reports 1994: 15). Simply put, the objective is to secure a Rohingya’s human security so that he/she may live in dignity and freedom from fear and want.

Using the aforementioned variables, the following risk categories have been formulated using COSO’s (2012: 4) category examples and have been formatted slightly to be oriented more closely to this study’s objective with the guidance of the 2016 UN Human Security Handbook (2016: 21):

- 1) Catastrophic: severe impact on human security resulting in imminent death with no mitigating factors in place.
- 2) Critical: severe impact on human security resulting in the long term suffering of an individual where the individual does not live in dignity without prospects of their circumstances changing in the near future. Natural rights are threatened.
- 3) Moderate: where the basic insecurities of the individual are secure according to the idea of natural rights (basic human rights). But the lawful rights are absent, leading to a higher level human security threat. The risk is identified and the formulation of mitigating factors is in the process of implementation.
- 4) Minor: temporary and expected human security risks with available capacities and resources to be directed to existing mitigation plans to reduce the risk impact.
- 5) Negligible: human security threat has undergone the process of identification and is managed and mitigated by existing and sufficient empowerment structures to meet the needs of the individual.

Finally, the foundation of this research will use available sources published by international organisations and governments. These institutions provide the most up to date, in-depth research on exploitation and refugee crises'. Sources such as The UNODC's annual report, the UN Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; UN publication on Human Security in theory and practice and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 2016, amongst others, will be used to establish international anti-human trafficking and exploitation standards. Furthermore, secondary sources such as books, journal articles and investigative news reports that inform on the developing Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh will be used.

1.5 Ethics and Limitation

In terms of ethics, all documents exploited in this paper will be accessible in the public domain and while official documents will be used, none will be classified. All used documents will be accredited in accordance with the University's antiplagiarism rules and standards. Furthermore, this study will not be using human participants.

Finally, there are several limitations that avail themselves to this kind of research. Due to the location and conditions of Rohingya refugee crisis in addition to time constraints, both field work and the use of human participants will be impractical. Furthermore, the currency of the Rohingya refugee crisis means that there are limited scholarly sources that are available for what will essentially be a desktop study. This means that sources produced through investigative journalism, organisations and governments will make up the bulk of the sources used in this research.

1.6 Research Structure

Chapter 1: Introduction. The explanation of the research topic of this study will be introduced. Additionally, the literature overview and the methodology informing this research will be given.

Chapter 2: The identification and definition of the main concepts, assumption and phenomena of this research in the context of the Critical Security Studies theoretical framework and provide concept clarification for the main concepts.

Chapter 3: The context of the plight of the Rohingya refugee crisis will be explained. Additionally, the new vulnerabilities faced by the Rohingya in Bangladesh will be identified.

Chapter 4: A vulnerability assessment will be employed to determine what conditions contribute to the vulnerability of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and how this vulnerability contributes to the likelihood of the Rohingya falling victim to labour and sexual exploitation.

Chapter 5: The likelihood and impact of exploitation on the human security of the Rohingya will be established to determine the risk rating of their human security being jeopardised under circumstances of labour and sexual exploitation.

Chapter 6: Based on the findings from these earlier chapters, this final chapter will include the lessons learned from this case study. Lastly, the conclusion of this research will be given.

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide conceptual clarity as it relates to the grounding theory and paradigm of this study, Critical Security Studies and Human Security. This chapter will explore and define exploitation and vulnerability, as it relates to the research question. Finally, in order to better understand the Rohingya as refugees and stateless persons, as well as the legal implications that arise from this, the definition and differences between a refugee, asylum seeker, stateless person and migrant will be given.

2.2 Critical Security Studies

There are an array of perspectives within and definitions of Critical Security Studies (CSS). Traditionally, while highly debated, security most commonly referred to the protection of the state from military threats. In this regard, the state is the entity that must be secured, however, definitional clarity as to what is meant by being secured, what and who the concept should be applied to as well as the causes of insecurity are all contested (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams 2015: 1-2). With such theoretical security perspectives limited to the state and various components lacking definitional clarity, came the need for an evolution of traditional security approaches. From this need came CSS, which pertains to the broadened and deepened conceptualisations of traditional theoretical frameworks such as realism, liberalism and structuralism (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams (2015 :4). In addition, CSS argues that security is a derivative concept, one that is constructed subjectively and thus, does not have an apolitical condition or objective (Smith 2005: 41)

The need for CSS came with the realisation that traditional theoretical approaches were unable to account for and address current global insecurities. The failure of traditional theories in accounting for the end of the Cold War served as a key turning point and reminder of the insufficiency of traditional security theories. Additionally, events such as the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States brought to the fore the influential role of non-state actors in global politics, which traditional approaches could

not account for due to their state-centric foci as mentioned above. These global events highlighted the need for theoretical frameworks to engage more deeply with issues related to hard and soft power, war and peace and most importantly, both state and non-state actors (Bilgin 2008: 94-95).

From this need came the move towards rethinking traditional security, or as Booth puts it, the 'emancipation' of security for the individual, which serves as the foundation for CSS. This emancipation, Booth (1991: 319) defines as the freeing of an individual from constraints which prevent him or her from fulfilling tasks that they would otherwise freely choose to fulfil. Such preventative factors include traditional security threats that not only comprise of war but expands to include non-traditional security threats to the notion of being able to 'freely choose' to pursue certain opportunities. In addition, sources of threats to the emancipation of the individual must include that the individual as opposed to the state as the sole entity that is to be secured (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams (2015 :11).

Within this emancipation of security, the approach of the Welsh School serves as the grounding approach for this study. The Welsh School challenges the notion of the state as the referent object, which refers to the entity which must be secured and links traditional security to critical security theory. Hobden & Jones (2008: 153) argue that the state is a source of insecurity as opposed to providers of security for individuals and communities. Therefore it is the individual, not the state that must be secured. Additionally, the Welsh School advocates for the broadening and deepening of the security agenda, the former pertains to the inclusion of other non-traditional issues such as the environment, economic, societal and political spheres. The latter refers to the entity of analysis and looks beyond the state to include other actors such as individuals, groups and institutions, as discussed above (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams 2015 :11). The Welsh School emphasises that it is through the emancipation of the individual by which security can be achieved, as Booth (1991:319) puts it, the insurance of emancipation is what can produce true security, not order or power.

In this study, the Welsh School's emphasis on the emancipation of the individual will serve as the foundation for analysing the Rohingya as the reference object to be

secured from exploitative circumstances born from their vulnerability as refugees and stateless persons.

2.3 Human Security Paradigm

While there is much debate about the utility of human security to academic research and policy makers, due to its broad nature, it is undeniable that the concept of human security has value. Security in recent years has evolved to further consider the security of the individual, bringing to the fore the Human Security paradigm. Human security goes beyond traditional and in many cases, non-traditional security foci to looks at the individual as the entity to be secured in security studies . As Paris puts it:

“The idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of middle power states, development agencies, and NGOs-all of which seek to shift attention and resources away from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development. As a unifying concept for this coalition, human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition” (Paris 2001: 88).

Furthermore, in an attempt to provide more conceptual clarification, the Commission on Human Security describes human security as the ability:

“...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission on Human Security: 2003: 4) .

With the aforementioned definition in mind, human security, in broad terms, is ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ as well as the ability for one to live in dignity, pertaining to a person’s access to human rights and equality and freedom (United

Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Responses 2009: 22). The UN Development Report (United Nations: 1994: 23) defines human security as a people-centred approach to security, meaning that it places the individual at the centre of analysis. Human security is concerned with how freely people live, breathe, make choices, are able to access economic and social opportunities and whether they live in peace or conflict. Within these definitions there lies seven categories of threats to human security identified by the United Nations (2009), which include economic insecurity, health insecurity, food insecurity, environmental insecurity, personal insecurity, community insecurity and political insecurity.

The UN Development Report (United Nations 1994: 25) is the foundational document which identifies and defines securing the aforementioned dimensions of Human Security as follows:

- Economic security pertains to the assurance of basic income, through dignified and productive work that is remunerated. In the worst cases, this income should be provided through some form of a public financial safety net.
- Food security refers to individuals having access to food through physical and economic means, by growing food for themselves, having access to public food distribution or by buying food.
- Health security means that people have access to health care and treatment including preventative care. Access to quality health care is essential in protecting individuals from infectious diseases and parasites that cause illness and death.
- Environmental security refers to individuals living in healthy physical environments without fear of environmental catastrophe, particularly those resulting from environmental degradation provoked by human beings such as deforestation and industrialisation.
- Personal security refers to ensuring the physical security of individuals and protecting them from physical violence. Threats to individuals' personal security emanate from states, internal conflict, crime and domestic violence, child abuse and even threats from one's self such as suicide.

- Community security pertains to drawing security from belonging to a group of people such as a community, organisation, family or religious and ethnic groups. Tension and conflict between groups threatens community safety.
- Political security means that individuals must be able to live in societies which respect and protect their basic human rights.

While Human Security is a widely popular political framework employed in the 21st century, it does, however, have two main conceptual issues. The first issue is that there is no precise definition of human security, making for confusion amongst scholars as to what it actually is. The second issue is that scholars who support human security have an interest in the terms' very broad and vague nature, opening the paradigm up to serious criticism (Paris 2001: 88).

However, while there is much debate about the relevance and value of Human Security, there are parallels between Human Security and CSS. The broader conceptualisations of human security, such as its advocacy for security theorists and policymakers to re-orient their security foci to go beyond the state and focus on the individual as the referent object is one and will serve as that grounding perspective guiding this paper (Bourne & Bulley 2011: 454 and Newman 2010: 78).

2.4 Exploitation

A number of disciplines ranging from law to economics have sought to explore the meaning of exploitation. Like many social science concepts, exploitation is ill-defined. According to the Protocol to Prevent and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2009), exploitation can be understood to include, "at minimum," all forms of forced sexual exploitation, forced labour or similar services, slavery, the removal of organs or servitude. This, however, is not a definition, rather it represents what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015:24) labels "an open-ended list of examples". There are, however, two common definitions of exploitation used by scholars.

The first definition is the technical definition, referring to the use of a situation or thing in which to benefit from it, usually financially. The second definition is normative,

referring to the negative relationships between people where an individual or group is unfairly taken advantage of by other individuals or groups for their own ends or benefit (Cambridge Dictionary 2018). More simply put, The UNHCR's Action for the Rights of Children (*n.d.*: 3 (B)) states that exploitation is the use of something or someone for one's own selfish purposes or profit. De Jonge van Ellemeet *et al* (2006: 3) affirms these definitions and builds onto them by describing the exploitation of a human being as one's attempt to benefit as much as possible by means of abuse or for one to take excessive advantage of another person. In the work place, De Jonge van Ellemeet *et al* also describes exploitation as an individual being made to work in unfavourable conditions in order for another to benefit from their labour or otherwise as much as possible.

Building onto these definitions, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2019) has identified various illegal activities to be components of exploitations such as, "the clandestine hiring of undocumented foreign workers without any contract, the non-respect of the laws on security and hygiene at the workplace, the non-abiding of the maximum working hours, the payment of starvation salaries far below the legal minimum wage, tax evasion, the unfair competition with law-abiding businesses sometimes leading to their bankruptcy, and the ensuing aggravated deficit of the state budget".

However, in order for exploitative practices to be deemed wrong, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2015: 21-22), states that the practice of exploitation must show characteristics of individuals or groups taking unfair advantage of others and their situations. In order for this principle to be better understood, the nature of fairness needs to be understood, this too lacks definitional clarity. The UNODC states that the concept of exploitation possesses both cultural and temporal dimensions. The nature of unfairness, on the other hand, is not defined. Rather, the most common literature describes unfairness on a continuum, where on the one end of the spectrum it describes the socially and legally acceptable forms of individuals to derive benefit from the unequal relationship between them, like a regulated capitalist system. On the other end of the spectrum is where unfair advantage results in the harm of others, through means of slavery and servitude.

Furthermore, exploitation exists prominently in the context of human trafficking. Human trafficking is composed of three elements, the first of which pertains to action, the second pertains to the means by which the former is made possible and finally, the purpose, which is defined as exploitation. While exploitation may be difficult to define, it takes many forms. Exploitation ranges from common lawful practices of exploitation, common amongst businesses, where many states accept practices that give people the right to buy and sell labour capacities in relation to the free-market, to instances where harm to others and circumstances of servitude and slavery occurs, as mentioned above (UNODC 2015: 23).

In this study, the vulnerability and level of protection an individual or group is privy to will play a large role in defining the unfair exploitation of refugees with particular reference to De Jonge van Ellemeet *et al's* more broad definition of exploitation. This, in conjunction with the aforementioned activities and categories that follow will serve as the threat to the human security of the Rohingya refugees referred to in chapter 4 and 5.

With this in mind, the US government with reference to the Protocol to Suppress and Prevent and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children has identified six major forms of exploitation which include: forced labour, involuntary domestic servitude, debt bondage, child soldiers, forced child labour and sex trafficking (UNODC 2009). Stop the Traffik (2018), an anti-trafficking non-governmental organisation, identifies other forms of exploitation to include forced marriage and forced organ harvesting.

While there are a disturbing number of officially identified forms of exploitation, the level of a person's vulnerability to falling victim to such forms of exploitation plays an integral role in ensuring their human security. Furthermore, vulnerability also plays a key role in allowing policy makers to identify the vulnerable groups and understand why and how they are vulnerable to such forms of exploitation. Subsequently, this knowledge influences policy strategies that are able to more effectively speak to the establishment and maintenance of these groups' human security. Therefore, it is also important to understand the concept of vulnerability.

2.5 Vulnerability

When analysing the conditions under which exploitation is able to exist and grow, it is often interpreted in relation to a form of vulnerability. In the context of groups and individuals, it is their vulnerability that becomes the object of exploitation (UNODC 2015:21). Therefore, it is essential that an understanding of the concept of vulnerability is acquired in order to better understand the concept of exploitation. Vulnerability, then, is defined by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2018) as:

“the diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard. The concept is relative and dynamic. Vulnerability is most often associated with poverty, but it can also arise when people are isolated, insecure and defenceless in the face of risk, shock or stress.”

With this definition in mind, in many instances, those most vulnerable to exploitation are foreign citizens who are not yet legally documented, either due to migrating illegally to pursue better economic opportunities or due to the fact that they are in the process of seeking asylum. Often, in desperate circumstance with little choice, these groups seek out means of employment, however, due to their precarious situation, they are often exploited by potential employers (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2019). In response to tackling such issues of vulnerability, international organisations such as the UNHCR and The European Council on Refugees and Exiles have built further on this definition by identifying who these vulnerable groups and individuals are.

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2017: 13) identifies asylum seekers and refugees as particularly vulnerable groups to exploitation and human rights violations, not only within their country of origin but also along their journey to safety and often in refugee camps in the destination country. These additional circumstances of vulnerability further add to their trauma. In recent years, it has been noted that the number of asylum seekers and refugees that have fled from circumstances of torture and those who are unaccompanied minors have seen sharp increases. Within these vulnerable groups, there also lie smaller groups of individuals that are classified as more vulnerable due to factors such as their age or gender.

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2017: 15) and World Health Organisation (2019) identify vulnerable individuals to be minors, particularly those unaccompanied by a guardian, the ill, elderly and disabled, pregnant women and single parents with young children, individuals who have or are victims of human trafficking, torture, rape and other forms physical, sexual or psychological violence, persons with mental disorders who are malnourished and destitute.

For instance, the influx of refugees into Europe serves as a prime example of the vulnerability and exploitation of child refugees. Child refugees are often without parents and are destitute once they have reached Europe. Child refugees constitute over half of the refugee population and of these, over 10000 have been reported missing after entering Europe, most of whom are believed to have been victims of sexual exploitation and trafficking. In this regard, Europol has identified links between smuggling gangs and the exploiters of those they smuggle into various forms of slavery (Zenko 2017), further highlighting the nexus between vulnerability and exploitation.

With the role that vulnerability plays in exploitation in mind, it is also necessary to identify and define the objects of this study in relation to the aforementioned concepts. Illegal immigrants fleeing areas of conflict are perhaps the most vulnerable individuals who fall at the mercy of the receiving state's generosity. The status given to asylum seekers plays a significant role in this determination and will therefore also determine how effectively – or if at all – an asylum seeker's safety and security will be ensured.

2.6 What is a Refugee?

Conversation, news reports, political campaigns and policy drivers, to mention a few, in recent years, have been heavily influenced by issues of migration. Most notably, the numerous and large-scale refugee crisis' have taken centre stage. Whether its Syrian refugees travelling illegally to Europe via small boats or pictures showing the bodies of children washed ashore, the global refugee crisis has commanded attention and become heavy points of debate in political conversation across the globe.

However, in these conversations, the distinction between migrant and refugee are mistakenly used interchangeably or used as an umbrella term to classify stateless persons and asylum seekers, all of which have different international legal implications and can have serious ramifications for the human security of these groups. By using inaccurate umbrella terms, misunderstandings influencing policy may lead to a disjuncture in the fulfilment of the protection responsibilities of destination states for refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (B)). This brings us to the question of what a refugee is and how a refugee differs from a migrant, asylum seeker and a stateless person?

The term “refugee” was first notably defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees but limited in its scope as it was used as an instrument to deal with refugees in Europe during the post WWII era, specifically to events occurring prior to 1 January 1951. With a clear need for the review of this date and broaden the definition’s inclusion, came the 1967 Protocol which removed this limitation, allowing for the concept to apply irrespective of time, so that refugees today are classified in terms of circumstances (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019: 2-3 (A)). The UNDP/ UNHCR handbook, with reference to the 1951 Convention and with the omission of any reference to a particular time period in relation to the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as follows:

“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 2019: 2-3 (A)).

Put more simply, a refugee is an individual who has fled their country for reasons pertaining to their persecution or the risk of serious violations to their human rights. These violations were perceived to be such great threats to these individuals’ lives that they felt they had no other option but to flee their country and seek refuge in

another as their own government could not or would not protect them from these threats. In many cases, a refugee's state could be the source of the threat to the individual's safety. A refugee is an individual who has the right to international protection (Amnesty International 2019). Today there are an estimated 25.9 million refugees across the globe and an estimated 37,000 people are forced to flee their homes as a result of persecution and conflict daily. Of these refugees, it is estimated that more than half are adolescents. Most of these refugees come from 3 countries, Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan which account for 57% of the total refugee population (UNHCR 2019 (B)).

With this in mind, the Syrian refugee crisis is a prime example of individuals fleeing their country due to life threatening circumstance. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrian citizens have fled violence from both the Syrian government, opposition groups and terror organisations such as Islamic State resulting in 13 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (Buchan 2016). World Vision (2019) reports that the number of Syrian refugees currently sits at over 5.6 million with an additional 6.2 million Syrians internally displaced. Of the affected, half are estimated to be children.

While the definition of a refugee is argued by many scholars to be in need of expansion to include other elements, such as those that threaten the ability for an individual to live a decent life and free from circumstances of poverty. Lister (2012: 651-660), however, argues for the narrow definition set out in the convention, adding that issues of poverty can be addressed more sustainably and economically efficiently through international aid and development projects and does not entail the element of urgency needed when addressing the immediate basic needs of a refugee.

An asylum seeker is very similar to that of a refugee but has an important distinguishable element. An asylum seeker is a person who is in the early stage of applying for protection in another country. An asylum seeker is a person fleeing their country for fear of persecution or threats to their human rights to seek refuge in another country but is awaiting or in the process of applying for legal recognition from the destination country, implying that a refugee has already gone through this process and

obtained the legal documentation to be classified as a refugee (Amnesty International 2019).

A migrant, however, is different to an asylum seeker and a refugee legally and in safety and security circumstances. A migrant is not seeking asylum/ protection. Rather they are seeking opportunities for a better quality of life. There are many kinds of migrants, some scholars and policy-makers even differentiate between forced and voluntary migrants (International Committee of the Red Cross 2018). In recent years, labour migration has become a common strategy for economic growth amongst developing countries such as the Philippines, which sees over a million of their citizens leaving the country each year to pursue better economic opportunities abroad and send money back home. Currently, about 10 million Filipinos live and work abroad (International Labour Organisation 2019).

Finally, a fourth term has come to the fore when classifying these groups called 'stateless' persons. A stateless person is very different to a migrant, asylum-seeker or refugee in legal terms. A stateless person is not a person who has no state within which to reside due to circumstances of safety and security or economic and environmental threats within their country of origin. Rather, a stateless person is someone who, regardless of these circumstances, has not been recognised by their birth country as a citizen. By not having a claim to citizenship to any country, a stateless person cannot lay claim to certain rights and protections.

In addition, when one is stateless, they do not have documentation pertaining to their identity. By an individual not having documentation to prove where they are from, the process for seeking asylum and being protected as a refugee becomes ever-more complicated (UNHCR 2018 (B)). A prime example of the occurrence of statelessness is the Kuwaiti Bedouins. After Kuwait gained independence, many groups did not apply for citizenship as they were illiterate or not educated enough to understand the importance of applying. The Kuwaiti Bedouins are one such group that have been stripped of their basic rights and labelled illegal residents in their country of origin, rendering them stateless (Batha 2011).

2.7 Conclusion

Chapter 2 has provided conceptual clarification on the grounding theories and key concepts that will be employed in the analysis sections of this paper. In this chapter it was established that by allowing for the inclusion of non-state actors, groups and individuals to stand at the centre of security analysis, human security in the analysis of refugee crisis' is essential. Human security applied here not only allows for the analysis of Rohingya to remain at the centre of this study, but goes further to include the safeguarding of these individuals from an array of sources that may prove to be major threats to their survival.

CHAPTER 3:THE ROLE OF BANGLADESH AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the context of the most recent Rohingya refugee crisis will be explained. This chapter will begin by exploring the historical origin of conflict between the Rohingya Muslims and Myanmar's Buddhist nationalist majority. Thereafter, the conditions under which the Rohingya lived before they fled to Bangladesh, the context of the latest ethnic cleansing in Myanmar and the impact of the Rohingya on Bangladesh will be explained. In so doing, this background will elucidate the unique vulnerabilities the Rohingya face compared to other refugees.

3.2. The Rohingya in Myanmar

Since Myanmar's independence from 60 years of British colonial rule in 1948, the history and origin of the Rohingya Muslims have been disputed by the predominantly Buddhist Government of Myanmar. Formally known as Burma and recognised as such in the state's 1947 Constitution, Myanmar saw its current name change in 1989 after the military junta took control of the state. "Myanmar" recognised as "The Republic of the Union of Myanmar" in its 2008 Constitution, was argued to be more closely associated with federalist and democratic ideologies (Government of Myanmar 2008), but for many, it is a reminder of military enforcement (Mohajan 2018: 2).

With this independence, came the refusal of the Government of Myanmar to recognise the Rohingya as part of its historical make up, albeit that the settlement and growth of its Muslim population can be traced back as far as the 15th century, when Muslims in their thousands migrated to what was known at the time as the Arakan Kingdom until the 17th century (Global Security 2011). Notwithstanding the etymological roots of the label 'Rohingya', commonly believed to have been derived from the name 'Arakan' in the dialect of the Rohingya, both the Buddhist people and Government of Myanmar

claim the label to be a self-identifying term with no ties to the former Arakan Kingdom (Albert and Chatzky 2018).

During the period of the Arakan Kingdom, now today as part of Northern Rakhine in Myanmar, Bengal (Bangladeshi) Muslims traded with Rakhine State (Albert and Chatzky 2018). These traders settled in Myanmar and increased in number during the British occupation from 1824, when Bengali migration to Rakhine was encouraged during the rice picking seasons to increase production for export to other Western countries. As a result of British encouragement, in the span of 50 years, the Muslim population in Rakhine had doubled and became one of the foundational elements fuelling animosity between Buddhist locals in Myanmar (Prichard 2018). From this tension came the rise of Buddhist nationalism influenced by Japanese fascism and the beginning of Japanese military investment in the training of various Buddhist militias and the Burmese military, eventually playing a key role in the beginning of the Anglo-Burmese war. The animosity between the Buddhists and the Muslims grew ever deeper at the onset of WWII, when the Muslim population of Myanmar took the side of the British and the Buddhists took the side of the Japanese. After WWII and Myanmar's independence, the divide between the Buddhists and the Muslims became further entrenched when the Muslims fought for equal rights but were denied (Mohajan 2018: 2).

Until their 2017 exodus, most of the Rohingya population of Myanmar had been confined to Rakhine State, one of Myanmar's poorest regions, a state on the west coast of Myanmar (Mohajan 2018: 2). Today, much of the tension fuelling the Buddhist oppression of the Rohingya stems from the fact that Myanmar is surrounded by Muslim state neighbours such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Malaysia. It is common belief which fuels islamophobia in Myanmar, that if these states were to attack Myanmar, that the Rohingya would not support Myanmar, but rather their Muslim attackers. As a result of these sentiments, in conjunction with the aforementioned events in Myanmar's history, the Rohingya Muslims have been isolated, economically exploited and culturally and politically oppressed (Wolf 2017).

The presence of oppressive strategies has been intermittent throughout Myanmar's history with one of the earliest instances of Rohingya fleeing Myanmar dating back to

1978, when military dictator General Ne Win intensified oppression of the Rohingya Muslim Minority and other native groups such as the Kachin and Shan people and branded the Rohingya illegal immigrants. To achieve this, General Ne Win ensured that the Rohingya could not meet the citizenship criteria. That same year, in 1978, a quarter of a million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh seeking asylum. A year later, in 1979, Bangladesh began the process of repatriating the Rohingya (Mohajan 2018: 14). These minority groups make up a third of Myanmar's population and have experienced numerous instances of state-sponsored violence. More recently, in a 2011 UN fact finding mission, it was determined that violence against the aforementioned groups were found to be serious crimes under international law (Human Rights Watch 2019).

While the Government of Myanmar continues to deny the presence and make-up of the Rohingya in its state's history and origin, the Rohingya's centuries old presence in the state is clear. It is also important to recognise that much of the historical tension underpinning current conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State can be attributed to historical third party interference from both the British and the Japanese. Such circumstances were present in Rwanda past third party interference by the Germans and Belgians, which created a divide between the Hutu's and the Tutsis that would eventually snowball into genocide, a picture painted almost identically in the Rohingya refugee crisis.

3.3. Myanmar Country Profile

Myanmar is situated in Southeast Asia, bordered by China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos, home to a population of 53 Million people, (See Annexure A for more detail) (BBC 2019). In 2017, Myanmar recognised 135 ethnic group, however, the Rohingya were not among the recognised, as discussed above. The dominant religion is Buddhism and Burmese is the predominant language (Aljazeera 2017 (A)).

In terms of its economic disposition, Myanmar is a poor but quickly developing nation, however, in 2017, it was estimated by The World Bank (2017) that rural areas presented as having 6.7 times higher poverty stricken individuals than urban areas, meaning that of the 24.8% of Myanmar's population living under the poverty line, the

majority live in rural areas and in Rakhine State, home to majority Rohingya groups. It was further estimated that 4 in 10 people were likely to fall under the national poverty line. In addition, according to BTI, in 2018, Myanmar's combined education and health expenditure amounted to the same as its total military expenditure of 13% of the national budget. It was further found that corruption is an endemic issue plaguing the legal integrity of the country. Despite issues of corruption and little investment in its health and education sector, Myanmar is one of the fastest growing economies emerging from a history of economic isolation and mismanagement.

Politically, the rise of Buddhist nationalist groups and sentiments have significantly impacted Myanmar's policies. Conflict in Rakhine State is not the only instance of ethnic violence. Almost a third of Myanmar is likely, if not already, experiencing a humanitarian crisis (The World Bank 2019). Historical tensions between the Buddhist majority and Muslim minority have flared in recent years. In 2013 and 2014 separate incidences in which the occupation of Muslim neighbourhoods by Buddhists, resulted in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Muslims. In 2013 and 2014, a subsequent 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh for sanctuary, who were later joined by 700,000 Rohingya in 2017 (Religious Literacy Project 2017).

However, despite the most recent eruption of ethnic violence in the country, between 2017-2018, Myanmar grew 6.8% due to strong domestic telecommunications trade and heavy economic and developmental support given to the country by The World Bank. The World Bank's continued support is based on its argument that stability and development will contribute towards the attainment of peace in the country (The World Bank 2019). Countering this argument are humanitarian aid agencies who have criticised the World Bank's \$100 million project towards its development planning in Myanmar's Rakhine State, arguing that this could worsen tensions and do more harm than good in the long term (Lewis and McPherson 2019).

3.4. Bangladesh Country Profile

Bangladesh is one of Myanmar's neighbours, situated in South Asia, and is one of the most densely populated states in the world with a population of 162 million people, almost three times that of Myanmar. Economically, Bangladesh is also grappling with

widespread poverty but has made great progress in addressing such issues sustainably by reducing population growth and investing in education and health care (BBC 2019). From 1991 to 2016/2017, Bangladesh was able to successfully reduce its poverty rate from 44.2% to 14.8% before the most recent influx of Rohingya refugees (The World Bank 2019).

Politically, Bangladesh is a majority Muslim country with 88% of the population being followers of Islam and 98% of its population speaks Bengali (Nations Online 2019). Much of Bangladesh's social tensions are political rather than ethnic, a contrast to Myanmar's. Its current political climate is tense as Bangladesh continues to suppress opposition groups or individuals who disagree with the ruling Awami League (Human Rights Watch 2018). Another factor further adding political and economic strain on Bangladesh is the recent Rohingya refugee influx.

According to World Vision (2019), today there are over 740, 000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who fled Myanmar's state sponsored genocide, joining over 200,000 Rohingya who had fled to camps in Bangladesh to escape violence in Myanmar in earlier years. Bangladesh has had to cope with the sudden influx of over 700,00 Rohingya and a total of over 900,00 refugees who have been absorbed in many local communities (See Annexure B for more detail).

These communities, such as Ukhiya, have seen serious demographic changes with Rohingya outnumbering the locals and has put severe pressure on infrastructure and Bangladesh's resources. One consequence of this influx on local communities is the increase in food prices and strain on access to water sources (Beaubien 2019). Such fast population increases and further strain to the resources and capacities of Bangladesh pose a threat to the developmental goals of Bangladesh and severely impact the strides in poverty and population reduction efforts in the country.

3.5. Who are the Rohingya?

The Rohingya are a minority, predominantly Muslim population of an estimated 3.5 million, dispersed around the globe, who practice a variation of Sunni Islam. The

Rohingya race are a mixture of diverse ethnic groups such as Arabs and Bengalis and account for 35.6% of the Rakhine population (Mohajan 2018: 14). There are an estimated 1.3 million Rohingya that formerly lived in Myanmar's Rakhine State and are considered illegal immigrants by the Government of Myanmar (Prichard 2018). The Rohingya are described as "one of the most persecuted minorities of our time," (Bhatia et al 2018:105), having been branded as a threat to national security in 1962 and stripped of their all forms of political representation.

Since the 1982 Burmese Citizenship law of October 15, 1982, the Rohingya have been turned into de-facto foreigners in Burma, their native country, only allowed to travel with government permission and confined to ghetto-like camps in Rakhine, one of the poorest states in the country with its poverty rate sitting at 78% in contrast to 37.5% for the national average (Aljazeera 2018, Albert, and Chatzky 2018). Additionally, the Rohingya's non-naturalisation meant that they could not meet the criteria to hold political positions, serve in the armed forces and did not have citizenship documents (Mohajan 2018:6).

As a result of discriminatory government efforts, the Rohingya are a stateless minority group who do not possess any official identification documentation rendering them illegal immigrants in their birth place (Aljazeera 2018). The Rohingya therefore, do not have access to basic rights and services that the citizens or legal immigrants within Myanmar have, in addition to being highly impoverished and uneducated. Rakhine State, being one of the poorest parts of Myanmar in conjunction to discriminatory bureaucratic practices, procedures and regulations against the Rohingya have rendered the Rohingya an abused and impoverished group since Burma's independence (The International Crisis Group. 2018).

3.6. Causes of the Exodus of the Rohingya from Myanmar

On the 25th of August 2017 the Government of Myanmar began a disproportionate retaliation against the Rohingya people of Rakhine State in response to an attack on 30 army and police border posts by a Rohingya resistance group that resulted in the deaths of 12 officers. The Arakan Resistance Salvation Army (ARSA) later took

responsibility for this attack in a 18-minute long video and have been branded a terrorist organisation by the Government of Myanmar (Edroos 2017, Albert and Chatzky 2018).

Although recognised by the Government of Myanmar as a Muslim terrorist organisation, motivated by a strong desire to establish Islamic rule in Myanmar, the ARSA denies such claims and describes themselves as a group fighting for the basic rights of the Rohingya Muslims, which they have been denied by the Government of Myanmar (Edroos 2017). The ARSA, formerly known as the Harakkatul Yakeen (Faith Movement), first emerged in 2016 and recognises its struggle as a legitimate self-defence fuelled by the needs of basic human survival (International Crisis Group 2018).

In 2018, however, Amnesty International revealed that the ARSA's attack was much more brutal than previously thought. After an in-depth investigation it was determined that the ARSA were responsible for at least one massacre of an estimated 99 Hindu's in neighbouring villages in Rakhine state. Half of the bodies were found in four mass graves, the other half are still missing and of those found, 14 were under the age of 18. All this occurred at approximately the same time as their attack on the military border posts from the 25th – 26th August 2017 (Amnesty International 2018).

Despite this violence and Myanmar's claims, in an interview with Aljazeera (2018), the Asian Programme Director of the International Crisis Group, Anagha Neelakantan, confirms the ARSA's stance as human rights fighters rather than terrorists, stating that the ARSA does not act with any clear ideological motives, rather that they are driven solely by the need to protect the Rohingya. Furthermore, the government of Myanmar also claim that the ARSA are linked to other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), however there is no evidence to support such claims (Edroos 2017). To support this analysis, the ARSA has put out statements denying their links to any terrorist organisations and are described as a group "determined to remain relevant as an insurgent and political force" (International Crisis Group 2018).

Myanmar's response to the ARSA's attack was egregiously disproportionate and amounted to what numerous states and international organisations have determined to be ethnic cleansing. This was reaffirmed in a UN investigation within which it was found that the attacks displayed "genocidal intent" and went further to reveal that of the 80% confirmed rape instances, 82% were gang rapes committed by Myanmar military officials known as the Tatmadaw (Aljazeera 2018 and OHCHR 2018: 16). This brutal campaign included the burning down of at least 700 Rohingya villages and the mass rape, torture and murder of men, women and children (See Annex C). Allegations have also surfaced that Myanmar security forces had opened fire on fleeing Rohingya civilians and had planted landmines near border crossings to which the Rohingya fled to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. These were mainly placed near the Naf River, which constitutes the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Albert and Chatzky 2018). Through surveys conducted in Rohingya camps in the city of Cox's Bazar, it was estimated that in the first 31 days of violence breaking out in Myanmar between 9,425- 13,759 people died. Medecins Sans Frontieres came to the following estimations:

"of these deaths at least 71.7% were due to violence, including among children under 5 years old. This represents at least 6,700 people, including 730 children. Overall, gunshots were the cause of death in 69% of the violence-related deaths, followed by being burnt to death in their houses (9%) and beaten to death (5%). Among children below the age of 5 years, more than 59% killed during that period were reportedly shot, 15% burnt to death in their home, 7% beaten to death and 2% died due to landmine blasts," (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2017).

With an understanding of the history, origin and recent events fuelling the exodus of the Rohingya in mind, it is clear that this group has indeed been persecuted by the Myanmar government under which they have been oppressed for decades. The conditions of persecution under which the Rohingya were subjected to, both in the recent and longer term, also clearly fall within the violation of their human security and clearly highlight the conditions of conflict from which they have fled.

That said, there are three common kinds of conflict identified by Bugajski (2011:1) as intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and trans-state conflict. The conditions

described above fall clearly within the definition of intra-state conflict, speaking most strongly to the inclusion of civil conflict that is heavily influenced by deepened inequalities, significant outflows of refugees, anti-immigrant pogroms and rhetoric, and inter-ethnic conflict.

The aforementioned human rights violations speak to the complete disregard for the first guiding principles of the implementation of human security defined in the United Nation's Human Security Handbook (2016: 6-7) as:

“The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.”

With the aforementioned acts of violence and various forms of persecution in mind, there are clear human security threats that avail themselves to the Rohingya. The first and most prominent is economic insecurity due to the Rohingya's confinement to the impoverished Rakhine state for decades and the severe health and food insecurities these present as their ability to pursue a better quality of life is purposefully stifled. The second is personal insecurity due to the physical violence, exploitation and ethnic cleansing the Rohingya have fallen victim to, with their recent mass exodus serving as a prime example of their vulnerability. Finally, political insecurity comes to the fore, which was present in the subjugation of the Rohingya to statelessness, various forms of state-sponsored human rights violations and political repressions with no justice for the Rohingya, particularly in Myanmar's 2016 ethnic cleansing operations.

Furthermore, it is clear that the Rohingya have fled an area of extreme conflict and persecution, rendering them eligible to seek asylum in another state. However, due to their lack of documentation as a result of political oppression and denial from Myanmar, this has become an almost impossible task. Further contributing to the absence of their recognition as refugees by Bangladesh is Bangladesh's lack of capacity. Regionally, a lack of positive sentiment and policy for the recognition of refugees on the Asian continent influenced by ASEAN, the main regional organisation, which will be discussed more in-depth in a later section, further exacerbates the Rohingya's chances of recognition. As a result, the Rohingya have remained illegal

immigrants in destination states. This in itself poses a threat to the human security in the short and long term of the Rohingya and will be discussed further in chapter four and five.

3.7. The Rohingya Refugee Crisis of 2017

Due to governmental endorsed attacks against Rohingya civilians, hundreds of thousands Rohingya have fled Myanmar to a number of countries across the globe such as Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, India, The Gambia, and the United States but its neighbour, Bangladesh, has been the destination country of choice for over 700,000 thousand Rohingya (Prichard 2018). Fleeing Rohingya with little to no resources other than the clothes on their back have been unable to cross the Naf River, (See Annex D for more information). Rohingya have, therefore, resorted to building rickety rafts with whatever material they can find such as bamboo, rope, jerrycans and plastic sheets to make the journey across the river to safety, with hundreds having been estimated to have drowned on route to Bangladesh due to capsized rafts (United Nations 2017 (A)).

Since the violence broke out in 2017, the total number of Rohingya asylum seekers has risen to over 900,000 in Bangladesh as they join their fellow Rohingya who had fled spouts of violence in previous years (Wake and Yu 2018). This exodus has been so great in number that the saturation of Rohingya in camps across Cox's Bazar have risen to become some of the most dense in the world (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2018). As a result, Cox's Bazar has become home to the largest refugee camps in the world to which the World Food Programme (2018 (A)) reports that, "Kutupalong is not only the biggest refugee camp on the planet, with a population of 1 million and counting, it's also the most densely populated. And it took just six months to more than double in size".

It is important to note that most of the arriving Rohingya are women and children with many in need of medical assistance, having sustained injuries cause by gunshots, fire, landmines, machetes and shrapnel. These asylum seekers have found temporary safety and access to basic resources such as food, shelter and healthcare.

Notwithstanding this access to resources being significant progress towards reducing numerous insecurities for the Rohingya, they still remain extremely vulnerable to seasonal environmental threats such as monsoons, gender based violence and are highly dependent on aid agencies which rely on donor support (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2018).

These humanitarian aid agencies including IGOs such as the UN and NGO's such as Human Rights Watch, which have played an integral role in the protection of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, by stepping up to support Bangladesh and even take the lead where Bangladesh cannot. The UNHCR specifically played a key role in the early days and months of the Rohingya influx, having airlifted 1,500 tons of emergency supplies to the areas receiving and now housing the Rohingya (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (H)).

The UNHCR, together with other NGO's such as Medecines Sans Frontieres, Save The Children and The World Food Programme (2018 (B)) have been able to deliver lifesaving medical care to the Rohingya who do not have access to local medical facilities. Materials for building shelters have been provided to the Rohingya along with the installation of latrines, ground water wells and water pumps to better water and sanitation facilities. However, over 60% of the available water supplies in and around the refugee camps are contaminated increasing the already high risk of water-borne and communicable disease breakouts (Albert and Chatzky 2018). Furthermore, international aid organisations and Bangladeshi departments in Cox's Bazar are feeling the strain and are described as "overwhelmed, hampered by funding shortfalls, poor coordination and planning and a challenging operating environment" (Wake and Yu 2018: 2).

In addition, safe spaces for young children to play and access to learning facilities have been set up as well as critical food distribution centres. Such initiatives have played a key role in the mitigation of the spread of disease and hunger in the camps, which would have been a stark reality for Bangladesh, which is already struggling with its own domestic capacity issues (Save the Children 2018 and UNHCR 2019).

3.8. Bangladesh's Response.

The Rohingya have, for many years, fled persecution from the Government of Myanmar to seek refuge in Bangladesh. Before 1992, the Rohingya were recognised as refugees and resided in two official refugee camps set up by Bangladesh in Cox's Bazar's Kutupalong and Nayapara. However, due to the increase in the number of Rohingya crossing into Bangladesh, from 1992 onwards, their recognition as refugees has been denied and they are now recognised as unofficial refugees or unregistered migrants, left to set up their own shelters around the two official refugee camps (Prichard 2018).

Despite these circumstances, the significant part of Myanmar's Rohingya refugee outflow is migrating to Bangladesh, a state already limited in available resources to cater for the most recent influx of Rohingya. While Bangladesh has made significant gains in its economic development, having been moved into the lower-middle-income bracket by the World bank and in 2018 it sat at over 7 percent in GDP growth, the economic strain on its resources that the Rohingya pose to Bangladesh's economy in the long term are argued by, son of the prime minister, Sajeeb Wazed (2018) to be a threat to its economic progress.

Economic strain on the Government of Bangladesh is not the only area of concern for the state, but its local sentiments and the environmental cost the Rohingya have on the state are also stress points. With the recent exodus, local sentiment towards the Rohingya seem to have improved, however, as the International Crisis Group (2018) states, "continued positive relations cannot be taken for granted." The rapid influx of fleeing Rohingya has taken a toll on local communities in and around refugee camps as farm land has been lost and deforestation has taken place to make space for the Rohingya, resulting in the worsening of environmental degradation.

In addition to this locals are feeling more economic strain in the wake of dropping, labour rates due to the increase in cheap labour from the Rohingya, transport time has increase and the cost of living has gone up. Furthermore, locals have grown

concerned about the health and security implications the camps will have on their communities (International Crisis Group 2018).

From the onset, the Rohingya have been blamed for a number of crimes including the increase in Bangladesh's domestic drug trade by means of smuggling contraband over the border . As a result, the Rohingya have also become a threat to law, order and national security by threatening to drive up crime in this regard, sparking fear amongst the locals and further scrutiny from the Bangladeshi Government (Venugopal 2018). Perceived or real threats, spurring from the Rohingya refugee influx, to the safety of locals in Bangladesh may drive up tensions in hosting communities which will require more resources to be deployed to affected areas to prevent the escalations of tensions into violence and to better police affected areas to quash opportunities for the trafficking of contraband, effectively straining Bangladesh further.

In response to the aforementioned fears, Bangladesh was accused of blocking aid agencies from entering the country to assist the fleeing Rohingya for fear that it would encourage the Rohingya to migrate to Bangladesh, this strategy, however, did not deter the Rohingya. Another strategy employed is the restriction of marriage between the Rohingya and local Bangladesh citizens to prevent the Rohingya from becoming eligible for citizenship. The use of biometrics in the processing and issuing of Identification Documents has also been a strategy employed to make it more costly and difficult to acquire fake Bangladeshi ID's on the black market. While these policies and strategies have been put into place, due to lack of preparation and thus legal and operational frameworks for dealing with refugees, a number of policy process and legal hurdles have come to the fore such as the back log in the registration of Rohingya in its camps (Venugopal 2018 and International Crisis Group 2018).

Despite the situation Bangladesh has found itself in, it is important for Bangladesh to be recognised for its efforts in being at the forefront of the humanitarian response and for opening its borders for the Rohingya. On the other hand, due to their lack of willingness to recognise the Rohingya as refugees, the Rohingya have only been able to enjoy few and very limited rights. This is evident in Bangladesh's implementation of another of its many policies, concerning the limitation of the Rohingya in all economic and social aspects of integration. Additional policies have made access for donors and

organisations difficult and have impeded the planning and development of long-term strategies for the likely long-term stay of the Rohingya in Cox's Bazar. Instead, Bangladesh is putting its full force behind the short-term stay of the Rohingya and expediting the repatriation of the Rohingya back to Myanmar. With local sentiment and government capacity already showing signs of strain and growing fears of the long-term impact of the Rohingya staying in Bangladesh, numerous plans for their repatriation have been negotiated in bilateral talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, major fears of the conditions under which they will return and the conditions to which they will return have been expressed by the wider international community (Wake and Yu 2018: 2).

The problem of repatriation is that it may be initiated before the conflict has ended and stability has been restored with clear measures put in place to ensure the protection of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Hence the international community's condemnation of previous repatriation attempts on the part of Bangladesh. Repatriation, according to international law must be voluntary, and must be initiated under conditions of dignity and safety. While Myanmar has expressed a willingness to allow the Rohingya to return, it has stipulated that those returning must provide identity documents which few have due to the conditions under which they fled or due to the denial of their citizenship in Myanmar that left them without official identification documentation (Xchange Foundation 2018 (B), Wake and Yu 2018: 2).

Despite Bangladesh and Myanmar having gone back on forth on talks and numerous agreements on plans to repatriate the Rohingya, the environment in Rakhine State has yet to be declared conducive for the safe and voluntary return of the Rohingya. The recent agreement which was meant to have started on the 23rd of January 2018 where 156,000 Rohingya would be repatriated and last for a period of two years has seen no Refugees return to Rakhine State through official channels. These efforts have, however, been scrutinised by the international community as immature (International Crisis Group 2018).

During this time, Myanmar has made claims that it is planning to build better schools, religious buildings and villages for returning Rohingya, however, satellite imagery provided by the Australian Strategic Institute show no signs of reconstruction and the

continued destruction of Rakhine residential areas (Clarey 2019). In addition, Myanmar authorities continue to bar Humanitarian aid agencies, particularly the UN from delivering essential medical and food supplies to areas controlled by ethnic armed groups as well as their movements being highly restricted in local government controlled areas. Aid workers have been threatened with arrest if attempting to do otherwise (Human Rights Watch 2019).

Another concern for Bangladesh is one that poses a potentially serious threat to its national security. This concern is the threat of the ARSA's significant presence in the camps and the likely militarisation of other Rohingya refugees in the camps. In response to this concern, Bangladesh's intelligence service has asserted its authority and presences in the camps with a focus on high-level as opposed to low-level security threats by rectifying checkpoints, perimeter controls and inserting informants in and around camps (Aljazeera 2017 (A)).

The problem of controlling and monitoring the growth of the ARSA is that members, particularly senior members who escaped the genocide, avoid entering into the refugee camps and avoid participating in compulsory biometric registration conducted by Bangladeshi authorities for their own security and as a result, are able to move around Bangladesh more freely. Up until March 2018, Rohingya were easily able to move between refugee camps and other regions of Bangladesh because Rohingya look very similar to local Bangladeshi people. After March 2018, however, the Rohingya are only able to travel if they have medical referrals as Bangladesh is trying its best to contain the Rohingya and ensure they aren't working, entering local schools or using local medical facilities illegally. Therefore, when attempting to leave the camps, Rohingya have to have substantiated medical reasons for doing so.

The ARSA, however, had taken a huge hit in numbers during the genocide, and while recruitment in the camps are a legitimate fear of the Bangladeshi Government, many refugees are concerned with issues of basic living standards in the refugee camps. Furthermore, Rohingya civilians are coming to terms with the trauma and loss they have experienced with the knowledge that the ARSA was used as the motivation behind the ethnic cleansing, in addition to the fact that the enemy against which the ARSA rallied is far away. In spite of these issues, the ARSA has stated that they are

determined to regroup and remain relevant as displayed in their January 5th 2018 attack on a military convoy in Northern Rakhine State. However, the geography of the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and the strong presence of the Bangladeshi intelligence services will make their mission more difficult (International Crisis Group 2018).

A final point of acknowledgment in Bangladesh's for the Rohingya is its relocation plan should the Rohingya not be repatriated in the near future. The government of Bangladesh has committed \$280 million dollars to relocate the Rohingya to a flood prone island called Bhasan Char and explained that it will mobilise all necessary resources to flood proof the area. The international community is concerned by this prospect and no Rohingya have expressed a desire to be moved to Bhasan Char (International Crisis Group 2018). Despite this plan, no information has been given by the Bangladeshi Government on how it plans to ensure this uninhabited island, of which parts of it are eroded every year during monsoon season, will be able to safely house almost a million Rohingya refugees safely (United Nations 2018 (D)). Concerns over the already restricted movement of the Rohingya and their relocation to this island, local journalists even referring to this plan as the island acting as a prison for the Rohingya (Adams 2019).

While Bangladesh has taken on the burden of the crisis, and international aid response has been significant, the limited role in ending and holding accountable those responsible for the atrocities committed in Myanmar has been minimal. The intervention and response time has been heavily influenced by the UN P5 role players such as Russia and China and international alliances such as ASEAN, which has sparked concern for the long term restoration of peace and justice in the region for the Rohingya.

3.9. International Response

Based on claims that Myanmar is trying to restore stability within its borders, UNSC members such as China and Russia have resisted efforts to increase pressure on the Government of Myanmar. As a result, there has been minimal pressure from states to

bring an end to the persecution of the Rohingya and hold their security forces and those in government accountable for the human rights violations committed (Albert and Chatzky 2018). This attitude was emphasised in an interview on the drafted UNSC resolution on a repatriation plan for the Rohingya and accountability measures on the part on Myanmar which was drafted by the UK where the Russian UN Ambassador stated that he thought it was useless, calling it both inappropriate and untimely (Nicols 2018).

Despite this, in a UN 15 month long Fact-Finding Mission, repeated calls have been made for the investigation and prosecution of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief, and other high-ranking leaders for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2019). Several countries such as Norway and Sweden have expressed their support for the UN's referral of Myanmar officials to the ICC . Additionally, the US imposed both financial and travel sanctions against two Myanmar military units and four of Myanmar's military commanders. However, China continues to protect Myanmar from international backlash by hampering UN measures and intervention through its veto powers and increasing its financial investment in the country as international funding is cut (Human Rights Watch 2019).

While that lack of state responses to the crisis dominates headlines, it is important to also recognise that soon after the genocide began, civilians across Asia took to the streets to protest against the violence and urged their governments to take action. States such as Malaysia and Indonesia called on Myanmar authorities to bring an end to the violence and Indonesia made it clear that it was both ready and willing to help the Government of Myanmar engage in peace talks (Sipalan and Paul 2016). In addition, the US funded a \$1,4 mil investigation into the atrocities committed by Myanmar forces and downgraded Myanmar to the 3rd and lowest tier on the 2018 trafficking in persons report (Human Rights Watch 2019).

The United States also took soft-power action in 2017 when it imposed limited sanctions on Myanmar for their military crackdown on civilian Rohingya in Rakhine State and both widened and intensified these sanctions on Myanmar's military commanders as the number of human rights violations mounted. International donors

including Canada, the UK, U.S, Norway and South Korea have contributed significantly to humanitarian assistance efforts for the Rohingya. Furthermore, the UN had requested over 900 million dollars for 2018 in immediate relief funds for the Rohingya refugee crisis (Albert and Chatzky 2018). Of that request, 69% (\$655) of the target was achieved (UNHCR 2019)

3.9.1. The Role of ASEAN and The Rohingya

Although the response from the international community appears to be extensive, Wake and Yu (2018: 2) has found that, “political and diplomatic progress to address the root causes of the crisis has been minimal” due to the Association of South-East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) division on an appropriate response to the crisis. This has contributed significantly to the perception of a lack of response due to the way in which it views forced migration.

Many states and organisations in the Asian region view forced migration as a bilateral issue between the host country and the country of origin or as a domestic matter, as a result states are reluctant to take action (Venugopal 2018). The stark reality is that international efforts to increase pressure on the Government of Myanmar has done little to bring the violence to a halt and with serious opposition to UN intervention from China and Russia, this is unlikely to change in the near future.

ASEAN has been a major barrier for making progress on refugee protection policies and frameworks in the region. This is because many Asian parties are not signatories to “the Refugee convention and its related principles [which] forms the basis of the international protection regime for refugees and asylum seekers” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees n.d (A)). There are 145 signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, however, in South and South-East of Asia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste are the only signatories to the convention. Notably, missing nations from the convention are Bangladesh and Myanmar. Most states in this region also lack in the establishment of domestic legal frameworks that address forced migration. As a consequence, the neglect of asylum-seekers and refugees is common to this region due their failure to recognise those who require special protection (Venugopal 2018).

One of ASEAN's main pillars reinforces this lack of recognition by solidifying the "mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations" and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" (Association of South-East Asian Nations 2000). ASEAN's Human Rights Declaration policy focus is put on issues of economic migration and makes reference to "women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and vulnerable and marginalised groups" (Association of South-East Asian Nations 2013: 4), with no specific mention to forced migrants, asylum seekers or refugees. The Declaration goes further, however, and leaves the rights of refugees up to the discretion of host states meaning that states have the freedom to determine under what conditions they will issue refugee status to asylum seekers. In the case of the Rohingya, with Bangladesh not a signatory to the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 protocol, this means that it is under no obligation to recognise the Rohingya as refugees.

As a result, member states of ASEAN are ill prepared to deal with refugees and asylum-seekers, let alone in large and sudden instances and are also inadequately equipped to meet the needs of vulnerable refugee groups. Due to lack of preparedness the impact on local communities is exacerbated. Such circumstances fuel dissatisfaction from local populations towards their governments and can result in hostile and discriminatory sentiments towards asylum seekers and refugees (Venugopal 2018).

3.10. Conclusion

This chapter has contextualised the Rohingya refugee crisis by describing the historical background of ethnic tension in Myanmar and its role in the 2017 genocidal attacks. In addition, much focus has been paid to the role Bangladesh and the international community has played in housing and providing vital aid to the Rohingya in refugee camps in Cox's Bazar. Furthermore, the stifled action in holding Myanmar accountable for its crimes against humanity, due to Russian and Chinese interference and the nature of Bangladesh's regional associations has shed light on the unlikely possibility of any justice being achieved in the near future. Finally, the short term

approach to housing the Rohingya in Bangladesh, in conjunction with the little space, resources and capacity that Bangladesh has, means that the Rohingya are left in limbo, uncertain about their future residence, repatriation or relocation plans.

CHAPTER 4: THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ROHINGYA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to interrogate the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya refugees in relation to four human security categories most commonly faced by all Rohingya refugees on a daily basis so as to identify areas in which they are vulnerable to exploitation. These human security categories include health, economic, food and personal security. In so doing, this chapter will determine whether or not Rohingya refugees are at higher risk of being exploited due to the numerous vulnerabilities they face in Bangladesh's refugee camps. This vulnerability assessment will aid in determining the levels of risk as understanding the vulnerabilities of a group can help gauge how these are being managed.

4.2. Health Insecurity

Historically, the inadequate quality of living conditions in refugee camps have presented a number of health hazards to those who occupy them. Often refugee camps struggle with similar issues relating to poor housing conditions, damp and overcrowding, all factors which create conditions conducive for the emergence of several health hazards. In these camps, such conditions commonly result in rodent infestations, the transmission of diseases such as Lassa Fever and the development of respiratory infections (Stravaggi 2018 and Unite for Sight 2015).

Similarly, humanitarian aid agencies providing medical assistance in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip have seen a high percentage of communicable diseases present in vulnerable groups such as children. In this study, it was found that children made up 10% of diarrhoea cases and 24% of intestinal parasite cases in 2018, of which diarrhoea is identified as one of the leading causes of child deaths in refugee camps with a high likelihood of spreading (Stravaggi 2018). These cases serve as examples of the very real risk of the development and spread of diseases and infections in overcrowded refugee camps. While refugees flee their countries of origin to find safe haven in their destination countries, they face numerous insecurities that destination

countries are often unable to address due to lack of capacity. What is also worrying is that, in a study conducted in 2011, in camps across Africa and Asia, it was found that in children under the age of 5, malaria and pneumonia accounted for 20% of deaths and diarrhoea accounted for 7% of child deaths (Anderson *et al* 2011).

While organisations such as the UN and the WHO, as well as the Government of Bangladesh, acknowledge these health risks, according to Financial Tracking Service (2019), in 2018 only 41.1% of the health appeal relief plan budget for health programmes was reached. In addition to the budget target for water, hygiene and sanitation had only reached 26.5% (US\$36.2mil of US\$136.7 mil), showing donor sympathy and prioritisation of health related needs as low. This is an additional struggle faced by governments and humanitarian organisations who do not have the financial capacities to mobilise the resources needed to secure the health security of refugees, particularly those taken in by developing and/or financially strained states.

With the aforementioned historical trends in mind, according to the UNHCR (2019 (C)), of the 25.9 million refugees across the world, half are children, and in Bangladesh an estimated 54% of Rohingya refugees are under the age of 18, presenting the Rohingya as a highly vulnerable group susceptible to contracting and spreading diseases in the camps (Islam and Nuzhath 2018). In Bangladesh's refugee camps, there are two areas of concern regarding the health security of the Rohingya and those are water and sanitation, as well as access to healthcare facilities.

While Bangladesh is one such developing and financially strained state, Human Rights Watch has acknowledged the Government of Bangladesh's successful partnership with humanitarian agencies to prioritise the prevention of disease outbreaks through the vaccination of the Rohingya refugees. However, while these preventative measures have been largely successful, in July 2018, 8000 cases of diphtheria were reported in the Rohingya refugee camps alone, compared to 7100 cases reported globally in 2016, which is cause for serious concern and a reflection on the need for existing vaccination strategies to better secure the health security of these refugees (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 2018 and Human Rights Watch 2018).

4.2.1. Water and Sanitation

As explained, the living conditions of refugee camps tend to be poor and conducive to the spread and development of infections and diseases. In a study conducted by Human Rights Watch (2018), it was found that in Bangladesh, there were limited plans for the extension of existing refugee camps to better cope with over-crowding, in addition to the fact that there is no infrastructure for the promotion of good sanitation or drainage, causing major concerns for the health security of the Rohingya. Further concern stems from the Financial Tracking Service (2019), which recorded that in 2018, only 25% of the Rohingya crisis relief programme budget for shelter and non-food items was reached, presenting as the lowest area by percentage to have received funding from donors. This indicates that a change in the current number and quality of sanitary facilities as well as access to equipment that promotes clean drinking water harvesting, storing and distribution is unlikely. These infrastructural limitations generate a number of long term security issues for the Rohingya including water contamination, water scarcity and poor hygiene.

Of these security issues, water security is one of the big challenges needing to be addressed by Bangladesh with the help of the international community. While refugee camps are situated close to “clean” ground water, this water still needs to go through the process of disinfection, as water is one of the main carriers of disease, further highlighting the importance of its purification process. This water, although technically clean, undergoes the process of purification through the use of chlorine. The process of cleaning the ground water begins by pumping the water out of the ground, the chlorine is then added to kill off any bacteria that could have contaminated the water and is then pumped into water tanks. These water tanks can hold up to 90,000 litres. The water is then distributed to the various households (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2018 (A)). While the water is clean when sitting in the tanks, their journey through the water pumps to the water distribution tanks is where the problem of contamination begins, as these pipes are compromised by the location of latrines, the monsoon season and lack of space.

Although the process of water purification seems thorough, it was found that the majority of the clean water contamination occurred after the water had been collected,

referring to points during the collection, transit, usage and storage of the water. Of the 9000 tests conducted by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) (2018(A)), 46.5% showed the presence of e-coli contamination. In addition, it was found that latrines were positioned too close to the drinking water sources due to lack of space, resulting in 89% of sampled households having contaminated drinking water. Furthermore, when interviewed refugees were asked what their main concerns were about the living conditions of the camps, the majority of interviewees indicated that it was their lack of access to safe drinking water (Human Rights Watch 2018). This indicates the extent of water insecurity while also showing a heightened level of awareness amongst the Rohingya concerning water contamination.

Another source contributing to water contamination occurs when latrines are situated too close to these water tanks and the water pumps overlap with latrine pipes. Due to a shortage of space, the practicality of placing these pipes a safe distance from one another becomes an almost impossible task. What's more is that the integrity of the water pipes are particularly vulnerable during the monsoon seasons, where flooding and landslides usually occur, resulting in these pipes bursting and feeding into each other. Monsoon season has also resulted in the overflow and/or collapse of many latrines contributing to prolonged leakages and poor sanitation due to the already limited number of latrines (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2018 (A)).

However, while monsoon season brings its own sets of problems, so does the dry season, which brings with it severe water shortages and has become another area of concern. Bangladesh has distinct seasons which see a massive increase and then decrease in the amount of rainfall. While the Rohingya rely on water mainly pumped from the ground, the concern lies in the stresses that the 20,000 tube wells being pumped at the same time brings. This pressure on the ground water supply has resulted in a sudden and dramatic decrease in available water, bringing to the fore the very real prospect of water shortages (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (D) and Hendrick 2019). When reflecting on the numerous points of water contamination, the destructive nature of monsoon season, the threats posed by Bangladesh's dry season, which highlight the very real possibility of water shortages in the camps, the main perceived concern of Rohingya's having access to safe drinking water becomes a more legitimate and distressing concern.

Further contribution to the culmination of water security threats is the nature of the Rohingya's mass exodus. Due to the unexpected urgency to respond to the Rohingya refugee influx, there has been inadequate planning and coordination in the placement of many of the water and latrine pipes (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (D)). A consequence of this poor planning is evident in the way the latrines have been set up in the camps, being placed too far for many Rohingya to walk to during the night due to safety reasons (Human Rights Watch 2018). Such constraints hinder efforts to promote good hygiene as women feel unsafe to use the designated female latrines for fear of falling victim to sexual assault (United Nations Children's Fund 2019 (A)).

Overall, the refugee camps' access to good sanitation and safe drinking water is lacking, particularly in areas where the camps have been extended (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2018 (B)). This makes the Rohingya more vulnerable to facing health security threats as the likelihood of communicable disease outbreaks increases. This is highly unlikely to change as local Bangladeshi communities are struggling with the same problem themselves. Bangladesh already presents with poor domestic water and sanitation statistics showing how issues of contaminated water is widespread with a high of 60% of citizens relying on the consumption of unsafe drinking water and only 40% of the population having access to proper sanitation (Hendrick 2019).

With these various water and sanitation concerns in mind, it is clear that most issues of access to safe drinking water and good sanitation facilities feed into one another. These multidimensional concerns further complicate solution strategies which are exacerbated by financial constraints due to poor donor prioritisation, and lack of capacity

4.2.2. Access to Healthcare Facilities

Over and above the water and sanitation concerns, there lies the additional issue of poor access to healthcare. While humanitarian relief organisations have increased the ability for Rohingya to access health care, including woman-friendly centres, many of

these NGO's have expressed concern about the lack of access to key health care programmes such as trauma care for the long term.

Among the numerous forms of violence experienced or witnessed by survivors, the lasting effect of sexual assault remains at the forefront of female trauma infliction and is prolonged if pregnancy occurs and the female decides to terminate or carry the child to term. In the span of 7 months - from August 2017 to February 2018 - at the height of the mass influx of Rohingya to Bangladesh, the number of sexual assault cases attended to by MSF sat at 226 with 162 of the victims classified as rape survivors and the majority identified as under the age of 18 (Islam & Nuzhath 2018).

Given the number of the Rohingya sitting in the hundreds of thousands, most of which are female, the number of assault cases seems relatively low. It is also important to note that in traditional Rohingya culture, being raped is seen as bringing shame upon their families, in addition, carrying the baby to term is also considered shameful. Such cultural associations with rape survivors and shame are a common global phenomenon. In refugee camps in Uganda, such as Bidi Bidi, much of the same mentality exists, where topics of menstruation, sex and rape are taboo. There have been cases where raped women have denied their assault to police officers despite the presence of witnesses to the assault and these women having left the camps due to feelings of shame (Akumu 2018). While there are limited indications of figures in this regard, it can be assumed that there are vast numbers of women who did not seek medical assistance amongst the Rohingya due to the shame they would face from their families and communities. A further health risk then presents itself when rape survivors choose to deliver their babies in shelters and not medical clinics. One such Rohingya is 27 year old Shafika, who was gang raped in Myanmar and subsequently fell pregnant. While she desperately wanted to abort the baby due to the stigma it carried in Islam, she did not know how to go about getting medical assistance in the Bangladeshi refugee camp. Nine months later, she gave birth to a baby boy. A final issues such survivors subsequently face is that these babies may serve as reminders of the trauma they experienced in Myanmar (Beech 2018 and Cheshire 2018).

While Bangladesh has partnered with humanitarian groups such as MSF to provide health care to the Rohingya, their slow issuing of some work permits for the

implementation of particular programmes have resulted in the stalled implementation of reproductive and sexual health care for the Rohingya (Human Rights Watch 2018). What is troubling is that sexual assault was one of a vast number of violent tactics inflicted upon the Rohingya community during the genocide in Myanmar, of which included the use of machetes, guns and arson. Now, sexual assault and domestic abuse have become enduring concerns in the camps, sparking men to join the fight in protecting Rohingya women and spreading awareness with the support of humanitarian aid agencies, drawing more attention to the need for better access to health care (Murray 2019).

Generally, the mental health impact on refugees who have been forcibly displaced is significant. The effects of the aforementioned types of violence experienced by the Rohingya has been compounded by the lack of availability, poor quality and access to post- trauma care services (Islam & Nuzhath 2018). This is confirmed in a study conducted by the Xchange Foundation (2019: 16) which found that of the study participants, 86% of Rohingya identified that there was a serious lack of psychological support in the camps.

In the face of slow health programme implementation, the risk of HIV and AIDS contraction and spread is also a high risk amongst the Rohingya. This stems from the fact that in 2015, Rakhine state, had reached its highest HIV and AIDS prevalence amongst locals. It is therefore highly likely to have been exacerbated by the sexual violence that ensued as a tool of torture. In addition, of the Rohingya woman (including adolescent girls) 9.2% of the refugee population are lactating mothers and 4.9% are pregnant, increasing the mother-to-child spread of HIV, either due to a lack of access to ARV's or the lack of access to medical facilities to detect the presence of HIV and AIDS (Islam & Nuzhath 2018). Another area of concern is that of partner to partner HIV infections which are either spread due to ignorance of one's HIV status, their lack of access to ARV's, condoms and sexual assault in camps. In 2018, there were a recorded 273 cases of HIV and AIDS which had increased to 319 in that same year, with an estimated 277 on treatment and 19 deaths (Gozal *et al* 2019).

Overall, the Rohingya appear to be left highly vulnerable to health risks stemming from water and sanitation issues as well as a lack of access to health care programmes

and facilities. While humanitarian organisations are doing their best to mitigate these risks, there are two main hurdles they face. The first hurdle is that of their financial constraints due to donor funding being the lowest in areas means that the opportunity to mitigate a number of these risks is not available. The second being that the government of Bangladesh has become a hurdle in that it is ensuring the Rohingya have little to no access to health care by stifling the speed of programme implementation often as a tactic to prevent the Rohingya from staying in their country or due to the cultural stigma associated with some of these programmes.

4.3. Economic Insecurity

Being restricted in such a way as to remove the opportunity for a refugee to earn a living in a legal, regulated and dignified way, threatens the economic security of that refugee. Furthermore, the Rohingya are not entitled to refugee rights as they are not recognised as such by the Bangladeshi government. While it is thought that all the needs of refugees are catered for by humanitarian relief organisation, this is not the reality for many refugees across the globe. As a result, refugees become desperate to find means to support themselves and it is this desperation that increases their vulnerability to various forms of exploitation. This is evident in The Freedom Fund's (2016:17) report on Slavery and Exploitation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which found that Syrian refugees had to find alternative means to support themselves beyond aid but were denied the legal right to work. The report indicated that under these circumstances, Syrian refugees have been left more vulnerable to exploitative forms of work that do not require a refugee to provide formal paper work such as identification documents or work permits.

4.3.1. Employment and Opportunity

Much like the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the Rohingya have been confined to their camps and denied the legal right to work. While basic food and shelter are covered by humanitarian organisations, this is not always enough for bigger or growing households. As a result and with no alternative means of generating income, the Rohingya are more at risk of being exploited as refugees are generally willing to take whatever opportunities that present themselves, regardless of whether or not they are

dangerous, risky or even if their children are expected to be a part of it (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (E)). In 2018 (C), the Xchange Foundation reported that 2 out of 5 Rohingya rely on a family member with an informal job, some noted forms of employment were fisherman, ice-breakers to store the caught fish, drying the fish and working on collecting and transporting salt. In some instances, Rohingya were selling off their food rations to make an income (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2007). In so doing, their food security is further jeopardised as needs for medical supplies and the like surpass that of their food needs in certain instances.

Despite these restrictions, the Rohingya community have shown what the Xchange Foundation calls 'resilience', by finding informal work in areas outside the camps to support their families and secure their livelihood. Usually these opportunities present themselves in the form of begging, fishing, domestic work and small commerce, but once they start, more often than not they find that they are paid much less than they were promised (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (E) and Xchange Foundation 2018 (C)). This constitutes exploitation and while the conditions under which these Rohingya work may be extremely poor, there are no protected and monitored conditions under which they can legally earn an income.

History has shown that future prospects for the Rohingya refugees achieving self-reliance in Bangladesh has been stifled due the government of Bangladesh's view that they would be repatriated to Myanmar in the near future (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2007). This short-term mentality is also applied to the recent Rohingya influx with no prospect of changing, rendering the likelihood of their future economic circumstances taking a turn for the better by legal means, highly unlikely. This paves the way for the Rohingya's increased and prolonged vulnerability to exploitation and abuse.

As a result of the above, the Rohingya are highly vulnerable to exploitation in their 'illegal' pursuit for income. Subsequently, there are two insecurities that avail themselves. The first is that their economic insecurity may be slightly decreased as a small income is better than no income. However, this income is dependent on the exploiter who has the means to employ various tactics to turn an exploited situation

into a slavery situation by making use of violence, threats, deception, coercion and/or abuse of power (BBC 2016). In addition, the working Rohingya may suffer physically under the working conditions they are subjected to. What exacerbates their vulnerability further is their lack of education and lack of opportunity to pursue any form of education in Bangladesh.

4.3.2. Education

Education is a tool of empowerment, however, Bangladesh has begun the enforcement of the restriction of Rohingya refugee children from attending Bangladeshi schools. This is in contravention of Bangladesh's commitment to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and clear discrimination against the Rohingya population, which is already a vulnerable group. As discussed above, Bangladesh is driven by its belief that the Rohingya will be repatriated soon, therefore its government justifies this contravention by arguing that the Rohingya's short-term stay renders their integration into Bangladesh's curriculum an unnecessary use of funds. This argument is alarming as education can play a key role in creating hope and stability in refugee camps (Neve & Schuetse 2019 and Patinkin 2018). As such, the lengths to which the Government of Bangladesh will go to, to prevent the perceived integration of the Rohingya into their societies and their determination to repatriate the Rohingya avails itself.

Along with government restrictions, there exists negative local sentiments towards the integrations of Rohingya children into local schools. In a survey conducted by the Xchange Foundation (2018 (C)), it was found that an 85% majority of local Bangladeshi respondents indicated "no" when asked if Rohingya children should attend their local Bangladeshi schools. The long-term consequences of their integration into Bangladeshi society would result in extreme pressures on already strained resources and capacities of the Bangladeshi government and could result in a contribution to xenophobic sentiments arising amongst local Bangladeshi communities.

While negative state and local sentiment towards the integration of Rohingya into local schools is vast, humanitarian agencies have set up temporary learning centres with

facilitators for Rohingya children in the face of these restrictions. Additionally, while United Nations Children's Fund (2019 (B)) and other humanitarian agencies boast the set-up of around 1600 learning facilities and over 145,000 children returning to these facilities as the new school year started, the reality is that these centres only provide around 2 hours of daily instruction and are mostly set up for pre-primary and early primary school levels. There are no centres or institutions set up or permitting the education of adolescent or adult Rohingya presenting as 98% of youth between the age of 15-24 as not having access to education. In addition, only a quarter of school going youth attend these centres (Human Rights Watch 2018 and World Vision 2019). This means that of the almost 500,000 children under the age of 18, only 145,000 have access to learning facilities (United Nations Children's Fund 2019 (B)). This leaves a large portion of school-going youth idle, with few safe spaces to occupy their time, leaving many of them vulnerable to falling into the hands of traffickers, abusers and radicals who may lure them in with promises of purpose and activities to better their quality of life.

In addition, according to OXFAM International (2019), only 4 in 100 Rohingya refugee youth have access to some form of basic education or vocational and life-skills training. Despite their limited educational opportunities in Bangladesh, in Rakhine State adult illiteracy sat at over 50% above the national average, proving the little education they received even before their mass exodus to have been little to none. Many Rohingya, therefore, believe that the learning facilities are better than nothing, despite their inadequacies. These learning centres do not deliver an accredited curriculum and Bangladesh is hesitant to use any Rakhine State curriculum in their camps with the purpose of ensuring that there is nothing to imply the Rohingya's integration into Bangladeshi society (Human Rights Watch 2019).

In conjunction with already poor educational opportunities for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, there is the barrier of relying on donor funding to provide overall education to the Rohingya. The main obstacles at present to providing education to the Rohingya is that the educational programmes rely on donors. According to the Financial Tracking Service (2019), in 2018, only 49.1 % of the appealed relief budget for education for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh was reached. The aforementioned, in addition to lack of proper accredited schooling for the Rohingya, is

the issue of few facilities and lack of space for these classes. Most of these classrooms are bamboo constructed shelters, and are at risk of collapsing or being washed away during the annual monsoon seasons (Patinkin 2018).

Overall, the lack of educational opportunities for the Rohingya has increased the likelihood of rendering the Rohingya youth a lost generation, stripped of the opportunity to develop skills for a more prosperous career oriented future. Furthermore, another area of concern was identified by Oxfam's Bangladesh Country Director as that of young women who do not have access to education after they hit puberty. Poor education coupled with the fact that job opportunities within the camps are too scarce have left many single mother households without an income. The desperation that stems from this often leaves these women more vulnerable to falling victim to exploitative work (Oxfam International 2019). In addition, the Government of Bangladesh has missed out on an opportunity to bring more stability and hope to the refugee camps.

However, it is also important to acknowledge that Bangladesh is already struggling with its own human development issues. Before the 2017 influx of Rohingya, Bangladesh had a workforce that comprised of 87 million unskilled individuals. While Bangladesh had made great strides in student enrolment in the two years prior, the quality of education and the retention of these enrolled students in the higher grades were still causes for concern (The World Bank 2016). Therefore, capacity is an undeniable obstacle for Bangladesh which would be overwhelmed by the sudden demand for state education from hundreds of thousands of Rohingya.

4.4. Food Insecurity

In their report, Human Rights Watch (2018) found that one of the most common complaints amongst sampled refugees was that of lack of food distribution. This despite humanitarian organisations such as the World Food Programme (2018 (B)) and the government of Bangladesh having mounted a large scale relief response to bring food to the Rohingya. The WFP and its partners have since implemented school meal programmes that revolve around good nutritional impact that reaches over

320,000 students. However, only a small portion of the Rohingya population are attending these 'schools' therefore the number who have access to these meals are extremely limited. In response to this, the WFP has developed plans to expand their reach and implement other food safety nets, particularly for children to ensure their healthy social, physical and cognitive development. An additional intention of the WFP is to stem the occurrences of child marriages that are arranged to lessen the household burdens when there is not enough food to go around. However, the start dates for the implementation of these plans are unclear.

4.4.1. Distribution incorrect and limited

The most pressing concerns facing the food security of the Rohingya are the distribution quantities of food and fuel to cook this food. Making meals out of ingredients such as oil, lentils and rice require cooking fuel which is too expensive for the Rohingya to buy and is scarcely provided for in the camps, forcing many to venture into the forest to collect wood (Beltrami 2017). Without cooking fuel, it makes eating their rations an impossible task. Wood is not freely given to the Rohingya and many often have to venture out of the camps into the woods to collect firewood. This puts people in danger of being abused, kidnapped or harassed by the Forestry Department and traffickers as well as exploiters of all forms (Human Rights Watch 2018).

A common hurdle in the delivery of food aid in refugee camps is that once it has reached the distribution centres, there are numerous logistic and administrative issues which prevent the food from getting to those who depend on it being delivered on time. In the Rohingya refugee camps, it is reported that families are being distributed food incorrectly and as a result, many families are sitting with too little rations while other are given a surplus that they then illegally sell to generate an income. This entire situation leaves many families in a position where their food security is jeopardised (Brak, 2018). Investigative Journalist Victoria Milko (2019) explains that much corruption within the community leadership in Rohingya refugee camps are responsible for many security and administrative issues, which could be another significant factor hindering correct and timely food distribution.

4.4.2. No Opportunities to Access Food on Their Own Terms

Closely linked to the lack of access to nutritional food is the lack of income opportunities for the Rohingya to freely spend on food when necessary. While there are organisations such as the ISCG (Inter-Sector Coordination Group) trying to help with monetary distributions it is not enough. The ISCG had reported that in July 2018, of the 350,000 refugees it had tried to reach for cash or in-kind livelihood support, it only managed to reach 35%. This was due to lack of funding for which only 20% of its US\$48 million target was reached (Inter-Sector Coordination Group 2018). Such interventions are not sustainable or wide-reaching enough to ensure the Rohingya have access to food on their own terms. This is a direct risk to their food security as is defined in the UNDP in which Rohingya refugees rely on humanitarian aid agencies who lack the reach and capacity to meet their own distributive targets and renders the Rohingya disempowered in the long run. What is alarming is that the Rohingya rely heavily on aid for food, however the capacity of these humanitarian agencies to meet the basic food needs of the Rohingya are dependent on donations.

What is more cause for concern is that in a similar refugee crisis, The Freedom Fund (2016: 17) had reported the decline of food aid to the Syrian and Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to \$13.50 per day. This in conjunction with surging cost of rent, food and other services, Syrian refugees have resorted to food rationing by reducing their daily meals, begging, going into debt or seeking employment leaving them vulnerable to exploitative conditions. Because the Syrian refugee crisis reflects many of the circumstance present in the Rohingya camps, one can argue that this serves as a long term downward progression of food aid in the Rohingya refugee crisis. This is already echoed in a survey conducted by the Xchange Foundation (2018: 19 (C)), which found that of the 1,700 refugees spanning 16 refugee camps, 66% agreed that they did not have sufficient access to firewood, food and water for their households (Beltrami 2017). Another alarming fact is that, according to the Financial Tracking Service (2019), of the \$240.9 Million only 171.2 million was committed with an overall 69.3% of appeal funding reached for Rohingya relief from 89.3% in 2017 to only 25% reached in the 6th month of 2019. This indicates a downward trajectory in donor allocation to food provisions for the Rohingya.

4.5. Personal Security

The final category of vulnerability discussed in this paper is that of personal security. In their report, Human Rights Watch (2018) characterises Cox's Bazar's mega camp as severely over-crowded. Camps in Cox's Bazar filled quickly forcing many Rohingya to set up camp in nearby areas. In 2019, there are over 30 unregistered refugee settlements (Mercy Corps 2019 (A)). It was also noted that camps that are overpopulated not only pose serious health security risks due to the heightened probability of the spread of communicable diseases but that instances of community tensions and sexual and domestic violence also tend to increase. Increased risks of the aforementioned pose a serious personal security risk to the Rohingya confined to these camps (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Key events of concern to the Rohingya's personal security are the 2018 killings in the camps, which have spread fear amongst the Rohingya after the murder of 19 people. Of those killed, some were community leaders, one of which was Arif Ullah, a new community leader appointed to lead thousands of refugees was stabbed 25 times in broad daylight on a busy street. While the Bangladeshi Army patrol the camps in the day, there are far fewer at night. Very few Bangladeshi police focus on the perimeter protection of the camps and untrained, unarmed watchmen are appointed from the refugee population to take on the internal safety responsibility (International Crisis Group 2019). Such weak security initiatives mean that non-violent political representatives in the camps are likely to experience continued threats to their lives and the function they fulfil. Additionally, conditions conducive to the recruitment of Rohingya into criminal enterprises for protection grows as violence and murder go unaddressed.

Such violence seems to have surged in the camps since the recent Rohingya influx but is not new. Aid workers and Bangladeshi police involved in the camps before the mass exodus indicated that violence was present in the camps and at the time had blamed these occurrences on people struggling for control of supplies (Paul & Siddiqui 2018). However, reports of killings and abductions within the refugee camps have been blamed by Bangladeshi media groups on the ARSA. The ARSA have, however,

condemned the violence and expressed their gratitude to the Bangladeshi government for their role in keeping the camps safe (Birsal 2019). Furthermore, Police report that idle youth are to blame, stating that they are more prone to engaging in criminal activity, much of which is associated with gender-based violence, domestic violence and internal feuds (Dhaka Tribune 2018).

While violence in camps is recognised by all parties involved in the Rohingya refugee crisis, the International Crisis Group (2019) reports that the violence in camps goes un-investigated and that law and order is severely lacking. The report states that there is a violent struggle within the camps for control over camp territory and the presence of wide spread corruption and extortion. The report describes gangs and militants as milling and kidnapping with impunity and that murders in the camps occur almost every night. This poses a serious risk to the personal security of the Rohingya who live in fear of being caught up in the violence.

In the aforementioned report, it was also noted that, particularly in situations such as mass refugee influxes, states must take care to manage the relationship between locals and refugees so as to prevent inter-community tensions. Additionally, in these emergency situations, the need to protect woman and girls from instances of trafficking and sexual and physical assault including domestic violence should also be a high priority. Human Rights Watch also indicated that interviewed refugees expressed fears of being trafficked, children going missing and safety concerns at night (Human Rights Watch 2018).

In addition to the high prevalence of murder in the camps, Xchange Foundation's (2019: 25) report on the Rohingya experience in the camps found that of the 1,277 participants interviewed over a three day period, 91% believed that there were Rohingya families who had young children go missing from the camps. In addition, 86% of participants who were parents to children under the age of 18 expressed that they were *very afraid* of their children going missing in the camps. This indicates that there is a high level of awareness surrounding the presence of human trafficking in the camps. This is confirmed by the IOM, which found that of trafficking victims that came forward for help, 420 cases had been identified in the period between December 2018 and June 2019, totalling four times higher than the 14 months prior (Karim 2019).

Furthermore, the loss of employment, displacement, the loss of family support structures and community isolation often breed an environment conducive to increased domestic and intimate partner abuse. Mediciens Sans Frontieres (2018 (B)) have stipulated in their crisis update that cases of domestic violence and intimate partner violence are high, and while a culture of gender in-equality contributes to this violence, displacement significantly contributes to its prevalence. With the contributing circumstances that make an environment conducive to violence unlikely to change, the vulnerability Rohingya face in terms of physical violence jeopardises their personal security.

This is further exacerbated by the fact that the Financial Tracking Service (2019) reflected that in 2018, overall 'Protection' only reached 39% of the total appeal, 'Child Protection' only reached 82.6% and 'Gender-based Violence' only reached 51.1%. With overall donor support for protection sitting low and the security situation within the camps unlikely to change, the desperation for Rohingya to leave the camps and find better living conditions increases, heightening the personal insecurity of the Rohingya, even if the intention is to achieve the opposite.

4.6. Findings

From the vulnerability assessment, which considers the human security component, vulnerabilities at local level in this regard, the impact they have on the Rohingya and the mitigation capacities available in, a vulnerability rating is determined (See Annex E). From this assessment, it is clear that the Rohingya are a seriously vulnerable group sitting between highly vulnerable and extremely vulnerable in relation to the extent to which their health security, economic security, food security and personal security are threatened.

Health Security presented with vulnerabilities stemming from poor living conditions, water scarcity and contamination as well as limited access to health care facilities, all of which create conditions for the development and spread of diseases in the camps. In the second category, economic security vulnerabilities emanated from the

conditions of no employment and education opportunities. Third was food security for which incorrect and limited food distribution on the part of aid agencies as well as the inability for Rohingya to access food on their own terms were identified sources of vulnerability. Finally, personal security presented vulnerabilities for the Rohingya in the form of violence in the camps.

In all four instances, it was determined that the Rohingya are highly vulnerable. Additionally, there are elements present that are forcing the Rohingya to venture out of the camps to look for income or opportunities to better their quality of life and/or secure their safety. These elements are driving the desperation within the Rohingya, which leave this group of stateless individuals more vulnerable to making more risky decision to secure their basic needs.

4.7. Conclusion

Vulnerability plays a crucial role in laying the foundation for determining the risk rating of an event occurring. In this chapter, it was determined that in all four human security elements discussed - economic, health, food and personal security – the Rohingya are highly vulnerable to being exploited. This determination was based on the fact that the lack of long-term planning, in conjunction with highly restrictive laws, and serious capacity constraints on the part of both the government of Bangladesh and humanitarian organisations have rendered the Rohingya extremely desperate to better their circumstances and therefore highly susceptible to exploitation. Furthermore, poor long-term planning on the part of Bangladesh and its unwillingness to integrate the Rohingya into its society have proven to be serious obstacles for the international community's efforts to alleviate the numerous risks facing the human security of the Rohingya.

This chapter will serve as the foundation for chapter 5, in which an exploration is conducted into how the Rohingya are exploited in relation to sexual and labour exploitation, as a consequence of their vulnerabilities. Thereafter the determined likely conditions of exploitation will be used to scale the extent to which these risks

jeopardise the human security of the Rohingya by employing a risk matrix to determine a risk rating.

CHAPTER 5: RISK OF EXPLOITATION OF ROHINGYA IN BANGLADESH

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the context and conditions under which the Rohingya find themselves exploited will be explored. While there are many factors driving the Rohingya to remain in positions of exploitation, clear parallels will be drawn between a Rohingya being misled into exploitative work and their desperation for income rendering them unwilling to leave or report their exploiters to Bangladeshi authorities. This exploration will take place within the analysis of the risk of sexual and labour exploitation amongst the Rohingya communities in Bangladesh. These risks will draw on the vulnerabilities identified and discussed in chapter 4, to which this chapter will build on the likelihood and impact of the Rohingya falling victim to exploitative working conditions.

5.2. Trauma and Exploitation Amongst Refugees

In addition to the numerous vulnerabilities that expose refugees to exploitative conditions, the trauma they undergo, particularly in relation to violence and displacement, inflicts immense emotional damage on the refugee. This trauma results in the hampering of refugees' self-protective instincts and increases their tendency towards engaging in riskier behaviour. In conjunction with their lack of protection, and their desperation to seek out opportunities for a better quality of life, refugees are left "defenceless, desperate, and at risk of being exploited" (Women at Risk International *n.d.*).

This statement rings true in the context of the Rohingya, who have survived years of oppression and state sponsored violence in Myanmar that constituted genocide and crimes against humanity, as discussed in earlier chapters. Now that they have sought safety in Bangladesh's refugee camps, their desperation to better secure their basic needs has become the Rohingya's priority as humanitarian aid is becoming increasingly insufficient for many households. Compared against other refugee crisis' such as the Syrian refugees and their stay in Lebanon, there seem to be many

parallels with regards to human security concerns. The Lebanese camps also contend with issues such as over-crowding, poverty and unemployment, limited infrastructure and poor housing conditions as well as many restrictive laws that force Syrian refugees to seek illegal work outside of the camp (The Freedom Fund 2016: 20). Such comparisons will be utilised when considering likelihood in the risk assessment employed in this chapter.

5.3. Sexual Exploitation

5.3.1. Definition and Context of Sexual Exploitation

While there are many conventions and protocols that do not explicitly define sexual exploitation, according to the United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (2017: 28) sexual exploitation “is generally understood as referring to profiting from the prostitution of another person”. This broad definition leaves much up to states for interpretation. However, in 2003, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan defined sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (Annan 2003:1). Therefore, considering that Annan’s definition provides more clarity, his definition will be employed in this section.

In this section, the focus will mainly be on the sexual exploitation of women and girls as there is very little data that supports the presence of sexual exploitation of men. This does not imply that men and boys are not subjected to sexual exploitation or sexual assault. In fact, boys and men are sexually exploited, however, within the Rohingya camps, the form of exploitation is one of an abuse of power and influence more so than for monetary purposes. While adolescent boys are more likely to be sexually exploited for monetary purposes than men, many men and boys are lured into situations leading to sexual assault by other men in positions of power, who employ pornography as a tactic for some form of sexual exploitation (Women’s Refugee Commission 2018: 33).

For the purpose of this analysis, in relation to sexual exploitation, particular focus will be paid to the exploitation of women and female children. This is due to the fact that

the numbers for tracking the sexual exploitation of boys and men are few and far between, as it is not as common. Furthermore, there exist no male focused facilities and/ or programmes that deal with and track instances of male sexual assault. This, in conjunction with the stigma attached to sexual assault, which works against men seeking out medical care, are both significant factors working against bringing any kind of scalability to these situations.

5.3.2. Sexual Exploitation of Rohingya in Bangladesh

While there are limited sources that speak to scale in this regard, there are better data sources available on the sexual exploitation of women and female children, who are the common victims of sexual exploitation. This is alarming as women and girls make up 52% of Rohingya refugee population, meaning that more than half of the Rohingya are seriously at risk of being sexually exploited (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019: 16 (C)). According to the IOM's (2018: 2 (A)) situation report on Bangladesh, cheap prostitution is estimated to cost \$6 while Rohingya women are only paid \$0,8-\$1,20 per service by their exploiter. This draws on Annan's definition, speaking clearly to the sexual exploitation of Rohingya women for unfair monetary profiting .

Further exacerbating the Rohingya's situation is that during humanitarian emergency situations, women and girls are at high risk of sexual and gender-based violence across the globe, both in the area of conflict as they flee their homes and once they have settled in their destination country. At the time of their report, the Freedom Fund's study strongly suggested that sexual exploitation by means of coercion and force are a growing security issues facing the Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, with their exploiters being of both Syrian and Lebanese origin (The Freedom Fund 2016: 12). More recently, in 2018, the UN called on Uganda, a state with the most welcoming refugee policies in the world, to investigate serious allegations into corruption and human trafficking surrounding instances of sexual exploitation and abuse. Specific allegations are being made by South Sudanese refugees who are allegedly being trafficked from the North of Uganda back across the border into South Sudan and then sold as wives to combatants. Allegations have become so serious that western donors

have suspended humanitarian aid pending results of the investigation due to suspicion of government officials being complicit in these crimes (New24 2018).

In addition, it must be noted that in Bangladesh, sex work is legal, however, it is poorly regulated, making sexual exploitation an easier and more lucrative market driven by increased sex tourism than typical states where prostitution is illegal. According to the IOM (2018:6 (A)), of these women and girls who find themselves in the Bangladeshi prostitution industry, many were found to have been married off to known traffickers by their families due to an inability to afford their daughters' dowries. A huge area contributing to Rohingya engaging such marriages for their daughters is the Rohingya's widespread tradition of engaging in child marriage.

Child marriage is considered a form of exploitation in itself. In the Rohingya community it is a common practice, which has increased since their most recent exodus. Fuelled by the need to reduce strain on the household, refugees are agreeing to marry their underage daughters off, to reduce the number of mouths to feed and to keep them safe from sexual violence. A father of a young female Rohingya was interviewed and explained that he was marrying off his 15 year old daughter because there would be one less mouth to feed, less clothes needed to be bought and to keep her safe because he was afraid of the boys in the camp (Vyas 2018).

Child marriage puts these girls at risk of sexual exploitation as is evident in the Syrian refugee crisis, where girls are trafficked under the guise of child marriage and sold into the sexual exploitation industry. In Uganda, many females are married before the age of 18. Many refugees confined to camps or reliant on subsistence, remain trapped in poverty and marry to secure their financial well-being. While refugees in the north of Uganda, particularly amongst Congolese refugees marry young women as legal protection from prosecution for having sex with a minor (Girls Not Brides 2019 and Gottschalk 2017). Similarly as in the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the number of women who were found to be married under the age of 18 sat at 41% (Malala Fund 2018). While this cultural practice is employed as survival and protection tools it does, however, expose girls to an increased likelihood of falling victim to sexual exploitation.

Regionally, what is concerning is that the continent with the highest rate of child marriages in South Asia, where both Myanmar and Bangladesh are located. It was found that 45% of 20-24 year old women reported to have been married before the age of 18, putting this at almost 1 in 5 girls married before the age of 18 in the region (United Nations Children's Fund 2017 (A)). This shows a high prevalence for child marriage in the region, heightening the risk, particularly amongst Rohingya refugee girls falling victim to early child marriage and subsequently rendering them more vulnerable to exploitation thereafter.

Further exacerbating circumstances leading to the increased vulnerability of women and girls being trafficked is the structure of Rohingya households. Single woman households in the camps constitute a vast portion of the Rohingya refugee households making up 16% of the 52% of women and girls in the camps (ISCG 2019). In addition to the fact that there are no legal means to engage in income generation, these women are identified as even more dependent on humanitarian aid, thus more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse when they look for alternative means of income to support their families (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2007).

When seeking work, the Freedom Fund's study noted that many Rohingya women are coerced into performing sexual favours in exchange for employment, rent or food while other women engage in survival sex as a means of income to provide for their families. However, with regards to the latter, the study was unable to determine whether or not these women were able to negotiate the terms of their services or the extent to which they were subject to coercion (The Freedom Fund 2016: 12). These trends are echoed in Kenya, where single mothers in the Kakuma Refugee Camp find no other alternatives but to sell their bodies to provide for themselves and their children, while other young women are described as having "mastered the art of survival using her body" (Atieno 2018).

Vyas (2018) also writes of a pimp who was interviewed and explained that most of their clients are business men who prefer young pretty girls so they target poor girls, usually under 18 who have a single parent household. They invite these girls over for tea and snacks and then lure them in with a job offer to support their families. Usually these young girls are too desperate to refuse. One 14 year old girl interviewed

explained that she was going to work as a cleaner but that the woman who offered her the job became her pimp. The girl earns \$3 per customer she sees and her pimp controls everything she does. The girl feels compelled to stay for the money and too ashamed to seek help due to the stigma (Vyas 2018).

The profiling used to target the Rohingya is a testament to the high vulnerability of Rohingya girls falling into sexually exploitative work. This is echoed in the IOM's efforts to help Rohingya women and girls which stated that of the women and girls the organisation helped in Cox's Bazar, 10% have been subjected to some form of exploitation (International Organisation for Migration 2018).

5.3.3. Human Security Threats and Sexual Exploitation

When identifying the physical and health risks associated with the sex industry, a study conducted on the health risks of female sex workers in Thailand, including those trafficked for sexual exploitation will be drawn on. It was found from the sample of 815 participants that the rate of abortion, condom non-use, client refusal to condom use and mistreatment and violence in the work place, stood between 71-95% and of those who were trafficked for sexual exploitation, it was found that 40% began as minors (Decker *et al.* 2012).

A history of mistreatment and violence in the commercial sexual exploitation industry in Bangladesh is confirmed in a BBC investigation that took journalists undercover to speak to some of these Rohingya victims. The most noteworthy victim was a 14 year old minor who was trafficked for sex work, upon her arrival to her new working location, the minor was threatened with a knife, beaten and then raped after refusing to have sex with two of her exploiter's clients (BBC 2018). While this presents as an isolated incident, women who are sexually exploited are exposed to continued and protracted instances of abuse.

Furthermore, a study conducted in the US on victims of sexual exploitation speaks more directly to the abuse stating that the trauma experienced by sexually exploited women in the US are repeated and prolonged in nature. Such violence leads to serious

long-term physical and psychological harm. Additionally, it was found that women and girls who were sexually exploited were most likely to be tied to their exploiter through drug dependency, as the exploiter uses various drugs as a form of intimidation and control (Gerassi 2015: 595-596). Finally, the long lasting health consequences of forced sexual contact, identified in 2006 by Stop Violence Against Women, results in STI's, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions, urinary tract infections, bleeding and infections to name a few.

In a further study conducted by the Xchange Foundation (2018 (A)), it was found that minors between the ages of 13-17 are ending up in forced labour and prostitution. In their investigation, the Xchange Foundation found that Rohingya girls were cheap for their clients and where there were no clients available, they lived with the exploiters to help the exploiter's family with household chores. This draws directly on De Jonge van Ellemeet *et al's* definition of exploitation in chapter 2, where the exploiter takes excessive advantage of Rohingya women under their management.

In terms of mitigating the threat of the sexual exploitation of Rohingya women and girls in Bangladesh, there seems to be no change in the stance of the government of Bangladesh to lift restrictive laws relating to legal work and access to state education and health care, all key elements contributing to the vulnerability of the Rohingya. In addition, gender based violence programmes in Bangladesh that are set up for the Rohingya refugees have caused concern over the lack of adherence to basic gender based violence principles, and making use of unqualified practitioners.

Finally, issues of blurred lines in the oversight and accountability in humanitarian response plans further hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of gender based violence programmes (Vigaud-Walsh 2018). Additionally, the declining donor sympathy trend, on which most of the humanitarian aid programmes rely, is declining year on year, indicating that the possibility of better operations and more initiatives implemented for the protection of the Rohingya is highly unlikely. Overall, mitigation efforts seem to be poorly implemented and efforts on the part of Bangladesh to alleviate many of these pressures for the safety and security of the Rohingya seem to be unchanging in the near future.

5.3.4. Findings

From the employed risk assessment drawing on annex H (based on annex F and annex G), it was determined that the risk of sexual exploitation received a risk rating of 12, indicating that the risk of Rohingya falling victim to sexual exploitation is medium to high risk. The likelihood of a Rohingya individual finding themselves in a position of sexual exploitation was determined to be of a medium likelihood sitting between a 35%-65% of occurring while the Rohingya are in Bangladeshi camps. The impact assessment yielded a higher rating, reaching the critical region for impact on the exploited individual's health, personal, economic and food security. Additionally, it presented with severe injury and prolonged suffering likely to occur with better mitigation measures unlikely to be implemented.

While the reality of those finding themselves in the sex industry under exploitative conditions experience serious exposure to violence and numerous infections, amongst other things, many Rohingya victims find that these risks are worth the chance to make an income, even if it is very little. This demonstrates a serious lack in humanitarian aid available to the Rohingya, so much so that they are driven to work under inhumane conditions for food and economic security. With mitigation plans that speak directly to the lifting of laws which prohibit the integration and legal work of the Rohingya in Bangladesh unlikely to change, the prospect of this risk decreasing in likelihood and impact become highly unlikely.

5.4 Forced Labour

5.4.1. Definition and Context of Forced Labour

Forced labour is defined as “work that is performed involuntarily and under the menace of any penalty. It refers to situations in which persons are coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means such as manipulated debt, retention of identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration authorities” (International Labour Organisation 2019). More common place than sexual exploitation is forced labour, which preys on the vulnerability of men, women

and children. This broader reaching form of exploitation has become common place for the Rohingya who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation due to their desperation. Often seeking to work, Rohingya start their jobs and generally find that they are not paid what they were promised, are not permitted to leave their work premises, they work longer hours and are sleep deprived. Further increasing the likelihood of their exploitation is that fact that trafficking rings existing before the most recent Rohingya influx have expanded with the dramatic population increase of 200,000 to over 900,000 Rohingya refugees (International Crisis Group 2019).

In refugee emergencies, the prevalence of forced labour often soars with the population increases in destination countries, where asylum seekers seek out work opportunities to secure their own and their families livelihoods and protection. This is echoed in the Freedom Fund's report on *Slavery and Exploitation of Refugees* (2016: 7). This report indicated an increase in the prevalence of refugee child labour in Lebanon since 2011 when the Syrian conflict began, souring to a high of 60%-70% of children employed under the worst conditions ranging from picking beans, potatoes and figs to working in construction, auto repair shops and markets. This was attributed to the high demand for child workers from Lebanese employers as they are far cheaper to employ than adults (Freedom Fund 2016: 7).

Subsequently, in 2016, it was found that of the 40,3 million individuals across the world that have fallen victim to some form of modern day slavery, 10 million were identified to be children, mostly trapped in positions of forced labour and child marriage (Kelly 2017). A further example is Uganda which had identified at least 267 trafficking victims, of which 84 were children accounting for 30% of the identified victims and 82 accounted for as victims of forced labour, which represents over 30% of the total trafficked victims having fallen victim to forced labour. These statistic indicate a high prevalence of labour exploitation amongst trafficked victims in refugee camps.

This is deeply concerning when looking at the Rohingya refugee crisis considering that as of July 2019, the UNHCR reported that children under the age of 18 made up 54.3% of the Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019 (C)). Furthermore, a major risk for child protection is the fact that, according to Save the Children (2018), 1 in 2 Rohingya children are

unaccompanied as parents or guardians were killed in Myanmar. Over 43,000 parents were reported missing and presumed dead in the first 6 months after Myanmar's largest crackdown on the Rohingya with an estimated 28,300 children reporting the loss of one parent and 7,700 children reporting having lost both (Time 2018). This has been described by the Head of Child Protection at the UNICEF, Jean Lieby, as "a major risk". Indicating the majority of the Rohingya community fits the profile of those sought out for labour exploitation in relation to vulnerability and demographics given that most are children and unaccompanied by an adult parent or guardian (UNHCR 2019 (F)).

5.4.2. Drivers and Threats of Labour Exploitation for the Rohingya

In 2018 (A), the IOM reported that Rohingya refugees are looking for opportunities to work but there aren't many opportunities inside the camps, and the few that are available are usually unpaid volunteer work. The IOM identified that 2/3rds of Rohingya women and girls, who have received the help of the IOM in Cox's Bazar have found themselves in situations of forced labour. Much like the case of sexual exploitation, the vulnerability lies in the desperation of the Rohingya to find alternative means of income to secure their safety and basic needs

This is much the same in the case of Syrian refugees who only have the option of seeking out illegal work. For many children and adult Syrian refugees, the employer they work under is often their sponsor who, in many cases, threatens to end their sponsorship of the refugee if he/she refuses to fulfil certain tasks. Additionally, a refugees' sponsor also threatens to report the refugee to the authorities as they may not have legal status in Lebanon. Furthermore, landlords of refugees also often force refugees to work for little to no pay to secure their housing, leaving the refugee highly vulnerable to exploitation (The Freedom Fund 2016: 14). In the case of the Rohingya, there are stark similarities. In Bangladesh, the International Organisation on Migration (2018: 7 (B)) found that bonded labour connected to forced labour is widespread and that exploiters target poor and indebted individuals who commonly face physical and verbal abuse in conjunction with poor pay and long working hours putting the health and physical security of exploited Rohingya in jeopardy.

Another contributing factors to the endangerment of the human security of the Rohingya through exploitative work is that of their families. It was also found that Syrian refugee families resort to sending their children to work out of desperation and the need to make an income to survive. Additionally, it was noted that camp leaders hire out children from the camps to Lebanese employers and profit from their labour (The Freedom Fund 2016: 7-8). In the case of Congolese refugees in Uganda such practices are common where children have to work to help put food on the table due to under funding from humanitarian aid agencies and the government of Uganda, in addition to further internal displacement in camps due to conflict (United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees 2019 (G)). Given this trend across various camps, it is likely that much the same will occur in the case of the Rohingya crisis.

This is mirrored in the Rohingya refugee crisis where it was noted that families that are desperate for income are selling off their children into bonded labour to pay of their families' debts during the nine months of the fishing season. In exchange, the families receive \$217 from their exploiters in cash and the child works to pay off whatever is outstanding (Arnold 2017). Instances of Rohingya falling into bonded labour vary in nature. For example, a 12 year old Rohingya was forced to work to help pay off the wedding of her older sister and found herself working in bonded labour for two years. This minor was getting paid CAD \$45 a month, which is just over \$34 dollars, that was sent directly to her father and was subjected to beatings on a regular basis (Yu 2017). Such instances are difficult to quantify given the low prevalence of victims reporting their abuse for fear of the legal ramifications of having been found to have sought out work outside of the camps.

More prevalent instances of bonded labour were identified by the IOM (2018: 3 (A)) to occur when Rohingya men are allowed by fisherman to set up camp on their lands. Fuel and penalties are then expected by the land owners and when the Rohingya men are unable to pay, many times due to illness, the land owners send people to beat up that person for not paying. This happens in several other work areas such as salt cultivation, rickshaw pulling and Tom Tom/ taxi drivers.

Other forms of forced labour begin on deceptive terms and the promise of dignified work. Instances of physical abuse under exploitative conditions are also common. A

Rohingya woman confirmed this trend by sharing her story. She had left the camp to work as a cleaner and nanny for CAD \$7.60 (just over US \$5) a month and was also subjected to beatings if she made any mistakes (Yu 2017). Many women pursue work in the domestic work and fishing industry. Some woman who work in drying fish earn between \$1,20 \$2.40 a day, while some men earn between \$1.20-\$3.60 for a five day boat fishing trip, far under a dollar a day (PRI 2018). Another example of a false promise on income is of a boy under the age of 15 who had told Allard and Wilkes (2017), Reuters' reporters, that he was promise 250 taka a day, however, he states that he now earns only 500 taka (\$6) for 38 days of work in building roads.

5.4.3. Humanitarian Aid Agencies

In an effort to combat child labour, particularly in regards to families trying to pay off their debtors, UNICEF has been offering families the same amount with the hopes that they will not send off their children to work. This however is not sustainable or empowering for these families in the long run, and with decreasing donor sympathy, the longevity of such an initiative is called into question. Before the most recent influx, UNICEF was able to assist 400 families with cash aid amounting to the same as their debts to prevent children from being sold into work (Arnold 2017).

Despite efforts by humanitarian agencies, the prohibition of legal work for the Rohingya, render them with no other alternative to generate income safely. Forced labour affects men, women and children exponentially. The International Organisation on Migration (2018 (A)) reports that of the 99 cases of trafficking and exploitation amongst the Rohingya refugees that they have been dealt with, 57 women and girls were found to have fallen victim to forced labour.

5.5. Findings

Labour exploitation received a higher risk rating than sexual exploitation. This is because the likelihood of a Rohingya falling into exploitative labour situations is greater as this form of exploitation is more common and far reaching. As a result, labour exploitation received a higher likelihood of occurring rating as it is more conspicuous than sexual exploitation and is far less discriminatory in terms of the gender and age

of the victims. Labour exploitation therefore receives a 'highly likely' in the likelihood category meaning that there is a 65%-90% chance of a Rohingya finding themselves in a position of labour exploitation. In terms of an impact rating, labour exploitation received a 'critical' rating, like sexual exploitation, indicating that severe injury and prolonged suffering is likely to occur with the prospect of change in the near future unlikely. This is because, much like sexual exploitation, the impact on the exploited Rohingya's personal and health security may render the victim exposed to serious and prolonged instances of physical harm in conjunction with their exposure to disease and malnutrition.

Much like in the case of sexual exploitation, many victims are willing to accept these risks for the income they receive or debt they will be paying off. This work is a means of securing their financial and food security, and for some, even their personal security. This is because many employers offer their workers opportunities to stay out of or away from the camps for prolonged periods of times. The overall risk rating in this case is 16, which indicates a high risk of a Rohingya individual finding themselves in exploitative labour conditions.

5.6. Conclusion

Overall, both types of labour and sexual exploitation fall within concerning risk classifications, which are more than likely to increase negatively as mitigation efforts are unlikely to increase on both the end of the government of Bangladesh and humanitarian aid agencies. It was found that while many Rohingya are misled into exploitative working conditions, they opt to stay in these situations for the income security it provides that the camps and other lawful means do not allow for. While there is clear evidence to suggest that both occurrences of sexual and labour exploitation are rife regarding the Rohingya, their desperation and resilience in finding alternative means for a better quality of life, outside of the camps and avoid repatriation to Myanmar seems to be the overriding element keeping the Rohingya in these exploitative roles.

With this in mind, it is therefore necessary for the government of Bangladesh, in partnership with humanitarian aid agencies such as MSF, Save The Children, WFP and UN agencies, to begin taking serious steps towards mitigating these threats. Possibly the step that holds the most weight in addressing the wicked problems facing the Rohingya is for the government of Bangladesh to begin considering the integration of the Rohingya into their society and to lift the laws prohibiting Rohingya youth from entering schools and for working aged Rohingya to lawfully pursue safe working opportunities. While Bangladesh is a country already struggling with a poor population and low employment, with proper and long term integration plans, there is an opportunity for the Rohingya to positively contribute to the growth of Bangladesh's economy, if invested in.

CHAPTER 6: Ways Forward and Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to summarise the key lessons learned in the approach of the Bangladesh and the international community to dealing with the Rohingya refugee crisis. In this regard, their notable successes and shortfalls will be highlighted. Thereafter, key take-aways from the security risk analysis as it related to securing the Rohingya's human security will be drawn on as the point of departure for proposed recommendations on moving forward. Finally, the conclusion summarising the main arguments put forward in this study be provided.

6.2. Lessons Learned

6.2.1. Short-term Outlook.

The government of Bangladesh is adamant that adopting a long-stay approach to the Rohingya 'migration' crisis is unnecessary and continues to pursue and affirm its intention to repatriate the Rohingya to Myanmar in the near future. However, despite Bangladesh's efforts in deploying its resources to initiate several voluntary repatriation operations, all have been unsuccessful due to safety concerns regarding the restoration of peace in Rakhine State.

As a consequence of Bangladesh's short-term approach, the Rohingya have become heavily dependent on the support of humanitarian aid agencies to ensure that their basic needs are met. However, this is proving to be unsustainable as donor support decreases and the Rohingya's stay in Bangladesh increases year on year. What's more, is that this short-term approach has created an environment conducive to increasing the vulnerability and exploitation of the Rohingya and has contributed to their confined, idle and desperate disposition, in which their human security is increasingly threatened as time goes on.

Having regard to the aforesaid, Bangladesh has achieved some notable successes in relation to securing its own national interest. Bangladesh's isolationist policies have effectively prevented the Rohingya from claiming refugee rights. This strategy has afforded Bangladesh the luxury of preventing further pressures on its already struggling capacity and limited resources by barring the Rohingya from accessing government institutions such as entering into local schools and having access to medical facilities.

A possible shortfall for Bangladesh is that, due to their isolation and limited access to humanitarian aid, the Rohingya have sought illegal and exploitative work that is not regulated and is not taxed for the benefit of the government. An additional shortfall is that illegal work often leads to increased criminality in Bangladeshi territory when those involved are vulnerable individuals by means of trafficking of goods or individuals for various forms of services.

Finally, the fact that Bangladesh is both resource and capacity-strapped all support the argument that the integration of the Rohingya into Bangladeshi society, not only for their contribution to the local communities but also for their protection, is highly unlikely to change. Therefore, it is clear that the circumstances contributing to the vulnerability and subsequent exploitation of the Rohingya will persist or even worsen as donor support wanes, putting their human security at increasing risk.

6.2.2. Historical Trends and Regional Support

Rohingya migration into Bangladesh has occurred several times since Myanmar's independence. Given the historical migration of Rohingya into Bangladesh due to conflict, in addition to Myanmar making no strides in rebuilding destroyed homes and infrastructure or restoring peace in Rakhine State, it can be argued that it is highly unlikely that the Rohingya will be repatriated in the near future.

Additionally, poor regional attitudes and crisis planning in relation to refugee influxes on the continent have proven to be a great hurdle in ensuring the human security of the Rohingya. Bangladesh being part of ASEAN, has received little cooperation and support from its neighbours to put pressure on Myanmar to take responsibility for its

crimes. China, an ASEAN member state and P5 Member of the UNSC has thwarted UN efforts to intervene in Myanmar and has invested even more in Myanmar in the face of sanctions on the part of the international community. With this in mind, possible resettlement plans for the Rohingya into neighbouring countries seems to be off the table for Bangladesh as this would require the adoption of a long-term approach to addressing the Rohingya crisis.

Furthermore, trends in refugee influxes suggest that their exile from their states of origin generally last for several years. The UNHCR estimates that amongst Syrians, South Sudanese and Congolese refugees, it would take an estimated 18 years for their total resettlement, an operation in clear need of long-term planning. In the case of Bangladesh, it has already been argued that repatriation in the near future is unlikely. Resettlement plans are also an unlikely option to succeed due Bangladesh's neighbours (UNHCR 2018 (A)). With refugees suggesting the need for long-term crisis planning, unlikely cooperation from its neighbours and declining capacity on the part of humanitarian aid agencies, Bangladesh's approach is unlikely to be both sustainable and effective enough to repatriate Rohingya in the near future.

With the aforementioned in mind, there is a clear indication that the quality of life and living conditions of the Rohingya are unlikely to improve. In addition, the uncertainty of their repatriation and long-term physical safety will continue to weigh on the Rohingya, who fear returning to the horrors inflicted upon them by the government of Myanmar. As a result, the Rohingya are likely to compromise what little security they do have to ensure they do not return to Myanmar.

6.2.3. Human Security

Bangladesh has rendered the Rohingya a disempowered and desperate population through its policies . While there is major support from international actors by way of providing food, clean water and sanitation, access to medical assistance and some form of education for young children, the question of maintaining these operations in the face of the Rohingya's likely long-term stay appears to be unsustainable.

The above creates sustained uncertainty which has serious implications in ensuring the security of the Rohingya. Subsequently, such implication put further pressure on the Rohingya to become self-reliant, even by means of engaging in illicit work which renders them more vulnerable and likely to fall victim to exploitation. The drivers behind this need for self-reliance are consequences of the Rohingya being an idle group that is searching for purpose, certainty and economic security with the knowledge that humanitarian aid can only last so long and go so far.

A final driver, and probably the most significant is the unwillingness for Bangladesh to work closely with humanitarian aid organisations to implement a sustainable long-term plan in order to ensure that every Rohingya in its camps are able to stay in its territory under safe and dignified conditions. Slow, bureaucratic responses to the implementation of humanitarian operations in the camps have hampered the access and quality of many health and food programmes for the benefit of the Rohingya.

Overall, continued short-term and isolationist strategies will perpetuate increasing risks to the human security of the Rohingya with more severe impacts as time goes on and resources become depleted. Likely future deaths of the Rohingya due to their relocation to flood a plain territory as a serious consideration on the part of Bangladesh as a solution to the overcrowded Rohingya camps and the concern of food shortages and clean water serve as a prime examples of catastrophic impending risk to the human security of the Rohingya at present and in the near future.

6.3. Ways Forward

Moving forward, there are several players, both domestically and internationally that have key parts to play in ensuring that the Rohingya are able to live under dignified conditions, free from fear and want. All parties must shift their approaches to the crisis in order to remove the present drivers contributing to the vulnerability and desperation of the Rohingya. In so doing, significant progress towards lessening the risks of Rohingya falling victim to various forms of exploitation can be made.

6.3.1. UN and Other Governments

The UN and donor governments play a significant role in the crisis. Both have diplomatic influence that goes a long way in working with Bangladesh and Myanmar to bring about peace and stability to the conflict and Rohingya settlement areas.

Diplomatically, both players need to continue to encourage China to use its influence to put pressure on Myanmar and oppose the human rights violations its government has committed against the Rohingya (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018). Additionally, the international community must continue to push for accountability from the government of Myanmar and employ international organs such as the ICC in addition to encouraging international acknowledgment of sanctions against Myanmar to ensure that this is achieved.

Amongst those who need to acknowledge the Rohingya refugee crisis are ASEAN member-states. Member-states must begin efforts to pressure Myanmar to meet the conditions necessary for the safe and voluntary repatriation of the Rohingya. These states can begin by offering their assistance and play a part in the resettlement of the Rohingya to lessen the burden on Bangladesh but also to play a role in bettering the safety and security of the Rohingya that they adopt (Human Rights Watch 2018). Donor governments and the UN can support these member states by aiding in the resettlement of extremely vulnerable Rohingya such as unaccompanied children to third states where they have relatives who have already settled (Human Rights Watch 2018 and Humanitarian Policy Group 2018). In addition, the UN and donor governments must encourage the diplomatic intervention of ASEAN member-states to engage with state councillor Aung San Suu Kyi with the intention of reaching a resolution to the crisis and to restore peace for the eventual voluntary and safe repatriation of the Rohingya (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018).

Furthermore, donor governments play a key role in the financial support of operations on the ground in Cox's Bazar. However, the troublesome prospective plans for the development and relocation of the Rohingya to the flood prone island, Bashar Char, is a stark reality that threatens the personal security of the Rohingya and further isolates them from possible integration and access to recourses. The international

community can halt this operation by ensuring that they do not fund this operation and oppose its initiation until the assessments of independent experts determine this project to not be a danger to the lives of the Rohingya (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Finally, donor governments must continue to call on the government of Bangladesh to allow the UNHCR to lead the crisis response and coordinate amongst the various role players internationally and on the ground to provide Bangladesh and ground staff with the appropriate support to better capacity and operational sustainability for the long term.

6.3.2. Government of Bangladesh

Bangladesh is the most significant player regarding the security of the Rohingya. The most critical step moving forward is for Bangladesh to recognise the Rohingya as refugees, to better ensure their human security and accept the long-term help from the international community that is being offered. While giving refugee status will increase stresses on the capacity and resources of Bangladesh, its cooperation with humanitarian aid agencies and donor governments will be a means of reducing this burden significantly (International Crisis Group and Humanitarian Policy Group 2018). Such steps must begin with the ratification and implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, in addition to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Convention (International Organisation for Migration 2018 (C)).

Secondly, Bangladesh must move to reconsider its legal measures in relations to the Rohingya. Laws that provide transitory relief for the Rohingya need to be adopted. Measures to process refugees and asylum seekers that have access to state resources and facilities such as health care, education and employment need to be implemented (Venugopal 2018). In this regard, particular focus must be paid to ensuring that all children have access to education to prevent them and future generations of Rohingya becoming, what some describe as a lost generation. Furthermore, should the Rohingya be integrated into society for the long term, Bangladesh must take measures to equip the Rohingya with skills and opportunities to be self-reliant and in a position to contribute to the Bangladeshi economy.

However, in order for the aforementioned to be sustainably achieved, the rights of the Rohingya to freedom of movement must be acknowledged and supported by the government of Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2018). These steps will play a key role in lessening the drivers contributing to the undignified living conditions of the camps and ensure safe work opportunities for the Rohingya, all of which will reduce their vulnerability to exploitative work. By taking these legal steps, Bangladesh will have the opportunity to better address domestic concerns over Bangladesh-Myanmar cross-border drug trafficking (Venugopal 2018).

In addition to crime related matters, concerning possible radicalisation and internal camp conflicts, Bangladesh needs to enhance its intelligence operations and training for security units in the camps. This can be achieved by investing in capacity, training and better engagement with the Rohingya community for information gathering and analysis to create better response strategies (Bashar 2017). Furthermore, Bangladesh must work closely with all agencies working on the ground with the Rohingya. Such efforts will aid in the betterment of regular information collection in relation to the industries that contribute to the trafficking and exploitation of Rohingya. These steps will allow for the quantification of the presence of trafficking and exploitation, in addition to the identification of their causal factors to better strategize solutions that address these wicked problems (The Freedom Fund 2016). With this in mind, Bangladesh needs to ensure that its state organs, which have a direct hand in the rate of trafficking and exploitation prosecutions, are appropriately resourced to function more effectively.

Furthermore, Bangladesh must adopt a long-term crisis plan for the Rohingya as there is no sign of peace restored in Myanmar in the near future. In so doing, more sustainable operational and financial planning strategies can be implemented to relieve pressure on the government of Bangladesh and to better ensure the Rohingya are able to reside under dignified conditions (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018). Should there be continued short term strategies employed by Bangladesh, and no development of long stay operations, “Bangladesh risks worsening their plight and could propel the crisis in a dangerous new direction” (International Crisis Group 2018). With this in mind, Bangladesh must consider making additional space available in Ukhiya subdistrict for the overcrowded camps such as the Kutupalong-Balikhali Expansion Camp. This can be achieved by giving more land to the Rohingya or

building proper housing upwards to ensure that the camps are compliant with the minimum standards in the UN Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response and the Humanitarian Charter (International Organisation for Migration 2018 (C)).

Finally, the government of Bangladesh needs to remove bureaucratic process that hinder the humanitarian aid organisations and donors from engaging in and implementing long-term crisis operations. This can be achieved through more efficient issuing of visas, work permits and providing access to camps to aid workers and donors (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018).

6.3.3. Humanitarian Aid Organisations

Humanitarian aid organisations have played a vital role in ensuring the health, food, economic and personal security needs of the Rohingya are met to the best of their ability. However, these organisations need to strengthen cooperation efforts with other partners in Cox's Bazar. With collective coordination, aid operations must begin to consider running in the context of the Rohingya's long-term stay. In addition, the inclusion of the Rohingya in the problem solving process as a means of empowering the Rohingya and increasing their access to information that more accurately contextualises the risks they face is valuable (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018). One measure could be for the sharing of certain databases to ensure that the overall impacts of the risks and their extent are better captured, allowing for resources to be better prioritised.

In addition, these organisations must play a role in the international arena to pressure for talks and the restoration of peace, security as well as accountability in Myanmar. The international community needs to step up efforts to push the government of Myanmar to allow the UN and other NGO's such as Human Rights Watch unfettered access to Rakhine state. These organisations will serve as monitoring agents to evaluate the state of peace restoration in Rakhine and will allow for the international community to more accurately scale the level of destruction that ensued during the 2017 government sponsored crackdown (International Crisis Group 2018 (C)).

6.3.4. Donor Crisis Funding in Bangladesh

Lastly, donors must be encouraged to acknowledge the stresses that the over 1 million Rohingya have put on local communities, particularly in Cox's Bazar, and invest in the infrastructure and development in local communities, particularly those in close proximity to the camps. Furthermore, donors need to commit to more flexible, longer-term, multi-layered funding for crisis operations. Finally, and most importantly, like all other actors, donors must recognise the likely protracted nature of this crisis and the need for action and resources with longer-term horizons (Humanitarian Policy Group 2018)

6.4. Conclusion

It has been two years since the 2017 mass exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh. In this time, continued denial of the Rohingya as refugees has created conditions that are conducive to rendering the Rohingya vulnerable to various forms of exploitation.

In chapter 3, the impact of historical tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar on the current Rohingya crisis were discussed. It was noted that since its independence, Myanmar has struggled with recognising minority groups, particularly the Muslim Rohingya in northern Rakhine. As such, Myanmar has denied the Rohingya's claim to citizenship and rendered the Rohingya a stateless group. Periodic state-sponsored violence and strategies to remove the Rohingya from its territory through various means have seen thousands of Rohingya moving back and forth over the border into neighbouring countries seeking asylum.

Of these countries, Bangladesh was identified as having hosted the most Rohingya, opening its borders to over 700,000 Rohingya flooding into its territory due to ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, to join over 200,000 other Rohingya who had fled across the border in previous years. Despite their large influxes, Bangladesh has continued to deny the Rohingya refugee rights with the hopes of repatriating them to prevent further strain on their already limited state resources and capacity. Such has been achieved by refraining from acknowledging the Rohingya as refugees and enforcing legislation

that reinforces the isolation of the Rohingya from local communities and government facilities.

Bangladesh's aforementioned strategy, in conjunction with the Rohingya's stateless disposition are discussed and analysed in chapter 4 as key factors contributing to their vulnerability. In this study, the use of a vulnerability assessment that considers the implication of vulnerabilities facing the Rohingya in terms of their health, food, personal and economic security were assessed. As a result of this assessment, it was found that, in relation to their health and economic security, the Rohingya are highly vulnerable to exploitation. In the case of their food and personal security, the Rohingya are extremely vulnerable to exploitation. It was also found that their vulnerable disposition is unlikely to change unless better mitigation strategies are adopted by the government of Bangladesh.

Subsequently in chapter 5, a risk assessment was employed to determine to what extent the risk of exploitation jeopardises the human security of the exploited Rohingya. It was determined that under exploitative conditions, in all economic, food, health and personal security cases, the human security needs of the Rohingya sat at medium to high risk of being jeopardised. Under conditions of sexual exploitation, the human security impact on the Rohingya was critical with the likelihood of occurring sitting at a medium probability. Furthermore, labour exploitation was determined to sit at a high risk of jeopardising the human security of the Rohingya, with the security impact on the Rohingya determined to be critical and the likelihood being highly probable.

Finally in chapter 6, the lessons learned from this research and ways forward were identified. Overall, while it was determined that Bangladesh is already a resource and capacity strapped state with little regional support in the crisis, its adoption of short-term operations with the hopes of repatriating the Rohingya are both unsustainable and unlikely to be achieved. Therefore, it was concluded that it is necessary for Bangladesh to change its current strategy and work more closely with humanitarian aid organisations, independent donors and donor governments to prepare for the likely long term stay of the Rohingya. Through this move, the overall burden of better integrating the Rohingya into Bangladeshi society will be lessened. Subsequently,

Bangladesh will be in a position to better ensure the Rohingya's human security and to create conditions conducive to the dignified stay of the Rohingya.

While Bangladesh was identified as the key player in finding solutions to the compromised security of the Rohingya, it is not without recognition that the entire international community must continue to pressure Myanmar to be held accountable for its actions so as to take steps towards the restoration of peace and security in Rakhine State. Once achieved, the facilitation of the safe, stable and peaceful repatriation operations of the Rohingya can begin. Finally, upon their return, Myanmar must ensure that the Rohingya are recognised as an ethnic group and recognised as citizens.

ANNEXES


Annex A: Cox's Bazar Location



Source: Aljazeera (B)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/rohingya-crisis-explained-maps-170910140906580.html>


Annex B: Rohingya Refugee Camp Sizes



Source: Mercy Corps (B)

<https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/bangladesh/rohingya-refugee-crisis-quick-facts>

Annex C: Buildings Destroyed in Rohingya's Rakhine State



Source:
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/02/burma-satellite-images-show-massive-fire-destruction>

Annex D: Bordering River Between Myanmar and Bangladesh



Source: <https://www.avonadvocate.com.au/story/4894339/australia-calls-on-myanmar-for-measured-action/?cs=5>

Annex E: Vulnerability Assessment ¹

Vulnerability Assessment Table

Human Security Component	Vulnerabilities At Local Level	Impact on Rohingya Community	Mitigation Capacities	Vulnerability Rating
Health Security	Poor living conditions	Increased likelihood of the spread of diseases and infections with high mortality rates amongst children	Only 41.1% of health relief budget reached. Donor sympathy and prioritisation is low.	Highly Vulnerable
			No permanent housing options on the table for the Rohingya.	
			Seriously high numbers of disease breakouts calls vaccination efforts into question	
			Relocation plans for Rohingya to areas with high likelihood of flooding is a serious consideration for Bangladesh	
	Water contamination, water scarcity and poor sanitation	Ground water levels are dropping quickly.	Water and Sanitation Budget only reached 26% of target. Donor sympathy and prioritisation is low.	

¹ Compiled by candidate for this study

		Water contaminated by overlapping sewerage pipes.	Poor planning of Humanitarian Organisation in placement of latrine and water pipes.	
		Spread of Diseases through water.	Over-crowding means lack of options for space and placement of latrines and water drums.	
		Latrines damaged by Monsoon season.		
		Latrines placed too far for many women to walk to alone.		
	Limited access to health care facilities	Lack for trauma care facilities for physical and mental trauma.	Humanitarian agency programmes stalled by Bangladeshi Government.	
		Rape survivors choose to give birth in shelters due to shame.	Lack of capacity and funding for humanitarian agencies.	
		existing facilities are over capacity and of poor quality.		
		Vulnerable to HIV exposure.		
Economic Security	Employment and Opportunity	Aid is insufficient for big or growing families.	Bangladesh Government stands by law prohibiting Rohingya from working legally.	Highly Vulnerable
		Need to find external sources of income.		
		Rohingya work illegally under unregulated working conditions.		
		Vulnerable to exploitative working conditions.		

	Education	Rohingya youth lose out on educational opportunities.	Donor sentiments were low in 2018 reaching less than 50% of its financial target.	
		Idle youth left vulnerable to falling victim to crime or becoming part of criminal networks.	Bangladesh Government stands by law prohibiting Rohingya from entering Bangladeshi schools or accessing Bangladeshi curriculum.	
		Access to 2 hours of learning facilitation for pre-primary and primary school levels only.	Humanitarian organisation take sole responsibility for learning facilities.	
		Adult illiteracy will remain high.		
Food Security	Distribution incorrect and Limited.	Rationing as a result of inadequate distribution of food aid.	No indication on plans to better distribute food aid.	
		Going into the woods to find firewood, at risk of violent attacks or abduction.		
		Families with surplus of food supply sell off what extras they have.		Extremely Vulnerable
	No opportunities to access food on their own terms.	Malnutrition in Rohingya due in insufficient access to food.	Donor funding is dropping significantly from 2017 to the first half of 2019, with only 25% of the funding target for food reached.	

		No access to land or resources to grow their own food.	NGOs are handing out livelihood cash support to families but this is not far reaching or sustainable to make a big enough impact.	
		No lawful income sources to buy food and fuel where needed.		
Personal Security	Violence in camps.	Increased community tension.	Bangladesh does not have the capacity to increase police presence and the rule of law in camps.	Extremely Vulnerable
		Increased domestic violence.	Donor sympathy is low with protection only having reached 39% of its funding target.	
		Murders in camps.		
		Lack of quality police presence in camps.		
		Competition for leadership in camps fuelling tensions.		
		Lack of rule of law and corruption amongst officials in the camps.		
		Gender-based violence.		
		Trafficking of women and children is a very real reality.		

Annex F: Impact Scale on Human Security – Sexual Exploitation²

Impact Scale on Human Security Category				
Rating	Descriptor	Definition	Example	Rohingya: Sexual Exploitation
5	Catastrophic	Likely to result in death.	State sponsored/ community violence (Community security)	
		Loss of or severe damage to property.		
		No management or mitigating response procedures in place. No plans or capacity for the attainment and mobilisation of resources.		
4	Critical	Likely to result in sever injury.	Inability to freely access food sources (Food Security/ economic security/ environmental security)	Women being subjected to steroid injections, STI's, all forms of physical violence if they do not cooperate or deal with violent clients, unsafe abortions, unsafe births.

² Compiled by candidate for this study

		likely to result in prolonged suffering of an individual where the individual does not live in dignity (Natural rights are threatened).		Many Rohingya relive their trauma of sexual assault through their work as a sex worker. They are underpaid, threatened verbally and physically, and work in their pimps houses as domestic workers and nanny's when they don't have clients.
		Management or mitigating response procedures minimal or in early stages of development. Capacities and Resources not available yet.		Humanitarian organisation are focused on financial hand out initiatives reliant on donors. Only legal means of security come from aid and the only possible work opportunities are in the camps for humanitarian organisations without pay.

		Unlikely that circumstance will change in the near future.		Government is firm on their stance to prohibit the Rohingya from legally entering into the Bangladeshi economy, therefore the future prospect of the Rohingya pursuing legal and safe forms of work is highly unlikely. Government also unlikely to make sex work illegal in the near future or develop the capacity to better regulate the industry.
3	Moderate	Natural rights are secure but potential for lawful rights to be jeopardised.	Political oppression by way of being denied the right to vote (Political Security)	

		Risk is identified, mitigation and management procedures are developed and in the process of implementation. Capacities and Resources available but not yet mobilised.		
		likely that circumstance will change in the near future.		
2	Minor	Potential, temporary and foreseen risks to the human security of individual.	Seasonal sever weather conditions (environmental security)	
		Mitigations and management in place and capacities and resources available and mobilised.		
		Circumstances are changing for the better.		

1	Negligible	No significant potential for death, injury, the damage/loss of property or the infringements on the freedoms and dignity of the individual.	Petty crime- Pick-pocketing (economic/ personal security)	
		Risk has undergone the process of identification and is managed and mitigated by existing and sufficient empowerment structures to meet the needs of the individual.		
		Alleviation of the risk is imminent		

Annex G: Likelihood Scale Human Security Trends – Sexual Exploitation³

Likelihood Scale: HS trends			
Rating	Descriptor	Definition	Rohingya: Sexual Exploitation
5	Very High	90% or greater chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps	N/A
4	High	65% up to 90% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps .	N/A
3	Medium	35% up to 65% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps.	Government is firm on their stance to prohibit the Rohingya from legally entering into the Bangladeshi economy, therefore the future prospect of the Rohingya pursuing legal and safe forms of work in highly unlikely. Government also unlikely to make sex work illegal in the near future or develop the capacity to better regulate the industry. While women and female girls make up a large portion of the Rohingya population, sexual exploitation is not as far reaching as labour exploitation. Additionally, the stigma associated with sex work works against the prevalence of women option to join the sex industry unless trafficked vs the likelihood of women and girls falling victim to forced labour in the fishing or domestic work industry.


³ Compiled by candidate for this study

2	Low	10% up to 35% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps	
1	Very Low	< 10% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps.	

Annex H: Risk Matrix⁴

		Risk Rating				
		5	10	15	20	25
Likelihood	4	8	12 (Sexual Exploitation)	16	20	
	3	6	9	12 (Labour Exploitation)	15	
	2	4	6	8	10	
	5	10	15	20	25	

⁴ Compiled by candidate for this study



Annex I: Impact Scale on Human Security Category – Labour Exploitation ⁵

Impact Scale on Human Security Category				
Rating	Descriptor	Definition	Example	Rohingya: Labour Exploitation
5	Catastrophic	Likely to result in death.	State sponsored/ community violence (Community security)	
		Loss of or severe damage to property.		
		No management or mitigating response procedures in place. No plans or capacity for the attainment and mobilisation of resources.		

⁵ Compiled by candidate for this study

4	Critical	Likely to result in sever injury.	Inability to freely access food sources (Food Security/ economic security/ environmental security)	Rohingya are subjected to physical beatings and working under conditions of extreme heat. Children are subjected to working on high risk sites such as construction sites and fishing boats. Here, the physical security and health security of exploited Rohingya are severely threatened.
		likely to result in prolonged suffering of an individual where the individual does not live in dignity (Natural rights are threatened).		Children are unwillingly forced into working off debt to help the family. Individuals live in fear of being turned over to Bangladeshi authorities, being kicked off the land they live on or will lose their only chance at earning an income if their sponsorship/ job is taken away
		Management or mitigating response procedures minimal or in early stages of development. Capacities and Resources not available yet.		Humanitarian organisation are focused on financial hand out initiatives reliant on donors. Only legal means of security come from aid and the only possible work opportunities are in the camps for humanitarian organisations without pay.

		Unlikely that circumstance will change in the near future.		government is firm on their stance to prohibit the Rohingya from legally entering into the Bangladeshi economy, therefore the future prospect of the Rohingya pursuing legal and safe forms of work in highly unlikely.
3	Moderate	Natural rights are secure but potential for lawful rights to be jeopardised.	Political oppression by way of being denied the right to vote (Political Security)	
		Risk is identified, mitigation and management procedures are developed and in the process of implementation. Capacities and Resources available but not yet mobilised.		
		likely that circumstance will change in the near future.		
2	Minor	Potential, temporary and foreseen risks to the human security of individual.	Seasonal sever weather conditions (environmental security)	

		Mitigations and management in place and capacities and resources available and mobilised.		
		Circumstances are changing for the better.		
1	Negligible	No significant potential for death, injury, the damage/loss of property or the infringements on the freedoms and dignity of the individual.	Petty crime- Pick-pocketing (economic/ personal security)	
		Risk has undergone the process of identification and is managed and mitigated by existing and sufficient empowerment structures to meet the needs of the individual.		
		Alleviation of the risk is imminent		

Annex J: Likelihood Scale Human Security Trends – Labour Exploitation⁶

Likelihood Scale: HS trends			
Rating	Descriptor	Definition	Rohingya: Labour Exploitation
5	Very High	90% or greater chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps.	
4	High	65% up to 90% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps.	Trends in the Syrian refugee crisis, 8 years on, shows strong parallels to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Already several instances of men, women and children stuck in positions of forced labour. Amounts they earn are far less than what they were promised or above the dollar a day standard. No long-term mitigation strategies in place to curb the Rohingya's need to seek alternative income outside of the camps. Likely to increase as donor sympathy decreases and aid become more insufficient.

⁶ Compiled by candidate for this study

3	Medium	35% up to 65% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps.	
2	Low	10% up to 35% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps	
1	Very Low	< 10% chance of occurrence during the stay of a Rohingya in Bangladesh's refugee camps	

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