# POOR GOVERNANCE AND TERRORISM IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE SINCE 2017

**by**

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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ENI | Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi |
| FRELIMO | Frente de Libertação de Moçambique |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISCAP | Islamic State Central African Province |
| LNG | Liquid Natural Gas |
| MANU | Mozambican African National Union |
| PAF | Portuguese Armed Forces |
| RENAMO | Resistência Nacional Moçambicana |
| RNM | Resistência Nacional Moçambicana |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| UDENAMO | National Democratic Union of Mozambique |
| UNAMI | National African Union of Independent Mozambique |
| UN | United Nations |
| ZANLA | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army |

# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Identification of the research theme

The research theme describes the current manifestation of terrorism in northern Mozambique. This is done by evaluating three periods: the war of liberation against the Portuguese (1964-1974), the civil war between the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RNM) (1977-1992), and the present time, since 2017. The former two periods offer contextual information to situate the last-named period. This research specifically focuses on 2017-2020 as the period in which terrorism 'of a new kind' has emerged.

Terrorism emerged in northern Mozambique in 2017 and is ostensibly attributed to Muslim militants. The first attacks occurred on 5 October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia, a town in the northern province of Cabo Delgado (Fabricius 2017). Three police stations were attacked and two subsequent clashes with government forces occurred over the following two weeks (Fabricius 2017). This was followed in March 2019 by the killing of 13 civilians in Cabo Delgado and the destruction of over 120 houses (Eyewitness News 2019). The group held responsible, known as 'Ansar al-Sunnah' or 'Al-Shabaab', appears to be inspired by international terrorist clerics and followers, specifically from Tanzania, such as Sheik Aboud Rogo (Wholley 2018), who is listed in the 1844 Sanctions List of the United Nations Security Council (United Nations 2014). These individuals share similar aspirations, including the rejection of Western education and the establishment of Sharia law (Africa Centre /for Strategic Studies 2018; Wholley 2018). The Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) claimed responsibility for the attacks (Vines 2020). This was the first spate of attacks since the guerrilla offensive during the anti-colonial war in the 1960s, as well as attacks by *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) members during the Mozambican civil war. Nine hundred people have been killed since October 2017 (see Figure 1); between the beginning of 2020 and 21 March 2020 more than 80 attacks and 100 deaths occurred (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020).

**Figure 1**: Attacks by Al-Shabaab in northern Mozambique



(Hall 2020)

Academics and practitioners speculate about the reasons for the recent re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique and the underlying explanations. Research that has been conducted, such as Wholley's (2018), is inconclusive and to some degree speculative. Chatham House (2019) outlines competing explanations for current terrorism in the north offered by academics. The first explanation is proposed by Sheik Said Habibe, Joao Pereira, and Salvador Forquilha (Chatham

House 2019). They state that international jihad linked to Tanzania, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Swahili coast is the explanation for northern Mozambique's terrorism (Chatham House 2019). Secondly, Joseph Hanlon and Simone Hanson link such terrorism to the criminality of the 'heroin coast' (Chatham House 2019). Local Islam is at the core of the explanation offered by Eric Morier-Genoud and Lizzat Bonate (Chatham House 2019). Lastly, Yusuf Adam believes that poverty and popular uprising are to blame for the attacks in Cabo Delgado (Chatham House 2019). These remain competing explanations. Former journalist and Human Rights Watch researcher for Mozambique, Zenaida Machado, states that there is "no solid evidence" on competing explanations for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique (Allison 2019). Limited information on the details of the attacks and the unreliable nature of the information coming out of Cabo Delgado have resulted in inconclusive answers about the terrorist attacks. The information is unreliable because locals fear the repercussions of sharing information with the media (Allison 2019). Mozambican investigative journalist Estacio Valoi came "closer than almost anyone else" to investigating details about the attacks (Allison 2019). He visited the scene of the first terrorist attack shortly after the attack and stated that further investigation into the development of the situation led him being "surrounded by … undercover agents and people wearing military uniforms, recording the interviews that we were doing" (Allison 2019). This restricted the nature of the questions that journalists could ask. Valoi was later arrested as they were leaving the town of Mocimboa da Praia, detained in military headquarters for two nights, and their equipment was confiscated (Allison 2019). The government instituted an "illegal ban on the movements" of journalists, researchers, and representatives of civil society (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 2).

In the light of the aforementioned, this study exploratively argues that poor governance contributes to a condition of human insecurity that in turn accounts for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique.

## 1.2. Literature overview

The literature overview briefly describes the concept of governance, its link to human security and how existing literature accounts for the relationship between these concepts and terrorism in

northern Mozambique. This leads to the demarcation of the research question. The gap that has been identified in the literature relates to the government's role in influencing the re-emergence, development and decline of terrorism in a state. This links directly to governance and the inability to provide citizens with human security.

### 1.2.1. Governance

Put simply, governance is the ability of an administration to implement sound policies through legitimate institutions as stipulated in the country's constitution, in order to provide for the needs of the population and to ensure the well-being and survival of the state and its people, spanning all provinces of a state. Effective governance's fundamental concepts include transparency, accountability, citizen participation, the rule of law, effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and coherence (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). Thus, this research asserts that poor governance is the inverse of effective governance. This conceptualisation will be used throughout the study. It applies to the chosen case in terms of the historical trajectory of terrorism in the north, allows for the introduction of governance indicators in Chapter 3, and its key concepts are reiterated in the country's constitution, as well as the provisions of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) signed by the Mozambican government.

### 1.2.2. Human security

As a paradigm, human security is 'security' that focuses on the needs of the people; it is interpreted as 'security for the people' and the focus is explicitly placed on the well-being and welfare of citizens (Elliott 2015: 13; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015). Therefore, it is the absence of human security that empowers non-state actors to exploit the insecurity and vulnerabilities of human beings. As McRae (2001: 15) notes, "[w]hen states fail, civilians suffer foremost." This study asserts that the absence of human security leads to human insecurity. Different dimensions of insecurity that threaten the individual are discussed in Chapter 3. Human security was first introduced in the United Nations (UN) Human Development Report of 1994. This is the foundational statement of the human security concept and is therefore used in this research as the underpinning of the applicable human security dimensions. The four dimensions applicable to this

research's argument are personal, community, political, and economic security. Personal security is the protection of individuals from "physical violence", including state-sponsored violence, violence from other states, or violence from other groups (UNDP 1994: 30); community security involves the protection of individuals from the loss of traditional values and relationships (UNDP 1994: 31); political security is concerned with a society that "honours [individuals'] basic human rights" (UNDP 1994: 32-33); and economic security requires "an assured basic income" for civilians, and where that is not possible, a "publicly financed safety net" must be in place as a last resort measure (UNDP 1994: 25). There is a relationship between poor governance and human insecurity. For example, just as lack of transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and the rule of law (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7) contributes to political insecurity (UNDP 1994: 32-33), lack of effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and coherence (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7) contributes to economic insecurity (UNDP 1994: 25).

### 1.2.3. Conflict, with specific focus on terrorism

Terrorism remains a contested concept. While Enders and Sanders (2006) define terrorists as "sub-national actors" who threaten to use force, this definition excludes the role of the state in acts of terror. Thus, Ganor's (2008: 18) definition is most suitable for this research and will be used throughout: terrorism is violence that is "deliberately used against civilians" as a means to achieve a political goal. This definition includes state and non-state actors who perpetrate violence against civilians. John Mitchell's explanation of conflict development, in Blake (2016: 28), contextualises the recent re-emergence of terrorism in the north. A conflict situation comes about when the goals of two sides are incompatible (Blake 2016: 28), in this case the northern Mozambicans and the historical ruling authorities. Goal incompatibility leads to incipient conflict due to "the emergence of difference" (Blake 2016: 28) between the northerners and the ruling authorities. Once these "mutually incompatible goals" are recognised by either side, alternatives are considered and this recognition develops into "latent conflict" (Blake 2016: 28). This recognition happens when each side "[develops] attitudes and perceptions about goal incompatibility" (Blake 2016: 28). Latent conflict is associated with "conflict attitudes and perceptions" about the situation of conflict, and may include characteristics such as suspicion and tension (Blake 2016: 28). Lastly, "manifest conflict" develops when one side takes "identifiable action" to achieve its goals, and forces the

other side to change its own goals (Blake 2016: 29). As the historical trajectory of the north in Chapter 3 will show, conflict has been a constant in the north. Incipient and latent conflict has occurred since colonial times in the north, because of the incompatibility of goals held by the northerners and the Portuguese respectively. State-sponsored and non-state-sponsored terrorism, occurring since colonial times up to the most recent acts of terror, are portrayals of manifest conflict. Therefore, while terrorism was not a constant throughout the north's history, incipient and latent conflict remained constant. Acts of terror in the north are manifestations of conflict. These build on sustained incipient and latent conflict in the region.

El-Said and Barrett's (2011: 210) framework of violent extremism contextualises the current situation of terror in the north. This framework is based on two key components: an enabling environment and the history of the population (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210). The former component is characterised by poor governance and socio-economic and political insecurity, whereas the latter component entails the historical experiences in society. The enabling environment has two interconnecting levels: a local environment and a global environment. The enabling environment and the history of the population interact and intersect one another (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210). This intersection provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the underlying factors that explain the manifestation of terrorism.

Northern Mozambicans encounter a local environment (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210) that is characterised by political and economic insecurity (UNDP 1994: 32-33, 25), as Figure 1 depicts. The global environment — referred to as 'regional terrorism' in this research — pertains to the influence of Muslim terrorists (from countries such as Tanzania) on current terrorism in the north. These regional terrorists take advantage of the human insecurity realities in the north, which will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. Together, these two sub-sections of an enabling environment interact and intersect with a history (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210) of sustained terrorism at the hands of both state and non-state perpetrators. This history of terrorism results in personal and community insecurity (UNDP 1994: 30-31). The result in northern Mozambique is terrorism. Therefore, terrorism in this research paper is conceptualised according to Ganor's (2008:18) definition of terrorism and encompasses El-Said and Barrett's (2011: 210) framework.

*Figure 2:* **Components of terrorism in northern Mozambique**



### 1.2.4. Poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism

Piazza (2008: 472) establishes a solid connection between poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism. In referring to the arguments of Ehrlich and Liu (2002), O'Neil (2002) and Gunaratna (2002), Piazza (2008: 472) argues that when governments are ineffective in the provision of "basic security and economic sustenance" for their citizenry, "basic human insecurity" is a result and is thus "a key contributing factor" to the re-emergence of terrorism. Ultimately, "poor governance, poor economic development, corruption and the lack of human rights" are 'push factors' towards

terrorism (Piazza 2008: 472; Du Plessis 2015). This not only links poor governance to terrorism, but human insecurity to terrorism, and is applicable to northern Mozambique.

Piazza's (2008: 472) connection of poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism relates directly to the two key components of terrorism in northern Mozambique: an enabling environment that interacts with and intersects a history (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210) of terrorism. The nature of Muslim militant terrorism in northern Mozambique is depicted in Figure 2. On the one hand, northern Mozambique is an enabling environment for terrorism (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210). It is characterised by political and economic insecurity (UNDP 1994: 32-33, 25). Political insecurity in the north prevails because of poor governance practices that include lack of transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and the rule of law (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). Economic insecurity is a result of lack of effectiveness, efficiency, consistency and coherence in governance (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). On the other hand, a history (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210) of terrorism has been a permanent feature in the north. This encompasses personal and community insecurity (UNDP 1994: 30-31) since the colonial period, as governance practices were oppressive and threatened the human security of the people.

*Figure 3:* **Poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism in northern Mozambique**

Therefore, this research argues that the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique since 2017 can be attributed to the "basic human insecurity" experienced by the northerners, owing to the lack of provision of "basic security …" through effective governance (Piazza 2008: 472).

The research problem notes the inconclusive evidence underlying the reasons suggested for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. This study argues that the perpetuation of poor governance partially accounts for the current situation of terrorism. Poor governance in itself is an insufficient explanation. Poor governance has spanned the history of northern Mozambicans in the form of oppressive practices and sustained violent threats to personal and community security, and contributed to an environment that has enabled terrorism of a 'new kind' through threats to political and economic security of northern Mozambicans. Although oppressive practices of governance and state-sponsored terrorism, which characterised the colonial and war of liberation periods in the north, fell away after Mozambique gained its independence in 1964, poor governance continued, as the state could not effectively meet the "basic security" (Piazza 2008: 472) needs of the northerners. The discovery of liquified natural gas (LNG) in the north in 2010 and the approval of the extraction project in 2017 (Crooks 2018) exacerbated political and economic insecurities for the northerners (see Figure 3). Youths claim that the "few jobs" in this "extraction industry" are being allocated to individuals from provinces excluding Cabo Delgado (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 2). This grievance is a result of the government's ineffective provision of "basic security and economic sustenance" (Piazza 2008: 472). It involves opportunities for the northerners, among others in this new-found industry. Therefore, the insecure nature of this local environment has allowed regional Muslim terrorists to take advantage of political and economic insecurity in the north. This is compounded by community and personal insecurity grievances related to sustained historical terrorism. Regional Muslim terrorists highlight and use the northerners' insecurities as 'pull' factors to terrorism.

**Figure 4**: LNG discoveries in northern Mozambique



(Hall 2020)

Therefore, this study argues that poor governance in northern Mozambique leads to human insecurity across an enabling environment and a history of terrorism. This creates a breeding ground for the re-emergence of terrorism.

## 1.3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

Most of the literature on terrorism presents a one-sided explanation to account for its cause; the focus is prevalently placed on armed groups or their militants, while ignoring the many ways in which states (through governance, in particular) can influence the "emergence, development, and decline of violence" (Bosi *et al* 2014: 3). Commentators such as El-Said and Barrett (2011: 199)

acknowledge that literature on terrorism "generally revolves around" socio-economic and religious causes. Gradually, the explanations on a single cause of terrorism have been debunked. Terrorism is "multi-factorial" and thus "cannot be predicted" by a single cause (Allan *et al* 2015: 2). Viewing terrorism solely in terms of socio-economics overlooks an important political dimension of the problem (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 199). Similarly, the role of religion is "often overstated" (Cachalia *et al* 2016: 20) in terrorism and perceiving terrorism as an exclusively religious act might lead to the application of a "theology-based understanding [of terrorism] ... devoid of political, economic, or social content" (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 199). Therefore, this may result in "weakly designed … narrow or misdirected … strategies" and solutions to address terrorism (Cachalia *et al* 2016: 20). The two key components of the re-emergence of terrorism in the north — an enabling environment and the northern Mozambicans' history of terrorism — therefore show that literature centred on single religious and socio-economic causes of terrorism is discredited (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 199).

The research problem is that there is an insufficient explanation to account, at this point, for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. Habibe, Pereira, and Forquilha site international jihad as the explanation for northern Mozambique's terrorism (Chatham House 2019), whilst Hanlon and Hanson link such terrorism to the 'heroin coast's' criminality (Chatham House 2019). Local Islam and poverty are also stated as factors that account for the re-emergence of terrorism, according to Morier-Genoud and Bonate, and Adam respectively (Chatham House 2019). This study argues that poor governance contributes to a condition of human insecurity that in turn accounts for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique.

The re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique challenges the explanation on the sole causes of terrorism in the literature. This research identifies a gap in the literature. It pertains to the state's role in facilitating and/or providing the 'breeding ground' or enabling environment for terrorism. This research's argument is twofold. Firstly, terrorism is not attributed to a single causal factor. Secondly, ignoring the state's role in providing a 'breeding ground' for terrorism is problematic. Therefore, the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique is likely to stem from the state's inability to secure its people's personal, community, political and economic security adequately through effective governance practices (Botha 2008: 32).

This research will discuss the history of terrorism in the north since the pre-colonial era as one of two components of the north's terrorism, the indicators of poor governance in the north, the implications of the area's orientation for regional terrorism and therefore the emergence of terrorism of a new kind, and the factors that potentially account for the re-emergence of terrorism in the area. In doing so, it will lay the foundation for future research on whether two or more factors such as poor governance and human insecurity may account for terrorism within other, specific focus areas and answer the research question stated below.

## 1.4. Research question and sub-questions

The research question formulated for this study is: By taking into consideration the geopolitics and history of northern Mozambique, how can poor governance and human insecurity account for the re-emergence of terrorism in the region since 2017?

To substantiate the research question, the following sub-questions are examined:

- What are the geopolitical and historical factors that characterise northern Mozambique?
- How are poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism conceptually linked?
- What are the nature and extent of poor governance, human insecurity, and terrorism in northern Mozambique?

## 1.5. Research aim and objectives

In keeping with the argument, the research question and sub-questions, the aim of this study is to "explore what" (Neuman 2014: 1) has accounted for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique since 2017.  Accordingly, this study has the following objectives:

- As a geopolitical and historical framework, to provide a context for northern Mozambique.
- As a conceptual framework, to clarify and explain governance and human security.
- As a prescriptive framework, to explore poor governance and human insecurity to account for the re-emergence of terrorism.

## 1.6. Research methodology

The spate of terrorist attacks in northern Mozambique, which began in 2017 and have continued with varying degrees of intensity since then, have attracted the attention of academics and practitioners, but there is no consensus on the causes of the re-emergence of terrorism in the region. As a consequence, the researcher intends to conduct exploratory research to examine this "little understood issue" to "develop preliminary ideas" (Neuman 2014: 38).

In this study, governance and human security – manifesting as poor governance and human insecurity in northern Mozambique – will be explored as concepts that have contributed to the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017. A conceptual framework will be followed in which governance, human security, and terrorism will be identified, geopolitics of the region with be identified and reviewed, the history of northern Mozambique will be identified, and thereafter the manifestation of poor governance, human insecurity, and terrorism will be identified and explored.

The research design entails a trifold literature review. The first part of the literature review is contextual (Neuman 2014: 89) and focuses on the geographical and geopolitical circumstances to provide a background on the region. The second part of the literature review is historical (Neuman 2014: 90) and is intended to trace the development of conflict, specifically terrorism, in the region from the 1890s to the present. The third part of the literature review is theoretical (Neuman 2014: 90) and aims to explain the concepts of governance and human security and how these concepts have been manifested in the region as underpinnings for the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

The research method is qualitative and draws on primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources include government policy documents such as the constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (*n.d.*), academic articles and foundational documents of the UN and articles from media houses that report on the terrorist attacks in the north as secondary sources. These are supplemented by attendance of conferences and seminars such as Chatham House (2019) to elicit the viewpoints of academics and practitioners who are directly or indirectly involved in the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique.

Data sources will be qualitatively analysed to isolate and refine the researcher's understanding and interpretation of the material (Bezuidenhout & Cronje 2017: 228-232), in order to compare findings and to arrive at and formulate the researcher's own explorative findings concerning the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique.

## 1.7. Research structure

This study is conventionally structured in four chapters to frame northern Mozambique and are presented as an introduction, a geopolitical and historical overview of conflict (specifically terrorism), poor governance human insecurity and the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017, followed by a concluding assessment.

### *Chapter 1: Introduction*

This chapter includes the research theme, the literature overview, the formulation and demarcation of the research problem, the research question and sub-questions, the research methodology, the research structure, the limitations and delimitations and the ethical considerations.

### *Chapter 2: Historical overview of conflict in northern Mozambique*

This chapter offers an orientation of Mozambique as a country, specifically northern Mozambique as the focus area of sustained historical terrorism since pre-colonial times. This leads to the identification of a broader regional context, specifically to locate northern Mozambique's history of terrorism and situate regional terrorism as a factor contributing to the north's situation. Significantly, this chapter describes the history of terrorism experienced in the north, and its contribution to personal and community insecurity as 'push' factors towards terrorism. It also mentions geopolitics linked to political and economic security, without delving so deeply into an explanation of the two human security concepts that it dilutes Chapter 3's analysis.

*Chapter 3: Poor governance, human insecurity and the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique*

This chapter conceptually reviews literature on governance, human security and terrorism. It applies this literature to northern Mozambique. This chapter also frames governance according to the country's constitution, discusses governance and human security in the north and allows for a discussion on the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

*Chapter 4: Evaluation and recommendations*

This chapter serves a twofold purpose. Firstly, it summarises and evaluates the research findings to assess the extent to which the research question and sub-questions were answered. Secondly, it exploratively highlights potential areas of future research.

## 1.8. Limitations and delimitations

This study has two limitations. Because of the isolation of region, as well as a media ban instituted by the Mozambican authorities, data sources concerning northern Mozambique are limited. Moreover, the study is limited to the re-emergence of terrorism involving Muslim militants.

The following are temporal and spatial delimitations: The re-emergence of terrorism is temporally delimited to the period from 2017 to the present day and the study is spatially delimited to northern Mozambique.

## 1.9. Ethical considerations

This study will not engage with human subjects. All efforts have been made by the researcher to avoid plagiarism. The researcher has ensured that correct citations were used throughout this research.

## 1.10. Conclusion

Based on the aforesaid identification of the research theme, the literature overview, the identification and demarcation of the research problem, the research question and the research sub-questions, in the next chapter attention will be paid to the geopolitical and historical overview of northern Mozambique.

# CHAPTER 2

## HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

### 2.1. Introduction

Northern Mozambique has a persistent history of continued conflict, which dates back to the arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century and continues to this day. The history is set against a wider geopolitical context that has not changed, as the region remains geographically and geopolitically peripheral compared to the rest of the country.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual literature review of the geographical, geopolitical and historical circumstances regarding conflict and oppressive governance in northern Mozambique.

In order to achieve the aim, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a geographical orientation of northern Mozambique. The second section deals with the geopolitical realities of northern Mozambique. The final section addresses the history of conflict, specifically terrorism, in the region. In conclusion, the chapter's trajectory links the geographical orientation of the region to geopolitical realities and history to show that the region has a history of persistent conflict and oppressive governance.

### 2.2. Geographical orientation

Situated on the eastern seaboard of southern Africa, Mozambique is approximately 786 000 square kilometres in size (Trading Economics 2020). This makes the country fairly large when compared to other states such as South Africa and Zimbabwe. Mozambique has a total population of over 30.37 million people and 25 ethnic groups, and Portuguese is the official language (World Population Review 2019, Lloyd 1995: 152, Worldatlas 2019). Mozambique's capital seat of government, Maputo, located in the south, is the country's most densely populated area, with nearly 1.2 million people (World Population Review 2019). Forty-five thousand Mozambican

civilians are of Indian descent (World Population Review 2019), which speaks to Indo-African Wahhabis, their variation of Islam, and the multidimensionality of Islam in northern Mozambique. Roughly 30 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 18 percent is Muslim (Africa Research Bulletin 2019).

*Figure 5*: **Map of Mozambique**



(Geographic Guide n.d.)

Northern Mozambique shares borders with the United Republic of Tanzania and Malawi, but it is the former border that is of concern. The north's "remote, thick jungle" spans the area along the province's border with Tanzania, which enhances its porousness of and thus facilitates easy movement across the border (Stewart 2018). The porous border aids criminal syndicates that operate between the southern border of Tanzania and northern Mozambique (Reuters 2019). The focus of this study, northern Mozambique, consists of three provinces, namely Nampula, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado (see Figure 6). Nampula is the north-eastern province, Niassa is separated from Zambezia province (the central coastal province) by the Ligonha River, and Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province of the country. Cabo Delgado borders Tanzania and consists of 17 districts, namely Ancuabe, Balama, Chiure, Ibo, Macomia, Mecufi, Meluco, Metuge, Mocimboa da Praia, Montepuez, Mueda, Muidumbe, Namuno, Nangade, Palma, Pemba and Quissanga (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 3). For the purpose of this research, Cabo Delgado province is the focus, specifically the districts of Mocimboa da Praia, Pemba (the capital district), Quissanga, Nangade and Macomia, where terrorist attacks have emerged since 2017. Cabo Delgado "occupies a central place in the national mythology"; it is the origin of FRELIMO, the origin of the anti-colonial struggle and the area in which the "first liberated zones were declared" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 12). Besides Nangade, these are coastal districts, with Macomia having a "large plateau area" that extends into the region's interior (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019). While Mocimboa de Praia is the district from which Al-Shabaab emerged, the group launched most attacks in Macomia (Matisnhe & Valoi 2019). It is noteworthy that Islam is practised by the Mwani and Makwe speakers, who make up the majority of these districts' populations (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019). Pemba district is also specifically noteworthy for this research, as illicit markets and trafficking networks for natural resources are rife, through Pemba's port and streets (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020).

The proximity of northern Mozambique to the Mozambique Channel and the Indian Ocean is noteworthy and relevant to this study. Mocimboa de Praia district has a strategic port for illicit traders. Shipping routes along Mocimboa de Praia's coast are utilised by traffickers and smugglers of the illicit economy in the region (Walker 2020). The lack of "maritime security actors" along this coastline not only destabilises the region in terms of personal security, but also allows for an avenue for Al-Shabaab to carry out attacks (Walker 2020). Poor maritime security, together with

the low "risk of being intercepted" by maritime security officials, may introduce attacks from the sea as "a viable option" for Al-Shabaab (Walker 2020).

Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces fall within the top five provinces with the highest population levels in the country (City Population 2019). According to the National Institute of Statistics in Mozambique (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019a), the total population of Cabo Delgado is roughly 2.3 million people. These data are based on the recently released census results of 2017 for Mozambique. Members of the youth in Cabo Delgado who are aged between 15 and 29 constitute roughly 560 000 of the population (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019a).

*Figure 6*: **Map of northern Mozambique**



(All Africa 2020)

## 2.3. Geopolitical context of northern Mozambique

The concept of 'geopolitics', like many concepts in international relations academia, is contested. According to O'Tuathail (1998: 1), geopolitics present a way to link "local and regional dynamics to the global system". Etienne Swanepoel (2009) defines geopolitics as the "power ... [to synthesise] the intersections between politics, economics, and geography". This research adopts Swanepoel's (2009) definition of geopolitics, as his explanation indicates how broad impersonal forces dictate the way a country acts and reacts to its geographical and political environment. This is significant in the following description of northern Mozambique's geopolitical landscape and the way in which the FRELIMO government manages these impersonal forces between the north — particularly Cabo Delgado province — and the rest of the country.

The geopolitical context of the country and northern region is an additional, foundational factor that will subsequently be examined to contextualise the resurfacing of terrorism. The importance of Cabo Delgado is simultaneously discussed, which links the geographical orientation, history of terrorism and Islam in the north to the geopolitical context.

Five 'broad impersonal forces' conceptually shape the general geopolitical reality of northern Mozambique: firstly, its peripheral location in the region when compared with the country as a whole; secondly, the geographical location of Tanzania; thirdly, the population of northern Mozambique; fourthly, the religious divide between the south and the north; and finally a resurgence in the strategic importance of northern Mozambique as a result of the discovery of coastal gas and oil reserves. The five broad impersonal forces not only shape the geopolitical reality of northern Mozambique, but also contribute to the manifestation of poor governance, human insecurity and ultimately terrorism in the region.

The first 'broad impersonal force' is the shape of the country. Mozambique can be conceptually conceived in the shape of the letter "Y" (See Figure 1). The bottom of the Y represents the narrow southern region of the country where the seat of government and most of the economic activities are located. The proximity to South Africa and the location of Maputo harbour are also of importance; these are drivers of economic prosperity and infrastructural development because the south is narrower and geographically compact when compared with the north of the country. It is for this reason that the southern part of the country is relatively more prosperous from an economic

perspective. Moving to the "V" part of the conceptualisation, northern Mozambique presents a different perspective. The surface area is much larger than the southern region, Cabo Delgado is located some 1 600 km from the capital, and the infrastructure that links the south and the north is poor. The northern provinces are failing to keep up with the south in terms of development and meeting the basic needs of the population through service provision (Stratfor 2019). More specifically, Cabo Delgado is Mozambique's least developed region and "still lags behind" the south (Postings 2019). It is relatively difficult to govern Cabo Delgado, as the country's power is centralised in the southern capital (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). Physical and organisational structures of the north, known as infrastructure, are underdeveloped in comparison to the south. Cabo Delgado's citizens are "the most likely to live without essential services", including electricity, access to hospitals, roads, and running water (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). Specifically, Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces have the lowest number of schools across the country (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces also record the lowest number of libraries, with five each, as opposed to the 15 libraries in Maputo City (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019b).

By region, the north had the lowest gross domestic product (GDP) in Mozambique in 2017 (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c), as Cabo Delgado is labelled "the country's poorest province" (Rogers 2019). While statistics on Cabo Delgado's unemployment percentage are not published, writers such as Matfess (2019) state that the province has "high levels of youth unemployment". On 23 May 2018, roughly 100 members of the youth in Cabo Delgado protested in Palma over unemployment and the discrimination in job distribution for the LNG projects, as they claim their "job applications [at the natural gas facilities] are ignored" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13; Stratfor 2019). This confirms Swanepoel's (2009) description of geopolitical issues: an "[intersection] between politics, economics, and geography" is evident in northern Mozambique (Swanepoel 2009). The south is the main source of wealth in the country, which leaves little opportunity for employment and economic prosperity in the underdeveloped north. In essence, therefore, northern Mozambique is geopolitically delinked from the south and has tended to remain peripheral. It is consequently plagued by poor governance in the form of lack of transparency, accountability and the rule of law.

The second 'broad impersonal force' concerns the geographical location of Tanzania (see Figures 1 and 2). In 2012, Tanzania began experiencing an increase in "militant Islamist attacks" (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). Tanzania's vulnerability to this extremism emerged from a "radicalised ideological spillover" from Somalia (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). This threat in Tanzania challenges northern Mozambique. Mozambique's security forces arrested 470 people in June 2018, including 314 Mozambicans, 50 Tanzanians, three Ugandans, and one Somali, while 100 individuals were unidentified (De Salema 2018). Police allege that these suspects are linked to Al-Shabaab of northern Mozambique (De Salema 2018). As many of the suspects are "foreigners", some argue that "transnational jihad" has made its way into Mozambique (Matfess 2019). In October 2018, the Tanzanian police force arrested over 104 "suspected Tanzanian militants" who were planning to set up bases in Mozambique (Africa Research Online 2018). Notably, about 50 Tanzanian citizens were among the 180 suspects awaiting trial for the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado (Africa Research Online 2018). The 104 Tanzanian suspects are members of a group that murdered several police and administrative personnel in Tanzania's province of Pwani during 2016 and 2017 (Africa Research Online 2018). Mozambique and Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2018 that stipulates their collaboration in fighting terrorists (Africa Research Online 2018). In addition, a Kenyan-based Muslim cleric, Sheik Aboud Rogo Mohammed (se Figure 6), was assassinated in 2012 for reasons pertaining to his alleged support for Somalia's Al-Shabaab militants (De Salema 2018). He was described as a "regional jihadist [theologian]" (Stewart 2018), as he wielded transnational, regional influence, and had links to terrorism in northern Mozambique (De Salema 2018). Rogo's followers moved south and established a presence in Kibiti, Tanzania, which is "just north of the Mozambican border" (Frey 2018a). By 2015, Rogo's followers had crossed into Cabo Delgado (Frey 2018a). The geographical proximity of the north and Tanzania, coupled with porous borders, is a further geopolitical complexity that has contributed to terrorism in the north since 2017. This reality has an impact on non-state, regional terrorism, as the influence of militants from Tanzania contributes to an enabling environment for terrorism.

*Figure 7*: **Sheik Aboud Rogo portrayed in a jihadist propaganda magazine**



(Gaidi Mtaani 2019)

The third 'broad impersonal force' is the population of the northern region. The population of northern Mozambique is high in comparison to the south; Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces fall within the top five provinces with the highest population levels in the country (City Population 2019). According to the National Institute of Statistics in Mozambique (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica Gabinete Do Presidente 2019), the total population of Cabo Delgado is roughly 2.3 million people. These data are based on the recently released census results of 2017 for Mozambique. Members of the youth in Cabo Delgado who are aged between 15 and 29 constitute roughly 560 000 of the population (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica Gabinete Do Presidente 2019). The number of jobs promised by the LNG projects "remains low" for the unskilled, local population (Brincat 2020). This creates resentment towards the government among the large number of youths in the north. There are historical tensions among the population in the north. These tensions occur between three ethnic groups in the north: the Makua, Makonde and Mwani. The Makua and Mwani are predominantly Muslim groups (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 102), and the Makonde "retain their traditional religion" despite the influence of Islamic traders over

centuries in the north (The University of Iowa *n.d.*). The Makonde's religious practices involve celebrating and remembering their ancestors (The University of Iowa *n.d.*). The Makua historically led in Cabo Delgado, as the Makondes were initially "perceived as of lesser rank" and were the domestic workers of the Makuas (Opperman 2018). This dynamic gradually changed, however, and the Mwani group became "steadily marginalised" (Opperman 2018) and "historically discriminated against" (Durmaz 2018) by the Makonde and the Makua (Wholley 2018). During the struggle for independence, the Portuguese spread propaganda in Cabo Delgado stating that the Makonde "is the enemy of the Makua tribe" and that the Makonde "want to oppress and dominate the Makuas" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 102). This colonial propaganda "fostered … hostility" between the ethnic groups (Durmaz 2018). The Makonde were a source of resistance and revolution, as they made up the Mozambican African National Union (MANU) (Bonate 2009: 280), one of three organisations that merged into FRELIMO and would challenge the Portuguese. The Makonde group is the group from which FRELIMO originated as early as 1960 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 79), as well as the tribe of FRELIMO President Filipe Nyusii (Durmaz 2018). The Portuguese emphasised "FRELIMO'S [the Makondes'] allegedly anti-Islamic policies", which created further resentment between the groups (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 102). Most residents along the coast of the north are Mwani (Durmaz 2018). They are a minority ethnic group that specifically reside in Cabo Delgado (Wholley 2018). The group's population numbers between 120 000 and 200 000 people, of which 90 percent are Muslim (Wholley 2018). The Muslim Mwani feel "marginalised" by the government (Africa Defense Forum 2019) and they resent the Makonde (Wholley 2018). This is because the Mwani are losing their land and thus livelihood as a consequence of LNG operations in the north (Durmaz 2018), facilitated by the FRELIMO government whose leader is a Makonde. In essence, the relatively high population levels in Cabo Delgado, coupled with the lack of job opportunities and the Mwani population facing historical marginalisation, contribute to socio-economic grievances and resentment towards the government. This reality has an impact on poor governance owing to the lack of effectiveness, accountability and consistency on the part of government.

The fourth 'broad impersonal force' in Mozambique concerns the religious divide between north and south. This research argues that although religion has not been the sole causal factor of terrorism since 2017, it is still significant, as it contributes to the personal and community security of the northerners. Religion is not the central focus guiding this research in terms of a causal factor;

poor governance and human insecurity, rather, are the central focus. Islam has been present since as early as the eighth century (Bonate 2007: 56). However, competition between ethnic variations of Islam between the northern Mozambican Sufis and Indo-African Wahhabis, together with the influence of regional terrorism from Tanzania (Africa Research Online 2018), results in the multidimensionality of Islam in northern Mozambique. The FRELIMO government established an alliance with the Islamic Council of Mozambique as recently as June 2019 (Bonate 2019). The purpose of this alliance is to "end the insurgency in Cabo Delgado … [and] counter violent extremist recruiting efforts" through synergy between the government and the Council in the north (Bonate 2019). Significantly, Bonate (2019) states that the Council is an institution against which the Al-Shabaab insurgency stands, as the initial conflict stemmed from a disagreement between the youth of the north and the Council. The problem of terrorism therefore stems from "the enmity between" Al-Shabaab and the Council, which "started long before 2017" (Bonate 2019). The reinforcement of Sufi versus Wahhabi conceptualisations of Islam, together with the competition between these two variants, stands at the forefront of the complex geopolitical issue facing the north and the country as a whole. The Sufi-dominated north was "consistently … [undermined]" by the "first national head" of the Islamic Council (Bonate 2019). Many black Muslim youths from the north, having travelled to Islamic universities abroad in the 1980s and 1990s, became "frustrated with the lack of employment and other opportunities" upon returning to the north (Bonate 2019). These youths directed their anger at the Council. They perceived the Council's leadership as "accumulating wealth through business dealings with FRELIMO and syphoning funds" granted by international Islamic non-governmental organisations, as opposed to addressing the "socio-economic" grievances of ordinary Muslims of northern Mozambique (Bonate 2019; El-Said & Barrett 2011: 199). The mostly "Indian mixed-race" membership of the Council from the south instils the "perception of racial prejudice" against Africans and northerners, which contributes to the complexity of grievances held by the youth in the north. This reality affects the persistence of poor governance practices in the north. The FRELIMO-backed Council has oppressed the northern Mozambican Sufis by barring their youth members from participating in politics. This contributes to a history of conflict between the opposing religious sides, as well as an environment where political insecurity is rife.

The final 'broad impersonal force' is the natural resources in the north. On the one hand, the discovery of oil and gas deposits off the coast of northern Mozambique has elevated the strategic

importance of the region. This is because of the economic potential and competition between multinational corporations for extraction. Cabo Delgado houses the continent's three biggest LNG projects: the Mozambique LNG project (operated by Total, formerly Anadarko) is worth $20 billion, the Coral LNG project (operated by Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi [ENI] and ExxonMobil) is worth $4,7 billion, and the Rovuma LNG Project (operated by ExxonMobil, ENI, and China National Petroleum Corporation) is worth $30 billion (Rawoot 2020). Italy's ENI and the US's Anadarko are the "principal holders" of the gas industry in the north (Ebrahim 2020a). The extraction and development of LNG is taking place in the coastal town of Mocimboa da Praia. Gas is scheduled to be produced from 2022, while Mozambique's government will begin receiving funds in 2028 from the projects (Ebrahim 2020a). The vast oil and gas deposits that have been discovered off the coast of the north have attracted "international conglomerates" to the area and act as potential factors for the reconstruction of "the impoverished country's economy" (Morier-Genoud 2017). Described as Africa's "new petro-state" (Stoddard 2019), Mozambique is projected to benefit greatly in terms of investment in the LNG industry and therefore to benefit economically from the projects. These LNG projects are expected to generate roughly $100 billion "in state revenue" by 2045 (Frey 2020c). A portion of the revenue from LNG projects is meant to assist the servicing of a "Eurobond" that the Mozambican government restructured in 2019 (Frey 2020c). This debt is at $900 million (Frey 2020c). However, many residents of Cabo Delgado believe that these benefits will not have a positive impact on the local community (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 285). On the other hand, Cabo Delgado houses what is said to be the largest ruby deposit in the world (Stratfor 2019). Mozambique is also rich in coal, timber and mineral sands (Bucuane & Mulder 2007). This reality has an impact on the local environment, as potential economic opportunities arise, which may contribute to economic security.

## 2.4. History of conflict and specifically terrorism in northern Mozambique

This section explains how and why history intersects with four of the broad impersonal geopolitical forces: firstly, the peripheral location of the region; secondly, the geographical location of Tanzania; thirdly, the population of northern Mozambique; and fourthly, the religious divide between the south and the north. The fifth broad impersonal force— natural resources— forms part of Chapter 3.

The history of conflict in northern Mozambique dates back to the colonial occupation at the beginning of the 15th century, and can be divided into four periods: firstly, the colonial period from the 1890s to 1964; secondly, the anti-colonial war from 1964 to 1975; thirdly, the civil war from 1977 to 1992; and finally, the post-1994 era, which created an annealing environment for the re-emergence of terrorism after 2013.

**The colonial period from the 1890s to 1962**

Conflict occurred in the form of violence visited on the indigenous population by the Portuguese colonial authorities, with incipient and latent conflict as an initial response by the indigenous population. The colonial period, from the 1890s to 1962, was dominated by Portuguese policies that centred on the implementation and perpetuation of oppressive governance practices, particularly in northern Mozambique. The northerners were subjugated through oppressive governance practices, which included manifest conflict in the form of state-sponsored violence directed at the indigenous population. In this regard, Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 27) outline three periods of "colonial policy" in Mozambique. The first period lasted from the 1890s to 1926, and "was characterised by a highly decentralised and disorganised colonial government"; corruption was rife and there was "mismanagement at all levels" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 27). Secondly, the Salazar regime came into power in 1928 and "imposed a highly centralised authoritarian government" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 27). Thirdly, the formation of FRELIMO in 1962 highlighted an increase in opposition to colonial rule.

Governance during this period aimed at the subjugation and oppression of the indigenous population in order to serve the colonial master. With the arrival of the Portuguese colonial administration in Mozambique came the creation of "agricultural plantations" (Torp *et al.* 1989: 12). The "most oppressive aspects" during the colonial period are associated with the Mozambican slave trade and the "brutal repression" by the Portuguese administration in these plantations (Cabecinhas *et al* 2010: 29). Mozambique's Bantu-speaking natives were forced — coerced through the use or threat of violence — by the Portuguese to pay tax and enter the slave trade in these plantations (Torp *et al.* 1989: 12). These labourers worked under "gruelling conditions" and sustained repeated physical abuse (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 34). For instance, girls as young

as 15 years old were taken and "made to submit sexually" to officials, they worked for no pay, and they were not given food (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 34).

International "leasing companies" — the Mozambique Company, Niassa Company, and Zambezi Company — assumed sovereign rule over and responsibility for the development of northern Mozambique (Torp *et al* 1989: 12; Cabecinhas & Feijó 2010: 32). This move to dedicate the north to the plantation economy explains the present asymmetry between the north and south of Mozambique; the south remained under Portugal's direct rule, which enabled the development of a "service economy" there and resulted in the underdevelopment of the north (Cabecinhas & Feijó 2010: 32). In this way, governance during this period contributed to creating a geopolitical reality that pushed the region to the periphery of the country. This continues to this day, as there is lack of economic prosperity, infrastructural development, and extension of service delivery because of poor governance.

In 1920, Lisbon's government appointed a new high commissioner in Mozambique in an effort to rectify the "political crisis" that resulted from mismanagement and corruption (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 38). High commissioner Manuel Brito Camacho appointed Antonio Salazar as the finance minister in 1928 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 38). Salazar "consolidated his dictatorial power" over the next four years (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 38). Salazar's policies favoured "highly centralised, authoritarian rule" that was evident in his idea that "the human and natural resources of Mozambique had to be more effectively and directly exploited" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 39). For example, in 1938 the Salazar regime imposed "forced cotton production" and by 1945, more than 1 million Mozambican peasants — "primarily from the north" — were working in the cotton industry under coercion (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 45). By 1960, Mozambican natives had endured "brutal exploitation and the plunder of their valuable land" on the part of the Portuguese administration (Frey 2018a).

Oppressive governance practices were bolstered by violence in what could in today's terms be called state-sponsored terrorism. Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 29) explain that the administrators had "absolute power to accuse, apprehend, try and sentence their subjects". These administrators committed "the most violent acts with impunity" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 29). Portugal took

part in military campaigns of "effective occupation" in Mozambique from 1895 (Bonate 2010: 583). The boundaries of Mozambique had been outlined as early as 1907 and districts were decided upon (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 29). Each district was divided into European and non-European areas. Africans lived in "rural subdistricts" and these were divided into "localities (*postos*)" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 29). One Portuguese official "governed" each subdistrict and locality; these officials ruled as "petty tyrants" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 29).

It was during this period that the oppressive governance practices instituted by the Portuguese resulted in manifest conflict with the indigenous population. As a result of growing dissatisfaction, this period culminated in a key event, the Mueda Massacre, on 16 June 1960, which marked the beginning of the anti-colonial struggle from 1962 to 1975. Portuguese influence and violence were strongly resisted, firstly by the Makonde ethnic group in the north and later by the Tsonga group in the south (Torp *et al* 1989: 12). This points to the significance of northern Mozambique during the pre-1964 era of violence. This was the first instance of visible opposition to administrative, oppressive governance at the time and culminated in becoming the driver towards the anti-colonial struggle. The Mueda Massacre was a key event in the state-sponsored terrorism of the Portuguese colonial rulers against northern Mozambicans. In the Mueda district of Cabo Delgado, the Portuguese military forces massacred 600 Mozambicans on 16 June 1960 (Frey 2018a). The Mozambicans had staged a peaceful protest to demand an end to "colonial subjugation", as they believed that the colonial system had been solely structured for the well-being of Portugal (Frey 2018). This "popular vigilance to consolidate peace and development" that took place in Cabo Delgado laid the foundations for the beginning of the anti-colonial struggle (Frey 2018a).

**The anti-colonial period from 1962 to 1975**

During this period, conflict was met with conflict in the north, the cradle of the liberation struggle (West 2005: 7-8). Incipient and latent conflict boiled over into manifest conflict in the form of the liberation struggle, which included armed conflict and terrorism. This was underlined by poor governance and human insecurity; personal and community insecurity persisted as individuals experienced physical violence. In this period conflict occurred in the form of terrorism by FRELIMO and the Portuguese, non-state-sponsored and state-sponsored terrorism respectively.

FRELIMO used non-state-sponsored terrorism to liberate the country. The persistence of terrorism from both parties contributed to the sustained history of conflict in the north, thus creating an enabling environment for the re-emergence of terrorism.

The anti-colonial war was firstly centred on and waged in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces, then spread to Tete in 1969, and thereafter to central Mozambique in 1973 (Torp *et al* 1989: 13). The "harsh rejection of independence demands" by the Portuguese colonial rulers was a driver of the anti-colonial struggle, and resulted in guerrilla warfare (Henriksen 1976: 378, Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 84). These demands were a means to counter state-sponsored terrorism in the north. FRELIMO launched its first offensive for independence against the Portuguese on 25 September 1964, in the administrative post of Chai in Macomia district, Cabo Delgado (Torp *et al* 1989: 13; Frey 2018a). The attack was launched by "a nascent rural network" in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 83). After FRELIMO launched its first attack in 1964, the Portuguese regime commanded the Portuguese armed forces (PAF) to begin a "brutal counter-guerrilla campaign" (World Peace Foundation 2015). This led to mass atrocities largely on the part of the Portuguese. Colonial forces retaliated by committing atrocities (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 84). The Portuguese entered villages in the north and "murdered many people", set people alight in their huts, and shot those who tried to escape (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 84). This demonstrated state-sponsored terrorism. The aim of the colonisers' campaign was to weaken FRELIMO into surrendering by dissolving ideological support for FRELIMO (Henriksen 1983: 133). The means to achieve this included regular detention and torturing of Mozambican civilians by the PAF and the General Security Directorate (Henriksen 1983: 134). This was a way for the Portuguese forces to forcefully gain information from civilians about FRELIMO. Torture included electric shocks and whippings (United Nations Commissions of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique 1974: 70). The "deliberate killing" of civilian groups, termed 'mass murder', occurred in Cabo Delgado, Tete, Beira, Niassa, and other provinces (United Nations Commissions of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique 1974: 70).

Two years later, FRELIMO attacked "weakly held" military and administrative offices in northern Mozambique (Henriksen 1976: 378). The Makonde people along the northern Mozambican and southern Tanzanian border gathered recruits and established bases there during the first years of

the anti-colonial guerrilla campaigns (Henriksen 1976: 380). FRELIMO's "inexorable spread of sabotage" between 1973 and 1974 led to a weak offensive by the Portuguese against FRELIMO strongholds in northern Mozambique (Henriksen 1976: 397). The most "traumatising" project stemmed from violent 'villagization' methods on the part of the Portuguese rulers (Pirio *et al* 2019). This "fortified relocation" method, known as "*aldeamentos*" and categorised as state-sponsored terrorism by the Portuguese administration, was a policy of forced relocation of civilians that proved to be the "most egregious instances of civilian deaths" (Jundanian 1974: 535; World Peace Foundation 2015). The policy was first proposed by the governor of Cabo Delgado, Colonel Basilio Seguro, in 1965 (Judanian 1974: 523). Along the Tanzanian border, the Portuguese "herded thousands of peasants into villages encircled by barbed wire" (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 100). The PAF demanded that civilians enter the *aldeamentos* (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 100), "abandon their homes … within 3-15 days" of being notified, and resettle in areas controlled by the Portuguese administration (United Nations Commissions of Inquiry on the Reported Massacres in Mozambique 1974: 51). If civilians refused, they were named 'terrorists' and murdered (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 100). The PAF used torture to "instil fear" in the population; a disincentive and warning of the results of resistance behaviour (Henriksen 1983: 155).

Added to this was violence on the part of FRELIMO during the anti-colonial era. It is known that mutual suspicion, mistrust, and violence existed in FRELIMO ranks during the anti-colonial struggle (Igreja 2010: 785). Practices portraying these undercurrents were only disclosed after 1992, in public debates between FRELIMO and RENAMO at the end of the civil war (Igreja 2010: 784). Before independence in February 1975, FRELIMO introduced the "Mocuba Plan": the process of rounding up suspected FRELIMO collaborators of the Portuguese regime (Igreja 2010: 785). The plan was described as the purging of "reactionary elements within FRELIMO" (Igreja 2010: 785). Accused individuals were sent to "re-education camps" as a means to 'discipline' them; roughly 240 to 300 "political detainees" were paraded and ridiculed through a "show trial" in Nachingwea, Tanzania (Igreja 2010: 785). FRELIMO "extracted confessions" through coercion and torture, and detainees stood before a "tribune of honour", presided over by FRELIMO'S Machel (Igreja 2010: 785). The concept of 'psychological violence' was applicable. Ramiro *et al* (2004: 131) state that 'psychological violence' is synonymous with "psychological maltreatment, non-physical violence, emotional abuse, [and] non-physical aggression". While the concept is

defined differently by different people, current definitions point to non-physical, "interpersonal violence"; psychological violence encompasses "emotional torture … intimidations, [and] social embarrassments" (Ramiro *et al* 2004: 131). Evidently, this was the case with FRELIMO's Mocha Plan.

**The civil war period from 1977 to 1992**

Despite attaining independence in 1974, manifest conflict persisted across the country in a protracted civil war that started in 1977 and continued to 1992.  The civil war was between two key actors: FRELIMO and RENAMO. However, the war had regional connotations involving the erstwhile Rhodesia, South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania.

**FRELIMO's formation**

In the early 1960s, a small group of Mozambicans organised the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), MANU, and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 79-80). All three groups were founded by exiled Mozambicans; UDENAMO was based in southern Mozambique, MANU's "initial support" stemmed from Tanzania and Kenya, and UNAMI was based in Malawi (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 80).  In 1962, the three groups merged into FRELIMO, led by Eduardo Mondlane (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 81). FRELIMO created a "nascent rural network" in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and it staged FRELIMO's first attack against the Portuguese in Cabo Delgado on 25 September 1964 (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983: 83-84).

**RENAMO's formation**

It was during the post-liberation struggle period that the FRELIMO government involved itself in an "external front of conflict" by supporting Rhodesia's anti-colonial fighters (Igreja 2010: 786). By 1977, FRELIMO had adopted sanctions against Rhodesia and allowed Rhodesian Patriotic Front fighters to attack "white-ruled Rhodesia" from within Mozambican territory (Lloyd 1995: 153). As a result, the military of Ian Smith's colonial regime in Rhodesia invaded Mozambique,

and "wreaked havoc" on the Mozambican people and the country's infrastructure (Igreja 2010: 786). RENAMO was formed in 1976-1977 as a counter-measure by the Rhodesians (Schwartz 2010: 35). The group was directed by Rhodesian security forces and was made up of Mozambicans who were both discontented with the FRELIMO government and had suffered and escaped FRELIMO's "violent persecution" (Schwartz 2010: 35, Igreja 2010: 786). Its strongholds included central and northern Mozambique, particularly Gorongoza in northern Sofala (Hall 1990: 51). RENAMO reached Cabo Delgado by May 1984 (Emerson 2014: 135).

## FRELIMO's use of violence

FRELIMO utilised violence as "an instrument of politics and self-perpetuation" in an attempt to sustain "political projects of state ruling elites" in Mozambique during this period (Igreja 2010: 784). This amounted to state-sponsored terrorism (Botha *n.d.* 30). In 1978, the then FRELIMO party secretary, Oscar Monteiro, stated that "[the FRELIMO leadership had their] policy, [they] arrest; [they] arrest the reactionaries; [they] have no fear regarding this ... [they] punish" (Igreja 2010: 785). FRELIMO introduced a "villagisation project" in the north (Lunstrum 2009: 888). The reintroduced project — stemming from a history of Portuguese 'villagisation' — was an 'enabler' of "social control", allowing FRELIMO to "territorialise" the post-colonial landscape and address the lack of national identity in its state inherited from colonial rule (Lunstrum 2009: 888). Reintroducing this project was a means of intimidation by FRELIMO; it 'unearthed' the violence experienced by the Mozambicans at the hands of the Portuguese. Civilians in northern Mozambique began to resent and resist the project as FRELIMO's 'villagisation' was ultimately entrenched through the use of state terrorism (Lunstrum 2009: 888).

## RENAMO's use of violence

RENAMO is globally renowned for "its grotesque campaign of terror" against the population of Mozambique (Manning 1998: 161). RENAMO soldiers used "spiritual, magical, or cultic power" during the civil war against the FRELIMO government (Wilson 1992: 528). This guerrilla war employed "terror tactics", and RENAMO's "systematic terror tactics" moved into a "cult of violence" that was used as a significant instrument in RENAMO's fight for control of the country

(Manning 1998: 162; Wilson 1992: 529). Violence became RENAMO's essential component in its quest to secure authority. RENAMO members employed a "spiritually-empowered cult of military capacity" and terrorised civilians out of their villages (Lunstrum 2009: 884; Wilson 1992: 581). Wilson (1992: 527) describes how RENAMO killed civilians with "unsharpened axes or knives", and forced onlookers to kill their own relatives.

RENAMO "unmade state power" by utilising terror in destroying communal villages and denying the "villagisation project" (Pirio *et al* 2019), a process defined by Lunstrum (2009: 884) as 'deterritorialisation'. RENAMO aim was to 'erase' the spaces and people that FRELIMO constituted as "state territory ... [and] state subjects" respectively (Lunstrum 2009: 889). This was effected through the use of terror and "[savage] wartime tactics" directed towards the social, political, and spatial components of the country; namely the state, "the peasantry", and "the very structure" of the villages (Lubkemann 2005: 494; Lunstrum 2009: 884). During the 1980s, RENAMO's "regular military units" comprised "local gangs of robbers" and poor civilians who appeared "satisfied" with merely "drawing a trail of blood after them" (Torp *et al* 1989: 20). Mutilation of civilian bodies was a routine practice of RENAMO fighters, which projected FRELIMO's inability to secure its citizenry (Lunstrum 2009: 889). RENAMO's acts of terrorism ultimately dissolved state power (Lunstrum 2009: 889). Although Mozambique signed the Nkomati non-aggression accord in 1984 (South African History Online 2019) and socialism was abandoned in early 1990, civil war continued, a stalemate deepened, and the government could not defeat RENAMO in rural areas (Lloyd 1995: 153). By the end of the civil war, roughly 1 million people had been killed and 5 million people had been displaced, either as a direct or an indirect result of the "cruel" civil war (Torp *et al* 1989: 19; Vines 1991: 1; Lunstrum 2009: 888). While the end of the civil war introduced perceptions of security and peace, the depth of violence during this 16-year-long war remains fresh in the minds of all within Mozambique, including those in northern Mozambique. Brutal acts of terrorism against one another engrained a sense of insecurity and fear within the Mozambican population, lasting well beyond the end of the civil war.

Not only was the civil war costly in terms of lives; it also had a significant impact on the livelihood of the population at the centre of the conflict. Apart from the civil war, FRELIMO also had to contend with establishing a new political dispensation (including governance structures) in a country that was essentially in a state of chaos when it took over power.

In the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal in 1974, FRELIMO as the incoming government inherited a country that was essentially dysfunctional and poorly equipped for post-independence revival.  In this regard, Hall and Young (1997: 55) note that FRELIMO had to "fan out into, try to administer, and eventually win over, whole areas of the country hitherto regarded as enemy terrain." This terrain was socially and economically organised "at the service of colonial exploiters" (Hall & Young 1997: 55).

The aftermath of the Portuguese departure was characterised by severe economic problems, a collapse in governance and administration, as well as conflicting opinions among the FRELIMO leadership regarding the future path of the country (Hall & Young 1997: 36-60). Moreover, the northern region of the country was particularly vulnerable and because of geopolitical circumstances, FRELIMO was unable to establish effective control through sound governance institutions. It appears that the north and south were already divided regarding the future trajectory of the country. For example, the delegation from the Cabo Delgado province unsuccessfully proposed greater financial and administrative autonomy for provinces at the Mocuba Conference in 1975, but this was turned down by the transitional government on the grounds that is was an attempt to institute an unrepresentative system (Hall & Young 1997: 54).

Moreover, FRELIMO's affiliation with liberation movements, namely the African National Congress and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which were involved in an armed struggle against the regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, made Mozambique a target for external interference and destabilisation. In order to counter the threat from ZANLA that was using northern Mozambique as a springboard for attacks into eastern Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation established RENAMO in 1976 to wage an internal 'fifth column" proxy war against FRELIMO.  Although the ensuing civil war between RENAMO and FRELIMO was country-wide, RENAMO's stronghold was located in central and northern Mozambique, particularly Gorongoza in northern Sofala (Hall 1990 : 51), because FRELIMO was unable to establish a meaningful presence to exercise effective governance (Hanlon 1984: 229-231). The centrality of the main operational base in Gorongosa, together with its proximity to Rhodesia (and later South Africa) as a rear echelon, was strategically ideal for launching guerrilla operations against FRELIMO in southern and northern Mozambique. Because of its relative

geographical isolation and the inability of FRELIMO to establish effective governance and security institutions in the rural areas of the country, RENAMO had the unique distinction of being one of a handful of Southern African revolutionary movements that maintained an uninterrupted internal presence for the duration of the civil war.

Apart from the violent conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, northern Mozambique was also characterised by incipient and latent conflict involving traditional authorities, which affected governance during the civil war negatively. As Cabrita (2000: 21) notes, "most Mozambicans from the central and northern regions have a bias against those from the south." On the one hand, it was during the civil war that traditional authorities were key actors in the RENAMO constituency, especially in the central and northern regions where the organisation enjoyed strong support, as it was founded on an accommodating relationship (Kayuni 2016: 73). On the other hand, FRELIMO, after coming to power in 1994, embarked on a Marxist approach to reconstructing the country, which included dismantling the system of traditional authorities that were deemed incompatible with a revolutionary society (Kayuni 2016: 72). This move placed it at loggerheads with the traditional authorities that were well entrenched in the north and added to the schism between FRELIMO and the population at large.

## The post-1994 period

The post-1994 period is characterised by continuing incipient, latent and manifest conflict in northern Mozambique, initially involving FRELIMO and RENAMO and later FRELIMO and Al-Shabaab. While conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO arose over political differences, it was sporadic and of lower intensity. However, it is the more recent conflict between FRELIMO and Al-Shabaab that has captured national, regional and international attention because it has become persistent and is of higher intensity.

## FRELIMO and RENAMO

Incipient, latent and manifest conflict involving FRELIMO and RENAMO has continued in northern Mozambique since the end of the civil war. Poor governance practices, including the sustained exclusion of RENAMO from participation in politics and political and economic

insecurity, contribute to an enabling environment in which terrorism has re-emerged. In 2013 violence again returned to northern Mozambique over RENAMO demands for greater representation in the armed forces and changes to the electoral law (Mail & Guardian Online 2013). In 2013, clashes broke out between RENAMO and FRELIMO forces in central Sofala province; a year of fighting ensued and over 60 people were killed (Fletcher 2013; Jentzsch 2019). Renewed clashes took place from mid-2015 to late 2016. One hundred civilians died and over 10 000 fled to Zimbabwe and Malawi during this time (Child 2017; Jentzsch 2019). A report by Bowker *et al.* (2016) states that the FRELIMO government was responsible for the population being "in the crosshairs" from 2013 to 2016. Calling this "Mozambique's Invisible Civil War", Bowker *et al.* (2016) state that victims attribute this violence — including looting and burning of towns, and rape and murder — "exclusively to government forces". Bowker *et al* (2016), together with Doctors without Borders and Human Rights Watch, argue that the fleeing of Mozambicans to Zimbabwe and Malawi was the result of government forces setting fire to their villages, and sexually abusing and executing civilians. While the FRELIMO government generally terrorised the population residing outside the north, this state-sponsored violence characterised the 'psychological environment' in which northern Mozambicans resided. Ultimately, while RENAMO has not used non-state terror post-1994, the underlying themes of its grievances remain poor governance and thus human insecurity. Therefore, RENAMO's contribution to conflict since 1994 is seen as opposition to governance that is largely exclusionary, and thus oppressive, of FRELIMO loyalists. For the purpose of this study, attention will not be paid to the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, as the focus is on the emergence of terrorism of a 'new kind' in the north: that of Muslim militant terrorism by Al-Shabaab.

**Al-Shabaab and FRELIMO**

During the same period. incipient, latent and manifest conflict involving FRELIMO and Al-Shabaab emerged in northern Mozambique. The difference in Al-Shabaab's manifestation of conflict is that the geographical location of Tanzania has allowed for the influence of regional terrorism in pushing northerners towards terrorism against the state, specifically Muslim militant non-state-sponsored terrorism. Al-Shabaab has replaced RENAMO as a group sponsoring conflict in the north, yet the underlying conditions of poor governance and human insecurity have remained unchanged. This 'new face' of terrorism in the north is due to the influence of regional terrorism,

given the geographical location of Tanzania as a geopolitical reality for the north. Furthermore, state-sponsored terrorism since 1994 has been evident in the case of the "illegal detention" of journalist Amade Abubakar (Frey 2019), a heavy-handed response by the government to Al-Shabaab's attacks. Abubakar was arrested in Cabo Delgado, illegally detained for nearly two weeks in Mueda town, and charged with "violation of state secrets using a computer" and "public instigation to frame using a computer", according to Mozambique's Public Protector's Office (Frey 2019). Abubakar was seized by security forces when he documented displaced individuals who were fleeing to Macomia town to escape the relatively recent terrorist attacks in the district's centre (Frey 2019). Abubakar was also interrogated unlawfully; he was "grabbed" without a warrant for arrest, and subsequently "kept incommunicado in Mueda barracks for 13 days" (Frey 2019). Frey (2019) points out that the longest a suspect may be kept in "preventative detention" before facing a judge, according to Mozambican law, is 48 hours. In addition, the journalist was denied a defence lawyer and he complained of being "brutally beaten by soldiers" during detention (Frey 2019). Thus, security forces under the control of FRELIMO are encroaching on individual human rights and the rule of law in Mozambique. They are also violating "various international human rights conventions" of which Mozambique is a signatory, according to the Media Institute of Southern Africa, as cited in Frey (2019). Particularly violent means have been used, involving physical violence against Abubakar, as well as psychological violence, as described by Ramiro *et al* (2004: 131).

Therefore, Al-Shabaab's attacks, and FRELIMO's terrorising of Abubakar that showcases further state-sponsored terrorism, ultimately contribute to "an intermittent civil conflict dating back four decades" in northern Mozambique (Jentzsch 2019).

## 2.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to describe how the geopolitical circumstances and a history of conflict shaped conditions for the re-emergence of terrorism. The chapter provided a geographical orientation of northern Mozambique and thereupon identified five geopolitical factors that distinguish northern Mozambique from the rest of the country. This was followed by a review of the history of conflict over the colonial period from the 1890s to 1962, the anti-colonial period

from 1962 to 1975, the civil war period from 1977 to 1992 and the post-1994 period. Six findings concerning northern Mozambique were identified in the chapter:

- Firstly, the region has a history of continuing conflict and oppressive governance practices involving the Portuguese, FRELIMO, RENAMO and Al-Shabaab as perpetrators of conflict and at times, terrorism.

- Secondly, the region is peripheral to the south of the country, where the seat of government resides.

- Thirdly, northern Mozambique is close to Tanzania in terms of geographical location. This has implications for cross-border movement.

- Fourthly, the region is characterised by a higher population density than that in the south; it has a Muslim majority that consists of unemployed youth.

- Fifthly, there is a religious divide between Muslim communities of the north and the south, dating back decades.

- Finally, the region has attracted national and international attention because of its natural resources. The management of these resources by government has implications for the north, as these resources are not being translated into economic opportunities for the northerners.

Based on the above-mentioned findings, the next chapter analyses the deficiency of governance and human security in northern Mozambique as factors contributing to the re-emergence of terrorism in the region.

# CHAPTER 3

## POOR GOVERNANCE, HUMAN INSECURITY AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

### 3.1. Introduction

Governance and human security in northern Mozambique could together create a stable environment for stability and development. However, as has been evident in the previous chapter, geopolitics and history have combined to construct a peripheral region plagued by persistent conflict. Poor governance and human insecurity in northern Mozambique overlay geopolitics and history, lack of transparency and accountability, limited citizen participation, an uneven enactment of the rule of law, low levels of effectiveness, efficiency, consistency, and coherence. When the government does not prioritise the well-being and welfare of its citizens, this absence of human security empowers non-state actors to exploit the insecurity and vulnerabilities of human beings. Together, poor governance and human insecurity have created an enabling environment for the re-emergence of terrorism.

The aim of this chapter is to conceptually review literature concerning governance and human security and thereupon to apply the concepts to northern Mozambique. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter begins with governance as a concept, which is thereupon framed in terms of the constitution of Mozambique to establish how governance is practised in northern Mozambique. Human security in the same region is then discussed to arrive at a conclusion and the findings indicate that northern Mozambique is characterised by poor governance and human insecurity, which together create an enabling environment for the re-emergence of terrorism.

### 3.2. Governance as a concept

As a concept, governance is challenging to define. There are, however, commonalities in the work of various commentators such as Kaufmann *et al* (2010), Thomas (2010) and De la Harpe *et al* (2008) that are appropriate for this study. In essence, governance is associated with the ability of

an administration to implement sound policies through legitimate institutions as stipulated in the country's constitution, in order to provide for the needs of the population and to ensure the well-being and survival of the state and its people, spanning all provinces of a state. The concept encompasses the promotion of democratic values, including a process by which governments are chosen, monitored, and replaced, and the rule of law, human rights, and social justice are maintained by all government and non-governmental authorities (Kaufmann *et al* 2010: 222; Thomas 2010: 31; De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). This research asserts that poor governance is the inverse of effective governance. The fundamental underpinnings of effective governance include transparency, accountability, citizen participation, the rule of law, effectiveness, efficiency, consistency, and coherence (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). This conceptualisation by De la Harpe *et al* (2008) is applicable to this research, as it spans the conceptualisations of Kaufmann *et al* (2010) and Thomas (2010). It also incorporates details from Mozambique's constitution that describe how governance ought to be. This allows for a deepened conceptualisation of poor governance that is applicable to the current reality of poor governance in the north.

### 3.3. Governance according to Mozambique's constitution

The constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (*n.d.*) was adopted on 21 December 2004 and amended in 2007. An overview of the contents includes the basic principles of the republic; its foreign policy and international law components; descriptions of nationality, fundamental rights, duties, and freedoms; economic and social organisation; and descriptions of branches of government and their powers. Effective governance principles presented in the constitution include accountability, the rule of law and effectiveness.

**Accountability**

Accountability allows civilians to know the manner in which government operates, and it ensures that "civil servants are acting in the interest of the [civilians] that they serve" (Institute for Government 2020). Mozambique's constitution holds the government accountable for "[satisfying] the basic needs" and "[promoting] social well being" of its people (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28). The constitution identifies in its principles that the state is responsible as

the "regulator and promoter of economic and social growth and development" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29). The constitution further details that "the state shall promote the fair distribution of the proceeds of labour" as well as "promote the extension of education" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 33, 26). The government is also held to account for "balanced development … without prejudice … [and] the state shall guarantee the distribution of national wealth" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28).

Thus, accountability of government according to its constitution is based on socio-economic inclusion. This will be examined throughout this chapter regarding accountability in northern Mozambique.

**The rule of law**

The rule of law is "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society" (The World Bank Group 2019). Northern Mozambique is "governed by the rule of law", which is "based on … the respect for … guarantee of … [and] strict observance of … the fundamental human rights and freedoms" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 2, 20, 84). Therefore, human rights and freedoms — such as "the right to security" and "freedom of the press" — lie at the foundation of the rule of law in northern Mozambique (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 14, 18). The constitution states that "freedom of the press [includes], in particular, the freedom of journalistic expression and creativity" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 15). Citizens will also have the "right to … information" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 27). "The right … to safeguarding of [northern Mozambican's] economic interests" is also stipulated as a basis of effective governance in the north (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 27, 2). The "guarantee" of education as a "fundamental human right [and] duty of all citizens" further underlies effective governance in the north (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.*: 2, 27). The state may guarantee the right to education through the promotion of "equal access to the enjoyment of this right by all citizens" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 26). The constitution further states that "nobody shall be discriminated against, persecuted, prejudiced, deprived of his or her rights or benefit from … on the grounds of his faith or religious persuasion or practice" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 16). In addition, "everyone has the right to security and nobody shall be detained and put on trial except in accordance with the law … the right to

defence and trial is an inviolable right guaranteed to every accused" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 18, 20). Lastly, "the function of the police … shall be … to ensure respect for the democratic rule of law and the strict observance of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 84). Ultimately, respect for and guarantee of human rights and freedoms are precursors to "the rule of law [as] the fundamental principle of [effective] governance by the state" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 2) in northern Mozambique.

Therefore, abiding by the rule of law according to Mozambique's constitution is based on fairness and even-handedness of government. This will be studied throughout regarding the rule of law in northern Mozambique.

**Effectiveness**

Effectiveness is "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (The World Bank Group 2019). The government must effectively and efficiently "[regulate] and [promote] … economic and social growth" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29). This is to ensure "the achievement of material and spiritual well-being and quality of life for its citizens", as a desirable outcome of effective governance (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3). This is successfully produced by "building … a society of social justice" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3).

Ultimately, the effectiveness of government according to the country's constitution is based on the treatment (or marginalisation) of all civilians on the part of government. This will be assessed throughout regarding effectiveness in northern Mozambique.

**3.4. Poor governance in northern Mozambique**

Poor governance in northern Mozambique is categorised according to accountability, the rule of law and effectiveness. These realities are experienced by the northerners and contravene the tenets of accountability, the rule of law, and effectiveness envisaged in the constitution — the highest

law of the land. This section will provide a well-rounded, in-depth discussion on how the Mozambican government contravenes its effective governance 'ideals' in the north. As a result, the government continues to entrench human insecurity and establish the north as an enabling environment for terrorism.

**Accountability**

Accountability begins with the establishment of government institutions that are able to provide in the needs of the population, specifically regarding the provision of basic needs in the form of goods and services, for example education, to regulate social growth and development equitably.

The government lacks accountability in northern Mozambique. Colloquially, Cabo Delgado province is given the nickname of the *Forgotten Cape* or *Cabo Esquecido* (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 12), as the population remains on the periphery. The north ranks "at the bottom" socially and economically across the country (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 12). This translates into socio-economic exclusion (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 12). In this regard, there are two main examples that indicate unaccountability to the north. These are the poor nature of the education sector and the uneven distribution of the nation's wealth.

Poor education is a driver of socio-economic exclusion in the north**.** According to the national consensus of 2017, Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces have the lowest percentage of students enrolled in secondary school and are the provinces with the lowest number of secondary schools (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). Moreover, the Statistics Institute reports that student-teacher ratios are an indicator of the quality of education in the country (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). The aim of the education system is to improve the quality of education, where increased 'quality' depends on a lower student-teacher ratio (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). Cabo Delgado has the highest student-teacher ratio in Mozambique, with just over 70 students per teacher (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). Because of the nature of centralised power in Maputo, only 0.3 percent of Cabo Delgado's population has "post-secondary education" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13). This is the lowest percentage across Mozambique. The province has the highest level (79 percent) of families that are headed by individuals with a peasantry

occupation; together with Inhambane, Cabo Delgado has the lowest level (0.1 percent) of families headed by individuals whose occupation is in higher leadership (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13). Cabo Delgado's illiteracy rate in 2015 was 60.7 percent, against the national average of 44.9 percent (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13). Cabo Delgado also has the highest level (55.9 percent) across Mozambique of school-age children who do not attend school owing to "lack of interest" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13). Matsinhe and Valoi (2019: 13) argue that while the government blames the northerners, the living conditions in Cabo Delgado are a result the government's long-term neglect of the province (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13).

Therefore, the Mozambican government does not "promote the extension of education" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 33, 26) in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. It is therefore *not accountable to northerners*, as the government is not "acting in the interest of the [civilians] that they serve (Institute for Government 2020), in this case, the youth. The *rule of law is contravened* as the youth is not guaranteed education as a "fundamental human right [and] duty of all citizens" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.*: 2, 27) and youths in the north do not have "equal access to the enjoyment of this right" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 26), as do those in the south. Thus, the *government is ineffective* in providing quality public service to the youth (The World Bank Group 2019); social growth is consequently impeded (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29).

Moreover, the northerners remain on the periphery, as government excludes them in its allocation of funds from LNG companies. This uneven distribution of economic growth shows the ineffective translation of natural gas profits into socio-economic gains for northern Mozambicans. LNG extractive companies are investing roughly 50 billion dollars in the region, an amount four times Mozambique's annual GDP (The Economist 2018). Tensions have surfaced about the distribution of the economic gains (Matfess 2019). The country's economy is worth roughly 13 billion dollars and investment in these gas projects can aid in growing the economy (Stoddard 2019). While billions of dollars have already gone into investments for drilling off the northern coast, this has resulted in only "little benefit" for local communities (Morier-Genoud 2017). Stoddard (2019) refers to "the resource curse" as the inability of developing nations that are rich in resources to "translate their natural wealth into wider prosperity". The inward flow of investment of these projects has "largely benefited Maputo's political elite" rather than people within the "poorer

North" of the country (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 283; Kleibl & Munck 2017: 206). Thus, the government is *not accountable* in "[satisfying] the basic needs" and promoting "economic … growth" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28) in terms of income for the northerners. There is "[unfair] distribution of the proceeds of labour" in the LNG industry and the government has not "[guaranteed] the distribution of national wealth" for the north (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28). This further jeopardises "the right … to safeguarding of [northern Mozambican's] economic interests" in terms of the equal distribution of funds from LNG companies (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 27, 2). The government is *ineffective* in "promoting economic … growth" and "material … well-being" for the northerners through the distribution of funds (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3). Thus, the implications of lack of accountability in the region are socio-economic exclusion experienced by the northerners, and grievances held by this community.

**The rule of law**

The rule of law in northern Mozambique is problematic. Not only is it a historical characteristic of the region, but there are also persistent systemic defects and practices that subvert the rule of law when politicians use it as a "political weapon" (Shega 2010: 1). This leads to lack of even-handedness and fairness, which alienates the population.

Although Mozambique's political reform process focused on the rule of law and accountability, civil, political and social rights and liberties, as well as political competition (Shega 2010: 1), political reform in northern Mozambique has remained in the backwaters. In this regard there are four examples that indicate an absence of the rule of law, namely the draconian government response to the re-emergence of terrorism, poor policing, lack of effective control over natural resources and inability to institute effective control of international borders with neighbouring countries.

Lack of even-handedness in the application of the rule of law is evidenced by the response of the government to the re-emergence of terrorism in the region; the FAM was responsible for serious violations of human rights, accompanied by loss of life. In broad terms, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019: 14) state that Mozambique's constitution has been "suspended extrajudicially". This is because the

government has responded to the threat and attacks in Cabo Delgado "as if … the rule of law does not apply", along with ignoring "regional and international human rights standards" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 14). Thus, the government has implemented "an illegal … undeclared state of emergency" in that it has not admitted loss of control over events in the northern provinces (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 14). The government can therefore arrest and detain locals, and deny them "constitutionally guaranteed … rights" as part of "a declared state of emergency" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 14).

Specifically, the Mozambican government has employed harsh tactics in its response to terrorist attacks in the north (Opperman 2019). Columbo (2019: vi) states that a main destabilising factor in the north is a response by government that focuses on military action rather than "community development programmes". The government has "[moved] towards oppression", as seen in its armed response on 5 October 2017 in the Mocimboa da Praia district (Frey 2017), rather than using non-violent means in an attempt to create peaceful conditions, by understanding the grievances and needs of the community (Frey 2017). It is reported that similar tactics have been used against the local population at large; suspects were arrested and imprisoned for an extended time without being charged with any crimes (Opperman 2019). Yussuf Adam argues, as cited in De Salema (2018), that violations of human rights occurred in part of the Mozambican defence force. In its fight against terrorists, the defence force as an organ of the state has been "killing, flaying, burning, and closing mosques" in reaction to attacks (De Salema 2018). On 23 February 2020, Julio Parruque, the governor of Cabo Delgado, called a meeting with journalists in which he warned the media to "refrain from reporting" on the terrorist attacks (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 11). This was the day after a local radio station journalist was arrested (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 11). Described as "an intimidation meeting to show the regime's intolerance against press freedom", Parruque stated that from that day forward, he would not tolerate the province's journalists who were "interested in reporting" on topics including the terrorist attacks, corruption, illicit trade, and other socio-political issues (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 11). Specifically, the unlawful arrest and brutal beating of journalist Abubakar in Cabo Delgado testify to governance practises that are "unacceptable under the democratic rule of law" (Frey 2019b). Therefore, the government is *not accountable,* as it is not "acting in the interest of [its civilians]" (Institute for Government 2020), and it is not promoting social well-being (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28). The government

*contravenes the rule of law* under which "everyone has the right to security and nobody shall be detained and put on trial except in accordance with the law" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 18, 20). The "freedom of the press including, in particular, the freedom of journalistic expression and creativity" is contravened, as seen in the abuse against journalist Abubakar (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 15). The police have not "[functioned]" under the rule of law in ensuring the strict observance of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 84). The closing of mosques further contravenes the rule of law in the north, as Muslim civilians are "prejudiced [and] deprived of [their] rights or benefits … on the grounds of religious persuasion and practice" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 16). Lastly, the violations on the part of the defence force show the government's *ineffectiveness* in "building … a society of social justice" for northerners as victims of these violations (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3).

In addition, lack of fairness regarding the rule of law is evident in the government's oppression of civil society, where the opponents of governance practices are silenced and at times, assassinated. Cabo Delgado province is notoriously known for its "weak civil society"; there are allegations and "strong beliefs" that the government's "secret intelligence service" has infiltrated and destroyed the province's civil society (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 11). Hamilton and Sayed (2019: 288) present information of an assessment of the country's civil society. The authors state that the Mozambican government is constantly monitoring the activities of civil society leaders (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288). These leaders have difficulty in voicing their views about corruption and the abuse of power by government (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288). The findings reveal that those who criticise "injustices" by the state or companies working in the north's natural resources extractive industries are labelled "opposition sympathisers" and forced to change their opinions (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288). Added to this are the assassinations of high-profile opposition and civil society leaders who challenge the workings of government (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288), among others Mahamudo Amurane, the mayor of the north's Nampula province, who was killed outside his home in October 2017 (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288). Amurane was believed to have been killed because of his "strong stance against government corruption" (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 288). Thus, the inability to voice personal opinions that challenge current governance in the north points to a *contravention of the rule of law*; civil society leaders do not have the freedom to exercise their "right to … freedom of expression" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 27). Government is *ineffective*

in ensuring "the achievement of … well-being and quality of life" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3), as the assassinations show a disregard for life.

Lack of even-handedness in the application of the rule of law is further evidenced in poor policing measures in response to terrorist attacks since 2017. Inadequate and ineffective training and equipment undermine the police service in the north and its mandate to protect civilians (Business Monitor International 2018; Stewart 2018). While the Mozambican police service reacted rapidly to the initial terrorist attacks, it has been unable to pre-empt and proactively prevent subsequent attacks (The Conversation 2017). The "poorly trained, ill-disciplined" police force is not only feared by the communities, but lacks the equipment that is necessary to deal effectively with the terrorist threat (Opperman 2019). This implies that the police service is unlikely to be able to exercise formal, sustained control over the attacked areas (The Conversation 2017). This *contravenes the rule of law*, as civilians' "right to security" is not guaranteed; the police cannot "ensure strict observance of the fundamental right [of security]" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 19, 84). The government is *ineffective* in ensuring the "quality of the civil service [the police]" (The World Bank Group 2019). While a proposal to approve a policy for "combating and suppressing terrorism" was issued in parliament merely days after the first attack, the National Assembly only passed an "anti-terrorism law" a year after the initial attacks (Frey 2018b; News24 2018). In the face of an urgent, ongoing terrorism problem, it is evident that the government is *not accountable* when it comes to "acting in the interest of the [northerners]" in terms of ensuring their "right to security", under the *rule of law*, by implementing an anti-terrorism policy swiftly (Institute for Government 2020, Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 19). The unlawful arrest of citizens who provide information on the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado is seen as a "violation of the witness protection law" (Frey 2019c). This is also an obstruction of "the right to security" in terms of detention and trial, as well as obstruction by police in ensuring "the strict observance of the fundamental right and freedoms" of these northerners (Frey 2019c; Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 20, 84). A citizen recalls how, "… in Cabo Delgado, when [northerners] denounce the suspects in the armed attacks, the police come at night to the homes of the people who provided the information and take them to the police station … they often end up being arrested" (Frey 2019c). Therefore, poor governance is evident, as the inability to exercise the "right to … freedom of expression" in reporting on the terrorist attacks contravenes *the rule of law* (Republic of

Mozambique *n.d.* 27). The unlawful detention and arrest of these whistle-blowers further impede "the right to security" in the north under the rule of law (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 18).

Moreover, lack of control over natural resources by the government indicates its lack of even-handedness regarding the rule of law. It has led to human rights abuses and loss of life when multinational companies exploit the north's natural resources. Cabo Delgado houses what is said to be the largest ruby deposit in the world. A firm based in the United Kingdom (UK) (Leigh Day) is pursuing cases against Gemfields — a natural resource mining company with headquarters in London — on behalf of over 100 small-scale ruby miners who claim that Gemfields' security guards and police "shot … [beat] up … and sexually abused" the miners (Stratfor 2019; The Economist 2018). Pirio *et al's* (2019) evidence fits this argument: Gemfields "reportedly fuelled" Al-Shabaab's first attack in October 2017 by destroying the property of local miners and even torturing and killing some residents. Leigh Day's report, cited by Hamilton and Sayed (2019: 285), also accuses Gemfields of "illegally confiscating" land from locals. Ultimately, the report concludes that the "most disturbing aspect" of Leigh Day's investigations is "the implication that the local government has been complicit in the abuses" (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 285). Therefore, the government is *not accountable* in promoting the social well-being of northerners in the face of abuse (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.*28). Despite *the rule of law*, there is no "respect for … guarantee of … [and] strict observance of … the fundamental human rights and freedoms" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 84) of the northerners, as victims of Gemfields' abuse. Their "right to security" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 18) is also jeopardised. The complicity of the government in this abuse also impedes *effective* governance, as "the well-being and quality of life" of northerners are disregarded (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3).

Lastly, a hindrance to the rule of law is seen in the government's lack of even-handedness in securing the international borders of the north. The porousness of the borders hinders efforts to secure the north's border and its civilians from potential external threats (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 285). This allows for the threat of Muslim militancy from neighbouring Tanzania (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2018). The porous borders also allow organised crime networks to operate across the northern border (Haysom 2018). Illicit trading involves products such as wildlife, drugs and human trafficking (Haysom 2018). Nationals from Tanzania, Mali, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia

and other states in the region are among the individuals involved in the criminal markets in northern Mozambique (Pirio *et al* 2019). A general lack of law enforcement allows the traffickers to operate through bribery (Pirio *et al* 2019). This industry has "openly benefitted" political leaders, including those of the FRELIMO government (Haysom 2018). Mateso Kasian, a "mastermind" Tanzanian poacher, openly implicates "high-ranking Mozambican politicians" in the operation of his "poaching gangs" that operate from southern Tanzania into northern Mozambique (Valoi 2017). This poacher is "well-connected" to members of the Mozambican government (Valoi 2017). Therefore, the government is *not accountable* to northerners, as the porous state of the border jeopardises the social well-being (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28) of northerners, in the face of potential external threats such as militants from Tanzania. The *rule of law is contravened,* as the illicit nature of these networks prevents government members from "[abiding] by the rules of society" (The World Bank Group 2019). Thus, the implications of the contravention of the rule of law are unfairness and lack of even-handed governance experienced by the northern community.

**Effectiveness**

Northern Mozambique experiences poor socio-economic services, underdevelopment and poor infrastructure, which jeopardise the well-being and quality of life of northerners. This is a further result of "decades of exclusion and neglect" at the hands of government (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 17). In this regard, there are five main examples of ineffective governance practices in the north, namely the centralising of power in the south, the level of youth unemployment in the north, land ownership issues and forced resettlement, withholding of civilian funds and the corruption scandal regarding International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. This marginalisation and exclusion place the northerners on the periphery of the country.

Ineffective governance is evident in the north, as the Mozambican government centralises all its power in the south and excludes the north. There is a "persistent imbalance between the richer South and the poorer North" (Kleibl & Munck 2017: 206) and thus the north is difficult to govern (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). Therefore, the government is *not accountable* for ensuring "balanced development" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28) between the north and the south; it is

not accountable as the "regulator and promoter of economic and social growth and development" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29) in the north.

Secondly, the government's ineffective provision of socio-economic services, through governance, extends the marginalisation of the northerners. Cabo Delgado has "the highest rates of youth unemployment" in the country (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 284). This characterises the socio-economic inequality experienced in the north, which also involves poverty, "missing social services and economic opportunities" (Kleibl & Munck 2017: 206). The lack of "quality … public services" is evidence of the *ineffectiveness of government* in "promoting economic and social growth" (The World Bank Group 2019; Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29). This leaves the northerners with a poor "quality of life" and lack of "material … well-being" (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 3).

In addition, marginalisation is experienced, as is evident in the way land issues are developing in response to ineffective governance practices. Competition over land and distrust of local government officials are additional underlying poor governance factors. According to Yussuf Adam, serious issues related to land ownership prevail and it is a "struggle [that] cuts across religious or ethnic issues" (Frey 2017). In the Palma district of Cabo Delgado, citizens are dissatisfied with the resettlement project taking place as a policy implemented by government (The World Bank Group 2019). Thousands of fishermen and farmers in the district have been resettled by government in areas away from Anadarko's LNG plant, "without prior consultation" (Pirio *et al* 2019; Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 185). Foreign companies promised to resettle locals and compensate them after "a thorough consultation process with affected communities" (Rawoot 2020). However, locals have expressed concern that their objections are ignored by these companies while compensation has also been inadequate (Rawoot 2020). The new land that these relocated locals were given encroaches on the land of other locals, which causes conflict between the northerners (Rawoot 2020). Funds, intended to assist displaced citizens, are also being diverted, payment for the land that is purchased by Anadarko is insufficient, and compensation for citizens' food-producing crops is inadequate (Pirio *et al* 2019). Fishermen have often been resettled inland, translating into a loss of livelihood for these individuals (Pirio *et al* 2019, Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). The locals that have been displaced by LNG companies and their projects face "the prospect

of starvation" (Rawoot 2020). Further forced removals of locals are to take place, in order to accommodate "support facilities" for Total and ENI's projects (Rawoot 2020). According to a report by Anadarko in 2016, over 500 families would be "physically relocated", and 952 families would lose access to arable land for income opportunities (Rawoot 2020). More than 3 000 northerners would lose access to their fishing grounds because of LNG operations (Rawoot 2020). Youths of Pemba have protested about these companies not giving jobs to the locals and ignoring their job applications (Hamilton & Sayed 2019: 285; The Economist 2018). This establishes feelings of distrust towards the government. These jobs are untaken by "highly skilled expatriates", as most youths in the north are illiterate (The Economist 2018). This reflects *lack of effective* governance, as "government's commitment" to this policy is "[discredited]" (The World Bank Group 2019); the social well-being of the northerners is impeded, as government is *not accountable* for their means of survival (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 28). Lastly, the diverted funds, diversion from food-producing crops, and inability to access job opportunities show that the northerners cannot exercise their "right … to safeguarding [their own] economic interests" under t*he rule of law* and thus maintain a good quality of life (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 27, 3).

The northerners are further marginalised by the government, as the government is unjustly withholding civilian funds. Yussuf Adam is a historian of Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo and has researched northern Mozambique since the 1970s. On a visit to Cabo Delgado villages, Adam found that citizens were discontented about proceeds that they claimed were owed to them but retained by government (Frey 2018b). These villagers supposedly did not receive 20 percent of the funds from timber harvests they claim they were entitled to, as "corrupt schemes" within local administration retained these funds (Frey 2018b). Extreme poverty, coupled with "misgovernment" (Frey 2018b) and corruption, is characteristic of the livelihoods of these northern Mozambicans. Thus, the retaining of funds by government officials portrays the *unaccountability* of government; withheld income places these northern Mozambicans at a disadvantage regarding "the fair distribution of the proceeds of labour" from their timber harvests (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 33).

Lastly, government corruption and its effects on the socio-economic nature of the north further places the region on the periphery. The IMF discovered US$2 billion in "secret loans" to state-owned enterprises and suspended its aid to Mozambique (Wholley 2018). These loans were intended for the protection of the fishing industry and coastal lines in Mozambique, including those in the north (Hanlon 2018). When this debt was revealed in 2016, the IMF put a stop to its Standby Credit Facility, "a short-term balance of payment loan", which triggered an economic crisis (Hanlon 2018). This crisis introduced further difficulties for communities, specifically in the poorer north; "closed sawmills" and largely contributed to unemployment in northern Mozambique (Frey 2017; Kleibl & Munck 2017: 206). These events triggered a financial crisis that nearly crippled Mozambique in 2016-2017 (Frey 2019a). Inflation affected food prices negatively, the government cut its spending in the education sector by hiring fewer teachers, and the building of infrastructure was placed on hold (Hanlon 2018). Especially Cabo Delgado's education sector was affected adversely, since the area has the highest student-teacher ratio in Mozambique (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 2019c). Thus, government officials are *not accountable,* as they are not "acting in the interest of the [northerners]" (Institute for Government 2020); the government is jeopardising "the enjoyment of [education] … as a right [and] duty" of the north's youth under *the rule of law* (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 2, 27). This corruption, inflation, and the economic crisis have hampered the regulation and promotion of "economic and social growth" in the north (Republic of Mozambique *n.d.* 29).

Ultimately, the realities of governance in northern Mozambique reflect poor governance by the state. Government actions as described above prove to contravene the three applicable characteristics of effective governance: accountability, the rule of law and effectiveness (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7). These are reiterated in Mozambique's constitution. The manifestations of poor governance as seen above contribute to political and economic insecurity in the north. These human security underpinnings create an enabling environment for current terrorism, when combined with the aspect of regional terrorism. Thus, political and economic insecurity are crucial for understanding how poor governance accounts for the re-emergence of terrorism in the north. The implication of lack effectiveness in the region is marginalisation experienced by the northern community.

## 3.5. Human insecurity in northern Mozambique

Human security focuses on the needs of the people; it is interpreted as 'security for the people' and the focus is explicitly placed on the well-being and welfare of citizens (Elliott 2015: 13; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015). Human security was first introduced in the (UN) Human Development Report of 1994. This is the foundational statement of the human security concept and is therefore used in this research as the underpinning of the applicable human security dimensions. This research asserts that human insecurity is the inverse of human security. There are different dimensions of insecurity that threaten the individual. The four dimensions applicable to this research's argument include personal, community, political and economic security. While the former two dimensions are applied to the history of conflict in the north, as described in Chapter 2, political insecurity and economic security are the focus of this section. Political security is concerned with a society that "honours [individuals'] basic human rights" (UNDP 1994: 32-33), and economic security requires "an assured basic income" for civilians, and where that is not possible, a "publicly financed safety net" must be in place as a last resort measure (UNDP 1994: 25). Together, political and economic insecurity characterise the local environment, with which regional terrorism intertwines to create an enabling environment for terrorism.

The relationship between poor governance and human insecurity is illustrated in Figure 2. Specifically, just as lack of accountability and the rule of law (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7) contributes to political insecurity (UNDP 1994: 32-33), lack of effectiveness (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7) contributes to economic insecurity (UNDP 1994: 25).

The current realities of governance in northern Mozambique are applicable to this argument. As Piazza (2008: 472) notes, lack of governance regarding the provision of "basic security and economic sustenance" for a country's citizenry results in "basic human insecurity"; this is a "key contributing factor" (Piazza 2008: 472) to the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. The current realities of poor governance that centre on lack of accountability, the rule of law and effectiveness act as underlying grievances and thus 'push factors' towards terrorism. Political, economic, community, and personal insecurity is crucial in northern Mozambique.

Political insecurity and economic insecurity are significant human security dimensions that characterise the local environment that enables terrorism. In this regard, "poverty, inequality, and governance" remain the key drivers of the current conflict in the north (Frey 2020d). Former health minister, Ivo Garido, argues that "social exclusion" is the main cause of the terrorist attacks in terms of opportunities for employment (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 13). The government's absence from the north, as well as poor social services, allows Al-Shabaab to recruit people based on "extreme poverty and [the north's] economic marginalisation" (Ebrahim 2020a). Recruitment relies on root causes that include "impoverishment, a lack of income-generating activities, and social services" (Ebrahim 2020a). The limits of economic opportunity, the northerners' "popular frustration" with high corruption levels, and the government's poor management of budgets have "sown the seeds" of "widespread discontent" in the north (Frey 2020b). The group took advantage of the feelings of disaffection felt by the local youth and began recruiting them (Pirio *et al* 2019). The northerners feel discontented with government because of lack of support in the region (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). The lack of hope and opportunities in the northern communities has led the youth to join Muslim militants (Ebrahim 2020a). The group pays its members wages while the north remains an environment that knows "very little if any formal employment" (Ebrahim 2020a). Discontent with the government has been exacerbated by "recent failed resettlement" projects to make way for LNG plants (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). This local environment supplements a history of conflict in the north, throughout which Muslims of the north have experienced insecurity and marginalisation in the form of community and personal insecurity (see Figure 2). The history shows that tensions have erupted between opposing Muslim organisations in the country, and organisations represented by the north have been placed on the periphery. This history shows that northerners have not been protected from the loss of traditional values, the core feature of community security. Personal insecurity has been a reality for the northerners, who have experienced physical violence inflicted on them by state and non-state actors since the pre-colonial era. Thus, lack of governance in the north has led to "basic human insecurity" (Piazza 2008: 472); Al-Shabaab has stepped into this 'void' left by government and the result is terrorism. A traumatic existence is a consequence of human insecurity in northern Mozambique, as the state is unable (or unwilling) to protect the population. By exploiting human insecurity, it is into this 'protection vacuum' that non-states actors such as private security organisations, crime syndicates and terrorist groups insert themselves as trauma alleviators. The militant group has emerged from a community

that is experiencing insecurity as a result of poor governance. These northerners have looked towards Al-Shabaab to fill the 'vacuum' created by poor governance and political, economic, community, and personal insecurity in the north.

## 3.6. Re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique

### 3.6.1. Terrorism as a concept

According to John Mitchell's explanation of conflict development, cited in Blake (2016: 29), conflict has been a constant in the north; incipient and latent conflict has characterised the north since colonial times, and state-sponsored terrorism and since the colonial period non-state-sponsored terrorism have testified to manifest conflict. Although terrorism has not been a constant in the north, the persistence of incipient and/or latent conflict has led to terrorism as manifest conflict since 2017. Terrorism displays "definitional grey areas" (Martin 2011: 2). Lunstrum (2009: 890) argues that 'terror' amounts to "acts of extreme and often symbolically charged violence ... used to scare victims into compliance". Rogers (2008: 171) defines terrorism as "the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group ... to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group ... with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding ... to political demands". Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009: 28) define it as "violent, intentional acts intended to seriously intimidate the population ... or seriously destabilise or destroy 'the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country …" Thus, Ganor's (2008:18) definition is most suitable for this research and it will be used throughout: terrorism is violence that is "deliberately used against civilians" as a means to achieve a political goal. This definition includes state and non-state actors who perpetrate violence against civilians, and is in accordance with conflict development in the north.

With little to no consensus on one definition, many definitions of terrorism include three elements. Ganor's (2008: 18) definition allows space for the introduction of these three elements: 1) Intimidation (forcing or "[inducing] a government/general public to perform or abstain from performing any act" and instilling fear); 2) Disruption (of any public service/the delivery of an essential service to the public); and 3) Creation of "general insurrection" (to cause feelings of insecurity among the public, and to "induce, cause, or spread feelings of terror or panic") (Botha

2008: 28). These elements are chosen for this study, as they not only deepen Ganor's (2008: 18) definition, but also explain the specific behaviour of Al-Shabaab.

It is important to note that extremism is a component of all terrorist behaviour. It is defined as a "deeply held belief system" that motivates perpetrators to commit violent acts (Martin 2011: 2). Violent extremism is the "catalyst" and motivation for terrorist behaviour; essentially, a "precursor" to terrorism (Martin 2011: 2). Bjorgo (2005: 256) agrees in stating that the distinguishing factor of terrorism among other forms of violence is its "criminal and gormless character" with deliberate attacks, through violent behaviour, on civilians. Therefore, the choice is made to utilise 'terrorism' in this research paper as physical, violent attacks are carried out in northern Mozambique.

Terrorism has taken on a 'new face' in the north. While state and non-state terrorism has taken place over the years, terrorism by Muslim militants is occurring for the first time in the north. These acts of terror are attributed to the group known as Al-Shabaab.

### 3.6.2. Al-Shabaab's profile

Al-Shabaab's presence in northern Mozambique has developed greatly since its first attacks in 2017. The group continues to recruit insecure members of the youth in the north. It also presents a sustained challenge to the government through deadly attacks on northern communities. While this threat is playing out in northern Mozambique, it has implications for the regions beyond the northern demarcations.

**Founding**

While information on the founding of the group remains largely unverified, owing to the limits on media in the region, early references to the group responsible for the attacks in northern Mozambique include 'Ansar al-Sunnah', 'Al-Sunna wa Jama'a', or 'Al-Shabaab'. This could refer to its origins or potential links to the Somalian group of the same name (Wholley 2018; Morier-Genoud 2019). A group of unemployed and uneducated youth objected to poverty and exclusion from society in 2015 (Frey 2018a). When Al-Shabaab first emerged in the north in 2015, the group drew inspiration from Salafist circles outside Mozambique and were encouraged by these circles to "penetrate local mosques … [and] change the way [these mosques] interpreted Islam" (Ebrahim

2020a). Three Islamic sheiks claim that Al-Shabaab's "new faith" interpretation of Islam was "imported by Tanzanian nationals" who found the north "fertile ground" (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 9). Religious extremists from neighbouring states were influenced by radical scholars in the Middle East, and entrenched themselves in Cabo Delgado through a strategy of marrying locals, acquiring land, and ultimately "[propagating] their violent and extremist ideology" in communities (Ebrahim 2020a). When the group failed to "penetrate local mosques" and failed to win the support of Muslim leaders within their society, Al-Shabaab set up its own mosques and *madrassas* — Islamic colleges (Ebrahim 2020a, Pirio *et al* 2019). In Cabo Delgado, Al-Shabaab was created as a "sub-organisation" within the Islamic Council and took on a revised reading and practice of Islam (Morier-Genoud 2019b). Al-Shabaab was initially seen as "young and brash", and being "at odds" with the Muslim Council in northern Mozambique (Pirio *et al* 2019). It was legally registered with the state, built mosques, and preached a stricter form of Islam that came to be more radical and activist than the mainstream Muslim organisations had liked and tolerated (Morier-Genoud 2019). In 2010, villagers of Nhacole in Balama district decided to "get rid of the group" and Al-Shabaab's mosque was destroyed (Morier-Genoud 2019). After these youths were expelled from the north's traditional mosques, they built their own mosque and "adopted a strange code of conduct" that transgressed traditional beliefs and practices (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 10). After "coming into conflict" with the state and the Islamic Council, this group of young Muslim men turned violent (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). This led to a terrorist problem in the north that has been "germinating since 2015" (Ebrahim 2020a). Tensions rose between Al-Shabaab members and the communities in Macomia district and in late 2016 the Mozambican government "acceded to [the communities'] request" by arresting and bringing Al-Shabaab leaders to court (Morier-Genoud 2019) Al-Shabaab members were accused of "engaging in disinformation, rejecting state authority, refusing to send their children to school, and using knives to protect themselves" (Morier-Genoud 2019).

**Filling the 'vacuum'**

Al-Shabaab is inserting itself into the 'vacuum' created by poor governance and human insecurity in northern Mozambique. Al-Shabaab is exploiting the fact that economic wealth from the LNG industry has not translated into opportunity and prosperity for northerners; the group is "presenting itself as a better alternative" for the locals; Al-Shabaab "[cares] for" the northerners and their

"well-being" (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). Al-Shabaab ultimately formed "fundamentalist cells" of 10 to 20 men to challenge the state (Frey 2018a).

Al-Shabaab became "a new family that gave [its members] social value" (Frey 2018a). The group has attempted to "capitalise" on the "void" created by government in the north; it has established madrassas and offered food and shelter to children in the north (Ebrahim 2020a). Rather than embarking on "a large-scale killing spree" like the insurgents since 2017, the militants recently "distributed food" and retreated from Mocimboa de Praia, with some locals "cheering them on" (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). Recent videos of armed militants reassure northerners that Al-Shabaab is not targeting civilians, but government buildings and barracks (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). Vines (2020) agrees that the group has shifted its strategy: there is "an effort to avoid harming civilians", and "to win hearts and minds" through the distribution of "food, medicine, and fuel" to "loyal" civilians (Vines 2020). Al-Shabaab has been controlling banks and grocery stores in the north, over and above distributing money and food to locals (Ebrahim 2020b). These locals are "[applauding] such tactics" (Ebrahim 2020b). Attacks are directed at the state and representations of the state. These include "police stations and military barracks" (Vines 2020).

## Ethnic orientation

The terrorist group emerged within a particular religious, social, and ethnic group known as the Mwani (Morier-Genoud 2019, Frey 2018a). This group feels that it has been marginalised for decades by the dominant Makonde group (Frey 2018a), in terms of economic development (Morier-Genoud 2019). They have also supported RENAMO rather than the Makonde-majority FRELIMO (Frey 2018a). Moreover, Swahili is the *lingua franca* spoken by the militants (Vines 2020).

## Sheik Aboud Rogo Mohammed

Regional terrorism in the form of cross-border militant influence interlinks with the local environment and establishes an enabling environment for terrorism (see Figure 2). Young Muslim men felt frustrated with "the breakdown in governance" in Cabo Delgado, and "turned to extremist ideology" inspired by Sheik Aboud Rogo (see Figure 7) (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). Sheik Aboud Rogo was the "[mastermind]" behind attacks on American

embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 (Ebrahim 2020a). Pirio *et al* (2019) state that Al-Shabaab is inspired by "radical" teachings of Mohammed. The United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia listed Sheik Aboud Rogo Mohammed on 25 July 2012 in its 1844 Sanctions List pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1844 (2008); paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2002 (2011); and paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (United Nations 2014). The Committee stated that Mohammed was a threat to the "peace, security, and stability" of Somalia, as he supplied the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, with "financial, material, logistical, or technical support" (United Nations 2014). Mohammed is described as an "extremist Islamic cleric" who was based in Kenya and exercised his influence over terrorist organisations in East Africa (United Nations 2014). His aim was to promote a campaign of violence throughout East Africa (United Nations 2014). Young men from Tanzania and "further north" joined Al-Shabaab of northern Mozambique after the killing of Mohammed in 2012 (Frey 2018a). Mohammed's followers began "building a presence in Kibiti, Tanzania", near Mozambique's northern border, and they crossed the Ruvuma River by 2015 into northern Mozambique (Frey 2018a). The group forces communities to watch recorded sermons of Sheik Aboud Rogo (Ebrahim 2020a).

**The illicit economy**

Al-Shabaab's marginalised youth members are linked to networks within Mozambique and the wider region; networks of "contraband, military training, religious leaders, and financial support" (Frey 2018a). Al-Shabaab's "hard currency" is reportedly sourced from the smuggling of gemstones, ivory, and wood (Africa Research Bulletin 2019). The militants do not have control over "any major contraband trade" (Haysom 2018: 1). However, the illicit economy as a whole provides "varied opportunities" for both civilians and militants, and is a source of grievance for the former (Haysom 2018: 1)**.** When its religious sect (prior to the founding of the insurgency) was established, Al-Shabaab members joined "formal and informal economies" (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). They traded goods from Tanzania and participated in trade in timber in Macomia and ivory in Quirimbas National Park in Cabo Delgado province (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). The militants now "[fill] the vacuum" left by international traders within the illegal ruby industry (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020) when they departed after a government operation in

February 2017 that led to the breaking up of illegal mining gangs (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). Al-Shabaab "first established itself" in resource-rich areas of the north: Mocimboa de Praia remains a centre for illicit trafficking of heroin, migrants, ivory, and timber; Macomia houses the trade of timber, involving corrupt government officials for over two decades; Montepuez has the largest ruby deposit globally, and elites have captured and "forcibly displaced" farmers in the area; and Balama has been a centre area for "ivory poaching and trafficking since 2011" (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). The group has involved itself in the illicit trade of ivory, timber, and rubies in order to obtain funding and finance training (Frey 2018a, Ebrahim 2020a). "Informal elites" support the group through illicit trade, as it allows more space for the elites' businesses to operate (Frey 2018a). Ultimately, Al-Shabaab's militants recruit collaborators in and around northern areas of illicit trade, and the illicit industries provide potential funding opportunities for the group (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). This is highly likely in illicit industries trading heroin, rubies, gold, timber, and ivory (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020).

**The Islamic State affiliation**

The Islamic State has claimed that Al-Shabaab is affiliated to its ISCAP (Fabricius 2020a). ISCAP has claimed responsibility for over 30 terrorist attacks in the north (Ebrahim 2020b). Northern Mozambique is the "perfect gateway option" that suits the Islamic State's strategy, argues counter-terrorism expert in Africa, Jasmine Opperman (2019a). On 4 June 2019, the Islamic State claimed an attack in Mozambique under the banner of ISCAP (Opperman 2019). It stated the following: "The soldiers of the Caliphate were able to repulse an attack by the Crusader Mozambican army in Metubi village, in the Mocimboa area ... they clashed with them with a variety of weapons, killing and wounding a number of them ... the mujahideen captured weapons, ammunition, and rockets as spoils" (Opperman 2019). Matfess (2019) states that the Islamic State "piggy-backing" on Al-Shabaab's local attacks not only distracts from the "spectacular losses" suffered by the Islamic State, but allows it to strengthen and restructure itself. To achieve this, the Islamic State has divided itself into *wilayahs* — administrative sectors — in order to "find homes" in unstable environments where governance is weak in counter-attacking the organisation (Opperman 2019). The Islamic State's focus is clear: it will maximise all available opportunities to "entrench itself" in areas outside Iraq and Syria (Opperman 2019). To accomplish this, Opperman (2019a) argues

that the Islamic State "needs proxies" that are already present in areas affected by conflict; smaller attacks "suit [the Islamic State's] strategy to perfection". Al-Shabaab factions in northern Mozambique provide this opportunity (Opperman 2019).

**Al-Shabaab today**

Recently, there has been an exponential increase in the number of militants in northern Mozambique (Ebrahim 2020b). Cells have grown from having 10 individuals to over 100 individuals (Ebrhaim 2020b). A study by Mondlane University estimated that Al-Shabaab has roughly 1 000 "core members" that are divided into 100 cells with one religious leader heading the cell (Africa Research Bulletin 21908). With a "very decentralised command structure", Al-Shabaab leaders are reportedly located in neighbouring Tanzania and other Mozambican districts (Wholley 2018). Estimates show that Al-Shabaab has roughly 1 500 members capable of attack (Ebrahim 2020a). Al-Shabaab also funds trips for young men to acquire "military and Islamic training" in Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia, and for regional "radical clerics" into Mozambique (Frey 2018a). Al-Shabaab offers the youth an identity, a "purpose in life", and an income through wages and profits from illicit trade markets in the north (Ebrahim 2020a).

The insurgency is entering "a new phase" of attempting to establish "a social base" (Frey 2020d). According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, mentioned by Frey (2020a), from 2019 until April 2020 there was a 300 percent increase in "[Muslim] militant attacks" in the north. The project report states that no other country in the world experienced "as big an increase" (Frey 2020a). More than 80 attacks and 100 deaths have occurred in 2020 so far (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). Killings take place by means of beheading, maiming and dismembering captured individuals (Fabricius 2020a). The group aims to isolate and control the population of the north physically (Ebrahim 2020b). This is possible through the destruction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges, and seizing control of security and military bases (Ebrahim 2020b). Once this is achieved, Ebrahim (2020b) argues that Al-Shabaab's intention is to implement Sharia law "with brutal force".

### 3.6.3. Developments since 2017

Al-Shabaab's attacks have not stopped and have developed in terms of how often the attacks occur and how much damage they inflict on government facilities, buildings, infrastructure and the lives of the northerners. Al-Shabaab's attacks are allegedly designed to promote insecurity (or 'general insurrection') with the goal of "enabling criminal enterprises in the region" (Botha 2008: 28; Wholley 2018). Their initial objectives were clear: they searched out a particular individual, "usually a 'government-linked politician'" or an individual who had informed officials on the terrorist group (Frey 2018b). The group uses 'intimidation' by "[terrorising] villagers" in remote communities with the aim of imposing Sharia law in the province (Eyewitness News 2019; Botha 2008: 28). The initial attacks on police stations in October 2017 were aimed at the disruption of a key social service, while the group created general insurrection in the state by "stoking unrest" (Eyewitness News 2019; Botha 2008: 28). In December 2017, the government carried out an operation in Miumbate of Mocimboa de Praia; killing 50 individuals and arresting 200 (Columbo 2019: 3). Al-Shabaab beheaded "10 unarmed civilians" on 27 May 2018 (Columbo 2019: 3). In February 2019 an attack on an Anadarko vehicle was carried out. The convoy was attacked while travelling from Mocimboa da Praia to its Afungi base in Palma district (Opperman 2019). Workers and goods were transported in the convoy (Pirio *et al* 2019). The attack led to the suspension of construction operations at the LNG plant (Opperman 2019; Pirio *et al* 2019). Al-Shabaab used "homemade explosives" in another attack on a truck carrying passengers and goods on 31 May 2019 (Columbo 2019: 3). The Islamic State first claimed its presence in the north on 4 June 2019, in response to an attack on 2 June 2019 (Columbo 2019: 3). An attack occurred on the Tanzanian border on 26 June 2019, which resulted in the death of Tanzanians (Columbo 2019: 3). Ultimately, attacks have remained consistent from mid-2019 and have continued into 2020.

Significantly, Al-Shabaab has increased its attacks in 2020 and captured key towns (Fabricius 2020b). On 23 March 2020, Al-Shabaab took part in its "largest military operation" since the start of the insurgency (Ebrahim 2020b). Muslim militants occupied the centre of Mocimboa de Praia on 23 and 24 March 2020 (Vines 2020). A "successful assault" was conducted both by sea and land on the "strategic port" district (Ebrahim 2020b). The group destroyed barges belonging to LNG companies, captured the district, assumed control of a military base and seized "military equipment from two battalions", along with "military patrol vessels" and boats (Ebrahim 2020b).

The district's airport was destroyed; the group robbed three banks; facilities in the port were destroyed along with government buildings and prisoners were released from jail (Ebrahim 2020b; Vines 2020). They raised banners affiliated to the Islamic State (Vines 2020). Both attacks resulted in the death of 20-30 members of the country's security force (Vines 2020). Ewi and Louw-Vaudran (2020) argue that attacks in March 2020 may indicate a "long-term strategy" to seize control of communities in the north, and to embark on a "sustained guerrilla campaign" that draws inspiration from RENAMO's tactics of the past. This strategy surfaced in a video released by the militants. This video stated the aim of the group: to replace Mozambique's government with Sharia law (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020). The video states that the militants call on all viewers to "fight" under the Islamic State's flag, as they "do not want the FRELIMO flag" (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020).

On 7 April 2020, Al-Shabaab militants killed 52 civilians in the Muidumbe district of Cabo Delgado when these civilians refused to join the group (Frey 2020c). Al-Shabaab launched an attack on 21 May 2020 in the Macomia district of Cabo Delgado (News24 2020). This "early morning assault" forced thousands of locals to flee (News24 2020). The police withdrew from the area, with one officer stating that "[the police cannot] defeat [Al-Shabaab] … they are very strong" (News24 2020). Private security companies' helicopters "flew in hours after" the attack (News24 2020). Ultimately, 200 000 northerners have been forced to flee from their homes and villages and more than 1 100 locals have died at the hands of the militants since 2017 (News24 2020).

### 3.6.4. Response by government and outcomes

The response by the Mozambican government to the north's terrorist attacks has evolved: the government first denied the seriousness of the threat; it then used force to stifle attacks; private security companies were subsequently contracted by government; and lastly, the SADC was approached. This section provides a detailed description of these responses and their outcomes.

**Denial**

The first response by government was to deny the seriousness of the terrorist attacks, which ultimately led to an escalation of terrorist attacks. The Mozambican government has denied the serious nature of Al-Shabaab until recently; "dismissing" the situation as "mere criminality"

(Fabricius 2020b). The surge in attacks in 2020 has made it impossible for the government to deny the crucial nature of the terrorist attacks (Fabricius 2020b).

## The use of force

The government's second response to the terrorist attacks was to use force in the north, but this proved unsuccessful and contributed to further grievances on the part of the northerners. Mozambique's defence force is facing the "unfamiliar threat" of terrorism by Muslim militants (Opperman 2019). The army of Mozambique is "largely ineffective" in its attempt to stifle threats; young, inexperienced soldiers are being deployed in the north (Ebrahim 2020a). Reliance on "hard-power tactics" of response includes the reportedly unlawful arrest and detention of young Muslim suspects and a clampdown on the media, as seen in the case of Abubakar (Opperman 2019; Matfess 2019; Frey 2019b). Human Rights Watch reports that security forces "round up" men in Cabo Delgado and hold them in "military detention without due process" (Pirio *et al* 2019). This characteristic of poor governance — as detailed in Chapter 3 — potentially aggravates the situation in the north. Rather than responding to attacks in a non-violent manner and attempting to establish "conditions of peace" — understanding the needs of the people — the government has moved "towards oppression", states Yussuf Adam (Frey 2017). Opperman (2019a) argues that "latent fear" exists in terms of a direct confrontation of the terrorist sects in the northern region, which allows cells to roam freely in an environment of lawlessness.

## Contracting private security companies

Subsequently, the government hired private security companies, which also failed to curb the terrorist attacks in the north. President Nyusi states that various companies have offered their availability and support in order to stifle the attacks (Frey 2020a). Erik Prince, the founder of the private military firm Blackwater, supplied the government with helicopters and support staff in 2019 (Vines 2020). These were replaced by 170 Russian "privateers" of the Wagner group (Vines 2020). While the government has contracted international private security companies, these companies are "not necessarily the right kind" (Vines 2020). Wagner, the private Russian military company, is "a shadowy band of mercenaries" that uses "deadly force on behalf of the Kremlin" (Kyzy 2020). The presence of Wagner in "geopolitical hotspots" represents the "coordination" of commercial incentives and the Kremlin's national interests and the pursuit thereof (Kyzy 2020).

Russia is able to offer "geo-strategic expansion … opportunities" through Wagner (Kyzy 2020). The Wagner group arrived at Nacala airport in September 2019 (Vines 2020). Trucks, an "Mi-17 helicopter gunship", and drones were brought along and subsequently "deployed into the combat zone" of Cabo Delgado (Vines 2020). Wagner had 11 of its soldiers killed by the militants in November 2019; several of the soldiers were beheaded (Fabricius 2019, Vines 2020). These "Russian mercenaries" retreated from northern Mozambique after the militants defeated them (Fabricius 2019). Therefore, while the Wagner group is considered one of the largest private security firms globally, it has been "ineffectual" in ending and preventing terrorist attacks (Ebrahim 2020b).

The Mozambican government used the services of the Dyck Advisory Group, which is based in South Africa (Ebrahim 2020b) and is owned by former Zimbabwean Colonel Lionel Dyck who assisted FRELIMO in its defeat of RENAMO in the 1980s (Ebrahim 2020b). It was contracted for four weeks and conducted attacks in the north.

Private security groups are also contracted by the Mozambican government "to protect foreign workers" in the north (Ebrahim 2020a). The Mozambican government has agreed to pay 80 percent of the costs needed to protect foreign workers on LNG plants (Ebrahim 2020a). This payment is made to a private security group, Lancaster Six Group, a firm affiliated to Blackwater chief executive Erik Prince (Ebrahim 2020a). The government has agreed to paying this large sum in return for "an undisclosed percentage of ownership in state gas reserves" (Ebrahim 2020a).

It is suggested that the government is also considering contracting Israeli and Gulf State officials to assist in combatting terrorist attacks in the north (Vines 2020). States including the United States of America, France and the UK, as well as Angola, have also offered their support to the Mozambican government (Vines 2020). The Mozambican government has acquired military equipment from Russia, Pakistan, and France. However, this is insufficient (Ewi & Louw-Vaudran 2020) for its fight against the insurgents.

Rather than increasing the political, economic, community and personal security of the population in the north, the Mozambican government has resorted to military security that includes the use of private security organisations as a solution. This has further marginalised the population and heightened grievances held by the northerners.

### 3.6.5. Regional and continental implications concerning the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique

Poor governance and human insecurity in northern Mozambique not only have domestic implications; the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique has regional and continental implications. These include implications for Tanzania, in that the Muslim community on its side of the border could follow suit of Al-Shabaab fighters in northern Mozambique. Cross-border operations and the arresting of Tanzanian militants involved in attacks in the north speak to such implications. Youth members who identify with Al-Shabaab and are drawn in by regional terrorism actors lead to further implications for all of northern Mozambique's neighbouring states and their youths. This has potentially destabilising implications for the SADC region as a whole.

If the threat of Al-Shabaab continues in the country and spreads beyond the borders of Mozambique, this has implications for possible forms of mediation and/or intervention by the SADC and the AU. Ultimately, if Al-Shabaab is not met with an effective counter-terrorism strategy, it will persist in its objective of establishing a caliphate (Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2020). The militants are "openly declaring" their aim to create a caliphate in the north (News24 2020).

**Approaching SADC**

Most recently, the government has approached the SADC in an effort to obtain regional support to curb the terrorist attacks in northern Mozambique. Frey (2020a) states that Mozambique needs support from organisations to end the terrorist attacks, as it is a problem that involves not only Mozambique. The government has "at last" acknowledged the serious national and regional threat posed by Al-Shabaab (Fabricius 2020b). The SADC could only intervene once the Mozambican government formally requested its assistance (Chikohomero 2020). As Chikohomero (2020) observes, it took the Mozambican government "two and a half years to make such a representation" to the SADC, after opting rather to contract private security firms (Chikohomero 2020). SADC leaders met in Harare on 19 May 2020 to "formally discuss the insurgency" for the first time (Fabricius 2020b). This summit on the terrorist threat in northern Mozambique took place two and a half years after Al-Shabaab's initial attack in Cabo Delgado (Chikohomero 2020). This followed Mozambique's "formal request" to the SADC regarding the "urgent security situation" in the north

(Fabricius 2020b). President Filipe Nyusi emphasised that the government needs "co-participation" for this "multinational problem" as a solution depends on other states too (Frey 2020a). President Nyusi, according to the SADC meeting in May 2020, wants the SADC to take the "the Cabo Delgado war" seriously and regard the Islamic State as a serious threat to the country and wider region (Fabricius 2020b). Chikohomero (2020) states that the SADC must "act fast" to prevent further instability in northern Mozambique and the wider region. Although the SADC meeting ushered in hope for a plan on how the SADC can assist Mozambique, there are "no clear indications" of the SADC's "regional counter-terrorism strategy" in the north (Chikohomero 2020). The SADC's chairperson, Tanzanian President Magufuli, was not invited to the meeting (Chikohomero 2020). This was unexpected, as Tanzania's own national security is under threat from Al-Shabaab's operations (Chikohomero 2020) near the Tanzanian border.

**The AU**

The AU has yet to be involved in concrete support for the government against the terrorist attacks. In February 2020, the AU Peace and Security Council expressed its concern about the terrorist attacks in the north (Ebrahim 2020b). While the AU acknowledged the north's crisis, as well as "its willingness to support Mozambique", it could not intervene ahead of the SADC (Chikohomero 2020). This follows the "principle of subsidiarity" that governs SADC-AU relations (Chikohomero 2020). The AU's Peace and Security Council has stated the urgency to provide training and equipment to the government in order to address the threat posed by the militants (Ebrahim 2020a, Fabricius 2020a). President Nyusi did not attend an AU meeting in March 2020, as he visited Cabo Delgado instead (Fabricius 2020a). The AU's Peace and Security commissioner urged "permanent exchange of information with the Mozambique authorities" (Fabricius 2020a).

**3.7. Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to conceptually review literature on governance and human security and thereupon to apply the concepts to northern Mozambique. This chapter provided an explanation of governance as a concept, which was framed in relation to the country's constitution. This made it possible to establish how governance is practised in northern Mozambique. Human

security was subsequently discussed as a concept and thereafter the reality of human security was discussed. Seven findings concerning northern Mozambique were made in the chapter:

- Lack of accountability as a governance principle is seen in the socio-economic exclusion and grievances in northern Mozambique

- The contravention of the rule of law is portrayed as unfair, as is evidence of lack of even-handed governance.

- Ineffectiveness is reflected in the marginalisation of northerners.

- Political, economic, community and personal insecurity is the result of poor governance. This leads to frustration, discontent and feelings of marginalisation on the part of the northerners. This interlinking of human insecurity components — that characterise an enabling environment and a history of conflict — portrays "basic human insecurity" as a push factor towards terrorism.

- Al-Shabaab is filling the 'vacuum' created by poor governance and lack of human security in the north.

- Government has responded ineffectively to the terrorist attacks. The attacks have not been halted.

- Terror attacks in the north have regional and continental implications; threatening the stability of northern Mozambique's direct neighbours, the SADC region, and the African continent.

Based on the above-mentioned findings, the next chapter presents an evaluation of the study's argument regarding poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism and offers recommendations for future research.

# CHAPTER 4

## EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 4.1.    Introduction

The aim of this study was to explore what accounts for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique since 2017, as the fundamental problem is that there is no agreement among academics and practitioners.  In response to the problem the research question concentrated on examining the geopolitical and historical context, as well as governance and human security.

The study thereupon argued that poor governance in northern Mozambique leads to human insecurity in a region that is geopolitically marginalised and historically typified by continued conflict. This, in turn, creates a breeding ground for the re-emergence of terrorism.

### 4.2.    Summary

The study was conventionally structured into four chapters.  The first chapter provided an introduction to the study and the second described the geopolitical and historical context of northern Mozambique.  The third chapter examined the concepts of governance and human security and their manifestation in northern Mozambique.  This, the final chapter, presents a concluding evaluation and makes recommendations for future research.

As an introduction to the study, the first chapter identified the research theme, provided a literature overview, formulated and demarcated the research problem, identified a research question and sub-questions in response to the problem, isolated the research aim and objectives and explained the research methodology with specific reference to the concepts used in the study, the research design, the research method and the data analysis.  In the second chapter a geopolitical and historical overview of northern Mozambique was conducted to clarify the context of this region. The chapter identified five geopolitical drivers or 'broad impersonal forces' that distinguish northern Mozambique from the rest of the country.  From a historical perspective, the region has been vexed by violence in the form of terrorism that started in colonial times and has continued to the present. The third chapter examined the current context of the region with respect to governance and human security and showed that poor governance and human insecurity are

pervasive, consequently creating a breeding ground for the re-emergence of terrorism. The final chapter exploratively substantiates that the pervasiveness of poor governance and human insecurity in the region, which is geopolitically peripheral and has a history of conflict, has created a breeding ground for the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

## 4.3.    Key findings and evaluation

Terrorism in northern Mozambique has re-emerged since 2017. This is due to poor governance that has resulted in a history of conflict in the north, as well as a local environment and regional terrorism that have enabled terrorism in the north. A history of conflict intersects with this enabling environment, and terrorism of a 'new kind' is occurring (see Figure 2).

**The five geopolitical forces**

The government's management of the five geopolitical forces in Cabo Delgado has contributed to the emergence of Muslim militant terrorism since 2017. These forces include the shape of the country, the north's geographical location to Tanzania, the population of the north, the religious divide between the north and the south and the discovery of oil and gas deposits in the north.

Firstly, the shape of the country regarding the imbalance between the more prosperous south and the poorer north leaves government not accountable for ensuring political and economic security of the northerners. It does not regulate and promote economic and social development in the north; the basic human rights of the northerners are jeopardised through political insecurity (UNDP 1994: 32-33) and there is no assured basic income or a "publicly financed 'safety net'" because of economic insecurity (UNDP 1994: 25). This experience of poor governance and political and economic insecurity translates into "basic human insecurity" as a "key contributing factor" (Piazza 2008: 472) to the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. This insecurity leads to socio-economic exclusion (Matsinhe & Valoi 2019: 12) as a 'push factor' to terrorism in northern Mozambique. Grievances are held among the northerners, Muslim militants recruit northerners based on these grievances, and the north is established as an enabling environment for terrorism.

Secondly, the geographical location of Tanzania challenges northern Mozambique because of Tanzania's vulnerability to extremism. The involvement of Tanzanian militants in Mozambican terrorist attacks points to the porous nature of the north's border with Tanzania. Regional militants

are able to cross into the north, entrench themselves in communities and influence locals to join their cause. The porous borders have also allowed illicit networks to operate in the north. Illicit trade is often the only source of income for northerners who lack employment opportunities and who are not assured of a basic income or a "publicly financed 'safety net'" (UNDP 1994: 25). This economic insecurity is a push factor to terrorism; it presents basic human insecurity as a key contributing factor (Piazza 2008: 472) to the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. The probable involvement of Muslim militants in illicit trafficking allows for recruitment opportunities among locals who are involved in the illicit economy. Locals are propelled to join the militant cause, as the militants capitalise on grievances about economic insecurity. Thus, this geopolitical reality has an impact on non-state, regional terrorism, as the influence from militants from Tanzania, coupled with economic insecurity, creates an enabling environment for terrorism.

Thirdly, the population of the north contributes to the emergence of terrorism. The high rates of youth unemployment portray the lack of effective and accountable governance in the north. It leads to economic insecurity, as unemployment levels threaten an assured basic income for northerners (UNDP 1994: 25). This is a 'push' factor to terrorism as "basic human insecurity" is a "key contributing factor" (Piazza 2008: 472) to terrorism in the north. Coupled with this are the historical tensions between the Makua, Makonde, and Mwani. Al-Shabaab is largely made up of members of the Mwani ethnic group, who have experienced historical marginalisation and thus political insecurity. This contributes to grievances and resentment towards the government. Al-Shabaab capitalises on these grievances by offering the marginalised Mwani youth an identity, a "purpose in life", and an income through wages and profits from illicit trade markets in the north (Ebrahim 2020a). The political and economic insecurity of the locals is compounded by this influence of militants from abroad. Thus an enabling environment for terrorism is established.

Fourthly, the religious divide between the north and the south promotes the persistence of oppressive governance practices. This leads to the emergence of Muslim militant terrorism. The FRELIMO-backed Islamic Council expelling Al-Shabaab (as a religious sect) from its communities portrays community insecurity; northern Mozambican Sufis face oppressive governance practices, as they are barred from participating in politics; tensions have erupted between conflicting Muslim groups in the north and Al-Shabaab has therefore used its interpretation of Islam to provide a sense of identity and a feeling of community (UNDP 1994: 30-

31) to locals who have grievances against the Council and the government. This situation compounds a history of conflict between the opposing religious sides. It also creates an environment in which political insecurity is rife, and Al-Shabaab has filled this void.

Fifthly, the discovery of natural resources in the north, specifically oil and gas, has led to poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism. As economic opportunities have arisen owing to the prospects of the LNG industry in the north, these are not translated into economic security for the northerners. Uneven distribution of economic wealth from LNG projects portrays governance that is not accountable and does not promote economic growth for northerners. This contributes to "basic human insecurity" as a "key contributing factor" (Piazza 2008: 472) to the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique. There is no assured basic income or a "publicly financed 'safety net'" (UNDP 1994: 25) for the northerners. This geopolitical factor represents the 'final straw' for Muslim youth militants of the north, who have experienced sustained poor governance practices and human insecurity, and find refuge in an identity provided to them by regional terrorists. This has enabled the north to become a breeding ground for terrorism.

**The history of conflict**

When an enabling environment for terrorism, which that is characterised by the five geopolitical forces, intersects the history of conflict, terrorism is the result. The history of conflict has conspired since 1890 to perpetuate poor governance and human insecurity. Oppressive governance practices, as well as state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored terrorism, have characterised a history of conflict, personal and community insecurity and terrorism in northern Mozambique.

During the colonial period, state-sponsored conflict and terrorism by the Portuguese laid the foundation for the historical trajectory of violence, including terrorism, in northern Mozambique. The area was rife with state-sponsored terror against the indigenous population and northern Mozambican opposition to this ignited further violence, as the paper's discussion on the anti-colonial struggle demonstrates. The indigenous northern Mozambicans responded with terrorism that was directed at liberating the country. State-sponsored terrorism and the subjugation of northerners through oppressive governance practices contributed to personal and community insecurity; the northerners were not protected from physical violence and tensions erupted between

Muslim communities and the Portuguese (UNDP 1994: 31). During this time, poor governance initiated incipient and latent conflict (Blake 2016: 28). This would ultimately lead to violence, the manifestation of conflict as seen in the liberation war. In essence, the region has a history of conflict that is underlined by poor governance and human insecurity. This resulted in a history of sustained conflict and violence in the north, which is at the foundation of the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

During the anti-colonial period, FRELIMO's violence offered another stream of conflict that plagued northern Mozambique. It contributed to the progression of conflict in the country, specifically the northern region, and to personal and community insecurity. Both the offensives by the Portuguese and FRELIMO detail how both parties took up aggressive, physically violent means to terrorise the Mozambican population, northern Mozambique and the Portuguese administration respectively. FRELIMO's violent response shows its opposition to the Portuguese's violent, oppressive means of governance. Poor, oppressive governance and human insecurity were sustained during this time, and thus laid the foundation for the ongoing nature of poor governance and human insecurity for northern Mozambicans today. Personal and community security were undermined, a history of conflict was cemented, and this lies at the basis of the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

A history of conflict including terrorism was sustained beyond the pre-1964 and anti-colonial eras, through poor governance and a state-centred focus on security. In 1974, FRELIMO became the ruling administration and RENAMO was excluded from participating in politics in the newly independent state. This exclusion as a poor governance practice instilled political insecurity for RENAMO, and in response, it took up arms and carried out non-state-sponsored terror attacks. RENAMO's operations stemmed from Gorongoza in the north, the base from which attacks occurred. This sustained history of conflict has further established northern Mozambique as an enabling environment for the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017. This period extends the trajectory of historical conflict in the north and further solidifies terrorism as a characteristic engrained in northern Mozambique's history. The move from state-sponsored terrorism by the Portuguese to state-sponsored terrorism by the FRELIMO government strengthens the link between governance practices, personal and community insecurity of the people, and terrorism in

the north. This trajectory of terrorism in the north is further evident in the rehashing of conflict since 1994.

The post-1994 period portrays sustained poor governance by FRELIMO, sustained personal insecurity against northerners such as the journalist Abubakar, and violent conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO. This all contributes to the history of conflict that characterises northern Mozambique, and has foregrounded the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

Ultimately, a historical overview of conflict in the north shows that terrorism has persisted in the north, through governance practices of the Portuguese administration during the colonial period and the FRELIMO government during the civil war era. The sustained oppressive governance practices — and subsequently state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored terrorism — by the respective governing bodies and opposition forces throughout northern Mozambique's history contribute directly to the sustained personal and community insecurity of the northerners. It has laid the foundation for the recent emergence of terrorism, through the history of conflict of the northerners. This intersects with an enabling environment for terrorism and the influence of regional terrorism, which have collectively brought about terrorism of a 'new kind' in northern Mozambique.

**The nexus between poor governance, human insecurity, and terrorism**

This research paper has argued according to Piazza's (2008: 472) connection of poor governance, human insecurity, and terrorism. This connection relates directly to the two key components of terrorism in northern Mozambique: an enabling environment that interacts and intersects with a history (El-Said & Barrett 2011: 210) of conflict, including terrorism. The geopolitical forces and a history of conflict in the north show that poor governance has been an embedded factor in the region. This is seen in either lack of effectiveness, accountability and the rule of law, or the persistence of oppressive governance practices, and state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored conflict and terrorism. The geopolitical reality and the history of conflict experienced by northerners intertwine, and when compounded by regional terrorist influence, Muslim militant terrorism is the result.

**Al-Shabaab fills the 'vacuum'**

While the geopolitical realities depict poor governance, this is compounded by insecurity, including feelings of frustration, discontent, and marginalisation. These human insecurity grievances in the north lead Al-Shabaab to fill the 'vacuum' left by poor governance and human insecurity.

Firstly, the poor state of education contributes to the emergence of terrorism. The poor student-teacher ratio in Cabo Delgado suggests that the large population density in the north should dictate the way in which the FRELIMO administration governs the region and instils human security principles. The geographical location of Cabo Delgado, a province relatively far from the administrative hub of Maputo, results in lack of service delivery in the education sector on the part of the government. This causes political and economic insecurity, as education as a "basic human right" is not being extended effectively to northerners, which leads to unemployment (UNDP 1994: pol and Econ). Al-Shabaab takes advantage of "basic human insecurity" (Piazza 2008: 472) and lures recruits with promises of economic gain.

Moreover, the north's low GDP rate shows that the value of goods and services produced in the north are lagging behind the rest of the country. This impedes economic security for the north and contributes to an enabling environment for terrorism (UNDP 1994: 25, El-Said & Barrett 2011: 199).

The harsh tactics used by the government in responding to attacks further exacerbate political insecurity in the north. There is a poor relationship between the state and its populace (UNDP 1994: 32-33), which leads to feelings of resentment and distrust towards the government among northerners. Al-Shabaab exploits these grievances and offers northerners an avenue to challenge the state. The government's actions against civil society further entrench discontent and distrust among the northerners; serving as a 'push' factor towards terrorism. The arrest of whistle-blowers creates a breeding ground for terrorism in the north, as the relationship between the state and its populace is eroded. This political insecurity promotes a favourable environment for terrorism.

The abuse of locals by multinational companies and the complicity of government in this exacerbates political insecurity and further cements grievances against the government.

The forced resettlement of locals away from LNG plants exacerbates grievances and contributes to an enabling environment for terrorism. With livelihoods destroyed, and no access to fishing and farming areas, Al-Shabaab fills this void by providing food, medicine and income opportunities to locals.

Lastly, corruption scandals such as the suspension of IMF loans contributes to political and economic insecurity. The north has experienced a cut-back in its education sector as well as loss of employment in response to the corruption-induced economic crisis.

Ultimately, northern Mozambique has a history of conflict that intercepts and intertwines with an enabling environment for terrorism. These components are the result of the persistence of oppressive governance practices and state and non-state terrorism, as well as lack of accountability, effectiveness and the rule of law. This leads to the exclusion of the north from the rest of the state, as the region is placed on the periphery by government. This then perpetuates personal, community, political, and economic insecurity in the north, which stimulates discontent, mistrust and grievances held by the youth. The nature of this insecurity characterises northern Mozambique as an enabling environment that has long experienced a history of incipient, latent and manifest conflict. Thus, once regional terrorism influences the local environment, Muslim militant terrorism, as manifest conflict, is the result.

### The contravention of the constitution, SADC and AU principles

The constitution of Mozambique is the highest law of the land. As Chapter 3 shows, it is the benchmark against which effective governance in the north is measured. Chapter 3 discusses how the government is contravening aspects of accountability, effectiveness and the rule of law, as stipulated in its constitution. It is important to note that documents of the SADC and AU, to which Mozambique is party and/or signatory, explain the regional and continental standards of effective governance. Just as Mozambique contravenes its own constitution, it contravenes SADC and AU principles of effective governance and thus human security.

On the one hand, "good governance" is a key component in the SADC's mission statement (SADC 2012a). In order to "promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development", Mozambique must uphold the principle of "human rights, democracy, and the rule

of law" (SADC 2012a). The SADC's (2012b) Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan reaffirms that governance is "entrenched in a culture of democracy, full participation by civil society, transparency and respect for the rule of law", which are crucial underpinnings of effective governance (De la Harpe *et al* 2008: 7) and political and economic security (UNDP 1994: 25, 32-33). On the other hand, the AU's (2002: 3,7) Constitutive Act binds Mozambique to the principle of "respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, and good governance". The AU's Charter reiterates that the Mozambican government must "foster … transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability in the management of public affairs" as an objective for member states (African Union 2002: 3). The commitment of the government to conditions of the rule of law will "advance political, economic and social governance" (African Union 2002: 11). Together, these documents explain what the domestic situation of Mozambique as a member state implies regionally and continentally.

Mozambique agrees, as a member of the SADC (1993: 5), to provide "economic, political, social values and systems" in order to enhance "good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights …" The SADC's provisions state that the government undertakes to "refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of [the SADC's] principles [and] the achievement of its objectives", including corruption (SADC 1993: 7). The government has "failed to secure" the northern border with Tanzania (Ebrahim 2020a). This exacerbates organised crime and corruption is promoted. The ensnaring of state officials, including the police, undermines the rule of law and leads to the distrust of the public and non-transparency of government. Thus, this reality of poor governance threatens the human security of the northerners, as it is not a reflection of a "transparent [and] accountable administration", according to the SADC (2012b).

Economic and political insecurity is seen in the uneven distribution of wealth, high unemployment levels and the poor state of the north's education sector. Therefore, with limited access to basic facilities and opportunities to maximise their potential, the government fails to provide "economic, political and social values and systems" that enhance effective governance, "respect for the rule of law, and the guarantee of human rights …" (SADC 1993: 5).

The unlawful arrest of whistle-blowers prevents full participation by citizens in governance (SADC 2012b), as they fear the police in their efforts to provide information on the terrorist attacks.

The forced resettling of locals away from LNG plants, as well as job opportunities not being made available to northerners, results in governance that is not "entrenched in a culture of … transparency and the respect for the rule of law" (SADC 2012b).

Moreover, the retaining of proceeds due to locals by the government contravenes the SADC's provisions, as "economic, political and social values and systems" that Mozambique fails to provide hamper effective governance and "respect for the rule of law" (SADC 1993: 5).

On the other hand, as an AU member state Mozambique has undertaken to design and implement social and economic policies with the aim of promoting development and human security (African Union 2002: 5). Transparent and "accountable administration" must be ensured and the government is committed to "improving efficiency and effectiveness of public services" as a means to advance effective governance (African Union 2002: 11). The fight against corruption is reiterated more concretely as an objective of the AU's Charter; the Mozambican government must "fight against corruption in conformity with the provisions of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption" (African Union 2002: 3). This Convention was adopted in Mozambique's capital, Maputo, in July 2003. Mozambique must act in accordance with the principles of the "condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption", and must commit itself to "improving efficiency and effectiveness of … combatting corruption" (African Union 2002: 4, 11).

However, the porous borders in the north reflect poor governance by the state. Inability to secure the northerners from external threats reflects a weakness of government's "[undertaking] to design and implement social … policies" with the aim of promoting "human security" (African Union 2002: 5).

The passing of a proposal to combat and suppress terrorism that was only initiated a year after the initial attacks shows that the government is not accountable for the "management of public affairs" in respecting the principles of "human security" (African Union 2002: 3,7).

Lastly, the forced resettlement of fishermen and farmers also depicts government's inability to promote "development and human security" (African Union 2002: 5).

Therefore, it is evident that while the Mozambican government's practices of poor governance lead to human insecurity and the contravention of its constitution, the SADC's and AU's principles of effective governance are also contravened. The Mozambican government must focus on abiding by SADC and AU provisions in order to govern the north effectively, thus addressing human insecurity, and must deal with grievances at the foundation of Muslim militant terrorism in the north and the potential development of these across the country and the wider region.

## 4.4. Recommendations

This researcher makes the following recommendations:

- The origins of Muslim militant terrorism in northern Mozambique is under-researched. Thus, this researcher proposes further research in this area.

- In the absence of definitive research on the RENAMO Junta dimension in Mozambique, this area is also in need of future research.

- Further research is needed to establish more definitive links between poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism.

- Further research is needed on potential responses by the SADC and the AU to poor governance, human insecurity and the terrorist attacks in northern Mozambique.

## 4.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to evaluate whether poor governance and human insecurity can account for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique since 2017. Six findings concerning northern Mozambique were made in the chapter:

- Poor governance has resulted in a history of conflict in the north. It has also shaped the north as an enabling environment, as regional terrorism compounds local insecurity. This history of conflict and an enabling environment interlink and result in the north becoming a breeding ground for the re-emergence of terrorism.

- The government's mismanagement of the five geopolitical forces in the north has contributed to the re-emergence of terrorism since 2017.

- A history of conflict has conspired since 1890 to perpetuate poor governance and human insecurity into the present. This occurs in the form of community insecurity and personal insecurity.

- Lack of effective governance has enabled the north to become a favourable environment for terrorism; economic and political insecurity compounds community and personal insecurity, which in turn has created a void in the north. Al-Shabaab fills this void as the provider of economic, political, community and personal security for the marginalised northern community. Al-Shabaab is beginning to challenge the state as the provider of security for the northerners, as seen in its recent strategic focus on winning the 'hearts and minds' of the locals.

- The Mozambican government contravenes its constitution as the highest law, as well as regional and continental standards of effective governance.

- Lastly, recommendations of the chapter include future research in the following areas: the origins of Muslim militant terrorism in northern Mozambique; the RENAMO Junta; definite links between poor governance, human insecurity, and terrorism; and potential responses by the SADC and the AU to poor governance, human insecurity and terrorism in northern Mozambique.

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# SUMMARY

## POOR GOVERNANCE AND TERRORISM IN
## NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE SINCE 2017

by

Tijana Sakota

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**DEGREE** : MASTER OF ARTS SECURITY STUDIES

Terrorism emerged in northern Mozambique in 2017 and is ostensibly attributed to Muslim militants. The first attacks occurred on 5 October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia town in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. The group known as 'Ansar al-Sunnah' or 'Al-Shabaab' appears to be inspired by international terrorist clerics and followers, specifically from Tanzania, such as Sheik Aboud Rogo. These individuals share similar aspirations, including the rejection of Western education and the establishment of Sharia law. The Islamic State Central Africa Province has claimed responsibility for the attacks. This was the first spate of attacks since the guerrilla offensive during the anti-colonial war in the 1960s, as well as attacks by *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) members during the Mozambican civil war. Since October 2017, 900 people have been killed and by 21 March 2020, over 80 attacks and 100 deaths had occurred.

The aim of this research paper was to account for the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique, through the relationship of at least two causal factors. The research problem was that most of the literature on terrorism presents a one-sided explanation to account for its cause; the focus is on armed groups or their militants, while ignoring the many ways in which states (through governance, in particular) can influence the re-emergence of terrorism. The two key components of the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique — an enabling environment and the northern Mozambicans' history of conflict and specifically terrorism — therefore show

that literature centred on single religious and socio-economic causes of terrorism is discredited. The re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique challenges the explanation that terrorism is attributed to a single cause. This research identified a gap in the literature. It pertained to the state's role in facilitating and/or providing the breeding ground or enabling environment for terrorism. This research's argument was twofold. Firstly, terrorism is not attributed to a single causal factor. Secondly, ignoring the state's role in providing a breeding ground for terrorism is problematic. Therefore, the re-emergence of terrorism in northern Mozambique is likely to stem from the state's inability to secure its people adequately, providing personal, community, political and economic security through effective governance practices. This research argued that when governments are ineffective in the provision of basic security and economic needs for their citizenry, 'basic human insecurity' is a result and thus contributes to the re-emergence of terrorism. Ultimately, poor governance, poor economic development, corruption and lack of human rights are 'push factors' towards terrorism. The locals are left feeling discontented and marginalised by government, which creates grievances as a stepping-stone towards terrorism in the north. Ultimately, the culmination of a history of conflict (including specifically terrorism), poor governance practices, and the influence of regional militants not only creates an insecure environment in the north, but establishes the region as an enabling environment for terrorism.

**KEY WORDS**

Poor governance, human insecurity, terrorism, northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, Muslim, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sunnah, breeding ground, rule of law, FRELIMO, RENAMO, grievance, liquid natural gas, youth, regional terrorism, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, SADC, AU.

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