

“HONOURED MORE IN THE BREACH THAN IN THE OBSERVANCE”: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA¹ AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, 1965 TO 1979

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Abstract

The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemning Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965, culminating in Resolution 253 of 1968 imposing comprehensive mandatory international sanctions on Rhodesia. With a few exceptions, notably South Africa and Portugal, most member states supported the resolution and pledged their commitment to uphold and enforce the measures. Yet, most countries, including those at the forefront of imposing sanctions against Rhodesia, broke sanctions or did little to enforce them. An examination of the records of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia (the Sanctions Committee) shows that sanctions against Rhodesia were honoured more in the breach than in the observance.

Keywords: Sanctions, UDI, United Nations, Security Council, Sanctions busting, Ian Smith, Harold Wilson

Introduction

On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesia Front Government of Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from Britain in response to the colonial authority’s reluctance to grant independence to the country under white minority rule. Facing mounting pressure to use force to topple the illegal regime in Rhodesia from the Afro-Asian lobby at the United Nations (UN), Britain opted, to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia, instead. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson confidently predicted at the time

¹ The names Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia are used interchangeably in this paper. While the UDI leaders referred to the country only as ‘Rhodesia’, the United Nations continued to call it ‘Southern Rhodesia’ throughout the UDI period.

that Rhodesia would not survive for long and would collapse “in a matter of weeks and not months”.² Britain immediately expelled Rhodesia from the Sterling Area, froze Rhodesian assets in the United Kingdom, banned trade in arms and any further investment in Rhodesia, suspended the country from the Commonwealth Preference Area, banned any purchases of tobacco from Rhodesia and decreed that Rhodesian passports would not be recognised in Britain.³

On November 12, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 216 (1965) calling on states neither to recognise nor to render any assistance to the illegal regime in Rhodesia.⁴ Eight days later, the Security Council passed Resolution 217 (1965) exhorting states to sever diplomatic relations with the Smith government and encouraging the United Kingdom to vigorously enforce the sanctions it had imposed on its rebellious colony.⁵ Next came UN Security Council Resolution 232 (1966), declaring the situation in Southern Rhodesia a threat to international peace and security and calling all states to prevent the import into their territories of Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, and meat and meat products; the transfer of funds to Rhodesia; any trade in arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia; the supply of motor vehicles or equipment for the manufacture of motor vehicles and aircraft to the country; or the supply of oil and oil products to the Southern Rhodesia.⁶ In 1968 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 253 (1968)⁷ imposing

² Cmnd.2890, Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, Final Communiqué Lagos, 12 January 1966, cited in Richard Coggins, “Wilson and Southern Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa”, *Contemporary British History*, 20, 3 (2006), 271.

³ U.K. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Official Report, 5, 720 (HMSO 1966), columns 349-356.

⁴ UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 216 (1965)* [Southern Rhodesia], 12 November 1965, S/RES/216 (1965).

⁵ UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 217 (1965)* [Southern Rhodesia], 20 November 1965, S/RES/217 (1965).

⁶ UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 232 (1966)* [Southern Rhodesia], 16 December, 1966, S/RES/232 (1966); **For a discussion of the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, see M. P. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (London: Macmillan, 1980); L. T. Kapungu, *The United Nations and Economic Sanctions against Rhodesia* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1973); D. L. Lonsman, *International Economic Sanctions: The Case of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1979); Robin Renwick, *Economic Sanctions* (Boston: Harvard Press, 1981); H. R. Strack, *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia*, (Syracuse: University Press, 1978).**

⁷ UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 253 (1968)* [Southern Rhodesia], 29 May 1968, S/RES/253 (1968), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f27434.html> [accessed 4 April 2018].

comprehensive mandatory international sanctions on Rhodesia. With a few exceptions, notably South Africa and Portugal, most member states supported the resolution and pledged their commitment to uphold and enforce the measures. Had all the countries strictly lived up to their promises, the regime would, indeed, have collapsed in a matter of weeks. As it turned out, Rhodesia did not collapse. Its economy actually thrived, at least until 1974, in spite of sanctions. Thereafter, while the country's economy faced increasing challenges, mainly because of the escalating liberation war, spearheaded by the two leading Nationalist liberation movements, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), it still did not collapse.⁸

At the time, the Rhodesian economy did look particularly vulnerable, as the economy was small and based on a narrow range of export products dominated by tobacco. In 1965, exports accounted for approximately 40 per cent of Rhodesia's Gross National Income, with tobacco accounting for 30 per cent.⁹ According to Galtung, the Rhodesian economy was ideal for the success of economic sanctions because of its heavy dependency on foreign trade and the concentration of this trade in one product, namely, tobacco.¹⁰ It was this apparent vulnerability of the Rhodesian economy which probably convinced Harold Wilson to invoke sanctions against the country, confident that the economy would not withstand the pressure for long. Yet, the Rhodesian economy survived for a long time thereafter.

The failure of sanctions to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia led scholars, such as Strack, Losman, Doxey¹¹ and others to conclude that sanctions were an ineffective tool of diplomacy and may, in fact, produce unanticipated consequences. In Strack's opinion,

⁸ For a contrary view, see William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, "When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Southern Rhodesia Re-Examined", *African Affairs*, 87, 347 (1988), 207-37.

⁹ D. G. Clarke, "Zimbabwe's International Economic Position and Aspects of Sanctions Removal" in W. H. Morris Jones and D. Austin (eds.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House* (London: Cass, 1980), E. G Cross, "Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Policy: The Rhodesian Experience" in *Zimbabwe Economic Society, Symposium: University of Zimbabwe* (1980).

¹⁰ J. Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia", *World Politics*, 19, 3 (April 1967), 26-48.

¹¹ Strack, *Sanctions*; Lonsman, *International Economic Sanctions*; Doxey, *Economic Sanctions*; Renwick, *Economic Sanctions*.

Sanctions may be dysfunctional or counterproductive, producing results opposite to those desired by the initiators of sanctions. Sanctions can be counterproductive in the sense that they tend to increase the internal political cohesion of the target state and increase its will to resist the demands being made upon it by the sanctioning agency.¹²

It is contended here, however, that Rhodesia survived comprehensive mandatory international sanctions until 1979 because the sanctions regime was, largely, a sham. While paying lip service to sanctions, most states, Britain and the United States included, knowingly, willingly and consistently violated them. Companies across the globe conducted business with Rhodesia in defiance of UN sanctions, sometimes with the knowledge and complicity of their governments.¹³ In any case, the potential effectiveness of sanctions was already blunted by the fact that Wilson had forewarned the Smith regime as early as October 1965 of their coming in the event of a UDI, reportedly leading to a brief postponement of UDI while a Rhodesian government committee studied the “feasibility” and “survivability of economic sanctions”.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Smith regime also used the time to develop various sanctions-busting structures and strategies, including setting up dummy companies in many countries across the world and establishing misleadingly-named “information” and “tourist” offices in various capitals, which, in reality, were to drive the subsequent sanctions-busting project.¹⁵

In any case, sanctions were bound to be little more than a token gesture because those who were championing them and were supposed to be the enforcers were at the forefront of breaking them. Britain and the United States

¹² Strack, *Sanctions*, p. xii.

¹³ This view concurs with that of Joseph Kurebwa in Joseph Kurebwa, *The Politics of Economic Sanctions on Southern Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] 1965 to 1979* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2012).

¹⁴ Richard Coggins, “Wilson and Southern Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa”, *Contemporary British History*, 20, 3 (2006), 365.

¹⁵ According to Philemon Makonese of the Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) in 1974, because of the advance warning the Southern Rhodesians received about the advent of sanctions, they immediately moved to establish, Sanctions-busting offices in Europe, America, Asia (Japan) and . . . Africa . . . Offices were opened in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Lourenco Marques, Beira, London, Bonn, Munich, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Basel (Switzerland), New York, Washington, Sydney, and Tokyo . . . a good number of them . . . appear Under innocent looking names . . . the Southern Rhodesian Information Office (in Paris) . . . the Southern Rhodesian Tourist Office (in Basel) . . . the Southern Rhodesian Information Office (in Washington) and . . . the Southern Rhodesian National Tourist Board (in New York). Statement reported in *Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland (AABN), Report Southern Rhodesia sanctions seminar; AABN Kommunikee* (Amsterdam: Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland (AABN), 1975), 7. (Hereafter, *AABN Kommunikee*).

were some of the biggest sanctions breakers in the UDI period, as can be seen from the fact that, out of the 593 companies accused in the Security Council's Sanctions Committee¹⁶ of breaking sanctions in 1978, 444 were British and 92 were American companies.¹⁷ This paper seeks to demonstrate that despite the very impressive United Nations Security Council resolutions imposing what, on paper, looked like a strict sanctions regime, sanctions were more honoured in the breach than in the observance. For most countries, economic and other interests proved stronger than adherence to moral principles.

Comprehensive mandatory international sanctions

As noted, Resolution 253 (1968) imposed comprehensive mandatory international sanctions on Rhodesia and called for a ban on the import of "all commodities and products originating in, or destined for Southern Rhodesia". The resolution bound Member states to prevent the entry into their territories of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesia passport and of persons who had furthered or were likely to further or encourage unlawful actions of the Salisbury regime and the operation of airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, member states were to prohibit any activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia. Lastly, the resolution emphasised "the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia".¹⁸

To monitor compliance with comprehensive sanctions, Resolution 253 (1968) created the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee. It was instructed to examine any reports submitted to it by the Secretary-General and to seek and receive information,

from states, specialised agencies, international organisations . . . as well as private individuals regarding the implementation and alleged

¹⁶ The full name of the committee created by RES 253 (1968) was the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia.

¹⁷ J. Warson, "Entangled Ends of Empire: The Role of France and Francophone Africa in the Decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia", *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 16, 1 (2015), 3.

¹⁸ UN Security Council, S/RES/253 (1968),

breaches of sanctions and [to recommend] to the Council ways and means by which member states could more effectively carry out the Security Council decisions regarding sanctions.¹⁹

It submitted annual reports on its work and on cases of sanctions violations until the end of UDI in 1979. Unfortunately, neither the committee nor the Security Council itself had any power to punish transgressors, meaning that there was no effective deterrent to sanctions breaking apart from naming and shaming.

On paper, therefore, Resolutions 232 and 253 appeared to be water tight, covering an impressively wide range of commodities and services that should not be made available to or received from Southern Rhodesia. Given the smallness of the Rhodesian European population, which Louise White has referred to as “a suburb masquerading as a nation”²⁰ and the vulnerability of its economy as a land-locked country highly dependent on trade with, mostly, Western European countries,²¹ a serious, tightly-monitored and effective implementation of sanctions would have brought Rhodesia to its knees in a very short time. Yet, sanctions failed to destroy Rhodesia for many years, mainly because of the blatant and wanton breach of sanctions by most member states which flouted virtually all the Security Council prescriptions on mandatory sanctions.

Indeed, by March 1970, the Security Council was already expressing regret that “the measures so far taken have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end” and stating that this was partly because “some states, contrary to [UN] resolutions . . . have failed to prevent trade with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia” and the fact that the governments “of the Republic of South Africa and Portugal have continued to give assistance to . . . Southern Rhodesia, thus diminishing the effects of the measures decided upon

¹⁹ UN Security Council, S/RES/253 (1968). Its full name was the UN Security Council Committee Established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia [Hereafter, the UN Security Council Sanctions committee].

²⁰ Louise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Southern Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonisation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 29.

²¹ For a discussion of Southern Rhodesia’s heavy dependence on export trade with Western Europe, see D. G. Clarke, “Zimbabwe’s International Economic Position and Aspects of Sanctions Removal”, W. H. Morris Jones and D. Austin (eds.), *From Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House* (London: Cass, 1980), 29-31; E. G. Cross, “Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Policy: The Southern Rhodesian Experience”, Zimbabwe Economic Society, *Symposium-University of Zimbabwe* (1980).

by the Security Council”.²² This became a refrain repeated in all subsequent Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, showing that the call to enforce sanctions was clearly falling on deaf ears. Thus, as late as 1977, the Security Council was still, “deeply concerned that . . . (sanctions) . . . have so far failed to bring to an end the illegal regime” and pointed out that “sanctions cannot put an end to that regime unless they are . . . strictly supervised and unless measures are taken against states which violate them”.²³

A major weakness of the UN sanctions regime from the very beginning was the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to enforce them. South Africa voted against Resolution 253, ostensibly, because it did not believe in such measures and insisted that the dispute between Britain and its colony was a domestic issue which should be resolved by the two parties on their own. Meanwhile, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Japan were not yet members of the UN²⁴ and were, thus, not bound by UN sanctions. Because of its neutrality policy, Switzerland refused to subscribe to sanctions. In February 1967, the Swiss government informed the Security Council that “for reasons of principle, Switzerland, as a neutral state, cannot submit to the mandatory sanctions of the United Nations”. It promised, however, that its Federal Council would “*see to it that Rhodesian trade was given no opportunity to avoid United Nations sanctions through Swiss territory*” [emphasis added].²⁵ This proved to be one of the most mendacious statements of all time, as Switzerland proceeded to become the financial hub for various sanctions-breaking companies, schemes and projects throughout the UDI years.

Concerned, particularly, about South Africa and Portugal’s refusal to enforce sanctions, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2383 (1968) calling for South Africa and Portugal to be forced to comply. Clearly demonstrating the lack of will on the part of the big powers to ensure that sanctions against Rhodesia were strictly enforced, the United States and Britain voted with

²² UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 277 (1970) [Southern Rhodesia]*, 18 March 1970, S/RES/277 (1970), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f24824.html> [Accessed 28 March 2018].

²³ UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 411 (1977) [Mozambique-Southern Rhodesia]*, 30 June 1977, S/RES/411 (1977), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f17130.html> [accessed 28 March 2018]

²⁴ They only became members in September 1973.

²⁵ UN Security Council S/RES/253.

South Africa and Portugal to reject the resolution.²⁶ Subsequent attempts to extend sanctions to South Africa and Portugal failed because of consistent opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States.²⁷ Thus, Portugal and South Africa were allowed to continue to undermine UN sanctions. However, South Africa and Portugal were not the only countries to circumvent sanctions. Numerous other countries turned a blind eye to their nationals' sanctions-busting activities, their public support for sanctions, notwithstanding.

Subverting the sanctions regime

South Africa was at the forefront of subverting international sanctions partly because of its sympathy with kith and kin in Rhodesia, many of whom had originated in South Africa or where they had relatives. Its leaders were also aware that, if sanctions against Rhodesia succeeded, this would set a precedent which would see the same strategy applied to South Africa because of its apartheid system which faced worldwide condemnation.²⁸ South Africa, thus, maintained economic ties with Rhodesia and acted as a conduit for the country's clandestine trade with the rest of the world. Evidence that South Africa and Portugal were assisting Rhodesia to break sanctions was highlighted by the seventh report of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee which stated that Southern Rhodesia's exports "increased from a total estimate of \$474 million in 1972 to an estimated total of \$640 million in 1973", but import statistics of those countries that continued to import goods from Southern Rhodesia (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, United States, Malawi, Zambia, Switzerland and other countries) amounted to only \$171 million of Rhodesian exports in 1973. It was evident, therefore, that "some \$479 million of SR exports were originating in neighbouring countries . . . indicating that SR was able to send its commodities to the world markets through South Africa and Mozambique".²⁹ As a lot has been written on South

²⁶ UN General Assembly Resolution 2383 (XXIII). 7 November 1968, Question of Southern Rhodesia

²⁷ United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonisation, *Decolonization*, 11, 5 (July 1975), 31.

²⁸ A.S. Mlambo, "We have Blood Relations over the Border ': South Africa and Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965–1975", *African Historical Review*, (2008), 40:1, 1-29

²⁹ UN Security Council Committee Established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia, *Seventh report of the Security Council Committee Established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia* (New York: UN, 1975), S/11594/Add.3, Appendix 1, paragraphs 2-5, 35.

Africa's role in facilitating Rhodesia's sanctions busting campaign, South Africa's role need not detain us here.³⁰

While South Africa and Portugal were open about their disdain for international sanctions, many other countries continuously broke sanctions even though they claimed to be in full support of them. The offending countries included France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, West Germany, Britain, the United States of America, Israel, various African countries (Gabon, Kenya, Angola, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South West Africa),³¹ Brazil, Mauritius, and Taiwan, among others. Even vocal supporters of the African liberation struggle in southern Africa, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites and China were accused of violating sanctions, while the Japanese took advantage of the vacuum created by the withdrawal of British products to supply Southern Rhodesia with a wide range of goods.³² German, Japanese, French and Dutch exports increased by 62%, 62%, 22% and 24%, respectively, while Swiss imports from Rhodesia increased by 107% in the two years following UDI.³³ Methods used to break sanctions included "false certificates of origin of the goods; the concealment of the true destination of the goods; and the establishment of letter-head-companies or fronts".³⁴ Select case studies are discussed below.

FRANCE

Recent work by Joanna Warson³⁵ has documented France's widespread and consistent violation of Rhodesian sanctions for both economic and political

³⁰ Mlambo, A. S. "We Have Blood Relations Over the Border': South Africa and Southern Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965-1975", *African Historical Review*, 40, 1 (2009), 1-29; R. C. Good, *The International Politics of the Southern Rhodesian Rebellion* (London: Faber & Faber, 1973); J. Jardim, *Sanctions Double Cross* (Lisbon: Intervenção, 1978); J. Handford, *A Portrait of an Economy Under Sanctions, 1965-1975* (Salisbury: Mercury Press, 1976).

³¹ Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland were captive countries which had no choice but to trade with the neighbouring white minority-ruled countries since their economies were intricately intertwined with these neighbours. Because of its landlocked location and its historic economic and transport dependency on its southern neighbour, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia found it difficult to completely disengage, economically, with that country.

³² K. Flower, *Serving Secretly: Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe 1964-1981* (London: John Murray, 1987), chapter 4.

³³ J. Handford, *A Portrait of an Economy Under Sanctions, 1965-1973* (Salisbury: Mercury Press, 1976), 21.

³⁴ Francis Nehwati, "Economic Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia", *The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo 9-14 April 1973: papers and Documents* (Nordic Africa Institute, 1973), 159.

³⁵ J. Warson, "Entangled Ends of Empire: The Role of France and Francophone Africa in the Decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia", *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 16, 1 (2015); J. Warson, "A Secret History of African Decolonisation", *History Today*, 65, 4 (April 2015), 36-43.

reasons; the second being a desire to undermine British hegemony in southern Africa. France was signatory to both Resolution 232 and 253. Soon after UDI, the French government had declared that France would stop French companies from trading in Rhodesian tobacco, sugar, chrome, asbestos, arms and helicopters, and that French companies would no longer be permitted to sell oil to that country. This commitment notwithstanding,

In the first three months of 1967 . . . France imported two hundred per cent more Rhodesian merchandise than it had done in the same period in 1966 . . . From importers of Rhodesian tobacco, sugar, and metals, to exporters of French oil, arms and automobiles, allegations were made against French companies throughout the UDI period.³⁶

On October 5 1970, the *Rhodesian Commentary*, published by the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, reported that:

Kits for Renault and Alfa Romeo cars have arrived in Rhodesia at a time when stocks of certain other models previously assembled were believed to be running low. This latest coup by the government will bring sighs of relief from harassed potential car buyers . . . The news is generally hailed as yet another victory against sanctions . . . since the end of 1968, French, German and Japanese cars have at all times been assembled in Rhodesia from kits.³⁷

It is estimated that approximately 50 per cent of all cars on Rhodesian roads during the UDI period “were made by one of two French manufacturers: Renault and Peugeot”.³⁸ On 23 October 1970, the United Kingdom government reported to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that French, German and Italian car manufacturers were still shipping motor car assembly kits for Renault, Peugeot, Citroen, BMW and Alfa Romeo cars to Rhodesia for assembly by Willowvale Motor Industries in Salisbury.³⁹ The French, German and Italian governments denied that their companies were

³⁶ J. Warson, “Entangled Ends of Empire”, 2-3; J. Warson, “A Secret History of African Decolonisation”, 37.

³⁷ UN Security Council, “Fourth Report of the Committee Established in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253 (1968)”, Special Supplement No. 2, (1971) (Here after called “UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Fourth Report”), Special Supplement No. 2”, 1971, S/9844/Add.2, Annex VII, page 125.

³⁸ J. Warson, “A Secret History”, 2.

³⁹ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Fourth Report, 175

supplying cars or car-assembly kits to Rhodesia but only to its neighbouring countries.⁴⁰

In 1974, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee listed a number of sanctions violations by several French companies, including Peugeot Automobiles which continued to operate a car assembly in Rhodesia, and Aluminium FraGais, which also operated in Salisbury and Bulawayo. A French company manufacturing armoured vehicles, Panhard, was said to have sold several vehicles to the Rhodesian government in 1973, while the Alouette helicopters which the Rhodesian Security Forces used to combat national liberation fighters were also supplied by France. These helicopters were manufactured in France by a state-owned company called Sud-Aviation (SNIAS) and then transported to Rhodesia “in Cargo Airlines operated by French Line UTA”. According to Warson, the Rhodesian Defence Forces depended heavily on arms and air transport and fighter jets supplied by France and had “at least 50 French-manufactured Alouettes in the service of the Rhodesian Air Force . . . between 1965 and 1980”.

In addition, Rhodesian Forces also used “Mirage F1 planes and Maxtra rocket launchers” also from France.⁴¹ Moreover, France was also reported to have sold a number of diesel locomotives to Rhodesia via the Mozambican port of Beira, while a French bank was named as one of several international banks which had pledged “secret loans for the construction of an Austrian steel plant in Rhodesia”.⁴² Meanwhile, five years after Resolution 253, a Rhodesian Information Office still operated in Paris and co-ordinated trade between the two countries and also facilitated travel to Rhodesia.⁴³ Despite the Resolution forbidding any airline and travel links with Rhodesia, in 1974 the French travel company UTA still maintained offices in Salisbury and Bulawayo and helped to promote Rhodesian trade and tourism overseas.

France also facilitated Rhodesia’s sanctions-busting campaign by enlisting the support of two Francophone countries, Gabon and Ivory Coast in establishing a trade network that helped Rhodesia to carry on trading with a number of

⁴⁰ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Fourth Report, 1971, S/10229/Add.1, 115.

⁴¹ J. Warson, “A Secret History”, 2.

⁴² UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, *Eighth Report*, S/11927, Annex V., 48.

⁴³ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, *Eighth Report*, S/11927, Annex V, 49.

African and European countries for the entire UDI period.⁴⁴ In Gabon, France found an enthusiastic ally in its president Omar Bongo who actively collaborated with Rhodesian sanctions-buster Jack Malloch in violating international sanctions. An alleged CIA agent, participant in several African wars and coups, a man who did some work for the French Secret Service in the Katanga during the Congo Crisis of the 1960s, smuggler of arms into Biafra during the Nigerian civil war and a man closely involved with the notorious mercenary Bob Denard, Malloch was also closely linked to the Rhodesia Special Air Service regiment and participated “in some of that unit’s long-range cross border operations”.⁴⁵

Despite the fact that Malloch was, clearly, not a friend of the liberation struggle and that Gabon was a full member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was in full support of the liberation of southern Africa from white minority rule, Bongo used his office to enable Malloch to register his Trans-Africa Airline (TAA), established in 1964, in Gabon and to fly on sanctions-busting missions for Rhodesia as a Gabonese company. Malloch’s planes could, thus, fly to Europe and other countries freely. When Trans-Africa folded up, Malloch set up Affretair which smuggled Rhodesian beef, disguised as Gabonese, into European and African markets even though Gabon did not produce beef at all. Affretair cargo planes, carrying loads of beef and other Rhodesian products, flew from Salisbury to Libreville, where Bongo’s people would have the papers of a re-registered aircraft and cargo manifest showing that the cargo originated in Gabon. Using Malloch’s planes, Rhodesian government officials travelled to various European capitals at will to make sanctions-busting arrangements. Also with Bongo’s support, Malloch used his many dummy companies registered in Switzerland and Lichtenstein and other European countries to smuggle goods into Europe and Rhodesia.⁴⁶

Like many public figures who, outwardly supported sanctions but secretly violated them, Bongo was unfazed by his duplicitous conduct, as evident in the

⁴⁴ J. Warson, “Entangled Ends of Empire”, 8-12.

⁴⁵ Allan Brough, “Tango Romeo: The life and Times of Jack Malloch” www.jackmalloch.com Accessed 14/03/18; Dan Remenyi, *Captain Jack Malloch: The Life and Times of a Southern Rhodesian Entrepreneur* (Reading: ACPIL, 2014).

⁴⁶ J. Makuwire, ‘How Omar Bongo Rescued Ian Smith’, *The Zimbabwe Times*, 11 June 2009; J. Warson, “A Secret History”, 3.

fact that in June/July 1977, he hosted an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers meeting in Gabon which adopted resolutions condemning:

All kinds of collaboration with the racist illegal regime of Rhodesia, countries of the world, particularly those sanctions breaking Western countries, as well as Japan and Israel . . . (urging them) . . . to put an end to their economic, trade, military, sports, telecommunications and other kinds of cooperation with the retrogressive regime of Salisbury.

The Gabonese Minister of Foreign Affairs participated fully in drawing up the resolution, knowing very well that his country was one of the worst offenders.⁴⁷ When challenged by the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on the Affretair arrangement, the Gabonese Government responded that Affretair had now been incorporated into Air Gabon, the national airline, and, therefore, “the former shareholders of Affretair became ipso facto shareholders of Air Gabon”. The Gabonese government, thus, dismissed this matter as no longer an issue, stating “so far as the Gabonese Republic is concerned, the Affretair problem has already been resolved, since the company no longer exists”.⁴⁸ This was very misleading, for, while Affretair ceased to exist, the same operators of the airline were still operating but only now as part of Air Gabon. They continued their smuggling activities on behalf of Rhodesia. In October 1977, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee was informed that Affretair had been replaced by two airlines, namely, Air Gabon Cargo based in Libreville, which used “the same office and facilities previously operated by Affretair” and Cargoman Ltd of Geneva and Muscat, which was also run by the same former Affretair staff. The planes of the two airlines were reportedly landing at Brussels, Ostend, Lyons, Balalaie, Doha, Maje Island (Seychelles), Kinshasa, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Lubumbashi, Colombo and Schiphol. It was clear, therefore, that Air Trans Africa, Affretair, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Ltd were all the same airline whose operations were designed to circumvent UN sanctions.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ CM/Res. 551(XXIX), OAU, Council of Ministers Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session, *Resolutions Adopted by the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers*, Libreville, Gabon, 23 June – 3 July 1977.

⁴⁸ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Tenth Report, Special Supplement 2, vol. 1, 1978, S/12529/Rev.1, 223.

⁴⁹ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Tenth Report, Special Supplement 2, vol. 1, 1978, S/12529/Rev.1, 228.

BRITAIN

As the colonial power which had invoked sanctions against the rebel regime of Ian Smith, it would have been expected that Britain would be exemplary in its observance and enforcement of international sanctions. The truth, however, was that British companies, sometimes with the knowledge of members of the British government, contravened sanctions. This is because for Britain, as Paul Moorcraft observed, “Sanctions were a gesture, never a concerted policy . . . they were applied slowly, half-heartedly and cynically”.⁵⁰ Indeed, Britain only imposed sanctions on Southern Rhodesia “primarily to ‘save face’ with the Afro-Asian nations”.⁵¹ Arguably, British government leaders did not really believe in the efficacy of sanctions, nor were they wholeheartedly committed to enforcing them. In fact, Britain, like many other countries, turned a blind eye when its nationals violated UN sanctions. For example, soon after the oil embargo decree, evidence showed that two British oil companies, Shell and BP, were contravening sanctions, first, by ferrying oil by road through Beit Bridge and, later, by railway from the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques. In 1967, annoyed at the fact it was being constantly accused by the British government of breaking international sanctions, the Portuguese government revealed that out of the total of 169 oil tankers which entered Lourenco Marques between April 1966 and May 1967, 58 were “of British nationality and in the service of British companies”.⁵²

In 1976 an investigative report by the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ (hereafter called CSA) entitled *The Oil Conspiracy* confirmed that “South African subsidiaries of Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP had, since the unilateral declaration of independence, supplied Rhodesia with all its oil requirements” and that they did this by selling oil to a South African company called Freight Services Ltd., which, “with the knowledge and intention of the oil companies, had resold the oil to Rhodesia”.⁵³

⁵⁰ Paul Moorcraft, “Southern Rhodesia’s War of Independence”, *History Today*, 40, 9 (September 1990).

⁵¹ Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, “The Oil Conspiracy: An Investigation into How Multinational Oil Companies Provide Southern Rhodesia’s Oil Needs”, (New York: CSAUCC, 1976), 8.

⁵² National Archives of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, (hereafter referred to as NASA-DFA) 1/156/1/18/10. Vol. 1, Petroleum – British Action in Moçambique Channel.

⁵³ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, *Eleventh Report*, Thirty-Fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, (1979), 247, S/13000Vol. II; The Centre for Social Action, *The Oil Conspiracy: An Investigation into How Multinational Oil Companies Provide Southern Rhodesia’s Oil Need* (New York: The Centre for Social Action,

The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and the United States where the companies were headquartered received this incriminating report but did absolutely nothing to either further investigate on their own or to reprimand the oil companies concerned. In fact, the British government wrote to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that it had studied the CSA's report and had discussed it with the oil companies mentioned. It was persuaded, however, that "neither those companies nor any company in which they had an interest had engaged either directly or indirectly in supplying crude oil products to Rhodesia".⁵⁴

Commenting on the British government response, one Bernard Rivers (co-author of *The Oil Conspiracy*) observed that he had found the response "an extremely puzzling statement" and concluded that "the only possible explanation for the response by the United Kingdom Government had been that the head offices of Shell and BP had not been aware of the activities of their South African subsidiaries or that they lied to the United Kingdom Government".⁵⁵ The truth, however, was that "both the parent companies and the United Kingdom Government" had known that the companies' oil was being passed on to Rhodesia by their South African subsidiaries, so the response of the United Kingdom Government presented to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee in 1975 "had been known by the Government to be untrue". The governments of the United States, France and the Netherlands had also made similar denials to allegations about their companies.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, in 1966, Britain disingenuously deployed its Royal Navy, commonly known as the Beira Patrol, off the Mozambican coast, ostensibly, to enforce the oil embargo by preventing oil tankers offloading their cargo at Beira. The Navy was only withdrawn in 1976, following the independence of Mozambique from Portugal. Patrolling the Mozambican Channel was, merely, a public relations exercise, as Rhodesia was still able to import oil through

June 1976); The Haslemere Group & The Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Submission to British Government Enquiry on Allegations of Sanctions-Busting by Shell and British Petroleum", 23 April 1977.

⁵⁴UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Thirty-Fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 247.

⁵⁵UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Thirty-Fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 247.

⁵⁶ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 248.

Mozambique's southern port of Lourenco Marques which the Royal Navy did not patrol for fear of offending South Africa.⁵⁷

In March 1977, Martin Bailey published the *Shell and BP in South Africa* report highlighting the role the two companies still played in keeping Rhodesia's oil needs supplied. The publicity following the report eventually spurred Prime Minister James Callaghan to set up the Bingham Commission of Enquiry to investigate how Rhodesia had been obtaining oil since UDI and whether British oil companies had been involved in selling oil to the country.

In its 1978 report, the Commission recorded that "Shell and BP had been supplying Rhodesia with oil for most of the period since the unilateral declaration of independence".⁵⁸ The report confirmed that, following the imposition of the oil embargo in December 1965, oil and oil products had been sent to Rhodesia by road from South Africa. Then in December 1966, Shell Mozambique Ltd (owned by both Shell and BP) began supplying oil from the Middle East and from Shell and BP's Durban refinery directly to Rhodesia through Lourenco Marques even though Shell Mozambique was a British company registered in London and, therefore, subject to British sanctions legislation. The oil products were sold to a South African intermediary, Freight Services, which then sold to GENTA, the Rhodesian procuring agent, for resale in Rhodesia.⁵⁹ In order to cover up their illegal activities,

Shell and BP . . . with the full approval of their head offices, began in January 1968 to operate on the basis of a 'swap' arrangement in which, instead of supplying oil directly to Rhodesia, they would reimburse the French company, Total, for the total amount of oil it would have supplied to Rhodesia on their behalf. This arrangement was accepted and endorsed by Shell and BP executives and a British Government

⁵⁷ R. Mobley, "The Beira Patrol: Britain's Broken Blockade Against Southern Rhodesia", *Naval War College Review*, 55, 1 (2002).

⁵⁸ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Report on the Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Southern Rhodesia*, (London: HMSO, 1978) (Hereafter, The Bingham Report]; UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 249.

⁵⁹ J. Handford, *Portrait of an Economy Under Sanctions, 1965-1975* (Salisbury: Mercury Press, 1976), 21.

Minister, George Thomson, at two meetings held on 21 February 1968 and 6 February 1969.⁶⁰

It is alleged that, on being informed of the 'swap' arrangement, Thomson had replied that, "since the Government could truthfully say that no British oil was reaching Rhodesia, its position was quite defensible".⁶¹ According to another source, "at least, two ministers in Wilson's Cabinet and high-ranking civil servants were told about [the swap]"⁶² Thus, the violation of sanctions by British companies continued with the full knowledge and approval of the British Government until Mozambique's independence in 1976, by which time Shell and BP had supplied "about 2 million tons, constituting nearly 20 per cent of Rhodesia's needs" since 1966.⁶³ Government was fully in the picture about the sanctions violations, as the relevant information was shared "at meetings between the oil companies and Government in 1968 and 1969".⁶⁴

The British government was happy to support sanctions busting by Shell and BP, as long as this remained a secret and the companies did not supply oil to Rhodesia directly. This was acknowledged by the former Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1978 when he said that he had known that British oil was reaching Rhodesia, but had been satisfied "that the oil was not being supplied by British oil companies themselves".⁶⁵ Thus, his government had agreed to the swap arrangement, but resolved to keep this a secret, "lest British 'sincerity' on enforcing the embargo be questioned".⁶⁶ Harold Wilson maintained the charade of insisting that his administration had faith in the sanctions policy, even though the British government had known "as early as December 1967 that economic sanctions had not stopped oil from reaching Rhodesia".⁶⁷ In the face of such blatant duplicity, the President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda was well justified to declare that "Wilson lied to me just as he lied to the world",

⁶⁰ *The Bingham Report*; UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 249.

⁶¹ Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 249.

⁶² Bernard D. Nossiter, "British Cover-Up".

⁶³ Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 249.

⁶⁴ Thirty-fourth Year Special Supplement, No. 2, Vol. II, 249.

⁶⁵ Roy Reed, "Callaghan Asks Study of Breaches of Oil Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia", *New York Times*, December 16, 1978.

⁶⁶ *The Washington Post* September 20, 1978, - Bernard D. Nossiter, "British Cover-Up"; Kenneth Rodman, *Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 201), 146-147.

⁶⁷ Roy Reed, "Callaghan Asks Study of Breaches of Oil Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia".

especially given the fact that over the 12 years in which his own government violated oil sanctions, he had consistently flayed “the French, Portuguese, and the United States for ensuring Rhodesia’s unbroken supply of oil”.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, two British multinationals, Lonrho and Anglo-American continued to operate in Southern Rhodesia throughout the UDI years. With its business connections and operations in South Africa, Lonrho was a ready vehicle for circumventing sanctions and, indeed, invested substantially in the country, acquiring a number of companies, including Rhodesia Mining Star (1966), Nippon Motor Sales (Rhodesia) (1966); David Whitehead & Sons (1968); Rhodesian Wattle Co. (1969); Zambezi Coachworks (1969); Shamva Gold Mine (1969) and Falcon Athens Gold Mine (1974). In 1973-74 alone the number of Lonrho companies in Southern Rhodesia is reported to have increased from 32 to 40.⁶⁹ Reportedly, in order to circumvent sanctions, in 1968 Lonrho bought the uneconomic Edmundian Copper Mine just across the border in Mozambique, presumably to enable it to export copper from the richer Rhodesian Inyati Copper Mine on the Rhodesian side of the border which it had acquired in 1965. According to Cohen, this “”allowed Inyati’s copper to be transported across the border and then re-labelled as ‘ex-Edmundian’, after which it continued its journey to Beira to be sold on the world market”.⁷⁰

THE UNITED STATES⁷¹

The United States was also a major sanctions violator despite its public pronouncements in support of the African people’s demand for majority rule. Yet, America’s reaction to UDI, under the Johnson presidency, had been one of immediate condemnation. Indeed, the day following UDI, America decreed a

⁶⁸ Bernard D. Nossiter, “British Cover-Up”

⁶⁹ workerssocialistparty.co.za/struggle-for-a...zimbabwe/can...zimbabwe.../chapter-4 Accessed 06-04-18

⁷⁰ Andrew Cohen, “Lonrho and Oil Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37:4 (2011), 729. Lonrho was also accused of shipping copper from its mine in Karoi (Southern Rhodesia) in 1969 disguised as being of Mozambique. See Francis Nehwati, “Economic Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia”, in *The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo 9-14 April 1973: Papers and Documents* (Nordic Africa Institute, 1973), 160.

⁷¹ Much literature on the United States and UN sanctions exists, therefore, only a brief outline will be given in this paper. Among them are A. de Roche, *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001); G. Horne, *From the Barrel of a GUN: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); A. Lake, *The ‘Tar Baby’ Option” American Foreign Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University press, 1976); Eddie Michel, “The Luster of Chrome: Nixon, Southern Rhodesia, and the Defiance of UN Sanctions, *Diplomatic History*”, 42, 1 (2018), 138–161.

comprehensive embargo on the shipment of arms and military equipment to Rhodesia, discouraged American private travel to the country, suspended import quotas for Rhodesian sugar, and withdrew diplomatic status from the minister for Rhodesian Affairs in the British Embassy in Washington.⁷² Although the United States supported Resolutions 232 (1966) and 253 (1968), it eventually became clear that, in practice, the United States was “second only to South Africa in sanction-busting”.⁷³ Influential for the United States’ lukewarm approach to sanctions, at least until the Carter administration, was the policymakers’ conviction that whites in Southern Africa were there to stay and the “only way that constructive change can come about is through them”. This was the considered recommendation of the 1969 National Security Study Amendment 39 (NSSM39).⁷⁴ The American government acted on this advice by softening attitudes towards and policies on white-ruled southern Africa and engaging more in communication with rather than ostracism of these regimes.

A major breach of UN sanctions was the passing of the Byrd Amendment in 1971 permitting American Companies Union Carbide, Foote Mineral and Allegheny Ludium to import chrome from Rhodesia. The justification was that this would free the United States from dependence on the Soviet Union for the strategic mineral. As a result, “19 ship loads of Rhodesian strategic minerals were imported into the U. S. between April 1 and October 1 1972, in violation of U. N. sanctions. The items shipped were chrome ore and nickel”.⁷⁵ Southern Rhodesia exports to the United States jumped from \$115 000 in 1970 to \$25 670 000 in 1973.⁷⁶ With the adoption of the Byrd Amendment, the United States joined the ranks of South Africa and Portugal as the only nations publicly and voluntarily breaking sanctions against Rhodesia.⁷⁷ Despite a widespread outcry against this violation of sanctions, the United States continued to import Rhodesian minerals until the repeal of the Byrd Amendment in March 15 1977.

⁷² United States Department of State Bulletin, December 1965, 908, Cited in Tonye Awoye Whyte, “U.S. Reaction Towards UN Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia from 1965-1977: An Analysis”, MA Thesis, Atlanta University (1981), 25.

⁷³ Whyte, “U.S. Reaction Towards U.N. Sanctions”, 38.

⁷⁴ Mohammed El-Kawas and Barry Cohen, “*The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa*,” NSSM 39 (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1976). See also E. Michel, “The Luster of Chrome”.

⁷⁵ *The Washington Post*, January 4, 1973.

⁷⁶ Report of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, S/11594/Add.3, appendix I.

⁷⁷ E. A. Paschall, “The Price of United States Noncompliance with United Nations Southern Rhodesian Sanctions”, *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 5, 2 (1975), 564.

The United States also violated sanctions in other ways. For instance, although Resolution 253 prohibited tourists from visiting Rhodesia, in August 1974, newspaper columnist Jack Anderson reported that hundreds of US travel agencies had violated sanctions for years by arranging tourist visits to Rhodesia and that in 1973, 20% of Rhodesia's visitors (approximately 288 105) were from the United States.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington DC and the Air Rhodesia office in New York City, whose general manager was also the representative of Rhodesian United Touring Company (UTC), were allowed to continue to operate in violation of the UN sanctions resolutions.⁷⁹

The Rhodesian offices were facilitating the violation of sanctions in other ways as well, the most blatant being the General Manager of the Air Rhodesia office in New York's arrangement for Mervyn Eyett, his superior at Air Rhodesia headquarters in Rhodesia, to visit the United States to meet "with executives of McDonnell Douglass, Boeing and United Airlines to arrange for the purchase of three Boeing 720s for Air Rhodesia". In 1973, he also arranged for the "sale of a DC-8 to the Rhodesian regime . . . which is, presently, being used to export Rhodesian beef. United Airlines trained the pilots for both the DC-8 and the Boeing 720s in Denver, Colorado".⁸⁰ Captain James Mackenzie Sweeney of Rhodesian Airways later told of how he and two others entered the United States via Frankfurt, Germany, travelling on false passports and how they received training to fly Boeing 720 aircraft in Denver, Colorado. On completion of the course, they left for Basel, Switzerland, where the purchase of the three Boeings 720s was already underway. They could not fly the aircraft directly to Rhodesia, however, since authorities would not validate their flying licences. Therefore, German pilots flew the planes to Lisbon from where the Rhodesian pilots took over flying to Salisbury via Angola.⁸¹

Air Rhodesia, apparently, bought the three Boeing 720s from one Carl Hirsman, a Swiss banker with business interests in Europe, Africa and the

⁷⁸ Paul Irish, Janet Hooper, "Tourism to Southern Rhodesia: Breaking Sanctions" (New York: Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, October 1974. [Hereafter called CIC Brief, October 1974].

⁷⁹ CIC Brief-October 1974.

⁸⁰ CIC Brief-October 1974. Because of the negative publicity that accompanied the above activities, the United States Treasury Department, finally, closed the Air Southern Rhodesia offices in May 1974.

⁸¹ Mitch Stirling, Air Southern Rhodesia's Boeing 720s. SouthernRhodesianheritage.blogspot.com/2013/05/air-SouthernRhodesias-boeing-720s-continued.html Accessed 29-3-18.

United States and who had bought the planes in the US in 1970. Although his US export licence contained the clause that the US Government must authorise all future release, he was allowed to sell the planes to Rhodesia unchallenged. The coincidence of the purchase of the aircraft and the training of Rhodesian pilots to fly the planes suggests that there was collusion and coordination among the involved parties, including American airline and other leaders.

Clear evidence that sanctions were merely cosmetic is the following report which appeared in Rhodesia at the time:

Air Rhodesia's three Boeing 720 jet airliners were acquired after 'dozens of false starts' in the airline's secret negotiations in several countries to buy passenger jets. Captain Pat Travers, the chief executive, revealed . . . that they had received many offers of American, British, and European aircraft, but there was always a hitch until the 720s were offered . . . [According to Captain Travers,] . . . "It would surprise a few United Nations officials to know which countries were willing to sell to us."⁸²

Furthermore, American air carriers, Pan American, TWA and other American airlines continued to work closely with Air Rhodesia, cooperating in making reservations and ticketing⁸³ in defiance of Executive Orders 11322 and 11419 of January 5 1967 and July 29, 1968 which expressly prohibited,

Operation of any United States Air Carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or (ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Rhodesia.⁸⁴

As late as April 1974, it was reported to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that 21 US airlines still maintained "interline agreements" with Air Rhodesia. Meanwhile, like British Shell and BP, America's Mobil oil company was also violating the oil embargo. CSA revealed how "Mobil Oil Corporation's subsidiary in South Africa and its subsidiary in Rhodesia jointly planned and

⁸² Air Southern Rhodesia-Those Embargo-Busting Jets, [http://SouthernRhodesianheritage.blogspot.com/2013/05/air-Southern Rhodesias-boeing-720s-continued.html](http://SouthernRhodesianheritage.blogspot.com/2013/05/air-Southern-Rhodesias-boeing-720s-continued.html)

⁸³ Anthony Lake, *Business As Usual* (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974), 6.

⁸⁴ Whyte, "US Reaction to UN Sanctions", 99.

implemented a decade long campaign to provide Rhodesia's oil needs", despite repeated denials by Mobil's executives in the United States that they were breaking sanctions.⁸⁵ Like its British counterparts, Mobil used middleman companies and GENTA to disguise its sanctions breaking.

NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands was yet another major violator of international sanctions, as evidenced in two cases publicised by the Netherlands Anti-Apartheid Movement (Anti-Apartheids Bevegings Nederland –AABN) in 1974. The first involved a company known as Etablissement Zephyr (Zephyr), a shell company working with Joba Chemicals, based in Amsterdam, which was channelling goods from and to Southern Rhodesia in blatant violation of international sanctions. The company had a global network of collaborating firms.⁸⁶ Established in 1948, originally as an international trader in light chemicals and pharmaceuticals, Joba became a trader of general merchandise after sanctions were imposed on Southern Rhodesia, supplying its Rhodesian clients through two Rhodesian firms, namely, Central African Pharmaceuticals (CAPS) and Aromex. The former specialised in the importation of light and heavy chemicals and some medicals, while the latter dealt in a "large range of general merchandise, industrial tools and spares." Joba integrated its supplier-client network in 1970 by establishing Zephyr Amsterdam, as "a paper organisation to cover up Joba's illicit trade with Southern Rhodesia".

It also established a transport and shipping firm called Sabal to facilitate the physical transportation of goods to and from Rhodesia directly through, Beira in Mozambique, but used mainly the well-established shipping firm SCAC based in Rouen, France. SCAC then either shipped the goods to Beira or Lourenco Marques or liaised with Affretair to fly the commodities in and out of Europe. Financing these operations were the Dutch bank, Van Lanschot, and the Overseas Bank in Geneva. Instructions to ship goods in either direction came from Joba with strict conditions that "the packaging should in no way

⁸⁵ Whyte, "US Reaction to UN Sanctions", 75; Centre for Social Action, *The Oil Conspiracy* (New York: United Church of Christ, 1976), 3.

⁸⁶ Suppliers of goods through the Zephyr network included firms from West Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan, United States, Switzerland, China, France, Finland, Chile, Israel, Hungary, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, Turkey, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands, among others.

indicate the supplier and under no circumstances was the client in Rhodesia to learn the origin of his goods".⁸⁷

The second case exposed by the AABN involved the well-coordinated smuggling of Rhodesian tobacco into the Netherlands and its distribution to companies all around the world by companies in the Zephyr network.⁸⁸ The tobacco smuggling network was first reported in a Dutch newspaper in June 1973 which revealed that the Netherlands was massively involved in the Southern Rhodesian tobacco trade, using false certificates of origin to import, approximately, 6 000 metric tons of Rhodesian tobacco per year. Despite the newspaper's detailed statistical evidence, the Dutch Government's organ for investigating economic offences reported rather surprisingly in May 1974 that "no trace of tobacco smuggling could be found in the Netherlands and further investigation would be uncalled for!"⁸⁹

AABN reported that its research revealed that Joba Chemicals/ETb. Zephyr Co. imported large amounts of cigarettes which had been warehoused in Beira from late 1972 to early 1973. The three Dutch companies involved were Tobacco Export Import Compagnie (TEIC), a subsidiary of Rothman International; A. L. van Beek International, B. Q. and Oskar Rohte Jishoot. They dealt mainly with Salisbury Tobacco Exporters (Saltobex), a company jointly owned by Oskar Rhohte Jishoot and TEIC. The two companies had subsidiaries all over the world, including in West Germany, Brazil, Dominican Republic, United States, Turkey, Greece, Colombia, Jamaica, Fiji, Malawi and Zambia, among others. TEIC and Van Beek used Rothman International connections worldwide to distribute the smuggled tobacco. A Japanese company, Mitsui, was, reportedly, importing Rhodesian tobacco through a Rothman International Verafumos Company of Brazil. On the basis of this evidence, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee concluded: "It appears that Security Council resolutions 217 (1965), 253 (1968) and 333 (1973) which prescribe sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are being heavily violated in the Netherlands."⁹⁰

At the centre of the Zephyr network was one John Bredenkamp, a leading sanctions breaker and owner of the Casalee Group of Companies, registered in Geneva, which started off as tobacco leaf merchants trading Rhodesian

⁸⁷ [S/11594/Add. 2, Annex v, Page 3-4]

⁸⁸ S/11594/Add.2, Annex v, page 50.

⁸⁹ S/11594/Add.2, Annex Q, page 51. This would seem to suggest that the Dutch government was deliberately turning a blind eye to the violation of sanctions.

⁹⁰ S/11594/Add.2, Annex Q, pages 51-53.

tobacco and then expanded into trading all types of products in violation of UN sanctions. “The Casalee Group grew . . . to become the fifth largest tobacco merchant in the world and the biggest non-US leaf tobacco company.”

Bredenkamp used a company which he had set up in 1976, Intabex (Tobacco), to sell Rhodesian tobacco and then used the proceeds to procure arms, fighter planes and other products for the Smith regime.⁹¹

OTHER COUNTRIES

Other European countries were also involved in sanctions breaking, as evident in the big multi-nation conspiracy to finance the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company (RISCO) production capacity from 400 000 tons to 1 million tons per year which came to light in 1974 and which the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee described as, “the most serious case to come before it of violation of the sanctions . . . in terms of both the money and the number and importance of the financial institutions and industrial corporations involved”.⁹²

The matter came to light first in the *Sunday Times* (UK) of April 14, 1974 which revealed that there had been a widespread conspiracy to evade sanctions by a number of foreign firms, including VOEST (National Steel Company) of Austria, European American Finance (Bermuda) Limited, an offshore subsidiary of European American Bank, which was a New York bank jointly owned by six European banks (including Britain’s Midland Bank); European Banks International; another Brussels-based subsidiary of European American Banking; and Handels-Gesellschaft, based in Zurich, Switzerland. The scheme was said to involve £24 million.⁹³ Apparently, plans to finance RISCO had been drawn up in 1972.

The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee summarised the scheme as follows:

A major Austrian company was to build the new plant. A large German steel manufacturer was to buy the extra steel produced. And two banks – one Swiss, one Austrian – were to provide the money to build the new plant. The Austrian company is named as VOEST and the German

⁹¹ NIZA, John Arnold Bredenkamp, archive.niza.nl/docs/200503291053497103.pdf

⁹² S/11597, United Nations Security Council, Special Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia on External Participation in the Expansion of the Southern Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. 15 January 1975, page 8.

⁹³ *Sunday Times*, April 14, 1974.

company as Neunkircher-Eisenwer. A Swiss bank was also to fund the project. A consortium of Rhodesian banks was to guarantee the foreign loans. They were Barclays Bank International, the Standard Bank, Nefirho and Rhodesian Acceptances.⁹⁴

Later, 13 organisations met in Paris to work out the complex arrangements of how to transfer the required currency to Rhodesia clandestinely. All organisations attending this meeting, except Swiss banks, (Switzerland was not a member of the UN) would have broken UN sanctions. At the meeting, it was agreed that European American Finance (Bermuda) Ltd would provide a £12 million multi-currency loan to RISCO “through the medium of Handelsgesellschaft of Zurich”.

The plot became public when a British subject, Kenneth McIntosh, who had been employed by a Rhodesian merchant bank, obtained incriminating documents detailing the conspiracy and dispatched them to a relative in Britain for safe keeping. He had, subsequently, made good his escape but was arrested in Malawi and deported back to Rhodesia. Following McIntosh’s arrest, his relative had passed the documents on to the *Sunday Times* (UK). McIntosh was tried and sentenced to five years in prison for obtaining the documents which were harmful to Rhodesia’s interests. The state prosecutor struck a deal with McIntosh’s attorney for the papers to be retrieved in return for a reduced prison term for his client. The attorney travelled to Britain to negotiate with the newspaper for the return of the documents but the newspaper refused and proceeded to publish them. In retaliation, the Rhodesian courts convicted McIntosh on 113 extra counts, including violation of the Official Secrets Act by sending the documents to Britain. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison. In a dramatic ending to the saga, McIntosh was assisted by one of his prison guards to escape from the country. According to *New York Times*,

Mr McIntosh had been taken by Mr Spencer (a prison guard) from Salisbury Prison to a hospital for medical treatment. Subsequently . . . Spencer telephoned the prison to say that McIntosh had arrived safely. By the time the hospital was checked this morning, both men were

⁹⁴ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee January 1975 report, Annex 1. Significantly, the first two Rhodesian banks were subsidiaries of British banks!

missing. It was then learned that Mr Spencer's family had already left the country.⁹⁵

Several European countries also contravened the prohibition of promoting or engaging in tourist activities to Rhodesia. In May 1975, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee reported that it had received information that,

a number of travel agencies, airline companies, car-rental firms and credit-card companies in many countries were involved in organising and providing ancillary services for promoting tourism or facilitating travel to and from Southern Rhodesia . . . contrary both to the spirit and letter of Security Council provisions establishing sanctions against the illegal regime'.

West Germany was reported to be providing "the largest contingent of overseas tourists visiting Rhodesia from Western Europe", but the government was not doing anything to stop this traffic.⁹⁶

Japan was yet another sanctions breaker, described by Colin Legum in 1969 as having a "notorious record of breaking sanctions against Rhodesia" and accused of exporting "about £4.5 million worth of supplies to Rhodesia in 1967 . . . importing £400 000 worth of Rhodesian goods"⁹⁷ in violation of sanctions. As noted, Japan took advantage of Britain's withdrawal from the Rhodesian market to flood the country with its goods, particularly Toyota, Isuzu, and Mazda cars and other Japanese models. In January 1971, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee learnt that Rhodesia had received 800 fully assembled Toyota Corolla cars in the months of September and October 1970.⁹⁸

On April 5, 1974, the *New York Times*' reported that "in the last two years, Japan's official figures of the imports of chrome from South Africa were considerably larger than South Africa's statistics for chrome exports to Japan". For instance, in 1972 "Japan imported 445 000 metric tons from South Africa, while South African export figures showed only 253 000 tons were exported".

⁹⁵ *New York Times*, February 6, 1975.

⁹⁶ s/11927, 25.

⁹⁷ Colin Legum, "Japan and Africa 1968" in Colin Legum and John Drysdale (eds.), *Africa Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents, 1968-69*, vol. 1 (London: Africa Research, 1969), 44.

⁹⁸ UN Security Council Sanctions committee Fourth Report, 175.

According to the newspaper, diplomatic sources were charging that Japanese concerns had been using false South African certificates of origin and shipping the chrome through either South Africa or Mozambique". In addition, in violation of Resolution 253, Japan's External Trade Organisation was maintaining a representative in Salisbury.⁹⁹

In July 1974, the Organisation of African Unity denounced Japan for trading with Rhodesia. Documents in its possession revealed that "nine Japanese trading firms had been exporting Japanese products to Rhodesia secretly, via Mozambique". Again, Japan's official trade statistics for chrome showed higher amounts imported into Japan than exported from South Africa, raising suspicion that "the difference demonstrated the amount of chrome that Japan was importing from Rhodesia against the UN resolutions".¹⁰⁰

Even the Soviet Union was also accused of breaking sanctions, its avowed support for the African liberation movements, notwithstanding. In its Ninth and Tenth report in 1977 and 1978, the UN Security Council Sanctions committee recorded a complaint from the British Government that the Soviet Union and four other Eastern European countries, including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, had been accused in a report to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee by British UN representatives in September 1976 of conducting "regular trade" with Rhodesia in a "major sanctions-breaking operation". The trade was, apparently, conducted through a Rhodesian trading agency, Michelle Enterprises Ltd, which, allegedly, exported "tobacco and other agricultural commodities from Rhodesia and, in turn, imported chemicals, metals, and agricultural requirements from Eastern Europe". The trade was reportedly conducted through three Geneva-based companies, Comaisa, Tobatrade and Centrex, which had been set up for the purpose. The trade also involved the sale in Eastern Europe of cigarettes made from Rhodesian tobacco and packaged "as Benson & Hedges, Pall Mall, Lucky Strike, Chesterfield and State Express – all fraudulently purporting to have been manufactured in the United States and Britain". Subsequently, "the Soviet Union state-owned trading company, All-Union Corporation for Trade in Miscellaneous Goods, and the Bulgarian state tobacco trading company had

⁹⁹ The *New York Times*, April 5, 1974.

¹⁰⁰ Masako Osada, *Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations Between Japan and South Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 65.

entered negotiations through a Geneva company, Intabex, to buy Rhodesian tobacco from the Rhodesian company, Tradim-pex”.

The paper further reported that a Lichtenstein-based firm called Tobmark Ltd facilitated the purchase of Rhodesian tobacco for “Tobacco State Enterprise of Iraq and Tabak DSO Bulgarskituni of Sofia, Bulgaria”. It concluded that other countries charged “included West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, several African nations, Turkey, Iraq, Israel and the United States”.¹⁰¹ This charge was vigorously rejected by the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations as well as by the Soviet Union.¹⁰²

On its part, the Middle East Airlines Air Liban of Lebanon sold a Viscount commercial plane to Mervyn Edward Eyett, formerly head of the Air Rhodesia office in New York and, reputedly, Ian Smith’s chief procurer. When challenged by the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, the airline executive argued that Eyett was an aircraft agent whose headquarters were located in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique and that the first time it learned that the plane had “subsequently been acquired by Air Rhodesia” was when Air Liban received an enquiry from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The airline also stated, unconvincingly, that “it had no knowledge whatsoever of the intentions and motives of the purchaser”.¹⁰³

On its part, Australia continued to export wheat to Rhodesia. On being challenged why it had recently sent a large consignment of wheat to Rhodesia, the Australian Government came up with a very disingenuous response, arguing that it had “permitted the export of wheat to that country [Rhodesia] on humanitarian grounds” because “sanctions [were] never intended to deprive the Rhodesian population – of whom the overwhelming majority are black Rhodesians – of basic foodstuffs”. It went on to claim that “wheat is an important part of the diet of the majority of the black population of Rhodesia and it is no part of the Australian Government’s policy to inflict hardship on the indigenous population through its application of sanctions against the Smith

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council, Sanctions Committee, Ninth Report, Special supplement No. 2, Vol. 1, S/12265 and Tenth Report, January 1978, S/12529; also reported in *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1977.

¹⁰² UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Tenth Report, Supplement No. 2, Vol. 1, 1978, S/12529/Rev.1, 15-16; 154; 161.

¹⁰³ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, Fourth Report, 1971, S/10229/Add. 1, 125.

regime”¹⁰⁴. This startling claim was made even though the main staple of the majority African population was, in fact, maize and not wheat.

A number of African countries continued to trade with Rhodesia in spite of international sanctions. Apart from Gabon, whose case was discussed earlier, other African countries which violated sanctions were Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia, South African Customs Union countries, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South West Africa (Namibia) Kenya, Madagascar and Cote d’Ivoire. The hostage states of Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana had little choice since they were heavily dependent on the neighbouring white-ruled country economies, while Zambia’s economy and transportation routes for her copper and other exports made it difficult to cut all ties with the white-ruled countries to the south. Even when Zambia eventually closed its border with Rhodesia, it was impossible to completely stop economic interactions. Meanwhile, Malawi’s Kamuzu Banda had taken a deliberate decision to cultivate close ties with white-ruled Southern Africa and defied the Organisation of African Unity and African critics of his policy, ostensibly, for the good of his country.¹⁰⁵

Keeping Rhodesia’s Defence Forces armed

Clear evidence that many governments merely paid lip service to sanctions is the fact that Rhodesia was able to secure arms of war and planes for its army and air force throughout the UDI period. The arms may have been more expensive to procure because their acquisition was handled through third-parties or middlemen, but they made their way into the country, nevertheless. Most worrying was the fact that some of the leading pro-sanctions countries supplied these arms and aircraft. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement published a list of the arms of war which Rhodesia acquired from 1967 to 1977, revealing that Rhodesia sourced arms and aircraft from Italy, the USA, the UK, France, Switzerland, Jordan, Luxemburg, Israel, Belgium, Portugal and West

¹⁰⁴ UN Security Council Sanctions committee, Fourth Report, 1971, @/10229/Add. 1, 140.

¹⁰⁵ A. S. Mlambo, “Voci discordanti: l’Organizzazione dell’Unita African e la Dichiarazione Unilaterale di Indipendenza, 1965-1979 / Discordant Voices: The Organisation of African Unity’s Response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1965-1979”, *Afriche e Orientali*, Special Issue 2 (2011), 108-122.

Germany.¹⁰⁶ In its May 1979 report, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee acknowledged that arms were still getting into Rhodesia despite sanctions, describing the process in which this happened as follows:

Violations of the existing arms embargo to Southern Rhodesia appear to begin with legally-sanctioned transfers which are then redirected, somewhere between the supplier and the alleged legal recipient. This redirection appears to be effected by private arms brokers or middlemen of diverse nationality, operating from diverse nations who are able to evade government restrictions through forged documents, [and] clandestine shipments.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

As shown, many countries which had publicly supported Resolutions 232 (1966) and 253 (1968) wantonly violated both the spirit and the fact of the law of the resolutions. It is instructive that, as late as May 1979, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee was still listing the same violations which it had identified from its very inception and which made an appearance in virtually every report since then. These included: continued air links with Rhodesia; the existence of Rhodesian information and other offices in member states territories; supply of military equipment to Southern Rhodesia; continued supply of oil and oil products to the country; trade violations, the persistent operation of foreign companies in Southern Rhodesia, and the recruitment of mercenaries to fight in Rhodesia, on-going sporting activities, and South Africa's continuing support for Southern Rhodesia, among other issues. It emphasised that Southern Rhodesia had "survived the full effect of the sanctions through the failure of certain states to implement those sanctions

¹⁰⁶ Anti-Apartheid Movement, *Fire Force Exposed* (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979), Appendix 1 lists the following arms and aircraft: 19 Aermacchi-Lockheed Trojan Al60-C4 Light military aircraft, 2 Viscounts aircraft; Lockheed C130 cargo planes; 2 Aerospatiale SA330 Puma helicopters; Hawker-Hunter jet fighters; Tiger-cat missile system, 41 Centurion tanks, 120 Aden canons; 3000 SAM missiles, 400 000 rounds of 30mm ammunition; @ DC-8-55 F jet traders, 1 CL cargo plane; 20 Cessna-Reims FTB light reconnaissance planes; 4 QV-10F twin fuselage spotter aircraft; 6-12 Mirage II jet fighters; 106 mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles; Aloutte III helicopters; 22 Siai Marchetti SF 260 Warrior light strike aircraft; G3 self-loading rifles; and 11 Agusta Bell AB 205 'Huey' helicopters.

¹⁰⁷ UN Security Council, Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia in Implementation of Paragraphs 3, 12, and 8 of Security Council Resolutions 409 (1977), 411 (1977) and 445 (1979), Respectively, S/13296, 4 May 1979.

scrupulously, if at all . . . deliberately, negligently, or unwittingly”¹⁰⁸. Instead of “certain States”, the report might as well have said “most states”, for, as noted, the list of sanction violators was long. They continuously undermined mandatory sanctions and helped the illegal regime survive.

The complicity of many countries in this colossal deception was acknowledged by US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in a 1977 memorandum to the United States President in which he wrote:

Since we [the US] are making a major effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment in this country, you may be interested to know that many other nations pay lip service to the UN sanctions but do little to enforce compliance. South Africa facilitates sanction breaking by providing false certificates of origin and disguised trade channels. Rhodesian exports are often consigned to South Africa and re-exported. Although we have no official trade figures published by the Smith government, the relative health of its economy is testimony to widespread sanction breaking . . . It is clear that the Japanese take more Rhodesian exports than any other country. West Germany is Rhodesia’s largest trading partner in Western Europe but there is also substantial Rhodesian trade with the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Italy. Switzerland acts as Rhodesia’s financial clearing house and dummy corporations in Lichtenstein also facilitate the Rhodesian trade. Rhodesia’s oil supply originates in Iran and is trans-shipped through South Africa. If we are successful in repealing the Byrd Amendment, I will approach our friends in Western Europe and the Japanese about their sanction violations. Unless we get our own house in order, however, we will have trouble persuading our allies to observe sanctions.¹⁰⁹

Clearly international sanctions against Rhodesia were more honoured in the breach than in the observance, as countries acted very differently from what they professed to be committed to do.

¹⁰⁸ UN Security Council Sanctions Committee Report, 4 May 1979, S/13296.

¹⁰⁹ NLC-128-5-22-7, The Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance to the President – Memorandum February 14, 1977. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/.../1977.02.14%20Vance%20Memo%20for%20Carter.pd>