The Pathology of Political Conundrum and the Utilisation of M&E Information in the Public Service in Africa

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ABSTRACT

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems continue to be at the centre of and a reference point for effective public service performance management ethos. A clear distinction exists between performance measurement and performance management, the latter carrying an addition for use of M&E performance information generated from the M&E systems. The performance management regime has been overtaken by the new public governance or the so-called "New Public Service" that goes deeper in suggesting a wholesale use of M&E information within complexities of stakeholder management and the public service political space. The debate on the consumption of M&E performance information starts in the quest for pursuing an agreement in the public interest. Evidence demonstrates that politics and political space affect the level of adoption and use of M&E information. The ferocity of politics and complexities of the political operating environment have the ability of distressing consumption of M&E information.

INTRODUCTION

This article on the pathology of political conundrum and utilisation of monitoring and evaluation performance information in the public service seeks to establish the relationship between and influence of politics on consumption of performance information. It stems from the premise of six elements pertaining to the process of institutionalising monitoring and evaluation (hereafter referred to as M&E). M&E becomes complete and

effective when the public service embraces all six elements, namely: defining measuring object (planning), development of performance indicators, data collection, data analysis, reporting, and consumption of performance information.

This article is based on the partial findings of the study on *Analysis of the M&E System of the Tanzanian's Local Government.* The study brings into focus the extent to which the above-mentioned six M&E elements are relevant and interlinked. The research was conducted in five of Tanzania's Local Government Authorities (LGAs), representative of all four categories that exist in the country. The study employed a qualitative research method, investigating relevant regulatory frameworks for M&E at national and local government levels. The study further reviewed local government documents related to the six elements of institutionalisation of M&E. This article is based on the premise that, first, effective M&E system happens when there is a wholesale adoption and operationalisation of all six elements; and second, a performance management regimen is incomplete and may not bring intended positive effects in circumstances where the public service fails to consume the generated M&E performance information.

A NEED FOR M&E IN AFRICA?

Basheka (2012:31) argues that public administration systems in Africa existed before colonialism, even though they are not widely documented. The pre-colonial African governments devised mechanisms for service delivery by the leadership or governments with some degree of monitoring and evaluating the same. African public administration faced various capacity-related challenges. By the 1980s, external and internal turmoil forced African governments to take measures and adopt strategies that could address service delivery woes. African governments undertook measures to improve service delivery, however, the most prominent ones linked with M&E are the public service reforms and poverty reduction strategies. These reforms and strategies contributed to the establishment of single or multiple national M&E systems in the continent.

Public service reforms appeared in various shapes on the African continent and even beyond. It is an indisputable fact that reforms were introduced by external influences. However, a demand for changes in the public service existed from as early as the 1980s. The reforms emphasised mainly results and accountability (Morgan, Baser & Morin 2010:31). It was assumed that M&E is a product of various reforms that took place in the public service. However, there is a controversy as to whether M&E as a practice and profession emerged from public service reforms. Nevertheless, M&E is essential as it facilitates measurement of performance, informs decision-making, determines

resource allocation, guides human resources management, and recognises performance Mngomezulu & Reddy (2013:96). The actions of public administrators and ability of the government to provide the required level of services is managed through a performance management regime. Greiling (2005), cited in Fourie (2012:131), argues that performance management aims at improving external accountability within the context of governance, while simultaneously increasing the internal efficiency of government institutions. It is in this context that this article examines the extent to which politics and political environment affect the consumption of M&E performance information.

In the context of public administration, M&E aims at realising a performance management regimen that supports the provision of quality services through increased accountability, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency. M&E acts as an enabler to the government officials in the provision of services from design, execution, reviews, feedback, and reporting stages. The scientific management, classical, rational, systems or human relations approaches of the public administration highlighted key elements necessary in building an appropriate and effective M&E system for the public service (Kimaro 2017). M&E can be a subset of performance management, while the latter cannot be effective in the absence of the former. The operationalisation of an M&E system depends on the existing public administration environment, where the political environment and dynamics of politics at hand affect decisions made on generated M&E performance information.

CONCEPTUALISING M&E INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Monitoring and evaluation systems generate performance information (PI) in qualitative or quantitative form, or in both. Lopez-Acevedo, Krause & Mackay (2012:27–30) present essentials of an M&E system which includes demand for and utilisation of generated PI. Conceptualisation of monitoring and evaluation PI can be described from a rights and democracy perspective, that is, participation in policy processes. Aristotle, for example, presents 'man' as a political animal and suggests taking turns in leadership of a 'just' organisation Scruton (2007:38). On the other hand, the pressure to governments to be more accountable and results orientated led to the adoption of public service reforms and measures in order to set systems of accountability. Chelimsky (2006), cited in Latib (2014:461) shifts focus and value from the 'nuts' and 'bolts' of national M&E systems to the extent to which they foster inclusivity in decision-making and accountability of public authority and use of meager resources. Kimaro (2017) described *POSDCORB* (derived from the initial letters of the various management roles: Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting), and how the prescribed

management style influences the M&E elements. *POSDCORB* sketches M&E in an organisation, providing avenue for operationalising the same through the prescribed management roles.

The M&E systems have been introduced to facilitate interactions between governments and citizens. New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) insisted vehemently on inclusion of non-state actors in the management of the affairs of the governments. Morgan & Cook (2014:23) summarise the NPG stance as prioritisation of the common good over administrative processes with efficiency and effectiveness. The M&E performance information sets a forum of which the government and citizens meet and describe expectations, achievements and challenges in service delivery. In summary, NPG propositions offer avenues in which to scrutinise government efficiency and effectiveness in a detailed and organised fashion. Performance-based incentives and sanctions are defined in these forums. According to NPG, trust and legitimacy form part of incentives for good performance as determined by the PI. An analysis of M&E and resulting PI ought to scrutinise values embedded into the system. Pertinent questions related to reasons for establishing M&E systems relate to design, level of adoption in various government spheres, inclusivity, type of PI generated, and its utilisation.

Sustainability of M&E systems depends on enforcing in the supply and the demand side the generation of useful and reliable PI in a timely manner. Olsen (2015:101–104) describes relevance and preferences of public service managers with regard to forms of PI, that is, qualitative or quantitative. The type of PI determines the adoption of suitable methodology for capturing the results of government interventions (Holvoet & Renard 2012:68). Ideally, PI results from the performance indicators identified in the planning documents (inputs, outputs, outcome, impact, and composite). The pre-NPM/NPG performance information dwelt on internal indicators, such as processes. The NPM/NPG era advocates concerns of both the supply and the demand sides of M&E and PI is measured at outcome and impact levels (Lopez-Acevedo *et al.* 2012:88).

RELEVANCE AND CONSUMPTION OF M&E PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

M&E systems have been implemented at various levels and public service institutions in different countries. There are countries in which M&E systems are well established at the central level compared to the local government. Tanzania and the Republic of South Africa are examples of such (Kimaro 2017). The varied interpretations and the level of institutionalisation are caused by several factors that include: comprehensiveness of the

Figure 1: Monitoring and evaluation domain

Monitoring and evaluation domain facilitating performance measurement and performance management domains

Defining measurement object

Formulation of indicators

Data collection

Data analysis

Reporting

Use of performance information

Performance measurement domain

Performance management domain

M&E regulatory frameworks; political will; availability of resources; institutional and individual capacities; and demand for M&E information, to mention but a few. Despite the challenges facing M&E in the public service, the same continue to be an important management tool. Figure 1 presents the disparities that exist between performance measurement and management. A meaningful system that measures public service performance ought to be broader in context and scope to include consumption of generated M&E performance information. Performance management become meaningful when generated information is applied to enforce accountability and facilitate policy processes.

Bouckaert & Halligan (2008:32) add to the correlation between performance measurement and performance management by pointing out that the latter carries both measurement and management of information and action. On the other hand, Mngomezulu & Reddy (2013:94) add that M&E is a key tool used in all stages of performance measurement and performance management, especially when it relates to the level of reporting

performance results to stakeholders. M&E performance information consumption is of the utmost importance because it establishes the existing performance management regime. Among the four performance management regimes introduced in the work of Bouckaert & Halligan (2008), two present a commitment of the public service institutions to producing and consuming performance information (performance management and performance management regimens). It is important to note that a successful performance management regime cannot exist without a comprehensive, well-institutionalised M&E system.

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS ON THE USE OF M&E PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

Science supports understanding of social and political phenomena. Pathology is a science of establishing cause-and-effect relationships, together with the consequences of the same. Political or social pathology are common terms that establish relationships between various socio-political variables. The political base of power and power relationships among various actors fits in the context of Harold Lasswell's definition of politics as *"who gets what, when, and how"*. Since the beginning of government, there has been some form of agreement on power relations though agreed political processes. Politics influence policy processes in either a negative or a positive way. The political environment determines public administration institutions' decision making in pursuit of common good or public interest, or *vice versa*.

Thornhill (2012:58) argues that the influence of politics on public administration depends on the type of society, groups, political history, and type of government. Complexity of politics in the public service varies depending on categories of groups based on religion, tribes, political history, race, gender, or a combination of these, which contribute to complex political demands of and influences on public administration. The source of politics and political influence in the public service emanates from one or other or all of these: within the public service affecting the whole government; within the public service institutions; or external to the public service, that is, communities, interest groups, political parties, development partners, or regional and global institutions.

The level of interaction between public administration and political environment predominantly depends on the level of democratic processes and institutions. Complexities of politics and the political environment in the public service increase over time. Looking further back to the American public administrations' '*Spoils System*', one question which arises is whether politics is a necessary evil in the public administration governance

systems. The definitions of politics are located squarely in the public administration dis-cipline. *"The Study of Administration"*, written in 1887 by Woodrow Wilson, emphasises the separation of politics in policy processes from the administration. He further argues that policy should be limited to politicians or elected officials, while the administration should implement policies, as political influence could lead to corruption, irrational deci-sion making, and interference in administrative efficiency.

The relationship between politics and administration determine level of use of M&E infor-mation in public administration. Key variables picked from the models are policy and policy processes; and appointments into the public office. The models describe scenario where there exists a fertile ground for utilisation of M&E information, for example, when public service upholds professionalism and absence of party supremacy. Furthermore, the models raise a pertinent variable of public administrators appointments to service that influence effectiveness of the M&E systems and use of generated performance information. Security of tenure of public administrators of a given model determine willingness of the same to generate, share and utilise M&E information. Hostile political conditions and lack of security of employment contribute to public administrators or executive shying away from M&E information that may have political consequences and opt for a neutral or middle ground.

Intergovernmental relations of a particular country determine the political environment between the central and local government. The intergovernmental relations shapes and influence operations, particularly of the latter. Fourie (2011:159) describes well the relationship and political environment between the central and local government. He defines political decentralisation to shifting authority by selecting political leadership and representatives from central to local governments, thereby transferring the authority for socio-politico-economic divisions from central to local government and to communities. Fourie (2011:159) further argues that successful decentralisation requires a strong and committed political leadership at both the national and local spheres of government. The complexities of such relationships influence the extent of political influence that the central government has over the local government. Decentralisation-by-devolution intends to give autonomy to the local government with a minimal level of control from the centre (*eyes-on, hands-off*), however, this has not been the practise in many cases.

CONSUMPTION OF M&E PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

Kimaro (2017) states that the six elements of institutionalisation of M&E include: defining measurement object; formulation of indicators; data collection; data analysis; reporting; and use of performance information. An effective M&E system in the public service carries

Figure 2: Consumption of M&E performance information

all the six elements, therefore completing the performance management cycle. Ideally, the sole purpose for creating M&E systems is to facilitate use of performance information to improve public sector management and governance (Lahey, 2015:2). Governments need to go beyond the generation of performance information (supply) to using the same in decision making. Accurate internal and external reports which are generated solely from the M&E system need to trigger its adoption and use for various purposes.

Figure 2 presents various uses of M&E generated performance information. It informs decisions on initiating, scaling up, or eliminating programs, credible information about results, also in resource allocation or budgeting processes as argued by Lopez-Acevedo *et al.* (2012:6) and Pollitt & Bouckaert (2011:170). Linkages exist between performance information with reviews of institutional plans: objectives or goals, strategies, targets and corresponding performance indicators. Successful institutionalisation of M&E and performance management regimes contribute to execution of sanctions and rewards to individuals, managers, units or entire institutions based on performance results. Nonetheless, Bouckaert & Halligan (2008:28) caution on the possibility of inadequate capacity in institutions to put in place instruments (tools, techniques for generation and anchoring of data, and processing of information into procedures or documents). Seasons (2003:434) adds that lack of use of M&E information in decision-making processes may lead to some institutions becoming wary of M&E processes themselves, perceiving them as lengthy and complicated.

Monitoring and evaluation complement one another. The first challenge on the consumption of M&E-generated performance information lies in the foundation and construction of the system itself. In an ideal situation, monitoring and evaluation can co-exist with both given prominence, practised in a complementary manner. However, monitoring can exist without evaluation or there could be a situation where one is dominant over the other; in many cases, monitoring overrides evaluation. This situation shows existence of less demand for M&E information, as is the case with the Tanzanian local government (Kimaro 2017). Tanzania, just like many developing countries, faces a number of challenges on performance evaluation. Common bottlenecks towards M&E information utilisation includes accountability based on budgets than outcomes; collection of too much performance data, uncoordinated and overlapping institutional arrangements for M&E and not conducting performance evaluations.

An effective way of analysing the demand for and use of M&E systems-generated performance information starts with the existence and implementation of evaluation plans. The research on analysis of local government M&E systems in Tanzania's local government shows that only 20 percent of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) under the study possess an evaluation plan mentioned in the Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP), though not detailed enough to mention envisaged evaluation studies (Kimaro 2017). Furthermore, the study reveals that only 40 percent of the local government strategic plans allowed for plans to conduct performance review based on performance indicators. This is a good movement towards promoting evaluation in the local government. However, sporadic existence of evaluation defeats the object of establishing M&E systems and for the consumption of performance information.

UTILISATION OF M&E INFORMATION ON THE CROSSROAD

On a scale of 1 to 4, utilisation of M&E performance information in Africa scored less than 1.83 (Holvoet & Renard 2012:70). Two explanations for the low score exist: that there is less demand for the PI; or that there is inadequate political commitment to utilising the same as it is being generated by the countries M&E systems. The public service operates in a more complex decisional environment, unlike the private sector, with lower managerial control (Cohen, Eimicke & Heikkla 2008:191–192). The analysis of the political-administration interface stems from answering some basic inquiries. The first inquiry tends to look at the influence of politics on administration in the existing environment of the country or community. The second revolves around protection of public service employees' positions in the occurrence of executive-political accidents – in case

there is a serious difference of opinion with political actors in respect of positions or decisions. The inquiry stems from investigating how public administration involves groups with competing interests in the policy and decision processes. It is of interest to assess how far these groups are taking into consideration existing facts derived from the institution's monitoring and evaluation frameworks or upholding of professional standards. The last but by no means the least area of inquiry centres on the role of political leadership in championing M&E systems and its products.

Existing political environment

At the centre of the New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm lies a desire for the public service to operate and realise *values* agreed with other non-public partners, win *trust*, and receive *legitimacy*. According to NPG, customer satisfaction advanced by the NPM is limited in realising the prescribed values, trust and legitimacy. Moore (1995) and Heyman (2004), cited in Morgan & Cook (2014:41), provide universal dimensions that build trust: values, legitimacy, support, and operational capacity. The NPG proponents advocate for building performance management that connects the public service with the non-public-service actors and networks in the governance process through prescribed avenues (Osborne 2010:9; Denhardt & Denhardt 2015:1). Furthermore, the collaborative approach is applied to the implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting stages. A striking feature of the NPG in performance management is its stance relating to the development of indicators the impact of which will have a spill over effect to the citizens, thereby influencing values, trust and legitimacy towards government in a positive or negative manner. Morgan & Cook (2014:23), Osborne (2010:6–10), and Denhardt & Denhardt (2015:2) summarise the NPG's standpoint as prioritisation of the public interest or common good over administrative processes with efficiency and effectiveness.

NPG cannot claim the beginning of interactions between government and non-state actors, but rather formalisation of ferocious interactions in a complex public service environment. Public programs and policies attract and stimulate political conflict (Cohen *et al.* 2008:191), and competition of interests among various actors within and outside the public administration. The NPG ignites increased politics and a complex political environment to the public service that influences consumption of performance information generated from the M&E systems. The current local government operating environment is influenced by various actors and systems, such that there are complexities in defining the common good and public interest. The public service's inadequate capacity to digest and analyse information, define common good/public interest, and setting priorities further complicates the internal and external political operating environment.

M&E regulatory frameworks

Regulatory frameworks related to M&E systems determine the extent to which there is demand and consumption of M&E performance information. Demand for and consumption of M&E performance information starts with establishment of corresponding policies, regulations and guidelines. It is an indisputable fact that politics and the political environment determine the existence and adequacy of regulatory frameworks in support of M&E and consumption of performance information. In most African countries, with the exception of South Africa, there are sporadic establishments of the M&E regulatory frameworks. Boyle (1989), quoted in Bouckaert & Halligan (2008:12), notes that political conditions influence commitment towards measuring performance, which means that political leadership needs to inculcate a performance measurement and management culture in the public service. The government M&E system in Australia that was built in 1987–1997 was considered successful and produced high quality performance (*Lopez-Acevedo et al.* 2012:7). This was, however, dismantled when a new government came into power in 1996, an action which undermined key roles and functions of institutions at the forefront of spearheading M&E in the government system. This is a typical example of lack of political commitment by a subsequent government. The political commitment is expected to trickle down from national institutions to the lower levels of government structures or from governance structures (for example, a board of directors, or municipal councils) to lower levels of specific institutions (lower-level management, departments or units). The political environment sets the pace for creating linkages between accountability, decision making, resource allocation, rewarding, sanctioning, and the generated performance information. All of the above-mentioned linkages depend heavily on existing regulatory frameworks of the public service.

Performance information and "analysis paralysis"

Performance information feeds into programmatic and administrative decision-making processes. Various factors contribute to the type and effectiveness of M&E systems in the public service. The sections above described the relationship between central and local government as one of the key factors in understanding of the robustness of the M&E systems. The central government, also development partners, put governments under too much pressure to generate numerous repetitive samples of M&E performance information (Kimaro 2017). Donors' influence on African countries led to establishment of various national or sectoral M&E systems that are not necessarily linked or integrated. Cohen *et al.* (2008:189) describe the existence of high expectations of public service managers to interpret performance information, while the environment may not allow them to undertake the task effectively.

Figure 3: DCC's exorbitant number of generated M&E related information

Monthly	Quarterly	Biannually
Management reports, financial reports, procurement reports	Reports ro 3 councils committees internal audit reports, development projects, procurement reports	HR Reports
Total = 36	**Total = 24**	**Total = 2**

Public service institutions produce either too little or too much information that can-not be processed into meaningful conclusions (*paralysis analysis*). A Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) commits to producing no fewer than seven (7) types of reports for in-ternal and external stakeholders. However, given the frequency of reporting, the DCC is obligated to produce a minimum of twenty-one (21) reports annually for external stakeholders. On the other hand, the DCC strategic plan mentions sixty-two (62) reports annually for internal purposes, as calculated from the reporting frequency (a combina-tion of all monthly, quarterly, bi-annual, and annual reports). The requirement by the DCC to produce numerous reports find its origin in the existing regulatory frameworks developed by various central government institutions and the ruling party. The exorbitant number of reports generated by public service institutions relate to existing politics and the political environment, bringing demands from the central government, development partners, and the ruling political party.

Stakeholders' inclusion in public administration governance

Bratton (2012:518) argues that the current situation of African local government shows more than 50 percent of people not satisfied with responsiveness of local councilors to their needs, requests and complaints. Denhardt & Denhardt (2015:160) state that "*to serve citizens, …public administrators must not only know and manage their own re-sources, they must be aware of and connected to other sources of support and assistance,*

Table 1: People receiving information from the local government

S/n	Type of information	Yes	No	Posted in a public place	Announced verbally in public
1	Local government budgets	28.8	71.2	14.5	14.2
2	Taxes and fees collection	26.5	73.5	8.6	17.9
3	Audited statement of council expenditure	15.9	84.1	6.5	9.3
4	Financial allocations to key sectors	23.0	77.0	10.6	12.4
5	Posters on HIV/AIDS	84.7	15.3	75.1	9.6
6	Guidance on how to report corruption/make official complaint	33.6	66.4	18.6	15.0
7	Allocations for Capital Development Grants	27.1	72.9	11.5	15.6
8	Allocations of recurrent grants	24.6	75.4	9.9	14.8
9	Allocations to schools in respondent's locality	23.3	76.7	10.4	12.9
10	Allocations to health facilities in respondent's locality	16.5	83.5	7.1	9.5
11	Allocations to health facilities in respondent's locality	16.5	83.5	7.1	9.5
12	Constituency Development Catalyst Fund allocations and expenditures	6.7	93.3	2.4	4.2

Source: Chaligha (2014:2–3), cited in Kimaro (2017)

engaging citizens and the community in the process… they must share power and lead with a passion, commitment and integrity in a manner that respects and empowers citizenship". Chaligha (2014:1) argues that accountability of the local government is made possible when government feels obliged to provide information on performance, decisions and implementation at all levels.

As described in the sections above, the debate on public service performance shifted beyond improvement of efficiency, effectiveness and implementation of plans to include service outputs, satisfaction, outcomes, and citizen trust (Morgan & Cook 2014:5). Trust leads to the acquisition of government legitimacy and authority to govern the state. Stakeholders' involvement is charted in various stages, including the sharing of M&E or performance information. The 2013 *Citizen Survey* established the extent of accountability of the Tanzania's local government. The survey probed into how stakeholders receive various pieces of local government information from the LGAs' headquarters

and levels below them (ward, village, hamlet, and street). The survey findings revealed that few members of the public receive performance-related information, as described in Table 1. However, findings further reveal that 26.5 percent and 15.9 percent of the public received information on revenue collection and audited Council statements respectively. The analysis of the local government M&E systems indicated LGAs concentrating more on monitoring financial information and performance (Kimaro, 2017).

Systems theory refers to interactions of internal and external elements that impinge on organisational operations (Denhardt, Denhardt & Blanc 2014:141). Recently, stakeholders and public opinion have been promoted to the extent of advocating proposals for inclusion of performance indicators that measure the 'trust' of the public or citizenry towards their government. The shift from NPM to NPG has broadened objectives of performance measurement and management to include service outputs, satisfaction, outcomes and, ultimately, citizens 'trust' and government legitimacy (Morgan & Cook 2014:5). Public policy documents may succumb to failure unless they address the expectations of those giving legitimacy and authority to govern. NPG values fail to exist in an environment where performance information is not provided to citizens or where the capacity of recipients to translate and act upon information is limited.

Public service leadership

Security of employment has an effect on allegiance by public administrators to politics and objectivity in making decisions. Revisiting Mafunisa's summarised types of administrative-political dichotomy, the categories determine the reactions of public service executive leadership towards generated M&E performance information. There exist assumptions that public service managers are rational beings, however, these may try to avoid having to make choices or act according to the circumstances. Kusek & Rist (2004:20) mention the role of political leadership in implementing results based on data from the M&E system by advocating for a strong and consistent political leadership to champion and institute the system. The type of government determines the level of details provided by the M&E systems. Guidelines on 'Political Viability' and 'Disclosure of Findings found in the African Evaluations are considered politically sensitive in some African countries (Patel 2013:2). Furthermore, Patel adds that the above-mentioned guidelines are stated as a compromise between the proposals of countries with a relatively open government, freedom of press, and generally participative political processes with those which are relatively autocratic or military dictatorships. It is important to note that forces within an institution or government are powerful to determine changes or produce negative energy against a positive change. The above-mentioned paragraphs show causal factors that push and pull towards not only reporting but also the type and level of details of M&E information.

CONCLUSION

The role of M&E in the public service cannot be over-emphasised. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems play a central role in public service performance management. Performance management promotes consumption of M&E performance information generated from M&E systems. The new public governance suggests that there should be a deepened relationship between the public service and its stakeholders. These further increase the complexities of relationships between the government, its stakeholders, and stakeholder management. The consumption of M&E information in Africa cannot be pegged at a desirable level. Politics play a key role in the processes of designing, generation, reporting and consumption of M&E performance information. The article argued that political dimensions and the environment from which the public service M&E systems operate have a direct effect on consumption of M&E information. Politics and factors related to the political environment that affect consumption of M&E performance information were described as existing intergovernmental relationships, willingness to make citizens part of the governance processes, leadership, and the existence of appropriate regulatory frameworks. The submission illustrated selected examples from the Tanzanian local government.

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