PLAYING BALL: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND FIFA IN SOUTH AFRICA 2010

By

YANKHO LIKAKU

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for
The degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

AFRICAN EUROPEAN CULTURAL RELATIONS

at the

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

SUPERVISOR: MR. ANGELO FICK
CO-SUPERVISOR: PROF. LIZE KRIEL

28 March 2018
DECLARATION

I, Yankho Likaku, student number 11296233, declare that this dissertation of limited scope entitled “Playing Ball: The relationship between the state and FIFA in South Africa 2010” is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or have quoted from have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. The mini-dissertation has not, in part or in full, been previously submitted for any other degree or examination at this or any other university.

I further declare that ethical clearance to conduct the research has been obtained from the Department of Visual Arts (Visual Culture Studies) and the participating organisation, which is the University of Pretoria.

Yankho Likaku

28 March 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to thank my GOD who began a great work in me and will finish it until the day of Jesus Christ (Philippian 1 verse 2). His word has continuously strengthened me and pushed me to completion.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the colleagues and the institution that made this study possible. A special thanks to the following people for their contribution in the writing of this dissertation:

- My supervisors, Mr. Angelo Fick and Prof. Lize Kriel, for their mentorship, guidance, support, stimulating suggestions and prompt constructive feedback. Their valuable knowledge and supervision have been fruitful and helped me in shaping new ideas.
- My parents, Fred and Patricia Likaku for the verbal and silent support that was always present during my masters; their love, prayers and constant inspiration deserves a special mention.
- My brothers, Rodney and Yalenga for always setting the standard on excellence and pushing me to meet it, with advice and encouragement.
- My Pastors, Pastor At and Pastor Nyretta Boshoff for sowing the word and discipline in my life, I am forever grateful.
- My mentors, Mr. Rhulani Garrine and Mrs. Nomvula Garrine for widening my gaze and strengthening my faith and teaching me constantly to achieve and complete each task. Mrs. Ndayi Takawira for always going out of her way to give advice and guidance.
- Lastly, my friends who have seen this paper come into fruition from an idea to a paper. Evans Ngondo, you have been a brother and friend through it all.
This qualitative study is based on literature from before, during, and after South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup (2005 – 2014). The objective is: (1) to explore the relationship between one developing state, South Africa, and one supranational organisation, FIFA, in order to shed light on a pattern that seems to have become prevalent in the post-millennial world; (2) to explore how the shift in global politics at the end of the Cold War has affected how domination manifests in relations between states, but also between states and capitalist corporations.

KEY TERMS
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA); domination, sports and state interaction, World Cup success, South Africa 2010 World Cup and the state, state and corporate engagement, sports and political economy.
# Table of Contents

DECLARATION .............................................................................................................................. II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................. III

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. V

**CHAPTER 1: SCIENTIFIC OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH** .................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Problem Statement and Questions ......................................................................................... 1

1.3 Aims and Rationale ............................................................................................................... 2

1.4 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 4

1.5 Literature .............................................................................................................................. 5

1.6 Chapter Layout ...................................................................................................................... 8

**CHAPTER 2: THE WORLD OF FIFA** ...................................................................................... 9

2.1 Football Origins and Professionalisation ............................................................................. 9

2.2 Fédération Internationale de Football Association ............................................................. 12

2.3 *Le Comité International Olympique* .................................................................................. 14

2.4 World Cups .......................................................................................................................... 22

2.4.1 Sports, Capital, State ........................................................................................................ 25

2.4.2 World Cup Tournaments and International Relations .................................................. 28

2.5 Rous to Havelange (FIFA’s Expansion) .............................................................................. 30

2.6 FIFA’s structure ................................................................................................................... 34

2.7 Institutional Transformation ................................................................................................. 38

2.8 Commercialisation: From a Football Federation to a Transnational Corporation ............... 43

2.9 FIFA & Beyond: Blatter ...................................................................................................... 52

2.10 Politicised Transformation .................................................................................................. 53

**CHAPTER 3: FIFA AS A POLITICAL ACTOR** ....................................................................... 56

3.1 FIFA Funding ......................................................................................................................... 60
3.2 FIFA Demands .................................................................................................................. 61
3.3 FIFA and Government Interference .............................................................................. 63

CHAPTER 4: 2010 SOUTH AFRICA FIFA WORLD CUP ....................................................... 69

4.1 Commercial Interests ...................................................................................................... 77
  4.1.1 Advertising ................................................................................................................ 82
  4.1.2 Controlled Access Sites ........................................................................................... 87
  4.1.3 Public Open Spaces and City Beautification .............................................................. 89
  4.1.4 Public Roads and Traffic Guidance .......................................................................... 91
  4.1.5 Enforcement ............................................................................................................ 91

4.2 National Interests ............................................................................................................. 94

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 106
CHAPTER 1: SCIENTIFIC OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

1.1 Introduction

Studies show that with globalisation from the 1990s, governments have less power in exercising control over extra-territorial organisations (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 892). Further research into the subject of how such relations are established and sustained, and how they affect ordinary citizens of nation states, is important to answer questions of accountability and responsibility between governments and citizens, especially in the developing world. Due to the popularity of football, and the re-articulation of its governing body as a multinational corporate entity, it may be important to examine power relations between this entity and elected governments. This is especially important as the governance of this multinational organisation has become the subject to legal scrutiny.

As a transnational global football regulator, FIFA is adamant that its governance is a private matter, which in turn raises questions of accountability or lack thereof. The hosting of World Cup tournaments has led to major changes inside countries: there have been alterations to civil and criminal codes and procedures; financial irregularity and allegations of corruption as well as ethical misconduct and impropriety in the relationship between politicians and FIFA officials (Tang, 2013).

In states like South Africa the oversight mechanisms intended to monitor and restrain corruption are crucial for maintaining the democratic governance. Therefore, an adequate understanding of how FIFA works, taking into consideration the allegations of corruption against it, is important in any assessment of the “success” of its tournaments, and more especially in states where spending priorities are as politically contested as in South Africa.

1.2 Problem Statement and Questions

Since South Africa had hosted the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup tournament in 2010, the organisation has come under international investigation
by the United States law enforcement agencies – led by the Office of the Attorney General headed at the time by Loretta Lynch and her Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team. While this investigation is ongoing, what can be established from existing literature and information in the public domain about the relationship between FIFA and South Africa in the run-up to, during, and in the aftermath of South Africa's hosting of the event?

- How was the South African World Cup 2010 bid established and won, and how was the tournament organised?
- How has nationalism figured throughout the lead-up to, during, and in the aftermath of the FIFA 2010 tournament?
- What were the measures by which the tournament’s success was proclaimed?
- What critique can be made of the ways in which laws and the economy in South Africa were changed by interactions with FIFA before, during, and after the 2010 tournament?
- Was the benefit broadly national, or were specific entities or individuals privileged over others in the beneficiation?
- What are the lingering consequences for South Africa, for South Africans, and for FIFA, of the terms on which its relationship with the South African government was negotiated, established, and executed?

1.3 Aims and Rationale

This mini-dissertation focuses on the transformation of FIFA from a sporting organisation into a transnational corporation and how through corporate partnerships in some instances, this transformation affects developing states. This aim with the project is to explore the relationship between a developing state, South Africa, and a supranational organisation, FIFA, to shed more light on a pattern that seems to have become prevalent in the post-millennial global political economy. The shift in global politics at the end of the Cold War has affected how
domination manifests in relations between states and between states and multinational corporations.

Due to the inability of governments to exert their authority and control over extra-territorial organisations (Meier et al, 2015: 893), the questions surrounding accountability and responsibility between governments and citizens, especially in the developing world, are better answered by interrogating the research into how such relations are established and sustained, and how they affect ordinary citizens of nation states. Considering the popularity of football as a game and the re-articulation of its governing body as a multinational corporate entity, it may be important to examine power relations between this entity and elected governments. This is especially important as the governance of this multinational organisation has become subject to legal scrutiny. As a transnational entity regulating almost everything related to football – from club level inside nation states, all the way to the global tournament it hosts every four years – FIFA has maintained that its governance remains a private matter, even though this very stance raises serious concerns about accountability.

In analysing the relationship between FIFA and its South African partners, this mini-dissertation will highlight how the 2010 World Cup tournament impacted on South Africa politically and economically. Additionally, it will attempt to explain how the negotiations between the state actors and the multinational actors happened along an uneven axis of power.

While nation states are meant to be accountable to their own citizens, transnational, supranational, and multinational entities are responsible only to their smaller set of private, mostly corporate, stakeholders. The relationship between FIFA and South Africa should give insight into a new pattern of power distribution between the global north’s private corporations and the global south’s nation states.
1.4 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The study outlines the relationship between FIFA and South Africa in the period leading up to and after the World Cup, by looking at research surrounding the inner workings of FIFA, FIFA’s relationship with national governments and specifically during the 2010 World Cup tournament in South Africa. The primary matrix of texts that will be examined includes news coverage from the period leading up to the tournament, coverage of the World Cup 2010 itself, and news coverage of the aftermath, alongside legislation passed by the South African government, policy documents related to this, commentary on these, and studies of FIFA.

These ideas will be examined through what is known as the conflict theory in the sociological study of sports that is highlighted in Coakley (1978). This view places sports in a system of structures and relationships shaped by economic forces, studying sports in terms of how they are used to promote economic exploitation and capitalist expansion – in this case an ideology that has framed the relationship between international organisations and developing states.

As much as the theoretical approach is sports based, the critique in this mini-dissertation is intended to have a place in the politics of the under-developed global south, using the work of colonial discourse critics, political and cultural studies scholars like Žižek and post-colonial studies scholars on nationhood, nationalism and corporate power like Bhabha, Anderson and Farred, which will aid in interrogating why South Africa may have been able to justify using nationalism and nationhood as grounds for wanting to host the World Cup.

The study focuses on how the power and privilege of elite groups may be perpetuated by the ways in which sports events facilitate specific kinds of political-economic relations between organisations like FIFA and national governments in the re-packaging and representation of sports as entertainment and business. In the relationship between national governments and multinational corporate entities, one may see reflected the new political economy of the post-millennial global order – an order in which multinational corporations
operate within states and states have limited or no control on the level at which the corporate actors can be held accountable.

1.5 Literature

The literature on the history and political economy of FIFA and the relationship between sports, money, and politics is a major source for our understanding of the organisation’s dynamics and power (Tang 2013). As much as the presence of supranational and multinational organisations is beneficial to the development of states, the inability to control the governance of these organisations has negative implications on the state as well. FIFA’s presence in states is underscored by the existence of Football Associations (FA) governed by regional federations that report to the FIFA headquarters in Geneva. The extra-territoriality of the governing bodies makes it difficult for the state to influence the running of the FA in its country, which makes the hand of government non-existent in the governance of the sport in the country. Meier and Garcia (2015: 895) show that FIFA has influenced national governments as they have managed to defend the autonomy of football governance against public authorities. This has been so due to the economic implications if a suspension from international participation were to be imposed on a country. Also, the public appeal of the sport has made sure that any government action that may result in a suspension may negatively affect the government in power in terms of social appeal (Meier & Garcia 2015: 895).

The popularity of football has advantaged FIFA, which then manages to undermine the sovereignty of national governments to get its way. The same could be said of how financial institutions in the 1980s have had dealings with national governments and undermined the sovereignty of the governments (Mohan, 2009: 3). According to Mohan the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) policies that were administered by the IMF and the World Bank in poor countries that were in debt had conditions gave these financial institutions power over policy-making in the developing countries. Since these countries were affected by a long history of intervention from developed countries, the ability of the IMF and World Bank
conditions to affect their policy making brings into question the sovereignty of these developing countries (Mohan, 2009: 3). Therefore, in this case FIFA can be seen as a substitute for financial institutions to emphasise that the power structures facilitating power relations that existed through the exchange of money can look different and achieve the same result.

There is not so much written on the matter of football governance, the vast body of literature focuses on nationalism and power, and the relationship between nation states and capital. For the analysis of the relationship between South Africa’s state and FIFA, Meier and Garcia (2015: 893) have commented on the power of FIFA over national governments as a new actor in world politics. This paper serves as necessary precedent on the matter that this mini-dissertation intends to engage in. This will allow for my study not only to add to the discussion on football governance, but also further to underscore the idea that the problem is not the organisation itself but the relationship in which the organisation exists and the power dynamics which it perpetuates.

When engaging with the idea of the interaction of FIFA and South Africa in particular, the major literature in this study, on post-colonial nationalism, informs the question of how sports are and can be used to enhance post-colonial nationhood. This readdresses the norm that exists in political engagement along differing ideological lines. Žižek (1994) posits that the word ideology has become nuanced and viewed in a negative light. He seeks to find out what caused the sudden rise in interest in dealing with issues that ideology and its implementation in social understanding poses to the social and cultural theories and political practice. In addition to Žižek’s view of ideology, Bhabha (1990) examines the essentialist approach towards nationalism, an approach which assumes the uniformity of the formation and existence of all nation states.

The problem with the essentialist understanding of nationality is in its attempts to define and naturalise third world “nations” by means of the supposedly homogenous, innate, and historically continuous patterns of tradition. These patterns, Bhabha stresses, misrepresent the tale of developing and third world nations and warrants their inferior global “status”
(Bhabha, 1990: 5). Nations are narrative constructions that come from the mixed interaction of contending cultural communities (Bhabha, 1990: 5). This echoes Anderson, whose seminal text in the field posits nationalism as a feature of culture that has to begin with a history and a structure (Anderson, 1983: 49). The structure arises from the history in which the culture finds itself (Anderson, 1983: 49) Anderson (1983: 50) concludes that when communities get to a point in which all the members cannot interact with one another on a personal basis, it has become too big and it must to a large extent be imagined. Anderson says very little about what differentiates the nation from political organisation in other forms. He views nationalism less as an ideology than as a form of cultural expression, “naturalised” as such (Anderson, 1983: 52). In saying this, Anderson, suggests that nationalism can be viewed from inside or outside, which needs to be taken account of in the imagination of communities (1983: 52).

Finally, Billig (1995: 18) uses the term banal nationalism to describe the daily and continual practice of nation building and nationalism that some other scholars neglect to interrogate. After apartheid, South African society went about trying to realign its ideologies to fit a multi-racial and multi-cultural, accommodating society (Fick, 2017). This then impacted on the construction of how they viewed the nation. Therefore, nationalism is a difficult concept to use in the country, due to the history that surrounded the term.. This raised antagonistic questions that were based on racial lines (Freschi, 2011: 43). How does one who was oppressed brutally for long, fight on the same side as the former oppressor? This calls upon a reinforcement of nationality.

The name “Rainbow Nation”, then given to South Africa by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, highlighted the dawning of a new day, a day that embraced the differences and diversity of the new society (Freschi, 2011: 43). In this light, the post-apartheid make-up of the country, which no longer places cultural groups in their own particular areas, reinforces the idea of imagined communities as these cultures go ahead to make sense of their difference while embracing it. The attempts at reiterating the unity by enhancing opportunities for nationalism included sports. The Rugby World Cup in South Africa seemed to pull the nation together
(Nyar, 2014: 21). This puts sports in South Africa in the very delicate position where it can be viewed as having the power to unite a nation; hence the allure of the FIFA bid of 2010.

### 1.6 Chapter Layout

Having stated the aims with the study and the author’s approach to the topic in the current chapter, the subsequent chapters of this mini-dissertation will be presented as follows: Chapter 2 will outline the origins of football and its professionalisation, how this has impacted on FIFA, and the role that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has played in relation to FIFA. Then the chapter will look at how the Word Cups have benefited FIFA, how this was related to the political and economic shifts within FIFA depending on the person in charge. The growth within FIFA due to the presidential changes influenced the further shifts in the structure and the institutional transformations within FIFA. The chapter will then conclude by exploring the role played by commercialisation in the shift of FIFA from a federation to a transnational organisation that operates like a multinational corporation.

Chapter 3 will examine the political economy of FIFA. It will highlight FIFA’s funding methods to member nations, it will also look at the demands FIFA makes on World Cup host nations and how FIFA deals with interference from government.

Chapter 4 will pay close attention to the 2010 World Cup tournament. It will focus on how, through their interaction, FIFA displayed a behaviour of domination. All this will contribute to the explanation how FIFA’s behaviour of domination in its interaction with host nations relates to its commercial interests and the obligations it has to its partners.

Chapter 5 will bring the discussion to a close by highlighting that the World Cup tournament only benefitted South Africa to a certain extent. It will discuss the limitations of these benefits, which could not be sustained, and show that the main reason the benefits were unsustainable was the lack of tangible benefits to the local population in the form of knowledge exchange, significant economic change, and widespread job creation.
CHAPTER 2: THE WORLD OF FIFA

2.1 Football Origins and Professionalisation

Football, formally known as association football, has grown largely through its connections with the contemporary aspects of life which can be said to have caused the subsequent professionalisation of the game (Buhler, 2007: 322). Modern football, is said to have originated from the inception of the Football Association (FA) that was established in 1863, in England (Buhler, 2007: 321), which streamlined the rules of play. Prior to the establishment of the 1863 football association, other attempts at standardising the game existed, the most popular of which was in Sheffield (Buhler, 2007: 322). The Sheffield Football Club was predominantly made up of former public-school students who had their own set of rules compiled from play at the public schools (Harvey, 2005: 126). Harvey (2005: 125) postulates that the origins of football go beyond the establishment of the FA in 1863, which could be taken as the first step in the professionalisation of the game, and builds on the impact of the Sheffield football games and their connections to public schools. Harvey founds his argument from the point of community engagement and social interaction placing the start of the history of football on different forms of it, namely Shrove-Football (commonly perceived as the first form of modern football where half the city wrestled for a ball on annual holidays, particularly Shrove Tuesday) (Buhler, 2007: 322). In addition to the various types of football, Harvey also pays close attention to who played it, emphasising that the working class played a large role in spreading the popularity of football as opposed to the position held by some scholars who place the prominence of the game on the public school and university students, “the elite” (Harvey, 2005: 128). As much as Harvey advances an alternate argument, he does not entirely neglect the mainstream discourse of the origins of professionalised football that places the onus of formalising the regulations of football on the elites of the public schools and universities (Buhler, 2007: 322). Curry and Dunning second this position stating that the
influence the Sheffield Football Club had on the national body of football was substantially less than scholars credit them for (Curry & Dunning, 2013: 431). These two positions emphasise that the common argument on the spread and origin of football is narrow and leaves out many of the influences on the game prior to 1863.

The spread of football from the period of Harvey’s research takes into consideration the geography, the economy and the social makeup of the society which also affected the rules surrounding the game in those areas (Harvey, 2005: 129). From all this stems what Harvey dubs the “First Football Culture”. The Sheffield Football culture of 1857-1867, which may have had their own rules, was separate to other football cultures that were also present in England at the time (Harvey 2013: 2155).

The subsequent establishment of the FA in 1863 was significant to modern football; it brought together the matters that split the previous foundations of football (Harvey, 2013: 2156). Curry and Dunning (2016: 242) refer to “handling” as the starting point of the split between the various forms of football because, “[t]here was a clearly defined difference between the well delineated varieties of the game – the handling and carrying type and that which stressed more use of the feet – which has over time grown more pronounced” (Curry & Dunning, 2016: 242). These debates resulted in the separation and the formation of the 1863 FA and an association specifically for rugby football in 1864. Curry and Dunning (2013: 242) further suggest that this split was due to the significant anti-rugby nature of the Sheffield rules. The prevalent idea from Sheffield affiliates was “that the rugby form was inferior to the kicking game because it accentuated physical force over skill” (Curry & Dunning 2013: 243). Regardless of the shift, both rugby and association football in England go back as far as “1314 when it was used to refer to a class of loosely regulated folk-games which included handling and throwing as well as kicking” (Curry & Dunning 2013: 245).

The establishment of the FA paved the way for the discussion regarding the professionalism of football. The debates around professionalism and amateurism divided many clubs and players alike. The northern parts of England and Scotland were inclined
towards the professionalisation of the game merely as it afforded them the luxury of playing it consistently (Hunter, 2003: 15). Later in the nineteenth century the divide between amateur and professional football began to grow (Hunter, 2003: 15). Before professionalism had even been instituted, Blackburn Olympic had begun to professionalise their players. They were the first to give their players jobs, aided with their wages and added on further payments (Hunter, 2003: 15). Subsequently, the years of clashes between professional and amateur teams resulted in the FA officially allowing for professionalism in July 1885 (Lloyd & Holt, 2005: 22). The FA capped the wages of the players and as much as players fought the decision, almost resulting in strike action in 1909, the maximum wage cap would only drop much later – in 1959 (Lloyd & Holt, 2005: 24). The professionalism introduced in 1885 meant that clubs could pay their players only if the players were local to the area they were playing in (Gibbons, 2001: 82). The rules surrounding the professionalism also prohibited professionals from lending their services to more than a single club per season without following the appropriate procedure (Gibbons, 2001: 82). This was made possible through the registration prerequisite for all professional players (Gibbons, 2001: 83).

In some places the game had already begun to take hold in the community prior to the advent of professionalism; as argued by the affiliates of the Boston based Oneida Football Club, established in 1862 in the United States of America, one year before the English FA was set up (Allaway, 2001). In other cases association football progressed quicker than in Britain after professionalisation. The Argentine Federation of Association Football, founded by F.L Wooley in 1891, organised the first championship tournament in the same year, which then made the Argentine league the oldest after England (Pears, 2006). The endeavours of Wooley of formalising football in places other than Britain were instrumental to the spread of football to many continents and countries. The greatest and the more publicised spread of football can mostly be accredited to FIFA.
FIFA played a large role to influence the shift to professionalisation of football and the establishment of a national federation (Nagel et al., 2015: 407). The more renowned of these factors include the increased popularity of and subsequent participation in the sport, the growth of the financial structures where sports sponsorship and management are concerned due to the increased popularity, increased global funding due to the marketability of sports and, in some cases, the politicisation of the sports.

2.2 Fédération Internationale de Football Association

FIFA was established in 1904 as a small non-profit organisation with a focus on international cooperation in an attempt to affect international peace and progress through football (Planet FIFA, 2016). The eurocentrism in FIFA when it was established could be largely justified by the rapid shift towards the professionalisation of football in Europe. The geographical origins of FIFA were in central Europe (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). The countries present when Robert Guérin (the first president of FIFA) led the first FIFA meeting in Paris were Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (Tomlinson, 2007: 58).

Eurocentrism as coined by Amin (Amin, 2009: 166), the somewhat racist nature of the organisation in the beginning can be seen as a necessary evil to ensure growth (Copeland, 2017). Ironically, Europe could not anticipate the kind of impact that the growth into the periphery, as Amin refers to it, would have on the sport. Soon this growth would have reached the point at which it could pose a threat to the standing structure of the organisation. The periphery now having larger voting blocs in comparison to Europe, Europe would have to use force, by whatever means necessary, to ensure they maintain control. In this case what was previously the periphery showed the potential of becoming the next centre (Copeland, 2017).

According to Tomlinson (2007: 58), “[i]n its early days FIFA was so Eurocentric that no need was seen for any separate European organisation”. Tomlinson (2007: 58) further notes that Jules Rimet’s idea of a global football unity was based on “an entrenched colonialism”, which
would prove very difficult to maintain for the FIFA presidents after Rimet. This was because presidents after Rimet were dealing with a decolonising world.

The FIFA presidents before Jules Rimet, Robert Guérin (1904-6) and Daniel Woolfall (1906-18), who were French and English, respectively, set FIFA up in such a way that France and England remained the dominating countries over the first seventy years (Tomlinson, 2007: 56). After Guérin had set up what was the foundation of FIFA, he did not succeed in organising the first tournament. Thus, according to Tomlinson (2007: 57), followed the rise of Englishman Daniel Woolfall. Woolfall insisted (as cited in Tomlinson, 2007: 57) that “[i]t is important to the FA and other European Associations that a properly constituted federation sh

ould be established and the FA should use its influence to regulate football on the continent as a pure sport and give all continental associations the full benefit of the many years of the FA.” Woolfall’s noble intention was to build on Guérin’s legacy, but it would not suffice, mainly because his grounding belief was that football and its excellence were rooted in the values of the amateur players (Tomlinson, 2007: 57).

In 1914, during Woolfall’s tenure, the membership of FIFA grew from the seven initial members to twenty-four (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). The new countries included South Africa, who joined in 1909-10, Argentina and Chile, who joined in 1912, and the United States, joining in 1913 (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). FIFA had begun to grow beyond the continent but the global growth only took a firm hold after the First World War (WW1).

After WW1, in 1921, Jules Rimet took over as FIFA president. Rimet, alongside the 24 member associations, pursued a programme for further professionalisation of the football federation. Rimet believed that football could be a tool towards the creation of a global football family (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). According to Rimet, sports could be used for good in the world; it could unite nations, encourage progress of morality, and it could bring entertainment and pleasure while bridging racial gaps. Sports, he believed, were the answer to a divided world (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). The moralising stance of Rimet is ironic when taking into consideration
the current legal claims made against FIFA with regard to corruption and vote rigging. FIFA has long strayed from what Rimet had hoped it would be and represent in the world.

Rimet’s hopes for FIFA’s global growth came with much resistance, the strongest of which was the difficulty to overcome the nature of European superiority within the organisation (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). Rimet did not believe that the administration of world football should be based upon geographical or regional groupings, and the development of continental confederations and the empowerment of football confederations in Africa and in Asia was resisted (Tomlinson, 2007; 58).

2.3 **Le Comité International Olympique**

The inception of the ancient Olympics in Greece (776 BCE- 393 CE) was used by the Greeks as a tool for physical education (Krüger, 1999: 3). The Olympics were designed to strengthen the bond between the Greeks and were a sign of the unity of a world that was civilized despite all their differences in politics (Worrall, 2016).

In 1892, Pierre de Coubertin, secretary of the French Athletics Federation and manager of a Paris sports club, after realising that it would be difficult to compete with the English under their own rules, proposed to have an international Olympic Games (Worrall, 2016). After getting the support for the international games, Coubertin held a meeting at Sorbonne, Paris, in 1894 where he defined the amateur rules and the beginning of the Olympic Games internationally (Krüger, 1999: 4).

Coubertin’s plan was to start the international games in Paris, but this did not sit well with the Greeks who were firm in their belief that the Olympic Games belonged solely to them and thus should remain in Athens. According to Krüger (1999: 4), for Coubertin to achieve his goal of international games in Paris, he reached a compromise with the Greeks, where he accepted that “the first Olympic Games should be in Athens in 1896 and the second in Paris in 1900, respecting the four year cycle, but giving the Greeks relatively little time to prepare”. 
Coubertin also suggested that “the Greek literary historian Vikelas should be the first president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), with himself as the secretary-general” (Krüger, 1999: 5).

Coubertin was prominent in the constructive years of the IOC. He tried to make the Olympic Games alluring to the young athletes to achieve the goals he had set for having a competitive French team (Krüger, 1999: 5). “Coubertin assumed that the beautification of the games and the attempt to imbue them with the solemn spirit of the ancient Greeks would instil in them a spirit that young people would really accept. For this he developed flags, a hymn and an Olympic oath; he was thinking about fireworks for the opening ceremony to give the games a uniqueness that would set them apart from mere world championships that were being started for several amateur and professional sports at that time” (Krüger, 1999: 5).

The rise in amateur sports around the world and especially in Europe aided the growth of the Olympic Games tremendously. Coubertin realised that the Olympic Games could allow people who were interested in more than one sport could be very helpful in addressing matters that affected all the sports represented at the Olympics (Worral, 2006). Even though the organisation was self-recruiting and not all the participant nations were represented, the creation of the International Olympic Congresses by Coubertin ensured all participating countries a voice (Worrall, 2006).

The 1896 Greek Olympics event was infamous for having low calibre all male (311) athletes form thirteen countries, which resulted in what Krüger (1999: 6) refers to as poor standards for an international tournament. Coubertin made sure that the Olympic Games in Paris in 1900 would be different. The 1896 Greek tournament was not as Coubertin had initially anticipated and it showcased how he may have needed a great deal of work in terms of organising a tournament of this magnitude (Chappellet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 17). The 1900 tournament highlighted that the four year cycle of the Olympic Games was possible and that representation could be better. The representation in Paris was significantly different in
comparison to the Greek Olympics four years previously: there were “1,319 male participants (plus eleven female participants) from 22 countries” (Krüger, 1999: 7).

When the Olympics went back to Athens in 1906 – planned deliberately to be off the four year schedule - in order to mark the ten year anniversary of the games, the IOC made a great contribution to the development of the international games (Lennartz, 2002: 8). In 1906, for the first time in Olympic history, the media was highly involved, “special sports newspapers were formed and started to create an excitement for sport” (Krüger, 1999: 7). Athens 1906 also had the first instance of public demonstration at an international sporting event (Krüger, 1999: 8). It was by then already Olympic custom to hoist the flags of all the winners and runners up at the award presentation ceremonies. When Irish long jumper Peter O’Connor was placed second at the 1906 Olympics, he asked that the Irish flag be raised for him (Krüger, 1999: 9). This request did not please Coubertin who was an anglophile at the time, and so he refused to meet the request (Krüger, 1999:9). This resulted in O’Connor’s team mate climbing up the flag pole and putting up the flag himself due to the refusal of the Olympic officials (Krüger, 1999:9).

The modernity of the Olympics as we know them only came about at the 1908 London Olympics. These were different due to the British experience in organising tournaments of the magnitude before Coubertin had begun to host the international Olympics. Even though these games may have run better, the difficulties that ensued in the Olympics in London in 1908 and in Sweden in 1912 showed the IOC that they should no longer allow the host nations to dictate the rules of the tournament, but rather set a standard and guarantee uniformity in the rules and the by-laws with the sports federations (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 17).

By the time the Olympics took place in Berlin in 1916 the nature of the games had changed into a highly nationalistic format (Krüger, 1999: 7). This was highlighted by Krüger’s reference to Germany and England with regard to national and governmental preparation for the Olympic Games. According to Krüger “in Germany where everything was organised by the government, the national parliament discussed the feasibility of financing Olympic Sports, not
just for staging the games, but to pay for selecting and coaching the athletes. While in England this was discussed from the viewpoint of the amateur rules, in Germany it was discussed as a matter of state rights, as sports from the German viewpoint was considered part of culture” (Krüger, 1999: 7).

The participation in and victory during the Olympic Games was growing in popularity among nations, because it not only allowed nations to be recognised but also gave a sense of pride on which they as a collective could celebrate themselves. The pride of victory was more so important for the formation of the nation because “to have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more – these are the essential conditions for being a people” (Renan, 1996: 53). Thus, victory in the Olympic Games did not only provide states with a common goal and common will that would unite them, it was the victories of such events that would form the bedrock of national pride for nations going forward.

The further development of the Olympics was curtailed by the outbreak of WW1. During the period where there were no international games, the IOC dealt with women’s rights. In a time where, globally, women were second class citizens, Coubertin and his counterparts from Turkey and Japan believed that women were not equal in the male centred history of the Olympics (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 21). Coubertin and his counterparts who championed this inclusion lost out to the other members, but still compromised the position of women in the tournament: their agreement was to curb female participation by not having as many events for women as there were for men (Worrall, 2016). Furthermore, during the war Coubertin went about ensuring that the Olympics would not be affected by the struggle for power between the antagonists and moved the IOC to Switzerland, who was a neutral party. FIFA under Jules Rimet would, approximately ten years later, in 1932, follow suit and move from Paris to Zurich.

The next games were only hosted in 1920 in Antwerp. The IOC strategically picked Antwerp after the war to ensure that Americans could stay off the coast on a ship and also
that food could be guaranteed for all the participants (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 22). This seemed to have worked very well and the games were a success, but Germany and their allies were excluded from the games because of the destruction they had inflicted on the allies (France & Great Britain) during the war (Krüger, 1999: 11).

In 1924, when Coubertin was replaced by Henri de Baillet-Latour, FIFA and Rimet were on a steady rise and Rimet was hungry for an international football tournament hosted by FIFA. De Baillet-Latour was a man who believed in the running of committees as opposed to the micro-management of Coubertin before him (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 27). This allowed him to be very successful at keeping the IOC together and to realise what had been Coubertin’s dream during his tenure as president of the IOC (Krüger, 1999: 12). This dream of all the nations and all the sports to be represented at the Olympic Games was finally a reality. De Baillet-Latour was heavily focused on expanding the Olympic Games and ensuring they consistently run efficiently (Krüger, 1999: 13). He would, like FIFA in its later years, accept any political doctrine regardless of how it treated its citizens as long as “they would underwrite the notion that sports and politics were separate and that they would not try to force their beliefs on any other members” (Krüger 1999:13). To achieve this magnitude of growth de Baillet-Latour did what FIFA would then implement at a later date during its own expansion, and call upon the sponsorship of Coca-Cola for their 1928 Olympic Games (Barney, Martyn & Wenn, 2004: 384). The growth of the IOC inspired the ambitious Jules Rimet to run the 1928 football tournament for the IOC. Whereas this may have been an attempt by the IOC to assuage FIFA and its ambitions, it only served to embolden Rimet. Before then the only world football tournament was in the Olympics.

Even though the IOC and FIFA are both sports governing organisations they are neither similar nor equal in function (Owen, 2016). Owen (2016) attributed this to FIFA’s inability to adhere to the high standards of ethics that the IOC has championed throughout its existence, which is not entirely true. Under Samaranch the IOC was not as untainted by corruption and collusion as Owen would like to suggest in his writing. Juan Antonio
Samaranch, a Catalan businessman, was prompted to take charge of the IOC by former IOC president Avery Brundage. According to Krüger (1999: 22), Samaranch was a great choice as the next IOC president not only owing to his business prowess and his investment in various sports in Spain but also for turning a profit and converting sports into spectacles. This, coupled with a sense of political charisma which previously awarded him the privilege of being the Spanish ambassador to Moscow, aided Samaranch when he eventually ran for the position of president of the IOC.

Horst Dassler, owner of Adidas, was speculated to have aided Samaranch in expanding his influence within the Eastern European countries for his election (Krüger 1999: 22). Horst Dassler was the son of founder and owner of Adidas, Adolf Dassler. Before Adidas became the major sneaker company around the world, it was the Dassler Brothers shoe factory (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). The shoe factory focused on producing shoes for athletes in Herzogenaurach, Bavaria, in Germany (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). In the 1920s Adolf Dassler, a shoe designer, and his brother, Rudolf Dassler, began the process that resulted in two global shoe companies, Adidas and Puma. The German political system during Hitler’s regime from 1933 to 1945, made it very difficult for large businesses to not be involved in nation building and in aiding the government in times of war (Barrett, 2008). Therefore, when the German Olympic track-and-field team showed interest in the designs from Adolf Dassler, business with the National Socialist German Workers’s Party (the Nazi Party) seemed highly lucrative for the brothers (Keyser, 2015: 22). The brothers’ focus still remained on seeking out top athletes.

At the 1936 Olympics, the brothers had given the German team Adolf Dassler designed shoes but also took particular interest in American sprinter Jesse Owens (Keyser, 2015: 22). This resulted in the Dassler Brothers shoe factory sponsoring both the German team and Jesse Owens (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). The German sprinter who was placed third and Owens who took home more than two gold medals gave the Dassler brothers the exposure they were looking for.
With the beginning of the Second World War (WW2) in 1939 many sporting goods corporations became complicit with rising nationalism (Keyser, 2015: 26). Some countries lost their factory workers to the military and due to the lack of resources many companies shifted their focus towards manufacturing uniforms, boots, machinery, or vehicles for the military (Keyser, 2015: 26). In the United States, the US Army Corps were supplied with flying boots from Converse; in Britain, Gola supplied army boots (Keyser, 2015: 26); whereas in Germany, Mercedes provided the vehicles, Hugo Boss provided uniforms for the military, and Lufthansa produced the radar equipment used in Germany’s air force (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). The Dassler brothers used their factory to make parts for German army tanks (Keyser, 2015: 26); they also manufactured the Panzerschrek, a rocket launcher and the smaller Panzerfaust (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009).

It was the Dassler brothers’s link to the success of Jesse Owens that resulted in their breakthrough after WW2 (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). “The US Air Force set up its own operations at the former military base in Herzogenaurach. When the sports-crazy Americans got wind of the fact that the Dassler brothers had produced the shoes that Jesse Owens had run in, they started buying all the products the company could produce. Large orders for footwear for basketball and baseball (and hockey) soon rolled in and gave the company its boost on the road to becoming a worldwide success story” (Kuhn & Thiel, 2009). Due to a family feud that came about during the war – with Rudolf’s strong Nazi leanings and Adolf’s neutral perspective resulting in Rudolf going to the war and Adolf staying at the factory to manage manufacturing – the Dassler Brothers Shoe Factory split into Adidas and Puma. The 1954 FIFA World Cup tournament got Adidas more exposure that would propel it to global prominence (Barrett, 2008). Adidas sponsored the winning team, West Germany, with kit and boots (Barrett, 2008). As soon as Adidas gained this exposure they began to sponsor more countries and other companies began to offer to sell Adidas merchandise across the globe for them.

Samaranch’s connection to Dassler at the point of change in the IOC mimics the relationship between Dassler and Joao Havelange during his election campaign to FIFA
president between 1972 and 1974. Like Samaranch, Havelange also implemented many changes in FIFA upon his election. One of the changes that Samaranch introduced was through the Olympic Congress in 1981, where the rules concerning amateur participants were reduced to only a formality (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2010: 29). This meant that one could participate in the Olympics regardless of whether one was a professional or an amateur in the sport, where previously only amateurs could participate.

Another similarity in Dassler’s relationship with Samaranch and Havelange was the upscaling of sponsorship on their tournaments and organisations after their elections. FIFA was largely sponsored by Coca-Cola and Adidas and also made money through selling itself and its logo as a brand. Television rights were also sold to a middleman who would then sell the rights further. In the beginning, this middleman for FIFA was International Sports and Leisure (ISL)—a company formed in 1983, by Dassler. Samaranch, in the IOC, followed a similar path “[w]ith the help of Adidas he started to market the Olympic emblem between the games. This, named the Olympic programme (TOP), provided the IOC with an enormous amount of money which was partially distributed among the federations, the National Olympic Committees, but it was also put into the Olympic solidarity programme with which the IOC tried to raise the standard of sport in young and developing countries” (Krüger, 1999: 23). This was something that FIFA under Blatter would also pursue quite ferociously. It is also worth noting that when FIFA began its partnership with Coca-Cola, they were copying the rubric set already by the Olympics in the 1920s (Krüger, 1999: 24).

Structurally, the IOC “has complete control over who becomes, and who remains, a member. There is no one-member-per-country stipulation” (Owen, 2016), whereas “FIFA have no such luxury. Once the Republic of X’s Football Association is in the club, then it is in the club” (Owen, 2016). To place the differences between FIFA and the IOC in context, it is worth noting that the IOC opposed the rise of FIFA because FIFA’s dream of a football tournament hosted by them interfered with the IOCs monopoly on global football tournaments. As much as the IOC tried to curb the growth of FIFA, the global expansion of the organisations was
similar upon the election to office of Havelange and Samaranch, as can be seen in their respective relationships with Dassler. Whereas the IOC changed their rule on the amateur nature of the tournament, FIFA from its inception intended to build beyond the boundaries set by the IOC on the global football tournament. For one, FIFA did not insist on the amateur status of the players who participated in the tournament (Glanville, 2005: 10), which appealed to all the countries that had professionalised and wanted their best players to adorn the national colours (Glanville, 2005: 10).

2.4 World Cups

The FIFA World Cup Finals have become the most viewed sports event in the world, with the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup tournament estimated to have had 3.9 billion viewers in total and the final match alone having had 7 million of those viewers (PWC, 2011). This had a further impact on the global sports revenues of the tournament which were estimated at US$121.4 billion with a projected annual growth rate to 2015 of 3.7% that would see the revenues of the 2014 World Cup tournament in Brazil get close to or exceed the US$146.3 billion mark (PWC, 2011). The share of the FIFA World Cup tournament revenues to teams is based on the stage which each team reached and not distributed equally among the FIFA members. As much as the revenue sharing is uneven, the overall numbers attached to the World Cup tournaments have made them highly marketable. The expected revenues are estimated to benefit both the host nation and FIFA.

The general assumption is that the World Cup tournaments increase the platform for job creation, positively affect tourism and help the economy sustain itself after the tournament. This projection is based on the assumption that the money generated from ticket sales and FIFA sponsorship is enough to benefit the country (Sportslens, 2016). To a certain extent the assumed monetary benefit coupled with the prevailing idea of exposure and an implicit sense of global acceptance due to the fact that the nation was chosen as a host, has been the justification of states to their polities for pursuing the World Cup tournament. The unfortunate
thing is that the inverse is more often than not more true, “the money spent on hosting the tournament, both the direct cost of setting up the infrastructure and the opportunity cost cancel out the revenue” (Sportslens, 2016). With this taken into consideration, it is worth investigating why countries still want to host the World Cup tournaments. In most cases, it comes down to the mandate and motive of the bidding team of each nation (Ehrenfreund, 2015). Thus, it is important to interrogate the makeup of the prospective host nations’ bid committees to begin to understand the reason why a nation would be looking to host the World Cup tournament, as the bid committees benefit the most in instances of success (Sportslens, 2016).

Though states may understand the negative effects of a World Cup tournament, it is important to bear in mind that the bid committee which speaks for the nation (Zuma, 2004) ultimately understand why it would like to host the tournament and merely transfer this position to the population in a way that they would buy into. This, to a certain extent, explains why the benefits of the World Cup tournaments do not entirely meet everyone's expectations and begins to explain how World Cup tournaments have garnered a sense of utility by national governments. They are a tool of national governments for local gain. For instance, these tournaments have been used to invoke the loyalty and camaraderie from the locals to prospectively win the electoral vote (Keating, 2010). In this way the tournament can also be used to gain national support and influence integration between the people of a country, subsequently reviving a sense of “nationhood and patriotism” (Sportslens, 2016). The Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Shuvalov, illustrated this during their 2018 World Cup tournament bid when he stated that “football can help to unite the people of Russia, raise their national pride and from that point of view, its importance to the country’s development is difficult to overstate” (Sportslens, 2016). Considering this, nations have put up billions of taxpayers’ money to prepare bids eligible to host World Cup tournaments for what seems to be the people’s own good (Bond & Cottle, 2011: 17).

According to Andrew Jennings (2006: 15), the monopoly that FIFA have on FIFA World Cup tournaments has forced states to go beyond the minimal requirements to be considered
in the bidding process. More recently the public investigation into and subsequent banning of former President of FIFA, Sepp Blatter, together with some of FIFA’s executive committee members, as well as the exposure of the vote rigging systems of FIFA, has shed light on the not so straightforward process that decides the winning bid. The ousting of Blatter in his seventeenth year as president, and investigations into the corruption claims in the FIFA headquarters by the US Attorney General of the time, Loretta Lynch, have given further insight into the world of FIFA and revealed that bribery and special favours have become the order of the day in the bidding process (ESPN, 2016). This raises many questions regarding the legitimacy of the hosts of the tournament in the years prior to, and including the South African 2010 World Cup tournament and the tournaments thereafter (a further investigation into the bribery claims of every tournament awarded is beyond the scope of this paper). The bribery investigations have further brought to light how FIFA executives, who voted for host countries, have used their ability to vote for a country only for their own gain, be it for the federation they presided over or personally (Jennings, 2006: 12). These were the gains besides the minimal requirements that included FIFA sponsors and their commercial interests that FIFA had to guarantee as part of their sponsorship. These FIFA sponsorship guarantees have resulted in FIFA enforcing their demands on nations who had subsequently implemented policy changes to ensure their eligibility as hosts of the World Cup tournament.

The need to make some states change their policies to ensure their ability to host the World Cup tournament brings into question the reasons why it is necessary to host the tournament. Where does FIFA get the legitimacy to influence the policy changes of a state? Tang (2013) looks at how host countries of the past and the future have been affected by a change of laws and questions where the line is between the states’ sovereignty and the governing bodies’ preconditions. The FIFA preconditions state that “before choosing a host country, FIFA requires a government guarantee regarding certain legal issues, including, but not limited to: security, visa procedures, labour procedures, labour regulations, customs and tax law, and infrastructure” (Tang, 2013). This brings to light the issue of FIFA’s domination
over host states. Tang (2013) further questions the extent to which governments need to implement FIFA’s stipulations, whether FIFA has an enforcement mechanism in the event of lack of compliance by states, and where FIFA begins to put pressure on countries to adhere to any infringements they may have in terms of human rights. The reasons behind this legitimacy can be multiple and vast but in the interest of this dissertation it would be necessary to highlight a few. The legitimacy of FIFA can be traced to the relationship between sports and capital and further the relationship between capital and the state.

2.4.1 Sports, Capital, State

FIFA’s partnerships occurred through the merging of capital and sports which can be accredited to FIFA capitalising on globalisation and the spread of capitalism in the 1980s and beyond. Big business involvement with sports in the early twentieth century meant that “television, sponsorship, ownership and advertising” (Permanent Revolution, 2010) all became sources of profits. With the globalisation of football, the financial gain for players and teams has been significant. Globalisation has made it normal for clubs listed on stock exchanges to get a cut of television rights and sign huge sponsorship deals (Permanent Revolution, 2010). Commercial giants seek widespread exposure through partnerships with sports clubs as well; to have their names brandished on team merchandise or associated with the players affords them great branding which results in larger revenues (Permanent Revolution, 2010).

Adidas began this sponsorship of teams in the 1954 World Cup tournament where West Germany won wearing Adidas kit and boots (Jennings, 2006: 54). To this day Adidas has remained a large player in the sponsorship of football teams and players. For one, they recently signed a $1.3 billion deal with Manchester United (a football club) over a period of ten years (Thompson, 2014). In this deal “Adidas will provide uniforms for all the clubs’ teams from the 2015-2016 season, Adidas will also be the exclusive worldwide distributor of Manchester United merchandise” (Thompson, 2014), continuing in the same path begun in 1954. Adidas
had used its prior involvement and experience with nation states specifically the German athletics team, as mentioned earlier, when the world climate changed at the time of World War II. As stated earlier, at the end of the war, the Dassler Brothers’ factory managed to return to their status as a shoe factory catering for the American base in their town, which resulted in many large orders. By constantly adapting to the local and global political climate Adidas has remained relevant in interactions with nations across decades (Keyser, 2015: 26). This ability to remain relevant by adapting has allowed this sort of big money corporation to be a strong partner to FIFA by sponsoring the organisation’s endeavours. The involvement of the sponsors in club football and football globally highlights the close relationship between the spread and growth of football and capital. One can see the dependency between the two and in turn this explains how the football governing body may be entangled in commercial interests which lead to agreements that cause its growth and ensure its continued presence.

The state’s need for capital is underscored by the state’s need to develop. This has resulted in bilateral or tri-lateral trade agreements and, in some cases, aid agreements. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) is one such agreement. This agreement aims to promote multilateral economic growth trade between the parties by agreeing on a series of trade negotiations (Williams, 2017) This trade agreement between the US and the EU “is about reducing the regulatory barriers to trade for big business, things like food safety law, environmental legislation, banking regulations and the sovereign powers of individual nations” (Smedley, 2015), and bears a close resemblance to the demands that FIFA places on host nations, especially when states pass legislation that guarantees FIFA operations run unhindered during the World Cup tournaments, as did South Africa. This showcases how, due to the relationship between the state and capital led by the impact of globalisation on the state, big corporations and commercial actors have been able to influence states and act in states as long as they guarantee states’ revenue from the their interaction. This has reduced the role of the state in the global arena to that of a regulator (Investopedia, 2015), where transnational
corporations (TNC), multinational corporations (MNC) and international organisations (IO) are concerned. The emergence of TNCs and or MNCs and IOs as actors that interact with the state directly is of particular interest. This is due to the changing roles of the state in international relations between 1945 and the 1980s and beyond. Prior to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945, states interacted solely with each other. The establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is more commonly known as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), meant that developing states could interact with quasi-state institutions or what could be known as international organisations (IOs). These IOs are global and are said not to be influenced by the member states, but they have state members who vote on courses of action of the organisations.

As the world continued its process of globalisation, in the 1980s and the early 1990s the shift of world economics due to Thatcherism and Reaganism saw a growth in capitalism which impacted on the role of the state (Ashford, 1989: 1). FIFA, which can be seen as an IO, in that it has members who represent nations but is not run by the states, capitalised on the highly commercial global economic period and began its significant growth. Due to the growth of sports through television, global sports federations and TNCs became major players in international discourse and began to interact more directly with states. The capital that FIFA supposedly offers World Cup tournament hosts in terms of economic prosperity merges the role of sports – as a capital actor – with the nation state. This interaction either works out for the better or for the worse of the nation state because FIFA are guaranteed to benefit due to their demands. With this in mind it is easier to understand how FIFA may leverage the prospective exposure of a football World Cup tournament, the supposed social benefits, the sponsorship it comes with, and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) it may create as benefits for the host nations as long as they comply with the non-negotiable demands. FIFA must also ensure a guarantee on all the benefits in question, especially to its partners, highlighting how it may indeed be influenced by commercial interests. FIFA makes serious demands on host nations due to its revenue and commercial interests; these demands can in some cases hurt
the countries in question. South Africa was not exempted from the lack of guarantee to regain what they spent for infrastructure and in preparation of the World Cup tournament (Bond & Cottle, 2011: 29). Former President of the USA Bill Clinton, in a speech regarding the World Cup tournament bid for the USA, illustrated how the bid committee assume a position of proxy for the state (Corbett, 2010). Cases that have exposed FIFA for its corruption and below the table vote-rigging have exposed that state officials linked to football have also been embroiled in the corruption where they have been involved in the negotiations (Brummer & McKune, 2015). The nature of extraterritoriality that MNCs have, makes it extremely difficult for states to hold them accountable, especially when they openly state that they are an entity unto themselves and answer to no one, like FIFA does (Jennings, 2006: 60).

2.4.2 World Cup Tournaments and International Relations

The heavy European focus that was present within FIFA before the first World Cup tournament allowed for a politicisation of the tournaments. One of the major reasons for this could be how the world was colonised by Europeans at the time. Allowing the colonies to participate on a level playing field was seen as diluting the game and what it stood for. This was evident in the inaugural FIFA World Cup tournament that took place in Uruguay. Rimet was trying to fulfil his dream and making the tournament truly global and because Uruguay had dominated the international tournaments prior to the 1930 World Cup, it made sense to Rimet to award them the first World Cup (Tomlinson, 2007: 58). The resistance of the European FIFA members was evident in the participation: out of the fifteen teams that participated in the first World Cup tournament, seven were from South America, four were from Europe and two from North America. The Europeans did not have much of a representation in the first World Cup tournament due to the travel concerns and antipathy towards the opening up of football globally (Tomlinson, 2007: 58).

The tournament’s participation may have been low but it showcased the move towards a global tournament and the persistence of Jules Rimet’s FIFA. To further the ambition for the
international presence of FIFA, Rimet decided to move the headquarters of the federation to Zurich, Switzerland, in 1932 (Planet FIFA, 2016). The relocation to Switzerland began the growth of FIFA from a small organisation with an income that was restricted to the membership fees of the member countries, into a far more complex entity (Hill, 2011: 134). Like the IOC moving to Switzerland, FIFA did not only guarantee positional security in terms of the neutrality of the country during wars (Krüger, 1999: 20), but also the neutrality allowed for FIFA to be guaranteed economic security at any point. Switzerland’s neutrality made its banking and monetary institutions operate differently from other countries, which to a large extent protected FIFA in its colluding and vote rigging (Krüger, 1999: 20). With the favourable tax rates for organisations and corporations in Switzerland as a tax haven, it was the right place for the secure status for any rapidly and globally growing organisation in the 1930s. Another factor that made Switzerland a good option was that it maintained its democracy even when its neighbours Italy and Germany turned to fascism and nationalism. This subsequently benefitted Switzerland, and by extension FIFA, during the Great Depression in the 1930s, as it affected them much later on and to a lesser extent (Bordo, Helbling & James, 2007). FIFA was thus always protected from any scrutiny within Switzerland’s borders until Loretta Lynch and her FBI team began to investigate FIFA (Rassel, 2012: 780). Switzerland’s cooperation resulted in several FIFA officials getting indicted and more recently FIFA itself handing documents over to law enforcement.

Rimet, like his IOC counterpart Coubertin, was soundly grounded in the opinion that sports and politics should remain separated, especially amidst the tensions between participating states. The success of the 1934 and 1938 World Cup tournaments was of particular concern for FIFA due to the tensions that were present between the European participants and the South American ones. The tension arose from the allocation of host nations. Both continents had hopeful hosts for those World Cup tournaments. At the end of the 1938 World Cup the World War II caused World Cup football to stop until the 1950s. The global football hiatus due to war helped FIFA strengthen its structure and membership.
2.5 Rous to Havelange (FIFA’s Expansion)

In 1950, when the World Cup tournament returned after WW2, the FIFA structure had begun to grow and the institution went through even more changes. Rimet carried FIFA past the initial post war period and only left the organisation in 1954. In this period Rimet had done the groundwork for an organisation that was growing in membership due to the global spread of decolonisation and self-determination.

Germany under Hitler had caused a lot of destruction across Europe. This subsequently affected Germany and its allies negatively both socially and economically. Countries that were once under German rule were for the first time beginning to lead themselves. The weak economic nature of these newly independent countries after 1945 made the states vulnerable to further annexation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and their communist ideology. As the USSR spread across Eastern Europe, the United States of America (USA) led the charge against the spread of communism and the USSR’s influence in Europe, Asia, South America and Africa by encouraging states in these continents to become independent and further aiding their development. This strong opposition of the USA against the USSR raised the tensions of the Cold War period, which ran from 1947 to 1991. The realisation of self-determination by states in opposition to colonial empires and larger political organisations under one governmental rule during this period was broadly known as the anti-imperial movement. The states that successfully managed to realise self-determination were eager to have a global presence and FIFA was more than willing to allow newly independent countries into their ranks (Macmillan, 2009).

The Cold War’s global political and military tension allowed for sports to be used in a more politicised manner (Lindsay, 2013). Sports during this period were an alternative to war. This made an impact on sports development. States linked sports to their politics during the Cold War, to further their political ideologies, to express their culture and as a form of diplomacy (Lindsay, 2013). Lindsay (2013) notes that during this period in international relations sports tournaments were seen as a battleground on which national rivals showcased
their ideological supremacy and this would only be achieved through victory. Due to this particular importance placed on victory during the Cold War era, the USSR “invested large amounts of reserves into the development of their athletic programs over the years from the early 1950s throughout the 1980s” (Lindsay, 2013).

FIFA’s international spread, as envisioned by Rimet, was in the middle of all this global tension. Rimet was succeeded by Rodolfe Seeldrayers, who was president for one year, and subsequently succeeded by Arthur Drewry, who was president from 1956 to 1961 (Tomlinson, 2007: 57). Drewry was a great supporter of Sir Stanley Rous and accredited his tenure as FIFA president to Rous, who was secretary general of the English FA at the time (Tomlinson, 2007: 58). Drewry had previously been part of the English FA’s International Selection Committee where he interacted with Rimet during his bid to have England readmitted to FIFA, after which Rimet chose him as the vice-president of FIFA (Tomlinson, 2007: 58). In 1961, Rous became president of FIFA, having already had tremendous influence on the shaping of the international game as secretary of the English FA and also as an international referee (Macmillan, 2009). In the forefront of many influential rule changes, he played a major role in the development of football (Macmillan, 2009). Rous, like Coubertin, believed that sports had to have a base of teaching, and thus Rous went about revolutionising football in England (Tomlinson, 2007: 59). To achieve this Rous established “a more efficient bureaucratic base, introducing teaching schemes for all levels of the game – coaching, playing, refereeing” (Tomlinson, 2007: 59). Also, like Coubertin who believed in a global sporting family through the Olympic Games, Rous saw football as a tool to create a global family. Tomlinson (2007: 59) quotes him as saying that, “[t]he unparalleled opportunities which the war years have given the Association of being of service to countries other than our own has laid an excellent foundation for post-war international development.” This statement demonstrates the level of involvement FIFA was willing to have in international development through sports. This formed the basis on which FIFA’s ability to remain apolitical made them a very attractive global institution for newly independent states that had political ideologies other than democracy.
FIFA used its influence to become an asset for both corporations and governments. Rous claimed, “[t]he FA’s War Emergency Committee had boosted football’s international links with influential people through cooperation with the armed forces” (Tomlinson, 2007: 59). The appeal of FIFA for some states going through their development process was extremely evident when, in some instances in the 1960s and 1970s, countries joined the football association before they did other global governance institutions like the United Nations (Planet FIFA, 2016).

When Rous became president of FIFA in 1961, the global political climate had changed. The World Bank and the IMF were in effect trying to stop the spread of communism across the globe, the Cold War had begun, and many states were gaining independence through decolonisation (Lindsay, 2013). Rous, having been an international football referee, believed in the amateur ideals of the game and not so much in its professionalisation (Macmillan, 2009). During his time as a referee, Rous changed and influenced the game a great deal by “rewriting the rules of the game” (Tomlinson, 2007: 59). Rous saw in football the opportunity to preserve some influence over the culture of the world during the commitment to expansion and modernisation that was taking place. The shift towards more lucrative World Cup tournaments with more global participation, which included third world countries, began to expose Rous’s traditional side and his unwillingness to allow the game to grow (Tomlinson, 2007: 59). England winning in 1966 on their home turf did not make it any better; mistrust grew from commentators who saw the win as “too cosy and collusive” (Tomlinson, 2007: 60). Tomlinson (2007: 60) notes the comments made by Swiss national team coach, Dr A. Foni stated that the “[t]op Latin American and European teams were favoured in their respective continents, meeting the weakest teams in opening games, having more rest than their distant cousins.” Such allegations raised questions against Rous and the fairness of the global tournament.

Rous, like Rimet, was focused on the forward movement of football; he was concerned with the expansion and modernisation, but he was also rooted in the traditional expressions
of the game that surrounded the amateur game (Tomlinson, 2007: 60). Therefore, Rous found it very problematic to stay president of FIFA. As the game grew, so did the opposition against him within FIFA (Glanville, 2015: 12). Members within FIFA were focused on World Cup tournament finals looking increasingly lucrative, and on emerging Third World nations wanting more representation in the world game (Tomlinson, 2007: 60), which made Rous appear old fashioned, too English and pro-colonialism (Tomlinson, 2007: 60). That made it easy to replace him by João Havelange, who was focused on bringing more representatives into the game and who built his campaign around their inclusion. During the 1974 elections Rous was ousted. Most of the national federations from countries in the third world mistrusted Rous’s attempts towards expansion. Their assumption was that Rous’s expansion of the game would have an imperialist focus; in that he saw their inclusion into FIFA and in the World Cup tournaments the same way the British colonialists had seen their interaction with the third world during colonialism (Tomlinson, 2007: 61).

Once Havelange became President of FIFA, the organisation changed drastically. He propelled the shift of FIFA from a dominant sporting body to a corporation. This had a lot to do with his appreciation of diversity among people. Tomlinson (2007: 62) noted Havelange as saying that his background, growing up in Brazil among people of different races, and understanding their mentalities, made it easy for him to join a diverse and multi-racial environment like that of FIFA. Also owing to his experience in business, he not only interacted well with the third world national association presidents, but also with the leaders of the more developed world and he positioned himself as the man for both interests (Tomlinson, 2007: 63). Havelange impacted a lot of change within in various aspects of the organisation and more will be said about him in this mini-dissertation when addressing the respective changes. Havelange drew from his experience in Brazil as the head of the Brazilian Sports Federation where he succeeded “with an expanded national and regional league and cup set-up underpinned by commercial intervention” (Tomlinson, 2007: 63). Havelange began the process of restructuring FIFA by ensuring that he fulfilled the promises he gave the developing
countries during his campaign. To do this, Havelange proposed to increase the number of teams that participate in the World Cup tournaments from 16 to 24. He also created more tournaments within FIFA, namely the junior and under-20 World Cup finals. He instituted the construction of a new headquarters for FIFA to include more representatives and provided resources to national associations that needed the assistance. He helped with the development of stadia, brought about training courses for coaches, referees, medical and technical help, and also introduced inter-continental tournaments to ensure that continents could maintain a high standard of football once the World Cup tournament comes around every four years (Glanville, 2015: 50).

2.6 FIFA’s structure

What started out in 1932 as an office in Zurich with seven members, making money from the subscription fees of those members, had by the end of Rous’s tenure grown into an organisation with one hundred members, organising a World Cup tournament with sixteen participants every four years. This changed completely once Havelange had begun his expansion. At the end of his tenure as FIFA president, Havelange’s FIFA had a World Cup tournament with 32 participants, tournaments for the youth, a tournament for women, and an industry of football that was globally worth close to $250 billion per annum (Tomlinson, 2007: 64). Havelange achieved many of his goals by including big corporations in the processes of FIFA through sponsorship agreements. The biggest of these corporations included Adidas, Coca-Cola, and McDonald's (Tomlinson, 2007: 63). An amalgamation of change within FIFA through commercialisation, sponsorship agreements and funding brought about changes in the FIFA structure.

At the top of the FIFA structure is the president, who is elected by the FIFA Congress for a four year term with the option of being re-elected indefinitely (Balser & Larkin, 2015). FIFA Presidents are also expected to preside over the FIFA congress, the executive and emergency committee meetings and to chair the committees in which he has been appointed.
to preside over (FIFA, 2015). The president has the ability to change the course of the whole organisation, which means that the FIFA president is not only the face of football, but the face of football’s role in global politics and social economics. This is why the personality of the president has determined the direction FIFA as an institution will take. Each president has made significant decisions that have moved FIFA through what can only be called a great transformation. When Rimet was president, he went about moving FIFA from Paris to Zurich and grew the participation in the World Cup tournament, Rous expanded FIFA further by instituting training courses for coaches and referees, and Havelange brought about the televised growth of football.

The FIFA congress that is tasked with electing the president is composed of the 209 members of FIFA who are grouped into continental confederations which are comprise of regional federations of national associations. The members of the FIFA congress have an executive committee that governs over the sessions and makes decisions when the FIFA congress is not in session (Bialik, 2015). The executive committee is made up of the president, the secretary general, eight vice-presidents and fifteen members. Each member serves a four year term and can be re-elected. The positions on the executive committee are given in relation to the “economic and social importance of football for the respective continent and origin” (Bialik, 2015). It is necessary to note that the Oceanic Football Confederation (OFC) has one vice-president, the Confederación Sudamericana du Fútbol (CONMEBOL) and the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) has one vice-president and two members, the African Football Confederation (CAF) and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) have one vice-president and three members and the Union des Associations Européenes de Football (UEFA) has the largest representation, with two vice-presidents and five members which gives the UEFA the most influence (Bialik, 2015). The size of the executive committee makes its decision making a long and ineffective process (Bialik, 2015).
Second in command to the president in the FIFA hierarchy is the secretary general. The secretary general of FIFA is appointed by the executive committee. The position has responsibility over the finances, international relations, the organisation of the FIFA World Cup tournaments, and other tournaments that FIFA organises (FIFA, 2015). In as much as the executive committee elects the secretary general, where the institutional hierarchy is concerned, the vice-presidents fall under the secretary general and also preside over the standing committees and the judicial bodies (Bialik, 2015). The FIFA congress, which watches over the executive committee, also agrees and decides on the rules, amendments, statutes as well as the elections of the Presidents and World Cup tournament hosts (Bialik, 2015). Each member of the congress has an equal standing within the congress. This means that each vote is equal, regardless of how small the country the federation is representing (Bialik, 2015).

The concept of equality in the voting that FIFA insists on is a testament to the democracy and equality they would like to uphold (Tomlinson, 2007: 58). However, this one-member-one-vote policy is very problematic, since the “soccer power in smaller nations concentrates itself in fewer officials and stakeholders. That makes these nations’ votes more vulnerable to corruption from bribery” (Bialik, 2015). For Havelange “the secret ballot, one member one vote system gives him absolute control. Vanuatu has the same voting rights in a FIFA congress election as Germany, Faroe Islands the same voting weight as Brazil” (Tomlinson, 2007: 58). This is good for an international organisation the size of FIFA, but as Tomlinson (2007: 63) wrote, “[f]or years this has worried more powerful football nations, as voting outcomes and decisions can be assured from the accumulated commitment of tiny constituencies. Majorities necessary to change the rules, procedures or statutes of FIFA are exceedingly difficult to mobilise or muster.” In such cases not only are political officials involved in the running and management of football, but smaller nations are also more vulnerable to influence from global actors who promise prospects of future funding for football related projects as well as other developmental endeavours (Bialik, 2015). This form of influence is
effective, since what may seem like a small amount of funding for the organisation, is a large amount for smaller nations (Bialik, 2015).

The distribution of development funds from FIFA to national federations was administered by the Goal Programme and the Financial Assistance Programme (FAP). The Goal Programme caters for projects that include the building of new fields and association offices and the FAP funds a wider variety of projects which are open for FIFA members (Bialik, 2015). The assumption would be that the states that are smaller and the national associations that need more aid would get more funding from the programs, but like the voting, the funding is also spread equally (Bialik, 2015). This was not always the case. In its infancy, FIFA took a fee for the membership, but in the mid-1970s this changed when Havelange brought in widespread sponsorship. This meant that FIFA created a space for itself where countries would be gaining more from being members. This further allowed for bribery for any country that might need more money to fund its projects (Planet FIFA, 2016). The funding is reported by FIFA to authorities who audit the organisation’s books and put in FIFA’s reports; however, the problem arises when the smaller federations use the funds to enrich the officials (Bialik, 2015). This is even more disturbing when it is used by those in charge at FIFA to buy voting allegiances of member federations (Bialik, 2015). This is one of the things that Loretta Lynch and her FBI team have accused FIFA of (Radnege, 2017) and into which investigation was still ongoing at the time of writing. The FBI are investigating “two companies and more than 40 individuals, including four former FIFA vice-presidents, indicted for skimming more than $200m from the game in the Americas through bribes and kickbacks” (Radnege, 2017). Lynch alleged that this operation to bring to justice these FIFA leaders was due to their “rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted corruption” (Radnege, 2017). All these functions in the FIFA structure are major parts of the governance of FIFA, some of which have greatly influenced the transformation of FIFA or have come about due to FIFA’s transformation.
2.7 Institutional Transformation

As FIFA grew so too did their sphere of influence. Institutional changes in federations in general and in this case FIFA specifically occur due to a perception by federations that they “need to establish temporary management structures and programmes of a complex and dynamically changing environment” (Nagel et al., 2015: 408). Havelange has taken full claim of how FIFA currently runs and the measures put in place that resulted in its rapid growth (Tomlinson, 2007: 64). He “transformed an administration-oriented institution into a dynamic enterprise brimming with new ideas and the will to see them through, so that now the administration is managed in the form of a modern firm” (Tomlinson, 2007: 64). As a result, the changes that happen within FIFA reflect for the most part on the hopes of the president at the time and where they would like to take the federation in their tenure. Rimet opened up the membership of FIFA from the start and illustrated this by awarding Uruguay the first World Cup tournament (Planet FIFA, 2016). The largely European membership of FIFA in 1930 perceived this as a threat to their exclusivity and due to the financial costs of the trip to Uruguay many of the European contingents opted to sit out the Uruguay World Cup tournament. This threat to exclusivity and the attempt to keep other nations out can be seen as Eurocentrism. It presupposes a universality amongst all Europeans, which is a myth (Amin, 2009: 166). Amin describes Eurocentrism as a pro-European social theory, he follows up that Eurocentrism in actual fact distorts the theories of society as “it draws from its storehouse of components, retaining one or rejecting another according to the ideological needs of the moment” (Amin, 2009: 166). Amin reinterprets the formation of Eurocentrism with the inclusion of the Arab Islamic world in Europe, dispelling the single minded, solely European basis of other thoughts surrounding Eurocentrism (Amin, 2009: 186). Maeso and Araujo are of the opinion that in any engagement with pro-European perspectives, as with the decision of the Europeans whether to participate in the South American World Cup tournaments, it is very important to note that Eurocentrism in this understanding must be viewed in line with the development of “western knowledge and its law for universal validity, since this provides a certain historical mapping of
the world that unambiguously establishes which events and processes are scientifically relevant and how they are interpreted” (Maeso & Araujo, 2015: 1). The pro-European members who were the initial members of FIFA were assuaged by the allocation of the 1934 and 1938 World Cup tournaments to Italy and France, respectively (Hill, 2011). Though Uruguay were the champions at the time, they boycotted both the 1934 and 1938 World Cup tournaments in Europe as retaliation for the minimal European participation in 1930. This signalled a growing tension between the members of FIFA and the hosting of the tournament (Van der Merwe, 2009: 22). It seemed that in this case Uruguay was standing against what could be seen as Eurocentric thoughts and its subsequent behaviour. Therefore, Uruguay’s boycotting of the European-hosted World Cup tournaments could very well have been due to the tension in the nationalism. At this point in the history of the World Cup tournaments there was not much financial benefit in hosting a World Cup tournament; hosting was seen as recognition of a country’s position in the global arena. As much as Rimet intended to have a truly international tournament, the demands of the numerous European members, where football was concerned, may have posed a problem for him.

From the time of global conquests, from 1870-1914, Europe had developed a way in which they did things, which, they believed, was right; it was unfathomable to do something differently. Europeans measured the third world according to a European standard on the assumption that the progress towards development is universal (Amin, 2009: 186). Amin critiques this point of view stating that “the socialist experiments and the efforts of third world countries must be analysed and appraised in some other way than by the yardstick of Eurocentrism. The argument which declares “they could have done as we (Westerners) did; they did not, it is their fault,” eliminates from the outset the real problems encountered by the peoples who are victims of capitalist expansion” (Amin, 2009: 186). These victims of the capitalist expansion encountered Europe through imperialism and slave labour. The European colonisers justified this process of slavery and imperialism as a natural order of progression towards development that their supposed ancestors the Greek and ancient Romans had
begun with their use of slave labour (Amin, 2009: 249). This, as was seen in the global conquest and colonial rule, led to racism as it coexisted in relation with the market relations that resulted in the selling of the labour and the value of the produce that came from it (Amin, 2009: 253). Because of the developments in the ways the colonising Europeans did things, Europeans began to look at themselves differently, they believed they were what everyone should be or should aspire to be, and this explains why most states that were colonised to this day speak English, French or Portuguese (Amin, 2009: 172). Europeans had developed a serious mistrust to anyone that was not similar to them—the only way to trust a person not similar to them was to make them as similar as possible, but in the case of race, one could speak, dress and behave like a European but due to their skin they would never be European enough to be treated as an equal (Amin, 2009: 172).

Hitler illustrated the Eurocentric racist inclination at the Berlin Olympics. Hitler invited all the winners into the presidential box for a handshake and public congratulations from the German leader; however, Krüger (1999: 15) writes that, “[t]he last event of the day had been the men’s high jump in which two Afro-Americans placed one and two. Hitler, who had already stayed longer in the stadium than the original time schedule of the event, left immediately after the final jumps and did not congratulate the high jumpers. De Baillet-Latour complained to Hitler the next day and told him that he should congratulate in public all or none, to avoid discrimination. So from then onward Hitler welcomed only the German medal winners in the VIP room underneath the grandstand of the stadium.” What this showcased was that no matter how forward thinking and universal the thoughts of the global sporting organisations were, they could not safeguard every participant against the racism that was part of the European culture. Race or what could be called historical demographics with reference to location has played a prominent part in the history of FIFA even during its expansionist growth.

Rous was the first to concede the FIFA Presidency to a non-European. Rous held a pro-European position where football was concerned. He recognised the prowess of the South Americans, but he relegated Africa, Asia and Oceania to competing for only one spot in the
1966 World Cup (Planet FIFA, 2016). As far as Rous was concerned, countries that sat outside South America and Europe were not good enough to compete and first had to prove themselves, only after which the World Cup tournaments would become more accessible to them (Planet FIFA, 2016). His anti-global position on participation in the World Cup tournaments made it very difficult to see his claim to re-election as a testimony of a movement beyond the Eurocentrism and racism of the 1900s.

Amin’s idea of Eurocentrism was prevalent and it explained the European self-understanding and experiences in their historical progress as more superior to other nations (Amin, 2009: 166). Amin critiques this viewpoint of the European thought. According to Maeso & Araujo (2015: 7), Eurocentrism was fuelled by the development theory of modernity in Europe, which states that “[m]odernity is racial, and the specific relationships between power and knowledge that forge the contemporary contours of Eurocentrism can tell us about the histories of race and racism and their enduring legacies.” The European mind set of superiority over the rest of the world was frowned upon globally, especially when countries began to gain their independence. Thus, the position of European superiority held by Rous was a mere reflection of the social discourse in Europe. This position did not serve Rous very well when the 1972 presidential elections came up. As already mentioned, Rous ran against Havelange, a Brazilian, who presented a position contrary to Rous’s Eurocentric one.

FIFA before Havelange’s shift reflected the sense that the world economy had towards developing nations. With the move towards independence of the colonies, the countries that colonised these countries did not initially recognise the self-determined nature of these countries and this attitude seeped into international organisations. These countries may have gotten their independence, but they were not seen as equals by European nations. The growth of the independence movement in the ‘60s and ‘70s created a platform for the growth of FIFA and its potential reach. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a group of countries that formed during the Cold War, specifically in 1961, who did not want to be formally associated with either the USA or the USSR and was growing in numbers in the wake of an independence
wave (Nuclear threat initiative, 2017). These countries that were non-aligned had the objective to "create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member states becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers" (Nuclear threat initiative, 2017). This fell in line with Rimet’s desire for football being the universal sport and being unaffected by world politics. With this being said it is worth noting that during his tenure, especially in the 1930s, such a drastic shift was not possible. For one, the USA was undergoing and recovering from the Great Depression and most of the countries that eventually gained independence in the ’60s and the ’70s were still colonised. Therefore, the position federations took towards Rous or Havelange was important due to the position and direction FIFA was going to take after the elections.

Havelange ensured the support of the countries that felt neglected by Rous’s FIFA and promised to go beyond his predecessor’s effort and visited every African federation to ensure them that he would extend FIFA’s reach and access to them. The nature of the Cold War made the states behind the Iron Curtain unreachable. This was mainly due to the ideological differences between the USA and the USSR. All the countries that were aligned with the USA were on the western side of Europe. The countries on the eastern side of the Europe were all aligned with the USSR. These two blocs of ideology were separated by a wall in Berlin, Germany. Havelange made sure he visited the football federation that represented the Soviet bloc (Planet FIFA, 2016). During his visits Havelange would convince federation heads to vote for him as the next president of FIFA by using the support of the world’s best player at the time, Pele, or by handing out gifts to officials and their wives (Planet FIFA, 2016). Havelange, by ensuring a reach beyond the Iron Curtain, placed FIFA in the right position to stand for universality of the game and also increase the membership for voting purposes. He would encourage them to join the organisation and with their entrance into FIFA Havelange would be guaranteed the votes that would come with them. Furthermore, it ensured that no matter who would win the Cold War, FIFA would eventually be unaffected. Havelange ensured the Soviet bloc that he would support their bid for the Moscow Olympics in 1980, if they in return
vote for him as the next FIFA president (Planet FIFA, 2016). Sports in the Cold War were a point of pride for nations which led them to strive to be the best and to host tournaments (Lindsay, 2013). Havelange’s campaign process was a prelude of vote rigging that would grow in FIFA during his tenure. Once Havelange had managed to convince enough federations to oust Rous and elect him, the direction of FIFA’s change began the course it has managed to maintain to date.

2.8 Commercialisation:

From a Football Federation to a Transnational Corporation

The spread of football further entangled the decisions made in FIFA with the political contexts that it was operating in, especially when exorbitant amounts of money were concerned. The exorbitant amounts of money came into FIFA when it began to commercialise not only itself as a brand but the World Cup tournaments too in the mid-1970s. The commercialisation of football and FIFA changed the path that FIFA would take as a sports federation. The amount of money in the game increased tremendously. Commercialisation of FIFA and football and the World Cup tournaments brought to an end the days of FIFA’s dependence on membership fees. Havelange, during his expansion of FIFA to global participation, realised that the World Cup tournaments could be sold as a commodity (Planet FIFA, 2016). This was the commodification of football that today is seen as the norm.

In the 1970s when FIFA began its commercialisation, it took advantage of the instability in the changing global economy from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and gold convertibility of the US Dollar, and the resultant fluctuation of exchange rates and a hike in the price of oil (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2017: 49). These changes resulted in increased inflation rates and high unemployment. The high unemployment and inflation triggered high debt levels, especially in African and Latin American countries, at the start of the 1980s because of the steep increase in the rate of exchange on the dollar to combat the inflation (Ohno, 2017). The change in the
The economy was highlighted by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which signalled the supremacy of capitalism over the USSR-led ideology of communism. The 1980s presented a decade where FIFA’s earnings grew significantly through the television rights of the World Cup tournaments, among other things. The global economic and financial management system of the 1980s were characterised by a change in the policy making processes of industrial countries towards the thinking that was popularised by the Japanese leader Masayoshi Ohira, the United States’ Ronald Regan, the United Kingdom’s Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl in Germany (Boughton, 2002: 3). The changes were spurred by the debt crisis of 1982. To avoid rapid inflation and counter unemployment, these countries either controlled money supply or cut income tax rates but raised sales taxes, which was known as supply side economics, to make up the deficit for the economy (Ashford, 1989: 1). Whereas the industrial countries monitored their own economies, the third world ran swiftly into debt, unable to pay back what they owed as the service payments rose drastically (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2017: 50).

In 1982 Mexico began a period of turmoil resulted in many nations announcing that they would not be able to repay their debts (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2017: 50). To counter their debt crises many third world countries began to reform their policies to cater for more stability, liberalisation, and privatisation with the aid of institutions like the IMF, the United States Treasury, and the World Bank (Ohno, 2017). This resulted in the IMF’s growth in influence in the 1980s. The IMF came in to aid developing countries through their crises. They would do this by playing a major role in industrialising countries by providing capital and managing the system (Boughton, 2002: 4). This unfortunately did not necessarily help the developing nations. The developing nations, with the aid of the IMF, had to drastically implement measures for fiscal consolidation “which contributed to a prolonged recession and a lost decade of development in those regions” (United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2017: 51). This showcased how the IMF was inadvertently a tool that promoted the capitalist ideology as opposed to a tool that
helped curb the problem of debt in the developing countries. The debt crisis placed the IMF in a position where they officially began to act in the capacity of managers of financial crises globally (Boughton, 2002: 3).

Ultimately, in the 1980s, countries were united in what was known as a revolution that occurred silently “towards policies that were more cooperative, outward oriented and more market friendly than before” (Boughton, 2002: 5). This allowed for FIFA to make use of its non-profit status to gain benefits which included minimal tax deductions on all the money it made, therefore making them a very profitable non-profit organisation. FIFA made large gains in countries hosting World Cup tournaments as the countries would need to grant FIFA a complete exemption from tax. This meant that “a hosting country must agree to forgo tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars in tax for the benefit of FIFA, an organisation which enjoys favourable home country income tax at 4.25%, further adjusted for the four-year operating cycle” (Ruwo & Makarudze, 2015). This allowed FIFA to become financially lucrative rapidly in the 1990s when globalisation became prevalent and spread across the world. Globalisation meant that FIFA could trade goods, offer its services, and use its capital influence broadly (Boughton, 2002: 5).

The commercial transformation of FIFA was presented and largely supported by other major TNCs (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 893). There was much to gain for FIFA and other corporations. Already in the 1928 Olympics, the IOC showcased the partnership between sports and capital by partnering with Coca-Cola, allowing the Olympic Games to grow in size, accommodating more participants, and catering for more sports (Barney et al. 2004: 384). Coca-Cola in this exchange began to gain more exposure by attracting client bases in the host cities of the Olympic Games (Barney, Martyn, & Wenn, 2004: 384). Coca-Cola’s exposure grew even larger when the development of television had raised the profile of global sports to remote viewers (Barney, Martyn, & Wenn, 2004: 384).

Havelange planned a similar expansionist path for FIFA that would lead to its transformation. He highlighted his plans for FIFA’s expansion in his eight point plan, stipulating
how he was going to go about delivering on the promises he had made in his campaign. To achieve those promises, Havelange knew that FIFA would need money. To get that money, commercial partnerships were vital for FIFA. The TNC at the forefront of the FIFA transformation was Adidas and its owner, Horst Dassler. From the previous exposure of Adidas at the 1936 Olympic Games, with their partnership with Jesse Owens, and their further growth after the war, various sports had raised their interest in Adidas sponsorship. As a consequence of Adidas sponsoring the West German team that won the 1954 World Cup tournament with a kit and boots, their market grew to include even more sports (Barrett, 2008). Adidas sponsored the top national football teams and provided them with resources in the form of money and equipment (Planet FIFA, 2016). To ensure that Adidas would gain from the expansion of FIFA, Dassler made it his business to engage with potential presidents: “he surveyed the candidates, did his private deals and helped them to victory with Adidas money. He made them presidents and let them remember that he could keep them in power or push them out. All they had to do was play the game, which meant looking out for Adidas” (Jennings, 2006: 13). Adidas and Coca-Cola were brought on as sponsors to shoulder the costs of the multitude of expansion tournaments that Havelange had introduced. The FIFA under 17 World Cup, the FIFA under 20 World Cup, the FIFA Confederations Cup, and the FIFA Women’s World Cup would cost FIFA a lot of money to run, money that Adidas and Coca-Cola could provide.

Due to the growth in technology and globalisation, media broadcasts of sports and the selling of television rights became seriously lucrative business for FIFA. Television broadcasts allowed for World Cup tournaments to impact societies across the globe at the same time and not just the host cities (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 11). At the point of its emergence in the late 1920s, televisions could only be accessed by the few and remained largely as experiments in labs with no consistency of image quality and broadcast ability (Schultz, 2007: 8). Only in 1948 did the mass production of television sets bring broadcasting into many households, and developing a preference for television programming (TV Technology, 2013). The television
allowed people across the globe to watch live broadcasts and the demand for live sports events increased (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 11). Fans now had the unique opportunity to choose where they watched live sports events. They could choose to pay the cost for the stadium entry, travel to the stadia, food and beverages, and accommodation during large sporting events, or pay to watch the event in their homes (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 11). With most global sports events the costs around being in the host city are exceptionally high. The broadcasting of sports on television had brought to the public a convenience that could be obtained at a price which was considerably more affordable (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 11). The widespread television coverage greatly impacted tournaments such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA football World Cup tournaments. The FIFA World Cup tournaments grew tremendously. According to Siu (2014), “[f]rom 1954 to 1986, the number of TV sets worldwide increased more than twentyfold, from a little more than 30 million to more than 650 million.” This was a significant jump from the first televised World Cup tournament in 1954. Television had begun to showcase its potential in making money for sports organisations through the selling of television rights (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 17). Whereas, prior to television broadcasting, the sports organisations and the host city would have had to share the revenue of ticket sales, television broadcasting allowed for the hosts to gain from the ticket sales and the sports organisations from the selling of the rights (Siu, 2014). It was not only the television broadcasting that allowed for the opportunity to make money; the television adverts were big money opportunities luring many more corporations to want to be part of the FIFA sponsorship group (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 66). Gratton and Solberg (2007: 209) state that “[p]rofit maximising advertising channels will always prioritise sports and events that attract the interest from mass audience”; therefore, giving the tournaments’ sponsorship partners priority slots during the broadcasting of the tournament. This lucrative endeavour grew the pool from which FIFA and the IOC could draw potential sponsors. As was the case with the sponsorship and commercialisation of the World Cup tournaments, FIFA also emulated the IOC as far as television broadcasts were concerned. In 1954 it began to televise the World Cup tournaments
to further its growth. The IOC had already begun experimenting with televising the Olympic Games in 1936 (Siu, 2014). In its endeavours to reach an international audience, FIFA was seemingly building on a platform set by the IOC.

Havelange promised side-lined national teams that he would give them a bigger World Cup tournament. This meant the inclusion of eight more teams and more money too to run the tournament (Jennings, 2006: 12). According to Jennings (2006: 12), Dassler was willing to advance the money to ensure the start of the commercial growth of the federation. Havelange promised in his campaign that the money from the commercialisation would be used to create more competitions and training courses for coaches and referees (Jennings, 2006: 12).

Once Adidas and Coca-Cola were on board, they invested heavily, guaranteeing funding for the training sessions and all the other promises made on the eight point plan (Jennings, 2006: 20). Both Adidas and Coca-Cola benefitted in the 1990s when televised football spread across the world rapidly. Coca-Cola had guaranteed itself exposure all over the world and benefits, where promotions were concerned, in every tournament. The partnership between FIFA and Coca-Cola in the commodification of football and FIFA merged business and sports as did the partnership between Coca-Cola and the IOC. FIFA’s commercial partners exchanged funding of the eight point plan for their logos on all World Cup related merchandise and advertisements (Jennings, 2006: 20). Coca-Cola could also “by underwriting the stadium advertising contract with FIFA, […] retain substantial stadium advertising for its own use (six boards in every match), as well as obtaining the stadia franchise for the sale of soft drinks, guaranteed television exposure for the Soccer Skills competition, world-wide promotional use of the mascot and symbol, local advertising opportunities and soft drink products exclusivity at zero cost” (West Nally, 2014).

As previously mentioned the commercialisation of football was more successful due to the role that television played in spreading the viewership of the game (Planet FIFA, 2016). In order to gain the most out of it, FIFA ensured that it had the monopoly on television rights in the 1980s. Subsequently, the demand on television rights went up with the growth of the
popularity of football and so too their prices. The commercialisation of football was channelled toward the consumer and due to the high demand the price on supply was high (Schultz, 2007: 8). Football was to be sold to the general population for their consumption, which not only fed into the urges of capitalism but also meant FIFA was catering for the viewership of a lot more people. Due to this demand of global viewership television rights were extremely lucrative for FIFA and many television broadcasting networks were willing to pay to supply the consumer (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 9). Where the World Cup sponsorship was already benefitting FIFA; the television rights pushed FIFA into a position of monetary dominance where it could sustain itself without the support of its members.

Prior to this ability to self-sustain, members had to pay a membership fee to FIFA. This meant that the federations that were better off could give more money to FIFA and in turn have a somewhat viable claim at influencing the decisions made in FIFA. It just so happened that the UEFA had leagues that were growing rapidly and becoming increasingly more lucrative. The success of the professionalisation of the English Premier League, the Spanish La Liga, and the German Bundesliga, among other leagues, is a product of the demand of television broadcasting of football (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 12). These leagues have maintained a very high standard, not only in the game but also in the financial pulling power through sponsorships and television rights (Conn, 2017b). Collectively, these three European leagues alone have accumulated revenue of approximately 10 billion dollars and 7.8 billion euros, to date (Conn, 2017b). Most of this revenue is generated from the size of the domestic and international sale of television rights which has set the English Premier League far ahead of any other league in its earnings (Conn, 2017b). The English FA gets about “£2.8bn per season, £8.4bn in total over three years” (Conn, 2017b), which is “approximately double that of the Bundesliga’s own improved deals, which are expected to pay around €1.4bn annually to the clubs in Germany’s top two divisions” (Conn, 2017b). Whereas this may have worked fairly well in some leagues because of the large involvement of companies and sponsors and public officials, other countries have experienced a downward spiral of revenue and
transparency in the running of the leagues. This is further illustrated with the entanglements between the national football league, and companies and sponsors, which can also create a fertile ground for fraud and corruption. This fraud and corruption grows in the wake of the exorbitant amounts of money that surrounds football activity (Okoth, 2002). As mentioned earlier for domestic leagues especially, the profit of the team and anyone affiliated in the sporting event was only in the ticket sales per game and therefore the size of the stadium mattered most. Television broadcasting has made ticket sales from stadia supplementary income as the bulk of the money comes from the television rights and sponsorship deals that come with them. The goal for Havelange was to shift the revenue power within FIFA from the federations to FIFA itself. With the liquidity of the European federation, Havelange needed to break the Eurocentric mindset that prevailed in FIFA. The best way to do that was to have a larger financial impact on member states as opposed to the states having that control over FIFA, as they previously did.

Companies were set up to deal specifically with the buying and selling of television rights and this is where Havelange and FIFA began to shift the revenue power. FIFA, from the mid-1970s, would sell the rights to these companies and these companies would then resell them (Jennings, 2006: 56). The first company to play this role of middle-man was International Sport and Leisure (ISL), which was set up by Dassler (Jennings, 2006: 56). Dassler, who had already had affiliations with FIFA as a sponsor, wanted to further his ambitions of football domination and to make money (Jennings, 2007: 57). As television rights were the biggest source of income for FIFA, the middle management required a lot of money to make more money off the rights. In the early years of the introduction of television rights, ISL went unrivalled, until IMG, an American company, grew as a competitor. IMG had gained acclaim in many other sports and intended to branch into football as well. IMG won over their competitors by paying more than them, and they did the same for football. In 1995, Eric Drossart, the president of IMG in Europe made a bid to buy the television rights for the World Cup tournaments in Korea and Japan (2002) and in Germany (2006). IMG offered 2 billion
Swiss francs at a billion per tournament, which was at the time the largest bid FIFA had received and world football had seen (Jennings, 2006: 58). Drossart, after making the bid, informed every executive committee member about it, which angered Blatter, due to his relationship with the owner of ISL, Dassler (Jennings, 2007: 58).

The process being outlined shows how closely related the selling of television rights had been to the vote rigging processes in FIFA. This process that was outlined gave Blatter no plausible deniability and further brought to the fore any queries of whether the voting process was equal and level across every bid; Blatter would have to justify his not awarding IMG the television rights when they had offered the largest bid ever in FIFA history (Jennings, 2007: 58). Drossart’s being vocal about the voting process raised questions about the vote rigging, corruption and bias in the bid awards in FIFA. Subsequently, the process behind vote rigging was highly scrutinised and audited (Jennings, 2006: 58). The need for close scrutiny was largely due to the history of vote rigging in Havelange’s campaign and management of FIFA. FIFA had not maintained the transparency they claimed to uphold (Tang 2013). The more FIFA could fend for itself financially the less they could be policed by any public authorities and officials.

The commercialisation of FIFA had entangled FIFA with corporations and companies that it regarded as its partners. These entanglements raise questions and suspicions of favouritism as well as exclusivity. The exclusivity with ISL previously highlighted raised questions about why FIFA reached the decisions it reached. The connection between ISL and Adidas, through Dassler, entangled all of FIFA’s decisions. This highlights that FIFA’s corporate promises took preference over their role as a football federation. What makes this problematic are the claims of bribery within FIFA from sponsors and partners to ensure that the partners would make more money from tournaments (Jennings, 2006: 60). This has not only tainted the individuals and the institution involved but also the decisions that were made. The television broadcast deals that were signed in the 1990s were not taken through the proper channels, which involved the entirety of the executive committee (Tomlinson, 2007:
These claims, which can only be seen as unethical dealings within FIFA by Havelange, seemed to have compounded allegations that were raised against him before (Tomlinson 2007: 60) “concerning missing funds in the accounts of the Brazilian sports federation, involvement in arms deals and other murky business practices.” These allegations dredged up by Drossart against FIFA have a similarity to the basis on which Loretta Lynch has based her claims against FIFA officials in Switzerland and in the United States. This shows that there really was no accountability in FIFA’s decision making processes, especially where its sponsorship partners or companies affiliated with partners were concerned.

### 2.9 FIFA: Blatter and beyond

Blatter was waiting to take up the position as Havelange came up to his retirement. Blatter had previously tried to run against Havelange but he did not manage to win (Jennings, 2006: 87). So the 1998 elections presented his moment for victory (Jennings, 2006: 87). Blatter used the relationships that his predecessor Havelange had fostered in the run up to his campaign, in the form of Swiss commercial partners and private jets from Qatar, including all the FIFA bodies that had been working on his behalf through Havelange, before he actually announced his intention to run (Tomlinson, 2007: 68). Blatter formed personal relationships with the African federations during Havelange’s trips to these countries, beating out his opponent, UEFA president Lennart Johansson, whose voting base was largely European (Tomlinson, 2007: 68). Blatter was continuing in the footsteps of Havelange by making the game accessible to everyone unlike Johansson who seemed to represent a return to a European dominated game. Blatter learned this during his work implementing Havelange’s eight-point plan, and the Coca-Cola and Adidas funds that ensured it would happen (Tomlinson, 2007: 68). The football development he had to ensure in remote countries resulted in Blatter building not only relationships, but also his vocal campaign based on the universality of football.

Once Blatter had won, he began to change the structure of the organisation to gain more controlling power. He instituted what he called a special bureau within FIFA that was to
be tasked with making decisions without the authorisation of the executive committee to assist with the growing workload in FIFA (Tomlinson, 2007: 69). A decision as controversial as this within FIFA did not help the queries against him regarding corruption and the unclean nature of FIFA. During the process of implementation for the special bureau, Blatter increased the number of the executive committee members, doubling the number (Tomlinson, 2007: 69). After adding more people to the executive committee, Blatter ensured they started getting paid and further reorganised the executive committee to ensure that those in the committee that had supported him during the campaign were rewarded with key positions (Tomlinson, 2007: 69). This not only served as a reward and a bolster for his supporters, it also ensured that Blatter’s decision in the committee would always go unchallenged. Havelange and Blatter’s tenures showcased the inclination of political decisions in FIFA being driven by the interests of the president of the organisation and partnership interests. This highlights that the dynamics within FIFA through history have shifted according to the preferences and the organisational goals set by the president (Tomlinson, 2007).

2.10 Politicised Transformation

FIFA’s endeavours to commercialise, established the institution as an entity that generates self-enforcing, path dependent processes. When FIFA gained the ability to make money through means other than the membership fees of member states, they also centralised the control over their revenues. The shift in the commercialisation of football coincided with changes in the global economy of sports. The rise of China has further impacted the growth of football. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made an intentional effort to promote the interest in football among the Chinese population (Barham, 2016), which has resulted in much growth in interest toward football. This has been reflected through the amount of money spent in the transfer window of the football league. The Chinese Super League transfer window for 2016 came up to 331 million euros, equivalent to $365 million, which pales in comparison to the 1.165 billion pounds that were spent in the premier league at the same time (BBC Sport, 2016).
Furthermore, the presence of China in the age of globalisation and technological development has also seen the placement of four Chinese owners of clubs in leagues in England (Williams, R., 2017). Paul Suen Ho Chung from Trillion Trophy Asia is the owner of Birmingham City; Tony Xia from the Recon Group is the owner of Aston Villa; Guochuan Lai, an entrepreneur, is the owner of West Bromwich Albion in the Premier League; Jeff Shi of Fosun International is the owner of Wolverhampton Wanderers; and more recently Gao Jisheng has paid 210 million pound for 80 per cent control of Premier League team Southampton (Williams, R., 2017). This may well be the beginning of the Chinese domination in English football or football in general, with China changing the investment laws regarding investments in football clubs and hotels outside their borders (Williams, R., 2017). What it instead may do is force a focus inward on developing their local football and achieve their goal of a dominant Chinese national team (Barham, 2016). China is imitating what happened in Europe during the Cold War – by increasing the amount of money they put into their sports development to gain global superiority. This may continue the trend of making sports lucrative globally, which results in the further expansion of the sports economy.

By the mid-1970s, after FIFA had signed deals and formed partnerships with major TNCs, FIFA was no longer just a football federation. The organisation’s transformation also allowed for the emergence of distributional politics in the federation (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 896). FIFA could now have the financial resources to substantially aid the development of their members. This created a gap in which its national subsidiaries could commit fraud and corruption that Lynch has shown in her investigation and is illustrated with the bribe paid by South Africa to FIFA to win the bid for the 2010 World Cup tournament.

FIFA transcended their dependence on membership fees and reduced the political influence that came with paying members. Furthermore, from the mid-1970s FIFA could control their federations more easily and effectively. Regional federations and their executive committee vice-presidents under FIFA jurisdiction could organise majorities through distributional policies or even more blatant vote rigging methods. This is why vote rigging has
been prevalent in most if not all of FIFAs voting processes including and not limited to the
election of presidents, the selling of television rights, and most importantly the allocation of the
World Cup tournament (Jennings, 2006: 70). The election of the presidents could arguably be
the most important of all these decisions; this could be mostly due to their ability to influence
the direction of the federation. The influence over the federations has ultimately resulted in the
successful increase in the global visibility of football and FIFA, which can also be attributed to
the FA’s buying into the plans that were promised at the elections. The hope that was created
by the campaign promises, including FIFA’s ability to deliver on them, has allowed FIFA the
loyalty of their members.
CHAPTER 3: FIFA AS A POLITICAL ACTOR

Power and politics have been part of FIFA since the beginning. FIFA’s growth was accompanied by the centralisation of the power within the organisation. When the dependence structure of FIFA changed from the members to itself after commercialising in the mid-1970s, FIFA could make decisions concerning football without the voice of national federations having a larger influence. The ability to centralise the decisions within FIFA called for the formation of support within the executive committees within FIFA. This is why Blatter ensured that his decisions remained unrivalled by increasing the number of executive committee members. He was also pleasing his allies in FIFA by placing them in key positions within the executive as a reward for their alliance (Tomlinson, 2007: 69). FIFA’s centralisation made the man at the top of FIFA the man to please if any federation wanted anything to work in their favour. This included and was not limited to the development of football within their countries to the allocation of World Cup tournaments and also the sales of the television rights.

Horst Dassler, owner of Adidas, had found Blatter at Longines SA and suggested him to Havelange, who was FIFA head at the time (Jennings 2006: 40). Havelange, after the word from Dassler, hired Blatter and put him in charge of the implementing his eight-point plan, and the Coca-Cola and Adidas funds that ensured it would happen (Tomlinson, 2007: 45). His success during this process with the Goal Programme in Africa and in developing countries that were previously sidelined in Rous’ tenure as FIFA president saw Blatter rise in the FIFA rank to secretary general in 1981 and further as Havelange’s protégé (Tomlinson, 2007: 68). Blatter finally became the president of FIFA in 1998. As president Blatter rewarded the heads of the confederations that showed him support by placing them in key places in the executive committee, showing that the relationship with Blatter and FIFA under him would be rewarding to anyone on the right side of the man in charge (Tomlinson, 2007: 68). This to a large extent may explain the federations’ allegiances to FIFA. As much as Tomlinson makes a valid point in explaining what drove the allegiances of the national federations, he does not take into consideration the need for football development in general as one of the reasons for the
allegiances of the federations. The demand for football only increased, especially after the introduction of broadcast television. At global tournaments national teams and the national federations that send them benefit from the exposure, participation and the television rights from the broadcasting (Gratton & Solberg, 2007: 82). For this reason, many previously sidelined federations, especially in the third world, were still yearning to develop the football in their countries to a point at which they were competitive and regularly represented at large sporting events. Blatter had proven successful in spreading football to the developing world and assisting with football development during his term as the general secretary of FIFA (Jennings, 2006: 40). Due to this success for any federation looking to develop after Havelange’s tenure, Blatter was seemingly the man more likely to ensure this happened.

Federations within FIFA are guaranteed to benefit. Their benefits are structured in two ways, firstly the annual 250,000 dollars FIFA funding and the funding of the World Cup tournament hosts and participants. This World Cup funding for the hosts is attached to the domination of national law by FIFA through their demands on the host nation. The inability of governments to get involved with national federations when needed, is problematic for the policing of FIFA officials within nations (Rassel, 2012: 798). Even under Swiss law, it was not until the office of the attorney general of Switzerland cooperated with Loretta Lynch’s investigation into FIFA that they could stand against global sporting organisations the size of FIFA (Rassel, 2012: 798). This is mainly due to the fact that “under Swiss law, prosecutors have no legal authority to investigate bribery in sporting organisations” (Rassel, 2012: 780). This results in these organisations occupying the space to function freely in their own way without accountability, this may, in retrospect, be the aggravating factor behind these organisations relocating their headquarters to Switzerland (Rassel 2012: 780).

The size that FIFA has grown into since its move to Switzerland has further increased its reach due to its non-profit nature and the inability of the government to meddle in the affairs of such organisations. FIFA’s member national federations are divided into confederations. This micromanagement of members helps the president maintain adequate control over the
entire body. All 211 members are divided into six confederations, namely the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Confederation of African Football (CAF), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), the Confederation of South American Football (CONMEBOL), the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA). Even with the micromanagement, the number of national federations involved has resulted in the inability by FIFA to manage and control each national federation effectively, which has led to cases of corruption on the local level of football governance (Okoth, 2002).

Due to FIFA being only accountable to themselves, investigating these claims is a non-starter for national governments. The loyalty that FIFA managed to gain from the national federations extends FIFA’s reach into nations. This can be attributed to the annual benefits of their affiliations with FIFA from the mid-1970s, as well as FIFA’s vocal position as a law unto itself that has made it very difficult to interrogate the vote-rigging processes (Jennings, 2006: 80).

It is this same bribe culture of vote rigging that surrounds the buying and selling of television rights that Loretta Lynch has pursued FIFA for since 2015. This also affected South Africans who were allegedly part of this bribing process for the 2010 World Cup tournament. South Africa allegedly paid ten million US dollars to host the World Cup tournament in 2010 (Hartley, 2016). This money was tracked to have been paid to now retired executives, both under investigation, Jack Warner and Chuck Blazer, in order to ensure votes for South Africa (Rumsby, 2015). According to claims within FIFA, the money was sent through FIFA accounts for Warner and was allegedly for the African Diaspora in the Caribbean, but it turned out that it was a bribe (Hartley, 2016). This allegation resulted in Lynch investigating the entire 2010 FIFA World Cup (Rumsby, 2015) and further implicating the World Cup tournaments that were awarded to Russia for 2018 and Qatar in 2022.

Some of FIFAs bribes were paid to senior officials in tax havens, which have made it difficult to trace to whom they were sent (Planet FIFA, 2016); however, Lynch’s investigation resulted in internal investigations within FIFA to weed out corruption and fraud. Gianni
Infantino’s (the current president of FIFA) inquiry into his organisation by US law firm Quinn Emanuel has handed all the necessary information, which has come to twenty thousand pieces of evidence, over to the Swiss authorities (Conn, 2017a). Among these allegations also lay the claims that Havelange was continuously accepting bribes and was part of the vote rigging processes in FIFA from the moment at which FIFA began to handle the selling of television rights on their own (Planet FIFA, 2016). This sense of cynicism surrounded Blatter’s term in office (Conn, 2017a). From the beginning of his tenure he dealt with looming queries of corruption that did not cease (Conn, 2017a).

Regardless of the number of queries surrounding corruption, FIFA’s allegedly unmatched rapport in the delivery of the promises from its presidents may have attributed to the sense of invincibility that reigns through the federations. This rapport was emphasised when the presidents of FIFA and or including its officials were met by high ranking national officials in the states that they visited (Planet FIFA, 2016). FIFA delegates were treated with much respect when they arrived in countries hoping to host the World Cup tournament (Jennings, 2006: 105). Jack Warner, executive committee member of CONCACAF in FIFA from 1990-2011, was taken to a safari trip courtesy of the South African hosting committee and granted an audience with former president Nelson Mandela, a privilege reserved for few (Jennings, 2007: 110). In some cases, the high regard of the FIFA officials could have been an attempt by nations to gain favour from the executive committee members due to the power granted to them during the voting processes for World Cups hosts, among other things. This has created the space for FIFA to politicise football on both the national and international level. FIFA, which has a global presence, commenting on the national make-up of local footballing clubs has transcended their jurisdiction, and therein lays the problem with FIFA and their interaction with states. FIFA has become able to engage in local matters through their national federations.
3.1 FIFA Funding

One of the many reasons FIFA may have reached into national federations is because it had funded those federations. The commercial power that FIFA has to a large extent allows them this privilege. FIFA’s commercialisation made the status of the federation stronger than most sports governing bodies, mostly due to the accessibility to larger amounts of funds in its revenues (Meier & Garcia 2015: 891). With the increase in revenue FIFA has obtained the ability to grant member FAs large amounts of money for development which in turn attracted more members (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 893). According Okoth (2002), “[t]he $250,000 annual funding by FIFA to member federations for projects of their choice has become a curse to African federations.” This was because as much as this money was labelled by FIFA for youth development it was not restricted to youth development. This is the loophole that many national federation officials have found to use the money for their own benefit. By extension, national federations developed a financial dependency on FIFA and in some cases “the financial dependence of smaller FAs on FIFA’s support heavily benefitted the power of FIFA executives and the role of FIFA as a governing body itself” (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 895).

Another stream of funding from FIFA to national federations comes during the World Cup tournaments. FIFA can make in excess of 4.5 billion dollars in revenue from their sponsors, broadcasters from the buying of television rights, deals for the licensing and the hospitality from a lucrative World Cup tournament (USA Today, 2014). This money is then shared further among the participating national federations, which amount to only 32. The 32 teams get to share a little more than 400 million dollars, leaving the surplus to FIFA. The winning teams’ national federation in the 2010 South African World Cup tournament walked away with 30 million dollars which was 5 million less than the winner in the Brazil World Cup tournament in 2014 (USA Today, 2014). The runners up of the tournament are awarded 25 million, third place 22 million and fourth 20 million dollars, all the other teams that participated also get a share of the pie depending on how far they got in the tournament. Quarterfinalists get 14 million dollars, round of 16, 9 million dollars and the teams that failed to advance from...
the group stages, 8 million dollars; all of this is on top of the 1.5 million dollars that they all get in advance for preparation for the tournament (USA Today, 2014). This continual funding shows how national federations consistently want their teams to remain on good terms with FIFA and also to make it to the World Cup tournaments.

### 3.2 FIFA Demands

Whereas the participants only focus on achieving a place in the World Cup tournament finals, the automatic placement of the hosts brings about so much more revenue. Due to the funding from FIFA and its commercial partners attached to hosting a World Cup tournament, most states are motivated to bid for the privilege. The benefits of hosting are expressed in economic and commercial reasons – these may in some cases be inflated and make bidding to host the World Cup tournaments a costly and highly competitive process (Rassel, 2012: 808). Additionally, most countries insist on hosting a global event like the World Cup tournament for diplomatic and political reasons (Rassel, 2012: 810). Whereas this was mostly prevalent during the Cold War as sports increased the political strength of the nation globally, Rassel (2012: 809) states that “[n]ational governments are now using these events to exert political pressure for diplomatic or political gains.” Because to the relevance of sports, global tournaments have been organised to enhance the recognition of the nation for the government locally and for the nation as a whole. National governments justify taking taxpayer’s money for the World Cup tournament under the guise of national unity or economic benefit but end up only using it for their own agendas (Bond & Cottle, 2011: 17). World Cup tournaments have thus been used as a tool for fighting human rights, to encourage international cooperation as well as to prove the benefit of one political ideology over another as was the case in the Cold War.

This highlights a point that Meier and Garcia (2015: 895) make, which emphasises that, “FIFA’s power over national football industries and policy-makers seem to result from the fact that FIFA provides national football industries with an exclusive and vital club good, that
is, participation in global football. Failure to comply means that national football industries are excluded from international football, FIFA subsidies and protection against player mobility."

Therefore, FIFA imposes its preferences on the governments and its officials (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 896). In the event that a government interferes with the workings of the national federation FIFA intervenes to uphold its autonomy from third party intervention. FIFA’s access to global football, which benefits a nation’s football industries, allows them to further impose their preferences on states (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 897).

According to Meier and Garcia (2015: 894), “FIFA controls market access, which is a vital club good for national football industries,” and due to “the strong dependence of national industries on global market access allows transnational private regulators to impose their will on national governments,” which results in the benefit of FIFA most of all from World Cup tournaments. FIFA requires that the host country suspend all the VISA restrictions they may have and allow anyone affiliated with FIFA access to the country during the duration of the tournament. Additionally, FIFA requires a country to suspend workers’ rights to allow FIFA to get any work done at a low cost where the World Cup tournament is concerned; the working conditions at stadia in Qatar for the 2022 World Cup tournament illustrate this (Booth, 2013). The construction of the new stadia in Qatar in 2013 had cost at least 4,000 migrant workers’ lives (Booth, 2013). FIFA’s tax exemption guarantees them a return on their investment. FIFA takes all the money made without paying anything back through taxes. This also extends to import and export taxes on FIFA related resources. FIFA also requires the host to create new laws to protect FIFA’s official sponsors, as demonstrated when a group of women in South Africa during the 2010 World Cup tournament was arrested for wearing orange during a match and was accused of ambush marketing for Bavaria beer (Laing, 2010). Finally, FIFA requires the host to set up rules that are specifically put in place for FIFA to access the host nation’s legal system. This was prevalent during the 2010 World Cup tournament where FIFA courts were set up in Johannesburg, to deal specifically with FIFA related issues during the World Cup tournament (Hyde, 2010; Rassel, 2010: 815). All these measures allow for FIFA to
guarantee that there will be money made from each World Cup tournament. It has been reported that the World Cup tournament in South Africa was the most successful in terms of revenue before the 2014 World Cup tournament in Brazil which earned FIFA 4 billion dollars and was 66 per cent more than the World Cup tournament in South Africa (Ozanian, 2014).

The FIFA demands on prospective hosts are the most prevalent signs of FIFA’s domination over national governments during the World Cup tournament bidding process and it is a tool for FIFA to ensure that it makes the most out of the World Cup tournament. The FIFA demands are reinforced by FIFA itself for the duration of the tournament. Even in the event that the governments may provide political assistance in maintaining the concentrated control over international football and the revenues that it comes with hosting, FIFA is adamant that governments present a risk that would result in the destabilising of their established self-reinforcing institutional arrangements (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 899).

The lack of accountability that the FIFA executive committee has to anyone other than FIFA itself creates a platform for the FIFA brand of domination to go unchallenged; the most notable of which manifests itself in FIFA’s interaction with host nations of the World Cup tournaments (Jennings, 2007: 150). This invariably means that FIFA has, through its domination, shown the ability to suspend the judicial and legal statutes of entire nations on the basis of ensuring that FIFA’s business during the World Cup tournament is not interfered with. The prospects of hosting the World Cup tournaments are estimated to create a growth in activity that results in long term wealth, revenue, (monetary) gains, and rapport that comes from the prestige (Rassel, 2012: 817). In some cases that may be exactly what a country needs and enough grounds to not question FIFA’s demands.

3.3 FIFA and Government Interference

When national governments get involved in the workings of national federations FIFA also comes in to the aid of the national federation. Even if governments get involved under legitimate grounds FIFA are cautious of any third party interactions. The most interesting part
of the role that FIFA plays in these interferences could be taken up by national officials entrusted by governments (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 899). FIFA navigates this fine line very well, reinforcing its regulating powers, which may result in strong arming national governments that interfere in national federation and by extension FIFA’s business. This has created the perceptions that FIFA is not subject to governments’ laws. Whereas, it seems governments are largely affected by their rightful intervention in FIFA business under their jurisdiction. Government officials who were willing to investigate had been “blocked by strict FIFA rules that Government interference in running soccer in member states is punished by sanctions” (Okoth, 2002), rendering officials helpless.

FIFA plays an advisory role over the government-accepted national football associations. Governments legitimise and accept the authority of the national federations within their borders, but due to the statutes FIFA member national federations are part of, the governments, by extension, accept FIFA too. Three articles within the FIFA statute that national federations sign legitimise FIFA’s intercessions when governments intervene. Article 13 in its three clauses states, to begin with, that “members have the following obligations…to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties” (van Maren, 2015) and also that “violation of the above-mentioned obligations by any member may lead to sanctions provided for in these statutes” (van Maren, 2015) and finally that “violations of par. 1(i) may also lead to sanctions even if the third-party influence was not the fault of the member concerned” (van Maren, 2015), meaning that when member federations have states interfere in their affairs, FIFA can without explanation issue a sanction or suspension, as will be illustrated later in this chapter where FIFA suspended the Tanzanian football association.

This gives FIFA the freedom to overlook any explanations third parties may have for their involvement. Article 13 motivates the position of Article 17 which states that “each member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third parties” (van Maren, 2015). This emphasises that “all the bodies need to be elected or appointed within
each respective member” (van Maren, 2015). The second clause of article 17 highlights that “another measure for addressing an eventual non-compliance with the obligation of independent management of affairs is the non-recognition of wrongfully elected bodies or decisions passed by such bodies” (van Maren, 2015), where FIFA deems what a wrongfully elected body is. In this statute, FIFA has further allowed itself not to acknowledge an election of any one of the membership bodies if there is a lack in the independence of the national federation itself and if it has had interference from a third party. If articles 13 and 17 are not upheld, Article 14 reinforces FIFA’s ability to suspend a member (van Maren, 2015). With Article 14, “when violations are deemed to be so serious to require prompt attention, the Executive Committee or even the Emergency Committee may step in and adopt the relevant decision” (van Maren, 2015). Suspending a national federation due to the intervention of a third party is effective because “a suspension leads to a loss of all membership rights, which effectively prevents other members from entertaining any sporting contact with the suspended member” (van Maren, 2015). Suspensions can also be supplemented with the imposition of sanctions in the form of fines, return of awards and the deduction of points by the disciplinary committee (van Maren, 2015). This means due to FIFA’s non-interference laws, governments who interfere with national authorities have to deal directly with FIFA.

Global TNCs have occupied a space that intergovernmental institutions and public authorities have failed to occupy (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 891). This was evident in Tanzania in 2000; FIFA had suspended the Tanzanian Football Association (FAT) from all global participation. Okoth (2002) states that “[t]his followed a row of dismissal of FAT leadership. Tanzanian Government had removed FAT executive committee in July on suspicion of corruption. The Minister of Sports and Culture Mr. Juma Kapuya dissolved the committee under Chairman Muhiddin Ndolanga and secretary general Ismail Aden Rage, who were accused of fraud and theft involving about $52,500.” In reaction to the Tanzanian government suspending the FAT executive committee, FIFA refused to take the decisions as final and sent to Tanzania Joseph Mifsud from Malta, a FIFA delegate with the role of organising a temporary
committee that would run a new election (Okoth, 2002). Mifsud suggested that recently removed Ndolanga head the committee and also select supporting members to be reinstated. This request was denied by the Tanzanian Sports Council only to relent in 2001 and have Mifsud back at the top of FAT (Okoth, 2002). This highlights what can only be classified as a high tolerance on corrupt behaviour from FIFA. It also showcases FIFA as having the ability to overrule national decision to emphasise their autonomy, as FIFA mediators overlooked the decisions and concerns of the Ministry of Sports and Culture through their minister. This behaviour of governmental disregard fosters bad relations between FIFA and the government, but due to the popularity of football in many nations governments do not risk being suspended by interfering in the affairs of the national federations, and by extension FIFA, and watch from afar as allegations of corruption cloud the affairs of their national federations and FIFA as well.

FIFA demonstrated this in the same year in Kenya, where FIFA insisted on an audit of the Youth Development Fund’s over $250,000 annual grant of the previous year (Okoth, 2002). FIFA’s auditors from KPMG pinpointed a missing amount of $82,000 (Okoth, 2002). According to Okoth (2002), “[r]ather than restrict the fund to its purpose, $40,000 ended up in the federation’s main account without a letter of authority and reason of transfer. The report said the money catered for various KFF expenses which was not in accordance with the application approved by FIFA and not backed by supporting documents.” In reaction, FIFA stopped funding the Kenyan Football Federation (KFF). This did not last very long, Okoth states that the KFF officials managed to convince FIFA officials to restart the payments but to deduct the $82,000 that was missing in the audit (Okoth, 2002). All the while the government insisted that the three men at the top of the Kenyan Federation get suspended, “the chairman spared the chop yet he is the signatory to all federation’s accounts” (Okoth, 2002). Yet again FIFA confirmed how the national federations’ executives could get away with corrupt and underhanded behaviour.

In cases where FIFA believes its position to regulate global football is being challenged is where the intolerance of the institution is prevalent (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 901). FIFA’s
intolerance to interference is highlighted where the public authorities have found legitimate reasons to enforce their control on aspects in the governance of national federation and the football systems (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 901). FIFA uses its multi-level governance mechanisms to enforce the compliance by national FAs and for national FAs to move up conflicts with national governments to the FIFA level (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 901). To ensure that there is no national interference in the running of FIFA and FIFA supported bodies (national FAs), FIFA has in its statutes a demand that they have independence from any third party in FIFA matters which is non-negotiable for national FAs before membership (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 901). When an FA has been judged by FIFA as not being able to independently manage their affairs and ensure that there is no influence from any third parties (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 898), they run the risk of being suspended by the FIFA executive committee or the congress (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 898) even when they are being rightfully intervened in. Government interference is defined as “any legislative act adopted by parliaments as well as judicial actions against FAs or their officials” (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 898).

In the moments that FIFA has judged a government as interfering, the suspension has been very effective as it has allowed FIFA to maintain their role of superiority and dominance over the matter and the national government (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 899). Therefore, to avoid suspension and the public disdain that comes from the locals due to it, national governments tend to comply with FIFA’s demands, which Okoth (2002) considers to be eroding the fabric of football in Africa and creating the space for more fraud, due to the lack of accountability the national federation officials have in their conduct. The lack of accountability on the side of the national federation officials as well as corrupt ministers within their borders when they misappropriate the funds from FIFA has an impact on FIFA. It highlights a sort of leniency from FIFA on these matters and portrays FIFA as creating the platform on which this may be possible for fraud and corruption to thrive. This was also evident where South Africa was found to have allegedly paid FIFA officials ten million US dollars. The money was paid to Jack Warner, the then CONCACAF president, under the guise of the African Diaspora in the
Caribbean region (Hartley, 2016). Hartley (2016) mentions that “[t]hey disguised and funneled the bribe money through the financial accounts of FIFA, member associations, and the 2010 FIFA World Cup TM local organizing committee.” The South African local organizing committee could place the blame on the structures of FIFA that may have created a platform where fraud is normal, especially due to South Africa’s disappointment as hosts of the 2006 World Cup tournament. Loretta Lynch has shown with her investigation that FIFA can indeed answer to the law as some of the charges of bribery and fraud flowed through the USA and resulted in cooperation with the Swiss authorities to get FIFA executives indicted for participating in these practices. FIFA seems to have gone to great lengths to maintain autonomy and entrench the lack of accountability in its ranks before Loretta Lynch’s intervention. To achieve this they have resorted to what can only be seen as a brand of domination that is tacitly legitimised globally. This involves a small network of profit-maximising sponsoring TNCs which include Coca-Cola, Adidas, and other MNCs, which are not necessarily corporations who define strict parameters for countries hosting World Cup tournaments (Meier & Garcia, 2015: 899).

South Africa on their way to the 2010 World Cup was not exempt from all this interaction with FIFA. An outline of the South Africa’s bid and their interaction with FIFA will be explored further in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4: 2010 SOUTH AFRICA FIFA WORLD CUP

Before Nelson Mandela became South Africa’s first democratically elected president in 1994, South African football had already begun the process towards a non-racial association to represent the sport in 1990 (Van der Merwe, 2009: 18). The Football Association of South Africa (FASA) came about when two different football associations combined. It was specifically focused on the inclusion of white players and got suspended in 1961 after another football federation in South Africa for non-racial and previously marginalised football participants lobbied FIFA to have the racist federation suspended for their lack of representation (Van der Merwe, 2009: 21). The federation for the majority was known as the South African Soccer Federation (SASF) and it was an amalgamation of three federations: the South African Bantu Football Association, which was formed in 1933, the South African Indian Football Association, formed in 1903, and the South African Coloured Football Association, which was formed in 1936 (Van der Merwe, 2009: 21). The success of the suspension of FASA was predicated on FIFA’s position of universal inclusion in the sport that Rimet had hoped for (Tomlinson, 2007: 63). That was until Rous, the next FIFA president, reinstated FASA into the world body, proving two things: Firstly it conformed to Rimet’s idea about the impartiality of FIFA towards local politics (Tomlinson, 2007: 63), but secondly it communicated a tolerance of racial segregation and apartheid in South Africa, which the African bloc in FIFA found disturbing (Van der Merwe, 2009: 22). In reaction, the African bloc voted for Havelange in the election for the next FIFA president in 1974.

The African and side-lined nations in FIFA had begun to show their interest in having a larger involvement in the global tournament, both as hosts and participants. The participation side of the tournament, as mentioned earlier, was part of Havelange’s eight-point plan on which he had managed to deliver to the blocs that had shown him support in his election (Tomlinson, 2007: 65). By delivering on the promises of the eight-point plan, Blatter extended hosting opportunities to the minority federations. After South Korea and Japan co-hosted the 2002 World Cup tournament, a decision followed that led to South Africa hosting the 2010
World Cup tournament – Africa’s World Cup. Qatar 2022 seems also to have been a reflection on Blatter’s project of taking the football World Cup tournament to different and new places around the world. It is worth noting that there are financial and sponsorship decisions that also influence the decisions on the hosting of the World Cup tournaments. Bond and Cottle (2011: 3) emphasise that paramount to deciding who hosts the World Cup tournament, FIFA prioritises its financial gain. Bond & Cottle propose (2011: 3) propose that “FIFA’s desire to expand its market means willingness to grant hosting rights to countries where there is no mass appeal for soccer, provided that the host country satisfies FIFA’s budgetary and commercial interests”, further confirming that the allocation of the World Cup tournament to Qatar was not purely based on the need to spread football to all corners of the world, but on how FIFA could gain. As much as the financial reasons may dominate the decision making process, it is hard to refute that the previously segregated federations have now had the opportunity to host the World Cup and thus FIFA’s mandate of spreading football to every corner of the world is validated.

A combined South African Football Association (SAFA) was admitted to FIFA and allowed to participate in the global game again in 1992 (Van der Merwe, 2009: 23). Due to football’s large and predominantly black fan base in South Africa, this game was seen as the chance for the previously marginalised to gain prominence in the global dialogue (Fischer, 2014). Sports in South Africa have proven effective when used as a tool for national cohesion as was illustrated by the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament when President Nelson Mandela stood with a predominantly white rugby team to display solidarity in the new South Africa – a non-racial South Africa (Höglund & Sundberg, 2008: 808). The newly unified SAFA managed to gain the trust of CAF and hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations (AFCON) and the 1999 All African Games (Van der Merwe, 2009: 23). The FIFA World Cup tournament was the only global sporting event South Africa wanted to host that they had not hosted yet (Van der Merwe, 2009: 23). South Africa thus pursued the host status for first the 2006 World Cup tournament and then later the 2010 World Cup tournament.
The 2006 World Cup tournament campaign and bidding process ended in disappointment for South Africa and its bidding team. In both the 2006 and 2010 World Cup tournament campaigns, South Africa bid with the motive and aim to represent the whole of Africa. South Africa intended to use the tournament as a tool of diplomacy through sports (Ndlovu, 2010: 145). South Africa had used sports diplomacy in various instances before their campaign to host the FIFA World Cup tournament in the form of the 1996 Rugby World Cup tournament, the 1999 All African Games, and the 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup tournament. South Africa used these moments of sports diplomacy to appeal for support from other African countries to get what they wanted from them without having to use force or money, but by trying to sell their culture, policies, and political thoughts as all-inclusive and unifying for the continent (Ndlovu, 2010: 146). Predicated on the popular South African philosophy of “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” which in English reads comprise “you are a person because of other people” (Ndlovu 2010: 146); it was argued that the efforts were encouraging a sense of community. This position was clear in the 2010 World Cup tournament campaign, which SAFA called Africa’s World Cup, signalling that it was Africa’s turn (Cornelissen, 2010: 132).

To have this World Cup tournament in South Africa actually happen, SAFA had to rectify the wrongs that it had made in its bid to host the 2006 World Cup tournament. Van der Merwe (2009: 24) explains that the LOC had to “encourage capital construction and heighten the country’s international visibility for the purposes of attracting tourism,” to “elicit national pride” (Van der Merwe, 2009: 24) and to offer “local power brokers in government, sport, media and business an opportunity to renegotiate or consolidate their role in the new South Africa” (Van der Merwe, 2009: 24). At both times South Africa was applying to host the tournament, the only other competition was Morocco, but when it came down to it, neither of them were good enough to gain the status as the 2006 World Cup tournament hosts (Moscoe, 2000). South Africa lost by one vote in the final round of voting, losing out to a better equipped Germany (Moscoe, 2000). Blatter’s announcement that the World Cup tournament in 2010
would be solely an African affair gave South Africa another chance to host the event, but this time only competing against other African states and their national federations.

Many commentators have reported on why South Africa failed to win the host status for the 2006 World Cup tournament. Understanding their thoughts gives insight not only into what South Africa changed in their bid to eventually succeed in hosting the World Cup tournament in 2010, but also into claims that vote rigging processes in FIFA was at play during the allocations and decisions about the host nations. This includes Blatter’s announcement of the 2010 World Cup tournament being solely an African World Cup tournament as part of the vote rigging – even more so because after he had made the announcement, he also announced that it was from that point forth that the World Cup tournament host status would rotate between confederations, only to revert this practice after Brazil was granted host status for the 2014 World Cup tournament in 2007 (Van der Merwe, 2009: 24). This casts a shadow of doubt over the World Cup tournaments that won the host status after that announcement. This, once again, highlights the claim of vote rigging in FIFA for the 2006 World Cup tournament.

According to Jennings (2007: 178), Blatter promised both Germany and South Africa, but he had to deliver the World Cup tournament to Germany first. Thus, the guarantee of an African 2010 World Cup tournament from Blatter was a way for him to make good on his promise to South Africa as well. To achieve this, both Jennings (2007: 178) and Moscoe (2000) have highlighted the role played by Charles Dempsey of the OCF in South Africa’s loss. Jennings (2006: 89) believes that he was paid off by Blatter to stay away from the voting to ensure that the voting goes Germany’s way. Moscoe (2000) alleges that the confederation that Dempsey represented had instructed him to vote for South Africa, yet he chose to abstain from the vote. The reports from the OCF of their surprise concerning Dempsey’s absence and that he had been instructed to vote for South Africa solidifies claims of the vote rigging processes that were at play. Dempsey’s vote would have resulted in a 12-12 stalemate among the executive committee members and that would have meant Blatter’s vote would have gone
for South Africa as he had overtly spoken on their behalf during the 2006 World Cup tournament campaign (Moscoe, 2000). Dempsey's absence meant Blatter did not have to break the tie and Germany could be to be hosts of the 2006 World Cup tournament, resulting in Blatter delivering on his alleged promise to Germany (Moscoe, 2000). Blatter's conduct cannot be easily accounted for, but this could have been part of the processes that needed to happen to satisfy the existing global political economy that FIFA has built with a plethora of commercial actors who, along with FIFA, also seek to make maximum revenue gain from the World Cup tournaments.

Bond, Desai, and Maharaj (2010: 5) enhance this view by taking into consideration the local elites and corporations that were in partnership with FIFA, who also wanted to gain from the tournament. According to them it was these local corporate elites who were either part of or work with "large corporations and politically-connected black tenderpreneurs (who win state tenders thanks to affirmative action, if linked to established white firms)" (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 5) that gained the most and ultimately emerged the true winners of the FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa. These local elites created a problem for the country by hoarding the revenue. This financial hoarding of revenue that takes place among the elites is what is known as a process of post-apartheid accumulation (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 5). According to Bond, Desai, and Maharaj (2010: 5), this accumulation is the product of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) which "was created by the ultra wealthy white business community in this country, who were involved in mining and financing and other big business, as a method of countering a programme of nationalisation. It was a matter of co-option, to co-opt the African nationalist leaders by enriching them privately." This stifles widespread benefit from global tournaments like the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa due to factors such as corruption. The impact of this on South African society would be felt after the World Cup tournament. What this post-apartheid accumulation has done, is further the inequality in income and "set the stage for future economic calamities once debt payments become due" (Bond, Desai & Maharaj 2010: 5). Moscoe (2000) also highlights how personal
bias can influence the vote rigging processes that result in the awarding of the host status by noting that Dempsey’s affiliation with the, previously racist, Football Association of South Africa (FASA) during apartheid led him to vote against their suspension in 1961 and influenced his decision to abstain from voting for a World Cup tournament hosted in South Africa, organised by a multi-racial South African Football Association (SAFA). This alone provides enough grounds for FIFA to investigate their voting processes and bidding processes.

Other commentators believe South Africa’s loss of the World Cup hosting bid in 2006 was attributable to their not trying hard enough to win the votes (Van der Merwe, 2009: 27). This could be so, but looking at the vote rigging processes shows how South Africa may have been contending with years of an existing global political economy that has existed within FIFA, which inevitably resulted in their loss. It is also possible that South Africa did not present a good enough bid to the executive committee for consideration; this argument takes into consideration the quality of the bid that their main competitor, Germany, may have presented (BBC Sport, 2000). FIFA requires many developments or assurances of developments in terms of security, transport, infrastructure and at least eight modern standard stadia with a capacity of between 40,000 and 60,000, among other demands that will be discussed later in this chapter (Bond, Desai & Maharaj 2010: 21).

The failure of South Africa’s bid was linked to four areas: infrastructure, crime, transport, and broadcasting, which, in comparison to Germany, put South Africa in a bad place (BBC Sport, 2000). The stadia in South Africa were not as developed as those of Germany, the South African crime rate was a risk for foreign visitors for the World Cup tournament, especially in Johannesburg. Even though the bid team had ensured that they would use their budget to ensure the safety of visiting spectators, the uncertainty of the situation in comparison to Germany put South Africa on the back foot (BBC Sport, 2000). The complaints concerning transport were around the movement of the teams and officials whose hotels were far from the stadia, and the many visiting guests who would have to rely largely on the taxis, which remained the most common means of transport in the country (BBC Sport, 2000). Finally, the
season in South Africa appeared to present a problem due to the summer in Europe – demonstrating how the European countries preferred not to have the World Cup tournament at their inconvenience, because the 2010 World Cup in Africa and the 2014 one in Brazil would still present the same challenge for Europe (BBC Sport, 2000).

The more comprehensive reasons, that did not involve the inner workings of FIFA, allowed South Africa a better chance to improve on their bid for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. South Africa seemed to continue where their campaign left off before the 2006 World Cup tournament bid by appealing to African universality (Van der Merwe, 2009: 25). This was reflected in their suggestion during the bid to have the countries surrounding South Africa to host the other countries in a way for them to benefit from South Africa hosting the World Cup tournament and also as a way for South Africa to gain their federations votes (Cornelissen, 2007: 244). South Africa also went out of its way to assist in football related matters in other parts of the continent. They began in Mali in 2002 and then in Ghana in 2008 for the African Cup of Nations by providing the countries with human resources, financial assistance, technical skills, transportation, and facilities for communication (Ndlovu, 2010: 149). South Africa also extended their assistance through the availability of former national team players namely Mark Fish and Phil Masinga, who were part of a delegation that went on a peace tour to Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of the South African government’s promotional endeavours of the 2009 Confederations Cup tournament and the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament (Ndlovu, 2010: 151). The fact that the 2010 World Cup tournament was exclusively promised to only African states (Jennings, 2006: 272) enhanced the need to make a continental success of the winning bid. Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and South Africa were competing to host the first ever of its kind in Africa. South Africa’s slogan was “Ke Nako” (Sotho for “It’s Africa’s turn”) (Van der Merwe, 2009: 26) to signify a sense of unity behind the bid.

SAFA also improved their bid this time around, rectifying the pin-pointed flaws of the 2006 World Cup tournament bid. It is worth noting that this time the competition was different,
South Africa was competing with fellow developing African countries and not the more developed north, and South Africa would this time around have better transport links, media coverage, sporting facilities, and hospitality in comparison to their competitors, giving them an edge above the other bids (Van der Merwe, 2009: 26). Above their seemingly standout position in terms of development in comparison to their competitors, South Africa still had to commit to making more developments which would cost them even more money. South Africa reportedly spent five billion dollars on top of the 1.1 billion that FIFA also invested in the development of stadia, roads and links for public transport, hospitality, and security (Bond, 2010). This may have made the South African World Cup tournament at the time the most costly to host. By the start of the tournament, South Africa had spent a collective four billion dollars on specifically the pre-World Cup tournament development of infrastructure, stadia, and transport links (Mars, 2010: 10).

South Africa was announced as hosts of the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament in 2004. Once South Africa had been awarded the hosting status and rights of the 2010 World Cup tournament they – SAFA and the national representatives of the LOC and by extension South Africa – had entered into an existing global political economy of sports that FIFA had formed over decades that involved multiple commercial actors who are FIFA’s partners (Cornelissen, 2007: 245). These commercial actors along with FIFA – who form the group that the LOC had to work with – are driven by financial gain from every World Cup Tournament and seek guarantees on the revenue from the World Cup tournament (Rassel, 2010: 805). FIFA stipulates that these guarantees exempt itself and its partners from tax, as one of the demands for hosting the World Cup tournament (Rassel, 2010: 805). As already mentioned, FIFA and their affiliates are allowed into the host country without any VISA restrictions for the duration of the tournament, allowing them to suspend workers’ rights, and to set up rules for FIFA to access the host nation’s legal system (Rassel, 2010: 806). These demands placed the LOC, and by extension South Africa and SAFA, in a delicate position where they had to navigate
the commercial interests as well as the national interests of the 2010 FIFA World Cup
tournament.

4.1 Commercial Interests

As FIFA commercialised and successfully commoditised football by means of branding itself
and selling the television rights of the of the World Cup tournament, it also began to build a
political economy that involved many actors (Cornelissen, 2007: 247). These actors range
from FIFA itself to large media corporations that deal with the television rights and benefit from
the sale of the rights, multinational sports firms, the hosts federation, and all of its cities.

As previously mentioned, from 1974, with Havelange beginning the process towards
commercialisation, the most prominent of these actors were Adidas and Coca-Cola
(Tomlinson, 2007: 65). Once these two companies had signed on as FIFA sponsors, FIFA in
turn guaranteed their benefit from World Cup tournaments. What began only as kits for teams
has resulted in Adidas providing all the official footballs for the World Cup tournaments since
the Mexico 1970 World Cup tournament. Adidas has also provided the official referee attire
for these tournaments, thereby perpetuating what they had started in the 1954 World Cup
tournament as sponsors of winning team West Germany – brand exposure (Barrett, 2008).
FIFA’s partnerships with many commercial entities resulted in their demands on host nations
and the changing of civil laws into criminal laws by the nation to protect FIFA’s commercial
partners. This raises questions of whether FIFA is an entity that stands on its own and answers
to no one other than itself or if it is steered by corporate officials. Cornelissen (2010: 132) is of
the opinion that FIFA proves through its interaction with its partners how it can indeed be
steered by the interests of the corporate officials. FIFA’s partners were both global and local,
and these included Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates, Hyundai, Sony, VISA, First National Bank,
These partners had agreements with FIFA that SAFA had to uphold as soon as they signed
on as hosts. Part of these agreements’ guaranteed FIFA’s partners uncompetitive and full
exposure from the tournament (Cornelissen, 2007: 250). The involvement of local partners highlights how the local elite had taken part in the revenue guarantee and benefits that FIFA ensured its partners.

It seemed there was not enough space for the benefit of both ordinary people and the local elite in South Africa prior to and during the World Cup tournament. According to Bond, Desai & Maharaj (2010: 9), “in 2005, one in three South Africans hoped to personally benefit from the World Cup, but this fell to one in five in 2009 and one in 100 by the time the games began.” The World Cup tournament took opportunities away from the locals and sometime this was reinforced by the elites. Elites like African National Congress Member of Parliament from KwaZulu Natal, Shiaan-Bin Huang, who was arranging the deal for the production of the mascot Zakumi, awarded the production rights to Chinese companies as opposed to the many factories that lay idle in the land he was elected to represent in Parliament (Bond & Cottle, 2011: 27). This is one example of many deals that elites made to guarantee their own success from the World Cup tournament as opposed to widespread benefits. Many of these deals also resulted in FIFA hiring foreign based companies to lead the productions in collaboration with South African companies and sometimes also calling upon foreign labour. This resulted in “losses for the South African economy as remittances and profits land[ed] in international companies” (Bond, Desai & Maharaj, 2010: 17), as opposed to staying in the country; thereby affecting the trickle-down that was projected to happen. LOC CEO Danny Jordaan claimed in 2005 that the World Cup tournament would be worth 50 billion rand profit for South Africa, even after settling the costs for the infrastructure, but in actual fact the number was approximately half of that and the locals did not benefit from it (Bond, Desai & Maharaj, 2010: 9).

South Africa guaranteed FIFA 17 concessions that they had agreed to in their Bid Book. These guarantees were further enforced by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2006 (Bond, Desai & Maharaj, 2010: 10). South Africa guaranteed FIFA and its partners the inclusion of “a tax-free bubble around FIFA-designated sites, unrestricted import and export
of all foreign currencies to and from South Africa, as well as their exchange and conversion into US dollars, euros or Swiss francs, the suspension of any labour legislation that could restrict FIFA, its commercial partners, media and broadcast members, free security, and medical care, the protection of FIFA’s intellectual property rights, and guarantees to indemnify FIFA against all claims and proceedings against it” (Bond, Desai & Maharaj 2010: 10). In addition to all the concessions by the South Africans, FIFA made further demands to have these concessions reinforced by demanding that the state ensure that special courts are set up and that FIFA has access to an office with free and unlimited telephones, internet, and equipment for communication (Bond, Desai & Maharaj, 2010: 10). To further reinforce these promises made to FIFA and its partners, South Africa imposed Acts and by-laws to ensure that the guarantees are protected by the law.

One of the first acts of legislation that allowed for the unhindered work of FIFA in South Africa was published in September 2006. This was published as Act No. 11 (Republic of South Africa, 2006a) and 12 of 2006 (Republic of South Africa, 2006b), which was the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act 2006. These acts placed into South Africa’s law the demands FIFA had made and the concessions South Africa had agreed on as a host. They opened up the space for the protection of commercial interests within South Africa during the 2010 World Cup tournament. They allowed for there to be other acts and by-laws concerning FIFA to be passed, if deemed necessary, to guarantee that FIFA and the LOC execute successfully the World Cup tournament in 2010. Through these acts, South Africa was signing away part of its sovereignty and its democratic rights. These acts and by-laws temporarily suspended some public functions that are protected by the constitution and empowered FIFA and the LOC (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 7).

The South African government through the passing of these Acts “was obliged to enforce FIFA’s laws, including the curtailing of democratic rights” that are meant to protect the people (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 7). These acts also made anything placed under the auspices of the FIFA World Cup tournament admissible. By this FIFA could claim anything
under its auspices and government would have to enforce its protection. This was most
evident when the LOC was asked questions by the media about improper allocation of
contracts and manufacturing which were projected to benefit the locals (Hyde, 2010a). LOC
CEO, Jordaan, offered no responses under the reasoning that all information was protected
by virtue of being FIFA business and further banned specific reporters (Hyde, 2010b). It is
disheartening when the freedom of speech that is entrenched in the South African Bill of Rights
is trampled on to protect big corporations. When reporters are banned from press conferences
for asking the questions that reveal the nature of the misconduct that is occurring, it is
somewhat authoritarian and it shows a blatant disregard for the protection of the people of the
country in their freedom of expression (Evans, 2010). This is even more problematic when the
people being silenced are serving in a role that offers the checks and balances that make
democracy what it is (Evans 2010). Journalists had to be accredited by FIFA to have access.
What is problematic about this accreditation is that the journalists who would get accredited
would have to agree not to bring disrepute to the World Cup as a trademark, FIFA, or its
partners, including the LOC, while they are reporting or they would be banned. This
compromised the quality of reporting on the World Cup tournament (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj
2010: 8). Act No. 11 was passed “to give effect to the Organising Association Agreement
between FIFA and SAFA and to the guarantees issued by government to FIFA for the hosting
and staging of the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa and to provide for matters
connected herewith” (Republic of South Africa, 2006a). Act No. 12 further extended the reach
of Act No. 11 (Republic of South Africa, 2006b).
FIFA and both its global and local partners were further protected by the extension of
the Minister of Trade and Industry’s powers under the Merchandise Act 1941, to take into
consideration that if the Minister of Trade and Industry outrightly declared the 2010 FIFA World
Cup South Africa as protected, it would therefore be a protected entity under the law within
sections 15A (1) and 15A (1) (a)(ii) of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 (Republic of South
Africa, 2006a; 2006b). The ability for the minister to decide this, confirms how local elites
played a major role in guaranteeing that FIFA and its partners would profit from the World Cup tournament. The 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act 2006 laid the framework within which every host city had to adhere to by-laws to guarantee the World Cup’s success. This meant that as part of the guarantees that South Africa had agreed to make to FIFA, if a city was chosen as a host city, it had to meet, what FIFA considered, the standard. Each host city and its municipality had “the responsibility to manage, administer, maintain and implement these by-laws and ensure that all areas and activities outlined under section 1.1.15 hereof [were] effectively dealt with in accordance with these By-laws and notices there as well as any other applicable provincial and/or national legislation relevant to the staging and hosting of the competition” (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). This led to South Africa undertaking many development decisions that reinforced the inequality gap by benefitting the few and, in other cases, not taking into consideration the impact of the infrastructure development after the World Cup tournament. One of the major infrastructure developments for transportation was the Gautrain. The Gautrain, a fast rail network that was built to link Johannesburg, Pretoria and OR Tambo International airport cost in excess of 25 billion rand but it only benefits a few. It costs “riders five times more than previously advertised, gambles on shifting rich people’s behaviour away from private cars” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 20). Zwelinzima Vavi, a labour leader, stated that “Gautrain does nothing for those who really suffer from transport problems – above all, commuters from places like Soweto and Diepsloot. Instead it takes resources that could improve the lives of millions of commuters” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 20).

Some of the other development decisions surrounded the construction of stadia. Bond, Desai and Maharaj (2010: 4) state that the decision to build a new stadium in Cape Town as opposed to upgrading the already existing ones was influenced by revenue prospects. The upgrades on the Newlands Rugby pitch and Athlone’s stadium, which would have been more inexpensive options, were overlooked because “a billion television viewers don’t want to see shacks and poverty on this scale”, said a FIFA representative (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 20).
This prevailing attitude resulted in what can only be known as “white elephant” stadia which are seldom used (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010:25). Durban’s Moses Mabhida stadium, which accommodates 70,000, was built despite the already existent Absa Stadium, home to Sharks rugby team, which sits 52,000. As much as this stadium is impressive, what is problematic is the decision to build the stadium was undertaken without consideration of the existent problems plaguing Durban which range from “vast backlogs of housing, water/sanitation, electricity, clinics, schools and roads, and the absurd cost escalation” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj 2010: 4). The construction of the Mbombela stadium resulted in the demonstration of more than a thousand students. This was because the schools that were on the site that the stadium was built were not rebuilt, which affected the academic literacy of the students affected (Bond, Desai, & Mahraj 2010: 6). When one closely looks at the trend of decision making within South Africa, it is hard to believe that the World Cup tournament in 2010 was not driven by commercial interest and financial gain.

As mentioned earlier, each municipality of the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa had to adhere to the by-laws stipulated in relation to advertising, controlled access sites, public open spaces, public roads and traffic guidance, and city beautification and street trading (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). Each of these areas had a lasting impact, especially on understanding the extent to which the interaction between South Africa and FIFA had eroded the sovereignty and democratic rights of South Africa. The by-laws covered multiple areas that FIFA needed for protection to guarantee its success from the 2010 World Cup tournament.

4.1.1 Advertising

The by-law protected the areas surrounding, near to or on the way to World Cup tournament controlled premises from any adverts that were not of FIFA’s sponsorship partners, removing all competition in South Africa during the World Cup tournament period. With this in place, any ambush advertising was seen as a criminal offence, as opposed to a
civil offence. This was evident in the already-mentioned incident when the FIFA courts convicted a group of 36 women in South Africa during the 2010 World Cup tournament. The women wore orange dresses during a match and were arrested and accused of ambush marketing for Bavaria brewery (Laing, 2010). The criminal charges carried up to six months of jail as a maximum penalty (Hyde, 2010a). Hyde (2010a) reflects on this situation stating the harsh and swift nature of the FIFA courts. Bond, Desai and Maharaj (2010: 8), in addition, state that “cases of this sort made FIFA seem extremist” and this extremism reflected the loss of state sovereignty on South Africa’s part to FIFA as this seemingly civil case became a criminal offence. The global political economy surrounding major events had begun to change, with these sorts of shifts of law from civil to criminal happening in more tournaments, like the New Zealand 2015 Rugby World Cup and the Brazil 2014 FIFA World Cup (Cornelissen, 2007: 254).

This advertising by-law also made it impossible to advertise anything during the World Cup without the permission of the municipality (eThekwini Municipality, 2009) especially if it was in a FIFA controlled access site, close to the stadium, close to a FIFA fan park, on the road to the stadium, or visible from the stadium or any other area that the municipality demarcated as a FIFA World Cup tournament space (eThekwini Municipality, 2009).

In some cases host cities had to be wary about advertising the city (Cornelissen, 2010: 137), which is worrying as this hindered the local government from promoting itself as a tourist destination during the World Cup (Mars, 2010: 12). These by-laws resulted in FIFA affiliate, MATCH AG, dealing with accommodation and ticketing packages and tourist programmes, which was something that could have been dealt with by local non-affiliated companies. The areas which MATCH AG was in control over, were areas that were projected to make the most money during the World Cup tournament. Tickets which are normally dealt with by the national federation as well as the local television rights, which in turn form the income they generate from the World Cup tournament, were under MATCH AG and FIFA’s control (Cornelissen, 2007: 251). FIFA’s control resulted in a sub-committee giving the allocations of the sales of
tickets to regions and the costs of the tickets determined by the make-up of the participating teams (Cornelissen, 2010: 140). South Africa, whose football fans are the mostly low income and medium income majority, needed to get special access to the World Cup tournament as the tickets were costly. The LOC had to make sure their people could get access to games. Due to the way FIFA was dealing with the prices and allocations, SAFA had to request from FIFA more affordable tickets for its people. Even after the request, it turned out that the lowest tickets for the game cost R200, which was at the time equivalent to R7 to the dollar in exchange, which meant that the locals could not easily afford to watch the games, especially the low income earning ones (Cornelissen, 2010: 137). This once again highlights how the South African World Cup tournament was for the elite in society. To make it even worse, what was supposed to be an African tournament gave very little access to the rest of Africa into the games. The rest of Africa was allocated one-fifths of the 2.93 million tickets available for the World Cup (Cornelissen, 2010: 137). It was projected that the ticket sales to non-South African citizens would be the biggest contributor to the income of the South African tourism industry (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 14). The ticket sales to this segment of World Cup tournament spectators in South Africa “only accounted for 2 percent, with just 11 300 Africans holding tickets” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 14).

The expectation was that African ticket holders would get up to 48 145 ticket holders, the failure to meet this target is a reflection on the poor distribution channels within African and unaffordable prices for the majority of African football enthusiasts (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 14). The implication of this is that the claims made by the Deputy Director General in the Department of Tourism, Sindiswa Nhlunayo, that South Africa was ready and prepared to host the best World Cup tournament ever by providing modern infrastructure and turning all participants into tourism ambassadors, could not be fully realised as the high ticket prices for Africans and the increased accommodation and transport costs meant that not many Africans could actually attend the games (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 14).
With regard to selling accommodation, accommodation and ticket packages and tourist packages, MATCH AG showed consideration for neither the local market nor their expertise. What was projected to bring approximately 500,000 visitors, was in actuality 150,000 visitors. This meant that in order still to guarantee FIFA revenue off the packages that were not sold, MATCH AG had to return 400,000 hotel bookings, and the South African National Parks returned approximately 14,000 beds to the local market (Mars, 2010: 13). This then placed the burden to sell this accommodation on the local hotels, for whom by then it was too late. What made MATCH AG dealing with these packages more problematic was how they were not negotiated at competitive rates for the local service providers; they were restrictive and unequal to make money off the sales (Mars, 2010: 13). In the negotiation of lower prices there were allegations against MATCH AG for using its position in affiliation with FIFA to strong arm the industry and to force them to lower their prices (Cornelissen, 2010), leaving room for MATCH AG, FIFA, its partners, and all the foreign national federations and their teams to capitalise on driven down accommodation packages during their stay in South Africa. This emphasises the manner in which FIFA conducted its business after the guarantees government had given. It shows that it is most concerned with the commercial interests and benefits of the tournament for itself and its partners (who include Adidas, Sony, VISA, Emirates, Coca-Cola, Hyundai-Kia, McDonalds, local telecom giants Telkom and MTN, First National Bank, Continental Tyres, Castrol, McDonalds, and Indian IT company, Satyam) and not so much about the local benefit.

Because of FIFA’s partnership with the SABC, they also had a hand in the local broadcasting of the World Cup tournament and all related matters that required the protection of FIFA and its partners. Due to South Africa undertaking to “enforce the protection of marketing rights, broadcast rights, marks and other intellectual property rights of FIFA and its partners” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 9), the SABC also had to ensure that the content on television could not breach this agreement. In enforcement of this, the SABC and three other South African television networks turned down the movie Fahrenheit 2010 before the World
Cup tournament, issuing a statement that “our job is obviously to promote the World Cup and flighting anything that can be perceived as negative is not in our interest” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 9). Yet again this illustrates how the South African elite actively enforced and protected the commercial interests of FIFA and its partners for their own gain.

In some cases FIFA and the LOC infringed on the media’s right to report on anything surrounding the World Cup tournament and their role in checking on behalf of the populace the validity of the grounds on which FIFA and LOC were acting to bring them the World Cup tournament. Evans (2010) reported that media houses in South Africa submitted a joint complaint to FIFA stating that “the restrictions outlined by FIFA unjustifiably restrict the media’s ability to report critically on the FIFA World Cup and any related or ancillary topics.” This, as mentioned earlier, referred mostly to the accreditation from FIFA which was founded on the agreement of journalists to not bring disrepute to FIFA and or its partners, including the LOC during their reporting or else be banned (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 9). The journalistic hindrances were severe to the extent that a writer had been detained by police for distributing fliers against xenophobia in a FIFA designated zone (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 9).

Evans (2010) further states that the LOC reinforced the limit on journalism by restricting newspapers from accessing information that was related to the tender process between the LOC and service providers, on the grounds that they were acting on a private function of the football governing body; therefore, they were not obligated to give out any information to the public. This was not enforced for long as reports of match fixing by SAFA officials and the bribe to Jack Warner by SAFA was widely disseminated by the media. By restricting access to their information, the LOC under the guise of FIFA, enabled the openly illegal acts of corruption and the incompetence in the organisation of the World Cup tournament (Evans, 2010), just as long as FIFA and its partners were protected.
4.1.2 Controlled Access Sites

These areas were designated sites where FIFA events were staged, either the stadium or fan parks (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). These areas were only accessible if granted access to by FIFA through tickets that the municipality had to enforce (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). This part of the by-laws specifically also addressed that no business be conducted in these areas, especially on match days, unless they had specific written approval from the municipality that would undoubtedly protect the FIFA sponsorship partners (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). This was one of many instances where FIFA’s strict marketing laws were not entirely going to benefit the locals. In this case local informal traders who could typically make sales outside fan fairs and stadia could not do this anymore, since any behaviour of the sort under by-law would be deemed illegal (Rodrigues, 2010), making it even worse for the already high levels of unemployment and for those who informally traded to make money. This was also addressed under by-law sub section 6 on Street Trading. Sub sections 6.3.1.1, 6.3.1.2, and 6.3.1.3 states that “no person shall, except with the prior written approval of the Municipality granted specifically with regard to competition, carry on the nosiness of Street Trading at any Controlled Access Site or Exclusion Zone during the Term; carry on the business of Street Trading in a Restricted Area; carry on the business of Street Trading in a garden or park to which the public has a right of access” (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). Due to this the treatment of traders was in most instances improper. Most traders were rounded up or displaced to temporary relocation areas as part of the cleaning-up the streets process for the World Cup tournament (Rodrigues, 2010).

In Durban, traders were facing displacement from their usual early morning market place due to the construction of a shopping mall for the World Cup tournament (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 11). Whereas in Durban, consistent and continued resistance form the traders proved successful, in Cape Town traders were not so fortunate. They were displaced to make room for a FIFA exclusion zone (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 13). This in turn paints FIFA in a point of contradiction; where on the one hand the officials brag and speak
highly of their ability to help communities through football, whereas on the other hand, the inability for local informal traders to participate in business around FIFA areas renders them unable to benefit from the visiting football enthusiasts. It also reflects a point of contradiction for the government whose post-millennial post-apartheid South Africa aspires towards equality (Fick, 2017). This aspiration towards equality is catered for in the Constitution, where it emphasises that “age, gender, class, and that old fiction, race, are not supposed to over-determine our relations with one another” (Fick, 2017).

FIFA and its partners benefit from World Cup tournaments on the back of the guarantees made by the host nations. South Africa’s guarantees made and enforced through its elites have only served to widen the inequality gap, proving without doubt that the true nature of inequality that exists in South Africa is economic. The reason why in this case race is not considered the top most agent of inequality is due to the earlier mentioned “tenderpreneurs” who were black and a product of BEE. With that in mind, one realises that it was a black elite, in partnership with white firms that benefitted from the World Cup tournament in South Africa (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 5). These partnerships have happened in the construction sector where Tokyo Sexwale, Minister of Human Settlements at the time of the World Cup tournament, partnered with Group5/WBHO and the first national Director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa, Bulelani Ngcuka’s Mvelaphanda group, partnered with Vivian Reddy’s Edison Power, in a major electricity deal (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 5). The implication of these figures in these major deals and their positions in government confirms the notion that the even the local elite only cared about their commercial benefit during the 2010 World Cup tournament in South Africa and in the long run perpetuated the inequality. Emphasis is placed on the political positions held by the individuals previously named due to the society’s obsession with status as mentioned by Fick (2017). This obsession with status looks not only at the title or the social positioning of a person but also takes into consideration their position in society where in some cases it reflects as the geographical location in which a person is born (Fick, 2017). What is important in the case used by Fick (2017) of
geographical location is what the place referred to says about the person and how it adds to one’s interest or renders them fearful. This line of thought validates the decision to build a new stadium in Cape Town as opposed to upgrading the Athlone stadium which is in a predominantly black neighbourhood. It also explains the disregard toward informal traders for the benefit of commercial gain and financial success from the World Cup tournament for FIFA, its partners and the local elite.

4.1.3 Public Open Spaces and City Beautification

Due to the World Cup tournament any construction that was happening in any host city had to be covered up to the satisfaction of the municipality, especially if it was close to transport links and or entertainment areas (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). The by-law also meant that the municipality could call on any company with the license or permits to conduct any construction or work at any site that was related to FIFA (eThekwini Municipality, 2009), which meant that the government did not have to send out tenders for the work that needed to be done, they just needed to make sure it was done. This created fertile ground for malpractice in the allocation of such works that government would eventually have to pay for.

Sub-section 4.2.11 of the by-law stated that “No person shall at a Special Event or in a Public Open Space, in particular or in any other area within the municipality, in general, without the Approval of the Municipality camp or reside” (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). Enforcing this sub-section of the by-laws resulted in the displacement of numbers of people in an attempt to beautify the cities for media coverage (Rodrigues, 2010). As much as it may have been understandable, what is disturbing about this practice of displacement is the reflection this has on South Africa’s history of settlements.

South Africa was previously plagued with separation and forced displacement on a racial basis during apartheid. To enact a similar practice only for capital empowerment was a form of segregation based on class and essentially the same thing. This in turn shows the
influence that FIFA and its commercial partners have over the host states in their pursuit of revenue from the World Cup tournament. By rounding up the homeless and initiating the displacement of many urban poor to “temporary relocation areas” (Rodrigues, 2010) and “transit camps” (Rodrigues, 2010) for the favourable attributes for global branding, they replayed the apartheid practice and made a mockery of the struggle against it (Rodrigues, 2010). It seems that, when Government signed up to host the FIFA World Cup tournament, and then, when it passed the 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act 2006, corporate interests had begun to dictate their interaction with the citizens under the auspices of ensuring the success of the World Cup tournament.

This section of the by-laws also made it impossible for prostitutes – another informal sector – to serve their trade during the World Cup tournament. This may not be due to the money that they could make but due to the illegality of sex work in South Africa (Richter, 2010: 16). The cleaning-up of the streets for the World Cup tournament, which involved the rounding up of hawkers, the homeless and migrants, would also further affect the sex workers (Richter, 2010: 16). Richter (2010: 16) states that even without the need for clean-ups due to a global event, sex workers live in fear of either being taken in to the cells, or being beaten up by law enforcement officers, in other instances getting raped and/or killed. The enforcement of the World Cup clean-up operations could only serve to be more problematic for the sex workers, who feared imprisonment for the duration of the World Cup tournament’s events. This attests to the lack of awareness of government officials concerning sex workers and their rights as humans, even though they participate in an informal and illegal market. The laws that sex workers are subjected to, are outdated and are of apartheid standard, according to Richter (2010: 16). Richter argues that they do not take into consideration the changing climate of the formerly segregated society. The Sexual Offences Act, also known as the Immorality Act, No 23 of 1957 “made it an offence for a white person to have sex with a black person or to commit any immoral or indecent act” (Richter, 2010: 17). This has been struck down many times as
the law goes against the current multi-racial and democratic South Africa and the values it upholds, yet the sex workers are prosecuted, to this day, under this Act.

These incidents highlight a blatant disregard for the social welfare of the South African people from the LOC and the municipalities by having enforced FIFA’s demands through the law and the by-laws passed for the organising of the World Cup. It brings out in the open what could be seen as South Africa’s tendency to make public sector needs into business opportunities that are backed by state market policies which only benefit the elite and, in this case, FIFA’s commercial partners and not the people as a whole (Rodrigues, 2010).

4.1.4 Public Roads and Traffic Guidance

Driving or cycling in restricted zones was made illegal, unless otherwise authorised, or if it was needed for health reasons (eThekwini Municipality, 2009). This would mean that only vehicles of the sponsor partner would be allowed anywhere near a stadium, Fan Park or any FIFA restricted zone.

4.1.5 Enforcement

As much as the law and the by-laws had been enforcement mechanisms in themselves, in order to ensure that they were indeed adhered to, SAFA and the LOC, through government assistance, also called upon the South African Police Services (SAPS) and established special FIFA courts to expedite the enforcing of the new laws during the 2010 World Cup.

SAFA was weary of the concern regarding the crime and safety during their campaign for the 2006 World Cup tournament, so much so that they even iterated that they would use their budget on security and safety, but this did not manage to convince the voters (BBC Sport, 2000). With that in consideration, it was of paramount importance that this be rectified during the organising phase of the 2010 World Cup tournament. This resulted in the employment of more than 41,000 new police officers, which would increase the number of law enforcement to approximately 190,000 by the start of the World Cup tournament (Alexander, 2009).
SAPS also specially trained 200 officers to be part of a reaction force who would be on standby during the World Cup tournament in case of terrorist threats (Alexander, 2009). Above all the man power being added to deal with the security for the World Cup tournament, SAPS also trained intervention teams to deal with crowd troubles, trouble makers during match days; they equipped the forces with ten brand new water cannons, forty helicopters which would be used for sky patrol and a 24 hour multi-lingual helpline (Alexander, 2009). SAFA was determined to ensure that the World Cup tournament safety was achieved. Also, as mentioned earlier, “to enforce the protection of marketing rights, broadcast rights, marks and other intellectual property rights of FIFA and its commercial partners” (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj, 2010: 8), South Africa ensured there were police on hand.

The World Cup Courts were also instituted to ensure that the by-laws were adhered to. The courts were constituted by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) (Hughes, 2010), which was established by the Constitution of South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996), through the National Prosecuting Authority Act No.32 of 1998 (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The NPA, under this act, has the authority to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the State, which in turn allows the NPA to execute any functions that relate to the commencement and discontinuing of criminal proceedings on behalf of the State (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The NPA legitimised the proceedings of the FIFA Courts and solidified how, due to the World Cup tournament, civil offences would be prosecuted under criminal law. This was because the laws and by-laws made civil offences criminal ones and prosecution followed the contravention of anything stipulated in the laws or by-laws. The courts were also a guarantee for FIFA and a prerequisite to deal with the criminal issue that existed within South Africa (Hyde, 2010).

What FIFA started in South Africa, by instituting the courts to fix the “crime image” of South Africa, became a standard in global tournaments to follow (Cornelissen, 2007: 245). The FIFA Courts in the Johannesburg magistrates’ court dealt specifically with anyone who was casting a negative light on the football tournament. The courts with their autonomy and a physical location were a representation of Zurich in South Africa during the proceedings of the
World Cup tournament (Hyde, 2010). As per the agreement, South Africa had to establish 56 FIFA Courts around the country, employing 1,500 dedicated personnel for the day-to-day running (including magistrates, prosecutors, public defenders, and interpreters) (Hyde, 2010). All these efforts for convictions were made in a country where the justice system already could not cope with more serious crimes overloading the courts on a daily basis (Hyde, 2010). The FIFA Courts were quicker at processing those accused of violations; it was stated that it could take the same time as it would a match – 90 minutes – for someone to come in and to know the verdict of their crime, which is typically unheard of in South Africa (Pesca, 2010). The verdicts were also extremely severe due to the media coverage (Hughes, 2010). A man was given five years for stealing a cell phone during the World Cup tournament (Hughes, 2010).

Hughes (2010) also states that what made these sentences problematic, was the inconsistency between provinces and municipalities and the fact that the locals believed that this was just temporary and that the justice system could not sustain this kind of sentencing at this kind of pace. South Africa was making evident the lengths they were willing to go in order to prove that crime in South Africa could be dealt with and that it could be dealt with effectively. The effectiveness of these sentences and their rapid nature cost the government six million dollars, which they allocated to the courts for the duration of the tournament, further confirmation that proving FIFA wrong was not inexpensive on South Africa’s part (Pesca, 2010). This is problematic because “South Africans are so often protesting the absence of any public service that the country has been labelled the ‘capital of protest’” (Rodrigues, 2010). “Against these realities, the spending of close to R33 billion on a football tournament and billions on the running of the courts for a month is a testament to there being no concern for their national welfare among its decision makers” (Rodrigues 2010). This shows a blatant disregard of social welfare from the LOC for its people and in the long run gives a basis to claims that in actuality the World Cup tournament did not benefit the locals.

With close and analytical investigation into how FIFA and SAFA – and by extension South Africa – reached agreements to achieve the demands for hosting the World Cup
tournament, and how this affected the people of South Africa, one notices that the process mirrors the effect of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP entails a trade agreement between the US and the EU “about reducing the regulatory barriers to trade for big business, things like food safety law, environmental legislation, banking regulations and the sovereign powers of individual nations” (Smedley, 2015). TTIP has similar effects as the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act 2006 and the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa By-Law which had commenced in 2009. The similarity lies in the trade guarantees that South Africa had given to FIFA through these laws, which protected not only FIFA but also FIFA’s sponsorship partners. Therefore, where Smedley (2015) states that the TTIP is “an assault on European and US societies by transnational corporations”; the instituting of FIFA’s demands was an ambush on South Africa by commercial organisations through their sponsorship agreements with FIFA, which the World Cup tournament host nation had to uphold. SAFA upholding these demands had a negative effect on the locals. This relates to a complaint made about the TTIP by Smedley (2015), who states that the TTIP could “undermine the democratic authority of local government”. All in all the methods through which FIFA and its partners manage to get their guarantee of revenue from the World Cup tournaments is not unique as a practice. The concern with both practices lies in the impact on the locals and the local governing bodies.

4.2 National Interests

The hosting of the tournament places the national actors and the population in a position where their cohesion benefits the success of the tournament (Nyar, 2014: 21). According to Billig (1995: 122) “sport is not something peripheral to the contemporary world; there are regular, heavily sponsored and commercialised sporting tournaments the world over.” Thus sports cannot be separated from the daily rituals and beliefs of a sort of people and their cultures (Billig, 1995: 20).
Labuschagne (2011: 32) refers to the nation as cultural entities and the collective behaviour of a people which by extension means that without the collective understanding in behaviour the formation of the nation would be stifled. Labuschagne’s (2011: 32) view relates quite closely to the idea Anderson brings forward in his writing on imagined communities. As previously referred to, Anderson (1983: 49) postulates that the formation of the nation or nationalism is a feature of culture that has to begin with a history and a structure. This structure, he believes, arises from the history in which the culture finds itself.

For South Africa, the post-apartheid post-millennial society strives towards equality; therefore, finding ways in which the society can come together to further this endeavour is important to the forming and reinforcing of nationhood. The nation to Anderson (1991: 49) is not different to any political organisations manifested in different ways. To him nationalism is natural and an expression of the culture as opposed to the formation of an ideology (Anderson, 1983: 52). The ways in which nationalism is deployed in communities, as outlined by Anderson, supports Billig’s claim of the banality of nationalism, which posits that the practice of nation building is daily and continual (Billig, 1995: 18). This means that manifestations of nationalism are expected in nations. As expected as these daily reinforcements of national unity can be, there is still the need to use external factors in the aiding of this formation. This need comes up in two instances: war, or the creation of pride or enjoyment in the nation.

The use of the World Cup tournament to enforce national unity falls perfectly in the realm of enjoyment. Žižek (1993: 201) argues that it is only through enjoyment that communities can continually stay together. By emphasising the enjoyment in the reinforcing of nation-building, he shifts the problem from fundamentalism that may come from the nuance around ideology towards capitalism (Dean, 2016: 20). Žižek views capitalism as progress and inevitable (Žižek, 2003: 354). With the widespread effects of globalisation it is hard to refute this claim. This could thus express the inevitability of nations using capitalist methods such as television broadcasting, consumerism, and commercial gains as national building attempts, as seen through FIFA World Cup tournaments. The World Cup tournament was intended to
merely be a moment of enjoyment to continually form the cultures that reinforce the national unity and identity.

To Labuschagne (2011: 32) the formation of all such cultures and subsequently national identity, in actuality refers to “an emotional attachment to a state and its institutions, which provides the glue that keeps the constituent parts unified.” Attachment to the nation is symbolised in and through flags, anthems, national public holidays, national monuments and stadia, national currencies, languages, and founding myths (Billig, 1995: 18). Sports have a unique way of reinforcing these symbols in nations. This is more evident when nations use sports for reconciliation and nation building as was the attempt of the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament in South Africa. The success of the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament put an expectation on the South African 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament to yield the same success (Nyar, 2014: 21).

As sports can reinforce the sense of nationality on a daily basis (Billig 1995: 18), it is also its neutrality that makes it effective in nation building. Its neutrality ensures that different kinds of people can buy into the sport regardless of creed, race or religion. The diverse popularity coupled with the vast broadcasting through media coverage brings people together due to the hype surrounding the global event (Labuschagne 2011: 32). The social cohesion may also serve as an act for the onlooking foreign visitors, to portray a clear, unhindered multicultural nation (McKaiser, 2010: 8). The vast media coverage that surrounds global sporting events is a product of the global political economy of sports that formed in FIFA in the 1980s, that not only spearheaded the growth of FIFA but also resulted in the involvement of many commercial actors. This meant that football was no longer just a leisure activity; it has the potential to generate money as a business. This money is made mostly by calling upon the large force of the society, consumerism and large capital to enforce its strength (Billig, 1995: 123).

The 2010 World Cup tournament is no exception, the large involvement of the media meant that as much as nation building and social cohesion was expected in South Africa due
to the World Cup tournament, the effects of this practice were not only recognised, they were also overestimated and oversold (Labuschagne, 2011: 35). Former President Nelson Mandela expressed adequately the sort of expectation that surrounded the social cohesive machine of the World Cup tournament. Mandela was quoted as saying that hosting the World Cup tournament would be a dream come true for him and the whole nation (Jennings, 2006: 268), as the World Cup tournament presented the path towards “the uplifting of not only our people but will also contribute to the growth of our economy” (Jennings, 2006: 268). “Our people” in this case could mean one of two things. Firstly, the South African populace as a whole or, secondly, as Mandela was involved largely in the Struggle, it could be understood as the people he fought for equality for, the black majority (Nyar, 2014: 23). The latter in turn signals the World Cup tournament as a success for a previously marginalised group in South Africa and not so much South Africa as a unified people. This may be due to the fact that football as a sport had thus been marginalised along with the black majority.

Once independence had been won and South Africa was allowed to participate in the international football tournaments, the largely black football teams gave visual credence to this separation: football presumed to be for black people and rugby and cricket for everyone else. The post-apartheid sport psyche did not change this; football has to date remained psychologically speaking a “black game” and its counterparts more “white sports”, even though all of the sports have experienced a cross-pollination of racial participants. What solidifies the racial segregation or the racial classification of sports is how rugby and cricket have quota policies for blacks and other participants who are not white whereas football does not have this for white participants.

In this light, the nationalism of the World Cup tournament can be seen as the victory of race, the coming into being of the black people’s cultural implications represented in social behaviour of every South African in support of the World Cup tournament as opposed to their previous racial organisation in protest to the white minority (Bhabha, 1990: 2). The black majority did not only regain power but now began solidifying their position in South African
social-economic discourse. The downside to this is that any negativity that may surround or have surrounded the World Cup tournament would also fall on the claimant of the success of the social cohesion.

Another aspect of this social cohesion can be seen in the stories and meanings behind the entire infrastructure that was used for the World Cup tournament; a sort of social rebuilding had taken place. A South Africa that is being built anew for all the South Africans, the rainbow nation, was repainting itself and the World Cup tournament was the opportune moment to begin this redrawing of the nation as was the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament. According to Jordaan, the investments in all the upgrades were not just about the World Cup tournament; in his opinion, South Africa in the years after 1994 had plateaued in terms of infrastructure development. He was of the view that, in order to attract more foreign investment, infrastructure had to improve significantly and the World Cup tournament’s preparations presented the best opportunity (Tladi, 2010). Jordaan affirmed thoughts by Bhabha (1990: 2) that, “[t]he society of the nation in the modern world is that curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public significance and the two realms flow increasingly and uncertainly into each other like waves in the never-ending stream of the life-process itself.” This results in the private sector sometimes gaining their benefits off the backs of the public and consequently the private can strong arm the public (government as their representatives) to get their way. Thus, as much as the World Cup tournament managed to pull South Africans together, South Africa could not guarantee the sustainability of this cohesion. This can be attributed to the terrible trickle-down of the World Cup tournament, which did not fulfil the promises that it made to locals in terms of closing the inequality gap, job creation and skills transfer (Bond, Desai, & Maharaj 2010: 26). Also because South Africa had overspent in hosting the World Cup tournament and only the local elite had benefited from the commercial interaction with FIFA, the increased level of inequality and the lack of the trickle-down would make sustaining a social cohesion a tall order amongst South Africans (Bond & Cottle, 2011).
The lack of sustainability of the social cohesion of the World Cup tournament rendered the government’s claims of social gain a farce. The World Cup tournament’s cohesion bred a charade of national unity that did not deal with the actual issue in South Africa, which is that diversity was, and still is, not embraced; it is kept silently passive and dealt with in the unity of global sporting tournaments (McKaiser, 2010: 9). This emphasises that there was indeed a sense of social cohesion and nation building with the World Cup tournament, but the expectations needed to be scaled down completely. The benefit of scaling down the expectation of the nation building machine surrounding the World Cup tournament is that one realises that the nation building and social cohesion that the World Cup tournament brought to South Africa was effective, but temporal. The sustainability of such cohesion was one that would force a shift in the political position of not only the ruling party of the time, but also its opposition, which was highly unlikely to happen. This was because the ability to cause a shift of this nature in society would involve the capital giants of the country as well, who would need to rally behind this change and push even harder to a place where they can create a job market to maintain the production of people who need jobs. Some of these local capital giants would have participated in SAFA’s ambush of South Africa’s society with commercial partners that they would be reluctant not to gain as much as they did without having to put in place the mechanisms and structures needed to result in a holistic benefit for the nation. Therefore, only further doubt has been raised where sustainability is concerned, due to the lack of adequate strategies put in place.

The politicisation of the World Cup tournament only served to benefit the politicians who believed largely in the social cohesion mechanism of the global tournament to gain voter support (Kotowski, 2014). This shows the neutrality of football in the way that it can be used to express and reflect, engage political and national practices and all the while allow for people’s discourse(s) on the very idea of what a nation is (2014), which is why it could be used by the government to garner support. But this too is temporal and cannot be sustained where no discourse surrounding what a nation entails, is present. The Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC) report on the Impact of the 2010 World Cup on Social Cohesion, Nation Building and Reconciliation (2011: 14) stated that “the increased sense of social cohesion during the period of the World Cup was significantly impacted on by the increased sense of safety during the World Cup, which facilitated socializing and mixing across racial and social boundaries.” This, according to the survey, was largely due to the encouragement of public spaces where supporters could go and watch the games, which included fan parks, beer gardens and the new stadia across the country (Human Sciences Research Council, 2011: 13).

One can learn from this that close proximity of South Africa’s cultural diversity is possible and should be maintained for continued results. The World Cup tournament in 2010 removed the sports racial barrier as everyone watched football and supported Bafana Bafana – the South African national team (Labuschagne, 2011: 36). There was no longer a divide between the white Afrikaner rugby fans and the black local majority of football fans. The success of the local team in the global tournament is very important in this exercise (Labuschagne, 2011: 36) as was evident with the winning South African team in the 1995 Rugby World Cup tournament. Success, it seems, reinforced the nation building attempt of the tournament which allowed for a magical moment where the then president Nelson Mandela posed with the trophy along with white Afrikaner players, signifying unity (Labuschagne, 2011: 37). The 2010 World Cup on the other hand, had only one moment when Bafana Bafana player Simphiwe Tshabalala scored the opening goal of the tournament. South Africa’s early exit in the group stages worked against the steps towards nation building through the World Cup tournament. This further left unanswered the questions surrounding the sustainability of these practices, which will then result in continued social cohesion beyond large sporting events and events in general. Whereas “the hosting of the World Cup did positively impact on South African citizens’ confidence in the government to deliver services, this had an unintended consequence of raising South African citizens’ expectations in terms of service delivery in general. South Africans who saw the successful delivery of infrastructure and
development for the purposes of the World Cup tournament, subsequently questioned why similar urgency has not been applied to meeting their service delivery needs” (Human Sciences Research Council, 2011: 14).

The way in which social cohesion was created in the country through the World Cup tournament, we see here, is not one that the government intended to sustain or maintain. Labuschagne (2011: 40), in line with this, states that the success of nation building would likely be sustainable where the socio-economic benefits from the tournament could assist with the continual post-World Cup tournament standard of cohesion set by the government through its efficiency. This can work if the money is generated and creates a clear benefit for the locals, if it allows for there to be a continuation in the formation of social cohesion amongst the population as there is a reinforcement of the benefits it has on the people (Cornelissen, 2010: 141). Therefore, as much as the World Cup tournament may be successful in bringing people together, the sustainability of this success lies on the government to continue creating a platform for social cohesion amongst its people and local capital. This is problematic, as the World Cup tournament did not leave much for the people to believe they had gained other than the grand structures of the stadia and the costs to maintain them. Thus, as much as the World Cup tournament garnered support for the current regime, the new standard set would only serve to show them as incompetent and return their voter support and the sense of social cohesion to the point at which it was before the World Cup tournament. Cottle (2011: 1) states that “in addition to tangible economic benefits and the sports legacy, the World Cup was supposed to provide intangible benefits, such as helping to forge a cohesive national identity and building a positive image of South Africa. But this was a transient moment and the World Cup legacy was more mythical than practical,” which in turn leaves a legacy of exploitation in South Africa for the locals and unmet socio-economic hopes from the World Cup tournament.

The World Cup tournament held in South Africa created an expectation for the socio-economic benefit of the people of South Africa which did not happen in as large a scale as was anticipated (Mars, 2010: 13). This sentiment was due to the belief that the World Cup
tournament would create more than 130 thousand new jobs and grant the government pay-out of about half a billion dollars (Jennings, 2006: 268). Bond (2010) states that whereas FIFA made approximately three billion dollars, South Africa was suffering from the losses they incurred in constructing the stadia and upgrading infrastructure for the World Cup tournament. South Africa had overspent in hosting the World Cup tournament based on the projected income that the World Cup tournament was meant to generate but which did not materialise (Bond & Cottle, 2011).
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

After looking at whether the World Cup tournament in South Africa has succeeded in bringing its people together, it is worth noting what the legacy of the tournament in the country has been, and to throw it forward to the World Cups in Brazil and Russia.

The effectiveness of the World Cup tournament on South African soil can be assessed in terms of the sustainability of the social cohesion and integration after the tournament and also the economic benefits to the country. It seems that in this instance nationalism was to a certain extent a front for the global and local elite to prosper under a veil of national gain. The commercial benefits that FIFA and its partners have gained from the World Cup tournament in South Africa, which have not reflected back into the economy or dwindled after the World Cup tournament, are of particular importance where the subsequent World Cup tournaments are concerned. What is even more problematic is how the South African government went out of its way to ensure that FIFA and its partners were guaranteed their revenue with very minimal or no competition. The impact of FIFA’s demands on the national norm through the passing of laws and by-laws signals a problematic relationship between FIFA, as an international sports organisation, and South Africa through the LOC. This highlights the impact of commercial interests behind FIFA on the state through World Cup tournaments. Though the World Cup tournament did serve the interests of the few, the social cohesion that it fostered within South Africa, though temporary, was effective. The sustainability of such a cohesion was one that would force a shift in the political position of not only the ruling party of the time but also its opposition. The capital giants of the country would need to rally behind this change and push even harder to a place where they can create a job market to maintain the production of people who need jobs.

The World Cup tournament is important in orchestrating this social integration, but the temporal nature of the event itself signals how the tournament cannot in itself guarantee the
sustainability of strategies that were put in place. Kotowski (2014) has stated that “football is just as much about culture and even politics as it is about trying to kick a ball into the net,” which in turn justifies how the World Cup tournament can be and was used to bring people together by politicians to gain voter support. Kotowski (2014) further highlights that football can be seen as a way of expressing or finding a way to reflect the national identity, a way of engaging in politics and national practices and finally as a way of allowing people discourse(s) on the very idea of what a nation is, which is why it could be used by the government to garner support as well as to cover up what the prevailing issues of their people are.

As much as the World Cup tournament benefited South Africa to forge cohesion amongst its people and create a better global image of the country, where the World Cup tournament failed South Africa and its people was in its inability to produce any tangible economic benefits. The lack of widespread job creation that was promised and revenue in the long run made the World Cup tournament not as successful in South Africa as was anticipated. Cottle (2011: 1) refers to the social cohesion and the positive image building of South Africa during the World Cup tournament “a transient moment” that impacted on the legacy of the World Cup tournament in that it “was more mythical than practical” (2011: 1). This in turn leaves a World Cup tournament’s legacy of exploitation and corruption in South Africa for the locals. The World Cup tournament it seems was a global and FIFA impressing mission by a few who were intended to gain from this, FIFA at the top of the list. “FIFA regulations and controls of economic and other rights such as ticketing and accommodation were perceived to be significant obstacles to South African citizens fully enjoying the potential economic benefits of the World Cup” (Human Sciences Research Council, 2011: 14). This resulted in a negative position with regard to hosting the World Cup tournament by some locals who vocally made the argument that there really were no benefits economically from hosting the World Cup tournament.

The prevailing argument is that there was a “diversion of resources away from poverty alleviation and a waste of money on the construction of stadia” (Human Sciences Research
Council, 2011: 14). As much as these arguments have singled out the stadia as the element which money was wasted on, this may just be the echoing of a sentiment as opposed to be an irrefutable truth. This is an echoing of an aggrieved position of the locals who expected the World Cup tournament would ensure economic growth, an increase in jobs and opportunities to gain employment and further small business opportunities which did not happen. The lack of shared knowledge, skills from the interaction with the guests as well as very little empowerment of the locals painted an ineffective legacy of the World Cup tournament and South Africa’s interaction with FIFA. The lengths to which FIFA went to ensure it got all the revenue it expected from the host nation even if the host nation did not benefit from the World Cup tournament, highlights how it has been driven by commercial interests and how it was ready to dominate the states to achieve its goals. By using its massive political economy, enforced by its equally large partnership base, to suppress local competitors and by using government backing through national federations and the LOC to legitimise their requests, FIFA manages to have a guarantee on all its operations in a state during the World Cup tournament with no or very little consequence, answering only to itself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ozanian, M. 2014. World Cup Brazil Will Generate $4 Billion for FIFA, 66% more than 2010 Tournament. Sports Money. [Online]. Available:
113


