

THE 'MIDDLE POWER' DEBATE REVISITED: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNITED  
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2007-2008 AND 2011-2012

**By**

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## **DECLARATION**

I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree DPhil (International Relations) at the University of Pretoria is my own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

**SIGNED: Sithembile Mbete**

**24 April 2018**

## ABSTRACT

South Africa's post-1994 leadership in multilateral forums and its efforts to be a bridge-builder and norm-entrepreneur in the international arena, have earned it the label of 'middle power'. The label itself is contentious, as there is no commonly accepted definition of middle powers and there is disagreement about whether the label applies to South Africa. This study contributes to the discourse on a new normative 'middle' in the realm of structural power, by using the case of South Africa's two terms as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (2007 - 2008 and 2011 - 2012). The Council represents the most powerful forum of global structural power, and therefore offers a useful and compact arena in which to analyse South Africa's participation from a middle power perspective. The original contribution of the study is, on the one hand, its approach from a hitherto under-researched global South perspective, and on the other hand its purposeful analytical nexus between theory and practice in international relations. In doing so, the refinement and development of an important theoretical construct – the 'middle power' idea as related to the distinct diplomacy of certain emerging powers – is supported by a critical understanding of an actual case of state (South Africa's) behaviour in the contemporary realm of structural power.

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## **DEDICATION**

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### List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFRICOM	The United States Africa Command
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARF	African Renaissance Fund
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AUHIP	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa (Afrique du Sud), India, China
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CAR	Central African Republic
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COP	Conference of the Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration Programme
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of

	Congo
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
G4	Group of Four contenders for UNSC permanent seats (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)
G7	Group of Seven advanced economies
G8	Group of Eight advanced economies (Russia became the eighth member of the G7 from 1998 until 2014)
G20	Group of Twenty major economies
G77 plus China	Group of 77 at the United Nations
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GIBSA	Germany, India, Brazil & South Africa
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPCs	Highly indebted Poor Countries
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA	India, Brazil & South Africa
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organisations
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KPCS	Kimberly Process Certification Scheme
LCG	Libya Contact Group
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement

LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LSE	London School of Economics
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAC	New Agenda Coalition
NAM	North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NDP	National Development Plan
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTC	National Transitional Council
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ONUB	United Nations Operations in Burundi
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Producing Countries
P2	Two Non-Western Permanent Members (China and Russia)
P3	Three Western Permanent Members (France, UK, US)
P5	Five Permanent Member of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, US)
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
Polisario Front	Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro)
PRC	People's Republic of China
R2P	Responsibility to Protect

RTD	Right to Development
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Integrated Mission in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
US/ USA	United States/ United States of America

USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organisation
WPS	Women, Peace & Security
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	The Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front



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## **PART ONE: THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK**

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Identification of the research theme

A central preoccupation of International Relations (IR) theory is the distribution of power in the international system. IR scholars from various theoretical perspectives define states by their place in the international hierarchy of power. Power hierarchies are used to explain how states act on the international stage. For realists the international power structure is determined by the distribution of power capabilities between states: unipolar (one great power), bipolar (two great powers), or multipolar (three or more great powers). States seek to balance the growing hegemony of others within the system through alliances or through building up greater material capabilities (Lake 2013: 556). Martin Wight's (1978) seminal text, *Power Politics*, distinguished between dominant powers, great powers, and minor powers. Middle powers and regional great powers are separate categories with the former being secondary to great powers and the latter being potential rivals for middle powers in the broader international system. Organski's (1958) power transition theory introduced a typology of power hierarchy consisting of dominant powers (superpowers), great powers, middle powers, and small powers. Buzan and Waever (2003) distinguished between superpowers, great powers and regional powers, with the first two having global influence and the last having significant influence in their regions. The literature on middle powers expanded during the Cold War preoccupation with the superpower rivalry of the United States (US) and the Soviet Union. In balance of power theories, middle powers were system stabilisers that played important roles as mediators and peacekeepers (Henrikson 1997; Nolte 2010; Carr 2014).

Following the end of the Cold War the world entered a unipolar period with the US as the world's single superpower (Krauthammer 1990). US unipolarity peaked with the Bush government's unilateral decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The world has gradually been moving to a multipolar configuration since the financial crisis of 2008 with power increasingly diffused. China is a significant challenger to the US's superpower status, regional groups like the European Union (EU) and new informal international organisations (IOs) like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are major poles of power and multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations continue to amass

power capabilities that rival those of states. While some scholars have characterised the new world order as ‘nonpolar’ because of how power is diffused among numerous poles (Haass 2008), others prefer to emphasise the fluidity of the new structure by calling it polypolar (Spies 2010). Samuel Huntington (1999: 37) uses the term ‘uni-multipolar system’ to describe the situation in which international politics moved from a bipolar system towards the unipolarity of the 1990s. He argues that ‘the superpower’s effort to maintain a unipolar system stimulates greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multipolar one. Now the international system is passing through one or two uni-polar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21<sup>st</sup> century’. The challenge to US unipolarity has come from ‘major powers’. These included countries like China, Germany, and Japan and regional formations like the EU. However, the challenge to the unipolar system has also come from middle-size states in the developed and developing world that use coalition-building to balance the US’s power (Flemes 2009).

One of the ways in which IR scholars have sought to understand the influence of weaker states on stronger ones in the international system and on the system, itself is through the middle power concept. Middle powers are intermediate states in the international system and as such hold a position in the middle of global economic, military and influence rankings. They are also states that engage in certain policy behaviours including a preference for multilateral diplomacy, pursuing compromise solutions to international conflict and their aim to be ‘good international citizens’. It is widely accepted that countries such as Canada, Australia, and Sweden are middle powers. However, the inclusion of countries such as South Africa (as well as Brazil, India and Malaysia amongst others) under the middle power category generated doubt about the utility of the middle power concept in analysing state identity and behaviour within the structure of global power. This was particularly due to the range of differences between traditional middle powers and the new contenders for this status. David Cooper (2011: 319) criticises the expanded list of middle powers as illustrating ‘the elasticity, inconsistency, and subjectivity of the contemporary middle power classification’.

Despite this criticism there is increasing acknowledgement of the role being played by ‘the new middle’ in the changing power structure, even if there is little consensus on whether

these states are best labelled emerging, regional or middle powers (Cooper and Flermes 2013). Eduard Jordaan (2003) developed a schema to refine the middle power concept to include states in 'the new middle'. He used the label 'emerging middle power' to describe states with developing economies that are also regional powers and play a norm-promoting role in the international system. As an African scholar Jordaan takes a critical view of middle powers as stabilisers of the international system who uphold the status quo distribution of global power, while seeking to mitigate its most unjust consequences. This has proved to be a widely used contribution to middle power literature in the past fifteen years. This dissertation uses Jordaan's schema as a foundation to develop an analytical framework of traditional and emerging middle power role conceptions. The analytical framework is used to examine South Africa's foreign policy behaviour during its terms in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Jordaan (2003) was influenced by South African scholars like Van der Westhuizen (1998) and Schoeman (2000) who characterised post-apartheid South Africa as a middle power in an effort to understand the country's role in the international system. The end of apartheid brought with it a profound transformation of South Africa's domestic politics, which influenced its international identity and approach to its foreign relations. As the party of the new leadership, the African National Congress (ANC) was the biggest domestic influence on South Africa's new national role conception. This was informed by its ideological foundations of African nationalism, anti-colonialism and non-racial democracy. South Africa's identity was also informed by the anti-apartheid struggle as an international human rights campaign (Klotz 1995).

While South African policymakers do not explicitly self-identify as a middle power, most of the stated aims of the Republic when it lobbied for its non-permanent membership in the UNSC – *inter alia* representing the interests of Africa, being a bridge-builder between global North and global South and ensuring rules-based multilateralism – fit the middle power characterisation. Cooper (2011:319) observes that the concept is so often applied to South Africa that the Republic tops the list of countries newly ascribed middle power status in the literature 'to such a degree that it might almost qualify as a new exemplar'. South Africa is thus a good country case to use for drawing insights about the middle power concept.

South Africa's election to a non-permanent seat on the UNSC from 2007 to 2008 and then again from 2011 to 2012, was a highlight of its post-apartheid foreign policy and a symbol of its ultimate reacceptance into the community of nations. As a forum, the United Nations (UN) has historically held significance for the country: South Africa was one of the fifty-one founding members in 1945 and the organisation was instrumental in the global struggle against apartheid. When apartheid ended the UN played a significant role in the reestablishment of cordial relations between South Africa and the rest of the world. Furthermore, as permanent membership of the UNSC is one of South Africa's stated ambitions its tenure on the UNSC was seen as a trial run if or when Security Council reform takes place.

However, the excitement about South Africa's place on the UNSC was overshadowed by the Republic's controversial voting record. During its first term, South Africa was accused of supporting rogue states when it voted against resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. In its second term, it was accused of voting for Western-sponsored regime-change in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya. What emerged from both terms was tension between the role South African policymakers wanted to carve for the state in the international system and the role it was expected to play by both domestic and external observers.

The focus of this study is whether intermediate states and regional powers can have a meaningful impact on international structures like the UNSC. How much can states influence international structures, and how much are they shaped by international structures? Using an analytical framework of middle power roles, this study contributes to the middle power concept by operationalizing the roles and attendant behaviour of middle powers. Moreover, it contributes to the literature on South Africa foreign policy by offering the first comprehensive, systematic analysis of South Africa's behaviour during both its terms in the UNSC.

## **1.2 Literature overview**

This section provides an overview of the literature related to the three core areas under

examination in this study, viz. structural power, middle powers, and South Africa's two terms in the UNSC to contextualise the study and to identify the gap this research seeks to fill.

### 1.2.1 Structural power

An analysis of global power is important in a study of middle powers because it enables us to situate these powers relative to others in the international system. This is especially necessary in a global context in which power is shifting between the North and South. Furthermore, the locus of this study, the UNSC, is the apex of global structural power. Therefore, a discussion of power forms the necessary conceptual foundation to answer the research questions posed by this study. Despite its centrality to explaining relations between states, the definition of power is 'essentially contested' within IR (Gallie 1956). Realism, specifically neorealism, has dominated discussions on power in IR literature with its focus on how states can use their material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not have done. However, realist literature has obscured other ways of thinking about power as shaping the structures, processes, norms, and rules that constrain the behaviour of states. Critical and constructivist approaches to power seek to address this shortcoming. As Holsti (1995: 128) argues:

When you are looking for the effects of structural power, ask some of the following questions: Whose agenda is being discussed? Whose rules are being debated? Who established those rules? Who determines whether the 'playing field' is even? Who provides the referees? Whose standards are prevailing? Whose language do we use when debating and bargaining?

This section aims to grapple with these questions by exploring different approaches to understanding structural power. It will identify four necessary conceptual considerations about structural power that will inform the analysis of South Africa's role in the international system and its behaviour in the UNSC: 1. Structural power is shaped by the distribution of power in the international system; 2. The post-Second World War structure of power is based on US hegemony; 3. Power is an important variable for understanding the politics of international institutions; and 4. The experience of colonialism and postcolonialism has shaped the global South's conceptions of structural power.

Realist scholars argue that international politics is about the struggle for power among states in order to fulfil their national interests in a world defined by anarchy (Morgenthau 1968).

Neorealists extended the power analysis by arguing that national interests and behaviour were defined by the distribution of power capabilities in the international system (Waltz 1979). Power distribution determined the structure of the international system so the only states that mattered were those with preponderant power capabilities to influence the international system. What this means is that a state's position within the power hierarchy will determine its interests and behaviour in international relations. States with similar power capabilities could be expected to behave in similar ways to maximise their power relative to others in the same category. In this view, power is defined as the ability to control material resources, primarily military resources. Power is thus a relational concept concerned with the ability of actor A to get actor B to do what actor B would otherwise not have done (Dahl 1957). One of the consequences of this approach to power analysis is the focus on great powers, or those states with the requisite power capabilities to influence the behaviour of others. This kind of theorising was most evident during the Cold War when the international power structure was defined by the rivalry of the two superpowers, the US and the USSR.

The 'end of history' declared with the end of the Cold War implied the establishment of a permanently unipolar power structure defined by liberal democracy and capitalism with the US at its centre (Fukuyama 1992). While realists continued to view the international system in terms of material power capabilities, the transformation of world order required a nuanced conceptualisation of power to explain the varied ways in which power manifests in a world not defined by superpower rivalry. The operation of international institutions, a state's location within the structure of global economic production, the nature of knowledge production and the dynamics of international finance all constrain the ability of states to make decisions and shape their futures (Strange 2015). A broader understanding of power is critical to analyse the opportunities and limitations of states that are not great powers. While intermediate states could be ignored in a bipolar context, after the Cold War interest grew in the influence of middle powers and regional powers in a range of new international issues like trade liberalisation, human security and international finance (Cooper et al 1993; Cooper 1997).

Critical literature on power has contributed a more nuanced understanding of power in international relations by exposing how power operates in non-material terms. Robert Cox



(1996) uses the Gramscian definition of hegemony to include the ideas, institutions and rules that maintain the supremacy of the state at the centre of a given world order. However, this idea of hegemony is not only based on the dominance of one state over others but also on the operation of global civil society. He argues that:

World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production (Cox 1996: 137).

This conceptualisation of hegemony is instructive when thinking about how power is distributed and functions at the global level. The global hegemon is able to construct the system in its image and to set the rules and institutions that constrain the behaviour of other actors. Unlike the realist and liberal conceptions of hegemony, Cox's definition allows for a consideration of civil society or the social structure of the state system. Furthermore, it does not view hegemony merely as material dominance, but rather as the ability to shape the ideational and social context of global affairs.

The discussion so far has contributed two important conceptual considerations for this study. The first is that structural power is informed by the distribution of power in the international system that has allowed some states to exert control and set the rules of the game that constrain others. Secondly, this process can be understood as hegemonic in that the international system is constructed in the image of the state at the centre of the world order. In other words, structural power is a social construction.

Constructivism allows for the analysis of power as a set of social relations shaped by the interaction of agents with structures and with each other. Barnett and Duvall (2005: 3) define power as 'the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate'. Guzzini (2005: 496) argues that the constructivist approach to power allows us to answer three significant questions: first, what does power mean? Second, what does power do? Third, how does power come to mean and be able to do what it does? We are able to answer these questions because the paradigm takes

an explicitly social approach to explaining power.

Barnett and Duvall (2005: 10) develop a taxonomy of power that captures the way the interests and actions of actors are shaped by the 'enduring structures and processes of political life'. There are four forms of power in the taxonomy. Compulsory power is the ability of one actor to have direct control over another. Institutional power is the ability of an actor to exercise indirect power over another through institutions designed for its advantage. Structural power is the mutual constitution of social capacities and interests among actors. Productive power is the way power is produced through social relations. The emphasis on how power is constructed and institutionalised and how the agency of actors is shaped by structures of global power is highly relevant for this study. We will discuss each form of power in turn.

Compulsory power is the power between actors when one can influence the actions or circumstances of another. This is the first face of power as posited by Dahl (1957). This kind of power is evident when A has an intention to exert influence over B, there is a conflict between A and B's interests or desires, and A has the material resources to achieve the response it wants from B. Unlike Dahl (1957), Barnett and Duvall (2005) argue that compulsory power is at play even when A acts unintentionally. People whose homes are bombed accidentally during an air strike are on the receiving end of the bomber's power, even if that was not the bomber's intention. Barnett and Duvall (2015: 14) argue that 'because power is the production of effects, arguably compulsory power is best understood from the perspective of the recipient, not the deliverer, of direct action.' Many global South critics adopt this view of power in condemning the actions of the West, especially the US, in world politics. America's security interventions in the Middle East like the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and the use of the threat to withdraw humanitarian aid to influence how developing countries vote in multilateral forums are just two examples of compulsory power in the contemporary world order. However, the emphasis on this kind of direct manipulation obscures the reality that hegemonic power is felt in more nuanced ways in the rules, structures and processes of international politics. The questions about structural power asked by Holsti (1995) earlier in this section are answered in Barnett and Duvall's (2005) conceptions of institutional, structural and productive power.

Institutional power is concerned with the way in which formal and informal institutions continue to enable the states that created them to yield power over others through the rules and procedures that define those institutions. This form of power is the ‘control of others in indirect ways’ and is seen in the relation between actors that are ‘socially removed from one another’ but whose relations are mediated through institutions (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 15). Barnett and Duvall (2005: 16) argue that ‘long-established institutions represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to shape the future choices of actors’. Consistent with the view of Barach and Baratz (1962) about the power of agenda setting, they identify institutional arrangements as influencing the agenda setting process. The ability of powerful actors to define what can legitimately be included in the international agenda and to constrain the ability of other states to set the agenda is of particular interest to this study on South Africa’s behaviour in the UNSC. In the first term in the UNSC, and to a lesser extent in the second term, South African policymakers sought to influence the agenda of the Council as allowed for in UNSC rules of procedure. However, they were constrained by the permanent five member states (P5) whose veto power and permanent status endows them with power over the elected member states and constrains the choices of a country like South Africa even in issues of direct national interest.

Structural power relates to ‘the structures... that define what kinds of social beings actors are’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 18). It is the result of direct relations between two actors that shape their social abilities and interests. Social structures shape both the capabilities of actors and their conception of their identity and their subjective interests. This is the ability of A to influence the wants and desires of B in order to get B to act in A’s interests. Therefore, B does what A wants her to do willingly and not under coercion. Lukes (1974) argues that this ability to shape wants and desires is in itself an exercise of power. If B voluntarily acts in a way that A desires, even if this action was contrary to B’s interests then A is exercising power over B. Lukes (1974: 24) asks:

Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things?

While he uses the example of women in unequal societal relationships his analysis can be used to explain the unequal power relationships between states in the international system, especially the ability of former colonisers to shape the interests of their former colonies. This view of the continued influence of colonial powers over their colonies is prevalent among African states, not least South Africa. This perception played an influential role over its decision-making during its UNSC terms. The third face of power has much in common with the Joseph Nye's (1990) liberal theory on soft power and Gramscian literature on hegemony (Cox 1996).

Productive power is closely related to structural power as it also concerns the effect of social structures on the capabilities of actors. However, while structural power focuses on how power acts within specific structures, productive power is about the ways in which power is produced through social relations more broadly as seen through 'systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope' (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 20). Productive power is thus concerned with discourse and how the subjectivity of people is produced. Michel Foucault contributed another dimension to the power debate that emphasised the role of power in constructing the subjects involved in a particular relationship. Power produces subjects and is thus fundamental to the structure of all social interaction (Foucault 2002). Foucault saw all social practices (medicine, psychiatry, labour, religion, and politics) as being essentially power relations. Therefore, in this fourth face of power, power is omnipresent and there is no chance of liberating oneself from power relations. Digester (1992: 982) argues that we can make sense of this somewhat startling claim by assuming that 'beneath our intentional, day-to-day political (or economic or personal or moral) actions and practices there are deeper values and norms serving as background conditions'. Therefore, using Foucault's notion of power, we can uncover the historical context and discover the source of the norms and values underlying relations between people.

The discussion of Barnett and Duvall's (2005) taxonomy provides the third major conceptual consideration for this study: the importance of power as a variable in explaining the behaviour of states in multilateral institutions. Barnett and Duvall (2005) criticise the emergent global governance literature for being overly influenced by liberal preoccupations

on human agency and economic interdependence, while ignoring power as a factor in shaping the institutions, which govern relations among states. This has even great for this study on the behaviour of middle powers the UNSC, which represents the apex of institutionalised global power.

The Security Council was never intended to be democratic or representative. The five permanent members – the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China – are in effect the governing elite of the UN, endowed with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security (Venter 2003; Bosco 2009). Johnstone (2005) points out that since 1991 most of the UNSC’s deliberations have occurred outside of formal Council meetings with no keeping of informal records. This strengthens the dominance of the veto powers and potentially undermines the formal equality of Security Council members as established by Article 24 of the UN Charter. The entrenchment of structural power in the UNSC has made the election for non-permanent seats highly competitive as these represent a limited opportunity for small and middle powers to participate in the world’s highest structure of global governance. However, this has also sparked debate about the elite permanent membership of the institution and prompted calls for it to be democratised. While a detailed investigation into the debate on UNSC reform falls outside the remit of this thesis, the Council provides a useful arena in which to observe the power inclinations and aspirations of states.

The final conceptual consideration comes from Guzzini’s (2005) question about how power has come to mean and do what it does. Answering this question requires a historical perspective on how power has come to be distributed the way it is and how the structure of power has been constructed over time. IR as a discipline has tended to ignore this question by taking Western experiences as universal and ignoring the reality that the international system was constructed through interactions between the West and the rest. Conceptions of statehood and nationhood are based on the Westphalian state and the various processes that led to the formation of the European state system. This ignores the experience of the vast majority of states in the world, many of whose formative experience was of colonialism and decolonisation. A central contention of this study is that postcolonial understandings of power shape the thinking of states of the global South.

Postcolonial and critical race theory has opened new perspectives on how to understand structural power and the development of the contemporary world order. Postcolonial approaches challenge mainstream theories on international organisations in two ways. Firstly, they emphasise the colonial origins of international organisation and highlight the ways in which the contemporary multilateral system was shaped by the encounter between Europe and the rest of the world. In the immediate post-World War Two period scholars such as Fanon (2004) and Albert Memmi (1990) sought to deconstruct the relationships of power and domination between the coloniser and the colonised. In his seminal text *Orientalism*, Edward Said (1979) argued that the Europe invented the Orient as a contrasting image, ‘the other’, through which Europe could establish a dominant identity as civilised, moral and enlightened. This image had little to do with the reality of the actual places in India and the Middle East referred to as oriental, but it served a powerful purpose to justify colonial exploitation and conquest.

Walter Rodney (1973) made a similar argument in relation to the international political economy by arguing that Africa’s underdevelopment is a direct consequence of European colonial expansion. Wealth was transferred from Africa to Europe through exploitative trade relations, specifically the trade in human beings and natural resources. Rodney argues that ‘what was called international trade was nothing but the extension overseas of European interest’ (Rodney 1973: 78). The European colonial powers shaped Africa’s economies for their own needs, deciding what Africa should cultivate or mine based on what would be most useful for Europeans. For Rodney this process was the beginning of the relationship of dependency between Africa and Europe. What is significant about Rodney’s perspective is how it frames the development and underdevelopment, of Europe and Africa respectively, as co-constitutive. Contrary to (mostly) Western scholars who have ignored Africa as part of the global economy and view it as underdeveloped because of its place *outside* the capitalist economy, Rodney places Africa in a central relationship with Europe and makes it a key part of the story of Western development. This idea of co-constitution of the global North and South is a theme that ran throughout South Africa’s tenure in the UNSC with policymakers emphasising underdevelopment as one of the root causes of insecurity in the African conflicts, which make up the majority of issues on the Council agenda. South Africa called

for African conflicts to be seen in the full context of colonialism and neo-colonialism and for Western powers to contribute to development on the continent by applying international rules equitably.

However, even the international rules themselves have been shaped through colonial violence and exploitation. Orthodox IR theorists see the contemporary international system as an extension, through decolonisation, of the European, Westphalian state system (Barkawi 2010). This perspective ignores the fact that the treaty of Westphalia (1648) coincided with the early colonisation of the non-Western world. Those states that were a part of the Westphalian system were granted sovereignty in contrast to other territories in the world that were not sovereign and could thus be made subjects of the European states. The international system as we know it was shaped by this relationship and was not merely the result of European states interacting with each other (Seth 2011). Therefore, the formation of the contemporary international system of states as 'like units' cannot be divorced from the processes of colonisation and decolonisation (Seth 2011). The extension of sovereignty to the colonised world was the result of mass struggles against colonialism, and not merely the benevolence of morally superior Europeans (Anghie 2006; Barkawi 2010).

Concerning the manifestation of structural power in international institutions, colonialism enabled the construction of international institutions that were meant to preserve the privileges of colonial powers. Muppidi (2004: 278) argues that those with power have been able to construct the meaning of rules 'to continue governing over the powerless without the voice, consent or participation of those who are to be governed'. As Du Bois (1917) argued, the First World War was not so much a European war as a contest for colonial territory. When Jan Smuts drafted the blueprint for the League of Nations, his goal was to preserve British imperialism and to win greater legitimacy for South Africa through the mandate over the former German colony of South-West Africa (Mazower 2009; 2012). According to Anghie (2006), the mandate system entrenched two different types of sovereignty, one for European powers, and another for non-European former colonies. The mandate system of the League was reincarnated as the trustee system of the United Nations that continues to this day as the organising function of peacekeeping operations. Thus, colonialism can be argued to have been essential to the formation of our modern system of international organisation.

Anghie's work further challenges one of the key assumptions on which international organisation is based: that all states are equal in international law.

This is the second contribution of postcolonial literature: challenging the liberal underpinnings of the contemporary international system. Liberalism is based on the centrality of individual rights in social life. These rights are exercised politically through democracy and economically through capitalism. Liberal theory is drawn from the experience of European societies and its intellectual origins lie in Enlightenment philosophy. Postcolonial theorists challenge the liberal assumption that Western civilisation and law is peaceful and good. Barkawi and Laffey (2006: 335) criticise the presumed 'ethical character of the West' in liberal approaches to IR. They argue that liberal theories take a Eurocentric view of the West as ethical and progressive by 'othering' the violence and tyranny enacted by the West. Western crimes such as the Herero genocide of 1904, British concentration camps during the Anglo-Boer war, the horrific crimes of King Leopold in the Congo in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, French violence in Algeria and British brutality in Kenya are excluded from liberal narratives of rules, norms and values in international relations. Even the Holocaust, which took place in Europe, has been 'othered' as the cause of a madman to uphold the myth of the West as ethically superior to other societies (Mazower 1998; Barkawi and Laffey 2006).

Critical race scholars have made an important contribution to IR scholarship by showing the racial origins of liberal ideology and IR as a discipline. While the division of people by race, culture, nationality, and religion can be argued to be a natural part of human character, such discernment of difference took on a particular ideological and political character in Europe during the Renaissance. European understandings of race and difference evolved to form the justification for colonial conquest, colonisation, and transatlantic slavery (Grovoqui 2001). The writing of Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers considered the progenitors of IR theory, such as Hugo Grotius and Emmanuel Kant, was based on racial hierarchies that painted white European Christian society as the height of civilisation in comparison with the childlike peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas (Henderson 2017). Europe differentiated itself from the parts of the world it was trying to conquer by developing 'a hierarchy of values, cultures and civilisation' based on 'symbolic and substantive differences' (Grovoqui 2001: 430). As Trouillot (1995: 74) has argued:



The invention of the Americas ... the simultaneous invention of Europe, the division of the Mediterranean by an imaginary line going from the south of Cadiz to the north of Constantinople, the westernization of Christianity, and the invention of a Greco-Roman past to Western Europe were all part of the process by which Europe became the West. What we call the Renaissance, much more an invention in its own right than a rebirth, ushered in a number of philosophical questions to which politicians, theologians, artists, and soldiers provided both concrete and abstract answers. What is Order? What is the State? But also, and above all: What is Man?

The question of ‘what is man?’ was central to the scientific racism of the nineteenth century that used Darwinian theory about the survival of the fittest as ‘objective’ evidence of the supremacy of whites and the inferiority of non-whites. Whites were the only race that was granted humanity and thus granted ‘human rights’ including self-determination and liberty. Non-white people were considered perpetually childlike at best, animalistic and brutal at worst, and were seen to require trusteeship and guidance to aspire towards civilisation (Dubow 1995). This bifurcation of the world between those who are fully human and those who have yet to earn their humanity continued in the post-Cold War order defined by globalisation, the promotion of human rights and humanitarianism, and the shrinking of the world through digital technology. IR scholarship continues to portray the non-Western world, especially Africa, as peculiarly dysfunctional because of their primitive cultures and religions. As Grovogui (2001: 440) argues:

Many have undertaken their humanitarian actions while assuming that natural endowments, immutable cultural dispositions, and distinct regional attributes—all bearing on race—account for the physical, social, and political ills that affect the different groups in need of assistance or solidarity. Consistently, many attribute the spread of poverty, AIDS and other diseases, and social conflicts in Africa to the natural environment (or nature), sexual promiscuity (barely veiled racial innuendo), and political proclivities leaning on dysfunction (political culture).

Postcolonial and critical race criticisms of IR are not mere contrarian theoretical musings. They resonate with the actual diplomacy and international behaviour of non-Western policymakers since the Second World War. The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM), the New International Economic Order (NIEO), OPEC, the G77 plus China, IBSA and more recently the BRICS are attempts to overturn the racist, imperialist logic of structural power to create a more equitable world order. Unfortunately, many Western and white scholars have dismissed these initiatives as a distraction from the important work of the ‘real powers’ in international relations. An example that is relevant to this study is David Bosco (2009) whose authoritative history of the UNSC, *Five to Rule Them All*, acknowledges the ‘incisiveness’ of NAM’s critique of international political and economic inequality, but dismisses NAM efforts to put these issues on the Council agenda as ‘empty rhetoric’.

Many scholars of South Africa’s international relations are dismissive of Pretoria’s criticisms of global inequality, neo-colonialism, and Western paternalism (Vale and Taylor 1999; Geldenhuys 2005; Graham 2008; Jordaan 2010). They see these issues, either as a distraction from the national interest, or as a betrayal of the country’s human rights foreign policy (Nathan 2011; Melber 2014). Few South African scholars have engaged with the debates on postcolonial and critical IR literature, which ironically but perhaps unsurprisingly are taking place in Western universities. This is a curious omission given South Africa was the main stage of Du Bois’ 1903 contention that ‘the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line’ (Du Bois 1994). South Africa was also integrally involved in the formation of the 20<sup>th</sup> century world order. The Anglo-Boer war, Smuts’ involvement in forming the League of Nations and the UN (Mazower 2009) and the anti-Apartheid struggle’s contribution to the normative foundation of the post-Cold War order are examples of South Africa’s role in the story of the world (Klotz 1995). Post-apartheid South Africa’s place in the power hierarchy and its relationship to structural power is a direct consequence of imperialism and race politics.

This study seeks to fill this gap in South African IR literature by taking the influence of colonialism and race in the formation of contemporary structural power seriously. Emerging middle powers seek to achieve greater involvement of the South in addressing global challenges, especially those that involve them directly. This is a challenge to the colonial/imperial model of the West taking leadership of issues concerning the South. In the UNSC, South African policymakers frequently sought to highlight how the colonial world order had been entrenched through the unequal distribution of power in the UNSC. They

further attempted to use the UNSC as an arena to challenge Western hegemony and reconfigure global power relations. One of South Africa's stated aims during its non-permanent terms on the UNSC was for the global South to have a greater say in resolving conflicts on the Council's agenda because the vast majority of those conflicts affected states in the South.

The discussion now turns to middle powers within the context of structural power. As the label implies middle powers are states that hold a position in the middle of global economic and military rankings. However, middle power also implies a set of policy behaviours. One of the first modern conceptions of middle powers comes from Jan Smuts' (1918) *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion*. Smuts (1918) described an intermediate rank of powers, below the rank of Great Powers but above the minor states, that could undertake special responsibilities in the international system such as taking on the administration of the League's mandated territories. The middle power concept came into greater use after the Second World War. In the negotiations on the UN held at San Francisco in 1945, Canada and Australia championed the rights of middle powers, those below the Big Five, but powerful enough to deserve priority in the elections to the non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King (quoted in Glazebrook 1947: 308) argued that representation on the UNSC should be determined on a functional basis; he explained 'those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected'.

As will be seen below, the literature on middle powers largely ignores power despite this category of states being identified by their place in the international hierarchy of power. Middle powers are not only middle-ranked states; their behaviour is traditionally associated with the maintenance and legitimation of the existing power structure. These states are meant to be system stabilisers that act to preserve the hegemonic world order because stability works in their interests. The literature on emerging middle powers adds another dimension by focusing on middling states that occupy the semi-periphery of the hegemonic order and seek to raise their power position, while preserving the stability of the system. As discussed in section 1.1, the expansion of the middle power definition has been criticised for undermining the utility of the concept. This study revisits the middle power debate by analysing the actual

foreign policy of a state in the middle of the power hierarchy that seeks to improve its position and influence the primary institutional manifestation of structural power, the UNSC.

### 1.2.2 Middle Powers

Carsten Holbraad (1984) traces the early development of the middle power concept to the 19th century German writer, Karl von Clausewitz, who first used the term in 1831 to describe a state that occupied a geographical position separating great powers, was a good neighbour and offered strategic protection to its great-power neighbours because it was strong enough to defend itself. Much of the academic literature on middle powers emerged during the 1960s as opportunities seemed to open in the bipolar balance of power of the Cold War for secondary powers to act with greater independence. Writers from Canada, Western Europe, and India began exploring the role of middle powers.

Cold War era scholars emphasised the material aspects of the middle power definition and its influence on statecraft. In particular, realist conceptions of middlepowermanship have focused on the material capabilities and relative international position of a state. Holbraad's (1984) formulation of middle powers is based on a state's relative position in the hierarchy of powers. He argues that middle powers 'can be distinguished best in terms of the strength they possess and the power they command' (Holbraad 1984: 4). Bernard Wood (1988) focuses on Gross National Product (GNP) as a determinant of middle power status creating a list of middle powers based on their GNP rankings. These materialist definitions of middle powers are criticised by Chapnick (1999) for being imprecise and arbitrary. He argues that the choices about the size of GNP or the place in the hierarchy of states used to determine 'the middle' is entirely subjective and thus lacking in analytical utility.

Liberal scholars were concerned with the 'political significance' of middle powers and sought to understand the term as more than a mere category in the hierarchy of states (Chapnick 1999: 79). Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1993) emphasise behaviour in their characterisation of middle powers. According to them the behavioural characteristics of middle powers are:

their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes and their

tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy (Cooper et al 1993: 19).

Cooper (1997) further identifies the opportunity for middle powers in the post-Cold War era to pursue ‘niche diplomacy’, in other words to identify specific issue areas on which to focus diplomatic resources instead of trying to influence every area of international life. Traditional middle powers such as Canada and Sweden are recognised for promoting democracy and human rights in international affairs based on the democratic character of their domestic political systems. Lee (1999) discusses the tendency of middle powers to form coalitions around mutual interests and to pursue North-South perspectives, acting as bridge-builders in the international system. The behavioural definition of middle powers has come to dominate middle power scholarship. According to Flesher (2007: 8), ‘most scholars have accepted a definition of middle powers that is based on their international behaviour rather than on their material power’.

Based on the behavioural definition of middle powers, the middle power role has been actively taken on by states such as Australia and Canada, and there have been several related studies on the diplomacy of these states (see Cooper et al 1993; Chapnick 2005). Higgott and Cooper (1990) discuss the diplomacy of Australia and Canada as leaders of the Cairns Group of states during the World Trade Organisation’s Uruguay Round of negotiations. Their article emphasises the niche diplomacy – focused international activity in specific issue areas for maximum gain – engaged in by these states and their role in forming coalitions to liberalise global agricultural trade. Cooper (1997) distinguishes between different styles of behaviour among self-identified middle powers; particularly the difference between Australia’s ‘heroic’ approach to diplomacy and Canada’s ‘quiet diplomacy’.

Despite the utility and widespread acceptance of the behavioural conception of middle powers, it has been criticised for its lack of conceptual clarity and weak operationalisation. Ungerer (2008:265) has criticised the behavioural approach to middle powers for being tautological: middle powers are middle powers because they act like middle powers. Hurrell (2000: 1) asserts that efforts to construct a coherent theory of middle powers ‘have led to a dead-end’ as it has proved difficult to develop a consistent set of criteria for middle powers. Furthermore, creating a link between certain shared characteristics of middle powers and a

common set of behaviours has proved even more difficult. This undermines the explanatory value of the middle power concept. Nevertheless, this research proceeds from the view that given the consistent leadership shown by states other than the great powers in the global arena, the middle power concept is valuable in understanding the role of intermediate states in a changing world.

Robert Cox's (1989) neo-Gramscian notion of 'middlepowermanship' emphasises the role of intermediate states in a context of shifting global power relations. According to Cox (1989) in a world order characterised by hegemony, middle powers play a supporting role in maintaining orderliness and security in relations between states. From this perspective one could argue that middle powers sustain the structure of global power.

Eduard Jordaan (2003) adopts Cox's critical approach to distinguish between traditional and emerging middle powers. He contributes an important global South perspective to the middle power literature by engaging analytically with the influence of regional powers on the global stage. Jordaan (2003) characterises middle powers according to their constitutive and behavioural characteristics. According to Jordaan (2003), a state's place within the global power hierarchy, combined with its domestic political and economic characteristics, informs its foreign policy behaviour. Jordaan (2003) identifies six differences between traditional and emerging middle powers: democratic tradition; position in global economy; domestic distribution of wealth; regional position; regional orientation; and view on the international system.

Traditional middle powers are those like Canada and Australia that have established democracies and industrialised economies. They lie at the core of the global economy and have high levels of domestic income equality. They are mostly established, stable, social, or liberal democracies with an interest in maintaining the current global order. In order to do so they promote universal liberal values and advocate peaceful resolution of international disputes. Traditional middle powers are more concerned with influencing the broad international system than their own regions, so their foreign policies are not regionally oriented (Jordaan 2003).

Emerging middle powers are recently democratised and lie in the semi-periphery of the global economy. They are theoretically promoters of democracy and human rights but also have an anti-imperialist normative slant. They are regional powers that use their regional influence to legitimise their interests in matters of global concern. While they have an interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the international system, they promote reform in order to shift the balance of global power in their favour. Emerging middle powers seek reform instead of radical global change in order to maintain their power position relative to weaker states. The crucial difference between traditional and emerging middle powers is their regional influence. Emerging middle powers are regional powers whose foreign policy is geared towards exerting influence in their regions (Jordaan 2003).

To enable a more nuanced analysis of the role of middle powers within the context of structural power, this study borrows language from role theory to develop an analytical framework of middle power behaviour. The scholarship on roles has its genesis in the seminal paper by K.J. Holsti (1970) on national role conceptions in international relations. A role is patterned individual behaviour that conforms to some social expectation of behaviour for all occupants of a particular social position. Both the individual occupying the position and those around them have the same understanding of individual's role, which leads them to amend their behaviour in relation to one another. A role is a combination of an actor's self-conception and the expectations of the actor prescribed by others. Role theory is useful for understanding 'middlepowership' as patterned behaviour derived from both structural conditions and national role expectations. In a ground-breaking article Landsberg and Monyae (2006: 131) use Holsti's framework to identify seven international roles for South Africa: voice, example setter, mediator-integrator and regional sub-system collaborator, the diplomat, bridge-builder, activist multilateralist, and faithful ally. This study takes inspiration from their work to identify a set of generic traditional and emerging middle power roles based on the literature that can be used to analyse the foreign policy behaviour of a state to determine the extent to which it behaves as a middle power (see section 2.4).

This research takes up the challenge of developing the middle power concept by applying it to an under-investigated case, South Africa's terms in the UNSC. With South Africa being one of the prominent additions to the list of middle powers, such an investigation provides

clarity on the actual behaviour of a state that has been labelled an emerging middle power in global governance.

### 1.2.3 South Africa on the UNSC

There is a limited body of literature on South Africa's two terms in the UNSC. Much of the available literature focuses on the controversies and dynamics of a single term (either the first or the second) and there has been no systematic analysis of both terms in relation to South Africa's role in the international system (see Kagwanja 2008; Bischoff 2009; Serrão 2011). Suzanne Graham (2013) has come closest to a comprehensive study on South Africa's behaviour in the United Nations with her doctoral research analysing South Africa's UN voting data from 1994 to 2008. However, her study focuses on South Africa's voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and is chronologically limited to references to the Republic's first (2007/2008) term in the UNSC.

The literature on the first term is mostly concerned with the controversial voting decisions made by the Republic and the apparent move away from a normative foreign policy towards one based on material interests. According to Van Nieuwkerk (2007), the country acted as an emerging middle power in the UNSC by aligning itself with the global South agenda at the expense of its own principles. In concurrence with this view Spies (2008) argues that South Africa's actions in the UNSC represent a 'dichotomy between rhetoric and practice' in which the Republic rhetorically supported human rights but upheld sovereignty in relation to the human rights violations perpetrated by its global South peers. Jordaan (2010) characterises this dichotomy as signalling the move from a 'liberal' foreign policy to a 'liberationist' one. He depicts this as a negative shift from universal morality towards an 'amoral' focus on solidarity and anti-imperialism.

Other scholars like Bischoff (2009), Kagwanja (2008), Kornegay (in Institute for Global Dialogue [IGD] 2012), and Nathan (2011) highlight the counter-hegemonic, anti-imperialist orientation of South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC. Kagwanja (2008) and Kornegay (in IGD 2012) take a sympathetic view to South Africa's anti-imperialism as a necessary antidote to US unilateralism and an imbalanced international power structure. Habib (2009) criticises simplistic portrayals of South Africa's decision-making in its first term in the



UNSC and calls for an approach that engages seriously with Pretoria's explanations of its decisions. This study responds to this call by using a framework of middle power roles and behaviour to interpret the decisions made by South Africa in the UNSC.

In spite of the controversies associated with its first ever stint on the UNSC, South Africa won a second term on the Council in October 2010. Re-election to the Council almost immediately after its first term was a significant achievement that was viewed as an endorsement by the Africa Group of South Africa's performance in the first term. Van Nieuwkerk (2007), Bischoff (2009), Kornegay (in IGD 2012) and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR 2013) argue that the primary lesson learned by South African policymakers was to improve the Republic's public diplomacy and to communicate its positions more clearly.

The literature on South Africa's second term addresses alternative definitions of the normative aspects of South African foreign policy. According to Kornegay (in IGD 2012), a distinguishing feature of South Africa's second term was the transformed geopolitical environment that followed the global economic recession of 2009. In 2011, the UNSC was composed of a number of emerging powers including South Africa, India, Brazil, Germany, and Nigeria. Serrão (2011), Naidu (in IGD 2012) and Nganje (2012) write about the expectation for emerging powers to shape the processes and decisions of the Council. Scholars described 2011 as 'something of a test-run for permanent membership' for Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa (SWP 2011: 2). Another dimension of South Africa's second term that has received attention in the literature was its pursuit of the so-called African Agenda through lobbying for greater cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). Nganje (2012) discusses Pretoria's use of its presidencies of the UNSC to develop a closer working relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC culminating in the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2033, which committed the UNSC to this goal.

While South Africa succeeded in its Chapter VIII goals, its record in country specific decisions illustrates the challenges of the pursuit of the African Agenda. The most notable of these was the vote in March 2011 on Resolution 1973, which sought to impose a 'no-fly

zone' over Libya in an effort to resolve the political crisis in that country. South Africa voted in favour of this action, going against its usual pro-sovereignty stance, and was heavily criticised as a result. Mckaiser (2011), Nganje (2011), Serrão (2011) Kornegay (in IGD 2012) and De Waal (2013) highlight the challenges faced by South Africa in its attempts to lead on African issues and to uphold the norms of the international system.

This study aims to contribute to the literature on middle powers and South African foreign policy by applying a middle power analytical framework to an actual case of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. Given the frequency with which South Africa is labelled a middle power, the concept should enable us to achieve some clarity about the role South Africa played during in the UNSC. The study does this by developing a typology of middle power behaviour and applying it to the analysis of South Africa's decisions in the UNSC. The intention is to determine whether there was any consistency in South Africa's behaviour in these specific cases and whether the middle power label withstands the application to South Africa's actual foreign policy behaviour.

### **1.3 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem**

The research problem this study examines is the extent to which South Africa behaved as a middle power during its tenure in the UNSC from 2007 to 2008 and 2011 to 2012. This problem prompts three main research questions:

1. What is the nature of structural power in the global system and how is it manifested in the UNSC?

How has the concept of 'middle power' evolved to account for the behaviour of specific types of states in the global arena?

2. How has South Africa's diplomatic identity – within the context of global structural power – been projected and perceived since 1994?

The research is based on the hypothesis that in a contemporary global power structure that remains dominated by the global North, as exemplified by the UNSC, South Africa aimed to use its tenure on the Council to promote a normative agenda that included the transformation of global governance. This is consistent with the role other emerging and regional powers are

trying to play in the shifting global political economy (Efstathopoulos 2011; Bayer and Keyman 2012; Burges 2013; Cooper and Flemes 2013). Middle powers have traditionally played the role of system stabilisers and mediators. However, changes in the global structure of power prompted first by events following the 9/11 attacks and then by the global economic recession in 2009, have created opportunities for a different type of middle power to emerge and influence the global system. South Africa's tenure in the UNSC highlighted the anti-imperialist and reformist orientations of its foreign identity.

The argument developed in the thesis is that South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC was, largely, consistent with that of middle powers. The study argues that in its first term in the UNSC South Africa projected itself as an emerging middle power seeking to bridge the interests of the global North and South and to promote consistent adherence to the UN Charter. Moreover, South Africa promoted African solutions for the African conflicts on the UNSC agenda through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the second term in the UNSC, South Africa adopted a more traditional middle power approach by being less critical of the Western powers and being more cooperative on human rights and humanitarian issues. However, it found it difficult to play this role consistently because of the fallout from NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011. Therefore, South Africa is argued to have alternated between emerging and traditional middle power roles depending on the issue. This study contends that states can play both traditional and emerging power roles, given the specific situation and issue. However, a misunderstanding of the historical normative foundations of South Africa's anti-hegemonic stance and its perspective on UN reform, led to skewed expectations of its behaviour. These historical foundations can only be understood through an analysis of the foreign policy positions of the governing ANC in exile and in government. It is further argued that, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the changes underway in the global power structure, greater conceptual understanding is needed of the new norms promoted by states of the new middle, their conception of reform and the kind of change they seek in the international system.

The conceptual focus of the study is the IR debate on middle power behaviour. The middle power concept is used as an analytical tool to understand South Africa's voting and related diplomacy during its two non-permanent terms on the UNSC. The constitutive and

behavioural characteristics of emerging middle powers, as described by Eduard Jordaan (2003), are used as a point of departure to identify indicators against which to test South Africa's performance on the UNSC. This framework is augmented by the language of national role conceptions to identify a set of middle power roles and attendant behaviour (Holsti 1970).

The chronological focus of the study is South Africa's two non-permanent terms in the UNSC from 2007 to 2008 and from 2011 to 2012. While these periods are the focus of the study, reference is made to the years immediately preceding election to both terms and the years immediately following the Republic's tenure. This will offer insight into South Africa's campaigns for election (during which it articulated its aims and objectives to be at the main table of global structural power) and allow for evaluation of its performance.

Geographically, the research is focused on South Africa's voting decisions and other activity in the UNSC; in other words, the global as opposed to regional level of power. As it deals with UNSC membership, the study focuses on the South African state as a unitary actor. It does not seek to investigate the bureaucratic or policymaking dynamics of the South African state. However, its analysis is informed by consideration of the policy role of sub-state actors such as South Africa's governing party, the ANC.

#### **1.4 Research Methodology**

This study employs a qualitative single-case case study approach to investigate the middle power concept and its application to South Africa in the UNSC. Yin (2009: 14) defines a case study as 'an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident'. Case study research is detailed and thorough analysis of a particular phenomenon. The case under consideration here is South Africa's tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2007 to 2008 and 2011 to 2012. The unit of analysis is South Africa's decision-making in the UNSC, operationalised as instances in which South Africa engaged in some active foreign policy behaviour such as vote, write a paper, organise a meeting or substantively attempt to influence a Council decision.

The research methodology is inductive (rather than deductive) and therefore, opens the opportunity for additional research on the theme. An analytical framework of middle power role conceptions and role performance (behaviour) is developed in chapter two and used to interpret South African decisions in a variety of debates on the country-specific and general and thematic issues discussed at public meetings in the UNSC. The different issues are clustered in themes derived from the principles underlying South Africa's foreign policy: promotion of human rights and democracy, commitment to the rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda. This approach seeks to match South African behaviour on particular issues with a particular middle power role to determine the extent to which South Africa behaved as a middle power. This contributes to both the literature on middle powers and their role in the global power structure and the literature on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy.

The study used primary and secondary data sources. The main primary data sources were the meeting records of UNSC meetings in 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012. I focused on the meeting records in which South Africa had made a statement or voted in a particular way. In 2007 and 2008, South Africa participated in 445 public meetings; it made statements in 119 of these and participated in 121 votes (see table 4). In 2011 and 2012, South Africa participated in 434 public meetings, made 152 statements, and participated in 119 votes (see table 5). I examined all 271 statements South Africa made in UNSC meetings and its voting record in 240 votes. I also examined policy documents from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). These included the Foreign Policy Green Paper of 1996 (DFA 1996), the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (DFA 1999), the various strategic plans released from 2003 to 2012, the Draft White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy (DIRCO 2011a) and the National Development Plan (NPC 2012)

Another important data source was the speeches and other public statements by nine politicians who were influential in the formulation and execution of South African foreign policy from 1994 until 2012. Foreign policymaking is often an elite enterprise undertaken by the highest leadership echelons of a state. What these leaders say about the identity, interests and concerns of a state are a reliable indicator of that state's foreign policy. The names of the

leaders included in this analysis are in the table below:

Table 1: South African leaders and foreign policymakers 1994-2012

Nelson Mandela	President	1994-1999
Thabo Mbeki	President	1999-2008
Kgalema Motlanthe	President	2008-2009
Jacob Zuma	Deputy President President	1999-2005 2009-2018
Alfred Nzo	Minister of Foreign Affairs	1994-1999
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma	Minister of Foreign Affairs	1999-2009
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane	Minister of International Relations and Cooperation	2009-2018
Aziz Pahad	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs	1999-2008
Ebrahim Ebrahim	Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation	2009-2014

The secondary sources I used were the existing literature on middle powers, South Africa's foreign policy, and South Africa's two non-permanent terms. This includes reviewing books, journal articles, print media publications, and other research reports that deal with the topic. Given the nature of South African international relations scholarship I used research reports by think tanks and commentary from policy analysts extensively. The IGD, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) were especially rich sources of data.

I was privileged to undertake two 'field' visits that contributed to this study. In 2015, I was hosted by a South African official working in the UN Secretariat at the UN headquarters in New York. This visit provided me with the rare opportunity of an insider's perspective of the UN. I sat in on a General Assembly meeting, saw the different chambers in which UNSC deliberations take place, and was able to interact with UN officials in the delegates lounge. This experience exposed me to the dynamics of the UN as a working institution and gave me

a sense of the power relations, opportunities and constraints facing global South delegates in New York. Seeing the Security Council chamber with its large media gallery, the meeting rooms where informal deliberations take place away from the public glare and the spaces where delegates socialise gave me an important, intangible spatial sense of the UNSC at work that contributed to my understanding of the UN meeting records and statements I read.

In 2016, I visited Kigali, Rwanda to interview South African and AU officials on the sidelines of the AU summit. While I was unable to secure on-the record interviews, I was able to have three informative, informal conversations with a senior AU official of the Peace and Security Council, and two senior DIRCO officials working closely with the AU and the UNSC. I refer to some of these officials' observations at various points in the study.

A major contributor to the initial stages of my research was my stay as a visiting scholar at the University of Waterloo in Canada, from September to December 2014. The aim of the visit was to assist in the development of the theoretical approach of this study. I worked under the supervision of Prof Andrew Cooper of the university's Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA) who is the leading scholar on middle powers. I audited Prof Cooper's post-graduate course on International Organisations, which strengthened my theoretical and conceptual understanding of the contemporary world order and international institutions.

## **1.5 Structure of the research**

The first chapter introduced the aims and objectives of the study, provides a preliminary literature overview and set out the research problem to be investigated.

Chapter two develops a definition of middle powers centred on the roles these states play in the international system. It discusses the different theoretical approaches to defining middle powers, focusing on positional, liberal, critical and constructivist approaches. It then uses Holsti's (1970) theory of national role conceptions and role performance to develop a typology of middle power roles and behaviour. This typology is the analytical framework of the study.

Chapter three examines South Africa's post-Apartheid foreign policy, specifically the roles the Republic has tried to play in international politics. It provides an overview of the evolutionary aspects of South Africa's post-apartheid diplomacy that have earned the country the label of middle power. This chapter examines South Africa's foreign policy statements and actions between 1994 and 2012 using the analytical framework developed in chapter two. It aims to identify whether recurring foreign policy themes and particular behaviours fit into the middle power national role conceptions and behaviours in the typology.

Chapters four and five investigate South Africa's first term in the UNSC. Chapter four examines South Africa's behaviour in relation to the themes of promotion of human rights and democracy, and commitment to rule of law. Chapter five focuses on the peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda.

Chapters six and seven investigate South Africa's second term in the UNSC. Chapter six examines South Africa's behaviour in relation to the themes of promotion of human rights and democracy, and commitment to rule of law. Chapter seven focuses on the peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda.

Chapter eight concludes the thesis with an assessment of the extent to which middlepowermanship has explained South Africa's behaviour during its two terms on the UNSC.



## CHAPTER TWO: MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter develops a definition of middle powers centred on the roles these states play in the international system. Middle powers are states with intermediate capabilities that occupy a place in the middle of the international distribution of power. Besides their material status, middle powers are associated with certain kinds of behaviour mostly intended at maintaining the stability of the extant world order. The search for an ‘objective’ definition of middle powers has become a central preoccupation of the scholarship on this category of states. Nevertheless, this thesis proceeds from the view that given the consistent leadership shown by states other than the great powers in the global arena, the middle power concept is valuable in understanding the role of intermediate states in a changing world. Dennis Stairs (1998: 282) has argued:

The impression that there really are certain powers of secondary rank with similar capabilities and similar minds, and with a similar approach to the maintenance of the international system, seems somehow to survive the ‘real-world’ observation that things are in fact a jumble.

South Africa has been included among this list of powers often enough to require an engagement with the middle power literature if one is to discuss the Republic’s foreign policy.

The chapter begins by discussing the different theoretical approaches to defining middle powers, focusing on positional, liberal, critical and constructivist approaches. It then moves to an examination of Eduard Jordaan’s (2003) framework of traditional and emerging middle powers, which contributed to a nuanced definition of middle powers from different parts of the world. I argue that Jordaan’s schema insufficiently identifies what middle powers actually *do* in relation to other states in the system. I therefore, use Holsti’s (1970) theory of national role conceptions and role performance to develop a typology of middle power roles and behaviour. By using the literature on roles and identity to develop a middle power analytical framework, this dissertation joins a growing body of literature examining the relationship between domestic and international influences of middle power diplomacy (see Choi 2009; Gecelovsky 2009; Kenkel 2010; Carr 2014; Black and Hornsby 2016). The typology of

middle power roles will be used in chapters three to seven to interpret South Africa's foreign policy and behaviour during its elected terms in the UNSC to determine the extent to which South Africa played the roles associated with middle powers in the Council.

## **2.2 Defining middle powers**

Keohane (1969: 296) defines a middle power as 'a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution'. This definition denotes a certain level of military and economic capacity as well as some organised form of cooperative foreign policy behaviour. Middle powers do not have the power capabilities to shape the international system single-handedly neither are they so weak as to be forced to merely accept the effects of the system on them. Despite Keohane's succinct definition, one of the peculiarities of the middle power literature is that there is 'no commonly accepted definition or method of definition of middle powers', beyond the general description of being in the middle of the power distribution of states. (Ping 2005: 3). The middle power literature can be divided into four broad theoretical categories: realist, liberal, critical and constructivist.

Realist scholars define middle powers according to measurable material capabilities and/or geographical position such as, gross national product (Wood 1987), population size (Holbraad 1984) and level of human development (Neack 1993). Middle power definitions based on quantifiable measures have been criticised for having little explanatory or predictive value because this 'swaps what we can count for what we want to know' and neglects the examination of power that enables scholars to explain why certain states behave in certain ways (Carr 2014: 73).

Liberal scholars define middle powers by their foreign policy behaviour. In a seminal text, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) focus on state agency to explain why middle powers behave in particular ways in the international system. These scholars reject material definitions of middle powers because they shed little light on the motivations and substance of middle power internationalism. Instead, they focus on middle power internationalism as *the style of*

behaviour middle powers adopt in international relations. This style of behaviour includes 'their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes and their tendency to embrace notions of "good international citizenship" to guide their diplomacy' (Cooper et al 1993: 19). Because of their limited material resources, the diplomacy of middle powers requires entrepreneurial flair and technical expertise. The behavioural definition is criticised for being tautological—a middle power is a middle power because it behaves like a middle power, and any state that behaves like a middle power is a middle power! (Ravenhill 1998; Ungerer 2003) Moreover, the liberal emphasis on agency precludes questions of power and structure from their analysis. Critical theorists provide an alternative definition that centres power and the position of powers in the global political economy.

Critical scholars such as Robert Cox (1989) adopted Gramsci's conception of hegemony to theorise the role of middle powers in the international system. Cox (1989: 825) defines a hegemonic order as one in which 'the rules and practices and ideologies... conform to the interests of the dominant power while having the appearance of a universal natural order of things which gives at least a certain measure of satisfaction and security to lesser powers'. It is in the interests of middle powers to support the stability of the hegemonic order because an orderly world environment governed by rules and norms limits the exercise of power by big states and enables smaller states to benefit from interdependence, such as international trade. Middle powers are therefore status quo powers that do not seek to challenge the legitimacy of the hegemon or revolutionary change in the world order.

Cox (1989: 828) argues that having middle-range material capabilities is a necessary though not sufficient condition to play the middle power role; it is 'not an adequate predictor' of having the disposition to act as a middle power in the world order. He identifies several domestic characteristics including relative independence from major powers, a degree of neutrality in major conflict, being committed to stable international relations and a willingness to facilitate changes in the system (Cox 1989). Cox's formulation emphasises the constitutive relationship between agency and structure in international relations, as the middle power role is shaped by both position in world order *and* the foreign policy orientation of a state. Therefore, the middle power role is not 'a fixed universal' but one that changes with the

international system and the ability of a state to fulfil the role in any given historical period (Cox 1989: 825). A state that performs the role of middle power in one epoch can play a different role in another. As will be seen in section 2.3 a variety of states have been defined as middle powers since 1945 because of the particular roles they played vis-à-vis the world order.

Constructivist approaches view ‘middlepowership’ as a deliberate identity selected and expounded by policy makers to signal the role their country plays in the world. Role theory that emerged from the foreign policy analysis of the 1970s is a useful way of understanding ‘middlepowership’ as a set of roles: patterned behaviours derived from both structural conditions and national role conceptions. In a seminal paper, K.J. Holsti (1970: 245-246) defined national role conceptions as:

The policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.

A state’s behaviour is informed by role conceptions and role prescriptions coming from the external environment including the structure of the system, international rules, norms and laws as well as multilateral and bilateral treaties. Holsti (1970) argues that when there is a conflict between role prescriptions and role conceptions, the latter trumps the former because states are sovereign entities that act primarily in terms of national interests. This is relevant for this study because of the apparent contradiction between South African policymakers’ national role conceptions and international expectations of how the Republic should behave in the UNSC.

This study adopts an eclectic approach that borrows from different IR theories. It is concerned with how South Africa in the UNSC used its power resources (realist), was influenced by the character of the governing ANC (liberal), is constrained by its position in world order (critical) and is formed by particular role conceptions and identities (constructivism and role theory). Eduard Jordaan’s (2003) framework of traditional and emerging middle powers is the other important component of the analytical approach used in

this study.

### 2.3 Traditional and emerging middle powers

Jordaan (2003) adopts a neo-Gramscian approach to distinguish between traditional and emerging middle powers according to their positions in the international system. In a useful departure from the ‘material versus behavioural’ definitional debate, Jordaan argues that the constitutive (material) characteristics of middle powers inform their foreign policy behaviour. Middle power internationalism is the pursuit of an activist foreign policy by interfering in issues beyond a state’s immediate sphere of influence; a preference for compromise solutions to international problems; and a preference for multilateral diplomacy. Middle powers are reluctant to challenge the global status quo either economically or politically’ and they value international law because it contributes to the stability and predictability of world order. Jordaan (2003) identifies six differences between traditional and emerging middle powers- democratic tradition; position in global economy; domestic distribution of wealth; regional position; regional orientation; and view on the international system. Jordaan’s typology of traditional and emerging middle powers is summarised in the table below:

Table 2: Jordaan’s traditional and emerging middle power typology

	Traditional Middle Powers	Emerging Middle Powers
<b>CONSTITUTIVE DIFFERENCES</b>		
Democratic Tradition	Stable liberal or social democracies	Relatively unstable, recently democratised
Position in world economy	Core	Semi-periphery
Domestic distribution of wealth	Highly equal	Highly unequal
Regional influence	Low	High
<b>BEHAVIOURAL DIFFERENCES</b>		
Regional Orientation	Low	High
View on international system	Appeasing and legitimising	Reforming and legitimising

Source: Jordaan (2003: 168)

Jordaan (2003) defines traditional middle powers as states with established, stable, liberal or social democracies, and industrialised economies. They lie at the core of the global economy and have high levels of domestic income equality. This makes them ‘legitimisers’ of the global political economy because they seek to maintain their relatively privileged position. They do not try to transform the system to make it equal, but they make a major effort at mitigating global economic inequality through development aid. Middle powers like Sweden and Norway are among the most generous foreign aid donors, in terms of gross national income (Myers 2016). Some scholars argue that this is an external extension of their generous domestic social welfare systems (Jordaan 2003). Through humanitarian interventions, these middle powers aim to appease less-privileged states and critics of global inequality. Jordaan (2003: 176) describes appeasement as ‘the pacification and containment of potential threats to world order’. Traditional middle powers are not the most powerful states in their immediate geographic neighbourhood. This makes them more inclined to influencing the broader international system than their own regions. According to Jordaan (2003: 172) ‘traditional middle powers appear rather ambivalent about regional integration and cooperation’ and pursue an international identity independent from the dominant state in their region.

Conversely, emerging middle powers are recently democratised and lie in the semi-periphery of the global economy. They are proponents of reforming the rules, norms, and structures of the global political economy to make it more inclusive. They seek to improve their position in the global economy relative to states in the core. However, they refrain from advocating fundamental change in the political economy because of their relatively privileged regional position that gives them ‘competitive advantage’ over their neighbours that usually lie at the periphery of the global economy. Emerging middle powers are regional powers that use their regional influence to legitimise their interests in matters of global concern. Jordaan (2003) characterises this position as reformist and legitimising of the international system. Because of their semi-peripheral position, emerging middle powers do not have the financial resources to be major aid donors like traditional middle powers. Furthermore, they are preoccupied with ameliorating the high socio-economic inequality that characterises their societies.

While they are rhetorically promoters of liberal values of democracy and human rights, the internationalism of emerging middle powers also has an anti-imperialist normative slant. This

comes from their position in the semi-periphery of the international system and their histories of colonial and imperial oppression. Jordaan (2003: 167) excludes several non-Western states from the middle power category because they 'deviate from hegemonic orthodoxy'. He excludes non-Western nuclear powers like China, India and Pakistan; states accused of sponsoring terrorism like Libya and Syria; so-called 'economic deviants' like China and Cuba; and states that do not prioritise spreading democracy in the world like Mexico and the majority of states in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia objectively fits the criteria of an emerging middle power but does not qualify as one because it refuses to participate in the UNSC and other international organisations and questions the legitimacy of the whole international system. The exclusion of India from Jordaan's list of middle powers is an exception in the 21<sup>st</sup> century literature because in spite of its nuclear status, India is considered to promote stability and the norms of the dominant world order (Efthapoulos 2011). Emerging middle powers display, what Du Bois (1994) called 'double consciousness': the condition of living a double life that comes from existing in two distinct social worlds. For Du Bois (1994) American blacks felt this sensation because of living in a society that devalued them and consequently needing to view themselves 'through the eyes of others'. Similarly, emerging middle powers in the contemporary world order try to reconcile their status as intermediate states with substantial power resources with their relatively weak position in the context of structural power.

While Jordaan (2003) portrays middle powers from the developing world as a post-Cold War phenomenon, Cooper (1997: 15-16) identifies three waves of what he calls 'new middle power' activism by developing countries in the international system. The first began in the 1950s and is associated with the rise of the NAM and prominent leaders of the organisation like India, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia. The second wave included Nigeria, Mexico, and Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s. Like the middle powers of the first wave, these states 'were critics rather than supporters of the norms and apparatus of the international system' (Cooper 1997: 15). However, they used a variety of diplomatic initiatives like North-South coalitions to achieve influence in certain niche areas. The Lagos Forum, convened by Nigeria in 1987, was referred to as the 'Concert of Medium Powers'. The third wave includes Malaysia and Argentina, which became integrally involved in international economic initiatives in the 1990s. A notable conclusion from Cooper's analysis is that middle power

behaviour is not a constant, but rather something that is adopted and discarded by countries as global and domestic conditions change. This is consistent with Cox's contention that the middle power role is not fixed but changes according to changes in world order.

Jordaan's framework has been criticised for making the middle power concept even more ambiguous by adding the qualifying adjectives of 'traditional' and 'emerging' (Burgess 2013). As Carr argues (2014: 75) 'if middle power status means different things for countries of different cultural or economic perspectives, then the term would be of little merit'. The latter criticism ignores the reality that there clearly are groups of states with from different parts of the world that tend to play similar roles in international relations, particularly in international organisations. Yet, those from the global South engage in particular behaviour (regional leadership and promoting reform of global governance) that requires interrogation to understand the shifting parameters of the contemporary world order. The middle power concept provides a useful common starting point to analyse their behaviour. That is why scholars continue to use the traditional/emerging typology both to explain the behaviour of specific states and for comparative purposes (Efsthathopoulos 2011; Balcer 2012; Hornsby and van Heerden 2013; Black and Hornsby 2016).

#### **2.4 Middle power role typology**

From the literature discussed above, I define middle powers as *middle-sized states that play particular roles to stabilise and legitimise the extant world order*. Middle powers are essentially status-quo powers whose aim is to ensure the sustainability and stability of the international system and create a predictable context for the pursuit of their national interests. I identify eight middle power roles. Four roles are generally applicable to both traditional and emerging middle powers: *policy entrepreneur*; *diplomatic broker*; *multilateral manager*, and *mediator*. Two of the roles, *good international citizen* and *example*, are particularly associated with traditional middle powers. The final two roles are *regional leader* and *champion of the South*, both associated with emerging middle powers. The traditional middle power roles are consistent with these powers' position at the core of structural power and their interest in promoting liberal norms and values. The emerging middle power roles are consistent with states that lie on the semi-periphery of the international system and so have a



more ambivalent relationship with structural power. Emerging middle powers have relatively substantial capabilities but are constrained by the challenges they face as developing countries with highly unequal societies and high poverty levels. This leads them to challenge the status quo of structural power through regional leadership and championing the cause of the developing world.

Distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers allows us to provide a nuanced explanation of South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC. South Africa was criticised for not behaving in a way associated with traditional middle powers by challenging the structure of power in the UNSC, promoting African solutions for the African conflicts on the agenda and defending the sovereignty of global South states over other considerations like human rights (Van Nieuwkerk 2007; Bischoff 2009; Jordaan 2010). Separating the characteristics and behaviours of different kinds of middle powers enables us to identify traditional and emerging middle powers by observing their actual foreign policy behaviour. This opens the possibility that states may reflect characteristics of both kinds of middle power at different times depending on the issue. Indeed, chapters four to seven of this study will demonstrate that South Africa played different middle power roles on different issues in the UNSC. In the first term it tended towards behaviour associated with emerging middle powers, while in the second term it tried to behave more consistently with traditional middle powers.

#### 2.4.1 General middle power roles

Middle powers are closely associated with multilateral diplomacy. Cox (1992: 161) defines multilateralism as 'relationships among more than two states with respect to some specific issue or set of issues'. Ruggie (1992: 568) expands the definition to become an *institutional form* that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct. Middle powers do not have sufficient power to act individually to achieve their interests, so they use international organisation (through formal institutions and coalitions of likeminded allies) to combine resources with other states to achieve their goals. Rules-based multilateralism also provides the protection middle powers require to defend themselves from the aggression of great powers. International institutions provide middle powers with bargaining power that they may otherwise lack.

As Cooper (2000: 4) explains, multilateral diplomacy enhances the ‘voice opportunities’ that enable middle powers to exercise influence in the international system. Middle powers tend to act as catalysts to initiate coalitions around particular issues, facilitators in setting agendas and organising meetings and managers by ensuring the day-to-day running of coalitions, whether within formal international organisations or not (Cooper et al 1993). These roles are associated with the functional notion of middle power diplomacy that emphasises the different functions they perform in international organisations. Cooper (1997: 9) describes these roles as forming ‘a specific pattern of statecraft’ displayed by middle powers. I have synthesised Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s roles with other ideas from the literature to develop three general middle power roles *policy entrepreneur*, *diplomatic broker* and *multilateral manager* and *mediator*. The role conceptions associated with middle power multilateral diplomacy are discussed below.

### *Policy entrepreneur*

This role conception involves launching diplomatic initiatives, initiating and drafting policy, taking the lead in finding solutions for specific problems, and using technical expertise and/or diplomatic skill to start diplomatic processes. It includes playing an active role in advocating new international rules and norms. In the post-Cold War world, the sources of leadership are more diffuse and include ‘soft power’, which has become as important as material power (Nye 1990). Middle powers are able to deploy their diplomatic skills to act beyond their material capabilities to lead in the development and execution of global policy, particularly within international institutions.

Burges (2013: 293) describes how middle powers are renowned for arriving at bilateral and multilateral negotiations with ‘with tiered negotiating positions and prepared alternate texts for a host of contingencies... providing the consensus-generating or conflict defusing alternate proposals necessary to continue building and strengthening the rules-based multilateral system’. This was seen in the active role middle powers played in establishing the G20 as an alternative international financial forum in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Canada played an entrepreneurial role in developing the idea of the G20 as a meeting of finance ministers in 1998 after the East Asian Financial crisis (Cooper 2013). When the meeting transformed into a heads of state summit, Canada and self-identified middle power South Korea used their technical leadership to formalise the instruments and

operations of the forum. For both countries the G20 provided a diplomatic niche to initiate and lead innovation in solving international problems.

Niche diplomacy refers to the concentration of energies and resources on a specific issue in international politics. Middle powers tend to engage in niche diplomacy because they have limited resources that prevent them from taking an interest in every aspect of international relations. They select diplomatic issues in which they can take the lead and exert their influence. This often happens based on specialised knowledge or technical competence in an area. Cooper (1997) differentiates between the types of niche diplomacy adopted by middle powers in terms of scope and style. In terms of scope, some middle powers focus on building niches in a small number of high-stakes issues, while others direct their niche-building activities over a broad spectrum of issues to spread their influence. Concerning style, some middle powers adopt ‘a heroic style, with an attendant degree of public diplomacy and risk-taking’, while others practise a quieter, more routine diplomacy based on consensus and institution building (Cooper 1997: 10).

Policy entrepreneurship requires resources like a skilled diplomatic corps with advanced technical ability, communications expertise, and analytical capabilities. As will be seen in chapter three one of the challenges South Africa faced after 1994 was developing its diplomatic service to be able to play an influential role in international affairs. The elected terms in the UNSC were a significant test of how far Pretoria had developed its diplomatic resources.

#### *Diplomatic broker*

This involves setting the agenda in specific diplomatic issues, building coalitions of support as well as planning and convening meetings. States playing this role build consensus from different opinions using skilful communications with state and non-state actors. They are actively involved in forging agreements and arranging follow-up processes to ensure the fulfilment of a particular initiative. Multilateralism is often related to ‘coalition-building’ with like-minded states pooling resources to assert their interests on the international stage (Cooper 1997). Because of their limited material resources and relative size, middle powers usually cannot afford to keep diplomatic missions across the world or take active involvement in every international issue (Higgott 1997). Therefore, coalitions with other

states or civil society organisations are a valuable diplomatic tool in the middle power arsenal. Cooper et al (1993: 118) stress that ‘multilateralism and coalition-building can only work if there are more states willing [to] agree to join coalitions as followers than there are states seeking to play a leadership role’. A classic example of coalition building is the Cairns Group, established by Australia and Canada during the Doha round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations (Higgott and Cooper 1990). This North-South coalition of agricultural states played a balancing role against American and European agricultural interests.

Acting as a bridge between different groups of states is a classic middle power role. According to Lee et al (2015: 4), bridge building entails being a ‘link between a great power and a small power, playing the role of mediator when the two sides are at odds and of a channel for communication when there is a breakdown in dialogue’. Traditional middle powers played this role by facilitating discussion between developed and developing countries to ameliorate the North-South economic divide (Pratt 1990). The bridge facilitates confidence-building measures between opposing sides and engages in ‘brokerage diplomacy’ to bring parties together. This role is particularly important in the context of increasing interdependence among states and non-state actors in which confidence and trust are ever-important for addressing the multiple manifestations of conflict and insecurity on the planet like global terrorism, climate change and the contagion of global financial instability. South Africa and Turkey have been considered bridges because of their geographical position at ‘the centre’ of the world; their history of having a foot in the West/North and East/South as well as having developed and developing world characteristics. South Korea considers itself a bridge between the US and Asia as well as between the developed and developing world.

A growing trend is for middle powers to form coalitions with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other non-state actors to achieve international goals (Jordaan 2003; Behringer 2004; Bolton and Nash 2010). As Behringer (2004: 4) explains, ‘the coalition then uses the “soft power” of persuasion, through both state-led diplomacy and NGO-led advocacy to convince as many holdout states as possible’ to accept the given proposal. However, as Hurrell (2000) presciently argued coalition politics are more complicated in the contemporary world order because of the fluidity in North-South divides, regional dynamics

and the wide range of issues on the global agenda. Consequently, ‘a natural ally on agricultural trade may take a very different line on biosafety and trade in genetically-modified products’ (Hurrell 2000: 5). States are diversifying their range of coalition partners and forming issue-based networks to negotiate an increasingly complex world order. Countries with good networks have ‘more information, communication tools and human networks, so (they) can convene or put together winning coalitions more easily’ (Cooper and Mo 2013: 10). Networks strengthen the soft power resources to persuade others. Middle powers have used such cooperation to great effect in the security realm on issues such as banning landmines, cluster munitions, and developing norms on child soldiers in conflict (Bolton and Nash 2010).

While South Africa has worked closely with NGOs on certain international issues, during the UNSC terms Pretoria had strained relations with NGOs, especially those concerned with human rights. Domestic and international NGOs were among the most strident critics of South Africa’s behaviour in the UNSC illustrating some of the shortfalls of not forming coalitions with increasingly influential non-state actors.

### *Multilateral manager*

The role conception of manager implies both leadership and day-to-day management of institutions of the international system. This includes leadership roles in international organisations and promoting and enforcing specific international regimes. It can involve establishing specific regulatory international institutions and deploying technical expertise to lead problem solving in particular issues. This role requires a commitment to maintaining the rules and laws of the international system. Henrikson (1997: 46) argues that multilateral institutions display middle power’s managerial role, which he defines as ‘the practical ability to give direction and effect to international undertakings, especially in institutional settings’. Institutions provide middle powers with bargaining power that they may otherwise lack and taking leadership positions in these institutions such as the presidency of UNGA provides middle power’s actions with systemic authority.

This understanding of the importance of institutions to their diplomacy is the reason middle powers like Australia, Canada and Brazil sought to be given special status in the Charter of the UN (Glazebrook 1947). In lieu of such recognition, they performed functional roles in the

organisation, like peacekeeping or *good offices* in times of conflict, to secure their global position. While generally supportive of middle powers being given Charter recognition, Henrikson (1997: 55) acknowledges the reality that some middle power diplomacy is mere status seeking and that ‘often middle powers are not reliable. Sometimes, they simply want to be there’.

The managerial roles South Africa played during its tenure in the UNSC are under examined in the literature. Parts two and three of this dissertation will discuss South Africa’s managerial behaviour as the lead country on Timor-Leste, organising UNSC visits to Africa and sitting on Council committees.

### *Mediator*

One of the roles associated with middle powers is that of mediator. As Cooper (1997: 8) puts it ‘in certain circumstances, the role adopted by middle powers encompassed mediatory activity between two antagonistic Cold War blocs’. (Cooper 1997: 8) In the post-Cold War era middle powers have played this mediation function by participating in international peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and acting as a bridge between industrialised and developing states in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), UN and WTO.

Henrikson (1997) sketches the history of middle power diplomacy to show that its focus was on mediation, especially reducing tensions between the opposing Cold War blocs in the period between the late 1940s and early 1960s. By engaging in conflict resolution, making connections between different groups and using technical capabilities to manage international relations multilaterally, middle powers sought to ensure stability and avoid another world war. As followers of the US hegemon during the Cold War, traditional Western middle powers tended to follow Washington’s lead in security issues, making their contribution through mediation and peace-keeping (Cooper et al 1993).

In security studies, the middle power concept is associated with the evolution and development of peacekeeping. In that historical context, middle powers were those states that were far enough removed from the power politics of the superpowers to play the role of peacekeepers by contributing troops to UN peace missions and playing the role of mediators in conflicts. A classic example of this is the role played by Canada to resolve the Suez Crisis

in 1956. The number of peace enforcement activities, in which the UNSC authorises the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in terms of Chapter VII, has increased markedly since the 1990s. This has become a source of tension between the global North and South. The difference of opinion on international intervention is one of the major issues of contention between the global North and South as will be discussed in the chapters on South Africa's tenure in the UNSC.

#### 2.4.2 Traditional middle power roles

One of the important differences between traditional and emerging middle powers in Jordaan's typology is their political systems and societal values. Traditional middle powers have established democracies and societies defined by high levels of equality and social trust. These societies have become models of liberal enlightenment values of human rights, democracy, and equality. Realists would argue that while the US, as the hegemon, claims the same liberal values the responsibilities of its power position prevent it from shaping its foreign policy on these values. Conversely, traditional middle powers can project an international image of good citizenship and exemplary behaviour.

##### *Good international citizen*

These states champion the liberal political values of democracy and universal human rights. They advocate adherence to international law and common rules of conduct for all states. They aim to be responsible world citizens by fulfilling all their expected duties, meeting all their financial commitments, and contributing their share of personnel and material resources to maintain global peace and security. They engage actively in humanitarian interventions and are often generous donors of development aid. Their concern in global issues extends beyond their immediate region or issues of direct national interest to the wellbeing of all of humanity. Normative definitions of middle powers from the period immediately after World War II claim that middle powers behave altruistically in international affairs or are morally superior to other states; verging 'on angelic perfection' (Cooper 1997: 7). Australian diplomat Gareth Evans coined the term 'good international citizens' to describe this angelic nature.

Graham (2008: 88) defines a good international citizen as a 'a state that is willing to place international society's welfare ahead of the incessant pursuit of its national interest'. As

discussed earlier middle powers have an interest in promoting stability in world order, ensuring universal adherence to international law, honouring international commitments, and conducting their diplomacy through international institutions. These behaviours serve the common good by strengthening international norms and organisations. Another way of seeing good international citizenship is as analogous to good domestic citizenship: abiding by the laws governing the society, consistently paying taxes and other duties, not associating with criminals or social deviants, and participating constructively in social structures (Jordaan 2010). Being a good citizen entails abiding by the norms and rules associated with one's position in society. Norm entrepreneurship and norm promotion are important aspects of good international citizenship. A norm can be defined as 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). These behavioural rules inform the way states engage with each other on the international stage.

The idea of good international citizenship is criticised for obscuring the reality that middle powers, like all states, are motivated by their national interests. Cooper et al (1993) view middle power diplomacy as based on a kind of 'enlightened self-interest' in which acting to solve international problems ultimately served the interest of middle powers in maintaining a peaceful, orderly and stable world order. Gareth Evans (quoted in Carr 2012: 52) acknowledges that middle power diplomacy 'is ultimately no less self-interested than any other kind', however its methods of cooperation, coalition-building and mediation can be applied to a wide range of issues and serve the interests of 'not just a few, but many, nations'. Such cooperative diplomacy also limits the extent to which the major powers can exert their dominance and impose their will on the rest. Middle powers do not have the authority or power to forcibly get their way so they behave well, cooperate, and negotiate to achieve their goals and meet their needs.

Some scholars have argued that the meaning of good international citizenship is not fixed but depends on the cultural context. Solomon (1998: 3) is dismissive of the good international citizenship associated with middle powers because the 'judgemental criteria... are value-based and are specific to certain cultures'. These 'certain cultures' are invariably Western. Indeed, in 1989 Evans (quoted in Carr 2012: 52-53) described Australian good international citizenship as 'an extension into our foreign relations of the basic values of the Australian



community, values at the core of our sense of self and which a democratic community expects its government to pursue'. Hurrell (2013) argues that emerging middle powers have challenged the dominance of Western liberalism in international affairs because:

... the West alone represented rationality, progress and universal history. It was in relation to the non-European world that differentiation and hierarchy were clearest. Hence the widely-held belief in the concept of civilisation and in a hierarchy of races...

Since the end of the Second World War, non-Western countries have been engaged in a battle against the inequality of the Western dominated world order and the unequal power relations it produces. For non-Western powers, being a good international citizen entails speaking truth to power and trying to moderate the power of the US. This was evident in South Africa's first term in the UNSC in many of the statements made by Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo about the Republic's self-defined duty to promote strict adherence to the UN Charter and prevent abuse of the UNSC in the service of US national interests.

#### *Example*

Closely linked to good international citizenship is the idea of being an example of ideal behaviour on the international stage. Because of their limited resources, middle powers use soft power to influence the world. Soft power is 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies' (Nye 2004: x). Middle powers can use their ideational resources and diplomatic skill to attract other states to adopt their point of view. The ideational power that comes from being a policy exemplar has been used by middle powers to advance their policy preferences in the international system (Beeson 2011). As will be discussed in chapter three, South Africa's relatively peaceful democratic transition has enabled it to be an example of successful conflict resolution and democratisation.

### 2.3.3 Emerging middle power roles

Emerging middle powers are countries from the global South with relatively new or weak democracies and unequal societies. The political systems of these countries are made weak by the high levels of inequality and some kind of politicised social cleavage like race or religion. This makes their stability and their influence in the international system precarious because

they are always a crisis away from being a minor power. The most important distinction of emerging middle powers is that they are also regional powers, whose global influence is based on their regional significance. Because of their place in the semi-periphery of international political economy, emerging middle powers have an interest in promoting the interests of the global South in international relations.

### *Regional leader*

Emerging middle powers are primarily leaders in their regions, and secondly middle powers in the global political system. As Schoeman explains (2000: 47), without the word ‘emerging’ preceding it, the concept of middle power ‘does not necessarily have a geographical connotation, or one referring to a level of development’. Conversely, emerging middle powers have a regional role and are developing countries. Emerging middle powers are powerful in their own regions and take on the responsibilities of a great power within the region, such as regional security and the maintenance of order, and the provision of public goods. Nolte (2010) uses the concepts of regional power and emerging middle power interchangeably, arguing that the choice of which term to use is dependent whether the analysis is about regional or global phenomena. This thesis adopts a similar approach, which is why it seeks to determine whether South Africa behaved as a *middle power* in the UNSC, a global multilateral institution.

Schoeman (2000: 48) provides an articulation of the interplay between the regional and global roles of emerging middle powers that is worth quoting in full:

Emerging middle powers seem to play or are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers and police; they have the responsibility for keeping their backyard neat and orderly with a measure of support from the big powers. These powers, at the regional level, seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and norms in terms of which international politics and relations are conducted. A broader role is also expected in their ‘moral position’ or status. Sometimes they are called upon to exert an influence in specific cases where big power influence does not seem to be sufficient to find solutions to problems.

As is evident from this description the ‘emerging middle power’ appears to be more of a role expectation imposed on certain developing countries by the US and other major powers, than

it is a role conception adopted by policy makers based on their particular social, historical and political context. In the absence of the centralising force of colonialism or Cold War bipolar alignment, regional powers stabilise the hegemonic order and enforce acceptable rules of international conduct within their regions. The emerging middle power role is similar to the notion of 'pivotal states' in US Cold War literature where a pivotal state is defined as a country with such great regional importance that its prosperity bolsters the whole region, while its collapse would generate chaos across its borders. Schoeman (2000: 49-50) identifies three conditions that must be met for an emerging power to fulfil its role as a pivotal state. 1. Its domestic political, social, and economic dynamics must be conducive to it playing the role of stabiliser and leader in the region. 2. It should be willing and able to assume such a role. 3. The leadership role should be acceptable to its neighbours in the region. In essence, then, emerging middle powers are major powers writ small.

The condition that regional powers' leadership role be acceptable in the region has been a challenge for countries like Brazil, South Africa and Turkey who struggle to gain acceptance as a leader from putative secondary powers in their regions (Habib 2009, Malamud 2011). Emerging middle powers tend to enjoy greater recognition of their status on the international stage than in their neighbourhoods. They are often more convincing as regional leaders in international forums like the WTO, UN, and the G20 than in regional forums where the neighbourhood geopolitical dynamics are strongest and they face greater challenges to their leadership (Malamud 2011).

A consequence of the difficulties emerging middle powers face in exerting regional leadership is the phenomenon of South-South cooperation in the form of emerging power club diplomacy. An example of this is IBSA, in which India, Brazil, and South Africa banded together as like-minded states with similar political and economic profiles and similar interests on the international stage. When IBSA was formed in 2006, all three countries found it easier to cooperate with each other across great geographic distance than with their immediate neighbours. Flemes (2007) explains how these states are lobbying for a stronger role for developing countries in global governance, while trying to manage complex regional relations and pursue domestic political and economic development. As Nel and Taylor (2013) convincingly argue, the foreign economic policies of the IBSA states intentionally or

unintentionally undermine the development of their regional neighbours, raising doubts about their ideals of South-South cooperation. As will be discussed in chapters six and seven all three IBSA countries served in the UNSC in 2011, which serves as a useful illustration of how these powers behave together in the global arena.

### *Champion of the South*

One of the characteristic features of emerging middle powers is their criticism of the post Second World War international system, particularly the power distribution within the primary institutions of global governance like the UN and the BWI. These states use multilateral institutions to challenge aspects of the global power distribution and to assert the interests of the developing world. This includes voting as a bloc in the United Nations, through NAM and the G77, and taking common positions in international trade and climate change negotiations.

Jordaan (2003: 174) cautions that emerging middle powers have an interest in maintaining the aspects of the global political economy that endow them with privilege compared to their immediate neighbouring states that lie in the periphery. Emerging middle powers do not want revolution. They seek merely reform of the most exploitative and exclusionary aspects of the international system to improve the welfare and competitiveness of the global South. Sometimes emerging middle powers will adopt more radical positions towards global governance to appeal to developing states on the periphery of the global economy. Because they do not have the resources to provide humanitarian and development assistance at the same scale as traditional middle powers, emerging powers tend to attempt 'heroic' international interventions to retain support from smaller states. An example of this is South Africa's mediation attempts in other African countries like Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi or Brazil's mediation and development efforts in Haiti (Jordaan 2003, Moore 2011).

Middle power scholars have criticised emerging middle powers like Brazil, India and South Africa for being 'more concerned about global power politics' and using their regional groupings to increase their status relative to major powers (Choi 2009: 57). Putative emerging middle powers like the IBSA countries have great power ambitions and are not content with remaining where they are in the global distribution of power. Since their inclusion in BRICS,

Brazil, India and to a lesser extent South Africa are seen as 'rising powers' using multilateral institutions to enhance their status (Cooper 2013: 964).

Cooper and Mo (2013: 11) argue that 'when a country pursues middle power leadership, it must temper its status-aspirations' because the system-stabilising, supportive, bridging role they play requires them to be able to be both leaders and followers. The new dynamic described by Cooper and Mo recall Cox's (1989: 825) prescient caution that the middle power role should not be viewed as 'a fixed universal' but as 'something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system'. Subsequent chapters will assess South Africa's ambiguous role in the international system. It has been included in the list of rising powers (i.e. BRICS) but it does not fit comfortably because of its relatively weak material capabilities and small population size. Perhaps the tension between aspiring to great power status but being limited to middle power behaviour by its capabilities is one of the explanations for South Africa's behaviour during its UNSC terms?

The criticism of status-seeking emerging middle powers is unreasonable if one takes a full reading of global history. Western middle powers *can* unquestioningly accept the system because they lie at its core and have been included in the management of the post Second World War world order since the beginning. Countries like Brazil (which was considered for a permanent UNSC seat before the San Francisco negotiations) and India (which was still a British colony in 1945) were 'left out' of the core of the global political economy shaped by the US after the war. As Hart and Jones (2010: 67) argue 'unlike Canada, Japan or many European countries, the rising powers were never fully integrated into the post-1945 order. Being on the outside looking in has heavily conditioned their strategic interests and conceptions of national purpose'. South Africa is slightly different to Brazil and India because Jan Smuts was actively involved in the negotiations on the post-war order but saw his (and by extension South Africa's) participation as being a part of the British Empire, not as an independent state.

When it took power in 1994 the ANC, socialised by the anticolonial struggle in the UN and involvement in NAM, identified with Africa and the developed world and sought to use its

moral weight from the negotiated settlement to Apartheid to increase the influence of the developing world in international politics. Nel (2010: 951) describes this as ‘the struggle for recognition of developing countries’ as full citizens and equal partners in international society. This ‘struggle for recognition’ was evident in South Africa’s statements and actions during its tenure in the UNSC.

## 2.5 Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, the table below summarises the traditional and emerging middle power roles and behaviour that will be used to analyse South Africa's decisions and actions during its two terms in the UN Security Council:

**Table 3: Typology of middle power role conception and performance**

<b>National Role Conception</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>
<b>GENERAL MIDDLE POWER</b>		
<b>Policy entrepreneur</b>	International problems can be solved through diplomatic skill and specialist knowledge	Launch diplomatic initiatives and develop policy responses to global problems
<b>Diplomatic broker</b>	Facilitate cooperation with like-minded states to solve international problems	Set agenda, plan and convene meetings and facilitate negotiations between parties
<b>Manager</b>	Ensure efficient operation of international organisations and international regimes	Manage day to day operation of the international system
<b>Mediator</b>	Lead in making and enforcing peace across the world	Contribute resources to peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building initiatives and participate in conflict resolution
<b>TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWER</b>		

<b>Good international citizen</b>	Collective wellbeing of international society is as important as national interest	Adhere to international law, fulfil international duties and promote democracy and human rights
<b>Example</b>	Use soft power to attract other states to own point of view and use own experience to inform international decisions	Make material and ideational choices in own interest but also in broader global interest Demonstrate the value of following international norms
<b>EMERGING MIDDLE POWER</b>		
<b>Champion of the South</b>	Be a vanguard in giving voice to the needs of the weak and poor in the international system	Promote reform of global governance and place concerns of developing world at the centre of foreign policy
<b>Regional leader</b>	Take responsibility for regional governance and security	Initiate regional integration and cooperation and lead regional peace and security initiatives

While the literature on middle powers has been mired in debates on theoretical minutiae, the concept itself is still useful for explaining the behaviour of middle-sized states in the international system. The Coxian view of middle powers as stabilisers of the international system provides a good starting point to discern the patterns that can be categorised as middle power behaviour. States from disparate cultural, historical and economic backgrounds have played similar roles to stabilise world order, mitigate conflict and promote good neighbourliness. Jordaan's (2003) distinction of traditional and emerging middle powers allows for one to make sense of the variations in behaviour of middle powers from the global North and South. This is significant because waning US hegemony has opened up new opportunities for middle-sized states to influence international affairs.

The middle power concept is tied to notions of state identity. Constructivist scholars argue that identities are important because they generate national interest (Wendt 1999; Hopf 2002). In other words, who you are determines what you want. Holsti's (1970) framework of national role conceptions and role performance provides language to think about identities in

the social context of international affairs. The roles states play are determined by policymakers' national role conceptions, influenced by ideology, society and history, as well as external role perceptions. States can have multiple role conceptions that they deploy in different contexts. The discussion of identities and roles is significant for this study because South Africa underwent a major identity change with the end of apartheid. The efforts of the ANC government to construct an international identity and roles for the Republic will be discussed in chapter three.

Multilateral diplomacy is an important avenue for middle powers to act on the international arena because they can combine their resources with similar states to achieve their goals. International organisations provide the ideal setting for middle power diplomacy because these states can exercise their relative technical and diplomatic skill to initiate international policies, facilitate agreements and manage day-to-day international affairs. As semi-peripheral states, emerging middle powers use international organisations to project their regional power and interests on the global stage.

This chapter developed a definition of middle powers using Holsti's language of national role conceptions and role prescriptions. In the middle power definition used in this thesis, *middle-sized states that play particular roles to stabilise and legitimise the extant world order*, middle power is a meta-role composed of a set of smaller roles and behaviours. The concept of roles allows one to examine middle power behaviour as a function of both individual and social factors. The middle power roles in the analytical framework offer a valuable set of indicators to categorise state behaviour.

The next chapter applies the framework of middle power roles to South African foreign policy from its democratisation in 1994 to the end of its second term in the UNSC in 2012. This a necessary background in understanding the role post-apartheid South Africa set out to carve for itself in the international system, the notable features of its foreign policy, and the successes and failures of this foreign policy. This discussion provides the context for the subsequent analysis of South Africa's behaviour in its two terms in the UNSC.



## CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1994

### 3.1 Introduction

South Africa has frequently been characterised as a middle power since 1994. This chapter examines South Africa's foreign policy statements and actions between 1994 and 2012 using the middle power role typology developed in chapter two. This will be done by identifying whether recurring foreign policy themes and particular behaviours fit into the middle power national role conceptions and behaviours in the typology. The Republic's policy makers do not explicitly identify it as a middle power. Indeed, I have only been able to find three official references to South Africa as a middle power from a sitting president or minister.

In the reply to the budget vote in 2009, Deputy Minister of International Relations Ebrahim Ebrahim (2009) stated that 'as a middle power we also recognise the limits of our ability to reverse human rights abuses globally, but that does not absolve us from standing on principle'. He referred to South Africa as a middle power again in 2012 when speaking on South Africa's role in conflict resolution in Africa. He argued that 'cognisant of our influence as a middle power, South Africa has played to its strengths within the international system in order to promote the African agenda' (Ebrahim 2012a). The first formulation recognises middlepowership as a function of occupying a particular place in the global distribution of power with attendant constraints and responsibilities. The second ties South Africa's place in the global hierarchy of power to its duty to promote Africa's interests. This is consistent with Nolte (2010) and Schoeman's (2000) contentions that emerging middle powers play dual roles as regional powers and middle powers.

In a speech given at the University of Pretoria, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (2012) cited Adam Balcer's (2012: 4) characterisation of South Africa as a middle power: 'the biggest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, high national income for African standards, and considerable deposits of raw materials'. Nkoana-Mashabane (2012) added what differentiated South Africa from other middle powers was 'the context within which our foreign policy is framed – we are part of Africa with its mixed fortunes; and a country that not long ago was subjected to the apartheid system and treated as an outcast by the international community'. This statement reveals a

slight discomfort with middle power status, defined in material terms. Indeed, Balcer's definition of middle powers confuses middle power status with being a middle-income country. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane takes a broader view by emphasising South Africa's status as an outsider in international society and its identification with the periphery, specifically Africa. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the tensions between middle powers of the global North and South is that the former were included in the core of the post-war global political economy, while the latter were excluded. In the South African case, being an international pariah under apartheid compounded this exclusion. As will be seen in the rest of this chapter the baggage South Africa carries about its history, its identity and its place in the world informs the roles it plays on the regional and global stage.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the foundations of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy using Nelson Mandela's 1993 article, 'South Africa's future foreign policy', as its basis. It then turns to an historical and ideological exploration of the various kinds of internationalism that have shaped the ANC since its formation in 1912. This interrogation of the ANC's international thinking is important because the party (its leaders and officials) has been the primary driver of South African foreign policy since 1994. The chapter then uses official statements of foreign policy, ANC foreign policy discussion documents, speeches by presidents and ministers as well as the literature on South African foreign policy to determine the extent to which South Africa played the middle power roles identified. The chapter thus provides the contextual policy background for the case study of South Africa's tenure in the UNSC.

### **3.2 Foundations of South African foreign policy: Mandela's foreign policy manifesto**

In 1993, a few months before South Africa's first democratic elections, the influential *Foreign Affairs* journal published an article by Nelson Mandela entitled 'South Africa's Future Foreign Policy'. This article is widely viewed as the foreign policy manifesto of the ANC government and the blueprint for democratic South Africa's foreign policy. Academics and international observers have latched onto it as the beacon of the country's foreign policy despite the inevitable changes in emphasis and priority since it was written.

The article was published in a preeminent international journal that would be read by Western policy and business elites at a time when the ANC was trying to reassure the international community that it was indeed 'ready to govern' (ANC 1992) and transform South Africa into a 'responsible international citizen' (Mandela 1993: 86-7). As a result, the focus of the article is primarily on economic and trade issues revealing the ANC's acceptance of global capitalism and its abandonment of its decades-long commitment to socialism. The tension of living up to international expectations, while meeting domestic needs is reflected in the cautious approach of the article that seeks to appease all possible constituencies resulting in what Hamill and Lee (2001: 39) describe as a 'rather bland essay'. Nevertheless, the principles set out in the article, as well as its articulation of the challenges faced by South Africa at home and abroad remain a valuable starting point for understanding the Republic's foreign policy.

Mandela begins by situating himself as a citizen of South Africa, southern Africa, and Africa in the context of a changing world order. This establishes not only his identity as an African, but also South Africa's primary identification with the continent. He states that the intention of an ANC government's foreign policy is to turn South Africa into a 'peaceful and prosperous country' (Mandela 1993: 86). Among the challenges the country faces is to transcend apartheid and build a single, united nation out of its diverse population. Notably one of the first tasks Mandela (1993: 87) identifies for the incoming government is to develop 'a truly professional diplomatic service which will serve all of South Africa's peoples and represent their rich diversity'. Emphasising the importance of a skilled diplomatic service indicates that the ANC intended to play an active international role and to leverage its international activity to achieve its national interests. This is significant for this study's aim because middle powers are recognised by their professional diplomatic service and highly skilled representatives. We can then deduce that Mandela's vision for South Africa's diplomatic service is consistent with one of the characteristics of middle powers.

Mandela (1993: 87) sets out six beliefs that will be the pillars of democratic South Africa's foreign policy and that will distinguish it from the way 'apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations':

- The centrality of human rights in international relations and the recognition that rights extend into the political, economic, social and environmental spheres;
- The promotion of democracy is the route to just and lasting solutions to the problems facing humanity;
- Justice and respect for international law should guide international relations;
- All nations should strive for peace and conflict should be resolved through internationally agreed, non-violent mechanisms including arms-control;
- South Africa's foreign policy should reflect the interests of Africa;
- Economic development is achieved through international and regional cooperation in an interdependent world.

Carlsnaes and Nel (2006: 17) argue that these principles have informed and continue to inform South Africa's post-Apartheid foreign policy. Indeed, the first Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo described them as constituting

The broad aspirational tenets of our approach to foreign policy, and, if consistently adhered to, will render our foreign policy predictable and in line with our perception of the kind of nation we seek to be, and the kind of world we wish to live in (DFA 1996: 20).

Despite the development and growing complexities of the policy, the Mandela principles form the backbone of the country's international relations. This view is supported by an examination of the DFA/DIRCO strategic plans that set out the South Africa's strategy for its international engagement for the coming three years. Each strategic plan since the first in 2003 sets out the Mandela principles as the foundation of South African foreign policy. This is not to argue that South Africa's foreign policy is consistent or coherent, but 'it displays an underlying cognitive normative cohesion whose essence is captured by the principles' (Carlsnaes and Nel 2006: 18). Moreover, any inconsistencies and contradictions evident in the country's actual foreign policy reflect the tensions present in the 1993 principles from the outset. For example, placing human rights at the centre of South African foreign policy has often clashed with the belief that Africa's interests should shape the country's behaviour. The decision to continue the production and sale of arms on the open market as part of economic development appears inconsistent with the belief in promoting pacific resolution of conflict

and arms control.

Peter Vale (1997) contemplated whether democratic South Africa would be a middle power. He set up an image of post-Apartheid foreign policy making as a battle between ‘upstairs and downstairs’ foreign policy structures with upstairs being Apartheid foreign affairs department and downstairs being the new ANC government officials whose diplomatic formation came from the international anti-apartheid struggle. Vale (1997) argued that how the opposing histories of global engagement and opposing worldviews of these groups would be managed would be the determining factor for the kind of role SA will play. Specifically, the extent to which the downstairs was constrained by the traditions of the upstairs and the extent to which the new government could see the world differently from the old would determine the success of SA foreign policy. It could be argued that the ‘contradictions and inconsistencies’ (Nathan 2005) evident in South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 are related to the clash between ‘upstairs and downstairs’ traditions of seeing the world. Perhaps Pretoria’s anti-imperialist posturing in the UNSC, thirteen years after the ANC took power, was the belated assertion of the downstairs after years of accommodating the upstairs view of the world.

A discussion of the ANC’s international thinking can explain the reason for global governance reform’s high position in the party’s rhetoric. It is to this discussion we now turn.

### **3.3 The ANC’s internationalism**

Evans (1999: 623) identifies three waves of internationalism in ANC politics: liberal internationalist (1912 to 1960), socialist (1960-1993), and pragmatist (1993 to the present). These waves of internationalism informed the foreign policy orientation of the ANC’s ‘broad church’ after 1994. Each kind of internationalism implies particular norms that still shape South African foreign policy. These include anti-imperialism, democracy in its liberal and socialist manifestations, civil and socioeconomic human rights, and growth-oriented economic policy.

Since it was founded in 1912, the ANC has had a strong internationalism as part of its programme for national liberation in South Africa. Evans (1999) argues that in the first five

decades of its existence the ANC promoted a liberal internationalism committed to the civilising norms of the British Empire and was oriented towards being recognised by British elites as loyal Imperial subjects. In the early years, the ANC used petitions and deputations to Britain to advocate for the rights of educated black Africans in the Union. Evans' characterisation ignores the strong anti-imperial and Pan-Africanist slant of the ANC's early internationalism. As Z.K. Matthews (1983: 62) recalled the primary response of Africans to the liberal internationalism of President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War was to call for recognition as citizens and to call for an end to racial oppression:

When President Wilson published his 14 Points, the phrase 'self-determination for small nations' caught the ears of Africans. Did the 'nations' to which he referred include us? Did they mean us, the black peoples of Africa, too? At Fort Hare we talked of little else. The consensus was that the makers of the world did not count us as a nation or as part of any nation... We lived in South Africa, but we were not regarded as a part of the South African nation. Indeed, when white leaders spoke of the 'nation' of South Africa, they meant only the white nation. When they gave population figures of the nation, they only gave the number of Europeans.

Matthews' account reveals that even in the early twentieth century, Africans viewed Western idealism critically and were fighting for recognition as human beings with equal entitlement to rights and self-determination. Under ANC president Sefako Makgato, the ANC became the first political organisation in South Africa to propose a bill of rights in 1923 (Ndlovu 2013). The draft document recognised the rights of black South Africans as human beings, including the right to own land and enjoy liberty, justice, and equality under the law like all British subjects.

The project of developing a bill of rights continued in 1943 under president Dr A.B. Xuma with the adoption of *Africans' Claims in South Africa* as ANC policy. That document contained two parts, 'The Atlantic Charter from the Africans' Point of View' and the 'Bill of Rights' (Karis and Johns 2015). Xuma was inspired by the Atlantic Charter, which was the result of a meeting between US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the Atlantic Ocean in 1941. The Charter set out eight principles that were the foundation of allied cooperation in the war: no territorial or other aggrandisement;

no changes to territory against the will of the people concerned; the respect of the right to self-determination; the promotion of free trade; the desire for cooperation to achieve social welfare; lasting freedom from want and fear; freedom of the seas and the achievement of peace through the disarmament of all nations pending the ‘establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security’ (NATO n.d.). While the Atlantic Charter was primarily an agreement on war aims between the US and the UK, it took on a life of its own and was adopted by colonised people as a rallying cry for independence and self-determination (Mazower 2009). The ANC leaders argued that since Jan Smuts had endorsed the Atlantic Charter as the foundation of the post-war world order, his government should ‘grant the just claims of her Non-European peoples to freedom, democracy and human decency’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 271). As Xuma states in his preamble to the *Africans’ Claims*:

In South Africa, Africans have no freedom of movement, no freedom of choice of employment, no right of choice of residence and no right of freedom to purchase land or fixed property from anyone and anywhere. Under the guise of segregation, they are subjected to serious educational, political and economic disabilities and discriminations, which are the chief causes of their apparent slow progress.

We urge that if fascism and fascist tendencies are to be uprooted from the face of the earth, and to open the way for peace, prosperity and racial good-will, the ‘Atlantic Charter’ must apply to the whole British Empire, the United States of America and to all the nations of the world and their subject people (Karis and Johns 2015: 271).

Xuma convened a committee of twenty-eight African intellectuals to produce a response to the Atlantic Charter to communicate black South Africans’ ‘undisputed claim to full citizenship’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 270). They argued that the rights laid out in the Charter for ensuring the freedom of European nations occupied by Nazi Germany should be extended to the colonised people of Africa and other parts of the world. Among the observations of the Committee were that the principle of no territorial aggrandisement be applied to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Abyssinia as well as to prevent South African annexation of the British protectorates of Southern Africa (Karis and Johns 2015: 274). In

respect to changes in territory they urged the end to the situation of the past where Africans were treated as ‘pawns in the political game of European nations’ and moved from their land without their consent (Karis and Johns 2015: 275). This was linked to the right of self-determination as Africans had been deprived of their freedom and independence and were governed by ‘Alien governments’, which were ‘not accountable to the indigenous inhabitants’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 275). The ANC called for the Allied powers to ‘accord Africans sovereign rights and to establish administrations of their own choosing’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 275). One of the most important observations relates to the fourth principle of the Charter—the promotion of free and equal trade. The *Africans’ Claims* condemned the historical and ongoing exploitation of Africa’s natural resources ‘to the detriment of her indigenous inhabitants and the enrichment of foreigners’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 276). It called for ‘any economic assistance that might be rendered to weak and insufficiently developed African states’ to be ‘of such a nature as will really promote their economic progress’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 276). This argument for equitable economic development and the cautious approach to international economic aid has been constant in the ANC’s post-apartheid policy documents and, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, informed some of South Africa’s decisions in the UNSC.

The African perspective on the Atlantic Charter was accompanied by a ‘Bill of Rights’, in which the rights are listed under seven headings: full citizenship rights and demands, land, industry and labour, commerce, education, public health and medical services, and discriminatory legislation (Karis and Johns 2015: 278-282). The sophistication and prescience of this document challenges the myth that white liberals during the anti-apartheid struggle were responsible for the ANC’s rights culture and commitment to constitutionalism (Ndlovu 2013). Regarding full citizenship, the ANC called for the abolition of race-based political discrimination, equal access to justice, freedom of residence and movement, full rights to land ownership and land use, the right to education and, significantly, the right of freedom of the press. The latter demand is explained by the presence of prominent newspaper owners and journalists among the ranks of ANC leaders. As was envisaged in 1923 the bill of rights included ‘the right to an equal share in all the material resources of the country’ so everyone should have ‘the right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land’ (Karis and Johns 2015: 279). The ANC demanded the repeal of discriminatory land and residential laws.



Importantly African farmers demanded the right to access the same financial assistance and subsidies as white farmers. When Dr Xuma sent the *Africans' Claims* to Prime Minister Jan Smuts, it was rejected. Smuts condemned the document as 'propagandist' and 'wildly impracticable' (Karis and Johns 2015: 30).

Nevertheless, the *Africans' Claims* went on to become official ANC policy and was adopted as the official vision for a democratic South Africa. It informed the better-known Freedom Charter and was referenced by the lawyers who drafted the ANC's 'Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa' during the transition (Ngcukaitobi 2018). Former President Kgalema Motlanthe has referred to the 'continuity of both the aspirations of our people and their loyalty to a particular world view' in the *Africans' Claims* and the Bill of Rights of South Africa's celebrated Constitution of 1996 (Ngcukaitobi 2018: 271). The above discussion illustrates that arguments of the 'Western' or liberal foundations of the ANC's human rights internationalism are mistaken. The ANC's commitment to human rights was founded in anti-colonial struggle and was based on the demands of oppressed people for sovereignty, freedom, and self-determination. This is a broader conception of human rights than the liberal universalism that dominates 21<sup>st</sup> century discourse. Moreover, in the pan-Africanist tradition, the ANC's conception of human rights was based on the humanity of all people regardless of race or gender. This deviates from the liberal human rights paradigm, which is founded on racist conceptions of who is human (see section 1.2). Thus, the argument presented by many scholars of South African international relations that the values of sovereignty and anti-imperialism are incompatible with human rights and democracy are based on an ahistorical understanding of the ANC's internationalist thought.

From the 1960s, the ANC's internationalism came to be expressed more explicitly in the language of Marxist-Leninism. This was a consequence of the closer relations between the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) after both organisations were banned by the apartheid state. The ANC took on a distinctively third world internationalism that projected the national struggle against racial oppression on the global stage. The formalisation of the alliance with the SACP in 1969 brought the ANC into the socialist international and led to alliances with friendly socialist governments across the world. It also crystallised the definition of apartheid as 'colonialism of a special type' in which white

settlers used capitalism to exploit the majority black colonised population (ANC 1987; Thomas 1996: 58). This placed the anti-apartheid struggle firmly within the global history of colonisation and the Cold War between revolutionary socialism and capitalist imperialism. According to this view, the defining feature of the international system is the systemic exploitation of the Americas, Africa, and Asia by Europeans through the spread of empire (Tambo 2014).

Indeed, the foreign policy discussion document from the ANC's 1994 conference describes the defining challenge of the post-Cold War world as 'the ever-growing conflict between a highly-industrialised and affluent North and an impoverished, under-developed, highly populated South' (ANC 1994). The ANC government sees the quest for sovereignty by states of the global South as fundamental to creating a more just and equal world order. This entails reforming global governance institutions, particularly the UN, as was stated by Mandela (1993).

The sudden end of the Cold War and the discrediting of socialist governance led key ANC leaders to adopt a pragmatic internationalism based on the imperatives of reintegrating South Africa into the global political economy. This internationalism entailed the acceptance of neoliberal ideology of free markets; free capital mobility; deregulation; privatisation of public services; and globalisation (Monbiot 2016). The influence of these ideas was felt in the policy changes of the National Party government in the latter half of the 1980s. Apartheid ended in South Africa as neoliberal policies were being imposed on countries across the global South through IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes.

Marais (2001) and Terreblanche (2002) have written authoritative accounts of how the ANC's leadership was socialised into neoliberal ideas during the negotiations to end apartheid in the late 1980s and 1990s. By the time the ANC took over power in 1994, party elites had acceded to the common sense of neoliberalism and soon adopted neoliberal policies like the macroeconomic framework of Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which was criticised for being a 'self-imposed structural adjustment programme' (Van Heerden 2017). The ANC chose to pursue a foreign policy aimed at attracting foreign direct investment to address its developmental challenges, while using multilateral forums to

promote South-South cooperation to mitigate the erosion of sovereignty and deepening inequality caused by globalisation. The ANC government was criticized for ‘talking left and walking right’ in its foreign policy because it adopted anti-imperialist rhetoric in multilateral organisations while promoting neoliberal economic policies domestically and in Africa (Bond 2002).

This criticism has been directed at other states characterised as middle powers like Brazil and India. It points to the challenge faced by middle powers from the global South to integrate into the international system, while opposing the unfair effects of global structural power on developing countries. Emerging middle powers have to balance the typical middle power behaviour of mediation and stabilising the hegemonic world order defined by ‘the West’ with the need to transform that world order in the interests of ‘the rest’. As will be seen in chapters four and five, South Africa’s attempts to use its moral authority and relative resources to challenge unfair practices in the UNSC earned it the ire of the P3 during its first term and a decline in its reputation as a good international citizen. Chapters six and seven demonstrate that Pretoria’s attempts to rehabilitate its reputation in the second term by supporting the intervention in Libya and cooperating on human rights issues earned criticism from important domestic constituencies and did not have the expected effect of regaining support from the P3.

The discussion document for the ANC’s 1997 conference explains the ANC’s choice to engage in the neoliberal global economy by arguing that there were two approaches that the ANC should avoid in dealing with new world order. The first was to unquestioningly integrate into the global economy ‘as a “municipality” of this “global village”’ and the second, ‘ultra-leftist’ option was to reject any engagement with the global economy to avoid the constraints of neoliberalism. The ANC (1997) suggested:

Both these approaches are wrong. The weakness of the first approach is that it takes no serious account of the unevenness, imbalances and inequalities of the current global environment. Particularly, it does not recognise the fact that the current international situation is not necessarily structured to the advantage of a country like South Africa. This approach makes us submit to this reality without an attempt to challenge or reshape it. The weakness of the second approach is

that it fails to realise that South Africa is a small country that is already heavily dependent on and inextricably tied to the current international economic regime. In addition, this approach fails to recognise the degree to which a struggle for the deepening and consolidation of the (National Democratic Revolution) needs to be accompanied by an active foreign policy seeking to maximise opportunities within existing norms and structures.

The ANC chose to take a middle way ‘to identify opportunities in the search for a just, human and equitable world order’ by forming connections with other countries in Africa and the developing world to reform global governance (ANC 1997). This approach of forming coalitions with like-minded states in Africa and the global South is a consistent feature of ANC foreign policy statements. At the 51<sup>st</sup> National Conference, the ANC passed a resolution to create a G7 of the South, which led to the formation of IBSA (ANC 2002). In 2007, the party passed a resolution to form the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (ANC 2007). The 53<sup>rd</sup> National Conference passed a resolution to strengthen the ANC’s relations with ‘like-minded international organisations’ including the Socialist International, Sao Paulo Forum, and NAM (ANC 2012).

In a leftist critique of South Africa’s foreign policy, Ian Taylor (2001) argues that ANC leaders’ socialisation into neoliberal ideology during the transition (from the first negotiations in Lusaka in the 1980s until CODESA) took the ANC back to its bourgeois roots and led to an abandonment of the socialism it promoted during exile. The wholesale adoption of neoliberalism, as seen through GEAR and other domestic policy, has caused tensions between the ANC leadership and its majority poor black domestic constituency who expected greater focus on redress and redistribution. This tension plays out with the ANC’s partners in the tripartite alliance: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the SACP. Because of the ANC’s acceptance of neoliberalism, it is forced to play to two different audiences in the domestic and international sphere. On the one hand, it plays to domestic and transnational capital to show that it is a responsible global player adhering to the neoliberal consensus on issues of trade, finance, and good governance. On the other, it is cognisant of the damage caused by globalisation on those in the periphery of the global political economy. It therefore tries to play to this audience (workers, poor and states at the margins of the global economy) by taking a reformist position in international affairs to

mitigate the worst effects of globalisation on them.

Taylor (2001) argues that playing to different audiences has resulted in contradictory foreign policy positions. On the one hand, South Africa has been critical of the West's unfair trade practices; called for reform of IOs, supporting 'pariah' states like Libya and Cuba; and held leadership positions in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and NAM. On the other hand, Pretoria lobbied to attend G8 meetings; launched the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to encourage greater foreign direct investment in Africa; voluntarily adopted more stringent trade reforms than the WTO required; and rapidly liberalised the domestic economy. According to Taylor (2001), South Africa's occasional lashing out at the West suits both its leaders and Western leaders because it helps maintain the façade of independence and endows it with legitimacy as an influential global actor. Yet, it also enables the Republic to play the role of 'bridge' between the West and the developing world, especially Africa

Much of Taylor's (2001) argument is convincing, particularly his analysis about the taming effect of global capital on ANC policy and contradictions caused by playing to different audiences. However, he overstates his criticism of the 'Africanists' in the ANC and understates the character of the liberation struggle as fundamentally a nationalist anti-colonial struggle that adopted socialism/left ideology because of circumstance. He downplays race, identity, and the search for self-determination as motive forces for the anti-apartheid struggle. These forces have contributed to sovereignty, autonomy, and independence being the central values of the ANC's international orientation. As was stated in chapter one, this study takes race and anti-colonial struggle seriously as factors informing South Africa's foreign policy. The convergence of race and class in South African society, as well as the explicitly racist logic of colonial dispossession and apartheid mean purely class-based analysis of the country's foreign policy excludes important variables. Similarly, liberal analyses of the anti-apartheid struggle as a struggle for universal human rights (Borer and Mills 2011, Jordaan 2010, Geldenhuys 2011) ignore the fact that black South Africans conceived of rights as including justice, self-determination, and autonomy. The achievement of formal political equality was not the ultimate goal of the struggle; the ultimate goal was humanity, independence, and freedom.

Moreover, Taylor (2001) and other leftist scholars' (see Jordaan 2003) conviction that the ANC could have challenged neoliberal hegemony in any fundamental way appears to underestimate the profound domestic crisis in South Africa in 1994. As Landsberg (2005: 724) argues:

Because of its precarious domestic situation, South Africa's policy makers need to engage the international community—we include the industrialized North and the developing South as part of the international community—in a way that deliberately tries to help address its national condition, and the African condition.

The ANC government internationalised their elections slogan 'a better life for all' in an effort create the global conditions for domestic economic development. Indeed, in the resolutions of its 51st National Conference the ANC (2002) noted that:

The world remains divided between the rich developed nations and the poor developing nations, and that this gap is widening, as is the gap between rich and poor within all societies. The South African reality, of a divided society, one section being rich and well-resourced and the other poor and under-resourced, reflects this international dichotomy.

South Africa's attempt to ameliorate these domestic and international divides has led to it displaying behaviours associated with middle powers. The chapter now examines examples of South African foreign policy between 1994 and 2012 to determine the extent to which the Republic played the roles identified in the middle power role typology developed in chapter two.

### **3.4 Interpreting South Africa's foreign policy through the middle power role typology**

#### **3.4.1 General middle power roles**

##### *Policy entrepreneur*

In an address to the National Assembly on 13 June 2000, President Mbeki described South

Africa in multilateral engagements as ‘a very active participant in all these gatherings, with our voice carrying some weight, however limited’. He went on to explain that:

At the centre of all the engagements... is the critical question of our time, of how humanity should respond to the irreversible process of globalisation while addressing the fundamental challenges that face the bulk of humanity. These include poverty, underdevelopment, the growing North-South gap, racism and xenophobia, gender discrimination, ill health, violent conflicts and the threat to the environment.... This engagement must necessarily address among other things the restructuring of the UN, including the Security Council, a review of the functioning of such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank, the determination of agenda and the manner of operation of the WTO and an assessment of the role of the G7. Central to these processes must be the objective of reversing the marginalisation of Africa and the rest of the South, and therefore compensation for the reduction of national sovereignty by increasing the capacity of the South to impact on the system of global governance (Mbeki 2000).

Mbeki (2000) argued that although South Africa had been criticised for ‘punching above our weight’ in its international relations, it was encouraging that the country was ‘listened to with a degree of attention by many on our continent and the rest of the world’. From the statement above, South Africa appears to have adopted the role of a policy entrepreneur in its goal of creating a more just and equitable world order to benefit countries of Africa and the South. The literature on South African foreign policy suggests three key areas in which the country has played the role of policy entrepreneur: nuclear non-proliferation, promoting Africa’s economic interests in multilateral institutions and transforming the continent’s security and economic governance structures. The first two areas will be discussed here and the third will be discussed in section 3.4.3 under *regional leader*.

South Africa has earned the acclaim of being one of the only countries to ‘voluntarily’ end its nuclear weapons programme in 1990 (de Villiers et al 1993). It acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1991. The democratic government became an active player in the debate on nuclear weapons joining nuclear-related multilateral arrangements like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Van Wyk 2013). One of

South Africa's first acts as a policy entrepreneur was at the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference of 1995 when negotiations stalled because of disagreement between nuclear and non-nuclear powers on whether to extend the treaty. South Africa broke the deadlock by preparing a detailed policy position, the so-called 'South African concept' (Landsberg and Masiza 1996). This enabled the countries of the global North and South to reach agreement on an indefinite extension of the treaty and strengthening its disarmament provisions (Hamill and Lee 2001; IGD 2008). South Africa later led the process of developing the Pelindaba Treaty, establishing Africa as a nuclear free zone, which was signed in April 1996.

South Africa has been actively involved in developing policy to improve the economic fortunes of poor countries in Africa and the South. During the Mbeki presidency Pretoria supported the campaign for unconditional debt relief to Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), many of which were in Africa. At the G8 Okinawa summit in 2000, Mbeki urged the members to write off up to US\$70bn of nominal HIPC debt (Alden and Le Pere 2004: 293). From 2002 to 2006, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel was the chair of the Development Committee (DC) of the IMF, which advises the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Board of Governors of the Bretton Woods Institutions on financial assistance for trade and environmental programmes in developing countries (IGD 2008: 22). In that position, South Africa was able to advance policies on governance and anti-corruption, education financing and debt relief for HIPCs. South Africa's policy entrepreneurship in the area of international finance can partly be explained by the highly skilled bureaucracy developed in the National Treasury under Manuel's tenure. A great deal of investment went into educating Treasury officials at top overseas universities and socialising them into the community of international finance mavens. This endowed South Africa with the necessary technical expertise and familiarity with the international finance environment to have outside influence in the BWI.

### *Diplomatic broker*

Diplomatic brokers are facilitators and convenors in international relations. They plan and convene meetings, write communiqués and follow-up on negotiations. The broker role is often associated with being a bridge between different groups of countries. South Africa's policymakers have often described the country as a bridge between the developed and developing world because of the first and third world elements of its economic structure, its



long sea line along both the Atlantic and Indian oceans, and the diverse population that comes from its history of settler colonial occupation (Barber 2005). As Minister Alfred Nzo explained to the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs on 14 March 1995:

... The position in which South Africa finds itself is that it has features both of the developed and the developing world. It is truly at the point of intersection between both worlds - an industrialised state of the South, which can communicate with the North on equal terms to articulate the needs, the concerns and the fears of the developing world. Conversely, we can interpret the concerns and the fears of the developed world (DFA 1996).

What is clear in the statement above is the deep sense of responsibility felt by South African policymakers to represent the interests of the global South, especially Africa, and to be an interlocutor with the West. The co-existence of two worlds within South African borders endowed the country with an ability to navigate the conversations on multiculturalism, globalisation, and diversity in a changing global order with greater ease than states characterised by greater homogeneity (Cossy 2008).

Domestic and international critics have challenged this self-identified role. On the domestic side, ANC members have expressed discomfort at the extent of accommodation with Western interests implicit in the bridge-builder role. Internationally, South Africa's efforts to represent Africa have been met with resentment by other African countries and efforts at South-South cooperation with Latin America and Asia have not always yielded the expected results. For example, South Africa's BRICS partners have pursued neo-imperialist economic policies in Africa with little regard for Pretoria's broader vision for the continent (Shaw 2015). Others contend that South Africa has been indispensable for strengthening the legitimacy of the global neoliberal project of creating a multipolar world in the image of the West. This project needed to include an African representative to legitimise it as a truly global enterprise, even though its effects further entrenched the marginalisation of much of the continent. As Jaffrelot (2008: 5) argues, 'to some extent, if South Africa didn't exist, the international community — that dispensable fiction — would have to invent it'.

South Africa used its leadership of several international organisations, including UNCTAD, NAM and G77 plus China, to facilitate international action on a range of issues. In its

chairmanship of UNCTAD IX in 1996, South Africa aimed to revitalise the organisation as a 'mouthpiece of the developing world' (Cornelissen 2006). This goal is in line with Pretoria's broader objective of making the international system more equitable for poorer states and its desire to be perceived as a leader of the developing world. Pretoria played a bridging role between the North and South when it facilitated the agreement in the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Revision conference of 1995. On another nuclear related issue, it became actively involved in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) of middle powers that facilitated a resolution to the tension over India and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 (IGD 2008).

South Africa played the role of diplomatic broker in the Ottawa and Kimberly process. The Ottawa Process is the name given to a series of negotiations on banning the use of anti-personnel landmines launched by Canadian foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy in Ottawa in 1996. South Africa was one of the fifty states that participated in the meeting and signed onto the Ottawa Declaration. Former Foreign Affairs Director-General, Jackie Selebi, chaired the follow-up conference in Oslo, Norway in September 1997. The conference resulted in the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction. According to Maslen and Herby (1998) Selebi's facilitation contributed to the success of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference:

... The crucial role played by the Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Jakob Selebi of South Africa, should not be forgotten. With skill and determination, he drove the process forward to a successful conclusion without the need for the full three-week negotiation period. His contribution to the favourable outcome of the Ottawa process should be duly recognised.

Cornelissen (2006: 41) describes the Ottawa process as a normative project of 'a collection of middle powers' in which South Africa played the role of diplomatic broker together with Canada and Scandinavian countries to ensure the success of the initiative. Using diplomatic and technical skill to facilitate multilateral negotiations is typical of middle powers, because they do not have the great-power resources to use coercion.

The Kimberley Process was launched in May 2000 when Southern African diamond-producing countries met in Kimberley, South Africa to discuss how to stop the trade in 'conflict' diamonds and to protect legitimate diamond industry (Grant and Taylor 2004). This

came from concerns about the practice of trading in rough diamonds from conflict areas to support rebel movements and perpetuate civil wars. The discussions culminated in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) that was launched at a ministerial meeting in November 2002 (DFA 2004). South Africa was Chair of the Kimberley Process in the first year of international implementation of the KPCS in 2003 and again in 2013. By convening the initial Kimberley meeting and then actively participating in agenda setting, planning and reporting South Africa played the role of a diplomatic broker.

In the post-Mbeki period, South Africa has played an important facilitation role in the G20 and international climate negotiations. In the G20, it has used its position as the only African member to influence the group's agenda to advocate for the interests of the region as a whole (Qobo and Dube 2015). Since 2008, South Africa has been co-chair of several working groups including Reform of the IMF, Development, Financial Inclusion, and the Climate Finance Study Groups (Mminele 2012).

South Africa's played a bridge-building role in UN climate negotiations as part of the BASIC group (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) that first emerged as an alliance in 2009 at the 15<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In Copenhagen, the BASIC heads of state negotiated the final agreement with US President Obama in the final days of the conference (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2014). South Africa successfully hosted COP17 in Durban in 2011, which was widely referred to as an 'African COP' (Vickers 2013: 688). In Durban, South Africa introduced the 'indaba' negotiation technique to break deadlocks in the negotiations and accelerate decision-making. While this approach was criticised by some for unduly extending negotiations in Durban (Patel 2011), it is widely credited for leading to the breakthrough in the Paris COP in 2015. A West African diplomat described it as 'a very effective way to streamline negotiations and bridge differences' (Vaughn and Randerson 2015). The final Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus by all 195 UNFCCC member states and committed members to endeavouring to keep global warming below two degrees Celsius. South Africa's innovative, problem-solving approach to brokering the climate negotiations is consistent with the role of diplomatic broker.

In addition to facilitating international negotiations, South Africa has developed a reputation as a leader in global summitry and hosting big international events (Alden and Schoeman 2015a). Within the first 20 years of democracy, the country hosted several international conferences including the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban in 2001, World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 and COP17 in Durban. In the non-governmental realm, the country has been host to many international sporting events including the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 1998 Cricket World Cup, and most famously, the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Cornelissen 2010). These events contribute to the country's image as a convenor and facilitator of global relations and friendship. The pressure to play host to the world has at times become overwhelming. In 2002, the government declined a request to host a WTO meeting because of insufficient resources in the same year it was hosting WSSD. The government has been criticised for agreeing spend money on hosting big world events, in a country with such high levels of poverty and unemployment. The 2010 World Cup did not yield the economic gains and job creation promised. Brazil faced similar challenges in its hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 (Chade 2017). These challenges point to the difficult balancing act of middle sized states in the South that want to prove themselves as influential global actors, while dealing with pressing developmental problems at home.

### *Multilateral Manager*

South Africa's multilateral manager role has been most evident in Africa and within the UN. On the continent, it led the establishment of the AU and its composite organs including the Peace and Security Council and the Pan-African Parliament. The Pan-African Parliament is headquartered in Johannesburg and receives its funding primarily from South Africa. NEPAD's head office is located in Midrand and not Addis Ababa like the AU. South Africa contributed R472.45 million to the AU in the 2015/16 financial year making it one of the highest contributing countries to the continental body (Du Plessis 2016). Landsberg (2008) points out that despite Pretoria's contributions to African governance bodies, it is relatively unrepresented in the ranks of personnel. This is inconsistent with the role of multilateral manager, which implies not only the establishment of organisations but overseeing their day-to-day management and having a capable cohort of officials to staff them.

In the UN, South Africa has been especially active in ensuring that the financing and management of the organization does not prejudice the interests of developing countries. This is partly in response to the tendency of Western powers, especially the US, to withdraw funds from the organization when they feel it is not acting in their interests. The DFA strategic plan from 2005-2008 states ‘South Africa also continues to play a prominent role in terms of the UN’s budgetary and administrative activities to ensure that South Africa’s interests as well as those of the Continent, are adequately catered for in the UN budget’ (DFA 2005: 57). When South Africa was chair of the G77 plus China in 2006, the global South succeeded in getting rich countries to commit to actionable programmes as a follow up to important world summits and it convinced the UN to raise its spending ceiling for the 2006-7 financial year to enable the completion of all programmes and resolutions (IGD 2008). In addition, South Africa led developing countries in advocating for five UNGA resolutions increasing the number of personnel from the global South in the UN Secretariat, making it easier for suppliers from the global South to access the UN procurement system, improving the Secretariat’s accountability systems, renovating the UN headquarters and financing the expansion of the Secretariat (IGD 2008).

South Africa was actively involved in the formation of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and it contributed towards making sure that the new Council had adequate resources and administrative support to make it more effective than its predecessor (CCR 2013: 17). South Africa served two consecutive terms on the Human Rights Council where its goal was to ‘also fully engage in the ongoing institution-building processes of the newly established Human Rights Council to ensure that the Council’s agenda, working methods and programmes address the needs of the poor and the vulnerable’ (DFA 2008: 5). In 2010, South Africa began a three-year term on the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

South Africa played an influential role in the discussions on establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 (Fritz in HSF 2009). South Africa was one of the first signatories to the Rome Statute, which it domesticated in its legal system through *The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act of 2002* (Du Plessis 2008). Pretoria contributed several key ideas to the text of the Rome Statute and it

resisted US pressure to sign a bilateral non-surrender agreement that would prevent Pretoria from surrendering US citizens or employees to the ICC, incurring significant costs in the form of lost US military aid funding (Grant and Hamilton 2016: 171-2). Despite this illustrious history, as will be seen in chapters five and six, South Africa has been unwilling to extend its management role to helping resolving tensions between the ICC and the AU over accusations that the Court targets African leaders. The ANC's (2012) Mangaung Conference resolutions state:

Much as the ANC does not condone impunity, authoritarian and violent regimes, it is concerned about the perception of selective prosecution of Africans and urges the ICC to also pursue cases of impunity elsewhere, while engaging in serious dialogue with the AU and African countries in order to review their relationship.

One of the challenges of being a manager in international organisations is developing the requisite skills and capabilities to perform the role. This was reflected in the 1994 conference discussion document that emphasized the challenge of developing the new South Africa's diplomatic capacity after 'apartheid all but crippled international relations'. The Green Paper (DFA 1996) called for the country to 'apply the criteria of national interest, capabilities and feasibility' in deciding on the extent of its involvement in international issues, particularly in UN peace missions on the continent to which South Africa was expected to contribute. The White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions (1999) argued building the professionalism of military and police personnel as one of the benefits of participation in multinational peace operations.

### *Mediator*

Being a mediator and contributor to international peace missions is the main reason South Africa has been characterised as a middle power. The Republic's success in averting a drawn out violent conflict at the end of apartheid raised international expectations that the new government would contribute positively to conflict resolution in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. In this regard, preventive diplomacy, mediation, peace making, peacekeeping, and peace building have become key priorities in the Republic's foreign policy.

The White Paper on Peace Missions explained:

As a responsible member of the UN, the OAU and the SADC, South Africa must prepare for active participation in peace missions and, where appropriate and authorised, humanitarian interventions. Such participation will not only serve the cause of international and regional peace and security but will also be in pursuit of its national interests (DFA 1999: 19).

Unlike traditional middle powers, which participate in peace missions outside their own regions, the majority of South Africa's peace initiatives have focused on Africa. This is because the majority of the UN's peacekeeping activity since 1990 has been on the continent. In its first forty years of existence the UNSC authorised only one peace operation in Africa, the UN Operation in the Congo in 1960. Between 1989 and 2011, 25 operations were mandated in Africa (SCR 10 May 2011). After 1994, Pretoria made it a priority to invest in its peace making, peace keeping and peace building capacity. It became evident quite early on that South Africa did not have the resources to play the role of continental peacemaker on its own. Therefore, Pretoria led the development of Africa's peace and security capacity through the peace and security architecture of the AU including the Peace and Security Council, African Standby Force, and continental early warning systems.

South Africa's approach to mediation has been to try export its own model of negotiated settlement including a transitional government of national unity, new constitution, inclusive national elections and sometimes a truth and reconciliation commission to promote national reconciliation. As the Peace Missions White Paper put it:

South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this strong national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts (DFA 1999: 19).

This model has been replicated to some degree in Burundi, Zimbabwe, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, and Timor-Leste (Solomon 2010). During the Mandela presidency, South Africa's mediation efforts tended to be heroic interventions based on his moral stature as a world icon. These initiatives met with varying levels of success. Mandela's mediation in the Lockerbie crisis in 1995 was a great diplomatic success (Hamill and Lee 2001), however his efforts in facilitating a negotiated settlement in Burundi and in the DRC failed (Landsberg 2000). South Africa's first attempt at peace enforcement was in Lesotho in 1998 when Pretoria sent six hundred troops to restore order after a disputed election. The UN and OAU criticised South Africa for taking unilateral action without their authorisation (Flemes 2009: 149). The lesson of the failed heroic attempts at mediation and peace missions was to adopt a multilateral and routine approach to conflict resolution.

Under President Mbeki, peace and mediation was conducted explicitly under the mandate of regional or global organizations (Landsberg 2000). Between 1999 and 2012 South Africa contributed troops or acted as mediator in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or AU peace missions in Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Solomon 2010). The notable successes were the free and fair elections in DRC and Burundi and the peace deal between Sudan and Southern Sudan. However, even within the cover of multilateral organizations, some conflict interventions were failures. Mbeki's position as mediator in Cote d'Ivoire was short-lived after the rebels accused him of being biased towards the regime of incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. Similarly, Mbeki found it difficult to build trust with opposition parties in the mediation in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless he eventually succeeded in establishing the government of national unity (Solomon 2010). President Zuma's administration has tended to engage in mediation and peace enforcement without the backing of multilateral organisations in the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

South Africa's mediation was not limited to Africa. President Mandela successfully mediated between Libya, the UK and US to negotiate the handover of the two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988 (Boyd-Judson 2005). In 2002, while chair of NAM, South Africa hosted a retreat with leaders of Israel and Palestine at Spier Wine Estate in Stellenbosch that was intended to contribute to the Middle East Peace



Process. According to the DFA (2004: 31) it was the first time both sides of the conflict had communicated with each other in over a year and ‘the participants also praised the informal, non-prescriptive and constructive atmosphere created by the President and the South African hosts’. The Spier conference was the beginning of a multi-year initiative meant to bring together Israeli and Palestinian leaders to negotiate an end to their decades long conflict (Landsberg and Monyae 2006). The DFA (2004: 29) stated that ‘South Africa has remained consistent in its approach and, due to our own experience of negotiating a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, has credibility with those Israelis and Palestinians who are genuinely committed to forging their own peace agreement’. South Africa also sought to mediate in the peace building process in Iraq in the aftermath of the US military intervention there. In March 2006, President Mbeki hosted an Iraqi parliamentary delegation including representatives from the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions to share lessons about South Africa’s national reconciliation.

The common factor in all South Africa’s mediation efforts is a desire to replicate the Republic’s experience of conflict resolution and democratic transition in other countries. This has been criticised by scholars as ‘injudicious’ (Solomon 2010: 133) and reflecting ‘some delusions of grandeur’ (Geldenhuis 2005: 153). Pretoria’s efforts to play the role of ‘good international citizen’ and ‘example’ will be discussed in the next section.

### 3.4.2 Traditional middle power roles

#### *Good international citizen*

South Africa’s negotiated settlement and the human rights credentials developed during the anti-apartheid struggle have contributed to its reputation as a good international citizen. Good international citizens are states whose international behaviour is motivated by the common good and liberal values. Geldenhuis (2005: 1) argues South Africa ‘features prominently as a norm formulator in multilateral forums, especially in Africa’ but as will be seen in this section Pretoria struggles to act consistently as ‘norm enforcer’.

Mandela (1993: 88) stated ‘human rights will be the guide’ that lights post-apartheid foreign affairs. Given its history of authoritarianism South Africa could not ignore the rights of others. He argued that the country’s promotion of human rights and democracy must begin in

its relations on the continent because 'if there is a single lesson to be drawn from Africa's postcolonial history, it is that accountable government is good government' (Mandela 1993: 88). The ANC's 1994 document entitled 'Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa' took this sentiment further by stating 'we shall not be selective nor, indeed, be afraid to raise human rights violations with countries where our own and other interests might be negatively affected' (ANC 1994). South Africa's commitment to advancing human rights and democracy was also founded on a pragmatic reading of the changing norms of the new world order. The Green Paper notes that:

International organisations and governments all over the world increasingly place a high premium on the performance of countries and governments in these areas. Development assistance is, in many cases, linked to democratisation programmes, the observance of human rights and the exercise of good government. South Africa's own recent experience in this field makes it an example many refer to as a model. Many governments expect South Africa's adherence to these principles and values to be an example to other countries in Africa and elsewhere, inspiring them to democratise and to improve their human rights record (DFA 1996).

Within the rhetoric of liberal democracy and human rights was also the hint of different conceptions of what being a good international citizen means. At a speech to the United States Congress on 6 October 1994, Nelson Mandela stated:

The new age will surely demand that democracy must also mean a life of plenty. As the images of life lived anywhere on our globe become available to all, so will the contrast between the rich and the poor, within and across frontiers and within and across the continents become a motive force impelling the deprived to demand a better life from the powers that be, whatever their location (Mandela 1994).

Crawford (1995: 97) calls this link between prosperity and democracy 'instrumental logic'. This is consistent with the legacy of the Africans' Claims that envisioned human rights as including socio-economic rights, and not merely political rights. South Africa's constitution is founded on the idea that democracy should enable both political freedom and improvement of socioeconomic conditions so the Bill of Rights protects both negative and positive rights.

Indeed DIRCO (2011: 19) outlined South Africa's intention to strengthen the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights as equal to all other human rights by working with NAM 'to develop a legally binding instrument of the Right to Development (RTD)'.

Despite the rhetoric of human rights, the new ANC government chose to maintain relations with countries with dubious human rights records (for example Libya, Algeria and Cuba) because they had been loyal supporters of the liberation struggle (Van Nieuwkerk 2004). Pretoria also maintained warm relations with Indonesia during Indonesia's conflict with East Timor and failed to criticise human rights abuses perpetrated by the Suharto regime. In the 'two Chinas' debate, South Africa chose to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1998 despite the latter's poor human rights record. Few would dispute that this decision was ultimately the correct one. Many observers at the time interpreted these choices as the result of naïve loyalty towards those who had supported the liberation struggle. It could also be explained as characteristic of the ANC government's preference for constructive engagement instead of condemnation and exclusion in international relations. This approach is a notable deviation from the campaign to isolate the international regime during the liberation struggle. However, it is consistent with the values underpinning the negotiated settlement where the ANC chose a path of engagement and reconciliation instead of punishing former apartheid leaders. The peaceful settlement and forgiveness of past oppressors was celebrated by, in particular, Western observers. Therefore, the condemnation of efforts to give the same recognition to present-day 'international pariahs' is seen as hypocrisy by South African policymakers who view their links with human rights violators as consistent with their constructive engagement of the apartheid government.

The biggest test of the country's commitment to human rights was the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other human rights activists by Nigeria's military regime in 1995. The execution followed months of South Africa pursuing a strategy of 'constructive engagement' with General Sani Abacha's government in an attempt to resolve the situation quietly and amicably (Van Aardt 1996). When news of the executions reached Mandela at the Commonwealth summit in New Zealand, he called a press conference where he said he would 'explode the volcano' under Nigeria's leadership and called for Abuja to be expelled

from all international organisations (Black 2003). Other African leaders refused to support Pretoria's attempts to ostracise Abacha's regime. South Africa was a 'new kid on the block' in terms of African diplomacy and its failure to consult with other leaders before intervening in Nigeria was criticised. South Africa's behaviour was judged 'un-African' and one of Abacha's ministers branded the ANC 'token black leaders of this white country' (Landsberg 2000: 112). Western governments continued buying oil from Nigeria, despite their protestations about human rights (Black 2003).

After the Saro-Wiwa incident Pretoria adopted a more pragmatic view of human rights. The 1997 ANC IR discussion document proposed that:

We need to work out what it means in practice to place human rights, justice and democracy at the forefront of our foreign policy. This certainly should not mean that we should refuse to conduct any diplomatic and trade relations with countries whose record in human rights or democracy we regard as unsatisfactory. But it should also not mean that when we engage with the governments of such countries, we ignore, marginalise or subordinate these principles and only concentrate on trade and diplomacy (ANC 1997).

As a result, South Africa learned to advance its human rights and democracy agenda through multilateral forums and to avoid unilateral interventions, no matter how egregious the situation. Pretoria also discovered that promotion of liberal norms was not apolitical in a world defined by power asymmetry between the North and the South. South African leaders could not enforce 'good' international norms without being seen as Western 'lackeys' (Schoeman 2000). Consequently, human rights and democracy were given a qualified place in the country's diplomatic practice, if not its rhetoric, and were balanced against other imperatives like African unity and anti-imperialism.

Scholars have argued that the policy of 'quiet diplomacy' pursued towards the recalcitrant Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe was influenced by lessons learnt from the Saro-Wiwa incident. Black (2003: 35) quotes then Minister of Defence Mosiua Lekota referring to the lesson South Africa learnt in Nigeria that it applied to Zimbabwe:

We could have invaded Zimbabwe as some people suggested- but what would this have achieved? ... We suddenly found that we were the only ones who condemned the planned hanging. As a result, we learnt a valuable lesson that, especially in Africa, you cannot act alone because you will find yourself isolated and, in a position similar to that of the apartheid government.

Indeed, Mbeki (2016) illustrated the influence of the Saro-Wiwa incident on South Africa's later reluctance to pursue human rights in an explanation of South Africa's diplomacy in the Myanmar and Zimbabwe issues during its first term in the UNSC, titled 'Propaganda and the Pursuit of Hegemonic Goals — the Myanmar and Zimbabwe Experience'. Mbeki begins with an account of the Saro Wiwa incident as the 'first major test' of South Africa's human rights diplomacy, and argues that 'our Government drew its own conclusions from this painful experience with regard to the complexities of the construction of inter-state relations, including as this relates to the effective promotion of human rights'. He goes on to quote former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who wrote that human rights were used by the Reagan administration as a tool of geo-political influence. Mbeki's article reveals the extent to which his government came to view human rights discourse as something used opportunistically in service of US national interests and not in the genuine interests of developing countries.

Another characteristic of good international citizens is their provision of humanitarian assistance and development aid. According to Jordaan (2003), emerging middle powers tend not to express their good international citizenship by being international donors. However, a glance at the evidence shows this characterisation is inaccurate. While it is obvious that wealthier Western powers would be able to dedicate greater resources as donors, different generations of emerging middle powers have also contributed a great deal as donor states. During the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria was one of the largest donors to Southern Africa's liberation movements through the South African Relief Fund (Obi 2015: 172).

By 2012, South Africa was meeting the World Bank criterion of 0.7 per cent of GDP spent in humanitarian and development assistance (Vickers 2012: 536). This primarily happened through the African Renaissance Fund (ARF), which had a budget of R1 billion in the 2012-2013 financial year (DIRCO 2012). However even before the ARF was established in 2000,

South Africa contributed humanitarian assistance to Rwanda in 1994 in the aftermath of the genocide and to Mozambique after the 1999 floods (Crawford 1995). Beyond the African continent, Pretoria has been a regular donor to the Palestinian Authority to ameliorate the humanitarian situation there. Some of South Africa's humanitarian assistance has been done through the IBSA trust fund, which has funded initiatives in Palestine, Haiti and Guinea-Bissau amongst others (Vickers 2012).

All this donor activity led to calls to create an official development agency, with the ANC's 52<sup>nd</sup> conference in 2007 passing a resolution for government to establish the agency (ANC 2007; Vickers 2012). At the time of writing plans for SADPA appear to have stalled, with no indication of when it will be formed. The delay with the establishment of SADPA illustrates a bigger problem with South African foreign policy—the development of excellent plans with little to no follow-through. The ability to implement plans and act on one's word is fundamental to being taken seriously as an influential state in the international system. This applies even more to middle powers whose soft power is closely linked to their reputation as reliable and trust-worthy international citizens. South Africa's inability to follow-through on plans is inconsistent with 'middlepowerness'.

A final dimension of good international citizenship is commitment to international law. Rules-based multilateralism and promotion of the rule of law are high on the list of priorities in South Africa's foreign policy. Pretoria has emphasized the place of the UNGA, the only international organisation with universal membership, as the primary international organisation in the world (Mbeki 2007). The DFA (2005) stated:

As participants in the UN system, the (multilateral) Branch must be active in the protection and promotion of South Africa and Africa's interests in the current global geo-political power configuration to ensure the pre-eminence and centrality of the UN.

During its tenure in the UNSC, South Africa sought to promote strict adherence to the UN Charter by challenging attempts by the P5 to expand the mandate of the Council beyond the maintenance of international peace and security. The mandate of raising challenges highlights another dimension of good international citizenship, namely speaking truth to power. This is what Cooper and Mo (2013: 1) call being 'issue-specific dissenters'.

Many of the Republic's diplomatic interventions have been directed at strengthening the rules of the international system to make it fairer and more equitable for all states. However, South Africa has been criticized for its failure to ratify legal conventions to which it has ascended and for unsatisfactory reporting on its treaties (Thipanyane 2011). This could be because of weak commitment to the principles enshrined in these treaties. Essentially, that Pretoria signed the treaties but has little intention of implementing them. However, one of the treaties Thipanyane (2011: 5) mentions is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that protects socio-economic and cultural rights, a stated priority for Pretoria. Alternatively, it could be because of public administration failures that make the government incapable of managing all its commitments. Regardless of the reason, the failure to keep up with treaty obligations is contrary to the expected behaviour of middle powers. Middle powers are meant to be good at keeping their global commitments because of their values and norms, and because of the efficiency and skill of their public administration. On this score, South Africa appears to fail the middle power test.

### *Example*

Being a good international citizen is closely linked to being an example in international relations. As mentioned in section 3.4.1, South Africa's feat of peaceful settlement of apartheid, transition to democracy and establishing a constitutional order based on one of the most progressive constitutions in the world have endowed it with the reputation of example to the rest of the world. Hamill and Lee (2001: 37) explain it thus:

South Africa has moved not merely from 'pariah to participant', to quote Greg Mills, but from pariah to moral exemplar, a transformation in a state's international image so rapid and so profound as to be almost unprecedented in the annals of international politics.

South Africa has expressed itself as an exemplar in international politics in two important ways: exporting its model of conflict resolution abroad, and promoting an African Renaissance based on its governance and economic policies.

As discussed in section 3.4.1 the Republic has tried to export its model democratic transition to Africa and the world. Indeed, South Africa's relatively peaceful transition and its choice of

conflict prevention were seen as an example for Africa and the rest of the world. The role of example was a result of both the national role perceptions of policymakers and the role prescriptions of external actors. In an address in December 1999, a former US ambassador described South Africa as ‘an inspiration to people not only on this continent, but throughout the world...’ (Mills 2000: 3). Pretoria embarked on several peace making and peacebuilding initiatives across the world because of its self-conception as an example of successful conflict resolution. In his State of the Nation Address in 2003, President Mbeki proudly spoke of several South African experts who were travelling to Iraq to share their knowledge on disarmament:

These are the experts who led our country’s programme to destroy our nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as the missiles for the delivery of these weapons in conditions of combat. The work they did has now resulted in the South African example of disarmament being recognised internationally as an example of best international practice (Mbeki 2003a).

The national role conception of being an example is also illustrated in South Africa’s activities in Haiti, which is not in its direct sphere of influence, where Pretoria sought to share ‘the South African experience of reconciliation’ (DFA 2006a: 26).

Expectations for South Africa to use its status as an example to punch above its weight on the world stage were often a great burden. After all Pretoria inherited many domestic socio-economic and political challenges that required sustained attention and effort to resolve. It proved difficult to balance these domestic constraints with expectations to solve problems facing other countries. Alfred Nzo articulated this sentiment in a speech to Parliament in 1999:

I often think that our successful democratic transition has created perceptions that we are capable of miraculous interventions, which would instantly solve the many conflicts in our region and beyond. The reality is more complex and demands more painstaking commitment than instant quick-fix solutions (Mills 2000: 264).

South Africa’s model of transition has proven to not be easily transferable to other contexts (Geldenhuys 2005). The process of instituting a transitional government of national unity,



new constitution, inclusive national elections, and sometimes a truth and reconciliation commission to promote national reconciliation has not resulted in sustained peace and democracy in most post-conflict situations. Renewed conflict in Burundi, DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan are examples of the failure of the South African model. The notion of liberal peace on which South Africa's transition was based has been criticised in recent years for perpetuating violent conflicts in Africa and undermining efforts to address the root causes of conflict (S/2015/490).

With regards good governance and economic development, South Africa was expected to be the African model of how to thrive in a globalised world. Mills (2000: 255) explains that many in the West hoped that 'South Africa would provide an exportable model of development and transition for the rest of Africa'. As discussed in section 3.4.3 Mbeki translated these expectations into his vision of African Renaissance. Among the key tenets of this vision were resolving conflicts on the continent, inculcating good governance and attracting foreign investors to grow the economy. This was based on the priorities undergirding South Africa's negotiated settlement. The idea was that peace, stability, and democracy were prerequisites for development. As Mbeki (2003a) stated:

We speak in favour of peace because our people prefer peace to war. They yearn for peace because they know from experience that without peace there can be no development. Without development we will not be able to realise the goal of a better life for all.

'A better life for all' was the ANC's campaign slogan in the 1994 and 1999 elections. Therefore, Mbeki was explicitly projecting domestic concerns on the international stage. Using the South African example to inform foreign policy is seen starkly in the statements of policymakers in the UNSC. In both the first and second term, South Africa frequently referenced the anti-apartheid struggle, its democratic transition, and progressive legislation as examples for the rest of the world to follow. As we have seen these accomplishments are the basis of South Africa's national role conceptions and role prescriptions from the rest of the world. However, other members of the UNSC, especially Western powers, tended to dismiss South Africa's claims to international influence as hubris when they went against their interests. Pretoria had to balance its inclination to assert itself as an example of best practice in the UNSC and the constraints of its position within the structure of global power as

reflected in the Council. One could argue that the reason South Africa's efforts as an example in the UNSC were not always successful is because the example role is about co-option and persuasion rather than asserting one's influence. In other words, examples lead through soft power; shaping the preferences of others by being appealing and attractive instead of demanding recognition. The cases discussed in subsequent chapters illustrate the decline of South Africa's soft power and provide some clues as to how policymakers could rebuild its soft power to become an influential example in the contemporary world order.

South Africa's engagement in Africa and the global South has been based on the example of its domestic politics. The next section applies the emerging middle power roles of *regional leader* and *champion of the South* to the Republic's foreign policy since 1994. These roles are associated with middle powers from developing countries that started to assert themselves on the world stage after the Cold War. However, certain characteristics of these roles are similar to the general and traditional middle power roles in the analytical framework developed in chapter two. The primary difference is the regional scope of behaviour and the focus on the interests of the global South as distinct from the global North. Thus, the roles and behaviour associated with emerging middle powers in the current world order lack the universalism of traditional (liberal) middle powers.

### 3.4.3 Emerging middle power roles

#### *Regional leader*

Regional leaders are powerful in their regions and take responsibility for regional governance and security. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy has been characterised by its identification and engagement with the African continent. In his outline of Pretoria's new approach to Africa, Mandela (1993: 89) stated that 'South Africa cannot escape its African destiny'. This entails South Africa's interests being consistent with the interests of the continent and a commitment to African security and development. As the continent's most sophisticated economy, there were expectations for South Africa to contribute to Africa's prosperity and stability. As Mbeki put it in 1995:

South Africa's problems cannot be worse than those experienced by other African countries. Despite our own limitations and problems, it is our objective

to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained development. These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy (DFA 1996).

The mission for African socio-economic development and peace became the driving force of South Africa's international relations under the Mbeki presidency. Mbeki's approach to African upliftment was based on the ANC's conviction that the post-Cold War global political economy had entrenched the marginalisation of Africa through unfair trade practices; high levels of debt and protracted civil wars. One of the party's discussion documents states:

The concentration of the global economy into trading blocs has underscored protectionism, not in Africa, but in the North; Depressed international commodity prices have enriched, not Africa, but the North; The shift in international investment patterns have encouraged business, not in Africa, but in the North; Mounting debts has benefited institutions, not in Africa, but in the North.

This is not to say that poor and undemocratic government has not characterized Africa over the past three decades. But the emerging global economic circumstances are not conducive to the development of democratic cultures in African states. We believe that Africa is once again the victim of a new and grossly unjust global system. Accordingly, we believe that it is of critical importance to highlight the debt issue. The service payments of developing countries now exceed all resources flows from developed countries; there is, therefore, a net transfer of resources from South to North. Unless the issue of debt relief is dealt with more sympathetically an intolerable burden will continue to be placed on future generations of impoverished people in the South (ANC 1994: 12).

The African Renaissance was a vision of continental upliftment to address the concerns listed above. Mbeki first articulated this vision in 1997 in Chantilly, Virginia where he gave an address to the Corporate Council on Africa's 'Attracting Capital to Africa' Summit (Mbeki 1997). The irony of launching the African Renaissance in the US was not lost on scholars (Vale and Maseko 1998). Scholars initially criticised the African Renaissance as being 'high on sentiment, low on substance' (Vale and Maseko 1998) but the agenda for the continent's

renewal was soon manifested in reforming the continent's institutional architecture and pursuing a common programme of economic development (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007).

The former was achieved through the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the AU, which was inaugurated in 2002. The AU was aimed at achieving greater continental cooperation and integration in order to enable African states to strengthen their social, economic, and political relations (Kagwanja 2006). Furthermore, it was aimed at creating an institutional framework through which African states could participate effectively in a globalising world especially with regards accessing international markets and capital. The organisation would also be charged with maintaining peace and security on the continent through peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The rapid creation of the AU was a rare display of cooperation among African states, which fuelled hopes of a new era in continental politics. However, as Kagwanja (2006) observes this cooperation was temporary and the organisation became the scene of power struggles between the continent's 'Big Men'. The emphasis on liberal democratic values (which some leaders felt were imposed by South Africa) and the aim of working closely with the North were viewed with particular suspicion.

NEPAD is the brainchild of Mbeki, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and President Olusegan Obasanjo of Nigeria (Akokpari 2004). It is a programme of African economic recovery focussed on achieving good political and economic governance on the continent in order to channel greater foreign direct investment to spur economic growth. It was warmly welcomed by the G8 nations as an historic initiative to provide for Africa's recovery and of forging a new relationship between the continent and the developed world (Sidiropoulos and Hughes 2004). NEPAD was essentially 'a moral contract' between African countries and the major economic powers for the former to adopt democratic governance and liberalise their economies, in exchange for economic investment, debt relief and development assistance (Akokpari 2004: 246). It has become the 'centrepiece' of South African foreign policy. NEPAD, officially, forms the basis for the Republic's bilateral and multilateral relations in Africa and the world (Qobo 2010: 14).

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was a South African initiative aimed at changing the neo-colonial relations between Africa and donor countries by shifting

responsibility for policing good governance to African countries themselves (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). NEPAD has been criticised for being an elite-driven programme more concerned with gaining the support of the developed world than the interests of ordinary Africans (Akokpari 2004). It has also been described as a thinly veiled imposition of South Africa's neoliberal economic policy, GEAR, on the rest of the continent (Kagwanja 2006: 170). This criticism is consistent with concerns about South Africa's hegemonic ambitions in Africa. The argument goes that Pretoria seeks to achieve its national interests by shaping the continent's economic and political institutions in South Africa's image (Adebajo 2007). Yet, South Africa has displayed a marked reluctance to adopt a hegemonic role on the continent. We can identify three main reasons for South Africa's lack of hegemony in Africa: the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, the ANC's ideological opposition to hegemony, and the context of African politics.

The question of whether South Africa can or should play a hegemonic role on the continent has been a central theme of foreign policy since 1994. International observers, especially Western governments, expected democratic South Africa to take a dominant leadership position in Africa and take responsibility for governance and security on the continent. This was based on an assumption that the Republic's preponderant economic and military power could be easily translated into direct influence over other African governments. Moreover, Western observers assumed the ANC government was willing to play the role of hegemon on the continent. South Africa is often portrayed as the 'gateway to Africa' because of its relatively developed economy, especially the financial system. Barber (2005: 1083) argues:

Frustrated by their failures to resolve Africa's problems of poverty and political instability, (Western governments) saw South Africa as the best internal hope of stimulating economic growth and bringing order to the troubled continent. As a result, a burden of expectation fell on the new government, based on the hope or assumption that it would be able to achieve the goals that had eluded others. The ANC government was cautious, suspecting that the West wanted to reduce its commitment to Africa by transferring responsibility to Pretoria.

South African policy makers have been acutely conscious that it would be a struggle to gain the legitimacy necessary to be accepted as a leader by other African states. The primary reason South Africa has been reticent to play a dominant role in Africa is largely the legacy

of apartheid aggression in Africa and the concern that the Republic would again face isolation if it adopted aggressive policies. This has led to Pretoria avoiding the use of material power to exert influence on the continent. Instead, it has opted to use of 'soft power' instruments like providing ideational and institutional leadership in the AU and NEPAD (Flemes 2009). Flemes (2009: 138) refers to this strategy as 'co-operative hegemony': the use of regional institutions as a foreign policy instrument of regional powers. According to this argument, South Africa's conceptualisation and underwriting of governance institutions in Africa and Southern Africa is a strategy of exerting influence without explicitly claiming hegemonic status. Alden and Schoeman (2004, 2013, 2015b) have persuasively argued that South Africa's economic and military power does not translate into the Gramscian sense of hegemony as the ability to have one's values accepted within one's sphere of influence. For example, South Africa's economy dwarfs those of Swaziland and Zimbabwe yet it has struggled to turn its material power into the ability exercise influence over the authoritarian regimes of King Mswati III and President Robert Mugabe. Pretoria has been unable to create what Burges (2008) calls 'consensual hegemony' by creating consensus around its favoured values of democratic governance in the region.

As the governing party, the ANC has consistently rejected a role conception of regional hegemon, whether in Southern Africa or Africa as a whole. The ANC's 1994 foreign policy discussion document calls on South Africa to 'explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region' and instead, 'seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence'. The Green Paper (DFA 1996) states:

The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally, not as a regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic relations is balanced and mutually beneficial.

In the IR discussion document for the 53<sup>rd</sup> national conference, the ANC (2012: 14) reiterates:

The ANC and the South African government have deliberately avoided playing a hegemonic role in African institutions and politics. We have resisted the call for

us to take a hegemonic posture, which others have called a robust regional leadership that we lack... We do not need to be a hegemonic power to safeguard a progressive agenda. Rather we must acknowledge our responsibilities as the largest economy in Africa and hold fast our continued belief that our prosperity is directly linked to the prosperity of Africa.

Moreover, ANC policy documents, official government documents and speeches of senior policymakers contain many criticisms of US hegemony characterised by the Washington Consensus, international military intervention and the enforcement of neoliberal democracy abroad. Pretoria's reluctance to be seen as a hegemon in Africa can be linked to the ANC's disdain for the effects of US hegemony on world order. An examination of the speeches of senior policymakers in the Mbeki government illustrates this pattern. In their speeches between 1999 and 2008 Thabo Mbeki, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Aziz Pahad make frequent references to hegemony. For example:

We must continue to be the conscience and the voice of the weak and the powerless in the face of the dominant hegemony of the strong and powerful (Mbeki 1999).

Coalitions of the willing on issues that require collective action have also proved to be short-term solutions that also lack credibility. They are often used simply to assert the hegemonic intentions of a minority of countries (Dlamini-Zuma 2006a).

We have to contend with the hegemony of a super-power (Pahad 2007).

Foreign policy during the Mbeki government seems to have been informed by a clear ideological opposition to hegemonic international politics. Ironically, Mbeki was accused of being hegemonic and domineering in domestic politics, which eventually led to his losing his position as president of the ANC and the Republic. By contrast, Jacob Zuma came to power by denouncing hegemonic ambitions in the domestic realm, while expressing greater comfort with expressing hegemonic intentions internationally. An examination of Zuma's international relations speeches from 2009 to 2016 yielded zero references to hegemony. Instead, there is frequent reference to South Africa's 'national interests' and its leadership in Africa (Landsberg 2010). As Alden and Schoeman (2013: 112) argue, under Zuma South

Africa adopted 'an unashamed claim to African leadership'. This was seen most controversially in the campaign for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to become chair of the AU Commission, despite opposition from many member-states. While Dlamini-Zuma was elected to this position, South Africa was accused of being a bully and suffered significant damage to its image on the continent. Some scholars previously argued that it would be in South Africa and Africa's favour if Pretoria adopted a more hegemonic role on the continent (Habib and Selinyane 2006; Habib 2009). However, the aggressive approach of the Zuma government has only weakened South Africa's position by undermining the soft power resources that are the Republic's strength in continental politics.

As will be seen in the coming chapters, the differences between Mbeki and Zuma's approaches to the continent influenced the Republic's behaviour in the UNSC. In the first term on the UNSC, South Africa emphasised common African positions and sought consensus with other African member states on important decisions (see chapters four and five). South Africa's second term in the UNSC was characterised by tensions with other African member states, notably Nigeria and Morocco. This undermined the promotion of African interests in the Council (see chapters six and seven).

The complex dynamics among African member states in the UNSC can be explained by the peculiar context of African politics. Tiekou (2015: 13) cautions against assuming hegemony is possible within the African context. He argues that states like South Africa and Nigeria have difficulty turning their relative economic strength into 'effective diplomatic influence' because of their deep internal problems and resource limitations, as well as the history of colonialism that has made African leaders deeply resentful of powerful states. He argues resentment drives 'African ruling elites to mobilise often against any hegemonic seeker' and the norm of 'pan-African solidarity' socialises African leaders into taking a consensus approach on international issues and defending each other in public (Tiekou 2015: 16). The relative frailty of African state sovereignty, what Robert Jackson (2007) terms the difference between empirical and judicial sovereignty, makes it difficult for any single African state, or even the AU, to play a hegemonic role. As will be seen in parts two and three, African states tend to fight to strengthen their sovereignty in international organisations rather than to dilute it.



While the government has emphasized a cooperative stance towards the rest of the continent, South African business has expanded aggressively into many African countries raising concerns about the replication of neo-colonial or even apartheid economic relations (Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu 2005; Alden and Soko 2005; Qobo 2010). The ANC's 2007 IR discussion document raised the prospect of developing a business code of conduct to regulate the behaviour of South African multinationals in the continent (ANC 2007). That is not to say, the government does not have commercial or economic interests on the continent. One of the features of South Africa's engagement on the continent has been the expansion of investment by State Owned Enterprises like Eskom, Transnet, and PetroSA in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, and DRC (McKinley 2004).

South Africa's credentials as a regional leader are also undermined by widespread anti-African xenophobia, which has resulted in frequent flare-ups of fatal violence across the country. The Republic's migration policies have been criticised for being xenophobic and exacerbating the view of Africans as 'illegal aliens' (Crush and Dodson 2007; Landau 2010; Klotz 2013). State and societal xenophobia has reduced South Africa's credibility within regional organisations, not least the AU (Sidiropoulos 2008). Interestingly, South Africa is not the only the putative middle power with a record of xenophobia and anti-immigration policy. Australia had a long-standing whites only migration policy and has faced international criticism for its off-shore immigrant detention centres (Doherty 2017). Anti-immigration sentiment has also flared up in Brazil (Garcia 2017), Canada (The Globe and Mail, 7 August 2017), Norway (Walker 2016) and Sweden (The Economist, 23 June 2017). While it goes beyond the scope of this study, investigating why extreme xenophobic views thrive in so-called middle powers is a rich area of future research.

The above discussion on South Africa's role as a regional leader points to a challenge facing intermediate states from the global South such as Brazil, India and Turkey. The US expects these states to exert their leadership as 'like-minded regional managers to address the requirements of stability and order' (Alden and Schoeman 2015b: 243). However, these regional powers struggle for legitimacy *within* their regions. As Malamud (2011:1) demonstrates, Brazil has been unsuccessful in using regional leadership as a 'springboard' to

global influence. While it has achieved recognition on the world stage as an emerging middle power, it has been unable to win the legitimacy it requires from its neighbours to play the role of regional leader effectively. South Africa's rhetoric of solidarity, anti-colonialism, and non-interference in multilateral forums such as the UN can be understood as part of its efforts to create 'consensual hegemony' in Africa. Emerging middle powers are often more convincing as regional leaders in international forums like the WTO, UN, and the G20 than in regional forums where the neighbourhood geopolitical dynamics are strongest. The next section explores how emerging middle powers behave as champions of the South to challenge structural power, while securing their position relative to weaker states in the developing world.

### *Champion of the South*

Democratic South Africa has tried to craft a role for itself as a champion of the global South: defending the interests of the South in multilateral forums, challenging US hegemony and, promoting South-South and North-South partnerships to transform the relationship between the developed and developing world. The ANC (1994) discussion document 'Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa' states:

South Africa stands firmly as a country of the South. We are therefore deeply conscious of the importance of developing and sustaining multilateral forums which address the interests of the South. A democratic South Africa will play an active and leading role in the development and strengthening of multilateral fora, which empower the nations of the South.

As discussed in section 3.3, anti-imperialism and solidarity are important values underpinning the ANC's internationalism. The multilateral formations that socialised ANC leaders in exile were the NAM, G77 plus China and to a lesser extent the OAU. It is unsurprising, then, that these institutions became the natural 'home' and community of post-apartheid South Africa. The ANC (1994) explained it thus:

South Africa has had a special link with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Even before the formal establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 the South African National Liberation Movement had forged links with the founders of the movement at the historic 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian

Peoples in Indonesia where our movement was represented by a two-member delegation.

In many respects our struggle for peace, freedom and justice parallels the epic quest of the non-aligned countries, which went through a similar experience and, which stems from the consolidation of their own independence, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Over the years, the NAM has become a central institution of the South where it continues to set the agenda for the coming decades. In the changing world situation the Non-Aligned Movement's relevance and importance cannot be over-emphasised. A strong and militant NAM can only benefit our nascent democracy.

Democratic South Africa adopted the rhetoric and ideological orientation of anti-imperialist organisations of the global South. Pretoria promoted 'a global multilateral rules-based regime to eradicate poverty and deprivation' (DFA 2004). This included initiatives to reform and democratise the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, advocating fairer trade through the WTO, promoting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and supporting the sovereignty of the people of the Middle East and Africa. South Africa took a similar approach to defeating 'global apartheid'<sup>1</sup> as it took in pursuing domestic socio-economic development. Pretoria sought to attract Western capital to invest in the South by using South-South cooperation to promote liberal democratisation and neoliberal economic reforms under the guise of adapting to globalisation. The rationale was that if the developing world adopted Washington Consensus policies on its own terms, then it would achieve maximum benefit from the resulting Western investment and would safeguard its sovereignty in the process. As Landsberg and Monyae (2006: 139) explain 'a constructive and purposeful relationship between ourselves and other countries of the North' would encourage economic development and reduce inequality between the North and the South'.

The Mbeki presidency was characterised by efforts to form strategic relationships with like-minded countries of the South and the major powers of the North. This is typical of middle

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<sup>1</sup> Defined, by Booker and Minter (2001: 11) as 'an international system of minority rule whose attributes include differential access to basic human rights, wealth and power'.

powers that use coalitions of like-minded states to achieve their foreign policy objectives. South Africa formed coalitions to shape globalisation to be a force of greater inclusion and equality in the global economy. As Mbeki (quoted in Bond 2006) stated in 2003:

If we were to follow the prescriptions of neo-liberal market ideology, we would abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and underdevelopment... Poor as we might be, as precisely because we are poor, we have a duty to contribute to the elaboration of the global governance concept... opposing the neo-liberal market ideology, the neo-conservative agenda, and the unilateralist approach.

The ‘elaboration of the global governance concept’ was done through initiatives like IBSA and the G20 group of developing countries at the Fifth Ministerial WTO conference in Cancun in 2003. IBSA was launched through the Brasilia Declaration, adopted on 6 June 2003. India, Brazil and South Africa are often included in the lists of emerging middle powers because of their democratic domestic systems, regional leadership, bridging role in international relations, and their unequal societies. In terms of the Declaration, the three ‘vibrant democracies’, agreed to regular cooperation on international issues as well as similar socio-economic challenges facing all three countries. Specifically, they agreed to cooperate on efforts to reform the UN and promote UNSC expansion and reform. All three countries have positioned themselves as prime candidates for expanded UNSC membership. With regards the economy, the Declaration states:

While welcoming the expansion of economic growth, employment, and social development, and the accompanying rise in standards of living, in several developing countries as a result of freer movements of trade, capital, and technology, the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, India and South Africa expressed their concern that large parts of the world have not benefited from globalisation. They agreed that globalisation must become a positive force for change for all peoples and must benefit the largest number of countries. In this context, they affirmed their commitment to pursuing policies, programmes and initiatives in different international forums, to make the diverse processes of globalization inclusive, integrative, humane, and equitable (Brasilia Declaration 6 June 2003).

The statement above evokes the anti-hegemonic ambitions of previous South-South

initiatives like the NIEO of the 1970s that challenged the post-Second World War economic order. However, the circumstances of the 21<sup>st</sup> century compelled IBSA to adopt more complex strategies: spoiling behaviour, balancing the major powers or being co-opted depending on the specific issue (Stephen 2012). IBSA lobbied for recognition as influential powers in the international system and equal partners to the major powers. Moreover, they tried to use their presence in international institutions to fight for the redistribution of ‘wealth, prestige, and power in the global political economy’ (Nel 2010: 951). However critical scholars argue that instead of presenting an alternative vision to the prevailing neoliberal consensus, IBSA merely served ‘reify neoliberalism as common sense’ (Taylor 2009: 45) and to give ‘legitimacy to the status quo’ (Bond 2006: 4). In addition, the policies followed by IBSA states sometimes ‘deliberately but also unintentionally create sub-optimal conditions for the development of some of their Southern neighbours’ (Nel and Taylor 2013: 1091). From this perspective, IBSA’s claims to challenge the hegemonic world order were reformist at best, and at worst perpetuated or exacerbated global inequalities. As will be seen in chapter five, the IBSA states as well as China and Russia (BRICS), were members of the UNSC in 2011. The presence of all five of the leaders of the ‘Post-Western World’ (Stuenkel 2016) on the Council did not significantly change the work of the Council.

The reform of global governance, especially of the UN, has been a significant aspect of South Africa’s global South agenda. One of the legacies of the anti-apartheid struggle on democratic South Africa is Pretoria’s emphasis on rules-based multilateralism in which all states (regardless of size) can contribute effectively to global governance. South Africa was first brought onto the General Assembly agenda by India in 1946 and it was newly independent African states, from the 1960s, that maintained the anti-apartheid struggle in the UN. Kagwanja (2008: 39) argues that the period of anti-apartheid struggle in the UN ‘also laid the foundations for the contending visions of the world between the liberation movements and regional organisations on the one hand, and the key powers of global politics, on the other’. Western powers were generally more reluctant to take strong action against apartheid and the most vocal voices against the regime came from the newly independent African states and other NAM states in the General Assembly.

Another legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle is Pretoria’s identification with the concern for

development and poverty among global South members of the UN as exemplified in the struggle for a NIEO in UNCTAD in the 1970s and a call for greater emphasis on the MDGs. Democratic South Africa has lobbied for the UN to focus more on development and poverty reduction as strategies for conflict prevention rather than the emphasis on Western defined 'peace and security' (Landsberg 2015: 46). In that regard, Pretoria has been a vocal advocate for the enlargement of the Security Council to reduce the influence of the Western P3 members and to make the Council more representative of the interests of the South.

During its two terms in the UNSC, South African officials were accused of betraying Mandela's legacy by calling for UN reform and challenging power imbalances in the Council, but a closer look at the *Foreign Affairs* article shows that democratising the international system was a deeply held conviction for him too. In the 1993 article, Mandela (1993: 89) argues:

It is the ANC's view that the United Nations has a pivotal role to play in fostering global security and order. But to achieve this serious attention must be paid to a restructuring of the organisation. South Africa intends to play a vigorous role in the debate on this issue. The United Nations should not be dominated by a single power or group of powers, or else its legitimacy will continuously be called into question. We hope a mechanism can be found so that the Security Council can reflect the full tapestry of humankind.

In his last address to the General Assembly on 21 September 1998, Mandela repeated this sentiment saying:

... This very Organisation, including its important Security Council, must itself go through its own process of reformation so that it serves the interests of the peoples of the world, in keeping with the purposes for which it was established (Mandela 1998)

UN reform has thus been central to South Africa's multilateral diplomacy under the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma presidencies. A senior DIRCO official interviewed for this study provided a valuable insight into Pretoria's perspective on the history of the UNSC and the reasons reform is necessary. He argued that the UNSC was created to prevent a third world war in Europe after the damage caused by the First and Second World Wars. The official explained:

... regardless of how we define them as World Wars, they were basically European wars caused by the Europeans and largely fought in Europe. And were fought to protect European interests. And Europe still remains, in spite of the fact that they suffered as well, but they remain the beneficiaries of the outcome of those two wars. Now you have a situation that after the formation of the UN in 1945 they create this Council to make sure that they prevent future wars. It's dominated by Europe: you have three European countries as permanent members, that is Russia, France and the UK, and of course then you have the Americans. So, you basically have the West dominating that Council... But fast forward to today's world... after decolonisation, you find that the agenda as we speak today, 70% of it is on African issues. But then you look back and say historically this Council was not created for Africa.

Therefore, South Africa's call for reform is aimed at making the Council relevant for the current issues dominating its agenda by including Africans and developing countries. Pretoria is also concerned with the continuation of colonial relations between major European powers and the continent. US dominance of the post- Cold War global order has made Washington the major imperial power of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Washington is perceived as using the Security Council to pursue its national interest and protect its allies. An example of this is the failure of the Council to implement sanctions against Israel in its longstanding conflict with Palestine. Pretoria also condemned the US' unilateral decision to invade Iraq in 2003 which was done without the support of the Security Council (Bond 2004). UNSC reform would thus serve to balance the power of the US and its Western allies by including a greater diversity of members. The UNSC has only ever been reformed once, in 1965, when it was enlarged from 11 to 15 members. The veto power of the P5 remained. Scholars and practitioners from the global North have questioned the practical purpose and normative justification for UNSC reform (Weiss 2003).

South Africa took an active involvement in the discussions on UN reform that were launched by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005 (A/59/2005). Among the issues on the reform agenda was the expansion of the UNSC, including permanent seats for Africa and Latin America. South Africa was a leading candidate for one of the African permanent seats. Pretoria initially allied itself with the G4 nations (Germany, Japan, Brazil and India) that were leading contenders for permanent seats in an expanded Council (Kagwanja 2008).

However, the Republic's alliance with the G4 threatened to isolate it from other African states, which were pushing for a unified African stance. South Africa tried to act as a bridge between the G4 and AU to convince them to take a common stance to ensure their proposal would achieve the requisite two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly. However, the two groups could not reach consensus and the reform effort failed when it was voted on at the General Assembly in September 2005.

The 2005 attempt at reform failed because of a number of issues including the unwillingness of the permanent powers, especially China and the US, to expand the number of permanent members. South Africa's attempts at unifying the G4 and African positions and thus secure itself a seat were undermined by the power dynamics among African states. South Africa's involvement illustrates the tension between its aim to be seen as one of the emerging global powers and its struggle for support from other African states. In aligning itself with G4 nations Pretoria was putting itself forward as not only the prime candidate for an African permanent seat but also as a leader of the region. Its later difficulty in swaying the African position to make it consistent with the G4 demonstrates its actual weakness in African politics. While Pretoria may be perceived as a natural leader of the continent by external observers, it has struggled to find legitimacy and authority among other African states. This has undermined its attempts to assert itself within the UN.

Under President Zuma, South Africa has aligned itself more closely to the emerging powers as part of the BRICS. BRICS has transformed from a gimmicky investment classification into an alternative power bloc in the international system, with ambitions of challenging the Western dominated world order. In 2010, South Africa lobbied intensively to be included in the group, with an official from one of the BRIC countries characterising its campaign as 'embarrassing' (Alden and Schoeman 2015b: 115). Nevertheless, South Africa was accepted as a member in December 2010. Critics argue that South Africa does not fit into the BRICS because of its relatively small economy and population size. South Africa is seen as the junior partner in BRICS and it is unclear what impact South Africa has been able to have on the values and operation of the organisation. However, politically South Africa shares many of the objectives of the BRICS and it is able to justify its place as a representative of the African continent. As Minister Maite Nkoana- Mashabane (2010a) explained in a speech at SAIIA in



2010:

As South Africa, we should remember that some of the countries that we characterise as emerging powers have been our fellow travellers as Africans in the struggle against colonialism. We have over the decades forged strong ties of solidarity and partnerships with these countries, with a view to promoting development and reconfiguring the structures of power in international relations in favour of developing countries... We share similar perspectives about the reform of global governance, in particular the imperative for enhanced representation and voice of developing countries in decision-making processes. Significantly, we share a common view that multilateralism and rules-based global governance mechanism is the best guarantor of stability and provides a better framework for asserting our values and interests. We also share the desire to augment our agenda-setting capabilities so that we can engage effectively in multilateral processes, while also defending our policy space and flexibility given the massive development responsibilities our countries carry.

Therefore, policymakers explicitly view South Africa's membership in the BRICS as an important political project to reconfigure structural power and assert the influence of the global South in global governance. The concern with agenda-setting and ensuring rules-based multilateralism was evident in 2011 when all the BRICS served in the UNSC.

Concerns have been raised that its alliance with non-democratic countries like China and Russia will have a negative socialising effect that causes South Africa to neglect its founding norms<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, critics from both outside and within the ANC argue that the economic benefits of being part of BRICS are limited (ANC 2012) and the alignment with China and Russia merely perpetuates neo-imperial relations and potentially exacerbates Africa's marginalisation (NPC 2012). South Africa's BRICS membership is not a case of middle power diplomacy. At best, it demonstrates South Africa's ambitions of being a great power. At worst, it puts the Republic in a position of dependence on China and Russia with limited capacity to influence decisions within BRICS and in global governance as a whole. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, South Africa's alignment with China and Russia raised questions about the independence of its foreign policy and the extent to which its activism in

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<sup>2</sup> I owe this observation to Prof Mzukisi Qobo.

the Council was genuinely driven by principle. It could be argued that Pretoria's anti-hegemonic stance is specifically directed against Western, especially US, hegemony. As the world moves towards a Chinese led and defined order, could we expect Pretoria to play an increasingly traditional middle power role aimed at stabilising and legitimising the hegemonic world order? Indeed, some scholars see South Africa as one of the key pillars in the emerging Sinocentric world order (Stuenkel 2018). This is theoretically consistent with Cox (1989)'s contention that the middle power role evolves with the needs of the extant world order.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

Understanding South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy requires the norms and ideas underpinning the ANC's internationalism. The norms that form the foundation of South African foreign policy include sovereignty, anti-imperialism, human rights, neoliberalism, and pan-Africanism. The contradictions among these norms account for the contradictory behaviour evident in foreign policy since 1994. Mandela's 1993 foreign policy manifesto captures this inconsistency in the six principles it set out for South Africa's democratic foreign policy. South Africa's norm inconsistencies can be explained by the country's contested and fluid identity. South Africa does not have a consistent national identity domestically that it can project internationally. This results in much of its foreign policy becoming a contestation between different versions of 'South Africanness' playing out in the international arena. Recognising the inherent inconsistencies in South African identity and norms allows for a more nuanced understanding of the Republic's foreign policy behaviour.

By prioritising multilateral diplomacy, acting as a bridge in international affairs and being a mediator in conflict situations, South Africa adopted a middle power diplomatic style. This allowed it to be included in the proliferation of middle power lists developed by scholars in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Policymakers did not need to explicitly define the Republic as a middle power. 'Middlepowership' was read from Pretoria's decisions and actions on the global stage, especially its approach to international organisations. However, this middle power orientation was underpinned by the experience of the anti-apartheid struggle that endowed the ANC with a strong anti-imperialist character. Therefore, while South Africa was comfortable being a bridge and stabiliser of the world order, it sought to

mitigate the most unequal aspects of that world order in the interests of the global South. Pretoria also aimed to create a more equitable political economy for Africa, partly in its own interests of living in a stable, prosperous neighbourhood.

Taking an active role in UN processes is one of the main examples of South Africa's middle power behaviour. This led to it being considered as a prime candidate for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC. Given the UN's importance in the development of the post second world war definition of middle powers, examining South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC is an ideal case study to assess the extent to which it acts as a middle power in a particular situation. The next four chapters make up the case study component of this thesis. Chapters four and five examine South Africa's first term in the UNSC, from 2007 to 2008.

Chapter four provides a background of the Republic's election to the UNSC and its stated foreign policy approach to its tenure. It then discusses the non-African country situations and thematic in which South African delegates made statements in public meetings.

## **PART TWO: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNSC 2007-2008**

## CHAPTER FOUR: SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines South Africa's behaviour during its first term in the UNSC. As explained in section 1.4, the study focuses on issues in which South Africa engaged in some active foreign policy behaviour such as voting, drafting a paper, organising a meeting or substantively attempting to influence a Council decision. The middle power role typology will then be used to interpret whether this behaviour conforms to the behaviour of middle powers. South Africa participated in a variety of debates on the 28 country-specific issues on the agenda and 17 general and thematic issues discussed at public meetings. The different issues will be clustered in themes derived from the principles underlying South Africa's foreign policy: promotion of human rights and democracy, commitment to the rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda. The chapter begins with a discussion of the global and domestic context of South Africa's first tenure in the Council. This is followed by an analysis of South Africa's behaviour in relation to the relevant principles underlying its foreign policy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the roles South Africa played in relation to the middle power framework.

In 2007, the elected membership of the Council was composed of Belgium, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, and South Africa. The 2008 membership was Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa, and Vietnam. In both years, there were seven NAM members on the Council giving them sufficient votes to block adoption of a resolution. This is significant because of the practice of NAM members voting as a bloc in UN organs, especially the Security Council (Mingst and Karns 2007: 70). Having South Africa and Indonesia on the UNSC concurrently also strengthened NAM's position because both countries are leading members of the bloc and coordinated some of their actions during their tenure (see SCR 1 March 2007: 10).

The Council held 445 formal meetings in 2007 and 2008. Members of the Council can make statements in debates, briefings and during votes on resolutions. South Africa

made statements in 119 public meetings of the Council during its first term. The UNSC adopted 121 resolutions; South Africa voted in favour of 120 and abstained once. South Africa voted against two draft resolutions, on Myanmar and Zimbabwe, which were not adopted because of vetoes by China and Russia. The presidency of the Council rotates among members each month, following the alphabetical order of the Member States' names in English. South Africa held the presidency of the Council in March 2007 and April 2008.

**Table 4: South African participation in UNSC, 2007 and 2008**

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>Total</b>
Formal meetings	202	243	445
Resolutions	56	65	121
Presidential statements	50	48	98
SA yes vote	56	64	120
SA no vote	1	1	2
SA abstain	0	1	1

Source: United Nations Website <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/>

From the beginning, it was clear that Pretoria's approach to the Council was focused on pursuing the interests of Africa and the global South. In her statement on South Africa's election to the Council Minister Dlamini-Zuma (2006b) expressed the country's gratitude to the people of Africa and the world 'for the confidence bestowed upon us to serve the people of our continent and indeed the world' in the UNSC. She credited Africa and the South for electing South Africa to the position. The statement further said South Africa was accepting the position 'conscious and convinced that the multilateral system of global governance remains the only hope for the challenges facing humanity today'. This commitment to multilateralism is consistent with South Africa's broader commitment to democratising global governance to create a more just and equitable world order.

Specifically, South Africa pledged to 'create synergies' between the AUPSC and the

UNSC for conflict prevention in Africa. The only non-African region that was explicitly mentioned in the statement was the Middle East, where South Africa pledged to work with all members of the UNSC to pursue 'peace and stability'. The statement closed by reaffirming South Africa's commitment to 'comprehensive reform of the United Nations' including the UNSC (Dlamini-Zuma 2006b). It is notable that the statement did not include any language popular with the Western powers, especially the US at the time, including promoting human rights and democracy, fighting terrorism and combatting weapons of mass destruction.

#### **4.2 The global and domestic context of South Africa's first term**

South Africa was elected to the UNSC at a time of growing resistance to the unilateralism that characterised US foreign policy under President George W. Bush. The US invasion of Iraq, its imposition of the 'War on Terror' on other countries and the renewed 'neo-imperial' interest in Africa raised concerns about the threats to sovereignty posed by US foreign policy (Kagwanja 2008). These concerns were exemplified in the resistance to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) being based in a country on the continent. In the end, AFRICOM was headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany when it launched in 2008. In the resolutions of the ANC's 2007 national conference, AFRICOM is described as the 'latest American design to interfere in continental affairs' (ANC 2007; Sidiropoulos 2008: 114). Thabo Mbeki promoted regional security and economic governance initiatives under the AU and NEPAD, in part, to counter US imperial intentions on the continent. During Mbeki's second term in office, South Africa was buoyed by relatively high economic growth rates (an average of five per cent between 2005 and 2007) and stability to take on responsibility for balancing US unilateralism in Africa through investing in continental governance and security (Statistics South Africa n.d.).

UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, revived the debate on UN reform in 2005 with his report entitled 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all' (A/59/2005). The report recommended enlarging the Council to twenty-four members divided between four regions (Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and

The Americas). In 2005, the AU adopted ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”’ (Ext/EX.CL/2 [VII]). The document proposed permanent seats with the veto for Africa. As discussed in section 3.4, this placed South Africa in an awkward position because it had already started cooperating with the front runners for permanent seats in the UNSC, the G4. The G4 were willing to give up veto power for permanence in the UNSC. In the final event, the reform efforts failed because the P5, especially the US and China, were unwilling to sacrifice their structural power (Vickers 2013: 691). Although the reform efforts failed, they resulted in putting South Africa in the spotlight as a significant actor in the UN, which favoured it in the elections for non-permanent members to the UNSC in October 2006.

South Africa was the only African nation running for the available African seat and the AU endorsed its candidature (Kagwanja 2008). This is different from other global regions like Western Europe and Others and Asia where more than one candidate per region stands for the annual election for a UNSC seat and elections are often preceded by intensive campaigning with all the lobbying and bribery that entails. Nevertheless, South Africa’s government, media, some academics, and civil society saw the election as a major achievement and opportunity for South Africa to influence events on the world stage. South Africa’s election to the UNSC coincided with the election of new Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. On 14 October 2006, in a statement congratulating the new Secretary-General, President Mbeki said he hoped that ‘Mr Ban Ki-Moon would continue working with leaders of Africa in their quest for the renewal of the continent, the consolidation of the African Agenda and indeed the development agenda of the south in general’ (DFA 2006b).

Writing soon after South Africa was elected to the Council; Adekeye Adebajo (2006) argued that expectations for the country to play an influential role during its tenure were misguided. The reality of the Council structure was such that permanent members have huge advantage over the ten rotating members, not only by virtue of the veto, but also because of the benefits of permanent membership such as institutional memory and priority with secretariat staff. Moreover, resolutions are



based on closed-door trade-offs between permanent members that have been negotiated over many years. Therefore, the ability for South Africa or other non-permanent members to make an impact in just two years was severely limited. Adebajo argued that for South Africa to have impact it would have to be ‘as an African power on issues concerning the continent’.

Attempts for South Africa to weigh in on cases outside of its sphere of influence were ‘likely to be perceived as delusions of grandeur- and rebuffed’ (Adebajo 2006). Events in South Africa’s tenure were to confirm Adebajo’s misgivings. South Africa’s goals for its tenure were ambitious and aimed at contributing to reform of the Security Council. However, these ambitions were constrained by the realities of having a non-permanent seat, which provides limited opportunities for states to have an impact on everyday Council work let alone radically change the distribution of power between its members.

Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) provided greater insight into South Africa’s approach to its UNSC term in a speech on the topic of *The UN at 60* at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) on 25 October 2006. The most striking parts of Dlamini-Zuma’s LSE speech were when she spoke about the UN’s role in the anti-apartheid struggle and the lessons this held for the organisation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. She argued that it was African states, supported by others in NAM, which led the fight against apartheid in the UN. Because of apartheid South Africa’s favourable relations with Western countries, the P3 were reluctant to act against Pretoria. Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) explains:

Even though apartheid was declared a crime against humanity, action against it at the United Nations did not always receive unanimous support. In the Security Council; the three Western permanent members consistently opposed resolutions against South Africa, including through the repeated use of their veto powers. In particular they used the veto to block the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.

The General Assembly was the body that drove the Agenda to resolve the South African problem peacefully together with UNESCO, ILO, WHO and others.

The UNSC was not responsive to the General Assembly even as it tried to impose economic sanctions against the Apartheid regime; the three Western Members of the UNSC used their triple veto.

Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) further argues that the ability of the Western member states to use their veto to support the apartheid regime despite the view of the majority of UN member states illustrated the problem of the ‘asymmetrical exercise of power’ in the UN and the need for the Security Council to be more representative<sup>3</sup>.

The arguments made by Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) shed light on the ANC-led government’s view of the UN as an embodiment of the unjust and unequal structural power that defines world order. Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) portrays the General Assembly as an ally in the fight against apartheid because the African and NAM states used that forum to condemn and isolate the apartheid government. Conversely, the Security Council is portrayed as an undemocratic institution driven by the major Western powers, which refused to respond to the calls of the majority of UN members to condemn apartheid and instead chose to serve their narrow national interests. The minister argues that the lack of harmonisation of the UNSC and UNGA, as demonstrated in the case of South Africa, is a fundamental weakness of the UN. Moreover, regional organizations, like the OAU, played a vital role as a bridge between the UN and the Southern African liberation movements. Similarly, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the AU Peace and Security Council could contribute to maintaining the UN’s relevance if there was sufficient burden and resource sharing between the two institutions for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa.

Another lesson of the anti-apartheid struggle in the UN is the importance of empowering people in conflict situations to find their own solutions rather than the

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<sup>3</sup> Recent revelations that all five permanent UNSC members ‘busted’ sanctions and continued supplying arms to the Apartheid regime even after the imposition of sanctions led credence to this argument (see Van Vuuren 2017).

UN imposing solutions from the outside. Dlamini-Zuma (2006a) argues that

South Africans negotiated their own transition themselves with international support. They found their own innovative solution since they understood the fault lines better than anybody else in that country.

The UN needs to learn not to impose solutions on conflict situations but rather to support the efforts of those who would have to live with the consequences of decisions in the long term. This means the UN ought to be cautious about using sanctions to bring about change in conflict situations. She calls for the UN to ‘review the role of sanctions as a useful tool that needs to be used judiciously and with care. Sanctions should support peace making and peace building rather than impede it’ (Dlamini-Zuma 2006a). This is a notable departure from the position held by the ANC under apartheid when it supported sanctions as the most effective mechanism to weaken the apartheid state and force it into negotiations. Much of the controversy about South Africa’s first term in the UNSC related to its opposition to imposing sanctions on recalcitrant regimes like Sudan, Iran, and Myanmar.

As is evident from the above discussion South Africa’s approach to the UNSC was activist and intended at pursuing norms of democracy and equality in global governance. Peter Kagwanja (2008: 46), who was part of a roundtable convened by the DFA to discuss how South Africa should approach its time on the Security Council in November 2006, argues that from the beginning the country’s role on the Council ‘took on a distinctively activist hue’. He quotes a senior Department of Foreign Affairs Official who argued:

In our new role on the Security Council, we have two options: to go there and look at where the wind goes, and then wait and see where it blows us, where everyone goes. We would get good publicity and would be loved. But if we behaved this way, would this be consistent with our foreign policy objectives or the views we hold as members of the South, the developing world? Would we be able to recognise ourselves after two years? The UN should not change us. We should change the UN.

Kagwanja (2008: 46) states that Pretoria’s diplomats were cognisant of the moral

authority South Africa carried because of its transition and they ‘were prepared to tap into this political resource to make an impact on global governance’. Reactions to South Africa’s diplomacy on the Council, however, indicate that the country’s reputation was not as durable as expected. South Africa’s moral authority is based on assumptions about its commitment to liberal democracy and human rights, not on a liberationist ideal of sovereign equality of states and democratic global governance. The contradiction between the role expectations of South Africa and the national role conceptions of its policymakers played out starkly during its first term in the UNSC.

### **4.3 Promotion of human rights and democracy**

South Africa’s first meeting in the UNSC was on the topic of ‘threats to international peace and security’ (S/PV.5615 2007). Ambassador Kumalo’s statement set out a number of themes and issue that would be a recurring feature of South Africa’s tenure. Kumalo reminded the Council that the nature of threats to peace and security had changed since 1945 from being predominantly inter-state conflicts to ‘complex, multifaceted and interconnected threats that go beyond the mandate of this Council’ (S/PV.5615 2007: 16). He highlighted poverty and underdevelopment as root causes of the majority of conflicts on the UNSC agenda, including terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This broad definition of security that linked security to poverty and development would be a feature of South Africa’s statements on other issues on the UNSC agenda. All organs of the UN had a role to play in achieving collective security and addressing global threats, in line with the UN Charter.

South Africa challenged ‘mandate creep’ by the Council into non-security issues several times throughout its term, most controversially in its vote on human rights abuses in Myanmar. Instead of addressing legitimate Council issues like Israel-Palestine, Kumalo argued that the UNSC was increasingly addressing issues that fell beyond its mandate. This was seen in the Council resorting:

To Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that may not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, when it could have opted for alternative provisions of the Charter to

respond more appropriately, utilizing other provisions of the same Charter. Chapter VII should be invoked, but as a last resort (S/PV.5615 2007: 17)

Under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ and its specific powers are given in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII (UN Charter). Chapter VI grants the UNSC powers to recommend the peaceful settlement of disputes through appropriate procedures and the right to investigate any dispute to determine whether it threatens international peace and security. Chapter VII grants the UNSC authority to take action ‘with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’ (UN Charter). The UNSC is authorised to identify aggressors and take enforcement measures, including economic sanctions or military action (Karns and Mingst 2007). This action is binding on all UN member states. During the Cold War, the UNSC relied mostly on Chapter VI to discharge its mandate. Indeed, before 1992, even peacekeeping forces were authorised under Chapter VI. In the post-Cold War era, the UNSC has increasingly used Chapter VII interventions. Regional powers from the global South have criticised this trend as a continuation in the colonial relations between the P3 and the global South because this elite group uses their structural power to intervene militarily and economically in poorer countries. As seen in Kumalo’s statement South Africa holds the view that Chapter VII is overused and should be limited to prevent the encroachment of the UNSC in issues outside its mandate. South Africa’s resistance to the use of Chapter VII was criticised by many observers, particularly in its first vote in the UNSC on the situation in Myanmar.

#### 4.3.1 The situation in Myanmar

One of South Africa’s most controversial decisions in its first term in the UNSC was its vote against a draft resolution condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar. The situation in Myanmar was placed on the UNSC agenda on 15 September 2006 through a procedural resolution tabled by the US (SCR 28 September 2006). Until then China had resisted Myanmar being placed on the formal agenda of the Security Council because it argued the situation was an internal issue, which must be solved nationally (SCR 1 June 2006). The use of a procedural vote was significant because

procedural matters need nine votes in favour and permanent members cannot use their veto. Therefore, China and Russia could not prevent Myanmar's inclusion to the Council agenda. However, China and Russia were expected to veto any substantive resolution on the situation in Myanmar.

While the P5 made extensive use of the veto during the Cold War, there has been a shift towards consensus decision-making in the Council since 1990 (Karns and Mingst 2007: 25). The drafters and supporters of a resolution try to get broad agreement on the text before submitting it for discussion in order to avoid the kind of inaction that characterised the Council when it was defined by the superpower rivalry. Consensus decisions give the UNSC the appearance of legitimacy because individual P5 members cooperate with the majority instead of using their structural power to enforce their particular perspective or interests. However, the *threat* of the veto is still a powerful tool in the P5 arsenal, which is frequently deployed. Since the Iraq War China and Russia have often threatened to use the veto to counter plans for intervention by the P3. Consensus decision-making and the veto are important in the case of Myanmar because it was always very clear that China and Russia would not compromise on a draft resolution. China was vehement that the situation in Myanmar did not belong on the Council agenda. There was thus no prospect of any Council action on the issue — whether a presidential statement or resolution — succeeding (Steinberg 2007).

Nevertheless, the US put forward a draft resolution for informal discussions and successfully introduced it for debate on 12 January 2007. Draft resolution S/2007/14 was co-sponsored by the US and UK. The draft expressed deep concern at the slow process of democratic reforms, the continued detention of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and the restrictions by the military junta on humanitarian actors. It deplored the attacks against civilians, including women and children, by the military and the resulting crisis of internally displaced people and refugees. The draft resolution expressed deep concern about 'the transnational risks posed by the situation in Myanmar' especially HIV/AIDS and drug and human trafficking (S/2007/14). One the basis of these concerns the draft called on the government of Myanmar to halt

civilian attacks, release political prisoners and begin a substantive process towards democratisation. The results of the vote were nine in favour (Belgium, France, Ghana, Italy, Panama, Peru, Slovakia, the US, the UK), three against (China, Russian Federation, South Africa) with three abstentions (Congo, Indonesia, Qatar). The resolution failed because of the vetoes from China and Russia (S/PV.5619).

Speaking before the vote, Ambassador Kumalo emphasised that South Africa did not wish 'to question, to judge or to comment on the content of this draft resolution. For the record, I wish to reaffirm that my delegation is concerned about the situation in Myanmar' (S/PV.5619 2007: 4). However, the delegation was voting against the draft for three reasons. First, that the draft compromised the Secretary General's 'good offices' mission led by the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari. Kumalo argued that Gambari's ability to do his job would be undermined by the draft, potentially closing the line of communication with the Myanmar government forever. Secondly, that the draft dealt with issues best left to the UNHRC. If these issues were to be picked up by the Security Council, the UNHRC would be unable to deal with them. The third and most fundamental reason was that the draft fell outside the mandate of the Council, which is to deal with matters of international security. Kumalo stated that the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in the Philippines had reaffirmed in a statement on 11 January 2007 that Myanmar was not a threat to its neighbours and was therefore not a threat to international security (S/PV.5619 2007: 4).

Indonesia and Qatar, which both abstained from the vote, made similar arguments to South Africa about the UNSC's Charter mandate (S/PV.5619 2007: 4-5). Congo also abstained from the vote and its delegate, Basile Ikouebe, noted that the country had been opposed to Myanmar being placed on the Council's agenda in the first place. This position was consistent with the view of non-aligned and ASEAN countries which did not see the situation in Myanmar as a threat to international peace and security. He said Congo could have voted against the draft but had chosen to abstain 'in a spirit of reconciliation' in the hope that the co-sponsors of the draft would find another way to deal with the problem (S/PV.5619 2007: 8).

While South Africa was not the only elected member state concerned with the problem of the Security Council encroaching on the mandate of other UN organs, it was harshly criticized for its 'no' vote and accused of betraying its history of human rights struggle (Jacobsen 2007). Indonesia, Qatar and Congo acknowledged the human rights challenges facing Myanmar before presenting their arguments for abstaining. Indeed, Indonesia integrated its concerns about the procedural aspects of the draft with its concerns about the substance of the challenges in Myanmar (S/PV.5619 2007: 4). For example:

The other basic question is whether the proposed draft resolution is likely to be effective in achieving its goal. No doubt it is directed at very important goals, namely, the restoration of democratic institutions and practices in Myanmar, the achievement of justice for the victims of human rights violations and the attainment of national reconciliation so that Myanmar can move forward as a member of the world community in good standing. Indonesia and all its fellow members of Myanmar in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) share these goals. But we must pause to think whether the proposed draft resolution would help to achieve that goal. There have been Security Council resolutions that did not achieve their objectives. Before adopting this draft resolution, let us be sure that it is going to be effective.

Kumalo's refusal to address the substance of the human rights concerns in the draft appeared to observers as uncaring and a contradiction of the ANC's many years of activism within the UN for sanctions against the apartheid regime's violation of human rights in South Africa (Naidoo 2009). Moreover, South Africa's raising of similar concerns to those of China led to accusations that Pretoria was merely trying to ingratiate itself with the rising superpower and to distance itself from the West (Mail and Guardian 15 January 2007). These objections were based on the view of South Africa's foreign policy as one guided by human rights as was articulated by Mandela in 1993. They did not take into account the global changes that had taken place since then, primarily the concerns about US unilateralism.

Perhaps South Africa could have communicated its concerns like Congo, Indonesia,



and Qatar by abstaining. Abstention would have allowed South Africa to register its concerns about the resolution, while not giving the appearance of callous disregard for human rights and would likely not have resulted in the same vociferous criticism. South Africa's concerns about the draft were valid. In a thorough discussion of US policy on Myanmar under the Bush presidency, Steinberg (2007) argues that the draft resolution did not meet the criteria for intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because ASEAN did not consider the situation in Myanmar as a threat to international peace and security in the region. He posits that 'the reason for the United States placing that on the UNSC agenda was more theatre than reality and related to internal U.S. political influence than in expectations of approval' (Steinberg 2007: 222). Thus, there were legitimate reasons for South Africa not to support the draft resolution as presented in the UNSC.

From the discussion above, it is clear that South Africa primarily played the role of the champion of the South in the situation in Myanmar. By advocating strict adherence to the UN Charter and calling on ASEAN to take the lead on whether to define the situation as a threat to international peace and security, South Africa was seeking to counter US unilateralism and the abuse of the Council for US national interests. Pretoria assumed its moral legitimacy was unconditional and would enable it to balance US interests. This assumption was naïve. South Africa's global authority was based on a hegemonic interpretation of the anti-apartheid struggle as a struggle for liberal human rights and of the transition to democracy as a vindication of Western liberalism. It was always contingent on the approval and acceptance of the hegemon. Adebajo (2009) criticises South Africa for acting like 'a 15-year-old juvenile trying to save the world' when it 'should simply have abstained and hidden behind the Russian and Chinese veto'. He convincingly argues that it was problematic for an ANC-led, democratic South African government to be using the same arguments to protect Myanmar that the apartheid government used to protect itself. South Africa's use of its first vote in the UNSC to oppose the US earned the ire of the dominant voices in the international community and inflicted reputational damage that was arguably disproportionate to the crime. Promoting human rights has become an important marker of civilisation and good international citizenship and South

Africa's Myanmar vote marked it as a deviant or 'rogue democracy' (Gerson 2008).

The delegation appears to have learned an important lesson from the Myanmar vote because the statements made in subsequent votes on other issues were less combative and took care to emphasize human rights and humanitarian concerns. Moreover, the Myanmar vote taught South Africa about the limitations of elected membership of the Council, which endows only temporary status and limited power in relation to the P5. As Minister Dlamini-Zuma stated in her foreword to the UN Mission's report on the 2007-2008 term:

In this, our first membership of the Security Council, we learned valuable lessons regarding the complexity not only of the issues facing the Council, but also of the Council itself- a body with established traditions and vested interests. Elected members participate for a very short period in an environment characterized by power inequalities (DFA 2009a).

South Africa's vote on the draft resolution in Myanmar displayed a low level of sophistication and diplomatic skill. South Africa could have abstained, commented on substantive issues and maintained its principled position like Indonesia. In its naiveté and lack of diplomatic nous, South Africa did not behave as a middle power on the situation in Myanmar.

#### 4.3.2 Western Sahara

The struggle for independence and self-determination for Western Sahara has been an important cause for the ANC since its days in exile. Western Sahara's liberation movement, *Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro* (Polisario Front), has been fighting for self-determination since 1975. Polisario and its supporters have argued for Sahrawi independence in terms of the UN's decolonisation resolutions, especially UNGA resolution 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) that provide for the declaration of independence. The ANC considers Polisario one of its sister movements; every national elective conference since unbanning in 1990 has included a resolution supporting Western Sahara's struggle for self-determination. Support for Polisario was a common African position from 1982 to 2017. Morocco was forced to

withdraw from the OAU in 1982 when 26 member states recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Western Sahara placed South Africa in the odd position of having to direct its anti-imperial activism in the UNSC against a fellow African power, Morocco.

The mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is renewed every six months. The Group of Friends of Western Sahara (Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) has led UN deliberations since the 1990s (SCR 18 April 2007). On 30 April 2007, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1754 to renew MINURSO's mandate. The resolution also referred to the renewed negotiations between Morocco and Polisario for a peace plan, after both parties had sent proposals to the Secretary-General with their conditions for talks.

Ambassador Kumalo reiterated South Africa's support for Western Sahara's right to self-determination and stated that his delegation would 'reluctantly' support the resolution because it did not want to 'stand in the way of creating a platform' for negotiation between the two parties. He insisted that he had to 'place on record' his delegation's discomfort with the wording of parts of the resolution and its unhappiness with the way in which the Group of Friends had approached the matter by giving 'us less than 24 hours to decide' on the draft resolution. Kumalo complained:

This is what sometimes causes the Council not to be viewed as more credible: some of us who are not in those groups, are never given enough time to decide on such issues. We hope that in the future, those drafting resolutions will make room for the rest of us to fully participate.  
(S/PV.5669 2007: 2)

South Africa also criticised resolution 1754 for only including reference of Morocco's plan, effectively ignoring Polisario (S/PV.5669 2007). Kumalo argued that this was evidence of the Group of Friends' bias towards Rabat.

South Africa's diplomacy on Western Sahara placed great emphasis on human rights, in contrast to other issues on which the delegation consistently argued that human

rights concerns fell beyond the mandate of the Council. At the 31 October 2007 meeting Kumalo expressed that the draft resolution (S/2007/637) excluded human rights violations in Western Sahara despite the inclusion of the issue in the Secretary-General's previous three reports:

But the Council, which is very vocal about human rights issues in other parts of the world, has decided to be silent on the human rights of the people of Western Sahara. This double standard is the reason that people sometimes do not take the decisions of this Council seriously (S/PV.5773 2007: 2).

South Africa was the only member that made a statement at the meeting. In spite of South Africa's reservations, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 1783. Kumalo (S/PV.5773 2007: 3) justified voting for the resolution as supporting the negotiation process in the hopes that the Sahrawi people could achieve self-determination 'because that may be the only way for them not only to be in charge of their lives, but even to protect their own human rights'. South Africa's call for the UNSC to condemn human rights abuses in Western Sahara was part of its view that collective rights like self-determination have as much salience as individual human rights.

On 30 April 2008, when South Africa held the presidency of the Council, Kumalo again accused the Group of Friends of undermining the Council with the manner in which it approached the drafting of the MINURSO renewal resolution (S/2008/284). He argued:

As has been our experience in this matter in the Council, the Group of Friends have once again failed to be receptive to any substantial change to the text that was initially agreed to by the Friends. Unlike other Council outcomes, there was once again no real attempt to reach a compromise on the contentious paragraphs so that we could be assured of a balanced text (S/PV.5884 2008: 4).

The representative of Costa Rica also criticised the Group of Friends for sidelining other Council members (S/PV.5884 2008: 2-3). He lamented:

Costa Rica has worked constructively and demonstrated flexibility, creativity and, today, humility, despite the particular negotiating dynamic with which we were faced. Our proposals to improve the paragraphs on human rights and respect for international law were never reflected in the text or negotiated in consultations. The implications of such a negotiating process are many and do nothing to strengthen the Council's legitimacy and transparency. Progress may be slow, as they say, but we have expressed our concern, maintained our position in the negotiations and defended the ideas and principles that underpinned our campaign to obtain the seat we now occupy on the Council

The issue of UNSC inconsistency and manipulation by certain powerful states goes to the heart of South Africa's arguments for UNSC expansion and reform. These arguments were always phrased in terms of securing the legitimacy and credibility of the UNSC in particular, and the UN as a whole. Kumalo again emphasised the double standards on human rights in the Council:

My delegation finds it extremely curious that some Council members selectively are quick to pronounce on the human rights situations in countries that are not even on the agenda of the Security Council, such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe, but refuse to deal with human rights abuses in Western Sahara, which this Council has been faced with for decades. This double standard creates a clear impression to the international community that the Council simply does not care about the human rights of the people of Western Sahara (S/PV.5884 2008: 4).

South Africa's human rights diplomacy in the UNSC demonstrates how difficult it is to pursue a rights-driven foreign policy. In the case of Western Sahara, the promotion of human rights was consistent with Pretoria's principles of self-determination, solidarity, anti-imperialism, and UNSC reform so it was easy to make explicit reference to human rights in UNSC statements. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Myanmar, human rights protection was inconsistent with self-determination and solidarity. Herein lies the rub for South Africa: its claims of pursuing a principled foreign policy are undermined by the lack of consistency in pursuing any of its stated foreign policy principles, whether universal human rights or anti-imperialism and

sovereignty. South Africa's behaviour on the issue of Western Sahara appears to fit the emerging middle power categorisation in the analytical framework. The Republic promoted human rights norms, emphasised self-determination and took a leadership role on this long-standing regional issue. Its behaviour was also consistent with the ANC's history of activism on Western Sahara. However, one could argue that in so far as South Africa failed in communicating the nuances of its position on human rights and territorial integrity in the case of Western Sahara, it did not play the kind of policy and norm leadership role associated with middle powers.

#### 4.3.3 Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

South Africa's diplomacy on WPS was one of the most criticised aspects of its tenure. It has been used by scholars as an example of inconsistency and contradictions in the Republic's foreign policy (Nathan 2008; Jordaan 2010; Borer and Mills 2011). This issue starkly illustrates the tension between Pretoria's commitment to anti-imperialism and the African Agenda on one hand, and its claim to good international citizenship through the promotion of women's rights, on the other. It is discussed in some detail here because it is an excellent case of the difficulties South Africa faces in crafting a consistent role for itself in international affairs.

South Africa's first action on WPS in its first term took place on 7 March 2007, in the Republic's first ever meeting as the president of the UNSC (S/PV.5636 2007). In that meeting, Ambassador Kumalo read a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/5) reaffirming the Council's commitment to the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. The statement urged UN member states to increase representation of women in national, regional, and international institutions for conflict prevention and resolution. It further recognised the need for gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and took note of the 'Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations' (S/2000/693). The statement expressed the Council's deep concern at 'the pervasiveness of all forms of violence against women and girls in armed conflict' including 'grave sexual violence' (S/PRST/2007/5).

Given that presidential statements are drafted and promoted by the president of the Council, South Africa's selection of WPS as the subject of its first meeting as president indicated the importance of the issue for Pretoria. Presidential statements are passed by consensus so the statement reflects a broad agreement regarding the importance of the Council stating its position on sexual and gender-based violence in conflict. However, in the course of 2007, the opinions of member states on the issues diverged.

While there was broad in-principle agreement that sexual violence in conflict was a problem that needed to be addressed, several African states felt that Western interest in the issue was targeted at specific African governments. Observers have cogently criticised the voyeurism and pathologising rhetoric adopted by many Western activists against rape as a weapon of war. This rhetoric served to perpetuate stereotypes of savage, hypersexual African men and the perpetual victimhood and sexualisation of African women and girls. Yet, sexual violence in the DRC and Darfur is a real problem with dire consequences for the health, livelihoods, and social lives of women in those countries (Hindle 2017; IJR 2017). South Africa faced the complicated choice of either adopting the same critical language as Western countries at the risk of perpetuating negative stereotypes of Africans and being alienated in the continent or challenging the Western position at the risk of being seen as condoning sexual violence. Typically, Pretoria tried to take a compromise position and bridge the differences between the West and Africa. However, its efforts were unsuccessful and it ended up being accused of defending perpetrators of sexual violence.

On 23 October 2007, the UNSC held its annual open meeting on the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1325 (S/PV.5766 2007). Organisers of thematic debates often prepare concept notes to guide discussion towards their objectives. As president of the Council, Ghana prepared a concept note on the topic 'Towards coherent and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)', suggesting that the debate focus on how states could effectively meet the obligations set out in the resolution including gender mainstreaming at national and international levels (S/2007/598). However, France had

hosted an ‘Arria-formula’<sup>4</sup> meeting on 1 October about the situation of women in armed conflict in Africa, in which victims of mass rape from DRC and Sudan had presented harrowing testimonies. This raised expectations that the 23 October meeting would deal specifically with sexual violence and rape, as opposed to general issues around the implementation of resolution 1325.

The result of these divergent expectations of the debate was a set of statements, which spoke past each other. Slovakia, Belgium, the US, UK, Panama, France, Peru, the Netherlands, and Portugal all made extensive reference to sexual violence and rape in conflict (S/PV.5766 2007). The US representative noted that his country had introduced a draft resolution entitled ‘Eliminating the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as instruments to achieve political or military objectives’ (A/C.2/62/L.16) in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The representative of the UK, Ms Pierce, gave graphic descriptions of the crimes described in the France-organised meeting, including:

Public rape in front of families and communities, forced rape and incest between victims, the introduction of objects into victims’ cavities, the pouring of melted rubber into women’s vaginas, the shooting of women in the vagina and inducing abortion using sharp objects (S/PV.5766 2007: 17).

South Africa, Ghana, Russia, China, Congo, and Indonesia spoke about the problem of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations but did not refer to DRC and Sudan. They also placed sexual crimes in conflict within the broader context of sexual violence in societies, as well as the need to have greater representation of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Ambassador Kumalo aligned his delegation with the SADC statement read out by the delegate of Zambia. Kumalo stated that ‘South Africans pride ourselves’ on having women in senior positions in government, business and civil society (S/PV.5766 2007: 24). This

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<sup>4</sup> Arria formula meetings are informal meetings organized by a UNSC member/s to be briefed by individuals or organisations with knowledge about what is happening on the ground in a specific issue that may or not be on the UNSC agenda. Because they are informal, Arria-formula meetings have no record and no outcomes (SCR 9 May 2017).



was an indication of the extent to which South Africans had ‘recognised the need for mainstreaming a gender perspective in all aspects of our lives’. While Kumalo did not directly criticise the Western emphasis on African conflicts, the content of his statement reflects South Africa’s resistance to being drawn into the debate on sexual violence in DRC and Darfur. By speaking about South Africa’s gender equality credentials and previous advocacy of making sexual violence a war crime, it appears Kumalo sought to justify his government’s stance of not explicitly joining the current debate on sexual violence and rape.

The major controversy regarding South Africa’s position in relation to sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war came not from its actions in the UNSC but from its challenging of the US’s draft resolution in the UNGA in November 2007. South Africa was criticised for joining with Angola to lead the Africa Group in opposing the original wording of the resolution to remove references to state-sponsored sexual violence in favour of wording on sexual violence in general (IGD 2008). Critics argued that South Africa’s actions served to dilute the resolution and remove its original purpose of condemning the use of sexual violence by repressive regimes like Sudan and Myanmar. This is seen as inconsistent with the Republic’s stated commitment to women’s rights. Gender activist Charlene Smith suggested Pretoria was trying to protect its soldiers that were accused of rape in countries like the DRC (Smith 2007). This is valid criticism as South African soldiers engaging in sexual misconduct or violence while part of UN peace operations is a recurring problem. However, the wording of the US draft resolution precluded sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers or other representatives of international organisations.

Other observers argue that South Africa and others sought to challenge the exclusion of ‘rape in detention centres and in situations of foreign occupation because such a resolution would embarrass the likes of the US, UK and Israel’ (IGD 2008: 15). According to the IGD (2008), South Africa wanted the condemnation of all kinds of rape in all kinds of conflict situations. Deputy Ambassador Sangqu stated:

We are objecting to the resolution because it is politicised and singles out clear categories of rape. We want a resolution that is non-politicised

and that looks at rape in a holistic manner in all its situations, including rape by soldiers in detention centres and in situations of foreign occupation.

Ambassador Kumalo accused the US of 'being very disingenuous' by focusing on 'condemning rape by military and government institutions', whereas South Africa wanted to condemn rape in all its forms. Indeed, progress since 2007 appears to vindicate this position. There has been a gradual shift since 2007 away from focusing solely on state-sponsored sexual violence in situations of armed conflict to including sexual violence under crimes against humanity, which enables widens the scope of international prosecutions for sexual violence (Hindle 2017).

The final resolution (A/C.3/62/L.16/Rev.2 2007) removed references to governments and state-sponsored sexual violence. The US expressed disappointment that they 'could not secure stronger language condemning government-sponsored rape. We could not have imagined that language along those lines would provoke controversy'. The IGD (2008: 15) argue that this resolution was a victory for the Africa Group that is 'historic in the annals of power politics within the UN' because small states managed to force the US to change its position.

While the November 2007 controversy has dominated subsequent analysis of South Africa's behaviour on WPS issues in the UNSC, the Republic adopted a more cooperative stance on these issues later in its term. At a high-level meeting on 19 June 2008, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1820 that was sponsored by fifty UN member states including South Africa (S/PV.5916 2008). The resolution recognised that sexual violence was used as 'a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group' and demanded all parties to armed conflict to immediately cease all acts of sexual violence against civilians (S/RES/1820/2008).

Minister Dlamini-Zuma represented South Africa and stated 'sexual violence constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity when committed as a part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population by State or non-state actors'

(S/PV.5916 2008: 12). She reminded the Council of South Africa's record regarding the inclusion of sexual violence as a crime in the Rome Statute, as well as the presidential statement adopted during the Republic's presidency in March 2007. She expressed pride in the high representation of women in South Africa's peacekeeping operations in Africa, which was a product of the 'mainstreaming of gender and human rights in predeployment training' (S/PV.5916 2008: 12).

South Africa's statement in the June 2008 debate engaged the problem of sexual violence and rape directly unlike the previous debate. However, there was no mention of specific conflict situations on the Council agenda like DRC and Darfur. This reflects Pretoria's belief that the issue was being used to target specific African governments instead of being sincerely addressed. By contrast, the European and American members of the Council all referred to cases of sexual violence in DRC, Darfur, Sierra Leone, and non-African contexts like Yugoslavia. After it was passed, reference to resolution 1820 was included in resolution 1828 (2008) on Darfur, which demanded all parties to the conflict to protect civilians 'from all forms of sexual violence, in line with resolution 1820 (2008)'.

The debates on WPS demonstrate the challenges Pretoria faced in consistent foreign policy behaviour. On the one hand, policymakers had legitimate concerns about the manipulation of the WPS agenda by Western powers to target particular states and downplay charges of sexual abuse by Western peacekeepers. On the other hand, South Africa's reluctance to name and shame countries where sexual violence against women is endemic to conflict opened it up to legitimate criticism of protecting women's rights abusers. Moreover, it displayed insensitivity to the victims of sexual violence within South Africa. The preoccupation with challenging structural power within the UNSC appeared as callousness and neglect of the wellbeing of the most powerless people in the world. In spite of these contradictions, one can argue that South Africa did behave as an emerging middle power on WPS because it led the African response against the UNGA resolution and managed to delay Council action on the issue. Moreover, discourse and international criminal jurisprudence on sexual violence has shifted towards South Africa's definition of sexual violence as a crime

against humanity and a war crime, whether perpetrated by state or non-state actors. This indicates that the opposing views in the debate on WPS have contributed to evolving norms and practices on the issue. South Africa's positions in the UNGA and UNSC are an example of such contributions.

#### **4.4 Commitment to rule of law**

A commitment to a rules-based international order and international law is one of the main principles underlying South African foreign policy. During its tenure in the UNSC this manifested in the Republic's resistance to mandate creep of the Council into non-security issues, promotion of strict adherence to the UN Charter, advocacy for international rules to be applied fairly among all states and a promotion of principles of international justice like complementarity. This section focuses on the debates on conflict in the Middle East and the thematic debate on climate change. Pretoria sought to influence deliberations on all of these issues by advocating for the UNSC to abide strictly by the rules and laws of the international order, particularly the UN Charter. The drafters of the UN Charter did not envisage it as an instrument of decolonisation or global equality. However, as discussed in chapter three, people in the colonised world saw the emancipatory potential of Charter's promise to 'reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small' (UN Charter; Mazower 2009). South Africa's frequent references the Charter and the fair application of the rule of law can be seen in light of this lofty ideal. However, the situations discussed below illustrate that sometimes the Republic's concerns were less about the principle of international law than *who* was making the rules and *who* was benefitting.

##### **4.4.1 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iran**

A month after South Africa took up its seat in the Security Council, the IAEA reported to the Council, on 22 February 2007, that Iran had failed to comply with a December 2006 resolution and was continuing with nuclear enrichment activities (Kessler 2006; Global Policy Forum 2007). In response to that report, the P3 plus

Germany, proposed the inclusion of tough new sanctions measures including a travel ban on certain Iranian officials, cutting off billions of dollars in export credits for companies trading with Iran and a prohibition on arms imports by Iran. Russia and China did not agree with new punitive measures so the Group of Six compromised with a draft resolution expanding the list of individuals and companies covered by the assets freeze and travel restrictions imposed in resolution 1737 (Lynch 2007).

South Africa responded to the Group of Six draft resolution with a document of its own proposals, which effectively weakened the new sanctions package. Ambassador Kumalo indicated that the proposals were intended as a protest by the 10 elected members of the Council against their exclusion from the big power negotiations of the previous three weeks. Heinlein (2007) quotes Kumalo:

If we are asking for things deleted, that's exactly what we do with any resolution that comes here. We always have the right to suggest, 'can you change this word. Can you do that? Why do you guys want to treat this resolution as if it's written by god or has the wisdom of god in it?' It's a regular resolution. We are doing what, as elected members of the Security Council, we are supposed to do.

Indonesia joined South Africa in proposing an amendment to the draft resolution (Avni 2007). The Western Powers objected to the amendments with the French Ambassador to the UN describing them as 'not consistent with the approach the Security Council is following' (Avni 2007). Because South Africa held the presidency of the Council in March 2007, the P3 accused it of abusing its power to delay new sanctions. Despite these concerns, slight modifications based on the South African and Indonesian proposals were included in the draft resolution and the meeting to vote on it was scheduled for 24 March. Kumalo said he had been led to believe that he would have more time to consider the resolution and he felt 'steamrolled' into holding the vote so soon (CNN 23 March 2007). This was disputed by the French ambassador who was quoted by CNN as saying that discussions were scheduled for an entire day. The Security Council adopted resolution 1747 by a unanimous vote. The final resolution prohibited Iran from the supply, sale or transfer of arms; called on other nations to exercised restraint in selling heavy weapons to Iran; placed restrictions on

the ability of certain Iranian officials and scientists to travel abroad and expanded an assets freeze to certain Iranian institutions and individuals (S/RES/1747).

In his statement on the vote, Kumalo stated that South Africa believed that coercive measures such as sanctions 'should be utilised with great caution and only to support the resumption of political dialogue and negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution' (S/PV.5647 2007: 4). He expressed his disappointment that not all South Africa's proposed revisions to the draft resolution were adopted. However, the resolution was an improvement on the previous draft because it acknowledged the need to respect the rights of all countries, including Iran, to exploit nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and it called on all signatories to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation to comply with their obligations. (S/PV.5647 2007: 5). He called for every effort to be made to resume dialogue so a negotiated settlement could be achieved.

In 2008, South Africa, Indonesia, Libya and Vietnam refused to discuss another draft sanctions resolution introduced by the P3 until the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, released his report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. They were uncomfortable with the Iran nuclear issue being led by the Council, as the IAEA is the international organization responsible for regulating peaceful uses of nuclear technology. These four countries wanted to the UNSC to take the lead from the IAEA. The major challenge for the sponsors of the draft resolution was to uphold Council consensus on the draft, given the signals from the group of elected members that they could abstain (SCR 26 February 2008). This indicates the influence that small and intermediate states can wield even within the constraints of structural power. As discussed in section 4.3.1, consensus decision-making has become an important marker of legitimacy for the UNSC. By threatening the consensus, the elected members could buy time and constrain the actions of the P3. Criticism from South Africa and Indonesia was especially sensitive because of their leadership their respective regions and NAM. Getting the buy-in of regional leaders is important for reinforcing the universality of hegemonic values and providing the actions of the hegemon with a veneer of legitimacy.

The draft resolution was debated on 3 March 2008 and adopted as resolution 1803 with fourteen votes and an abstention by Indonesia (S/PV.5848 2008). Speaking before the vote, Ambassador Kumalo expressed regret that the drafters of the resolution had not updated it to acknowledge Iran's progress with the IAEA:

The rationale for bringing the Iran issue to the Security Council in the first place was, we were told, to reinforce the decisions of the IAEA and to enhance its authority, and yet the current draft resolution does not accurately reflect what is happening at the IAEA. We are seriously concerned about the implications of this situation for the credibility of the Security Council, and the only reason we will vote in favour of the resolution is to preserve the previous decisions of the Council that Iran has not fully implemented. (S/PV.5848 2008: 7)

Kumalo stated that South Africa did not want war to break over the issue of nuclear enrichment in Iran:

The suspension of enrichment activities may under no circumstances become a goal in itself. In addition, it is incumbent on the Council to assure Iran that the call for suspension is not a smokescreen for any indefinite suspension or termination. In this regard, it would also be important to terminate the sanctions once the IAEA has addressed the remaining issues. (S/PV.5848 2008: 8)

South Africa reaffirmed the principle that Iran should enjoy the rights and responsibilities of any member state under the non-proliferation treaty once the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme had been established.

The Republic's diplomacy in the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iran was informed both by its stance on nuclear proliferation and by the ANC's cooperative historical relations with Iran after the revolution (Onderco 2016). Together with fellow NAM leader Indonesia, South Africa was criticized for trying to influence the kind of 'high politics' issue on which elected UNSC members are expected to take the lead from the P5.

Some questioned South Africa's stance to Iran's nuclear programme given that it is the only country in the world to voluntarily stop developing nuclear weapons and was actively involved in the negotiations on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (Jordaan 2010). Its support of Iran therefore appeared to be a contradiction of its history. However, Pretoria saw its actions as consistent with its previous stance on non-proliferation. Minister Dlamini-Zuma stated that while South Africa remained committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction it was:

Opposed to the view that the right to peaceful nuclear technology should be a preserve of the rich and powerful to the exclusion of the majority countries depriving the have-nots in perpetuity. The right to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is enshrined in Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and this right cannot be unilaterally abrogated by anyone (Dlamini-Zuma 2007).

Therefore, South Africa's activism on the Iran resolutions can be seen as a protest against the perceived desire of the nuclear powers to monopolise nuclear technology at the expense of the developmental needs of the majority of poor, weak states. The Republic acted as an activist and champion of the global South in advocating for greater consultation on the resolutions, as well as underscoring the rights of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. This is consistent with the roles and behaviour of emerging middle powers.

The Iran issue confirms Adebajo's (2006) observation that many Security Council decisions are based on closed-door trade-offs that have been negotiated over many years. Therefore, the involvement of non-permanent members is nothing more than a formality. This is an example of how a practice has evolved in the Council that may not be entirely consistent with the letter of the rules present in the UN Charter. As previously discussed, one of Pretoria's foreign policy aims is to ensure equal participation of all states in global governance according to international law. This means that all states should play by the same rules and the procedures of multilateral institutions should be respected. In challenging the Iran resolution, it appears the South African officials were challenging the undemocratic practices of the Council and pursuing their agenda of Council reform. However, Pretoria was also challenging



the reality that, by virtue of their structural power, the P3 and Germany assumed leadership for punishing and rewarding Iran regardless of the other international institutions and mechanisms in place for governing nuclear proliferation. Western powers seem to have held on to their colonial privileges and use their structural power in the UN to influence the decisions of states in the global South in ways that are analogous to colonialism. This raises the question of whether South Africa would have responded differently to the calls for sanctions if they had been led by China and Russia. Pretoria's issue may not be with the existence of structural power but rather who is at the top. A different configuration of power with a different set of states at making the decisions could have provoked a different response.

#### 4.4.2 The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has been on the UNSC agenda since 1946. Yet, the Council has played a minor role in mediating the conflict. Israel has refused to be bound by UN resolutions and the UNSC has proved powerless to take leadership on the issue because four of the P5 are included in the multilateral configuration that has led mediation attempts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Quartet' is a small group composed of the EU, Russia, the UN Secretary-General and US that has launched several mediation efforts over the past two decades. The UNSC's weakness on this issue is also a result of the US's support of Israel in the Council. The US has cast all of the vetoes related to the Israel-Palestine conflict since 1990 to prevent the UNSC taking any action on the conflict (SCR 17 December 2007: 18).

South Africa's position on the Israel-Palestine conflict is informed by its history of colonial occupation and apartheid, as well as the reality that the Republic is home to small but influential Jewish and Muslim populations. Within the UN, South Africa's actions on the Israel-Palestine conflict have been informed by its membership in NAM and the G77 plus China (DFA 2007: 54). In all its statements when this issue was debated during its UNSC term, South Africa aligned itself with the statement delivered by the NAM representative in the meeting.

At a meeting on 13 February 2007, Ambassador Kumalo raised concerns about the

‘financial blockade’ against the Palestinian Authority and the refusal of the international community to recognise the Hamas-led government elected by Palestinians in 2006. He urged ‘Israel to release all Palestinian tax revenues’ because ‘the taxes withheld by Israel belong to the Palestinian people and are neither development assistance nor generosity of any kind’ (S/PV.5629 2007: 8). Kumalo reiterated South Africa’s support for a two-state solution but argued Israel’s continued construction of new settlements in the West Bank undermined the internationally recognised borders of the two states. Notably, Kumalo read a letter from the Palestinian observer mission to the UN laying a grievance about Israeli construction on a sacred Muslim site and urged Israel ‘to avoid the destruction of this vital infrastructure’ (S/PV.5629 2007: 8). This demonstrates a role conception of champion of the South and bridge between the disenfranchised Palestinians and the UNSC. South Africa’s subsequent statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict followed a similar pattern: highlighting Palestinian progress towards stable government, condemning international and Israeli actions in Palestine, calling for a two-state solution and conveying some message on behalf of the Palestinian mission to the UN.

In the course of 2007, the US government launched an international mediation initiative between Israel and Palestine. On 27 November 2007, over forty states and international organizations gathered in Annapolis, Virginia for the Middle East Peace Conference. Minister Dlamini-Zuma represented South Africa (DFA 2007). Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert signed a joint understanding committing to an intensive negotiating process aimed at finalizing a peace agreement before the end of 2008. South Africa also participated in the International Donor Conference for the Palestinian State in Paris in December 2007. South Africa’s involvement in the Annapolis and Paris conferences demonstrates its activism on the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Republic’s subsequent statements within the Council referenced this involvement.

In January 2008, Libya joined the UNSC for the first time and was president of the Council. The Libyan delegation decided to use its presidency to organise two briefings on the situation in the Middle East, instead of one. This was significant

because the P3, especially the US, believe the Israel-Palestine conflict should be the purview of the Quartet and try to limit opportunities for the Israel-Palestine conflict to be debated at length in the Council. This is partly to prevent grandstanding and heated debate in the UNSC. In the age of video recording and live streaming, UNSC debates have become a public performance where states play to an international audience to name and shame each other. It may appear frivolous but shaping public perceptions of good and evil, right and wrong in world politics is an important tool to build legitimacy and authority for the major powers. The presidency of the Council allows elected members to convene meetings and decide on the agenda. This is an important tool for elected members to influence Council deliberations because they can set the terms of debate and invite non-Council members they feel should be included in deliberations (Thorhallsson 2011). Thus, the UNSC is ‘democratised’ and a wider scope of views recorded in official UNSC proceedings than would normally be the case. In this way, the usual ‘consensus’ position nurtured by the P5 can be challenged and exposed.

At the 30 January 2008 briefing on the Middle East, the UK ambassador raised a concern that ‘I am not sure whether debates such as this, which generate more heat than light, are a useful contribution to the (peace) process’ (S/PV.5827 2007: 11). Ambassador Kumalo responded in his statement that:

I know for a fact that my delegation believes that silence on the situation in the Middle East is more dangerous than even meetings where temperatures and heat might be raised. In fact, we would have preferred a meeting where all Member States could come and speak on this issue, because we do not believe that the issue at hand belongs only to fifteen Member States and four other invited Member States.

After noting Palestine’s need for financial resources, Kumalo stated that Pretoria had pledged:

\$1 million per annum for capacity-building and humanitarian assistance in Palestine over the next three years’ and had ‘also agreed with its partners within the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue

Forum to provide an additional \$1 million per year from IBSA funds for the same purpose over the same period (S/PV.5827 2008: 15).

Jordaan (2003) argues that being a donor and providing humanitarian assistance is classic middle power behaviour that is most often associated with traditional middle powers because they are developed economies. It is notable that South Africa acted as a donor both bilaterally and within the South-South multilateral organization of IBSA. As a grouping of putative middle powers, one of the ways IBSA has sought to challenge international power relations is by playing certain roles, like international donor, that are typically associated with the West.

In December 2008, relations between Israel and Palestine sharply deteriorated despite the impending deadline for a peace agreement in the Annapolis process. The UNSC met four times about the situation (S/PV.6030 2008; S/PV.6039 2008; S/PV.6045 2008; S/PV.6049 2008). On 16 December 2008, the UNSC adopted resolution 1850 reaffirming its support for the 2007 Middle East summit in Annapolis (S/RES/1850 2008). The resolution passed with fourteen votes. Libya abstained. Ambassador Kumalo noted that the resolution was the first passed on this issue in nearly five years. South Africa's final meeting in its first term in the UNSC on 31 December 2008 was an emergency meeting to address the escalating conflict in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel. Ambassador Kumalo argued that the increase in violence made it imperative that the Security Council condemn the attacks and demand that they cease immediately, in-line with its UN Charter-mandate to maintain international peace and security (S/PV.6060 2008).

South Africa played several roles in relation to the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict that collectively amounted to being an emerging middle power in the Council. The middle power roles South Africa played were of good international citizen and mediator. It was a good international citizen in respect of its promotion of the Security Council's role in addressing the conflict in terms of international law and the UN Charter. It was also one of the primary emerging power donors funding humanitarian and development efforts in Palestine, individually and within IBSA. As a mediator, South Africa promoted peaceful negotiations to resolve the sixty-year conflict

evidenced in Pretoria's participation in the Annapolis conference and its efforts to engage in bilateral mediation through the Spier process initiated by President Mbeki (DFA 2007).

As a leader of NAM in the UNSC, South Africa challenged the Council's inconsistency in addressing the Palestine question, evidenced in the reluctance of the United States to support initiatives to challenge Israel's building of settlements and to assert the rights of Palestinians. While the US, UK and France were eager to include issues like Myanmar and Zimbabwe on the Council agenda as threats to peace and security; they were resistant to using their full authority in the Council to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. It could be argued that South Africa's challenging of the P3 fits the characteristic of emerging power more than emerging middle power. However, the promotion of democracy and a negotiated settlement meeting both the interest of Israel and Palestine conforms to the middle power role. Unlike Libya, South Africa's approach to the Council was to bridge differences and mediate the conflict instead of solely championing Palestinian interests or countering US foreign policy.

#### 4.4.3 The situation in the Middle East: Lebanon

On 30 May 2007, South Africa cast its only abstaining vote in the Council on a draft resolution establishing a Special Tribunal on the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Resolution 1757 passed with ten yes votes and five abstentions from South Africa, China, Russia, Indonesia, and Qatar (S/PV.5685 2007).

In a statement after the vote, Ambassador Kumalo emphasised South Africa's in-principle support for the establishment of tribunal because the Lebanese people wanted the UN to assist in their efforts to bring to justice those responsible for those grave crimes and to end all impunity. Moreover, Lebanese ownership of the tribunal was of paramount importance and that it was incumbent upon the Lebanese authorities and people to reach a consensus position on the matter (S/PV.5685 2007: 3). In this regard, South Africa maintained that:

It is not appropriate for the Security Council to impose such a tribunal on Lebanon, especially under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations... the Security Council is mandated to act with impartiality and without bias. It cannot be seen to be taking sides in internal Lebanese politics (S/PV.5685 2007: 4).

South Africa was concerned about the precedent that the draft resolution would set because there was no consensus position in Lebanon on establishing this kind of tribunal. Pretoria was concerned that the UNSC would be seen as favouring one dominant political clique over others in Lebanon. Kumalo reiterated South Africa's view that consensus was necessary to ensure lasting peace and 'national reconciliation' in Lebanon (S/PV.5685 2007: 4). For these reasons South Africa abstained from the vote.

On 24 August 2007, South Africa challenged another draft resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL). Although the draft was unanimously adopted as resolution 1773, Ambassador Kumalo questioned the inclusion of 'unrelated sensitive issues' in the draft and expressed his delegation's preference for only including issues of 'a technical nature' in such renewal resolutions (S/PV.5733 2007: 2). He said South Africa was concerned that the resolution included issues, which 'the Council has on numerous previous occasions commented on in various resolutions and presidential statements' and expressed concern 'that these unrelated issues tend to be selectively chosen from other resolutions and statements of the past' (S/PV.5733 2007: 2). This seemingly minor quibble with the technicalities of resolution drafting reveals a more significant concern about the use of UNSC processes in a manner not consistent with the UN Charter. As in the case of Iran, South Africa sought to challenge the conventions of excluding elected members in drafting certain resolutions and the sense of ownership P5 members assert over particular agenda items.

#### 4.4.4 The situation concerning Iraq

Given South Africa's opposition to the invasion in Iraq, it could have been expected of the Republic to be more critical in debates on Iraq. However, this was not the case.

In most instances, South Africa cooperated with the consensus position in the UNSC, which entailed cooperating with the US. Pretoria chose instead to register its concerns about certain resolutions related to Iraq in its UNSC statements rather than voting against them. South Africa's concerns related to the UNSC not following the proper process in deciding to terminate the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). This is consistent with the role of champion of the South that advocates for international rules to be applied fairly to all states to enable greater equality.

At a meeting on 15 March 2007, Ambassador Kumalo stated:

Notwithstanding the events that led to the current situation in Iraq, the Security Council has a responsibility to ensure that the powers granted to the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) are exercised in a manner consistent with the decisions of the Security Council and that international law and human rights are upheld and respected by all parties (S/PV.5639 2007: 20).

Kumalo continued that South Africa welcomed the Iraq Security Conference held in Baghdad on 10 March 2007 and supported attempts to achieve an all-inclusive political process and national reconciliation in Iraq as well as constructive dialogue with the neighbouring States. South Africa was looking forward to participating in the International Compact with Iraq on 16 March 2007 (S/PV.5639 2007).

On 29 June 2007 the UN Security Council voted for resolution 1762 to terminate UNMOVIC's mandate and the related Nuclear Verification Office of the IAEA in Iraq (S/PV.5710 2007). The vote passed with 14 in favour, zero against, and one abstention from Russia. The decision to terminate the mandate of weapons inspectors was based on testimonials that all of Iraq's known weapons of mass destruction had been demobilised and that the Iraqi government had declared support for international non-proliferation regimes (SCR 31 May 2007: 19).

South Africa voted in favour of the resolution but raised concerns about the draft. First, Kumalo reminded the council that the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass

destruction was set out in resolution 687 (1991) as a precondition for the ceasefire that ended the first Gulf War. Sanctions against Iraq were therefore linked to whether the country still possessed or had the intention to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These provisions were further emphasised in resolution 1284 (1999). The purpose of both these resolutions was to ensure regional security in the Middle East. Kumalo emphasised that given that these two Chapter VII resolutions remained in force the Council continued ‘to be bound by its duty to help bring about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons disarmament and the removal of related delivery systems in the Middle East’ (S/PV.5710 2007: 13). He stated that South Africa would vote in favour of the draft resolution, ‘even though we would have preferred the mandate of the United Nations weapons inspectors to be closed on the basis of a United Nations report’ (S/PV.5710 2007: 13).

In an article, disparagingly titled ‘Barking at the Big Dogs’, Jordaan (2008: 547) criticised South Africa for pursuing an anti-imperialist foreign policy in the Middle East because this ‘renders it unlikely to be regarded as an impartial broker’ in the various conflicts. While acknowledging the damaging effects of the pursuit of Western national interests in the region, Jordaan (2008) portrays South Africa’s determination to show solidarity with the global South and challenge Western double standards as foolhardy and naïve. He describes South Africa’s stance on the Lebanon tribunal as ‘worrying’ because ‘South Africa has done further damage to its reputation as an impartial broker, for once again it has found itself in opposition to the US’ and raises concerns that South Africa is aligning itself to the US’s ‘sworn enemies’ like Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria.

On one hand this is an example of the reflex, among certain South African foreign policy scholars, to view alignment with the West as positive and solidarity with the developing world as negative (Geldenhuys 2011; Graham 2013). On the other, it is reflective of the concern of middle power scholars with the relationship between a middle power and the hegemon. As Jordaan (2008: 547) states the tasks of middle powers are ‘legitimising the norms espoused by the hegemon’ and performing ‘morally commendable tasks for the good of international society’. As Solomon



(2000) has argued these norms and morals are inevitably Western, meaning non-Western states are always at risk of being perceived to be ‘rogues’ in international society. So, while South Africa played roles associated with middle powers in middle eastern issues on the UNSC agenda — diplomatic broker, multilateral manager, mediator and good international citizen — its emerging power role conceptions of champion of the South and regional leader undermined its middle power credentials because they challenged the hegemonic world order instead of reinforcing it. This raises the question of whether the application of the labels traditional and emerging middle power would change in a different hegemonic order. In other words, if the hegemonic values of the world order were anti-imperialism, sovereignty, and non-interference, would South Africa act as a traditional middle power to uphold the hegemonic order? Or would it hold onto the principle of challenging hegemony regardless of the dominant power? The evidence indicates that in ‘an increasingly Sinocentric’ global system, South Africa would act like a traditional middle power as a lieutenant and supporter of the new hegemon (Stuenkel 2018). This is consistent with Cox’s notion of the flexibility of the middle power concept and perhaps reveals that the traditional/emerging middle power distinctions of the early 2000s are losing their relevance as we move into the new world order of the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### 4.4.5 Kosovo

Non-European member states are traditionally not active in deliberations on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other issues involving the former Yugoslavia. However, South Africa and Indonesia both took a keen interest in the issue of Kosovo independence because of the implications for territorial integrity, a fundamental principle of NAM (SCR 19 July 2007). The UNSC held a meeting on the situation in Kosovo on 18 February 2008, after Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February (S/PV.5839 2008). Ambassador Kumalo expressed South Africa’s unease with the action saying:

The South African Government has taken note of the unilateral declaration of independence by the assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government of the Serbian province of Kosovo. We

regret that such a step was not taken in conformity with a legal and political process envisaged by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) (S/PV.5839 2008: 16).

He referred to South Africa's own experience of transition to explain his country's position on the Kosovo issue: 'We have stated that it was difficult in the light of our own national experience, to accept that negotiations, no matter how difficult, could not lead to an amicable conclusion' (S/PV.5839 2008: 16). Kumalo argued South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and as a member of the African Union, upheld and promoted the principle of the territorial integrity of States and was concerned about the implications of the declaration of independence by Kosovo for the international community. In that regard:

South Africa will study their political and legal implications. The unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo presents the international community with a serious challenge. In view of this, South Africa will remain seized of this complex matter (S/PV.5839 2008: 16).

South Africa repeated its concerns at a meeting on 25 July 2008 at which the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was renewed (S/PV.5944 2008). On 26 November 2008, Mr Sangqu expressed South Africa's concern about Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, 'especially at the fact that it was not achieved through a negotiated settlement' (S/PV.6025 2008: 12). Sangqu thus welcomed 'the decision of the General Assembly to refer the question of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice' as a judgement would 'assist in clarifying the situation' (S/PV.6025 2008: 12).

The case of Kosovo saw South Africa playing an active role beyond its immediate sphere of influence on a question of global and not only African importance. The Republic projected itself as an example and good international citizen whose primary concern was maintaining the rule of international law. South Africa also played the

role of champion of the South to the extent that its opposition to Western support of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was based on concerns that the West could support other secessionist movements in the developing world thus undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity.

#### 4.4.6 Climate change

South Africa's opposition to the discussion of climate change as a threat to international peace and security was one of the controversies of its first term in the UNSC. The Security Council held its first ever debate on this issue on 17 April 2007 (S/PV.5663 2007). The daylong meeting was called by the United Kingdom to examine the relationship between energy security and climate. The representative for Britain justified initiating the debate on the grounds that climate change was a security issue in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world.

Many developing countries expressed reservations about discussing the issue of the climate in the Security Council as they saw it as a socio-economic issue that should have been dealt with by the General Assembly. The exception was representatives of small island states who argued that climate change was no less threatening to them than guns and bombs were to larger nations. South Africa was among those who cautioned against discussing the issue of climate change in the Security Council. Ambassador Kumalo argued that the debate did not fall within the mandate of the council. He stated:

While underscoring the fact that this debate does not fall within the mandate of the Security Council, South Africa would like to use this opportunity to outline the priorities for mitigating and adapting to climate change that are best addressed elsewhere within the United Nations system (S/PV.5663 2007: 16).

He blamed the continued threat of climate change on the fact that those who were most responsible for the changes in the climate were not taking the responsibilities to mitigate climate change or to assist vulnerable countries. He argued that developed countries should take the lead in providing new and additional funds for adaptation activities. It was also critical that all developed countries commit to legally binding

emission reductions and mitigation obligations under the Kyoto protocol. While climate change was indeed a very serious problem facing the world the impact of climate change did not directly threaten international peace and security. The issues discussed were primarily of a developmental nature and should be discussed in other UN bodies like the General Assembly and United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). He explained:

It is for this reason that South Africa attaches great importance to the assurance by the delegation of the United Kingdom that this Security Council meeting will not result in any outcome or summary. We further hope that these discussions will not in any way elevate the issue of climate change or the environment to being a Security Council agenda item (S/PV.5663 2007: 16).

The UN Mission's report on the 2007-2008 term described the climate change meeting as bringing 'to the fore the ongoing debate about the definition of security in the modern world' (DFA 2009: 17). The report explained South Africa's position as being that any decision on an expanded definition of climate change would need to be agreed by the full membership of the UN and not only the UNSC. Nevertheless 'South Africa joined other Council members in supporting a meeting on climate change' and valued the discussion on the topic (DFA 2009: 18).

President Mbeki expounded South Africa's position on climate change, development, and security at the UNGA general debate on 25 September 2007 whose subject was 'Responding to Climate Change'. Mbeki addressed the meeting after the UNSC peace and security in Africa summit organised by France (see 5.2.2). At the summit Mbeki gave a brief statement 'partly because I am expected in the General Assembly shortly. I want to go and respond to President Bush there' (S/PV.5749 2007: 4). His response to President Bush was an address directed at the resistance of the rich nations to contribute their share to mitigating climate change, particularly the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

Mbeki (2007) compared global inequality to South Africa's first and second economies and said his government aimed to strengthen the first economy to 'use it as

a base to transfer resources to strengthen and modernise the second economy and thus embark on the process to change the lives of those who subsist in this Second economy'. Similarly, Mbeki (2007) argued, 'there is an urgent need for massive resource transfers through development assistance, investment, trade, technology transfers and human resource development to these poor countries if we are to achieve the development goals and successfully adapt to the devastating impacts of climate change'. He suggested what was needed were similar resource transfers as those given to Western Europe after World War II and those that were given to certain Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s to aid their development. Mbeki (2007) asked 'why is there an absence of the same resolve to assist poor nations today?' The global village required an expansion of 'human solidarity' to 'build a durable bridge' between rich and poor citizens of the world. He closed his address by saying:

Together, rich and poor, developed and developing, North and South can and must truly hold hands and address the challenges of climate change and sustainable development; work together to defeat poverty and underdevelopment and ensure that every human being is saved from the indecencies and humiliations that are attached to the poor.

But to do that, we need first and foremost, to implement the decisions that we have adopted freely in this eminent house of the representatives of the global community. And so, let our actions speak louder than our words (Mbeki 2007).

Mbeki's remarks to the UNGA and Kumalo's remarks in the UNSC debate on climate change reveal South Africa's role conception as a champion of the South and regional leader on the global stage. Both policymakers criticised the developed world for not taking its share of responsibility for mitigating climate change and emphasised the need to share resources with developing countries for the good of all humanity. Mbeki's use of terms like 'bridge', 'human solidarity' and 'hold hands' indicates South Africa's role conception of being a bridge builder and link between the developed and developing world.

## 4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed South Africa's engagement on issues related to human rights and democracy, and the rule of law in the UNSC. Pretoria's goal for its first tenure in the Council was to be an activist for the interests of the African continent and the global South. Despite the expectations of, especially Western observers, South Africa did not adopt an explicit human rights focus for its tenure. As has been explained, the ANC government viewed the UNSC as an inherently combative arena dominated by the Western permanent members, which had supported the Apartheid government. For the ANC it was the general membership of the UN, in the UNGA, that supported the struggle for liberation. Therefore, it intended to use its tenure in the UNSC to balance the power of the P3. Unfortunately, this strategy was based on the assumption that democratic South Africa had infinite moral authority, which was disproved soon after the Republic took up its seat.

The vote on Myanmar was a shock to both South Africa and many observers across the globe. For Pretoria, its decision was a straightforward defence of the rules-based international order and a counter to US overreach. It was consistent with the thematic goal of promoting closer relations between regional organisations and the UN. Moreover, it was aimed at preserving the UNSC practice of consensus decision-making. To both domestic and international observers for the country that was the subject of the greatest international human rights campaign in history to vote against protecting the human rights of people in Myanmar was a betrayal of global goodwill and the ANC's historic legacy (Adebajo 8 June 2009). While the reasons for voting against the draft resolution were sound, Pretoria's decision was naïve and revealed an unjustified hubris in policymakers' role conception. One of the major criticisms was South Africa's deferring to China and Russia. In the case of Myanmar, Kumalo spoke directly after the Chinese representative and repeated many of the same concerns. This was strategically unwise because it made him seem like a parrot of the Chinese position when in fact the underlying approaches to the Council differ. China is notoriously non-interventionist and expresses discomfort about any kind of international intervention. In many cases, South Africa is activist and pro-intervention, however its primary concern is about who does the intervention and

why.

On the issue of Western Sahara, South Africa managed to find some consistency in its human rights principles and its defence of a fellow African region against neo-colonialism. This allowed Pretoria to play the roles of mediator, bridge, good international citizen and regional leader, which are all consistent with emerging middle powers.

The media and academic coverage of the WPS issue reveals the unfairness with which South Africa's foreign policy has been treated. Many scholars have highlighted Pretoria's 'irrational' behaviour in the WPS vote in the UNGA and applied those arguments to a different set of circumstances in the UNSC. Furthermore, scholars have not engaged with the arguments about dealing with sexual violence in all its manifestations and the risks of focusing solely on particular conflicts in the African continent. These arguments are a legitimate part of the debate on how to address gender issues and violence against women in conflict. In this respect, South Africa acted as a policy entrepreneur, bridge, example, champion of the South and regional leader in its behaviour on this issue.

In the Middle East South Africa consistently acted as a champion of the South by promoting the interests of Palestine, calling for national ownership of the Lebanese tribunal and emphasising Iran's right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In the case of Iran, South Africa's position was vindicated by the 2015 Iran nuclear Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that commits Iran to reducing its nuclear facilities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The deal was the result of the kinds of negotiations and cooperative approach that South Africa promoted throughout its first term. In the case of Kosovo, South Africa intervened in an issue that is usually the preserve of the Western powers in defence of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

South Africa's resistance to the inclusion of climate change on the UNSC agenda and President Mbeki's UNGA speech demonstrate the constitutive relationship between

domestic and foreign policy. By comparing international inequality to South Africa's 'two economies', Mbeki revealed the extent to which Pretoria's international decisions was influenced by the historical and current socio-economic and political structure of South Africa.

Constructivist scholars argue that identity informs national interests and is thus an important determinant of international behaviour (Wendt 1999). Identity is socially constructed and can change over time (Ashizawa 2008). South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC is illustrative of the effects of a major identity change on a state's role in international society. If we take a view of the UNSC as a microcosm of international society, it is evident that the community with that society that South Africa belongs to is NAM. South Africa acted most often in cooperation with Indonesia, a fellow NAM leader, as was evident in Iran, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Kosovo. NAM tends to act as a bloc in the UNSC. While South Africa was expected to act as part of the Western world in the UNSC, it was clear from the beginning that it saw itself as belonging in the community of non-aligned movement states and the G77+. This is unsurprising because the ANC's diplomatic formation in exile was as part of the NAM group and that identity or sense of belonging has not changed. This was particularly the case for Ambassador Kumalo who was a long-standing ANC diplomat in the UN in exile and had existing relationships with NAM diplomats. In the UN context, South Africa would identify with NAM on all issues including human rights, even in the face of contradictions with its own constitution. This conforms to other states included in the emerging middle power category.

We can thus conclude that South Africa largely played roles associated with emerging middle powers on the issues of human rights and democracy, and the rule of law in its first term in the UNSC. Pretoria's attempt to play these roles was not always successful, as seen most starkly in the Myanmar case. In its efforts to disrupt global structural power, South Africa sometimes came across as a weak upstart instead of a regional leader and emerging power. This demonstrates the difficulties faced by states from the South as they try to assert themselves on the world stage. With regards the middle power concept, South Africa's different role conceptions and attendant



behaviours fit both traditional and emerging middle power categories of the analytical framework. This raises the question of whether the rigid distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers is appropriate in a shifting world order.

Chapter five discusses South Africa's behaviour in relation to the issues of peaceful resolution of conflict and the African agenda during its first term in the UNSC.

## CHAPTER FIVE: LEADERSHIP IN AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

### 5.1 Introduction

In his 1993 article, Nelson Mandela stated that South Africa believed in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, including arms control, and in the centrality of Africa to its international relations (Mandela 1993). These two principles were linked in South Africa's time on the UNSC because African conflicts have dominated the UNSC agenda since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War itself was 'hot' in Africa because of numerous proxy wars between the US and the USSR that placed several countries on the continent on a post-independence trajectory of conflict, poverty and underdevelopment. This was exacerbated in the 1990s and 2000s by a rise in intra-state conflict. In response, the UNSC increased its use of Chapter VII interventions like sanctions and peacekeeping. By the time South Africa joined the Council over seventy per cent of issues on the agenda were African. This means major decisions about African peace and security are made outside of Africa by the P5, none of which is African. To balance this situation, South Africa chose to take an activist role in conflict management, prevention, and resolution on the Council. It also challenged the neo-trusteeship role of the UNSC on the continent by promoting greater the involvement of African states in resolving issues on the Council agenda through the AUPSC.

This chapter discusses South Africa's decisions in the UNSC in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda. These issues are related because of the prevalence of violent conflict in Africa and the continent's conflicts dominating the UNSC agenda. The chapter begins with a discussion of a selection of country-specific and thematic issues related to peaceful resolution of conflict. This is followed by a discussion of the African Agenda. Of particular importance is the Republic's advocacy of closer relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the roles South Africa played in relation to the middle power framework.

## 5.2 Peaceful resolution of conflict

One of the reasons South Africa has been characterised as a middle power is its involvement in conflict mediation and peace missions since 1994, a classical traditional middle power role. During its tenure in the UNSC, South Africa played an active role in discussions on specific peacekeeping mandates and on normative and thematic debates on aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The issues of the Great Lakes, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Small Arms proliferation and Security Sector Reform (SSR) will be discussed.

### 5.2.1 Great Lakes

Different conflicts in the Great Lakes region have been a central preoccupation of South African mediation on the African continent. Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC all fell into conflict and political instability in the early 1990s. This quickly spread into regional, cross-border instability as combatants, refugees and arms moved across the region. South Africa played an active role in the mediation processes of Burundi and DRC, as well as the broader regional mediation initiative of the Great Lakes (see Selebi 1999, Williams 2000 and Nhlapo 2015 for accounts of South Africa's early interventions). By the time South Africa joined the UNSC peace efforts in the region seemed to be moving in a positive direction.

During South Africa's presidency of the UNSC in March 2007, it hosted a meeting on the Great Lakes region where the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Ibrahim Fall addressed the Council about the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region held in December 2006 in Nairobi. A 'Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region' was adopted at the Summit. Fall opened his briefing by acknowledging South Africa's role in the region saying:

I also thank your country for the important role it has played and continues to play in stabilizing and bringing peace to the Great Lakes region. During my four-and-a-half-year tenure, which ends in a few days, I have enjoyed the unswerving support and wise counsel of your Government. I also need to thank the Republic of South Africa for the important political and diplomatic role it has played and continues to

play in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other parts of the region. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region could not have been a success if the peace processes in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had not also proceeded smoothly. Once again, I thank you. Your presidency of the Security Council this month and the convening of this meeting are further testimony to South Africa's commitment (S/PV.5637 2007: 2).

Kumalo responded:

South Africa is very privileged to have been part of the process leading to the convening of the International Conference. We remain committed to assisting the region in effectively addressing the objectives that remain on the transitional agenda. Today, we look back with pride and with hope for our African renaissance in the Great Lakes region (S/PV.5637 2007: 15).

By highlighting South Africa's role as a regional leader and mediator in the Great Lakes, Fall endowed it with the status of authority on this issue in the Security Council. These kinds of endorsements by external actors are one way in which South Africa's role as a regional leader was established in the UNSC. This is consistent with Holsti's (1970) formulation of the relationship between national role conceptions and role expectations from other actors. Fall's statement also supports Adebajo's (2006) contention that the greatest opportunities for South African leadership in the UNSC were in African issues, especially those in which the Republic had long been engaged. The specific country situations of Burundi and DRC illustrate this argument.

### *Burundi*

South Africa joined the UNSC with an extensive record of involvement in the Burundi peace process that predates UN involvement. Since Nelson Mandela took over the regional mediation initiative from Julius Nyerere in 1995, South African leaders and peacekeepers had played an active role in resolving the conflict in Burundi (Miti 2007). Then Deputy President Jacob Zuma helped to mediate a peace agreement that led to the 2005 elections where Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president of Burundi (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007). South African troops helped to

stabilized the situation in Burundi through the South African Protection Support Detachment and the African Union Mission to Burundi (Nhlapo 2015). The UN established the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004, which was converted into the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) in January 2007, with the mandate of consolidating and reinforcing the humanitarian and development activities of ONUB. Burundi was also one of the first countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (SCR 5 October 2007).

Charles Ngqakula was appointed mediator for Burundi in 2006. In this capacity he led the regional peace initiative on Burundi comprised of Burundi, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Ngqakula briefed the Council on two occasions during South Africa's first term: 28 November 2007 and 11 December 2008. Both meetings reflected concerns raised by South Africa in other Council debates on mediation including the international community's responsibility in providing adequate resources for conflict resolution, the importance of regional organizations in maintenance of international peace and security and the willingness to act as a diplomatic broker and mediator to bring together conflicting parties.

At the 28 November 2007 meeting, Ngqakula focused on the resource constraints facing the regional initiative of the African Union. South Africa was the only country providing food to former combatants that were coming out of the countryside to enlist in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme as part of the peace process (S/PV.5786 2007). Ngqakula asked for help from the international community in registering and reintegrating former combatants. South Africa played the role of regional leader and manager in forming a political directorate to manage the political aspects of the ceasefire agreement but it needed assistance with staffing and other resources. Ambassador Sangqu supported Ngqakula's briefing and expressed South Africa's honour at being involved in the peace process in Burundi. He further expressed South Africa's commitment to 'continue to contribute to the African Union special task force currently deployed in Burundi; and do whatever else is necessary to finalize the facilitation process and bring an end to the conflict' (S/PV.5786 2007: 9). The language of commitment to the Burundi process presents

South Africa as a good international citizen that is willing to act for the global good, regardless of its limited resources.

All the speakers at the November meeting acknowledged South Africa's mediation. China's statement was especially notable for its acknowledgement of South Africa's leadership in Africa and during its year in the UNSC:

China notes that in recent years, under President Mbeki, the Government of South Africa has held high the banner of African recovery, calling for the unity and strengthening of the continent and for the resolution of its difficulties and problems, and facilitating the resolution of many hot-spot issues, including the situation in Burundi. That Government has played an important role and has made important contributions, winning praise from all sides. Especially since the beginning of this year, South Africa, as a member of the Security Council, has called upon the international community to pay attention to hot-spot issues in Africa and to facilitate cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and has called for strengthened cooperation between the two organizations. The delegation of South Africa, under the leadership of Ambassadors Kumalo and Sangqu, has participated actively in the consideration of issues concerning the African continent. They have spoken out, contributed and done a great deal of work towards the resolution of those issues. The Chinese delegation is deeply impressed (S/PV.5786 2007: 11).

China's statement is significant because it is the ideal summary of how South African officials would have wanted their time in the UNSC described. This points to the close working relationship between the South Africans and the Chinese, and the synergies in their understandings of South Africa's diplomacy on the Council.

In the course of 2008, South Africa arranged confidence-building events in Cape Town and Magaliesburg to bring together the opposing parties in the Burundi conflict. Ngqakula reported on those events on 11 December 2008 and stated South Africa's intention to scale down its facilitation effort so the African Union Special Task Force could withdraw and the facilitation could close completely at the end of March 2009

(S/PV.6037 2008). Ngqakula's briefing indicated the strain of leading a longstanding mediation for South Africa and the desire to let the post-conflict peace building organs of the UN to take the lead.

As the primary mediator in the Burundi conflict, South Africa was able to take the lead on the issue in the UNSC and maintain Council interest on a situation that no longer held great importance for the Council. The briefings by Ngqakula shaped the Council narrative on the crisis from South Africa's perspective and are an example of the way smaller powers can use their presence on the UNSC to influence decisions beyond the limitations of structural power. However, Ngqakula's comments about the challenges South Africa faced in resourcing the mediation demonstrates that having a seat at the table was not enough to get South Africa the assistance it required from the international community. Since Burundi was not a major issue for the P5, South Africa struggled to convince the UNSC of the urgency of its interventions. So South Africa played an emerging middle power role as a regional leader and mediator but had to face the constraints that come from its relative weakness within structural power.

#### *Democratic Republic of the Congo*

The DRC was one of democratic South Africa's first conflict resolution efforts in 1997. When war broke out between the forces of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila, Pretoria sought to apply its experience by bringing together the two warring parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement (Miti 2012). This ignored the reality that Kabila's forces had defeated Mobutu's army with the support of an alliance brought together by Rwanda (Uganda, Burundi and Angola were other member). Thus, Pretoria's mediation efforts failed and Kabila declared himself president on 16 May 1997. Kabila's efforts to entrench power led him to turn against his backers in the Rwandan alliance and sparked a rebellion against his leadership in August 1998. What followed is known as Africa's First World War because Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Sudan got involved in the conflict in defence of Kabila, against the rebel forces supported by Uganda and Rwanda (Daley 2006). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 1999 but there was no resolution to the conflict. After Laurent Kabila's assassination in 2001, his son Joseph Kabila took over the

presidency and allowed the deployment of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Daley 2006).

Thabo Mbeki became actively involved in the mediation process. This resulted in the Pretoria Agreement of 2002 and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. The exit of foreign agitators in the conflict enabled the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to resolve the issues among the Congolese themselves. South Africa played an important role in managing the interests of the US, France, the EU and Belgium who had long exploited the instability in the DRC for access to natural resources (Miti 2012). Pretoria did this by underwriting the mediation process with its offer to put up fifty per cent of the mediation costs if Western donors would provide the rest (Miti 2012: 32). The Pretoria Agreement, also known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, laid the path for a transitional government to be formed in 2003 and preparations for elections to begin. According to Khadiagala (2009), South Africa had spent R819.6 million on the DRC by the end of 2003. South Africa played the role of regional leader, policy entrepreneur, mediator, and manager in the DRC from 2001. In this context, Pretoria was expected to play an active role in discussions on the DRC during its tenure in the UNSC.

South Africa's first major activity on the UNSC was to engage the Council, together with other lead countries, on plans for post-conflict peacebuilding in the DRC (DFA 2009). In July and October 2006, the DRC held its first democratic elections in over forty years and Joseph Kabila was elected president. The elections were the culmination of an extended peace process, supported by, amongst others, MONUC. MONUC was the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operation at the time, composed of thousands of troops from around the world (S/PV.5616 2007: 6). The EU supported the elections through the European Union-led peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR) as authorised in resolution 1671 (2006).

At the first meeting on the situation in the DRC in 2007, on 9 January, Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno (S/PV.5616 2007: 6) the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations explained the extent of the international intervention in DRC thus:



Five peace accords involving African countries, more than 35 Security Council resolutions, African Union and Southern African Development Community involvement, \$500 million in international electoral funding and strong support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have all contributed to the success of the peace process.

Guéhenno continued by calling on the international community to avoid early disengagement in the DRC because this posed the risk of a relapse into conflict and even greater international intervention at a later stage. As will be seen South Africa held the same views and used its seat in the UNSC to lobby for continued UNSC engagement in the DRC. Guéhenno (S/PV.5616 2007: 5) recognised South Africa's particular role in the DRC by saying:

It is difficult to overemphasise the significance of the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to which the United Nations and the European Union, together with many other Member States, have contributed. I would like to thank the many individual member States of the Council, and in particular South Africa, for their outstanding support to that vital endeavour.

In his statement, Ambassador Kumalo (S/PV.5616 2007: 14) paid tribute to the Congolese people for the gains achieved so far:

Everything that has happened so far in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the Congolese people... We look forward to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo taking shape, because we would also like to take the lead from that Government about the way forward... We hope that the support of the European Union will continue in the Congo, because the Congo still has a difficult road ahead. As has been mentioned here, there are still critical elections ahead of us. We as South Africa pledge ourselves to continue to assist the people of the Congo as much as we can on the road ahead.

These words reflect South Africa's role conception as a regional leader and mediator in the DRC. As discussed in chapter four, one of the lessons South African policymakers took from the struggle against apartheid and subsequent democratic

transition is the importance of national ownership of political processes. Kumalo's emphasis of the role of the Congolese people and the incoming government in leading the way forward is an example of this. In later debates on the situation in Myanmar and Zimbabwe, South Africa would reiterate that political solutions to conflicts cannot be imposed from the outside but must come from the people affected. Kumalo (S/PV.5616 2007: 14) further reiterated what Mr Guéhenno had said about the necessity of continued engagement in the DRC 'because experience has shown that the results of early disengagement are sometimes not positive at all'.

One interesting aspect of Kumalo's statement was his support of the EU's continued involvement in the DRC. Kumalo opened his remarks by welcoming the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Mr Javier Solana, saying: 'it is always good to hear him brief on African issues, in which he is deeply involved' (S/PV.5616 2007: 14). This is notable because South Africa has been criticised for being at best uncooperative and at worst hostile to Western powers during its tenure in the Council (see Fioramonti and Kotsopoulos 2015). There are two possible ways to explain the apparent contradiction.

The first is that the meeting under consideration was at the very beginning of South Africa's tenure before the Myanmar vote and other controversial decisions led to tensions between Pretoria and Western governments. Secondly, there was far greater cooperation and goodwill between South Africa and the West (particularly the EU and the US) in the UNSC than either side acknowledges. As will be seen later in this chapter this was especially the case on important African peace and security issues. One could argue that this confirms the view that the West supports the performance of dissent by emerging powers of the global South because it gives the impression of contestation that reinforces hegemony. So emerging middle powers are legitimisers of the extant world order (Jordaan 2003, Hurrell 2000). A more straightforward interpretation is that the simple narratives of friends and foes that are often applied to South Africa's relations with the world mask the reality that Pretoria behaves like all other states seeking particular outcomes on the world stage by choosing cooperation or opposition according to the specific issue area.

While the security was maintained in most of the DRC after the elections, the situation in eastern DRC continued to deteriorate throughout 2007 and 2008, especially in North Kivu. The conflict was internationalised with attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels of Uganda in North Kivu. Moreover, the government of the DRC accused Rwanda of 'acts of aggression' because Rwandan regular forces had 'launched an offensive' in an area on the DRC side of the shared border (S/2008/641). The international community was eager to avoid an escalation of tensions and the unravelling of the progress in the peace process. However, there was disagreement among Council members about the best way to do this. Some Council members supported an expansion of MONUC's capacities and mandate to address immediate security concerns. Others were reluctant to commit additional funding and troops to MONUC given similar demands from other (as important) UN peacekeeping missions (SCR 14 October 2008: 6-7). South Africa lobbied for an increase of MONUC troops to stabilise the situation in eastern DRC (DFA 2009).

On 20 November 2008, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1843 submitted by Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, South Africa, the UK, and the US. The resolution temporarily increased the number of troops deployed in MONUC by 3082 personnel. South Africa was the only country that spoke after the vote. Ambassador Kumalo (S/PV.6018 2008: 2) expressed pleasure at the outcome of the vote and reminded the Council of the importance of the political process to ensure lasting peace. In that regard, he highlighted that former Nigerian president Olusegan Obasanjo had been appointed by the Secretary-General:

To assist in the political process, and the good news is that the infrastructure for such a political process is contained in the Goma agreement and the Nairobi agreement, which are both available to the parties in the area to use to resolve the political situation. We hope that the resolution will also act as an encouragement...

South Africa's statement is consistent with the role conception of mediator as it emphasises the importance of a political process of negotiations to achieve a lasting resolution to conflict. This is consistent with the Republic's own experience of democratic transition.

The UNSC met on 26 November 2008 to consider the fourth special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of MONUC, Mr Alan Doss, reported that 250000 people had been directly affected by the resumption of hostilities in eastern DRC. He reminded the Council that 'overall peace and stability in the country cannot be attained without resolving the root causes of conflict in its troubled eastern regions' (S/PV.6024 2008: 2). South Africa's Deputy Ambassador, Mr Sangqu (S/PV.6024 2008: 12), reinforced Mr Doss' comments. Sangqu urged the international community to:

Synergise and consolidate its diplomatic and political efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict of this nature. The only way out of this crisis is a coherent political strategy implemented through consistent and concerted help from the Security Council and influential Member States of the region.

President Obasanjo had started this process in his role as Special Envoy. He was focused on confidence building between parties to the conflict within DRC and neighbouring countries. Sangqu argued that this would contribute 'to resolving some of the root causes of the conflict there' (S/PV.6024 2008: 12). South Africa expressed its willingness to 'assist in any way possible' in the political process and resolution of the conflict. This illustrates role conceptions as a regional leader and mediator.

Significantly given South Africa's previously controversial position on highlighting sexual violence in specific African conflicts (see section 4.3.3), Sangqu (S/PV.6024 2008: 12) lamented 'the gravity of the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—including arbitrary executions, rape, torture and degrading treatment'. This meeting of the UNSC took place two months after Thabo Mbeki resigned as president of South Africa in September 2008. Perhaps, the willingness to name rape as a concern in the DRC and to highlight human rights concerns reflects a new approach under interim President Kgalema Motlanthe and the new leadership of ANC President Jacob Zuma. As will be seen in chapter six, South Africa was more explicit in its support for human rights during its second term in the UNSC. The change in policy direction on the Council is not unique to South Africa. In most states, a change in government will lead to some adjustment of foreign policy

priorities and rhetoric. In US foreign policy, Barack Obama's administration that took over in 2009 diverged notably from the Bush administration on issues like the ICC and Israel-Palestine in the UNSC (see chapters six and seven). However, major global South states like South Africa face greater scrutiny of their shifting foreign policy positions because their place in emergent world order is unsettled.

On 22 December 2008, the Council adopted resolution 1856 extending MONUC's mandate. Kumalo welcomed the extension because:

It will assist MONUC in being proactive in its duties, in particular the protection of civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic... it is important that MONUC succeed, because without it we risk losing all the gains we have made not only in the eastern Congo but throughout the country. (S/PV.6055 2008: 7).

Kumalo further emphasized that MONUC could not replace the political process and that all countries in the Great Lakes region should support the Congo peace and reconciliation process as part of the broader peace and stability initiative in the region.

South Africa played the roles of regional leader and mediator on the issue of the DRC during its first term in the UNSC. The Republic's support of the political process in DRC, while simultaneously lobbying for the strengthening of MONUC reflects its approach to conflict resolution and mediation in Africa. This approach emphasizes regional facilitation of talks among parties to a conflict with a focus on confidence-building measures. The role of the international community is to provide the necessary military, economic and humanitarian resources to create the context for negotiations. However, such international support ought not to turn into full military intervention. South Africa's mediation approach is modelled on its own experience of negotiated transition from Apartheid where the process was driven by local actors with the international community merely providing the resources necessary for negotiations to succeed.

### 5.2.2 Somalia

When South Africa joined the UNSC in 2007, the conflict in Somalia had been

neglected by the UNSC for over a decade. This neglect can be partially explained by the UN's negative experience of military intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s that led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1995 and the Secretariat to advise caution in all subsequent attempts to bring peace to Somalia. It was the escalating problem of piracy on the coast of Somalia that affected international ships that led the Council to meet more frequently about Somalia in 2008. The frequency of Council meetings increased from eight formal meetings for a duration of 145 minutes in 2007 to sixteen formal meetings for a duration of 575 minutes in 2008. South Africa advocated for stronger international support for the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and for the UN to send its own peacekeeping mission.

South Africa's first UNSC meeting on Somalia held on 20 February 2007 was to vote on a draft resolution to authorize AMISOM as a Chapter VII mission (S/PV.5633 2007). South Africa was one of the co-sponsors of the draft (with Congo, Ghana, Panama, Slovakia, the UK and the US), which was unanimously adopted as resolution 1744. In his statement after the vote, Kumalo expressed his delegation's hope that

The adoption of this resolution will demonstrate to the people of Somalia that the international community does indeed care about their situation. The deployment of the African Union Mission is a start. We hope that it will signal that the international community, through the Security Council, will in the coming months also be able to help the Somali people rebuild their country (S/PV.5633 2007: 3).

A recurring theme of South Africa's engagement on Somalia was the neglect of the people of Somalia by the international community. At the same meeting, Kumalo paid tribute to the Ugandan soldiers of AMISOM who had lost their lives during the mission. South Africa chose not to contribute troops to AMISOM, despite its vocal support for the mission. When Holmes briefed the UNSC again on 6 December 2007 after visiting Somalia, Kumalo expressed hope that the UNSC would 'revisit the request for the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to speed up their assessment of whether it would be possible to deploy a peacekeeping operation to Somalia to assist the people of Somalia' (S/PV.5792 2007: 6). Sangqu repeated this

hope in a meeting on 17 December 2007 saying that despite its ‘often-cited admirable role’ AMISOM had ‘gone beyond its sustainability and effectiveness’. AMISOM’s mandate was to be ‘a stop-gap until the United Nations can deploy’ and the delays in UN deployment were undermining the effort to achieve peace and stability in Somalia (S/PV.5805 2007: 7).

In 2007 and 2008, piracy on the coast of Somalia added a new dimension to the conflict and contributed to the complexity of peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa. On 2 June 2008 the UNSC met to consider a draft resolution on combatting piracy that was adopted unanimously as resolution 1816. The resolution was controversial because of concerns that it usurped the powers of institutions governing the law of the sea and did not strictly fall within the UNSC’s mandate. The UNSC justified its action because the pirates were threatening UN humanitarian efforts by obstructing food deliveries to Somalia.

In his statement on South Africa’s vote, Ambassador Sangqu welcomed the adoption of the resolution and said his delegation ‘was guided by the fact that it limits itself to the situation in Somalia’. Sangqu reminded the Council to ‘be clear that it is the situation in Somalia, not piracy in and of itself, that constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Piracy is a symptom of the situation in Somalia’. He urged his colleagues not to be distracted from the broader issues in Somalia including ‘the political, security and humanitarian situation on the ground’ and referenced the statement in resolution 1814 that ‘sent a signal to the people of Somalia that the international community is serious about assisting them in resolving their conflict’ (S/PV.5902 2008: 4). South Africa was concerned that after ignoring Somalia relative to other conflicts, the UNSC was only mobilized to act because the commercial interests of some of its members were under threat.

When resolution 1838 on piracy was adopted on 7 October 2008, Kumalo made it clear that the only reason South Africa had voted in favour was ‘because the Transitional Federal Government has asked for help’. However, he wanted ‘to put it on record that the threat to international peace and security in Somalia originates in

the conflict that has ravaged that country for nearly two decades'. Kumalo criticized the UN's slow progress on the deployment of a peacekeeping force saying:

We would not want the Council to be seen only to respond when it is an issue of piracy that threatens not only Somalia but the assistance from many other countries, but this Council is slow when it comes to the fundamental problems of Somalia' (S/PV.5987 2008: 3).

He again spoke of South Africa's concern about the perception of double standards in the UNSC's approach to peace and security:

There is a real danger of the Council being perceived as selective when it acts only when the interests of certain member states are threatened, while ignoring those of Somalis themselves and the region at large. We remain committed to doing whatever we can to make sure that the people of Somalia are not allowed to suffer any more than they have (S/PV.5987 2008: 2-3).

The Permanent Representative of France agreed with Kumalo that 'we must not lose sight of the situation in Somalia itself' (S/PV.5987 2008: 4). The concern about the UNSC acting selectively in the fulfilment of its mandate was a recurring theme in South Africa's engagement on the Council. Pretoria was concerned about the Council's inconsistent behaviour because inconsistency threatened the UN's legitimacy among the world's people. This is typical of emerging middle powers that champion the interests of the South in their international interventions.

The final meeting at which South Africa spoke on Somalia during its first term was a high-level meeting attended by the foreign ministers of the P5 on 16 December 2008 where resolution 1851 on piracy was adopted unanimously. The resolution also finally included language on the deployment of a UN mission in Somalia. Kumalo praised this:

It is a good day for Somalia today, and Somalia does not have too many good days. But I am brave enough to say that today is a good day for Somalia, having listened to the concrete proposals that have been made in the statements made before mine. But let me begin by acknowledging



that there is no doubt that piracy in Somali waters has caught the world's attention (S/PV.6046 2008: 15).

In his typically quirky manner, Kumalo expressed hope that as 'one who has always accused this Council of avoiding its responsibility, listening today I am beginning to change my mind. Maybe because I am about to leave I am becoming nice' (S/PV.6046 2008: 15). He supported the call, by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for the Council to consider a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In January 2009, the Council adopted a resolution committing in-principle to the deployment of a UN mission in Somalia. South Africa played the roles of regional leader, mediator, and multilateral manager in the situation in Somalia.

### 5.2.3 Timor-Leste

South Africa was selected to be the lead country on the situation in Timor-Leste in the Security Council in 2007 and 2008 (SCR 2007). It took over the responsibility from Japan. Being a lead country on an issue entails drafting all Council outcomes on the issue in consultation with other UNSC members, UN members, and the affected Timorese parties. South Africa had been involved in UN work on the country as part of the UN Core Group of states (composed of Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US). In 2006, the UNSC established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) through resolution 1704 (2006) to assist in restoring stability to the country (SCR 2007). When South Africa took over as lead country the primary concerns of the UN were to oversee peaceful elections in 2007, support institution building and facilitate security sector reform.

At South Africa's first meeting on Timor-Leste in this capacity on 12 February 2007, Mr Kumalo stated that South Africa was 'honoured and humbled to be selected' for the role. Kumalo called on the international community to demonstrate its long-term commitment to enabling Timor-Leste to strengthen its democratic institutions. South Africa believed that the UNMIT needed to be strengthened and its mandate extended 'to allow the mission a reasonable period to develop a framework for long-term stability and development' (S.PV.5628 2007: 14). The concern with extending

UNMIT's mandate is consistent with South Africa's view that early disengagement by the international community in post-conflict situations is undesirable as it removes essential support before home grown institutions are established.

An expression of how seriously South Africa took its responsibilities was lobbying for a Security Council visit to Timor-Leste to see the situation first hand. Ambassador Kumalo led the mission from 24 to 30 November 2007 and it comprised of China, Indonesia, Russia, Slovakia, and the US (SCR 2007). The mission held meetings with Timorese officials and UNMIT. The goals of the visit were to reaffirm the Council's commitment to Timor-Leste; to encourage political actors to stay committed to the political dialogue; supporting efforts for accountability and justice; and evaluation the implementation of UNMIT's mandate.

South Africa organized an open meeting to discuss the mission report on 13 December 2007. Such an open meeting allowed non-Council members with an interest in the country, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Portugal, to participate. The Special Representative of Timor-Leste thanked Ambassador Kumalo and members of the delegation for:

The manner in which they engaged with all stakeholders, demonstrating extreme sensitivity, respect and understanding. The report of the mission is comprehensive and identifies the challenges and priorities that need to be addressed in order to consolidate peace and stability. (S/PV.5801 2007: 3)

The last meeting on Timor-Leste was held on 21 February 2008, after the attempted assassination of Timor-Leste's President and Prime Minister on 11 February (S/PV.5843 2008). South Africa ensured that a presidential statement was released immediately condemning the attacks, urging all actors 'to resolve any disputes through political and peaceful means' and expressing full support for UNMIT (S/PRST/2008/5).

Timor-Leste was not a particularly emotive or political issue for South Africa so it provided an opportunity to display the management, facilitation, and entrepreneurial

skills associated with middle powers. It demonstrates South Africa the technocrat, not the activist. At a time when the UNSC's attention to Timor-Leste was expected to wane, South Africa used the resources at its disposal as the lead nation to keep the country active on the Council agenda. This culminated in organizing the Council visit, which signalled the continued importance of Timor-Leste. As lead country, South Africa also had an opportunity to practice some of its ideals like including a broad range of UN members in Council meetings on Timor-Leste, emphasizing the work of country's in the region, promoting security sector reform and institution-building and making the link between security and development.

#### 5.2.4 Security sector reform

South Africa formed a partnership with Slovakia in the UNSC on the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) a term used to describe a variety of processes to improve the governance of security sector institutions as well as restoring or improving their legitimacy among the people in a post-conflict state. As countries with recent histories of conflict, Slovakia and South Africa used their experiences to assist the UN in developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to SSR. Coalition building with like-minded states is characteristic of middle powers and is consistent with the diplomatic broker role conception.

At a debate on 20 February 2007, Ambassador Kumalo highlighted South Africa's role as a diplomatic broker by notifying the Council that South Africa and Slovakia would co-host a workshop in Cape Town later that year to further develop UN norms on SSR. He projected South Africa as an example of how to use SSR to ensure successful post-conflict reconstruction. Kumalo explained how SSR had enabled the rebuilding of trust between the newly established democratic institutions and citizens after apartheid had eroded the legitimacy of state institutions like police, courts, and armies (S/PV.5632 2007: 15). A central pillar of the developing SSR norms is the significant role women must play in reforming post-conflict societies. Kumalo emphasized the example of South African women who participated as decision-makers advocating for democratic change and for a more equitable and just society for all' (S/PV.5632 2007: 16). This revealed a role conception of South Africa as a

good international citizen that sought to promote and implement women's rights domestically and globally.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sue van der Merwe addressed the second debate on SSR on 12 May 2008 (S/PV.5889 2008). She reported on the SSR workshop co-hosted with Slovakia in November 2007, together with the Slovak foreign minister. The International Workshop on Enhancing United Nations Support for Security Sector Reform in Africa was 'attended my many countries' and aimed to define the UN's role in SSR in countries affected by conflict on the African continent. Van der Merwe highlighted Africa's experience with post-conflict development as demonstrating that SSR was a long-term process that required national ownership to succeed. Contextual and country-specific interventions were necessary as the continent had 'long suffered from many attempts to impose one-size fits all solutions to security sector reform that have produced more problems than solutions' (S/PV.5889 2008: 7). States had both 'the sovereign right and responsibility' to provide security for their people. The Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2008/14) released after the meeting commended Slovakia and South Africa's joint initiative and encouraged further similar activities.

The partnership with Slovakia reveals one of the challenges of differentiating between small and middle states in world politics. It is useful to turn to Glazebrook's (1947: 308) suggestion that 'on general questions of status' the 'place of the middle powers emerges only by adding together three factors: their opposition to undue great-power control, their growing tendency to act together, and the influence they have individually come to exert'. As a middle-sized regional power of the South, South Africa fits all three of these factors. However, Slovakia, a small and regionally insignificant country that has a smaller land area, population, and GDP also does. Unlike South Africa, Slovakia is classified as a highly developed country with low inequality, is one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, and is a member of the OECD (CIA n.d). One of the consequences of inequality in the global system is that major African, Asian, or South American powers often occupy the same status as small European states in international forums. South Africa relied on Slovakia's

policy entrepreneurship and resources to influence the SSR debate in the UNSC, while it appears Slovakia benefitted from collaborating with one of Africa's major powers to make a disproportionate mark in the global security arena.

The DFA's report on its first tenure highlighted the success of the joint workshop for initiating 'a process through which Africa could make its contribution towards the development of a United Nations concept on Security Sector Reform' (DFA 2009: 15). In elaboration of its regional leader and bridge role, the DFA described the workshop as 'a unique opportunity for an exchange of views and experiences between policymakers and practitioners from African countries, on the one hand, and regional and international organisations and donor countries on the other' (DFA 2009: 15). It is telling that the co-hosted workshop in Cape Town was specifically about African post-conflict reconstruction, which means that Slovakia was playing a traditional middle power role of being concerned with issues beyond its immediate environment and South Africa was engaging as a regional leader and as a bridge between Africa and the developed world.

#### 5.2.5 Small arms

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is another manifestation of the impact of power inequality in the Council on international peace and security. With up to 875 million small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide and responsible for over half a million deaths each year, small arms are of particular concern in Africa where they are the main weapons used in conflicts (SCR 13 April 2007). Given most conflicts on the UNSC's agenda are African, there is a strong case for the Council to lead the development of a normative and regulatory regime to limit small arms proliferation. This would be in keeping with the Council mandate of maintaining international peace and security.

However, three of the P5 —the US, China and Russia— are among the biggest exporters of small arms and light weapons. The US, in particular, has argued that creating and advancing norms for disarmament is the responsibility of the General Assembly (SCR 13 April 2007). In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted the

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspect. Despite the recommendations of some countries, including South Africa, the Programme of Action was not binding on member states (A/CONF.192/15). Regional leaders from the global South have tried to influence the UNSC to take a stronger stance on small arms proliferation because of the destabilising effects such weapons have in their regions.

In 2006, Argentina tried and failed to convince the Council to pass a resolution on small arms. Its draft resolution eventually fell off the Council agenda. South Africa decided to revive the debate by circulating a draft presidential statement in March 2007, which invited the Secretary-General to submit a report on the issue to the Council in the next six months. The draft was supported by 14-member states and opposed by the US, which considered the request for a report as overburdening the Secretariat (SCR 13 April 2007). Nevertheless, South Africa succeeded in getting consensus for a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/24) to be passed on 29 June 2007. The statement expressed its concern that the proliferation and illicit manufacture of small arms exacerbated armed conflicts and undermined sustainable peace. However, the statement affirmed the right to individual and collective self-defence. Importantly, the statement requested a biennial report on small arms from the Secretary-General starting in 2008 (S/PRST/2007/24).

South Africa organised an open debate on small arms on 30 April 2008 during its presidency of the Council (S/PV.5881 2008). The debate followed the release of the Secretary-General's report on 17 April. Ambassador Kumalo stated that South Africa had organized the debate because in Africa, more people died from small arms than any other weapons. The UNSC had a responsibility to review how small arms and light weapons can contribute negatively to the maintenance of international peace and security. Kumalo highlighted the reality that small arms were 'the weapons of choice for the warlords, who have been able to recruit children as their preferred soldiers in some intractable conflicts, particularly in Africa' (S/PV.5881 2008: 19). South Africa believed that the issue of small arms and light weapons was directly related to the

Council's work on arms embargoes and DDR programmes. Therefore, the Council should ensure that peacekeeping operations were effectively resourced to enable them to carry out their DDR mandates.

South Africa's diplomacy in reviving the debate on small arms in the UNSC was a success of its first term and a display of its ability to broker diplomatic deadlocks and use its expertise to contribute constructively to an international policy issue. The issue of small arms is a significant case of South Africa pursuing an issue of importance to Africa and the developing world in a manner that was not combative towards the US. South Africa played the middle power roles of policy entrepreneur and diplomatic broker in ensuring that the subject of small arms remained active on the UNSC agenda, despite the reluctance of the US. Moreover, the Republic acted as a regional leader by consistently linking the small arms issue to the intransigence of African conflicts on the Council agenda.

### **5.3 African Agenda**

Africa is central to South African foreign policy. According to the DFA 2006-2009 Strategic Plan, the 'Consolidation of the African Agenda' informs the Republic's bilateral and multilateral engagements with the international community. The document states 'our national vision of building a united, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society is also relevant in the context of our vision for the Continent' (DFA 2006: 9). In this regard, Pretoria aimed to use its tenure in the UNSC to focus on resolving the root causes of African conflicts, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as preventing new conflicts from emerging. An important part of pursuing these objectives was promoting closer cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC, the continent's main decision-making body for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. South Africa served as a member of the UNSC and AUPSC simultaneously, which gave it access to both institutions to pursue its goals (DFA 2006: 11).

#### **5.3.1 Relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU**

Elected UNSC members generally use their presidencies of the Council to present

themes that are not officially on the Council agenda or to keep issues that would otherwise be neglected on the agenda (Thorhalsson 2011). South Africa dedicated both its presidencies of the UNSC, in March 2007 and April 2008, to the theme of closer cooperation between the UN and the AU. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter makes provision for regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security in line with the principles and purposes of the UN. Article 53 allows enforcement action to be taken by regional arrangements with authorization by the Security Council (UN Charter). Despite being included in the UN Charter from 1945, the superpower conflict during the Cold War left little room for regional organizations to play an active role in enforcement action or peacekeeping. The role of peacekeeper and mediator was left to traditional middle powers that were seen as ‘honest brokers’.

When the AU was formed in 2002, the AUPSC was established as a collective security and early-warning body to manage responses to conflict in Africa. Given the majority of conflicts on the UN agenda are in Africa, the continent’s leaders expected the UNSC to include the AUPSC in its decision-making, provide logistical and material support for peace missions and allow Africans to take leadership on African peace and security issues (Murithi 2007). Pretoria sought to formalise the relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC to prevent contestation over mandates and authority. South Africa’s concept paper for the 28 March 2007 debate identified several advantages that regional organisations had over the UN in conflict situations such as proximity and a greater understanding of conflict situations; more flexible processes; and the ability to intervene as soon as a conflict arose (S/2007.148).

At the meeting, Minister Dlamini-Zuma expressed South Africa’s hope that ‘during our tenure in the Security Council, we can contribute to better articulation and clarification’ of the relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC as mandated by AU leaders at the organisation’s summit in January 2007 (S/PV.5649 2007:2). Specifically, the summit called for the UN to look into the possibility of funding peacekeeping missions undertaken by the AU ‘through assessed contributions’ because the AU had taken responsibility for resolving conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, DRC and Sudan among others. Dlamini-Zuma was at pains to emphasize



that regional involvement in conflict resolution and mediation did not absolve the Security Council of the Charter responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. She stated that:

The Security Council remains the principal organ entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In that regard, we believe strongly that we should coordinate our collective security efforts under the United Nations' (S/PV.5649 2007: 3).

This was an important diplomatic move because Pretoria's frequent criticism of the structure and practices of the UNSC could have led to its Chapter VIII initiative being perceived as an effort to weaken the Council. The minister explained that South Africa's intention was to regularize the terms of engagement between the UN and regional organizations. This would allow the UN and AU to move beyond unsustainable ad-hoc arrangements towards clearly articulated 'burden-sharing'. This reflects a role conception of a policy entrepreneur introducing new norms of peacekeeping and providing the intellectual leadership to improve global governance. Scholars argue that emerging middle powers use their regional dominance as a springboard to exert influence on the world stage (Schoeman 2000; Jordaan 2003). As one of the driving forces behind the AU, Pretoria's promotion of the AU-UN relationship served its own interest of consolidating the African peace and security architecture and being recognised as an important global power. Success in formalising the AU-UN relationship would allow South Africa to influence UNSC deliberations even after its UNSC term.

The statements of Ghana, Indonesia, Russia, and China recognized South Africa as a regional leader on the African continent. The Chinese representative expressed this by saying:

In recent years, South Africa has made unremitting efforts and important contributions in promoting the development of the African Union and maintaining peace and security on the African continent. We would like to express admiration for this. (S/PV.5649 2007: 25)

Ghana's representative stated that his country 'remains deeply committed to President

Thabo Mbeki's vision of an African renaissance that would enable our continent to assume its rightful place of honour and dignity in the twenty-first century' (S/PV.5649 2007: 10). The recognition of one's status by other states is an important factor in foreign policy. It is particularly important for putative middle powers, which are sometimes difficult to discern from small states (Glazebrook 1947).

The meeting culminated in the adoption of a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/7), drafted by South Africa, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a report on deepening the relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC. The Secretary-General prepared a report as requested, which was released on 7 April 2008 (S/2008/186\*\*). It highlighted issues regarding the nature and structure of the partnership between the AU and UN that needed clarification. The most significant recommendation of the report was the establishment of an AU-UN panel of distinguished persons to consider the modalities of support to make financing of regional organizations more predictable, sustainable, and flexible.

During its presidency in April 2008 South Africa organised a summit-level debate, chaired President Mbeki, to discuss the Secretary-General's report (S/PV.5868 2008). The expected outcome was a resolution implementing the Secretary-General's recommendations (S/2008/229). South Africa invited twenty-one other African countries to participate in the meeting to share their experiences of UN peacekeeping operations. By inviting African member-states to participate in the debate, Pretoria was acting on its conviction that the UNSC be consultative and open to non-members in its deliberations as well as asserting itself as a regional leader. Presidency of the UNSC endows the incumbent with considerable influence over the Council agenda and processes. States with diplomatic and material resources can use their tenure to influence policy or practice in the UNSC. South Africa used both its Council presidencies to involve as the broader UN membership in debates. This is the kind of activism and entrepreneurship associated with middle powers.

Mbeki argued the major constraint on these African initiatives was 'the availability of the necessary and predictable resources'. According to Mbeki:

The issue of the funding of regional peacekeeping operations is central to defining and streamlining the relationship between the United Nations and African Union. We therefore welcome the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish an African Union/United Nations panel of distinguished persons to consider in depth the modalities of financing and supporting in other ways the peacekeeping operations undertaken by regional organizations. (S/PV/5868 2008: 2)

Mbeki stated he hoped the debate would provide clarity on the mechanisms and processes necessary to achieve the objective of a closer relationship between the UN and AU. The activist quest for autonomy was tempered by the reality of limited resources. Therefore, while emphasizing African independence, the thrust of the meeting was to plead for the necessary financial and logistical assistance for Africans to act on their commitment to resolving their own conflicts.

In a departure from the usual emphasis of the UNSC's deliberations on the countries that contribute troops and funds to peacekeeping operations, Mbeki emphasized the need for 'a comprehensive review of both the United Nations and the host countries with respect to United Nations peacekeeping missions'. Given South Africa's belief in national ownership of conflict resolution and peace building processes, it is unsurprising that Mbeki would focus on the experience of host countries in measuring the effectiveness of peacekeeping. He further stressed this point at the end of his statement when he said

Our peace-making efforts on the African continent have shown us that the resolution of conflicts requires an approach that places the views and efforts of the affected country and its people at the centre of the search for a peaceful solution, thus obliging the international community to intervene as a partner in support of the national effort. (S/PV.5868 2008: 3)

The debate culminated in the unanimous adoption of resolution 1809, which called for the UN Secretariat and AU Commission to work together on developing the AU's military, technical, logistic and administrative capabilities. This was a great success of South African diplomacy in the UNSC. It demonstrated South Africa as a regional

leader and mediator, as well as a policy entrepreneur that could initiate global policy and use skilled diplomacy and expertise to create a new way of doing things in the UN's highest organ. The representative for Zambia spoke of South Africa as a regional leader:

South Africa's presidency is therefore a further confirmation of the confidence of the international community in the leadership and role that South Africa continues to play in the various conflicts and their resolution. South Africa has in many ways enhanced Africa's initiatives in the resolution of some of Africa's long-standing conflicts. (S/PV.5868 2008: 8).

A prominent feature of the debate was the personification of South Africa's African leadership in Mbeki himself. For example, Gordon Brown began his speech by thanking Mbeki 'for his important and pivotal role' in the AU and NEPAD 'both of which are essential to ensuring African solutions to the challenges that Africa faces' (S/PV.5868 2008: 7). Sierra Leone stated that 'the remarkable talent and ability of President Mbeki, coupled with his consulate experience, convince us that we can exude pride and confidence that his special talents can be brought to bear on the proceedings of this meeting' (S/PV.5868 Resumption 1 2008: 4). The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mr Alpha Oumar Konare, started his statement with 'I particularly thank you, Mr President, for your country's leadership and your personal leadership on all African issues'. He further thanked Mbeki for 'listening to African peoples and African leaders' (S/PV.5868 2008: 34). Botswana's representative addressed Mbeki directly:

Indeed, the fact that you are presiding over this meeting is a clear testimony of your commitment and of the determination of your country, South Africa, to consistently use its membership of the Council to elevate to a global level the African agenda of achieving durable peace, security and sustainable development. (S/PV.5868 2008: 25)

In their framework of middle power behaviour, Higgott and Cooper include heroic middle power interventions that are led by particular statesmen. They use the examples of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau in Canada and Gareth Evans in

Australia. Mbeki appears to fit this characterization of a middle power leader who embodies the activist foreign policy and leadership of their country in the world. This kind of middle power leadership is associated with a 'heroic' style of diplomacy that concentrates on risky, high profile diplomatic initiatives that generate high levels of publicity (Cooper 1997: 10).

South Africa convened a meeting between the UNSC and the AUPSC in Addis Ababa in June 2007. In June 2008, the AUPSC and UNSC meeting took place in New York. The two bodies have met annually since 2007, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York. This was a major success for South Africa's African agenda for closer relations between the AU and the UN. Kumalo described the decision for annual meetings as very important:

Because of the issues that come before the Security Council that most of the time originate from Addis Ababa... the other thing that was important for those of us in Africa was an understanding that on peace and security matters the African Union always acts on behalf of the international community'. (S/PV.5706 2007: 2)

One of the challenges in achieving closer cooperation between the AU and the UN was finding a reliable mechanism for the UN to 'on a case-by-case basis', to assist the AU in its peace missions. Kumalo said it was:

A very difficult issue because it involves rules that are not set in the Security Council, but rather next door in the General Assembly, about how assessed contributions can be handled or used. But we thought that the fact that, we have begun to engage on this issue was extremely important (S/PV.5706 2007: 3).

As will be seen in chapter seven, the annual meetings between the UNSC and AUPSC quickly came to be perceived as mere talk shops more concerned with process and procedure, than making practical progress in resolving conflicts. An AU official interviewed for this study in August 2016 revealed that the joint communiqués for the previous two meetings had not been released because of lack of agreement on the substance and lack of political will on the side of the UNSC. He portrayed the annual

meetings as a mere show of acknowledging Africa when the real decisions about African conflicts were taken by the P5. He argued that until the AU had its own financial and military resources to back its own plans, the balance of power would always be in favour of the P5. This illustrates the limitations faced by middle powers of the South that can come up with policy innovations to have greater control over world politics, but still need the assistance of the West to enact their plans. In a world governed by realpolitik, policy influence is meaningless without financial and military muscle.

### 5.3.2 Visiting missions to Africa

Visiting missions have been used, since 1964 when the UNSC travelled to Cambodia and Vietnam, to engage in preventive diplomacy, gather first-hand information, support peace missions, and mediate among parties to a conflict. The UNSC undertook 51 visiting missions between 1990 and 2015 (SCR 29 February 2016: 2). In 2007, South Africa lobbied to be a co-leader, with the UK, of the visiting mission to Addis Ababa, Accra, and Khartoum. Since then, most missions have had co-leaders, usually a permanent and elected member. A senior DIRCO official interviewed for this dissertation explained South Africa's motivation in having African co-leaders for Africa visits in this way:

So, if you are going to that country, even if you are the penholder, then you'll have an African ambassador who is also a joint leader... you will see whenever we go to the continent; either South Africa or another African country will be a joint leader. And I think that was a strategic breakthrough in our view as well, to bring this African part and say *you can't have some group of white people coming to the continent leading the delegation...* I hope that practice will continue because it's part of this ideological shift that we are resolving these issues for ourselves (Italics added).

The statement above supports the argument made in chapter one that post-colonial and critical race perspectives of international relations resonate with the actual diplomatic and international experiences of African policymakers. In this instance, South Africa's motivation for being a co-leader in the Africa visits was partly to

counter the neo-colonial practice of the P5 (that includes two former colonial powers) going to Africa to influence events on the continent, while African UNSC members, who were likely to have greater interest and knowledge about the continent, were left in New York. Thus, South Africa challenged conventions structural power within the UNSC, in particular, and global politics, in general. The official's description of the visits was in racial terms-- '*some group of white people coming to the continent*'—because race is inseparable from Africans' experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism. As Grovogui (2001) argues, the language used in contemporary security and humanitarian intervention reifies racial conceptions of what is civilised or primitive, superior or inferior. An illustration of this language is UK Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones Parry's condescending description of visiting Ghana, at a briefing on 26 June 2007: 'Accra was what we expected: tremendous development compared with where we were three years ago. The whole city vibrates with the progress that Ghana is making' (S/PV.5706 2007: 4).

Despite the condescension in this one statement, Sir Jones Parry and Ambassador Kumalo worked closely and cooperatively with each other. Kumalo described working with Jones Parry as a 'tremendous honour' and said 'I will always value this experience, especially as someone who is in the Council temporarily. This is one of those things that I will take away when I leave here' (S/PV.5706 2007: 3). The significance of this statement is its revelation of the cooperative relations South Africa had with Western powers, including the UK, its former colonial master and rival on issues like the situation in Zimbabwe. It also reveals the differentiated status and experiences of permanent and elected members.

On 18 June 2008, Kumalo and new UK permanent representative, John Sawers, briefed the UNSC on the visiting mission to Djibouti and Sudan. A notable feature of this briefing was how Kumalo and Sawers described each other in warm terms. Sawers described Kumalo as my 'good friend and colleague' and said 'we were co-leaders in both countries, and it was a very fruitful partnership. I very much enjoyed it and benefitted from his wisdom and experience' (S/PV.5915 2008: 4). Kumalo concurred.

In the visiting missions in Africa South Africa displayed the middle power role conceptions of manager and regional leader because Pretoria took an interest in the processes, institutions, and rules of the UN to pursue its African agenda. The close working relationship between South Africa and the UK in the Africa visits illustrates that despite the tensions on how to approach certain conflicts and the anti-imperial rhetoric from South Africa, the countries considered themselves allies on critical issues in the Council. This reveals a pragmatism and problem-solving approach in South Africa's foreign policy that is very consistent with 'middlepowerness'.

### 5.3.3 Sudan

By the time South Africa joined the UNSC in 2007, it had been actively involved in Sudan for three years in its capacity as chair of the AUPSC and troop-contributor to the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), an AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur. AMIS was the only external military force Khartoum would accept in Darfur and it had official UNSC support through resolution 1564 (2004). However, AMIS was underfunded and faced with prohibitive logistical challenges. In 2006, the Western UNSC members sought to deploy a UN operation in Darfur at its summit in 2006, the AU recommended the establishment of an AU-UN hybrid force to address Khartoum's concerns that about Western interference and to assist Africa's intervention in Darfur. In a briefing on 7 December 2006, Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad explained it thus:

The hybrid force is a compromise. The Sudanese government has made it clear that it will not accept any outside forces so this is a compromise- the forces will be African and supported by (backstopping) by other forces from the UN- financial, logistical etc. This is a compromise since the UN has called for this force to be blue hatted, which has been consistently rejected by the Sudanese government. They will only accept an African force supported by the UN. There is no way that we as Africa can sustain our presence in Darfur without UN support (DFA 2006c).

The first time South Africa spoke on the Darfur in the UNSC was on 4 April 2007 when the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief,



Sir John Holmes briefed the Security Council on humanitarian problems facing Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (S/PV.5655 2007). Holmes described the situation in Darfur as the largest humanitarian operation in the world. He blamed the deteriorating situation on all parties to the conflict but stated that ‘the Government of Sudan has the primary responsibility for protecting its population and is accountable for the proper investigation and prosecution of those accused of committing crimes’ (S/PV.5655 2007: 5). Ambassador Kumalo expressed pleasure that Mr Holmes described the situation as a regional problem because ‘my delegation has always argued that, until the international community resolves the situation in Darfur, people will always suffer in the camps in Chad, Central African Republic and elsewhere’ (S/PV/5655 2007: 8). South Africa would emphasize the regional dimensions of conflicts in other parts of Africa and the world throughout its term. This is consistent with its role conception as a regional leader and its broader goal of building synergies between the work of the UN and AU.

This first statement on Darfur set the tone of South Africa’s engagement on the issue in the rest of its tenure. Kumalo’s long description of the suffering of the people of Darfur implied that the UNSC members, especially the P3, who were concerned with the bureaucratic processes of intervening in Darfur, were not genuinely concerned with the people most affected by the crisis. It is telling that Kumalo did not mention the government in his list of characters that posed a danger to the people of Darfur. By avoiding mention of the government among the aggressors in the conflict and implying that the Council was distracted by ‘political complications’, Kumalo was casting suspicion on Western emphasis on Khartoum’s role in the conflict and calls for sanctions against the regime.

South Africa cautioned against sanctions because of Al-Bashir’s conceding to the establishment of a UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur. Some Council members such as the US and UK were highly sceptical of Khartoum’s acceptance of the operation and insisted on the need to keep an eye on the government to ensure it implemented its commitments. At a briefing on the Africa visit on 26 June 2007, Kumalo expressed his trust in Sudanese government officials saying they were ‘very forthcoming and

unambiguous in their acceptance of the hybrid force' (S/PV.5706 2007: 2). Regarding implementation, Kumalo argued that the major challenge was securing a timeline of what was needed to deploy the hybrid mission. Kumalo's concern for the modalities of implementing the joint mission in Darfur indicates a national role conception of South Africa as a multilateral manager and regional leader in the UNSC.

In early July, the UK circulated the first draft resolution proposing a joint AU-UN mission in Darfur to be established for twelve months. The draft also included language on extending sanctions against Khartoum if it did not comply. At a 16 July 2007 meeting, Kumalo indicated South Africa's dissatisfaction with the inclusion of sanctions language in the draft. He said:

As the Council knows, there is a draft before us that has been provided by the United Kingdom, as the lead country. We are looking at the draft, but we just want to be sure that it stays in the spirit that we had on the trip. It was a spirit of cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of the Sudan, in addressing the issues of Darfur. That spirit is very important in terms of what will be contained in the resolution, which should essentially be an implementation resolution. (S/PV.5717 2007: 3)

This statement captures South Africa's concern, shared by China, Russia, Qatar, Indonesia and Congo, that further sanctions would only compromise the progress that had been made because Khartoum had softened its position and cooperated on the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). These countries also expressed discomfort with the apparently disproportionate emphasis on the government's failures instead of putting pressure on the rebel groups to honour their commitments and adhere to the peace process. As a developing country, South Africa was resentful of the practice of P5 members acting as lead countries in African conflicts on the UNSC agenda and thus having the freedom to draft resolutions according to their interests and interpretation of events on the ground.

In informal Council negotiations, the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed to remove the sanctions language and adopt a more conciliatory tone, in exchange for

keeping language on mandate command and control and framing the intervention in terms of Chapter VII. On 31 July 2007, draft resolution S/2007/468 sponsored by Belgium, Congo, France, Italy, Peru, Slovakia, and the UK was unanimously adopted as resolution 1769. As part of the compromise, the preamble of the resolution stressed that the hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character with troops sourced from African countries and the need to mobilise the financial and logistical resources to assist AMIS while UNAMID was being established. The resolution established UNAMID for an initial period of 12 months with a timeline for it to take over authority from AMIS by 31 December 2007.

In his statement on the vote, South Africa's Deputy Permanent Representative, Baso Sangqu welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution. He commended 'the agreement of the Sudan for the hybrid operation to be deployed in Darfur as detailed in the conclusions of the high-level African Union/United Nations consultations with the Government of Sudan' (S/PV.5727 2007: 9). By emphasizing negotiations, Sangqu promoted South Africa's position on the need to reward cooperation of recalcitrant regimes. With regards South Africa's thematic focus on closer relations between the AU and UN, Sangqu stated that 'resolution 1769 gives practical expression to the partnership between the AU and the UN, which, we hope, will go a long way in providing a strong basis for strengthened cooperation between the two organisations' (S/PV.5727 2007: 9). Moreover, South Africa encouraged the Secretary-General of the UN and the Chairperson of the AU Commission 'to continue to provide leadership and innovation' so UNAMID could be deployed as soon as possible.

The adoption of resolution 1769 was a major achievement for South Africa as an influential member of the UNSC. By exercising its specialist knowledge of the situation and its unique relationship with Al-Bashir's regime, Pretoria played the roles of multilateral manager, diplomatic broker, mediator, and regional leader to influence the UNSC's response to the situation in Darfur.

The excitement about UNAMID was tempered by the realities of deploying the new

and complex operation. On 27 November 2007, Mr Jan Eliasson the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Darfur and Mr Guéhenno Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council on the difficulties facing deployment of UNAMID including force generation, getting the troop composition acceptable to Khartoum and other bureaucratic hurdles from the UN system (S/PV.5784 2007). Representing South Africa, Mr Sangqu, tried to strike a conciliatory tone by describing the peace process in Darfur as a collective effort. He emphasized that ‘concerning these outstanding critical capabilities it is clear that we, in Africa, are not in a position to provide them and we appeal to those who can to provide the required capabilities’ (S/PV.5784 2007: 12). South Africa was also concerned by the delays in approving the budget for UNAMID and stressed the need for ongoing dialogue between the UN, AU, and Sudanese government to ensure the speedy deployment of the mission.

The financial and material obstacles to deploying UNAMID highlight the difficulties of implementing South Africa’s African agenda in the UNSC, specifically, and in other aspects of world politics, generally.

On 18 June 2008, Ambassador Kumalo and Ambassador John Sawers of the UK reported on the UNSC mission to Djibouti and Sudan. During the briefing, Kumalo highlighted the issue of UNAMID’s deployment because

In my humble opinion, the Council needs to pay much more attention to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). I was among those who, I suppose because we were on the ground, were very shocked at how under-resourced UNAMID is... I want to put on record that this under-resourcing of UNAMID is something that has to be watched... It was very humbling to realize that UNAMID was not at the strength that would enable it to actually respond to those people’s fears. (S/PV.5915 2007: 6)

At a joint briefing by the AU and UN special envoys to Darfur on 24 June 2008, Kumalo repeated South Africa’s concern about the rebels:

Among everyone that I talked to in Sudan, no-one ever believed that JEM was really serious about Darfur. First Vice-President Salva Kiir said that JEM has always had the goal of regime change. They are more worried about changing the Government in Khartoum... What about putting pressure on them? Of course, it is easy to put pressure on the Government because they are there, but these guys are operating out of the back of their pickup trucks. What about finding ways to also put pressure on them? Some of them live in Europe, so we can get to them if we want to. I am not saying we should not put pressure on the Government. But I am trying to ask: what is the way in which we could also apply pressure to these people? (S/PV.5922 2008: 11).

Kumalo's comments reveal a state-centric world-view and deep suspicion of anti-government forces. Despite statements of valuing human security, South Africa's arguments on Darfur were based on Westphalian statehood that privileges sovereignty over individual rights. By this logic, the crimes of rebel groups were worse than the crimes committed by the government against its people. This goes against the norm of 'sovereignty as responsibility' in which sovereignty is earned by being accountable to citizens and the international community (Deng et al. 1996). It is also inconsistent with the emphasis on human security in South African defence policy (Africa 2015). Scholars have criticised Pretoria's antagonism towards rebel movements and regime change, given the ANC's history as a liberation movement that fought to overthrow an authoritarian regime. Critics view the ANC government's defence of the sovereignty of African and developing countries under authoritarian rule as hypocritical and a manifestation of unprincipled anti-imperialism (Nathan 2005).

Kumalo expressed concern at the lack of resources directed to UNAMID. Earlier, Eliasson's had described UNAMID as a four-part musical composition, in which the four voices were not in harmony. Kumalo commented on this four-part harmony because he comes 'from Africa, where we sing without instruments' (S/PV.5922 2008: 12). He continued:

To really have a four-part harmony, you must all sing from the same sheet music or remember the same song. Right now, the four that he

mentioned that make up that four-part harmony do not even have the same sheet music among themselves so how can they sing together in four-part harmony?

He closed his statement thus:

When people of Darfur ask us the difficult question “Can you help us?” at this moment we should be humble enough to say that we are not yet well enough equipped to help them. We truly want to, but we are just not there yet.

This is another great example of Kumalo’s unique turn of phrase. More importantly, it illustrates South Africa’s view of conflict as a multi-layered and inherently complex phenomenon that requires multi-layered and complex solutions based on cooperation. South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution as a necessarily deliberative process, contradicts the approach of the Western security and development community, which focused on quick wins and implementable targets.

The UNSC referred the situation in Darfur for investigation by the ICC in 2005 to determine who was responsible for violence against civilians (S/RES/1594). This was the first ever use of the referral mechanism in the Rome Statute. The issue of ICC prosecutions in Darfur placed South Africa in an awkward position because on one hand, it was one of the main proponents of the ICC and ending impunity for international crimes, while on the other it advocated a policy of cooperation and negotiation with the Sudanese government.

Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council on 5 December 2007 the Government of Sudan had not complied with its legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC with regards the arrest of two indicted suspects—former government minister, Ahmad Harun, and Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb. While it is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, Sudan was expected to cooperate under UNSC resolution 1593 (2005). Moreno-Ocampo’s briefing implied that the violence in Darfur was ‘a calculated, organized campaign’ by Khartoum to destroy the population of Darfur (S/PV.5789 2007: 2). This is consistent with international human rights organisations’

characterisation of the conflict as genocide. He also expressed concerns about violence targeted at AMIS troops that had resulted in the death of ten peacekeepers. With regards cooperation between the ICC and the AU, Moreno-Ocampo thanked South Africa for hosting meetings in New York with him and the Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, and members of the UN Africa Group. This indicates South Africa's playing a role as a bridge and a regional leader.

Ambassador Kumalo tried to balance South Africa's support for the ICC and its defence of the Sudanese government in his statement. He highlighted the importance of the Court in deterring international crimes and described it as 'an advocate of adherence to the rule of law, and thus we expect cooperation with its work' (S/PV.5789 2007: 13). Kumalo lamented the fact that the ICC did not have the capacity to enforce its own warrants through a police force or army and was thus reliant on states to exercise its duties. In that respect, South Africa was of the opinion that 'there is a responsibility upon the Security Council to demand the cooperation of States, particularly in cases when the Security Council has referred cases to the Court'. South Africa thus urged the Government of the Sudan and other parties to the conflict to cooperate with the ICC. Kumalo ended his statement by saying South Africa supported 'the Council's issuing a declaration affirming its position', an ambiguous statement that stopped short of supporting Ocampo's call for the two officials to be arrested (S/PV.5789 2007: 13-14).

Kumalo's statement offered generic expressions of support of the ICC and engaged little with the detail of Moreno-Ocampo's report. He did not even mention the killing of the ten AMIS peacekeepers. This reflects the contradictions in South Africa's support for the ICC. On one hand the Republic opposes impunity for international crimes, yet its own reconciliation process (through the TRC) was more concerned with preserving peace than achieving justice. In essence, South Africa promoted combatting impunity in principle but stopped short of demanding justice for the crimes perpetrated by either side in Darfur. By contrast, Qatar, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, offered a detailed criticism of the Prosecutor's report, as well as a list of legal options for Khartoum other than complying with resolution

1593. South Africa's position was shared by Congo but not by Ghana, which emphasized 'the destabilizing effects of impunity' and described resolution 1593 as part of the peace process.

In 2008, the ICC Prosecutor continued with investigating the highest levels of the Government of Sudan, as well as attacks on AMIS camps by rebels. At a briefing on 5 June 2008, Moreno-Ocampo declared 'the entire Darfur region is a crime scene' (S/PV.5905 2008: 2). South Africa's statement in response to the briefing was almost identical to the one in December 2007. Ocampo sent a request to indict Al-Bashir to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC on 14 July. In response to the application to the pre-trial chamber, the AUPSC had released a communiqué on 21 July asking the ICC prosecutor to defer the indictment until the peace process was concluded. The AUPSC requested the UNSC to defer the ICC process, in accordance with article 16 of the Rome Statute.

At a briefing on 3 December 2008, Moreno-Ocampo told the Council that if the judges did agree on an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir 'there will be a need for united and consistent action to ensure the execution of the arrest warrant' (S/PV.6028 2008: 2). Coming as it did at the end of South Africa's tenure in the UNSC, Kumalo's statement at the meeting demonstrated Pretoria's reaction to the criticism it faced for some of its decisions in the Council. Kumalo characterized the debate on Bashir's indictment as how to balance 'judicial accountability' to end impunity for international crimes and 'the realities of bringing an end to conflict through a sensitive peace process'. He referred to Article 16 of the Rome Statute as an opportunity to 'allow the Council to strike a balance between the important principles of peace and justice, should the situation on the ground demand it' (S/PV.6028 2008: 15). Kumalo argued that the Council's consideration of the request by the AU Peace and Security Council was 'urgent' because it was best to apply article 16 before the arrest warrant was issued.

In closing his statement, Kumalo asked Moreno-Ocampo about his repeated warning to the UNSC not to be seen to be protecting President Al-Bashir and others who may



have committed crimes in Darfur. Kumalo asked:

Does this mean that if the Security Council discusses article 16 of the Rome Statute as it applies to this case, we will be understood as either attempting to protect these people or having been induced in some way into covering up of what is happening in Sudan? I think that needs to be made very clear. Otherwise, should the Council get into a discussion of this, those on the outside might think that we have been trapped into some kind of cover-up or inducement.

This apparently odd question reveals the concerns of the UNSC delegation and Pretoria at the public perception of their conduct during their UNSC term, which had been widely condemned for being supportive of dictators and against human rights. Many interpreted South Africa's insistence on strict adherence to the UN Charter and limited view of the UNSC's mandate as merely using technical arguments to protect authoritarian regimes and preventing the international community from exercising the responsibility to protect vulnerable people. Ocampo seems to have taken the question well and his response was favourable:

For the purpose of clarification may I begin by saying that I truly appreciate the question, in particular because South Africa stands as an example to the world on how to conduct a transition. As the Permanent Representative said, South Africa, as a founding member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), was leading the Rome discussions and throughout my five-year tenure, South Africa has been leading and supporting international justice. That is why I really appreciate his question and his frankness.

Ocampo continued that his job as a prosecutor required him to pursue the law without political considerations. This responsibility was different from that of the SA representative. He then went on to set out his case against Al-Bashir that 'what I see in the crimes committed in Darfur is that the crimes have the particularity that they are committed by the members of the Government, using the Government apparatus' and Al-Bashir 'gave the orders to commit the crimes' (S/PV.6028 2008: 20).

Kumalo responded:

My question was included to make it clear that people who are not in the Council should not see us debating this issue and then interpret it as if we are condoning all these horrible things that we have spoken of. We in no way condone them, and we regret that they took place, but we also have the responsibility to look at the entire matter... those who are sitting here must not get the impression that, just because we are asking the question, we therefore have taken one side or the other. We have not, and we are delighted that we have the Court, which can go in and search for all this information. (S/PV.6028 2008: 21)

He thanked Ocampo for his work and his clarification. The exchange between Ocampo and Kumalo was fascinating because it revealed Pretoria's great concern about how its actions in the UNSC were interpreted. This is seen in the constant reassurance that it was not supporting Al-Bashir by asking questions about article 16. Ocampo's description of SA as a friend of the Court and a supportive member state also indicates the tensions in managing the relationship between Pretoria and the ICC on both sides.

In its diplomacy on Sudan South Africa played the roles of regional leader, mediator, and bridge to achieve its aims. A significant part of the bridge-building and diplomatic broker role was in facilitating cooperation between the Government of Sudan and the UN about the specific modalities of the deployment of UNAMID. UNAMID was also the first practical manifestation of the Chapter VIII norm of cooperation between the AU and UN that was South Africa's main thematic focus during its tenure. These roles clashed with its commitment to international justice when the ICC Prosecutor scaled up investigations of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. In a global context in which human rights are the marker of civilisation, perceived support of the Sudanese government and President Omar Al-Bashir was enough to condemn any state to international opprobrium. IR scholars and observers criticised Pretoria for working 'assiduously to dilute efforts to address the Darfur crisis' (Nathan 2011: 56) and criticised South Africa as a 'rogue democracy' supporting a rogue regime.

Yet, South Africa scored one of its biggest successes as a regional leader in the UNSC

with the establishment of UNAMID, which happened because of Pretoria's engagement with Khartoum. Moreover, as will be seen in chapter six, the same Western powers that led criticism of Pretoria's support of Khartoum formed an alliance with Al-Bashir to help them in their military intervention in Libya. An interesting anecdote is of the co-author of a 2008 paper asking whether South Africa had moved from being 'a beacon of hope to a rogue democracy' because of its UNSC decisions on Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan, Princeton H. Lyman (Baker and Lyman 2008). Mr Lyman became US envoy to Sudan in 2011 and advocated a policy of cooperative engagement and negotiated settlement that was very similar to the one adopted by South Africa in 2007 and 2008 (Temin and Lyman 2013). The situation in Sudan demonstrates how realpolitik, human rights idealism, imperialist civilising discourse and, the manipulation of public perceptions, combine to undermine lasting resolution to horrific conflicts and perpetuate gross humanitarian crises in poor countries.

#### 5.3.4 Zimbabwe

One of South Africa's most controversial decisions in the Council was its vote against imposing sanctions on individuals linked to Robert Mugabe's government following the Presidential run-off elections on 27 June 2008. The vote came as little surprise to those familiar with the Pretoria's policy of quiet diplomacy towards the Mugabe regime. However, it still generated controversy as South Africa was seen as once again siding with an authoritarian regime and contradicting its official commitment to human rights.

Since the eruption of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe in 2000 (see Rafthopoulos and Phimister 2004; Moyo and Yeros 2007; Mamdani 2008), South Africa had pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy defined by the late Dag Hammarskjold as 'skilful negotiations, conducted with tact, persistence and impartiality but without fanfare' (Alden and Schoeman 2004: 3). This diplomatic approach was criticised by international observers for not being tough enough against Mugabe's regime. Critics argued that South Africa failed to use its regional dominance to condemn the rigging of elections in 2002 and 2005, and to support the

opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Lipton 2009). Pretoria defended its position based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in another country's domestic affairs. President Mbeki and several of his ministers portrayed calls for more robust action in Zimbabwe as tantamount to regime change and risking instability in Southern Africa.

The immediate crisis leading to the July 2008 vote was sparked by the general elections held on 29 March 2008. The MDC won the majority of seats in parliament and votes in the presidential election (SCR 28 April 2008). However, because the Morgan Tsvangirai failed to win an outright majority in the presidential poll, a run-off election was called for 27 June in which he would run directly against Mugabe. Violence against opposition supporters and leaders intensified in the run up to the second round of presidential elections with Tsvangirai withdrawing from the poll on 22 June citing the absence of an environment conducive to free and fair election (SCR 9 July 2008). In a Security Council briefing on the situation in Zimbabwe on 23 June 2008, Under-Secretary General B. Lynn Pascoe called on Zimbabwean authorities not to go ahead with the run-off election, as no outcome would be considered credible (S/PV.5919 2008). He further called for the resumption of humanitarian interventions in the country. Pascoe also noted the increase in regional pronouncements on the situation and highlighted the efforts of regional mediator, Thabo Mbeki, to bring together the opposing sides to find a political solution. The Council subsequently adopted a Presidential statement condemning the violence in Zimbabwe and calling for the government to respect the results of the 29 March election (S/PRST/2008/23).

Despite the international and domestic outcry, Mugabe stood as the sole candidate in the election and was declared winner. The election was deemed as not credible and falling short of accepted AU standards by several African monitoring bodies including the AU, Pan-African parliament, and SADC. In response to the election, the US circulated a draft resolution against the Mugabe regime on 3 July 2008.

On 11 July, the Council voted on draft resolution S/2008/447, which was sponsored by the US. The result was nine in favour (Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, United Kingdom, United States), five against (China, Libya, Russia, South Africa, Vietnam) with one abstention (Indonesia). The draft was defeated by the vetoes from China and Russia.

The draft called for an end to violence and political repression in Zimbabwe and expressed concern with the humanitarian situation in the country. Invoking Chapter VII of the UN charter, it characterised the situation in Zimbabwe as a threat to international peace and security in the region. It called on the government 'to immediately cease attacks against and intimidation of opposition members and supporters' and to begin 'a substantive and inclusive dialogue between the parties with the aim of arriving at a peaceful solution that reflects the will of the Zimbabwean people and respects the results of the 29 March elections' (S/2008/447). It also called on the government to end restrictions on international humanitarian assistance and to support international organisations to distribute food, medical assistance, and other humanitarian aid. The draft further requested the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative on the situation in Zimbabwe to support negotiations between political parties and to report to the Security Council on the political, human rights and security situation. The draft-imposed sanctions on the country, including an arms embargo and an assets freeze and travel ban against fourteen individuals found to have engaged in or provided support for actions or policies to undermine democratic processes and institutions.

South Africa based its vote against the draft on its obligations to SADC and the AU. Dumisani Kumalo, informed the Council of a joint media statement released that morning, in Pretoria, by the SADC facilitator (Mbeki), the national representative of ZANU-PF, MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Mutambara. The statement confirmed that talks 'aimed at finding solutions to the challenges in Zimbabwe' had had resumed in South Africa the day before (S/PV.5933 2008: 4). Kumalo reminded the Council that South Africa was appointed as a facilitator in Zimbabwe at the SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in March 2007. At the same summit, SADC had 'appealed for the lifting of all forms of sanctions against Zimbabwe'.

The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held from 30 June to 1 July

2008 had also expressed concern about the situation in Zimbabwe but ‘did not call for sanctions against the country’. Instead the AU ‘appealed to States and all parties concerned to refrain from any action that may negatively impact on the climate for dialogue’, encouraged Mugabe and Tsvangirai to initiate a dialogue aimed at reconciliation and democracy, and expressed appreciation for the continued mediation efforts of Mbeki and Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping (S/PV.5933 2008: 4-5). In light of the statements of SADC and the AU, Kumalo stated that as a member of both organisations, South Africa was ‘obliged to follow the decision of those regional bodies’ and would vote against the draft resolution (S/PV.5933 2008: 5). South Africa was encouraged by the dialogue between the Zimbabwean parties and therefore urged the UNSC to ‘give space for the African Union summit decision to be implemented’.

The delegates of China and Russia emphasised that the situation in Zimbabwe was not a matter of international peace and security in the region and remained a domestic concern. The representative from China called for the Council to respect the mediation efforts of SADC and the AU. Adopting the resolution would ‘unavoidably interfere with the negotiation process and lead to further deterioration of the situation’ (S/PV.5933 2008: 13). The Russian delegate argued the draft was consistent with ‘illegitimate and dangerous practices’ by certain Council members to adopt resolutions beyond the UNSC’s Charter mandate of maintaining international peace and security. He condemned these practices for threatening ‘to lead to a realignment of the entire United Nations system’ (S/PV.5933 2008: 9). A notable aspect of the debate on the draft was the criticism of Russia’s vote by its G8 partners, the UK, France and the US because its vote contradicted the position of the G8 that had been agreed at a meeting a few days before. The G8 had committed to introducing financial and other measures’ against individuals responsible for violence in Zimbabwe (G8 2008). The P3 argued that this decision entailed a UNSC sanctions resolution, while Russia insisted ‘it makes no reference to the actions of the Security Council.

This is one of the major examples of the tensions within the G8 that subsequently resulted in Russia from being excluded from the forum and greater polarisation

among the P5 along East-West lines. The consequence of this will be discussed in the sections on Libya and Syria in chapters six and seven.

Once again, there was some disparity in voting in the Africa camp. Libya voted against the draft saying that it was a violation of Zimbabwe's sovereignty and interfered in its internal affairs. Imposing sanctions was seen as an obstacle to African efforts to resolve the crisis, as they would negatively affect the people of Zimbabwe and create a climate of tension, which would not be conducive to finding a solution (S/PV.5933 2008: 5). Libya's vote was unsurprising given Brother Leader Muammar Gaddafi's rhetoric against Western imperialism and his desire to establish a Libyan-led United States of Africa (Landsberg 2000). Burkina Faso voted in favour of the draft.

The Burkinabe representative justified his delegation's vote by arguing that 'history, and in particular Africa's history, has accustomed us to situations in which a small spark has led to a great conflagration'. Therefore, the situation in Zimbabwe had to be regarded as a threat to peace and security in Southern Africa (S/PV.5933 2008: 6). While Burkina Faso endorsed the AU's mediation initiative, as a member of the Security Council it had to shoulder the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Voting for the draft with its provisions for an arms embargo to prevent a large-scale military conflict, would allow it to do this without compromising the AU's efforts. Burkina Faso's willingness to support international intervention in Zimbabwe can be explained by its experiences as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

ECOWAS is exceptional among sub-regional organisations in Africa, and indeed the world, in having frequently intervened militarily in the domestic conflicts of member states, beginning with Liberia in 1990 (Tavares 2011). Therefore, ECOWAS members are less defensive of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference than their counterparts in SADC. There are several potential explanations for this, including the fact that all SADC member states are still governed by the liberation movement that came to power at independence, whereas West Africa has seen numerous

constitutional and unconstitutional changes of power that have displaced the original liberation governments. The sub-regional differences in approach to intervention among African states were seen again in the Libya intervention discussed in chapter six. Deeper interrogation of the causes and consequences of these sub-regional differences goes beyond the scope of this study but is an area ripe for future research.

South Africa's vote on draft resolution S/2008/447 provides important insights into this study's primary concerns with categorising middle power roles and understanding the role of middle powers within the context of structural power. South Africa behaved as an emerging middle power by asserting its regional leadership in the vote. When it joined the UNSC, Pretoria rightly expected to take the lead on Zimbabwe given its proximity and leadership of SADC. However, Pretoria was challenged by the P3, especially Britain, which used their structural power to set the agenda on Zimbabwe including tabling the draft resolution. South African policymakers perceived the P3's attempts to place Zimbabwe on the UNSC agenda as a neo-colonial move to undermine African governance and to prevent African solutions to African problems. A senior DIRCO, official interviewed for this study, who was part of the South African mission at the UN, described it thus:

And that's the reason why you will recall the UK as a permanent member had wanted to have a Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe, but at the time we were involved in Zimbabwe under the auspices of SADC, which then is SADC under the African Union. So, we said no but you can't do that we are busy with a process here. You want to take a decision that then will undo everything that we have done ourselves. We are closer. SADC will be affected by any fallout in Zimbabwe more than any other person in the world. So, this is our backyard, please respect our views. It was for that reason then that the Russians had to veto the decision, the resolution that the UK (sic) was presenting. Because there was a facilitation coming from a sub-regional organisation, which you could technically say is a sub-regional organisation of the broader African Union, which is a regional organisation.



While the technical issues raised by the official are well known, what is especially relevant for this study is the sub-text of resentment at the UK using its structural power as a permanent member of the UNSC to interfere in a SADC process. South Africa mobilised the support of Russia and China to assert control of its 'backyard' to mitigate the risks of 'fallout' in Zimbabwe. Using the analytical concepts of this study, South Africa acted as a diplomatic broker to gain the support of like-minded states on the UNSC to obstruct the plans of the P3.

Distrust of the motives of the Western powers, especially the UK, is an important explanation for South Africa's quiet diplomacy in relation to Harare. This was compounded by perceptions that the West was especially concerned with land expropriation in Zimbabwe because it affected white farmers. South Africa's white-owned media was particularly vociferous in its calls for Pretoria to take a robust position against Mugabe and the public discourse was polarised along racial lines (Alden and Schoeman 2004). The racialised language of many of Mugabe's critics deepened ANC policymakers' resistance to publicly criticising Harare. Britain's prime minister during the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia, Harold Wilson, had famously refused military intervention because British soldiers could not be expected to fight against their 'kith and kin' (white Rhodesians). Mbeki evoked this notion by criticising Western powers for opposing land reform in order to protect their 'kith and kin' (Gevisser 2007: 440). As discussed in chapter one, the experience of colonialism and institutionalised racism continues to inform the behaviour of the global South, especially regional powers who have to balance their 'native' identities with their aspirations for world leadership (Grosvogui 2001; Jordaan 2003).

Critics dismiss such explanations to argue that the ANC government's support of ZANU-PF stemmed from their common history as southern African liberation movements. Mbeki was seen to be protecting a fellow member of 'the brotherhood of African leaders' (Gevisser 2007: 443) regardless of interests or concerns of Zimbabwean citizens. ANC policymakers frequently evoked the idea of a 'blood bond' between the ANC and ZANU-PF (Alden and Schoeman 2004; Solomon 2010). This argument was supported by Mbeki's obvious disdain for MDC leader Morgan

Tsvangirai, a trade unionist with no struggle credentials from the liberation war. Mbeki and other ANC leaders were suspicious of Tsvangirai's close ties to Western organisations. Solomon (2010: 137) provides a remarkable quote from a letter Mbeki wrote to Tsvangirai on 22 November 2008:

... it may be for whatever reason, you consider our region and continent as being of little consequence to the future of Zimbabwe, believing that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are of greater importance. In the end, when all is said and done, Zimbabwe [has] to exist in peace and productive collaboration with its neighbours in Southern Africa and the rest of Africa. Realistically, Zimbabwe will never share the same neighbourhood with countries of Western Europe and North America, and therefore secure its success on the basis of friendship with these and contempt for the decisions of its immediate African neighbours.

This message reveals Mbeki's distrust for the MDC and his acceptance of Mugabe's rhetoric that Tsvangirai was a British/Western stooge. Sentiments such as this eroded South Africa's chance of being seen as an honest broker by both sides of the conflict. The Republic's tendency to take sides in mediation is contradictory to the middle power role. Given the currency of Mugabe's anti-imperialist discourse among ANC supporters, it is unsurprising that South Africa chose African solidarity over robust criticism. However, as Solomon (2010: 138) cogently argues, 'Africanist solidarity' that sides with authoritarian rulers over African citizens is hollow and undermines any vision of African renewal.

The characterisation of quiet diplomacy as a consequence of unthinking loyalty among political allies is not quite accurate. The day before the disputed runoff election, on 27 June 2008, that precipitated the UNSC draft resolution the Mail and Guardian newspaper released a leaked discussion document written by Mbeki for Mugabe in 2001. Mbeki's stated intention in penning the report was to make 'a humble contribution to the work Zanu-PF must carry out'. Despite the deferring tone of this phrase, the report is a scathing evaluation of ZANU-PF's failures that created the conditions for urgent demands for land reform and the subsequent political and

economic crisis. Mbeki advises Mugabe that ‘to resort to anti-imperialist rhetoric will not solve the problems of Zimbabwe but may compound them’ and he criticises that Zanu-PF had become ‘an opponent of the democratic institutions of governance and democratic processes’ in Zimbabwe (Rossouw 2008). Surprisingly, Mbeki blames Zimbabwe’s economic crisis on ZANU-PF’s reliance on international funding to implement service delivery, which led to a high budget deficit and forced the government to rely on the IMF for assistance. Therefore, the blame for the crisis does not lie with Western governments but with ZANU-PF’s mismanagement of the economy. Mbeki cautions that Zimbabwe must not ‘end up in a situation of isolation, confronted by an array of international forces she cannot defeat, condemned to sink into an ever-deepening social and economic crisis’. This text is revealing of the nuance and complexity of Mbeki’s position on Zimbabwe. Habib (2009) explains it as emblematic of second-generation African nationalist leaders that have adopted a pragmatic approach towards reforming the global order. These leaders recognise:

the need to engage with the global order with a view to reforming it, understand the power relations within the international system with a view to subverting it. This second-generation response also focuses on developing mechanisms and alliances that enhance the leverage of post-colonial powers with this agenda (Habib 2009: 148).

The pragmatic approach towards challenging structural power by playing within the rules of the game is characteristic of emerging middle powers in the analytical framework developed in chapter two. This could explain Mbeki’s increasing intransigence in the face of impatient demands to publicly condemn Mugabe. As the 2001 report illustrates, Mbeki agreed with many of the criticisms against Zanu-PF and foresaw the international isolation that would follow Mugabe’s stance. However, he wanted space to engage with Zimbabwe on his own terms in a way that could subvert the power relations in the international system (particularly the neo-colonial relationship with Britain) instead of upholding them. Given his preference for behind the scenes, ‘red telephone diplomacy’ Mbeki believed the best way for African solutions for African problems was for African leaders to have frank negotiations with each other aware from the judgement of the Western glare or white gaze (Gevisser 2009: 443). This backfired because it came across as a mere continuation of

the old tradition of elite conspiring against the desire of the African masses.

A recurring theme in the literature on South African diplomacy towards Zimbabwe is the influence of the personality of Thabo Mbeki himself. Mbeki's policies on Zimbabwe and AIDS were the most publicly criticised of his presidency and generated the greatest number of scholarly musings on Mbeki's psyche and pathology (Gevisser 2007; Gumede 2005; Mangcu 2009). Xolela Mangcu (2009: 1) explained Mbeki's approach to Zimbabwe as stemming from 'a discourse of racial nativism' that was based on Mbeki's contradictory ideological formation and competing identities as a global citizen and an African. Through this interpretation, South Africa's 'double consciousness' in its international identity is explained through the personal 'double consciousness' of its chief architect. As discussed in chapter two, emerging middle powers have this character of existing in two distinct social worlds with tension between their self-identity and national role conception and the external gaze and role expectations. This is often reflected in the persons of their foreign policy architects such as Mbeki or former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. While there are libraries full of in-depth studies of the brains behind the foreign policy of major powers such as Churchill, Kissinger, both Bushes or De Gaulle, far less has been written about Nehru, Mbeki or Lula. This glaring gap in the literature will need to be filled to make sense of changes in international relations as the configuration of global power shifts from the global North to the South.

### 5.3.5 Rwanda

During South Africa's presidency of in March 2007, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1749 terminating the arms embargo and other sanctions against Rwanda on 28 March 2007. Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma chaired the meeting and the representative of Indonesia spoke after the meeting in his capacity as the chair of the UNSC Rwanda sanctions committee. Subsequently, the DFA claimed responsibility for the successful passage of the resolution:

South Africa took the initiative and successfully persuaded the Security Council to lift the residual sanctions that were still in place against Rwanda since 1994. The closure of the Security Council file was a key

objective of the Government of Rwanda, which sought to normalize Rwanda's position in the international community following the tragic events of its past. (DFA 2009)

I have not been able to corroborate this telling of the story, but the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs chaired the meeting indicates the importance it held for South Africa.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

South Africa's election to the UNSC came with great expectations that the Republic would be able to use its conflict resolution experience to help resolve intractable conflicts on the Council agenda, especially in Africa. South Africa made notable contributions in UNSC deliberations on the Great Lakes region because of its involvement as a mediator in Burundi and DRC. Indeed, the Republic's reputation as a middle power is based on its successful mediation of conflicts in that region. Other UNSC members acknowledged South Africa's role as a mediator, example, and regional leader marking a consistency between policymakers' role conceptions and the role prescriptions of others in the international community.

On the situation in Somalia, South Africa acted as a regional leader and bridge to challenge the UNSC to respond more actively to the crisis in that country. South Africa was critical of the Council's apparent inconsistency of not intervening in a dire security and humanitarian situation in Somalia, while being concerned with issues that did not strictly fit the UNSC's Charter mandate. By advocating for a UN mission to relieve pressure on AMISOM, South Africa was acting as a regional leader that was conscious of the resource constraints facing the AU. This was in line with its promotion of Chapter VIII cooperation between the AU and the UN.

The agenda items of Timor-Leste, SSR and Small Arms showcased South Africa's middle power leadership in the UNSC in terms of the four general roles associated with middle powers: policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, multilateral manager and mediator. In the case of Timor-Leste, South Africa was in the rare position of being

able to take leadership in a non-African country-specific situation. As with other regional leaders, South Africa is often pigeonholed into dealing with issues in its neighbourhood rather than influencing context on other continents in the way traditional middle powers do. SSR revealed how South Africa cooperated with an arguably less systemically important European country in order to promote a policy issue of interest to the African continent. Bringing the Small Arms debate back into circulation was a success of South African foreign policy that merged its good international citizen, multilateral manager, bridge, and regional leader roles.

One of the big concerns for South Africa in the Council was limiting the number of African issues placed on the agenda because it can be very difficult to remove a UNSC agenda item. South Africa is one of the few country specific issues to successfully lobby to be removed from the UNSC agenda. It advocated for Rwanda to be removed from the UNSC agenda in recognition of its apparently successful democratic transition and succeeded. As will be seen in chapter seven, it would later achieve similar success in Timor-Leste.

In relation to its African Agenda, South Africa succeeded in focusing the Council's agenda on cooperation between the AU and the UN in the resolution of African conflicts. This was done in three ways. First, through the debates on March 2011 and April 2012 that culminated in a presidential statement and resolution, respectively. Secondly, by advocating co-leadership of visiting missions to Africa so they would no longer be dominated by the P5 and non-African elected members. This practice continues today. Thirdly, by establishing the practice of annual meetings between the AUPSC and UNSC to discuss issues that feature on the agendas of both institutions. We can thus conclude that South Africa played the roles of policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, multilateral manager, mediator, and regional leader in the thematic and general issues related to Africa.

In the country-specific situations of Sudan and Zimbabwe, South Africa played the role of regional leader but struggled to communicate what it perceived to be its good international citizenship. In Sudan, Mbeki was legitimately criticised for his

apparently unyielding support for Al-Bashir despite the terrible atrocities he allowed to happen in Darfur. Given Mbeki's African Renaissance vision of African governments taking responsibility for their people (similar to Deng's notion of sovereignty as responsibility) it is odd that he was so supportive of a leader who displayed little interest of adhering to that maxim. The other case in which Pretoria was accused of blindly supporting a dictator was Zimbabwe. However, in that case, there is evidence that Mbeki was privately critical of Mugabe and tried to influence him behind the scenes. There is little evidence of this in the case of Sudan. Nevertheless, South Africa was not alone in acting inconsistently in relation to Al-Bashir. As will be seen in chapter seven, the Western powers were quick to drop their criticism when he became a useful ally in the fight against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.

A notable aspect of South Africa's diplomacy on Sudan was the challenge of balancing support for the ICC with anti-imperialism. While the Court was envisaged as a tool for Africans to fight impunity and take control of their own governance, the Rome Statute's provision for referral of cases from the UNSC to the ICC enables the P5 to influence the Court. Three of the P5 (US, China and Russia) are not signatories of the Rome Statute but have power over the ICC through their UNSC positions. The referral of Sudan to the ICC in 2005 and subsequent indictment of Al-Bashir placed South Africa's commitment to fighting impunity directly in conflict with its commitment to fighting international power imbalances. This tension was evident throughout the Republic's statements on the Sudan and the ICC. It could be argued that South African policymakers thought they could use the Republic's moral authority and example of balancing peace and justice at the end of apartheid to take the lead in the UNSC's approach to international crimes in Sudan. However, the failure to convince the UNSC to defer the Al-Bashir indictment under article 16 of the Rome Statute shows this was not the case.

We can conclude that South Africa played the role of an emerging middle power its first term in the UNSC. It was not always successful in playing the roles it set out for itself, but for the most part its behaviour was consistent with that of emerging middle

powers. This is an important theoretical point that national role conceptions will not always be enacted successfully. A state can try to play particular roles on the international stage and fail. Nevertheless, the middle power role framework is still a useful analytical tool to make sense of state behaviour.

Part three of the study turns to South Africa's second term in the UNSC. Chapter six examines South Africa's behaviour in relation to the promotion of human rights and democracy, and commitment to the rule of law, while chapter seven looks at peaceful conflict resolution and the African Agenda.



### **PART THREE: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNSC 2011-2012**

## CHAPTER SIX: THE CHALLENGES OF GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

### 6.1 Introduction

South Africa was elected to the UNSC for its second term on 12 October 2010. The AU had endorsed its candidacy at its 14<sup>th</sup> ordinary session in January 2010 and it was the only African contender to replace Uganda. It was elected with 182 votes out of 192. Foreign Affairs Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane attended the vote at the UN headquarters ‘to demonstrate South Africa’s commitment to the role of the United Nations Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security’ (DIRCO 2010a).

When South Africa was elected, the Minister expressed her ‘gratitude to the African Union and its Member States for the trust and confidence they have placed in our ability to advance the African Agenda of achieving peace, security and development, including respect for human rights’ (DIRCO 2010b). The direct reference to human rights was a departure from Minister Dlamini-Zuma’s statement when South Africa had been elected to its first term. This reflects the intention of the Zuma administration to avoid the criticism that South Africa was betraying its human rights legacy. Indeed, much of the rhetoric around Zuma’s election to first ANC then national presidency emphasised his character as a man of the people, more similar to the heroic Nelson Mandela than the technocratic Thabo Mbeki. Therefore, DIRCO and the Presidency highlighted the principle of promoting democracy and human rights over others underlying South African foreign policy.

This chapter and chapter seven examine South Africa’s behaviour in its second term in the UNSC. Chapter six focuses on the Republic’s actions and decisions on the issues related to human rights and democracy, as well as the commitment to rule of law. In terms of the analytical framework, both these principles are related to the role of being a good international citizen in the world. This entails promoting universal rights and values and acting according to the rules and laws governing international society. Pretoria wanted to take a non-confrontational and non-controversial approach to these issues in the second term to differentiate the Zuma presidency from that of

Mbeki and to recover some of the moral authority lost in decisions about Myanmar and Zimbabwe in the previous term. However, became clear early on in its tenure that South Africa would again struggle to balance its competing roles and interests.

The Council was very busy in 2011 due to the various crises in the Middle East and North Africa triggered by the Arab Spring. Libya, Mali, Syria and Yemen entered the UNSC agenda as country-specific items for the first time in 2011. In particular, the situation in Libya dominated South Africa’s diplomacy on the Council because of the fallout from the adoption of resolution 1973 authorising a no-fly zone in March 2011. This vote set the tone for the rest of South Africa’s tenure on the Council and almost all subsequent actions can be interpreted as a consequence of that decision.

In 2011 and 2012, there were 15 African, three Asian, three European and nine Middle Eastern country-specific issues on the Council agenda. South Africa participated in 434 formal meetings and made statements in 152 public meetings of the Council during its second term. South Africa voted yes for 117 out of 119 resolutions, abstaining in two.

**Table 5: South African participation in UNSC, 2011-2012**

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>Total</b>
Formal meetings	235	199	434
Resolutions	66	53	119
Presidential statements	22	29	51
SA yes vote	65	52	117
SA no vote	0	0	0
SA abstain	1	1	2

This chapter begins with the international and domestic context of South Africa’s

second term in the UNSC, as well as Pretoria's foreign policy goals in the Council. The domestic change in leadership from Mbeki to Zuma, as well as the changes in global power brought about by the Great Recession had a major influence on South Africa's foreign policy. The chapter then turns to the promotion of human rights and democracy. It starts with the conflict in Libya and the Sahel. Pretoria's decision to vote for resolution 1973, authorising a no-fly zone in Libya was ostensibly based on humanitarian concerns and a desire to promote democratisation in the country. This decision came up against the Republic's commitment to the rule of law because the NATO intervention appeared to exceed the terms of the resolution. In addition, South Africa appeared to fail in its role as an African leader because the AU was sidelined in the international effort to resolve the situation in Libya. Other human rights and democracy issues discussed in the chapter are the protection of civilians and WPS. This is followed by a discussion on the agenda issues related to the rule of law including counter-terrorism and Israel-Palestine.

## **6.2 The global and domestic context of South Africa's second term**

South Africa's second term took place in a context of major changes in the international system, most notably increasing multipolarity and a decline in US hegemony in the wake of the Bush administration's military adventures since 9/11. The US had elected its first black president, Barack Obama in 2008. Obama advocated a diplomatic approach of 'leading from behind' and minimising US exposure to international conflicts (Krauthammer 2011). The UK had elected a Tory government in 2010, for the first time since 1997, under Prime Minister David Cameron. China was beginning to flex its muscles as an emerging superpower as its economy continued to thrive in the midst of the great recession. Russia was under the caretaker leadership of President Dmitri Medvedev who made overtures of rapprochement with the Obama administration that masked Vladimir Putin's behind the scenes efforts to revive Russia's superpower status. During the course of 2011 and 2012, relations between the P5 divided more starkly along old Cold War lines. The P2 cast more vetoes than in previous years to prevent international intervention in Syria. The P3 united in promoting a particularly idealistic and interventionist view of liberal

peace based on R2P.

In South Africa, the ANC appeared to have recovered well from the bruising leadership battle between Mbeki and Zuma in 2007. The country successfully hosted the FIFA world cup in July 2010, displaying its reputation for ‘African’ hospitality and leadership in global summitry and events. Just over a year into Zuma’s presidency, South Africa was holding off the effects of the global economic downturn leading to its inclusion in the ranks of the emerging economies that would lead the world’s economic recovery and overtake the developed world. Nevertheless, the emphasis of President Zuma’s government was on achieving the ANC goal of a better life for all by redirecting national resources towards poverty alleviation and employment, instead of the international projects favoured by his predecessor. So, one of Pretoria’s goals when it was elected to its second UNSC term was to emphasise the links between this international recognition and domestic priorities.

Minister Nkoana-Mashabane presented South Africa’s approach to its second term in a speech at the University of Pretoria on 15 October 2010. She explained that South Africa would:

need to balance the often-divergent expectations of domestic constituencies and international audiences. As such, the country will have to contend with the formidable limitations that exist within the Security Council including the pre-determined agenda, and the reality of power and influence that are unevenly distributed within the Council (Nkoana-Mashabane 2010b).

This statement reflects the consciousness among policymakers of the negative responses to South Africa’s first term and the recognition of the challenge of managing the expectations of different sets of observers. An important part of addressing this was the establishment of a public diplomacy unit whose task was communicating foreign policy decisions. The Minister promised to communicate ‘more, better and faster with our people... especially regarding positions we take on debates within the Security Council’.

In an apparent jibe at the previous administration, the Minister said:

We will not trade our constitutional values and the rich tradition of struggle against injustice for political point-scoring. South Africans have to trust our judgement and never doubt our loyalty to our Constitution.

She further distinguished the approach of ‘President Zuma’s administration’ promising that it would follow Madiba’s vision of the international system ‘that is firmly grounded on human rights values and principles as espoused in relevant legal instruments’. Inherent in these statements is a criticism of the foreign policy of the previous government for having greater concern for punishing the West than protecting the rights of vulnerable people across the world.

Another difference in South Africa’s approach to its second term in the Council was the explicit reference to ‘national interests’. This was a new development in the foreign policy of the Zuma administration. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane reassured the country that membership of Security Council would not be ‘wastage of our limited fiscal resources’. On the contrary, it would be an opportunity to contribute to the resolution of conflicts that threatened to destabilise the region and had an effect on national security. Moreover, involvement in the UNSC enabled the country to develop its ‘institutional and substantive knowledge’ of the Council and the broader UN system. Among the precautions the government had taken in anticipation of its second term was the improvement of coordination within government ‘to improve our capacity to respond rapidly and effectively’.

The 2011 elected membership consisted of Gabon, Nigeria, SA, Lebanon, India, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2012, the elected members were Morocco, Togo, SA, Pakistan, India, Guatemala, Colombia, Germany, Portugal and Azerbaijan. The presence of Brazil, India, Germany, and South Africa on the Council in 2011 was considered a ‘test-run’ for an expanded Security Council, as all four countries are contenders for permanent membership. A group of think tanks from the four countries coined the label GIBSA to describe them (SWP 2011). GIBSA were expected to use the opportunity of their common tenure to ‘prove to the Council their positive contribution’ and to continue advocating for

UNSC reform (SWP 2011: 3). There is little evidence that these four states developed a common agenda on the UNSC but some of their decisions did coincide, as will be seen in this chapter and the next. The most significant decision was the abstention of Brazil, Germany, and India in the vote on resolution 1973 concerning Libya. Germany surprised many observers by not aligning its vote with the EU, which voted in favour. This will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3.1.

The IBSA countries did develop a common agenda for their year on the Council and released a joint statement setting out their plans, in New York on 12 October 2010. The IBSA Permanent Representatives to the UN noted the historic occasion of their common tenure in the UNSC and stated their intention to promote the principles and objectives of the global South. They identified greater transparency in the UNSC working methods as a particular goal. The three reiterated the statement of the Foreign Ministers of IBSA on 25 September 2010 at the 65<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly, which reaffirmed IBSA's 'commitment to multilateralism and to increased participation of developing countries in the decision-making bodies of multilateral organisations and institutions', especially the UN. In that regard, the IBSA Permanent Representatives reiterated their intent to cooperate on 'the urgent need' to expand the UNSC so it could be more representative of developing countries. They stressed 'their firm commitment to collaborate in the Security Council with the aim of making the Council more responsive and transparent in the execution of its mandate' (DIRCO 12 October 2010). The statement mentioned specifically cooperation in the area of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, especially between the UNSC and AUPSC. As will be seen in this chapter and chapter seven the IBSA did cooperate in various areas, *inter alia*, Libya, Israel-Palestine, Syria, Sudan and UN Working Methods.

While it was not a member of the BRICS when it was elected to the Council, South Africa was officially invited to join the BRICS in December 2010, which meant all five BRICS were on the Council in 2011. Many observers speculated about the consequences of having the multilateral grouping that represents the greatest challenge to post-Second World War structural power represented on the Council. The IBSA statement is notable in light of the tension on the issue of UNSC reform

with the other BRICS members, China and Russia. Beijing, and to a lesser degree, Moscow has been opposed to expanding the UNSC because this would dilute their influence as emerging superpowers. Ironically, it is the P3 that has been more open to UNSC expansion as part of a strategy of ‘soft containment’ of China’s increasing global influence (Kornegay 2011).

The other distinguishing factor in South Africa’s second term was the presence of two of its continental rivals: Nigeria in 2011 and Morocco in 2012. South Africa and Nigeria are the foremost contenders for an African permanent seat in an expanded Council. As discussed in chapter three, South Africa/Nigeria relations were fraught during the military regime of Sani Abacha, especially after the execution of the Ogoni rebels. Relations improved substantially under the Mbeki and Obasanjo presidencies, with both countries taking the lead in the establishment of the AU and NEPAD. However, relations cooled again under the Zuma presidency, as Pretoria moved closer to Angola (Maseng 2013). On 10 November 2010, Nigeria convened a meeting with the UN Permanent Representatives of Gabon, South Africa, and Uganda regarding their joint participation as non-permanent members of the UNSC (Uganda’s tenure was 2009 and 2010, with Nigeria and Gabon). The four countries released a joint statement on their participation in the UNSC, reaffirming their intention to cooperate closely and share experiences and approaches on the issues on the Council agenda. They also emphasized the need to promote Chapter VIII cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC (DIRCO 2010). The four stressed ‘the need for intensified collaboration’ and ‘the need for the Security Council to be more responsive and transparent in the execution of its mandate’.

Neither South Africa nor Gabon hosted a similar meeting in 2011 when Morocco was elected to the UNSC. As discussed in chapter four Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1982 because of issue of Western Sahara. Mauritania and Togo had received AU endorsement in the Council elections in 2011. However, Morocco leveraged its support in Europe, North Africa, and North America to win 151 votes and beat Mauritania (Nganje 2011) for a place in the UNSC. As discussed in chapter four, South Africa is a long-standing supporter of Polisario and the SADR. As will be seen



later in this chapter, Morocco's presence in the UNSC obstructed South Africa's diplomacy on the Western Sahara conflict. South Africa's second term in the UNSC illustrates the challenges Pretoria faces in pursuing its African Agenda in the contested terrain of continental politics.

### **6.3 Promotion of human rights and democracy**

#### 6.3.1 Libya

South Africa's response to the Libya crisis demonstrates the dilemmas it faced in playing some of the roles it created for itself in international relations. The Republic found itself in a situation where its aim to be a regional leader and champion of the South, was in conflict with being a good international citizen concerned about the humanitarian welfare of Libyan citizens. As in its first term in the UNSC, Pretoria communicated its position on Libya poorly. Pretoria was accused of inconsistency and contradictions. The African Union and League of Arab States' opposing solutions to the crisis complicated South Africa's advocacy of an increased Chapter VIII relationship between the UN and regional organisations. South Africa's tense relationship with Nigeria undermined the ability of these regional leaders to take the lead on a critical African security issue in the Council. The situation in Libya will be discussed in two parts: first, the adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973 and secondly, the period after the adoption of resolution 1973.

#### *Resolutions 1970 and 1973*

Demonstrations against the government of Muammar Gaddafi<sup>5</sup> began in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. An official 'day of revolt' was organised on 17 February 2011 in cities across the country. The regime responded violently to protestors with reports that Gaddafi had hired mercenaries to suppress the uprising. By 20 February 2011, anti-Gaddafi forces had taken control of Benghazi, Libya's second city. On 21 February 2011, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Libya in the UN, Ibrahim

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<sup>5</sup> The name Gaddafi is spelt in a variety of ways in the literature. I use the spelling 'Gaddafi'. However I have retained the spelling used by other authors in direct quotations.

Dabbashi, publicly broke away from the regime in a briefing at the Libyan mission in New York. Dabbashi expressed allegiance with the rebels and accused Gaddafi of starting ‘the genocide against the Libyan people’ (Moynihan 2011). Moreover, Dabbashi accused unidentified African countries of sending mercenaries to boost Gaddafi’s forces and warned ‘all African countries who are sending their soldiers to fight, to fight with Gaddafi, that they will not see their soldiers coming back’ (Moynihan 2011). The accusations that Africans were supporting Gaddafi and thus could not act as impartial brokers in the conflict would undermine the AU’s efforts at mediation. The Arab League released a communiqué condemning the regime and suspended Libya’s membership (Mozgovaya and Shamir 2011).

On 23 February 2011, the AUPSC met and released a communiqué condemning violence against pro-democracy protestors and Gaddafi’s threats against those opposing him. It further announced that it was sending a mission to Libya to assess the situation (PSC/PR/COMM [CCLXI]). During informal consultations on 24 February 2011 Council members discussed the options of imposing deterrent measures against Libya’s government under Chapter VII. On 25 February 2011, the Human Rights Council passed a resolution condemning human rights violations in Libya and establishing a commission of inquiry into human rights abuses (A/HRC/S-15/1).

Consequent to the discussions on deterrent measures against the regime, the UNSC drafted a sanctions resolution (S/2011/95) that officially placed Libya on the Council agenda. South Africa was one of the co-sponsors, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, the UK, and US. The draft was adopted unanimously as resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011. The resolution demanded an immediate end to violence and called on the regime to respect human rights and international law. It imposed targeted sanctions through travel bans, asset freezes, and an arms embargo. It further referred the issue to the ICC to investigate possible human rights crimes by the regime (S/RES/1970). The Council acted with greater urgency on the Libya matter than it has in other situations of conflict, passing a sanctions resolution just eleven days after the protests

began. This urgency is partly explained the consensus among members of the Council and regional organisations that the Gaddafi regime posed a genuine threat to civilians (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Indeed, media reports counted hundreds of people killed in just a few days of fighting and there were concerns that Gaddafi would apply his vast military arsenal on rebel cities. An article in The Guardian cited ‘reports from Tripoli described corpses left in the streets, burnt-out cars and shops, and armed mercenaries who looked as if they were from other parts of Africa’ (Black 2011).

Humanitarian concern about the welfare of Libyan citizens was the primary reason South Africa gave for voting for resolution 1970. In this case, South Africa’s traditional middle power concerns about human rights and its regional leader goal of having the AU take the lead in African issues on the Council agenda complemented each other. Ambassador Sangqu expressed his concern with the deteriorating situation in Libya and referred to the briefing by the Libyan delegation at the UN. He noted that ‘the council has responded swiftly and resolutely to that call’ (S/PV.6491 2011: 3). He characterized the resolution as a clear message to the Libyan authorities ‘to end the carnage against their people’. The resolution also complemented:

The decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council, which strongly condemned the indiscriminate and excessive use of force against peaceful protestors and called upon the Libyan authorities to end forthwith all acts of violence, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law. (S/PV.6491 2011: 3)

Sangqu expressed hope that the measures contained in the resolution would bring ‘peace and stability to this sisterly nation’. He called on the government and the people of Libya to find a speedy resolution to the conflict.

All African states on the UNSC and the representative of the League of Arab States, Lebanon, sponsored the resolution indicating its wide acceptance and legitimacy among states in the region. The support of African states for the resolution is remarkable because of their usual reticence to impose sanctions on recalcitrant regimes. While Mr Sangqu did not mention sanctions in his statement, the Nigerian representative Ambassador Ogwu stated her country’s support of sanctions ‘to the

extent that their impact is targeted and does not exacerbate the burden upon Libyan citizens' (S/PV.6491 2011: 3). It is remarkable that the African members supported an ICC referral given the AU's 2009 decision not to enforce the arrest warrant against Sudanese President Al-Bashir (Assembly/AU/Dec.221 [XII]). It appears that African states expected the referral to act as a deterrent against further violence. However, since the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo acted with unusual speed to secure a warrant of arrest from the ICC pre-trial chamber, the threat of ICC indictment turned into a reality in just a few weeks. This seems to have contributed to the intransigence of the Gaddafi and his inner circle.

While all BRICS states voted for the resolution, there was some diversity in their views. India, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, argued that the resolution's sections on the ICC could not be binding on the 78 UN member states and five UNSC members that are not states parties to the ICC. The Indian representative indicated that they thought the ICC referral was hasty but they took their lead from 'our colleagues from Africa and the Middle East' who 'believe that referral to the Court would have the effect of an immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of calm and stability' (S/PV.6491 2011: 2). Brazil, China, and Russia all referred to statements of the AU and Arab League in their reasons for supporting the resolution. In all subsequent statements on Libya, the BRICS would emphasize the perspective of regional organizations, especially the AU, in resolving the crisis.

The situation in Libya deteriorated after the passage of resolution 1970 and threatened to descend into a full civil war. The rebel leadership in Benghazi established themselves as the National Transitional Council (NTC): effectively an alternative site of authority to the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli. The NTC requested assistance from the international community to protect Libyans 'without any direct military intervention on Libyan soil'. The UNGA unanimously voted to expel Libya from the Human Rights Council (A/RES/65/265). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) released statements on 7 and 8 March, respectively, supporting a no-fly zone in Libya. Both organisations emphasised that they were not in support of military intervention with ground troops or any kind of

foreign occupation of Libyan territory.

The AUPSC established an Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee to mediate the Libya crisis on 10 March 2011 at a meeting chaired by Mauritanian President, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and composed of the presidents of South Africa, Congo, Mali, and Uganda. The AU sought to support the democratic aspirations of Libyan people while mitigating the consequences of conflict in Libya on the region (De Waal 2013). For decades, Gaddafi had actively supported a variety of armed rebel groups from countries across the continent, many of which had a presence in Libya. African leaders were aware that Gaddafi's weakening grip on power threatened to open the 'Libyan Pandora's box' of transnational armed groups and a massive arsenal of arms into the region. To avoid this situation, the AUPSC devised a 'road map' for peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis.

The road map entailed:

'(i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation of the competent Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and (iv) the adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis' (PSC/PR/COMM.2[CCLXV], paragraph 7).

Importantly, the communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.2 [CCLXV]) reaffirmed the AU's 'strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of *any foreign military intervention, whatever its form*' (italics added).

There is no record on the UN website that the AUPSC formally submitted its communiqué from the 10 March meeting to the UNSC. This was a serious oversight by Nigeria and South Africa, which missed the opportunity to make the AU roadmap a central part of the narrative on Libya. Both countries were members of the UNSC and AUPSC at the same time and could have presented the AU road map as an

alternative to the military options promoted by the Arab regional organisations and the EU. The road map was also poorly communicated to international media, civil society, and advocacy groups leading to it being excluded from the commentary on options for addressing the Libya crisis. This was despite the fact that the road map was consistent with Ban Ki-Moon's plan of diplomatic engagement, evidenced by the appointment of former Foreign Minister of Jordan Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib as his Special Envoy to Libya to offer his good offices and coordinate the UN's response to the crisis (S/2011/126).

The AU's silence allowed other regional organizations to take the lead. The communiqués of the, EU (S/2011/133) and Arab League (S/2011/137) are recorded as formal letters to the president of the Security Council making them a part of the official record of deliberations on Libya. On 11 March 2011, the EU resolved to recognize the NTC as its political interlocutor in Libya and to assist 'by all necessary means' to protect civilians given 'a clear legal basis and support from the region' (S/2011/133). Then on 12 March 2011, the League of Arab States called on the UNSC 'to shoulder its responsibilities and take the measures necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft and establish safe havens in areas that are exposed to bombardment' (S/2011/137). While the UK and France were supportive of a no-fly zone, there was some cautiousness among other European states and the US. Barack Obama was wary of launching another war in the Arab world, as the US was struggling to resolve the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bekker and Shane 2016). China and Russia opposed the use of military force without a specific trigger event, while Brazil and India were concerned that there was insufficient information to undertake military intervention (Shrivastav 2011). Nevertheless, a resolution was drafted and circulated in informal consultations on 15 March under Lebanon's sponsorship.

South Africa voted for resolution 1973, which was adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions. The other African member states, Gabon and Nigeria, also voted in favour of the resolution. The abstentions came from China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany (S/PV.6498 2011). The resolution expresses 'grave concern' at the

escalation of violence and reiterates the responsibility of the Libyan government to protect the Libyan people. South Africa proposed the language in operative paragraph two of the resolution that notes the dialogue efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the AUPSC's High-Level committee 'to find a peaceful and sustainable solution' (S/RES/1973; 2). This was intended as a reference to the AU's road map for negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The substance of the resolution is in paragraph four, which authorizes:

Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. (S/RES/1973 3)

Notably, paragraph five recognizes 'the important role of the League of Arab States' in peace and security matters in the region and requests the cooperation of the Arab league with other member states to implement the measures described in paragraph 4. Paragraphs six to twelve deal with the no-fly zone.

Ambassador Sangqu justified his delegation's vote in support of the resolution by describing South Africa's concern that the situation in Libya was 'fast becoming a full-blown civil war' South Africa was hopeful that the situation could be resolved peacefully 'in accordance with the will of the Libyan people' (S/PV.6498 2011: 9). Sangqu argued that such a 'holistic political solution' should 'preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya'. South Africa commended the AUPSC decision, on 10 March 2011, to send an ad hoc high-level committee to Libya to support efforts to find a political solution. With President Zuma as a member of that

committee, South Africa urged the committee to work with the Secretary General's Special Envoy and the Arab League to reach a political solution. Sangqu expressed concern that the Libyan authorities had defied resolution 1970. South Africa had voted for resolution 1973 as an appropriate response to the call of the countries of the region and as a means to protect civilians. Sangqu was emphasised:

As matter of principle, we have supported the resolution, with the necessary caveats to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya and reject any foreign occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians. It is our hope that this resolution will be implemented in full respect for both its letter and spirit. This is consistent with the African Union Peace and Security Council decision to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya and its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.  
(S/PV.6498 2011: 10)

Ambassador Ogwu from Nigeria referred to the 'magnitude of the humanitarian disaster' as the reason Nigeria voted in favour of the resolution. While maintaining Nigeria's opposition to 'foreign occupation', she referred to 'language in resolution 1973 (2011) that specifically carves out that possibility, constraining the actions of States seeking to play a role in the quest for peace' (S/PV.6498 2011: 9). The representative of Gabon was the only Council member that did not speak.

The other BRICS members abstained in the vote. The Indian representative expressed concern about the paucity of information about the situation on the ground in Libya, as well as the lack of clarity about the details of the enforcement measures proposed in resolution 1973. This included who would participate, how the intervention would be carried out, and what assets would be used. Brazil added that the text of the resolution, in particular paragraph four, 'contemplates measures far beyond' the Arab League's call for a no-fly zone. Russia was more direct in questioning the motivations of some Council members saying, 'provisions were introduced into the text that could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention'. China also expressed concern about the drafting of parts of the resolution (S/PV.6498 2011).



The response to South Africa's vote was mixed. Human rights organisations, domestic and international media, as well as some opposition parties welcomed the decision as a necessary expression of the Republic's commitment to human rights. The ANC, some academics, and mostly black observers condemned the decision for paving the way for foreign military intervention on African soil. Pretoria was perceived as selling out to the West and allowing the kind of imperialist intervention it was meant to oppose. A number of conspiracy theories were floated to explain South Africa's vote including that Barack Obama manipulated President Zuma in a last-minute phone call. South Africa's vote went against both its stated principles and the record of its diplomacy in the UNSC.

A senior DIRCO official interviewed for this dissertation gave two main reasons for voting for the resolution: concern about the welfare of civilians and the Arab League's support of a no-fly zone. The UN secretariat had presented information that the Libyan air force was already in Benghazi airspace and was preparing to flatten the city. South Africa, and other member states, was therefore under pressure to protect civilians and prevent a massacre. The pressure intensified after Gaddafi made a defiant radio address threatening to attack Benghazi: 'there will be no mercy. Our troops will be coming to Benghazi tonight' (Black 2011b). According to the official, Gaddafi's broadcast had swayed China and Russia not to veto the resolution as they were wary of being blamed for enabling a massacre in Benghazi.

The Arab League's call for a no-fly zone placed South Africa in an awkward position because it was the major proponent of Chapter VIII cooperation between regional organisations and the UNSC. Challenging the Arab position would have appeared as contradicting South Africa's main policy position on the Council. Moreover, the principle of protection of civilians was enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. Therefore, South Africa's decision was consistent with the AU's founding principles (Snyman 2011). The senior official stated that South Africa tried to reduce the chance of military invasion by inserting paragraph two to place any military action within the context of a political process led by the AU. Pretoria's expectation was that resolution 1973 would be 'implemented in its entirety' instead of

NATO's 'cherry-picking' of which paragraphs to implement. This statement seems very naïve given the evidence from the statements of the other BRICS countries that concerns about regime change featured prominently in the discussions on the draft.

McKaiser's (2011) account of the vote on resolution 1973, states that South Africa's UNSC mission briefed President Zuma thoroughly on the text and the team's reservations about regime change. However, Zuma instructed the delegation to vote in favour of the resolution in spite of the possible consequences. There appears to be some credibility to this version of events given that the beginning of South Africa's statement after the vote reads as if it was prepared for an abstention:

A holistic political solution must be found that will respect democracy, political reform, justice, human rights and the socio-economic development needs of the people of Libya, in order to ensure long-term peace and stability. That solution must also preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya. (S/PV.6498 2011: 9)

The statement closed with an emphasis on rejecting 'any foreign occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians. It is our hope that this resolution will be implemented in full respect for both its letter and spirit' (S/PV.6498 2011: 10). The statements above are far more consistent with South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy approach of balancing human rights principles with the preference for negotiated settlements to conflicts and the need to preserve the sovereignty of states in the global South.

Apparently, one of the challenges for South Africa's delegation to the UNSC was the lack of clarity on the AU's view on a no-fly zone (Mckaiser 2011). South Africa's officials at the AU headquarters reported to New York that there had been 'no explicit AU position' formulated on the no-fly zone. However, this should not have mattered because the AUPSC communiqué of 10 March 2011 made it very clear that the AU opposed foreign military intervention, 'whatever its form'. This confusion reflects the limitation of South Africa's African Agenda. While the mission in New York felt it had to consult with its counterparts in Addis Ababa, there is little evidence that officials at the UN consulted widely with other African members in the Council.

Indeed, a senior official interviewed for this study, insisted that Nigeria and Gabon ‘were already on board’ to vote for the resolution by the time South Africa raised its reservations in discussions. The official also claimed that the South Africans found out after the vote that the Nigerian ambassador had told others at the UNSC that her instructions were to vote with South Africa. The official said, ‘this can’t be true because Nigeria didn’t come to us to want to know how we’re going to vote’. This is inconsistent with the middle power roles of policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, and multilateral manager. It is also entirely inconsistent with the role of regional leader, which implies taking responsibility for regional decision-making.

Whatever the truth of the situation, this anecdote indicates that there was little to no consultation between African Council members about resolution 1973. It is an indictment on the AU that Africa’s two biggest powers could not coordinate and take a strategic position on a crucial continental security issue. They left regional leadership to the Arab League, represented by Lebanon, which had long disowned Gaddafi’s Libya as a part of the Arab community. Relations between Lebanon and Libya had been tense for over 30 years (Denselow 2011). It is evident from the text of resolution 1973 that the League of Arab States was given precedence as the primary regional organization and any military action was expected to take place with the League’s consent. The AU’s road map was scarcely mentioned as either an alternative or a complement to the Chapter VII intervention. As the biggest champion of a closer relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC, South Africa missed an opportunity to have a demonstrable effect on the workings of the Council.

In subsequent discussions on Libya, South Africa appeared to reverse its support of the intervention, criticising NATO for going beyond the provisions of resolution 1973. In a speech on Human Rights Day, just a week after the vote, President Zuma insisted that South Africa says, ‘no to the regime change doctrine, and no to the foreign occupation of Libya’ (Mckaiser 2011: 5). South Africa was accused of contradicting itself and once again showing that its foreign policy was ‘all over the place’ (Mckaiser 2011: 5). Pretoria’s floundering on resolution 1973 was a regression from its bold, albeit flawed, decisions in its first term in the UNSC. As stated in

chapter five, South Africa's foreign policy behaviour in the first term had an internal logic and consistency, even if it betrayed the expectations of external observers. The decision to support resolution 1973 was a major departure from previous foreign policy and officials tried to disavow the decision when it became clear they had legitimised foreign military intervention on African soil. The regime change agenda was not secret. David Cameron (2011) and Nicholas Sarkozy (Becker and Shane 2016) had expressed their desire for Gaddafi to go. Being a middle power is not only about being perceived as a good international citizen, it is also about shrewd diplomacy, leadership, and taking responsibility for world order. South Africa showed none of these characteristics in the Libya situation.

In response to resolution 1973, Libyan authorities agreed to commit to an immediate ceasefire on 18 March. This was communicated to the President of the Security Council in a letter on 19 March 2011 (S/2011/160). Unfortunately, French fighter jets were already in Benghazi airspace by 18 March 2011 preparing to enforce the measures authorised by resolution 1973. The French Permanent Representative to the UN notified the UNSC that in the early hours of 19 March 2011, France had begun using aircraft to prevent flights in Libyan airspace according to paragraph six of resolution 1973 and was using aircraft to prevent Libyan armed forces, 'including the armoured vehicles', from attacking civilians according the same day (S/2011/155). The planned 19 March 2011 visit to Tripoli of the AUPSC ad hoc committee on Libya had to be cancelled because the P3 could not guarantee their safe passage through Libyan airspace (S/2011/151). The African leaders took this as a great insult to their efforts within the AU and an indication that the Western powers were uninterested in a peaceful resolution to the Libyan conflict (De Waal 2013). On 29 March 2011 the Libya Contact Group (LCG) was officially formed, comprising the UN, Arab League, Islamic Conference, EU, and NATO. The AU was excluded from the LCG.

On 10 April 2011 the AU ad hoc committee was finally able to visit Tripoli to meet with Gaddafi who insisted that Africa should defend him from Western aggression and criticised the AU's 10 March 2011 communiqué calling for an end to attacks on civilians. The four presidents in the committee defended their position and called on

Gaddafi to enter negotiations with the NTC. Because they had the support of western military power, the NTC saw no reason to compromise for the sake of immediate ceasefire (De Waal 2013). The AUPSC held a ministerial level meeting in Addis Ababa on 25 April 2011 with representatives of the Libyan government and the NTC. The communiqué of the meeting set out a plan for negotiations between the parties to the conflict and requested the AU Commission ‘to schedule a briefing to the Security Council and engagement with it on the AU’s road map and its efforts to resolve the Libyan crisis’ (S/2011/307). Curiously, this communiqué was only sent to the UNSC on 16 May 2011, three weeks after the AUPSC meeting took place. This is a further example of the AU’s strategic blunders in communicating the roadmap to the UNSC.

A possible explanation for the weak AU response is that African leaders across the continent were divided with the majority wanting Gaddafi to cede power quickly, while some of Libya’s neighbours wanted Gaddafi to remain in power for fear of the instability spreading to their countries. Significantly, for this dissertation, Nigeria and South Africa were on opposite sides of the debate with Abuja favouring the swift removal of Gaddafi from power. Nigeria recognised the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya long before South Africa and the AU (Landsberg 2012; Obi 2015). As mentioned in section 5.3.4 West African states have been more comfortable with military intervention in their region than those in Southern Africa. The lack of coherence between the two African leaders in the UNSC undermined Africa’s ability to take a united position on Libya.

The BRICS were vocal in their criticism of military operations in Libya and their insistence that the only solution to the crisis was a political one according to the AU roadmap. At the BRICS summit on 14 April 2011, the five states released a communiqué arguing that resolution 1973 was being interpreted arbitrarily (BRICS 2011). They did not name NATO directly, but stated their opposition to military intervention. Barack Obama, Nicholas Sarkozy, and David Cameron released a joint letter on 15 April 2011 committing to the Libya military operations. They argued that their duty under resolution 1973 was ‘to protect civilians... not to remove Gaddafi by force’. However, ‘so long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO and its coalition partners

must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds' (BBC 2011a). This made it even clearer that the end goal of the intervention was regime change.

### *The aftermath of resolution 1973*

As the mandate for the intervention shifted from civilian protection to changing the government, South Africa was emphatic in its criticism of the implementation of resolution 1973. On 4 May 2011, when ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council about progress regarding the referral made in resolution 1970 Deputy Ambassador Doc Mashabane reaffirmed South Africa's support of resolution 1970 and expressed the Republic's concern about the crimes and human rights violations committed during the conflict in Libya. He urged the Prosecutor focus on crimes committed on all sides 'to protect the Court's integrity and to ensure that all those who were caught in the crossfire of the conflict are protected' (S. PV/6528 2011: 11). Significantly, Mashabane made a pointed reference to NATO's perceived excesses in implementing resolution 1973. He argued that the caveat in paragraph six that excluded the Court from investigating the actions of the implementing forces should not apply to 'any actions that fall outside the scope of resolution 1973 (2011)'. In other words, the Prosecutor should investigate allegations of international crimes committed by NATO and others in enforcing the no-fly zone.

On 16 May 2011, Ocampo requested the ICC pre-trial chamber to indict Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif Gaddafi and the Libyan foreign minister for crimes against humanity. At a UNSC meeting on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on 10 May 2011, Ambassador Sangqu expressed South Africa's concern that the implementation of resolution 1973 appeared 'to go beyond (the) letter and spirit' and was not respectful of Libya's sovereignty and territorial integrity (S/PV.6531 2011: 17). In the meetings in May, South Africa tried to assert itself as a good international citizen and mediator promoting the rule of law and human rights in Libya by focusing attention on the proper implementation of resolution 1973 and the crimes committed by all involved in the conflict. This quest for fair application of international rules was consistent with the role of champion of the South as it was intended at holding the Western powers and their allies to the same standards as governments in the global

South.

On 27 June 2011, B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council on the situation in Libya. Mr Mashabane was the only member who responded to his briefing, using the opportunity to condemn the NATO intervention and highlight South Africa's views on the Libya crisis. He noted that it had been 100 days since the beginning of NATO's 'aerial bombardment' of Libya and the situation had deteriorated in terms of deaths and destruction of infrastructure. Mashabane claimed:

Since the beginning of the Libyan crisis, South Africa has continued to call on the international community, including the Security Council, to focus its energies on finding a political solution, and not a military one. To date, we still maintain that the political, rather than the military, solution is the only way in which durable peace can be achieved in Libya. This is emphasised in paragraph 2 of resolution 1973 (2011), which stresses the need to intensify efforts aimed at a political outcome.

Mashabane argued that South Africa had voted for resolution 1973 to ensure the protection civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid to create an environment conducive to a negotiated settlement to the crisis. He insisted that 'our intention was never regime change; nor was it the targeting of individuals. The future of Libya should be decided by the Libyans themselves, and not by outsiders' (S/PV.6566 2011: 4). He mentioned the AU roadmap and described the AU as 'central to any solution in Libya'. By highlighting paragraph two of resolution 1973 and the AU roadmap, Mashabane did what South Africa should have done at the vote on 17 March 2011. Mashabane's statement was the first time the AU's approach was officially promoted as an alternative to military intervention by an African member state in the UNSC. It could be argued that this fulfils the middle power roles of policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, regional leader, and mediator. However, South Africa's assertion of leadership on Libya three months too late is the kind of mistake made by a small state fighting for status rather than a confident emerging middle power.

Unfortunately, South Africa's assertion of the AU's leadership in resolving the crisis was too little too late. By 15 July 2011, the LCG and other international actors had

recognised the NTC as Libya's legitimate government. This precluded any initiatives for a negotiated settlement and interim government. At B. Lynn Pascoe's next briefing on 28 July 2011, he claimed that the view of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy was that the only sustainable political solution in Libya would come from 'a ceasefire tied to transitional arrangements that address the aspirations of the Libyan people' (S/PV.6595 2011: 2). However, neither side was willing to make the necessary compromises to achieve this outcome. Pascoe discussed cooperation between the UN and all concerned regional organisations including the AU and Arab League. He urged the international community to 'speak with one voice, through the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, in order to bring about a political solution'. He mentioned a conversation between the Secretary-General and President Zuma on 22 July 2011 as an example of the close engagement between the UN and AU on the way forward in Libya. The AU had invited the NTC, Libyan government, and UN to a 'technical interactive' meeting on Libya to negotiate the terms of a peaceful transfer of power from the Gaddafi regime but the NTC chose not to participate. By this point the NTC had no incentive to negotiate with the regime or the AU because it was receiving arms from the US and France to win a military victory.

After the briefing, Mr Sangqu explained the framework agreement on a political crisis to the Libyan crisis decided at the AU summit in Malabo on 30 June and 31 July 2011 (S/2011/455). The agreement included a national dialogue, truth and reconciliation commission, and a commitment by the international community to support the decisions reached by the Libyan parties. This framework is similar to South Africa's transition process and the mediation solution it has promoted in other African conflicts. Mr Sangqu argued that the use of resolution 1973 to take sides in a domestic conflict to achieve regime change was damaging the UNSC's credibility. In light of this, he criticised the call from the P3 to unfreeze Libyan assets from oil revenues that were sanctioned in terms of resolution 1970 because doing so would be to support one side of the conflict (S/PV.6595 2011). Again, the AU summit communiqué (apparently dated 7 July 2011) was only presented to the UNSC on 22 July 2011 well after the NTC had been recognised by the most influential actors in the international community (S/2011/455).



Unfreezing Libya's assets caused a diplomatic spat between South Africa and the US. On 8 August 2011, the US formally requested the UNSC's Libya sanctions committee to release \$1.5 billion to the NTC for humanitarian purposes. At this stage neither the AU nor South Africa had recognised the NTC as the legitimate government. Sanctions committees require consensus of all fifteen Council members. South Africa effectively vetoed the US's call by proposing the decision be postponed until after the AUPSC meeting on 26 August 2011. In retaliation, the US circulated a draft resolution (S/2011/535) to release the funds to get around South Africa's objection. After consultations, member states agreed to refer to 'relevant authorities' instead of the NTC directly and the funds were released on 25 August 2011 (SCR 31 August 2011). The examples of the responses to Pascoe's briefings and the dispute on the sanctions committee illustrate South Africa trying to re-establish itself as a regional leader and policy entrepreneur in the UNSC.

By the time the NTC entered Tripoli on 21 August 2011, the Ethiopian and Nigerian governments had recognised it as the legitimate government of Libya and called on the AU to do the same. The AUPSC, chaired by President Zuma decided not to recognise the NTC as the legitimate government until it had agreed to implement the AU roadmap. President Zuma said the Constitutive Act of the AU was clear 'that governments that come to power through unconstitutional means would not be allowed to participate in the activities of the union. We cannot act outside of that...' (Fabricius 2011). Zuma argued that the NTC needed to commit to a negotiated transition that included all the different groups that claimed authority in Libya. Zuma criticised NATO for the execution of the no-fly zone saying, 'we still believe that, had the AU been allowed space to work, heavy loss of life would have been averted' (Fabricius 2011). South Africa's use of its regional position to delay acceptance of the NTC was shortsighted. By taking too long to recognise the NTC, the Republic rendered itself and the AU irrelevant to the resolution of the Libya crisis. Agility, entrepreneurship, innovation, and pragmatism are among the major characteristics that allow middle powers to punch above their weight. Pretoria stubbornly held on to its preferred path for Libya, instead of recognising the moment had passed and

adapting to remain relevant in the new circumstances.

South Africa was overtaken by the UN, which recognised the NTC as Libya's legitimate governing authority by adopting resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011. UN recognition has become the fundamental marker of statehood in world order and government legitimacy in world order. If the UN recognises one's status as a governing authority then one is legitimate in international law and diplomatic practice. Resolution 2009 committed support from the UN for the new Libyan authorities, including the establishment of a UN mission for elections, institution building, the promotion of human rights and economic recovery. It also provided for the progressive delisting of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets. Libya had resumed its seat in the UN under the NTC, so the newly appointed Libyan Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi attended the meeting.

Mr Sangqu reaffirmed the AU's initiatives to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Libya and argued these initiatives were 'always informed by and directed towards promoting the genuine and legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people'. Sangqu informed the UNSC that the AUPSC ad hoc committee on Libya had met in Pretoria on 14 September 2011 and 'indicated its readiness to work with the National Transitional Council and all other Libyan stakeholders towards the goal of the early establishment of an all-inclusive national unity Government' (S/PV.6620 2011: 6). Mr Sangqu restated South Africa's support for international post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, and rebuilding in Libya. Mr Sangqu described resolution 2009 as 'very important' to South Africa 'as it will serve as a foundation for all United Nations support to Libya's post-conflict reconstruction. Ownership of these efforts by the Libyan people is critical'. South Africa appeared to still promote an inclusive negotiated settlement to the conflict, in spite of the apparent victory of the NTC.

Sangqu highlighted three outstanding issues. First, there was a need for a ceasefire, including an end to the NATO military intervention. He expressed disappointment 'that the Council was unable to include a clear call for the cessation of hostilities'. He

further expressed concern that the Council had not come out in ‘strong and clear support’ of the 2.5 million African migrants that were facing killing and unlawful detention. These migrants had contributed to Libya’s economic development ‘for decades’. This was the first time that South Africa had spoken directly about the African migrants caught up in the Libyan conflict, who were mostly West African nationals. Nigeria had raised concerns about their wellbeing from the start of the crisis. The accusation, by the NTC, that the majority of these migrants were pro-Gaddafi mercenaries was a point of tension with the AU. Finally, Sangqu questioned the need for the enforcement of the no-fly zone given the improvement in the situation in Libya. He noted South Africa’s confusion at ‘the Council’s support for this enforcement, as we are all aware that the threats that warranted the no-fly zone no longer exist’ (S/PV.6620 2011: 6). It is telling that the Lebanese representative described the recognition of the NTC as Libya has ‘resumed its place in the Arab world’. The tensions between the AU and the Arab League regarding Libya would continue for the rest of South Africa’s term.

The AU recognised the NTC on 20 September 2011 effectively putting an end to the roadmap and framework agreement. AU Chair, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, the president of Equatorial Guinea made the announcement in New York before the start of the UN General Assembly (BBC 2011b). Many criticised the delay in recognising the new leadership of Libya as characteristic of the AU’s slow response to the crisis as a whole. In its sluggishness, the AU allowed itself to be overtaken by events and by other international actors, notably the Arab League and NATO. It is curious that the AU waited a full six days after the decision of the AUPSC on 14 September 2011 to work with the NTC. Indeed, the AU should have recognised the NTC at the 291<sup>st</sup> meeting of the AUPSC on 26 August 2011. As Maru (2011) argues the failure to do this excluded Libya’s former representatives to the AU, who were now supporting the NTC, from having a seat at AU meetings. This unwisely precluded the official cooperation between the NTC and AU that would be necessary to bring stability to the transitional process and prevent regional contagion of the crisis in Libya.

Given the value the AU places on the principle of subsidiarity—that matters should be

handled by regional authorities before being escalated to the UN—one would have expected AUPSC leaders to make their announcement before the commencement of the UN process. The NTC was already recognised by major African powers like Ethiopia and Nigeria, and announcement of the AU's recognition would have allowed the AU roadmap to be integrated into the UN process, albeit belatedly. An official close to the negotiations on forming a new government in Libya told Fabricius (2011) that 'even the US is nervous about whether the NTC will hold together—stability is the big thing now and an all-inclusive interim government will help to hold the country together until full elections'. Through its roadmap and knowledge of region, the AU would have been perfectly placed to lead the conversation on inclusive negotiations and stability because all the other international actors like NATO and the LCG had been preoccupied with regime change. Yes, the AU would not be engaging in the way that it had hoped when it developed the roadmap but it could have taken some of the momentum of change to make itself relevant again. In the event, the AU's delays only contributed in its being sidelined from the transition processes. It is fair to say that as the chair of the AUPSC and a member of the UNSC, South Africa missed a critical opportunity to reclaim its leadership role on African security issues in the Council and to influence global decision-making in the interests of the continent.

On 20 October 2011, Gaddafi was captured in Sirte and images of him being assaulted by rebel forces were broadcast across the world. He was killed and buried in an undisclosed location in the desert. The Libyan Permanent Representative sent a letter to the UNSC announcing 'the full liberation of Libya from the dictatorial regime of Muammar Qadhafi' (S/2011/660). On 2 November 2011, Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council about the ICC's Libya investigation. Ambassador Susan Rice of the US, condemned the way Gaddafi died acknowledging he 'engaged in countless barbaric acts, but this does not and cannot justify the apparently brutal way in which he met his death' (S/PV.6647 2011: 5). She welcomed the NTC's announcement of an investigation into the death.

Mr Sangqu repeated South Africa's commitment to the ICC but expressed about reports from the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Libya into arbitrary mass

arrests and mistreatment, in particular of black Africans suspected of being pro-Gaddafi mercenaries and hoped that the prosecutor would give ‘due attention’ to these crimes. Sangqu further expressed pleasure that the NTC had distanced itself from the atrocities and committed to conducting investigations. This was necessary to fulfil the principle of complementarity on which the Court was based. He encouraged the office of the prosecutor to open new cases to investigate sexual violence, including gang rape (S/PV.6647 2011).

The hopes of a peaceful transition to democracy under the NTC were dashed quite soon after the victory of Gaddafi’s death because of the vacuum left by his absence. Having ruled the country with an iron-fist for 42 years, Gaddafi had not created the institutions necessary for democratic governance including a functioning police force and military. The revolutionaries that had brought Gaddafi’s fall reorganised into militias across tribal lines and were resistant to coming under the control of the NTC. NTC leaders, like acting Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, were unprepared for the complexities of governance and had little knowledge of the Libyan situation as most of them had been living in exile. The western leaders of the military intervention disengaged from the country as domestic issues such as elections and economic crises in their own countries took precedence (see Shane and Becker 2016 for an excellent account of this period).

*From bad to worse: Security in Libya and the region*

In January 2012, South Africa used its presidency of the UNSC to have two formal meetings on Libya. The first, on 25 January 2012, included briefings by Ian Martin the Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya and Navi Pillay the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. These briefings were followed by informal consultations by member states, which are not recorded. Notably Mr Martin reported on the deterioration in the security situation and the difficulties faced by the NTC in putting in place a legislative and institutional framework to hold elections (S/PV.6707 2012). This confirmed the decline in the euphoria and optimism that followed Gaddafi’s removal.

Martin (S/PV.6707 2012: 2) described the growing criticism of the NTC as being

‘expressed in ways that go beyond a healthy democratic spirit, including some physical violence’. This had led to the resignation of the NTC’s Vice Chairman. Other challenges were the lack of full legitimacy of the NTC among the population, renewed protests in Benghazi, the spread of misinformation through the media and a deteriorating security situation because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country. Pillay (S/PV.6707 2011: 7) commended the NTC’s legal reforms and adoption of new legislation, such as a law on transitional justice. However, she raised concerns about the dire human rights situation, particularly abuses perpetrated by the revolutionary brigades. She also said she was ‘extremely concerned’ about the conditions in detention centre and the treatment of detainees held in the custody of the revolutionary brigades. This included sub-Saharan African nationals who were accused of being Gaddafi’s mercenaries.

At the second meeting on 26 January 2012, South Africa brought the issue of peace and security in the Sahel onto the UNSC agenda under the general topic of ‘Peace and Security in Africa’. South Africa invited Libya’s neighbours, Chad, Mali, and Niger, to participate. Lynn Pascoe reported that the security situation in Mali and Niger was deteriorating and Boko Haram had been strengthened to expand its operations outside of Nigeria. In his statement, Ambassador Sangqu said the report confirmed South Africa’s view that the way in which resolution 1973 was implemented ‘was going to have dire consequences for the countries in the region’ (S/PV.6709 2012: 17). While he agreed that the region had faced many problems for a long time, these were exacerbated by the military intervention in Libya.

South Africa was deeply concerned about the proliferation of arms in the region in the context of rising criminal and terrorist activities. He argued that ‘what started as a conflict in one country has now spilled over to become a regional problem with unprecedented consequences’ (S/PV.6709 2012: 17). He called on the international community to take responsibility and support a ‘multi-pronged’ approach to resolving the crisis based especially on cooperation between the UN and the AU as set out in resolution 2033. In a pointed reference to the P3, Mr Sangqu stated ‘it is unfortunate that the zeal of some members of the international community to resolve the Libyan

crisis militarily ignored our warning of consequences too dire to contemplate, which have now placed that region and Africa in their current quagmire' (S/PV.6709 2012: 17). He emphasised that the AU needed to play a central role in the resolution of the crisis in Libya and the Sahel. Sangqu evoked the notion of African solutions for African problems:

South Africa has repeatedly emphasised the need for a strategic political process to resolve the crisis in Libya and beyond that would include the central role of the AU. The report shows that clear political will exists among the States of the subregion to find common solutions to their common problems.

The next meeting on peace and security in the Sahel was organised by Togo during its presidency on 21 February 2012. The meeting related specifically to the impact of organised crime on West Africa and the Sahel but the effects of NATO's intervention in Libya loomed over the discussions. Mr Sangqu argued that the crisis in Libya had exacerbated the instability in the Sahel region because of 'an inflow of large numbers of returning jobless migrants and large quantities of weapons and ammunition'. He described the crisis in Libya as 'a regional problem with unprecedented consequences' (S/PV.6717 2012: 22). Among the other challenges facing the region was the growth of terrorist groups such as Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram. Sangqu urged the UN to work coherently to support the countries in the region.

ICC Prosecutor, Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council again on 16 May 2012 reporting that Libyan authorities had arrested Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. The NTC had presented an admissibility challenge to the ICC stating the government's intention to hold the trial in Libyan courts. This was the first time in the history of the Court that a state had requested to conduct a national investigation for a case under investigation by the Court. This was an important test of the Rome Statute's founding principle of complementarity that states have the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Moreno-Ocampo described the UN Commission of Inquiry into Libya's report (A/HRC/17/44), released on 2 March 2012, as 'a

comprehensive view’ of the crimes committed on both sides during the conflict (S/PV.6772 2012: 3). The Commission found that NATO had not deliberately targeted civilians in Libya and only five out of 25,944 air strikes had resulted in civilian casualties. While noting the findings of the report, Moreno-Ocampo reported that his office did not have the jurisdiction to investigate the NATO mandate in relation to resolution 1973, but his office had requested more information from the Commission of Inquiry.

Deputy Ambassador Mashabane repeated that South Africa’s position that it had voted for resolution 1970 to fight impunity in Libya not to support:

any effort or action that creates a perception of the Court being used for political expediency or as a tool for the furtherance of political objectives. It is for that reason that we continue to call for the Council to be principled on all cases in Libya that were referred to the International Criminal Court’ (S/PV.6772 2012: 8).

South Africa ‘was mindful of the primacy of national jurisdiction’ and had thus noted the NTC’s intention to try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in Libyan courts. Mashabane emphasized that crimes committed by rebel forces should also be investigated to avoid ‘the perception of a victor’s justice’ (S/PV.6772 2012: 9). Mashabane expressed South Africa’s concern for the political and security situation in Libya but commended the Libyans on the progress they had made in democracy and human rights. He again urged the Libyan authorities to address the conditions of African detainees ‘their continued arbitrary detention and reports of torture do not bode well for efforts to build a society based on respect for human rights and dignity’ (S/PV.6772 2012: 9). Libya held its first elections since 1969 on 7 July 2012. The elections were surprisingly peaceful, given the violence and lawlessness that followed Gaddafi’s death, and were declared free and fair by international observers (Kirkpatrick 2012).

The final formal meeting on Libya at which South Africa made a statement was on 7 November 2012. This was also the first briefing on Libya by the new prosecutor of the ICC, Ms Fatou Bensouda. Bensouda thanked the Council for their swiftness in



referring the Libya situation to the ICC and quoted members of the NTC who informed her Office that arrest warrants for Gaddafi, his son and Libya's foreign minister 'had played a crucial role in delegitimising' the Gaddafi regime strengthening the opposition's cause (S/PV.6855 2012: 2). She notified the Council that the new Libyan authorities had presented their case for the admissibility challenge for the trial of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi to be held in Libya. The decision of the pre-trial chamber on this admissibility challenge was pending. If it succeeded, Bensouda committed her Office to monitoring the proceedings and cooperating with the Libyan government.

Responding to the briefing, Mashabane noted the stagnation of the ICC's investigation into international crimes committed in the Libyan conflict. Events had unfolded rapidly after the adoption of resolution 1970 with the decision to initiate prosecutions 'made within weeks of the referral' and arrest warrants issued in June, just four months after the referral. However, 'to date... actual justice remains elusive' because there appeared to be less urgency to investigate crimes since the end of the conflict (S/PV.6855 2012: 6). Mashabane argued that 'for us, the need for justice does not end with the cessation of hostilities. If that were so, justice would not be an end in itself but only a means to an end'. This comment was a result of South Africa's concern that the ICC referral had only been a tool to ensure Gaddafi's downfall and not a genuine attempt at holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes. Indeed, the comment by Ms Bensouda that the NTC credited the ICC indictments for delegitimising the Gaddafi regime seems to support the view that the purpose of the ICC investigation was more political than legal.

Mashabane noted Libya's admissibility challenge and stated South Africa's support for complementarity in terms of domestic prosecution 'as the first option for ensuring justice' with the ICC as a last resort. He then asked the prosecutor what 'the general attitude of her Office' was to the admissibility challenge. He asked:

Does the Office of the Prosecutor believe that the complementarity test has been met? Was the submission filed by the Office of the Prosecutor supportive of the admissibility challenge, or did it challenge the claims

of inadmissibility? In her answers to those questions, we would be grateful, in the light of the inactivity test of the Court, if the Prosecutor could share whether, to her knowledge, prosecutions of Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi have been initiated in Libya, particularly as concerns Law 38, to which she referred this morning. (S/PV.6855 2012: 7)

Law 38 is a law the Libyan government introduced to grant amnesty for acts conducted at a national level during the '17 February revolution'. A different legislation, Law 35, was meant to limit the applicability of Law 38 because it 'purportedly ensures that any act found to be in contravention of international law and human rights covenants will not be exempt' (S/PV.6855 2012: 2). During her earlier briefing Ms Bensouda had told the Council that she encouraged the Libyan government to make sure that 'there is no amnesty for international crimes and no impunity for crimes, regardless of the perpetrator or the victim' (S/PV.6855 2012: 2). The prosecutor did not answer Mashabane's questions directly and merely responded that her Office 'finds it positive that the Government of Libya is engaging in the judicial process'.

Mashabane's question appears to have been aimed at determining whether the Office of the Prosecutor was acting consistently in the Libyan case with regards to allowing the admissibility challenge and taking the new government's word that it had initiated investigations against Saif Al-Islam. As discussed in previous chapters, one of South Africa's major criticisms of the UNSC was its inconsistency in adhering to international law, particularly the rules set out in the UN Charter. In certain cases, like Myanmar or Libya, the Council would act swiftly because it was in the interests of the P3. However, the UNSC was slow to act in the cases of Somalia, Western Sahara and Palestine because of the biases of the great powers. Similarly, Mashabane seems to be challenging the ICC's consistency in the Libyan matter because the former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo had responded very differently to Sudan's claims to be investigating crimes against humanity in Darfur. In the Sudan case, Mr Moreno-Ocampo had challenged the issue of admissibility and national jurisdiction because he did not believe the Sudanese government was seriously investigating crimes in Darfur.

Mashabane's question about Law 38 seems to be checking whether the Libyan government was applying its own laws without prejudice. However, this question can be interpreted as Mashabane's seeking to find grounds to grant amnesty to Saif Al-Islam, which would go against South Africa's stated commitment to human rights and impunity for international crimes. This is another example of the difficulty South Africa faced in addressing the Libya issue in a way that allowed the Republic to play its different roles consistently.

Morocco organised a meeting on 10 December 2012 under the title 'Peace and security in Africa: The Sahel: Towards a more comprehensive and coordinated approach'. The Moroccan representative started the meeting by reading a presidential statement on behalf of the Council members. The statement expressed concern about the 'underlying problems in the Sahel region' and the ongoing humanitarian crisis there. It specifically reiterated 'its grave concern about the consequences of instability in the North of Mali on the Sahel region and beyond' (S/PRST/2012/26). Among the other threats to the region identified in the statement was growing presence of terrorist groups, transnational organised crime and separatist movements. The UNSC welcomed the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel in resolving 'the multiple crises' in the region and encouraged him 'to finalise as soon as possible the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing governance, security, humanitarian, human rights and developmental issues as requested by Security Council resolution 2056 (2012)' (S/PRST/2012/26). The statement did not mention Libya or the military intervention as a contributor to instability in the Sahel.

Ambassador Sangqu (S/PV.6882 2012: 23) commended the initiative of regional leaders in the Sahel to address the situation in the region. He specifically mentioned the AU and its Special Envoy President Buyoya, and ECOWAS. Sangqu characterised the situation in the Sahel as a 'serious threat to security and stability on the African continent, as well as to international peace and security' because of the increase in terrorist activities, transnational organised crime and a deteriorating humanitarian situation. South Africa was concerned with the threat posed by terrorist

groups and criminal networks ‘as well as drugs, weapons and human trafficking, which are providing the financial wherewithal for their activities’. Sangqu noted that the AUPSC was of the view that the existing challenges facing the Sahel were aggravated by the crisis in Libya, which contributed to the influx in displaced persons, the increase in transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons. He advised that the international community work closely with the AU, ECOWAS and countries in the Sahel region to improve the situation.

Sangqu (S/PV.6882 2012: 24) expressed South Africa’s concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region and quoted reports that it would cost humanitarian agencies \$800 million to address the crisis in food security and nutrition in the region. One of the worst hit areas was northern Mali where Tuareg terrorist groups expelled from Libya had taken over. This resulted in the creation of internally displaced people and over 400 000 refugees, some of whom were part of the 30 000 Malian migrant workers who were forced to return from Libya after Gaddafi’s fall. South Africa was playing a leading regional role in the crisis as Minister Nkoana-Mashabane had committed the Republic to assisting Niger, Mauritania, Mali and Chad to address food insecurity caused by drought. South Africa had delivered more than 100 tons of nutrition for children in September and October 2012 and would be sending a full humanitarian support package to Mali in December 2012. The provision of food aid and other humanitarian assistance is consistent with the middle power roles of good international citizen and regional leader. Moreover, it demonstrates South Africa’s taking direct action in resolving the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel, instead of only focusing on apportioning blame for the creation of the crisis in the first place. This was important in the context of the fraught UNSC dynamics between African leaders and the US, in particular, in the second term. As will be seen in section 7.3.4 US Ambassador Susan Rice frequently insinuated that African states agitating for greater influence in the UNSC’s decisions on the continent were ‘free-riders’ who wanted recognition without contributing any of their own material resources.

South Africa argued that the problems of the Sahel region could only be resolved

through ‘a holistic and comprehensive approach from all of us’ (S/PV.6882 2012: 24). This entailed the international community working with the AU and ECOWAS to address the root causes of the problems in a long-term and sustainable way. Sangqu argued that the international community’s ‘commitment must remain unwavering’. It was for this reason Sangqu welcomed the appointment of former Italian minister, Mr Romano Prodi as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel. This was especially important for addressing the rapidly developing civil war in Mali where the Special Envoy should cooperate with the AU High Representative for Mali, President Buyoya to coordinate UN and AU efforts ‘in a manner that avoids duplication and promotes efficiency’. He urged Prodi to finalise the UN’s integrated strategy for the Sahel that comprised of development, humanitarian and security dimensions.

Sangqu (S/PV.6882 2012: 24) then focused on the situation in Mali because it was ‘the most urgent matter requiring our immediate attention’. South Africa saw the conflict in Mali as inextricable to the situation in the whole of the Sahel because the insecurity in northern Mali threatened its neighbouring countries. Sangqu expressed South Africa’s support for the AU and ECOWAS’ request for an African-led international support mission to be deployed in Mali to assist the Malian military to regain control of the north. He urged the UNSC to authorise the mission under Chapter VII and ‘provide a United Nations logistical support package’ because ‘that is urgent. The Council must be seen as united in supporting Malian forces to recapture the north’.

At the end of his statement, Sangqu reiterated South Africa’s view that if the situation in Mali was not addressed it would lead to further deterioration in the humanitarian situation and increases in human rights violations. He emphasised:

If left unchecked, the situation in the Sahel threatens to spread and affect other countries in the region and beyond, as well as to undermine international peace and security... Our discussion should be followed by concrete action.

As has been demonstrated in the extensive discussion in this section, the situation in Libya was the major test of South African foreign policy during South Africa’s

second term in the UNSC. It was arguably the biggest test of the whole Zuma administration. The findings of this study indicate that it was a test that Pretoria largely failed. Libya was a rapidly unfolding, complex situation on African soil that is exactly the kind of situation in which South Africa could have been expected to demonstrate regional and global leadership. Yet the Republic allowed itself to be outmanoeuvred by the Arab League (represented by Lebanon in the UNSC) and the P3. The conflict in Libya presented an opportunity for South Africa to play all the middle power roles in the typology: policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, manager, mediator, good international citizen, example, regional leader and champion of the South. Indeed, the Republic did perform some of these roles in relation to the Libya situation at different times during its tenure. However, the crisis exposed that Pretoria could not assert its influence in the face of realpolitik and the P3's enforcing of their structural power.

The context of revolutionary fervour and democratic transitions in the Middle East influenced the work of the UNSC, with members wanting to be seen to support popular calls for democracy while maintaining international peace and security. Still, the Council's rapid response to the Libya crisis was exceptional for an institution that is often derided for its sluggishness. The Council was able to move with such speed because the P3 used their power to influence UNSC processes in fulfilment of their national interests. Journalism and academic literature published since 2012 reveals the extent to which the interests of Western governments informed their motivations for the Libya intervention far more than humanitarian concerns (Shane and Becker 2016). Indeed, recent reports that Gaddafi funded Sarkozy's successful 2007 election campaign (Al Jazeera 2018) and that Blair's government assisted Tripoli in rendition and torture of two anti-Gaddafi activists (Cobain and Bowcott 2018) indicate that there was more to the intervention than was revealed at the time. It is particularly jarring that Britain, France and the US turned so quickly against Gaddafi when he stopped being expedient in the war against terror. As De Waal (2013) uncovered the West gladly cooperated with Sudan's Al-Bashir for intelligence, to provide ground troops and to supply weapons to the rebel forces in Libya. In effect, they traded one authoritarian leader in the region for another with little concern for the humanitarian

welfare of the people in those countries. This is how structural power operates as neo-imperialism to perpetuate the political and economic inequalities established by colonialism.

It would be unrealistic to argue that South Africa could have resisted the P3's machinations and prevented the NATO intervention. However, Pretoria squandered what power it did have to influence the global narrative about the crisis in Libya and the international response by not leveraging its position in the AUPSC to communicate the AU's roadmap to the world. Nigeria and South Africa were serving on both the UNSC and AUPSC giving them the ability to influence the decisions of both organizations (Cilliers et al 2010). By not cooperating with each other Pretoria and Abuja failed Mbeki and Obasanjo's vision of African renewal and agency. Even more, South Africa was on the Council with its IBSA and BRICS partners that used their awareness of the West's dubious intentions to oppose resolution 1973 and promote the AU's roadmap. It is true that the other BRICS states had their own national interests for not taking a firmer stand on resolution 1973. Both China and Russia chose not to use their vetoes, which enabled the NATO intervention. Arguably, Russia held out to use its power to protect its direct interests in Syria. It was convenient for China that its greatest competitor in distributing patronage in Africa, Gaddafi was weakened.. Brazil and India saw the issue as peripheral to their direct interests and an opportunity to assert valued principles of sovereignty and rule of law. South Africa wasted an opportunity to show that it deserves a place in the future configuration of power by showing its leadership on a major issue on its turf and the value the Republic adds to the BRICS.

### 6.3.2 Western Sahara

As discussed in chapter four, Western Sahara is a longstanding issue of concern for South Africa of the ANC's solidarity with the Polisario Front. South Africa addressed two formal meetings on Western Sahara—on 27 April 2011 and on 24 April 2012. As was customary, both of these meetings adopted resolutions extending the mandate of MINURSO. However South Africa used both opportunities to advocate for the inclusion of human rights abuses in Western Sahara in the resolutions. At the meeting

on 27 April 2011, Ambassador Sangqu described Western Sahara as ‘the last colony on the African continent and it is listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the United Nations’ (S/PV.6523 2011: 3).

In 2011 the meeting fell on South African Freedom Day, which commemorates the first democratic elections in 1994. Accordingly, Sangqu began his statement:

On this day, 27 April, 17 years ago, South Africans loudly proclaimed from their rooftops in the words of Doctor Martin Luther King Jr.: ‘Free at last! Free at last!’ This was in celebration of the fulfilment of our right to self-determination and freedom. Nelson Mandela stated that our freedom would be incomplete without the freedom and self-determination of others. The people of Western Sahara continue to be denied this inalienable right (S/PV.6523 2011: 2).

He further drew parallels between the uprisings in the Arab world and the struggle of the Sahrawi people. He asked that the UNSC act as swiftly in protecting the rights of the people of Western Sahara as it did in the cases of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. ‘As a responsible member of the Council’, South Africa had supported the interventions in those countries because the uprisings were ‘an indication that the status quo, when the human rights of people are denied, can no longer be sustained’. Consistently with the arguments made in the first term, Sangqu called for MINURSO to have a human rights monitoring mandate:

In keeping with the Council’s action in the past few months, we have to ensure that the rights of the people of Western Sahara are not ignored and are protected. Human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent. It is a travesty that MINURSO’s is one of the few United Nations mandates, and the only one in Africa, that does not include a human rights mandate. This double standard creates the impression that the Security Council does not care about the human rights of the people of Western Sahara.

Sangqu argued that South Africa was voting for the resolution to extend MINURSO’s mandate in order to ‘support efforts to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable



political solution, which will provide for the inalienable right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara' (S/PV.6523 2011: 3).

At the 24 April 2012 meeting, South Africa's claim to influence over Western Sahara was challenged by the presence of Morocco as an elected UNSC member. South Africa and Morocco were the only countries to address the Council after the adoption of resolution 2044 extending MINURSO's mandate. Sangqu welcomed the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Mr Christopher Ross, and the efforts of both parties to make progress in negotiations in June and July. However South Africa was disappointed that the Council had still not included a mechanism to monitor human rights within MINURSO's mandate. As in previous statements, Sangqu expressed concern about the 'selective approach to human rights by the Council' and argued it called 'into question the motivation of those who have conveniently looked the other way while human rights abuses are committed' in Western Sahara (S/PV.6758 2012: 3). Sangqu urged the UNSC to take an unbiased approach in Western Sahara and to support MINURSO in its mandate of bringing stability to the region, overseeing a referendum on self-determination and providing information on conditions in the country to the UN.

Morocco's ambassador, Mr Loulichki, did not mention South Africa directly in his statement. However, he rebutted some of South Africa's concerns. With regards the expansion of MINURSO's mandate to human rights monitoring he said, 'the Council was quite right to refuse, for the third year in a row, to consider broadening the mandate to include matters that are irrelevant to the functions and nature of the Mission' (S/PV.6758 2012: 4). He stated Morocco's position that a referendum could result in instability and promoted negotiations as the best way forward in resolving the impasse. Mr Loulichki made it clear that Morocco's commitment to negotiations with Polisario was based on the awareness that 'the Western Sahara is Moroccan and that Morocco must continue to exercise its sovereignty there' (S/PV.6758 2012: 4). As will be seen in section 7.2.1, Morocco directly challenged South Africa's policy on Western Sahara in a debate about the situation in Syria in which the South African representative had drawn a parallel between the struggle for self-determination in

Western Sahara and the insurgency in Syria.

The contestation between South Africa and Morocco in the UNSC reveals the limitations to the Republic's claim to regional leadership. In 2007 and 2008, South Africa was able to take strong positions on Western Sahara's self-determination and human rights without rebuttal from other Council members. Pretoria could have the last word after the votes renewing MINURSO's mandate. In the first term South Africa sought to play emerging middle power roles of regional leader and champion of the South by challenging the P3 to adhere to the Council rules and conventions in formulating the resolutions. The situation changed completely in 2012 when Morocco joined the Council and was able to take the lead on Western Sahara as the state with a direct, national interest in the matter. South Africa continued its policy of championing the cause of SADR, but it was rebutted by Morocco that asserted its ownership of Western Sahara.

### 6.3.3 Protection issues

The UNSC dealt with a range of protection issues during South Africa's second term. With the evolution of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century—including the rise in conflicts involving non-state actors, intrastate conflicts and the increase in displaced people—concern about the impact of conflict on civilians began to rise. Battles are no longer fought in demarcated battlefields among clearly defined combatants. Among the concerns were the involvement of children in conflicts and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. The P5 was divided in their enthusiasm for protection issues with the P3 advocating a more assertive approach for the UNSC in protecting civilians and the P2, especially China, being reluctant to intervene beyond the UNSC's Charter mandate. The P2 are particularly resistant to the UNSC taking on a norm-setting role (SCR 3 May 2011). In 2011 there were a number of issues on the UNSC agenda that required consideration of protection of civilians, specifically Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The fall out in the implementation of resolution 1973 reinforced the reluctance of many members to act to protect civilians in other conflicts.

In its first term South Africa resisted broadening discussions into non-traditional

security issues because of concerns about the mandate creep of the UNSC. In the second term South Africa was more accommodating in line with the focus of its diplomacy on human rights and good international citizenship. This section discusses a few snapshots of South Africa's behaviour in relation to protection related issues, specifically the protection of civilians in armed conflict and WPS.

### *Protection of civilians in armed conflict*

The UNSC held three meetings on the subject of protection of civilians in armed conflict in 2011 and 2012. Humanitarian intervention has a long tradition in the UN. However, R2P was formally adopted by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit. R2P is based on Deng's (1996) notion of 'sovereignty as responsibility' and requires governments to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. When a government cannot or will not protect its people from these crimes then the international community has a responsibility to intervene. R2P has three pillars (Bizos 2014):

1. Individual states have the responsibility to protect their populations;
2. The international community has the responsibility to assist states to fulfil their responsibilities;
3. If a state fails to discharge its responsibility, the international community has responsibility for protecting the population through measures set out in Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter. Only when peaceful measures fail can the international community invoke enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

South Africa supported the adoption of R2P because it was consistent with the African Renaissance vision of African states being responsible for the welfare of their populations. In 2008 the Republic hosted an informal debate on R2P at the UNSC. During its second term South Africa supported resolution 1973 and resolution 1975 that authorised military forces to 'use all necessary means' to protect civilians in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire respectively (Bellamy and Williams 2011). The use of force in both cases blurred the lines between humanitarian protection and regime change. South Africa was highly critical of the perceived abuse of protection mandates by international forces in both instances. In this context, South Africa's contributions to

the debates on protection issues in the UNSC emphasised strict adherence to rule of law to mitigate the abuse of R2P mandates by the P3.

At the 10 May 2011 meeting, Ambassador Sangqu (S/PV.6531 2011: 17) expressed South Africa's full commitment to the development of 'a strengthened normative and legal framework for enforcing' protection measures for civilians in conflict zones. He expressed his regret that despite numerous UNSC resolutions and presidential statements, 'the grim reality' was that parties to conflict displayed 'a lack of political will and complete disregard' for civilian lives during violent conflict. This was a violation of international law. South Africa called on all parties to conflict to improve the conditions of civilians. Sangqu made it clear that states 'bear the primary responsibility of protecting civilians within their borders' but emphasised that this did not absolve non-state actors from their responsibilities under humanitarian law. In a pointed comment, Sangqu noted that UN peacekeeping operations should fulfil their mandate for bringing peace and protecting civilians 'in an impartial manner'. He continued 'United Nations peacekeeping operations should never be seen to be siding with one party to a conflict, as that would undermine the integrity of United Nations efforts' (S/PV.6531 2011: 17). This statement was clearly directed at the P3 for using the NATO intervention in Libya to support rebel forces against Gaddafi. For South Africa, the responsibility to protect civilians applies to both state and non-state actors.

Sangqu expressed South Africa's appreciation for the efforts made by the governments of DRC and Chad 'to combat sexual violence, as demonstrated by the arrest of senior military officers involved in crimes of conflict-related sexual violence' (S/PV.6531 2011: 17). This statement demonstrates the shift in South Africa's approach to human rights from the first term when officials avoided explicit reference to sexual violence in African conflicts. Sangqu highlighted the initiative of fellow IBSA member, Brazil, in hosting informal consultations to discuss all protection related issues on the UNSC agenda including protection of civilians, children and armed conflict and, women, peace and security. He said, 'South Africa supports this holistic approach, whereby these issues are dealt with in a coherent manner' and called on the Secretariat to ensure that its actions in these issues were

‘mutually reinforcing’. South Africa raised concerns that the implementation of the protection measures in the Libya resolutions appeared ‘to go beyond their letter and spirit’. Sangqu (S/PV.6531 2011: 18) expressed South Africa’s view that:

It is important that, as international actors and external organisations provide constructive assistance, they should nonetheless comply with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, fully respect the will, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country concerned, and refrain from advancing political agendas that go beyond the protection of civilian mandates, including regime change.

In our view, such actions will undermine the gains made in this discourse and provide ammunition to those who have always been sceptical of the concept. In the final analysis, the implementation of these resolutions will determine whether our actions have yielded the intended result of protecting civilians.

This warning about the risk of undermining progress made on protection issues by extending the limits of protection resolutions was directed at Western powers that South Africa accused of using humanitarian concerns to advance their national interests. It fits with South Africa’s role conception of champion of the South and defender of the sovereignty of developing countries.

South Africa emphasised the importance of addressing the root causes of conflicts in order to ensure long-term protection of civilians. Sangqu (S/PV.6531 2011: 18) called on the UNSC to focus on ‘rule of law reforms; democratisation reforms; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; security sector reforms; and post-conflict reconstruction and development underpinned by early peacebuilding programmes’. This list of activities is based on South Africa’s own democratic transition, where legal and political reforms underpinned the resolution of armed conflict. So, the Republic was projecting a role conception of example in its recommendations. Sangqu ended his statement by reiterating the need for the UNSC to pursue its mandate consistently by avoiding selectivity in its application of protection of civilian mandates. Specifically, this meant the Council could not afford to ‘be seen to place the value of some civilians above that of others. Proactive actions that we have

witnessed in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire have also to be applied in cases such as Somalia'.

At subsequent meetings on this topic on 9 November 2011 (S/PV.6650) and 25 June 2012 (S/PV.6790), South Africa raised similar points on the importance of developing a normative protection framework, the application of protection responsibilities to both state and non-state actors, the need for consistency in UNSC protection mandates and the concern about overreach in the implementation of resolution 1973. Regarding the latter point, at the November 2011 meeting Sangqu stated:

In particular my delegation has expressed its condemnation of recent NATO activities in Libya, which went far beyond the letter and spirit of resolution 1973 (2011). Abusing the authorisation granted by the Council to advance a political regime-change agenda does not bode well for the future action of the Council in advancing the protection of civilians agenda. That could lead to a permanent state of paralysis within the Council in addressing similar situations in the future. Such actions could undermine the Council's credibility in protecting civilians. (S/PV. 6650 2011: 22)

As will be seen in chapter seven, the warning regarding the 'permanent state of paralysis' in addressing similar issues would be seen in Council deliberations on the situation in Syria. Arguably the fallout from the NATO intervention compromised the UNSC's ability to act decisively in Syria. As a result, the crisis in that country was still ongoing at the time of writing this dissertation with civilians suffering the brunt of air strikes and other military action.

At the June 2012 meeting, Deputy Ambassador Mashabane raised the issue of 'the use of unmanned serial assets against targets, which inevitably leads to the killing of innocent civilians' (S/PV.6790 2012: 27). This was a reference to the increasing use of drones, especially by the US under Obama. Mashabane referred to the concept, introduced by Brazil, of responsibility while protecting as a guide to limiting the damage to civilians during humanitarian interventions. South Africa was also concerned about 'the plight of migrant labourers, particularly those from sub-Saharan

Africa recently caught in the conflict in Libya (S/PV.6790 2012: 28). These early concerns about the fate of African migrants in Libya presaged the migrant crisis and revival of the slave trade that made headlines in 2017 (Nyabola 2017).

### *WPS*

South Africa continued its activism on WPS issues, particularly increasing involvement of women in peace processes and peacekeeping, and the full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). As in previous years, Pretoria emphasised South Africa's example of inclusion of women in peace building and governance. By 2012, 45 per cent of South Africa troops in UN missions were women and ten per cent of them were in leadership and command roles (S/PV.6722 2012). In a meeting on 28 October 2011, Ambassador Sangqu stated:

In that regard, South Africa is among the States with the highest representation of women across all spheres of Government. Women are also at the helm of ministries in the fields of international relations, cooperation and defence. In the area of peacekeeping, we have deployed gender mainstreaming officers in positions of command in peacekeeping missions to ensure that issues related to women are addressed. In addition, we are one of the top three troop-contributing countries with the largest contingent of women in peacekeeping missions (S/PV.6642 2011: 11).

As mentioned earlier, one notable difference in the Republic's activism in the second term was its willingness to engage directly with issues of sexual violence as a weapon of war and referring to specific situations of conflict in Africa. Pretoria did not appear as concerned with the colonial connotations of focusing on sexual violence in African contexts. Instead it engaged like a good international citizen promoting universal principles of gender equality. At a meeting on 23 February 2012, during the presidency of Togo, Mr Mashabane expressed concern that African countries continued to experience high incidences of conflict-related sexual violence:

We are appalled that the incidents of rape and gang rape increased in the recent conflict that struck Cote d'Ivoire. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rape, mass rape and other sexual violence continue unabated

in North and South Kivu. That is a matter of great concern to South Africa (S/PV.6722 2012: 26).

South Africa played the role of an emerging middle power on protection issues in the UNSC by promoting the need to protect civilians, while cautioning against world powers' pursuit of national interests under the guise of humanitarianism. This fits the behaviour associated with champions of the South and regional leaders that advocate for the strict adherence to international law in order to prevent abuses by powerful states against weaker ones. Arguably, this behaviour is also consistent with a broader view of good international citizenship as South Africa was speaking truth to Western powers for the purpose of guarding humanitarian norms. As Graham (2013) found in her doctoral study on South Africa's voting patterns in the UN, the Republic often excels in such normative debates on human rights but is reluctant to apply these norms in country-specific decisions. This discrepancy has contributed to accusations that South African foreign policy is inconsistent and contradictory.

#### **6.4 Commitment to rule of law**

Commitment to a rules-based international order is one of the underlying principles of South African foreign policy. As discussed in previous chapters, policymakers see this as an important component of the role of good international citizen in international affairs. During South Africa's second term questions of rule of law and the UNSC rules of procedure came to the fore because of tensions surrounding the implementation of certain UNSC mandates. South Africa is committed to a rules-based international order as a way of levelling the playing field between powerful and less powerful states. When the rules are applied equally to all states then ability of major powers to act arbitrarily is limited. This is especially important in the context of the UN. The UNSC is the only international institution with the authority to use force and whose decisions are binding on the rest of the UN membership. Therefore, by joining the UN, states cede some of their sovereignty to the Council, specifically to the five permanent members. South Africa advocates checks and balances to ensure the UNSC uses its powers fairly and consistently. It also promotes the right to due process for those affected by the Council's work. The principles of transparency and



accountability are recurring themes in the thematic debates on the rule of law and working procedures of the UNSC, which are discussed in this section.

#### 6.4.1 Thematic debates on the rule of law

South Africa organised an open debate under the topic the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security, on 19 January 2012 during its presidency of the UNSC. The debate was specifically focused on the report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post conflict societies (S/2011/634\*). Ambassador Sangqu explained South Africa's choice of the debate by relating it to the Republic's own experience. He argued:

Peacebuilding and peace making require an integrated and comprehensive approach that takes into account development, economic prosperity, the establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of justice (S/PV.6705 2012: 20).

Sangqu related the discussion on the rule of law to accountability for the most serious crimes committed during conflicts. He highlighted South Africa's commitment to fighting impunity. In this regard, he argued that national systems needed to be willing and able to investigate and prosecute international crimes:

It is for this reason that South Africa continues to champion positive complementarity, which is the key principle of the Rome Statute system designed to strengthen domestic jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. (S/PV.6705 2012: 20).

However, efforts to promote rule of law at domestic level needed to be matched by the promotion of rule of law at the international level. Referring to the implementation of resolution 1973, Sangqu cautioned that the unequal application of the UNSC's powers in different situations meant the UN 'runs the risk of being accused of double standards and of losing its credibility'. This statement is consistent with South Africa's role conception as a champion of the South. In a managerial contribution, South Africa encouraged the UNSC to make better use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by requesting advisory opinions on complex legal

questions. He argued that, apart from improving the effectiveness of UNSC's work, this would demonstrate to the outside world that the Council operates within the framework of international law and is not above the law. The debate culminated in the adoption of a presidential statement drafted by South Africa (S/PRST/2012/1).

On 17 October 2012, Guatemala hosted a thematic debate on the rule of law with a special focus on the role of the ICC. Mr Mashabane used the opportunity to expound on South Africa's view of the relationship between peace and justice. He argued that the UNSC and ICC represented 'opposite sides of the peace and justice coin' and thus needed to cooperate to ensure that these norms were balanced. According to Mashabane:

The relationship between peace and justice is reflected most strongly in article 16 of the Rome Statute, which provides for the Council to defer ICC investigations in the exercise of its primary mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.6849 2012: 16).

Mashabane made this link because of South Africa's concerns that the UNSC was undermining the work of the ICC. He argued that this was done in four ways: Firstly, UNSC referrals to the ICC did not oblige all member states to cooperate with the ICC, as was the case with resolutions under chapter VII; 'the reason for this is to exempt some permanent members from their duty to cooperate'. Second, both referral resolutions granted exemption from prosecution to nationals of certain states. Third, the resolutions precluded the possibility of using UN funding under the Charter for ICC related investigations. Fourth, the UNSC did not follow up on instances of non-cooperation, 'behaving as if referral was an end in itself'. Mashabane argued that this all led to perceptions that the UNSC did not take the ICC seriously. He stated 'we hope this debate will contribute to an honest stocktaking within the Council of how to better manage the relationship (S/PV.6849 2012: 17). In this debate South Africa projected itself as a good international citizen defending the rule of law, as well as a multilateral manager making concrete contributions to global governance. Curiously, by 2015 with the Al-Bashir arrest incident, Pretoria had shifted its criticism of the UNSC to the ICC. In 2016 the government initiated plans to withdraw from the Rome Statute. The abandonment of the Rome Statute, which South Africa was actively

involved in drafting and defending in international forums is the kind of behaviour that has led to the Republic being accused of inconsistency.

#### 6.4.2 Working Methods of the UNSC

For South Africa the rule of law in the international system is important to avoid arbitrariness and abuse of power. This is especially important in the UNSC where the P5 have the advantage of permanence and the veto to act in their own interests. South Africa advocated for greater transparency and consistency in the working procedures of the UNSC to protect the general membership of the UN from the vicissitudes of the P5. Since its establishment in 1945, the UNSC has used provisional rules of procedure that are liable to change from decision to decision. According to article 30 of the UN Charter the UNSC can establish its own rules of procedure and the P5 have used this provision to resist efforts by elected members to formalise UNSC procedures. An ad hoc approach to operations suits the P5 because it gives them flexibility in addressing issues on the Council agenda.

As I have worked on this study for the past four years, I have been struck by the frequency and informality of the changes in UNSC working methods from year to year. For example, during the UK's presidency of the Council in November 2010, it introduced a practice of horizon-scanning briefings. At the start of the month Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe gave a general briefing about the broader issues that could impact the Council's work that month (SCR 29 October 2010). This practice continued throughout 2011, for six months in 2012 and for three months in 2013, before fading out completely. What this illustrates is the ad hoc nature by which decisions on procedure are adopted and abandoned in the UNSC, often with no record of the reasons for these decisions.

In 2006, Japan led a process to formalise some of the Council's work when it chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. Japan served as chair of that working group for a full year, which allowed it to focus intensively on the Council's working procedures. Japan's appointment is another example of ad hoc changes in UNSC methods because prior to 2006, the

chairmanship of the working group rotated each month with the Council presidency (SCR 31 October 2011). During its presidency of the Council in July 2006, Japan produced a presidential note capturing all the major Council practices and understandings of working methods until July 2006 (S/2006/507). This note has been updated in subsequent years by successive chairs of the working group. The version being used by the UNSC during South Africa's second term was contained in a presidential note dated 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507). Among the key issues of concern regarding the Council's practices are transparency, interaction and dialogue with non-members of the Council, and efficiency.

On 30 November 2011, Portugal organised the Council's fourth open debate on the Council's working methods. The others took place in 1994, 2008 and 2010. The debate included twenty non-members. The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina that chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions described the open debate as evidence of 'the increased interest on the part of the entire United Nations membership, as well as the increased transparency of the Security Council in its work and its intention to interact with the general membership when addressing matters of mutual concern and benefit' (S/PV.6672 2011: 2). Bosnia and Herzegovina reported on the progress made in the working group that year.

In his response to the briefing, Mr Mashabane welcomed the overall improvement of UNSC working methods especially the increase in the number of public meetings and the increase in interaction between the president of the UNSC and the general membership. This contributed to increasing transparency and accountability. However, he argued:

More... must be done to ensure that such developments translate into substantive and meaningful engagement between the Security Council and the general membership, and that the views of the latter are reflected in the Council's actions. My delegation also welcomes the increased interaction between the President of the Council and the Presidents of the General assembly and the Economic and Social Council (S/PV.6672 2011: 11).

The specific mention of the interaction between the UNSC president and presidents of UNGA and ECOSOC is consistent with South Africa's views on UN reform. In South Africa's view UNGA and ECOSOC are the most representative and democratic UN organs because of they allow the active involvement of states from the global South. In an extension of this Mashabane (S/PV.6672 2011: 11) welcomed the growing relationship between the UNSC and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) but argued that the interactions should 'translate into a reflection of the views of the PBC in the Council's consideration of peacekeeping mandates'. Similarly, the UNSC had increased and regularised its meetings with troop-contributing countries, which improved its understanding of the conditions in peace missions. But this was insufficient. Mashabane reiterated South Africa's support 'for formalising the Council's rules of procedure in order to improve its transparency and accountability'.

South Africa noted progress in strengthening the partnership between the UNSC and the AUPSC. Nevertheless, these relations were not at the ideal level of complementarity. Mashabane recommended more regular interactions between the presidents of the UNSC and AUPSC on issues that were on the agendas of both Councils. South Africa proposed 'the use of video technology' to facilitate such regular interactions. In his conclusion Mashabane (S/PV.6672 2011: 12) expressed South Africa's view that:

Minor changes to the working methods will not necessarily address the more fundamental issue that affects the legitimacy and credibility of the Council, which is linked to the fact that the current configuration of the Council is unrepresentative, in particular in the permanent category. We think that we must therefore speed up the process of reform of the Council to make it more representative.

The other IBSA countries also used their statements to call for UNSC reform. India reiterated the need for 'expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories' (S/PV.6672 2011: 12). Brazil noted that 'the shortcomings in the Security Council's working methods cannot be entirely corrected without real reform, including changes in the Council's current power structure' (S/PV.6672 2011: 15). Changing the UNSC's 'current power structure' is the crux of emerging middle

powers' engagement on the issue of working methods. This distinguishes them from the Small Five states (Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland) that have taken an active interest in the issue but seek to separate the working methods discussion from debates on Council enlargement. Because of their position in the hierarchy of structural power, the Small Five would have no claim to new permanent seats on the UNSC so they lobby for improvement in the working methods separately to UNSC reform. By contrast, the main interest the IBSA states have in the working methods debate is to use it as a vehicle for wider reforms.

India organised the next open debate on UNSC working procedures on 26 November 2012. South Africa welcomed the increase in public meetings and public briefings by special envoys and special representatives. Mr Laher explained that as:

Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, South Africa has endeavoured to involve the broader membership and non-state entities in the discussions on the Group's agenda by opening up its meetings (S/PV.6870 2012: 17).

Laher further commended the increased engagement between the UNSC and troop-contributing countries as exemplified in resolution 2076 (2012) on the DRC. However, he repeated the need for UNSC reform because 'in our experience, elected members of the Council are confronted by numerous constraints that result from the current configuration, which affords dominance and permanence to the non-elected members'. These included the practice of P5 members allocating chairmanship of subsidiary bodies of the UNSC, which was a hugely time and resource intensive responsibility, to elected members without consulting them. Another problem was the fact that the P3 were penholders of almost every country-specific issue.

A senior DIRCO official who worked in the South African UN mission in the second term expressed it thus:

... so, the P5 doesn't chair committees, they distribute the committees to the ten of you. And of course, it requires a lot of resources both financial and human resources and it takes you out of the business in the Security

Council. So, in the Security Council you have two classes: the permanent five is the elite that decides the affairs of the Council and the elected ten, you are second-class members that's why all of you chair committees and the P5 doesn't. But then P5 decide, there's the so-called penholder, so if there's a conflict in the Congo, France is the penholder, it's leading meaning that they're the ones who are going to decide we want to pass a resolution that's going to slap that government of Congo with sanctions and it is unfair. We challenged those things so 1540 was given to us and the explanation was you have the capacity, you have the experts. And it's true we do compared to maybe the other African countries and the other elected ten so we chaired it. But in a way you can see, if you look at it with a critical mind, that the ten are being used as workers of the committee because the chairs must come back and report and so on and so forth, you have to meet on a regular basis to consult on different issues.

The descriptions used by the official are revealing because of their evocation of inequality and class struggle within the Council. South Africa's prevailing criticism of the Council is that it discriminates unfairly against representatives of the majority of the world's population by excluding elected members from making influential decisions.

In the November 2012 meeting, Laher raised South Africa's concern that small groups often drafted the resolutions of the Council, which were 'presented as faits accomplis to elected members' (S/PV.6870 2012: 17). While South Africa welcomed broad consultation with non-members, decisions should be open to debate by all members of the UNSC. This was a reference to cases like the Group of Friends drafting resolutions on Western Sahara or the Quartet making decisions with regards Israel-Palestine issues. In these cases, European non-members and other allies of the P3 influenced important UNSC agenda issues without consultation with elected members. Another concern regarding external consultations was the tendency for certain permanent members of the Council to selectively pick 'elements of decisions of regional organisations such as the African Union and the League of Arab States that advance the national interests of some members'. This was a direct reference to

the case of Libya where the P3 sidelined the AU in favour of the Arab League because the latter's approach to the conflict served P3 interests.

As evidence of South Africa's reputation as a regional leader and policy entrepreneur, the representative of New Zealand acknowledged the Republic's work on improving engagement between the UNSC and the AUPSC. He also praised the Republic from transforming the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa 'from the theoretical to the practical'.

In the debates on working procedures of the UNSC, South Africa projected itself as a champion of the South by advocating increased transparency and accountability in the Council's work. Pretoria challenged the incremental approach to the reform of UNSC working methods by calling for the rules of procedure to be formalised. Moreover, South Africa promoted the expansion and democratisation of the UNSC as a necessary part of reforming UNSC procedures. One of South Africa's major contributions to the working methods debate was in its efforts to improve the relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC. This contribution was recognised by other states, which saw South Africa as a regional leader. The case of working methods is one of the instances in which South Africa's role conceptions and role expectations were aligned. The statements of the IBSA countries support Nel's (2010) contention that emerging regional powers want redistribution *and* recognition. Within the context of the UNSC they seek redistribution of power and prestige for themselves and to be recognised as equal to major powers in the global power structure.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

South Africa's second term in the UNSC was dominated by the situation in Libya. The Republic had joined the UNSC in hopes of shedding the criticisms that followed the first term. President Zuma aimed to differentiate himself from his predecessor by reviving the human rights and democracy discourse associated with the Mandela presidency. Thus, Pretoria's initial statements on the second term included explicit reference to human rights and seemed more aligned to the liberal rhetoric of the P3



than the reformist language of the BRICS, which all served in the Council in 2011. The fallout from the implementation of resolution 1973 changed this approach. South Africa felt betrayed by the interpretation of the resolution as mandating regime change instead of protection of civilians. This disappointment appears to be based on naiveté and misreading of the resolution that is inconsistent with the behaviour of a middle power.

It also appears that President Zuma ordered the UNSC delegation to vote in favour of resolution 1973 despite their advice about the risks of doing so. This reveals the impact Zuma's brand of personal politics has had on South African foreign policy. Mbeki remade foreign policy institutions in his own image, according to his vision of African Renaissance. Zuma sidelined these institutions and bureaucratic processes leading to the impression that South African foreign policy is running on parallel tracks. This is unfortunate because by 2011 and 2012, South African officials had developed competence and familiarity with UNSC processes and customs so they could present South Africa's foreign policy with greater sophistication than in the first term. This is the kind of bureaucratic and diplomatic skill that allows middle powers to influence international affairs. However, it also requires political will to be effective. Perhaps in the case of emerging middle powers, with developing democratic and bureaucratic systems, the distinction between heroic and routine diplomacy is inappropriate. Both political leadership, 'the heroic', and skilled bureaucracy, 'the routine', are required (Cooper 1997).

In the case of Western Sahara South Africa continued to play its role as a regional leader and champion of the South by defending the SADR's right to self-determination. It also acted as a good international citizen, advocating for the human rights of the Sahrawi people. However, the Republic's authority on Western Sahara eroded in 2012 when Morocco joined the UNSC. This exposed the limitations of the regional leader role conception for emerging middle powers whose legitimacy is often greater in global forums than within their regions. South Africa continued its policy of defending Western Sahara but lost the privileged position of having the last word on this issue in UNSC debates. In an interview with the City Press after the fifth AU-EU

summit in Abidjan, then President Zuma announced that Morocco would deploy an ambassador to South Africa as a first step to resuming diplomatic ties (Masondo 2017).

Zuma's decision to resume relations with the Kingdom was apparently made without consulting the ANC or DIRCO, which had not changed their stance of supporting Western Sahara. The ANC reaffirmed its support of Western Sahara at the party's national elective conference in December 2017 after Cyril Ramaphosa was announced party president. The reality that a major change in ANC foreign policy could be adopted and just as easily abandoned at the whim of the president illustrates the difficulty of crafting a credible foreign policy when political and bureaucratic processes are not aligned. Almost a quarter century after 1994 South Africa can no longer use the excuse of being a 'new' democracy to explain its diplomatic inconsistencies. If Pretoria wants to be taken seriously for a prominent place in the new structure of global power, it needs to invest in developing sophisticated diplomatic machinery that can withstand the whims of political leaders.

South Africa played the role of an emerging middle power on protection issues in the UNSC by promoting human rights and humanitarian welfare. At the same time South Africa sought to limit the P5 abusing their structural power to pursue regime change under humanitarian pretences. In this regard, the Republic raised similar concerns as Mamdani (2010) that the responsibility to protect would become the 'right to punish'. Yet raising the double standards and neo-colonialism of the West appears cruel in the face of the horrific violence faced by Africans at the hands of their governments in armed conflict. Brazil used the notion of responsibility while protecting to express its dual concern for human rights *and* for holding powerful states accountable for abusing humanitarian interventions. Similarly, South Africa ought to build on its history of human rights activism to develop a language of human rights that combines the vital need to protect humanity with the imperative of dismantling colonial power relations.

The issues of civilian protection and rule of law were recurring themes in the debates

on the issues discussed in the next chapter. Chapter seven focuses on South Africa's diplomacy under the general themes of peaceful resolution of conflict and the African agenda.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: AFRICAN LEADERSHIP, BRICS FOLLOWERSHIP

### 7.1 Introduction

When South Africa took up its seat in the UNSC in January 2011, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane (2011) emphasised the importance of the African Agenda in the Republic's diplomacy:

South Africa will seek to strengthen co-operation between the G3 (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) in the Council, with the aim of elevating the African Agenda and the achievement of peace and security on our Continent and to coordinate efforts in this regard more efficiently. This is important in a Council where influence is unevenly distributed and certain members play a dominant role.

South Africa will continue its efforts to promote and enhance the Security Council's cooperation with regional organizations, particularly the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Closer co-operation between these two bodies will contribute to enhancing the convergence of perspectives and approaches in dealing with and responding to peace and security challenges on our Continent.

As in the first term, the African Agenda was intrinsically connected to the principle of peaceful resolution of conflict because many of the worst conflicts on the Council agenda were in Africa. Among these, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane (2011) identified 'the holding of the referendum in Southern Sudan, the crisis in Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire'. To balance this situation, South Africa chose to take an activist role in conflict management, prevention and resolution on the Council. It also challenged the neo-trusteeship role of the UNSC on the continent by promoting greater the involvement of African states in resolving issues on the Council agenda through the AUPSC.

This chapter follows the structure of chapter five to discuss South Africa's decisions in the UNSC in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda. The chapter begins with a discussion of a selection of country-specific and thematic issues related to peaceful resolution of conflict. This is followed by a discussion of the

African Agenda. Of particular importance is the Republic's advocacy of closer cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the roles South Africa played in relation to the middle power framework.

## **7.2 Peaceful resolution of conflict**

South Africa's second term in the Security Council was characterised by an escalation of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, in the wake of the Arab Spring. While some pro-democracy protests like those in Egypt and Tunisia appeared to successfully remove authoritarian regimes, protests in Libya and Syria triggered intractable conflicts<sup>6</sup>. This section discusses two examples of South Africa's diplomacy on peaceful conflict resolution in 2011 and 2012. The first example is of the conflict in Syria, which began in March 2011. The UNSC was unable to agree on a solution to the conflict because of the deep divisions in the Council following the Libya intervention. Notably, the P5 was increasingly divided along Cold War lines with China and Russia vetoing several resolutions relating to Syria. As will be seen, South Africa sided with the P2, despite its own humanitarian principles, ostensibly because of its fears of a repeat of the resolution 1973 intervention. The second example is the thematic debates on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. South Africa was actively involved in the 2005 World Summit discussions that culminated in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. The Republic's contributions to this debate illustrate its roles as a multilateral manager, successful example of post-conflict reconstruction, mediator and regional leader.

### **7.2.1 Syria**

Protests against the government of President Bashar Al-Assad broke out in mid-March 2011 in the city of Dar'a after fifteen teenagers were arrested and tortured for writing anti-Government graffiti (BBC 2016). Security forces responded with

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<sup>6</sup> Egypt saw a reversal in its democratic gains after its first democratic presidential election in June 2012 elected Mohamed Morsi as president. Morsi was deposed in a military coup, headed by current president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, on 3 July 2014 (see Hessler 2017).

violence against protestors triggering the spread of anti-government demonstrations across the country. The Council held its first formal meeting about the situation in Syria on 27 April 2011, under the general theme of ‘The situation in the Middle East’. Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe (S/PV.6524 2011: 2) informed the Council that while protestors had begun by demanding more political and economic freedoms, ‘they are increasingly calling for the downfall of the regime, echoing slogans that have been heard elsewhere in the region’. The Syrian government initially responded with some political, social and economic reforms. But this was accompanied by increasingly violent repression as the Syrian army began military operations against Dar’a and surrounds. Pascoe reported of the use of:

Artillery fire against unarmed civilians, door-to-door arrest campaigns, the shooting of medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics and mosques and the purposeful destruction of medical supplies and arrests of medical personnel.

One of the main challenges Pascoe identified was the limited access to information about the conditions on the ground because international and independent media was prevented from reporting from the conflict zones. This prevented ‘the collection and dissemination of accurate and impartial information’ (S/PV.6524 2011: 3).

Ambassador Sangqu said South Africa was ‘very concerned’ with the situation in Syria and regretted the loss of life in that country. South Africa called ‘on all parties to the conflict to show restraint’ and welcomed the lifting of the state of emergency, ‘which had been in place for almost 50 years’. Sangqu welcomed the governance reforms introduced by Syrian authorities and urged ‘the Government of Syria to move swiftly to implement the necessary reforms towards democratisation, in accordance with the will and aspirations of its people’ (S/PV.6524 2011: 6). Sangqu argued:

The voices of people in Syria and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa cannot be ignored. It is important for their Governments to ensure that the rights of their people are protected and that they be allowed to voice their grievances peacefully. Syria is integral to a wider resolution of the Middle East conflict; its stability is linked to that of its neighbours.

Finally, we urge the Syrian authorities to initiate an open, transparent and all-inclusive process with their people in order to address their grievances, and, in turn, guarantee their fundamental political rights and freedoms, including their rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech'. (S/PV.6524 2011: 6).

This statement reveals South Africa's support for the Arab Spring protests as legitimate expressions of the democratic will of the people of the region. Consistent with the role of good international citizen, the Republic advocated the protection of the human rights of protesting people in the Middle East and North Africa. This was also in line with the role conception of example because Pretoria saw the protests in the Arab world as analogous to South Africans' mass action in the struggle against apartheid. South Africa consistently emphasised the regional effects of the Syrian conflict, because many refugees from other conflict zones like Iraq and Palestine living in Syria faced the risk of being further displaced. The call for 'an open, transparent and all-inclusive process' to resolve the conflict came from South Africa's experience of the negotiated settlement. Deputy Minister of International Relations Ebrahim Ebrahim (2012b) expanded on South Africa's position on the uprisings at a lecture on 3 September 2012 at SAIIA:

Let me be clear, South Africa does not promote nor support dictatorships. In our view the Arab Uprisings have demonstrated clearly that the legitimate rights of the majority cannot be denied. Similarly, their aspirations cannot be reduced to a security problem to be managed. These popular uprisings have fundamentally challenged the whole Arab order, giving renewed hope and energy to people of the region and beyond for liberty, democracy and a better life. South Africa welcomes the positive changes that have been taking place in the MENA region. We have availed ourselves to post-uprising states to share our experience of successful political transition as they lay the foundations for their new systems of government.

On 4 October 2011, the UNSC met to consider the deteriorating situation in Syria. Thousands of civilians had been killed and thousands more displaced from their homes. Several countries including France, Germany, Portugal and the UK put

forward a draft resolution (S/2011/612) on the situation in Syria seeking to exert pressure on the Syrian authorities to cease violence. The resolution failed because of vetoes from China and Russia. Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa abstained (S/PV.6627 2011). Following this vote, China and Russia vetoed three other draft resolutions in 2012.

In explanation for abstaining from the vote, Sangqu expressed South Africa's deep concern about the deteriorating situation in Syria and its hope that the conflict would be solved peacefully and 'in accordance with the will of the Syrian people'. South Africa called for 'a holistic political solution' that respected democracy, political reform, justice and human rights, and the socio-economic development needs of the people of Syria. However, this solution would need to 'preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria' (S/PV.6627 2011: 11).

South Africa abstained from the resolution because of its belief that 'any action on the part of the international community on Syria, therefore, including action by the Security Council, should be cognizant of the regional implications.' In an implicit reference to Libya, Sangqu said it was important to be aware of the regional implications because 'we have seen recently that Security Council resolutions have been abused, and that their implementation has gone far beyond the mandate of what was intended'. South Africa was:

Concerned about the sponsors' intention to impose punitive measures that would have pre-judged the resolution's implementation. We believe that these were designed as a prelude to further actions. We are concerned that this draft resolution not be part of a hidden agenda aimed at once again instituting regime change, which has been an objective clearly stated by some. We are thus concerned about the fact that the sponsors of this draft resolution rejected language that clearly excluded the possibility of military intervention in the resolution of the Syrian crisis. We maintain that the Security Council should proceed with caution on Syria lest we exacerbate an already volatile situation (S/PV.6627 2011: 11).



South Africa's statement shows how much the Libyan intervention increased Pretoria's suspicions about military intervention and increased distrust about the motivations of especially the P3. Brazil, India and Lebanon alluded to similar reasons for abstaining in the vote. In their statements Brazil and India, referred to their respective bilateral engagements with the Syrian government as well as to the multilateral initiative led by IBSA that urged the government to cease violence and respect the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people. In contrast to its position on Libya, Lebanon defended the sovereignty and integrity of Syria as a 'brotherly Arab country'. Unlike the UNSC members Lebanon had even abstained from a presidential statement released on 3 August 2011 expressing 'grave concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria' (S/PRST/2011/16).

South Africa organised a formal meeting on Syria on 31 January 2012, during its presidency of the Council. The meeting was intended as an opportunity for the League of Arab States to brief the Council on its position on the crisis, in accordance with South Africa's thematic concern with the Chapter VIII relationship between the UNSC and regional organizations. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, briefed the UNSC on the Arab League's plan for political resolution of the conflict in Syria.

Ambassador Sangqu called for the 'violence to cease immediately' in Syria to bring an end to the violent loss of life. He went on to 'reiterate that any solution to the Syrian crisis should be Syrian-led, based on genuine national dialogue, devoid of any form of intimidation and free of interference from outside' (S/PV.6710 2012: 29). Sangqu referred to resolution 2033 that was passed on 12 January 2012 and promoted enhanced cooperation between the UNSC and regional organizations. He reiterated his support for the Arab League's leadership in addressing the situation in Syria. With regards to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, the only option was 'a comprehensive political solution' that would 'lead to political reform based on respect for democratic principles, rule of law, justice and human rights'.

Sangqu used the rhetoric of a champion of the South when he argued:

We strongly believe that any solution should respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and at the same time uphold the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter (S/PV.6710 2012: 30).

He continued that this was the view of Syrian citizens who believed that:

The crisis should be resolved peacefully, through Arab intervention alone and without international intervention, as it would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire.

As it had done in the case of Libya, South Africa emphasized that violence was being perpetrated by both sides of the conflict and called on the opposition to also cease attacking civilians. Sangqu urged the UNSC to ‘avoid any action that may run the risk of further polarizing the parties and lead to an escalation of the violence’. In a direct reference to Libya, Sangqu reminded the Council that military intervention had ‘unintended consequences’ for the country concerned and the wider region, which the Middle East could ‘ill afford’. In that regard, South Africa called for the draft resolutions being circulated among Council members to better reflect the sentiments expressed by the Arab League.

On 4 February 2012, the UNSC discussed a draft resolution condemning violence in Syria and supporting the Arab League’s Plan of Action for political transition. China and Russia vetoed the draft. All other Council members voted in favour. France, the UK and US condemned the vetoes and accused China and Russia of being ‘complicit’ in the Syrian regime’s repression of its people.

Ambassador Sangqu expressed concern that the situation in Syria continued to deteriorate ‘despite calls from the international community on the Syrian Government and the armed opposition to stop the violence and settle their differences in a peaceful manner’ (S/PV.6711 2012: 11). South Africa condemned the violent loss of life. Sangqu again advocated a peaceful political solution led by the Syrian people and for the UNSC to support the efforts of the Arab League ‘as the organisation with

knowledge of and proximity to the situation in Syria'. He said it should be given the 'necessary political space to find a solution to the Syrian crisis', which was an implicit criticism of the lack of political space afforded to the AU in Libya. In explaining why South Africa voted for the resolution, Sangqu said:

Fundamentally, no foreign or external parties should interfere in Syria as its people engage in the critical decision-making process on the future of their country. Any solution must preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. We are also satisfied that the final draft resolution (S/2012/77) was not aimed at imposing regime change in Syria, which would be against the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

On 1 March 2012, the Council released a press statement condemning the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria (SC/10564). Unlike presidential statements and resolutions, press statements are not official outcomes of UNSC deliberations. Despite attempts by member states the Council failed to reach agreement on bringing another draft resolution to the vote.

On 12 March 2012, as part of its presidency of the Council, the UK organized a high-level debate on recent political changes in the Middle East attended by the foreign ministers of the UK, Colombia, France, Germany, Portugal, Russia and the US (S/PV.6734 2012). Ambassador Sangqu's statement began with South Africa's assessment of the cause of the uprisings in the Arab region that is worth quoting here in full because of what it reveals about South Africa's worldview:

Our assessment of the uprisings in the Arab States, many created as colonial constructs resulting from the Sykes-Picot Agreement, shows that those protests, were, among other things, a cry for political emancipation from decades of totalitarianism, a cry for proportionate distribution of wealth and power, and a call for participation in democratic processes, including governance, and access to economic opportunities. It is clear that the patience of those peoples, who had lived under repressive regimes for many years, had been tested to the maximum. Indeed, the social contract in those societies had broken

down irretrievably. The Arab Spring is a clear indication of how much the people of those countries yearn for freedom, democracy and other basic human rights (S/PV.6734 2012: 21)

The statement above is consistent with the ANC's internationalism (described in chapter three) that sees global politics as defined by the exploitation of the global South by the global North as well as the hope in liberal peace as the route to representation, prosperity and security for the poor peoples of the world.

Sangqu cited the first five volumes of the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report as his evidence for the underlying causes of the Arab Spring. Central to this was the high rate of youth unemployment and the demographic bulge of over 50 per cent of the population under 24. These demographic realities 'should have raised alarms in the Arab world. The fact that most if not all of the uprisings were initiated by young people should not be surprising' (S/PV.6734 2012: 22). This reflects South Africa's belief that security and development are fundamentally linked and cannot thrive in an environment of political repression. The statement is as applicable to the Arab context as to South Africa, which was dealing with its own youth unemployment challenges and increasing protests by 2012. In fact, much of the analysis Sangqu gave about the causes of the Arab Spring could be found in chapter two of South Africa's National Development Plan (2012: 98) that deals with the opportunities and threats posed by the 'demographic bulge' of having a relatively young population.

Sangqu continued:

Obviously, in today's rapidly globalising and integrated world, the turmoil in the Arab world does not only affect Arab peoples and is not limited to the Arab world...Given the umbilical cord that connects Africa to the Arab world, the African continent has been adversely affected as a result of the undesirable spill over effects of the Arab revolutions. In that regard, we humbly offer the following thoughts for consideration (S/PV.6734 2012: 22)

South Africa's thoughts were as follows. First, governments should respect the will of

their people and people of the Arab region should have the opportunity to determine their future. This could only happen in the context of inclusive political systems. Secondly, security and development are interlinked and more emphasis should be placed on the developmental challenges facing people in the Middle East. While the UNSC should not ‘usurp’ the mandates of other UN bodies, it should take into account social and developmental issues in its deliberations. Thirdly, the Council should strengthen its conflict prevention mechanisms including by strengthening the UN and regional organisations’ early warning systems. Fourthly the UNSC should encourage partnerships with the IFIs to address the developmental needs of post-conflict countries with national owned and context-specific interventions. Fifthly, reconciliation and transitional justice efforts in countries coming out of conflict should be prioritized. Related to this was the need to adhere by the rule of law. In dealing with all these challenges the UN needed to work with regional and subregional organisations, which had greater insights into the dynamics of a conflict. Lastly, Sangqu warned:

It is not in the interests of international peace and security for the international community, including the Security Council, to use the plight of the Arab peoples to pursue self-interest and execute regime change. As the United Nations, we should abide by the same international law of which we purport to be the master protagonists. Therefore, the United Nations itself and countries implementing its mandates should at all times adhere to international law’.

These six points capture South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution.

There was some tension between South Africa and Morocco in the meeting. Sangqu referred to unresolved ‘long-standing issues of human rights abuses and colonization’ including in Western Sahara and Palestine. This prompted a strong retort from the ambassador of Morocco who responded at the end of the meeting:

Earlier, a delegation thought it was a good idea to refer to a situation that has absolutely nothing to do with today’s debate. It made comparisons that are as baseless as they are inopportune. I intend neither to follow nor to entertain that attempt to disrupt our debate, much less to detract

from the positive message of support and encouragement that we hope will emerge from this high-level meeting. That is our goal and should be the goal of all delegations. I would like each and every one of them to adhere to that premise and to contribute in a positive manner (S/PV.6734 2012: 28)

As discussed in chapter six, Morocco's being on the Council at the same time as South Africa undermined the Republic's ability to be active on the issue of Western Sahara. As was argued in section 6.3.2 South Africa's tensions with Morocco in the UNSC demonstrates the difficulties the Republic faces in building a regional leadership role.

On 14 April 2012 the Council adopted resolution 2042, which authorized the deployment of thirty unarmed military observers to Syria as an advance monitoring team to monitor the six-point plan developed by Special Envoy Kofi Annan to end the conflict. Ambassador Sangqu strongly supported Annan's efforts and called on both sides of the conflict to fulfil their commitments in terms of the six-point plan. While expressing pleasure that the Council had managed to reach agreement to adopt the resolution, Sangqu called on the international community to respect Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity in addressing the crisis (S/PV.6751 2012: 8).

The next resolution on Syria, resolution 2043 was adopted on 21 April 2012. Russia drafted resolution 2043, which established the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), an unarmed force to supervise the implementation of Annan's peace plan. Russia warned against any deviation from the provisions in the resolution because the 'Libyan model should remain forever in the past'. France, the UK and the US offered measured support of the resolution in their statements, emphasizing the risk of deploying unarmed UN personnel in Syria. The US was especially negative, noting that 'all of our experience with United Nations peacekeeping over the last 65 years teaches us that such missions require that there be a peace to keep in order for them to succeed'. Ms Rice stated that the US was not guaranteed to agree to a renewal of the UNSMIS mandate:

Let me be plain: no one should assume that the United States will agree to renew this Mission at the end of 90 days. Yet let there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of all of us if the Al-Assad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people (S/PV.6756 2012: 9).

South Africa noted the success of the advance team established in terms of resolution 2042 and that, ‘despite some challenges, the advance team has enjoyed freedom of movement and has not observed major military concentrations or conflict’ (S/PV.6756 2012: 7). Sangqu stated that the advanced team had been ‘a calming influence’ that had led to a reduction of violence. He repeated the call for all parties to comply with ‘all aspects’ of Annan’s six-point proposal (S/PV.6756 2012: 7). South Africa welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2043 and the ‘expeditious deployment’ of UNSMIS. Sangqu urged both all parties to the conflict to assist UNSMIS’s effectiveness ‘by facilitating its work and guaranteeing the safety of its personnel’ (S/PV.6756 2012: 8). He concluded his statement with:

Finally, it is equally important that all members of the international community give this resolution and the Annan plan the chance to succeed, and that they uphold and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, as well as the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 19 July 2012 the Council voted for draft resolution S/2012/538, submitted by France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The draft failed because of vetoes from China and Russia. South Africa and Pakistan abstained (S/PV.6810 2012).

Mr Mashabane strongly condemned the violence and loss of life in Syria that had been going on for 16 months. He called on all sides to put down their arms, implement the six-point plan and start the process for political dialogue and a peaceful transition. Mashabane described the situation as reaching ‘the threshold of a civil war, in which all parties have responsibilities and obligations under international humanitarian law’ (S/PV.6810 2012: 11). He called for all parties to prioritise ending

killing and protecting civilians. In addition, the ‘volatile situation’ was ‘fertile ground’ for terrorist groups. Mashabane described the Annan six-point plan as ‘the only credible mechanism that could deliver a positive and realistic outcome’. Hence South Africa was disappointed that divisions in the Council had prevented it ‘from executing its responsibilities’ to resolve the conflict in Syria. Instead of engaging ‘in a spirit of compromise and mutual respect’, the Council members had failed to agree on a text for the resolution. He lamented:

Yet the common cause that we affirmed when we adopted resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) three months ago has not seemed to prevail. We should have shown the utmost maturity in strategically executing these crucial tasks, taking into account the realities of the situation on the ground. Instead, we allowed narrow interests to destroy our unity of purpose (S/PV.6810 2012: 11).

Mashabane expressed South Africa’s support for Annan’s call for the UNSC to send a strong message to all parties to the conflict that there would ‘be consequences for their non-compliance with its decisions’. However, the Republic did not agree that the draft resolution would end violence or resolve the conflict:

Instead, the text, in an unbalanced manner, threatens sanctions against the Government of Syria without realistically allowing any action to be taken against the opposition, which would be permitted to defy the six-point plan without consequence. In similar situations where the international community, including the Security Council, has preferred one side over the other, such bias has resulted in the polarization of the conflict. This is especially true for such fractious societies as Syria’s (S/PV.6810 2012: 12).

Mashabane argued that the Council’s failure to reach an agreement threatened the Annan plan and undermined the chance of resolving the Syrian crisis peacefully. He further expressed South Africa’s disappointment at the failure to renew the UNSMIS mandate as the UN force was ‘the only functional tool for verifying and corroborating information on the ground and supporting the Annan plan, as recommended by the Secretary-General’ (S/PV.6810 2012: 12). South Africa concurred with concerns



about the safety of observers but thought the mission should be allowed to do its work in whatever form ‘when conditions on the ground so permit’. South Africa was ‘deeply disappointed’ that the continuation of UNSMIS was threatened by divisions in the Council. The ambassador for Pakistan expressed similar sentiments to South Africa and proposed a technical rollover of the UNSMIS mandate as an interim measure until the Council resolved its differences. Mashabane expressed South Africa’s support for a technical rollover of UNSMIS for a short period.

The vote reflected the deep East/West divisions among the permanent members of the Council. The ambassadors of France, UK and US criticized the use of the veto in strong terms with the UK say it was ‘appalled’ at the veto and France accusing Russia of trying ‘to win time for the Syrian regime to crush the opposition’. As usual, Ms Rice of the US was the most strident in her criticism calling the veto ‘dangerous and deplorable’ (S/PV.6810 2012).

Russia argued that the vote should not have taken place because the sponsors of the draft resolution ‘were well aware that it simply stood no chance of being adopted’. China supported the extension of the UNSMIS mandate and stated the draft resolution contradicted aims to reach peaceful resolution in Syria. The Permanent Representative accused the West of showing ‘only arrogance, not sincerity, during the consultations’. China supported Pakistan and South Africa’s proposal to adopt a draft resolution on a technical rollover of the UNSMIS mandate (S/PV.6810 2012).

On 2 August 2012 Kofi Annan announced his resignation as Special Envoy. On 3 August 2012 the UNGA adopted a resolution criticizing the UNSC’s inability to act on the crisis in Syria and called for a political transition. 133-member states voted in favour, 12 against and there were 31 abstentions.

On 30 August 2012 France organized a high-level debate on the humanitarian situation in Syria, focusing on the refugee crisis. Ambassador Sangqu expressed South Africa’s condolences to families that had lost loved ones in the crisis. He urged the Council to ‘remain fully engaged in pursuing a sustainable political solution in

Syria' and lamented divisions within the Council that 'had rendered it irrelevant and unable to play a constructive role in fulfilling its Charter-mandated responsibilities to promote peace in the Syrian Arab Republic'. Sangqu called for the Council to deal with the crisis 'in a balanced manner' (S/PV.6826 2012: 26). He thanked Mr Annan for his leadership as Special Envoy and commended the role played by UNSMIS, 'under difficult circumstances' including 'the intransigence of the parties'. Sangqu warned that 'any tilting of the proverbial political scales in favour of one country or grouping of countries in the Middle East will certainly unleash a geopolitical crisis with the potential to further destabilize an already unstable and fragile region'. In that regard, he continued:

Perhaps it is appropriate, given the allegations being made that some are arming the opposition, to ask whether arming the opposition in Syria is not indirect military intervention. We contend that a military approach may be convenient in the short term, but it will surely expose the country's fault lines and result in unending civil strife, as we have witnessed in other situations where solutions of this nature were pursued without taking internal political dynamics and contexts into account.

In an indirect reference to Libya, Sangqu expressed South Africa's hope that humanitarian concerns would not be used as a pretext for regime change in Syria. Sangqu repeated reiterated that there were more than 2.5 million people in need of help and 1.2 million displaced. He described the situation as 'appalling'. Sangqu claimed that though many concerns about the humanitarian situation had been vocalized there was insufficient action to provide the resources necessary for humanitarian relief. He applauded the work of the UN in visiting Syria and engaging with Syrian authorities. Sangqu argued 'the cooperation of the Syrian authorities and the opposition in facilitating humanitarian access should also be acknowledged and encouraged'. South Africa was concerned that refugees were fleeing Syria to neighbouring countries with their own challenges and that refugees from other countries, like Somalia and Iraq, now had to flee Syria (S/PV.6826 2012: 27). Sangqu closed his statement by urging the Council that:

It is now crucial and ever more urgent that we set aside the differences between us that are predicated on narrow nationalistic interests and save

Syria and the region from total collapse. The international community, and the Security Council in particular, should work in a spirit of unity to find a solution to the situation in Syria before it is too late.

On 26 September 2012 the UNSC held a high-level meeting on peace and security in the Middle East, which was attended by foreign ministers of all the countries on the Council. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane represented the Council. The meeting was organised by Germany and focused on the situation in Syria and the challenge of reaching a settlement in the Israel-Palestine conflict. With regards Syria, the minister condemned the violence and argued:

Those assisting either party militarily are worsening the situation and prolonging the bloodshed. We call on those involved in such initiatives to refrain from them in assisting the efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table, in order to launch a credible Syrian-led and —owned political process that will lead to a legitimate transitional arrangement that is aimed at established a democratic, pluralistic society that meets the legitimate aspirations of all the Syrian people. The resolution of the conflict should also preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria (S/PV.6841 2012: 12).

She concluded by arguing that the Council's inability to deal with the situation in Palestine and Syria only 'underscores the need for Council reform'. In the absence of reform, it was essential for the Council to cooperate with regional organisations 'as the unreformed Council attempts to grapple with contemporary threats to international peace and security'. Russia's foreign minister referred to the BRICS joint statement adopted that day that 'objectively assesses the way out of the Syrian crisis' (S/PV.6841 2012: 13). The meeting culminated with the release of presidential statement S/PRST/2012/20.

The situation in Syria raised many challenges for South Africa regarding the role it sought to play in the UNSC. On one hand, the Republic aimed to project its role as a mediator, good international citizen and example by using its experience of political struggle followed by negotiated transition to influence the Council's approach towards conflict resolution in Syria. However, this approach was complicated by

realpolitik on the Council, which manifested in the P3 and P2 using their structural power against each other. The power play between the permanent members came to take precedence over the imperative to solve the humanitarian crisis in Syria. In an attempt to play the role of champion of the South, South Africa's response was to challenge the regime change agenda of the P3 and remain relatively silent on the support the P2 gave to Bashar Al-Assad's regime. Despite policymakers' claims to the contrary, this was not a principled stance in defence of the world's powerless. It was effectively enabling a cruel dictator to destroy his own people. Writing about Libya in April 2011, Adebajo (2011) cautioned African leaders to avoid 'a schizophrenic, ethical dead-end' in their refusal to support Libya intervention. South Africa entered such an 'ethical dead-end' on Syria, on one hand lamenting the humanitarian crisis and championing the human rights of ordinary Syrians, while on the other condemning Western attempts at intervention as regime change.

There is no doubt that the regime of Bashar Al-Assad is responsible for turning relatively peaceful protests into a disastrous civil war that led to the displacement of millions and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The UNSC has been unable to discharge its Charter mandate to respond to the horrific crimes perpetrated in Syria. The Council's intransigence has created space for the situation in Syria to worsen into a global disaster. At a lecture at the University of Pretoria on 24 February 2014 Deputy Minister Ebrahim (2014) acknowledged the 'huge human tragedy' in Syria and lamented 'the continued deadlock perpetuated by intransigency by all the parties in the UN-sponsored negotiations'. He blamed the UNSC for its 'failure to consistently support the mediation process, mainly because of the narrow self-interests of some countries'. Again Ebrahim (2014) referenced South Africa's transition as a model for Syria:

Taking a cue from our own history we know that in order for the solution in Syria to be sustainable it must be representative and therefore **no** party can or should be excluded from the peace process. The struggle against apartheid lasted decades and was declared a crime against humanity, nonetheless the transition and the new constitution was negotiated between the liberation movements and the government of the day who were the perpetrators of apartheid. The

lesson here is that a lasting solution must be rooted in an all-inclusive process. This is especially important in diverse and polarised societies... If trust is not the basis of the talks no agreement will be reached neither will it be sustainable.

Another lesson from our own transition that is applicable to Syria is that discouraging developments should not be the end of negotiations nor of hope... However, it would appear that the various sides in Syria still hold out hope for a military solution to the conflict, which implies that they are not fully committed to the establishment of a transitional government leading to a new dispensation in Syria.

In our negotiating process all the parties took ownership of the process and as a result they also took ownership of the outcome. Today, no one can turn around and say that end result of the many years of talks, namely the South African constitution, is not mine. All South Africans, regardless of where they find themselves on the political spectrum know that solution reached is homegrown and therefore ours!

Ebrahim's (2014) comments on Syria reveal the extent to which South African policymakers' role conception of the Republic as an example shapes their image of other world conflicts no matter how different the context. While there were some similarities between the two situations, South Africa never descended into a full civil war under Apartheid. Pretoria's inability to communicate about Syria beyond the narrow frame of the South African experience undermined any chance they may have had to substantially influence the Syria discussion in the UNSC. In the event, the opportunities for South Africa to exert influence in such a critical security issue were minimal. As a middle power within the power structure of the UNSC, South Africa could only play the role of lieutenant for the P5 or assert its non-alignment. While it tried at different points to play both roles, it ultimately played the role of lieutenant to the P2, especially Russia by abstaining on draft resolution S/2011/612 and criticising the Western powers.

## 7.2.2 Post-conflict peacebuilding

Post-conflict peacebuilding is defined as ‘actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation’ (Annan 1998). As the UN deployed a greater number of peacekeeping operations to conflict zones, there was a growing awareness of the need to assist countries emerging out of conflict towards stability, reintegration and reconstruction. The 2005 World Summit resolved to establish ‘a dedicated institutional mechanism’ for ‘a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation’ (A/RES/60/1 2005: 24). The result was the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, which was established by resolutions in both the UNSC (S/RES/1645) and the UNGA (A/RES/60/180); the first time this occurred in the history of the UN. The Peacebuilding Architecture is composed of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBC is an ‘intergovernmental advisory body’ meant to provide advice and coordinate activities of major stakeholders on peacebuilding. The PBC Organisational Committee has a total of 31 members: seven members each from the UNSC, UNGA and ECOSOC, as well as the five top donor countries and the five-top troop-contributors to the UN. This composition is meant to encourage a holistic view of peacebuilding and enable better coordination between the UNSC, UNGA and ECOSOC on peacebuilding issues.

South Africa contributed actively to the establishment of the Peacebuilding Architecture. In 2007 and 2008, South Africa served as one of the UNSC’s seven members on the PBC’s organisational committee. The Republic also contributed to the PBC in its capacity as the facilitator of the Burundi peace process because Burundi was one of the first two country-specific configurations. In 2010, Ambassador Sangqu served on the five-year review committee of the PBC, with the permanent representatives of Ireland and Mexico (S/2010/393). This was an important acknowledgement of South Africa’s roles as a multilateral manager and regional leader within the UN. The panel found that five years after the PBC was established the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized’. Among the problems identified by the panel were the lack of national ownership in peacebuilding efforts, difficulties in sustainable resource mobilisation, the exclusion

of women in decision-making and the need for greater connection between the PBC in New York and field missions. The panel expressed its hope that its review would ‘serve as a wake-up call, helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way’ (A/64/868 and S/2010/393). During its second term in the UNSC, South Africa continued to promote the recommendations of the review panel.

South Africa’s first meeting on post-conflict peacebuilding was on 21 January 2011 and focused on institution building in post-conflict countries. Ambassador Sangqu associated South Africa with statement given by the Egyptian ambassador on behalf of NAM. This indicates that Pretoria’s approach to this issue was explicitly in line with the global South members of the UN. Sangqu drew on South Africa’s experience as a mediator to make his recommendations. He emphasised the necessity for national ownership and building local capacities. In this regard:

South Africa has played a significant part in post-conflict capacity- and institution-building in Africa through multilateral, bilateral and trilateral mechanisms, in such countries as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, among others. On behalf of the African Union (AU), South Africa continues to lead the committee on post-conflict reconstruction and development in the Sudan, whose role is expected to become even more critical in the post-referendum phase, especially in Southern Sudan (S/PV.6472 2011: 11).

This statement highlights South Africa’s roles as a regional leader, mediator and example. Sangqu said South Africa was ‘encouraged’ by the progress made in institutionalising the relationship between the PBC and the African Union. He urged the Council to consider revising its working methods to allow greater cooperation with the PBC, especially in the design of peacekeeping mandates that increasingly included peacebuilding tasks. As discussed in chapter six this was further expounded in the debates on the working methods of the UNSC.

On 23 March 2011 the PBC presented its report to the UNSC. Mr Mashabane suggested the PBC could improve its reporting by focusing on better coordination of

peacebuilding initiatives among various stakeholders, the role of women and civil society, enhancing cooperation and information-sharing, the role of regional authorities and the PBC's partnership with the IFIs. Linked to the latter point was the need for greater cooperation between the PBC and the PBF 'in ascertaining how countries emerging from conflict can be assisted financially in accordance with their priorities and national vision' (S/PV.6503 2011: 14). This was consistent with South Africa's view that donors be guided by the local context in their provision of assistance instead of imposing externally derived solutions to post-conflict challenges.

The senior advisory group on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict presented its report to the UNSC on 12 May 2011. This group was mandated to investigate how to provide the civilian skills needed in conflict-affected areas to build lasting peace. In his response to the report, Ambassador Sangqu emphasised the need to use national capacities and building partnerships, especially with regional organisations. He argued:

National capacities are central, and not just an appendage in post-conflict reconstruction. The failure to tap into capacities that are already in place, or to nurture and strengthen such capacities where they are lacking, will create a dangerous dependency syndrome, which will continue to stretch the meagre resources of the international community (S/PV.6533 2011: 11).

South Africa had already begun 'capacity-building programmes for countries emerging from conflict'. He cited the examples of Burundi and South Sudan, where Pretoria had contributed to the training of over 1500 officials of the new government. In an example of playing the role of a bridge South Africa had also 'entered into a triangular partnership with Germany, to provide training in South Sudan on correctional, judicial and legal services' (S/PV.6533 2011: 12). Sangqu emphasised the need for 'predictable, flexible and sustainable sources of funding' to ensure the development of civilian capacities was successful.

On 31 October 2011, the UNSC received briefings from the peacebuilding support office and the chairperson of the peacebuilding configuration for Guinea. Mr



Mashabane encouraged greater cooperation between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, and ‘noted with appreciation the World Bank’s fragile States hub established in Nairobi’ (S/PV.6643 2011: 9). In relation to Africa, South Africa encouraged greater cooperation with the AU, regional economic communities and the African Development Bank. He made suggestions for the way peacebuilding should operate in future:

In the long term, it is our belief that all United Nations peacekeeping missions should have some peacebuilding elements. Based on our past experience, South Africa is conscious of the centrality of women as peacemakers and facilitators in political processes and peacebuilding initiatives, particularly at the grass-roots level. Women at all levels of society have a role to play in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. An important dimension in advancing peace and preventing conflict is to ensure greater and more equitable economic justice and development.

South Africa’s final meeting on peacebuilding in the Council was on 12 July 2012. Mr Mashabane used the opportunity to provide his country’s response to the questions: ‘what is the added value of the PBC... What is the relevance of the PBC... and what is the role of the PBC?’ (S/PV.6805 2012: 21). In response to the first question, South Africa’s view was that:

it cannot be an over-exaggeration to purport that without the efforts of the PBC in the countries on its agenda, the situation would have been different to what it is currently, that is, that we could have seen those countries relapse into conflict.

However, the PBC had not reached its full potential because ‘all six countries on its agenda recently witnessed a reversal in their democratic processes’. The worst case was Guinea-Bissau whose government had been overthrown in a coup. In the process of ‘sharpening the tools’ of the PBC it would be best to differentiating between peacebuilding as an idea and the structure of the PBC as an institution. Mashabane made extensive reference to the 2010 review report, which South Africa had co-led. He reiterated the country’s commitment to the PBC because:

Africa has benefitted from the efforts of the PBC. We want to see a more robust, agile and resourced body that will help the continent avert conflict and consolidate fragile peace where it is created (S/PV.6805 2012: 23).

As part of the PBC review committee in 2010 and in its involvement in peacebuilding operations all over the continent, post-conflict peacebuilding is one of the areas in which South Africa developed technical expertise and experience to influence discussions in the UNSC. The statements discussed above demonstrate how Pretoria used its experiences to try move the Council away from externally imposed models of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (Paris 2002) towards a context-specific approach (Zondi 2017). However, given its attachment to sovereignty, democratic elections and unity governments, South Africa’s proposals were reforms rather than a transformation of the whole peacebuilding approach. This is consistent with the Jordaan’s (2003) argument that emerging middle powers are reformist and not revisionist powers. Another review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture took place in 2015. The Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture criticised the fact that ‘peacebuilding is left as an afterthought: underprioritised, underresourced and undertaken only after the guns fall silent’ (A/69/968 and S/2015/490). The expert panel recommended that sustaining peace should ‘be the principle that flows through all’ the UN’s engagements.

### **7.3 African Agenda**

South Africa continued its effort to play the role of regional leader in relation to African conflicts on the UNSC agenda. As was discussed in chapter six, the Libya intervention had devastating consequences for peace and security in the Sahel. During 2011 and 2012, civil war broke out in Mali and there was a rise in terrorist activity in West Africa. One of the major contributors to growing insecurity was the proliferation of arms from Libya after Gaddafi’s fall. The optimism accompanying the referendum on the independence of South Sudan in January soured with the re-emergence of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan later in 2011. Disputes between neighbouring African countries, Eritrea and Ethiopia, resulted in a fraught UNSC

debate in which South Africa and the two other African members found themselves on opposing sides. One of the successes of South Africa's second term was continuing the debate on closer cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC, which culminated in the passage of resolution 2033. This section examines the debates on the country-specific situations in Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire and Eritrea, as well as the thematic debate on the relationship between the UN and AU.

### 7.3.1 The situation in Sudan

Several matters related to Sudan were on the Council agenda in 2011 and 2012 including South Sudan independence; the Darfur peace process' on-going conflict in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces; and the ICC prosecutions for crimes in Darfur. South Africa joined the Council as preparations were underway for the referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan, which was held from 9 to 15 January 2011. The UK was the lead country on Darfur and the US was the lead on issues related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan. As it did in its first term in the UNSC, South Africa advocated the Council to allow the AU take the lead in mediating the various conflicts in Sudan. Specifically, South Africa promoted the work of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for the Sudan chaired by former president Thabo Mbeki. It also continued supporting UNAMID. By 2011, South Africa was one of 32 troop contributing countries to the mission with 781 troops, 154,154 police and 12 experts stationed in Darfur. Issues relating to Sudan played an important part in South Africa's diplomacy on closer cooperation between the UN and the AU in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN charter. It played the roles of regional leader and bridge to achieve its goals. First this section discusses the issues on the CPA and relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Thereafter it examines the issues related to Darfur and UNAMID on the Council agenda.

#### *Sudan and South Sudan*

The Council's first meeting in 2011 on the situation in the Sudan took place on 18 January when Mr Haile Menkerios Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sudan and Mr Benjamin Mkapa Chairperson of the Secretary-General's Panel on the Referendum in the Sudan briefed the Council on the recently concluded

referendum. Ambassador Sangqu's statement illustrates the roles of regional leader, mediator and example that South Africa played in relation to Sudan.

As a regional leader, Sangqu highlighted South Africa's interest in the referendum, in which 35 South Africans were involved as part of the 110-member AU observer mission. He paid tribute to the citizens of Southern Sudan who 'exercised their right to vote and to determine their future during the referendum on self-determination' (S/PV.6468 2011: 9). The success of their efforts was evident in the preliminary statements of the AU observer mission, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Mr Mkapa confirming that the referendum was free and fair. Sangqu urged all parties to maintain 'the peace and calm that characterized the referendum process' and urged compliance with the rule of law, particularly the Referendum Act and the timelines it set out. He commended 'the personal leadership and courage shown by President Al-Bashir and First Vice-President Salva Kiir Mayardit' in creating a peaceful environment for the referendum to take place'. He also welcomed their commitment to respect the referendum outcome.

Sangqu emphasised that the referendum was not an end in itself but a stepping-stone 'to sustainable peace, stability and development' and urged the international community to maintain its focus on the many challenges facing Sudan. In this regard, the work of Mbeki's AUHIP would play 'an important facilitation role in finding mutually agreed outcomes to post-referendum issues' (S/PV.6468 2011: 9). Sangqu encouraged the parties to continue cooperation with the panel. This was particularly important in light of the violence in Abyei province. He stated that the violent incidents highlighted the 'urgency and importance of concluding the political negotiation on Abyei, as facilitated by the AU Panel'. In all subsequent debates on Sudan issues, South Africa emphasized the role of the AUHIP over and above other international mediation efforts.

With regards mediation, Sangqu emphasised the need for mediation in Abyei and in Darfur. Although he did not explicitly describe it thus, the model of mediation he promoted was based on South Africa's model of all-inclusive talks, comprehensive

negotiated settlement and government of national unity. On Darfur, he expressed concern at the slow progress in the Doha negotiations and encouraged the Government of Sudan and opposition groups, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), to dedicate their efforts to finding a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the conflict in Darfur. In particular he urged the parties to seriously consider the proposals of the mediators and encouraged ‘the launching of the inclusive political process’ in the form of a conference with ‘the objective of reaching a global political agreement, as soon as conditions allow’. In terms of the North-South issues, Sangqu’s statement that he was ‘impressed by the call made by First Vice-President Salva Kiir for forgiveness and reconciliation, and for his security forces to protect the citizens of the North and their property in the South’ evoked the example of Nelson Mandela and his promotion of reconciliation and forgiveness in South Africa (S/PV. 6468 2011: 10).

The Council met on 9 February 2011 to discuss the final results of the referendum. Ambassador Sangqu continued his role as regional leader by emphasizing national ownership of the CPA, South Africa’s contribution to Southern Sudan and the role of the AU in achieving peace in Sudan. The final results of the referendum were 98.83 per cent in favour of secession. Sangqu stated that the successful referendum ‘demonstrated that national ownership accompanied by the support of the international community’ was essential for the full implementation of the CPA (S/PV.6478 2011: 16). He stated his encouragement at the commitment of the parties to the CPA to the speedy resolution of outstanding issues like Abyei. South Africa would ‘continue with the projects that it has launched’ since the CPA was signed and would ‘support, where necessary, ongoing peace and good neighbourliness between North Sudan and South Sudan’.

Sangqu referenced the AU’s initiatives— the AU summit ‘solemn declaration’ on Sudan, the AU HIP and the AU intervention in Darfur— seven times in his statement, highlighting the centrality of the region to resolving the conflicts in the Sudan. He used the uplifting rhetoric of continental unity and development to paint the achievement of peace in Sudan as a vital piece of the broader project of African

renaissance. The AU summit's 'solemn declaration' on the Sudan highlighted the colonial origins of Sudan's present challenges and the role played by the country's current leaders in granting the right of self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan. The AU 'welcomed equally North and South Sudan and the emerging post-referendum situation as building blocks for the ongoing project of African integration' (S/PV.6478 2011: 17). He expressed hope that the Sudanese people could 'fully participate as effective actors and beneficiaries in the common African endeavour of shared prosperity and continental unity'.

In his statement as head of the AUHIP, Thabo Mbeki, said:

We trust that the Council will also continue its invaluable assistance to the Sudanese people as they take their country through the momentous few months ahead of us. In addition, we are very pleased that African stands ready to assist the two African States that will emerge after 9 July as they confront the even greater challenges of nation-building than those they face today (S/PV.6478 2011: 5).

Mbeki expressed his hope that the Council would 'use its influence to encourage the rest of the international community to help'. In an uncharacteristically cooperative statement US Permanent Representative, Sudan Rice, called 'special attention to the African Union's intention to recognize the referendum's outcome and its call on all States to do likewise'. Rice's statement suggested that the US was willing to take the lead from the AU in addressing issues in Sudan (S/PV.6478 2011: 12). However, it will be seen later in this chapter that there were still significant differences between the P3 and Africa about how to resolve the conflict in Darfur.

Between February and June 2011, the situation in Sudan deteriorated with conflict intensifying between North and South Sudan over the status of Abyei province; conflict between opposing groups of South Sudanese; and the stalling of the peace process in Darfur. The Council held several private meetings and briefings on the Sudan in this time. In May 2011, the AU mandated Thabo Mbeki to mediate the situation in Abyei. When the Council's mission to Africa visited Sudan on 22 May 2011 they were unable to visit Abyei because it had been taken over by the Sudanese

Armed Forces. Instead they met with Mbeki in Khartoum to discuss how to resolve the situation. The Council received a briefing from Mbeki and Menkerios about Abyei, post-referendum issues and Southern Kordofan on 20 June 2011. Mbeki informed the Council that the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) had signed an agreement on Abyei. He commended the agreement and asked the Council to consider it very soon to allow for quick demilitarization of Abyei and the return of displaced people. He also spoke of the AUHIP's work in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. He told the Council that negotiations on post-referendum arrangements were continuing and the AUHIP aimed to conclude them by end of June so there would be clarity by beginning July (S/PV.6559 2011: 2).

In his statement, Mr Mashabane, welcomed the agreement reached on Abyei and congratulated Mbeki and Menkerios for their 'outstanding and sterling work'. He further commended the Ethiopian government's agreement to contribute troops to implement the security arrangement. The rest of the statement expressed South Africa's concerns about the various aspects of the deteriorating security situation and the lack of progress in finalizing the post-referendum negotiations and implementing the rest of the CPA. Mashabane reiterated the call made by the extraordinary session of the AU on the parties of the CPA 'to spare no effort to overcome the current difficulties... under the auspices of the AU High-level Implementation Panel on Sudan' (S/PV.6559 2011: 12). The statement indicated the extent to which South Africa took responsibility for the resolution of the situation between the North and South.

On Abyei, Mashabane pledged that 'South Africa will do everything it can to assist in and ensure the full implementation' of the agreement. He closed the statement by stating:

South Africa stands ready to support the two parties in constructing two viable, independent States in the Sudan and in building a mutually beneficial relationship between them based on peace and development. In this regard, we call on the international community to continue its

support to the parties as they address the critical challenges confronting them (S/PV.6559 2011: 13).

On 27 June the Council established the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). The governments of Sudan and Southern Sudan finalised an agreement on border security and a joint political and security mechanism on 29 June. Thus, preparing the way for South Sudan independence on 12 July. In a signal that it considered the core issues in the CPA resolved, on 11 July the Council adopted resolution 1997 to withdraw the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) by the end of August 2011.

On 13 July 2011 the UNSC met to officially welcome South Sudan as an independent state. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jeff Radebe represented South Africa. At the meeting the Council recommended that South Sudan be admitted as the 193<sup>rd</sup> member of the UN, which the General Assembly did on 14 July 2011. Radebe drew parallels between South Sudan's struggle for independence and the South African liberation struggle by saying:

For years, the people of South Africa, on the basis of our own history, have identified with the aspirations and desire of the people of South Sudan for independence, freedom, justice and self-determination (S/PV.6583 2011: 9).

Radebe informed the Council that South Africa had recognised the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011. Pretoria hoped that the new country would serve as inspiration 'to the millions of oppressed peoples across the globe who continue to suffer under occupation and colonialism'. Radebe illustrated South Africa's regional leadership and interest in influencing the situation in South Sudan by committing to assisting 'with all the means at our disposal in building on the technical capacity-building programs of the past five years'. He emphasised that both Sudans could count on Pretoria's support.

South Sudan was one of the cases of coordination between the IBSA countries, which all served on the Council in 2011. Radebe mentioned that India, Brazil and South



Africa had committed to supporting development efforts in the Sudan and South Sudan through the IBSA Poverty Alleviation Fund. Both the Indian and Brazilian representatives mentioned this project in their statements. An emerging middle power coalition providing humanitarian and development aid to the world's newest country is an example of the potential for a reconfigured world order. Brazil's ambassador went further in her expression of solidarity by commending the AU as 'an example of political coordination and integration that offers important lessons to other areas of the world' (S/PV.6583 2011: 8). She said that South American countries were paying attention to the African example as a model for their own regional organization. This is a strong statement of South-South solidarity and an important validation of South Africa's agenda in the UNSC from one of its closest South allies.

By January 2012, the two Sudans were involved in a dispute over oil sales and conflict had flared up along the border. On 6 March 2012 the Council issued a presidential statement demanding that Sudan and South Sudanese violence in the border regions and settle unresolved issues from the CPA (S/PRST/2012/5). Another presidential statement on 12 April 2012 called for 'a complete, immediate, and unconditional end' to violence between Sudan and South Sudan (S/PRST/2012/12). On 24 April 2012 the AUPSC adopted a 'roadmap' calling for, inter alia, immediate cessation of hostilities between the two parties within 48 hours, unconditional withdrawal of each side's armed forces to their side of the border and activation of the previously agreed border security mechanisms. It further urged the parties to unconditionally return to negotiations under the auspices of AUHIP. The communiqué contained strict timelines for its provisions to be met and requested the UNSC's support 'and its endorsement, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, of the Roadmap' (PSC/MIN/COMM/3. [CCCXIX]).

The Council met on 2 May 2012 to discuss draft resolution S/2012/279 sponsored by France, Germany, South Africa, Togo, the UK and the US, which was adopted unanimously as resolution 2046. The resolution endorsed the AUPSC's road map for peace between Sudan and South Sudan. Ambassador Sangqu expressed South Africa's concern at the escalation of conflict between the two Sudans that was at 'the

brink of war'. He reiterated that there was no military solution to the conflict and what was required was 'political will on the part of the parties to complete negotiations and commit to the realization of two viable States living in peace and each respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other' (S/PV.6764 2012: 4). He referred to the AUPSC communiqué that provided 'a clear road map' to address the conflict. The AUPSC had called on the UNSC to endorse the road map under chapter VII in order to ensure that the parties 'would commit to the processes and agreements' they had already agreed to. South Africa was pleased that the Council had adopted resolution 2046 unanimously and hoped that this endorsement would 'add momentum to the AU's effort'.

Sangqu urged the South Sudan and Sudan governments 'to seize the opportunity and fully comply' with their obligations under the AU road map so that they would fulfil their commitment to never return to war. A senior DIRCO official highlighted resolution 2046 as a success in South Africa's goal of closer cooperation between the UN and AU because it was a case when the UNSC had adopted, in full, a decision of the AU PSC.

#### *UNAMID*

While the ultimate goal of the CPA had been achieved with South Sudan's independence, the other major Sudanese issue, Darfur, continued to present challenges for the UNSC. On 29 July 2011, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2003 extending UNAMID for another year. The resolution was contentious because the P3 and African members could not agree on a timeline for the Darfur peace process. The Western countries advocated the creation of a 'conducive' environment of an end to fighting as a precondition to negotiations on peace. The AU sought to start the Darfur political process quickly, arguing that it was unrealistic to expect fighting to end before a peace deal had been negotiated.

In its statement after the adoption of resolution 2003, South Africa criticised the UNSC for not taking the AU seriously as a partner in UNAMID and the broader project of conflict resolution in Darfur. Ambassador Sangqu began his statement by describing the presence of UNAMID in Darfur as 'crucial' because its mandate

included facilitating the Darfur peace process and protecting civilians. He mentioned South Africa's contribution of troops and police to UNAMID as evidence for the Republic's support to the mission. He said South Africa had voted for resolution 2003 because it contributed to the search for lasting peace in Darfur. However, the Republic was concerned by the UNSC's reluctance to support the AUHIP's efforts to launch the political process in Darfur as soon as possible.

Sangqu argued that waiting for the creation of an enabling environment as a precondition to launching the political process 'would essentially hand a veto to any potential spoilers to the process' (S/PV.6597 2011: 3). The AU PSC had, unsuccessfully, 'appealed' to the UNSC to consider its proposal and reflect it in the resolution on the mandate renewal of UNAMID. Sangqu reminded the Council that UNAMID was a hybrid operation and a partnership between the UN and the AU. It was therefore 'critically important that both organizations value each other's contribution to the success of the mission'. South Africa was 'therefore disappointed by the timid and qualified support for the AU's request for the commencement of a Darfur-based political process'. Sangqu asserted South Africa's regional leadership by saying:

Given the proximity to and sustained involvement of Africans in resolving the conflict in Darfur, the international community would do well to heed Africa's call and support the efforts of the African Union on the Darfur political process. We reiterate the importance and pre-eminence of Africa's leadership in solving African problems. After all, that is in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter as expressed in its Chapter VIII. Failure to implement the Darfur peace process in a timely manner would have a devastating effect by delaying peace further, condemning the people of Darfur to untold suffering (S/PV.6597 2011: 3).

The representatives of Nigeria and Gabon gave similar statements, specifically challenging paragraph 7 of the resolution with its wording on preconditions for the peace process. This was an obvious case of the African states in the Council taking a common position based on a decision of the AU. While China and Russia supported

the AU's position, the US statement reasserted the supremacy of the UNSC in the final determination of whether enabling conditions for a political process in Darfur had been met. The US position appears to be a backlash against the practice of regular engagement between the AU and the UN that started during South Africa's first term in the UNSC. As will be seen in section 7.3.4 the relationship between the AUPSC and UNSC had deepened and there were growing calls for more equal power sharing between the two institutions. The US resisted these calls as undermining UN Charter provisions for the UNSC to take ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

On 5 June 2012, the ICC prosecutor Mr Moreno-Ocampo gave his final briefing on the Sudan to the UNSC. He spoke about the difficulties his office experienced in arresting those it had indicted. He suggested that the Council consider mandating member states and regional organizations to implement the indictments of Sudanese officials. Speaking on behalf of South Africa, Mr Mashabane reiterated the Republic's commitment to the Rome Statute and its support of a two-track approach to the situation in Darfur that included both judicial accountability and a political peace process. He again called on the Council to support the AU and UN facilitation framework for the Darfur peace process. Mashabane warned against the possibility raised in Moreno-Ocampo's report that UNAMID could act as an enforcement tool for the ICC arrest warrants. This would be inconsistent with the mission's mandate and would negatively affect its credibility (S/PV.6778 2012: 10).

He reminded the Council that the scope of the referral resolution 1593 limited the responsibility of states to cooperate with the ICC in order 'to accommodate the interests of some permanent members of the Council that have misgivings about the ICC'. It was therefore unlikely to adopt another resolution requiring all Member States to enforce the arrest warrants. Moreover, regional organizations were neither party to the UN Charter nor to the Rome Statute so it was 'difficult for us to conceive the legal possibility of obliging regional organizations to enforce arrest warrants issued by the ICC'. South Africa also opposed the suggestion that regional security arrangements be activated to enforce the arrest warrants, as this would be 'a

dangerous proposal that could add fuel to an already volatile situation’ (S/PV.6778 2012: 11). The meeting ended with a heated exchange between the prosecutor and the representative of Sudan, which illustrated how much the ICC’s investigation had become personalised as a battle between the prosecutor and individual Sudanese leaders.

The final briefing of the ICC on the Sudan during South Africa’s term was on 13 December 2012. This was new ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s first briefing to the Council on the investigation on Darfur. Speaking on behalf of South Africa, Dr Dire Tladi, reiterated South Africa’s view of the dual purpose of the ICC to punish international crimes and to promote peace and security. He expressed concern at the deaths of UNAMID peacekeepers and the widespread incidents of sexual and gender-based violence targeting especially women and children. With regards the arrest warrants on Sudanese officials, Tladi argued that ‘the problem of impunity in situations referred to the ICC by the Security Council goes much deeper and is more systemic than just non-cooperation by individual countries’ (S/PV.6997 2012: 9). In South Africa’s view, the Court was ‘caught in the crossfire of the political dynamics of the Security Council’, which meant that referral resolutions were written in a ‘skewed manner’ to allow some Council members to reserve ‘for themselves the right not to cooperate with the Court’. Tladi suggested that the only the way the ICC could execute its mandate was for the Council to that all Member States of the UN cooperate with the Court including the permanent members of the Council. South Africa was convinced that the Prosecutor’s call for cooperation would ultimately only ‘be realized only when the Council stops seeing referrals as an end in themselves’ (S/PV.6997 2012: 10).

South Africa successfully asserted itself as an emerging middle power on all the Sudan and South Sudan issues in the second term in the UNSC. Specifically, with regards to South Sudan’s independence and the residual conflict areas with Sudan, South Africa acted as a regional leader by guiding UNSC deliberations on these issues. The Republic’s UN mission was assisted in this regard by former president Thabo Mbeki’s chairing of the AUHIP for the Sudan. South Africa was able to

leverage off its specialised knowledge of the situation to significantly influence the UNSC's approach to the conflicts between the Sudans. With regards UNAMID, South Africa played the roles of regional leader and mediator by continuing to contribute troops, police and civilian experts to the hybrid mission. This enabled a practical application of the Chapter VIII agenda of closer cooperation between the UN and AU. South Africa's successful diplomacy on Sudan is an excellent illustration of Adebajo's (2006) argument that as an elected member, the Republic's greatest competitive advantage was to play the role of an African leader on African issues.

### 7.3.2 The situation in Cote d'Ivoire

Cote d'Ivoire was one of the cases where differences between South Africa and Nigeria influenced African unity on the Council. It also illustrated the contestation over South Africa's attempts to play the role of regional leader. UN peacekeepers were first deployed to Côte d'Ivoire to monitor the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussi Agreement of 24 January 2003 to resolve political unrest after an attempted military coup. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was tasked with protecting civilians (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Conflict worsened in 2004 leading to the AU's appointment of then President Mbeki as a mediator. Mbeki resigned after ten months because the mediations made little progress. The rebels accused Mbeki of being biased towards President Gbagbo and seeing his role as the restoration of Gbagbo's authority as the legitimate leader of the country. Others accused Mbeki of being anti-French as well as not cooperating sufficiently with regional actors like ECOWAS (Miti 2012). Conflict reignited over a dispute about the rightful winner of the 28 November 2010 presidential run-off election between incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger Alassane Ouattara.

On 2 December 2010 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOCI, Choi Young-jin briefed the UNSC about the elections and the Council issued a press statement noting Choi's briefing and welcoming the election (SCR 7 December 2010). Later on the same day, the head of the electoral commission declared Ouattara the victor with 54 per cent of the vote to Gbagbo's 46 per cent. However on 3 December 2010 the chairman of the Constitutional Council tasked with

validating election results, announced Gbagbo had won 51 per cent of the vote (Youant 2010). On the same day, Choi, in line with his Security Council mandate in resolution 1765 certified the results recognising Ouattara as the winner. On 4 December 2010 both Ouattara and Gbagbo were sworn into office in separate ceremonies. The UN, EU, US and France all recognised Ouattara as the new president and condemned Gbagbo's refusal to concede power (SCR 7 December 2010).

South Africa announced that it would state its position on the outcome of the election after the AUPSC had met to deliberate on the issue (DIRCO 4 December 2010). ECOWAS recognised Ouattara on 7 December 2010 and suspended Côte d'Ivoire's membership until Gbagbo had ceded power. The AUPSC endorsed the ECOWAS decision on 9 December 2010. The UNSC also endorsed ECOWAS' recognition of Ouattara. DIRCO (9 December 2010) released a statement announcing that 'having taken note' of the communiqués of the AUPSC and ECOWAS heads of state meeting, respectively: 'The South African Government urges President Laurent Gbagbo to respect and abide by the declarations issued by these Regional bodies with regard to the second round of elections in Côte d'Ivoire'. Pretoria called for 'restraint' and for Ivorian leaders 'to promote national reconciliation and unity'. However, the statement did not explicitly endorse Ouattara's election.

The AU deployed former President Mbeki to mediate the dispute between the two presidential candidates (Mail and Guardian 5 December 2010). Mediation efforts failed and violence worsened in the course of December 2010 and January 2011. ECOWAS states wanted to take tough measures against Gbagbo including sanctions and possible military intervention. South Africa equivocated and tentatively supported Gbagbo's call for a recount of the vote. On 28 January 2011 the AUPSC appointed a high-level panel for Cote d'Ivoire composed of the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, South Africa, Tanzania, the AU Chairperson and the president of the ECOWAS commission. China, Russia and South Africa tried to get the Council to explicitly welcome the AUPSC panel but France, the UK, Germany and the US were warier of giving the panel unreserved support (SCR 14 January 2011). The compromise was the release of a presidential statement (S/10149) acknowledging the

relevant decisions by the AUPSC. Statements from officials show that South Africa resented the influence France continued to have over Cote d'Ivoire as a former colony. However this sentiment was not shared by other African states, especially Nigeria and Gabon that also served on the Council.

South Africa was criticized for not following ECOWAS' lead in recognizing Ouattara as the legitimate winner of the November election. Critics said Pretoria's defending Gbagbo's refusal to cede office was a violation of the sub-regional and AU positions. When a South African warship was seen on the coast of Cote d'Ivoire on 8 February 2011 it was interpreted as a signal of support to keep Gbagbo in power. The president of the ECOWAS commission, James Victor Gbeho, was quoted saying 'as we talk now there is a South African warship docked in Côte d'Ivoire. Now actions such as that complicate the matter further' (News24 8 February 2011). Pretoria denied the accusations from ECOWAS and claimed that the ship was deployed as part of 'a routine training cruise' (News24 8 February 2011). The incident worsened tensions between South African and ECOWAS. On 10 March 2011 the AU confirmed its support for Ouattara as the legitimate leader of Cote d'Ivoire. ECOWAS, represented by Nigeria in the UNSC, sought the Council to pass a resolution enabling UNOCI to 'use all necessary means' to protect civilians and property and enable Ouattara to take office.

The Council stopped short of this by extending sanctions on Gbagbo through resolution 1975, which was adopted unanimously. In his statement on South Africa's position, Ambassador Sangqu stated that South Africa believed the AU, ECOWAS and the UN must persist in their quest to find a peaceful political solution to the current crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which is now rapidly slipping into civil war'. He referred to the AU's recognition of Ouattara as the President of Cote d'Ivoire and said South Africa had voted for resolution 1975 because it was 'fully in line' with the AU road map. South Africa later played the role of example by advising the new government of Cote d'Ivoire to adopt a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to promote national reconciliation.



South Africa's delayed recognition of Alassane Ouattara led to criticism on its credentials as a good international citizen and as a regional power. Pretoria was seen to be protecting Gbagbo's illegitimate power grab, condoning human rights abuses and ignoring the democratic will of the Ivorian people. This undermined its role as a good international citizen. As a regional power that promotes the rhetoric of African solutions to African problems, Pretoria was criticised for not taking ECOWAS' lead of recognising Ouattara. ECOWAS Commission president, Gbeho, expressed ECOWAS' concern that 'apparently because of certain geopolitical interests, some countries are keen on awarding a failure mark to ECOWAS at this stage so that they themselves would shine' (News24 8 February 2011). This indicates the level of suspicion of South Africa's motives among West African states.

Interestingly, South African policymakers and officials use similar language of geopolitical manipulation to describe ECOWAS' support of Ouattara. On 9 March 2018, I attended a closed consultation about South Africa's planned bid for a third term in the UNSC (2019-2020) at DIRCO. Speaking about Côte d'Ivoire's 2010 election, a senior official implied that ECOWAS and the UN were manipulated into supporting Ouattara by France's neo-colonial machinations (DIRCO 2018). South Africa's concerns about French interference in the election outcome were downplayed by other African leaders and isolated the Republic in continental decision-making forums. The contestation with Nigeria on how to address the Côte d'Ivoire crisis played out in the UNSC creating unnecessary division within the African group on the Council. As one of the scholars at the closed consultations pointed out, South Africa must accept that Francophone states on the continent have a peculiar relationship with France. Pretoria should be careful not to let its opposition to neo-colonialism undermine its working relationship with Francophone Africa on continental security issues. This will be especially relevant if the Republic joins the UNSC in 2019, as it will serve at the same time as Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea.

### 7.3.3 Peace and Security in Africa (Eritrea)

The debate on Eritrea is an example of how the disagreements between the African members in the Council placed constraints on South Africa's ability to act as a

regional leader. In late November 2011, IGAD approached the Council to complain about Eritrea's destabilising activities in the region, especially the provision of training, financing and logistical support to armed opposition groups. IGAD accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somali and Sudan. Gabon circulated a draft resolution, which was debated extensively and amended in informal consultations. Gabon's initial draft contained harsh sanctions including a ban on investments in the Eritrean mining industry and severe limiting of provision of financial services to prevent the channelling of funds to terrorist groups (SCR 29 November 2011). Gabon resubmitted a revised draft on 29 November 2011 with the expectation that the vote would be held on 30 November 2011. China, Russia and South Africa succeeded in delaying the vote on the draft because they wanted further amendments to weaken the punitive measures remaining in the amended draft resolution (SCR 1 December 2011).

Pretoria's reason for amending the resolution was because of its policy against imposing collective punishment on another African country through sanctions. Pretoria was also of the view that the dispute had more to do with the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea than any policy of destabilization. Moreover the situation of IGAD approaching the UNSC directly was a violation of the principle of subsidiarity because the organization had chosen to approach the UNSC directly instead of going through the AU as the main regional organization. A senior official interviewed for this dissertation implied that the resolution was enforced on IGAD and then Gabon by Ethiopia, which used its relative power to strong-arm weaker neighbours to pursue its national interest against Eritrea.

In the event, the draft resolution was co-sponsored by Gabon and Nigeria. It provided for the extension of sanctions against Eritrean elites and state entities. South Africa did not co-sponsor the resolution because of its reservations about the effect of further sanctions on Eritrea. Nevertheless, resolution 2023 was adopted with thirteen votes and abstentions from China and Russia (S/PV.6674 2011).

In his statement, Mr Mashabane acknowledged IGAD and the AU's efforts in the

horn of Africa. He recognised the allegations of Eritrea's destabilisation and called on the country to answer to allegations that it had sponsored Al-Shabaab. He expressed some reservations about the sanctions:

South Africa hopes that the additional measures contained in today's resolution will not have a negative impact on the people of Eritrea or their livelihoods. We also hope that these measures and sanctions will not adversely impact the economy of Eritrea. Our proposed contribution to the resolution was to ensure that it was balanced with more clarity, did not impose collective punishment on ordinary people in Eritrea and did not contain blanket measures that would have dire consequences. (S/PV.6674 5 December 2011: 4).

Mashabane continued that South Africa had a 'strong view that sanctions should not be viewed as an end in themselves but should complement the political process'. In this regard, he welcomed Eritrea's process of re-engagement with the international community and the AU 'following years of self-imposed isolation'. He referred to the statement made by the AU at its heads of State Summit held in Malabo in July 2011. In that statement the AU had committed itself to assisting the countries in the Horn of Africa to resolve their disputes peacefully and normalise relations. So South Africa would continue to 'emphasise the importance of the centrality of an African solution to resolving African problems' (S/PV.6674 2011: 4). Mashabane referred to paragraph two of resolution 2023, which called on the concerned parties to cooperate with the AU to peacefully resolve their disputes. Mashabane said South Africa supported the principle that the UNSC must provide an opportunity to Member States that are the subjects of Council deliberations to speak at the meetings concerning them. South Africa was disappointed that Eritrea was not given an opportunity to address the Council that day. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki had asked to address the UNSC in late October but Council members only formally discussed his request when they discussed the draft resolution on 30 November (SCR 1 December 2011). The Council invited Afwerki to address the meeting on 5 December 2011 before the vote took place. However Eritrea responded that the invite was short notice and requested another date. This request was not heeded by the Council so Eritrea was not afforded the opportunity to present its perspective. Mashabane (S/PV.6674 2011: 4)

expressed South Africa's disapproval:

The manner in which the Council dealt with a request by a State Member of the United Nations—in this case Eritrea—leaves much to be desired. It is our strong view that the Council should be more sensitive and considerate when dealing with heads of State whose countries are the subject of its consideration.

The Eritrean issue provides interesting insights into the extent and nature of cooperation among African states. Given the AU's rhetoric of African solutions for African problems one could expect consistent cooperation among the African members of the UNSC. However the African member states were not united on resolution 2023. Gabon lobbied actively for its initial draft that included severe sanctions measures. Nigeria co-sponsored the resolution but made it clear that its preference was a political settlement of the dispute Eritrea and its neighbours. The disunity in the continent about how to address Eritrea played out at the global level at the UNSC instead of in the AU. This violated the principle of subsidiarity in which problems are dealt with at a sub-regional and regional level before being escalated to the global stage. South Africa was sensitive to African member states being manipulated to serve the national interest of other African powers. The DIRCO official interviewed about this issue explained South Africa's criticism of the Eritrea resolution as a case of principle trumping African solidarity. For South Africa, 'it cannot be African unity at all costs in that Security Council'. The Eritrea case illustrates how hard it is for South Africa to play a regional leadership role in the face of rivals within the African continent.

#### 7.3.4 The relationship between the UN and the AU

During its second term in the UNSC, South Africa decided to continue with its thematic focus on enhancing the relationship between the UN and AU in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Republic had won two big successes in this issue in 2007 and 2008. The first was the institutionalization of an annual meeting between the UNSC and the AUPSC. By 2011 the organizations had held five consultative meetings, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York (SCR 10 May 2011). The fifth meeting took

place in Addis Ababa on 21 May 2011 (S/2011/350). The second was the report of the AU-UN Panel of Distinguished persons established in terms of resolution 1809 chaired by former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi (S/2008/813). The panel report (S/2008/813) underscored the importance of a working partnership between the UN and regional organizations in successfully addressing the challenges of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The report stressed the need for forming a cooperative vision in which the AU would be able to rapidly respond to African security challenges and the UN would provide the support for sustained peace operations. In this regard, the panel recommended new financial mechanisms to provide case-by-case support for AU-led peace missions mandated by the UNSC, as well as a programme of long-term capacity building for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

South Africa used its presidency of the Council in January 2012 to promote the strengthening of the UN-AU relationship. It organized a summit-level thematic debate on 12 January 2012 aimed at ‘adopting concrete measures to ensure greater coherence between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent’ (S/2012/13). With the AU’s tenth anniversary in 2012, South Africa argued for the necessity of formalizing and clarifying the working relationship between the AUPSC and the UNSC. This issue took on special importance after the AU was sidelined in the UNSC’s response to the Libyan crisis. The report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the partnership between the AU and the UN on peace and security, that was circulated before the January meeting, highlighted a number of emerging security threats facing the continent including election-related conflicts and violence; terrorism and transnational organised crime; protracted border disputes and conflicts; and conflicts born of environmental stress as a result of climate change (S/2012/20).

South Africa identified the need for coherence of strategic objectives and clear division of labour between the UN and AU in order to address the emerging security challenges. The question of coherence and coordination remained important despite the practice of annual meetings between the UNSC and AUPSC. These meetings dealt

with procedural rather than substantive issues and there was poor follow-up by the two Councils on the annual meetings. As was seen in Libya, the UNSC and AUPSC had not developed a mechanism for ensuring their efforts in the same conflicts on the continent were complementary and efficient (S/2012/13).

President Zuma opened his statement as chair of the meeting by placing the debate within the broader agenda of Security Council reform. He reminded the Council that when the UN was formed in 1945 the majority of African countries were still under colonial rule and ‘our concerns, issues and voices were not considered’ (S/PV.6702 2012: 2). This absence of African input was evident in the composition of the UNSC, which had no African permanent members despite the fact that 70 per cent of the items on the UNSC agenda concerned Africa. Of course, the proliferation of African issues on the Council agenda is a post-Cold War phenomenon that was not anticipated by the founders of the UN. Nevertheless, President Zuma argued that the ‘failure of representation’ pointed to the need for urgent reform of the Council. The AU had ‘contributed immensely’ to increasing security and promoting democracy and human rights in Africa. It had also given ‘practical meaning to the vision of the United Nations Charter on cooperation with regional organizations’ (S/PV.6702 2012: 3). President Zuma acknowledged that the Charter gives primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the UNSC, including in Africa. However South Africa was of the view ‘that recognition should be accorded to the fact that the Charter encourages cooperation with regional bodies, such as the AU, in carrying out the United Nations mandate in line with the spirit of subsidiarity’. He listed the advantages of such cooperation including rapid response to conflicts, familiarity with the context and national interests from the fact that neighbours often bear the consequences of conflicts in their neighbourhood.

An example of the regional consequences of conflicts was the situation in Libya. President Zuma criticized NATO’s aerial bombardments for exacerbating the conflict and resulting in a spill over to other countries in the region. He argued that the lesson to be drawn from Libya was that ‘greater political coherence and a common vision between the AU and the United Nations are critical to the resolution of African

conflicts. The views of the African Union must be listen to if we are to strengthen our relationship and prevent further conflict' (S/PV.6702 2012: 2). In order to ensure Africa's prosperity and stability, the international community needed to avoid the practice of proxy wars and international interference in the continent as happened during the Cold War. Zuma argued that 'Africa must never again be a playground for furthering the interests of other regions'. This strong statement was directed at the P3, which led the military intervention in Libya seemingly for their interests with little intention of considering the perspectives of the country's African neighbours.

Based on the 'insights and understanding' South Africa had gained from the experience of coordination between the AU and UN, South Africa had a few proposals for strengthening the relationship between the two organizations. First, it recommended that the relationship between the AUPSC and UNSC should be institutionalized to ensure alignment of policies, strategies and mechanisms for addressing conflict in Africa. This was important to ensure 'strategic political coherence' between the two organizations. Secondly, the UNSC 'should consider the possibility of developing and defining modalities for cooperation and decision-making between the two institutions'. This would enable clarity on how the UNSC should respond 'the requests, suggestions and proposals of the African Union Peace and Security Council'. Thirdly, there should be a clear division of responsibilities between the two organizations taking into account their comparative competencies and advantages. Finally, solutions needed to be found for the challenges of 'capacity-building and sustainable resource allocation' to enable the AU to be able to respond adequately to conflicts (S/PV.6702 2012: 3).

President Zuma closed his statement by mentioning that the ANC had recently celebrated the hundredth anniversary of its founding. He thanked the UN 'for supporting freedom, peace, human rights and justice in our country' and commended the Secretary-General for hosting a high-level symposium 'on South Africa's contribution to the fight against racism and xenophobia' in September 2011. Zuma pledged South Africa's 'dedication and commitment to human rights, peace, democracy and justice so that the support of countless men and women here at the

United Nations Headquarters can prove not to have been in vain' (S/PV.6702 2012: 4).

The US ambassador Susan Rice responded critically to President Zuma's statement. She first spoke of the AU's achievements in the previous decade. Ms Rice praised South Africa's 'leadership and dedication to peace in both the Sudan and Burundi' through its involvement in the AU's missions in both countries (S/PV.6702 2012: 14). Speaking of the AU's establishment she noted the provision in the AU Constitutive Act that allows for intervention in the affairs of a member state 'in respect of grave circumstances'. These were 'brave and worthy words'. This reminder of the AU's own 'responsibility to protect' clause was a subtle challenge to the criticism of the NATO military intervention in Libya. The rest of her statement was less subtle in its tone. Ms Rice criticised the AU members for not always providing 'unified or consistent views on key issues, and that the African Union has on occasion been slow to act on urgent matters' (S/PV.6702 2012: 15). She reasserted the primacy of the UNSC in dealing with international peace and security issues and was not 'subordinate to other bodies, or to the schedules or capacities of regional or subregional groups'. Cooperation between the AU and the UN needed to be based on the requirements of particular situations and could not be:

On the basis that the regional organization independently decides the policy and that United Nations Member States simply bless it and pay for it. There can be no blank check, either politically or financially.

Ms Rice described the annual AUPSC-UNSC consultations as not 'altogether productive or satisfactory'. She argued that the Council needed to do more than formalize these meetings but that the meetings had to 'prove their worth'. Rice raised the option of focusing on technical assistance from the UN to the AU as a more productive engagement. The AU needed to improve its internal management in administration, finance, human resources and accounting to facilitate a 'more productive relationship on the ground in Addis Ababa' (S/PV.6702 2012: 15).

In her statement, Ms Rice expressed the concerns of the US as a global hegemon with an interest in maintaining the distribution of power within the Security Council and



limiting African expectations of having greater influence within the Council. The US position on this issue was curious given the Obama administration's apparent preference for 'leading from behind' in security issues to prevent getting involved in intractable wars. Supporting the AU's efforts to lead in African conflicts appears to fit that vision. However, Rice's statement revealed a disdain and mistrust of African capacities.

A DIRCO official interviewed for this study argued the UNSC's influence over African conflicts was the main reason the Council remained relevant. In the absence of seventy per cent of its agenda items, the UNSC (and by extension the permanent members) would have considerably less influence over the UN. The official put it thus:

There was a strong feeling that, you want to take away the powers; we want to undermine the Security Council. Because you must understand some of the permanent members, they derive prestige out of being permanent members... There's nothing that today if you look at France and the UK can justify them being called superpowers. What makes them superpowers? Except for the fact that they are sitting in this prestigious position—but the strongest opponents, I must be honest with you, it was the Americans... The Americans were very much opposed to this idea... it's a political issue... if you resolve actually all the problems that we have in the continent the likelihood is that the Security Council will become irrelevant.

The reality is that, I must be honest with you; the Security Council is still a more relevant organ of the UN in so far as Africa is concerned. You look at the other (regions), even if there's a crisis in Asia or in Latin America, they quickly want to resolve their issues and say no this matter is not taken to the Security Council, we don't agree. But (Africa) is a part of the world where all of the issues are still under the Security Council. And if you look at the history of the Security Council, they will tell you twenty years ago Security Council used to meet four times per month but Security Council now meets daily. So it has become, people have created a, you know, interest, specialisation and careers out of the

Security Council. So you can even start questioning and say is there really an interest to deal with genuine issues there or it's more about the maintenance of this status as an important organ? So our view there was if you look at it you sort of perpetuate the colonial era of somebody taking decisions on your behalf. Because all those permanent five, none of them are Africans. And that's why we have been talking about the need to reform.

This statement captures the constraints African regional powers like South Africa face in their attempts to the neo-colonial structure of power in the UNSC. The only other region that faces as much UNSC interference is the Middle East; first because it was the site of colonial power battles between France and the UK and secondly because of the significance of oil for the US political economy. It is telling that other regions of the developing world, Asia and Latin America, have avoided significant Security Council in their affairs. The most likely explanation for this is that they fall squarely within the US's post-Second World War security interests. The US has seen the Americas as its concern for centuries. It established itself as the guarantor of Asian security, in opposition to Communist China and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War.

Despite the difficulties it faced, South Africa was able to play the middle power roles of policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker and multilateral manager to draft resolution 2033 and get unanimous support from the UNSC. Moreover, it used its expertise about African conflicts to contribute to the development of the AU-UN relationship.

#### **7.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated how South Africa acted as a leader and a follower in the thematic issues of peaceful resolution of conflict and the African Agenda in the UNSC. The Arab Spring informed many of the Council's deliberations during 2011 and 2012.

Protests in Syria commenced in March 2011 as part of the revolutionary fervour that

was sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa. As the situation escalated into full-scale civil war, the UNSC proved unable to reach consensus on how to address the conflict. This was mainly because of the fallout following NATO's intervention in Libya. Both Libya and Syria met the criteria for intervention in terms of R2P. The evolution of the resolution 1973 mandate from protection to regime change deepened distrust among UNSC members. The BRICS countries condemned the way in which NATO had handled its mandate in Libya and were reluctant to allow a similar process in Syria. So, the Council was gridlocked in its ability to effectively address the conflict in Syria.

South Africa played the role of follower on the Syria issue, deferring to Russia and China. Indeed, the situation in Syria provides an illustration of the kind of middle power South Africa would be in a Sinocentric world order. In a world defined by Chinese hegemony, it seems the Republic would uphold the norms of sovereignty and non-interference, while using its position to soften the state-centric approach with rhetoric on human rights and human security. Arguably, this is a similar role to that played by Canada and Australia in relation to the US—supporting the legitimacy of US military and economic interventionism in the developing world (regardless of the human costs), while providing the human rights language and humanitarian support to soften the blow in affected countries. It is doubtful that the 'neat' East-West division within the P5 will continue given the Trump administration's unpredictable policies, including an apparent affinity for Putin's Russia, and the potential tensions between the UK and France in a post-Brexit world.

Post-conflict peacebuilding is an issue in which South Africa provided leadership as a policy entrepreneur and regional leader both within and without the UNSC. South Africa contributed to the evolution of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture as part of the PBC review panel and in its advocacy of greater cooperation between the PBC and the UNSC. Yet its contribution was reformist rather than transformative because it perpetuated the problematic building blocks of liberal peacebuilding—state-centrism, elite negotiations, power-sharing agreements and a commitment to democratic elections regardless of the context. One of the 2015 Advisory Panel's

main criticisms of the Peacebuilding Architecture was the imposition of inappropriate peacebuilding templates and timelines in post-conflict situations. They argue that the rough template of fragile peace agreement, then transitional power-sharing arrangement and national dialogue, then new constitution and democratic elections is often hurried and insufficiently addresses the original causes of the conflict (S/2015/490: 15). The best hope for sustainable peace in African conflicts is a fundamental rethinking of the dominant peacebuilding models.

With regards the African Agenda, South Africa continued to play a regional leadership role in influencing the UNSC's deliberations on conflicts on the continent. In the Sudan, South Africa played an active role as a mediator, bridge-builder and regional leader in supporting South Sudan independence and then trying to resolve the disputes between the Sudans. Former President Mbeki continued to lead on international efforts in Darfur through his chairing of the AUHIP for the Sudan. Mbeki's post-presidential after life has followed the trajectory of African statesmanship, which he started carving for himself as president (Moore 2014). South Sudan starkly illustrates the problems with the rushed peacebuilding templates discussed above. The optimism of the referendum and independence was followed by deep disappointment as conflict with Sudan escalated.

An important difference between the first and second terms in South Africa's engagement on Sudan is the extent to which the US supported Pretoria's efforts in the second term. As discussed in chapter six, the US adopted an approach of constructive engagement with Al-Bashir in the wake of the Libya intervention. Al-Bashir channelled military support to the Libyan opposition with the support of NATO. De Waal (2013: 376) characterises Sudan's support as 'the biggest military contribution on the ground' and argues that the Obama administration was careful not to name Sudan's role in the coalition of actors involved in Libya. In its use of 'smart power' (Clinton 2011) and leading from the back (Krauthammer 2011), the US relied heavily on Sudanese intelligence, ground troops and infrastructure to support the NTC against Gaddafi. As a reward for Al-Bashir's support, the US has weakened sanctions against Sudan and advocates Thabo Mbeki's argument, that it heavily criticised in the past,

that there can be no solution to the crisis in Darfur without Al-Bashir (ST 2015).

The Obama administration was cooperating with Khartoum, at the same time it was condemning South Africa for not arresting Al-Bashir when he came to the country for an AU summit in 2015 (Clarke 2015)! The hypocrisy and cynicism of this about-turn is a prime illustration of the problem with the structure of global power where geopolitical considerations trump the humanitarian well being of millions of people. And, where the hegemon can act in total contradiction of the values and norms it claims to promote in the world. This creates a no-win situation for South Africa, which was slammed as a 'rogue democracy' for promoting cooperation with Al-Bashir to address the causes of the Darfur conflict in 2007-2008 but was never acknowledged for its foresight when the US and EU adopted this approach in 2011-2012 (Ngari 2017).

The situations in Côte d'Ivoire and Eritrea demonstrate the challenge South Africa faced in playing the role of regional leader in the UNSC. In both cases the approaches of the sub-regional organisations, ECOWAS and IGAD respectively, were in direct conflict with Pretoria's views. In Côte d'Ivoire South Africa was forced to concede to ECOWAS and accept Ouattara's victory, leading to accusations that the Republic's foreign policy was inconsistent and unprincipled. On Eritrea, South Africa mobilised China and Russia's support to dilute Gabon's resolution to remove the harshest sanctions language. Pretoria also used the UNSC as a platform to express its disagreement with the way IGAD had handled the issue. South African officials interviewed for this study argued that Gabon was 'being used as a front' by Ethiopia in its border dispute with Eritrea. The idea that African countries that disagree with South Africa are being externally manipulated is a recurring theme in Pretoria's rhetoric, as if other states are incapable of independent decision-making or choosing to side with a more powerful state for economic or military assistance is irrational. There is arrogance in Pretoria's self-conception as the only African state capable of resisting external manipulation and making principled decisions. It is this arrogance that makes other Africans wary of deferring to South Africa, even when there is good reason to.

The adoption of resolution 2033 was a major success for South Africa in the UNSC as it was a step closer to formalising the relationship between the AUPSC and UNSC. South Africa successfully played the emerging middle power roles of policy entrepreneur, diplomatic broker, multilateral manager and regional leader to draft resolution 2033 and get unanimous support from the UNSC. However the formalisation of the AUPSC and UNSC relationship faced some resistance from the US, which raised concerns about the erosion of the responsibility for the maintenance of international security. Moreover, the US displayed its resentment at Africa's desire for increased autonomy in resolving conflicts on the continent and its simultaneous demand of greater resources from the international community to enable this autonomy. Ms Rice demonstrated an explicit disdain for African governance in the debate on resolution 2033. Yet, in the situation of Sudan, the US allowed the UNSC to take the AUHIP's lead in resolving the issues in Abyei and Darfur. This illustrates the kind of compromises that the erstwhile hegemon must accept in the contest of shifting structural power.

The next chapter concludes the study and provides recommendations for further research.

## **PART FOUR: CONCLUSION**

## CHAPTER EIGHT: RECONFIGURING MIDDLE POWERS FOR A RECONFIGURED WORLD ORDER

### **8.1 Introduction**

This chapter summarises the principal findings of the study and demonstrates that to a large extent, South Africa played the roles associated with emerging middle powers during its two terms in the UNSC. In their decisions and actions in the Council, South African policymakers projected a variety of combinations of general, traditional and emerging middle power roles. By applying a middle power analytical framework to South Africa's decisions and actions in a wide selection of country-specific and thematic issues on the UNSC agenda, the study showed how policymakers' national role conceptions largely conform to middle power roles. Given the frequency with which South Africa is labelled a middle power, such an in-depth examination of a seminal case of post-apartheid foreign policy provides evidence to make broad generalisations about the Republic's diplomacy and the middle power concept itself.

The chapter begins by reviewing the analytical and theoretical framework of the study before presenting a summary of the findings. The next section returns to the sub-questions raised in chapter one that are central to this study to discuss the study's original contribution to knowledge and the major unresolved questions remaining. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion of future prospects for research, building on this study's findings.

### **8.2 Analytical and theoretical framework of the study**

This study investigated South Africa's place in structural power through the lens of a middle power analytical framework. The middle power concept is a useful one for examining the behaviour of states that are too weak to act alone to achieve their goals in international politics, but are strong enough to exert influence as part of a coalition or within international organisations. As discussed in chapter one, the effects of structural power in the world order are evident in the content of the global agenda, the international rules used to govern relations between states, the standards used to determine good behaviour, and who is included or excluded from certain forums. This



study is based on four key assumptions about structural power: 1. Structural power is shaped by the distribution of power in the international system; 2. The post-Second World War structure of power was based on US hegemony; 3. Power is an important variable for understanding the politics of international institutions and; 4. The experience of colonialism and postcolonialism has shaped the global South's conceptions of structural power (see section 1.2.1).

The analytical framework was developed in chapter two, which provided an in-depth literature review of middle powers. The literature on middle powers is inordinately preoccupied with developing an objective definition of the concept. However, all useful concepts are essentially contested and their definitions tested by changing circumstances (Gallie 1965). Instead of trying to find the perfect definition of what middle powers *are*, I focused on what middle powers *do* in interaction with other states. Using Holsti's (1970) idea of national role conceptions and Jordaan's (2003) typology of traditional and emerging middle powers, I defined middle powers as *middle-sized states that play particular roles to stabilise and legitimise the extant world order*. I identified eight-middle power roles: *policy entrepreneur; diplomatic broker; multilateral manager, mediator, good international citizen, example, regional leader and champion of the South*. The first four roles are generally applicable to both traditional and emerging middle powers, the next two are particularly associated with traditional middle powers and the final two are associated with emerging middle powers. One of the main theoretical influences of this study is Cox's (1989) conception of the middle power role as one that changes with the shifting power configurations of the international system. Thus the framework is intended to identify particular tendencies in that are associated with middle powers, instead of attaching a fixed definition to South Africa's international role.

The analytical framework is summarised below:

**Table 6: Typology of middle power role conception and performance**

<b>National Role Conception</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>
<b>GENERAL MIDDLE POWER</b>		
<b>Policy entrepreneur</b>	International problems can be solved through diplomatic skill and specialist knowledge	Launch diplomatic initiatives and develop policy responses to global problems
<b>Diplomatic broker</b>	Facilitate cooperation with like-minded states to solve international problems	Set agenda, plan and convene meetings and facilitate negotiations between parties
<b>Manager</b>	Ensure efficient operation of international organisations and international regimes	Manage day to day operation of the international system
<b>Mediator</b>	Lead in making and enforcing peace across the world	Contribute resources to peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building initiatives and participate in conflict resolution
<b>TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWER</b>		
<b>Good international citizen</b>	Collective wellbeing of international society is as important as national interest	Adhere to international law, fulfil international duties and promote democracy and human rights
<b>Example</b>	Use soft power to attract other states to own point of view and use own experience to inform international decisions	Make material and ideational choices in own interest but also in broader global interest Demonstrate the value of following international norms
<b>EMERGING MIDDLE POWER</b>		
<b>Champion of the South</b>	Be a vanguard in giving voice to the needs of the weak and poor in the international system	Promote reform of global governance and place concerns of developing world at the centre of foreign policy
<b>Regional leader</b>	Take responsibility for regional governance and security	Initiate regional integration and cooperation and lead regional peace and security initiatives

### 8.3 Summary of findings

During its first term in the UNSC, South Africa took an explicitly activist approach to its diplomacy to balance the unequal distribution of structural power in the Council. The roles it played most consistently are those associated with emerging middle powers — champion of the south and regional leader. South Africa promoted UNSC

reform to make the Council more relevant to address 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. In the absence of a reformed UNSC, the Republic advocated strict adherence to the UN Charter, the inclusion of the broader UN membership in debates and, most significantly, increased cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in the resolution of international conflict, according to Chapter VIII of the Charter.

South Africa's approach to its first Council term was consistent with Thabo Mbeki's conception of the Republic as the vanguard of African renaissance and the empowerment of the global South in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Mbeki's national role conception has been characterised as an oddity resulting from the 'curious... presidency' of 'an African moderniser' (Vale and Barrett 2009) as if it was the product of one man's personality quirks and not embedded in the norms, values and aspirations of black South Africans' struggle against colonialism and apartheid. As explained in chapter three, the ANC's project of national liberation in South Africa was accompanied by strong anti-imperialist internationalism.

This internationalism has taken on various forms since 1912. At different points in time, the ANC absorbed the language of liberal humanism, Marxist-Leninist revolution and neoliberal pragmatism to characterise its pursuit of national liberation, sovereignty and self-determination. Many scholars have attempted to separate Mandela's 'human rights' foreign policy from the decisions made during the two UNSC terms (see Borer and Mills 2011). However, a closer analysis of Mandela's 1993 'foreign policy manifesto' demonstrates that the different strands of the ANC's internationalism were there from beginning of the democratic period. Human rights (broadly defined) were prioritised with justice and respect for international law, peaceful conflict resolution, South Africa's African identity and the pragmatic need to adjust to a globalising economy. When faced with deep structural inequalities in its domestic political economy and worsening international divides between the developed and developing world, Pretoria adopted the roles and behaviours associated with emerging middle powers to mitigate the worst effects of neoliberalism.

Chapter three demonstrated how South Africa used its relative material and soft

power to ‘punch above its weight’ in international relations. This included showing *policy entrepreneurship* in nuclear proliferation talks, acting as a *diplomatic broker* to bridge differences between different international actors and a *multilateral manager* by taking responsibility for the day-to-day running of global governance. The primary reason South Africa has been labelled a middle power is its role as a *mediator* in conflicts in, *inter alia*, the Great Lakes, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and the Comoros. Pretoria’s financial and personnel contribution to peacekeeping drew comparisons to middle powers of the Cold War era like Canada and Australia.

South Africa’s relatively peaceful democratic transition and the prominence of human rights in the post-apartheid constitutional order led to its national role conceptions as a *good international citizen* and *example*. However the Republic’s location in Africa and its history of racist imperialism and violence endowed its foreign policy with a sense of responsibility to the region and a desire for global justice and equality. The former manifested in the role of *regional leader* taking responsibility for reviving the continent’s global governance and security architecture through the AU and NEPAD. The latter involved acting as a *champion of the South* by promoting rules-based multilateralism, forming South-South and North-South partnerships to equalise the global political economy and placing the developing world’s concerns at the centre of international organisations’ agendas. This study does not argue that South Africa was successful in its middle power posturing. Indeed, the Republic performed each of these roles unevenly and with varying degrees of effectiveness. National role conceptions will not always be enacted successfully. A state can try to play particular roles on the international stage and fail. Nevertheless, the middle power role framework is still a useful analytical tool to make sense of state behaviour.

As was seen in chapter four, South African policymakers went into their first term in the UNSC with high aspirations that ‘the UN should not change us. We should change the UN’ (Kagwanja 2008: 46). They did not pay heed to Adebajo’s (2006) caution that the structural power of the Council prevents non-permanent members from having any significant influence on the Council’s business. The benefits of incumbency and veto power endow the P5 with a massive advantage over the elected

members. So states that are elected to the UNSC for a brief two years should prioritise issues within their sphere of influence and limit their ambitions of greater systemic impact. South Africa learned this lesson the hard way with the backlash to its vote against the draft resolution on human rights in Myanmar. History has vindicated South Africa's decision. The government of George W Bush was motivated by domestic interests rather than genuine concern with resolving the issues in Myanmar (Steinberg 2007). Moreover human rights atrocities against the minority Rohingya population under the government of Aung Sang Suu Kyi (Tisdall 2018) illustrate that the situation in Myanmar was far more complicated than an evil junta versus rights-loving democrats. Nevertheless the South Africa's attempts to be at the vanguard of global action on the Myanmar issue backfired and led to unnecessary reputational damage. Reputation matters in international society, especially for middle-sized states that need to cooperate with others to have systemic impact (Keohane 1969).

As discussed in chapter five, South Africa was most effective in issues relating to African peace and security. This included thematic issues like SSR, small arms proliferation and WPS, as well as country specific situations in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan. However the Republic's greatest impact was in establishing a working relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The adoption of resolution 1809 was a classic middle power success story of changing international norms, using clever diplomacy to influence and lead in global governance. AU-UN cooperation was manifested in the establishment of UNAMID as the first hybrid peace operation between the UN and a regional organisation. It required innovation in the use of assessed contributions and the development of command and control structures. This means South Africa's diplomacy has had a lasting impact in the management of international relations. This is the kind of influence associated with middle powers.

South Africa seemed to confidently assert its contrarian leadership as an emerging middle power in the first twelve to eighteen months of its tenure (after it got over the initial shock of the Myanmar vote fall out). This began to wane in early 2008, after Jacob Zuma won the ANC's elective conference in December 2007. South Africa's

posture changed significantly in September 2008 when Mbeki was recalled as president of the Republic. The impact of criticism of South Africa's controversial decisions in Myanmar and Zimbabwe was evident in debates in the latter half of 2008. Ambassador Kumalo's exchange with ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo about the legitimacy of the AU's effort to suspend Al-Bashir's indictment in terms of article 16 of the Rome Statute is evidence. This shows that conceptions of South Africa's international role and the underlying values it should pursue were contested within the ANC. The removal of Mbeki brought with it a return to more conventional liberal human rights discourse and an apparent greater comfort with cooperating with the West. However we must guard against overstating the significance of the changes in Polokwane on South African foreign policy. As would be seen in the second term, the ANC government's international orientation tends towards anti-imperialism and global South solidarity regardless of the political principals in power.

The findings on South Africa's role performance in its first term in the UNSC are summarised below:

Table 7: South African roles and behaviours in 2007 and 2008

Country-specific/thematic issue	Role	Behaviour	Evaluation
The situation in Myanmar	Champion of the South	Voting no to draft resolution.  Opposing UNSC 'mandate creep' to protect sovereignty of Myanmar and assert leadership of ASEAN.	Naïve and unstrategic decision to vote no instead of abstain is not consistent with middle powers.

Western Sahara	Regional leader  Good international citizen	Promoting and protecting interests of SADR against P3.  Promoting human rights in Western Sahara.	On one hand consistent with emerging middle powers but failure to communicate nuance of human rights position is lack of policy entrepreneurship and norm leadership.
Women, peace and security	Regional leader  Champion of the South Policy entrepreneur  Good international citizen	Protecting African states from victimisation.  Promoting global governance reform. Speaking truth to Western power.	Acted as an emerging middle power by contributing to evolving debate on WPS norms.
Non-proliferation- Iran	Champion of the South  Example	Advocating equal application of rules to states.  Using experience of eliminating nuclear weapons to promote peaceful use for all states.	Acted as emerging middle power

Israel-Palestine	<p>Good international citizen</p> <p>Mediator</p> <p>Diplomatic broker</p> <p>Champion of the South</p>	<p>Speaking truth to Western power and providing humanitarian aid.</p> <p>Promoting peaceful negotiations and hosting bilateral mediation.</p> <p>Bridging differences between different parties in UNSC.</p> <p>Challenging Western inconsistency in dealing with issue.</p>	Emerging middle power
Lebanon	Champion of the South	Challenging Western deviation from international rules in drafting resolution.	Emerging middle power
Iraq	Champion of the South	Challenging Western deviation from international rules in drafting resolution.	Emerging middle power



Kosovo	<p>Good international citizen</p> <p>Example</p> <p>Champion of the South</p>	<p>Concern for rule of law.</p> <p>Experience of negotiated settlement and national reconciliation.</p> <p>Challenge breach of sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>	Emerging middle power
Climate Change	<p>Champion of the South</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Holding West accountable for not shouldering responsibility for climate change and ‘mandate creep’.</p> <p>Promoting interests of Africa.</p>	Emerging middle power
Great Lakes: Burundi and DRC	<p>Regional leader</p> <p>Mediator</p> <p>Example</p>	<p>Taking responsibility for regional security.</p> <p>Mediating in Burundi and DRC.</p> <p>Using model of SA negotiated settlement.</p>	Emerging middle power

Somalia	<p>Regional leader</p> <p>Mediator</p> <p>Multilateral manager</p>	<p>Taking responsibility for security in the region by advocating joint AU-UN mission in Somalia.</p> <p>Advising on day-to-day management of UN response to conflict.</p>	Emerging middle power
Timor-Leste	<p>Policy entrepreneur</p> <p>Diplomatic broker</p> <p>Multilateral manager</p> <p>Champion of the South</p>	<p>Organising UNSC visit.</p> <p>Facilitating engagement between Timor-Leste and UNSC.</p> <p>Managing UN response as lead nation.</p> <p>Taking particular interest in a developing country outside of Africa.</p>	Emerging middle power
Security Sector Reform	<p>Diplomatic broker</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Cooperating with Slovakia.</p> <p>Hosting meeting about SSR in Africa.</p>	Emerging middle power

Small arms	<p>Policy entrepreneur</p> <p>Diplomatic broker</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Informing UNSC thinking</p> <p>Breaking diplomatic deadlock on small arms debate.</p> <p>Concern with impact of small arms proliferation on African security.</p>	Emerging middle power
Chapter VIII AU-UN relationship	<p>Regional leader</p> <p>Policy entrepreneur</p> <p>Diplomatic broker</p>	<p>Policy innovation in resolution 1809 (2008).</p> <p>Taking responsibility for African governance.</p> <p>Bridging interests of Africa and UNSC.</p>	Emerging middle power
Visiting missions to Africa	<p>Multilateral manager</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Influenced the day-to-day management of UNSC.</p> <p>Took responsibility African security.</p> <p>Also displayed pragmatism and problem-solving.</p>	Emerging middle power

Sudan	Mediator  Diplomatic broker  Regional leader	Facilitating cooperation between Khartoum and UN.  Taking responsibility for resolution of Sudan conflicts and leading establishment of UNAMID.	Emerging middle power
Zimbabwe	Diplomatic broker  Regional leader	To get support of coalition of like-minded states.  Taking responsibility for sub-regional security.	Emerging middle power
Rwanda	Multilateral manager  Regional leader	Leading process to remove Rwanda from UNSC agenda.  Taking responsibility for regional security and governance.	Emerging middle power

South Africa entered its second term in the UNSC with the intention of restoring its moral authority as a champion of human rights. It thus projected itself more explicitly as a human rights and democracy promoting good international citizen than it did in the previous term (Nkoana-Mashabane 2010). However Pretoria was constrained in playing this role consistently because of the P3's manipulation of the humanitarian mandate in Libya to pursue their national interests. When the fallout from resolution 1973 (2011) became clear, South Africa increasingly played roles associated with emerging middle powers by championing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the developing world and challenging the dominance of the West in the UNSC. As the P5 became more polarised along East-West lines, South Africa positioned itself towards the P2 in a manner similar to traditional middle powers' positioning in relation to the P3. This was especially evident in 2011 when the whole BRICS served on the Council for the first time.

The NATO intervention in Libya, discussed in chapter six, defined South Africa's second term in the UNSC. With all the BRICS countries, Germany and Nigeria on the UNSC, 2011 was considered a 'test-run' for a Council with expanded permanent membership (SWP 2011). Thus the kind of military intervention conducted under resolution 1973 and the attendant fall out surprised and disappointed some proponents of UNSC reform. Western powers used the authority of resolution 1973 to pursue regime change in Libya using NATO instead of a UN mandated force. It is significant that the resolution does not mention NATO as the implementing force of the no-fly zone. It merely authorises member states (acting alone or in regional organisations) that have notified the UN and Arab League Secretaries-General. Thus the P3 were able to use their structural power to covertly get authorisation for a NATO intervention with the support of the Arab League, which surpassed the AU as the legitimate regional organisation in relation to Libya. The AU allowed itself to be marginalised in the deliberations on Libya. Both South Africa and Nigeria failed to exert their authority as African regional leaders in the UNSC to make the AU's roadmap a viable option to resolve the Libyan crisis. Indeed both countries and Gabon voted in favour of resolution 1973 despite the questionable intelligence on which it was based and reasonable expectation of instability resulting from an unmanaged transition from Gaddafi.

There is no doubt that Gaddafi was an authoritarian, cruel and violent leader. However, by 2011 he was a centre of stability and order within the Sahel and neighbouring regions. When Gaddafi was abruptly removed, with no plan for transitioning to new leaders the whole region fell into chaos as was seen in the civil war in Mali. The West withdrew from the situation as capriciously as it had entered, leaving Libyans and their African neighbours to deal with the consequences of

NATO's intervention. Among these consequences is the lack of stable government in Libya nearly seven years after Gaddafi, the revival of trading in African slaves and the immigration crisis destabilising Europe's liberal democracies. As a recognised regional leader, South Africa could have used its relative power to postpone resolution 1973. As was explained in chapter four, consensus decision-making in the UNSC has become highly valued since the end of the Cold War. Even the powerful P3 prefers to be seen to be making legitimate decisions that are accepted by all UNSC members rather than forcing its way. Hence if South Africa had chosen to abstain from resolution 1973 serious questions would have been asked about the legitimacy of the no-fly zone. This may not have stopped the resolution's being adopted, but it certainly would have raised doubts about its merit. In the event, South Africa went against its own principles by legitimising and legalising Western military intervention on African soil. It provided France, the UK and US exactly the kind of legal cover for their regime change agenda that the UNSC had refused to give George W. Bush in 2003 for his invasion of Iraq.

Libya increased divisions and tensions within the Council that impacted on all subsequent actions during the rest of South Africa's second term. As seen in chapter seven, the UNSC was increasingly divided along East-West lines and could not agree on how to address the worsening crisis in Syria. Syria's war is ongoing and 2018 commenced with horrific airstrikes by government forces on the few remaining rebel territories. This resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, including children. The abuse of the R2P mandate in Libya has precluded its uses in other contexts undermining one of the 21<sup>st</sup> century's most important normative innovations in international relations.

Chapter seven also demonstrated Washington's discomfort with the new regime of cooperation between the AU and the UN. One would have expected the Obama administration to welcome the opportunity to 'lead from behind' in African security; instead Ambassador Susan Rice expressed hostility to the AU's usurping the roles of the UNSC. The US sought to protect its ability to use its hegemonic position to decide on what interventions to use in African conflicts without being challenged by

alternative perspectives from regional organisations. To paraphrase Gloria Steinem, those in power do not give away their power; it must be taken.

A recurring theme throughout this study is the difficulty emerging middle powers face in projecting their influence within their regions. Chapter three discussed how democratic South Africa was punished for its response to Saro-Wiwa’s assassination in 1995. This influenced later policy towards Africa to tend towards quiet diplomacy instead of hostile confrontation. In chapter five we saw how Mbeki’s efforts to engage Mugabe privately to pursue reforms, while publicly supporting him, were rebuffed. Chapters six and seven show how limited South Africa’s sphere of influence on the continent is when other regional powers are present in international institutions. When Morocco was on the UNSC in 2012, it challenged the Republic’s authority in the issue of Western Sahara. Similarly Nigeria asserted its leadership on Côte d’Ivoire (chapter seven) undermining Pretoria’s mediation efforts. On Eritrea, South Africa came close to abstaining on a resolution drafted by Gabon and Nigeria because it perceived the resolution as an undue assault on another African state (chapter seven).

Table 8: South African roles and behaviour in 2011 and 2012

Country-specific/thematic issue	Role	Behaviour	Evaluation
Libya	Good international citizen  Regional leader	Voting in favour of resolutions 1970 and 1973 to prevent humanitarian atrocities in Libya.	Strategic failure to communicate AU road map and assert African leadership.

Western Sahara	Regional leader  Good international citizen  Champion of the South	Promoting and protecting interests of SADR against P3.  Promoting human rights in Western Sahara.  Challenging P3 abuse of UN Charter rules.	Attempts to lead were compromised by Morocco's presence on Council.
Protection issues- civilian protection and WPS	Good international citizen  Regional leader Example	Protecting humanitarian norms and speaking truth to P3 regarding abuse of humanitarian mandates.  Taking responsibility for protection in African conflicts  Using experience of conflict resolution to inform position.	Emerging middle power



<p>Thematic debate on rule of law</p>	<p>Good international citizen</p> <p>Champion of the South</p> <p>Multilateral manager</p>	<p>Advocating equal focus on rule of law in international sphere as domestically.</p> <p>Protecting global South from abuse of international law by the West.</p> <p>Taking interest in day-to-day management of international system.</p>	<p>Emerging middle power</p>
<p>Working procedures of the UNSC</p>	<p>Champion of the South</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Advocating transparency and accountability in the UNSC.</p> <p>Calling for UNSC reform.</p> <p>Being recognised for efforts to improve AU-UN relationship.</p>	<p>Emerging middle power</p>
<p>Syria</p>	<p>Champion of the South</p> <p>Example</p>	<p>Protecting sovereignty of Syria.</p> <p>Using experience of negotiated transition as reference for Syria mediation.</p>	<p>Emerging middle power but appeared to take lead from Russia and China.</p>

<p>Post-conflict peacebuilding</p>	<p>Multilateral manager</p> <p>Example</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Was part of review panel on peacebuilding.</p> <p>Used own experience to inform approach to peacebuilding.</p> <p>Concerned with successful peacebuilding in Africa.</p>	<p>Emerging middle power</p>
<p>Sudan</p>	<p>Diplomatic broker</p> <p>Mediator</p> <p>Regional leader</p>	<p>Facilitated engagement between UNSC and Khartoum.</p> <p>Mediated in Sudan and South Sudan.</p> <p>Took responsibility for resolving conflict within and between the Sudans.</p>	<p>Emerging middle power</p>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire</p>	<p>Regional leader</p> <p>Champion of the South</p>	<p>Took responsibility for resolution of post-election conflict.</p> <p>Sought to counter French neo-colonialism .</p>	<p>Unsuccessfully projected emerging middle power role because alienated other African states.</p>

Eritrea	Regional leader	Using UNSC position to counter Ethiopian efforts to punish Eritrea.	Emerging power	middle
Chapter VIII AU-UN relationship	Policy entrepreneur Diplomatic broker Multilateral manager Regional leader	Drafting resolution 2033 and getting it accepted by wider UNSC membership.  Also contributing to development of UN norms on cooperation with regional organisations.	Emerging power	middle

#### 8.4 Implications for theory

The investigative task of this study, examining to what extent South Africa behaved as a middle power in the UNSC, prompted four additional research questions whose answers provide generalizable theoretical insights. These questions are answered below.

*What is the nature of structural power in the global system and how is it manifested in the UNSC?*

Chapter one traced the development of the post- Second World War configuration of global power as socially constructed in the global hegemon, the US, in the wake of the devastation of two world wars. In spite of the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR, the main institutions of global governance were defined by the liberal internationalism propagated by first the UK in the early twentieth century, and then the US during the presidencies of Wilson and Roosevelt. The UNSC represents the

pinnacle of structural power in the international system. It has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and is the only international body with the authority to authorise the use of force. By signing up to the UN Charter, member states effectively cede some of their sovereignty to the UNSC, whose fifteen members can take binding action on their behalf. This includes authorising military intervention on behalf of the international community.

The past ten years have seen the greatest shift in global structural power since the end of the Cold War as the world has moved from a 'uni-multipolar' (Huntington 1999) system towards the possibility of a Sino-centric world order. Yet, the UNSC still reflects the distribution of power in 1945. This allows the permanent members to exert influence over global affairs that is sometimes disproportionate to their power as individual states. For example France and the UK maintain trusteeship relations with their former colonies, in spite of their vastly diminished material and ideational status. This is most evident in the Council's system of penholders, to which the P3 act as lead nations in matters on the UN agenda in which they claim ownership. The continuation of neo-colonial relations in the Council goes hand in hand with entrenched racism that portrays the West as the height of civilisation and the rest of the world's cultures as primitive.

One of the aims of this study was to take the influence of colonialism and race seriously in analysing international politics. This enabled a more nuanced and accurate representation of how South Africa acted in the UNSC given the constraints of structural power. The data discussed in chapters four to seven, demonstrates the prevalence of racial conceptions in the civilising rhetoric of human rights and the differentiated response to violent conflict in the UNSC. Rising nationalist populism and revival of fascist and racist politics in the US and Europe reinforces the value of theories that centre race and colonialism. It is clear that power analysis that ignores the racist origins of the contemporary world order will be limited in its ability to explain global politics.

*How has the concept of 'middle power' evolved to account for the behaviour of specific types of states in the global arena?*

The literature on middle powers is inordinately preoccupied with developing an objective definition of the concept. All useful concepts are contested. Instead of trying to find the perfect definition of what middle powers *are*, this study focused on what middle powers *do* in interaction with other states. Thus it developed an analytical framework of roles and behaviours associated with middle powers to apply to South Africa in the UNSC. The UNSC was selected as the ideal locus for such a study because it encapsulates the global power structure that constrains and informs middle powers' social identity.

The chapters on South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC show that the differences between the roles of emerging and traditional middle powers are overstated. By making types of middle power behaviour a function of constitutive characteristics, Jordaan's framework is too restrictive for understanding the different roles middle powers play in a changing world order. This is partly because at the time Jordaan was writing ideas about US unilateralism and socio-economic differences between developed and developing countries held greater certainty than they do now. The global context has shifted significantly in the thirteen years since he published his paper. Countries from the 'stable, democratic, developed world' created and suffered the worst effects of the 2008 global financial crisis; China has become the world's second most powerful economy *without democratising*; the consequences of Western military adventures in the middle east have led to an influx of refugees and a 'browning' of Europe that has been met by a xenophobic backlash most visible in the rise of right-wing parties, including in traditional middle powers like Sweden and Norway. Indeed the biggest difference Jordaan identifies between emerging and traditional middle powers — regional orientation — is not as significant as he makes out. Traditional middle powers such as Australia have taken on a far more explicit regional role in recent years because of shifts that have made regions more significant economic units (Carr 2013).

Australia's reorientation towards its region has been simultaneously accompanied by

the institution of brutal, undemocratic immigration policies and practices that contradict all claims of ‘good international citizenship’. The point here is that the context of blurring lines between developed and developing, first world and third world, democratic and undemocratic, necessitates different ways of identifying middle powers from different parts of the world. These states are contributing to reshaping international institutions and norms in the changing world order. South Korea is an excellent example of this phenomenon (Choi 2009; Chun 2014; Lee et al 2015).

This study used the terms traditional and emerging middle power to connote particular orientations and behaviours that distinguish middle powers whether they are developed or developing countries; or identify as party of the global North or South. The qualifiers do not do not imply a generational or developmental hierarchy among different sets of middle-range states and the framework does not rely on a correlation between material and/or geographic constitution and diplomatic behaviour. Instead the study used Holsti’s role terminology to associate middle power roles identified in the literature with particular types of state behaviour. By distinguishing between different middle power role conceptions and their attendant role performance, the framework is applicable to any putative middle power regardless of constitutive characteristics. This adapts the middle power framework for the fluidity of the current, post-2008 world order and creates opportunities for better understanding the influence of the growing variety of players on the global stage.

A country like South Africa can display similar middle power characteristics as Canada but have a distinct regional orientation because of its regional status. As discussed above Australia has taken some reformist positions in international relations in response to its increased regional orientation and quest for regional influence.

*How has South Africa’s diplomatic identity – within the context of global structural power – been projected and perceived since 1994?*

Most academic studies describe South Africa as having an inconsistent, contradictory or paradoxical foreign policy. An overview of some titles of academic articles written

about South Africa's international relations include 'South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: from reconciliation to ambiguity?' (Alden and Le Pere 2004); 'External and domestic sources of foreign policy ambiguity: South African foreign policy and the projection of pluralist middle power' (Bischoff 2003); 'Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy' (Nathan 2005); and 'Explaining post-apartheid South African human rights foreign policy: unsettled identity and unclear interests' (Borer and Mills: 2011). Several scholars have identified the reasons for this ambiguity/ inconsistency in South Africa's contested international identity. The basic argument is that South African foreign policy makers have constructed contradictory identities for the Republic that have influenced its behaviour on the global stage.

Chapter three identified the underlying ideas and principles informing South Africa's international identity by examining the foundations of the ANC's internationalism. The norms that form the foundation of South African foreign policy include sovereignty, anti-imperialism, human rights, neoliberalism, and pan-Africanism. The contradictions among these norms account for the contradictory behaviour evident in foreign policy since 1994. South Africa does not have a consistent national identity domestically that it can project internationally. This results in much of its foreign policy becoming a contestation between different versions of 'South Africanness' playing out in the international arena. Recognising the inherent inconsistencies in South African identity and norms allows for a more nuanced understanding of the Republic's foreign policy behaviour.

One of the findings of this study is that South Africa often failed to communicate effectively its foreign policy positions in the UNSC. In this respect the Republic did not behave as a middle power. Middle powers are excellent communicators and invest in public diplomacy because they understand this is an important aspect of soft power. Soft power does not come from moral authority alone. It is constantly developed and communicated through media. In response to the accusations of poor communication during the first term in the UNSC, DIRCO established a unit for public diplomacy in 2009 and launched a number of initiatives to communicate South African foreign

policy to citizens (Landsberg 2010). However the Republic failed to communicate its foreign policy positions during its second term in the UNSC as well. This study has demonstrated how poor communication prohibited South Africa from playing an effective leadership role in Libya (see chapter six) and Côte d'Ivoire (see chapter seven). Part of the challenge in these cases was that Pretoria neglected to communicate its policy positions to influential South African and international media. An essential part of public diplomacy is communicating to international publics. While DIRCO has invested a great deal in communicating to domestic publics it has neglected communicating with international publics through foreign media. This is an unfortunate oversight for two main reasons.

The first is that in an increasingly interdependent world, mobilising international public opinion has become an important tool of powerful states. From the age-old tradition of 'embedding' journalists with armed forces in conflict to strategically planting stories with influential media, manipulating the media narrative on major foreign policy issues is a reality of contemporary international politics. It is an essential element of soft power. As with other aspects of international politics in the context of structural power, developing countries are disadvantaged in their ability to compete by their relative lack of resources and the biases of international media. This is unfortunate but it is a reality that countries in the global South have to contend with. This is particularly important with the rise of 'fake news' and use of social media to manipulate global politics. (Chadwick 2018). South Africa should invest in its international communication by building effective working relationships with foreign correspondents in the Republic and international media at the UN headquarters. The development of dedicated social media platforms for key foreign missions (for example the UN Mission in New York) would enable direct communication of policy positions to both domestic and international publics.

The second reason communicating to international media is important is that the foreign policy journalism published by the majority of respected South African press is syndicated content from international news outlets like the New York Times and the Guardian. Therefore South Africans receive much of their news about South



African foreign policy from the foreign press. If the Republic wants to occupy a place in the core of the power hierarchy of the coming post-Western world (Stuenkel 2016), it needs to invest in public diplomacy and improve its communications capacity.

### **8.5 Suggestions for further research**

As I completed writing my dissertation in early 2018, DIRCO (2018) announced South Africa's candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC in 2019 and 2020. The Republic's candidature was successfully endorsed by the AU at its 30<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in January 2018. In preparation for the vote at the 72<sup>nd</sup> session of UNGA in June 2018, Pretoria embarked on a global campaign to ensure the highest level of votes for its candidacy. Since South Africa is the only African state running for the vacant seat it is likely to win a third term in the UNSC. This creates the opportunity for further comparative research on South Africa's three terms on the Council to determine the extent to which the Republic continues to play an emerging middle power role. Given the third term will take place under President Cyril Ramaphosa, an in-depth comparative study of the differences in South African behaviour in the Council under three different presidents would be a valuable contribution to the literature on post-Apartheid foreign policy.

South Africa's third term in the UNSC would take place in a vastly different context of global structural power than the period discussed in this study. Under President Donald Trump, the United States has all but abandoned its role-conception as guarantor of the liberal international world order. The UK's vote to leave the EU (Brexit) and the growth of right wing populism across Europe is contributing to a decline in the currency of democracy and global human rights discourse. China is entrenching its position as the new superpower and Vladimir Putin's Russia has put great power rivalry back on the international agenda. What opportunities does this shift in structural power hold for middle powers from the global South? An investigation of South Africa's behaviour in the UNSC within the framework of structural power may yield important insights into the changing world order.

The analytical framework developed in this study could be replicated to investigate the role conception and performance of other states in order to determine whether they play a middle power role in international politics. This would contribute to further refining the middle power concept.

A recurring theoretical theme of this study is the shortcoming of international liberalism. As the discussion on post-colonial and critical race theory in IR demonstrated, the foundations of the liberal world order are racist and sexist. Scholars in this tradition argue that liberal thought entrenches racial and gendered disparities in international politics. This perspective was evident in the foreign policy positions taken by South Africa and other developing countries in the UNSC. As was discussed in chapter three, South Africa's human rights orientation is a product of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. It includes self-determination and sovereignty, along with liberal political rights. This view of human rights is fundamentally about restoring the humanity of all people. Further research into South African perspectives on human rights and how they have been reflected in foreign policy could make a valuable contribution to global efforts to determine the normative and ethical foundations of a post-Western and post-liberal world order.

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