PROPOSALS FOR AN UPDATED POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

By

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All praise and blessings belong to the Almighty for granting me the opportunity and good health to complete this study.

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To my father, mother and brother, thank you for believing in me, for all the support, and for giving me the opportunity to further my studies. I am forever grateful for all the sacrifices you have gone through in order for Aamir and I to achieve our dreams.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife, Xidikari and daughter, Haneen. Xidi, thank you for your love, care and support during the past five years - you are my rock, my pillar of strength and my courage. Your unwavering love and support allowed me to complete this study.

And,

To the men and women of the SANDF who bravely serve in Peace Operations abroad, thank you for assisting in trying to bring peace to our brothers and sisters on the African continent. Your sacrifices should never be taken for granted.
**ABSTRACT**

Peace Operations (POs) continue to be the vehicle of choice when addressing and/or managing societies that are either in, or are emerging from, conflict. As evidenced by the existence of the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (SAPIPM), as well as by South African deployments in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) POs in, amongst others, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), South Africa clearly sees herself playing an important role in world POs, specifically those operating on the African continent. However, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, South Africa’s core policy framework in the field of POs, is generally acknowledged to be outdated.

In order to determine whether the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is outdated, the study is guided by the following main research question: With reference to South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, what are the gaps in its policy framework as a result of contemporary developments in POs. The study identified and critically analysed the gaps that have been created by the development of the five scholarly identified contemporary developments in POs – the Brahimi Report; the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda; the call for ‘Robustness’; the Capstone Doctrine; and, the advent of the regionalisation of POs – within the current 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. Further updates to, and inconsistencies in, policy regulations and practice were also identified in a) the discrepancies between policy prescription and practice in the field of South Africa’s contribution to POs, b) the lack of inter-departmental coordination in South African considerations for involvement in POs, and c) the key inputs around the role of the SANDF in South Africa’s involvement in POs as specified by the 2015 South African Defence Review. Out of these developments, it was deduced that the WPS Agenda, the importance of peacebuilding (as addressed by the Brahimi Report) and the call for ‘robustness’ are of particular significance as they affect both the strategic and tactical success of POs. Furthermore, revision to the current White Paper on SAPIPM must have the intention to incorporate experiences gained, lessons learnt during SANDF deployments to POs, to integrate new structures, as well as the continental and regional security architecture that have been established since 1999. Doing so will certainly serve as a foundation for future South African involvement in POs on the African continent, and beyond.
It was through this critical analysis and confrontation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM that the study identified the necessary changes and updates required in order for South Africa to continue to make a meaningful contribution in its involvement in POs. The study concludes that the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is outdated, and recommendations are offered in order to ensure South Africa’s future POs involvement policy framework reflects contemporary international developments and practice.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Africa Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of East African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTS</td>
<td>International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Agency for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHI</td>
<td>New Horizon Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOCPM</td>
<td>National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PE</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
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<td>PMs</td>
<td>Peace Missions</td>
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<td>POs</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC DF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPIPIM</td>
<td>South African Participation in International Peace Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPK</td>
<td>Traditional Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTPs</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF 1</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I and II</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>White Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPK</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. PRESENTING THE RESEARCH THEME

With the end of Apartheid, South Africa’s reintegration into the international community came with great international expectation that the country would now actively engage in conflict resolution efforts in both her region and continent. However, and understandably so, the new African National Congress (ANC) led government was heavily focused on its pressing domestic agenda, and thus “displayed a reluctance to engage in what would likely become expensive and cumbersome ventures outside of its national borders” (ACCORD, 2007:11).

Nonetheless, in its 1996 White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, the South African Government declared that “as a fully-fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations” (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 5, para. 19). However, the country only became involved in earnest after the proclamation of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions in 1999 – hereon referred to as the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. At the time South Africa was a relative newcomer to the field of peace missions1 (PMs), which is commonly referred to as peace operations2 (POs).

The aim of the now 18 year-old 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM3 (DIRCO, 1999) was to establish a well-defined mandate for dealing with the (potentially) large number of requests South Africa would receive for involvement in peace operations. Therefore, the mere existence of this policy paper has alluded to the importance to which the South African government has placed on peace operations, as a foreign policy priority, post-1998. At its height in 2012, South Africa ranked as the 13th largest (Africa’s 8th largest) contributor of military and police personnel to UN POs with a total of 2330 personnel (Heinecken and Ferreira, 2012:22). At present, South Africa ranks as the 17th largest (Africa’s 11th largest)

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1 South African terminology which suggests a broader series of diplomatic, political and military activities – including preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.
2 Widely used as a generic umbrella term denoting traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support operations.
3 In 2014, it was noted that the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) had started with a revision to the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions. However, the document was never made public, or released for public comment. This paper, therefore, is focusing on the approved and promulgated 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM and what a potential new policy should take cognisance of.
contributor of military and police personnel to UN POs with a total of 1 422 personnel (United Nations, 2017a).

1.2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW

The literature overview is divided into four sections, viz. the different schools of thought within POs literature; generational discourse on POs; general conceptual discourse on POs; and, the contemporary development of POs.

1.2.1. Schools of Thought:

After reading the available POs literature, one may identify two schools of thought. The Traditionalist school of thought as exposed by Bull and Watson (1984), Jackson (2001), and Bellamy & Williams (2010), view POs in strictly Westphalian terms, stressing non-interference in domestic affairs. Thus for the Traditionalists, the primary function of POs is to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. The main supporters of the Westphalian conception of POs have traditionally been China, Russia, Latin America and the post-colonial states in Africa, and Asia (Bellamy et al. 2010:5).

Secondly, the Revisionist school of thought as represented by scholars such as Kaldor (1999) and (2006), Keen (1999), Deng et al. (1996), Paris (2004), Evans (2008), Bellamy (2009), Sarkin (2009) and Bellamy et al. (2010), view POs in post-Westphalian terms, stressing the use of POs in intra-state conflicts, based on the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Deng et al., 1996). Thus, for the Revisionists, POs are not limited to maintaining order between states, POs should instead take on the much more ambitious task of promoting and sometimes enforcing peace, security, and political, institutional, social and economic reconstruction within states (Bellamy et al., 2010:4, 13, 38). The most vocal supporters of the post-Westphalian conception have traditionally been Western states and humanitarian NGOs (Human Rights Watch for example) (UN, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010:31-32, 36).

This is relevant to the study, as it will provide an analytical tool for understanding the current and/or alternative South African position.

1.2.2. Generations of Peace Operations:

A generational understanding and division of POs is apparent in the literature. There seems to be a generational division of a time-based, chronological Cold War and post-Cold War understanding (see Kenkel, 2013; Chan, 2011; Zwanenburg, 2005; Kuhne, 1999), and a
generational division in what POs wanted to achieve, as well as the tasks utilised in achieving them (Bellamy et al. 2010). These indicators serve the explanation of ‘generations’ of POs.

Kenkel, (2013), and Chan, (2011) hold that the chronologically based generational understanding has traditional peacekeeping (1958-1990) cited as first generation; multidimensional peacekeeping in the early-to-mid 1990s is referred to as second generation; following the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995 and the difficult UN experience in Bosnia, POs were briefly cited as third generation; while regionally delegated/partnership complex multidimensional operations after the millennium (2000) are viewed as fourth generation POs.

A second school of thought headed by Bellamy et al. (2010) hold that POs have not evolved in a straightforward or linear manner with a ‘clear and clean’ division between Cold War and post-Cold War operations (as a time-based ‘generational’ understanding has it). Bellamy et al. (2010:17), therefore contend that it makes little sense to categorise POs into a time continuum of generations, for instance, to distinguish between two, three, four or even five ‘generations’ of peacekeeping or POs (see Chan, 2011; Zwanenburg, 2005; Kuhne, 1999). They go on to explain that “defining POs this way, obscures more than it illuminates, because there have always been different types of POs [at any single point in time], and their development cannot be easily broken down into chronological eras” (Bellamy et al. 2010:17).

Nor are POs mutually exclusive. Thus, “a single operation may well move back and forth between the various aims or may involve more than one of these roles simultaneously” [emphasis added] (Bellamy et al., 2010:9; James, 1990).

The paper will therefore be cognisant of the two generational divisions and understandings of different types of POs. This is relevant to the study, as this will also provide an analytical tool for understanding and demarcating the current South African position and the requirements for participation in POs.

1.2.3. General Conceptual Discourse on Peace Operations:

Having read through the available literature, one realises that there are different ways of understanding POs and their relationship to broader processes and trends within international politics. Bellamy & Williams (2010), in the second edition of their widely acclaimed book Understanding Peacekeeping, highlight that, as the number, range and complexity of POs have grown, so too has the number of theories and concepts used by analysts and
practitioners alike to explain and understand them. Furthermore, the work of Bellamy & Williams (2010:14) is important to this study, as the authors delve into delineating the complexities associated with POs, and therefore portray the understanding that definitions and concepts are tools that are useful only insofar as they help us to understand better the issue in question.

There is a comprehensive literature on the definition and nature of POs (see for instance James, 1969; Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1994, 2008; Paris, 2000; Finnemore 2003; Zwanenburg, 2005; Durch, 2006; Aoi, 2007; Bajwa, 2008; de Bruijn, 2008; de Coning, Hetzel & Hojem, 2008; Bellamy et al., 2010; Diehl & Druckman, 2010 and Chan, 2011). A comparison of the arguments and texts in this area of discourse reveals a confusing mixture of concepts, views, and idea groupings, with different people and countries using the same terminology with slight-to-radically different meanings, and different words with the same or closely related meanings.

Taking into consideration the various definitions of peace operations, this paper defines a Peace Operation as an “internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect…transitions from war to peace” (Durch, 2006:xvii). POs are therefore a general type of activity that may be used to prevent, limit and/or manage conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Being mindful of the various ‘general types of activity’ as elucidated in the literature, this paper highlights these activities as Traditional Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and Peace Support Operations. Each of these types will be explored in more depth in this study, focusing specifically on the work of key authors.

In terms of Traditional Peacekeeping (TPK), the work of key authors identified are Goulding (1993), Diehl (1994), Rossouw, (1998), Donald (2001), Zwanenburg (2005), Hough et al. (2006), Ahmed et al. (2007), Aoi, (2007), Lloyd and Van Dyk (2007), Weiss & Daws (2007), Bellamy et al. (2010), Micheal & Ben-Ari (2011) and, Kenkel (2013). These authors note that although there is no consensus on what activities constitute TPK, it is understood as the deployment of an “‘interpositional’ buffer force between the frontlines, reducing contact between forces and diminishing the probability of escalation or an accidental rupture of the peace” (Kenkel, 2013:125). Examples of TPK: UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) deployed in Egypt which lasted between the years 1956-1967; the on-going UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in 1964; and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) between the years 2000-2008.
The work of Berdal (1993), Doyle et al. (1997), Bellamy et al. (2010), and the British military doctrine titled, Wider Peacekeeping (HMSO, 1995) are identified as key contributions to Wider Peacekeeping (WPK). These authors highlight that the wider qualification sees this form of POs intending to fulfil the aims of TPK as well as additional tasks (delivery of humanitarian relief, for instance) in a context of an on-going conflict. Examples of WPK: UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia between 1992-1995; UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) between 1993-1994; and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) between 2004-2007.

Peace Enforcement is concerned with the activities that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter entitled ‘Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, (and acts of aggression’ (UN, 1945). The UN Charter’s Chapter VII (UN, 1945) introduced the concept of Peace Enforcement (PE), and therefore serves as a key contribution. In addition to this seminal document, the work of Doyle & Sambanis (2007), and Bellamy et al. (2010) are also identified as important as they offer a contemporary delineation to PE. Examples of PE: the unified command in Korea (1950-1953); the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) as well as the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, 1992-1995.

Finally, as for Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the work of key authors identified are Bellamy et al. (2010), Chan (2011), and the British military doctrine titled, Peace Support Operations (HMSO, 1999). Simply, PSOs are a “multifaceted mission that combines a robust military force with a significant civilian component” (HMSO, 1999). Examples of PSOs are: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, 1995-2004; as well as the on-going International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, established in 2001.

1.2.4. Contemporary Development of Peace Operations:

POs are diverse in nature and each peace operation has its own character. Nevertheless, five key developments, which occurred after the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, can be identified.

1.2.4.1. The Brahimi Report:

The August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (United Nations, 2000), commonly referred to as the ‘Brahimi Report’, was a seminal policy document that changed the nature of POs. The goal of the Brahimi Report, was to take an unflinching look at POs
implementation problems within the UN system and then offer, in the words of Lakhdar Brahimi, “specific and realistic recommendations” for enhancing UN capacity for POs.

The report, based on promoting better management of POs, clarifies that its eleven premises are entirely focused on issues internal to the UN system itself. These include: capabilities (resources contributions, peacebuilding, planning, rapid deployment, mission leadership, personnel recruitment, training, accountability), decision-making (Security Council mandates), and doctrine (conflict prevention, human rights) (United Nations, 2000a: para.6; Swope, 2011: 15; Bellamy, 2010:129-133).

Furthermore, the report deals with the issue of how best to use force in the UN’s name (Bellamy & Williams, 2004:188). The report argued forcefully that once the UN had committed itself to conducting a peace operation its personnel must be able, if required, to impose order on conflict zones rather than wait for the belligerents themselves to reach equilibrium and simply ‘bury the dead’ if they did not (United Nations, 2000a:viii; Chan, 1997: 28).

The report therefore devotes most of its analysis to the issues of doctrine, decision-making, rapid and robust deployment, effective operation in the field, and efficient and integrated management in headquarters.

1.2.4.2. Women, Peace and Security “A-Gender”:

The discourse on, and the practical manifestation of, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda serves as the second key contemporary development in POs. The work of Arostegui (2013), Onekalit (2013), Cohn (2008), Hudson (2005), Väyrynen (2004), Anderlini (2000) and Machel (1996) have identified them as proponents of this key development. On 31 October 2000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (or, ‘1325’ for short), another seminal policy document, calling for women’s increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, as well as their protection during conflict. The works of Pratt & Richter-Devroe, (2011) and Rehn & Sirleaf (2002) are important here. They have noted that the difference between 1325 and former resolutions was that previous UN resolutions had treated women as victims of war, in need of protection. However, 1325 also recognised women as agents in building peace and guaranteeing security.
As part of the WPS Agenda, Resolution 1325 applies a three-pillar approach of ‘Protection’, ‘Prevention’ and ‘Participation’. Hudson (2005:795) notes that this is a holistic approach, involving both integration through the “add and stir” of women, as well as agenda-setting through the participation of women as decision-makers in peace processes, making for a comprehensive strategy in targeting the transformation of the social structures and processes that have allowed gender inequalities to persist. Abiola & Alghali, (2012:12) have identified that 1325 provides an overarching international policy framework for the UN, member states, other actors and all parties to the conflict to incorporate gender considerations in their activities. Thus, 1325 outlines actions to be taken by the Secretary General, the Security Council, as well as the UN as a whole to ‘mainstream gender’ into peace and security policies and practices (Cohn, Kinsella & Gibbings, 2004:130).

Resolution 1325 is a step in a chain of attempts to mainstream gender in the UN discourse on peace operations (Väyryn, 2004:126). 1325 has been supplemented and advanced by 6 other UNSC resolutions [1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013)] that together form the WPS framework.

1.2.4.3. The call for ‘Robustness’: a new era of POs?

The third key contemporary development in POs, is the increasing call for ‘robustness’. The Brahimi Report referred several times to the necessity of ‘robust peacekeeping forces’, in order to account for the modern day realities of contemporary POs (United Nations, 2000a: ix, xi, 1, 10, 54). Thierry Tardy explains that “robustness is designed to allow a POs force to protect itself, to provide freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate, or more broadly the peace process, is ‘taken hostage’ by spoilers” (Tardy, 2011:152). However, the problem with the call for ‘robustness’ is that it in some respects, it deviates from the three principles of POs: that of consent, impartiality, and the traditional non use of force except in self-defence. Robust POs were at the heart of what, in the early 1990s, was referred to as the ‘grey area’ of POs, an ill-defined activity situated between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Ruggie, 1993:28; Goulding, 1993:461). The UN and its member states have faced great difficulty in handling this grey area, in terms of both doctrine and operations (Jakobsen, 2000).

However, in trying to distinguish between robust POs and peace enforcement, the work of Zwanenburg (2005), Tardy (2011) and Swope (2011) comes to the fore. They all illustrate that when looking at the UN prescribed principles, consent is the broad Rubicon separating
robust POs from peace enforcement. In this case consent is required for robust POs, but not in the case of peace enforcement.

1.2.4.4. The Capstone Doctrine: A doctrine for the future?

The Capstone Doctrine, represents not only the fourth key contemporary development, it also represents an operational development that has impacted upon the environment of modern day POs. The purpose of the UN published ‘Capstone Doctrine’, was to “ensure that the growing numbers of United Nations POs personnel deployed in the field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks they are required to perform” (United Nations, 2008a:6).

The document goes further and lists three success factors that are crucial if a PO is to succeed. These are the need to be perceived as 1) legitimate and 2) credible by the host country population, and 3) the promotion of local and national ownership of the peace process (United Nations, 2008a: chapter 3). The Capstone Doctrine was also released to deal with the issue of robustness, as well as to try addressing the conceptual evolution of the three POs principles - consent, minimum use of force and impartiality.

In stark contrast to the Capstone Doctrines’ self-ascribed ‘high-level’ (United Nations, 2008a:9), Andrew Cottey (2008) highlights that the document explicitly “does not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual Member States” (Cottey, 2008:439). However, overall the new doctrine is an important milestone in formulating what constitutes UN POs, and it will serve as “useful guidance that will enhance a common understanding and approach to UN peacekeeping among Troop and Police Contributing Countries, and UN staff serving in peacekeeping missions” (de Coning et al., 2008:6).

1.2.4.5. Regionalisation: good or bad?

The fifth and final identified key contemporary development, one which is an institutional development as well, is that of the increased involvement of regional organisations in the POs forum.

POs were for long the purview of the UN [as identified and defined in the Agenda for Peace (1992: para.20)]. However, this qualification to UN presence disappears in the Brahimi Report’s definition published in 2000 (2000a: para.12). In the last two decades there have
been significant increases in the number of POs run by entities other than the UN. This highlights the dramatically changed POs environment, with the POs ‘market-place’ becoming undoubtedly multi-polar, involving many more actors than in the past, argues de Guttry (2011:34). Further, the Brahimi Report, in its treatment of doctrine and strategy, clearly envisages that regional organisations will remain the vehicle of choice for POs in non-benign security environments – such as those encountered in most complex emergencies in Africa (Malan, 2001:122).

Operationally, such an arrangement is made possible by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter sets out three Articles (Art. 52-54) which establish the possibility for, and conditions of, regional organisations and their activities in the field of international peace and security (United Nations, 1945: Art. 52-54, Ch. VIII). In the most general terms however, the operational relationship between the UN and regional organisations involved in POs has two variations. These may be identified as a) ‘subcontracting’ (Yamashita, 2012:169) or ‘outsourcing’ (de Guttry, 2011: 48) and, b) ‘partnering’ (Yamashita, 2012:169) or ‘joint running’ (de Guttry, 2011:49).

The most recent UN reform initiative was launched in July 2009 in the release of a “non-paper” produced by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) as a “consultative document” meant to contribute to “an on-going discussion about the future direction of UN POs and how this unique instrument can continue to serve the international community” (United Nations, 2009a:2). The document, built on previous POs reform efforts, is titled, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping, and is referred to as the New Horizon Initiative (NHI). The reason I bring this document up, is due to the fact that it is an expression of and by the UN to forge partnerships (loosely translated) in order to improve modern day POs.

Finally, and despite the emergence of regional POs, UN POs remain the world’s largest source of POs. Regional POs suppliers also generally defer to the Security Council’s power to authorise or endorse POs. Thus, the UN still holds the key to designing the future of more globalised POs cooperation (Yamashita, 2012:183).

Out of these developments, the WPS Agenda, the call for ‘robustness’ as well as the important role played by peacebuilding are of particular significance as they affect both the strategic and tactical evolution and success of POs.
1.3. FORMULATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The fundamental research problem covered by this study is captured in the following research question: With reference to South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, what are the gaps in its policy framework as a result of contemporary developments in POs? This leads to a sub-question: what changes are necessary to South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework in order to ensure that its policy framework reflects contemporary international developments and practice?

The central research assumption is framed as follows: taking into account new thinking on and developments in POs as discussed in the literature, South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is an outdated policy document. To elaborate: given that knowledge and experience at the United Nations, African Union and national level have developed and progressed since the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, it is important for the South African government to revise its POs involvement policy framework. This is imperative as in order for South Africa to make a meaningful contribution in its involvement in POs, the now outdated policy framework will need to take into consideration a range of international trends and developments in both POs policy, as well as practice. As such, the problem statement is that after 18 years of South African involvement in POs, the country’s policy framework is generally acknowledged to be outdated.

The study is demarcated in conceptual and temporal terms. With regards to conceptual delineation, the study will focus on understanding the theoretical discourse that has given birth to the term of POs. The study will also therefore seek to understand the advent of POs as encapsulated in the UN seminal policy documents, namely the Brahimi Report, UNSC Resolution 1325, the Capstone Doctrine, and the A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, as well as the supplementary theoretical discourse that has followed the development of POs.

As far as temporal delineations are concerned, the study will be focused on the evolution and contemporary development of POs since 1999, as this is the year the White Paper on SAPIPM came into effect.

1.4. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

The primary goal of this paper is to evaluate the continuing relevance of the current 18-year old 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM – also referred to as the South African POs involvement
policy framework – against international trends and developments in POs since the late 1990s. Further, the paper will establish what has been happening since the late 1990s in the POs environment, looking at both national and international developments in POs – in policy, literature and practice. The above will inform the investigation into the contemporary relevance of South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework, as it will indicate both the gaps in the 1999 White Paper, and what is required to update it. Therefore, the body of work will focus on a) the gaps in South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework as a result of contemporary developments in POs and b) the changes necessary to this policy framework. As such, the paper will contribute to and support policy development in the field of South Africa’s involvement in POs.

1.5. METHODOLOGY

The proposed study will take on a descriptive-analytical, as well as an inductive approach as there is a need to critically analyse the state of affairs of South Africa’s policy applicability and operationalisation in its involvement in POs. As such, the main unit of analysis is South Africa. This method is also most suited to the type of analysis undertaken in this study. The advantage of qualitative research is that it allows for the identification and interpretation of the political, economic and social factors that have affected the study undertaken, namely, the implications of international changes, trends and developments on both POs policy and practice on South Africa’s stated 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM.

Based on the descriptive, analytical and qualitative nature of the study, the researcher based the study on a review and interpretation of relevant literature based on primary and secondary sources regarding POs. Key primary sources come from two different sources. The first includes official and topical documents of and by various countries, and specifically of and by the South African government, such as White Papers, Annual Reports, Strategic Plans, speeches, statements and reports. The second sees the studying of UN Security Council and UN General Assembly documents. These UN documents are regarded as seminal documents and policy statements of and for POs. Secondary sources dealing with the thematic and conceptual analysis of POs and their respective South African relevance, such as journal articles, opinion editorials, press releases, monographs and book chapters, amongst others, will be critically investigated with respect to their illumination on the topic under study.
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

In addition to providing a general introduction to this study, the first chapter outlines the research problem and the demarcation thereof. The chapter also identifies the respective methodological approaches to the study. Moreover, a literature overview and the structure of the study will be provided.

The second chapter focuses primarily on the development of a conceptual and theoretical framework which will be used to guide this study. Within this context, the chapter explores both the scholarly development of the term ‘Peace Operations’ (POs), as well as the contemporary developments that have come to characterise the POs arena. As such, the paper will identify the different schools of thought within POs, as well as the various forms of POs as they have occurred and developed through the years. The paper then moves into delineating the so-called chronologically based ‘generations’ of POs view point, versus the intended ends based ‘generations’ of POs view point. Finally, the paper highlights five key developments which have occurred after the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. The purpose of the chapter will therefore be to delineate the paper’s POs working definition, as well as analytical framework employed in assessing the continuing relevance of South Africa’s 18-year old POs involvement policy framework.

The third chapter follows from the second chapter in which it highlights South Africa’s current POs policy framework. Here, the paper provides a brief historical context into South Africa’s POs involvement policy development prior to the proclamation of 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. In building on the theoretical and analytical framework developed in the previous chapter, the chapter then discusses and analyses the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, concluding that an update is required. This is important, as this chapter serves to identify the areas in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM that need to be updated/changed, or what new things are necessary to ensure that South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework reflects the new trends and developments identified in Chapter Two (the discussion and analysis of which is the focus of Chapter Four).

The fourth chapter provides a critical analysis in juxtaposing the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM against the five key contemporary trends and developments that were identified in Chapter Two so as to identify the gaps, as well as what is needed to update South Africa’s current POs policy framework. Moreover, the chapter both analyses the conceptual implications of the undertaken research on the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM as well
indicates additional updates, developments and considerations to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. These are as a result of further analysis revealing additional inconsistencies in policy regulations and practice.

The last chapter concludes and reflects on the research conducted throughout this study. The concluding chapter provides a brief summary and the evaluation of the research questions and assumptions formulated, and will identify areas requiring further research.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF PEACE OPERATIONS – INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Following its inception, in the form of the 1948 UN Truce Supervision Organisation deployed in Israel-Palestine, the nature and practice of POs has undergone significant change. Represented in the change from UN Charter Chapter VI traditional peacekeeping (dealing with pacific measures that can be taken with the consent of the belligerents – such as military interposition to monitor interstate cease-fire agreements) to complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations, where the military component is but one of many role players in an involved peace process (Bellamy et al., 2010:48). Moreover, and contemporarily, each new peace operation “now bears little resemblance to its predecessor, as the international community and regional organisations become involved in a succession of intrastate conflicts, each with its own unique demands and dynamics” (Rossouw, 1998:36).

As a result of the above, little agreement exists between governments, analysts, international organisations and practitioners about what POs are, and the differences between terms such as ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘peacebuilding’. Indeed, “governments and international organisations have often labelled many kinds of military activity as ‘peacekeeping’, occasionally in an attempt to legitimise their activities” (James, 1969:9; Finnemore 2003; Bellamy et al., 2010:14). Thus, Williams (2010) identifies, and correctly so, that POs and PMs are political activities and writes that “two actors looking at the same phenomenon might genuinely come up with two quite different ways of and conceptualising their experience”. So politically charged is the question of defining POs that the UN has still not clearly stipulated what it means by the term.

It is within this context that a need arises to explore both the scholarly development of the term ‘Peace Operations’, as well as the contemporary developments that have come to characterise the POs arena. The purpose of the chapter is therefore to delineate the paper’s POs working definition, as well to develop an analytical framework employed in assessing the continuing relevance of South Africa’s 18-year old POs involvement policy framework. This is done through the explication of the scholarly work undertaken in trying to make sense...
of the phenomenon of Peace Operations – this should not be mistaken for the (practical) work done by the UN, and its reflections on POs, as this is dealt with later in the chapter. This is important as the scholarly development of the term has both affected, and has been affected by the practical development of POs.

As a point of departure, the study identifies the different schools of thought within POs. This section will serve as the foundation for this paper, as it supports and leads into the sections that follow. With this in mind, the paper then lays out the various forms of Peace Operations, as they have occurred and developed through the years. The paper then moves into delineating the so-called chronologically based ‘generations’ of POs view point, versus the intended ends based ‘generations’ of POs view point. Finally, the paper highlights five key developments which have occurred after the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. In its entirety, this chapter provides the paper, as well as the reader, with an analytical framework as well as conceptual and contextual clarity.

2.2. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT:

After reading the available POs literature, one can identify that POs are either operationalised in Westphalian or post-Westphalian terms. These two contentions form the basis of the schools of thought that have come to characterise the POs arena.

2.2.1. Traditionalists and Revisionists:

The Traditionalist school of thought as exposed by Bull & Watson (1984), Jackson (2001), and Bellamy & Williams (2010), view POs in strictly Westphalian terms, stressing non-interference in domestic affairs. For the Traditionalists, the primary function of POs is to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. In its most extreme form, one may deduce that human suffering within states, no matter how painful, should not concern peacekeepers unless it directly threatens international order and the maintenance of peace and security between states (Bellamy et al., 2010:5-7).

Secondly, the Revisionist school of thought as represented by scholars such as Kaldor (1999) and (2006), Keen (1999), Deng et al. (1996), Paris (2004), Evans (2008), Bellamy (2009), Sarkin (2009) and Bellamy et al. (2010), view POs in post-Westphalian terms, stressing the use of POs in intra-state conflicts, based on the principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Deng et al., 1996). The underlying assumption of this post-Westphalian understanding is that “domestic peace and the way a state conducts its foreign relations is inextricably linked
to the nature of its political system and society” (Bellamy et al., 2010:4). From this perspective, it may be deduced that threats to international peace and security are not restricted to hostility between states, but probably may result from violent conflict and illiberal governance within them. For the Revisionists, therefore, POs are not limited to maintaining order between states, POs should instead take on the much more ambitious task of promoting and sometimes enforcing peace, security, and political, institutional, social and economic reconstruction within states (Bellamy et al., 2010:4, 13, 38).

The struggle between these two conceptions of POs is played out at various levels, but most importantly, it is at the fore of debates in the UN. This debate reflects a tension in the UN Charter over whether the security of states or the security of human beings should be prioritised. Current POs thus intrude into aspects of domestic sovereignty once thought to be beyond the purview of UN activity (Doyle & Sambinis, 2007:325). This is arguably the most important debate facing POs. There exists a clear divide in the interpretation by states of POs along these schools of thought, both pragmatically, as well as scholarly. The main supporters of the Westphalian conception of POs have traditionally been China, Russia, Latin America and the post-colonial states in Africa, and Asia (Bellamy et al. 2010:5). In contrast, and after the Cold War, the most vocal supporters of the post-Westphalian conception have traditionally been Western states and humanitarian NGOs (Human Rights Watch for example) (UN, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010:31-32,36).

Although this debate and struggle has not been solved conclusively, it tilted heavily in favour of the post-Westphalian conception of POs in 2005, with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle being endorsed and adopted by over 150 member states of the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. Whereas the Westphalian order rested on a notion of sovereignty that granted states protection from external interference, this post-Westphalian account is based on the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Deng et al., 1996) – the idea that “sovereigns enjoy the right to non-interference only insofar as the protect the fundamental rights of their citizens” (Bellamy et al., 2010:13,31-33). The emergence and development of the R2P norm is therefore a direct derivative of the Revisionist, post-Westphalian school of thought.
2.2.2. Why the change?

A question remains, however. What facilitated this understanding of POs away from its Westphalian conceptions, to the ascending post-Westphalian understanding? Well, the chronologically based view has the ending of the Cold War as the only significant transformation in international affairs. As a result of this, an often overlooked and important fact is actually the role played by globalisation in this transformation.

Simply, globalisation can be defined as the “intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders” (Holton 1998:11). Globalisation took on a new face, as it grew in strength due to the collapse of the bipolar system that the Cold War created. This opened the possibility of domination of transnational relations within the system, as states boundaries opened up to the flow of information, people and, goods and services which were impossible during the Cold War. Moreover, the rapid advancement of communication technology; the integration of international markets; the ease with which people could travel from one place to another, as well as the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (transnational organisations); together created a world where the state was not the only actor in the international scene, and in some cases not even the most important. However, and instead of becoming politically redundant, states now exist in a mutually constitutive relationship with globalisation as argued by Clark (1997). Thus, states now are both a principal driver of globalisation and are in return, being radically transformed by it.

Moreover, and since the end of the Cold War, most conflicts around the world have been intra-state, occurring in weakened and failed states, where political systems no longer function by exercising effective sovereignty and can no longer ensure a monopoly over the organised use of force. Here, the processes of globalisation have given rise to this distinctive form of armed conflict, commonly labelled as ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999). These are often states where local politics takes place under the patronage or backing of different militias serving a diversity of interests including economic ones (Kaldor, 2006). In such conditions, often seen as complex emergencies (Lloyd and Van Dyk, 2007:71), conflict frequently escalates and local violence travels across state borders to endanger regional or even global stability and security. To add to this, David Keen has observed, that for some belligerents, “winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes” (Keen, 1998:11-12).
Moreover, the spread of global communications has contributed to a growing awareness of political strife and humanitarian crises around the world, fuelling calls from Western and non-Western civil society groups for international society to assume a greater responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations (Bellamy et al., 2010:95). The challenge facing the international community is no longer limited to avoiding major wars or securing borders after wars. The development of post-Westphalian POs corresponds to the need to address these complex emergencies, which cannot be met without long-term and multi-actor engagement by the international community. In such contexts therefore, change implies transforming local, national and international social and political orders, and the inherent shifting to ‘post-Westphalianism’ (Kaldor, 1999:10-11).

2.3. GENERAL CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE ON PEACE OPERATIONS:

Following from the above, one realises that there are different ways of understanding POs and their relationship to broader processes and trends within international politics. Bellamy & Williams (2010), in the second edition of their widely acclaimed book *Understanding Peacekeeping*, highlight that, as the number, range and complexity of POs have grown, so too has the number of theories and concepts used by analysts and practitioners alike to explain and understand them. Furthermore, the work of Bellamy & Williams (2010:14) is important to this study, as the authors delve into delineating the complexities associated with POs, and therefore portray the understanding that definitions and concepts are tools that are useful only insofar as they help us to understand better the issue in question.

There is a comprehensive literature on the definition and nature of POs (for instance James, 1969; Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1994, 2008; Paris, 2000; Finnemore 2003; Zwanenburg, 2005; Durch, 2006; Aoi, 2007; Bajwa, 2008; de Bruijne, 2008; de Coning, Hetzel & Hojem, 2008; Bellamy et al., 2010; Diehl & Druckman, 2010 and Chan, 2011). A comparison of the arguments and texts in this area of discourse reveals a confusing mixture of concepts, views, and idea groupings, with different people and countries using the same terminology with slight-to-radically different meanings, and different words with the same or closely related meanings. Before moving forward then and in terms of this paper, what will be the core working definition of POs employed throughout the document?

Taking into consideration the various definitions of peace operations, this paper defines a Peace Operation as “internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect…transitions from war to peace” (Durch, 2006:xvii). POs, in this paper, are
therefore seen as a general type of activity that may be used to prevent, limit and/or manage conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Being mindful of the various ‘general types of activity’ as elucidated in the literature, this paper highlights these activities as Traditional Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and Peace Support Operations.

2.3.1. **Traditional Peacekeeping:**

Traditional Peacekeeping (TPK) is the conceptual point of departure for all the other forms of POs. Although there is no consensus on what activities constitute traditional peacekeeping, its underlying and implied objectives are reasonably clear (as illustrated in Goulding, 1993:452; Diehl, 1994:13; Rossouw, 1998; Donald, 2001; Zwanenburg, 2005; Hough et al., 2006; Ahmed et al., 2007; Aoi, 2007; Lloyd & Van Dyk, 2007; Micheal & Ben-Ari, 2011). Aoi’s (2007) work also highlights that TPK is premised on the so called ‘holy trinity’ principles of consent, minimum use of force and impartiality.

Bellamy et al. (2010:8) provide a definition to TPK as it is intended to support peacemaking between confrontational states by creating the political space necessary for them to negotiate a political settlement. TPK takes place in the space between a ceasefire agreement and a political settlement. Its objective is the creation of an environment conducive to efforts of peaceful conflict resolution by the belligerents. As such, Bellamy et al. (2010:174) highlight that TPK is based on three core assumptions: (a) primary belligerents are states; (b) combatant units are hierarchically organised; and (c) the protagonists wish to end the conflict and search for a political resolution.

A guaranteed activity of TPK, however, is “the deployment of an ‘interpositional’ buffer force between the frontlines, thus reducing contact between the forces and diminishing the probability of escalation or an accidental rupture of the peace” (Kenkel, 2013:125). Upon the attainment of a political settlement, traditional peacekeeping missions are withdrawn. Examples of traditional peacekeeping in practice are: the UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) deployed in Egypt which lasted between the years 1956-1967; the ongoing UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in 1964; and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) between the years 2000-2008.

2.3.2. **Wider Peacekeeping:**

Wider Peacekeeping (WPK) is best defined in the British military doctrine, which bears the same name. It refers to “operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in
support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential and actual conflict” (HMSO, 1995: 2.1). Kenkel (2013), highlights that the wider qualification sees this form of P0s intending to fulfil the aims of TPK as well as additional tasks (delivery of humanitarian relief, for instance) in a context of an ongoing conflict. Wider Peacekeeping (WPK) developed as an ad hoc response to the breakdown of ceasefires or political agreements that enabled the original deployment of TPK, combined with a belief on the part of the peacekeepers that they should continue to have some sort of role in the conflict area – most often humanitarian (Bellamy et al., 2010:8). Therefore, six characteristics of WPK may be identified.

i. Despite the existence of formal ceasefires, WPK occurs within a context of ongoing violence.
ii. WPK tends to take place in intra-state (Post-Westphalian), as opposed to inter-state (Westphalian) conflicts.
iii. Soldiers engaged in WPK are given tasks beyond those of traditional peacekeeping – organising and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, guaranteeing freedom of movement, monitoring ceasefires, and enforcing no-fly zones (Berdal, 1993; Doyle et al., 1997).
iv. WPK operations witnessed the exponential growth of the civilian ‘humanitarian community’ [primarily Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)], with whom peacekeepers were often supposed to coordinate their activities.
v. WPK operations/missions have frequently changing mandates – both a blessing and a curse in most respects, especially due to characteristic six.
vi. WPK operations suffer from a considerable gap between their means and ends.

[adapted from Bellamy et al., (2010:194-195)]

These operations are therefore characterised by the addition of civilian tasks related to political transition from conflict, “without an accompanying increase in permission to use military force” (Kenkel, 2013:128). Thus, WPK can be understood as an attempt to apply the ‘holy trinity’ principles of TPK – based on the ideas about managing Westphalian interstate conflict – in a post-Westphalian environment. Examples of wider peacekeeping in practice are: the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia between 1992-1995; the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) between 1993-1994; and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) between 2004-2007.

2.3.3. Peace Enforcement:

Peace Enforcement (PE) is concerned with the activities that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter entitled ‘Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and
acts of aggression’ (UN Charter, 1945). In their explanation of POs, Bellamy et al. (2010:8) contend that a PE operation aims to impose the will of the UN Security Council upon the parties to a particular conflict. Further, these authors highlight that a PE operation is arguably the closest manifestation of the collective security role originally envisaged for the UN by the authors of its Charter (Bellamy et al., 2010:8).

Doyle and Sambanis’ (2007) contribution to The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations explains that ‘peace enforcing’ operations extend from “low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of ceasefires and, when necessary, authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2007:327). Further, Doyle et al. (2007) go on to differentiate PE operations by highlighting that the defining characteristic of peace enforcement operations is the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or the entire UN mandate.

Given its controversial nature, PE operations do raise several challenges. First, and frequently, enforcement mandates are vaguely worded which leads to questions of interpretation, particularly over the explicit conditions that need to be achieved in order to terminate enforcement actions. In a post-Westphalian setting, this challenge is even more pronounced, and therefore analysts have called on greater clarity in the use of enforcement mandates. Secondly, and given the non-existence of a UN army, and the UN’s overstretched, and under-resourced bureaucratic mechanisms, there are a “variety of prudential concerns over whether the UN is in any position to conduct large-scale enforcement measures effectively” (Bellamy et al., 2010:227). Thirdly, a question arises as to whether the UN should be engaged in war fighting at all. This question leads to various answers, especially in relation to the North-South debate around Westphalian or post-Westphalian POs, their activities and underpinnings. Finally, we can question whether enforcement measures might prove counter-productive to the goal of building stable peace in the longer term. Again, this has both Westphalian and post-Westphalian derivatives, which deepen the debate of the utility of POs at both inter- and intra-state level.

Examples of peace enforcement in practice are: the unified command in Korea (1950-1953); the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) as well as the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, 1992-1995.
2.3.4. **Peace Support Operations:**

Chan’s (2011) article in the *Journal of Singapore Armed Forces* acknowledges that it was at least partly in an attempt to provide more coherence, as well as analyse how military power could be used to build stable peace (an oxymoronic relationship), that the UN and other actors developed the concept of ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs).

Simply, PSOs are “multifaceted missions that combine a robust military force with a significant civilian component” (HMSO, 1999). PSOs combine robust military forces capable of limited PE tasks with a strong civilian component that often includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies, police and justice offices. Thus, Bellamy *et al.* (2010) note that PSOs attempt the impartial enforcement of a political settlement, the substance of which may have been dictated by the interveners and supports the establishment of liberal democratic political systems and societies within states (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010:9).

Moreover, Bellamy *et al.* (2010:280) highlight that PSOs embody a particular approach to three fundamental issues facing peacekeepers: “(1) the use of force and its relationship to the principles of consent and impartiality; (2) how to close the gap between mandate and means; and, (3) the place of the military component within the broader, civilian-led peace operation” (for a further explanation of these, see Bellamy *et al.*, 2010: 281-284). Thus, the development of the activity and concept of PSOs comprises of the merging of ideas developed in wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and marks an attempt to overcome the problems of each. Examples of PSOs in practice are: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, 1995-2004; as well as, the ongoing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, established in 2001.

**2.4. GENERATIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS:**

In this section, the dominant time-based, chronological Cold War and post-Cold War generational division and understanding (sequential, linear approach) to POs will be explicated, and contrasted against the generational division and understanding of what the POs wanted to achieve, as well as the tasks utilised in achieving them (simultaneous approach). These indicators will serve the explanation of ‘generations’ of POs.

Kenkel, (2013), and Chan, (2011) hold that the chronologically based generational understanding (sequential, linear approach) has traditional peacekeeping (1958-1990) cited as
first generation; multidimensional peacekeeping in the early-to-mid 1990s is referred to as second generation; following the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995 and difficult UN experience in Bosnia, peace support operations were briefly cited as third generation; while regionally delegated/partnership complex multidimensional operations after the millennium (2000) are viewed as fourth generation peacekeeping. A second school of thought headed by Bellamy et al. (2010) hold that POs have not evolved in a straightforward, sequential or linear manner with a ‘clear and clean’ division between Cold War and post-Cold War operations (as a time-based ‘generational’ understanding has it).

The result is that the various forms of POs, or ‘generations’, are all operating together or in isolation of each other in the post-Cold War world according to the needs of a specific situation/operation (simultaneous approach). Bellamy et al. (2010:17), therefore contend that it makes little sense to categorise POs into a time continuum of generations, for instance, to distinguish between two, three, four or even five ‘generations’ of peacekeeping or POs (see Chan, 2011; Zwanenburg, 2005; Kuhne, 1999). They go on to explain that “defining POs this way, obscures more than it illuminates, because there have always been different types of POs [at any single period], and their development cannot be easily broken down into chronological eras” (Bellamy et al. 2010:17) as they are not mutually exclusive. As stated before, “a single operation may well move back and forth between the various aims or may involve more than one of these roles simultaneously” [emphasis added] (Bellamy et al., 2010:9; James, 1990).

The above-provided definitions and conceptualisations of TPK, WPK, PE and PSOs assume that peacekeeping is defined by the performance of particular tasks. Following, TPK tasks were performed in the earliest UN missions, but some early missions went well beyond the confines of the tasks associated with TPK. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), during the 1960s, serves as a case in point. ONUC (1960-1964) was a more complex, larger and multidimensional operation than anything previously attempted by the UN. Abi-Saab (1978) and James (1994a:46-55) highlight that at its peak, ONUC had 20 000 troops deployed in combination with a substantial civilian component, and the mission was assigned to fulfil a number of different roles – from state-building and human rights promotion to peace enforcement duties (Dayal, 1976; Månsson, 2005). Interestingly, these tasks may be associated with what would later become tasks of wider peacekeeping as well as PSOs.
Additionally, the extraordinary number of new missions in the post-Cold War era [20 new POs were created by the UN between 1988 and 1993 (Table 2.4.1)], represented a quantitative transformation. It did not, however, represent a direct and linear evolution between different generations of POs (Tharoor, 1996; James, 1994b; Goulding, 1993). Instead, this period, often identified as the dawn of the second generation, experienced re-engagement and then gradual expansion of POs “conducted along similar lines to those during the Cold War” (Bellamy et al., 2010:97). Only later, a whole new type of operation, necessitated by a changing environment, as well as predicated on different aims to TPK, emerged in Somalia and Bosnia (as identified above). To support this, it is significant to note that even these two missions started out as relatively traditional types of POs but developed slowly – and according to requirements – into something wholly different to what had come before.

Table 2.4.1. UN Peace Operations established 1988-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Place (dates)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Form of POs - as per tasks involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988-90)</td>
<td>Monitoring the withdrawal of the Soviet Union.</td>
<td>TPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq (1988-91)</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire</td>
<td>TPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola (1988-91)</td>
<td>Monitor Cuban withdrawal</td>
<td>TPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Namibia (1989-90)</td>
<td>Supervise transition</td>
<td>WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua (1989-91)</td>
<td>Monitor compliance of peace agreement</td>
<td>TPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola (1991-95)</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire and election supervision</td>
<td>TPK → WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara (1991-present)</td>
<td>Organise referendum on independence from Morocco</td>
<td>WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>El Salvador (1991-95)</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire, elections, demobilisation and human rights</td>
<td>WPK → PSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>Cambodia (1991-92)</td>
<td>Plan successive UN mission</td>
<td>WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Cambodia (1992-93)</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire, organise elections, supervise government, demobilisation</td>
<td>TPK → WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Mozambique (1992-94)</td>
<td>Assist implementing peace agreement</td>
<td>WPK → PSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>Somalia (1992-93)</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire, assist humanitarian relief</td>
<td>WPK and PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (1992-99)</td>
<td>Monitor and secure ceasefires, support humanitarian relief,</td>
<td>TPK → WPK → PE and PSOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we take a closer look at the above table, and pay attention to the mission descriptions, it suggests that the end of the Cold War did not inspire a sudden and dramatic about-turn in international insights of the role of POs in world politics, as the time-based propagators have it (Bellamy et al., 2010:100). As the historical portrayal suggests however, the UN actually took on more missions that were similar in type to the majority of missions conducted during the Cold War. As some of these missions (UNAVEM, UNAMIC and UNTAC for example) delivered on their initial aims (*intended ends*), only then did they take on new tasks that involved deeper engagement with internal conflict, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Most propagators of a time-based generational understanding may argue that a mission’s mandated composition may determine its nature. However, this is false. Bellamy et al. (2010:17) provide an explanation as to why this is. They write that:

*A lightly armed mission to impose the UN’s will on recalcitrant belligerents is still an enforcement operation – albeit a chronically weak one. Likewise, a ceasefire monitoring mission equipped with tanks and fighter jets is still a ceasefire monitoring mission.*

Thus, the *intended ends* and *means* (simultaneous) approach should take preference as it clearly shows that the stated mission aims, and tasks utilised, even if changing, determine the generational classification of said mission. I am therefore of the opinion, elucidated by...
Bellamy et al. (2010:17), that the chronologically based ‘generational’ understanding obscures more than it illuminates.

2.5. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS:

What the above alludes to is that POs are diverse in nature and each peace operation has its own character. Nevertheless, five key developments, which occurred after the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, can be identified. Operationally, POs have changed dramatically as a result of; the ‘Brahimi Report’; the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; the call for ‘robustness’ in peacekeeping; and, the ‘Capstone Doctrine’. Institutionally, there has arguably been one major change, that of the increased involvement of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. All of these changes have come together to continually evolve the institution and practice of POs

2.5.1. The Brahimi Report:

The August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (United Nations, 2000), commonly referred to as the ‘Brahimi Report’, was a seminal policy document that changed the nature of POs. It was also the first major foray into some aspects of UN POs since 1995. The goal of the Brahimi Report was to take an unflinching look at POs implementation problems within the UN system and then offer, in the words of its chair, Lakhdar Brahimi, “specific and realistic recommendations” for enhancing UN capacity for POs.

The report, based on promoting better management of POs, clarifies that its eleven premises are entirely focused on issues internal to the UN system itself. These include: capabilities (resources contributions, peacebuilding, planning, rapid deployment, mission leadership, personnel recruitment, training, accountability), decision-making (Security Council mandates), and doctrine (conflict prevention, human rights) (United Nations, 2000a: para.6; Swope, 2011: 15; Bellamy, 2010:129-133). More, to further meet the above challenges, the report identified three key, mutually-supportive, conditions for success that every single mission must have:

i. Political Support – ensuring appropriately articulated and communicated mission mandates, that are sufficiently resourced,

ii. Rapid and effective deployment (with a robust force posture) – getting POs on the ground as quickly as possible, within the first six to 12 weeks; and,

iii. Sound peacebuilding strategy.
With regards to the triumvirate principles of POs, Bellamy & Williams (2004) describe that in essence, the Panel suggested that the UN POs principles needed to be interpreted more ‘liberally’ to account for the modern day, and ever shifting realities of POs. Thus, the report deals with the issue of how best to use force in the UN’s name (Bellamy & Williams, 2004:188). The report argued forcefully that once the UN had committed itself to conducting a peace operation its personnel must be able, if required, to impose order on conflict zones rather than wait for the belligerents themselves to reach equilibrium and simply ‘bury the dead’ if they did not (United Nations, 2000a:viii; Chan, 1997: 28). All in all, the report therefore devotes most of its analysis to the issues of doctrine, decision-making, rapid and robust deployment, effective operation in the field, and efficient and integrated management in headquarters.

It is fair to say that the Brahimi Report was a game changer in many respects. The report set in motion a decade and more of reform that has culminated in the advent of ‘robustness’ in POs, the understanding of ‘developmental peacekeeping’ which focuses on peacebuilding, as well as in support of the looser and liberal interpretation of the UN POs principles. The Brahimi Report covered all aspects related to peacekeeping and issued 57 different recommendations, the most important of which dealt with improving the decision-making abilities at the UN – enhancing political support for POs; ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of forces; and shifting doctrine to account for the new realities of modern day POs. These three issues summed up the major problems with UN POs: poorly crafted, overly expansive and impossible to achieve mandates; an inability to properly resource missions or get them to the field in time to make a difference; and a general lack of understanding about the features and challenges of current missions. The good news is that since the Brahimi Report was released, the UN has made substantial improvement in both mandate formation (particularly in terms of more consultations with stakeholder groups and an better awareness of what missions can actually achieve) and shifting doctrine, yet it still falls short when it comes to the rapid and effective deployment of forces.

Finally, the Brahimi Report does not use gender-specific terminology because the subject matter addresses practical aspects of operational execution - it does not substantively engage in the political framework surrounding the staffing of UN missions. Avoiding those pitfalls is
also what made the *Brahimi Report* successful: “it became politically influential by being superficially apolitical” says Freeman (2002:193).

2.5.2. **Women, Peace and Security “A-Gender”:**

The changed nature of conflict has led to a real need to consider the effects of conflict on women, and to address their specific needs before, during, and after conflict (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010). The discourse on, and the practical manifestation of, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda serves as the second key contemporary development in POs. The WPS Agenda is a direct derivative of the call for gender mainstreaming. Thus, and as a starting point, the Agreed Conclusions of the Economic and Social Council of 17 September 1997, define gender mainstreaming as (United Nations ECOSOC, 1997):

> ...a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality...

Onekalit (2013) illuminates the fact that United Nations POs have been used as an instrument for international intervention in armed conflicts for over 50 years, but the organisation did not issue specific requests for women peacekeepers until the 1990s. Requesting women peacekeepers is just one element in the process of thinking afresh about POs after the Cold War.

Women constitute almost half the world’s population, and together with children, make up an estimated 80% of war victims (Machel, 1996). It therefore makes sense that they must play an active role in POs, especially as this “would impress directly upon their nature as caregivers to secure the protection of vulnerable populations and, importantly, to participate in peace processes” (Onekalit, 2013:43). In addition, women are not merely victims of conflict; “they also play active roles as combatants, peacebuilders, politicians, and activists, and are often in the strongest position to bring about peace in their communities” (Arostegui, 2013:535). However, their participation in these elements and processes remains partial, especially within formal procedures and processes (Arostegui, 2013:535). Thus, a call for gender mainstreaming was made.
On 31 October 2000, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (or, ‘1325’ for short), another seminal policy document, calling for women’s increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, as well as their protection during conflict. The UN has heralded 1325 as a landmark document that promises to protect women’s rights and guarantee their equal participation in peace processes. Pratt & Richter-Devroe, (2011) as well as Rehn & Sirleaf (2002) have noted that the difference between 1325 and former resolutions was that previous UN resolutions had treated women as victims of war, in need of protection. However, 1325 also recognised women as agents in building peace and guaranteeing security.

At its core, Resolution 1325 sets clear standards for integrating gender perspectives into POs (Väyrynen, 2004:126). The resolution reaffirms the “important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding”, and stresses the “importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution” (United Nations, 2000b: para.5). As part of the WPS Agenda, Resolution 1325 applies a three-pillar approach of ‘Protection’, ‘Prevention’ and ‘Participation’. Hudson (2005:795) notes that this is a holistic approach, involving both integration through the “add and stir” of women, as well as agenda-setting through the participation of women as decision-makers in peace processes, making for a comprehensive strategy in targeting the transformation of the social structures and processes that have allowed gender inequalities to persist.

Its 18 operational paragraphs cover three main themes. First, the resolution recognises women’s contribution to peacebuilding and conflict resolution and calls for their increased participation at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international conflict prevention and resolution initiatives. Second, it highlights the gendered aspects of war and armed conflict demanding the protection of women’s rights, including shielding women and girls from gender-based violence and other violations of international law. Finally, the resolution calls upon local actors, member states, but also the UN system itself, to adopt a gender perspective in POs, negotiations and agreements (United Nations, 2000b; Mackay, 2003:218; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011:492; Abiola and Alghali, 2012:12)

Moreover, 1325 outlines actions to be taken by the Secretary General, the Security Council, and the UN as a whole to ‘mainstream gender’ into peace and security policies and practices
(Cohn, Kinsella & Gibbings, 2004: 130). Thus, Abiola & Alghali, (2012:12) have identified that 1325 provides an overarching international policy framework for the UN, member states, other actors and all parties to the conflict to incorporate gender considerations in their activities. In her first article on 1325 in 2000, Sanam Anderlini identified the following as the components of 1325: (a) participation of women in decision making and peace processes; (b) gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; (c) the protection of women; and, (f) gender mainstreaming (Anderlini, 2000).

It must be noted that Resolution 1325 is a step in a chain of attempts to mainstream gender in the UN discourse on POs (Väyrynen, 2004:126). 1325 has been supplemented and advanced by six other UNSC resolutions [1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013)] that together form the WPS framework. Collectively, the WPS framework provides an internationally recognised legal framework for promoting gender equality in peace and security, ensuring the participation of women in all peacemaking processes, and protecting women against violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. They address all aspects of peace processes, including peace negotiations, political participation, response to sexual violence in armed conflict, judicial and legal reform, and security-sector reform (Arostegui, 2013:537). Thus, mainstreaming gender perspectives in all aspects of POs ensures that peace and security interventions are relevant to all stakeholders, responsive to their needs, and effective in the promotion of equality.

2.5.3. The call for ‘Robustness’: a new era of Peace Operations?

The third key contemporary development in POs, is the increasing call for ‘robustness’. The concept of robust POs emerged in the late 1990s as a response to the tragedies of Rwanda, Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia, where UN POs forces failed to stop massive violations of human rights, allegedly because they were not sufficiently robust. The Brahimi Report referred several times to the necessity of ‘robust peacekeeping forces’, in order to account for the modern day realities of contemporary POs (United Nations, 2000a: ix, xi, 1, 10, 54).

The issue of how best to use force in the UN’s name lies at the heart of Brahimi Report’s vision (Bellamy & Williams, 2004:188). The Report argued forcefully that once the UN had committed itself to conducting a peace operation its personnel must be able, if required, to impose order on conflict zones rather than wait for the belligerents themselves to reach equilibrium and simply ‘bury the dead’ if they did not (United Nations, 2000a; Chan, 1997:
As the Report put it, the UN must be capable of projecting ‘credible force’ in order “to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them” (United Nations, 2000a:viii). Thierry Tardy explains that “robustness is designed to allow a POs force to protect itself, to provide freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate, or more broadly the peace process, is ‘taken hostage’ by spoilers” (Tardy, 2011:152). Tardy (2011:152) also notes that robust POs is not a new concept and that it actually “has been partially implemented in some POs” and gives the DRC, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon as examples.

However, the problem with the call for ‘robustness’ is that it in some respects, it deviates from the three principles of POs, that of consent, impartiality, and the traditional no use of force except in self-defence. Kuhne’s (1999) early work was actually set to try and make sense of the operationalisation of robust POs. The work sees a robust peace operation, as a “Chapter VI wider peacekeeping, with consent and impartiality as basic operational pillars, plus the option of the threat or use of limited force for defending or implementing specific elements of the mandate, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter” (Kuhne, 1999:359). This is one, if not the main reason why the Brahimi Report called for the “liberal interpretation” of said principles, in order to account for the modern day realities of contemporary POs.

Robust POs were at the heart of what, in the early 1990s, was referred to as the ‘grey area’ of POs, an ill-defined activity situated between TPK and PE (Ruggie, 1993:28; Goulding, 1993:461). The UN and its member states have faced great difficulty in handling this grey area, in terms of both doctrine and operations (Jakobsen, 2000). However, in trying to distinguish between robust POs and peace enforcement, the work of Zwanenburg (2005), Tardy (2011) and Swope (2011) comes to the fore. They all illustrate that when looking at the UN prescribed principles, consent is the broad Rubicon separating robust POs from peace enforcement. In this case consent is required for robust POs, but not in the case of peace enforcement.

One pertinent question remains however, is whether ‘robustness’ is an approach or an activity? The UN and all regional organisations undertaking POs, need to take stock of the reality of modern day POs. These organisations will have to decide on which side of the ‘robustness’ argument they stand (approach vs. activity), and this goes especially to regions that provide the arena’s for the operationalisation and existence of POs. Individually, troop-contributing countries will need to know where they stand when it comes to ‘robustness’, and
collectively, the UN must continue its hard work in clarifying what it means by the concept. The world is a dynamic place, where nothing should remain stagnant, and this goes too for the operationalisation of ‘robustness’.

2.5.4. The Capstone Doctrine: A doctrine for the future?

The final operational change that has impacted upon the environment of modern day POs, is that of the Capstone Doctrine. Donald (2001) and Malan (2000) have elucidated what is meant by the concept of doctrine, as well as its relation to POs. Doctrine can be seen as “the foundation for military operations by establishing a framework for understanding how those operations should be approached” (Donald, 2001:108). In the case of this paper, doctrine has a different content and emphasis at various levels of application. “At the supranational level, doctrine manifests itself in various tenets of international law — the most overarching, of course, being the UN Charter itself” (Malan, 2000a:29). Practically it assists commanders that are supposed to train their men and women in accordance with, and it also provides the conceptual springboard for the preparation and conduct of operations (Donald, 2001:107). However when it comes to POs doctrine, it has provided limited clarity. To understand the difficulties and ambiguities with contemporary POs doctrine one first needs to take into cognisance that the ground-level operational environment has changed.

The importance of doctrine might also be discounted given that the slavish following of the prescriptive UN principles is likely to hamstring operations in the extremely volatile environment of contemporary POs, where ‘mission creep’ and varyingly compliant parties to the conflict are a given (Thornton, 2000:141). This is illustrated in that it seems as if doctrine writers addressed the new post-Cold War environment emphasising old principles. Moreover, national doctrine writers all blurred the lines with their conceptualisations of key POs terms. This is seen in that countries will preserve their independent military traditions, in the same way that they will preserve their political traditions and their independence and sovereignty, in general. The starting point for a deliberate process of developing integrated military doctrine must therefore be the recognition that the term ‘doctrine’ simply means different things in different countries and languages (Malan, 2000a:46).

It was against this background, in which the UN published the Capstone Doctrine. One of the objectives of producing it was to “ensure that the growing numbers of United Nations POs personnel deployed in the field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks they are required to perform” (United
Nations, 2008a:6). Swope (2011:42) notes that this new doctrine aimed to contribute to creating a common understanding of UN POs. It attempts to explain the complex environment within which UN POs operate. By better understanding the basic principles and concepts of POs, as well as their strengths and limitations, all those involved in POs will be able to perform better and meet mission objectives (Swope, 2011:42). The purpose of the document aimed “to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations POs, which are usually deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict” (United Nations, 2008a:8). As highlighted earlier, the Capstone Doctrine was also released to deal with the issue of robustness, as well as to try addressing the conceptual evolution of the three POs principles – consent, minimum use of force and impartiality.

According to the document, a key point to understanding POs, is to understand that conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement “rarely occur in a linear or sequential way” and that experience has shown “that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing” (United Nations, 2008a:20). This is in line with the earlier stated generational understanding of intended ends and means of POs.

To support this contention, the document goes further and lists three success factors that are crucial if POs are to succeed. These are the need to be perceived as 1) legitimate and 2) credible by the host country population, and 3) the promotion of local and national ownership of the peace process (United Nations, 2008a: chapter 3). As noted in the manual (United Nations, 2008a:36):

The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its legitimacy.

The perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is directly related to the quality and conduct of its military, police and civilian personnel. The bearing and behaviour of all personnel must be of the highest order, commensurate with the important responsibilities entrusted to a United Nations peacekeeping
operation, and should meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. The mission’s senior leadership must ensure that all personnel are fully aware of the standards of conduct that are expected of them and that effective measures are in place to prevent misconduct.

The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations is derived from its unique position in international law, the UN Charter and UN Security Council authorisation (de Coning et al., 2008:2). Legitimacy, therefore, is a crucially important asset of POs, one they are given by virtue of working under a Security Council mandate, who the international community has given authority for maintaining international peace and security. Losing this legitimacy seriously jeopardises the mission (Swope, 2011:51).

Credibility, the second of the success factors, is crucial. Early on, and throughout the deployment of an operation, credibility “is likely to be tested for weakness and division by those whose interests are threatened by its presence” (United Nations, 2008a:37). By establishing credibility early, the mission can “help to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood that a mission will need force to achieve its mandate” (United Nations, 2008a:38). Furthermore, Swope (2011:53) issues that when credibility is lost it “is hard to get back”, and by having low credibility or losing it, whether because of the weakness of the mission force or a lack of effectiveness, there will be negative effects on the mission’s legitimacy and the consent of the parties, in addition to a negative effect on the morale of mission personnel, who may become less effective, thereby creating even more problems. The knock-on effect is clear.

Finally, and because UN POs are meant to help countries emerging from conflict, usually internal, there needs to be a high level of national and local ownership in the maintenance of stability and following the peace process if the UN mission is to succeed (de Coning et al., 2008:2; Swope, 2011:54). This includes everything related to post-conflict reconstruction and development. “In planning and executing a United Nations POs’ core activities,” says the manual, “every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors” (United Nations, 2008a:39). By building national and local ownership as well as partnerships, the UN can improve the legitimacy of the peace process and the UN mandate, as well as “help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn” (United Nations, 2008a:39). The three additional success factors clearly all play into one another, as if a
mission is lacking in one of these areas, it causes a serious detriment to the upholding (or pursuit) of another.

More, the document is said to sit at the “highest-level of the current doctrinal framework” of/for UN POs (United Nations, 2008a:9). However, and immediately, this provides a problem. Cottey (2008:439) highlights, and in stark contrast to the ‘high-level’ the document ascribes itself, the ‘Capstone Doctrine’ explicitly “does not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual Member States” (United Nations, 2008a:9). This is problematic, as Victoria Holt & Tobias Berkman (2006:114) have observed:

Without its own doctrine, the UN relies on what is developed by Member States. Some countries have sophisticated doctrine for peace operations; others have none. Canada and Great Britain come closest to providing guidance to their armed forces on coercive protection and reflecting the language of The Responsibility to Protect. Few others have the protection of civilians identified strategically and as an overall goal of military operations.

Overall the new doctrine is an important milestone in formulating what constitutes UN POs. however, as it reflects decades of UN experience with POs and will be an invaluable tool to provide orientation and guidance to new and existing (UN) POs personnel (de Coning et al., 2008: 6). Finally, the various definitions and understandings of key terms and concepts that exist in national POs doctrines – such as of the United States, and the United Kingdom (British Army, 1996; US Army, 1993) – as well as in the POs doctrines of International Organisations – such as the United Nations and NATO – may have a significant influence on the undertaking of POs by regional organisations under Ch VIII of the UN Charter. It is to this that the overview turns next.

2.5.5. Regionalisation of Peace Operations:

The fifth and final identified key contemporary development, one which is an institutional development as well, is that of the increased involvement of regional organisations in the POs forum.

POs were for long the purview of the UN [as identified and defined in the Agenda for Peace (1992: para.20)]. However, this qualification to UN presence disappears in the Brahimi Report’s definition published in 2000 (2000a: para.12). In the last two decades there have
been significant increases in the number of POs run by entities other than the UN. This highlights the dramatically changed POs environment, with the POs ‘market-place’ becoming undoubtedly multi-polar, involving many more actors than in the past, argues de Guttry (2011:34). Further, the Brahimi Report, in its treatment of doctrine and strategy, clearly envisages that regional organisations will remain the vehicle of choice for POs in non-benign security environments – such as those encountered in most complex emergencies in Africa (Malan, 2001:122).

Operationally, such an arrangement is made possible by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter sets out three Articles (Art. 52-54) which establish the possibility for, and conditions of, regional organisations and their activities in the field of international peace and security (United Nations, 1945: Art. 52-54, Ch. VIII). The three Articles condition regional organisations and their activities in the field of international peace and security in three ways (United Nations, 1945: Art. 52-54, Ch. VIII; Yamashita, 2009:10): (a) they should be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations; (b) no enforcement action should be taken by them unless authorised by the Security Council; and (c) the Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation by them for the maintenance of international peace and security.

One may identify the two different types of partnerships that exist between the UN and regional organisations – operational and institutional partnerships (Yamashita, 2009: 1; Yamashita, 2012:167). Descriptively, an Operational partnership is a mission-to-mission partnership in a specific conflict situation. This partnership is also called ‘partnering’ (Yamashita, 2012:169) or ‘joint running’ (de Guttry, 2011:49). An Institutional partnership, on the other hand, involves working-level efforts between secretariats of the organisations concerned on issues related to mission preparation and management. This may also be identified as ‘subcontracting’ (Yamashita, 2012:169) ‘outsourcing’ (de Guttry, 2011:48).

Firstly, the principle of the UN primacy is translated into what may be called the “subcontracting” of these missions, in which a regional organisation is responsible for the POs and yet legitimised/authorised, monitored and directed by the Security Council (Yamashita, 2009: 16; Yamashita, 2012:169). The notion of subcontracting is anchored in the notion of UN primacy because regional POs are in essence UN operations delegated to regional organisations, and as such their success bolsters the credibility of the UN with a lesser operational burden. Furthermore, this arrangement is bolstered by provisions in
Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, and it is an important source of legitimacy for regional organisations’ POs. This sought of relationship is critical to the success factor brought forward earlier by the *Capstone Doctrine*. However, subcontracting presumes a hierarchical relationship that many regional organisations are rather cautious and even reluctant to develop and formalise (Yamashita, 2012:170).

By contrast, in envisaging a relationship between UN POs and regional POs as a network of interconnected POs capabilities, which implies a more horizontal relationship, is what ‘partnering’ is all about. Thus, the UN should partner with regional organisations to create such global network capabilities (Yamashita, 2012:170). This form of relationship obviously comes with several advantages. The first, and in contrast to the above, is that it is non-hierarchical, providing an “interactive nature that lessens the kind of wariness on the part of regional organisations” (Yamashita, 2009:25). This may be important in expanding the network towards regional actors which are already conducting POs (for example, NATO) or beginning to develop such capacity (for example, the AU). Finally, the ‘partnering’ concept encourages initiatives to foster new institutional partnerships with a wide variety of actors. However, it should be kept in mind that in order to potentially construct a world network of POs capabilities, and as in all things UN, it depends on the willingness on the part of the regional organisation, and eventually its member states, to join it (Yamashita, 2012:170-171).

The most recent UN reform initiative was launched in July 2009 is the release of a “non-paper” produced by the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) as a “consultative document” meant to contribute to “an on-going discussion about the future direction of UN POs and how this unique instrument can continue to serve the international community” (United Nations, 2009a:2). The document, built on previous POs reform efforts, is titled, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping*, and is referred to as the New Horizon Initiative (NHI). The reason I bring this document up, is due to the fact that it is an expression of and by the UN to forge partnerships (loosely translated) in order to improve modern day POs. It has three lines of action meant to achieve shared understanding, and unity of purpose of the challenges to POs and appropriate responses. Taken directly from the paper, they are (United Nations, 2009a: iv-vi):
• **A partnership in purpose:** a shared vision of the purpose of UN Peacekeeping and a more inclusive approach to designing, planning and managing UN Peacekeeping missions.

• **A partnership in action:** agreed approaches and capacities required to implement this vision on the ground and to deliver critical tasks, as well as manage crises.

• **A partnership for the future:** a collective dedication to building and sustaining the right capabilities for UN peacekeeping into the future, by examining new ways of drawing on global resources and flexible, innovative measures to deploy, support and sustain peacekeepers in the field.

The third line of action is crucial here, as here the NHI calls for building dependable and sustainable POs capabilities to “serve as a global peace and security instrument” (United Nations, 2009a: v). This third line of action has four sub-elements, but we will not be looking at all. The third of the four sub-elements is the most crucial as it reads “expanding the peacekeeping partnership” (United Nations, 2009a:v-vi) and calls for an expanded number of troop contributors to “enhance collective burden-sharing, in addition to increased cooperation between the UN and other regional organisations such as the African Union and the European Union in the hopes it will “maximise finite global peacekeeping resources” (United Nations, 2009a:vi). Clearly, the UN has demonstrated the favouring of the ‘partnering’ model of relationship as the world in its entirety is suffering from finite resources, nevertheless POs resources.

The advent, and continued rise of regionalisation in the maintenance of international peace and security is welcomed. There are many arguments for, and against it, but one thing is for certain: the UN can now devolve some of its responsibilities to regional organisations. The devolution of responsibility comes in a time where, as mentioned before, resources are finite. However good this may be, the UN needs to clarify which form of relationship it wishes to have with regional organisations. More, the problems highlighted earlier are detrimental to the consideration of regional POs. A suggestion would be that, each case that is brought forward for a possible peace operation, needs to be handled transparently and independently by the Security Council, so that no biases creep into the decision making.

Finally, and despite the emergence of regional POs, UN POs remain the world’s largest source of POs – regional POs suppliers generally defer to the Security Council’s power to
authorise or endorse POs. Thus, the UN still holds the key to designing the future of more
globalised POs cooperation (Yamashita, 2012:183).

2.6. MOVING FORWARD:

The information provided in this chapter is relevant to the study as it provides a framework to
shape and demarcate understanding and analysis. In terms of the schools of thought
highlighted, they are relevant to the study as they provide an analytical tool for understanding
the current, as well as alternative South African position on the function of POs. Moreover,
the paper is cognisant of the two generational divisions and understandings of different types
of POs. These are relevant to the study, as they will also provide an analytical tool for
understanding, as well as assist in demarcating, through the activities of participation in POs,
the current and past South African positions. Moreover, the conceptual framework to be used
for understanding POs will be: “internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts
to promote and protect…transitions from war to peace” (Durch, 2006:xvii). Furthermore, POs
are taken to be a general type of activity that may be used to prevent, limit and/or manage
conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Being mindful of the various ‘general types of
activity’ as elucidated, this paper has highlighted and defined these activities as Traditional

Finally, the five identified contemporary developments in POs – the Brahimi Report; the
WPS Agenda; the call for ‘Robustness’; the Capstone Doctrine; and, the advent of the
regionalisation of POs – provide the analytical framework against which to analyse the
continued relevance of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. The five identified developments
therefore also provide the framework to evaluate and demarcate what would be necessary in
an updated White Paper on South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions.

2.7. CONCLUSION:

This chapter critically analysed and defined the concept of Peace Operations and has
illustrated the nature of its contemporary development. Furthermore, the Traditionalist and
Revisionist schools of thought to POs, as well as the different generational understandings of
POs were identified and analysed in the chapter. Both the schools of thought and different
generational divisions highlighted, allow for both inter-subjective and objective analysis.
Throughout the discussion, it became clear that POs have not evolved in a straightforward or
linear manner with a ‘clear and clean’ division between Cold War and post-Cold War
operations. In addition, the paper’s working definition of the concept of POs and its accompanying activities were explicitly identified and analysed.

It is clear that POs have changed over time, and even though the nature and dynamics of the evolution are contested, one thing is certain – POs have become the most important means for the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden areas.

In addition, the identification of the five contemporary developments that have occurred since the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM highlights that POs are not stagnant. POs, or those who operationalise a peace operation – be it an individual country, regional or international organisation – need to be wary of the ever changing nature of both conflict, and the international system itself. Through these identified developments, it is clear that POs are incredibly dynamic in nature and have changed considerably since their inception. It is this continued change, or ‘evolution’, that we should stay abreast of in order to mitigate any future surprises that might occur in the arena of POs.

The abovementioned sections of the chapter, as evidenced in the discussion and analysis, therefore embrace the multidimensional and multifaceted nature of both the definitional, as well as operational and institutional characteristics of POs. As such, the outcome of this in-depth analysis and discussion is a concise and solid foundation that encapsulates the required conceptual and analytical framework for the remainder of this study. Overall, this chapter lays a theoretical and analytical basis upon which to appraise South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. Thus, and in using the before-mentioned conceptual and analytical framework on POs, the next chapter will briefly describe as well as critically analyse South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM.
CHAPTER THREE

SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACE OPERATIONS POLICY FRAMEWORK – DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (SAPIPM) forms the cornerstone of South Africa’s POs policy framework and will accordingly be unpacked here. However, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM was the product of a culmination of policy efforts by the South African government to make sense of POs as well as the potential role South Africa would play. Given this, it is therefore important that the paper provides a brief historical overview of the policies and documents that provided the thinking that underpins the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM.

With the end of Apartheid, South Africa’s reintegration into the international community came with great international expectation that the country would now actively engage in conflict resolution efforts in both her region and continent. However, and understandably so, the new African National Congress (ANC) led government was heavily focused on its pressing domestic agenda, and thus “displayed a reluctance to engage in what would likely become expensive and cumbersome ventures outside of its national borders” (ACCORD, 2007:11). Thus, after 1994, there was a strong sense that South Africa first needed to concentrate on its own development in order to address the huge inequalities that were perpetuated during Apartheid, as well as the international sanctions campaign against the Apartheid government.

Furthermore, and if the expectation were to be met, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would be expected to play an important role in South African engagement in POs in both the region and the continent. However, Alex Vines (2010:59) highlights that at first, the SANDF was not particularly interested in deploying into POs as it was preoccupied with transformation, “including the need to integrate seven different armed formations (many of which had been historical adversaries), while South Africa’s diplomatic corps had been isolated from Africa for many years and also faced the challenges of transformation” (Vines, 2010:59). Thus, the transformation of the SANDF into a truly national defence force was given priority over all other considerations.
Nonetheless, towards the late 1990s, there was growing recognition by the South African government, that South Africa’s prosperity and stability would be closely linked to the political and economic development of the continent as a whole, a realisation that reflected an appreciation of the close nexus between regional stability, security and development (Cilliers and Malan, 1996:343; ACCORD, 2007: 11; Nibishaka, 2011:1). This awareness contributed towards a change in attitude by the South African government, and there was a display of greater willingness to engage in African conflict resolution endeavours. Thus, and in also owing to the new ANC led Government’s unique struggle history, shaped by the indebtedness to foreign assistance (mostly, if not wholly, towards African governments) the ANC had had while in exile, the new South African government was quick to declare through its 1996 White Paper on National Defence, that “as a fully-fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations” (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 5, para. 19). This position was reiterated by then Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, noting that “there are also expectations from Africa that South Africa should make a significant contribution towards peace and development on the continent” (Mbeki, 1995).

As alluded to earlier, South Africa’s POs engagement could not be achieved without the SANDF, as they are the primary apparatus implementing South Africa’s POs capabilities (Du Plessis, 2003:106,132). The 1998 Defence Review (Department of Defence, 1998) affirms this by highlighting that, “the SANDF has particular skills and expertise in communications, field engineering (including mine-clearing), medical, and command and control functions which are relevant to the SANDF secondary role of peace support operations”.

Therefore, in the late 1990s, South Africa finally decided that she too needed to assist in conflict resolution efforts. In earnest, the country only became involved after the proclamation of the 1999 White Paper SAPIPM. The aim of the now 18 year-old 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM (DIRCO, 1999) was to establish a well-defined mandate for dealing with the (potentially) large number of requests South Africa would receive for involvement in POs. By issuing this White Paper, the South African government declared that, as a member of the UN, South Africa should assist the world body in its POs task. Since then, South African personnel have served in UN and AU missions in, amongst others, Burundi, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and the Comoros.
In addition, and to further indicate the importance to which the South African government has placed on its involvement in POs, as a post-1998 foreign policy priority, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM has been supplemented by various policy provisions and declarations. Briefly, this is evident in: a) the 1998 South African Defence Review; b) the 2012 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy; and, c) the 2015 South African Defence Review. However, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is South Africa’s core POs involvement policy framework, and is therefore the object of discussion and analysis of this chapter.

As a point of departure however, the paper first provides a brief historical context into South Africa’s POs involvement policy development prior to the proclamation of 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. Here, the paper turns briefly to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; the White Paper on National Defence, 1996; as well as the 1998 South African Defence Review. Getting to the crux of the chapter, and building on the theoretical and analytical framework developed in the previous chapter, the chapter then discusses and analyses the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, concluding that an update is required. This is important, as this chapter serves to identify the areas in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM that need to be updated/changed, or what new things are necessary to ensure that South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework reflects the new trends and developments identified in Chapter Two (the discussion and analysis of which is the focus of Chapter Four).

3.2. SOUTH AFRICA’S PRE-1999 PEACE OPERATIONS INVOLVEMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK:

The following documents provide an indication of the South African government’s initial philosophy and policy framework, the initial principles and guidelines for participation, the defence and military posture, and the logistical and financial implications of SANDF deployment for POs (Hough et al., 2006:104). Pertinently, post-apartheid defence policy in South Africa developed in an open and consultative manner. It developed in phases starting with the negotiations for the Interim Constitution of South Africa (1993), which included a chapter establishing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), whom as mentioned earlier, are the primary apparatus implementing South Africa’s POs capabilities.

3.2.1. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996:

South African contributions to peace operations were foreseen by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as it stated that the role of SANDF was “(a) to act in
cooperation with the Police Service; (b) to act in defence of the republic; and (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation” [South Africa, 1996: art 201(2)]. The Constitution stipulates, somewhat vaguely, that “the primary object [emphasis added] of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force” [South Africa, 1996: art 200(2)]. Thus, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa does not make any explicit provision for a separation in primary and secondary tasks of the SANDF, as envisioned and defined in important policy documents to come – the 1996 White Paper on National Defence of the Republic of South Africa and the 1998 South African Defence Review which are both “structured around constitutional imperatives guided by the amended 1995 Defence Act” (Ferreira, 2009:77).

3.2.2. **White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 1996:**

The 1996 *White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, (the White Paper on Defence) dealt with the issue of POs in a more explicit and at the time, complete manner. The White Paper on Defence sought as its mandate to differentiate between primary and secondary functions of the SANDF. Moreover, it was within this document that the South African government declared its “responsibility to participate in international peace support operations” (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 5. para. 19). The document (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 5. para. 25) further stated that;

> South Africa's consideration of involvement in specific peace support operations will not be limited to the possible deployment of troops. The involvement could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities... [emphasis added]

Critically, the policy document stipulated that the “primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression”. More, and in terms of the current mandate of the SANDF, participation in *peace operations* is regarded as a secondary function (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 2. para 11.9). The document then moves on to stipulate that, “South Africa shares the view with many of its neighbouring countries that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force is not required or feasible and that the country is therefore likely to engage in peace operations on an *ad hoc* basis if the need arises” [emphasis added] (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch 4. para 24).
Thus, South Africa's defence policy since the end of apartheid has prevented the country from taking a bigger role in African POs. As described above, the tone was set by the South African government's 1996 White Paper on Defence, which made the primary role of the armed forces defence against external aggression (IRIN, 2012). This emphasis on the primary function of the armed forces (preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty) was to constitute the major force design principle in the subsequent Defence Review (Williams, 2002: 207), the policy document we turn to next.

3.2.3. **South African Defence Review, 1998:**

For the first time in South Africa's history, and showing its increased importance in South African policy development circles, the 1998 *South African Defence Review* (the 1998 Defence Review) dedicated an entire chapter to international peace operations, covering the following aspects: policy framework, types of POs, authority and decision making, departmental and operational considerations, training and force design (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch 5). In its identified policy framework, the document (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch 5 para. 1-2, 5-6) states that:

1. As a fully-fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international **peace support operations**.

2. In the short-term, however, such participation will be regarded with caution since the political and military dynamics of these operations are new to South Africa and the Department of Defence.

...  

5. South Africa will only become involved in specific **peace support operations** if the following conditions are met:

5.1 There should be parliamentary approval and public support. This requires an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and the risk to military personnel.

5.2 The operation should be authorised by the UN Security Council.

5.3 Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC [Southern African Development Community] and undertaken with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU [Organisation of African Unity].
5.4 The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.

5.5 There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.

6. Involvement in peace support operations will not be limited to the deployment of troops. It could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, humanitarian aid, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities... [additions and emphasis added by author]

Even though this policy document determines the conditions to be met for South African involvement in POs, the authority and decision making procedures to be followed before possible deployment, the various departmental and operational considerations to be taken into cognisance when contemplating involvement in POs, it neglects the very important UN principles for POs. The 1998 Review also still reiterates the views of the 1996 White Paper on Defence, as to the ad hoc nature and secondary role of peace operations (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch 4 para. 12-14; Neethling, 2003a: 99). Thus, under the “force design” section of the chapter on “International Peace Support Operations”, the 1998 Review states that “in terms of the mandate of the SANDF, participation in international peace support operations is a secondary function. The SANDF will therefore not normally create special structures for such operations, but will rather provide for them within the primary structure” (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch 5 para. 34).

Thus the 1998 Review contained a major limitation, which was its emphasis on the primary function of defence as the raison d’etre for the existence of both the defence function and stable civil-military relations (Williams, 2002:205-206). To bridge these differences, and to prepare South Africa for what was (domestically and internationally) expected to become a growing role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, particularly on the African continent, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) [now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)] developed a White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, that was approved by Cabinet in October 1998 and tabled in Parliament in February 1999.

With South Africa’s pre-1999 POs involvement policy background now in context, we now turn to describe South Africa’s primary POs involvement policy framework (the before-mentioned 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM) so as to allow the paper to determine what is necessary to be updated or changed.
3.3. WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS, 1999:

The 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (SAPIPM) – the core South African policy development in the area of peace operations, as well as policy development in South African involvement in peace operations – sets out a proposed policy on South African involvement in POs and characterises the conclusion of a collaborative process which amalgamated the views of representatives of DIRCO (then Dep. of Foreign Affairs), “the Department of Defence (DoD), various other government departments, members of the academic community and civil society” (Neethling, 2003a: 95). Two corollary questions arise: why was the White Paper developed? And, what was the aim and/or purpose of this document?

One of the primary reasons for initiating the White Paper on SAPIPM (hereon referred to as “The 1999 White Paper”) process had been the absence of clear procedural guidelines for the government to react to requests for participation in a peace operation (Williams, 2000: 93). Thus, the aim of the White Paper was to “describe the nature of contemporary POs and to provide clear and concise inter-departmental policy guidelines on South African participation in such efforts” (DIRCO, 1999: 5). The White Paper formed the core policy response to the widespread expectations that South Africa had to contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts on the African continent.

As a starting point, the White Paper clearly makes the point that “although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded to Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus for future engagements” (DIRCO, 1999:22). Simply put, the White Paper states “South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood” (DIRCO, 1999:20). South Africa believes that her future is linked to that of Africa and without an end to “protracted conflicts and the establishment of secure and effective states, there are slim prospects for stability or sustainable socio-economic development” (ACCORD, 2007:22). Moreover, the White Paper reiterated the position that participation in the international community has increasingly become “a prerequisite for international respectability and for an authoritative voice in the debate on the future of international conflict management and the reform of
intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, the then OAU (now AU) and SADC” (DIRCO, 1999:20).

The White Paper therefore recognised that the changing security environment requires a multi-disciplinary approach to conflict resolution, incorporating the "political, economic, social, cultural and personal security...[and] that appropriate responses...must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and on-going economic and social development” (DIRCO, 1999:5). As a result of this understanding, the White Paper understood that each peace operation is unique in character and therefore highlighted that “this document should be regarded as an aid to capacity building and decision-making, rather than a definitive set of prescriptions” (DIRCO, 1999: 5). Thus, as a foreign policy document, it outlined the national interests of South Africa, as well as how these interests interfaced “with its philosophy on conflict resolution and its general approach towards Africa” (Neethling, 2002: 1; Neethling, 2003a: 95).

The 1999 White Paper further provides DIRCO with the lead responsibility of overseeing and coordinating South Africa’s involvement in international POs, and to this effect the Department established a National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM) in 1999. Aside from being mandated to coordinate South African engagement in international POs and maintain political oversight of such missions, the NOCPM “is also tasked to lead Pretoria’s whole-of-government approach to international POs, thereby leading the combined planning of the DoD, the Department of Safety and Security, and the National Treasury” (Lotze, de Coning, Neethling, 2013: 3) It therefore adopted a holistic, multi-disciplinary approach, where political and military tasks were also driven by humanitarian concerns.

The paper will now turn to briefly describing the contents of the 1999 White Paper so as to gage and highlight the necessity of an update to South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework. The paper will describe the White Paper by following the sequence of chapters that are presented in the White Paper itself so as to provide both reader and the paper with contextual and conceptual clarity.
3.3.1. **Contents of the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions:**

3.3.1.1. **Chapter One: Introduction**

This chapter of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM provides the introduction and background of the policy paper. The chapter provide an important consideration in terms of the dynamics surrounding an overly prescriptive policy, as well as the dynamics surrounding policy guidelines that are too open-ended (DIRCO, 1999: 5).

3.3.1.2. **Chapter Two: The White Paper on the Nature and Scope of Contemporary POs**

This chapter of the 1999 White Paper provides South Africa with her frame of reference for understanding POs.

The first section of this chapter deals with what the White Paper (WP) calls “the changing security environment” (DIRCO, 1999:5). This environment consists of two aspects upon which the WP is founded. First, the WP purports a move away from a traditional understanding of security (largely limited to military dimensions), to a more broadened understanding of security, “to include political economic, social and personal security” (DIRCO, 1999: 6). This leads the WP to understand the fact that “appropriate responses to on-going political, economic and social instability must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and on-going economic and social development” (DIRCO, 1999: 6).

Secondly, the environment, as explained in the WP, is characterised by the fall of superpower conflicts which has been accompanied “by the emergence of a variety of new conflicts” (DIRCO, 1999: 6). The WP moves to explain that, (DIRCO, 1999:6);

> ...the emergence of new ethnic rivalries, the resurfacing of old ethnic, religious, historical and regional differences, the fragmentation of sovereign states, increased contest over territories and national boundaries and the attempted resolution of these differences via a resort to arms. Such conflicts inevitably cause or exacerbate the sources\(^4\) of human insecurity.

\(^4\)The White Paper on SAPIPM highlights that poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy and malnutrition are the sources of human insecurity.
The White Paper was therefore appropriately conceptualised within the changing security environment. Further, and within the context of its leading philosophy, it adequately identifies that, (DIRCO, 1999: 18, 19):

...many of the crises that beset individual countries and their respective sub-regions have deep-rooted causes... All too frequently, the resources and energies of the international community, regions and sub-regions and the national state are mobilised mainly around the symptoms of the conflict. ...there is no single, simple or short-term approach to resolving crises...

From here, the second section of this chapter highlights South Africa’s conceptual understanding of POs. From the outset, the White Paper also sought to mitigate any conceptual confusion and ambiguities, so as to provide South African involvement in POs with clear and concise operational definitions. As noted earlier, throughout the mid-1990s, a seemingly confusing array of concepts and terms was used regarding the scope and meaning of, the then newly coined ‘South African’ concept of, peace missions. Terms such as "peace operations", “peace support operations”, "peacekeeping operations", "peace missions" and others “were used interchangeably to denote the overarching spectrum of activities related to involvement aimed at settling international disputes in terms of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter” (Neethling, 2003a: 95).

South African role-players then pointed out that although there was general consensus that all the above measures are aimed at conflict resolution, management and prevention, they were also in essence political and diplomatic (with the armed forces as one of the role-players), “the word ‘operation’ inevitably created the perception of a military activity” (Rossouw, 1999: 38; Neethling, 2003a: 96). It was then suggested that the term ‘peace mission’ be used as an appropriate “collective and overarching term to describe activities aimed at preventing or settling international disputes in terms of the UN Charter” (Neethling, 2003a: 95). The idea was to “have a term that would ensure the necessary emphasis on the political/diplomatic nature of the activity” (Rossouw, 1999: 38). Accordingly, the term ‘peace mission’ is described in the White Paper as an appropriate generic term to include ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘peacebuilding’. At the time, the DoD preferred the term ‘peace support operations’ in its policy documents, such as the White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review, highlighted above. The White
Paper on SAPIPM therefore suggests that the term ‘peace support operations’ be used to refer to all military activities in support of a peace mission (DIRCO, 1999:8).

Moreover, the White Paper emphasises the activity of peacebuilding and upholds that POs should be seen as long-term activities, as opposed to the perceptions of POs as short-term endeavours. The White Paper outlines peacebuilding as: “the inculcation of respect for human rights and political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the capacity of state and civil institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity” (DIRCO, 1999: 19).

The remaining sections of this chapter delve into describing the various roles played by civilians and the military in POs. Before highlighting these roles, the WP sets to further contextualise that before 1989, the activity of peacekeeping was predominantly a military one, with civilians largely involved in humanitarian assistance. However, with the change of function, scope and size of POs having blurred the “distinction between political, military and humanitarian tasks in the pursuit of peace” (DIRCO, 1999: 9), the activities of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance have merged into a single effort undertaken by a larger and multifunctional task force (DIRCO, 1999: 9).

On the roles of civilians, the White Paper on SAPIPM highlights that “most modern POs are led by a civilian representative of an intergovernmental organisation – most commonly a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG)” (DIRCO, 1999: 10). The White Paper then talks of the SRSG’s multinational support staff, who typically include “political officers, secretarial staff, translators/interpreters and technical staff” that are required to manage and control communication requirements of the SRSG (DIRCO, 1999: 10). More, the White Paper highlights that at a functional level, “civilians will also be engaged in a wide range of activities such as electoral monitoring and assistance, promoting and monitoring human rights, monitoring disarmament and adherence to sanctions, providing humanitarian assistance, demining and security provision” (DIRCO, 1999: 10).

The role of the military inevitably brings up the issue of ‘use of force’. Therefore to contextualise her input, South Africa stated through its 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM that a peace operation should “generally be achieved without the use of military force, although circumstances may necessitate the use of force to ensure the safety of the force or to fulfil the mandate of the operation” (DIRCO, 1999: 12). Simply put then, the White Paper highlights that the military commitment to POs includes those activities where the military operates “in
support of the political / diplomatic / humanitarian objectives of the broader mission” (DIRCO, 1999: 11). These roles include, but are not limited to “the separation of combatants; the disarmament of irregular forces; the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army; assistance with reintegration into civil society; assisting with elections for new governments; carefully controlling and restricting their own use of force; provide presence and observation; administer checkpoints and, conduct patrols” (DIRCO, 1999: 11, 12).

Another significant role of the military in POs is that of the unarmed Military Observer. Interestingly, as is true for POs, the tasks of the military observer are determined by the mandate of the particular peace operation as well as “the prevailing political and military situation” (DIRCO, 1999: 13). From here on, and in concluding this chapter, the White Paper describes the various roles played and tasks provided by the various components within the military, namely: the army, military engineers, military police, military medical capabilities, the air force, the navy and a national military support unit.

What is important to note however, is that the final two sections of the chapter, that of the roles of civilians and the military, are explanatory with no significant emphasis added to the potential role and tasks of a South African contribution. The White Paper does very well at exposing the various tasks and discussing them. However, the White Paper fails to adequately dictate South Africa’s civilian and military roles, and rather implies them.

3.3.1.3. Chapter Three: The White Paper on the International Mandate for POs

This chapter of the White Paper on SAPIPM is divided into three sections dealing with mandates coming from the UN, Regional and Sub-Regional structures. The “UN Mandate” section broadly details the processes leading up to the formulation and implementation of a peace operation. Here, the White Paper aims to describe the legal authority and capacity of the UN Mandate (provided by the UNSC resolution), which includes: the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); the overarching principle of consent, except in cases of UN Charter Chapter VII operations; the process followed after the mandate has been published; and, the importance of a clear chain of command within a peace operation in order for it to be successful (DIRCO, 1999: 14-16). This section therefore only talks in general about the use of, operationalisation, and importance of the UN Mandate and does not ‘bring it back’ to a South African perspective.
Secondly, in the “Regional and Sub-Regional Mandates” section of the chapter clearly stipulates that “Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for regional bodies such as the OAU [the present day African Union (AU)], North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or ECOWAS to participate in POs in their respective regions on the basis of their own initiative” (DIRCO, 1999: 16). Furthermore, even though it was uncommon at the time, and by use of examples, the section highlights that there had been “a clear trend towards deployment of a number of non-UN POs under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter” (DIRCO, 1999: 17). It identifies the POs conducted by: ECOWAS in West Africa; Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in July 1992; and, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia as evidence that regional POs have steadily gained ground (DIRCO, 1999: 17). From here on, the chapter talks about, the now outdated, OAU and its role in POs through the 1993 Cairo Declaration, establishing the OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. What is crucial here is that the White Paper states that through establishing the aforementioned Mechanism (DIRCO, 1999: 17);

...the African Heads of State and Government emphasised that the United Nations, with its cumulative experience, expertise and greater resources than the OAU, should clearly remain the pre-eminent international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security - including internal crises which threaten regional stability in Africa. [emphasis added]

The section then goes on to mention that “it was also realised that regional and sub-regional organisations on the one hand, and the United Nations system on the other hand, should endeavour to share proportionately the burden relating to the maintenance of world-wide peace, security and stability” (DIRCO, 1999: 17). Thus, the White Paper sought to make clear that regional POs under UN approval would be the most likely and sustainable way forward for POs. The section moves then to briefly describing the SADC, its (potential) role in POs, and the relevance it has to South Africa, as the country is a signatory of the SADC Treaty. It is interesting to note that the second section of the chapter does not provide the legal and authoritative verve as the first “UN Mandate” section. There is a reason for this.

Neethling (2003a: 97) explains that the early draft of the WP on SAPIPM (of July 1997) wanted to include the procurement of a mandate from both the regional OAU and sub-regional SADC if a peace operation in Southern Africa was to be conducted. This was due to
the fact that the White Paper on Defence, as well as the 1998 Defence Review, pronounced that SADC should sanction operations in Southern Africa, and that operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch. 5 para 24.5.; Department of Defence, 1998: Ch. 5. para 5.3.). However, Williams (1999: 12) notes that concern was expressed by certain role-players that the time-consuming nature of securing endorsement for POs from either the SADC and/or (O)AU could well militate against South Africa being able to respond to crises at all. Thus, the final White Paper on SAPIPM provided for participation that would occur if POs were authorised by the UN and agreed to between the UN, regional bodies (where applicable), the host country, the conflicting parties, and contributing countries” (DIRCO, 1999: 14-17; Neethling, 2003a:97).

3.3.1.4. Chapter Four; The White Paper on South African Philosophy on Participation in POs

Here, the White Paper reiterates South Africa’s broadened understanding of security, the causes of war and instability, and the advent of the so-called ‘new wars’ (DIRCO, 1999: 18-19). Furthermore, and in using the preceding information, the White Paper finally highlights South Africa’s philosophy on POs. It states that, (DIRCO, 1999: 19):

Peace missions should be viewed as long-term endeavours, which include a significant investment in peacebuilding, and not merely as short-term engagements... In all cases, peace missions should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and experiences, rather than the imposition of foreign modes of conflict management and governance.

Even though the White Paper goes on to describe that South Africa will endeavour to support these efforts, it will only do so “to the extent that its resources allow” (DIRCO, 1999: 19). Thus, the declarative nature of this section sees South Africa readying herself, as a responsible member of the UN, AU, and SADC, for active participation in POs.

The next section in this chapter details the correlation between South Africa’s national interests and POs. Here, and feeding off its own lived experience, the White Paper highlights that South Africa is a unique example to the international community of how a country “having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development” (DIRCO, 1999: 19). Thus, and due to this experience, South Africa feels...
compelled to participate in POs to ease the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.

At the time, South Africa had, what can at best be described as ‘emerging national interests’. Key to these ‘emerging national interests’ was South Africa’s foreign policy, which was based on six key principles that guided/guides her involvement in POs. These principles are [as identified in the White Paper on SAPIPM (DIRCO, 1999: 20)]:

- A commitment to the promotion of human rights;
- A commitment to the promotion of democracy;
- A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
- A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;
- A commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs;
- A commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an inter-dependent world

Even though the above is rather dated, one thing has remained as a constant. That is the fact that South Africa will always prioritise the African continent when it comes to preserving peace and stability. The country will do so in order to try and “promote trade and development and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts” (DIRCO, 1999: 20). This chapter therefore reinforces, clarifies and deepens the earlier chapter on “the Nature and Scope of Contemporary POs” noted earlier.

3.3.1.5. Chapter Five: The White Paper on South Africa’s Potential Contributions

The chapter starts by framing the scope of South Africa’s potential involvement by highlighting that South Africa’s participation in POs ranges from “broaden diplomatic and political initiatives to those missions with a more reactive focus” (DIRCO, 1999: 21). Later on in the White Paper, it notes that “contemporary POs require a combination of political, civilian, military and police elements, and South Africa may contribute to one, more or all of these elements in one or more missions” (DIRCO, 1999: 27). Given this broad scope, it allows the White Paper to talk of four ways in which the country may contribute – standby arrangements, civilian resources, police resources, and military resources.
Briefly, and in the first instance, the White Paper elaborates on the UN Standby Arrangements System that was established in 1995. Here, the White Paper notes that in order for South Africa to indicate its preparedness to get involved in POs, it is important for the country to create a pool of “high quality personnel who could be made available for active participation in POs through the existing UN Standby Arrangements System” (DIRCO, 1999: 21). The section briefly indicates how South Africa must link to the System, and the preparedness we need to exhibit within this arrangement.

On civilian resources, the White Paper outlines the guidelines and processes involved for South Africa to deploy civilian experts. Furthermore, the White Paper indicates the need for a civilian database that will “firm up the nature and scope of the potential contribution of South African citizens as experts on POs” (Kent & Malan, 2003:72). With respect to police resources, the White Paper notes the distinct advantage of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The White Paper notes that South African police officers have “have experienced the process of transformation first-hand, are well-suited for international service in support of the UN police officers mission” (DIRCO, 1999: 23). Moreover, the Department of Safety and Security (current Department of Police) is mandated to create a suitable readiness system including a “standby roster, selection procedures, and appropriate training opportunities” (DIRCO, 1999: 24).

Finally, and in the context of military resources, the White Paper reiterates the 1998 Defence Review’s stated contribution size of “up to one infantry battalion group” (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch. 5; DIRCO, 1999: 3, 25). It further outlines that “two battalion groups will be prepared for participation in POs, with the understanding that only one group will be deployed at a time, with the other held in readiness for rotation” (DIRCO, 1999: 25). The White Paper does however note that where involvement in POs with a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate, the “capabilities of the mechanised and parachute forces may also be used” (DIRCO, 1999: 25). Moreover, the SANDF is tasked by the White Paper to “formalise its minimum potential contribution to international POs through an appropriate readiness system which will include notifying the UN Secretariat of available contributions” (DIRCO, 1999: 25). It is further indicated that this contribution should be no less “than what has been outlined in the 1998 Defence Review, but may include additional assets such as air force elements” (DIRCO, 1999: 25).
Finally, South African contributions to POs would obviously have to be meaningful and carefully considered. In this regard, the White Paper states that in principle, “the level and size of a South African contribution to any particular peace operation will depend on how closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for contribution” (Neethling, 2003a: 99; DIRCO, 1999: 25).

3.3.1.6. Chapter Six: The White Paper on South Africa’s Principles for Participation:

Getting to the crux of the document, the principles for South African participation in POs were clearly spelled out in the White Paper (DIRCO, 1999: 25-30). These are seven-fold: a clear international mandate; sufficient means; a domestic mandate and budget; volunteerism; clear entry and exit criteria; regional cooperation and the issue of foreign assistance (DIRCO, 1999: 25-30). The policy guidelines of a "… clear international mandate, sufficient means, and a clear entry and exit criteria" are fairly basic requirements highlighted by the ‘lessons learned’ from latter-day UN POs (Malan, 1999: 2).

a) The White Paper on a Clear International Mandate:

By mentioning it first, the White Paper on SAPIPM underlined the importance of securing a clear and realistic international mandate for participation in POs. Involvement would only occur if the peace operation was authorised by the UN, agreed to by regional bodies (where applicable), the host country, conflicting parties and the contributing countries (DIRCO, 1999: 26). It was also emphasised that South Africa’s participation should be linked to concrete political solutions and should only occur in the event of: “a clear threat to and/or breach of international peace and security and/or a disaster of major humanitarian proportions and/or endemic causes of conflict which, unless addressed, may cause long-term instability” (DIRCO, 1999: 26; Williams, 2000: 93). Lastly, the White Paper acknowledges that past UN mandates were not static, and therefore that meant they were frequently reformed or altered after deployment. As a result of this, the White Paper insists that South Africa be consulted with before any changes are made to the original POs mandate. This is in light of the fact that the White Paper reiterates South Africa’s requirement of “a clear mandate that can be translated into a detailed operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity or differing perceptions as to the roles and tasks of various elements and national contingents” (DIRCO, 1999: 26).
b) Sufficient Means:

Here, South Africa highlights that comprehensive mission planning is imperative to ensure that the form and function of its committed personnel “are both necessary and sufficient to attain the stated goals and objectives” (DIRCO, 1999: 27). The White Paper states this as the country is wary of the danger of over-commitment of its personnel in an environment that is under-resourced, and therefore, does not have “sufficient means to achieve the set mandate” (DIRCO, 1999: 27).

c) Domestic Mandate and Budget:

Thirdly, the White Paper noted the issue of a domestic mandate and budgetary provision. It stated that two major stakeholders were involved in securing domestic approval for the country’s involvement in POs (the executive and the legislature), and a third constituency, the general public, had to be borne in mind, and informed, while reaching these decisions (DIRCO, 1999: 27-28; Williams, 2000: 93). The White Paper highlighted the importance of the legislature’s role in this process: the South African Parliament has to authorise finances for the country’s involvement in POs; Parliament as the authority to review the decision of the President to deploy forces; and finally, “its responsibility to be sensitive to the vicissitudes of public opinion regarding such deployments” (DIRCO, 1999: 27-28; Williams, 2000:94). However, the challenge in this regard is to “balance the necessity of popular domestic support with the need for decisive action when faced with a crisis where the security of people is imperilled” (Neethling, 2003a: 98).

Moreover, this section outlines the responsibilities of other relevant government departments. The importance of securing an integrated and coordinated approach towards participation in POs was aptly referred to in the White Paper as the “Principle of Shared Responsibility” with the Department of Foreign Affairs (present day DIRCO) as the lead department in coordinating this effort (DIRCO, 1999: 27).

d) Volunteerism:

Here, the White Paper highlights that South Africa’s overall participation in POs, as well as the specific participation of both civilians and the SAPS in any particular peace operation, is a matter of individual choice (DIRCO, 1999: 29). However, in terms of military units and sub-units, the principle of volunteerism must be applied differently as these military units “are required to train together as a team for long periods in order to be proficient” (DIRCO,
1999: 29). The White Paper therefore states that individuals must volunteer to be in those units or formations that are held in reserve for South Africa’s potential involvement in POs (DIRCO, 1999: 29).

e) Clear entry and exit criteria:

Next, the White Paper turns to the crucial and very important dual principles of clear entry and exit criteria. From the outset however, the White Paper only dedicates two paragraphs to this principle. In the first of these, the White Paper outlines that any entrance into the defined area must be preceded by the provision of decision makers with a thorough evaluation of the nature of the conflict and its relevance to South Africa’s national interests (DIRCO, 1999: 29).

In terms of exit criteria, the White Paper provides a somewhat vague and open-ended philosophy to dictate and guide the exit of South Africa’s involvement in POs. The White Paper notes that South Africa needs to be assured of clear exit criteria, which refers to “the achievement of a desirable political end-state to the involvement within an acceptable period of time, rather than to the technicalities of any military withdrawal plan”. This is an ambiguous statement that may lead to either a premature or overdue exit of South African personnel and/or her involvement in general (DIRCO, 1999: 29).

f) Regional cooperation:

The sixth of the listed principles deals with regional cooperation. Here, the White Paper propagates the idea of regional cooperation, especially with fellow members of the SADC in order to enhance the regions’ capacity to participate in POs. More, the section refers to the 1998 Defence Reviews’ proposal of setting up a POs centre in order to develop and coordinate “planning, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multinational forces” (DIRCO, 1999: 29; Department of Defence, 1998: Ch. 4 para. 14). Even though stating this principle and the previous quoted suggestion might allude to the eventuality of a combined SADC contribution to a peace operation, the White Paper clearly states that the foundation of South Africa’s policy on POs is one of national contributions to international efforts (DIRCO, 1999: 30). Finally, the section notes that in the spirit of cooperation, it would be pertinent that information on South Africa’s POs capabilities, intentions and deployments be shared with the secretariats of the UN, OAU (now AU) and SADC (DIRCO, 1999: 30).
Finally, the White Paper notes that with South Africa being a relative newcomer in the field of POs, she will be grateful for and will welcome foreign assistance for the purpose of building South(ern) African capabilities for participation in POs. However, foreign assistance should be non-intrusive and be aimed at the long-term capacity building in South and Southern Africa. Lastly, the White Paper notes that South Africa will not depend on one donor, and all assistance received must be compatible with regional peace and security interests (DIRCO, 1999: 30).

3.3.1.7. Chapter Seven: The White Paper on South Africa’s Procedures for Participation

The final section of the White Paper highlights the broad internal procedures to be followed by South Africa at the national level with respect to the deployment of civilians, the civilian police (SAPS) as well as military personnel (DIRCO, 1999: 30).

3.4. CONCLUSION

From what is evidenced, the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions embraced an all-inclusive multi-disciplinary approach, where humanitarian concerns drove political and military tasks. The White Paper was an all-encompassing document that sought to serve as a guideline for South Africa’s understanding of POs, to define the parameters of South Africa’s participation, as well as to be a mandate for the military, their specific requirements and deployment in alignment with UN principles and practices. Thus, the White Paper provides a very significant framework for South African involvement in POs as it covers both the philosophical and political aspects of involvement in POs, as well as the practical aspects of South Africa’s potential contributions (Neethling, 2004:135).

The White Paper also acknowledged that whilst guidelines and procedures had been suggested within the document, “they [would] have to be refined with growing experience of deploying on international service. Such experience [could] only be gained by converting potential resources into actual capabilities… [with the] hope that this White Paper will initiate such a process” [additions added] (DIRCO, 1999: 34). Thus, it is important to note that the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is seen as a living document that should be updated in-line with experiences gathered on international deployments, as well as one that is able to
accommodate different mandates, and the fluid nature of international peace and security. As a result of this, contemporary developments in POs, relevant experiences gathered by South Africa, and the dated nature of the document, the White Paper is now in need of some serious revision.

Finally, and even though the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM was a policy step in the right direction, as it clarified decision making procedure, and provided guidelines and principles to South African involvement in POs, it is now widely recognised that it is long overdue for revision. This is true in light of (a) the continuously changing nature of POs; (b) South Africa’s need for international conceptual alignment and clarification; (c) a serious under emphasis of the UN principles to partaking in POs, and most importantly; (d) the identified international trends and developments in both POs policy, as well as practice that have occurred since the White Paper’s promulgation in 1999.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE 1999 WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS – REVISION AND ANALYSIS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

From a foreign policy and national interest standpoint, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM has been a significant policy pronouncement that gave insight into South Africa’s early ambitions to enable and secure regional and continental peace, security and stability. Promulgated within the fledgling years of South Africa’s democracy, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM has provided a significant framework for South African involvement in POs as it has covered both the philosophical and political aspects of involvement in POs, as well as the practical aspects of South Africa’s potential contributions (Neethling, 2004: 135). South Africa’s participation in POs in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and Sudan have been justified against the belief that domestic peace and stability would not be achieved in a context of regional and continental instability (Ferreira, 2009: 87).

Thus, there was indeed a realisation and belief that South Africa’s prosperity and stability would be intimately linked to the political and economic development of both the region and continent. The 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM encouraged South Africa to take a closer look at its position on involvement in POs. The document has clearly outlined “those principles that the government believes should serve as a leitmotiv for involvement in POs” (Neethling, 2003: 109). However, the world and more specifically POs, have significantly changed since the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper. The increasing call for the mainstreaming of gender in all aspects of POs, the stress on the importance of peacebuilding strategies being built-in throughout the POs processes, as well as the advent of the call for robustness in POs are significantly important changes to the world of POs.

Much has changed in South Africa’s POs environment and actions since 1999, but nothing has changed in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. Operating within this context, and as a guiding policy framework, the importance of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, and its update and revision, so that South Africa’s actions follow from policy, cannot be stressed enough. Therefore, and in light of the five identified contemporary developments in POs – the Brahimi Report; the WPS Agenda; the call for ‘Robustness’; the Capstone Doctrine; and
the advent of the regionalisation of POs – one needs to question the continuing relevance of the current 18-year old 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM.

It is the aim of this chapter to delve into this precise question. However, and before juxtaposing and critically analysing the five identified contemporary developments against the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM in order to determine the gaps in the policy framework and the necessary changes that need to be considered, this chapter will firstly look into the conceptual understanding employed in the 1999 White Paper against what has been highlighted in Chapter Two of this paper, and deduce possible revisions to be considered. Before concluding, the chapter will move to briefly highlight additional updates, developments and considerations that have come in after further analysis revealed additional inconsistencies in policy regulations and practice. It is also important to note that the relative merits of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM will not be forgotten and will therefore be woven into the following analysis.

4.2. CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE 1999 WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS

As was noted earlier in section 2.3., the paper has defined a ‘peace operation’ as an “internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect…transitions from war to peace” (Durch, 2006: xvii). POs, in this paper, are therefore seen as a general type of activity that may be used to prevent, limit and/or manage conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. The term of POs is therefore seen as a collective and overarching term. Being mindful of the various ‘general types of activity’ as elucidated in the literature, the paper has highlighted and defined these activities as Traditional Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and Peace Support Operations.

As a refresher, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM employed the use of the term ‘peace missions’ (PMs). This term has too been used as an appropriate collective and overarching term to describe activities aimed at preventing or settling international disputes in terms of the UN Charter. The idea was to “have a term that would ensure the necessary emphasis on the political/diplomatic nature of the activity” (Rossouw, 1999: 38). Accordingly, the term ‘peace mission’ is described in the 1999 White Paper as an appropriate generic term to include ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’ and
‘peacebuilding’. The White Paper also suggests that the term ‘peace support operations’ be used to refer to all military activities in support of a peace mission (DIRCO, 1999:8).

Comparatively, the terms ‘POs’ and ‘PMs’ overlap in conceptual meaning and use, with the 1999 White Paper’s term of PMs bearing a resounding resemblance to the POs working definition of this paper as defined in section 2.3. Arguably, the 1999 White Paper has held its own over time with its definition, and conceptual clarification of the term ‘PMs’. However, the term ‘PMs’ is a South African terminology, whereas ‘POs’ is widely used as a generic umbrella term. Given that POs/PMs are primarily multinational efforts, and that therefore South Africa does not operate in isolation in the area of POs/PMs, one of two things may need to happen. Either South Africa champions the conceptual use and flexibility of its term of ‘peace mission’ on an international stage, or it adopts the term ‘peace operation’ so as to promote multinational conceptual convergence and understanding.

The above is a ‘conceptual merit’ to the South Africa role-players who shaped the understanding and definition of the term ‘peace mission’. Arguably another ‘conceptual merit’ of the 1999 White Paper, and that of the South African government in general, is the cognisance of the broadened, multidimensional security and strategic environment. The 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM has not taken to the understanding of POs as operationalised in Westphalian (inter-state) terms, as the literature suggests. Under section 2.2.1., the literature highlights that the main supporters of the Westphalian conception of POs have traditionally been China, Russia, Latin America and the post-colonial states in Africa, and Asia (Bellamy et al. 2010:5). In contrast, and after the Cold War, the most vocal supporters of the post-Westphalian (intra-state) conception have traditionally been Western states and humanitarian NGOs (Human Rights Watch for example) (UN, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010:31-32,36).

Finally, it is important to denote the position of the 1999 White Paper on the debate of the dominant time-based, chronological Cold War and post-Cold War generational division and understanding to POs, against the generational division and understanding of what the POs wanted to achieve, as well as the tasks utilised in achieving them. Simply, what is the position of the 1999 White Paper on the linear, sequential approach versus the simultaneous approach? Crucially, the 1999 White Paper does not clearly explicate its position on this debate. It does however make mention that “peacebuilding may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in the aftermath of the conflict” (DIRCO, 1999: 8).
Building on this tone, the 1999 White Paper should be updated/revised to clearly explicate its endorsement, and emphasise the policy prescription of a simultaneous, intended ends and means approach, in which many of the POs processes are implemented and managed simultaneously (Neethling, 2013: 263). In line with this, Olivier (2013: 116) has noted that present day POs require a “more fluid, non-linear interpretation of POs”, and suggests that the activities of POs “can either accompany or immediately succeed military operations in order to ensure sustainable development and security” (Tschirgi, 2003: 2). It is therefore key to remember that “a single operation may well move back and forth between the various aims or may involve more than one of these roles simultaneously” [emphasis added] (Bellamy et al., 2010:9; James, 1990).

A further consideration, a revised White Paper on SAPIPM must take cognisance of the possibility for alternative forms of POs to develop. It is therefore important that a revised White Paper on SAPIPM update its conceptual approach to POs to cater for this possibility. This is especially true when taking into account the 2013 SANDF deployment to the CAR as well as the VIP protection provided by South Africa (SANDF specifically) for 150 Burundian politicians returning from exile to assist in the political processes in Burundi’s power-sharing transitional government (Ferreira, 2009: 82, 89).

4.3. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE 1999 WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS

The purpose of this section is to juxtapose the five identified contemporary developments in POs – the Brahimi Report; the WPS Agenda; the call for ‘Robustness’; the Capstone Doctrine; and, the advent of the regionalisation of POs – vis-à-vis the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM in order to determine the gaps in the policy framework and the necessary changes that need to be considered.

4.3.1. The Brahimi Report

The first of the operational developments in POs, the August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, chaired by former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi, provided an opportunity for a first major foray since 1995 into some aspects of UN POs doctrine. The goal of the Brahimi Report, which Secretary-General Annan called “frank yet fair,” was to take an unflinching look at POs implementation problems within the UN system and then
offer, in words of Brahimi, “specific and realistic recommendations” for enhancing UN capacity for POs. With regards to the triumvirate principles of POs, Bellamy & Williams (2004) describe that in essence, the Brahimi Report suggested that the UN POs principles needed to be interpreted more ‘liberally’ to account for the modern day, and ever shifting realities of POs. More, to further meet the challenges of contemporary POs, the report identified three key conditions for success that every single mission must have (United Nations, 2000a):

i. Political Support – Mandates and Resourcing
ii. Rapid and effective deployment (with a robust force posture); and,
iii. Sound peacebuilding strategy.

In terms of the first condition, the Brahimi Report highlights that what is important is for mandates to not only reflect the realities on the ground, but also be matched with the means to implement them, thereby guaranteeing political support. The Brahimi Report therefore recommended that the UNSC adopt only clear, credible and achievable mandates for POs. Relating this to the South African perspective, and even though the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM notes the possibility of UN, Continental and Regional Mandates there is a direct need for an update here. A revised White Paper on SAPIPM needs to take into serious consideration the political support behind POs mandates, whether these mandates are issued, nationally, regionally (SADC), continentally (AU) or internationally (UN). Crucially, and as highlighted earlier, the 1999 White Paper sought to make clear that continental and regional POs under UN approval would be the most likely and sustainable way forward for POs (the change in this thinking, as a result of the regionalisation of POs will be dealt with later). A revised White Paper should therefore highlight conditions that the mandates need to meet in order for South Africa’s international participation in POs. Thus, a revised White Paper on SAPIPM should highlight that in order for South Africa to consider her participation in SADC, AU or UN POs, the founding condition must be an appropriately articulated and communicated mission mandate. This mandate would then set out unambiguous and doable tasks with apt timelines, is sufficiently resourced, and is above all, clear in the purposes and objectives of the mission.

The second consideration of a rapid and effective deployment, with a robust force posture, highlighted in the Brahimi Report, is mainly a condition that serves to benefit the UN, as well
as Chapter VIII organisations of the UN Charter. However, aspects of this condition will be dealt with later under the third identified development of “the call for Robustness”.

Arguably, one of the single most important developments that have occurred out of the Brahimi Report is that of a call for a ‘sound peacebuilding strategy’. Effectively, this condition brought to the fore the importance of what has become known as ‘developmental peacekeeping’. The Report highlighted that the traditional approach of firstly establishing security, and only then “addressing developmental issues, have proven inadequate to effectively address modern POs” (Olivier, 2013: 114). In response to this, the UN has introduced some changes aimed at addressing some of the underlying causes of conflict during the early stages of a POs. This emphasises the need for peacebuilding in all spheres (political, economic and social), “to prevent the resumption of conflict commonly seen when peacekeepers withdraw” (Ferreira, 2009: 89). Thus, Schoeman (2013: 216) notes that a purely military approach to POs is no longer viable. Human security aspects and post-conflict peacebuilding are of increasing importance. Thus, POs must go beyond the manning of a demilitarised zone, to its development.

It is within this context that credence is given to the adoption of the AU’s Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)\(^5\) policy framework in 2006, in The Gambia. Peacebuilding and PCRD are understood as a conjunction of “non-linear, highly complex, multidimensional and long-term processes that are essentially political and locally owned, and that is aimed at sustaining peace before, during and after conflicts” (de Carvalho, de Coning and Ahere, 2016: 3). The AU’s PCRD policy framework represents a breakthrough in the AU efforts to coordinate and support peacebuilding processes in Africa.

Philosophically, and another merit to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, the White Paper pronounced that POs should be viewed as ‘long-term endeavours which include a significant investment in peacebuilding and not merely as short-term engagements’ (DIRCO, 1999:19). Furthermore, peacebuilding was defined as the inculcation of respect for human rights and

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\(^5\) The AU’s Policy on PCRD (2006: 2, 7) explains that the policy is a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies that elaborate measures that seek to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development and pave the way for growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict. Given the peculiarities of each conflict situation, this policy is conceived as a flexible template than can be adapted to, and assist, affected regions and countries, in their endeavours towards reconstruction, security and growth. This policy consists of six cross-cutting indicative elements, representing the pillars upon which all PCRD efforts should be developed and sustained: a) security; b) humanitarian/emergency assistance; c) political governance and transition; d) socio-economic reconstruction and development; e) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and f) women and gender.
political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the capacity of state and civil institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity (DIRCO, 1999:19). However, Neethling (2013: 254) notes that nothing explicit was said, or highlighted, “about the practical implications or specific focus areas of military involvement in peacebuilding”. It is therefore pertinent that a revised White Paper both align itself to the continental AU PCRD policy as well as detail what roles the military component may play in peacebuilding, especially considering the fluid, simultaneous understanding to POs.

The above is certainly true given the fact that POs have on several occasions proved capable of keeping the peace, but the problem for the military component of POs is that “they are falling short of being capable of undertaking peacebuilding” (Olivier, Neethling and Mokoena, 2013: 186-187).

The Brahimi Report of August 2000 contains recommendations on principles and practicalities of UN POs that must be adhered to when considering identified areas for an update to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, e.g. the political support behind the dynamics of the issuing of mandates, their budgetary implications, as well as the promotion of peacebuilding. Broadly, and taking into consideration what was depicted in Chapter Two of this paper, as well as the analysis above, the Brahimi Report has an impact on Chapter’s Two (Nature and Scope of Contemporary POs), Three (International Mandate for POs), Four (Philosophy on Participation in POs) and Six (Principles for Participation) of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, respectively.

4.3.2. Women, Peace and Security “A-Gender”

The second of the operational developments in POs deals with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. As explicated earlier in 2.5.2. of this paper, the changed nature of conflict has led to a real need to consider the important role played by both men and women in the conflict cycle, as combatants, victims of the conflict as well as key role-players in ending the conflict. There was also a need to consider the effects of conflict on women, and to address their specific needs before, during, and after conflict (Bellamy et al., 2010).

On 31 October 2000, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (or, ‘1325’ for short), a seminal policy document, calling for women’s increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, as well as their protection during conflict. The UN has heralded 1325 as a landmark document that promises to protect
women’s rights and guarantee their equal participation in peace processes. Pratt & Richter-Devroe, (2011) as well as Rehn & Sirleaf (2002) have noted that the difference between 1325 and former resolutions was that previous UN resolutions had treated women as victims of war, in need of protection. However, 1325 also recognised women as agents in building peace and guaranteeing security.

As part of the WPS Agenda, Resolution 1325 applies a three-pillar approach of ‘Protection’, ‘Prevention’ and ‘Participation’. Hudson (2005:795) notes that this is a holistic approach, involving both integration through the “add and stir” of women, as well as agenda-setting through the participation of women as decision-makers in peace processes, making for a comprehensive strategy in targeting the transformation of the social structures and processes that have allowed gender inequalities to persist.

Resolution 1325 provides an overarching international policy framework for the UN, member states, other actors and all parties to the conflict to incorporate gender considerations in their activities (Abiola & Alghali, 2012:12). Moreover, 1325 outlines actions to be taken by the Secretary General, the Security Council, and the UN as a whole to ‘mainstream gender’ into peace and security policies and practices (United Nations, 2000b; Cohn, Kinsella & Gibbings, 2004: 130). The above is due to 1325 envisioning gender perspectives as being integral to all conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, and stresses the importance of ensuring the protection of women’s rights and the full involvement of women in all aspects of promoting and maintaining peace and security, with a strengthened role in decision-making (United Nations, 2000b: para. 5).

At its core, Resolution 1325 sets clear standards for integrating gender perspectives into POs (Väyrynen, 2004:126). The WPS Agenda is therefore a direct derivative of the call for gender mainstreaming.

Resolution 1325, supported by previous agreements such as the Beijing Platform for Action, the United Nations Charter, the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action (United Nations, 2000b), as well as supplemented and advanced by UNSC resolutions [1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122(2013)] together form the WPS framework. Collectively, the WPS framework provides an internationally recognised legal framework for promoting gender equality in peace and security, ensuring the participation of women in all peacemaking processes, and protecting women against violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. They address all aspects of peace processes, including
peace negotiations, POs, political participation, response to sexual violence in armed conflict, judicial and legal reform, and security-sector reform (Arostegui, 2013:537).

On a continental level, and endorsing these conventions and resolutions, is the protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (referred to as the Maputo Protocol) (African Union, 2003), which outlines a comprehensive framework of rights for African women across a range of spheres — including health, the economy and security (Heinecken, 2013: 149). The Maputo Protocol is closely aligned with Resolution 1325, which calls attention to the contribution of women in peace and security. Similarly, most African states have adopted the African Union Solemn Declaration on Gender Equity in Africa (African Union, 2004) and pledged their commitment to gender mainstreaming and the protection of women from violence and discrimination (Heinecken, 2013: 149). However, this has not been the case when it comes to South Africa’s foremost policy on POs.

Critically, and in its entirety, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM does not pay attention to the thinking of the WPS Agenda, nor does it deal with the call for gender mainstreaming. Gender-neutral, or gender-blind approaches to POs are fundamentally flawed, as war and peace affect men and women differently (Neethling, 2013:264). This is a significant gap in the policy framework. The 1999 White Paper only mentions the word ‘women’ twice, and only in relation to the potential contribution of the South African Police Service (SAPS) personnel as UN civilian police officers. A revised White Paper on SAPIPM must take note that mainstreaming gender perspectives in all aspects of POs ensures that peace and security interventions are relevant to all stakeholders, responsive to their needs, and effective in the promotion of equality. It is therefore imperative that a revision to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is undertaken to reflect this development, as gender mainstreaming is not only something which is beneficial, it is essential to the success of contemporary POs.

Since its proclamation, there have been several issues in operationalising the WPS Agenda that a revision and update to the White Paper on SAPIPM must be wary of. The first lies in that gender mainstreaming activities are essentially top-down, state-centric initiatives, only effective where legislative and judicial processes are supportive of such activities (Heinecken, 2013:148; Neethling, 2013:264). A problem with these “Western liberal, equal rights or integrative feminist positions (which underlie the gender mainstreaming philosophy) is that they cannot directly address the root causes and power hierarchies that perpetuate
women’s insecurity and inequality” (Heinecken, 2013: 148). This critique is what led the UN to develop the *Capstone Doctrine*, with one of its three success factors for POs being the promotion of local and national ownership of peace processes (United Nations, 2008a: chapter 3). The *Capstone Doctrine* and its impact on the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM will be addressed later.

Neethling (2013: 264), encapsulates the thinking of Sorensen (1998) and Heinecken (2013) (and later the UN itself) by noting that the most sustainable way to bring about change in men’s attitudes towards women is to develop and support women at grassroots level. He goes on to write that (Neethling, 2013: 264-265);

*A bottom-up approach to community development will be far more successful than a top-down or interventionist approach. This is where the strength of women lies, and if adequately supported by men and outside organisations there can be no doubt that conflict-ridden societies will experience peace and recovery far more readily than if they exclude women based on their gender.*

It has been highlighted that troop-contributing countries (TCCs) fail to meet their gender targets. One of the reasons lies in that women are often not assigned to meaningful roles and end up in administrative, support and other non-challenging positions (Schoeman, 2010:3; Cordell, 2011:37), “which defeats the purpose of increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations” (Heinecken, 2013: 155). Secondly, is that TCCs have not adopted gender-sensitive approaches to deployments. The TCCs have assumed, witting or unwittingly, a gender neutral approach to deployment and, as such, “the operational environment does not cater for the gender-specific needs of women in terms of privacy and hygiene, or in relation to the unique stresses the environment poses in respect of sexual harassment, sexual violence, isolation and family stress” (Heinecken & Van der Waag-Cowling, 2009:531–535). This affects not only retention and willingness to redeploy, but also operational success and, ultimately, peace, security and development (Heinecken, 2013: 155-156). What has happened since 1999 is that South Africa has had one of the largest women contingents deployed in POs and currently has the second largest women contingents deployed in POs with 265 female personnel (United Nations, 2017a). It is therefore important for a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM to take cognisance of the WPS Agenda and its impact on South Africa’s involvement in POs.
What is important is that “despite the Resolution’s many successes, significant obstacles remain in the translation of the Resolution from policy document to effective advocacy tool and action plan” (Shepherd, 2011:505), and this is especially true when considering that member states (TCCs to be more precise) are the ones who will have to ensure its continued implementation. A revised White Paper on SAPIPM must therefore be wary of the challenges posed by translating the WPS Agenda from policy to practice. A revised White Paper on SAPIPM should not be open-ended when it comes to the call for gender mainstreaming, and it should therefore assert its vision and direction in terms of this development. Finally, and to assist with the implementation of the WPS Agenda, a toolkit for gender and security sector reform has been developed (Bastick & Valasek, 2008). The aim of this toolkit is to provide practical suggestions as to how to implement security sector reform, in order to ensure the equal participation of men and women. A revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM should therefore take cognisance of this toolkit, especially if, and when, issuing directives.

The WPS Agenda presents a major development in the field of POs. It has therefore impacted on the entirety of the current White Paper on SAPIPM, from its introduction to conclusion. As mentioned earlier, this is a significant gap in the policy framework. Thus, a new and revised White Paper on SAPIPM is required to take the above into serious consideration.

4.3.3. The call for ‘Robustness’

The next operational development, which 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is silent on, that needs to be taken into consideration for an update to South Africa’s POs policy paper is the call for ‘robustness’. The concept of robust POs emerged in the late 1990s as a response to the tragedies of Rwanda, Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia, where UN POs forces failed to stop massive violations of human rights, allegedly because they were not sufficiently robust. The call for robustness began in earnest with the Brahimi Report and its call for a more liberal interpretation of the UN POs principles, in particular the principle dealing with the use of force. The Brahimi Report referred several times to the necessity of ‘robust peacekeeping forces’, in order to account for the modern day realities of contemporary POs (United Nations, 2000a: ix, xi, 1, 10, 54). As the Report put it, the UN must be “capable of projecting credible force in order to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them” (United Nations, 2000a: viii).

What is crucial, and the same with the trend identified above, the 1999 White Paper is silent on the call for robustness, signifying a gap that needs to be updated. This is especially true
considering that South Africa has herself contributed to the advent of robust POs with her involvement in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC, as well as advocating for the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) – briefly highlighted below. An analysis into the South African acceptance, and operationalisation, of robust POs is of particular importance here, both intellectually and practically. Intellectually, an updated White Paper on SAPIPM must take into consideration the theoretical developments and critique around the call for robust POs. Practically, and as mentioned, an update to the White Paper on SAPIPM must translate South Africa’s experiences in the FIB, and its advocacy in establishing the ACIRC, into a policy position on the issuance of the mandates of robust POs.

For instance, South Africa’s role, alongside that of Tanzania and Malawi, as part of the FIB has set it apart from other TCCs (Hendricks, 2015: 25). Notably, the FIB has been unlike any other UN operation, empowered “with the most aggressive mandate ever given to a peace operation” (ISS, 2013), and permitted to “go on the attack against armed groups it deems to be a threat to peace in the region” (Allison, 2013), thus preventing “the expansion of all armed groups, neutralising these groups, and disarming them” (Haenlein, 2013). The robust mandate of the FIB was to neutralise armed groups, to reduce the threat to state authority and civilian security and to make stabilisation of the country possible (Mutton, 2013: 2). This robust mandate translated into the FIB tasked with offensive operations to disrupt the actions of armed groups with or without the assistance of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). The Brigade was successful in disarming the M23 rebels, and the FIB’s success has entrenched the call for robustness in POs.

Moreover, and as a result in the delay (failure) to fully operationalise the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) as well as its Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) – especially in the face of the 2013 crisis in Mali – the call for robustness was further boosted by the South African tabled ACIRC at the AU’s 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in May 2013 (African Union, 2013). According to the AU (2013), the ACIRC was to:

... provide the AU with a flexible and robust force, made up of military/police capabilities, force enablers and multipliers, equipment and resources to be voluntarily provided by Member States on the basis of their willingness and capabilities, to be deployed very rapidly [within 10 days of the mandate] to
Roux (2013) explains that the ACIRC was a transitional arrangement, advocated as a new, robust military intervention tool which aimed at implementing “operations under ‘scenario six’ of the AU’s ASF: immediate combat intervention based on a humanitarian imperative to save lives, typically involving stopping or preventing emerging genocide, crimes against humanity, atrocities or war crimes by armed rebel forces”. ACIRC was seen as providing a robust and credible force that was to be deployed quickly to “conduct certain types of operations limited in both their goals and duration. It would consist of military capabilities, force multipliers and resources from the continent” (Théroux-Bénoni, 2013). Therefore, and unlike the ASF, and its regional standby forces, the ACIRC “is a purely military capability without police or civilian elements” (Williams, 2014: 154).

It is furthermore believed that the ACIRC is aimed at making the AU more reactive, capable and coherent, “by enabling it to respond quickly to crises with military means in the service of a political decision” (Apuuli, 2013: 80). The ACIRC therefore, when tabled by South Africa, strongly resembled the abovementioned FIB that was deployed in the DRC (IRIN, 2014). The AU has therefore noted the importance in establishing a more robust crisis response capability especially with the recurring demands for POs, especially those of the type and urgency that were needed in 2013 in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).

However, three issues arise around the call for robustness. The first relates to how would an update to the White Paper on SAPIPM deal with the fact that the call for ‘robustness’, in some respects deviates from the three principles of POs - consent, impartiality, and the traditional no use of force except in self-defence? The update and revision of the White Paper on SAPIPM would therefore need to pay attention the work of Kuhne (1999). The work sees a robust PO, as a “Chapter VI wider peacekeeping, with consent and impartiality as basic operational pillars, plus the option of the threat or use of limited force for defending or implementing specific elements of the mandate, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter” (Kuhne, 1999:359). This is one, if not the main reason why the Brahimi Report called for the ‘liberal interpretation’ of said principles, in order to account for the modern day realities of contemporary POs. The importance of the Capstone Doctrine in clarifying issues around the
use of force in relation to the call of robustness, cannot be discounted – the paper will refer to this in the next sub-section.

Secondly, robust POs have been critiqued as an ill-defined activity situated between TPK and PE (Ruggie, 1993:28; Goulding, 1993:461), with the UN and its member states (specifically TCCs) having faced great difficulty in handling this grey area, in terms of both doctrine and operations (Jakobsen, 2000). An update and revision to the White Paper on SAPIPM would therefore have to take stock of the work of Zwanenburg (2005), Tardy (2011) and Swope (2011). The authors illustrate that when looking at the UN prescribed principles, consent is the broad Rubicon separating robust POs from peace enforcement. In this case consent is required for robust POs, but not in the case of peace enforcement.

An update to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM must also clearly identify and define (as a result of South Africa’s experiences in the FIB) whether it sees robustness as an approach to POs or simply as an activity within POs. This recommendation is based on the United Nations DPKO and DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping which was issued, aiming at clarifying the “key issues surrounding robust POs” (United Nations, 2009b: 1). The document holds that robust POs is a ‘posture’ rather ‘than a specific activity’, meaning that “robustness…can be demonstrated in many ways, including the use of political dialogue” but also “targeted sanctions against identified spoilers…support and incentives to national reconciliation efforts and [even] the initiation of early peacebuilding activities to help deliver a tangible peace dividend to local populations” (United Nations, 2009b: 3). What one may draw from this document is that robustness in POs should not only be a military or police posture, but it also needs to be a political and operational approach that “signals the determination of POs to implement their mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process” (Tardy, 2011: 155)

What is clearly deduced from the above actions by South Africa, through its lived experiences of the FIB (see Allison, 2013; Haenlein, 2013; Hendricks, 2015; ISS, 2013; Mutton, 2013), and its advocacy for the operationalisation of the ACIRC (see African Union, 2013; IRIN, 2014; Roux, 2013), is that it views robustness as a fully-fledged strategic approach to POs, and not only as an activity. The recommendation therefore would be for an updated White Paper on SAPIPM to see robustness as an approach to POs. If an updated White Paper on SAPIPM were to opt in viewing robustness as an activity, the biggest challenge in this regard would be the ability of the South African government to convince
ordinary citizens (and voters), to the importance of strengthening the SANDF. What the White Paper on SAPIPM should then promote is that strengthening the SANDF is not a case of ‘guns over butter’, but that it is also in the interest of the country, at the level of its socio-economic aspirations and needs, to have a strong military which can act efficiently in building a secure environment in which South Africa can pursue its national goals and objectives (Schoeman, 2013: 218). This thinking is in line with the current 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM.

Finally, and in considering the earlier noted implications of the Brahimi Report’s stress on ‘developmental peacekeeping’ (i.e. peacebuilding and PCRD), the update to the current White Paper on SAPIPM must note that a robust POs approach should have elements of peacebuilding entrenched within it throughout the process. The call for robustness has therefore impacted on the current White Paper’s understanding vis-à-vis the nature of contemporary POs, the possible mandates that can be issued, the philosophy behind South Africa’s participation, the make-up of a potential contribution as well as the principles that will underscore South Africa’s participation. The 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, therefore, needs to be revised and updated to speak to the call of robustness in the area of POs.

4.3.4. The Capstone Doctrine

The final operational change that has impacted upon the environment of modern day POs, is that of the Capstone Doctrine. One of the objectives of the UN for producing the Capstone Doctrine was to “ensure that the growing numbers of United Nations POs personnel deployed in the field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks they are required to perform” (United Nations, 2008a:6). The importance of the document can be further devolved to national, country specific, perspectives in that the Capstone Doctrine aimed to contribute to creating a common understanding of POs (Swope, 2011:42). The document attempts to explain the complex environment within which POs operate. By better understanding the basic principles and concepts of POs, as well as their strengths and limitations, all those involved in POs will be able to perform better and meet mission objectives (Swope, 2011:42).

The importance of the Capstone Doctrine to a potential update and revision to the current White Paper on SAPIPM cannot be overlooked in that it aimed to contribute to creating a common understanding in the operationalisation of POs. To illustrate: doctrinal ambiguity and complexity severely affects POs. With POs normally being exercised on a multilateral
basis, by a combination of actors (with their own respective POs doctrines), the forces and civilian components of the POs struggle to integrate and infuse their skills and understandings. Further, this shows how the complexity of the new operational environment has confounded the doctrine writers’ efforts at simplification, created new problems where old ones seemed solved, and has left peacekeepers grappling with the same conceptual void that confronted them a two decades ago.

A revised White Paper on SAPIPM must take note that the purpose of the *Capstone Doctrine* aimed “to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary POs, which are usually deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict” (United Nations, 2008a:8). As highlighted earlier, the *Capstone Doctrine* was also released to deal with the issue of robustness, as well as to addressing the conceptual evolution of the three POs principles – consent, minimum use of force and impartiality. It is clear that the *Brahimi Report’s* call for a more ‘liberal interpretation’ of the three UN POs principles has had an important effect in both affecting the call for robustness, and the corollary issuing of the *Capstone Doctrine*.

According to the document, a key point to understanding POs is to understand that POs “rarely occur in a linear or sequential way” and that experience has shown “that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing” (United Nations, 2008a:20). This is in line with the earlier analysis recommendation involving the simultaneous, *intended ends* and *means* approach to understanding POs.

To support this contention, the document goes further and lists three success factors that are crucial if POs are to succeed. These are the need to be perceived as 1) legitimate and 2) credible by the host country population, and 3) the promotion of local and national ownership of the peace process (United Nations, 2008a: chapter 3).

The legitimacy of UN POs is derived from its unique position in international law, the UN Charter and UN Security Council authorisation (de Coning *et al.*, 2008:2). Legitimacy, therefore, is a crucially important asset of POs, one they are given by virtue of working under a Security Council mandate, who the international community has given authority for maintaining international peace and security. Losing this legitimacy seriously jeopardises the mission (Swope, 2011:51). Be this as it may, the deployment of forces as well as that of the civilian component to POs needs to carry the support and backing of both its political elite
and broader citizenry. If not, the deployment is in jeopardy of being questioned into its legitimacy, thereby bringing its perceived legitimacy abroad into disrepute.

Additionally, credibility (the second of the success factors) is crucial as, early on and throughout the deployment of an operation, it “is likely to be tested for weakness and division by those whose interests are threatened by its presence” (United Nations, 2008a:37). In devolving the condition of credibility to the potential participation of the SANDF in the context of contemporary POs, it is essential that it is credible in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and the international community. By establishing credibility early, the mission can “help to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood that a mission will need force to achieve its mandate” (United Nations, 2008a:38). Furthermore, Swope (2011:53) points out that when credibility is lost it “is hard to get back”, and by having low credibility or losing it, whether because of the weakness of the mission force or a lack of effectiveness, there will be negative effects on the mission’s legitimacy and the consent of the parties, in addition to a negative effect on the morale of mission personnel, who may become less effective, thereby creating even more problems. The knock-on effect is clear.

Before moving on to the third of the success factors, it is important for South Africa to take note of the first two factors illustrated above. This is especially true given the SANDF’s deployment into the CAR, with specific reference to the 2013 ‘Battle of Bangui’ which led to 15 SANDF soldiers losing their lives. The official government position into the deployment was that soldiers were deployed in line with Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on military cooperation signed between the two governments in 2007, and renewed in 2012. The SANDF were to initially lead the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process of the armed forces operating within the CAR. Moreover, military training was to be provided for very important person (VIP) protection and infantry soldiers “whilst they were also to provide equipment and uniforms, and refurbish bases” (PMG, 2013; Vreÿ & Esterhuyse, 2016: 14). The 2012 renewal saw South Africa deploy a security force for the military equipment and small training team already positioned in the CAR (PMG, 2013)

However, the details around what exactly the South African forces were doing in the CAR, are shrouded in controversy (Parker, 2013). Considering the dynamics of the situation in the CAR, the soldiers were seen by some as “propping up an unpopular military dictatorship” (Naidu as quoted by Parker, 2013), which had not abided by the January 2013 Libreville peace agreement. The accord saw rebel forces (the Seleka rebels) agreeing to the formation of
a coalition government headed by the incumbent President François Bozizé. Amongst the conditions in the agreement were the release of political prisoners, to enact reforms as well as the stipulation that forces from Angola and South Africa leave the country. Military deployment, however, ultimately forms only a part of the solution: there can be no credible POs force without the political backing of all the participating nations and/or actors (Neethling, 2013: 266; Olivier et al., 2013:203). Thus, South Africa’s continued presence in the CAR was a frustration for the Seleka rebels (Parker, 2013).

To make matters worse, the troops were deployed into what effectively was a country going through civil war, with light armoury and little to no support (Stupart, 2013). Vreý et al. (2016: 13) explain that in contrast to domestic military deployments (border protection or counter-poaching for example), foreign deployments “necessitate both justification and legalisation by means of the protection or extension of discernible national interests” [emphasis added]. Arguably however, this was not the case with the CAR.

Ashton (2013) and Vreý et al. (2016: 14) note that the explanations by the SA executive regarding the purported bilateral agreement that was supposed to legitimise the SA military involvement in the CAR are unconvincing and inadequate. There was speculation that South Africa was in the CAR to protect private SA business interests that were allegedly closely linked to the presidency (AmaBhungane Reporters, 2014). At the time, though, this was strongly denied by the South African president with arguments that South Africa intervened in the interest of the safety, stability and security of the region (Vreý et al., 2016: 14; Agency Staff, 2013). Taking this into consideration, as well as further detailing how South Africa may have lost domestic and international legitimacy and credibility during this operation, Vreý et al. (2016: 14) ask a pertinent question – “why only did South Africa get involved in 2013 after a decade of turmoil in the CAR and the DR Congo, and through unilateral action that excluded the SADC, the AU and the Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS)?” This is an important question considering the fact that according to South Africa’s foreign policy guidelines, the country expresses strong opposition to unilateral actions on the continent and demands bilateral and/or multilateral action (DIRCO, 2013). Furthermore, and in line with this thinking, there is a strong foreign policy preference for regional, continental and global political, economic and security structures and actors when engaging with and acting in Africa” (Vreý et al., 2016: 4). What is even more concerning is the fact that South Africa has no physical embassy or diplomatic presence in the CAR (Saunders, 2013: 254). Therefore, in cases where South Africa operates in a unilateral
manner, as it had in the CAR, without a clear-cut peace agreement or **consensus among the belligerents**, the possibility of South Africa being viewed as supporting one actor, thereby losing its legitimacy and credibility, is a plausible conclusion.

The above has dealt with issues of legitimacy and credibility South Africa may have had internationally, and in the host country. However, the death of the 15 South African soldiers in the CAR highlighted the importance of having local legitimacy. The South African population were not pleased with the reasons (illustrated above) that supposedly justified the deployment of the SANDF into the CAR. As highlighted earlier, POs need to carry the support and backing of both the sending political elite and broader citizenry in order to fully adhere to the factor of legitimacy. South African’s huddled around the question of whether the SANDF’s presence in the CAR was morally defensible “in view of South Africa’s apparent support for an illegitimate regime in order to protect what seemed to be economic interests with strong links to powerful domestic political networks” (Vreÿ *et al.*, 2016: 14; Ashton, 2013). The outcry from South Africa’s political elite in parliament, as well as the broader citizenry as a result of what happened in CAR, severely damaged local perceptions into the legitimacy of the actions carried out by South Africa, and by extension the SANDF, abroad.

Having outlined the above, it is therefore crucial that a revised White Paper on SAPIPM takes note of the lessons learnt as a result of the ‘Battle in Bangui’, as well as the importance to that both the SANDF, and the civilian component be supported by, and infused with, the necessary capabilities to enable its effective application in the environment of POs (Schoeman, 2013: 217). Arguably, had South Africa not ‘gone at it alone’ in the CAR, and had there been sufficient support for the troops in the CAR, the amount of fallen South African soldiers may have been less.

Turning to the third of the success factors, and echoing the earlier analysis on the preference of a bottom-up approach to gender mainstreaming, the **Capstone Doctrine** notes that in planning and executing the core activities of POs, “every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors” (United Nations, 2008a:39). As POs are meant to help countries emerging from conflict (mostly internal), there needs to be a high level of national and local ownership in the maintenance of stability and following the peace process if POs are to succeed (de Coning *et al*., 2008:2; Swope, 2011:54). This includes everything related to the activity of
peacebuilding, as stressed in the *Brahimi Report*. By building national and local ownership as well as partnerships, the organisation responsible for the peace operation (UN, AU, ECOWAS etc.) can improve the legitimacy of the peace process and its mandate, as well as “help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once POs have been withdrawn” (United Nations, 2008a:39).

It is at the tactical, local level where POs are well placed to empower and enable communities to transform out of conflict and build the peace. At this level for example, people are involved in a range of informal peacebuilding activities through civil society organisations, community-based organisation and churches (Sorensen, 1998: 6; Heinecken, 2013: 156). A wide array of services are therefore provided at this level, such as medical and psychological assistance, reaching out to the youth, providing shelter as well as the overall assistance to victims of violence. It is clear that these services should form an integral part of all efforts in POs, specifically in terms of peacebuilding (Heinecken, 2013: 157).

To its credit, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM makes mention of the success factor of local and national ownership as espoused in the *Capstone Doctrine*. The 1999 White Paper (DIRCO, 1999: 19) states that:

> Peace missions should...be viewed as long-term endeavours, which include a significant investment in peacebuilding, and not merely as short-term engagements...In all cases, peace missions should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and experiences, rather than the imposition of foreign modes of conflict management and governance [emphasis added].

However, it will be crucial for a revised White Paper on SAPIPM take cognisance of the above three success factors (especially in relation to South African experiences in the CAR), and their translation to a revised understanding of the principles of participation as well as the South African philosophy on participation in POs dictated in Chapters Four and Six of the current White Paper on SAPIPM, respectively.

### 4.3.5. Regionalisation of Peace Operations:

As indicated earlier in Chapter Two of this paper, in terms of institutional operationalisation of POs, there has been one major change. The change lies in the increased involvement of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. To further
increase its importance in transforming the POs arena, the *Brahimi Report*, in its treatment of doctrine and strategy, clearly envisages that regional organisations will remain the vehicle of choice for POs in “non-benign security environments - such as those encountered in most complex emergencies in Africa” (Malan, 2001:122). As discussed earlier, such an arrangement is made possible by Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945).

Should there be a need for a peace operation in the form of a peace enforcement operation (an issue which is beyond the scope of Article 52), the Charter clarifies, in Article 53, that these operations can be carried out by regional organisations, but only with the prior authorisation of the UN Security Council and under its authority (United Nations, 1945: art. 53). These arrangements are further bolstered by provisions in Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, and it is an important source of legitimacy (*Capstone Doctrine*) for regional organisations’ POs. This is the legal framework within which regional POs operate.

In the past, the UN almost monopolised the field of POs, however, the situation has now dramatically changed and the POs ‘market-place’ has undoubtedly become multi-polar, with many more actors than in the past (de Guttry 2011:34). There are many arguments for, and against it, but one thing is for certain: the UN can now devolve some of its responsibilities to regional organisations. The devolution of responsibility comes in a time where, as mentioned before, resources are finite. Regionalisation of POs does appear to offer a way of improving POs capacity of UN member states, which increases the likelihood of POs forces being found who can fulfil Security Council mandates. In terms of the evolution of regional POs, the year 2003 is the most important, for in both Europe and Africa, the respective regional organisations organised their first POs. The EU deployed police and military POs to Bosnia, Macedonia and the DRC, while the AU organised the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Yamashita, 2009:5). South Africa herself was instrumental in AMIB, deploying 1 600 troops out of the full mission strength of 3 335 military and civilian personnel (Ekengard, 2006:10, ACCORD, 2007:19).

The AU and regional organisations have deployed in contexts where the UN is not able or willing to, and as such, the idea of complementarity is key, “Africa matters not just as a recipient of POs, but also a provider of solutions” (de Carvalho, 2015). The advent, and continued rise of regionalisation in the maintenance of international peace and security is important for the strategic positioning of a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM.
With South African POs operating in a mainly African context, due to the primacy afforded to Africa in its foreign policy directive of an “African Agenda”, the increased involvement of the African Union in POs is of great importance.

The establishment of the AU marked a paradigm shift in dealing with conflicts on the continent. The formation of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the supporting security architecture – the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD), SADC, ECOWAS, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS) – signalled a renewed commitment to create an effective mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts. The AU has the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent, according to its Constitutive Act of 2000, signed by 54 African countries, which sees the AU, and supporting security architecture, as having a role in mandating and supporting POs on the continent (Murithi, 2013: 136).

The above needs to be taken into consideration as the current White Paper on SAPIPM does not allocate the same legal and authoritative verve to its section on regional and sub-regional mandates as it does to the UN mandate section (DIRCO, 1999: 14-17). Neethling (2003a: 97) explains that the early draft of the White Paper on SAPIPM (of July 1997) wanted to include the procurement of a mandate from both the regional (O)AU and sub-regional SADC if a peace operation in Southern Africa was to be conducted. This was due the White Paper on Defence, as well as the 1998 Defence Review, pronouncing that SADC should sanction operations in Southern Africa, and that operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the (O)AU (Department of Defence, 1996: Ch. 5 para 24.5.; Department of Defence, 1998: Ch. 5. para 5.3.). However, Williams (1999: 12) notes that concern was expressed by certain role-players that the time-consuming nature of securing endorsement for POs from either the SADC and/or (O)AU could well militate against South Africa being able to respond to crises at all. Thus, the final White Paper on SAPIPM provided for participation that would occur if POs were authorised by the UN and agreed to between the UN, regional bodies (where applicable), the host country, the conflicting parties, and contributing countries” (DIRCO, 1999: 14-17; Neethling, 2003a:97). Procedurally, this points to a lack of policy consistency within the South African POs involvement policy framework.
Given the emphasis placed on Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy, the advent of the AU’s, as well as SADC’s, Peace and Security architecture places a significant gap in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. It is therefore crucial for a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM to take, in addition to the supporting security architecture highlighted above, the following into consideration: the SADC Treaty and its Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

Concluding, the regionalisation of POs has given the potential for an AU or SADC mandated peace operation greater emphasis, especially in terms of securing endorsement from the regional organisation, thereby creating legitimacy and credibility. Given the renewed emphasis placed on regional organisations role in POs, a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM must highlight that mandates issued from the UN, AU and SADC will be the cornerstones on which South Africa’s potential participation in POs will be premised.

4.4. ADDITIONAL UPDATES, DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of this section is to further critique the current White Paper on SAPIPM so as to highlight inconsistencies in policy regulations and practice. Accordingly, the section will firstly look at the make-up of South Africa’s contribution POs and the discrepancies that exist in policy and practice. Secondly, the section deals an issue of inter-departmental coordination, even though the 1999 White Paper of SAPIPM enabled DIRCO, as the lead department, to establish the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM). Following, the section takes a brief look into the 2015 South African Defence Review, in order illuminate the respective pronouncements of the document on the issue of POs.

4.4.1. The South African Contribution

In terms of South Africa’s contribution, it must be noted that by 2005, it was suggested that POs were outrunning the SANDF’s budget capacity (Ferreira, 2009:81). The SANDF has apparently been told that it needs to justify its existence before it requests additional funding (Mandrup, 2007:157). The 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, premised on the dated 1998 Defence Review, therefore determined that SANDF participation in POs would be “at the level of up to one infantry battalion group” (DIRCO, 1999: 3, 25). Further, South African governments’ statement’s and policy as stated in the 1998 South African Defence Review (Department of Defence, 1998: Ch 5) as well as the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM (DIRCO,
1999: 3, 25), holds that the number of troops deployed into international POs will only exceed one extended battalion if core national interests are at stake. The government has by far exceeded that force level, [the SANDF in February 2009 had deployed three battalions of troops, consisting of 1 130 personnel in DRC, 636 in Darfur and 973 in Burundi (Vines, 2010:60)], but seem to be unwilling to release the needed funds to cover its deployments in POs (Mandrup, 2007:158). However, foreign policy challenges, interests and events in Burundi, the DRC, Burundi and Sudan soon overtook this policy position.

Currently, South Africa is the United Nations 17th largest contributor to POs, with a total of 1 422 personnel deployed in POs (1349 in the DRC, 50 in Darfur, Sudan, as well as 23 in South Sudan) (United Nations, 2017a; United Nations, 2017b). However, South Africa’s future role in POs could be compromised by declining defence expenditure: the average has dropped from three per cent of GDP in the late 1990s to 1.2 per cent in 2013 (Department of Defence, 2015). Importantly, deployments of this magnitude are not easily sustained, particularly if the minimum international norms of a one-in-four rotation are applied. Mills (2013: 221) notes that “to sustain 3 000 troops you require another 12 000 in the cycle, without allowance for unscheduled interventions, unplanned emergency assistance operations, sickness and injuries”.

Also, given the small number of operational units, SANDF soldiers have to deploy twice or thrice a year. To put this into context, “the British in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq and the French work in a cycle of one-in-six. They have five rotations at home before they go back into the conflict zone” (Solomon, 2010:142). The SANDF is working on a cycle of one-in-three which is neither optimal nor sustainable (Engelbrecht, 2009).

The 2015 South African Defence Review (which will be addressed later) notes that in pursuit of enhanced continental and international security, South Africa will remain a significant and responsible troop contributor to POs in Africa (Department of Defence, 2015: 135). However, the policy document also notes that (Department of Defence, 2015: 138):

> Involvement is discretionary and will be determined in the light of the specific situation and concurrent commitments... However, the commitment cannot be open-ended. **Criteria for involvement in specific missions and a pre-determined maximum level of involvement will be set by Government**...South Africa, in appropriate circumstances, will make elements of its Defence Force available to the peace operations of the United Nations and African Union; employ armed force to
assist other countries faced with insecurity; and conduct internationally agreed-upon constabulary operations [emphasis added].

Furthermore, the document reiterates that “the assumptions against which the 1998 Defence Review Force Design was constructed quickly became invalid. In any case, the selected force design was never attained” (Department of Defence, 2015: 46). It is therefore clear that the 2015 Defence Review has distanced itself from previous policy prescriptions as set out in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM as well as the 1998 Defence Review. It will therefore be crucial for a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM to take into account the practicalities that have unfolded on the ground since 1999, as well as the policy stance of the 2015 Defence Review.

4.4.2. Inter-Departmental Coordination

POs are not only multinational in nature, to TCCs they involve much more than only military forces. In South Africa, a range of other national departments and agencies are also involved in such actions, making the demand for cooperation and coordination a crucial ingredient of success (Schoeman, 2013: 222). Schoeman (2013: 222) notes that intra- as well as inter-“departmental rivalries and disagreements, or mere lack of mechanisms and structures to ensure cooperation and coordination, may undermine and weaken the ability to utilise foreign policy instruments credibly and efficiently, and therefore need constant monitoring and assessment”. Therefore the ability to exercise efficient coordination in relation to POs, is in itself an indication of the strength of capabilities for the implementation of South Africa’s POs policy framework.

On the issue of governmental coordination, until 2003, only the presidency, reflecting Mbeki’s autocratic stance over anything foreign policy, was involved in decision-making on participation in missions, rather than the NOCPM, as specified. The resulting implication was that there was no democratic civil input and control or inter-departmental consensus (Ferreira, 2009:87). For instance, the deployment of troops in Burundi, as Thomas Mandrup notes, was also a test case with respect to “the principles of distribution of tasks between different government departments in South Africa, allowing the assessment into how well the co-ordination between the different branches of government worked, as well as the allocation of funds etc.”(Mandrup, 2007:236).
However, this deployment was marred by confusion due to a lack of coordination. Decisions concerning the deployments in Burundi were often taken at the highest levels with limited consultation with the relevant structures as implied in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. ACCORD (2007:28), notes that in the haste to deploy:

...a general sense of confusion persisted amongst the decision-makers and the policy implementers in the DoD and the SANDF. This confusion related to the legality of the mission and the official authorisation process. Even to date some members of the operational team argue that discrepancies still exist as to whether or not an MoU or mandate were in place prior to deployment in spite of the relevant dated documentation available.

However, it is a tribute to the forces on the ground and the military and political planners at staff headquarters, that despite “these significant challenges the mission was successful in regards to its mandate to protect the political leaders” (ACCORD, 2007:28).

To highlight this, the South African government’s International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster (ICTS) released a delivery agreement in March 2011 that makes specific reference to the need for “strengthened internal coordination of South Africa’s contribution to POs” (ICTS, 2011: 10). The current White Paper on SAPIPM only provides DIRCO with the lead responsibility of overseeing and coordinating South Africa’s involvement in international POs. The above, therefore, may be as a result of the fact that the NOCPM was not ‘fleshed out’ in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, or in any other policy documents that have followed. A revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM therefore needs to flesh out the key role played by the NOCPM, and its associated responsibilities, from the inception of POs to its eventual conclusion.

4.4.3. The 2015 South African Defence Review

The South African Defence Review 2015, sought to balance the POs role of the country’s armed forces in the rest of Africa with domestic responsibilities for the military that include controlling South Africa’s borders and providing protection against international criminal gangs and terrorists. The 2015 Defence Review has some very important observations that a revised White Paper on SAPIPM should take note of, and more importantly align to so as to negate future policy inconsistencies.
Conceptually, upon reading the 2015 Defence Review, one is hit with a plethora of overlapping and non-specifically defined terms. Earlier versions of the 2015 Defence Review, specifically the 2012 Draft Defence Review as well as the 2014 Defence Review were inconsistent within themselves, as they employed different ways of spelling “peacekeeping” with peace-keeping, peace keeping and peacekeeping all being utilised throughout the document (Department of Defence, 2012; Department of Defence, 2014). Fortunately, the 2015 version has corrected these conceptual ambiguities. Nonetheless, and in this study’s case, the terms PMs and PSOs are now seemingly used interchangeably. Their distinctive characters, illustrated earlier, have now disappeared and the terms seem to mean one in the same (Department of Defence, 2015: 139-140). One is also struck by the term “crisis response” which the document locates within South Africa’s expanding regional and continental security responsibilities (Department of Defence, 2015:137). Does this term equate to the terms PMs, PSOs or POs?

The authors of the 2015 Defence Review make it clear that a military approach to POs cannot ignore the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peacebuilding as this will effectively impede lasting stability and human security (Department of Defence, 2015: 139). The 2015 Defence Review addresses the issue of participation in POs, by clearly stating that South Africa’s position as a leader of the continent requires it not only to contribute to democracy and economic growth, but also to play a leading role in POs. To this effect, the document noted that “South Africa…will concomitantly assume the obligation to provide experienced military leaders and proficient military forces for POs on the African continent” (Department of Defence, 2015: v).

Thus, the 2015 South African Defence Review aims to support goals set by the national government and proposes a “fundamental shift” from the priorities of the previous review in 1998. The document describes growing regional and domestic responsibilities that need to be shouldered by South Africa’s military. In addition to addressing core concerns about protecting national interests and ensuring proper accountability of the armed forces to government, the 2015 Review also highlights the military’s regional role in POs in Africa; Tshwane’s broader foreign policy response to the African ‘strategic environment’; the role of the armed forces in the policing of national borders and the provision of support to civil authorities in times of crisis; and the role that the SANDF can play in contributing to the country as a ‘developmental state’ (Department of Defence, 2015).
In general, the review recommends that South Africa should pursue a multilateral approach – with SADC, the AU, and the UN – and also forge bilateral partnerships in Africa in order to promote peace, security, and development on the continent (Department of Defence, 2015: 96, 98, 133). Practically, the review recommends increasing South Africa’s cooperation with, and support for, security and defence agreements and mechanisms with partner nations and regional and continental bodies.

To illustrate, and in further moving away from the 1996 White Paper on Defence, the 1998 Defence Review, as well as the 1999 White Paper on SAPIM all of whom stated that “South Africa shares the view with many of its neighbouring countries that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force is not required or feasible”, the 2015 Defence Review now reiterates specific pledges on the level of ground, air, sea, and logistical support to be supplied by South Africa to the SADC Standby Force (SADC SF), which forms part of the African Standby Force (ASF) for POs being established under the auspices of the AU and SADC, respectively (Department of Defence, 2015: 135-136).

The 2015 Defence Review has proposed a fundamental shift with a 30 year defence trajectory, seeking to address five core milestones. Accordingly, the South African military contribution plays itself out differently according to each of the Milestones which should be achieved as implementation goes along. The first milestone deals with “arresting the decline” in SANDF by 2015 – meaning dealing with the declining problems in its operations and providing a budget of 1.1% of gross domestic product (GDP). Here, South Africa’s current commitment to two medium, enduring POs can be maintained, “at the level of a battalion in each instance…with a 1 in 3 rotation-cycle in each deployment area, as opposed to the international norm of a 1 in 4 rotation-cycle” (Department of Defence, 2015: 175).

The second deals with "rebalancing" the SANDF by 2018. Here, it is stated that South Africa’s current commitment to two medium, enduring POs can be maintained “at the level of a battalion in each instance…with a 1 in 3 rotation-cycle in each deployment area, as opposed to the international norm of a 1 in 4 rotation-cycle” (Department of Defence, 2015: 178). In order for this to be achieved, it would require the budget increasing to 1.6% of GDP. The third milestone seeks to "capacitating" the SANDF by 2023. Here, it is stated that South Africa would be able to maintain two large, enduring POs at the level of a battalion-group in each instance. The document further highlights that “in each deployment area a 1 in 4 rotation-cycle can be achieved, implying a pool of eight battalion-sized units to conduct this
task appropriately…with one additional large enduring peace operation can be pursued at the level of a combat group. The combat group would operate in a 1 in 4 rotation cycle from a pool of four constituted combat groups” (Department of Defence, 2015: 181). In order for this to become a reality, the budget allocation would need to increase to 2% of GDP, and it would enable the SANDF to handle current missions.

The fourth milestone seeks to "develop the capability”, so that by 2028 the SANDF would be able to respond to new challenges. In this situation the document notes that three large, enduring POs can be sustained at the level of a combat-group in each instance. In each deployment area a “1 in 4 rotation-cycle can be achieved, implying a pool of 12 constituted combat groups to conduct this task appropriately” (Department of Defence, 2015: 183). Achieving this would require the budget allocation to jump to 2.4% of GDP. Finally, the fifth milestone was that the SANDF should be able to deal with situations of war. In the medium term, this would require a budget increase to 3.3% of GDP.

What may be deduced from the above document is South Africa does not foresee herself being confronted by a conventional war which may threaten her territorial integrity and sovereignty. This may be in light of the fact that a no-threat scenario has existed in South Africa since 1994. Therefore, and leveraging on what has transpired empirically as well as in keeping the SANDF gainfully employed, the SANDF envisions itself being deployed on continental and regional POs in order to ensure regional security and to prevent the spilling over of conflict into South Africa, i.e. to serve the national interest (Ferreira, 2009:76).

4.5. CONCLUSION

The above chapter identified and critically analysed the gaps that have been created by the development of the five scholarly identified contemporary developments in POs – the Brahimi Report; the WPS Agenda; the call for ‘Robustness’; the Capstone Doctrine; and, the advent of the regionalisation of POs – within the current 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. What may be deduced is that out of these developments, the WPS Agenda, the importance of peacebuilding and the call for ‘robustness’ are of particular significance as they affect both the strategic and tactical success of POs. The identified gaps that have been created as a result of the identified trends are considerable, requiring an update and revision to the current White Paper on SAPIPM. However, there is no need for a potent policy shift, as evidenced in the identified merits of the current White Paper on SAPIPM.
Moreover, in highlighting further inconsistencies in policy regulations and practice within the South African POs policy framework, the chapter provided further critique to the current White Paper on SAPIPM. Here, the paper noted discrepancies in what has occurred between policy prescription and practice in the field of South Africa’s contribution to POs. Moreover, the chapter highlighted the importance for a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM to take into account the practicalities that have unfolded on the ground since 1999, in particular the effects of the 2013 ‘Battle in Bangui’ in the CAR. Even though this has been an implicit policy position, South Africa should explicitly make known that she will now only engage in military actions, in support of POs, “under multilateral regional agreements, be they UN or AU led, and never again under questionable bilateral pacts with leaders of dubious democratic pedigree” (Ashton, 2013). Moreover, a revised White Paper will need to factor into account the policy stance in terms of potential and future contributions as stated in the 2015 Defence Review.

Additionally, the chapter addressed the issue of the lack of inter-departmental coordination in South African considerations of involvement in POs, concluding that a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM needs to flesh out the key role played by the NOCPM, and its associated responsibilities in coordinating anything related to POs. Finally, the chapter took a brief look at the 2015 South African Defence Review and its key inputs around the issue of the role of the SANDF in South Africa’s involvement in POs. What was revealed was that the SANDF increasingly envisions itself being deployed on continental and regional POs, and an updated White Paper on SAPIPM will therefore need to take this and their pronouncements via the 2015 South African Defence Review into account.

In taking note of what has been discussed, analysed and critiqued, one may provide an answer to the earlier postulated question about the continued relevance of the current White Paper on SAPIPM. Simply, the need for an update and revision to South Africa’s primary policy on participation in POs is clear.

It is important to note that the revision of the current White Paper on SAPIPM must have the intention to incorporate previous experience gained, lessons learnt during deployments to POs (involvement in Burundi, the CAR, the DRC and Sudan have been internationally acknowledged) and to integrate new structures, such as the NOCPM as well as the continental and regional security architecture, that have been established since 1999. Doing
so will certainly serve as a foundation for future South African involvement in POs on the African continent, and beyond.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE 1999 WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS – AN EVALUATION

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Peace Operations (POs) will continue to be the vehicle of choice when addressing and/or managing societies that are either in, or are emerging from, conflict. This is especially true for the African continent as it makes-up just over 75 per cent of the UN’s POs budget of about $7.87 billion p.a. Furthermore, over 82 per cent of all UN POs troops are deployed in Africa (United Nations, 2017c). This is a sad and opportune fact. Sad, as with its natural and resource wealth, cultures and dynamism the African continent seems to constantly be imbued in conflict. While on the other hand, this is an opportunity for South Africa to play a greater role in this environment, enabling her to promote peace and stability, as well as propagate and advance her national interests.

South Africa clearly sees herself playing an important role in international POs, specifically those operating on the African continent. It was the primary goal of this research study to identify the gaps in South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, with the purpose of assessing the continued relevance of the POs policy document against international trends and developments in POs since the late 1990s. This critical analysis of South Africa’s existing POs policy framework, namely the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, identified the necessary changes and updates required for South Africa to (continue to) make a meaningful contribution in its involvement in POs.

In concluding this study into proposals for an updated policy framework for South African participation in international POs, this chapter provides an overview of the main findings and limitations of the study. It also offers some general reflections on the policy implications of not updating the current 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, as well as offers ideas for further research.

5.2. OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS

This paper began by introducing the need for updating South Africa’s current POs involvement policy framework. From here, the dissertation provided a literature overview in order to contextualise the changes that have occurred in the POs environment since 1999, as
well as presenting the paper with its working definition. This step was fundamental to formulating research questions and the preliminary assumption that would guide the study. The paper also outlined the contribution of this study as well as presented the methodological tools and methods to be used.

Chapter Two explored and analysed the multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the definitional, operational and institutional characteristics of POs. Thus, the paper’s working definition of POs as well as its accompanying complexities and activities was explicitly identified and analysed. Throughout the discussion, it became clear that POs have not evolved in a straightforward or linear manner with a ‘clear and clean’ division between Cold War and post-Cold War operations. Moreover, POs have changed over time, and even though the nature and dynamics of the evolution are contested, one thing is certain – POs have become the most important means for the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden areas. This analysis identified and explored five contemporary developments in POs since the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, thereby providing a conceptual foundation that encapsulated the required analytical framework for the remainder of this study.

Before appraising the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, Chapter Three firstly dissected South Africa’s POs policy framework, inclusive of related policy proclamations (as in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the 1996 White Paper on National Defence, as well as the 1998 South Africa Defence Review). The research revealed that in the area of POs, South Africa embraced an all-inclusive multi-disciplinary approach, where humanitarian concerns drove political and military tasks. The 1999 White Paper was (at the time) an all-encompassing document that sought to serve as a guideline for South Africa’s understanding of POs, clarifying decision making procedures, defining the parameters of South Africa’s participation and potential contributions, as well as serving as a mandate for the military, their specific requirements and deployment in alignment with UN principles and practices. Moreover, it was made clear that the authors of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM envisioned a living document which needed to be refined and updated in line with the growing experience South Africa (could have) mustered in her international deployments in support of POs (DIRCO, 1999:34). The analysis in this Chapter merited the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM as a policy step in the right direction. However, it concluded that in juxtaposing the observations made from the investigation into South Africa’s POs policy framework against the theoretical framework of analysis, that an update is required.
This study postulated a single research assumption for validation in section 1.3. The preliminary research assumption was framed as follows: taking into account new thinking on and developments in POs as discussed in the literature, South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is an outdated policy document. To elaborate: given that knowledge and experience at the United Nations, African Union and national level have developed and progressed since the promulgation of the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, it is important for the South African government to revise its POs policy framework. This is imperative as in order for South Africa to make a meaningful contribution in its involvement in POs, the now outdated policy framework will need to take into consideration a range of international trends and developments in both POs policy, as well as practice. As such, the problem statement is that after 18 years of South African involvement in POs, the country’s policy framework is generally acknowledged to be outdated.

In Chapter Four, the gaps within the current 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM were explicitly identified and critically analysed. As a result of this analysis, the necessary changes to this policy framework were highlighted. The research revealed that much has changed in the worlds, as well as South Africa’s, POs environment and actions since 1999, yet nothing has changed in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. It became clear that out of the developments highlighted, the WPS Agenda, the call for ‘robustness’, as well as the important role that peacebuilding plays in all activities of POs (as stressed in the Brahimi Report), have become the most important developments that have shaped the continuing evolution, and success of POs. In terms of South Africa’s contribution to and coordination of POs, there are existing discrepancies occurring between policy prescription and practice – specifically with the role the NOCPM must play. In line with this, the research found that South Africa herself has grown in experience in the field of POs, serving in a multitude of varying POs. However, the experiences and lessons learnt have not been translated into concrete policy positions that would serve as a guide for future deployments – contrary to the expectations expressed in the 1999 White Paper.

It was further revealed in Chapter Four that through its deployments on international POs, the SANDF is expected to play a very important role as an instrument of South Africa’s foreign policy; however it lacks the resources to do so (see section 4.4.1.). Given its general decline, due to financial and budgetary constraints combined with leadership troubles which have led to its neglect over the past 23 years, the SANDF is expected to work miracles with the little that it has. What is clear is that South Africa is currently operating in the field of POs under a
policy document that is almost 20 years old, and that dates back from an era before South Africa became deeply involved in POs. The analysis therefore confirmed a) that considerable gaps exist within the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, b) which updates are required, and c) South Africa’s 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is indeed outdated. It is therefore imperative to update and revise the cornerstone of South Africa’s existing POs involvement policy framework.

5.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

There are two main limitations that this research study encountered. First, the multidimensional definition of POs, as well as the definitions of related activities, encountered in the literature, made it challenging to select the most appropriate definition that would facilitate the investigation into, and critical analysis of, whether gaps exist within the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, which would therefore adjudge it outdated. Additionally, the varieties of definitions used to define POs have made it challenging for policy makers, practitioners and academics to assist in the policy and decision making processes. A comparison of the arguments and texts in this area of discourse revealed a confusing mixture of concepts, views, and idea groupings, with different people and countries using the same terminology with slight-to-radically different meanings, and different words with the same or closely related meanings. As a result, it was challenging to theoretically frame the study within this context, as little agreement exists between governments, analysts, international organisations and practitioners about what POs are, and the differences between terms such as ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘peacebuilding’.

Secondly, and as briefly referred to in section 1.1., in 2014 it was noted that DIRCO had started with a revision to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM (PMG, 2014). Even though this information came to light in 2014, upon downloading the briefing document and slideshow presentation from the PMG website, it became evident that the revision to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM had started as far back as 2012. Five years later, the document itself has never been made public, and there is no indication that is has been officially considered, or adopted. Had it been released, even in a draft capacity, the document would have been analytically useful to this study in order determine what changes and updates were being considered by the South African government, and how these compared in relation to the observations and recommendations made by the study.
5.4. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY

Further research is required into national and international training for POs, given that POs are primarily undertaken by different countries that will have to merge their respective operational doctrines and understandings of POs. Moreover, this research into the training for POs should be expanded and explore the peacekeeping–peacebuilding nexus. Here, questions should be asked about the means of integrating peacebuilding strategies in all stages of the conflict management cycle. One can go further and investigate whether or not training for POs permeates all the way through the hierarchical levels of military organisation to the troops at the tactical level. This is distinctly important as POs, inclusive of peacebuilding strategies, are not traditional military roles. Training for POs should be provided for all the levels of management within the military, as well as to the identified troops and support services. The results of this research will greatly assist both POs practitioners and policy makers.

With this in mind, research is also required on the role of the military in undertaking peacebuilding activities. Essentially, this research should speak to the practical implications and specific focus areas of military involvement in the area of peacebuilding. This is due to peacebuilding being primarily nationally and locally owned, and considered as a non-military, civil activity. The research can go further and ask questions about the utility behind further equipping, supporting and capacitating the SANDF to do non-traditional military roles, such as POs and humanitarian assistance, as well as the potential impact this may have on the SANDF’s primary mandate of defending territorial sovereignty as well as defence against external aggression.

Finally, the research has showed that the responsibility for the coordination of South Africa’s involvement in POs rests on DIRCO as the lead Department. Further research should therefore be undertaken to investigate the importance placed by South Africa on POs in her officially pronounced foreign policy, the Diplomacy of Ubuntu (DIRCO, 2012).

5.5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is evident that much has changed in South Africa’s POs environment and actions since 1999, but nothing has changed in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. The 1999 White Paper needs to be reviewed as South Africa’s actions should follow from policy. As such, this study addressed the main research problem of investigating whether gaps exist in South Africa’s
current POs policy framework, the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, as a result of contemporary developments in POs. The study pointed out that gaps do exist in the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, as well as indicated in Chapter Four what changes are necessary to update South Africa’s POs involvement policy framework.

On the conceptual front - the term ‘Peace Missions’ (PMs) is a proudly South African terminology, whereas ‘Peace Operations’ (POs) is widely used as a generic umbrella term. Given that POs/PMs are primarily multinational efforts, and that therefore South Africa does not operate in isolation in the area of POs/PMs, one of two things may need to happen. South Africa either champions the conceptual use and flexibility of its term of ‘peace mission’ on an international stage, or it adopts the term ‘peace operation’ so as to promote multinational conceptual convergence and understanding.

The Brahimi Report of August 2000 contained recommendations on principles and practicalities of UN POs that must be adhered to when considering identified areas for an update to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, e.g. the political support behind the dynamics of the issuing of mandates, their budgetary implications, as well as the promotion of peacebuilding. Recommendations into filling the gaps created by the Brahimi Report were addressed in section 4.3.1. However, and in updating the identified sections, special attention must be given by the South African government to the institutionalisation of peacebuilding by the AU PCRD policy framework and its implications for a revised White Paper on SAPIPM.

The WPS Agenda presented a major development in the field of POs and has therefore impacted on the entirety of the current White Paper on SAPIPM, from its introduction to conclusion. This is a significant gap in the policy framework, one which a new and revised White Paper on SAPIPM is required to take into serious consideration. A revised White Paper on SAPIPM must prioritise the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in all aspects of POs to ensure that peace and security interventions are relevant to all stakeholders, responsive to their needs, and effective in the promotion of equality. It is therefore imperative that a revision to the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM is undertaken to reflect this development, as gender mainstreaming is not only something which is beneficial, it is essential to the success of contemporary POs. Further recommendations in terms of the WPS Agenda were highlighted in section 4.3.2.
The call for robustness has impacted on the current White Paper’s understanding vis-à-vis the nature of contemporary POs, the possible mandates that can be issued, the philosophy behind South Africa’s participation, the make-up of a potential contribution as well as the principles that will underscore South Africa’s participation. In the same way as with the WPS Agenda, the 1999 White Paper is silent on the call for robustness, signifying a gap that needs to be updated. This is especially true considering that South Africa has herself contributed to the advent of robust POs with her involvement in the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC, as well as advocating for the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). The 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM, therefore, needs to be revised and updated, as recommended in section 4.3.3., to speak to the call for robustness in the area of POs, especially if a South African contingent is to be regarded as credible and legitimate.

Thus, it is crucial for a revised White Paper on SAPIPM to take cognisance of the three success factors highlighted by the Capstone Doctrine, their translation to a revised understanding of the principles of participation as well as the South African philosophy on participation in POs dictated in Chapter’s Four and Six of the current White Paper on SAPIPM, respectively. South Africa needs to take serious note of the recommendations, indicated in section 4.3.4., to be considered in the update of the current White Paper on SAPIPM. This is especially true given the SANDF’s deployment into the CAR, with specific reference to the 2013 ‘Battle of Bangui’ which led to 15 SANDF soldiers losing their lives.

The regionalisation of POs has given the potential for AU or SADC mandated POs greater emphasis, especially in terms of securing endorsement from the regional organisation, thereby creating legitimacy and credibility. Given the renewed emphasis placed on regional organisations’ role in POs, a revised and updated White Paper on SAPIPM must take into cognisance the evolution of the security architecture of both the AU and SADC, as well emphasise that mandates issued from the UN, AU and SADC will be the cornerstones on which South Africa’s potential participation in POs will be premised. Further gaps and recommendations were identified in section 4.3.5.

In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, a revised White Paper on SAPIPM needs to address any additional developments, and inconsistencies, so as to negate future policy irregularities. In order to do so, a revised White Paper on SAPIPM should:

a. Authoritatively state the make-up of potential South African contributions to POs,
b. Flesh out the key role to be played by the NOCPM, and its associated responsibilities in coordinating anything related to POs, and
c. Take into cognisance the stance of the 2015 South African Defence Review on the future of South Africa’s involvement in POs.

Furthermore, revision of the current White Paper on SAPIPM must have the intention to incorporate experiences gained, lessons learnt during deployments to POs (involvement in Burundi, the CAR, the DRC and Sudan have been internationally acknowledged) and to integrate new structures, such as the NOCPM, as well as the continental and regional security architecture, that have been established since 1999. Doing so will certainly serve as a foundation for future South African involvement in POs on the African continent, and beyond.

Finally, Heitman, (2014) sums up the urgency to update and revise the 1999 White Paper on SAPIPM. He states that:

\[\text{We are in an era of rapid change, economic, social, technological and strategic, and defence policy, strategy and organisation must be intellectually and physically agile, able to adapt and evolve to meet new and evolving challenges.}\]
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