The securitisation of peacekeeping? The case of MONUSCO and Resolution 2098 (2010 to 2013)

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that this mini-dissertation is my own original work. Where secondary material was used, this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance with university requirements. I further declare that this mini-dissertation has not previously in its entirety or in part, been submitted for obtaining any qualification.

October 2017
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I would like to thank the Lord for granting me the aptitude, patience and perseverance that enabled me to see this through.

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations was established to restore and maintain international peace and security with peace keeping being the most visible component thereof. The evolutions of conflict, evolving circumstances, and shifts in international relations, have transformed the practice of peacekeeping. However, the tenets that were developed to guide the exercise of this responsibility, have been adhered to in the authorisation of peacekeeping missions over time, thereby establishing normal practice.

The authorisation of the Force Intervention Brigade in Resolution 2098 (2013) broke with the tradition of adherence to the tenets and can be termed to be an extraordinary measure in peacekeeping, and akin rather to war making. The introduction of extraordinary measures resonates with the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory which developed criteria to enhance understanding of the concept of ‘security’ and the subsequent justification of extraordinary measures. The study uses the case study of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo to evaluate against the criteria for securitisation to ascertain whether UN Resolution 2098(2013) was an instance of the securitisation of peacekeeping.

Such developments are significant given that descuritisation is nigh impossible to accomplish, that these peacekeeping interventions are currently predominantly in Africa, that South Africa plays an active role in the peacekeeping environment and that successful practices are replicated and used to shape future approaches to interventions.
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CHAPTER 1:
THE SECURITISATION OF PEACEKEEPING? THE CASE OF MONUSCO AND UN RESOLUTION 2098 (2010 TO 2013)

1.1 Introduction

Restoring and maintaining international peace and security is the responsibility of the United Nations (UN). Accordingly, the UN is the largest and most influential organisation making it the recipient of more public attention and scrutiny than any other organisation (Ritli, 2011:1). The practice associated with delivering upon its responsibility to restore and maintain international peace and security is peacekeeping, which remains the most visible component of the UN system. Shifts in international relations, evolving circumstances and new patterns in conflict shape and transform, albeit incrementally, the practice of peacekeeping (Malan, 1998:1).

Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, the conviction grew that the UN could achieve the ambitious objectives set forth in the UN Charter (UNSG, 1992:1), and the UN’s agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:10). A new interpretation of the Charter broadened the traditional reasons for intervention and legitimised UN involvement in domestic conflict, previously inviolable in terms of sovereignty clauses. In conjunction with this interpretation, an increased propensity to authorise the use force was observed, despite some countries remaining comfortable only with the traditional UN principles and practice. Funders and fielders of peacekeeping diverged in perceptions which introduced tension and divisions within the inter-state arena. Intrusion into aspects of sovereignty, once beyond the purview of the UN, shaped the scope and responsibilities for peacekeeping, making them progressively more ambitious, thereby increasing expectations and the chances of failure.

UN peacekeeping represents the largest deployed military force in the world (Better World Campaign, 2016:1). The UN is the predominant peacekeeper on the African continent with the keeping of peace in Africa being imperative in the objective of maintaining international peace and security. Of the sixteen UN missions deployed on four continents, 9 are in Africa (56,25%). More than US $5,8 billion or 75% of the total UN peacekeeping budget of US
$7.87 billion is allocated to African peace missions. UN personnel serving in African peace missions represent 83% (98,566) of the 118,792 staff complement of UN personnel (UN, 2016a:1-5). From the aforementioned statistics, it can be deduced that Africa presents as the most important arena for peacekeeping efforts. It has consequently been the laboratory for peacekeeping approaches and has repeatedly tested the capacity, resolve and functioning of the UN Security Council (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000:161).

The UN’s mixed results suggest that although the UN serves an effective role in legitimising enforcement coalitions for collective security, it was largely ineffective as a peace enforcer or war-maker in the intrastate conflicts that emerged after the Cold War. This, in a world where intrastate war has become the paramount concern of international peace and security organisations, challenged the UN’s future as a peace maker (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:2-3).

To secure its continued existence, the UN was obliged to consider approaches that would protect the survival of the organisation and those whom it aims to protect, and concomitantly, overcome the inherent political resistance within the organisation. Approaches adopted, thus far, in intractable conflicts, failed to deliver peace but have instead delivered ‘mission creep’, indicative that the issue may need to be elevated above politics to obtain consent for the introduction of extraordinary measures. This is analogous to the securitisation of peacekeeping wherein extraordinary measures are introduced to ensure the survival of a referent object. Persistent and perpetual insecurity implies that Africa will always have a need for stabilisation, and by extension peacekeeping. It therefore follows that innovations in peacekeeping would be developed, introduced and tested in Africa.

1.2 Literature review

1.2.1 Evolution of peacekeeping

Operations deployed by, or endorsed by, the UN have their implicit legal basis in the chapters of the UN Charter which deal with conflict resolution; Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Changes in international politics and practical experience have introduced progressive modifications in purpose and tasks, which in turn transformed peacekeeping operations from their original
design and purpose although, throughout, they remain underpinned by three key principles; consent, impartiality and the non-use of force.

Transformations in peacekeeping have been categorised as ‘generations’, characterised by the level of force employed by the military pillar, the type and depth of tasks conducted by the civilian pillar and the increased load-sharing with regional organisations. UN operations have evolved from a reactive stance, seeking to palliate conflict, to a proactive roleplayer seeking to influence the outcome. Conflict too has evolved from being interstate to intrastate, reducing the effect of the UN’s moral presence. The use of force between states and within states has declined whilst the propensity of the international community to use force to ensure collective security has increased (Kenkel, 2013:125). Five generations of peacekeeping can be distinguished:

First generation
Abusara (2010) introduces first generation peacekeeping operations, also known as traditional operations, which were exclusively UN operations. The operations were mandated under Chapter 6 for interpositional tasks when a peace treaty had already been reached. Kenkel (2013) proposes that the principle of state sovereignty and its inter-state inviolability gave rise to the development of three principles; consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. In these operations, forces were lightly armed, relying upon moral suasion to ensure mission success. Despite this passive approach, it was recognised that more bellicose environments would necessitate greater force as was demonstrated during the Suez deployment of 1956. Critique of this generation of peacekeeping centres around the perception that conflicts were ‘frozen’ rather than resolved with underlying causes not receiving due attention.

Second generation
Also known as multidimensional operations, these operations are temporally located in the immediate post-Cold War period which ushered in profound changes. The demand for peacekeeping operations increased substantially and the international community’s increased recognition of moral obligations gave rise to more missions being authorised. These operations were still predominantly Chapter 6 operations although conflict had evolved from interstate to intrastate, introducing greater complexities, and reducing the UN’s powers of moral suasion. Additional tasks were
delegated to the peacekeepers who were required to facilitate the transition to peace. The UN progressively shifted from a traditional, moral authority to exerting more aggressive, physical authority with activities in this generation being more assertive and interventionist than the traditional forebears. Kenkel (2013) however, identifies that the increased tasks and challenging environment contributed to an increasing gap between the means and ends, which compromised the ultimate success of the missions.

Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ Report of 1992 recognised that reform was a continuous process and attempted to address the shortfalls in peacekeeping. The endeavour was however, shortly followed by three devastating failures in UN peacekeeping; Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The three failures resulted from the restrictions imposed by the mandates, and their interpretations thereof and portrayed the UN as being powerless to act in the face of immense human tragedy. UN credibility, relevance and legitimacy suffered a setback as public perceptions that the UN was not able to meet the challenges of the new era grew (Abusara, 2010:21). This necessitated a reconsideration of approaches (Malan, 1998:3) and resulted in the UN Secretary General determining that the UN should not be alone in dealing with complex operations, expanding the responsibility, burden and also the blame, to regional organisations that were willing to participate in peacekeeping operations (Abusara, 2010:21).

**Third generation**

Kenkel (2013) attributes the introduction of the third generation operations to the Brahimi Report of 2000, which laid the foundation for more robust operations. These operations were primarily deployed under Chapter 7 mandates with increased authorisation to use force, but in practice, they did not represent a significant departure from the 2nd generation’s tasks. During these operations it became evident that operational realities challenged the rigid application of traditional principles but that the global north-south division retained differing opinions on the continued applicability thereof.
Fourth generation
Also termed peace support to peacebuilding operations, these operations encapsulated the notions of human security and positive peace. Tasks incorporated into the mandates included elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks, which impacted upon local autonomy and development. These operations addressed the roots of the conflict through political instrumentalisation and economic liberation to achieve their ends of sustainable peace (Kenkel, 2013:132-134).

Fifth generation
Kenkel (2013: 135-136) identifies a fifth generation in the hybrid missions that evolved in peacekeeping. These missions were established with mixed command, combining UN and regional organisations, deploying troops to the same mission under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate. This generation saw a shift in the division of labour in peace operations and the changing of attitudes towards international intervention. The global north largely internalised the use of force to protect civilians and uphold human rights while those in the global south, the major troop contributing countries, remained reticent to endorse the use of force in the name of human intervention.

Peter (2015) adds that a new era has been introduced where operations have become enforcement peacekeeping, where military solutions are enforced and political solutions precluded. Analysis of the evolution reveals an increased propensity to use force becoming a central component to peacekeeping, rendering Chapter 6 typologies increasingly irrelevant. Additionally, regional organisations became increasingly involved, sharing the burden and the blame for failures. It followed that further developments, as a result of changing operational environments and international relations, incorporated force at the higher end of the violence spectrum combined with a new approach to regional organisation burden-sharing.

1.2.2 The use of force in peace operations
Disillusionment with the salient failures and consent-based peacekeeping provided an important backdrop to the decision to use force in peacekeeping operations (Berdal, 2000:58). As has already been alluded to, peace missions adapt to circumstances and in a
number of cases, particularly in contemporary conflicts, peacekeeping will be inappropriate and peace enforcement more applicable to prevent a resumption of conflict (Spencer, 2004:9). The evolution of peacekeeping generations has progressively incorporated greater use of force in recognition hereof.

Van Der Lijn (2015:5) asserts that the nature of the crises and conflict determines the type of intervention required as well as which organisation is best suited to the task. This is supported by Slim (1995:10) who recognises ‘forces for courses’ in that some forces are better suited at some things than others. The utilisation of military forces for peace operations implies that the use of force remains inherent to peacekeeping. Hot-spots, where there is no peace to keep, necessitate greater use of force and more war-like missions to ensure mission safety and the creation of conditions conducive for lasting political solutions to be found. The international community’s recognition thereof is evidenced in the preference of Chapter 7 mandates in contemporary peace operations, albeit controversial with criticism from the international media and NGO communities. Justification of force on humanitarian grounds has circumvented this criticism and, in practice, the level of permissible force has increased progressively; the objects to be defended have been expanded and the reactive response has been replaced with pre-emptive defence.

Malan (1998:5) acknowledges that, despite the recognition that peace enforcement operations may be necessary, the UN lacks the institutional capacity to conduct them. A key contributing factor in this regard is the caveats and limitations that Troop Contributing Countries place on their troop utilisation which constrains an effective response. The effect is a robust mandate without a robust mission. Additionally, the political and military consequences of intervention on the higher end of the force spectrum changes conflict dynamics and does not comply with the principle of impartiality. Accordingly, the use of force challenges the traditional principles which remain salient to many troop contributing countries.

Van Der Lijn (2015:5) holds that the UN responded to concerns, criticism and member states’ reticence over the use of force by allocating more cautious mandates to UN missions, and delegating the operations at the higher end of the force spectrum to non-UN missions (regional missions). This approach correlates with Berdal’s (2000:61) assertion that one cannot wage peace and make war in one location at the same time. However, if one
considers the failures, which shaped the forceful approach, in conjunction with the criticism of the use of force, the contradiction can best be summed up by the phrase, “the UN will be doomed if it does act and damned if it doesn’t (Malan, 1998:3).

1.2.3 Securitisation

International security has a distinctive agenda rooted in power politics. An international security issue can be best understood in terms of a traditional military-political understanding as ‘something that threatens survival’. Buzan, Waever & de Wildt (1998: 21) submit that once an issue presents as a security issue, the term ‘security’ legitimises the use of extraordinary measures to neutralise the threat. McDonald (2008:566) explains further that the securitisation of an issue marks the end of engagement and dialogue, and the recognition that politics has failed to deliver security.

McDonald (2008) holds that securitisation is a conceptual framework, introduced by scholars referred to as the Copenhagen School, to explain the nature of security. The framework illuminates key aspects of ways how security preferences and practices are constructed in international politics. The framework was developed in response to the widening and deepening of security, and marked an attempt to limit the application of ‘security’ to all issues by providing an analytical grounding to evaluate what constitutes a ‘security threat’. In defining a security threat, Peoples & Vaughn Williams (2015:92-93), suggest that, if it is accepted that ‘security’ is about survival, then an issue has to pose an existential threat to a referent object in order for it to be deemed a security issue.

By presenting as an existential threat, securitisation frames an issue as either a special kind of politics or above politics, elevating an issue out of the realm of normal political debate into emergency politics. In the work of Buzan, Waever & de Wildt (1998), securitisation can therefore be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation. Once an issue is securitised, it subsequently justifies emergency measures, outside the normal bounds. However, for an existential threat to be securitised, it has to follow a specific process incorporating an audience, acceptance and actions.

Securitisation is a self-referential practice in that an existential threat does not really have to exist, it only has to be constructed, presented and accepted as such. Buzan, Waever & de Wildt (1998:24) and Peoples & Vaughn William (2015: 95) suggest that this introduces a
constructivist component to securitisation with intersubjective exchanges bestowing existentiality to the threat, and thereby endowing it with sufficient saliency to warrant exceptional actions. Roe (2012:254) adds that securitisation then creates new realities, as the emergency measures that are introduced alter the socio-politico relations associated with the issue. This in turn has a negative impact on the issue’s desecuritisation.

The core assumptions of securitisation have subsequently been adopted, adapted and developed by other scholars. Although initially only the state was recognised as a securitiser, Haacke and Williams (2008:5) illustrate that in contemporary international relations, non-state actors can also assume the role of the securitiser such that a societal collective, such as the UN, can be paralleled to the state as protecting and securing a ‘we’ identity. Balzacq (2010:65-69) reconceptualised and expanded upon the understanding of the required audience using Kingdons’ ‘three streams model’ which introduces responsiveness to external considerations. Abrahamsen (2005:59) added that the process of securitisation should be understood as gradual and incremental, with issues emerging as security risks and being treated in normal politics but evolving to become existential threats, necessitating exceptional measures. Watson (2011:8) also cautioned that securitisation can become institutionalised and no longer require a speech act, bearing a closer resemblance to normal practice.

Although securitisation can be associated with negativity arising from its exclusionary practices, Roe (2012:258) suggests that it can also be classified as positive if the outcome morally supersedes that of transcending the democratic principles with certain referents being privileged over others. This is further clarified by asserting that the moral correctness will depend on who benefits from securitisation. Watson (2011:8) however argues that although humanitarianism/human security has been used to justify the use of force, in contemporary international society it remains an exceptional response to have an armed humanitarian intervention.

Although traditionalists view all activities where the military is involved as being security instances, this does not equate to securitisation. Defence forces are maintained by states without an existential threat, but their posture and measures change when an existential threat is constructed, elevating their utilisation from the ordinary or traditional, to the extraordinary. The same will, by extension, hold true for UN peacekeeping forces.
1.2.4 The Force Intervention Brigade

Laurence (2014) recognises that although the UN Security Council had authorised the use of force on previous occasions, the mandate for the Intervention Brigade was the first to task UN troops with pre-emptive, offensive operations. Up until then, as proposed by Janik (2014), peacekeeping practice had evolved into a midway between doing nothing and enforcement under Chapter 7. UN enforcement operations under Chapter 7 remained elusive due to issues of consensus within the UN Security Council. Janik, although acknowledging that the Intervention Brigade remained a remarkable step for peacekeeping, stops short of perceiving the development as revolutionary due to the incremental nature of authorising force, which had preceded this decision.

Janik (2014) clarifies that restrictions on the ‘use of force’ represented the biggest obstacle to the successful implementation of a peacekeeping mandate and therefore required reinterpretation. The introduction of robust mandates and mandates under Chapter 7 eliminated the doubts of the permissibility to use force, and subsequently also contributed to the erosion of the tenets of impartiality and neutrality. Peacekeeping thereby evolved into a situation where peacekeepers were tasked to act in a manner only previously known to state armies, or military collectives under peace enforcement missions – signifying a remarkable development of the concept ‘peacekeeping’ since its inception.

Laurence (2014) explains this shift through the theory that previously inappropriate behaviour is found to be acceptable in terms of epistemic change. An episteme is intersubjective background knowledge that manifests in dispositions and practice. It shapes understanding through establishing fundamental categories and defining limits and creates order by making certain practices possible or impossible, desirable or unthinkable. In the 1990’s, in conjunction with the episteme that contained the core tenets of peacekeeping, new epistemes related to peacekeeping emerged. These epistemes held human security at its core and favoured liberal internationalism, respectively. Through this, inaction became associated with indifference to human suffering and catastrophic events then beget new practices because the old practices had failed. The repeated failures at protecting civilians experienced by the UN mission in the DRC were deemed unacceptable to practitioners, policymakers and locals alike. Although the practices were condemned, they were exactly
what competent peacekeepers would have done in the traditional peacekeeping sense. This demonstrates how new epistemes make old practices seem problematic and herald the arrival of new practices. Therefore, the practices associated with the Intervention Brigade, which were previously condemned, became possible because of changes in the background knowledge which shaped the way that practitioners, policymakers and host populations think about peace operations.

Cammaert (2013), Blyth(2013) and Fabricius (2014) attribute the failures in MONUSCO to the mandate interpretation by troop contributing countries. Troop contributing countries had an aversion to risk and were reluctant to acknowledge that a Chapter 7 mandate supports the use of force beyond self-defence. This lack of political will undermined the mandate which remains only as strong as the will of the leadership of the TCCs to implement it. The failures contributed to new understandings of acceptable/unacceptable practice and created an opportunity for the UN to push the boundaries of the peacekeeping doctrine and consider ‘radical’ options for the DRC.

It was difficult to achieve success in African intrastate conflicts with the traditional episteme. UN practices and policies became ineffectual at discharging the mandate and realising mission end-state and exit. Political will and lack of capacity hobbled the successes in MONUSCO further entrenching the problematic of the traditional episteme. As indicated, epistemes are intersubjective, bodies of knowledge and understanding which would link, conceptually, with the framing of an existential threat in securitisation. Additionally, the reinforcements provided to MONUSCO, most notably the Intervention Brigade, remain acknowledged as extraordinary and exceptional measures. It however, remains widely controversial. Hence, the question whether Resolution 2098 (2013) was the result of the securitisation of peacekeeping.

1.3 **Aim of the study**

This study investigates whether the extraordinary measures which were introduced to MONUSCO in Resolution 20908 (2013) were the result of the securitisation of peacekeeping. Established UN principles - neutrality, impartiality, consent and the minimum use force - inform the character of peace missions. The authorisation of Resolution 2098 (2013) and the introduction of reinforcements to MONUSCO, most notably that of the
Intervention Brigade, marked a break with peace mission tradition. On the basis of the traditional UN principles and practice, the introduction of the intervention force represented visible and conclusive evidence of the UN’s inability to address the problems and crises experienced in the DRC.

In interstate relations, sovereignty and its associated responsibilities, are inviolable. In the case of the DRC the UN gradually assumed, de facto, the sovereign responsibility associated with the state; that of protection of civilians. This shift in circumstances and the pattern of conflict transformed and shaped UN decision-making to the extent that the creation of the Intervention Brigade marked a shift towards greater coercion in the adoption of military instruments to achieve objectives in intractable, intrastate conflicts. It is therefore suggested that, with the extraordinary measures that were adopted, breaking with previous principles and practice, the UN effectively securitised its mission in the DRC, as a last resort, in order to achieve its objective of protecting civilians, and additionally, restoring its international credibility and relevance. The main question that this research aims to answer is whether Resolution 2098 (2013) is an instance of the securitisation of peacekeeping.

In answering this question, the following has been considered;

- What are the characteristics of securitisation?
- What were the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to Resolution 2098(2013)?
- To what extent does Resolution 2098(2013) represent a case of securitisation?

The research problem has been demarcated in conceptual, time and geographical terms. Conceptually the emphasis is on the use of extraordinary measures and force in peacekeeping missions, with particular reference to MONUSCO and the securitisation theory. The time-frame of the research is bounded from 2010, when the UN mission in the DRC evolved to become a Stabilisation mission, to 2013, when Resolution 2098 (2013) was authorised and the FIB created with a mandate to conduct offensive operations against armed groups. The geographic scope of study is limited to the DRC and the UN Mission in the DRC as this mission is one of the largest UN missions and the longest lasting African mission, which represents significant international community investment in DRC stability.
Additionally, the DRC has historically been the setting for UN peacekeeping innovations and the laboratory for the refining of Protection of Civilians guidelines.

1.4 Methodology and structure of study

Threats to international peace and security are assessed and constructed within the UN principle organs, most notably the UN Security Council. As such, the threat is relative and dependent on perspectives being framed by a particular actor. Codification and verbalisation of the threat-construct within audiences contextualises it and provides it with meaning. This constructivist premise guides the methodology chosen, with the best method available, which would provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, is the qualitative, case study method. This method allows for the focus on interpretation, allowing complex phenomena to be studied within context in order to obtain a rich and complex understanding of the specific phenomenon of study.

The approach to the research is a descriptive case study using MONUSCO, Resolution 2098 (2013) and the Intervention Brigade to ascertain whether the securitisation framework can be applied in peacekeeping. UN documents, media reports and secondary sources are used to contextualise how the threat manifested as an existential threat. Primary UN documentation that was reviewed includes UN Secretary General Reports, UN Security Council Resolutions and records of proceedings. The method used is qualitative and focuses on a single case study owing to the constraints in terms of length, academic requirements and to ensure that the scope remains reasonable in terms of research possibility.

In characterising securitisation, secondary sources that elucidate on the securitisation theory, its evolution, application and limitations were be consulted. In defining the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to resolution 2098(2013) and the Intervention Brigade, data sources used were primary UN documentary sources supplemented by secondary literature sources. Due to time and financial constraints, I did not conduct fieldwork, electing instead to focus on material readily available. The generalisability of the research is however limited by my choice of a single case study. This study is therefore a literature study.
In conjunction with the written material, I conducted an interview with a senior military official to verify secondary literature findings and provide a deeper understanding of the practical implication of Resolution 2098 (2013) on operations. The choice of candidate was purposive and not random due to the official’s extensive experience of tactical, operational and strategic levels of peacekeeping operations. This provided an expert opinion for an in-depth understanding of the operational impact of the resolution. The official has extensive hands-on experience of peacekeeping operations within the DRC, having been deployed within MONUC and MONUSCO respectively for 42 months, across four rotations, at various levels within the military spectrum of operations. This was followed by a four and a half year deployment, commencing in 2011, to the UN Headquarters in New York at the Current Military Operations Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations. At the time of Resolution 2098 (2013), he was within the structures responsible for the groundwork in preparation for MONUSCO reinforcements and as such, he has extensive knowledge of the process. The interview consisted of open-ended questions, contributing the maximum benefit in terms of the research. A list of core questions is attached as an appendix.

The study is structured in a conventional manner in that it incorporates a theoretical framework, a main empirical body consisting of two chapters and a concluding section which contains an evaluation.

Chapter one is a methodological chapter, consisting of an introduction and a literature overview. The literature overview contributes to identifying the gap in the literature which in turn, informs the research theme, the aim of the study and the formulation of the research problem. The identification of the research theme and problem direct the choice of research method used in the research and how the research is structured prior to commencing with the empirical study of the core constructs.

Chapter two presents a conceptual and theoretical framework for the analysis of securitisation. The discussion focuses on the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitisation and subsequent academic contributions to the theory. The characteristics and criteria for securitisation are identified and expounded upon and used to develop a framework from which to analyse and evaluate the case study. In order to understand the environment
wherein the framework will be tested, the evolution of peacekeeping operations will be expanded upon prior to the specific focus on MONUSCO's evolution in chapter three.

Chapter three contains a historical overview of the UN Mission in the DRC, providing the data for contextualising and analysis. The synopsis highlights the situation within, and relationship between, the DRC state and governance, the protection of its civilian communities and the UN mission's operations, all of which impact upon UN relevance and legitimacy. The period covered is from 2010 when the UN mission evolved into a stabilisation mission up to and including 2013 with the release of Resolution 2098 (2013) and the subsequent reinforcements to MONUSCO.

Chapter four evaluates the data from the UN mission in the DRC against each of the criteria in the framework for securitisation which was developed in Chapter two. The evaluation will ascertain to what extent it can be held that Resolution 2098 (2013) represented the securitisation of peacekeeping.

In conclusion, chapter five will revisit the research problem and evaluate whether peacekeeping was securitised and the implications thereof for the future of peace missions. The chapter reviews the implications of securitisation and how the UN has internalised the lessons learned from the DRC intervention in the four years since the inception of the Intervention Brigade and identifies potential future research areas.

1.5 Conclusion

The African battlespace is the predominant theatre for contemporary peace missions. Peace missions are shaped, transformed and reformed by relations, circumstances and conflict trends. As such, reform is a continuous process with new approaches being adopted in the hopes of achieving success. It can be expected that successful approaches, or even approaches that halt further decline, will be replicated in similar circumstances. Replications can shape doctrine and the future of peace missions. As a UN troop contributing country and continental power, South Africa should be aware of the possible evolution in peace missions and its ramifications.
Securitisation ensures a referent object’s continued survival and would be considered a suitable approach when facing an existential threat. In peace missions it may be perceived as a means to bridge the gap between mandate implementation and audience expectation, thereby restoring, collaterally, relevance to the UN operations. The securitisation of peace missions, if morally justifiable, could make a significant impact on the balance of power, re-establishing strength and resolve in peace missions and permitting the pro-active resolution of security issues. Unfortunately, once securitised, desecuritisation remains elusive. Additionally, the sustainability of the ‘survival’ established with securitisation remains hitherto largely untested and could, conversely, contribute to perpetuate conflict.
CHAPTER 2:  
SEURITISATION AS A THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT

2.1 Introduction

Securitisation is the process through which an issue is constructed as a matter of security, necessitating extraordinary measures. Security is an intensely political concept which is difficult to define. Buzan (2007:36-37) used ‘an absence of threats to acquired values’ and ‘the ability to maintain an independent identity and functional integrity’ as plausible definitions for security. Classical approaches to security, particularly during the Cold War, focused on the state and its preservation, with security being the goal and motive for behaviour. Accordingly, security is a fundamental characteristic of nation-states and international relations although in contemporary times it has been broadened and deepened to incorporate issues beyond the ‘state’.

Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerability, with states, or in this case the securitiser, seeking to reduce insecurity by either preventing, or lessening the threats or reducing their vulnerability to threats (Buzan, 2007:104). Threats, and threat perceptions, have long been an important facet of international relations and, when identified, imply that urgent action may be required. During the Cold War, traditional era, security pertained solely to the state and its sovereignty in conjunction with power politics within the international arena. International security is rooted in the traditions of power politics and is a complex mix of different agendas and multiple issues with each political entity pursuing its own interests, constructing its own threats and forming alliances where necessary. Different states have different interests and different thresholds for defining a threat (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:40) but it holds true that security is an arena of competing actors; both state and non-state.

Security encompasses survival and moves an issue to the forefront when it is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object. Security has long succeeded in being privileged above the political agenda making it something above being questioned (Knudsen, 2001:359). It has a special nature in that it legitimises and justifies the use of extraordinary measures to address threats; states can use force, mobilise or take special powers to address existential threats (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998: 21). It follows
that security is recognised as being socially constructed, politically powerful and signifying priority (Browning and McDonald, 2011:236). Even though it is acknowledged that certain issues are better dealt with within the realm of security than outside, ‘security’ retains significant power potential to change political processes which raise concerns regarding the ethics associated with the concept (Browning and McDonald, 2011:245).

The practices and meanings of security have been changing since the end of the Cold War. Non-military threats assumed more importance given the belief that military issues would no longer dominate international relations. The concept of security was broadened, expanding the security concept from exclusively military into political, societal, and environmental sectors and deepened; expanding the security concept to incorporate other referent objects other than the state (Knudsen, 2001:358; Sulovic, 2010:2).

The urgency associated with security resulted in the concept being abused and consequently introducing panic politics outside of the public sphere (Knudsen, 2001:360). Invoking security potentially initiates the dynamics of threat and defence which are traditionally associated with warfare (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:98) as well as the eternal conundrum as to whether the ends justify the means (Stone, 2009:8). Securitisation theorists aimed to reduce the abuse of applying security to everything. Securitisation theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, contributed to a broader understanding of security and security studies by rethinking the processes that issues go through to become ‘security issues’.

This chapter presents the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitisation and subsequent academic contributions to the theory in order to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework that permits the identification of characteristics and criteria for securitisation. The framework developed by the end of this chapter will be used to analyse and evaluate the case study in Chapter 4.

2.2 Defining securitisation

The concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation were introduced in Ole Waever’s analysis of the Cold War ending in Europe and the concept of societal security being introduced to make sense of the integration of European societies (Bilgin, 2011:401).
Securitisation contributed to security theory in that it offers a model for understanding how particular security conceptions and practices became possible in international relations, clarifying how issues come to appear on the political agenda (Knudsen, 2001:359). The Copenhagen School used securitisation theory to develop distinctive criteria for ascertaining and defining what does, and what does not, represent a security issue (Sulovic, 2010:3). This created awareness of the arbitrary nature of threats and that policy is not a given but rather chosen and created by politicians and decision-makers who have an interest in defining it in a specific way.

2.3 Theoretical origins of securitisation

Securitisation studies therefore seek to establish who securitises (actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results and under what conditions (felicity conditions). Both Tuarek (2006:4) and Peoples and Vaughn Williams (2015:95) consider Austin’s speech act theory as contributing to the formulation of the speech act component and how and when they succeed or fail. Austin’s speech act theory proposes that many utterances are equivalent to actions and distinguishes between three different types of speech acts. A locutionary act gives meaning to a certain utterance, an illocutionary act goes beyond this to couple a performative force to the meaningful utterance while a perlocutionary act is a meaningful utterance, coupled with a performative force, which brings about an unconventional effect. Securitisation is illocutionary, with security being achieved by uttering security. Accordingly, there is a constructivist component to securitisation theory because an issue can become a security issue by virtue of how they are presented in the speech act and accepted by the audience. Furthermore according to Austin’s theory, although performatives can be neither true nor false, they are subject to appropriate circumstances and follow appropriate rules and regulations. In the securitisation theory, these felicity conditions, which contribute to the success or failure of the securitisation process, include the following of a particular grammar and the construction of an existential threat, the position of authority of the securitising actor and the conditions historically associated with the threat regulations (Bagge Laustsen and Waever, 2000:708).

Tuarek (2006:12) furthermore identifies a correlation between Kenneth Waltz’s work and the construction of existential threats and felicity conditions. For Waltz, survival is grounds for action in a world where the security of states is not assured. Similarly, in securitisation
theory, security is framed fundamentally about survival, in the face of a threat constructed as existential, warranting exceptional responses that move issues out of the realm of normal politics into emergency, generating and justifying extraordinary responses. As such, “security is about survival, it is when an issue, presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object, justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998:21). Additionally, the limitations on who will succeed in securitisations, is modelled on the realist notions of capabilities and realities within the system. The more capabilities on the side of the actor, the less important the audience becomes which indicates that powerful security actors can also push securitisation to serve their own interests.

Securitising an issue has both internal and external, negative implications upon a state or securitising agent. Internally, it inhibits democratic practice and inclusiveness and, externally, it has a stimulating effect in terms of conflict, security dilemmas and escalation. Securitisation is initiated by actors and is, in essence, an inter-subjective, constructive process. Using a speech act to label an issue as a security problem legitimises emergency measures which in turn, alters the socio-political relations related to the securitised issue. Accordingly, securitisation can be seen as a process that has consequences which result in actors operating differently and creating new realities (Roe, 2012:254).

Williams (2003:514) identifies a connection between Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political divided into friendship and enmity, and the identification of an existential threat. In this regard, the identification of an existential threat, which warrants extraordinary measures, mirrors the intense condition of division in Schmitt’s concept of ‘political’. Therefore, just as the nature of the ‘political’ is determined by the division of friend or enemy, the nature of security is determined by the division between normal democratic rule obeyed politics and extraordinary politics which is beyond rules and regulations (Tuarek, 2006:10). This would suggest (Browning and McDonald, 2011:248) that securitisation’s framework of security-politics is a dichotomy between ‘panic politics’ and ‘normal politics’ but Abrahamsen (2005:59) and Donnelly (2015:917) differ from this perspective. They argue that the relationship between politicisation and securitisation is neither a dichotomy, nor a linear process but rather unfolds along a continuum, where issues progress gradually from normalcy to emergency. Between the two poles, issues are usually perceived as security risks rather than threats.
Securitisation is a recurring process in international relations, and securitisation theory has been established as one of the most influential, non-traditional security theories in existence (Floyd, 2011:437). It has penetrated academic security debates and has been applied to a number of diverse issues (Browning and McDonald, 2011:241), evoking controversy and eliciting extensive debate within critical security studies (Stritzel, 2011:344). Subsequent generations of securitisation scholars have built upon the core constructs to challenge and extend the application of the Copenhagen School. Critique has highlighted the under-theorising of its sub-components and the discounting the independent existence of an issue that is perceived as a threat (Knudsen, 2001:359-360) as shortfalls in the theory. Subsequent scholars expanded the theory from single speech acts, conforming to grammars of security, to embrace more dynamic articulations of security, and expanded the understanding of authority to incorporate more contextual and dynamic conceptualisations of authorisation in discourse (Stritzel, 2012:553).

Although it can be posited that securitising an issue creates a number of benefits, which include expediency and the breaking of rules, the Copenhagen School claims that it represents a failure; agents who fail to resolve an issue through the political realm resort to panic politics to resolve it (Donnelly, 2015: 914). Securitisation thus marks the end of dialogue and engagement and the recognition that politics has failed to deliver security (McDonald, 2008:566). Securitisation should therefore be perceived as negative, a failure to address issues as part of normal politics (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:29) and descuritisation should be viewed as the ideal.

The aforementioned illustrates that securitisation is a constructed process, consisting of components which are governed by felicity conditions, that results in an concern becoming a security issue and thereby transcending existing rules and boundaries. An evaluation of whether an issue has been securitised would therefore need to analyse each of the components, felicity conditions and extraordinary measures.

2.4 Components of securitisation
2.4.1 Actor

The securitising actor needs to draw the audience’s attention to the issue which is deemed to be a matter of security and persuade them about the legitimacy of the threat. Actors therefore need to have the ability to identify the needs, interests and feelings of the audience in order to persuade the audience to legitimise extraordinary measures to secure a referent object’s continued existence (Balzacq, 2010:9; Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 2009:26). In addition to possessing the necessary authority and legitimacy, securitising actors should also possess the means to put the measures proposed into effect, to counter the identified threat (Vuori, 2010:267).

Referent objects ‘speak’ through their authorised representatives and, because security is a very structured field, it has established processes which need to be followed to securitise and, in some cases, automatically designates authority through positions held. Accordingly, the probability of successful securitisation is enhanced when the actor is accepted by the audience as being in a position to speak authoritatively on issues that constitute a security threat (Stritzel, 2012:556).

The process of actor authorisation is dynamic and incorporates social struggles over who is authorised to speak with authority among competing voices (McDonald, 2008:550). The actor thus needs sufficient political and social capital to establish belief in his/her legitimacy and the legitimacy of the threat being framed (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams, 2015:96). In an institutionalised setting, security actors are often presumed to be political decision-makers with formal positions of authority, who are in a position to place their proposed measures into action to counter a perceived threat. Relevant actors include the security elites who are placed in positions of authority by virtue of being accepted ‘voices of security’ and having the power to define security.

This practice strengthens the traditional notion of state as securitiser, limits the scope of agents of securitisation and creates actor deficits in instances of high uncertainty and unprecedented occurrences. These latter instances open the field of security actors to incorporate and privilege actors with knowledge who can wield power and influence within the security field (Stritzel, 2012:556). Power politics, intertextuality and securitising moves are closely intertwined and people outside of positions of authority can utilise securitisation to achieve certain aims provided that they possess sufficient social capital. In order to
achieve this, actors dominate an information flow and successfully establish their particular reading of a perceived threat in elite and public conversations, with the aim of raising the profile of an issue so that it comes on the agenda of the decision-makers (Vuori, 2010:265-266). This then constructs a principal background and plot structure of meaning that helps to legitimise speakers and convince audiences (Stritzel, 2012 : 563).

Although initially privileging only the state as the securitiser, it has been subsequently acknowledged that non-state actors can also assume the role of the securitiser (Haacke and Williams, 2008:5). A societal collective can also be paralleled to the state with the aim of protecting and securing ‘we’ identities. There collectives are however, in most cases, governed by rules which indicate who may speak on behalf of the organisation (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:40).

2.4.2 Referent object
A securitising actor needs to present a specific issue which needs to be secured. In the securitisation vernacular, securitisation always refers to a specific issue i.e. ‘securitisation of x’, with x being the referent object (Zakapalová, 2012 : 9) and indicating that security action is taken on behalf of the particular referent object (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:36). Referent objects are valued and deemed to possess a legitimate claim to survival (Balzacq, 2010:35;Stritzel, 2007:358; Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:36) and these characteristics imbue the object with privilege in terms of actions that may be taken to secure it. Buzan and Waever (2009: 255) use the phrase “it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to” in order to simplify the identification of a referent object.

Traditionally, the referent object for security has been the state but the broadening of security invited a spectrum of possibilities for referent objects where different referent objects can be subjected to securitisation and subsequent labelling as a security issue (Williams, 1998:435). In theory therefore, securitising actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object but, in practice, there are facilitating conditions which constrain their success to particular referent objects. Survival differs between referent objects and an appeal to defend a particular referent object triggers different dynamics dependant on the referent object (Bagge Laustsen and Waever, 2000:706).
Buzan (2007) contributed to a broader understanding of the complexities associated with security by introducing levels and sectors beyond the state and the military. The sectors, as defined in Table 1, are separate but linked and can overlap, with the types of interaction, referent objects, and threats to referent objects differing between sectors. The same security logic can be applied in each sector but what constitutes an existential threat in one sector may not be mirrored in another sector (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:97).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Type of Interaction</th>
<th>Dynamic of securitisation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Relationships of forceful coercion</td>
<td>Existential threat to state/populace/territory/military capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere</td>
<td>Existential threat to biosphere/species/natural environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Relationships of trade, production, and finance</td>
<td>Existential threat to markets/finance/resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Relationships of collective identity</td>
<td>Existential threat to collective identity/language/culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Relationships of authority, governing status and recognition</td>
<td>Existential threat to sovereignty/organisational stability/ideology of a social order</td>
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Table 1: Security Sectors and the dynamic of securitisation (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:97)

The label ‘referent object’ grants securitising actions with legitimacy and morality (Buzan & Waever, 2009: 255; Floyd, 2011:431). Legitimacy deficits can however, be overcome by linking multiple referent objects together, which provides the respective referent objects with greater legitimacy and precludes the consideration of each independently (Vaughn, 2009:264) or attempt to establish a macrosecuritisation.
2.4.3 **Existential threat.**

Once the referent object has been legitimised, the actor needs to present an existential threat to an audience to garner support to rationalise, justify and legitimise exceptional measures, or the breaking of rules which would otherwise not be allowed, to counter a threat (Vaughn, 2009:266; Browning and McDonald, 2011:240).

Threats and vulnerabilities arise but, in order to qualify as a security issue, they need to pose a threat to the referent object's existence. In essence, it is anything that places the survival of the referent object in jeopardy or which would fundamentally alter a referent object if left unchecked. As such, an issue is constructed and presented as a threat and is not necessarily an objective, actual existential threat. However, that which constitutes an existential threat differs across sectors and levels, as can be seen in Table 1 (Buzan, Waever and De Widlt, 1998:27). The nature of the threat and its intensity will have an impact upon the success of the securitising move (Vuori, 2010:270) which then elevates the issue out of the realm of politics into security.

Only once the audience has accepted the securitising move, can an issue be deemed to be securitised.

2.4.4 **Securitising move/Speech act.**

The securitisation theory supports the assumption that fundamental transformations of social reality are possible through an act of speech (Stritzel, 2012:552). This speech act, which highlights an existential threat to a referent object to an audience, is deemed to be a securitising move and is an act of negotiation between the actor and the audience (McDonald, 2008:579). It should however, be noted that speech acts are not limited to verbal communication but have also been extended to non-verbal modes of communication also contribute to securitisation processes with actors 'speaking' security in various and varying lexicons, frames, images and voices (Donnelly, 2015:927). A securitising move only constitutes securitisation when it is successful.

A speech act has both internal and external facilitating conditions for success. Externally, the speech act's success is dependent on the social capital and authority of the actor and the veracity of the security threat amongst the audience. The veracity of the threat is
enhanced if there are conditions historically associated with the threat which augment its threatening nature (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998: 33, McDonald, 2008: 578).

Internally, the speech act needs to comply with the security form and grammar and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998: 33). Vuori (2010) identified three sequential components to the speech act; claim, warning and demand which is supported by the propositional content of proof or reasons for the claim or warning. A generic claim describes a threat, asserting that something is dangerous and potentially an existential threat, a generic warning states provides the consequences of inaction to the point of the realisation of the threat, a generic demand describes an action plan indicating that something should be done and the propositional content includes proof and reasons to support the claim (Stritzel, 2012:554).

Successful securitisations can become institutionalised, creating a securitisation grammar with watchwords that enhance the success of future securitisations (Vuori, 2010:259, Buzan and Waever, 2009 :267). These words or concepts automatically evoke the logic of danger, vulnerability and fear, are associated with referent values, and enable the construction of an intersubjective threat. The probability of institutionalisation increases when a threat is recurrent or persistent, as the response and sense of urgency becomes entrenched (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:27). Institutionalised securitisation no longer requires speech acts to persuade an audience and subsequently, bear a resemblance to what is accepted as normal practice. Furthermore, institutionalisation of securitisation could result in ‘states of exception’ becoming the norm of political practice, enabling governments to initiate extreme measures and create the ‘state of exception’ as a paradigm of government. One prime example of security institutionalisation is the retention of state militaries even in the absence of an obvious existential threat (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:97).

Visual images, which can also contribute to the success of a securitising move, deliver a message which impacts upon the viewer. Images however, do not constitute a language, which hampers the delivery of a specific message and meaning but can evoke emotions, a significant contribution to successful securitisation. Furthermore, affective images can facilitate securitisation processes through the provision of either evidence or a degree of plausibility for the securitising actor’s claims. Vuori (2010:262-264) uses the Doomsday Clock as an example to illustrate this concept with the Clock incorporating the components
crucial to successful securitisation; the lateness of the hour depicts the urgency of the issue and the impending doom (existential threat) with the possibility to reverse the course by moving the clock hands away from midnight (a solution).

If securitisation is accepted to be perlocutionary, with the power of securitisation located within the audience, translation aspects could give rise to varying understandings of the securitisation increase the possibility of a securitising move failing across different audiences. This is particularly applicable when securitisations follow more complex transnational flows involving multiple actors, multiple audiences and multiple transnational encounters in different discursive locales (Stritzel, 2011:350). A securitisation move may be successful within a domestic audience but when translated into a new audience, may fail and give rise to resistance and polarisation.

As such the securitising move constitutes the rhetorical component of securitisation with the audience subsequently providing the bridge from rhetoric into action and from securitising move into securitisation.

2.4.5 Audience
The aim of the securitising move therefore is to convince a target audience, based on what it knows about the world, that the claim about a specific issue is threatening enough to deserve immediate policy to address it (Balzacq, 2010:9). As the bridge, the audience is central to securitisation. It is the legitimising entity within the process (Floyd, 2011:435) and, without its endorsement, the securitising move fails to result in securitisation (Balzacq, 2010:9). Furthermore, legitimacy correlates with the size and inclusivity of the audience – greater inclusivity bestows greater legitimacy on the securitisation and the subsequent extraordinary measures. As the legitimising entity of securitisation, it follows that the UN General Assembly would be more legitimate than a smaller international body as its arguments are presented to the widest possible audience and are therefore more inclusive.

Whereas securitising actors are usually political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups, the composition of an audience can vary according to the political system and the nature of the issue at hand. Audiences can be sub-divided into public and policy-makers, with the former providing moral legitimacy to securitisation and the latter providing formal legitimacy. Although moral legitimacy is necessary, it is
insufficient, with formal legitimacy being a prerequisite for the adoption of extraordinary measures (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:59-61).

There can also be multiple audiences with different characteristics, possessing different logics of persuasion which hampers the attainment of acceptance. It follows that the securitising actor will be more successful if he/she has accurate perceptions about the audience’s needs and feelings and can use a language which will resonate with the audience (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:61).

Leonard and Kaunert (2010) utilise Kingdon’s three streams model to enhance understanding of the audience factor. This model assists in establishing the link between all the audiences who, despite responding to varied logics of persuasion, are all involved in the single policy-making process. The three streams model includes the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream with each stream characterised by specific participants.

- In the problem stream an actor constructs a problem using external events and indicators to capture the attention of decision-makers. The audience in this case, mainly includes the other decision-makers in the policy-making process. In the problem stream, decision makers continue to measure public approval or disapproval of policy problems which in turn feeds into the understanding of the problem (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:66).

- The policy stream concerns policy formation where policy alternatives are generated in policy communities. In this stream the audience will include specialists and technocrats with the argument being based on knowledge, rationality and efficiency (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:67).

- The politics stream encompasses public mood, pressure groups campaigns, election results, ideological distributions in institutions and changes in administration which may have an important impact on whether a policy proposal is adopted. Persuasion is the main activity in this stream with the audience consisting of both the decision-makers and the general public (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:68).
These streams couple at critical times to form a policy window where an opportunity is provided for advocates to push their solutions. Policy windows’ existence relies mostly on the perceptions of participants which create popularity for an issue. Policy entrepreneurs recognise this and advocate a pre-developed position, using as many related issues as possible to increase the probability of their success. These policy entrepreneurs already have developed solutions policies in hand for problems which still need to emerge. In securitisation, the securitising actor is the policy entrepreneur. Audience is thus conceptualised as comprising different audiences with different logics of persuasion with all being inter-linked because they are part of the same policy-making process (Leonard and Kaunert, 2010:74).

Once the audience accepts the securitising move, it chooses to tolerate the violation of established rules and regulations, and the imposition of extreme measures to reduce the threat. The implementation of emergency measures constitutes the active component of securitisation to ensure the referent object’s continued survival (Floyd, 2011:433).

2.4.6 Desecuritisation

It follows that once the referent object’s survival has been secured, an issue should be desecuritised. This would entail relocating security from the threat-defence paradigm back into the political realm, out of conflict and back into cooperation. Securitisation theorists, who view securitisation as a negative, have expressed a normative preference for desecuritisation, however desecuritisation is a complex process with a number of interrelated dimensions at play that introduce unpredictability into the process (Donnelly, 2015:917). Although a number of possible desecuritisation strategies have been proposed, the nature of the securitised issue remains a determinant of success with some strategies working better than others.

Desecuritisation can occur subsequent to the resolution of the threatening situation, where the threat is either disproved or neutralised (Vuori, 2010:271). Alternatively, it can be defined as being the opposite of securitisation, where securitisation is prevented from taking place, the dismantling of security which incorporates the deconstruction of securitisation or through an absence of speech. Issues only retain meaning whilst they are in use, the absence of securitising moves would detract meaning from the security issue, and end the securitising
game (Donnelly, 2015:916). Given that securitisation is about narratives, changing the dominant narrative or reasserting norms and values that contradict with the extreme measures, could desecuritise an issue. Deconstruction would then entail returning the referent object to the political realm in a post-securitisation realm (Donnelly, 2015:915).

However, security cannot be separated from politics and some issues possess inherent ‘securityness’ that makes their deconstruction and subsequent desecuritisation almost impossible (Fako, 2012:15). Because security can become entrenched and institutionalised, the conception of a viable strategy for desecuritisation can be virtually impossible (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:102). Accordingly, similar to securitisation, desecuritisation processes are never guaranteed to succeed, but the latter processes cannot be established by a simple speech act – they need to be accompanied by consistency and action (Donnelly, 2015:928) to bring desecuritisation into effect.

2.5 Supplementary securitisations

The contemporary globalised society has necessitated new approaches to manage and resolve security issues. Globalisation and the spread of information technologies has increased interconnectedness, interdependence, collective responsibilities, collaborative efforts and the areas of influence. Existing security arrangements have been challenged with national policies no longer existing in isolation but being influenced by policies outside of borders. As such, domestic and international security mechanisms work in concert and so too, does securitisation.

2.5.1 Macro-securitisation

Macro-securitisations are securitising moves aimed at ensuring the survival of a global referent object, which is characterised by its universality, with referent objects extending beyond nation-states or regions to incorporate, potentially, the whole of humanity or civilisation (Vuori, 2010:258). Two significant examples of macro-securitisation include the Cold War and more recently, the Global War of Terror. There are four universalisms that can serve as a source of macro-securitisations; inclusive universalisms claiming to be applicable to all of mankind, exclusive universalisms which lay claim to superior rights and status for a particular group, existing order universalisms which claim the global level
international social structure as a referent object and physical threat universalisms which claim dangers that threaten on a planetary scale (Buzan and Waever, 2009:261).

The same rules that apply to other securitisations define macro-securitisations; the identification of an existential threat to a referent object and the call for extreme measures from a securitising actor/s, using appropriate speech acts and addressing responsive audiences (Buzan and Waever, 2009:265). Macro-securitisation however, requires that the referent object be above that of national or regional level (Vuori, 2010:258) and expands the relationship between securitising actor and audience, as it raises the possibility of multiple audiences across time (Buzan and Waever, 2009:275). Speech acts would however remain incomplete until the process of translation and transcription is completed when engaging with multiple audiences (Donnelly, 2015:918).

Macro-securitisations structure relations, and all other securitisations are hierarchically ordered beneath the macro-securitisation (Buzan and Waever, 2009:253). These types of securitisation can assist in the formation of regional security complexes where subsystems become linked as a result of the threat and security concerns, inevitably introducing internal coherence and unity to an otherwise diverse group of states (Peoples, Vaughn and Williams, 2015:100). It should however be noted that middle scale collectivities are more amenable to securitisation with system levels proving to be largely incapable of triggering the level of mass identity required for securitisation (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:37).

2.5.2 Moral securitisation
Securitisation contains inherent mobilisation power which can be abused if posited in undesirable hands (Floyd, 2011:436). The Copenhagen School views securitisation as negative and a failure due to the de-democratisation and the potential for security dilemmas and escalation. Out of urgency and necessity, the speech act calls for speedy actions which negates the slower speed of normal politics which allows for debate and inclusion. As a result of the exclusionary processes and violent logic framing security, security is met with an inherent, abiding scepticism and is perceived to serve the interests of the state or securitising actor (Browning and McDonald, 2011:240).

Roe (2012:250) asserts that whilst the process can be associated with negative connotations, securitisation can also be classified as positive if the outcome morally
supersedes that of transcending democratic practices with certain referents privileged over others. Depending on who benefits from securitisation, securitisation may be deemed to be either morally right or morally wrong (Roe, 2012: 258).

In an effort to provide analysis tools to evaluate the moral justness of a securitisation, Floyd (2011:428) revised and extended the securitisation. Floyd recognises that the securitisation theory precludes an objective threat assessment and rejects theorising the security actor’s intentions. In her opinion, a securitising act is only complete if it has been followed up by a change in behaviour by the relevant agent. Her revised securitisation theory holds that securitisation equals a securitising move plus a security practice. This is key to ascertaining the motivations behind a securitising actor – sincere rhetoric would be followed by a supporting security practice. Securitisation thus only exists once behaviour has been changed in response to the existential threat.

Floyd extrapolates from the just war theory to determine whether one could classify a securitisation as just. Just as moral theory has been incorporated into warfare, and operates as a constraint as to how and when wars are fought, the expectation remains that the same will hold true for securitisation. In this regard it is theorised that securitisation would be constrained, making its occurrence less likely, and that the process of securitisation would become more democratised.

Securitisation can only be justified as the right thing to do if it refers to an objective existential threat. It needs to be ascertained whether the aggressor really has the intention to destroy the referent object and if it possesses the capabilities to do so. Both of the conditions have to exist simultaneously. In the absence of either of these criteria the threat is rendered as non-objective. The non-state context is more difficult to assess and will need to rely upon the level of support and past actions to predict intention and capabilities. If words are matched by deeds, the threat can be deemed to be sincere (Floyd, 2011: 430-431).

Additionally the referent object needs to be morally legitimate and this refers to whether it is to the benefit of human well-being. Even though there are no universally accepted human values and human needs it is accepted that it would refer to well-being and incorporate human rights and certain individual liberties – basically human well-being (Floyd, 2011:432).
The emergency measures introduced subsequent to securitisation can break established rules and regulations in the effort to ensure the referent object’s survival. It is cautioned that the degree of response should be commensurate to the aggressor’s capabilities. Additionally, the response should aim to address the threat and not an unrelated issue. Assessing who the beneficiary of a response is would be a good indicator of whether the response indeed was designed to address the threat (Floyd, 2011:433).

2.5.3 Counter-securitisation

Extrapolating from the security-dilemma, it is considered almost impossible for a securitisation to exist on its own, with the minimum usually being a matched pair. Counter securitisation, or mutual securitisation, as it is also referred to, is described as resistance against securitisation and can have different outcomes upon securitisation depending on where in the process it presents. Legitimacy endows securitisation with a positive normative appeal and any erosion of this legitimacy weakens the power of persuasion in getting an audience to accept the securitisation and authorise extraordinary measures (Browning and McDonald, 2011:552). As such, legitimacy presents as a natural target for counter-securitisations which may also introduce a securitisation of its own to legitimise actions. Securitisation in this context is posited as an action-reaction game or moves and counter-moves where legitimacy is targeted by both sides. Delegitimising tactics can be adopted against any of the components within the securitisation process – the referent object, the securitising actor, the speech act or the extreme measures (Stritzel and Chang, 2015:552-553).

The result of counter-securitisations is that there is a continuous communication struggle where authority, legitimacy and consent need to be constantly evaluated, established and re-established. Securitisation can, at times, be met with resistance that challenges securitisations through counter-securitisations. This phenomenon transforms securitisation into a complex, adversarial struggle between at least two competing actors which may delay, prohibit or even reverse the securitisation process. Counter-securitisation in turn requires securitisation to expand the scope of relevant audiences and referent objects and to emphasise the legitimacy and authority of speakers during the securitisation process (Stritzel and Chang, 2015:549).
In order to enhance the understanding of the environment wherein the framework will be tested, the evolution of peacekeeping operations will be expanded upon so that exceptionality can be measured against the norm.

2.6 The evolution of UN peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations are the flagship of the UN and its most visible and riskiest activity. The deployment of UN forces draws international attention to an unfolding human situation, generating perceptions and expectations for deliverables. Peacekeeping results and deliverables form the foundation of UN legitimacy and any failure has the potential to weaken the organisation’s legitimacy (Guéhenno, 2015: 293).

The end of the Cold War marked a significant shift in the global legal and political environment with the UN increasingly willing to expand UN roles, including intruding into aspects deemed to be within the purview of domestic sovereignty. Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) Agenda for Peace acknowledged the changing contexts and formalised peace activities for UN operations:

- Preventive diplomacy to prevent disputes from arising between parties, preventing escalation and limiting their spread when they occur.
- Peacemaking to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Peace-keeping as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
- post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

Peacekeeping scholars contributed further to the typology of peacekeeping by classifying UN actions into generations;
• First generation activities included an interim arrangement of UN presence as an inter-positional force, with the consent of the parties, to serve as a confidence building measure to monitor a truce while a comprehensive peace agreement was reached. Peacekeepers are lightly armed or unarmed and the conflict is either kept at bay or prevented from escalating. The consent-based nature ensured the preservation of sovereignty.

• Second generation activities were complex, multi-dimensional deployments designed to consolidate a self-sustaining peace. Operations included traditional military functions and various police and civilian tasks. The roles adopted in settling these conflicts included that of peacemaker (facilitating a peace treaty), peacekeeper (monitoring implementation), peace builder (monitoring and developing developmental infrastructure) and, in a limited way, peace enforcer when peace treaties falter.

• Third generation activities are referred to as peace enforcement operations which extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of ceasefires and, where necessary, authoritative assistance in rebuilding failed states. The defining characteristic of third generation activities is the lack of consent by one or more parties to some, or all, of the UN mandate. Militarily, third generation operations were used to deter, dissuade and deny, using force to persuade parties to resolve conflict by negotiation.

As illustrated in Table 2, there are fundamental differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement – peacekeeping requires consent and impartiality while peace enforcement requires international forces to confront belligerents. The UN however, proved to be ineffective at imposing order by force with operations of 1993 and 1994 exhibiting problems (Doyle and Sambanis, :327).
Peacekeeping knowledge, acquired through experience, social conditioning and learning was altered significantly by the hopes and failures of the 1990s. UN institutional legitimacy was at a critical juncture, potentially an institutional crisis. There was diminishing support for formal institutions with much less confidence in institutions than what there was at the time of the UN’s creation in 1945. With states opting for collective security, the relevance of states as the building blocks of the international community was in the process of weakening. This necessitated the development of new practices and, by 1999, the UNSC increasingly resorted to delegating and decentralising peace responsibilities to regional organisations (Malone, :123). Traditionally, the UN’s use of force was reserved for extreme cases with peace enforcement mandates being delegated to regional organisations, while the UN focused on peacekeeping operations (Karlsrud, 2015:41). Scholars equate this adaptation to the fourth generation of peacekeeping. It should, however, be noted that once the UNSC had authorised a force that was not under UN command, it effectively lost control over it further weakening the UN concept. (Guéhenno, 2015: 290). Accordingly, the UN’s political space began to shrink and its relevance to diminish in correlation with the emergence of collectives and the development of their capacity and capability.

In an effort to retain relevance and legitimacy and counter its declining utility, the UNSC opted to use the UN as its preferred tool for conflicts in Africa. African regional and sub-regional organisations were still increasing their competence and improving their track records in peace initiatives (Karlsrud, 2015:41). Three UN missions authorised in 1999 served to demonstrate that the UN was still a player that had considerable advantages over other organisations. It did however, need to revive its legitimacy and rebuild confidence. The retention of operational activities necessitated reform and adjustments so that the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEACEKEEPING</th>
<th>PEACE ENFORCEMENT</th>
<th>ENFORCEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impartial</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
<td>Not Impartial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent Required</td>
<td>Consent desirable but not required</td>
<td>Consent not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force only in self-defence</td>
<td>Use of force in self-defence plus specific use of force authorisation</td>
<td>Full use of force authorisation</td>
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Table 2 : The Peacekeeping to Full-Scale Enforcement Spectrum (Boulden, 2001:3)
could demonstrate that it remained a competent and capable operator, possessing authority and being instrumental in developing new processes (Guéhenno, 2015: 294).

Institutional introspection necessitated the Brahimi Report of 2000 which stipulated that peacekeeping operations should only be deployed where there is a peace to keep. Contemporary operations do not adhere to this principle – peace missions are deployed to internal conflicts where there is little peace to keep and armed groups are only partially under the control of those who consent to a peace mission (Abiola & Otte, 2014:9; Karlsrud, 2015:42). To bridge the incongruence between theory and practice, with effect from 2000, the term ‘all necessary means’ was incorporated into the wide mandates which included the protection of civilians. These robust mandates, described missions which stood somewhere between a more pacific settlement of disputes, short of the use of force, and enforcement action under Chapter VII (Janik, 2014: 146). In accordance with these operations, UN commanders had to strike a balance between engaging in warfare and resorting to the passive military posture which characterised UN operations. The use of force in favour of one of the parties made adherence to the impartiality principle progressively more difficult to sustain. The justification proposed for this violation was that if the intervener tilts the local balance of power, it would allow one side to win and in effect, stop a war (Janik 2014:151). Impartiality was thus re-interpreted to being an adherence to the principles of the Charter and the attainment of the objectives incorporated in a mandate that is rooted in the Charter principles (Janik, 2014:152).

Although the 2008 Capstone Doctrine identifies stability and security as goals, it did not refer explicitly to stabilisation. Traditionally, UN doctrine opted to authorise a coalition of the willing, regional entities when enforcement was necessary to stabilise a particular situation. UN stabilisation missions deviate from this norm (De Coning, 2014:2). The term stabilisation was introduced into UN operations in 2004 in the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 and has subsequently been used in the authorisation of three other missions; MONUSCO (2010), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2013) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (2014). This proactive approach has however, attracted criticism from UN member states who voiced concern that stability operations give rise to interventionism and interference.
Stabilisation missions are believed to have been inspired by USA counter-insurgency strategies developed in Iraq and Afghanistan which are centred on the clear, hold, build operational concept. Contrary to what peace missions are traditionally meant to do, these operations are conducted in the midst of ongoing conflict and utilise military means to stabilise a country (Boutellis, 2015:1). The essence of the stabilisation is to achieve peace by managing or removing an aggressor, transitioning from large-scale peacekeeping operations in areas affected by widespread insecurity to smaller-scale with targeted security and development programmes. It follows that stabilisation missions which identify parties that pose a threat to a particular government do not comply with the principles of impartiality or consent in achieving their mandate (De Coning:2014:2).

The concept of “protection of civilians’ mainstreamed in UN peacekeeping discourse within 10 years after first being introduced in a peacekeeping mandate in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999. Civilian protection was prioritised and incorporated increased risk that unrealistic expectations of the peacekeepers, both internationally and within host states, would be created (Nasu, 2011:367) and operational difficulties and failures have raised concerns about the absence of operational clarity in this regard. Increasing troop numbers and additional capacities create impressions and expectations that peacekeepers will be able to undertake more robust and effective civilian protection activities (Nasu, 2011:369). The steady expansion of peacekeeping operations without extending the commensurate resources and the gaps between the rhetoric and action compounded the situation, serving to reinforce perceptions that the UN was ineffective as a guarantor of international peace and security, and repeating the mistakes that had almost ended the UN in the 1990s (Guéhenno, 2015: 302).

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in its 2009 New Horizon Report urged peacekeeping to be ready to act ion more flexible, effective and efficient ways to cope with the strains on the UN and its capabilities and identified a number of gaps which affected peacekeepers; mobility assets which include helicopters, strategic lift capabilities and mobile infantry units, force enablers such as logistics and transportation units and an information gathering capacity which includes surveillance equipment and analytical specialists. The report also identified the hesitancy to use force, derived from TCC limitations and caveats, and a lack of UN Security Council political support, as contributing to the lack of UN success in robust operations (Weir, 2010:20).
2.7 Conclusion

Even though security has been broadened to encompass diverse issues beyond state sovereignty and deepened to introduce a variety of actors, other than the state, into the realm of security, it remains a contested issue. In justifying the means utilised, the ends need to be framed existentially. Its constructivist nature, where issues are positioned as security threats, provides for different perspectives and approaches, with the securitisation theory aiming to provide an understanding of how and why security preferences and practices are constructed.

The framework of securitisation, against which to measure the case study, therefore comprises an actor who attempts, through the securitising move, to persuade an audience about an existential threat to a referent object, in order to legitimise the introduction of extraordinary measures to ensure continued survival. Actions taken in the name of security are tantamount to being securitised issues which can be distinguished by the priority, urgency and extraordinariness afforded to them.

Securitisation elevates an issue out of politics and out of the norms and practices which would normally bind responses. Although drawing attention to an issue, the invoking of security usually legitimises the use of force which contradicts global aversion thereto. As such, it establishes a practice which is negatively perceived and exclusionary, where actors can escape the jurisdiction of politics and deliberation. Furthermore, it presents a dichotomy between security and politics – with security prevailing when politics has failed.

The spectrum of issues which have been securitised is not exhaustive, and extraordinary measures imposed in a specific field or issue could expose the same issue to scrutiny to ascertain whether securitisation had taken place to elevate the issue beyond politics. The next chapter will elucidate upon the events in the DRC, that laid the foundation for the development of the referent object(s) and existential threat(s) that ultimately led to the introduction of Resolution 2098(2013).
CHAPTER 3:
THE CASE OF THE DRC AND PEACE INITIATIVES

3.1 Introduction

The DRC has been devastated by internal armed conflict which has continued since 1996 and is the host to the UN’s largest and costliest peacekeeping missions. In 2016, MONUSCO, as one of sixteen global peacekeeping missions, fielded 20 percent of the troops and was allocated 16 percent of the annual peacekeeping budget (Clarke, 2016). The country is significant because of its vast natural resources, its location in the centre of the African continent and its size. It neighbours nine countries which are, to varying degrees, troubled by regional, ethnic and religious conflicts themselves and it can be perceived as a junction for many of the African regional bodies (Janik, 2014:170). Even though the DRC’s vast natural resources have continually attracted interest and intervention from abroad, it can at best only be described as a conflict driver to the current conflict and not the origin thereof. The Security Council has consistently referred to the situation in the DRC as a threat to international peace and security (Janik, 2014:155) as insecurity in the country has substantial ramifications for its nine neighbouring countries.

The Great Lakes Region is characterised by, amongst other things, ongoing conflict and is the theatre of the some of the most intractable, pervasive and turbulent violent conflicts in Africa (Obuoga, 2016:12). Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are dynamic and complex, involving multiple and interlocking regional and international actors. Although initially starting as intrastate conflicts, strong cross-border dimensions and transnational ethnic identities ensure that conflicts in the region are always interconnected and often spread to destabilise the whole region (Kanyangara, 2016:4), with the existence of transnational ethnic groups playing an important role in the diffusion or escalation of conflicts in the region (Kanyangara, 2016:7). The conflict has had a severe humanitarian cost manifesting in displacement, destruction of infrastructure, illegal exploitation of natural resources, the growth of illegal armed groups and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Obuoga, 2016:12). International Rescue Committee (2016) statistics estimate that the recurrent crisis has affected over 15 million people with an estimated 5.4 million deaths since 1998 and an estimated 1.6 million people displaced by the crisis.
Academics divide the conflict in the DRC into three eras – the First Congo War which ended with the toppling of Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997, the second Congo War which started after Laurent Kabila (who succeeded Mobutu Sese Seko) had a fall-out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies in August 1998 and lasted until the peace deal united the country in 2003. Although possessing aspirations to the opposite, Congolese citizens have entrenched conflict into their psyche, adapting to the principle that power comes from the barrel of a gun and resultantlly instrumentalising violence as a legitimate tool to resolve conflict (Kets and De Vries, 2014:3). Accordingly, despite a peace deal being reached, conflict has continued in the eastern DRC, and can be considered a third episode of war (Stearns, 2012:8).

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the evolution of the UN’s peace operations and thereafter investigate how this evolution manifested in the DRC to the extent that UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013) was authorised.

3.2 Background to the DRC conflict

During the colonial period, the Congo was colonised by the Belgian King Leopold with the focus being primarily on the extractive wealth of the country and not on its development. The country gained its independence in 1960, but has yet to gain its peace. Since the time of Congolese independence, political power has been about retaining supremacy and not building a strong, accountable state. In 1965 the notorious military dictator Mobutu Sese Seko seized power from President Kasavubu in a coup with support from both the United States and Belgium. During his 32 year rule, he brutally quelled new rebellions and personally dominated the Congo, stoking ethnic tensions to distract from challenges to power and to rally support (Stearns, 2012:8). The demise of the Cold War marked the beginning of the end for Mobutu and this, in conjunction with his failing health, the suspension of international economic aid to Congo and the global collapse of raw commodity prices, marked the beginning of him losing his grip on power (Enough Project, 2009).

Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, Mobutu provided shelter and protection to the two million Rwandan refugees who had fled to eastern Congo and to the Rwandan Hutu army and militias that directed the genocide. As the new Tutsi government was establishing itself, its neighbouring DRC provided more than two million Hutus sought refuge in eastern Congo.
In 1996 Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi considered the Mobutu regime to be a source of regional destabilisation and an obstacle to development. Accordingly, the states represented a regional coalition, determined to do away with the Mobutu regime (Koko, 2011:31). Angola was also significantly involved in Mobutu’s removal from power. Nationally, Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) evolved into the embodiment of the nation’s vote of no-confidence in the government. Kabila, with regional assistance, unseated Mobutu to become the DRC president in May 1997. The alliance with regional states was however, opportunistic and shortlived. In 1998, Kabila asserted his independence and domestic power base by purging Rwandan elements from his government and accusing the latter of exploiting the eastern DRC’s mineral wealth (Enough Project, 2009).

The 1998 rebellion which started in the Kivu regions in opposition to Laurent Kabila’s government, led to widespread and large scale armed confrontations (Kayode, 2014:103). Under the auspices of promoting their national security, as a result of Kabila’s perceived indecisiveness regarding their respective oppositions operating from within the DRC, both Uganda and Rwanda re-invaded the DRC. They fuelled the war though their illicit and covert support of proxy rebel groups (Kayode, 2014:102, Enough Project, 2009). Kabila secured military assistance from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola which provided the military support necessary to retain his regime. Kabila called on UN intervention to resolve the conflict, citing a blatant case of invasion by Rwanda and Uganda but the UN Security Council was not convinced. Its response called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, non-interference in internal affairs and for an end to the conflict, as opposed to the deployment of troops under Chapter VII as was requested by Laurent Kabila.

Efforts to resolve the DRC conflict peacefully centred on the Lusaka Process which involved the three major Congolese groups in the conflict and their regional supporters. The Lusaka talks resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in July 1999 and the subsequent creation of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in November 1999. MONUC was tasked with supervising and implementing the Lusaka accord. At its creation, the different roleplayers, DRC government, regional countries, citizens, had deeply conflicting expectations of the Mission and, although it did not have much capacity, it raised expectations (Guéhenno, 2015: 118). At the commencement of MONUC’s deployment, the DRC was divided into three vast fiefdoms
controlled by the government, the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MCL) and MONUC quickly morphed into a symbol for the re-affirmation of the DRC’s sovereignty (Koko, 2011:33). Despite MONUC’s presence, violence persisted and, in 2001, Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by a bodyguard and replaced by Joseph Kabila, his son.

As a result of its historical legacy, threats to the incumbents originated internally, resulting in the successive DRC governments fearing internal collapse rather than foreign invasions (Stearns, 2012:330). As such, the governments have failed to create strong armies and bureaucracies and have constantly relied upon external assistance to quell rebellions. To aid in assuring external assistance, conflict has always been described as involving armed groups, using existential threat logic in order to justify a firm military response. Retaining the focus on security and military matters ensures substantial investment in the DRC armed forces and evokes responses from the international community. Cold War leaders, the UN and other non-state actors have consistently responded, removing the pressure from the DRC government to create a strong security sector and public sector to deliver on its social contract (Stearns, 2012:331).

The Congolese conflict is complex with a number of different protagonists who proliferate and compete for power and access. In addition to the local dimensions, the conflict is influenced by national and regional dimensions. As a result of continued Rwandan interference and invasion, ethnicity differences permeated society in the eastern DRC, polarising communities in terms of ethnicity; Tutsi and Hutu. Anti-Rwandan/Tutsi sentiment is pervasive with many Congolese viewing Rwanda as the root of the Congolese war. The vicious cycle of armed conflict, regional intervention, corruption and poverty has resulted in the DRC acquiring the reputation of being a hopeless case, unable to develop (Kets and De Vries, 2014:1).

3.3 The UN in the DRC

Greater areas pose greater expectations and challenges to peacekeepers. Accordingly, the DRC presents as an immense challenge to peacekeepers. UN missions in the DRC are exceptional – the UN mission to the Congo in 1960 was an exception to the norm. This mission was the first time that the UN had involved itself in an internal conflict and it could
not escape taking sides and authorising the use of force which went beyond self-defence (Janik, 2014:149). Its second mission to the Congo from 1999, still ongoing today, has had to deal with severe challenges in its commitment towards the return of peace, security and stability in the DRC (Koko, 2011:30), and is also perceived as being the laboratory for peacekeeping initiatives.

3.3.1 From peace keeping to peace enforcement

The UNSC recognised the Lusaka agreement as a viable basis for the resolution of the conflict and, through Resolution 1258 (1999), authorised the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel to establish contacts, maintain liaison and provide assistance (UNSC, 1999:1-2). Through this resolution, the UN discharged the international community’s responsibility to support the resolution of the conflict. Effectively, this was a first generation deployment; monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka agreement (Reynaert, 2011:11) and providing information for the potential further role of the UN. Resolution 1279 (1999) expressed concern with the consequences of the conflict and the severe consequences of the conflict on the humanitarian and human rights situation and accordingly, decided that the multi-disciplinary personnel deployed to the DRC would constitute the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The tasks assigned to MONUC essentially remained the same as those mandated to the liaison component (UNSC, 1999b:2-3).

3.3.2 From peace enforcement to stabilisation

UNSC Resolutions 1289 (2000) for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone and 1291 (2000) for MONUC formed part of the evolution towards more robust peacekeeping. This was in accordance with the Brahimi Report of 2000 that called for the extension of peacekeepers power. The deterrence capability could only be credible and feasible provided that the peacekeepers would use force to deter spoilers (Reynaert, 2011:12). In recognition that the traditional peacekeeping practice was ineffective, the issuance under Chapter 7 (Res 1291) provided for the use of force to protect the mandate. MONUC’s force strength was increased to 5 537 with the mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue of 2002 brought the Congolese factions together in dialogue to develop a road-map to peace and stability and resulted in the initiation of the transitional
phase. Accordingly foreign forces’ withdrawal was to come into effect. However, despite the Chapter 7 mandate efforts calling attention to the violence occurring in the Kivus, there was little inclination to authorise a strong engagement for MONUC. In 2003, violence spiked in the Ituri District in north-eastern DRC with the prospect of massive killings and the UN was faced with the choice between abstention and intervention. Guéhenno reveals that the dilemma at the heart of peacekeeping “is the choice between the risk of a failed intervention – which can damage the credibility of peacekeeping so much that peacekeeping is no longer available for those situations where it could make a real difference – and the risk of abstention in a situation where intervention could have prevented mass atrocities” (Guéhenno, 2015: 128).

The UN opted for intervention and deployed a UN Battalion to the area however, the forces had limited capacity and provided limited protection to the civilians. It became apparent that the UN alone, which militarily, was inadequate in terms of mandate and force (Guéhenno, 2015: 127), would be incapable of halting the situation and that a multinational force with resolve would be required. Europe was approached to field the multinational force with France establishing a list of conditions for deployment which included a limited space and limited timeframe. Operation Artemis, the first test of EU-UN cooperation in Africa, was deployed to stabilise the rapidly deteriorating situation. The operation was granted a Chapter VII mandate and it achieved its objective through proactive and robust use of military force (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 18-19). The need to avoid the creation of security vacuums upon the withdrawal of the EU forces, necessitated the UNSC to increase and expand MONUC’s mandate prior to the withdrawal. Resolution 1493 (2003) transferred Artemis’ robust mandate to MONUC and authorised a troop increase up to 10 800.

Latent tensions in the transitional government came to a head in Bukavu in 2004 when fighting broke out between factions loyal to the Kabila government and those factions which were close to Rwanda. Tutsi elements in the run up to the 2006 elections feared their loss of influence in the eastern DRC. This group was previously part of the Rally for Congolese Democracy, which had exercised control of almost a third of the DRC and was to be reduced, through elections, to control over virtually nothing. Fears of anti-Tutsi persecution combined with business and political interests, to foment a new rebellion. In 2004, Laurent Nkunda launched an insurgency, claiming that he was trying to protect his Tutsi community from the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe elements still present in the Kivus. From 2 to
9 June 2004, Bukavu was under the control of forces that had challenged the transitional government. The capturing of Bukavu by renegade forces even when MONUC’s numbers and equipment were far superior, lost the credibility and momentum the mission had secured up until then with a diplomat stating that MONUC had made a fool of itself (Guéhenno, 2015: 141).

Military capacity was once again favoured as leverage in the political situation and the UNSC agreed to an increased troop ceiling of 17 000. The mission was reconfigured with new Divisions, additional troops, a new military commander who was more dynamic and adopted a more effective operational tempo. During this era, rebel groups were issued ultimatums and, non-adherence ensured subsequent military action which restored MONUC’s military credibility. It did however, come with the risks and costs of peacekeeper targeting and fatalities.

With the elections ahead, the Force Commander, Patrick Cammeart, demonstrated a proactive attitude - willingness to intervene and to use force where necessary. Although this had positive results, the negative consequences associated with the proactive stance increased resistance to this form of activity for UN peacekeepers (Reynaert, 2011:16). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, although acknowledging the duty to protect civilians, claimed that it was not the peacekeepers’ role to go on the offensive against militias as they were not engaged in war (Reynaert, 2011:17). The 2006 democratic elections ended the transitional period and transferred the primary responsibility to protect civilians to the sovereign DRC state. It was assumed that successful elections would mark the peacekeeping exit but this practice was revised after relapses into conflict. In the DRC MONUC resolutions were focused on supporting the FARDC with a comprehensive list of conditions being drawn up as prerequisite conditions for withdrawal (Abiola and Otte, 2014:5).

In 2008 MONUC’s mandate became more assertive and active with the prioritisation of ‘protection of civilians’ (Kjeksrud and Ravndal, 2011:5) which was a reflection of the DRC government’s lack of capability. DRC forces tried in vain to defeat Nkunda militarily and to engage the group in negotiating peace deals and, in 2009, the DRC government entered into a deal with Rwanda, allowing Rwanda to send troops into the DRC to hunt down the FDLR in exchange for the arrest of Gen Nkunda and the integration of the latter’s forces into
the Rwandan army (Stearns, 2012:323). The Peace Accord of 23 March 2009, was signed between Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defence of the People of the Congo (CNDP) and the Government of the Congo which was designed to transform the CNDP into a political party and to absorb the military wing into the FARDC (Kayode, 2014:104). Furthermore, the agreements of 2008 and 2009 gave rise to domestic and international optimism about the DRC’s transition to security and, in the same year, Pres Kabila publicly announced his intent that MONUC should withdraw from the DRC in 2011. However, prevailing state weakness and failure prevented the DRC government from consolidating peace in the east and facilitated the proliferation of armed groups (Stearns, 2012:329), necessitating the prolonging of the UN mission’s presence. Confrontations and protracted conflict in these areas presented as a perpetual obstacle to the peace process and peace building (Kayode, 2014:106) and precludes the UN mission from achieving its tasks and executing its exit.

UN engagement comes with high risks; for the troops, for the institution’s reputations and for the citizens on whose behalf the intervention takes place (Guéhenno, 2015: 317). In the DRC, grand plans were elaborated and immense hopes were generated. The repeated failures to meet the expectations contributed to delegitimising the presence of UN troops in the country (Guéhenno, 2015: 120), generating resentment and outright hostility (Guéhenno, 2015: 314). The UN’s inability to achieve locally relevant results remains a key determinant of relations between the DRC government and the UN. Accordingly, it became increasingly evident that the DRC was too big and too complex for the MONUSCO to man and protect with its limited troops and resources (Kayode, 2014:112), and the 50th anniversary of the DRC’s independence was used as motivation for MONUC to reform (Kets and De Vries, 2014:7). The passive posture was not delivering peace with aggressors continually demonstrating their dominance over the eastern DRC despite a UN presence. It was time to recognise that the large-scale, country wide operation needed to modify. MONUC had evolved from limited observer mission to a multidimensional and now needed to transform into an integrated stabilisation mission in order to use military means to target the threat localised in the eastern DRC and effectively stabilise the country.

3.3.3 From stabilisation to enforcement
In 2010 MONUC evolved into the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, incorporating stabilisation into its name which was indicative of increased resolve to use force proactively to protect civilians and stabilise the country (Karlsrud, 2015:44).

Stabilisation peace initiatives were introduced in peace operations during the Bosnia/Herzogovina operations in 1995, and indicate the support to given to the stabilisation of a country as it transitions from conflict to peace. Stabilisation entails military efforts to stabilise an operating environment through neutralising elements that work contrary to this objective and, together with the host government and other partners, support the extension of state administration and governance (Akpasom and Lotze, 2014 :18). Stabilisation missions require a higher degree of intensity, robustness and risk (De Coning, 2014 :39).The new mission was authorised to use all necessary means to execute its mandate which incorporated the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the DRC government in its stabilisation and peace efforts.

The demand for quick and visible stabilisation results from the DRC, the UNSC and the international community placed MONUSCO under pressure (De Vries, 2016: 4). This expectation was however, counterweighted by troop contributing countries’ national interest and caveats, which determine the level of commitment to robustness.

By the end of 2010, the signatories to the March 2009 Goma Agreements had expressed dissatisfaction at the level of implementation, with resistance from the CNDP continuing to grow (UN, 2011a:3, UN, 2011b:4). However, perusal of the UNSG reports for 2011 reveals that although the UNSG remained ‘deeply concerned’ about the insecurity, and MONUSCO’s capacity to respond, which was undermined by the critical capability gap of...
military helicopters, the security situation remained relatively stable. Conflict persisted in the eastern provinces (UN, 2011a:1, UN, 2011b:1) but the protection of civilians was recognised as remaining the sovereign responsibility of the DRC government. Given the human security focus, a key indicator of an improvement or deterioration of security is that of Internally Displace Peoples’ statistics. According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons (also known as "IDPs") are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border" (OHCHR, 2016:1). Figure 1 depicts the IDP’s from the introduction of the stabilisation component.

By October 2011, the security situation in the Kivus was assessed to have deteriorated as a result of the loss of operational momentum due to FARDC reconfiguration which had resulted in diminished military pressure on the armed groups(UN, 2011c:1). Additionally, integration efforts were problematic and showing signs of unravelling (UN, 2011c:17). MONUSCO had responded to the situation by adopting a more robust posture and continuing to develop new approaches to civilian protection. A more proactive stance to contain armed group activities and deter them from attacking civilians was attempted (UN, 2011a:15-17). The situation, however, did not warrant any increased authorisation in force levels (UN, 2011b:17). A positive development however was the consolidation of regional relations throughout the year with security and economic issues being addressed through dialogue and cooperation.

In January 2012, with persistently active armed groups, the UNSG recognised that a flexible and robust military posture remained important in deterring armed group activities. The security situation had deteriorated to the extent that it was of ‘serious concern’ (see Figure 1 for 2012 IDP
statistics). Supporting evidence for the DRC’s instability can be found in analysing statistics available for the relevant period. The Fund for Peace’s (2016) Fragile States Index (FSI) was consulted for this purpose.

The FSI is an annual ranking of states, after South Sudan’s independence in 2011 there were 178 states, based on their levels of stability and pressures which they face. Data is collected from January to December of the preceding year and scores are apportioned based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators. A higher score indicates greater instability with the key indicators for the purposes of this study assessed to be that of (a) refugees and IDPs, (b) group grievance, (c) security apparatus and (d) external intervention. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the overall FSI trend experienced over the period 2006 -2015 and the respective indicators (a-d) over the same period.

From the graphs it is evident from the upward movement, which represents worsening trends, that 2013(which represents events in 2012) was the worst year in terms of overall score. It scored 111.2 and was ranked the state second most-susceptible to state failure. The scores for the relevant indicators remained consistently above 9 from 2012 and that refugees, security apparatus and external intervention scored very close to the top score of 10.

Key to the deteriorating situation was the CNDP desertions and continued influence. The extent of CNDP influence within the FARDC in the Kivus created the impression that the CNDP had absorbed the FARDC and not the other way round. FARDC efforts to reverse this perception included attempts to break the chain of command, to reorganise the forces and redeploy them outside of the Kivus (ICG, 2012:3-4). Increasing international pressure to arrest Gen Bosco Ntaganda, an ICC indictee serving in the FARDC and a member of the CNDP, resulted in
the DRC government ordering his arrest in 2012. Kinshasa’s decision called the amnesty clause, granted to the CNDP, into question. This, in conjunction with allegations made that the DRC government failed to honour the terms of the agreement, resulted in the defection of 300 soldiers from the FARDC who were formerly the majority of the CNDP military wing.

The mutiny in April 2012 shattered the illusion that the eastern DRC was moving towards stability and revealed the fragmentation prevalent within the FARDC (Kets and De Vries, 2014:7). The group named their movement the March 23 Movement with the acronym M23, demanded the full implementation of the 23 March agreement and were under the leadership of Gen Ntaganda. Other armed groups took advantage of the security vacuums created during the mutinies and reinforced their movements and extended their areas of operation and influence. Additionally, new armed groups mobilised in North Kivu. This resulted in an intensification of attacks against civilians, increasingly targeting specific ethnic groups, and a significant deterioration in the humanitarian situation (UN, 2012c:5-7). Despite these developments, the UNSG report in May 2012 did not recommend any MONUSCO reconfigurations or amendments to troop strength for the 2012 MONUSCO mandate renewal (UN, 2012b:18).

The M23, operating in the Rutshuru, Goma and Masisi areas, re-ignited the conflict and created its own administration and financing system in parts of North Kivu. By September 2012, they had established control over the east, perpetrating acts against civilian communities and the FARDC (Janik, 2014:160, Kayode, 2014:105). Simultaneously, anti-Rwandaphone and anti-Rwandan resentment increased. With the plethora of actors (and their support from neighbouring countries) the eastern DRC region was effectively transformed into a battle ground with many actors which could quickly degenerate into inter-ethnic clashes. The M23 intensified their attacks on the FARDC, and a cycle of offensives and counter-offensives ensued. The FARDC was incapable of withstanding the assault and a number of FARDC fled into neighbouring countries while the M23 continued to expand and consolidate its position in North Kivu. Consequently, domestic security concerns reduced military pressure on FDLR targeting which served to undermine the confidence and relations between the DRC and Rwanda (UN, 2012c:1-2).

MONUSCO forces had come to the support of the FARDC with attack helicopters firing upon M23 positions and MONUSCO peacekeepers getting caught in the crossfire between the
two groups (UN, 2012c:3-4). The surge in activities resulted in escalated tensions and increased humanitarian needs with displacements rising significantly. The scale and magnitude of the crisis and the multiplication of threats, led MONUSCO to rapidly increase and robustly adapt activities and operations to fulfil its task of protecting civilians. As a result, MONUSCO redeployed troops to North Kivu to reinforce the FARDC capacity, to deter any attack on Goma and provide the North Kivu Brigade with increased tactical flexibility. The M23 mutiny was perceived to have reversed hard-won gains in security, stabilisation and reconciliation in the eastern DRC. In his November 2012 UNSG report, terms of concern and condemnation became increasingly intense with concern transforming into ‘deeply disturbed’. It was recognised that, although a military means alone would be incapable of resolving the continuing crisis, an adequate military response would be required to respond to M23 activity and to protect civilians from further attacks.

The balance of forces favoured the FARDC but, given that MONUSCO had, over time, adopted a more assertive stance and taken a directly combative role, assuming responsibility for security and effectively assuaging the pressure on the FARDC to reform and perform. This created structural ineffectiveness that ensured sustained M23 victory in clashes. MONUSCO had numerically superior forces, firepower and air superiority but it did not obstruct the M23 advance.

The M23’s capturing of the provincial capital of Goma in November 2012 was a low point for MONUSCO. The mission had proved to be incapable of stopping the new rebellion and had again failed to fulfil the crucial component of its mandate; protection of civilians. Between May and November 2012, MONUSCO had been retaliated against by the population, an armed group had issued it with an ultimatum, another armed group had assumed control over a town where MONUSCO was deployed and had executed residents, and public demonstrations had been held to complain about the mission’s passivity. DRC government officials accused the mission of being tourists and a memo was submitted to the UN DPKO that MONUSCO should leave or implement its mandate (ICG, 2012:12).

The Kampala Dialogue commenced in December 2012 between the DRC government and the M23 but failed to make much progress, lagging for months, because of insufficient military pressure (Feingold, 2014:1) being exerted on the M23 to comply. The increased
insecurity, with a UN presence unable to guarantee peace and stability, prompted the regional states to consider alternatives before the crisis deepened.

The regional dimension

The path of the conflict assumed a new dimension which threatened the peace and stability of the region, catalysing regional action with the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) becoming increasingly aware of the developing security situation and calling extraordinary summits to develop an approach to resolving the crisis. The Goma crisis of 2012 had reinforced the perception that MONUSCO was not capable of dealing forcefully enough with the armed groups, and regional states argued for an intervention brigade which could respond in kind to the M23 (Karlsrud, 2015:44).

The adoption of the Africa Standby Force Policy Framework in 2003 developed six scenarios which would guide the development and deployment of the ASF with the 6th scenario envisioning intervention in situations where the international community did not act promptly, such as in genocide or other grave circumstances (Akpasom and Lotze, 2014:19). In a continuance of the logic of the 6th scenario, part of the approach adopted by the ICGLR incorporated the creation of a neutral international force to eradicate the M23, FDLR and other armed groups in order to secure border areas. Participation in peacekeeping operations, had boosted African peacekeeping capacity and possibly contributed to the confidence in developing the African Neutral Intervention Brigade (NIB) plan. The pressure for the establishment of the NIB, in conjunction with the AU’s support for a peace enforcement mandate for the African Union Mission in Mali, made it conceivable that African entities were pushing more for peace enforcement mandates, similar to their more-developed regional counterparts.

Subsequent meetings developed modalities to make the neutral international force operational. In parallel to these developments, the region continued to diplomatically engage with the parties to the conflict. Although most members supported the early establishment of the force, some countries were cautious about the practicalities of making such a force operational. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda expressed an interest in forming part of the force but, given the historical background, the DRC opted to involve countries in the SADC region (ICG, 2012:13). Initiatives aimed at
operationalising the force included the development of a concept of operations and the approaching of SADC and other African partners to secure troop contributions and secure further AU and UN support (UN, 2012c:7-9). Cycles of violence and attacks threatened initiatives to bring peace and stability and security to the region and the international community therefore had to act, proactively, to prevent the impending break down of law and order, humanitarian crisis and the threats to the peace process (Kayode, 2014:108). Regional initiatives were recognised as a potential avenue, with the international community engaging increasingly with regional partners with the aim of reinforcing regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and refining the proposal of a neutral international force (UN, 2012c:16-17).

The lack of funding for the regionally proposed Neutral Intervention Force impeded its deployment. The UN recognised an opportunity to restore its reputation after the humiliation suffered in Goma in November 2012 and made a counter proposal to establish the Force Intervention Brigade, composed of troops from the SADC countries (Karlsrud, 2015:45). This simultaneously prevented the involvement of SADC as a separate actor.

In a subsequent regional development, a Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was signed by representatives of 11 countries in the region in February 2013. The Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the region outlined key activities at national, regional and international levels required to end the recurring cycles of violence and had the support of a number of bilateral and multilateral partners with the UN, AU, SADC and ICGLR acting as its guarantors (UN, 2013a:3). This framework incorporated regional states’ support for the boosting of MONUSCO’s capacity to undertake unilateral offensive military operations against the M23 and other armed groups through the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade. The M23 represented an active threat which the DRC government perceived as a direct threat to its control over the eastern DRC as well as a proxy-force for foreign intervention. Kinshasa needed the support from the region and MONUSCO to eradicate the threat and was forced to make certain concessions in the Peace and Security Framework which it might ordinarily not have made (Kets and De Vries, 2014:11).
Ten years of robust mandate had had been insufficient to stem the ongoing conflict and deliver peace dividends. This deteriorating situation and the fact that the international community had been embroiled in this conflict for more than a decade without tangible peace, ensured that the international community became more resolute to take significant steps to address the situation. Key to this failure was the ambiguity in the interpretation which had been overruled by national interests and caveats to force utilisation. The humanitarian situation had moved beyond the need for robust peace enforcement and required an unambiguous mandate to enforce stability.

3.3.4 The introduction of UN enforcement operations
The severity of the Congo crisis and its humanitarian aftermath obliged the international community to take urgent, decisive and proactive action that did not follow on the unsuccessful, traditional trajectory. The UN’s credibility in the DRC was almost non-existent in the DRC after years of humiliation and needed to be rebuilt (Kulish and Sengupta, 2013:2). The possibility of increased use of force was an option that both the DRC and the international community agreed to; inaction or maintaining the status quo was no longer an option (Lamont and Skeppström, 2013:34).

During its presence in the DRC, MONUSCO registered significant progress; the territory was reunited through a political process, foreign armed forces formally withdrew, credible national elections were held and the economic situation continued to show significant improvement (UN, 2013a:1). The western and central parts of the DRC generally stabilised with the significant degradation of the capabilities of foreign armed forces. The UN mission evolved progressively since 1999, assuming more tasks and responsibilities to meet the requirements of an evolving and demanding situation (UN, 2012d:15) but the eastern DRC continued to be plagued by recurrent waves of conflict, chronic humanitarian crises and serious human rights violations (UN, 2013a:2). These cycles of violence presented as an obstacle to peace in the DRC and threatened the overall stability and development of the Great Lakes Region (UN, 2013a :2). The implementation of the robust mandate had a shortfall in the necessary political will and military capabilities to implement it (Kjeksrud and Ravndal, 2011:11) with bilateral memorandums of understanding creating caveats which presented as an obstacle, trumping the mandated tasks which involved high risk and political unease.
Past efforts had failed to address the core reasons for the eruption of crises and it was recognised that a new, comprehensive approach, which addressed the underlying causes of conflict, was required. An underlying reason identified was the government’s limited ability to exert full authority over its territory and provide basic services and security to its population. Armed groups thrive in the vacuum created by the absence of effective state authority and these armed groups constitute the main threat to the country, its population and general stability and cohesion of the region. The UNSG recognised that until the DRC could assemble a capable Congolese Defence force, a military enforcement capability, designed to neutralise the threat posed by the most recalcitrant elements of the armed groups, would be required (UN, 2013a:12).

The concept proposed by the UNSG was the introduction of a dedicated intervention brigade which would be under the Force Commander’s operational command and would have peace-enforcement tasks of preventing the expansion of, neutralising and disarmament of armed groups. The activities assigned to the Force Intervention Brigade would be aimed at creating an environment conducive for the creation of state authority and sustainable stability. It would also contribute to creating the time and space required for strengthening the FARDC to assume its sovereign responsibilities (UN, 2013a:14). Additional capabilities would be required for advanced information collection and analysis to enhance situational awareness and enable timely decision making which would be provided by the deployment of the aerial surveillance systems. The Brigade would be composed of three infantry battalions and their enabling units and force multipliers consisting of an artillery battery, a special forces company, a signals unit and support components and would be deployed within the missions authorised strength (UN, 2013a:14).

The rationale behind the initiative that was introduced was that it would contribute to an end-state that would enable MONUSCO to successfully complete its peacekeeping mandate through reducing the threat posed by armed groups to such a level that they can be managed by national security authorities (UN, 2013a:15).

Resolution 2098 (2013) was deliberated upon for about an hour in the Security Council on 28 March 2013 and, although the resolution was passed unanimously, it was however met with some reservations. During the Security Council Members’ statements, the UNSC was
commended for being responsive to the DRC’s request and for capitalising on a regional initiative, ensuring the support of the countries in the region (UN, 2013:2-3). The DRC perceived the threat posed by the armed groups as being an almost existential challenge to the DRC with the unprecedented human drama in the DRC presenting an exceptional situation which would require exceptional measures to definitely put an end to the recurring cycles of violence (UN, 2013:10-11). Concerns centred around the compromising of the UN founding principles, particularly the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations, and the fact that such operations could increase perceptions of the UN as a roleplayer and taking sides, thereby presenting the UN as a viable target, increasing the risk of attacks against civilian and humanitarian components of the UN (Karlsrud, 2015:45). An additional concern was the lack of consultation. Members felt that, although the changing situation warranted a sense of urgency, consultations had not been as in-depth and inclusive as what they should have been for a resolution of this nature. It was expressed that these consultations should have been held with the entire membership and in particular with the major troop contributing countries of the UN because of the new tasks being called for and the impact that the decision may have on the entire system of peacekeeping (UN, 2013:5-6). The FIB was recognised as contributing to the realisation of the mission and thereby responding to the need to set MONUSCO up for success and enabled MONUSCO to remain current and supportive of regional developments and adaptive to the political, military and humanitarian realities in the DRC.

Resolution 2098 (2013) was significant as it revealed that the principles of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction had lost their privileged status, particularly when it conflicts with the protection of fundamental human rights (Janik, 2014:172). The introduction of the FIB was also unprecedented in UN operations – peace operations had frequently operated under Chapter VII, which allows the use of force, but the combination of a robust mandate and a military component capable of offensive action was unparalleled (Lamont and Skeppström, 2013:11). The term neutralise was new to UNSC resolutions and denoted an offensive posture which does not necessarily respond to a threat (self-defence) but can be launched without provocation. The terms of Resolution 2098 (2013) transformed the military component of the peace operation from a ‘civilian’ into a ‘combatant’ and a legal, permanent target.
The considerable concern within the Security Council was recognised in the resolution’s assertion that the FIB was established ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent’. Kayode (2014:114) however reflects that this statement is merely a way of saying that the FIB will not be a precedent if it fails in achieving its mandate and, if it is successful, then it may present a new future for UN peace operations. Its precedent is therefore dependent on the success or failure to achieve its mandate. It is also true that the FIB may serve as a reference point for future UN operations, thus serving as an indirect precedent. For the first time in UN peacekeeping history, a UN force was mandated to carry out targeted offensive attacks in a robust and mobile manner with the aim of neutralising, disarming and demobilising the armed groups involved in the crisis.

Troop Contributing Countries to the Brigade are South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, all SADC countries. New tools, technologies and capabilities entered UN missions which included aerial surveillance drones, developing an intelligence capability and incorporating special forces to support more conventional forces (Karlsrud, 2015:44). Neutralisation activities rely upon intelligence activities in order to be successful but intelligence activities are controversial within the context of peace operations. The use of the term neutralisation would have opened up increased acceptance of intelligence activities as a necessary component of peace operations (Lamont and Skeppström, 2013:8). The FIB had access to attack helicopters, aerial surveillance vehicles, superior weapons, intelligence, trained personnel and military apparatus, capabilities that do not differ from an army established and mandated to go to war (Kayode, 2014:113).
3.4 Conclusion

The characteristics of contemporary conflict place and the normative shift to humanitarianism have placed greater demands on UN forces and have impelled responses that are far removed from the traditional, classic keeping of the peace. The UN’s continued relevance, credibility and legitimacy was under threat from the gaps between policy, principles, practice and reality in the contemporary non-international armed conflict which dominates the peacekeeping arena. Accordingly, the UN needed to adapt ways that are flexible, effective and efficient in coping with the strains on the organisation and its capabilities. Throughout the evolution of peacekeeping, the UN consistently endeavoured to reflect and manage the changing environments and context of peacekeeping by incrementally adjusting the use of force. Up until 2013, the UNSC had authorised progressively forceful operations but had stopped short of mandating the full-scale use of force, except to non-UN forces.

The DRC and Sudan are the two countries where the UN has invested the most but efforts to resolve the conflict had ended in failure. In the DRC, MONUC’s credibility suffered from its mission failures – most notably its failure regarding protection of civilians and a new initiative was required to deliver tangible results and restore credibility and legitimacy. The introduction of Resolution 2098(2013) and the mandating of the Intervention Brigade was a step further for the ‘use of force’ trajectory – taking the UN to the extreme end of the use of force continuum beyond peace enforcement to enforcement.

The ‘fall of Goma’ was a catalyst, creating awareness of the precariousness of the UN’s position and transforming political opinion towards the greater use of force. The greater use of force, with greater operational success however, was a trade-off for impartiality as the favourable outcome tips the balance in the DRC government’s favour. The introduction of the FIB came amidst considerable concerns but the force managed to secure the M23’s demise through the adoption of a military strategy that forced a political solution. The FIB also altered the regional dynamics as continued, proxy support would ultimately have implied going to war with SADC. Peacekeeping became war-making with extraordinary measures being introduced to ensure success, a modicum of stability and the rehabilitation of MONUSCO’s credibility.
In the next chapter, the developments in the DRC leading to the introduction of the FIB will be evaluated against the criteria established for securitisation in Chapter two to ascertain whether Resolution 2098 (2013) can be classified as the securitisation of peacekeeping.
CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE CASE FOR SECURTISATION OF PEACEKEEPING 

4.1 Introduction

The years from 2009 to 2012 marked an intensification in conflict and insecurity that culminated with the fall of Goma in November 2012. This was a clear indication that UN peacekeeping efforts at stabilisation were inadequate to deliver security (De Vries, 2016:2). Traditional approaches to UN peacekeeping consistently failed to address the persistent insecurity in the DRC, particularly in the primary responsibility of ‘protection of civilians’. The UN was thus confronted with the realisation that their efforts in the DRC would not amount to security if the presence of armed groups persisted (Moscoe, 2015:1) and that a different approach to conflict resolution would be required.

Although protection of civilians is primarily a function of state with the UN Charter Article 2(7) (UN,1945) stipulating that the UN should not ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter’, the principles of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘non-indifference’ trumped the sacrosanctity of sovereignty. Accordingly, the DRC’s incapacity to deal with the problems and threats inherent in the state and to protect its citizens from harm, shifted the responsibility for the protection of the community to the wider international community, in effect to the UN peacekeeping mission.

Security, being a relational concept, implies that insecurity does not exist only at state level but extends into the system level. The regional level mediates the interplay between states and the international system with state and system security being inextricably linked. However, domestic insecurity can spill over and have a negative impact on stable regional relations (Buzan, 2007:128-135). In reaction to the perceived disinterest and incapacity of global players, support to the maxim of ‘African solutions to African problems’ grew. The maxim was used mainly in political and security issues with regional organisations representing the basic unit for the operationalisation thereof. As such, regional organisations, with a compelling interest and familiarity with the conflict dynamics, were expected to claim prominent roles in the prevention and resolution of insecurity in their neighbourhood (Nathan, 2013:49). In the Great Lakes, strong cross-border dimensions and
transnational ethnic identities in the region result in interconnected conflicts that often spread to destabilise the whole region (Kanyangara, 2016:4).

The response to the recognition that state authority and civilian security was being threatened, was the UNSC’s Resolution 2098 (2013) which strongly condemned armed groups operating within the DRC and introduced exceptional measures to peacekeeping in the DRC. Accordingly, it could be argued that this resolution, and the exceptional measures it introduced, marked the start of the securitisation of peacekeeping. This chapter will evaluate how developments unfolded in the DRC peacekeeping theatre and within the United Nations multilateral forum, juxtaposed against the securitisation criteria as identified in Chapter Two. The framework for analysis would investigate who securitised (actor), for whom or what (the referent object), why or on what issues (threats), with what results and under what conditions (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:32). Additionally, it will be remembered that securitisation comprises both a securitising move and a successful securitising action or, as Roe (2008) defines it, rhetorical and active securitisation.

4.2 Setting the stage for securitisation of peacekeeping in the DRC

During securitising moves, the securitiser (or securitising actor) needs to frame the threat in such a manner that the audience is convinced that a referent object is deemed worthy of being saved. The primary purpose of the securitising move is therefore to rationalise, legitimise and secure support for the exceptional measures envisioned during the action component of securitisation (Vaughn, 2009:266).

4.2.1 The securitising actor

The securitising actor needs to introduce priority and urgency to an issue and convince a political force to take action to achieve security. The actor however, needs to possess sufficient political and social capital which empowers the actor to speak authoritatively on matters of security. Although it is acknowledged that non-state actors can also ‘speak security’, most organisations also have rules about who may speak on their behalf (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:40).

From the above, it is established that insecurity manifested at three levels; national, regional and international. In matters of security an actor needs to possess authority, legitimacy and
the necessary means to put the proposed measures into action (Vuori, 2010:267). Given that the threat manifested at three levels, it follows that more than one actor would participate in the securitisation process.

As the de facto security provider in the DRC, MONUSCO is in a position to speak, in conjunction with the DRC government, authoritatively on DRC security issues. At the regional level, the ICGLR speaks on matters of regional security. At the multinational level, the UN has been established to maintain international peace and security with the UN Charter providing the means of implementing the maintenance of peace and security. The Charter creates six principal organs in the UN with the Secretariat and the UNSC being central to matters of security.

Chapter V of the UN Charter established the UN Security Council (UNSC) as the entity primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and granted it specific powers. In Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII the Charter vests significant power in the UNSC to act on behalf of all states (Mortimer, 2007:111) to respond to threats, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. The UN Charter’s stipulation that no enforcement action may be undertaken without UNSC authorisation (Maloney, 2007:120) ensures that the UNSC retains the formal authority to wage war or make peace which endows its actions or speech with inherent legitimacy (Thakur, 2006:xii).

The UNSC does not act in isolation – its decisions are largely informed, facilitated and assisted by the provision of insight from the UN Secretary General (UNSG) (Thakur, 2006:323). The UNSG is the UN administrative head, the personification of international interest, guardian of the Charter and the voice of the world’s conscience (Newman, 2007:175; Thakur, 2006:321). In terms of Article 99 of the Charter, the UNSG is to bring to the attention of the UNSC any matter that, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. This provides the UNSG with the responsibility of assessing the human rights and security situation in states, and providing the UNSC with early warning and/or initiate conflict prevention (Newman, 2007:175).

It then follows that, in the case study, the relevant actors, deemed to possess the authority to speak security are MONUSCO, through the UNSG, the ICGLR and the UNSC.
4.2.2 The referent object
Security action is taken on behalf of the particular referent object (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:36) with a securitising actor presenting an issue which needs to be secured. Referent objects are valued and deemed to possess a legitimate right to survival (Balzacq, 2010:35; Stritzel, 2007:358) which privileges the issue in terms of the actions that may be taken to secure it. In the case of the DRC, state authority needs to be restored, UN peacekeeping practice needs to be redeemed and stability and security need to be provided to prevent loss of life and livelihood and ensure human security.

The DRC’s existence as a state with sovereignty was created in 1960 and the protection thereof as a referent object is sacrosanct in international relations. In terms of sovereignty, which is a state characteristic, states should possess supreme power and authority to govern the totality of its territory.

The UN is a multifaceted, multinational entity with peace keeping operations being the visible, tangible component against which the organisation’s performance and relevance is measured. Following the peacekeeping failures of the 1990’s, the UN’s future credibility and functional survival was brought into question. As such, Buzan, Waever and De Wildt (1998:55) recognised that the “United Nations in its context of its peacekeeping operations had begun to acquire the beginnings of referent object status’. Further defeats and failures would introduce increasing challenges to its continued relevance and existence. Peacekeeping practice can additionally lay claim to universalist privileges. Peacekeeping’s continued existence, and endeavours to establish international peace and stability, benefits humanity as a whole. This universality increases peacekeeping as a referent object’s appeal to a range of actors and audiences and strengthens the success of a securitising move (Buzan & Hansen, 2009:268).

The paradigm of human-centred security challenges the traditional conceptualisation of national security, arguing that people should be placed at the centre of security. Human security means protecting people from severe and pervasive threats and situations. The ‘protection of civilians’ clause in the UN peacekeeping operations’ mandates operationalised this endeavour and placed it as a primary objective for mission success. The severe humanitarian cost incurred as a result of the recurrent crisis (Obuoga, 2016), established
the need to stem any further humanitarian cost and established human security as a referent object.

The three referent objects are interrelated and would be secured if MONUSCO managed to successfully implement its mandate. Accordingly, it could be argued that MONUSCO’s success was the referent object which needed to be achieved so that the corresponding referent objects could simultaneously be secured.

4.2.3 The existential threat

Threats and vulnerabilities arise but, in order to qualify as a security issue, they need to pose a threat to the referent object’s existence. In essence, an existential threat places the survival of the referent object in jeopardy or could fundamentally alter a referent object if left unchecked. Historical references of threat, danger and harm facilitate the framing of a threat as being existential (Peoples and Vaughn-Williams, 2015:96). At state level, existential threats would include situations that undermine recognition, legitimacy or governing authority while those at systems level undermine the rules, norms and institutions that constitute these regimes and society (Buzan, Waever and De Wildt, 1998:22).

Prevailing state weakness and failure prevented the DRC government from consolidating peace in the DRC and facilitated the proliferation of armed groups (Stearns, 2012:239), such as the M23, which threatened the existence of the state, peacekeeping practice and affected communities.

The DRC government did not build or possess strong state security institutions and was thus reliant on external assistance to quell rebellions and extend authority. The UN mission became progressively more responsible for assuming state functions and for affirming the DRC’s sovereignty on behalf of the government (Koko, 2011:33).

The UNSC consistently referred to the situation in the DRC as a threat to international peace and stability (Janik, 2014:155), thereby justifying its continued presence and intervention in the country. The vicious cycle of armed conflict and intervention posed severe challenges (Koko, 2011:30) and expectations of peacekeeping, which the mission failed to achieve, thereby contributing to the delegitimisation of the mission’s presence in the country (Guéhenno, 2015:120). MONUC/MONUSCO was consistently accused of failing to achieve
its core mandate and for being unable to deter attacks. These failures attracted global attention and widespread criticism (Kayode, 2014:112). Such failed interventions can damage the credibility of peacekeeping to such an extent that it is no longer a viable solution for situations where it could make a difference (Guéhenno, 2015:128). This effectively threatens continued existence of the UN’s peacekeeping practice, and by extension, the organisation’s rules, norms and institutions. Additionally, according to the interviewee (2016) the M23 insurrection displaced the UN mission in the DRC from its exit strategy track and set it back years in its exit strategy, effectively adding billions of dollars, in literal cost alone, to the peace effort.

The conflict’s humanitarian cost posed an existential threat to the lives, livelihoods and future of the affected communities. More than 15 million people were affected by the conflict with an estimated 5.4 million deaths (International Rescue Committee, 2016).

Accordingly, with the presence of the relevant actors, legitimate referent objects and existential threats, the foundation had been laid for the rhetorical component of the securitisation process.

4.3 The rhetorical component of securitisation of peacekeeping in the DRC

4.3.1 The speech act
During the speech act, an actor identifies an existential threat to a referent object, using persuasion to obtain authorisation to securitise the referent object. Speech acts are, however, not limited to verbal communication but also incorporate non-verbal modes. Actors can thus use various and varying lexicons, frames, images and voices to ‘speak’ security (Donnelly, 2015:927).

MONUSCO failures at protection of civilians was attributed to the major troop contributing countries being averse to playing a greater role in ground-based fighting (IHS, 2012:1). Accordingly, the DRC indicated their preference for a strengthened MONUSCO mandate, to enable the mission to aggressively pursue armed groups. This opinion was shared by both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) which also perceived the lack of offensive action to be MONUSCO’s failure. Both of these regional bodies were proponents of a
stronger mandate which would authorise peace enforcement with sufficient robustness to eliminate all negative forces (Wolters, 2013:1)

Consequently, the ‘uttering of security’ took place at a number of levels and audiences with effect from the August 2012 ICGLR summit. During the course of 2012 the ICGLR held a number of summits and extra-ordinary summits to engage each other about the gravity of the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The situation was framed as constituting a serious threat to peace, security, stability and development in the entire Great Lakes Region. The August conference tabled three proposals to address the insecurity in eastern DRC. One was the creation of a distinct regional force composed of ICGLR member states, with the second being a regional, or wider international force, incorporated into MONUSCO, while the third option proposed a new interim MONUSCO force to fill the current security vacuum, pending the creation of a neutral regional (or wider international) force to fight the ‘negative forces’ (IHS, 2012:1). All three options presented for the audience’s approval favoured the use of military force as a solution to the crisis.

On 24 February 2013, after almost three months of talks between the ICGLR, SADC, the African Union (AU) and the UN (Zounmenou and Kok, 2013:1), the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC and the region was signed by eleven African countries. The Framework outlined national, regional and international actions, aimed at ending the violence. As part of the international actions, the Security Council was to remain engaged in seeking long-term stability for the DRC and to review the MONUSCO (SESG Office, 2013:1). The ICGLR had successfully framed the threat to persuade its audience however, it lacked sufficient resources to implement the associated action. Given that the threat had been framed, accepted and prioritised, and a relevant document prepared, the next audience that needed to be persuaded was the UNSC.

In accordance with UN protocol, the UNSG provided his Special Report on the DRC and the Great Lakes Region to the UNSC on 27 February 2013. This document can be perceived as the speech act which was communicated to the UNSC for consideration ahead of the deliberations for Resolution 2098 (2013) that created the FIB. In his report, the claim was made that the DRC continues to be plagued by recurrent waves of conflict, humanitarian crises and serious human rights violations and warned that this presents as an obstacle to
peace and threatens the overall stability and development of the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, his action plan recommended a new, comprehensive approach that would address the underlying causes of conflict (UNSG, 2013b:2).

Similarly to the PSCF, the report was sub-divided into actions that were expected from the national, regional and international levels. Emphasis was placed on human security, highlighting displacement, food insecurity and the spread of disease (UNSG, 2013b:10) which provided the proof to support the claim that peace and stability was being threatened. The international community was requested to make a renewed commitment to the restoration of lasting peace in the region through the proposed establishment of the intervention brigade with enforcement tasks to address the insecure environment (UNSC, 2013b:13-14). Pursuant to protocols, the special report was communicated to the members of the UNSC (UNSC, 2013c:2), the relevant audience which would issue the resolution that would establish the FIB and authorise the extraordinary measures.

4.3.2. **The audience**

The audience, as the legitimising authority, is central to the securitisation process (Floyd, 2011:435). Without audience acceptance and endorsement, a securitising move fails to securitise an issue. Audience diversity has a direct impact upon the success of securitising moves with macrosecuritisations being more difficult to achieve given the diversity of the audience. However, greater audience inclusivity also bestows greater legitimacy upon the securitisation and extraordinary measures.

The ICGLR proposal and PSCF can be fit the criterion of an African solution for an African problem, negating potential allegations of interference in African affairs. Accordingly, the ICGLR initiatives can be viewed as being tacit regional and continental endorsement of the existential threat. As such, Africa provided moral support to the securitisation. However, because authorisation for the use of force can only be granted by the UNSC, this moral support was insufficient to adopt the securitisation and subsequent extraordinary measures. Formal support had to be obtained from the UNSC in the form of a UN resolution, which is binding upon all UN member states.

UNSC decisions are informed by the UNSG prior to the passing of a UN Resolution. If the UN resolution is viewed as an indicator of a successful securitising move, the UNSC can be
construed as the audience with the UNSG, through his special reports, being the actor persuading the UNSC.

The UNSG reports which incorporated statistics, the International media’s heightened interest in humanitarian issues within the international media and the publicised UN failures served as which indicators and external events which captured the attention of the respective decision-makers and audiences. The urgency peaked during the fall of Goma in November 2012, which embarrassed and humiliated UN peacekeeping operations. As such renewed global attention was drawn to the security issues in the DRC and the problem of UN peacekeeping. Perceptions about the DRC realities were formed which influenced how the council was persuaded during the securitisation process. Accordingly, the UNSC did not require much persuasion during the deliberations ahead of the approval of Resolution 2098 (2013).

Although the UNSC possesses the authority, it has no real coercive power as it is dependent on its member states to operationalise its resolutions (Thakur, 2006:xiii). As such, the UNSC’s audience comprises of the member states present during the resolution’s deliberations. The records of the meeting held on 28 March 2013 (UNSC, 2013c) indicate that 15 members were present which included a representative from each of the permanent seat members and a representative from the affected country, the DRC. The records show that the meeting lasted less than an hour and, when the draft resolution was voted on, the vote was unanimous.

The audience expressed their concerns at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the need to ensure the protection of human rights and international humanitarian law (UNSC, 2013c:5). Western powers had been advocating for the position that would transform UN peacekeepers into a partner in military campaigns (McGreal, 2015:7). However, India, as a major troop contributing country to peacekeeping operations, opposed this position as it did not want to see peacekeeping as an end but rather a means to bring about the goal of political stability. Furthermore, India challenged the adoption of a more aggressive stance stating that although the country remained committed to peacekeeping, it was on the proviso that peacekeeping remains what it is known to be – non-partisan. The representative from the USA made mention of the need to be “particularly mindful of the need to set MONUSCO up for success” (UNSC 2013c:8) which was the only apparent
evidence of the need to securitise peacekeeping so as to protect the UN as referent object. Despite the recognition that the organisation was in jeopardy, only the USA, which is cognisant of power politics, made specific mention of it. This creates the possibility that the securitisation of peacekeeping was, although perhaps the primary concern, concealed behind and between more morally acceptable rhetoric.

Support for the UN organisation was expressed in the same document by the DRC, when it stated that “the UN has once again proven its active solidarity with those who suffer the horrors of war, ….has also shown its unwavering determination and an increasingly resolute commitment to work for peace and security in the world” and later “Faced with this almost existential challenge, the UN has been the most loyal, constant and decisive partner our country could have”. In essence an accolade, reaffirming the organisation’s value and place in global society. The securitisation of peace initiatives in the DRC was aimed at simultaneously serving the goal of securing the DRC state, the UN’s position in global society without expressly articulating the need to do so and the human society.

Resolution 2098(2013) was the outcome of the UNSC meeting that was held on 28 March 2013. As such, the rhetorical component of securitisation was successful and the active component authorised. Accordingly, the break from accepted norms and rules with the use of force was legitimised and justification provided for the adoption of extraordinary measures.

4.4 Securitisation in action

MONUSCO was under constant pressure from the DRC government and the UNSC to deliver quick and visible results (De Vries, 2016:4). The failures to deliver upon ‘protection of civilians’ affected the mission’s credibility, and the international community became progressively more amenable to introducing significant steps in the peacekeeping initiative (Janik, 2014:160). Additionally, the intractability of the DRC conflict, after many years of peacekeeping could create the perception that past efforts were useless, and in order to stem this perception, steps were to be taken that would not normally be considered.

During the UNSC deliberations on 28 March 2013, the DRC representative’s statement unambiguously revealed the exceptional nature of the decision when the situation in the
DRC was described as “an exceptional situation that demands exceptional measures if we are ever to be able to definitively put an end to the hellishly continuing cycle of conflict” (UNSC, 2013c:11). Statements made by other countries during the same meeting buttress the proposition that exceptional measures were introduced to peacekeeping reflected the securitisation of MONUSCO in the authorisation of Resolution 2098 (2013).

The records from the UNSC deliberations indicate that the matter had been given a sense of urgency and priority, elevating it out of public/political debate. Even the audience referred to it as being a significant resolution. The Guatemalan representative (UNSC, 2013c:4) lamented that although “the sense of urgency is understandable given the changing situation on the ground, we feel that Council members should have had more time to express and resolve their concerns”. Argentina (UNSC, 2013c:6) reinforced this perception by stating, that “the consultations that preceded the adoption of the resolution were not as inclusive as in-depth as called for by a resolution of this kind to address all the concerns particularly as the decisions taken may have an impact on the entire system of peacekeeping.” From the aforementioned, the matter was decided with public/political debate being limited.

Some of the MONUSCO failures had been attributed to the availability of resources. As such, Resolution 2098 (2013) authorised reinforcement capabilities for MONUSCO which included the Intervention Brigade, additional combat support aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), an Intelligence capability and an Electronic Warfare (EW) capability. The EW capability has yet to be deployed within MONUSCO (Interviewee, 2016). The resolution reinforces the exceptionality perception through the stipulation that it was created “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping”. The inclusion of the phrase ‘without creating a precedent’ was incorporated to allay fears among the UNSC members as not all members were free of doubts and anxiety about the implications of the resolution.

The crux of the ‘exceptional measures’ was to be found in the authorisation of the Intervention Brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations with the aim of neutralising armed groups (UNSC, 2013c:7). Through this task, UN peace missions moved from being a passive capacity in protection of civilians to being an active neutraliser of armed groups (Interviewee, 2016). Additionally, the decision that these operations could be undertaken either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC was a break away from the traditional notion of
acting jointly or, in support of, host nation forces. Although the capacity remained largely the same, the use of force was changed unequivocally. The use of force authorised went far beyond the previous mandates of the use of force in self-defence and for ‘protection of civilians’ (Moscoe, 2015:4). MONUSCO had moved from implicit permission to use force (robust mission) to the explicit expectation to use force. This change in resolve and intent was tested by the M23 in initial engagements with the Intervention Brigade, fully expecting the retention of the passive status quo.

Force composition was changed with the introduction of the Artillery Battery authorised in Resolution 2098. This capability of indirect fire was absent within the framework MONUSCO forces. With the change in the nature of the threat and the mandates awarded to peace missions, peacekeeping was removed from its positional capability, which is mostly comprised of Infantry forces, to incorporate Special Forces\(^1\) which became a necessity in the mandates of peace missions (Interviewee, 2016).

Effectively, with the introduction of the Intervention Brigade, the UN was conducting counter-insurgency operations which necessitated the introduction of situational awareness capabilities, hitherto unacceptable within peacekeeping. Offensive operations, by their nature, increase the likelihood of collateral damage which, in peace keeping terms is unacceptable when viewed in conjunction with the ‘protection of civilians’ clause. As such, technologies that advance situational awareness and accuracy are integral components within offensive counter-insurgency operations (Interviewee, 2016). This effectively introduced the controversial field of Intelligence to peacekeeping and opened the window for technologies that would advance intelligence and situational awareness.

The use of intelligence is however traditionally associated with the military, secrecy and national interests and in conflict with the ethos underpinning the UN organisation and its peacekeeping. UAS’ too, are associated with scepticism and emotionally-laden uneasiness which has shaped attitudes about their utilisation. Additionally, their encroachment upon civil liberties is questioned. The UAS was so-termed in MONUSCO to break from the negative connotations associated with drones and drone strikes (Interviewee, 2016). The UAS were equipped with infrared equipment and deployed to provide surveillance for ground

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\(^1\) Special Forces possess skills integral to war fighting but not necessarily relevant to peacekeeping. One such skill is that of snipers and these were used to great effect against the M23 positions.
forces. Although these systems have been utilised in peace missions, they had not previously been utilised to inform a combat capability, and under conventional laws on war these operators and their drones would be legitimate combatants, and thus open to attack by enemy forces (Stupart, 2013:1).

The combat support aircraft deployed to MONUSCO forces were lightly armed and unsuited to the task at hand against the M23 as they were unable to withstand the tempo and intensity of fighting (Stupart, 2013:1). As such, a higher order, third generation combat support aircraft in the form of South Africa’s Rooivalk was incorporated into the mission’s capabilities. This was the aircraft’s first combat deployment, and three Rooivalk were to boost MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade in executing its offensive mandate (Helfrich, 2013:1). The Rooivalk is a highly mobile weapons platform that can also be used for reconnaissance purposes. Armed with unguided rockets and a powerful 20mm high velocity cannon, the Rooivalk can direct accurate and effective firepower on rebel positions from a better position than the Mi-8 or Oryx. Beyond this, the helicopters are able to provide good reconnaissance for ground forces through sophisticated imaging avionics hardware. The enhanced observation capabilities were able to provide reconnaissance day and night, regardless of weather conditions (Stupart, 2013:1). It should however be noted, that the use of close air support is controversial in peacekeeping as their utilisation exceeds the proportionate use of force principle. Additionally, they are a show of force and not a show of peace and retain the potential for collateral damage (Lin-Greenberg, 2011:445).

The incorporation of stabilisation had established the practice to use military means to stabilise. Resolution 2098 (2103) took this practice a step further. In effect, with access to attack helicopters, UAS, superior weapons, intelligence, trained personnel and military apparatus and the offensive mandate, MONUSCO was no different from an army established and mandated to go to war.

4.5 Conclusion

Securitisation ensures the continued survival of a referent object. The failure to effectively address the threat which the M23 posed to the DRC government and its citizens resulted in the M23 posing an existential threat to national, international and human security. A solution needed to be introduced which would simultaneously secure the survival of the DRC’s
sovereignty, its citizens and restore the UN to its internationally recognised role of guarantor of international peace and security. Following on from the increasing propensity within the international community to use force to ensure security, the UN opted for the use of the military tool in an offensive, enforcement role. This however, contravened the existing rules and principles governing peacekeeping, effectively equating it to the securitisation of peacekeeping in the DRC.

The qualitative evaluation of the developments of the DRC against the identified criteria for securitisation revealed that in the run-up to the introduction of Resolution 2098(2013), the criteria for securitisation were fulfilled. The securitising actor framed the threat existentially to the audience by means of a speech act in order to receive acceptance and legitimisation for the breaking of rules and the introduction of extraordinary measures. It would however be pertinent at this juncture to recognise that the securitisation in this instance was moral and justified in accordance with Floyd’s identified criteria, even if the response’s proportionality of force could be questioned. Using the ensured survival of the UN as a referent object might not have delivered the same result and this, perhaps is why its survival was cloaked behind the more morally acceptable international responsibility of protecting civilians and ensuring the survival of a state.

The sequencing of introducing a securitising intervention many years into a peace mission is puzzling. Logic would dictate that a peace mission would commence with such an intervention and evolve into peacekeeping when there is actually a peace to keep. This conundrum could possibly be explained by the evolution of the nature of the conflict and the tasks that the UN has increasingly been required to perform. In instances of intrastate warfare and where the state is incapable of performing its primary responsibilities of ensuring the security of its citizens, the UN is required to exercise the de facto sovereign responsibilities.

The process of securitisation was followed and, when capabilities were matched with intent, it delivered success to the UN, MONUSCO, the DRC and its citizens. Despite its success at ensuring continued survival for the referent objects, the Intervention Brigade has yet to be decommissioned and by extension, peacekeeping to be desecuritised. Conversely, it would appear that the securitisation has become institutionalised precisely because of the operational successes it achieved. The longevity and sustainability of the success will
however only be evident in the future, but with the initial successes which securitisation brought to bear, it will be difficult not to export this solution to other peace missions, institutionalising the increased use of force within the peace doctrine. The concluding chapter will proceed to investigate the effects of securitising peacekeeping and how the UN has internalised the lessons learned from the DRC intervention in the four years since the inception of the Intervention Brigade.
CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION: THE DEMISE OF UN PRINCIPLES AND THE RISE OF SECURITISATION

5.1 Introduction

This study explored the question whether securitisation theory could be applied to peacekeeping. The case of Resolution 2098 (2013) in the DRC was used to assess, analyse and evaluate whether the events that preceded and followed the authorisation of Resolution 2098 (2013) could be framed as being an instance of ‘the securitisation of peacekeeping’. In accordance with the preceding chapter’s conclusion, this research finds that the introduction of Resolution 2098 (2013) marked the beginning of the securitisation of peacekeeping.

This chapter concludes the study with a summation of the findings and highlights how the UN has internalised and repeatedly securitised peacekeeping missions, the significance of the research and implications for the future of peacekeeping before providing a few closing thoughts and concerns.

5.2 Findings

Contemporary peace operations are moving closer to being combat missions and are linked to a broader shift and reinterpretation of established UN principles related to peacekeeping missions. Amendments made to peacekeeping practice over time have been in response to the changes in the international community’s experience. This experience, in turn, shaped perceptions and what approaches and practices were deemed to be acceptable and effective. With the onset of humanitarianism, the concept of inviolable sovereignty was challenged and this changed peace operations dynamics. Human suffering became unacceptable and the principle of non-interference was replaced by the normative principle of non-indifference, obligating states to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Peace operation goals have become more ambitious and the activities deemed to be appropriate for peacekeepers have expanded and evolved as described in chapter 3 of the study. Failures in peace operation practice shaped the thinking regarding peacekeeping approaches and practices. The need to overcome them created opportunities for new approaches and practices (Laurence, 2014), most notably the increased propensity to use
of force and the delegation to regional entities. Incrementally, these practices have favoured the reassertion of traditional security with the emphasis on the military sector and military means to address peace operations. Despite the evolution to the use of armed force, peacekeeping missions such as MONUSCO continued to fail to deliver upon their mandate and were deemed to be passive bystanders.

From analysing the literature, securitisation takes place when an actor convinces an audience that a referent object is existentially threatened by an issue in order to justify and legitimise the use of extraordinary measures to address the threat (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 21). In the case study there were multiple referent objects; the DRC citizens’ right to life, the DRC state’s right to sovereignty and continued existence and, less manifestly, the continued relevance and existence of peacekeeping. Similarly, the actors and audiences were pluralities, each with a contribution to the securitisation process. The most concrete evidence of securitisation was the introduction of measures deemed to be extraordinary within the realm of peacekeeping. The introduction of force, which violated the UN principle of ‘minimal use of force, except in self-defence’, suggested extreme measures which, in turn, stimulated the deductive premise that peacekeeping had been securitised. The findings after applying the securitisation criteria to the case study supported the hypothesis that peacekeeping was securitised with the evidential data being consistent with the theory.

Despite Security Council assurances that the Intervention Brigade was created on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent or prejudice to any of the agreed principles of peacekeeping (UN, 2013a:6), hindsight reveals antithetical evidence. In 2017, four years later, the Intervention Brigade remains authorised in MONUSCO mandates although its operational successes are less inspiring than at its inception. Despite the presence of the intervention brigade and the explicit authorisation to use force, livelihoods of DRC citizens remain under threat with the human rights situation continuing to deteriorate amidst rising violence and political turmoil (UNSC, 2017a:7). Threats to the DRC’s sovereignty and the future of peacekeeping are, however, less existential in 2017 than what they were in 2013. As such, securitisation benefited state sovereignty and prolonged peacekeeping’s relevance but did not benefit human security in the long term. The essence of this could lie within the ‘use of force’ which introduces further human costs and resistance against an external force. The prolonged presence of the Intervention Brigade, despite ostensibly being established
for a year on an exceptional basis, could represent the institutionalisation of securitisation within the mission and, potentially, within the UN at large.

It has become evident that governments’ ineptitude to deliver their sovereign responsibilities and the subsequent imperative that the UN accepts this responsibility is the point of departure for the UN peacekeeping’s failings. An environmental scan of the African conflict landscape in 2013 revealed that the DRC, Mali, Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and Central African Republic conflicts required sustained UNSC attention since 2013. UN peacekeeping initiatives have however, been consistently insufficient to deliver security and peace dividends which necessitated a reconsideration of its peacekeeping repertoire. The predominant narrative was the use of robust force in the ‘protection of civilians’ but this did not deliver success and needed to be taken a step further.

In the current era, with global communication and human consciousness, the human costs of conflict are unacceptable and demand prioritisation. Accordingly, extensive debate within an audience would cost lives, and is not tolerable. From the application of peacekeeping, it is evident that the trajectory being followed to ensure peacekeeping success was a greater use of force. This trajectory however, has been met with resistance from UNSC member states, predominantly the major TCC’s, which are averse to the risk of casualties. The UN needed to find a way to overcome this obstacle, hence the securitisation. Securitisation, which introduced urgency and priority and elevation out of politics, provided an avenue to overcome this resistance to change. The effect of not securitising would have rendered the UN, yet again, unable to address African insecurity effectively. The defeat of the M23 in November 2013 was a FIB success, which diminished the pressure on the MONUSCO operation in particular and the UN in general.

In 2014, the UNSG acknowledged the threat-capacity shortcoming in the peacekeeping repertoire, and commissioned a high-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to conduct a comprehensive assessment of UN peace operations and how they could be made more effective, efficient and responsive. The report (UN, 2015) was published in 2015 and acknowledged that most UN peace operations take place in Africa and concomitantly recognises the AU as the UN’s key regional partner. In its conclusion the document calls for change and stipulates that new and stronger ways are urgently needed to address international peace and security challenges. This was followed in 2015 with the United
Nations Special Forces Manual, tacit confirmation of extending the use of force. The Special Forces Manual describes how these forces can influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process. The unique characteristics of such forces are recognised, not least of which their abilities that are beyond that of conventional forces and which include the use of force.

5.3 **Significance and implications of the findings**

The African solution to continental conflict has been the adoption of the AU’s flagship project and ambitious vision of ‘Silencing the guns by 2020’, part of the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It is arguably this vision, and it’s rapidly approaching deadline, that is driving the AU’s increased willingness to authorise peace enforcement missions (ISS, 2016: 2). Perusal of other African peace initiatives has revealed that a similar trajectory is being followed in South Sudan and, potentially, in Mali.

In South Sudan, the adoption of Resolution 2304(2016) (UNSC, 2016a) created a 4 000-strong, regional protection force in response to the collapse of security in Juba. Consistently, as in the case study, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was facing daily threats, impediments and challenges and it needed to be enhanced to prevent and respond to violence in South Sudan (UNSC, 2016b). Both the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU had called for the provision of a protection force albeit without the South Sudanese government’s consent (violating a further cornerstone of peacekeeping; consent) (UNSC, 2016c: 1-12). Ironically, Resolution 2304 (2016) authorised the deployment of additional troops to ensure the safety and security of UN mission personnel already deployed to South Sudan, who were already mandated under Chapter 7 to use force to provide ‘protection of civilians’. The UN protectors were not only ineffective, but needed to be protected. This development represented another instance of utilising securitisation. The resolution was not made without reservations and concerns about the UNSC’s increasing tendency to overstep the established principles governing UN peacekeeping operations, including the disregard of the host country’s consent and calls for more diplomacy and dialogue and less threats and sanctions (UNSC, 2016c: 1). As it transpired, it was only in September 2016 that President Salva Kiir agreed to the UN deployment and after the UN had threatened to impose an arms embargo on South Sudan.
Kiir’s opposition to the deployment stemmed from the perceptions of national sovereignty being breached and UN neutrality being compromised (DW, 2016).

Mali can be used as a further example of UN securitisation of peacekeeping. Amidst a deteriorating security situation which threatened regional security, the AU, in January 2015, proposed an AU Intervention Force for Mali to preserve the peace agreement. After further security decline, opposing arguments were posed during UNSC deliberations over Resolution 2295 (2016) (UNSC, 2016d) pertaining to the phrasing of the mission’s posture. Mali stakeholders had urged for a more robust posture which was supported by France that proposed a more proactive, robust posture, effectively utilising MINUSMA in pre-emptive, counter-terrorist activities. Security Council members, particularly Russia, limited MINUSMA’s application. In July 2016 a Joint UN and AU technical team mission was deployed to Mali to assess the situation and potentially, amend the mission (UNSC, 2016e and f:1-3).

In a further precedent in terms of the authorisation of extraordinary peacekeeping measures, UNSC resolution 2303 (2016) (UNSC, 2016g), in July 2016 authorised the deployment of 228 police officers for the United Nations in Burundi. Deliberations during its draft phase were divided as Council members were at odds over the issue of mandating the deployment of police without host-state consent. The resolution was passed with four abstentions and has been summarily rejected by Burundi (UNSC, 2016h). According to Burundian authorities, acceptance of the resolution would be in violation of its sovereignty.

Whereas this study focused on the erosion of the ‘use of force’ principle as the primary rule broken, subsequent UNSC deliberations have extended the exceptionality to challenge the principle of consent (Ahram, 2016, Lee, 2016). All four of the examples utilised to demonstrate exceptionality in support of the hypothesis that peacekeeping has been securitised, have occurred in four African peace missions. Conflict is a part of the African landscape. In 2014, Africa experienced more than half of worldwide conflict incidents, despite having only about 16 percent of the world population. Where conflict intersects with threatening international peace and security, as most contemporary, transnational conflicts are apt to do, UN forces are deployed to restore and maintain peace and security.
It can therefore be said that UN peacekeeping operations are an unavoidable component of the African landscape. The AU, too, is increasingly asserting itself as both a regional and global peace participant and has recognised that the passive approach adopted thus far is not delivering the required end-state. African states, as peacemakers at both diplomatic and military level, need to remain cognisant of developments within the realm of peace operations. Failure to do so could cost dearly in terms of life and credibility.

From the data used to support the hypothesis, potential pre-existing conditions that could give rise to ‘securitised peacekeeping options’ can be identified. These conditions include:

- A government incapable of delivering its sovereign responsibilities.
- A deteriorated security situation where a UN mission in incapable of delivering upon its mandate
- A peace agreement in place which needs assistance to ensure implementation
- Regional forces urging for an enforcement deployment.

The greater use of force could however alienate troop contributing countries which are averse to peacekeeping risks. Should this take place, opportunities will be created for regional entities’ participation. As such, African capacity can be enhanced and expanded upon so that Chapter 8 peacekeeping operations can again become the vehicle for operations on the extreme end of the force spectrum.

Further research would be required to ascertain, and possibly quantify, to what extent the traditional peacekeeping principles are still deemed applicable. The resistance being offered amongst member states pertaining to the disregard of peacekeeping principles should be further investigated to ascertain the real rationale behind the objections and to determine whether the traditional principles exist literally or figuratively to conceal other national imperatives. African researchers could take the ‘African solutions for African problems’ model further to research and develop applicable practices and principles for peacekeeping. With peace operations mostly taking place in Africa, it would be optimally beneficial if Africa was the custodian of these peacekeeping practices and principles.

5.4 **Concluding remarks**
There are a number of limitations in the UN peacekeeping model, not least of which its applicability in contemporary conflict situations, guided by principles developed in another era for a different type of conflict. Adherence to these established principles bestowed legitimacy upon traditional peace operations. Contemporary peacekeeping is fundamentally different to its Cold War predecessors and the onset of responses to intrastate conflict necessitated a complete overhaul of peacekeeping practice and principles. In the period from inception to contemporary times, impartiality has been reinterpreted, sovereignty has been trumped by humanitarianism, the use of force has been expanded in the service of moral outcomes and in 2016, this was followed by neglect of consent in the interest of human suffering. The UN peacekeeping principles were developed as peacekeeping evolved and were designed to overcome the Cold War paradigm. The principles are however, inadequate for the current conflict realities and yet some member states continue to cling to their inviolability. In contemporary times these principles are being increasingly reinterpreted, potentially eroded and deemed inapplicable and new legitimisation tools need to be developed. Jai Shanker Menon, the Force Commander of the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Israel-Syria dispute, in May 2017 at the force commanders’ briefing to the UNSC, stated that while the core peacekeeping principles remained constant, the increased violence and cruelty against civilians had led to the emergence of another principle – the need to protect civilian populations, human rights and humanitarian operations (UNSC, 2017b:2). It is this new principle which prevails above the traditional peacekeeping principles. Until such time that these legitimisation principles are established, this study proposes that the UN is utilising securitisation to overcome resistance and legitimise peace operations that supplant and violate the established norms and rules of peacekeeping.

‘African solutions to African problems’ is a maxim which most African countries ascribe to in their post-colonial assertions of sovereignty. UN failures to provide speedy deployment and acceptable deliverables will necessitate that regional organisations will drive to accept responsibility for peace enforcement operations. Although Africa still lacks the operational capabilities to match the needs of the continent, experience is being enhanced and capacity developed. Interventions are a projection of power and the FIB stands as a successful (initially) projection of African power. Intervention Brigades are being utilised to provide the overall peace mission with operational credibility - this, despite the recognition that military solutions do not deliver sustainable peace.
Hindsight of the FIB operation however raises certain questions. Did securitisation secure the UN, the DRC and its people and establish conditions necessary for peace or does its success lie in the institutionalisation of securitisation throughout peacekeeping missions? From the aforementioned, I believe it to be the latter as the UNSC deliberations pertaining to peacekeeping endeavours are adopting the grammar of securitisation in the inclusion of threat, warning and action required.

It is further proposed that securitisation in the DRC further prolonged the UN presence in the country – the presence of the FIB and its operational successes interrupted DRC development processes, diminishing the imperative for the DRC to establish national capacity to deliver upon its sovereignty responsibilities. Despite successes, the underlying causes of conflict persist with recurring conflict continuing to characterise the country. Furthermore, the balance of power was tilted firmly in the government’s favour and it is likely that, if MONUSCO had to be withdrawn in totality and immediately, the DRC would lack the capacity to sustain the mission’s gains. If the ultimate withdrawal of the UN from a secure DRC was the objective, securitisation has failed dismally. If, however, the objective was to ensure continued presence within the DRC and to institutionalise securitisation as a solution to be duplicated in intractable conflict, the securitisation was a major success.

However, in the interests of maintaining or restoring world peace and security, the words of Martin Luther King, “war is a poor chisel to carve out tomorrows”, should receive due contemplation to desecuritise peacekeeping.
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Interview

Interview with Interviewee, an official with significant peacekeeping experience, Pretoria, 16 September 2016.
The non-exhaustive list of open ended interview questions to be posed:

- What was the catalyst behind the formation of the FIB (this would relate to the existential threat component)
- How did MONUSCO differ from MONUC (differentiation between Peace keeping and stabilisation and the graduated process regarding the introduction of force)
- How did the FIB differ from MONUSCO forces (Extreme Measures)
- What measures were introduced to help FIB achieve its objective (Extreme measures)
- What successes did the FIB achieve? Has it achieved its objective? (desecuritisation component)
- What duration do you envisage the deployment of the FIB? (desecuritisation component)
- What is the rationale for retaining the FIB despite agreements for drawdown? (desecuritisation)
- How influential is the regional dynamics in the DRC peace process? (actor component)
- Do you foresee this kind of operation becoming more of a standard in terms of the UN (and regional organisations) in response to intractable conflicts? (obtain a more overall picture as to where peace operations are heading)