To what extent did South Africa pursue the African Agenda in the UN Security Council between 2011 and 2012?

By

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DECLARATION

I declare that this mini-dissertation, which I hereby submit for the degree Master of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Pretoria, is my own original work and has not previously been submitted for any degree at another university. All the information which was utilised has been acknowledged.
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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the South African election, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2011, the country amongst other things, promised to pursue an African Agenda for Peace and Stability on the continent and in all regions of the world, especially in the Global South. This was coupled with the promise to promote the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations (UN) as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. These became fundamental foreign policy principles of how South Africa would behave in the Security Council. The UN Charter mandates the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Council. Scholars that have analysed the United Nations often argue that the Council’s decision-making process is driven by the interests of the five permanent members who possess veto power. Thus, it is widely believed that, members that have continuous membership and veto power not only affect the passage of resolutions but also prevent certain issues from entering the agenda through the threat of a veto. While veto-wielding member states can use the veto to bargain their positions, non-permanent members of the Council can have limited influence on the agenda due to the unequal distribution of power. The power-politics argument is widely discussed in the literature of the United Nations; however, limited systematic analytical research has been done to understand how countries other than big powers exercise their influence in the UN Security Council, despite lacking the right to veto power. To contribute to the understanding of the power-politics argument, ways in which emerging countries influence the agenda will be identified. This research report analyses whether and how South Africa delivered on the promise to pursue African interests during its tenure in the UNSC in 2011-2012. This study embarks on content analysis of selected South African interventions and reports regarding African issues in the UNSC.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC: African National Congress
AMISOM: The African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union
APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture
AU: African Union
AU PSC: African Union Peace and Security Council
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
C34: United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
DPP: Darfur-Based Political Process
DIRCO: Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
FOCAC: Forum for China-Africa Cooperation
G-4: Group of Four
G-20: Group of 20
G-77: Group of 77
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GSP: High-level Panel on Global Sustainability
HLP: High Level Panel
IBSA: India, Brazil, South Africa
IOR-ARC: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IR: International Relations
LJM: Liberation and Justice Movement
MEPP: Middle East Peace Process
NAM: Non-Aligned Movement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for African Development
OAU: Organization for African Unity
PRSTs: Presidential Statements
PRC: People’s Republic of China
P-5: Permanent Five (US, UK, PRC/China, France, Russia)
SADC: Southern African Development Community
TNC: Transitional National Council
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNHC: United Nations Human Rights Council
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
US: United States of America
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO: United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHRC: United Nation Human Rights Commission
WB: World Bank
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO: World Trade Organizations
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1 AIM AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introductory Overview

The aim and purpose of this study is to analyse the extent to which South Africa pursued the African Agenda in the UN Security Council between 2011 and 2012. This is in line with what Pretoria promised would be a priority for its second tenure in the Council. From the onset, South Africa maintained that its objectives in the second term would be the peaceful conflict resolution of conflict in the world and the enhancement of relations between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and regional bodies, including the African Union (AU) organs amongst others. The study focuses on how the country stayed true to its promise to pursue an ‘African’ focused agenda and the interests of the Global South. This will be achieved by analysing, firstly the resolutions, presidential statements, interventions and other activities South Africa initiated during its tenure on the Council. Additionally, by further pondering how the country used the influential presidency role it assumed during its tenure, to serve these objectives. How South Africa used its participation in various committees, how it harnessed its chairing of the Council, the range of its interventions, and workshops it facilitated, amongst others. South Africa has always believed in the centrality of the UN as a legitimate multilateral platform with the mandate to address global peace and security. While it should be acknowledged that the country was participating on a global forum to address global peace and security issues, the concern here is how it advanced the interest of the continent directly or indirectly within the Council.

The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 and currently has 193 Member States. The Security Council is one of the six organs of the United Nations, which include: The General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice and the Secretariat (UN, 2017). Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Council is composed of 15 Members: five permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); each member has one vote while the permanent five have veto power. South Africa was elected by 182 states.
in the General Assembly (GA) to once again represent the Africa group in the UNSC for the year 2011-2012 (Graham, 2015:83).

South Africa is one of the original 51 founding members of the United Nations (UN) which came into existence on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of October 1945. However, the country’s relationship with the UN was marred by the apartheid policy which led to its suspension in 1974 from all activities in the GA (Kagwanja, 2008:39). South Africa’s re-joining to the UN after the end of apartheid with the assistance of the international solidarity meant that the country carried moral responsibility to pursue a just and equitable world system. The legacy for the global struggle against apartheid for South Africa meant that the vision for the country, global governance, is a belief on rule based on multilateral systems which will allow for and give smaller states an opportunity to play an effective role in addressing global peace and security challenges. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane had argued that South Africa was the best candidate for the seat as it always prioritised peace and security, domestically and internationally (SAPA 2010).

Since 1994, the country had contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security through active participation in UN and regional peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Landsberg (2015: 50) noted that as early as February 2010, the AU Summit held in Addis Ababa endorsed South Africa’s candidature for the non-permanent seat on the UNSC for the period 2011-2012. The Minister of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) vowed that South Africa would continue its commitment to strengthening rule based multilateral systems and further support multilateral approaches to international peace and security issues, broadly. Significantly, she promised that Pretoria intended to pursue “the African Agenda and contribute to achieving peace and stability in the continent and in all regions of the world” (Landsberg (2015: 50)

The study is further concerned with how South Africa worked through the African Group and various multilateral arrangements such as the Non-Aligned Movement, BRICS and G77+China to advance the interests of the continent. This in turn helped to place the study in its context of SA’s role in UN multilateralism. There is no doubt that South Africa’s intentions were first and foremost mandated to build its reputation as a global player on peace and security issues, guided by its principle of advancing the African Agenda. Hence this study takes note of how South Africa sought to enhance its moral status in global governance.

It is the intention of this study to offer an analysis of the supposed legacy of South Africa’s tenure in the council, while providing recommendations on how non-permanent members can
exert their influence in the council. Additionally, the purpose of the study will be focused on South Africa’s activities and intervention which were aimed at advancing Africa’s interests.

1.1.1 The Research Focus

This study analyses the extent to which South Africa, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council pursued the African Agenda in the UN Security Council between 2011 and 2012 and why? In terms of its working structure, the Security Council has five permanent members (P5) (Russia, China, USA, Britain, France) and the 10 non-permanent members who are voted in for a period of two years which are non-renewable. As evident above, the African continent, despite its membership size in the UN, has no representation on the permanent category of the Council. This is even though over time more than half of the council agenda items concerns issues about and related to the African continent since the millennium years.

Given South Africa’s non-permanent status in the Council in 2011 and 2012, and the limitation of not being a permanent member in the Council, the contending issue has always been what meaningful role and impact can it make within two years. The question was on whether South Africa will be successful in placing the interests of the African continent and those of the global South on the agenda or will it simply address issues raised by the P5 (Serrao, 2011: 2). South Africa was elected unopposed in the General Assembly by 182 of the 192-member states of the UN in 2010 to serve in the Council. The election drew a lot of attention due its first tenure and already active role within the UN structures and agencies. Serrao (2011:2) asserts that “while it is generally true that non-permanent members enjoy limited scope on the Council compared to the P5 in relation to agenda-setting, current composition of the Council appears to set the stage for a robust session and would allow heavyweights such as Brazil, India, Germany and South Africa to exert some level of influence”.

When the country was elected for the second time to serve as a non-permanent member, it boldly promised the following among others, to:

1. Promote the African Agenda, including highlighting the continents priorities in the area of peace and security;

2. Advance the Developmental Agenda of the Global South

3. Continue to work together with all the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) in pursuit of
It was within South Africa’s conviction that these objectives were achievable despite its non-permanent membership status and the limited time of two years in the Council.

Central to this study, we ask: what did South Africa do to achieve these aims and whether its activities between 2011 and 2012 amounted to ‘exercised influence’ on the UNSC Agenda for the good of Africa.

Reading through the literature on agenda-setting, particularly in multilateral institutions, one is confronted by the limited amount of literature on agenda-setting capabilities specifically of elected non-permanent members of the Security Council. The bulk of the literature on agenda-setting is however saturated with the study of agenda-setting influence of the news media, influencing behaviour and policy formation. Most of the literature examines how the media agenda is built. Within political sciences, however, agenda setting is used to describe and explain how political actors such as the Parliament, political parties and even government determine their priorities, what they should give attention to or ignore and what issues needed to be decided on and which stands to take on an agenda items (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006: 89). In political sciences, little is said about whether small states can set an agenda in the multilateral fora, though there is evidence to show that non-state actors do influence and lobby agendas through international diplomacy such as climate change, migration and the environment. The purpose of this research is to fill that gap.

i) Pursuit of an African Agenda at the United Nations

A lot was expected when South Africa was elected by the UN Assembly on 12 October 2010 to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the period 2011 to 2012, since it was the second time South Africa would be serving. Thus, many regarded South Africa’s first term from 2007 to 2008 as a learning curve and expected South Africa to be bold in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. In addition, the African Agenda principle had been carried throughout its association with the UN after readmission to the international system of governance. In the beginning of 2011 then President of the Republic, Jacob Zuma promised that South Africa would use the term to promote and advance the continent’s (Africa) Agenda, human rights, justice and international law, economic diplomacy through regional and
international cooperation, and transformation of the international system of governance, especially within the UN systems (White Paper 2011). Mandela (1994), in his inaugural address as Head of State, proclaimed to the UN General Assembly that “as part of the Organization of National Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) we will play our role in the struggles of these organisations to build a continent and a region that will help to create for themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and prosperity”. Like Mandela, for President Thabo Mbeki, the African Agenda was the cornerstone of his foreign policy outlook, through SADC and the AU. In the 2008 Foreign Affairs paper Mbeki maintained “SADC is the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional integration and development” (Presidency 2008). It will be argued later in the coming chapter how this African Agenda was carried out throughout the years.

Chapter 3 of this paper will analyse in detail how South Africa advanced the interests of the continent since readmission. It is well documented that Pretoria has played a leading role in various organs within the UN such as the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UNSC and various General Assembly Committees. This reaffirmed the country’s status as a leading player in international relations. Landsberg (2015: 44) observed that South Africa believed that its influence and authority emanated from its exemplary peaceful transition. However, there are doubts if membership means influence of the Global Agenda. It is the intention of this paper to ponder South Africa’s role and influence in the UNSC in the context of growing South African agency in global affairs.

South Africa believed that it had the capabilities of advancing the interests of the continent in the UNSC. Graham (2015: 83) noted the four pillars underpinning Pretoria’s Foreign Policy: consolidation of the African Agenda; South-South cooperation; strengthening North-South cooperation; and the participation in the global system of governance.

According to the UN, more than 60 UN member states have never been members of the Security Council. This is testament to the amount of lobbying and influence needed for a country to be voted into the influential Security Council. However, if member states of the UN and the non-permanent members of the UNSC are party to a dispute being considered by the council, they may be invited to take part, without a vote, in the council's discussions. However, the council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member state. This is an important factor that South Africa as one of the African members on the council, though on a non-permanent basis, had to bear in mind. It is in this context that one delves into the initiatives,
interventions, sponsoring of resolution, submissions, statements and official documents South Africa released during the period to understand its behaviour during its second term.

The research will analyse several cases that came before the UNSC such as Libya and Ivory Coast and others in the global South to attempt to answer whether South Africa advanced the interest of the African continent in the position it took.

ii) Advancing the Developmental Agenda of the Global South

The global South refers to countries located in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These are countries often referred to as emerging economies or developing countries. These countries have agreed to collaborate among themselves in what is referred to as South-South cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, social, environment and technical domains. South-South Cooperation (SSC) refers to the agreed exchange amongst countries in the geographic South, to develop and diversify their economies while at the same time emancipating and liberating their economies from the colonial bondage with the North (Gosovic, 2016: 733). This SSC is also aimed at gaining influence and voice in Global Politics by pooling forces together and acting as a collective on issues of mutual concern. Gosovic (2012: 733) revealed that five decades have since passed and “the SSC has been an orphan on the UN international development agenda, in the shadow of North-South cooperation”. It is against this background that when one or more of these countries are serving in the UNSC as a non-permanent member, it will be imperative to analyse whether they are advancing the agenda of their constituency. Multilateral platforms such as the UN have been viewed as a platform through which countries in the Global South could use to enhance their voice and status in Global Governance. For South Africa, the UN has been the heartbeat of its multilateral diplomacy since its readmission into the Global Governance System. As indicated earlier, the country has campaigned for the UN to be the epicentre of Global Politics in addition to its urgent reform, particularly the UNSC (Landsberg 2015: 45).

For South Africa, according to Landsberg (2015: 45), the multilateral diplomatic strategy has been to advance the interest of the continent and economies in the South. Thus, the strategy has been to work through the UN platforms such as the Africa Group, G77 + China, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and other states in the South with similar ideology to advance its multilateral diplomatic objectives. It can be argued, as Nieuwkerk (2007: 73) observed, that South Africa’s behaviour within multilateral institutions is consistent with its image as an emerging middle country in Africa and in the global South. For emerging powers such as India,
Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa, multilateral institutions are an important framework to project their power and influence (Graham, 2011: 412). It is in this view that countries of the Global South participate in the UN platforms so that their aspirations and interest are served. Therefore, the interest of those in the South are the subject of this study to determine whether South Africa advanced the interest of similar states in the Global South.

**iii) Security Council - African Union’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) interface**

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, proclaims that the Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional organizations. History has taught us that it is not often the case where the Council makes decisions and resolutions in consultation with the region where the issue originated from. In some instances, decision by the UNSC goes against local or regional organization’s arrangements such as the recent Libyan crisis and elections in Ivory Coast whereby the African regional organizations were already involved. In those instances, the African Union was engaged on its parallel conflict resolution initiatives while the UN was pursuing its own resolutions. This resulted in many arguing that if the Security Council did not stay true to its charter of working through regional arrangements, it will continue to face legitimacy and capability questions.

It is the purpose of this study to establish how South Africa through its initiatives, influenced the agenda of the Council and enhanced strengthening of the framework of cooperation between the UN and continental bodies on the continent and AU instruments. As stated previously, a large percentage of the UNSC agenda focuses on the conflict situation on the African continent (Ebrahim, 2012, and Lekaba and Maseng, 2014: 395). It is the purpose of this study to analyse how South Africa behaved during the deliberations on issues of African conflict.

**iv) Lead the African and global South agenda on the transformation of the United Nations system**

In 2005, AU foreign ministers adopted the ‘Ezulwini consensus’ as Africa’s common position on UN reform, including the UNSC and broader matters such as poverty, debt, trade, conflict, terrorism and crime. The reform on the UN system is not the African Agenda alone but also that of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and those in the South. The consensus is that the Security Council needs reforms to be brought in line with the new realities of international relations which bring equal continental representation and voting rights at the UNSC.
(Bourantonis 2007: 89). The current P5’s veto system is undemocratic when seen from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. These latter can simply be ignored due to their non-permanent status in the Council. It is on the backdrop of this observation that this study analyses whether South Africa advanced the African Agenda position in pursuit of the reform of the UNSC and how. It is imperative to note that the UN Charter itself is drafted in such a way that the power to effect the necessary reform proposal is in the hands of the current permanent members of the council. These members can choose to accept or reject amendments which are against their wishes and interest. The purpose of the study is therefore to analyse whether South Africa leveraged on its status while in the Council to initiate debates about reform either alone or as a group of countries.

1. 2. Literature overview

1.2.1 Background on the study of Agenda Setting

In the literature, agenda setting studies have usually focused on the influence of mass media on the public agenda (Guo 2014: 113). It is on how the audience learns what issues are important from the priorities set by various sources of influence on behalf of the news media. Recent studies on mass communication assert that the day to day decision making by journalists on issues to put in their publication influences the perceptions of important policy issues for the public. This influence of mass media on political issues is referred to as the agenda-setting influence role of the media (Protess and McCombs 1991: 2). Gandy (1991: 261) underlines the overemphasis in the literature on the media and its impact to set an agenda. He proposes that research should go beyond this kind of agenda setting to also focus on societal forces that may have a bearing on the policy-making and decision-making processes, which include the media itself. Gandy (1991:261) emphasises the importance of awareness and consciousness about issues based on experience. In political space, politicians may intentionally put issues on the public agenda and influence the direction of media issues. The conclusion made is that, public issues and political action are not driven by knowledge and perceived importance of issues but that there are complex and competing factors that constitute Agenda Setting. So, Agenda Setting in this study is understood to be about influencing what becomes considered, discussed and decided upon. The argument is that because a complex set of competing factors account for agenda setting, generally, several issues on South Africa’s agenda in the UNSC must be considered before we answer the question whether the country has influence the agenda in the Council.
It should be noted that Agenda Setting as a study has its origin from the United States of America (USA), and one should be careful to apply such concept to different political systems. However, there is a consensus among scholars that Agenda Setting should be seen through two distinct theoretical approaches: Pluralist and Elitist school of thought (Studlar 1993: 17). The Pluralist approach is concerned with the role of interest groups, the public, and the media in developing the political agenda. Conversely, the elitist approach concentrates on Agenda Setting from those in government institutions. As most of the literature was developed in the USA, the focus has been on formal institutions of government rather than political parties themselves. The focus of this study is intended to be on the State and how it set its agenda in Global Governance.

This study will draw from these two approaches of Agenda Setting because they encompass an understanding that Agenda Setting is a contested process involving a variety of factors and may include the agency of various actors competing for influence. It asserts that the process is not static and that the issues, actors and process of Agenda Setting are forever changing. As McClain (1993: 5) argued, this is grounded in the distribution of resources and factors in society, and how accessible are decision makers. This study draws primarily from the elitist approach as our concern here is the behaviour of a nation state instead of interest groups or the media. From the pluralist point of view, it is agreed that agenda setting is not static and nation states will from time to time draw support from media and interest groups outside the formal global governance system.

In practice, the Pluralist approach to agenda setting sees as crucial the role of competing groups that are equal in power and have similar access to the policy-making process. Therefore, the assumption is that there is what McClain (1993: 7) terms a “free enterprise” system of policies where these interest groups constantly compete for influence. Consequently, in this sense, groups take turns in winning their preferred policy direction and others will win the other times. The underlying belief is that all groups will have their turn, and no one will be systematically excluded. The Pluralist approach is criticised for tending to be more idealistic, it is useful for understanding the influence of actors with less power than competitors, the fringe actors such as non-permanent members of the Council. It is useful for reflecting on the influence of the power struggle and resource allocation which groups might have in the competition for influence.
In modern Diplomacy, the role of various institutions, eminent persons, sub-national and local governments has been gaining momentum even in mainstream political literature (Cooper et al, 2013, Barston 2013, and Pigman 2010) Therefore, questions have been asked whether the pluralist approach is a window to view the agenda setting processes? These scholars have maintained that the elitist approach better explains the imbalanced world system with competing powers to influence the agenda. On the surface however, it can be argued that the Pluralist approach better explains the influence of minority group interaction in Agenda Setting. One will lean towards the elite group, which draws its policy agenda from the body or institutions which these lower groups are members of and where the minorities’ interests are served by them being the member.

1.2.2 Competition in the Agenda Process

Significantly, when issues are on the institutional agenda, a considerable amount of controversies and competition agendas may occur, especially on how the issues can be defined. Furthermore, controversies may also occur over the cause of the problem and the policies that are needed to achieve the desired results (Birkland 2006: 65). This demonstrates that Agenda Setting is not a linear process but a complicated process of competing ideas. This simply means that those with influential power and resources can exert influence so that their issues can reach a decision agenda. Ultimately power remains one of the most important attributes in the Agenda-Setting process. This will be dealt with in the coming sections.

1.2.3 Different kind of agendas to set

There are different types of agendas: Systemic Agenda, Institutional Agenda and the Decision Agenda; that discussions of agenda setting must concern themselves with. Systemic Agenda is any issue that can possibly be identified by those involved in the policy making process (Birkland 1997: 9). Cobb and Elder (1983: 85), who are the pioneers of Agenda-Setting Research explain that the systemic agenda is all items and problems that members of the political community believe warrant attention. Thus, not all issues make it to the agenda of society. However, if an issue or problem is elevated from the Systemic Agenda it goes to the Institutional Agenda. The Institutional Agenda deals with issues and items that are clearly and actively being considered by authoritative decision makers. Resources and time limitations; make it impossible for the Institutional Agenda to handle most issues and problems at the Systemic Agenda level. Ultimately, only a few items or agendas will reach the Decision
Agenda level, which contains items to be acted upon by a governmental body. This level, according to Birkland (2006: 65), may include bills and issues introduced and heard in the committees and are to be voted upon in the institutional body. For instance, one could ponder what agenda items South Africa brought to the UN’s most powerful decision-making institution, the UNSC.

1.3 The Research Problem

Non-permanent members of the UNSC have a huge task navigating several hurdles to push, shape or refine the UNSC agenda. Many scholars observed that, the biggest obstacle is the P5’s veto power, which empowers them to exert substantial control over the development of UNSC decisions (Farralla and Prantl 2016:603).

More than 60 of the 193 UN member states have never been members of the powerful UNSC (UN, 2017). It is an important multilateral diplomatic achievement to be voted into the Council because it is an important decision-making body within the UN System. However, it is important to note that; a State which is a member of the UN but not of the Security Council, may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the council considers that country's interests. This happens even when both members and non-members of the UN, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, are invited to take part in discussions which concern them; yet without the right to vote during decision-making (UN 2017). It is part of the reason why the UN reform agenda gained momentum, with South Africa being one of the countries which lead this charge. It was the purpose of this study to analyse how far South Africa stretched the reform agenda issue during its tenure in the council.

Despite these substantial impediments in exerting influence in this global governance institution, members can influence the UNSC’s decision-making process in several ways. For example, non-permanent members can influence the agenda when chairing the council’s subsidiary organs, including the dozen or more sanctions committees, which are distributed among elected members (Farralla and Prantl 2016: 604). Serrao (2011: 3), le Pere (2014: 39) and Graham (2015: 84-85) extensively mentioned South Africa’s influence chairing the 1540 Committee dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction and Non-State Actors, as well as the Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa. However, not much was mentioned about what issues the country brought to form part of its agenda on the council. It is the purpose of the study to fill this void.
According to the provisional rules of procedure of the UNSC, non-permanent members of the Council can contribute to UNSC business by assuming the rotational monthly presidency position in the Council (UN Security Council 2017; Iwanami 2011: 4). Thus, the President of the Council presides over the meetings of the Security Council and this provides them with opportunity to shape debate around agenda items. South Africa also received the opportunity to preside over the affairs and meetings of the Council during its 2011-2012 tenure. This study is intended to analyse South Africa’s influence on the agenda during its presidency. In addition, it will be of concern also to ponder whether South Africa played a proactive, leadership role on other issues when it did not hold the presidency.

The reform agenda of the UNSC led by the countries of the South has its own complications. This is because one of the fears is that representation on the Security Council through a regional block could lead to tendencies towards hegemony and domination, which have manifested in some regions. Brazil, Germany, India, Nigeria and South Africa are generally recognised as leaders in their respective regions. Therefore, the extent to which regional competitors or detractors are prepared to compromise their seat in the interests of UN Security Council reform is less evident.

Concerning the agenda of the reform of the UNSC, South Africa was viewed as being in a dilemma. The dilemma was perpetuated by the by well-known fact that the country had a direct interest in becoming a permanent member, while simultaneously it must abide by the common AU position. As stated before, this African position, the so-called Ezulwini Consensus – agreed that there should be two additional non-permanent seats, as well as two permanent, veto-wielding seats for Africa.

1.4 Research Methodology

This is an analytical study on the role of South Africa in the UNSC to advance the interests of the continent and the South. According to Kothari (2004: 2), analytical research is undertaken when the researcher uses facts or information already available and analyse these to make a critical evaluation of the material. Similarly, this study utilises data and information collected from available and verifiable open sources to answer the research question and thus understand the dynamics which explain South Africa’s influence in the Council.
This study will endeavour to embark on content analysis of selected South African interventions and reports regarding African issues in the UNSC. In content analysis researchers normally examine artefacts of social communication such as written documents or transcripts of recorded verbal communications to identify factors that relate the question at hand (Kothari 2004: 2). In this study, the task is to look for traces of South African interventions, initiatives through analysing press statements, speeches, official documents and media reports when the country served in the Council. The purpose will be to highlight instances and pattern of South Africa’s activities which were aimed at advancing the interests of the continent.

The primary literature on the agenda debate include DIRCO’s Annual Reports and publications accessed through the department website, South Africa’s UN mission statements and reports, UN Africa group reports and statements, UN documentation, declarations and reports available on the website. These will also include official South African government statements relating to UNSC activities during its tenure, also including statements on the theme of other international groups such as Non-Aligned Movement, G77+China, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and SADC.

Secondary sources include that which is from the private sector concerned with international relations, civil society organizations, academia, think tanks, international commentators and the media. Moreover, the study will not include interviews as part of data gathering while the use of fieldwork is not anticipated. Consequently, this study will not have any ethical implications. In respect to data, the study adopts a qualitative approach to analyse South Africa’s activities during its second term in the Council.

This is justified because, qualitative research often involves unstructured or semi-structured questions using which are open-ended to elicit responses in questionnaires, surveys, interviews, observations and text analysis (D'Cruz and Jones 2011: 61). As stated above, the study analyses the text and transcript of South African interventions and reports regarding issues of Africa’s interests and that of the Global South in the UNSC. In other words, the study seeks to analyse South African government’s response to the issues that found their way onto the UNSC’s agenda concerning the continent and those in the Global South. In addition, other conflict in the West and developed countries will also be focused on to evaluate how South Africa fared in Global Governance issues which ultimately could enhance its status.

In this research report, the units of analysis are: i) South Africa as a foreign policy actor, ii) Agenda setting and iii) the UN Security Council. As a unit of analysis, South Africa in terms
of its status classification, is viewed as an emerging power in the global political order (Schoeman 2015: 429). This classification of an emerging power is derived from a status of being “closer to a future super” but this is demonstrated by how a country utilises its emerging statues to influence issues on the high table of international politics (Abdenur and Weiss 2014: 1751 and Schoeman 2015: 429). This emerging power status is also derived from South Africa’s inclusion and participation in several multilateral fora such as BRICS, the Group of 20 (G20) and IORA. The country is generally viewed by its counterparts in Africa and globally as a future global power. Ranked by the World Bank as an ‘upper middle-income country’, South Africa is one of the largest economies in Africa (Brand South Africa 2015). In 2014, the World Bank listed its GDP at $350.1-billion (R5.416-trillion) and its population at 54 million. Per capita GDP is $6 483, according to the World Economic Forum (Ibid, 2015). It is in this instance that emerging powers are those who are able to draw on their economic and other source of power (hard or soft). Such as mediation and peaceful negotiations to exert influence within and outside their immediate neighbourhood and region and plays an active role in the campaign for the reform of global governance (Abdenur and Weiss, 2014:1751).

The country is one of the new entrance in global governance arena having been isolated due to its oppressive laws during apartheid regime. This is an important factor because according to Landsberg (2017: 44) South Africa believed that its international credibility as a global player was derived from its peaceful transition into democracy, which in turn gave it the vote-pulling capacity in multilateral fora. This is significant to bear in mind because the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy meant that South Africa could position itself within broader multilateral platforms such as the UN Security Council as a moral authority in conflict resolution and the global peace and security agenda (Kagwanja 2008: 40). Thus, the county earned itself a reputation for being able to exemplify a peaceful resolution to conflict which is one of the mandates of the UNSC.

Analysing agenda influence is not a linear process in political studies due to the complexities of agendas in social sciences; thus it is no easy task in the political sciences as well. This can be done qualitatively and quantitatively, but this is influenced by the nature of the questions being asked. In terms of the research design, the research intends to utilise the empirical data and records of the UNSC agenda to assess what agenda items were brought by South Africa and the subsequent reports South Africa submitted to advance the interest of the continent. D'Cruz and Jones (2011: 83) noted that experimental designs followed the views of the positivist scientific method designed to demonstrate the relationship between variables, and
testing hypotheses about these relationships. This means that, the text or submission from South Africa should be scrutinised to see whether it demonstrates the interests of the continent which has the capacity to solve its own problems.

It is imperative to caution that South Africa was serving in the UNSC focusing on global peace and security issues instead of entirely focusing on the interest of the continent. This is seen through its work on the Middle East crisis and nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, the analysis of its activities will also take into consideration how it used a global platform to highlight issues of concern for South Africa and the rest of the global South.

1.5 The Structure of the Research

The aim of the first chapter is to outline the purpose and background of how South Africa campaigned and influenced the agenda of the UNSC in respect to the question of African interest. The chapter outlines South African foreign policy objectives and its multilateral strategy. It further highlights the status of South Africa in international affairs particularly its global South status. It further assesses why multilateral diplomacy is important in pursuing the country’s interests. The chapter continues by outlining what South Africa promised was going to be its underlying priority in the Council. The purpose of this chapter is also about outlining the significance of the study and its contribution to the study of international multilateral diplomacy. The chapter further provide a justification on the research approach for this study. The chapter explains the complex nature of the agenda setting process in the social sciences.

Chapter two outlines within the literature, the historical overview of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives and its multilateral strategy. As Landsberg (2012: 2) argued, foreign policy analysis should be used to “explain how and why certain decisions were taken and to examine the relationship between intention and consequence”. In this case, we are analysing South Africa’s foreign policy agenda at the UNSC, pertaining to the African continent.

Chapter three demonstrates what has been written on South Africa’s participation in the UN since its readmission to the international community. The chapter presents all the available activities and initiatives which South Africa and other non-permanent members of the UNSC may partake in while serving in the Council. This includes infinitives on the 1540 committee on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) for African states and the chairing of the working group on conflict resolution in Africa. This section will additionally focus on one of the most historic legacies of its tenure, the unanimously adopting of resolution
2033 (2012), which reiterated the importance of establishing a more effective relationship between it and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). The country also initiated a debate in the Council on the reform agenda by taking up an issue in January 2012 through UN Security Council Open Debate on Justice and the Rule of Law. Moreover, this section will also focus on a number of cases where South Africa took controversial and firm position such as Somalia, DRC, Libya and Cote D’Ivore.

The aim of chapter four is to engage with all the gathered available records, speeches, press statements, official reports and scans through the text to make a determinant of South Africa’s influence. The interpretation is done in order to answer the question directly about the influence that South Africa has had in the UNSC and whether it lived to its expectations and strategic objectives in the Council amongst other things to be a guard of Africa’s interests.

The last chapter answers the question presented in this study, justifying how such a position of the study was reached. Thus, in answering the question of the extent which South Africa pursues the African agenda in the UNSC between 2011 and 2012, the study will provide the exact size of influence. This will be done while providing a rational of the successes and limitations of South Africa’s influence as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this literature review is firstly to understand how the literature describes South Africa’s approach to multilateral diplomacy from a historical perspective. Secondly, how it depicts the nature of participation and contribution by South Africa in Global Governance institutions specifically the UN Security Council. It will also grapple with the discussion about the kind of agenda a country such as South Africa pursued in the UN as well as its limitations and successes. Reading through various publications reveals that, the literature has provided an analysis of the various agendas pursued by South Africa in both tenures in the UNSC but does not dwell in detail into any one specific agenda. As a result, there is a broad summary of all the issues South Africa participated, voted or contributed to while serving in the Council.

2.2 South Africa’s Multilateral Approach

To provide a brief background, after the dawn of democracy South Africa aligned itself with the Global South at the demise of the Cold War which created space for a re-evaluation of Global Governance. Spies (2010: 76) maintains that the struggle against apartheid, justice and human rights “replicated in the country’s advocacy for redress of the democratic deficit at the global level”. It is for this reason that South Africa’s multilateral strategy from the beginning was essentially normative.

South Africa’s approach to multilateral diplomatic strategy should be understood within the country’s readmission to the international system of government and the global political order dominated by the end of the Cold War (Landsberg 2015: 43-47). The end of apartheid in the early 1990s coincided with the end of the bipolar Cold War (Spies 2010: 73). Thus, it was no longer an international system dominated by the East and West.

The literature reveals that from Mandela to Mbeki and now President Zuma, South Africa’s agenda had been the transformation of institutions where global rules were made: inter alia the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Spies 2010: 77 and Melber 2014: 131-145). The fear has been that, leading the transformational agenda of global institutions diluted South Africa’s substantive human rights agenda. This was because it was widely believed that when the matters of distribution of power took centre stage in South African foreign policy, then matters of human rights took a back seat.
Diplomacy is understood as the conduct and management of relations amongst independent and sovereign states, taking place through various ways and level (Barston 2013: 32). This may include state-to-state bilateral relations or through intergovernmental institutions of global governance such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the African Union (AU). These multilateral institutions provide space for states regardless of size and political system and equal participatory rights on issues of global governance. Thus, multilateral negotiations are viewed as a pivotal safeguard against hegemonic and similar global challenges which was evident during the Cold War. Landsberg (2015: 43-44) adds that “Multilateralism presents a platform and space for developing countries to have a voice and agency”. However, Barston (2013: 42) cautions that this global arrangement masks the economic disparities and other forms of power for project influence. However, this does not mean states will have equal influence on decision making processes.

The starting point of analysing behaviour in multilateralism is to understand the concept as “an institutional form that co-ordinates relations amongst three or more states based on generalised principles of conduct” (Cornelissen 2006: 2). The assumption or myth is that these platforms are non-discriminatory in nature because of the interconnectedness of the system. Secondly, the assumption is that states are guided by common/shared principles, without taking care of their individuality and autonomy. Whereas their individuality is derived from their own perceived status or influence.

2.3 Emerging Power’s Multilateral Agenda

Emerging middle powers such as SA, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and Malaysia attained their status mostly after the end of the Cold War. According to Spies (2010: 74) these emerging powers are characterised by being: the new democracies, semi peripheral in the world economy and materially at the domestic level. Jordan (2012: 289) maintained that, middle power countries exercise their foreign policy through multilateral channels. Multilateral diplomacy happens when states are involved in practice and institutions that facilitate cooperation between three or more states (Jordan 2012: 289).

The theoretical understanding of multilateral behaviour is that, multilateral diplomacy of peripheral or middle states are relatively more vocal, vigorous and even confrontational (Spies 2010: 76). Predominately, these peripheral states act as stabilizers of global order and by nature play an activist role in global governance and network with like-minded states to advance their agenda. The structure of Non-Aligned Movement within the UN system is the case in point.
For South Africa, Le Pere (2014: 51) explains that the multilateral and foreign policy agenda has been about global developmental and redistributive justice.

**2.4 South Africa in the UN Security Council**

South African’s participation and contribution in the United Nations particularly the UN Security Council is well documented. Scholars such as Landsberg (2015), Cornelissen (2006) Graham (2011), Zondi (2015), Nieuwkerk (2007), Naidu (2015), Masters *et al* (2015) and Lekaba and Maseng (2014) have written extensively on South Africa’s participation and contribution at the United Nations and other similar multilateral platforms. Most importantly, scholars were particularly concerned with South Africa’s historical contribution since its re-admission following the end of apartheid. Cornelissen (2006: 28) asserts that the United Nations was an important global platform in the re-integration of South Africa in Global Governance. Landsberg’s (2015: 43-44) analysis is concerned with how the country advocated for the rule based international system and peaceful settlement of disputes to address issues of international conflict since readmission to the international community. Therefore, since re-admission, South Africa had sought to increase its profile in the body.

For example, South Africa led the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) IX, chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights, and was a council member of the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Cornelissen 2006: 30-31). This was also coupled with South Africa hosting major political events such as the World Conference against Racism and World Summit on Sustainable Development (ibid).

In her analysis of South Africa’s participation and contribution to the UN agenda, Cornelissen (2006: 34-40) focuses on the period before South Africa was elected to serve in the Security Council. Thus, her analysis focused on activities in other UN organs with an emphasis on the behaviour of the country in the General Assembly. She acknowledged that South Africa’s overall participation in the UN was based on two elements; the first, was to “raise the profile of poverty and development on the UN agenda” (Cornelissen 2006: 36). The second, Pretoria wanted to emphasize in the UN an elevated focus on Africa’s stability and security. This meant that South Africa since its re-admission had been shaping the course of the continent directly and indirectly through the UN platforms.

Like Cornelissen (2006), Naidu (2015: 60-64) provided a contextual framework of South Africa’s Global Governance identity as a country advocating for a participatory and inclusive
system in the midst of a global balance of power. In a nutshell Naidu (2015: 61) sees South Africa’s identity as that which is concerned with the reform of the global system.

In addition, Nieuwkerk (2007), Graham (2015), Zondi (2015), and Masters et al (2015) and Alden and Le Pere (2009) further expanded on South Africa’s participation and contribution in the UN Security Council during its 2007-8 and 2011-12 tenure. Nieuwkerk (2007: 61-77) and Graham (2015: 73-91) both agreed that South Africa’s behaviour in the Security Council, particularly its first tenure, was marked by controversies especially on failing to vote against human rights abuse in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. In the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa viewed the conflict as an internal matter which domestic political parties should resolve via dialogue. Thus Graham (2015: 73-91) uses the voting behaviour of South Africa between 2011 and 2012 as a unit of analysis. Thus, analysing how South Africa voted on African issues and issues outside of the continent.

In October 2006, South Africa was chosen by 186 of 192 states in the UN General Assembly to represent the Africa regional grouping as a non-permanent member of the UNSC from 2007 to 2008. According to Graham (2015: 76) from the onset, South Africa understood that it carried the responsibility of pursuing the African interest in the Council. Thus, according to Landsberg (2010: 181), South Africa used its membership and leadership position within the UN to mobilise developing countries to adopt clear positions on issues of poverty, underdevelopment and peace and security.

Furthermore, the 2011-2012 tenure had its own priority such as the protection of the territorial integrity of African states, acknowledgement of the role of other UN organs and cooperation with regional bodies on peace and security (Graham 2015: 76). This was significant, given the fact that South Africa had played a significant role in building the capacity of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Furthermore, Landsberg (2010: 184) observed that “South Africa was active in revitalizing the debate on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter”.

When South Africa was voted for the first time to serve as a non-permanent member in the Security Council it had put human rights as one of its foreign policy objectives. Hence it was criticised for its confusing voting pattern in the Council like in the case of Zimbabwe. Graham (2015) and Nieuwkerk (2007)’s analysis of South Africa’s tenures was particularly focused on the voting pattern of the country in the Council. They were not particularly analysing the overall policy agenda of the country brought forward in the council. However, Nieuwkerk (2007: 64)
acknowledged that “Keeping Africa on the agenda and pushing for concerted international action to prevent and manage African crises – ought to be the first prize”. Thus, acknowledging the fact that South Africa had always placed the continent at the centre of its foreign policy.

When South Africa served for the second time on the Council it became explicitly clear on its intention. Then foreign policy chief, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabene (2010) proclaimed that “South Africa would continue to champion and advance the African agenda bringing greater alignment to the work of the Security Council and that of the African Union, especially the AU Peace and Security Council of which South Africa is currently a member”. It became apparent that South Africa would put effort, resources and activities in advancing the interests of the continent. This was only to be achieved with the willingness of the UN to reform its attitudes on how it dealt with the continent. Thus, the reform agenda was to be pursued to make the African objectives realised.

2.5 Transformation Agenda in World Affairs

The global agenda to reform the UN charter in general includes structural reform, operating procedure and institutional purpose amongst others (Weiss 2003: 147 and Lekaba and Maseng (2014). From the onset, it is imperative to assert that until recently, only a few changes have taken effect to the Charter which includes the seat numbers in some of the UN organs such as the Security Council. However, the real substantive reform for the UNSC to make it more reflective of the growing membership and scope has not taken place. Kagwanja (2008: 42) supported this by asserting that the UNSC itself “had stood in the way of efforts to democratize global governance”, with the exclusive veto powers held by P5 reinforcing a counter democratic system.

South Africa has been one of the developing countries pursuing the reform agenda of the UN in general. However, as Landsberg (2015: 49-51), Naidu (2015: 65), Lekaba and Maseng (2014) and Efstathopoulos (2016: 429-432) noted, the agenda to transform the UN system and institutions of global governance is not new nor for South Africa alone.

South Africa and generally the continent at large had been pursuing the reform agenda dating as far back as the 1997 Harare Declaration (Kagwanja, 2008: 44). At the centre of the reform issues were the expansion of the UNSC both in permanent and non-permanent categories. It further proposed no less than two rotational seats for Africa in the Council based on the now African Union (AU) criteria. The proposal also proclaimed that the permanent members should
have powers and prerogatives of the existing five permanent members. It further proposed five non-permanent member seats in the Council. The Harare Declaration essentially formed the foundation of the AU’s 2005 Ezulwini Consensus on the UNSC proposals.

The primary reason for this agenda was to make, particularly, the UN Security Council more effective, transparent, democratic and sensitive to the interests of the continent and the global South when dealing with new challenges (Landsberg, 2015: 49-51 and Alden and Le Pere (2009: 80). The African continent and generally the global South are not represented on a permanent basis in the council. The literature is clear in that, South Africa contributed immensely in the transformation debate of the UN Security Council. Adopting its stands like that of the continent (Eftathopoulos, 2016: 432).

The culmination of The Harare Declaration was that the Ezulwini Consensus adopted by the African Union to formalise its agreement that Africa should demand two permanent members and five non-permanent members in the Security Council. However, according to Alden and Le Pere (2009: 80), South Africa exerted little influence on the reform agenda of the Council. This leads to the need to ponder on whether South Africa pursued this African agenda through its activities during the second term in the Security Council in 2011-2012.

2.6 The African Agenda.

As stated above, South Africa’s pursuit of an African agenda is not a new phenomenon but evident from Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma’s presidency. Lekaba and Maseng (2014: 402) and Landsberg (2010: 139) have written about the evolution of the South African foreign policy which tends to focus primarily on the head of state and what they signified or prioritised instead of being a country project. For example, Lekaba and Maseng (2014: 402) concluded that the “personality of a head of state plays a fundamental role in foreign policy formulation and stature of the country’s international relations”. The weakness with such assertion is that these projects are a result of government policy international orientation instead of personal projects of heads of states. However, it should be acknowledged that presidents do carry the weight of their country’s image wherever they are engaged internationally. To add, Landsberg (2010: 139) observed that the African Agenda was also evident through former President Mbeki’s involvement in the drafting of the African Renaissance vision. This was through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into what is now the African Union. One should caution that these initiatives are still predominately credited to Thabo Mbeki instead of it being seen as purely a South
African diplomacy project. Thus, Graham (2015: 83), Landsberg (2015: 47-48) and Naidu (2015: 62-63) and others have coined this as a personal diplomacy conducted by former President Mbeki. These initiatives had little to do with a South African project and focused on developing institutions within the continent which would deal with peace, security and economic relations. In some instances, authors used the presidency brand interchangeably with that of the country brand which clearly demonstrated that there was no clear distinction between the country image and the presidency.

South Africa through the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) repeatedly makes mention of the fact that Africa is the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2004) declared that South Africa is “part of Africa and of the South and therefore the priorities of Africa and developing countries are also our priority”. She went further to point out that the country had prioritised the strengthening of the continental and regional structures of the AU and SADC. This was a clear indication that this was not a personal agenda of Mbeki and his predecessor but of the country. On the interest of the Global South, she declared that South Africa was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 and was committed to promote South-South cooperation (Dlamini-Zuma 2004).

To add, President Mandela as the first democratic president of the republic made it clear through his inaugural address to the United Nations that the country would prioritise the African continent through the AU and SADC to be free of war and conflict. The president promised that “we will play our role in the struggles of these organisations to build a continent and a region that will help to create for themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and prosperity” (Mandela 1994).

Therefore, it is pivotal that the idea of an African agenda is explored in detail to seek clarity of what it means by an African agenda. Zondi (2015: 98) noted that “the African Agenda does not begin with the adoption of a post-1994 foreign policy but can be traced back to the evolution of African nationalism in South Africa”. He further went on to add that African nationalism had resemblance of liberal ideas hired from British and African-American political movements. It was Thabo Mbeki, he argued, who placed the ideas of African Renaissance as the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy in the twentieth century. The Africanist agenda was essentially about Africans to take pride in their African-ness despite the negative effects of colonialism, a
united Africa, and a continent that contributes to the reshaping of a new world order (Zondi 2015: 98).

In practice, the idea of an African Agenda rooted on an African Renaissance meant that this would be done in the pursuit of a peace agenda. Scholars revealed that this meant using the African Union peace architect, membership in the UN Security Council and advocacy for peace in conflict areas on the continent (Zondi 2015: 100 and Landsberg 2010: 140-141). This agenda was not to be pursued within Africa’s multilateral institutions alone but also in global governance institutions such as the UN Security Council mandated to “maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter). It meant that even in Global Governance institutions, “Africa has a right to be heard, to speak for itself, and the right to co-determine what was to be done” (Zondi 2015: 100). This meant that, the continent demanded on setting the agenda about its affairs, determine its own future and the right for Africa to adapt to democracy to fit its own conditions without compromising accountability. This was a call to promote the continent’s political, economic and social renewal.

Landsberg (2010: 149), observed that, during former president Thabo Mbeki’s reign, the African Agenda was put in practice by the establishment of an African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund in 2000, Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP) and the involvement in the transition of the OAU into the African Union (AU). Therefore, disputing a view held by academics such as Vale and Maseko (1998: 276-277) who claim that “when analysts and commentators pursue the African Renaissance idea for policy formulation there is little to work from, which for them it meant that this awakening is more of a promise than policy”. Consequently, the scholars see this Renaissance as loaded with sentiment but lacks substance.

Furthermore, Vale and Maseko (1998: 27) attempt to debunk this Renaissance conception using the ‘globalist’ and ‘Africanist’ approach. The globalist approach of the African Renaissance entails the economic prosperity of the continent in the midst of globalization characterised by free market, privatization, and diminishing power of the national government amongst others. This idealism sees Africa as a growing, competitive market amongst those in the West and Asia.

Meanwhile, the Africanist response to the Renaissance agenda has been critical as it had been “driven by the globalist politics, in which Africans are valued for their ability to absorb foreign ideas (Vale and Maseko 1998: 280). This had led the authors to ask critical question about who,
is really to benefit from the awakening. An interesting observation was made in conclusion that majority of Africans consider themselves marginalised from the affairs of their countries and that unless this was felt, the renewal would not happen (Vale and Maseko, 1998: 280).

2.7 Emerging Countries’ Influence in the UNSC

It is equally imperative to gather what else has been written about emerging and middle-income countries’ towards influencing the UN Security Council. Conley and Pahlow (2014: 95-108) studied Australia’s tenure on the UN Security Council 2013-2014 as a “voice for small and medium counties”. Ilgit and Ozkececi-Taner (2014: 183-202) focused on Turkey’s tenure at the UNSC 2009-11 and its quest for global influence. Scholars acknowledged the regional power status of both Australia and Turkey in their respective regions. On the one hand, Ilgit and Ozkececi-Taner (2014: 183) located Turkey’s influence at its strategic geographic location and its proximity to the Balkans and the Middle East made it a significant player in the economy, security and political realm in global politics. On the other hand, Australia, perceived itself as a middle power country, thus it was neither influential nor irrelevant but occupied a conceptual territory between the extremes.

In terms of impact, Australia used various methods to influence the agenda of the Council and the same can be said about Turkey, though not explicit. In summary, both Turkey and Australia were determined to contribute to the functioning of the UNSC and rule-based international order. However, there were notable failures within their campaign: for Turkey, it was the Syrian nuclearization issue in that the country failed to present a coherent agenda as it was most concerned with other issues in the region.

Andrew Hurrel (quoted in Schoeman 2015: 432) maintains that there are three distinct criteria that characterise emerging powers for example, expanding economic dominance and prowess, high levels of political power and military potential and finally capacity to exert influence in global politics. South Africa was exemplary to the above, through the use of its military might, it had the most advanced and industrialised economy on the continent, the country’s role in funding the African Union, its provision of intellectual leadership in the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its ongoing active involvement in peace building operations (peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building).
2.8 South Africa in the UNSC 2011-2012

Graham (2015: 73-90), Le Pere (2014), Efstatopoulos (2016: 429-450), Schoeman (2015) and Oshupeng and Lekaba (2014) have assessed South Africa’s participation and contribution in the Security Council during the 2011-2012 second term. Although, other scholars do look at how South Africa behaved on the council especially on the African issues, there is a lack of concrete analysis of a specific focused agenda that South Africa pursued in its interactions and submissions within the council. Oshupeng and Lekaba (2014: 395-404) were concerned with the competing agenda between South Africa and Nigeria with regards to hegemonic status on the continent since both served at the same time in the Council. In summary, the scholars found that Nigeria and South Africa cooperated in a number of initiatives such as NEPAD and NEPAD infrastructure programme. The countries were found to have failed to pursue the transformation agenda of the UN in 2012-2013 tenure. They differed on the case of Cote d’Ivoire and Libya but most fundamentally, both Nigeria and South Africa were sought to be taking the national interest on the question of UN reform. As both had aspirations of serving in the UNSC on a permanent basis.

Oshupeng and Lekaba (2014: 399) observed that there is an assumption that Africa is united whereas there are divisions within various economic blocks such as SADC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) who want to ensure they have a permanent seat. It can be concluded therefore that the scholars were primarily focused on the complex nature of the reform agenda and country’s interest. Thus, their objective was never about assessing South Africa’s influence of the agenda through its participation in the process.

Graham (2015: 83-90) made a brief assessment of South Africa’s contribution in its second term at the Security Council. She concluded that “there is no disputing that South Africa used its leadership position to focus the world attention to the interest of Africa”. Although she did not make explicitly clear whether Pretoria was successful in its pursuit of the Africa Agenda, she made several observations on South Africa’s voting pattern which will be of focus in the next section.

Graham (2015: 78) further noted that South Africa co-sponsored a draft resolution (s/2012/761) in October 2012 supporting two prolonged approaches which included the support of the Malian government while dealing with Al-Qaida and terrorists in the North. Thirdly, in January 2012 South Africa along with Cambodia, India and Pakistan sponsored a resolution which was
later adopted as Resolution 2033 on enhancing relationships between the UN and regional and sub-regional organization particularly the African Union. Although the scholar lists these interventions and support South Africa gave to advance the course of the African continent, the author did not go into details to discuss its implications for the continent but left it to the reader to make their own conclusion. It is the purpose of this study to engage these interventions and analyse them in detail the impact.

Efstathopoulos (2016: 429) came close to delve in detail South Africa’s agenda in its second term at the council in 2011-2012. His quest was to examine “how influential outsider states as non-permanent members of the Council perceive the legitimacy of the institution and whether they could perform a critical role in affecting the legitimacy of the institution” (Efstathopoulos, 2016: 429). In the findings, it was stated that the non-permanent members continued to engage and defend the legitimacy of the UN Security Council although it lacked representation from countries in Africa and the Global South. They do this, according to Efstathopoulos (2016: 445) to promote the reform agenda. The conclusion is that these states can influence issues in global governance but cannot shape or direct the legitimacy on their own capacity and activism. This means that there is a need for a wider campaign which involves those who are the permanent members to participate in the agenda.

Henning Melber (2014: 131-145) in his analysis of South Africa’s historic engagement with the United Nations also referred to its second term at the Security Council. However, not much was focused on the African Agenda, but that South Africa continued in its quest to make human rights as a light which guides its foreign policy. For example, in 2011 South Africa initiated for the adoption of a resolution within the UN Human Rights Council on violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In this instance, South Africa was direct in its intention to convey its stance on issues of human rights.

2.9 Conclusion

There was limited scope on the literature which is concerned with the impact of South Africa and other non-permanent members in the UN Security Council. Participation in the UNSC from a non-permanent member from the African continent is discussed but does not go into details concerning success and impact.

In South Africa, the consolidation of the African agenda was still punted as a key objective during President Zuma’s presidency. However, the African Agenda was being diluted by the
‘national interest’ or domestic imperatives. This was also hampered by the fact that South Africa does not enjoy a hegemonic status throughout the African continent as there are other states who aspire to play a similar role. This was evident particularly on the reform diplomacy agenda which was laid bare when the Ezulwini Consensus collapsed. Furthermore, the African continent is divided along various blocks such as Anglophone and Francophone, which hampered unity on the continent.

The literature was limited in its focus and analysis of South Africa as an emerging global player and other non-permanent members on the Security Council. When non-permanent members were discussed and analysed within the UN context they were simply subjects of a collective mandate of the region instead of their individual capacities and influences. Therefore, it is the purpose of this research to contribute to the study of individual state’s influence in the agenda of the UNSC.
CHAPTER THREE: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 2011-2012 IN PURSUIT OF AN AFRICAN AGENDA.

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the level and scope of South Africa’s (SA) activities in the Security Council as an elected member during its second tenure from 2011-2012. To do so, this chapter firstly provides a conceptual framework on how non-permanent members influence issues in the UNSC and survey the structural limitations faced by elected members. Secondly, the chapter dwells on the South Africa foreign policy approach over recent years and closely analyses the country’s activities between 2011-2012 which were aimed at pursuing the African Agenda and that of the Global South. A detailed analysis of the reform agenda is also provided. The primary source of information will be from the formal statements of the SA mission in New York, including that of Ambassador Baso Sangqu. As well as a variety of the annual reports of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) because DIRCO is responsible for the formulation, coordination, implementation and management of South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations programmes.

3.2 Structural Limitations on Non-Permanent members in the UNSC

When the UN was established in 1945, the US, Russia, China, France, and Britain became veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, given the primary, although not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining global peace and security. In practice, these permanent countries often initiate and shape or block, peacekeeping missions to further their strategic interests and to reinforce their historical spheres of influence (Landsberg 2012). The remaining 188 members of the UN can only join the Security Council as non-permanent members who are elected to the Council for two-year non-renewable terms.

The elected non-permanent members of the Security Council must navigate a series of obstacles to drive, shape or refine UNSC decision-making and issues of their region’s interests. As it is well documented, the biggest obstacle for this is the structure of the UN Security Council with five permanent members with wielding veto power, which empowers them to exert considerable control over the development of UNSC decisions (Efstathopoulos 2016: 432-438). This structural power dynamic has been the subject of a reform agenda for many decades.
Another obstacle for elected members is that few of them possess institutional knowledge of the UNSC’s diplomatic and decision-making processes prior to assuming their seats (Farralla and Prantla, 2016: 603). Since readmission to the global arena, South Africa has only served twice in the Security Council, in 2007 and in 2011. As Graham (2015: 83) noted, the advantage for South Africa in its second term was that its permanent representative Ambassador Baso Sangqu was the deputy during the country’s first term under Dumisani Khumalo. Thus, the ambassador was well vested on how to negotiate effectively in the UNSC decision-making processes while pursuing South Africa’s African Agenda. In addition, another powerful state in the continent, Nigeria, was also serving for the fourth time in the Security Council having been a member for the first time in 1966, few years after its independence in 1960. Additionally, Gabon was another African country in the Council. Therefore, it was always expected that South Africa will cooperate with its African allies to exert influence on issues of African interests.

On the contrary, the five permanent members have maintained a steady presence in the UNSC since its formation in 1946. This meant that these members, have accumulated valuable and enormous practical experience on Council decision-making. According to Farralla and Prantla (2016: 603) “the P5 can therefore use their substantive and procedural know-how to maximum negotiating advantage in deliberations with their far less experienced elected counterparts”.

It has been observed that the South Africa advantage had been its strategic membership of BRICS countries comprised of Russia and China who are members of the Security Council. This meant that South Africa had to benefit from close relationships with its BRICS counterparts in the council to pursue mutual interests but largely to represent Africa’s wishes in the Council. It was for the first time that the Security Council included all the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries in 2011. Furthermore, another advantage for South Africa was because of its membership to the Non-Aligned Movement and membership of such formations as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA).

3.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Approach and the UNSC

South Africa experienced colonization of a special type which was designed to deny basic human rights and participation in the direction of the country for most of its population. The South African anti-apartheid struggle for liberation was not only a struggle for human rights but fundamentally a national liberation struggle against a regime supported and aligned to the West (Jordan 2012: 283-299). It was a regime which was primarily based on racial
categorization and isolation, which denounced any form or talk of communism. This helped shape the South African foreign policy after the dawn of democracy, which was initially critical of the West in general and anti-liberal within the geopolitical context of the Cold War. It is no surprise that today South Africa has found partners in the East and the Global South (for example- Russia, China, Cuba) who have historically supported the anti-apartheid movement. Thus, the country felt that the transformation of the global political system was not for it alone. On his address at the University of Venda in 2011, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) reiterated that “having been born out of struggle, our history compels us to refrain from pursuing foreign and economic policies that will make South Africa an island of prosperity in a troubled sea of under-development, war, poverty, disease and illiteracy” (Ebrahim 2011).

It is no surprise that when serving for the second time in the UNSC, South Africa made a bold statement of commitments to the African continent. Speaking at the University of Pretoria on 15 October 2010, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane summarised the objective for South Africa's participation in the Council when she said, "we will endeavour to utilise our membership of the Security Council in a manner that will add value to the work of the Council". In this context, South Africa played an active role in the activities of the Security Council committees, working groups, commissions and other structures. “We will endeavour to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by inter alia participating in the Council's conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction agenda" (Minister Nkoana-Mashabane 2010).

Thus, the country’s overall strategic objective was:

1. The pursuit of an African Agenda at United Nations
2. Advance the developmental agenda of the Global South, and
3. Foster relations between the Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council,

In terms of the African Agenda, the South African foreign policy has always been focused on the continent. On this basis and as it has before, DIRCO sets out its vision as follows: DIRCO is committed to promoting South Africa’s national interests
and values, the African Renaissance and the creation of a better world for all (DIRCO 2011a). It confirms Africa’s centrality within South Africa’s foreign policy objective. Meanwhile, South Africa’s second tenure in the Security Council was packaged in a form of policy labelled as “Consolidating the African Agenda” (Ibrahim 2011).

3.4 Influencing the UNSC as an Elected Member: South Africa’s Experience

South Africa’s most recent period as a Council member, in 2011–2012, illustrated how Council membership provides a direct opportunity to exert influence on issues of Africa’s concern. However, this period also served as a sober reminder of how the capacity of elected members to introduce policy innovations can be severely constrained in the face of permanent member resistance, particularly on the reform agenda. As part of this survey we discuss some of the ways that South Africa navigated these limitations and sought to grasp its opportunities as an elected member. We then examine one case in which South Africa was able to exert demonstrable influence over a UNSC outcome, namely a landmark Security Council decision on strengthening the strategic cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council in Resolution 2033 building on the South African sponsored Resolution 1809 of 2008. The advantage for South Africa was that in 2011 and 2012, the country was serving on the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) for a two-year period ending in March 2012 (DIRCO 2012a).

3.5 South African Activities in the UN Security Council 2011-2012

It has emerged from the previous sections that emerging powers use multilateral platforms to direct their foreign policy. It is no surprise that South Africa regarded platforms such as the UNSC as an important and legitimate body for Global Governance. As noted by Landsberg (2015: 45) South Africa’s multilateral strategy has been to advance the interests and participation of the African continent and developing countries in the South. The country has been seen as one of the most important representatives of Africa in multilateral fora. This emanates from its status as a big economy on the continent and generally the Global South. South Africa has also been admitted to emerging power coalitions, such as the BRICS group, and remains the only African state in certain institutions, such as the G-20 Leaders Summit.

Scholars in International Relations overwhelmingly hold the assumption that the five permanent members (the ‘P5’, comprising of China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) are the only members that can exercise real power and exert significant influence over the
Council’s decision-making process and outcomes (Bosco 2014: 545-561). The source of the agenda making powers derives from the permanent five’s possessions of the veto power. This means they have the privilege of being able to stop the passing of a substantive resolution by voting against it. The controversial power of veto was part of the draft of the UN Charter in 1945. It is argued that the United States and Russia would probably not have accepted the creation of the United Nations without the veto privilege (Global Policy Forum 2002). Thus, to set any form of an agenda requires great and extensive manoeuvring through informal and formal activities within and outside the Council.

It is important to note, however, that the 10 non-permanent elected members of the UNSC (the ‘E10’) make up two-thirds of the Council and many times include states with a greater claim to objective power, than most UN member states, on account of their economic strength, population or territorial size (Farralla and Prantla, 2016: 602). When South Africa was in the Council in 2011 and 2012 it had Nigeria and Gabon as fellow African members. South Africa and Nigeria are two of the most influential and biggest economies on the African continent.

The press statement of Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda issued through a South African press attaché, on their joint participation in the United Nations Security Council as non-permanent members, put as part of their highest priority to “promote and champion the principles and objectives of the African Union Agenda on the UN Security Council, including striving to work to make the Security Council more transparent in its working methods” (Kota 2010). The African permanent representatives agreed on the need to promote and enhance the UN Security Council co-operation with the AU Peace and Security Council which was also identified as a priority.

For South Africa, Nigeria’s overlapping non-permanent membership on the Council was further raising the stakes in terms of how and whether or not Pretoria and Abuja can constitute themselves as an axis of synergy in advancing the African Union (AU) agenda and/or whether or not they can jointly take leadership in exercising a degree of leverage that supplements that agenda and lends it more international, not just African, credibility. At the time, the overriding issue before the Council as 2010 which came to an end was the upcoming South Sudan self-determination referendum (IGD 2012).

From the South African experience, a case can be made that non-permanent members can influence UNSC deliberations in a variety of ways while serving as elected members on the Council. South Africa adopted several strategies to pursue the interests of the continent and its
own. This, however does not mean that countries serving as part of the E10 can pursue and protect their own interest in the same way the P5 can. In addition, the influence of the non-permanent members does not mean the P5’s power and control does not constrain the capacity which the E10 can assert, to influence issues within the council.

3.6 Opportunities to exert influence

3.6.1 Chairing/participating in UN Committees

Notwithstanding the obstacle outline in the previous section, non-permanent members of the Security Council can influence the UNSC’s decision-making process and issues of interest in several ways. For example, Farralla and Prantla (2016: 604) pointed to the responsibility of chairing the Council’s subsidiary organs, including the dozen or more sanctions committees, which are distributed among elected members. South Africa had a substantial opportunity to influence Council decision-making in its capacity as member and chair of sanctions committees, such as chair of the 1540 Committee dealing with weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors, and also chairing of the Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa. The country also served as the vice-chair of the Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia Sanctions Committees.

As chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa of the UNSC, South Africa succeeded in improving the working methods of the UNSC by involving the broader UN membership and non-state entities in discussions of the working group to make it more accountable, responsive, transparent and effective. South Africa’s outreach success was replicated by other UNSC subsidiary bodies.

The DIRCO report of 2011-2012 takes note of South Africa participating in important committees within the UN structures. South Africa actively participated in the deliberations of the 2012 UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34). This committee is mandated to undertake a comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping policy issues in all their aspects. In this context, South Africa pursued discussions aimed at advancing the interests of the African continent in the area of the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacities. This bolstered African countries’ capacity to address the challenges associated with conflicts, mandates, protection of civilians, modern technology in peacekeeping and other related matters and therefore contributing towards peace, security and stability on the continent.
Furthermore, in the First Committee which deals with disarmament and international security, South Africa collaborated with Colombia and Japan on drafting and tabling a resolution on Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons which was consequently adopted by consensus (DIRCO 2012a). Together with the Netherlands and Switzerland, South Africa also presented a resolution on “Revitalising the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations” that was also adopted by consensus”.

3.6.2 Presidency of Council

The second most visible way in which elected members of the Council can contribute to UNSC business is as President of the Council. The Council presidency rotates in English alphabetical order monthly. This provides each elected member at least one chance to be President for the month. This is a direct way in which an elected member can directly shape the Council’s schedule during that month. In this instance, many E10 members utilised this opportunity to schedule one or more open debates on an issue of pressing importance. The highlight of South Africa’s term was serving in the Presidency of the UNSC in January 2012. During its term South Africa assumed the presidency, the country chaired the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability (GSP), in line with promoting the developmental agenda of the global South (Landsburg, 2015: 43-57). Given the importance of the subject to South Africa, President Jacob Zuma presided over the meeting. The UN Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the AU Commission, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, also participated in the event. South Africa’s initiative culminated in the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2033 of 2012, which focusses on achieving strategic and political coherence between the UNSC and AUPSC in dealing with conflicts in Africa (Graham 2015). These are two examples which demonstrate the country’s effort in pursuing the African agenda in the UNSC as a non-permanent member.

Another achievement during South Africa’s presidency of the UNSC was when Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane presided over a meeting of the Council on Somalia. The meeting laid the foundation for the eventual adoption of Resolution 2036, enhancing the UN’s support for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). South Africa also presided over an Open Debate of the UNSC on the promotion and strengthening of the Rule of Law in the maintenance of international peace and security in conflict and post-conflict situations during its presidency (Mxakato-Diseko, 2013). South Africa’s presidency was also utilised to address the situation
in the Middle East with Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim presiding over the Open Debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the question of Palestine.

3.6.3 Sponsoring and voting on resolutions

South Africa sponsored and co-sponsored several resolutions with its African counterparts Gabon and Nigeria but also with its BRICS counterparts in pursuit of the Africa Agenda. In 2011, the country co-sponsored 10 resolutions- all of which were co-sponsored with Nigeria and Gabon. Some of the resolutions included the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) on the authorization of no-fly zone in Libya to protect civilian population in the wake of uprising against Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi; UN Resolution 2020 (2011) on the situation in Somalia regarding piracy; UN Resolution 2000 (2011) and Resolution 1975 (2011) on the situation Ivory Coast following the inauguration of Alassane Ouattara as president. However, it should be noted that there were resolutions co-sponsored with UK, France, German and Portugal. A clear indication that the country stayed true to its foreign policy ambit in promotion of the African Agenda via BRICS and Non-Aligned Movement (Efstathopoulos 2016).

3.6.4 Debate and Workshops

One of the major status boosts for South Africa was the chairing of the 1540 committee focusing on nuclear disarmaments. The country used its facilitation and convening ability to influence issues of importance for the continent in the global arena. Thus, the country took it upon itself to ensure that African states were capacitated for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) for African States. Demonstrating that it stayed true to its objective of leading the African Agenda while serving in the council. In collaboration with the African Union Commission (AUC), with the support of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and with the facilitation of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations (New York), the Chair of the Security Council Committee convened the meeting in November 2012. The 1540 Committee was established by the Security Council to support States in their efforts to implement their obligations emanating from Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) aimed at preventing non-State actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons ("weapons of mass destruction"), their means of delivery or related material. South Africa hosted a workshop on Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) for African States on 21 and 22 November and attending the Indian workshop on synergies
between 1540 and nuclear security. SA used its facilitation and convening ability in order to influence the agenda of the Council.

When South Africa was serving on its second tenure in the Council it made a bold declaration that it would use its term to serve the interests of the African continent. However, the country was met with resistance and complexity of issues pertaining to the continent. While it succeeded in making the African position on many issues known, it failed in some instances to champion the issue to the interests and benefit of the continent in the case of Libya for example.

3.7 The Libyan Crisis and Dilemma of an African Agenda

Soon after South Africa became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2011, it was immediately faced with two key African cases on the Council: Côte d’Ivoire and Libya.

South Africa was instrumental in the earlier efforts of bringing a truce between the government of Muammar Gaddafi and the Rebels. The 2011 Libyan crisis which led to the UNSC passing Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 authorising a “No-Fly Zone” in the country, which South Africa supported (Serrao 2011). The crisis also brought to attention the working relationship between the African Union and the UNSC on conflict resolution in the country. The high level ad hoc committee mandated by the AU to broker peace between the rebel forces and the Libyan government was headed by President Thabo Mbeki. It was an opportune moment for South Africa to flex its muscle in support of the continental agenda in the UNSC. The AU wanted to negotiate and lead the peaceful resolution of the conflict, but the resolution resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s bombardment of the Libyan authority which resulted in the fall of the Gadhafi government. The military intervention by NATO frustrated Pretoria’s diplomatic efforts of pursuing ‘African solution for African problems’ and brought about doubt to the relationship between the AU and the UNSC.

The NATO action in the Libyan crisis confirmed how, once a resolution has been approved, the permanent five on the Council can often determine the nature and ends of a military engagement, free from the constraints of a wider multilateralism. This was a clear case of the undermining and side-lining of the AU, despite reservations by fellow members of the Council. South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Baso Sangqu said ”South Africa has taken note of the events of the last few weeks, including the death of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. As President Jacob Zuma has stated, South Africa would have preferred Gaddafi to be captured
and given an opportunity to stand trial in a Court of Law to answer for his actions” (DIRCO 2011).

During the passing of the resolution, it was an assumption of many that South Africa would consolidate its position on African issues by seeking support from its BRICS counterparts but it was not so in the case of Libya in 2011. Pretoria threw its support behind the US, UK and France by voting in favour of the resolution 1973., alongside Germany, its BRICS partners, Brazil, Russia, China and India who abstained from voting for Resolution 1973. It has emerged that South Africa misread the situation and voted in good faith supporting those in the West and defied the position of the African Union. Pretoria was of the opinion that there had been evidence of gross violation of human right and Pretoria wanted to uphold the principle of the Responsibility to Protect.

3.8 South Sudan

It is equally pivotal to outline, in brief the complex nature of conflict in the Sudan which clearly played itself even with the Security Council. The situation in Darfur is one example which has made the call for Africa’s representation in the Council even louder. Among the permanent members Council, the UK is the lead country on Darfur. During 2011 when South Africa was serving in the Council, the P5 were divided in its approach to the situation in Darfur, particularly on the viability of the Darfur-Based Political Process (DPP), in which the Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) were engaged. According to (CCR 2011), the UK and USA expressed reservations about the feasibility of this process, given ongoing repression by the Sudanese government. However, for lack of a better option, others, notably the African Council members – South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon – and Russia, were more supportive of the DPP. Nigeria and South Africa also expressed concerned that a proposed call for an enabling environment as a precondition for the political process in Darfur contravened the wishes of the AU Peace and Security Council on the issue and violated the spirit of AU partnership with the UN in relation to Darfur (CCR 2011). This was the case of balancing relations between the Council and the AU which indicated that the Council could be handicapped by the lack of representation in the Council.

When South Sudan issues arose on the UNSC, the USA was the lead country on South Sudan. As well as lead on issues pertaining to Sudan-South Sudan relations on the UNSC (CCR 2011). Since there was no African representation in the Council, a perceived lack of reliable information about the situation on the ground on African conflicts often worsens tensions on
the Council. During 2011 with regards to South Sudan and its relations with its northern neighbour, Council members complained about a lack of adequate information, particularly in relation to fighting in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan areas of Sudan. Many of the countries on the Council did not receive direct diplomatic reports from Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Juba; and the expiry of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in August 2011 exacerbated this reporting vacuum. As a result, Council members expressed an unwillingness to act on these issues without a proper grasp of developments on the ground. This temporary paralysis of the Council was accompanied by complaints from the 10 elected members of the Council that they had been excluded from important consultations in April 2011 and June 2011 on the wording of key statements by the Council’s presidency (Colombia and Gabon respectively) on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan and the situation in Abyei as well as last-minute drafting of a resolution on the new UN peacekeeping mission in the South.

In its second month after assuming membership in the Council, South Africa together with its IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) counterparts agreed on a multimillion-dollar aid programme focusing on South Sudan’s post-conflict and post-referendum development (Graham 2012 and IGD 2012). This was an important commitment from South Africa and its partners after limited donation from the UNDP programme. This demonstrated that South Africa leveraged its UN role beyond the Council structures to strategically advance the African Agenda. The country is a founding member of an emerging power alliance called IBSA forum.

3.9 Electoral Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011

The electoral dispute in the Ivory Coast of October/November 2010 took place during President Zuma presidency. The Electoral Commission in that country, together with the UN announced that the presidential challenger, Alassare Ouattara had won the second round with 54.1 percent of the votes, against the 45.9 percent by Laurent Gbagbo the incumbent president. The Constitutional Council on the other hand declared Gbagbo the winner with 51.4 percent against Ouattara’s 48.5 percent (CCR 2011). This led to a contestation between two camps on the basis of the Commission and Council rulings. The forces in favour of Quattara started to join forces with armed rebels in the North of the country, the Forces Nouvelle, to military push Gbagbo out of power and install Quattara. The Gbagbo side also dug its heels in, mobilizing youths and political activists to resist challenges against Gbagbo. Cote d’Ivoire thus descended into a stalemate which turned into a crisis. Throughout the crisis, South Africa maintained a view that
the incumbent could not be forcefully removed from power and that reconciliation and a
government of national unity would bring peace in the region. During the debate of Resolution
1975 (2011), the South African representative to the UNSC, Baso Sangqu said he “remained
deeply concerned about the situation and believed that the AU, ECOWAS and the United
Nations should bolster the parties’ efforts to find the best course to a political solution”
(Security Council 2011).

South Africa argued that its assertion about a negotiated settlement was in line with the
normative approach in conflict resolution in the African Union (Dewaal 2012). As is often the
case, this stance led to the criticism that the African continent was ‘protecting’ sitting heads of
state, shielding them from scrutiny and accountability for crimes against humanity. However,
Nigeria made its views known that it wanted the incumbent to leave office which differed
fundamentally from South Africa that wanted a negotiated settlement similar to what was
achieved in Kenya after the 2007 post-electoral crisis. Many have cited this reason as the one
which prompted France to intervene militarily in order to unseat Gbagbo and installed Ouattara
as the new president. The AU failed to broker peace, and this led to Gbagbo being forcefully
removed by French soldiers and rebels. The French handed him over to the International
Criminal Court in The Hague and Ouattara became the new head of state leading moves
towards a unity government. The scenario was a clear indication of the difficulties of
influencing agendas on the UNSC, especially as a non-permanent member. A case where
‘African solution for African problem’ was found wanting by the international community
mandated to safeguard international peace and security.

3.10 The Reform Agenda

The reform agenda for the UN system is not new, scholars and diplomats have cited several
reasons why the campaign had gained momentum recently. In 1964, only 51 states were the
founding members of the United Nations. The membership has since increased fourfold and
Africa and Asia make the majority in the UN. The issues that are before the UN have increased
over the years, including climate change, human rights, peace and security. Therefore, the UN
is urged to represent or reflect the increasing mandate even through participation in key organs
of this multilateral body. The call for the UNSC reform is a form of a strategy to bridge the gap
between the economies in the North and the South. In addition, the campaign is also about
making the UNSC more democratic and squash any questions about its legitimacy. Former
South African President, Nelson Mandela, told the UN General Assembly during the world
body’s fiftieth anniversary in October 1995: “The United Nations has to reassess its role, redefine its profile, and reshape its structures. It should reflect the diversity of our universe and ensure equity among the nations in the exercise of power within the system of international relations, in general, and the Security Council, in particular”.

The reform of the UN system campaign, especially for permanent representation of other regions is not for Africa alone, Japan and Germany declared their intention in 1992 and India and Brazil joined as they regard themselves as regional powers (Bosco 2014). The G4 as they are referred to, also backed the idea of Africa’s presence in the Council. This clearly showed the interest of many countries wanting to become members of the Council, a clear demonstration that countries would have to lobby in and outside their regions.

It was widely expected that Pretoria, among others would pursue the reform agenda of the UNSC in accordance with the 2005 African Union consensus. Thus, during the 7th Extraordinary Session of the African Union on the 7th - 8th of March 2005, the African Multilateral body, adopted the common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations, called “The Ezulwini Consensus”. The Organization through its document acknowledged that “in 1945, when the UN was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented convinced that Africa is now able to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose” (African Union 2005: 9-10).

The document proposed that Africa be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council, which according to the UN Charter is an organ of the UN responsible for matters relating to international peace and security. Thus, the representation of the continent according to the consensus meant not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto.

Reflecting on the second tenure of the country in the Council, in its final report DIRCO 2011-2012 made the following remarks with regards to the reform agenda of the council:

“In the current round of intergovernmental negotiations on UNSC reform, South Africa continued to be guided by the African Common Position (Ezulwini Consensus). South Africa maintained that comprehensive UNSC reform involves an expanded council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and that Africa must be represented in the expanded permanent category”.
The proposed reform also included an additional five non-permanent member seats. The dilemma for this consensus is that the AU did not indicate which states should represent the continent in the Council. The AU therefore would take the responsibility for electing Africa’s representatives and deciding on the relevant selection criteria for the position (African Union 2005: 9). Many scholars (Maseng and Lekaba 2014, Landsberg 2015 and Graham 2015) maintain that South Africa has the ambition to occupy one of the permanent seats.

South Africa and Nigeria as the two major states on the continent harbour ambition to occupy one of the proposed permanent seats in the Council. Though the two countries agree and support the common AU position on the UN reform, the two countries find themselves competing with other on the global state for influence. However, a complementary approach by both countries with the support of the AU would likely see progress on the issue of the reform. While competition between the two has derailed Africa’s progress to influence the reform agenda of the Council. Former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, claimed that it was natural for the two African powers to be leading the reform process: “if South Africa and Nigeria do not lead that struggle, then who will?” (Bosco 2013a). According to Maseng (2013) the competition between South Africa and Nigeria would lead to disunity within the continent and outside.

In addition, transforming the UNSC would require the willingness of the P5 and the amendment of the UN Charter. The amendment can happen through the two thirds of the members of the general assembly and the rectification by two thirds of the Security Council (Maseng and Lekaba 2014: 397). It is difficult to comprehend how the P5 will agree on the reform agenda which will compromise their veto powers earned after their triumph in WW II.

During its second tenure on the UNSC, South Africa declared that it would “lead the African and Global South agenda on the transformation of the United Nations system” (IGD 2012). South Africa found itself in a dilemma to balance its mission of pursuing Africa’s interests and its own long-term ambition for a permanent seat. South Africa had been cautious in pursuing the reform agenda, especially with its quest to be a permanent member by not campaigning unilaterally but by adopting a pro-Africa and pro-global South stance in its foreign policy. This trend was evident in its campaign for a UNSC seat, where South Africa consistently allied with the AU consensus.
3.11 SA’s Convening Capacity to Influence UNSC Agenda

One of the exemplary initiatives to highlight a reform agenda for the council was when South Africa convened an Open Debate on the “promotion and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security on Conflict and Post-conflict Situation” (DIRCO 2012a). The achievement for this South African initiative was that this debate led to the unanimous adoption of a Presidential Statement (PRST/2012/1). The South African initiative was as a result of the South African analysis that the permanent five abused the veto power and go beyond their mandate in the name of maintaining peace and security globally. By convening this meeting, South Africa demonstrated the ability to influence crucial members of the UNSC to discuss the controversial reform debate clearly demonstrating the influence of non-state members.

Under the current presidency of Jacob Zuma, South Africa gained influential and weight positions in global economic governance which allowed for strengthening its candidacy for a permanent seat and further push for global governance reform. In 2011, when South Africa was serving in its second tenure in the Council, it joined the BRICS group to become the only African state in this prestigious coalition of emerging powers. Many have sighted South Africa’s diplomatic activism as the main factor for its inclusion, this was because in economic indicators South Africa lagged behind the other BRICS members. The BRICS membership allowed South Africa to further consolidate its cooperation with two permanent members of the UNSC (Russia and China) and two of the leading candidates for permanent seats (India and Brazil) (Efstathopoulos 2016: 435).

South Africa’s invitation to the BRICS countries formation has added an impetus to the South African Agenda and status in global politics. Another milestone was in 2008, when South Africa became the only African member in the G20 Leaders’ Summit. BRICS summits also appeared to promote greater coordination on the issue of UNSC reform. As ‘China and Russia reiterated the importance they attach to Brazil, India and South Africa’s status and role in international affairs and support their aspirations to play a greater role in the UN’ (BRICS 2014).
3.12 The AU-UNSC Cooperation

South Africa built from its 2007-8 period, when it served in the Council, in building the formalization of cooperation between the AU and UNSC. The overwhelming dominance of African peace and security issues on the Council’s agenda, meant that Pretoria had to work towards the establishment of a formalised structure of the relationship between the UNSC and the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). This primarily aimed at avoiding what happened in the preceding year when the country was caught in between two conflicting approaches in dealing with the crisis in Libya. The structural formalization of the relationship between the AU and the UNSC became one of Pretoria’s major foreign policy priorities in its pursuit of an African Agenda. Thus, South Africa felt it needed a normative framework of cooperation on African issues in the Council. In its second year of the second term, January 2012, South Africa assumed the rotational presidency of the Council. Steering the UNSC to further debate the Resolution 2033, dealing with enhancing of the relationship between the Council and the AU and other regional organizations. The resolution called for the strengthening of relations between the UNSC and African regional bodies, in particular the AUPC and the Council, in conflict prevention, resolution, and management, and electoral assistance.

According to Nganje (2012) this development made the permanent members feel uneasy as they felt the power may be shifting away from the Council’s P5. Consequently, South Africa championed a landmark Security Council decision on strengthening the strategic cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council in Resolution 2033. This was built on South Africa’s sponsored Resolution 1809 of 2008 when it served for the first time in the Council. The Resolution 1809 came after South Africa hosted a special debate chaired by then President Thabo Mbeki and attended by heads of government in the Security Council, AUPSC, and African leaders who were non-permanent members.

During the 2011-2012 period, South Africa had actively participated in all 790 UNSC formal meetings, as well as meetings of subsidiary organs and working groups. The council adopted 118 resolutions, 51 presidential statements (PRSTs) and 150 press statements. South Africa voted in favour of all 118 resolutions and supported all PRSTs and press statements (Mxakato-Diseko 2013).

Permanent representative to the UN Ambassador Sangqu concluded that: "Looking back, South Africa's participation in over 800 meetings held by the Council during our tenure, we can boldly
state that South Africa has made a positive and significant contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts the world over” (Mxakato-Diseko 2013).

3.13 Conclusion

South Africa entered its second term in the Council as a full member of BRICS and the G20, reflecting its status as an emerging power in global politics. The country successfully promoted an African Agenda while joining hands with other developing countries in and outside the Security Council to push for global reform of global governance. As part of the activities, the country amongst others, chaired the UNSC Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa, championed a landmark Security Council decision on strengthening the strategic cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC and played a leadership role and significantly contributed to the work of the Council on African issues particularly on Sudan/South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), Western Sahara, Somalia, DRC, and Mali. The country also co-led Security Council Missions to Africa and led the conclusion of the peace mission in Timor-Leste, therefore consolidating the cause for self-determination of the Timorese people.

South Africa also promoted its positions with regard to the rule of law at national and international levels, development, post-conflict reconstruction and peace and justice. On other issues, South Africa broke ranks with its emerging power allies in the South, particularly in the case of the Libyan crisis and Ivory Coast electoral crisis. Generally, South Africa utilised the IBSA membership and partnership to enhance global South cooperation and the developmental agenda. It is important to add that, the call to reform the UNSC is part of a global strategy to erase the divide between the North and the South as there is an emergence of a new global order which has influenced South-South partners with the aim of having a rule based international system. Therefore, it can be concluded that South Africa stayed true to its objective to pursue the African Agenda while positioning itself as an emerging power within the international community by concerning itself with issues outside of the continent.
CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 2011-2012

4.1 Introduction

This aim of this chapter is to interpret the activities South Africa was involved in during the 2011-2012 tenure in the Security Council against the objectives of this study. It engages with available records to determine what might indicate South Africa’s influence. The interpretation is done in order to answer the question directly about the influence that South Africa has had in the UNSC. The chapter focuses on a number of initiatives by Pretoria to conclude whether the African interest was always pursued. In a nutshell, South Africa’s agenda has been the development of effective partnerships between the UN and regional organizations particularly the AU, maintenance of international peace and security; advancing the African Agenda, promoting the rule of law within multilateralism and the reform of the United Nations system. Therefore, this chapter draws a conclusion on whether the country succeeded in creating and pursuing an African agenda, South-South cooperation, resolution 2033 and South African influence. Then concludes by finalizing the assessment of how it succeeded in the pursuit of the reform agenda. The chapter also highlights the three challenges of the reform agenda experienced by South Africa and recommends that this can be rectified by incoming African members into the Council. Three major factors which have constrained South Africa’s reform agenda are: (i) the inflexible positions of the P5; (ii) the divisions within the AU; and (iii) the contradictions in South African foreign policy. All these will be a subject at the end of this section.

4.2 South African status in the UNSC

During its second tenure in the Council from 2011-2012, South Africa was fairly more successful in enhancing its status as a leader of the Africa continent. Under President Zuma, as shown in previous chapters, South Africa gained influential positions in global economic governance which allowed for the strengthening of its candidacy for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

The South African status within the region was also enhance by UN related activities which South Africa organised with others in the South on issues of safety and security. The workshop on Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) organised towards the end of South African’s second term was an example of a leadership role South Africa took to lead African issues in
the region and at UN. South Africa demonstrated that it will continue to champion the African agenda with the United Nations, African Union and other regional structures in order to uproot the scourge of global terrorism.

In summary, South Africa's tenure in the Security Council, was a bold statement on a positive and significant contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world. As an emerging middle power, South Africa reaffirmed its status as an influential player by pursuing the reform of multilateral institutions, building coalitions in and outside the UN and managing conflict (at least on the African continent).

4.3 The African Agenda

South Africa’s 2011-2012 tenure on the Council was built upon its previous experience aimed at contributing to achieving peace and stability in the African continent. It was evident that South Africa sought to strengthen the cooperation between the Council in addition to other regional and sub-regional organizations particularly on peace and security. It was the view of South Africa, that because of the power dynamics promoting the African Agenda and the promotion of the rule of law within multilateralism, will serve the interest of the Global South who have no permanent representative.

South Africa’s approach on the issue pertaining to the African continent has fundamentally been about the AU principle especially on conflict resolution. In addition, many have observed that it has always been about defending Article 40 of the UN Charter, which determines that the council should approach the solutions to conflicts without: “prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned” (UN Charter). It was this reason that South Africa supported Resolution 1973 on the case of Libya authorizing the “No-fly Zone”, as the country opposed the pursuit of a regime change agenda with disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Therefore, South Africa was within its AU mandate to stay true in guiding the interests of the continent, although the mandate and Resolution was abused by the P5 who pursued a regime change in Libya.

4.4 South-South Cooperation

On the Security Council, South Africa worked within its foreign policy parameters in promoting the South-South and North-South cooperation as well as African cooperation. In 2011, the country co-sponsored resolutions with Nigeria and Gabon demonstrating the Africa
United Doctrine. The country only abstained once – in the case of Syria on a draft resolution condemning violence. Nevertheless, through its statement, it expressed serious concerns at violence perpetrated by all parties in the Syrian conflict. South Africa solicited support within the NAM and BRCIS on many resolutions during its term and it was to South Africa’s advantage that within BRICS it had Moscow and Beijing to support its course, even on the issue of reform. These fora including the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation served as a status boost for the country. Therefore, promoting and strengthening South-South cooperation and supported the Agenda of the South through the BRICS; India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA); Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC); India-Africa Forum; NAM and G77, which was the country’s strategic objective.

4.5 Resolution 2033

Resolution 2033 of 2012 which was adopted from South Africa’s initiatives during its presidency and was a landmark decision as it makes specific recommendations on strengthening cooperation between the UNSC and AUPSC. Amongst the recommendations included is effective annual consultative meetings, the holding of timely consultations and collaborative field missions of the two councils to formulate cohesive positions and strategies. This undertaking by the council has ensured that there is greater harmonisation of intervention strategies in dealing with African conflict situations. This resolution remains one of South Africa’s success stories in its second term on the UNSC.

4.6 UNSC and AUPSC

As mentioned above, when South Africa took over the presidency of the Security Council in January 2012, it prioritised the need for greater cooperation between the Council and African regional organisations, particularly the African Union. Following the adoption of Resolution 2033, there has been a more synergetic relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC in addressing various African conflicts. South Africa is thought to have remained confident that the continued cooperation and unity between the two councils could be of immense benefit in respect of addressing the challenges confronting the continent.

Despite this formalization of relationship between these two councils, obstacles would still exist due to power, resources and political will which are always at play when conflict erupts on the African continent. In addition, African countries and regional bodies would need to
adopt clear, common positions on conflicts in the continent for effective cooperation with other multilateral organizations such as the UNSC in peace building initiatives.

When South Africa was serving on the Council, there were challenges regarding uncoordinated decisions within the Africa Group at the UN. Therefore, it would be the effort of the coming members to work more effectively through the AU office in New York, considering key AU decisions.

Many times, the African Union’s response to conflict intervention was slow and lacked resources. The UN Charter of 1945 gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for keeping peace, yet the Council has no substantial dedicated military force but relies on the armies of its member states whenever the need to deploy military personnel arises. In Addition, South Africa had the responsibility towards the capacity building initiative of the Africa Standby Force.

It can be stated with confidence that South Africa stood out as an influencing player in the Council and was able to maintain its integrity and independence on issues taking place in the UNSC agenda and did not succumb to pressure from powerful states. It has always been South Africa’s willingness to use its position as a non-permanent member of the council to influence processes and outcomes, strengthened by its reputation as a consensus-builder. Finally, South Africa gained valuable knowledge and experience serving for two years on this important organ of the UN.

4.7 The Reform Agenda

Undoubtedly, the reform agenda of the UN is an ongoing process and a prolonged process of intergovernmental UN negotiations. The agenda will have to be negotiated inside and outside the UN by interested and relevant parties.

It was made clear that the reform agenda was not of Africa alone but the rest of the continent and those in the global South who still faced marginalization in the Council. Thus, South Africa was guided by the African consensus because pursuing a unilateral campaign outside of the AU framework would have meant that the country isolated itself and put in jeopardy its ambition to occupy one of the permanent seats of the Security Council. To date, the African continent has not revised the consensus reached more than ten years ago. It remains the only formal continental position on the reform of the UNSC for African to pursue.
South African’s activities during their 2011-2012 period has been to keep the process and debate alive on the reform of the Council. This, in order to enable other African states to pursue the agenda when elected to serve in the Council long after South Africa. The challenge is that the reform debate and deliberations are predominately happening outside the Security Council’s formal meetings. The debate is predominately happening at the General Assembly of the UN and other regional structures outside the UN System. The General Assembly is unable to make binding decisions on amending the UN Charter on issues relating to the rules and structure of the UNSC; unless there is a two-thirds majority support in the Assembly and all P5 members. However, South Africa should be commended for initiating UN Security Council Open Debate on Justice and the Rule of Law which allowed for issues about the reform to be debated openly with permanent members and the elected members. This record demonstrates that Pretoria contributed immensely to the evolution of the reform debate in conjunction with the African group and those in the NAM.

In the beginning of South Africa’s second term on the Council, especially by April 2011, the UN Security Council used much of its time, energy and resources in the Arab spring with both Côte d’Ivoire’s post elections crisis on the agenda. This meant that South Africa as a member of the African block was to invest its resource on the current issues and place the reform agenda on a different timeline or on other forums within the UN system. Thus, the crowded peace and security agenda in the UNSC pushed the reform/expansion debate to the side.

The issue of veto by the permanent members, however, increasingly undermined the reform process, due to the P5’s reluctance to grant veto to prospective permanent members or abolishing their own veto power. In the absence of these fundamental reforms, the Council would continue to suffer a continued decline in its own authority and perceived legitimacy.

While many, including within the African continent, have questioned the legitimacy and credibility of the UN, the reform diplomacy allows for legitimising South Africa’s international status and its candidacy for permanent status. Thus, this reform agenda has been self-serving for South Africa as well. South Africa’s tenure also played a significant role in confidence building for African states towards the UN, particularly the Security Council.

In the growing worry of legitimacy of the UN, the inclusion of an influential African state in these fora had, to some degree, improved the representativeness of these organisations. The role South Africa played in the transformation agenda, though limited and the support it offered to the Council, made the UNSC be more accessible for African states and those in the Global
South. This significantly contributed to the democratization debate of the UN and the great need to reshape it.

In summary, the South African experience within the Council served as a reaffirmation that there is a fundamental need for reform of the Security Council and the expansion of its membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of this vital UN Organ. The world is evolving and no longer resembles the balance of power seen in the mid twentieth century at formation.

Notwithstanding the need for the reform of the Council, the agenda would have to be elevated to include more on the system itself instead of more emphasis on representation particularly in the Security Council. South Africa rode predominately on the representation ticket when it pursued the reform agenda. However, there are cases such as Libya and Syria whereby the country was advocating for the rule based international system. It can be concluded in brief that, substantial reform currently looked inconceivable without the willingness of those who held the veto power. Thus, member states did differ in terms of the shape of this transformation.

**4.8 Did South Africa fulfil its Reform Agenda?**

There is no doubt that South Africa contributed to the reform debate within and outside the Council. It did garner support from other regional blocks within the UN system. In terms of the actual reform process that would have to take place, little is known of what South Africa did, that is despite its diplomatic activism on the issue. Three general observations were made on the lack of influencing the reform agenda process. Firstly, the country did not have the ability to promote large scale transformation and influence a much larger reform contribution. Most of this was due to the non-permanent status of the elected members and the static AU position on the matter. Thus, the AU maintained an unyielding stand which cannot easily be accommodated by other parties and willing partners in the East. Furthermore, African states are in competition with one of the permanent members when the opportunity arises. Nomination of Africa’s representatives has not yet been put to a vote in the AU, which has led to splits or perhaps that is the perception being created.

Secondly, the division within the AU dampened the energy required to innovatively bring changes to the UN structure. Thus, the Africa group does not always speak in one voice although in principle they agreed to work together on issues of mutual interest in the Council.
The hegemonic contest between Nigeria and South Africa is a prime example. Although it was not the purpose of this study to analyse the relations amongst the African countries on the council, it is important to note that they agreed to work together in pursuit of the African Agenda. It was evident in the signing of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) infrastructure programme that the contestation of the two was in 2011 when South Africa is thought to have exerted more influence in Ivory Coast. In the presence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), they both disagreed on the issue of Libya particularly the recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC) which Nigeria favoured while South Africa’s approach was for an inclusive negotiated settlement recognizing both sides in the conflict.

It is an ongoing dilemma for the continent, that while countries in the Council pursue the interests of their region, they must also serve their own interests. Furthermore, these countries originate from their regional economic organizations. Therefore it is also in their interest to serve the regional mandate as it was the case with South Africa in SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS.

South Africa comprehended that it had to remain aligned with the AU position to inform its behaviour while serving on the Council. The purpose if that, despite the existing Francophone and Anglophone divide which exists on the continent, the country should be seen to be maintaining solidarity with its African counterparts. France and the UK as members of the Council were of the view that the UNSC should transform but scholars have pointed out the colonial interest of these permanent members especially on their former colonies.

The third factor which undermines South Africa’s reform diplomacy has been Pretoria’s foreign policy outlook. Accordingly, the country believes in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and human rights protection in Africa and the global South. However, there has been major contradictions in both South Africa’s terms serving on the Council. While South Africa was serving on one of the organs of the UN (UN Human Rights Council - UNHRC) it is said it controversially refrained from challenging the practices of states such as Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. South Africa found itself having to perform a balancing act and made sure it was not supporting impunity in the face of human right abuses we see on the continent and elsewhere in the South. It has always been a South African policy of supporting the principle of non-intervention and non-interference on domestic affairs of other states. Unless there is a case to be made on major atrocities being committed.
4.9 Conclusion

The role of regional leader and middle power states either on their own or as a group has gained considerable scholarly attention recently and this study has attempted to do this through studying the multilateral agenda of a single country. It was the purpose of this study to analyse the extent to which South Africa pursued the African Agenda on the Council.

The re-election of South Africa as a non-permanent member on the UNSC for the 2011–2012 period provided a new opportunity to further its reform agenda on the Council. From the onset, South Africa stated that its mandate was to pursue the interests of the African continent and the Global South in general. While South Africa did not achieve all its objectives of pursuing the African interest on issues before the Council, it made its views well-known.

The transformation of the Council is an ongoing process and it was shown that the permanent members have greater knowledge of the legal precedents that influence many of its decisions, and institutional memory that enable them manipulating the Council’s process to their advantage. Although, elected members have a consensus about the transformation of the Security Council, they do differ fundamentally on other issues. Thus, African states even within the multilateral platform such as the UNSC is divided on many issues and cooperation in some, therefore South Africa’s African Agenda will not always be Africa’s agenda.

The nomination of Africa’s representatives has not yet been put to a vote, therefore allowing the informal splits within the African group to remain. South Africa has been forced to remain aligned with the AU in order to maintain its solidarity with Africa and receive the 54 African votes in the case of a UN vote. Both terms provided South Africa with the opportunity to play a larger role in the reform process and demonstrate its capacity as a responsible member of the Council.

But there is no doubt that South Africa remained committed to champion the course of the African continent. It should also be noted that non-permanent members which have no veto or economic power, work even harder to promote their issues and agendas while hoping they will coincide with the interests of the P5. It is now the purpose of other African countries who are serving in the Council to ensure that the African continent moves to the centre of the global political system.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

South Africa’s second term in the UN Security Council involved many activities which deliberately focused on pursuing an African Agenda as per its promise in 2010. Its tenure also served to consolidate the country’s own ambition of a possible permanent seat in the Security Council. This means that there were ‘competition agendas’ within the South African activities; as foreign policy is not static and changes depending on circumstances. The country was not only involved actively in African issues but also in the situation in the Middle East and Timor-Leste. The candidacy in the Council served as a reaffirmation of South Africa’s emerging global player status in global politics. Therefore, the South African foreign policy assumed a truly global status building on from its first term in 2007-2008. In terms of the African agenda, it made a bold statement that it intended to promote the African Agenda, including highlighting of the continent’s priority in peace and security. The elected seat that South Africa occupied which is a seat shared amongst SADC and the East Africa block, was pivotal that South Africa worked with all members of SADC, African Union and the UN in pursuing the effectiveness of the global governance and multilateralism reform.

5.1 Key African Agenda Achievements

1. What would remain of the legacy of South Africa’s second term in the Council would be its work toward the solidification of the mechanisms of relations between the AUPSC and the UN Security Council through resolution 2033. Thus, it was revealed that South Africa worked tirelessly to ensure the evolving capacity of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and promoted new norms within the changing global security context where Africa features prominently through its sub-regional structures. In other words, the South African delegation used their time in the Council to build from the previous initiative on UN–AU co-operation by formalising and expanding its ambit. The passage of UNSC Resolution 2033 (2012), which built upon its predecessor UNSC Resolution 1809 (2008), reiterated the need for a ‘predictable, sustainable and flexible’ source of financial and logistical support and endorsed closer co-operation between the UN and the AU to improve its co-operation with the AU Commission.

Therefore, South Africa made it known that the African Union and sub-regional organizations had significantly improved their own role in building an architecture for peace and security, though there was room for improvement. While the Libyan crisis clearly demonstrated that
challenges remain, it cast a shadow over this effort to institutionalise new approaches to addressing conflicts on the African continent but the partnership between the UNSC and the AU still held firm.

2. South Africa, however, pursued the African agenda especially on the situation in Somalia where it worked with Nigeria in the peaceful settlement of conflict in the country. It further pursued the African position in the situation in Libya though not successful in the outcome of the crisis. In addition, amongst other activities aimed at advancing the African agenda, South Africa hosted a workshop on the Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) for African States which is focused on regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In summary, it can be concluded that there is evidence of South African activities specifically aimed at pursuing an African Agenda despite limitations of the country participating through a non-permanent seat.

3. For South Africa, through its first and second term in the Council, Pretoria was to be guided by its own experiences from the democratic transition from apartheid to democracy. Thus, through crisis in Libya, DRC, South Sudan, Ivory Coast, South Africa prioritized diplomacy inclusivity and transparency in resolving conflict, though not successful in all. South Africa’s role in and outside the Council is underpinned by a need to be involved in international peace and security efforts. As an active participant in the Council and through various missions in Africa and elsewhere South Africa played a significant role in peace building efforts in Libya, Somalia, DRC even after finishing its term in the Council, December 2012.

It can be concluded that, South Africa’s second term in the Security Council serves as a reminder to the world that the African continent is capable and is ready to deal with crisis that may occur in the region. Moreover, with the support of the UN, the continent can deal with its own challenges and troubles. Furthermore, a stamp of approval from the African continent particularly those in SADC and East Africa that South Africa is capable to lead an African Agenda provides South Africa with the credibility that it needs to represent the continent.

This research can report that South Africa used its second tenure in the Council to pursue a certain level of an African agenda particularly on the peaceful resolution of conflict and an agenda based on rule of law. South Africa Achieved three African objectives namely: the attempt to protect the territorial integrity of African states, cooperation with regional bodies on peace and security and acknowledged and enhanced the role of other UN organs. Those are
the three pillars of the South African Agenda its second term in the Council. However, in some instances, South Africa did not directly influence but significantly added its voice to the global campaign on the reform agenda of the UN system.

It is justifiable to spend a lot of attention on the relationship built with South Africa’s initiatives because the longer-term impact of the South African initiatives may be as significant for global governance as it is for Africa’s peace and security arrangements in the UN system. It could be argued that the South African decision to pursue the enhancement of regional security initiatives provides some hope or alternative during little reform of the Council. This is a move away from talking about reforming the Council on issues of representation of Africa in the permanent category in the Council as proposed by the Ezulwini Consensus. Therefore, the empowerment of regional organisations as security managers gave an impetus to legitimize and give credibility to the UN.

South Africa’s foreign policy has always been rooted in the interests and needs of the continent. The principle has always been to forge an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, and united; which contribute to a just world. Thus, through many statements analysed in this study, South Africa’s foreign policy conduct has been guided by the principled commitment to the African continent.

Although South Africa maintains that it will be guided by the interests of the African continent, the country understood that it is there to play its part in the maintenance of peace and security globally while advancing the interests of the Global South. The country was aware that it is there to focus on the building of multilateral institutions which are democratic and adherent to international law. Thus, it has always been the principle of South Africa’s multilateral strategy to promote a rule based international system.

5.2 Limitations of a Non-Permanent Member

1. The limitation for such influence primarily has to do with the rotational principle of the non-permanent seat itself in the Council. This is coupled with the presidency role which is afforded to non-permanent members to bring issues of their concern to the agenda table. Although there is a rotational non-permanent membership seat for SADC and the East Africa Block, there is no guarantee and evidence that these countries have established a mechanism to preserve institutional memory which the permanent members have in the Council.
5.3 Recommendations

1. There is no doubt that the UN system allows lower to middle class countries to exert influence on issues of global governance. However, for a sustained campaign that will lead to a meaningful and lasting legacy these countries should be more vocal, vigorous and even confrontational while serving in the Council.

2. There is an assumption that Africa is united whereas there are divisions within various economic blocks such as SADC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Divisions within the AU have dampened the energy needed to innovatively bring changes to the UN structure. Thus, the African group does not always speak in one voice although in principle, they agreed to work together on issues of mutual interest within the Council. Thus, until there is enough energy within the African Group, the block will not get all their priorities realised.

3. The African Agenda is being diluted by county ‘national interests’ or domestic imperatives. This is also hampered by the fact that South Africa continues to face challenges with regards to its hegemonic status throughout the African continent as there are other states who aspire to play a similar role. Therefore, South Africa should not punch above its weight and must derive its support firstly from regional structures on the continent where it has support.

4. To date, the African continent has not revised the consensus reached more than ten years ago. It remains the only formal continental position on the reform of the UNSC for African to pursue. It is this study’s recommendation that there needs to be continuous realignment to this position to suit the changing political environment in Africa and globally.

5. South Africa should solicit support in other multilateral arrangements such as NAM, BRCIS, IORA, IBSA and G20 to boost its status and positions in the UN. It is in South Africa’s advantage that within BRICS it has Moscow and Beijing to support its course even on the issue of UN reform.
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