Abstract

At the heart of the conundrum of regional integration in Africa is the very conceptual basis of the idea and its agendas. In southern Africa, the agenda has for decades been about fighting poverty and enabling a good life for the citizens of the region, but the so-called developmental regional integration agenda is undermined by the lack of coherence and synergy between the security and development arms of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The former has the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ of Security Cooperation and Defence (SIPO) and the development efforts are guided by the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Both claim to pursue human security by placing the plight of ordinary citizens at the centre of all efforts, yet in reality this shared aspiration has not provided a basis conceptually speaking, nor practically, for a deep cohesion in the manner in which SADC pursues its overriding goals. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of the concept and it also anticipates how it will evolve into a holistic idea in southern Africa. It identifies major obstacles to the achievement of the goal and offers possible solutions to the conceptual confusion that confounds the idea of human security by suggesting a comprehensive understanding of the concept and how it might apply in southern Africa.
1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War shifted the world's attention from matters of security and stability to issues of socio-economic conditions in a manner that rendered the old concept of security obsolete because it neglected social and economic threats to human welfare. As part of this shift, the concept of human security was adopted as an attempt to fuse the new security thinking with the doctrine of human development. The problem is that human security has since become a reincarnation of old security thinking that emphasise statist and militaristic considerations (Tickner 1995; Tieku 2007 and Plant 2012). Whereas in the 1990s, human security embodied all elements of human development — social and economic — in the 2000s it is increasingly being used as an adjunct to hard security. After the September 11 attacks, human security was equated with the rebuilding of collapsing states and provision of essential services to stem the recruitment of ‘terrorists’ or to win hearts and minds in enemy countries (Hough 2001). In this sense, human security became a means for achieving a hard security agenda rather than an end in itself. This means that in order to reverse the securitisation of the concept, we must begin by re-discovering the socio-economic discourse from which it emerged in the first place.

This article arises from a larger study whose terms of reference required an elucidation of what constitutes social and economic dimensions of human security as a framework for engagement between state and civil society in the SADC region around socio-economic issues like social security, public service provision, trade integration, economic production, poverty eradication, resource governance and beneficial cross-border migration. The study was also expected to propose mechanisms through which these actors advance human security and a set of strategic action areas that could form the basis for such concerted action. The paper departs from the premise that human security was born out of the evolution of the development discourse, particularly, the convergence between the expanded concept of security and the evolving human development agenda.

This article drew on a critical reading of a large body of literature, published and unpublished, regarding issues connected to the broad idea of human security including its social and economic dimensions. Discussions with experts in the field, including an expert at the SADC
secretariat, a Development Bank of Southern Africa’s (DBSA) regional integration expert, an analyst for the SADC Council of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), an analyst for the SADC Chamber of Commerce, an independent SADC integration consultant, and an author of several works that analyse the state of integration helped test the author’s initial ideas for this article. An earlier draft was also used to catalyse a debate with a team of experts at a southern Africa civil society portal on how to influence SADC to find a neat fit between its socio-economic plans and processes, on the one hand, and its security policy and endeavours, on the other. Inputs from all these processes were integrated into two revised versions of this article.

2. What do we mean by human security?

An analysis that is seeking to suggest an expanded understanding of human security as a commonly used concept in SADC discourses and documents must begin with a general definition of the concept of human security. A thorough analysis of different uses of human security is a subject for its own full discussion. This article focuses on arguing for a holistic or comprehensive understanding and application of the idea of human security. The following are some of the key features that various strands in the discussion of human security share:

— Firstly, human security is about the quality of life of people and about their social quality and deeper human relations (Gasper et al 2008).

— Secondly, it encompasses the pursuit of economic growth, improved access to resources, access to essential public services, political empowerment, and institutional support for purposes of enhancing human well-being (Thakur 1997).

— Thirdly, it promotes security from fear and violence, as well as from ignorance, poverty, and cultural deprivation (Van Ginkel and Newman 2000).

— Fourthly, it is about states and markets exercising their authority with the consent of the people (good governance) and for the good of the people (development) (Graham and Poku 2000).

— Fifthly, human security is the pursuit of sustainable human development by ensuring equity within and between generations (So-
Sixthly, it is empowerment of human beings to take charge of the efforts to improve their capabilities, enhance their well-being and protect their human dignity. (McLean undated).

Seventh, human security is the concern with soft issues of security, such as humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, restorative justice and national reconciliation (Cilliers 2004).

In this sense, human security is generally understood to be a concern about human-related issues in economy, social affairs and security. It is about measuring progress of everything on the basis of the circumstances of human beings rather than just things like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and income. It, therefore, represents the return of the human to the centre of deliberation about how to move society forward. It is about securing space, advantage and safety for the human. For this reason, it is people-centered, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented (UN Human Security Unit 2009).

The concept, as understood by the United Nations (UN) consistent with its tendency to allow greater space for humanist perspectives, entails protection of people from threats to their well-being, on the one hand, and empowerment for effective human agency, on the other. Yet, dominant discourses on the subject continue to narrow the concept to security with a human face or merely older paradigms of development by a new name. In practice also, the manner in which countries and international organisations like SADC and the African Union (AU) do their work fails to harness the comprehensive understanding of human security in order to align better efforts at protection (security) and empowerment, as well as provision.

3. The post-war agenda: Peace as human security and empowerment

After two devastating so-called world wars, the Western world was poised to find new ways of organising and managing power so as to prevent the recurrence of conflict by, among other things, focusing attention to promoting human well-being. A new idea of peace needed to replace the old one. The need to balance these two dimensions of stability was meant to inform the work of the UN at the onset. Launch-
ing the UN Charter on 22 June 1945, the United States (US) President Truman remarked that the Charter raised prospects that "all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people". The US Secretary of State, Edward R Stettinius, went further:

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace (Schlesinger, undated).

This inspired the creation of organs like the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to counterbalance the focus on politics, security and justice. This means that the UN was essentially about a fusion of security and developmental efforts for human advancement. Similarly, outside the centre of the Western world had also evolved many efforts that sought to bring the human back into the centre of all endeavours internationally, including the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference of 1955 that underlined human solidarity, collective self-reliance and the liberation of people into the mainstream of global dialogues.

Although the concept of human security gained currency only from the mid-1990s, the genesis of its framework can be traced back to contestations of ideas about development that saw the ascendance of neoliberal ideology with the backing of global/Western powers and their global governance institutions. The gestation of the idea related to the belief that the UN's mandate was to help the world advance the cause for peace on two fronts, as stated above; the economic growth orthodoxy of the 1950s that gave birth to the neo-liberal agenda and structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s; the UN conference diplomacy on the development agenda in the 1960s through to the 2000s; and the UN's human development index in the mid-1990s. All these developments helped shape various elements of a human development agenda. They culminated in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 that was the basis for the much-vaunted Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as its practical expression (Jolly, Emerij and Weiss 2005).

The economic growth discourse became a dominant response to the devastation of economies and social life during the big wars, thanks to the power of the US and the international finance institutions it would use to assert its global/imperial oversight over the world in the
post-war period. The Western-controlled World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), commonly known as the Bretton Wood Institutions, became pivotal institutional drivers of the narrative and provided the policy frameworks and practical implementation of the neo-liberal agenda for economic development (Mentan 2011). With massive political and military power on account of its role in the war, its economic prowess and its size, the US would emerge as the new custodian of the Western-controlled world order as older colonial empires like Britain and France diminished as they also lost colonies.

In contrast to this, the UN argued that to be effective, economic growth needed to lead to full employment, diminishing income disparities, domestic savings and investment and other forms of distributional equity. This argument was advanced in three important policy reports in the early post-war era: *National and International Measures for Full Employment* (1949), *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries* (1951), and *Measures for International Economic Stability* (1951). Whereas the growth discourse placed emphasis on economic growth, the UN proposed economic development by which it meant social outcomes rather than economic efficiency should be the true measure of progress.

The UN declared the 1960s a 'Development Decade', which the US President, John F Kennedy, captured aptly when he told the UN General Assembly in 1961 that, "Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope" (Jolly, Emerij and Weiss 2005: 5). Yet, the US would in practice undermine the expanded and decolonialising concept of development that would embrace sovereignty, self-reliance and empowerment of the downtrodden. It was clear to the UN that this could not be done without a change of economic paradigm and approach, but the Western bloc wanted to impose a growth paradigm that perpetuated inequality while generating super profits for the West. The *United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action Report* of 1962 declared, "Development is not just economic growth, it is growth plus change" (United Nations 1962). It went further to say:

One of the greatest dangers in development policy lies in the tendency to give more material aspects of growth an overriding and disproportionate emphasis. The end may be forgotten in the pre-
occupation with the means (United Nations 1962: 10).

To elaborate the various nuances of human development, the UN convened conferences and summits, namely, environment and development (1972); hunger and the world food problems (1974); population growth (1974); women and development (1975); employment and basic needs (1976); human settlements (1976); and science and development (1979). The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also developed international consensus on the need for special trade support for the least developed countries. This developmental dialogue helped focus global energies to 'growth plus'; growth that meets basic human needs and enhances human capabilities (Jolly, Emerij and Weiss 2005).

The particularly grave socio-economic conditions in Africa provided an opening for the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) backed by the most powerful states in the world to impose their neo-liberal agenda. The BWIs imposed market and state reforms on African countries as part of economic measures to deal with the economic problems sparked by the energy crisis of 1973. The BWIs made grants and loans conditional on fiscal discipline, reduction of inflation, relaxation of exchange controls, removal of price controls, reduction of budget deficits, and fiscal discipline, as well as drastic political reforms designed to trim the size of the state and its social expenditure. The latter led to massive retrenchment of public servants and employees of state agencies at the same time as the BWIs imposed a reduction in social expenditure. A leaner and meaner state simply could not respond to ubiquitous poverty and other social ills that bedevilled southern Africa in the 1980s and 1990s (Mhone 2003).

For this reason, some called the 1980s a lost decade. However, the UN used its new role of constructive dissent to present to the BWIs what it termed structural adjustment with a human face (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987). The UN argued for a balance between the urgent process of economic stabilisation and poverty eradication, human capital and protection of human rights. To this end, the UN provided various alternatives to structural adjustment.

The post-Cold War conditions introduced widespread changes to the politics of Africa, putting the UN and development agencies back in the centre of international and national development. The UN revisited the 1970s agenda through a series of summits and conferences,
namely: environment (Rio 1992), human rights (Vienna 1993), gender (Beijing 1995), social development and social security (Copenhagen 1995) and food security and social policy (Rome 1996). These culminated in the UN Millennium Summit of 2000 which synthesised all global developmental commitments into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Every country committed to a common agenda to reduce poverty, hunger and disease; to improve survival prospects for mothers and infants and to promote better education, equal opportunities for women, and a healthier environment. They agreed to put in place national development policies and to collaborate much more effectively to achieve these goals. The MDGs have become the singular measure of progress by all societies (United Nations 2006).

With the rediscovery of development, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the former executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, said:

I came to realise that development is more than mere economism, more than macro-economic aggregates and indicators, that human beings are not mere economic beings. They are also political, social, and cultural beings as well, and these affect their behavioural patterns in the economic domain (Jolly, Emerij and Weiss 2005: 15).

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) through the publication of the Human Development Report (HDR) positioned the idea of comprehensive human development as the overarching paradigm of human progress. It shifted the measuring of progress away from narrow macro-economic indicators like growth rates to a composite measure in the form of the Human Development Index (HDI). This encompassed income, literacy and education, health, life expectancy, technology and innovation, popular participation, democracy and human rights as indicators of progress.

4. The Peace and Security Agenda as a second front of human security

Focus on the 'second front' as Stettinius (quoted in Schlesinger 2006: 3) put it, viz peacebuilding and conflict prevention, also grew significantly after World War II. The UN and the Security Council put measures in place and adopted a plethora of resolutions to promote international
security or prevent a recurrence of conflict and war. The former 'Allied Powers' (the US, the United Kingdom (UK), the Soviet Union (USSR), China, and France), which constituted the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, collectively guaranteed security in the world. The Council's mandate was to prevent insecurity using either peaceful means or collective military action (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). The noble idea in this was to remove from any single power, however powerful, the ability to begin wars and cause destruction without consequence.

But in this way the permanent five inherited undemocratic and disproportionate power to use the UN to pursue their own strategic self-interests (Kumalo 2006). In spite of the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, the Security Council agenda remains largely fixated on hard security. Militaristic and statist conceptions of security predominate. Military might is still seen as a proper response to problems to international stability (Moller 2006). The focus of protecting states and non-state actors are often seen as illegitimate. The whole international system continues to invest a lot of time and energy in arms control, disarmament, peace-keeping, and military industrial complexes. In the aftermath of September 11, the notion of pre-emptive military strikes has re-emerged as a key response to terrorism, an outcome of marginalisation and underdevelopment (Xego and Oliver 2003). Even post-conflict reconstruction and development focuses on the stability of the state and security from military threats, even though it is increasingly clear that the challenge is the persistence of social and economic problems after wars (Hough 2003). Under these conditions, the militarisation of social and political life even in southern Africa continues unabated (Ikome 2007).

By the end of the Cold War, efforts were underway to redefine security away from a fixation with the security of the state from military threats to the exclusion of equally crucial social and economic threats (Brown 1977, Ullman 1983, Mathews 1989, Buzan 1991). The idea was to expand the concept of security to incorporate social, economic, and environmental factors that directly threaten human well-being. In this sense, therefore, security thinking shifted towards development at a point in time when development itself was being expanded to incorporate political issues like human rights and violence. The argument is that human security came to embody these simultaneous conceptual shifts. Below we demonstrate this fusion of concepts in the interest of
human welfare.

5. **Human security as a developmental response**

From an African perspective, a series of developments, from the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) of the early 2000s, testify to the evolution of continental ideas on issues of security and development simultaneously with the evolution of a greater global emphasis on human development and security. Cold War conditions allowed security and stability to dominate African politics, leaving the matter of development in the hands of external players like donors and NGOs. After the Cold War, the continent started departing from narrowly-defined security and stability approaches towards a holistic idea of development. It shifted away from ideology to concerns about the welfare of ordinary Africans.

While Africa maintained focus on developmental questions through its self-reliance initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s (principally, the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980), it was from 1990 onwards that it chose in a robust fashion the cause of development over fixation on security/stability for its own sake. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was adopted against the backdrop of an economic order dominated by the growth discourse and marked by skewed development and unbalanced trade between developed and developing countries. Africa had become the basket case for the world, heavily dependent on aid and loans from the West. The World Bank and IMF's austerity measures under the Structural Adjustment Programmes further deepened the African development problem. The LPA was premised on the conviction by African states to promote collective self-reliance by enhancing economic and social cooperation among themselves on the following priority areas — issues that coincided with the UN agenda for development. These included: food and agriculture; industry; human resource development; science and technology; transport and communications; trade and finance; energy; gender; development planning; and population development.

The idea was to accelerate productive economic development and reduce dependency, as well as to advance economic solidarity (Ikome 2006: 76-92). A major shortcoming of the LPA is that it did not
give regional economic communities sufficient space and capacity to carry forward the momentum it created. The Abuja Treaty of 1991, which established the African Economic Community (AEC), sought to turn these into effective locomotives for the new African development. The Treaty espoused the shift towards human development by promoting greater focus on human welfare and participation in regional initiatives. The immediate outcomes were the transformation of the Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992; the creation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994; the revival of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa and the East African Community (EAC) in 1998 and 1999, respectively; and the revision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty in West Africa in 1993. But the influence of nation states and the preponderance of the notion of state sovereignty served to constrain the evolution of effective regionalism and holistic development that the Treaty promised.

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) adopted in 2002 sought to build on advances made by the LPA and the Abuja Treaty in advancing a common African development plan. The NEPAD responded to the need for a plan that would promote self-reliance (as LPA envisaged) through regional integration (Abuja Treaty) in a manner that responds to the current phase of globalisation. NEPAD's answer was to add the idea of strategic partnership between Africa and the world in a concerted effort to eradicate poverty by enhancing human development (health and education) and boosting economic growth (investment, production, and technology). NEPAD also placed a responsibility on African states to create conducive political and economic conditions for this to happen by promoting peace and stability as well as democracy and good governance. In this sense, NEPAD sought a delicate balance between improved physical security and superior economic production in the pursuit of human development. This shows that NEPAD was born out of the same conditions that gave rise to the concept of human security. The policy programme and plans of NEPAD provide the basis for social and economic dimensions of human security in Africa, viz:

— **Human capital development** (improving education, health and other social sectors);
Agriculture and development (removing structural and institutional constrains to food production and commercial agriculture);

Infrastructural development to bridge the digital divide between Africa and the world and to promote economic growth (special focus on the energy, water, sanitation, transport and ICT infrastructure); and

Science and technology as a major impetus for industrial development and creation of employment.

In this sense, human development is a theme that runs through global and African initiatives. Given universal acceptance of NEPAD as a common African vision and programme; using the NEPAD programmes and plans as part of the content of Southern African Trust's (SAT) Human Security Agenda will enhance its legitimacy and credibility. In this sense, SAT should position its Human Security Initiative as an essentially NEPAD-enhancing intervention.

6. The SADC framework for human security: RISDP and SIPO

If the point we argue above is true — that human security was conceived as an attempt to establish two fronts for true global peace — then what are the implications for SADC's pursuit of security and development? What opportunities exist for greater alignment and synergy between them? And what does this say about the SADC broader development orientation, this commitment to a better life for all? The framework for the achievement of human security in SADC derives from its two mega plans adopted as part of SADC's institutional reform in 2003-2004. These are the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and its political programme which the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) embodies.

The transformation from SADCC to SADC was informed by a number of factors, namely, the need to balance security and development in response to post-Cold War conditions; the Abuja Treaty's vision of effective regional economic integration; the integration of new South Africa into the regional initiative; and improving the efficiency of SADC's institutional machinery. Whereas the primary goal of SADCC
was containment of apartheid South Africa, SADC aimed to deepen developmental integration with a view to eradicate poverty in the region. SADC was also formed to respond to particular issues of uneven development, poor economic convergence, low intra-regional trade, disease, food crises and high levels of poverty in the region. In this sense, the 15-member SADC is fundamentally about what we call socio-economic imperatives of human security.

The reform of the structures of SADC in 2003-2004 was meant to improve its efficiency as well as its effectiveness. A centrepiece of the institutional reforms was the devolution of implementation capacity to nation states with the creation of a National Committee inclusive of civil society. This was an attempt to democratise the integration scheme and build an efficient institutional vehicle for acceleration of regional integration for poverty eradication.

SADC also developed a common developmental and political policy agenda: the RISDP and SIPO. The SIPO was designed to create a peaceful environment for the achievement of its development agenda (the RISDP). At its adoption, SADC declared: "The SIPO is not an end in itself … it is an enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda [epitomized by the RISDP]" (SADC 2004: 5). The SIPO was to do so by protecting the people of the region from threats arising from a breakdown of law and order, conflict and aggression as its first objective declares. To achieve this, SADC agreed to promote peaceful interstate relations, establish early warning mechanisms, promote the development of democratic institutions and protection of human rights, enhance regional capacity to prevent and manage natural disasters, and to conclude a mutual defence pact against external military threats. An important point to note is that the primary goal was security of the people of the region rather than governments per se. This is a crucial conceptual space for advancing human security through SIPO.

As an elaboration of the SADC developmental agenda, the RISDP is premised on a holistic approach to human development focused on the well-being of the SADC citizen. Among many key areas of intervention, RISDP focused on target-specific and time-bound work on poverty eradication; combating HIV/AIDS; food security; social and human development (health, education and social welfare); gender equality; science and technology; environment; private sector; and trade liberalisation. Clearly, it embodies the gist of the UN agenda for
development as it evolved from the 1960s to the MDGs.

As in the case of the UN after 1945, the fundamental challenge for this grandiose framework is the fact that RISDP and SIPO have developed distinct institutional identities that separate rather than integrate them. They have become independent programmes rather than interdependent elements of a common agenda. The artificial gap between the two plans has cemented weak co-operation between SIPO and RISDP drivers within the SADC Secretariat.

Figure 1 illustrates that while the two plans continue to pursue the wellbeing of SADC citizens, they do so from their 'own' perspective (development or security) with little regard for the cross-cutting nature of the threats to human welfare. Improved outputs on either side do not necessarily lead to a better impact on the security of the welfare of the people. RISDP is being implemented without defining the role and effect of elements of political and military security, assuming that these are appropriately dealt with under the SIPO, and vice versa. Opportunities that should arise from a smart partnership with intermediaries like civil society formations and traditional authorities are missed by their continued exclusion on both sides.

Figure 1: SADC Development and Security Plans

The premise of human security is human agency, namely that people are capable of dealing with their adverse condition if given proper support. For this reason, human security is empowerment. This ability is
often undermined by conditions in society that further weaken the human being, the so-called threats to human security. This means human security is also about protection. Below, we propose the basis for aligning the two conceptually with the hope that this will lay the basis for policy synergy.

6.1 SADC agenda as human protection

Central to SADC's developmental paradigm must be a recognition that the sources of insecurity range from physical threats to socio-economic factors. So, in developing ideas about how to give practical meaning to this, SADC must consider its efforts as an anticipation of and response to threats categorised as follows:

— **War and conflict**: human beings are the main casualties in violent conflict. Conflict leads to loss of resources and even their lives. It wrecks infrastructures and livelihood systems and it increases the risks of recurring cycles of violence and conflict. SADC faces challenges of conflict in the DRC, Madagascar, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, while the culture of violence, especially gender-based violence, persists all over the region.

— **Natural disasters**: there are gradual changes in the physical environment which erode human capability over a long period of time, such as the deteriorating conditions of the soil, climate warming, drought, pollution, rise in sea level, and the depletion of essential resources. Industrial production contributes to erosion of human capability by contributing to global warming and pollution. The SADC region remains prone to violent natural emergencies that threaten human wellbeing, including floods, veld fires, and pestilence.

— **Poverty** is among the most serious threats to human progress in the SADC region. It undermines freedom from want as well as the capacity to meet one's most basic needs and those of one's family over the long term. Poverty is when there is a lack of employment, food or access to health, education and social protection. As inequality among social groups increases it leads to jealousy, criminality and even violence. Income poverty, which is the inability to raise income necessary to meet basic needs, is also prevalent in SADC.


— Adverse economic conditions: Conditions of low and uneven economic development between countries and within countries at SADC undermine human security. Efficient functioning of markets, improving commerce, effective industrial development, expanded trade and economic incentives contribute to eliminating social and economic threats to human welfare (Sen 1999a). The SADC experience shows countries that have strong economies are able to invest the fruits of high economic growth in human capital development and social service delivery for the fight against poverty (Sen and Dreze 1989: 221-234). On the other hand, weak economies are ranked low in the HDI. Economic crises such as the recent sudden rise in food prices and substantial increase in commodity prices further erode human well-being. Poverty provides a propitious climate for an interaction of factors that lead to conflict (Draman 2003).

— Weak human capital: degraded human capital compromises development in all its dimensions. For this reason, better educational attainment, increased competence, and healthier bodies do not only constitute a better quality of life in themselves, but they also enhance people's ability to contribute significantly to social and economic progress in society. In SADC, there is an abundance of evidence indicating that high human life quality also contributes substantively to economic growth. However, this should not lead to reducing people to mere tools and means of production and material progress.

— Diversity and social exclusion: discrimination must rank among the chief causes of social exclusion and conflict in many parts of southern Africa. Diversity which is meant to be a cultural heritage and an asset for human agency often leads to exclusion of a portion of the population and even to conflict. The exclusion of women, the elderly, the disabled, youth, and ethnic minorities continues to pose a serious danger to human security by limiting the participation of society in a collective public action to achieve social progress. Incidents of discrimination against and hatred of immigrants in South Africa and Botswana have to do with competition for resources between citizens and immigrants. The plight of refugees and economic migrants continues to look bad in the region. This arises in part from the exclusionist concept of
citizenship, a relational construct which distinguishes between 'us' and 'them'. It breeds xenophobia, exclusion of immigrants and even violence against them (Crush 2001; Zondi 2008). But it also has to do with weak human rights architecture in many countries.

— **Erosion of social values**: human security is partly about restoring certain social values and norms that promote harmony, social improvement, and responsible citizenship. These values are crucial for the formation and enhancement of identity and form part of the social fabric that propels community welfare (Anderson 1991: 1-6). Disintegration of this cultural heritage robs society of social capital necessary to advance human security in all its dimensions. This is the element that is particularly weak in the SADC agenda at the moment.

— **Neglect of human rights**: political and civil rights make it possible for citizens to make their needs and challenges known and to demand public action. In the absence of these rights, citizens are cowed into submission, suffering in silence; often, this forces them to find alternative means of meeting their needs, some of which have a disruptive impact to social order, such as crime. The challenge of popular discontent and criminality is a big one in the SADC region. The fact that no famine has occurred in a democratic country with freedom of expression and a free press suggests that the erosion of human rights deprives human beings of their ability to communicate creeping dangers and to call for action at the right time (Sen 1997: 12). Under conditions where socio-economic rights are neglected, there is poor public action on people’s access to basic necessities like food, shelter, health, sanitation and so forth.

— **The nature and conduct of the state**: a legitimate state has a major role in guaranteeing human security to society by creating conditions for human agency. However, the state is a major source of threats to human welfare in the southern African region through their failure to provide essential public amenities and by using their security apparatus to crush popular dissent. In some cases the state has participated in the plunder of national resources and corruption, thus robbing citizens of essential means of material progress. In the same vein, the external measures to curtail the role of the state led to loss of capacity to respond to domestic
needs and demands (Baltodano 2004). In this sense, both a weak and a strong state could present problems for human security.

### 6.2 Human security as empowerment

Human security seeks to enhance human capabilities and to transform the surrounding environment that can impinge on human agency. However, what human beings can do with their own agency is conditional on social circumstances around them, over which they may or may not have control. For this reason, strong institutional support from state, society and family can radically transform what ingenious people can and cannot do.

In this regard, policy measures designed to enhance outcomes in health, education, social security, housing, employment and human capital development are critical. But social policy also means the entire public effort to deal with basic social questions that threaten the well-being of individuals, families, communities and society. In post-conflict societies, it includes what society does to restore social order and transform institutional arrangements, patterns of resource distribution, and forms of human interrelationships to build a desired society. Social policy is about the social contract between state and citizens.

Policies on education and health are crucial in arming citizens with skills for advancing themselves. Areas of social policy that are weakest in the SADC region include employment and entrepreneurship; social insurance and its portability; community development policies, as well as incentivising instruments for enterprise development, rights to own assets, tax rebates, subsidies and capacity building. Social policies that expand the scope of people's participation in decision-making about development and opportunities to debate in order to influence these decisions are also weak (Maistry 2008). Social scrutiny is vital in the continuous process of institutional reform.

To effectively use the RISDP and SIPO to address threats to human well-being, SADC will have to overcome the artificial gulf between the two plans by promoting greater synergy between them. This synergy will come about when it is borne in mind that the ultimate focus is to improve the conditions of citizens in the region and that RISDP and SIPO are merely means to this end. The common target requires an integration of measures and activities from planning to evaluation without destroying their autonomous identities.
We propose the following stages in building the synergy between the development and security efforts in the regional integration process:

— **Greater awareness** of the commonalities in the programme. This includes promoting and sharing knowledge within the Secretariat and in the National Committees about on-going processes and activities on both sides. This should enhance awareness and mutual understanding between officials working on both plans;

— **Greater cooperation** in areas that are already closely aligned. This means that the Secretariat should take advantage of overlapping areas in the RISDP and SIPO plans of action to ensure joint planning and reviews as well as monitoring of progress. Progress reports must show how these areas of cooperation are advancing;

— **Greater harmony** in the areas that need work in order to synergise for joint implementation. This will need revision of existing business plans and implementation guidelines to give effect to input from the other side. This should be designed to build on cooperation and common understanding by extending it to areas where this cooperation is not a given;

— **Greater integration** is the ultimate goal. This is the culmination of consistent cooperation, sharing of knowledge and responsibilities, and harmony among annual and multi-year plans. Integra-
tion denotes complete merger of short-term objectives to realise
the common long-term goal, namely, poverty eradication and
economic development. It will be about eliminating separate plan-
ing and implementation processes and combining office space.

7. Key actors

Given the evolution of society over the past century and the challenges
that continue to confront people, especially in Africa, comprehensive
human security will not propel itself. It will require champions and cata-
lysts to help entrench in public and private policy, public action in
general, and common practice in society. To succeed, human security
will require a dynamic partnership amongst the following stakeholders:

— A capable and democratic state rather than a nanny state is a
  crucial driver of a synergised human security agenda (Sen
  1999b). The state holds constitutional power to provide security
  for people and institutions in society. It also regulates economic
  activities to promote redistribution of economic benefits and puts
  social policies in place to protect the vulnerable. It is also the
  state that drives partnerships with key actors like civil society and
  business. Currently, it is still member states that drive the agenda
  of SADC, holding overwhelming power over the Secretariat.

— Effective regional and sub-regional interstate institutions like AU
  and SADC provide a basis for states and countries to pool their
  resources and energies in the fight against poverty. They are
  best poised to overcome uneven development within and be-
  tween countries, strengthen the capacity of the nation state as a
  guarantor of social welfare, and to promote integrated responses
  to common problems. Any attempt to entrench human security
  must, of necessity, establish linkages with appropriate SADC
  organs as vehicles for promoting comprehensive human security.

— Development facilitators are key social partners of the state in
delivering public goods. They provide critical financial and tech-
nical support for implementation of policies and programmes.
They often get commissioned by government to act as imple-
mentation agencies for major projects. Some of these are state
funded. SADC Secretariat needs to develop a structured relation-
ship with major African development finance institutions like the
DBSA on the basis of combined needs arising from SIPO and RISDP.

External donors remain major sources of finance for regional integration as evident in SADC’s programmatic and operational budget (CPSI 2003). In 2006 a study of donors showed that up to 60 per cent of the total SADC budget came from European donors (Tjonneland 2006) and by 2014 the figure was estimated at 79 per cent, thus putting European donors especially firmly in a position of influence regarding the range of options and choices SADC needed to explore as it advanced its regional integration (Motsamai 2014). The temptation to export the successful European experience has always been high, but with the vastly different context and time in history between the two, exporting the European Union (EU) example was bound to confuse the regional aspirations for integration. SADC needs to investigate how it could use the Windhoek Declaration on effective coordination of donor aid as a framework for enhancing the nature and outcomes of cooperation between SADC and donors with a view to ensuring an improved quality of life for SADC citizens. This will, necessarily, require that donor programmes strengthen synergy between RISDP and SIPO for purposes of increasing the social impact of SADC interventions.

The private sector has a crucial role to play in human security through creating wealth for the benefit of society. Business ventures expand the economic cake to be apportioned to society and thus reduce patronage and corruption. Partnership with business should be aimed at wealth maximisation and improving the distribution of wealth in society. There must be efforts to limit the negative impact of industries that drive violence and conflict, such as some private military companies.

No regional integration project will succeed without the support of knowledge institutions which generate and refine knowledge needed in order to develop and implement effective policies in society (Sundström, undated). Universities, research institutions and think tanks have a special role in conceptualising and rethinking regional integration, exploring a region-specific model of integration, assessing the effect of existing programmes, and promote synergy between the security and development arms of SADC.
Their role will be to promote human security through research, dialogue, knowledge sharing, advocacy, and advisory services.

— Civil society has the task of providing public goods and enhancing good citizenship; and promoting a wide-spread public discourse including achieving holistic human security through strong synergy between the RISDP and SIPO arms of SADC's strategic regional agenda (Edwards 2004). SADC formally favours engagement with civil society, but the SADC-civil society interface remains weak. Part of the problem is the antagonistic relationship between civil society and governments, but another is the former's lack of capacity to make use of the policy space provided. This means that capacity building for civil society with a special focus on promoting of comprehensive human security and integrated planning will be critical. The time is ripe for the emergence of a strong and comprehensive network of civil society organisations that would drive its advocacy on holistic human security. The apex networks representing workers/trade unions, NGOs, economic justice formations, youth and gender formations, and peasants could be the nucleus of this network because they represent all major stakeholders in the civil society space except social movements that would have to be drawn in separately.

— The media plays a significant role in human development because it provides critical information, offers platforms for the exchange of ideas; and it holds powerful institutions in society like government and business to account. A history of hostile relationships between the media and states has resulted in the neglect of this crucial marketplace of ideas by all state-driven institutions including SADC.

8. Conclusion

The concept of human security is emblematic of changes in society and public action over the past half century and more, especially of the adjustments made after the Cold War period which has entered the public discourse. The underlying thinking on which human security is founded has evolved in the decades following the Second World War, principally the UN defence for the idea of development at the time when economic growth was seen as a panacea for poverty. This article has
argued also that human security is a hybrid term that fuses the new thinking about security — the idea of an expanded concept of security — and human development. Locating human beings at the centre of public action, the concept represents a convergence of security and development thinking around safeguarding and promoting human well-being.

Though African regional organisations have claimed to apply this concept, in reality they have not harnessed the potential it has for building synergy between the security and development arm of the regional agenda. In southern Africa, this is about finding deep synergy between the SIPO and the RISDP as overarching long-term places for both security and development front. Either the concept becomes a label for the softer side of hard-core security or merely for growth-oriented Western ideas of development. The article offers some strategies that could be adopted to deepen such synergy.

Bibliography


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