Inequality and Elections: The Nationwide Origins and State-Level Dynamics of India's Maoist Insurgency

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Abstract: This article investigates the causes of India's Maoist insurgency and its changing dynamics. To explain its origins, we empirically test three hypotheses using cross-state-level data: inequality of wealth in states; inefficient state government; and, disgruntled provocateurs. Our analysis reveals that insurgency is caused by inequality of wealth in states, *not* inefficient state governments and disgruntled provocateurs. Subsequently, we study variations in the number of Maoist attacks and the selected targets in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal using newspaper reports of events. Our analysis demonstrates that the numbers of incidents and the

type of targets selected depend on electoral competition between regional political parties and their interactions with Maoists. The findings, therefore, indicate that whereas inequality of wealth can explain the insurgency's presence in states, political competition within states could explain its dynamics.

Keywords: electoral competition, India, inequality, insurgency, Maoist, regional parties

Between 13 and 20 of India's 28 states have been gripped by leftist rural insurgencies,[1] affecting half a billion people, and resulting in approximately 6000 deaths.[2] The Indian government categorizes all such insurgencies as Maoist. In 2010, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared it as the "single biggest internal security challenge" facing India.[3] However, under the broad umbrella of a single Maoist movement myriad smaller insurgency groups operate almost independent of each other in these states.[4] The Maoist insurgencies' state-to-state bases give rise to two queries: First, are there certain underlying causes among these insurgencies? Second, what are the factors that explain the variations within these insurgencies over time?

Explanations of the causes and organizational characteristics of leftist rural insurgencies[5] all over the world show that they extend from cohesive and committed guerrillas fighting for social justice to disorganized profit-seeking mercenaries fighting to capture resources.[6] Explanations for the origins of the Maoist insurgency in India itself, based on qualitative and anecdotal evidence, center on: inequality within affected areas;[7] colonial legacies of indirect rule that underdeveloped state institutions and empowered repressive local elites;[8] colonial institutions that entrenched inequalities based on caste and tribal identities;[9] and the presence of radicalized urban elites in rural areas.[10]

Despite their focus on the Maoist insurgency's origins, however, such research ignores the second inquiry regarding variations in the frequency of incidents and the insurgents' tactics in affected areas. Perhaps such explanations are elusive because the Maoist conflict operates differently across states due to variations in state responses, electoral competition, and/or levels of prior conflict trends.

In order to address this gap, we first present a quantitative analysis exploring the shared causes of the Maoist insurgency's origins, which demonstrates that the insurgency's presence in a state is contingent on inequality of wealth, specifically measured as inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure, *not* lower levels of literacy and increasing urban unemployment. We choose to focus on states because states in India reflect ethno-linguistic boundaries, which influence access to employment and primary education.[11] However, our findings complement district-level empirical studies on the Maoist insurgency's origins. Specifically, Borooah's finding that district-level poverty is positively correlated with

Maoist presence, while literacy is negatively correlated,[12] and Murshed and Gates' insight that horizontal-inequality on caste and regional lines propelled the Maoist conflict in neighboring Nepal.[13]

We subsequently present a study of the eastern Indian state of West Bengal, based on archived news reports from the *Times of India's* Kolkata Edition, which were studied during field research in West Bengal by one of the authors. The analysis of approximately 700 events demonstrates that variations in the numbers of attacks and the insurgency's tactics is caused by the interaction of electoral competition between political parties aiming to control the state government with the Maoists seeking to expand territorial and political control across the state's districts.

Our findings dovetail with insights about the links between electoral competition at the state level and the occurrence of terrorism[14] and communal riots[15] in India. Specifically, whereas Piazza finds that state-level differences in party systems explain the different levels of terrorist activity,[16] Wilkinson elaborates the relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority polarization and communal riots.[17]

Thus, to complement our understanding of the broader causes of Maoist insurgency in India, we substantiate our findings by analyzing how political competition at the state level affects the severity of Maoist insurgency in India. By doing so, this paper presents a cross-state comparison and a case study of a single state in order to reveal that mezzo state-level factors can more holistically explain the dynamics of Maoist conflicts, which are inadequately reflected in national-level studies and those that focus on districts across-states.

In order to present the broader quantitative analysis and variations over time in the Maoist insurgency, the rest of this article is divided into three sections. The first section describes the history of Maoist insurgencies in order to delineate the second wave of insurgency studied by this paper from the preceding wave. The following section begins by reviewing existing explanations of the ongoing second-wave insurgency's origins, deriving three hypotheses from it. Subsequently, the section focuses on the empirical tests, which find that inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure is the most significant explanatory factor for the insurgency's presence. The penultimate section studies the Maoist insurgency in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal in order to demonstrate that the intensity and targets of violence are contingent on rivalries between mainstream political parties and the Maoists. The conclusion summarizes the article and discusses avenues for further research.

The First and Second Waves of the Maoist Insurgency: A Historical Overview

The first-wave of Maoist insurgency erupted in 1946 in the Telengana region of the then-princely state of Hyderabad in southern India, subsequently part

of the state of Andhra Pradesh, and currently the state of Telengana. Although the Telengana movement was suppressed by 1951, a year after Hyderabad's accession to India, Andhra Pradesh faced another Maoist insurgency in 1961, centered in the district of Srikakulam.[18] However, it was in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal, in a small town called Naxalbari, where the most prominent peasant-tribal-based radical leftist movement began in 1967 and continued until the early 1970s.[19] The Naxalbari movement was more organized and had a coherent ideological core[20] that was not restricted to land reform or changes to the local government but was aimed at capturing the national government.[21]

At its peak, the Naxalbari movement affected the following states. In the north: Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (which included the state of Uttarakhand). In the east: Bihar (then including the state of Jharkhand), West Bengal, and Orissa. In central India: Madhya Pradesh (which included the state of Chhatisgarh) and Maharashtra. In Southern India: Andhra Pradesh (which included the state of Telengana), Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In the North East: Assam and Tripura. Despite their nationwide presence, the effective suppression of the Naxalbari insurgency by 1971, and increasing political mobilization leading to the abrogation of democracy from 1975 to 1977, ended the broader insurgency through a combination of state repression and co-optation by nonviolent opposition movements.[22]

The second-wave of the Maoist insurgency, which this paper focusses on, appeared during the mid-1980s and early 1990s in the eastern state of Bihar (including Jharkhand) and the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (including Uttarakhand). The present wave of insurgency affects the following states. In the north: Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In the east: Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. In central India: Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, and Maharashtra. In southern India: Andhra Pradesh, Telengana, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala.

In terms of demography and geography, states affected by both the first and second wave of the insurgency have a belt of "rural tribal areas and daunting uninviting terrain" in common.[23] However, the Maoist insurgency is not reducible to a tribal rebellion because the general caste makeup of the movement is 20% upper castes, 32% backward castes, 30% former untouchables, and only 8% tribal and 2% from other marginalized groups.[24]

A further commonality between these insurgencies is the presence and leadership of second-tier urban intellectuals.[25] A "second-tier intellectual" is someone whose secondary education was in vernacular instead of English. This differentiated him/her from the more westernized "first-tier intellectuals' who are assumed to be more socio-economically mobile. These "second-tier intellectuals" may have attended elite universities for higher education, but their initial "vernacular" backgrounds impose a social drawback and would reveal their economic background.

The Maoist Insurgency's Core Cause: Institutions, Inequality or Instigation?

India's states have their own regional governments and vary in the levels of corruption, literacy rates, GDP per capita, and inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure. Explanations for the rise of peasant-based radical movements can be broadly divided into three types. The first and third hypotheses approach the causes of Maoist insurgency through the lenses of grievance theories.[26] The second hypothesis stems from the second generation of social movement literature that deemphasizes the grievance theories' reliance on structural explanations by revealing the role of agency via "second-tier" elites.[27]

The most established school of thought considers rural-agrarian insurgencies as stemming from the lack of economic development, inequality of wealth,[28] and policies of the developmental state that alienate traditional means of livelihood.[29] At its core, the political-economic theory of relative deprivation is founded on Ted Gurr's seminal thesis that it was not poverty itself but the relative level of poverty that made the poor critically conscious of injustice.[30] Since then, a whole body of literature on the Maoist movement has been built upon the above reasoning,[31] which can be distilled in the hypothesis: **Higher rates of inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure in a particular state are directly correlated with the existence of Maoist insurgency activity in that state**.

A second body of research explains radical-leftist insurgencies based in rural areas as arising from the political exclusion of subaltern groups.[32] These sets of explanations, which give primary emphasis on how agents and social movement organizations raise critical consciousness by particular forms of "framing,"[33] are relevant in three ways. First, they take into consideration both the structure of political-economic relationships in the affected areas; second, they analyze the networks of information surrounding and connecting the various insurgency groups; and, third, they address the reality of the elite led, subaltern supported structure of these insurgency groups.[34]

In short, they address Goldstone's second causal mechanism for starting a revolution.[35] From the point of view of the educated elites, unemployment would indicate that "an individual belongs to an existing group, which once provided important collective goods and services but no longer does so." Members of this section of elites would then withdraw their "commitment to the existing group" of urban middle or upper class professionals and commit to a new group, such as the subaltern groups in the rural areas. The new group would provide or is expected to provide "those goods and services," such as social status, "and moreover for the protest or revolutionary action offers expected net benefits," such as political power.[36]

However, such explanations conflate social movement organizations with political parties.[37] Because they do not distinguish the effects of political parties aiming to insert themselves into existing state institutions by representing a particular set

of interests from that of non-governmental or social movement organizations seeking to change the social structure upon which the state institutions themselves are based. Consequently, to avoid the definitional dilemma, it is more fruitful to focus at the level of individual political entrepreneurs/agents rather than the presence of social movement organizations.

Indeed, qualitative research highlights the importance of "second-tier elites" in giving political leadership and organizing Maoist insurgencies.[38] Quantitative analyses, however, faces a major conceptual hurdle in providing a direct quantification of the category of "second-tier" intellectual: the notion concerns self-definition, identity, and role construction. A partial counter-intuitive solution can be provided by considering the basic literacy rates as a good general indicator of the status of "second tier"/educated elites. Lower rates of overall literacy could indicate the "status" and "power" that can accrue to "second tier" elites when they shift allegiance by representing subaltern interests.

Furthermore, Ray's definition of "first-tier" intellectuals reveal that they have higher levels of social and economic mobility than the "second-tier" intellectuals.[39] Therefore, changes in the levels of urban unemployment in a particular state can act as a proxy for measuring the number of "second-tier" intellectuals who have both personal grievance against the system and are available to act as political entrepreneurs for such insurgencies. Thus, leading to our second hypothesis: **Lower levels of literacy and increasing levels of urban unemployment are directly correlated to the existence of Maoist insurgency activity in that state**.

Finally, using an older literature, the presence of such insurgencies can be attributed to the weakness of political institutions and the repressive apparatus of the state vis-à-vis the rising levels of political participation.[40] In a study on the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Ganguly posits that rising critical consciousness among Kashmiri youth during the post-independence period, the strangulation of democratic representation in the state by a compact between the federal and local regime, and the perceived weakening of the repressive capacity of the Indian state (at the federal and provincial levels) helped initiate the Kashmir rebellion in 1989.[41]

As this article compares the presence or absence of Maoist insurgencies at the level of individual states of India, consequently, a comparative analysis of the relationship between the state's capacity to respond and repress with the initiation of insurgency can be undertaken at the provincial level. In order to test the hypothesis that state repression and efficiency (responsiveness) are related to the initiation of insurgency, this essay modifies a hypothesis presented by Fearon and Laitin: "financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and crude counterinsurgency practices."[42] Whereas Fearon and Laitin use per-capita income of a country as a proxy for state capacity to repress, we also add an index of corruption as a measure for state responsiveness via provision of social

and economic infrastructure. Adding the second variable allows the hypothesis to not just extrapolate state strength from its ability to repress, but also its ability to effectively redistribute to society. Thus, presenting a third, "lack of law and order," hypothesis:[43] **High levels of state inefficiency and low levels of repression will be directly correlated with the existence of Maoist insurgency in that state**.

The following section tests the three hypotheses from the qualitative literature. The test attempts to address the central enquiry: what are the common critical factors at the state-level that gives rise to the Maoist insurgency?

Empirical Model

As all the cases of insurgency are located within India, this article undertakes a *large-n* test of the three hypotheses based on within-case comparison. Within-case comparisons help control for variations in institutional structures and absolute levels of development. Also, though the afore-mentioned historical evidence reveals two distinct waves of such insurgencies, this article *only* analyzes the second wave. In terms of methodology two issues arise: first, the empirical data should be collected from a period previous to the starting of such insurgencies, and, second, the data collected and tested in this article should all be from the same years. Whereas the limitations on the availability of data is the primary reason why data from the same years are not used, the theoretical problem should be allayed because the patterns of social and economic development at the level of individual states have not changed over the past two decades; that is, no state has crossed over from high income to the low income category, etc., and vice-versa.

A probit model is constructed where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the state is affected by Maoist activity and 0 if a state is not affected by such insurgency. The independent variables are presented and explicated after the presentation of each hypothesis in the following section.

$$Mao = f(log\,Equality\,of\,Wealth,\ log\,literacy,\ log\,GDP\,per\,Capita,$$
$$log\,Corruption,\ log\,Below\,Poverty,\ log\,Unemployment\,Rural,$$
$$log\,Unemployment\,Urban)$$

Where,
Mao: is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the state has a Maoist insurgency;
logEqualityofWealth: is the equality of wealth for each state;
logLiteracy: is the literacy rate of the state;
logGDPperCapita: is the per capita income of each state;
logCurruption: is the level of corruption of each state;
logBelowPoverty: is the percentage of people below the poverty line of each state;
logUnemploymentRural: is the unemployment rate of rural youth of each state;

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logUnemploymentUrban: is the unemployment rate of urban youth of each state.

Data and Results

The data is summarized in Table 1. The dependent variable, *Mao*, is a dichotomous dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a state is affected by Maoist insurgency and 0 otherwise. It only considers states affected by the present wave of Maoist insurgency. The variable has been based on news reports and existing literature.[44]

The first independent variable, *logEqualityofWealth*, tests the hypothesis that inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure causes relative deprivation that increases the probability of Maoist insurgency. The variable is based on the "State-wise Inequality Adjusted Per Capita Consumption Expenditure" 1999–2000 table. A higher score indicates greater equality or low inequality, and lower score indicates less equality or high inequality.

The independent variable, *logLiteracy*, is the literacy rate of the individual states. The variable helps test the hypothesis that low levels of overall literacy and high levels of urban unemployment, represented by the variable *logUnemploymentUrban*, can increase Maoist insurgency as "second-tier" elites can make common cause with the rural population. The variable *logLiteracy* uses the "Literacy Percentage" table for the year 2001 for each state. The variable *logUnemploymentUrban* measures the urban unemployment rates for individual states. It uses the "State-wise Unemployment Rate" for persons educated 15 years and above in India for 1999–2000.

The independent variables, *logGDPpercapita*, and *logCorruption*, measure the law-and-order condition and the ability of the state at the provincial level to distribute public goods respectively. The first measure utilizes the "State-wise Inequality Adjusted Per Capita Consumption Expenditure" for 1999–2000 table. The second measure utilizes the data from a table provided by Transparency International's "India Corruption Study, 2005," in which corruption is operationalized as an index, where a lower score indicates lower corruption, and higher score indicates higher levels of corruption; unlike the better-known country-level data, where higher values represent less corruption. Covering information from 2004 to 2005, the composite index surveys "petty corruption" as perceived and experienced by the "common man," taking into consideration government institutions that deliver both need-based and basic services. This variable is introduced because a state that has low levels of corruption is assumed to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens. Consequently, states with high levels of corruption can be considered as inefficient in disbursing public goods. As more corrupt states are given higher scores, the variable should be directly correlated to Maoist insurgency.

TABLE 1. Summary

Variable	Description	Source
Mao	This is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the state has an ongoing Maoist insurgency, 0 otherwise. The states so marked are the ones affected by the second wave of Maoist insurgency: from the mid-1980s to the present	Qualitative Literature
logEqualtyofWealth	The variable is introduced to measure the afore-mentioned hypothesis that inequality of wealth is correlated with the existence of Maoist insurgency. This variable is based on the "State-wise Inflation and Inequality Adjusted Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (1999–2000)" table. A higher score indicates greater equality and lower score indicated high inequality	Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2001.[65]
logLiteracy	This variable is based on the "Literacy and Literacy Rates, 2001 Census" for each state table. The connection with literacy rates and Maoist insurgency can be twofold. Low levels of overall literacy, high inequality of wealth, and high levels of urban unemployment can increase Maoist insurgency as "second-tier" elites can make common cause with the rural population	Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2002.[66]
logGDPpercapita	This variable is based on the "State-wise Per Capita Income (At Current Prices)" table for the year 2000–2001. This variable is introduced as a classic measure of state strength. The more the overall development of the state, that is, the more the per-capita income and GDP, the more a state can extract from its citizens. Thus, high levels of extraction can be considered a prerequisite for a state to foist effective coercion or repression on its citizens	Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2002.[67]

Variable	Description	Source
logCorruption	This variable is based on the data provided by Transparency International India's "India Corruption Study 2005" and, unlike its national-level counterpart, is operationalized as an index where the lower score indicated lower corruption and higher score indicates higher levels of corruption. Covering information from 2004 to 2005, the composite index surveys 'petty corruption' as perceived and experienced by the 'common man,' taking into consideration government institutions that deliver both need-based and basic services. This variable is introduced because a state that has low levels of corruption is assumed to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens. Consequently, states with high levels of corruption can be considered as inefficient. Given more corrupt states are given higher scores, the variable should be directly correlated to Maoist insurgency.	Transparency International, 2005.[68]
logBelowPoverty	This variable is acquired by using a survey by the Government of India on the "State-wise Number of Below Poverty Line (BPL) Families and Quantity of Foodgrain Allocated in India (2000–2002)". The scores for each state have been normalized by multiplying by the average size of the Indian family (3 children + parents = 5). The products have then been divided by the total population of each province.	For data on state population: Government of India. Census of India. Distribution of Population, sex ratio, density and decadal growth rate of population: 2001.[69] New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General, 2001. For data on Poverty: Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2003.[70]

logUnemploymentRural	This variable is acquired by using a survey by the Government of India titled "State-wise Unemployment Rate for Educated Persons (15 Years and Above) in India (1999–2000)". Rural unemployment, though used as a control variable, can also act as a measure of poverty and/or rural economic development	Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2001.[71]
logUnempolymentUrban	This variable is acquired by using a survey by the Government of India titled "State-wise Estimate of Unemployment Rates for Youth (15–29 Years) in Rural/Urban Areas of India (1999–2000)". Rural unemployment can indicate both economic development as well as the number of frustrated "second tier" elites available for recruitment into any insurgency. Though Urban unemployment may not be a direct factor, its importance in the theory vis-a-vis city youths leading insurgencies in rural areas makes this an important variable.	Government of India. Office of the Registrar General, 2001.[72]
Winning Seat Margin	This variable shows the differences in seat shares of winner and runner-up parties in elections for state legislatures (assemblies). The greater the number, the lower the political competition in the state, that is, the higher the difference in seat share, the lesser the political competition. This variable is important because it indicated whether the effects of political competition on the intensity and tactics of the insurgency, which we study in West Bengal, could be generalized to other states.	Dash, Bharatee B. and Sacchidananda Mukherjee, 2015.[73]

Two more variables have been introduced as controls. First, *logBelowPoverty*, is used to measure the level of absolute poverty in a state. This is based on a table titled, "State-wise Number of Below Poverty Line Families," for 2000–2002. The variable is achieved by multiplying the data for each state by the average size of the Indian family (5), in order to normalize it. The product is then divided by the population of each state to get a ratio of persons below the poverty line. Second, *logUnemploymentRural*, is used to measure the level of rural unemployment. This is based on the Table 1 titled, "State-wise Unemployment Rate Educated 15 Years and Above in India for 1999–2000."

Table 2 reports the results of the probit model. Model 1 of Table 2 reports the results of the model when inequality adjusted consumption expenditure is also used as an explanatory variable. The coefficient of *logEqualityofWealth*—that is, the log of equality of Wealth—is −11.60, and it is significant at the 1% level. This means that the greater the equality of wealth in a state, the lower the chances that the state will witness Maoist insurgency. Specifically, the results show that the probability of Maoist insurgency in a state increases from 1% to 90% when the level of inequality increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.

The coefficient for the variable representing the efficiency of government in disbursing public goods, measured via the rate of petty corruption (*logCorruption*), is −5.54 and significant at the 1% level. This particular finding shows that government responsiveness in individual states or the lack thereof is not a cause of Maoist insurgency. In fact, it leads one to believe that "inefficiency" of the provincial state apparatus in disbursing public goods reduces the opportunities for the existence of Maoist insurgency.

This paradoxical finding can be justified in light of Chhibber's explanation with regard to the functioning of democratic politics in India: the nature of affirmative-action programs based on ascriptive identities, an economy with high levels of state intervention, and the caste-based notion of politics all led to a race between ethnic/caste groups to capture state resources.[54] Consequently, petty corruption marketizes the functioning of government programs, which leads to two outcomes. First, the "petty" nature of this marketization (conducted by low level officials) yields relatively less unequal or opposite outcomes, as corruption at higher levels of governance would. In essence, middle peasants or local elites instead of feudal oligarchs profit from programs aimed at landless laborers and subaltern groups.[55] Consequently, second, such marketization makes it difficult to create a broad-based opposition coalition that can capture the state.[56]

As it can be argued that inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure subsumes the explanatory power of the other variables, Model 2 reports the coefficients of the probit model when the log of inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure is excluded. In Model 2, the coefficient for urban unemployment is negative and significant at 1%, while rural unemployment is positive and significant at 1%. As literacy is not significant in both Models 1 and 2, our findings negate the

TABLE 2. The Effect of Equality of Wealth on the Presence of Maoist Insurgency in the State.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
	Dependent variable $=$ *Mao*								
logEqualityofWealth	−11.598*** (0.006)		−4.925*** (0.003)						
logLiteracy	2.711 (0.436)	1.238 (0.629)		−1.537 (0.361)					
logGDPpercapita	−0.217 (0.931)	−4.032*** (0.003)			−1.149** (0.015)				
logCorruption	−5.538*** (0.007)	−4.653*** (0.001)				−0.708 (0.545)			
logBelowPoverty	−0.144 (0.890)	0.923 (0.233)					1.093* (0.066)		
logUnemploymentRural	1.206 (0.248)	2.579*** (0.001)						0.527* (0.078)	
logUnempolymentUrban	−2.273 (0.188)	−4.089*** (0.001)							0.446 (0.307)
Psuedo R-squared	0.60	0.40	0.388	0.022	0.106	0.009	0.059	0.068	0.025
Observations	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29

Note. This table reports the coefficients, the p-value obtained using robust standard errors, and the significance of a probit model. The dependent indicator variable, *Mao*, is equal to 1 if the state has a Maoist insurgency and 0 otherwise; *logEqualityofWealth* is the of gini coefficient of the state; *logLiteracy* is the log of the literacy rate of the state; *logGDPpercapita* is the log of GDP per capita of the state; *logCorruption* is the log of the Corruption in the state; *logBelowPoverty* is log of percentage of people below poverty line in the state; *logUnemploymentRural* is log of the unemployment of rural youth with 15+ years of education; *logUnemploymentUrban* is the log of unemployment rate of the urban youth with 15+ years of education.

***significance at 1% **significance at 5% and *significance at 10%

TABLE 3. The Effect of Electoral Competition on the Presence of Maoist Insurgency in the State.

	Dependent variable = *Mao*
logEqualityofWealth	− 9.180***
	(0.003)
Winning Seat Margin	− 2.396*
	(0.074)
logLiteracy	0.876
	− 0.804
logGDPpercapita	− 0.387
	(0.859)
logCorruption	− 4.834***
	(0.005)
logBelowPoverty	0.929
	(0.391)
logUnemploymentRural	1.660
	(0.102)
logUnempolymentUrban	− 3.490*
	(0.055)
Observations	26

Note. This table reports the coefficients, the p-value obtained using robust standard errors, and the significance of a probit model. The dependent indicator variable, *Mao*, is equal to 1 if the state has a Maoist insurgency and 0 otherwise; *Winning Seat Margin* is the difference of seat shares of winners and runners-up parties in total seats in state assembly elections; *logEqualityofWealth* is the log of equality of wealth of each state; *logLiteracy* is the log of the literacy rate of the state; *logGDPpercapita* is the log of GDP per capita of the state; *logCorruption* is the log of the Corruption in the state; *logBelowPoverty* is log of percentage of people below poverty line in the state; *logUnemploymentRural* is log of the unemployment of rural youth with 15+ years of education; *logUnemploymentUrban* is log of unemployment rate of the urban youth with 15+ years of education.
***significance at 1% **significance at 5% and *significance at 10%

application of Ray's explanation of the first wave of Naxalite insurgency in West Bengal to the second wave being studied here: specifically, unemployed "second tier" elites imbued with the rhetoric of revolution and seeking reaffirmation of their superiority were critical in framing the agrarian problems in terms of class conflict.[57] Rather, the answer may be more conventional. The rise in unemployment levels in the urban areas force urban youth to concentrate on finding employment, whereas affluence may allow them to expend their time and energy in alternative (radical political) pursuits.[58]

However, rural unemployment is positively correlated with Maoist insurgency, which strengthens the findings of Model 1, as rural unemployment should be highly correlated with inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure. Furthermore, in terms of the repressive and redistributive capacity of individual states, the coefficient for repressive capability, *logGDPpercapita*, is negative and significant at 5%. The redistributive and provision of public goods aspect, represented by *logCorruption*, is also negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, higher levels of repression and higher levels of corruption reduce the incidence of Maoist insurgency.

Corruption perhaps does not matter because in a corrupt environment the problem of income inequality may not be as severe in India. Indeed, the correlation between corruption and income inequality is negative, although it is not significant. This is likely, because in a corrupt state in the context of multi-party democracy, the problem of income inequality may not be less severe. Corruption may allow for transfer of wealth from the elite to the middle class, and that could trickle down to the poor.

Here, it is salient to notice that the variable for repression is not significant in Model 1, though corruption remains significant to an extent where its inclusion reduces the explanatory power of the variable for inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure (*logEqualityofWealth)*. This can be explained by positing that the repressive capacity of individual states may not be crucial: Maoist insurgencies are not law-and-order problems. Also, Maoist insurgencies do not occur because individual provincial governments are unresponsive to the needs of the citizenry; in fact, states with rank-and-file corruption at the level of the local government can inadvertently split the formation of effective opposition.

To summarize what Table 2 reveals: the coefficients of *logBelowPoverty, logUnemploymentRural, logUnemploymentUrban, logGDPpercapita*, are all insignificant when we include *logEqualityofWealth*. In Model 1, neither *logLiteracy* nor *logUnemploymentUrban* is significant. Although they are significant in Model 2, the model is miss-specified because it omits the most important variable that explains the presence of Maoist insurgency (*Mao*). The purpose of Model 2 in the table, therefore, is to show how adding *logEqualityofWealth* to the model improves R-squared by 20%. To further highlight this point, we include some more models, which introduce the right hand side variables one at a time. Model 3 shows that including *logEqualityofWealth* alone increases the R-squared by almost 40%.

Thus, it is neither a state's capacity to repress and redistribute nor the presence and instigation of external agents that explain Maoist insurgency. Rather, it is a sense of relative deprivation derived from inequality adjusted consumption expenditure, which fuels discontent with the existing system that can result in Maoist insurgency. The graph in Figure 1, which follows Table 2, shows that 73% of states that have inequality adjusted consumption expenditure above the median are affected by Maoist insurgencies, while only 13% of states below the median are thus affected.

**FIGURE 1. Inequality of Wealth and Maoist Insurgency**

Although inequality of wealth, measured by inequality-adjusted consumption expenditure, offers a general cause of the Maoist conflict in India, there are other underlying causes that makes this conflict severe in some states and low intensity in others. The nature of Indian federalism might be a possible answer because it places a considerable amount of policy-making authority on the states that includes counter terrorism and endows significant fiscal resources to this end.

Given the nature and dynamic of the movement at present and their own capacity, individual states have a range of choices that they can use to respond to Maoism: (a) rely on military and law enforcement measures to decisively defeat a terrorist movement; (b) rely on socio-economic political reforms to address grievances and root causes; (c) seek peaceful conflict resolution with the movement by negotiation; and (d) tackle terrorist threats through some combination of coercive measures and conflict management measures. The states have responded to the spread of Maoist rebellion in different ways, but their capacity to repress, as shown in the quantitative analysis, does not explain the causes of Maoist insurgency. Rather, state repression tactics in the course of the conflict are further influenced by the nature or political competition in the states. In the next section, we discuss how political competition within the state affects levels of Maoist conflict. Specifically, we analyze how levels of Maoist conflict was affected by political competition in West Bengal.

Electoral Competition and Maoist Insurgency in West Bengal

The levels of Maoist insurgency vary in intensity across and within states. The average number of events between 2010–2014 across 10 states indicate that it is highest in Chattisgarh and lowest in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. Similar trends are perceptible during 2005–2010. Guha mentions that Maoist insurgents have

FIGURE 2. Number of Maoist Incidents and Cualties in India: 2010

made maximum gains in the tribal districts in Maharashtra, Orissa, and Jharak-hand, but most of all, in Chattisgarh.[59] Kennedy and King posit that Maoist vio-lence has increased in the past 30 years, but it has occurred disproportionately.[60] Based on recent government reports, they show that areas of Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan have large tribal populations, but almost no Maoist insur-gency.[61] Such spatial variance is supported by the graph in Figure 2 that shows the levels of Maoist violence across India, based on Data from the Indian Min-istry of Home Affairs report on Left Wing Extremist Violence Statistics released in 2015.[62]

Thus, we analyze the contemporary Maoist insurgency in the Eastern Indian state of West Bengal, beginning in the early 2000s and declining by 2012, where the number of events and methods of the insurgency has varied considerably across districts. Specifically, our analysis of the insurgency demonstrates that, alongside economic factors, the political competition between mainstream parties during 2005–2011, may explain the incidence and tactics of the Maoist insurgency. West Bengal provides a unique opportunity to actually see how political competition affects complex conflicts like the Maoist insurgency. This eastern Indian state holds a historical significance as the center of the "first-wave" of Maoist conflict in the 1960s and 70s, popularly known as the Naxalite movement.[63] More impor-tantly for our study, West Bengal witnessed a protracted political transition the late 2000s, from a 34-year rule by a coalition of communist and socialist parties to a centrist Trinamool Congress party (TMC). During the political transition and the

competition that preceded, the period analyzed here, the Maoist conflict underwent changes as well, thus revealing how local politics affects the insurgency.

To understand this political competition and its effects on Maoist activity, we explore the nature of conflict and types of violence used in the major affected districts in West Bengal. We include details of violence from an extensive database on all Maoist related incidents in the state of West Bengal from 2005 to 2011, which was constructed from newspaper archival data from the *Times of India's* Kolkata edition. The reports of the approximately 700 incidents were analyzed for the geographic network of the Maoist insurgency, the targets, and the nature of violence used.

The data was gathered from the newspaper because the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs' database and other databases on the Maoist conflict provide a general count of casualties, dividing the numbers between civilian, military and Maoist deaths. The purpose of gathering data from the newspaper was to, first, substantiate these general numbers; second, provide specific accounts of the type and nature of violence used by Maoists; and, third, showcase similarities and variations within the conflict across different localities. While gathering data, particular attention was paid to the intensity of violence, in terms of numbers of events and their frequency. By investigating these interactions between civilians, the military, political parties and insurgents the qualitative data provides specific details on target selection, types of weapons used, location, and numbers of protests and deaths.

Specifically, we analyze 450 major events in West Bengal that involve the Maoists directly and indirectly. These events were selected based on the location of events, any event that happened on the state border regions were excluded. Out of these events, we focus on those initiated by the Maoists and those that involved violence in order to: a) kill CPI-M members and supporters; b) kill ordinary civilians; c) kill police and paramilitary forces; and, d) destroy government property. When we focus on these criteria, we find 155 relevant events for our analysis. The other incidents included protests, curfews and non-violent skirmishes. Out of these 155 events, 60 were committed against Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPI-M) members, and their supporters in the districts; 40 sought to destroy government and public property, including railway stations and schools; 15 were committed against villagers; and another 40 were targeted against the police and paramilitary forces.

The insurgency is concentrated in three districts—West Midnapore, Purulia and Bankura. Figure 3 shows the Maoist-affected districts in West Bengal. These three affected districts (2005–2011) are listed among the 13 backward districts (industrially not developed) of West Bengal.[64] While the occurrence of the Maoist insurgency in these districts supports our statistical finding, such insurgency is absent in the state's other backward districts.

FIGURE 3. Maoist Affected Areas in West Bengal during 2005–2011

The nature of political competition in the three affected districts, however, offers relevant insights about the Maoist insurgency. The late 2000s was a period of intense political competition between the Maoists, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and the CPI-M. Although from 2009 onward, TMC was gaining popular support in many districts, Bankura had a strong presence of the CPI-M, Purulia was still under Forward Bloc, a left-wing nationalist party allied with the CPI-M, and Midnapore was controlled by CPI-M.

In the 2011 West Bengal state assembly elections, the TMC-led alliance won 227 seats in the 294-seat legislature. Until then, the state was led by the CPI-M for more than 35 years. During the mid-2000s, CPI-M and TMC were the primary parties engaged in electoral competition. Such competition, however, was multi-layered: utilizing both democratic electoral politics and political violence. At one level, the ruling and opposition political parties competed for seats at village councils, the state legislature, and the national parliament. At another level, a violent triangular political competition occurred with shifting alliances between the Maoists and the CPI-M, the Maoists and the TMC, and three-way competition between the Maoists, the CPI-M and the TMC.

The analysis of the major events during 2005–2011 reveals that the majority of attacks were carried out against CPI-M party members or supporters. The second largest type of Maoist attacks were targeted to disrupt development initiatives and destroy physical infrastructure including railways and schools. The third type of attack was targeted directly against police and para-military forces. The fourth type of attack was against ordinary villagers.

The graph in Figure 4, based on data collected from the *Times of India* newspaper archives, shows the types of attacks used by the Maoists in West Bengal. A majority of the attacks were targeted specifically to eliminate any possible resistance from the ruling party and ordinary civilians who supported the CPI-M. These

FIGURE 4. Nature of Major Maoist Attacks in Bengal: 2005–2011

targeted attacks reflect an endemic political rivalry in West Bengal between the TMC and CPI-M; and often one party blamed the other for committing these crimes in conjunction with the Maoists.

One of the Maoists' motivation is territorial and political control, and they saw both the ruling party and the opposition political party members and supporters as possible threats to attaining this goal. Evidence from the following cases reveal that they have indeed followed a three-pronged tactic of targeting developmental projects, attacking party workers aligned with the CPI-M and the TMC, and coercing citizens to stop cooperating with local law-enforcement.

In one particular event on November 24, 2006[65] the Maoists targeted a road construction company in Belpahari. A squad of 100 armed guerillas in uniform exploded 3 landmines. In a similar incident on April 7, 2007[66] approximately 300 armed Maoists attacked a Central Industrial Security Force camp and a police station near Bokaro thermal power station in the Bokaro district of the neighboring state of Jharkhand, which borders the district of Purulia in West Bengal. Six people were killed, and the Maoists blew up a bridge connecting a Central Coalfields Ltd. project with the highway. On August 8, 2007,[67] 22 Maoists surrounded the camp in Neguria and fired 20 rounds, the program followed a policy of 'rapid domination strategy' to set up a free corridor along Jharkhand, and the districts of Purulia and Bankura in West Bengal. These events indicate that the Maoists primarily want territorial and political control and are hostile to developmental projects in the state that reflect positively on the incumbent CPI-M.

On April 23, 2008,[68] the Maoists killed local CPI-M Leader Sridam Das in Birbhum district. He was also the head master of a local primary school. In another incident on August 10, 2008,[69] the Maoists shot CPI-M supporters in Belpahari. These incidents show that anyone with peripheral connections with the ruling party were possible targets for the Maoists. In the pre-election years of 2009 and 2010, when the then-opposing political party TMC was trying to gain support in these regions, many TMC supporters were also targeted. The cyclic violence by the Maoists resembled hate crimes against those who were associated with the ruling party CPI-M and also the opposition political party of TMC.

Finally, in the context of competition between political parties and the Maoists' conflict with the state security forces, the Maoists also attempt to increase their control by coercing uninvolved citizens. Police claim that, as part of their strategy, Maoists either apologize after attacking civilians or brand their victims as police informers. In a report, Jharkhand police IG, Pradhan mentions, "We have specific information that the civilian population in certain rural areas are at the gunpoint of rebels. But once they are executed they would be branded as police informers."[70]

The above-mentioned patterns of Maoist violence in West Bengal demonstrate that political competition matters in explaining the dynamics of Maoist insurgency. Indeed, political competition can affect the likelihood of the appearance of Maoist insurgency in a state, although not as significantly as inequality of wealth.

In Table 3, we include a variable called *Winning Seat Margin* based on the state legislature (assembly) elections across India.[71] The greater the number, the lower the political competition in the state. When we include this in our earlier regression model (Column1, Table 2), we find a negative coefficient for this variable, demonstrating that the greater the percentage of winning seat, the lower the likelihood of Maoism in the state. In other words, the greater the political competition, the greater the chances of Maoism in a state. These results are somewhat consistent in the state level analysis of West Bengal. Consequently, whereas inequality adjusted consumption expenditure can explain the insurgency's origins, state-level political competition like the three-decad- long rule of the CPI-M and its subsequent electoral defeat by the TMC better explains the variation in the Maoist conflict over time.

Conclusion

Our study provides a first step to construct a theoretical model that can both explain the shared cross-state factors that cause the Maoist insurgency and account for district and state-level influences that explain variations in its intensity and tactics. Although inequality of wealth proves to be the salient cross-state factor in explaining the insurgency, comprehensive explanations integrating district-level studies with state-level ones can better explicate the insurgency's dynamics.

The quantitative analysis utilizes differences across states to investigate whether there are any shared causes of the Maoist insurgency. Specifically, a cross-sectional probit analysis on state-level data finds that inequality adjusted consumption expenditure explains the presence of Maoist insurgency in states. In contrast, the results are not consistent with the hypotheses that lower levels of literacy and increasing levels of urban unemployment are directly correlated to the presence of Maoist insurgency activity in a state.

To understand the dynamics of the Maoist conflict, we present an in-depth analysis of West Bengal, which shows how electoral competition at the state-level affects the insurgency's tactics and intensity. By looking at instances of violent interaction between the state and the Maoists, between civilians and the Maoists, and between the civilians and the state, our case study shows that provincial-level electoral competition influences official responses to the insurgency. Furthermore, political competition in a two-party dominant state creates an atmosphere of political rivalry that can be exploited by the insurgents. In West Bengal, political rivalry between the Maoists and CPI-M and between TMC and CPI-M gave rise to a series of hate crimes that defined the nature of Maoist conflict during 2009–2011 and was specific to the local political context of the three most affected districts of West Bengal.

Thus, indicating that the conflict's dynamics can be best understood by combining macro- and micro-level studies focusing on particular states. Within-state stud-

ies improve on cross-state analyses because state-level data has several drawbacks. First, a dichotomous variable does not take into consideration that such insurgencies affect each state, and even districts within them, at distinct levels of intensity and territorial scope. One such state meriting further study may be Chhatisgarh, where stiff competition between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Congress Party have led to accusations by leaders of both parties of the other party's collusion with Maoist insurgents.[72]

Despite the above mentioned contributions, this paper underemphasizes the role played by tribal populations in these insurgencies by focusing on relative deprivation. Therefore, further research is necessary in the vein of Hoelscher, et al, who use a refined demography and topography based approach to construct a district level analysis.[73] Specifically, by differentiating between urban and rural areas, measuring demographical attributes, and analyzing economic factors, further research could demonstrate how these district-level factors interact with state-level administration and politics.

NOTES

1. The term *radical agrarian* is not utilized because it insinuates a relationship based on control over factors of production in rural areas, which hides the independent influence of external actors/agency and other socio-psychological motivations for insurgency.

2. Subrata Bhaumik, "India's Maoists ready for talks," *BBC News*, February 2, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8507525.stm

3. "Naxalism biggest threat to internal security: Manmohan," *The Hindu*, May 24, 2010, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-security-manmohan/article436781.ece.

4. Ethan Beck, "The Spread of India's Radical Left Movement," *SAPRA India Bulletin* (2005), 7–10.

5. I use the US Department of State's definition of insurgency: "The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself." Insurgencies mainly target government property and institutions. According to Shcmid and Jongman, terrorists selectively or randomly harm non-combatants, to "serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist (organization), imperiled (victims), and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience/s) …". US Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Publication 1-02, 2010), 154. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 2nd ed. (Piscatway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 28.

6. Jeremy Weinstein. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

7. Mansoob S. Murshed and Scott Gates, "Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," *Review of Development Economics* 9, no. 1 (2005): 121–134.

8. Shivaji Mukherjee, "Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Legacies of British Indirect Rule" (paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, August 25, 2013), http://ssrn.com/, abstract=2299348

9. Ajay Verghese and Emmanuel Teitelbaum, "Colonialism and Armed Conflict in the Indian Countryside" (working Paper, 2014). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468133

10. Prakash Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India* (New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 1995).

11. Jamie Peck, *Workplace: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets* (New York: Guilford Press, 1996).

12. Vani K. Borooah, "Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of Naxalite Activity in the Districts of India," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 2, no. 2 (2008): 317–333.

13. Murshed and Gates, "Spatial-Horizontal Inequality."

14. James A. Piazza, "Terrorism and Party Systems in the States of India," *Security Studies* 19, no. 1 (2010): 99–123.

15. Steven I. Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

16. Piazza, "Terrorism and Party Systems."

17. Steven I. Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence* (2004).

18. Carolyn M. Elliot, "Decline of a Patrimonial Regime: The Telengana Rebellion in India, 1946–51," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (1974): 27–47; Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, 37–46.

19. Sumanta Banerjee, *In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India* (Calcutta: Subarnarekha, 1980).

20. The Srikakulam movement was centered on the personality of Vempatapu Satyanarayan, a secondary school teacher. The West Bengal movement had a more differentiated ideological-strategic and tactical structure, the former headed by Charu Mazumdar, while the latter was headed by Asim Chatterjee and colleagues. Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, 39 and 60.

21. Rabindra Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

22. Bipan Chandra, *In the Name of Democracy: JP Movement and the Emergency* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003).

23. Singh reiterates the support of tribal populations in such insurgencies. The Santhals, Lodhas and Oraons inhabiting the Chhota Nagpur Plateau traversing the provinces of West Bengal, Bihar (including Jharkhand) and Orissa. The Tharu tribe, the collective of Girijans (meaning: dwellers of the hills), and Adivasis (meaning: original inhabitants) of Uttar Pradesh (including Uttar Anchal), AndhraPradesh and Madhya Pradesh (including Chhatisgarh), respectively. Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*.

24. Beck, "The Spread of India's Radical Left Movement."

25. Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*, 69–73.

26. James C. Davies, "The J-Curve and Power Struggle Theories of Collective Violence," *American Sociological Review* 39, no. 4 (1974): 607–613. Bert Useem, "Breakdown Theories of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 215–238.

27. This article subsumes the rational choice oriented and resource mobilization models into the same framework because, whereas the first considers individual rational actors, the latter imposes a similar notion on social and political groups in the opposition. For the rational choice model, see: Mark Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 6 (1978): 1420–1443. For a resource mobilization model, see Kurt Schock, "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in Philippines and Burma," *Social Problems* 46, no. 3 (1999): 355–375. For a general theoretical overview, see: Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

28. Ted Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000). Prakash Louis, *People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar* (Delhi: Wordsmith, 2002).

29. David Snow, "Disrupting the Quotidian: Reconceptualizing the Relationship between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action," *Mobilization* 3, no. 1 (1998): 1–22.

30. Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

31. For an overview from the major academics and analysts, see B. Sarveswara Rao and G. Parthasarathy, eds., *Violence in Indian Polity and Naxalite Movement* (Vizag: Institute of Development and Planning Studies, 1995).

32. The term *subaltern* is used to emphasize the political-economic nature of exclusion; the role of the intellectual in forwarding critical realization of relations of dominance and subordination and a horizontal relationship of solidarity. For general theoretical explication, see Robert D. Benford and David Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639. For the Indian case, see Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*.

33. "…[A]n active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense

of a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them. The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as 'collective action frames.'" Benford and Snow "Framing Processes and Social Movements." 614.

34. Craig J. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 527–553. The two most objective works on the make-up and structure of these groups reveal the presence of external elites who defined issues within an ideological framework, based on which they proposed solutions, and identified targets and methods to achieve this solution. For the first wave of insurgency, see Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*. For the second wave, see Louis, *People Power*.

35. Jack A. Goldstone, "Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action," *Rationality and Society* 6, no. 1 (1994): 129–166.

36. Goldstone, "Is Revolution Individually Rational?" 134.

37. For the differentiation between social movements and political parties, see Diani, Mario "The Concept of Social Movement," *Sociological Review* 40, no. 1 (1992): 1–25. With regards to India, Singh considers the insurgency in Bihar as a social movement; the Naxalite parties are, therefore, social movement organizations. Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*. Prakash states that such a conflation, however, affects the status of non-governmental organizations, which work for women's rights or child laborers, working in these areas. Prakash Louis, *People Power* (2002), pp. 19-40.

38. Henrike Donner, "The Significance of Naxalbari: Accounts of Personal Involvement and Politics in West Bengal," *Centre for South Asian Studies Occasional Paper Nos. 14* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), eprints.lse.ac.uk/21343/1/The_significance_of_Naxalbari_%28LSERO%29.pdf

39. Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*, 69–70.

40. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

41. Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War; Hopes of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

42. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

43. Ranjit K. Gupta, *The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror* (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2004).

44. Beck, "The Spread of India's Radical Left Movement."

45. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *State-wise Inflation and Inequality Adjusted Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (1999–2000)*, (2001), https://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx

46. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *Literates and Literacy Rates, 2001 Census (Provisional): Population, Number of Literates and Literacy Rates by Sex—2001*, (2002), http://www.nlm.nic.in/literacy01_nlm.htm

47. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *State-wise Per Capita Income (At Current Prices) in India (2000–2001),* (2002), https://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx

48. Transparency International India, "India Corruption Study 2005: India Corruption Study to Improve Governance," New Delhi: India, http://www.transparencyindia.org/resource/survey_study/India%20Corruption%20Study%202005.pdf

49. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *Census of India: Distribution of Population, Sex Ration, Density and Decadal Growth Rate of Population: 2001*, (2001).

50. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *State-wise Number of Below Poverty Line (BPL) Families and Quantity of Foodgrain Allocated in India (2000–2002)*, (2003), https://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx

51. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *State-wise Unemployment Rates for Educated Persons (15 Years and Above) in India (1999–2000)*, (2001), https://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx

52. Government of India, Office of the Registrar General, *State-wise Estimate of Unemployment Rate for Youth (15–29 Years) in Rural/Urban Areas of India (1999–2000)*, (2001), https://www..indiastat.com/default.aspx

53. Bharatee B. Dash and Sacchidananda Mukherjee, "Political Competition and Human Development: Evidence from the Indian States," *Journal of Development Studies* 51, no. 1 (2015): 1–14.

54. Pradeep K. Chhibber, *Democracy Without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

55. Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 88–92.

56. As the presence of substantial areas of insurgency throws into question the "functioning" of liberal democracy, a successful removal of the regime depends on opposition forces' ability to coordinate with each other. Marc M. Howard and Philip Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2006): 365–381.

57. Ray, *The Naxalites and Their Ideology*, 17.

58. Though the New Social Movement theories apply to developed countries, the salience of the dual economies of developing countries should be considered. In India, for example, an advanced urban economy is located within an under-developed rural sector. Thus, allowing for post-material values to evolve within urbanized educated youth; which could be framed within radical leftist ideologies. For an overview of the New Social Movement theories, see Nelson A. Pichardo, "New Social Movements: A Critical Review," *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol. 23 (1971), pp. 411-30.

59. Ramachandhra Guha, "Adivasis, Naxalites and Indian Democracy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 42, no. 32 (2007): 3305–3312.

60. Kennedy and King find that tribal population who were dispossessed of their land are more likely to support the Maoist insurgents, but not all *adivasis* (tribals) support the insurgents. Supporters of the counterinsurgents do so because they are threatened by the Maoists, given the tribal people have previously collaborated with the state. Jonathan Kennedy and Lawrence King, "Adivasis, Maoists and Insurgency in India," *European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 54, no. 1 (2013): 1–32.

61. Kennedy and King, "Adivasis, Maoists and Insurgency in India."

62. Government of India, Left Wing Extremism Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, *Statistics of LWE Violence, 2010–2015*, http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new

63. The Naxalite movement gained prominence in 1967. It was marked by an armed conflict led by Charu Majumder in Naxalbari in Northern West Bengal. Land redistribution was the main motive guiding this movement.

64. Government of India, Development Commissioner, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, *Backward Areas: List of Industrially Backward Districts in the country*, http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/schemes/pcgbk01x.htm

65. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, November 24, 2006.

66. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, April 7. 2007.

67. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, August 8. 2007.

68. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, April 23. 2008.

69. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, August 10, 2008.

70. *Times of India* archives, Kolkata edition, October 15, 2009.

71. We are using the measure introduced by Dash and Mukherjee (2015), and appreciate Bharatee Dash for explaining and sharing the corresponding data. Bharatee B. Dash and Sacchidananda Mukherjee, "Political Competition and Human Development: Evidence from the Indian States," *The Journal of Development Studies* 51, no. 1 (2015): 1–14.

72. "BJP had a deal with Maoists in Chhatisgarh, says Digvijaya Singh," *Hindustan Times*, May 10, 2017. "Chhatisgarh: Maoists killed 70 BJP workers in 2 years, says Chief Minister Raman Singh," *The Indian Express*, June 24, 2016.

73. Kristian Hoelscher, Jason Miklian and Krishna C. Vadlamannati, "Hearts and Mines: A District-Level Analysis of the Maoist Conflict in India," *International Area Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (2012): 141–160.