URBAN INSURGENCY, COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND INTERNAL SECURITY*

1. INTRODUCTION

The classic concept of insurgency tended to emphasise a firm base from where the insurgent was able to operate in relative safety. The area selected ideally had to contain a local population with genuine or perceived grievances, who could be persuaded that they had a legitimate revolutionary cause.

Most insurgencies were rurally based, such as in Malaya where the jungle afforded the insurgents the necessary cover. Partial urban insurgencies such as the one that took place in Algeria's capital city Algiers from 1954 to 1962, did occur where it suited the revolutionaries.

In the early 21st century rural insurgencies still occur as is the case in Afghanistan and the Philippines, but the world's large urban centres are now becoming the insurgents' and terrorists' selected areas

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of operation. Densely populated areas in underdeveloped countries provide the ideal infrastructure for insurgency where security forces may find it difficult to collect intelligence, access the built-up areas and maintain law and order, particularly if the local population supports the revolutionaries or is intimidated into neutrality.\textsuperscript{1)}

Whereas the 20\textsuperscript{th} century insurrections were largely influenced by nationalistic motives, and thus somewhat restricted to national state boundaries, some contemporary insurgencies seek to impose revolutionary changes worldwide. Al-Qaida is an example of such a movement, which seeks to radically change the Islamic world, so that it can regain its ability to influence other regions and cultures. Al-Qaida uses modern communications and technology to achieve its ends, but the grievances and methods used to promote radicalism are not new. As in communist backed nationalistic revolutions, terrorism, subversion, propaganda and open warfare are used by 21\textsuperscript{st} century insurgencies, but with a much greater emphasis on the use of terrorism, and the introduction of suicide attacks.\textsuperscript{2)}

Examples of recent concise definitions of insurgency, counter-insurgency and civil war, are relevant in the modern era and are listed as follows:

— An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.\textsuperscript{3)}

— Counter-insurgency consists of those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.\textsuperscript{4)}

— Evidently a well considered definition of civil war should contain two criteria. Firstly, that a civil war is a war fought between at least two factions in the same country fighting for control of the political centre, or control of a separatist state, or to force a major change in policy. Secondly, that at least 1 000 people should have been killed in hostilities with at least 100 fatalities on each side.\textsuperscript{5)}
2. UNITED STATES COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE: 2006

Fighting in built-up areas is dangerous, time consuming and downright frightening. It negates the counter-insurgents organised military advantage to some extent, and degrades target acquisition systems. This allows the insurgents to often survive precision strikes which may hit the local uninvolved population.\textsuperscript{6}

2.1 Contemporary principles applicable to 21\textsuperscript{st} century counter-insurgency

The principles according to which the US Army and Marine Corps operate, take the complexities of the Iraqi insurgency and civil war into account. Since they, the US armed forces, have been, and still are conducting counter-insurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the new US Army and Marine Corps doctrine is authoritative. The 2006 doctrine lists historical and currently applicable principles of counter-insurgency as follows:\textsuperscript{7}

— The main objective of counter-insurgency is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

— Unity of effort with all government agencies is essential. Ideally a single counter-insurgent leader should have the authority to ensure it. However, that is seldom achieved, and synchronisation has normally to be sought with a lot of time-consuming liaison, particularly with non-government agencies.

— Since most insurgencies require a political solution, political factors are predominant, and the old adage that revolutionary wars require 80 per cent political action, and 20 per cent military, is still stated to bring the lesson home.

— The counter-insurgents must make an in-depth study of their environment, so that the security forces conducting the operations understand the society and culture within which they are operating.

— Effective counter-insurgency requires timely, specific and accurate intelligence, collected and analysed at the lowest possible
level, and disseminated to all who need it, in a form which ensures that it can easily be understood.

— The counter-insurgency must isolate the insurgents from their cause and from their support. Capturing and killing insurgents will be necessary particularly in the case of religious or ideological extremists, but since killing every insurgent is normally impossible, an orchestrated effort must be made to convince the uncommitted majority that the revolutionary cause is a bad one.

— The rule of law must be implemented and law enforcement operations must be undertaken as quickly as possible. The insurgency must be criminalised to cause it to lose public support. The counter-insurgency must operate within the law and eschew excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture and punishments without trial.

— Since insurgencies are by nature protracted, counter-insurgents must accept that a long-term commitment will be required to be successful. Counter-insurgency operations invariably demand considerable expenditure of time and resources, consequently the coalition and Iraqi governments, their populations, and the security forces, must be organised to provide the infrastructure for a long drawn out war.

2.2 A brief analysis of the US Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency doctrine

The "historical" principles listed above, are included in the current US Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency doctrine, published under the signatures of two generals with personal counter-insurgency operational experience as division commanders in Iraq. One of them, General David H Petraeus of the US Army, is the commander of the coalition forces in Iraq at present. He has subsequently been nominated, awaiting approval by the US Senate, for appointment as commander of the US Central Command. His span of command will then include both the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other is a Marine Corps officer, General James F Amos, who had considerable influence on the content of the doctrine.

The document is very detailed and meant to guide the com-
manders and soldiers in the field. Generally, the following strikes experienced users of such doctrines:

— Extensive use is made of counter-insurgency experience built up over centuries, and in particular the 20th century experience.

— The document is aimed at US/coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 21st century.

— The inclusion that religious and ethnic factors play a very prominent role in the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

— The realisation that modern technology, and particularly the development in the means of communication, such as internet, cellphones, world-wide instant television reporting and computers, have put the operations on the world stage in real time, available for friendly and enemy reporting and propaganda.

— That far more emphasis is placed on insurgency and terrorist tactics in urban areas, than has been the case in older counter-insurgency manuals. The point is made that as the world has become more urbanised and insurgent networks have become more sophisticated, urban insurgency has become more effective.

— The use of the concept of logical lines of operations (LLOs), which is explained as a line of operations which is a logical line, that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. It is pointed out that the commanders at all levels can employ LLOs, and that a commander's intent and vision expressed as LLOs, describes his/her design for a counter-insurgency operation. Further that unity of effort is gained by synchronising activities along the LLOs.

— The inclusion, evidently as a result of marine influence, of campaign design. It is stated that campaign design itself may be the most important aspect of counter-insurgency. To explain the concept it is described in relation to planning by elucidating that planning is a problem-solving process, whereas designing is problem setting. Design thus precedes planning but it is a living process and must continue throughout planning, preparation for execution, and execution itself. There should be a continuous
cycle of designing-learning and redesigning to achieve the ultimate goal, namely a successful counter-insurgency.  

— The doctrine has no security classification, is approved for public release and its distribution is unlimited. The content shows a very positive approach to counter-insurgency, with a high standard of integrity and moral values expected from the security forces involved.

— To employ the doctrine effectively requires a very high standard of training, effective planning, and well executed operations.

2.3 Co-operation between the military and the media

As stated in the principles of counter-insurgency, the local population, who are initially the uncommitted majority, must be convinced that the cause of the counter-insurgency is the correct one to support. The home population of a counter-insurgency force which is operating in a foreign country, such as the US forces who are involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, must also be convinced that their forces are being employed in a war which is relevant to the home country, and that the national blood and treasure are being expended for very good reason.

The media both local and international, as was already the case in the 20th century insurgencies, can complicate military operations extensively. Biased hostile reporting on modern internet and satellite links can cause wrong impressions very difficult to rectify. T E Lawrence, commonly known as "Lawrence of Arabia", stated in 1920 that the printing press was the greatest weapon in the armoury of a modern commander. In the early 21st century he may have added television and internet, in the armoury of the commander, and also that of the insurgent. Television, with its wide coverage and the simple fact that it requires little effort to understand, has a value equal to the most advanced weapon available to the military, and unfortunately to the enemy as well.

There are few professions which tend to misunderstand each other to a greater extent than the media and the military. To overcome the problem it is a good policy to allow journalists to accompany troops on operations whenever possible. Young journalists who are flown in and out of action are not given the time to truly understand the soldiers'
circumstances, and develop little sympathy for the military's problems. The military on its side must ensure that its soldiers, and particularly the officers, have an understanding of the media's characteristics, its disciplines, ethics, and requirements to report accurately and truthfully.

In urban counter-insurgency it can be very dangerous for media journalists and cameramen to accompany soldiers on patrol. The cameramen in particular stand out in spite of new technological developments to combat the problem, and soldiers can hardly guarantee their safety. The large number of media personnel killed in urban settings over the last few years confirms it, and the possibility exists that they are in fact targeted by the insurgents.

Fact is that the Iraqi population is consistently bombarded with videos, pictures and sermons promoting radical causes. Bin Laden is reported to have written a letter to his fellow insurgents that "it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach 90 per cent of the total preparation for the battles". It is thus imperative that counter-insurgencies devise ways to nullify the efforts of terrorist organisations, who use the available means of communication such as the internet and television.

3. COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN IRAQ IN 2007/2008

The Iraqi population lives mostly close to the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The country is largely urban with the capital Baghdad being home to four to five million people. Although some operations in rural areas take place, the outcome of the Sunni-Shi'ite struggle for political power, and the insurgency itself will be decided in the urban areas. Baghdad is the centre of the struggle and the town in which a large number of atrocities, aimed at destabilising the country, take place.

Measured against the definition of civil war, the situation in Iraq, to a large extent an urban confrontation, can be classified as a low-level civil war because of the Sunni-Shi'ite struggle for political ascendancy. The civil war is, however, much more complicated than the definition describes. There is a power struggle taking place between Sunnis and Shi'ites, but Iraq is also being subjected to a number of power struggles in which Sunnis are fighting Sunnis, and Shi'ites are fighting Shi'ites. There are tribal leaders, militia chiefs, politicised clerics, former government and military officials, criminals and warlords, all attempting
to either empower their factions or to enrich themselves. In the midst of these struggles the elected Iraqi government is attempting to establish itself as a functional entity.\textsuperscript{13)} That complicates the unrest in the country and it requires a political strategy that addresses both the insurgency, which is aimed at the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition, and the civil war. It is a circumstance or condition which can eventually influence the success or failure of the United States (US) led counter-insurgency.

As a result the military counter-insurgency forces are required to operate in close co-operation with the US Department of State. To further complicate the operations the military have to co-operate with friendly intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and police, aid and development agencies, and private enterprise and contractors, some of whom are easy for the military to co-operate with, and some who by their nature complicate planning and command extensively.\textsuperscript{14)}

3.1 The introduction of the 'surge' and the application of the new doctrine

In January 2007, the fifth year of the war in Iraq, the 'surge', that is the deployment of an additional 30 000 US troops, began. The strategy was based on the concept that an added five brigades would help to secure Baghdad and hunt down al-Qaida, and in so doing, decrease the level of violence, so that the Shi’ites and Sunnis would be able to establish a functional joint government.\textsuperscript{15)}

The operations to secure the capital could not start in earnest immediately, because although the surge was announced in January 2007, it took some months before the added troops reached Iraq, and could move into their allocated operational positions. As the additional troops deployed, a number of offensive operations were mounted to attack insurgent strongholds in Baghdad and in other areas throughout Iraq. In accordance with the new counter-insurgency doctrine the forces in Baghdad were deployed out of the large bases on the outskirts of the town, and into small operational bases in the city's violent unstable neighbourhoods, where they undertook foot patrols and connected with the local population in order to establish counter-insurgency networks.\textsuperscript{16)}
3.2 Securing the capital Baghdad

Of particular interest is that the coalition commanders tasked their staff to ascertain how Saddam Hussein had secured Baghdad against the many movements that wanted to overthrow his regime. They found out that he had established a defensive perimeter around the capital, where the Republican Guard were posted in the towns surrounding Baghdad. His élite Special Republican Guard operated inside the city itself.

US forces also gleaned intelligence, as a result of a raid on an al-Qaida command and control centre, that al-Qaida planned to capture and control precisely those towns around the capital which the Saddam Hussein regime had secured, so as to launch attacks on US forces in Baghdad. The US commanders consequently concluded that the belt of insurgent controlled areas around Baghdad had to be secured. The sectarian violence recurring in the capital was evidently supported by terrorist supply networks which made car bombs, mortars, rockets, and explosives available, for indirect fire into the city, as well as to the suicide bombers.17)

The operational strategic thinking described above bears witness to the fact that the US commanders are applying creative and original thinking to strategic and tactical problems. However, the main reasons for a measure of success lies in their application of a sound counter-insurgency doctrine, which has led to the security forces getting their 'boots on the ground'. With the soldiers actually deployed in the populated areas they have made contact with the local population, who in many areas feel safer as a result of their presence.

3.3 Positive results gained by introducing the new doctrine and the surge

A further outcome of the application of the new doctrine and the surge, is that a large number of former Sunni insurgents have begun to cooperate with the US forces. Even the Shi'ite Mahdi Army, a 60 000 strong militia, had been ordered by their leader Muqtada al-Sadr in 2007 to stop attacking US forces. The reason for the order is not as yet clear, but it resulted in a 15 to 20 per cent reduction in attacks on counter-insurgency forces. Efforts have also been made to convince al-Sadr's
militia to join a peaceful coalition, as some Sunni factions have done.\textsuperscript{18)}

Unfortunately al-Sadr decided otherwise. On 22 March 2008 the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) reported that the 'green zone', the security area in Baghdad where the Iraqi government buildings and the US and United Kingdom (UK) embassies are situated, had been attacked. A stand-off bombardment using rockets and mortars was launched early in the morning. The US authorities suspected that the Mhadi militia was responsible, in spite of the fact that they had not attacked the US forces for about seven months.

After the attack on the green zone the Mahdi militia also broke the cease-fire agreement in Basrah, where UK forces had already withdrawn. The Iraqi prime minister then ordered Iraqi security forces to proceed with operations against the militia on 24 March, in order to regain control of Basrah. The fighting which had spread to Baghdad as well, was then between Shi'i government forces and Shi'iite militia. By 31 March 2008 international television media stations were reporting that a new cease-fire agreement had been reached and that it had most probably been facilitated by the Iranian government. The latter is a Shi'iite country.

In an interview with the Iraqi Prime Minister on 7 April 2008 on CNN, it was mentioned that Iranian special forces were somehow involved in continued fighting in east Baghdad, where nine Iraqi's had been killed and 65 wounded. The surge and application of sound counter-insurgency doctrine has shown good results, but fighting between the many factions involved in Iraq is clearly far from over.

Statistics supplied by the US military of particular interest in ascertaining the real success of the applied counter-insurgency doctrine, and the surge, read as follows:\textsuperscript{19)}

— There were 130 000 US troops in Iraq prior to the surge and 30 000 additional troops were deployed in 2007.

— In 2006 the US casualty rate averaged 68 killed per month before the surge. It rose to 84 killed in August 2007 when new type operations had begun, but had fallen to 23 killed in December 2007.

— The monthly average of Iraqi civilians killed in 2006 equalled 2 871. In August 2007 it had decreased to 1 600 and by December to 550.
— The Iraqi military and police suffered a monthly average of 174 killed in 2006, with 76 killed in August 2007 and 72 in December 2007.

— Insurgent casualties during the surge were published in February 2008 as being 2 400 killed and 8 800 captured.

— Whereas only 1 500 Sunnis had indicated a willingness to cooperate with the US forces before the surge, 25 000 had joined the so-called "awakening councils", and 60 000 people, mostly Sunnis, had joined "Concerned Local Citizens" groups.

### 3.4 Security force to population ratios

The above statistics seem to indicate that an element of the population, mainly Sunni, are of the opinion that the counter-insurgency forces have the will, the means and the skills to win the war. The means or ability is very dependent on the security force to population ratio. During the Malayan counter-insurgency the British used a security force ratio of approximately 20 security force members to 1 000 inhabitants. This figure has generally been accepted as realistic for areas where the level of violence is high.\(^{20}\)

It is argued that the ratio of 20 to 1 000 is really only required in four of the provinces in Iraq where the violence level requires it. There are evidently four provinces in which the level of violence is considered moderate, and a ratio of six to 1 000 may suffice. Lastly, as many as ten provinces, which include the rural sparsely populated areas have low levels of violence, and ratios of about three to 1 000 are considered sufficient. If the high violence ratio of 20 to 1 000 is applied throughout the country, with a population of approximately 25.5 million, then about 511 000 security personnel would be needed.

In an "Iraq Weekly Status Report" of 25 July 2007, the US Department of State stated that there were about 354 100 trained and equipped Iraqi security forces available.\(^{21}\)

How well trained and how well motivated they are to be effective in a counter-insurgency role, in a country where sectarian violence is common, is not clear. However, with the US forces numbering 130 000 before the surge, plus 354 100 Iraqi forces, the overall security force strength would be in excess of 480 000, which must be adequate since
a high level of violence does not permeate throughout the country. The fact that a surge of 30 000 US troops was still needed to apply the new 'boots on the ground' doctrine, seems to indicate that the raw figures do not show how effective the Iraqi forces truly are. Since the fighting in Basrah ended in a cease-fire, no real conclusion as to their operational ability can be drawn either.

### 3.5 The time and cost factors

A common characteristic of insurgency wars is that they invariably have a protracted nature. The war in Iraq is no different, and time for the counter-insurgent involves expense, not only in lives, but also in terms of finance. The Iraqi government seems to be making little progress in establishing itself as a legitimate government in the eyes of the whole Iraqi population, and no acceptable political solution for power sharing between the Sunnis, the Shi'ites, and the Kurds has been forthcoming.

The war in Iraq is reported to cost the US approximately US$12 billion a month in 2008, in the sixth year of the war. By the end of the US fiscal year 30 September 2008 the Iraqi and Afghan wars will have cost the US budget US$845 billion, valued in 2007 dollars. This is based on the assumption that the US Congress fully funds the costs requested by the Administration. These figures include reconstruction expenses, embassy costs and other war payments, and not only the costs of military operations. The Iraq war is estimated to cost three-quarters of the total.\(^{22}\) This is not surprising considering the urban nature of the war, and the high density of the Iraqi population in the urban areas.

The Vietnam War which lasted 12 years cost US$670 billion in 2007 dollars.\(^{23}\) The Iraqi and Afghan hostilities thus already surpass the Vietnam costs. Whether the US Congress and the US public will continue to support the Iraq war, in the period of the new presidency starting in 2009, is debateable. Not only are the financial costs of the wars astronomical, but the cost in US fatalities especially in Iraq, is also receiving considerable media coverage. On 19 March 2008 it was reported in various written media sources that the US had suffered 3 990 military fatalities in Iraq, and that on 17 March as many as 29 395 personnel had been reported wounded in action. By 23 March international television media reported that US fatalities had risen to 4 000. In
spite of the surge's relative success, the insurgency and the low intensity civil war could drag on for years, while the casualty totals keep rising.

Evidently there are as many as 2,3 million displaced people in Iraq, and Iraqi refugees have left the country in large numbers. There are 750 000 in Jordan; 1,4 million in Syria; 31 300 in Sweden; and 2 700 in the US. There consequently seems to be little progress in the political and communal stabilisation of the country, while the misery caused by the initial coalition invasion in 2003, and the escalating misery and continuous violence caused by the insurgency, is brought to the attention of the US public on a daily basis by the media.

A large section of the US public feels that the lack of political success and much of the misery is caused by the Iraqis themselves. Hillary Clinton said as much on her presidential campaign trail when she stated that the Iraqi populace would only take responsibility for their own future after the Americans had withdrawn. Possibly by starting to disengage their forces, the coalition could force a new workable political dispensation on Iraq's religious and ethnic groupings. Withdrawal could, however, result in an extremely violent civil war, which is clearly a scenario which the US government finds totally unacceptable.

The British forces have reportedly already begun to withdraw some troops from Iraq, after having given a large measure of the counter-insurgency initiative in Basrah to the Iraqi security forces. The areas of counter-insurgency responsibility allocated to the UK forces, were fortunately seldom as violent as was the case in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the UK Ministry of Defence reported a 52 per cent increase in their original financial estimate of the war in Iraq. It is reported to be difficult to isolate the exact cost of the UK's international operational activities, but it is known that an additional 6,6 billion pounds was added to the UK core defence budget to fund such operations between 2001 and March 2007. Clearly counter-insurgency operations supported over long distances from home bases are an expensive undertaking.

By 19 March 2008, British forces had reportedly suffered 175 fatalities in Iraq, and each death receives a considerable amount of publicity in the UK, where the arrival of the remains are treated with a specific military ceremony often shown on national and international television. British involvement in the war in Iraq has never had over-
whelming support from the British public, many of whom reportedly feel that their government followed the US into the war unnecessarily.

4. COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM IRAQ

It seems wise for the South African military to learn from the US and coalition forces' counter-insurgency experience in Iraq, particularly because the Iraq insurgency is largely an urban war and should it ever occur in South Africa, it will most probably have an urban bias. Another reason for giving the Iraq experience attention, is that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been deployed in Africa for some time on peace support missions, and it could consequently inadvertently get involved in full-blown counter-insurgency operations elsewhere.

SANDF officers when presenting their visions of the likely characteristics of future operations in which the South African forces may become involved, quote the US conventional and counter-insurgency experience in Iraq liberally. However, African conditions must be seriously considered when applying the lessons. Firstly, the continent has its consistent weaknesses namely poverty, corruption and tribalism. Some of these ills are also common in the Middle East where religious extremism must be added. The latter is less prominent in Africa. Nevertheless, the recent upheavals in Kenya prove just how volatile poverty, corruption and tribalism really are.

Some African wars have been categorised as criminal insurgencies. Examples are the hostilities in Sierra Leone and Somalia which, similar to the wars in Colombia and Peru, have in fact been 'rebellions' with no clear political aims or known spokespersons with the overall aim of gaining political power. The 'strategy' of the insurgents was to spread terror amongst the population in order to deny the government the ability to govern. The rebel groups were thus able to rule their own territories to their own physical advantage. Such wars can best be described as intra-state ethno-political and/or criminal conflicts. They are often very prolonged, come to no definite resolutions, and it is doubtful whether any approved counter-insurgency doctrine is applicable in the circumstances.

Should SANDF troops be sent to carry out peacekeeping mis-
sions in territories which regress into criminal insurgencies, or where governments knowingly send government paid forces to harass segments of their own population, as in Sudan, conditions could become extremely traumatic for own forces. It has happened that the rules of engagement virtually make peacekeepers or counter-insurgents impotent, and simply unable to intervene effectively. Such situations must be avoided at all costs because the legacy of such an occurrence can follow a government and its military for years into the future, whether own forces were at fault or not.

A lesson from Iraq, confirmed by the operations in Afghanistan, is that countries should join international coalitions which form combined counter-insurgency forces with considerable circumspection. The US has virtually undertaken the total security force combat task in Iraq, with little help from any country other than the UK. That was probably foreseen by the US government, but the Afghan Taliban insurgency is being fought mainly by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The combined force numbers about 43 000 made up of contingents from various nations, but the overall commander may not deploy all the contingents for duties in the violent south. Troops from the US, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands and Canada, for example, are available for combat duties, while some contingents are not. This leads to endless dissatisfaction in the parliaments and media of home countries supplying the forces.

Africa has some large urban areas suitable for an urban approach to insurgency, coupled with terrorist tactics. Terrorist tactics in urban areas are difficult to counter and can be used by small independent cells who have little popular support. Population density in urban areas and modern technology makes terrorism a good option to sow disorder, weaken the government, intimidate the population, kill government officials so causing governments to adopt suppressive measures, and tie down and intimidate the security forces, thus limiting their responses to terrorist attacks.27

The US Army and Marine Corps published a new counter-insurgency doctrine in December 2006 aligned to the operations in which the US ground forces are involved now. It supersedes a doctrine published in October 2004. The practice of keeping doctrine current to be of real value to commanders and troops in the field, is sound.
5. CONCLUSION

The US Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency doctrine is sound and based on years of experience, but it requires too much time and cost to reach a result within a reasonable time. The religious dimension involved with the Sunni and Shi'ite factions struggling for power, and the presence of various ethnic groupings which include Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen complicates the situation infinitely. The support of neighbouring Iran for Shi'ite factions is a complication now starting to surface, and which may prove to be a major factor in deciding the final outcome of the hostilities.

The Iraqi civil war and counter-insurgency shows just how complicated and difficult successful urban operations are. It underlines the fact that most insurgencies are likely to be fought and decided in large urban areas in the future. A major lesson to be learnt is that no matter how powerful and efficient its military may be, no country should allow itself to become deeply involved in the insurgencies and/or civil wars of other nations, particularly when the battle space is far away. One can assume that the South African authorities have drawn that conclusion long ago.

Should an insurgency, or simply a political upsurge to show dissatisfaction with living conditions and or bad governance occur in South Africa (as has happened with protest over local government service delivery), it will almost certainly be largely urban based. To manage such upsurges successfully, if they have nation-wide support, requires well co-ordinated internal security doctrines for the police, who are the main actors, and for the military who must support them. The doctrines will have to cover many drills and legalities in detail, which must be included in procedures such as cordons and searches and crowd control. Internal security has to do with the maintenance of law and order, consequently the security forces must operate within the law themselves. If the police can be safeguarded to a reasonable extent from personal danger, they will be able to operate with circumspection, and by so doing safeguard the rioters from their own anger and lack of control.
REFERENCES

10. Ibid, pp 4-2 and 4-9.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

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AMENDMENT TO ISSUP BULLETIN 1/2008: MILITARY LOGISTICS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

Since the publication of *ISSUP Bulletin 1/2008* new information in regard to the adoption of the General Staff (GS) system in the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), has come under the attention of the writer of the *Bulletin*. On page 3 of the article it was stated that the system was adopted by the SADF in the 1970s, and that it still functions in the SANDF presently. Evidently the SANDF abandoned the GS system as a result of reorganization in the 1990s. However, the South African Army is according to new information, reverting to the GS system in the course of 2008. The latter, due to no fault of the sources approached, caused some misunderstanding.