

# Successful Anti-corruption Initiatives in Botswana, Singapore and Georgia

## Lessons for South Africa

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### ABSTRACT

Corruption is widely cited as the key reason for under-development and poverty. It is often stated that developing countries could address developmental challenges that they are faced with if they manage to curb corruption to minimum levels. The article seeks to provide a brief overview of the successful control of corruption in three selected developing countries (Botswana, Singapore [a developing country at an advanced stage] and Georgia). These developing countries have tremendously improved their rankings in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. The case for providing a brief overview on developing countries is much stronger than for developed countries as successful anti-corruption reforms by most developed countries were implemented while they were still classified as developing countries. The specificities of each country that are important in implementing the ethics and anti-corruption initiatives will be outlined. The data used in this article is gathered by desktop review in South Africa with pre-existing surveys, previous research and reports of different institutions used for describing the selected developing countries' control systems of corruption. The article will, furthermore, contextualise in the South African environment the arguments presented for the selected developing countries which have managed to curb the scourge of corruption. The arguments presented revolve around designing an implementation model for anti-corruption, political will, collective action, a dedicated anti-corruption agency and collaboration with other sectors of society.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Corruption feeds failed states and unless checked its major legacy will be an unjust and unstable world, tipping the outcome of uncertainties about the future in an ever more dangerous direction (Cockcroft 2014:231). There is a need to pause, reflect and propose sustainable solutions when the consequences of corruption are threatening the developmental goals of South Africa. The starting point is to learn from other developing countries that have successfully managed to control their levels of corruption. Learning from other developing countries also eliminates the criticism that comparing South Africa to developed countries does not provide a balanced comparison because developed countries are rich, politically stable and homogenous societies. The ethics and anti-corruption best practice from other developing countries is essential to ensure that the ethics and anti-corruption initiatives are properly implemented by South Africa in order to realise its vision of being an innovative, responsive and vibrant nerve centre for people-centred governance. This will further assist to position South Africa as the leading economy on the continent that is underpinned by sustainable economic development.

Many new presidents, governors, ministers and mayors are eager to reduce corruption because they know that corruption constrains development (Klitgaard 2013:1). This argument corresponds with the views of Mantzaris and Pillay (2013:112) who assert that political and administrative leaders need to appreciate that the war room against corruption needs new thinking, knowledge, strategies and comprehensive initiatives if they are to arrest and then reverse corruption's proliferation. Moiloa (2013:29) as well as Cockcroft (2014:231) accentuate that it is widely acknowledged that a lack of ethics and pervasive corruption imposes heavy costs, frustrates developmental efforts and makes it difficult for the government to reduce poverty.

## **INTERNATIONAL ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION BEST PRACTICE**

The international ethics and anti-corruption best practice with specific focus on three selected developing countries is the core of the article. It is intended to draw lessons which could assist in finding solutions that can enhance the implementation of ethics and anti-corruption in South Africa. In certain case studies it might not be the implementation of specific ethics and anti-corruption initiatives, but rather the environment that led to effective implementation that is scrutinised.

Hough (2013:7) advises about the importance of understanding country-specific dynamics before recommending, let alone implementing, reform

agendas, which is now a *sine qua non* of corruption analysis. The article is not necessarily seeking to recommend that strategies that are working in the three selected developing countries should be imported but rather to learn from them and use the experiences of these countries to infuse the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives in South Africa.

## Developing countries

Bauhr *et al.* (2010:4) accentuate that there is a “general consensus holding among international institutions like Transparency International (2006) and World Bank (2007) that corruption is the key reason for under-development and poverty as a result reducing corruption is thus not just a moral but also an economic imperative”. Developing countries could address developmental challenges that they are faced with if they can manage to curb corruption to minimum levels. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013a:1259) reveals that according to Andrews (2008) the “most relevant lessons lie not in what developed countries are doing to control corruption but rather in what they have done in the past, when their societies more strongly resembled the conditions in today’s developing world”. In line with this revelation, Rothstein and Teorell (2015:251) assert that if the endogenous theory of anti-corruption reform proves applicable to other cases, it seems that fundamental anti-corruption change could very well be brought about from inside.

The three selected developing countries are Botswana, Singapore and Georgia as they have excelled in controlling corruption. The rankings of these

**Table 1: Rankings of three selected developing countries in Corruption Perception Indices 2010-2015 (South Africa also included to show how it is performing as compared to its counterparts in the developing world)**

Country	Rank 2010 (Scores) – out of 178 countries	Rank 2011 (Scores) – out of 183 countries	Rank 2012 (Scores) – out of 176 countries	Rank 2013 (Scores) – out of 177 countries	Rank 2014 (Scores) – out of 175 countries
Botswana	33 (5.8)	32 (6.1)	30 (65)	30 (64)	31 (63)
Singapore	1 (9.3)	5 (9.2)	5 (87)	5 (86)	7 (84)
Georgia	68 (3.8)	64 (4.1)	51 (52)	55 (49)	50 (52)
South Africa	54 (4.5)	64 (4.1)	69 (43)	72 (42)	67 (44)

Source: (Compiled based on the TI’s CPI results from 2010-2014 available at [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) as at 08 January 2016)

three selected developing countries in Transparency International's CPI for the five-year period from 2010 to 2014 are presented in Table 1 and an individual analysis of control of corruption in these countries is assumed.

The article, therefore, provides a brief overview of international anti-corruption best practice in three selected developing countries (Botswana, Singapore and Georgia) which have successfully managed to control levels of corruption. The specificities of each country important in implementing the ethics and anti-corruption initiatives are outlined below.

### **Botswana**

Transparency International's CPI has consistently ranked Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa. Botswana is continuously showing signs of controlling corruption with impressive scores as compared to its continental counterparts. The fact that for the 2014 results the second best ranked African country is Cape Verde at position 42 shows that Botswana is doing something different. Botswana was ranked in position number 33 during 2010 and has managed to climb the CPI to position number 31 during 2014. Kapunda and Moffat (2012:89) highlight that Botswana's impressive economic growth and relatively low poverty levels are attributed to significant anti-corruption measures. Other African countries should be encouraged to note the success of anti-corruption reforms in a country which shares the most similar background variables and current conditions. The national ethics and anti-corruption legislation in Botswana include among others, the following:

- The Penal Code of Botswana, 1964 (Act 2 of 1964);
- The Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994 (13 of 1994);
- Proceeds of Serious Crimes (Amendment) Act, 2000 (13 of 2000);
- The Money Laundering Legislation (Excerpts); and
- The Banking (Anti-money laundering) Regulations of 2003.

The most important determining factor in ensuring the effective implementation of ethics and anti-corruption initiatives is the support of leaders. The influence that leaders possess can guarantee the effective implementation of these initiatives. According to Johnston (2012:469) Botswana teaches other countries important lessons about the value of socially rooted leadership. Although much of the success of anti-corruption reforms in Botswana is attributed to political will, it should also be highlighted that the establishment of a dedicated anti-corruption agency has turned political talk into action in terms of controlling the levels of corruption. Kapunda and Moffat (2012:86) report that instituting the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in Botswana has created new offences of corruption, including being in control of disproportionate assets or maintaining an unexplained high standard of living. Khemani (2009:25)

confirms that the DCEC “has enjoyed considerable success in implementing anti-corruption reforms due to strong political commitment, adequate resources and support from civil society”. The failure of anti-corruption agencies is, among others, associated with losing their operational autonomy which is deemed necessary for effective performance.

However, the role of the DCEC has been questioned in some quarters. A lingering concern for Good (2010:360) is that Botswana’s rulers “seem to think that they can get away with anything, safe inside their cocoon of perceived democracy and the absence of corruption”. The anti-corruption reforms stand a chance of failing once they seem to be targeting low level officials while the “big fishes” swim without fear of being disturbed. In defence of the impartial role of the DCEC, Sebudubudu (2010:257) highlights that although there is a perception that the DCEC targets mainly petty corruption, the DCEC has also dealt with a few high profile cases. In supporting this counter-argument, examples are given of a former general manager of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Fund (MVIF), jailed for fraudulently obtaining money from the MVIF; and a former Director of Roads, who was convicted and jailed for corruption. The counter-argument submitted by Sebudubudu (2010) in defence of the impartial role of the DCEC mentions officials at management level who have also been prosecuted for corruption; while Good (2010) is concerned about the lack of prosecution for political elite who seem to be exempted. In order to ensure continuous success in their implementation of anti-corruption reforms as well as retaining the trust of the general public within and outside Botswana, the DCEC is, therefore, advised to investigate and where necessary punish anyone regardless of his or her position, status, or political affiliation.

## **Singapore**

It is important to note that Singapore is a developing country that is at an advanced stage of development. As a result in some quarters it is classified as a developed country. It is not the intention of the article to be involved or justify that debate but rather to show how Singapore has managed to impressively control corruption. The results of Transparency International’s CPI as presented in Table 1 show that on average, among the three developed countries, Singapore has been the best performing in terms of control of corruption for the results from 2010 to 2014. Singapore has been slowly dropping on the overall table for CPI moving from an impressive position number one during 2010 to position number seven in 2014. Noticeably, there has not been a significant difference in scores for Singapore although it has been dropping in positions: 87 in 2012 to 84 in 2014. This could be attributed to consistent efforts to control corruption by Singapore.

The strength of anti-corruption reforms is in some instances associated with existing ethics and anti-corruption legislation in a particular country. According to Hin (2011:96) Singapore relies on two key legislations to combat corruption:

- **The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA):** governs the primary offences of corruption and most importantly, provides more powers of enforcement to the Corrupt Practices Independent Bureau (CPIB). The POCA was enacted in 1960 to replace the previous Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) which was introduced by the British. Garcia-Andrade (2012:7-8) indicates that POCA's scope, contrary to POCO's 12 sections, was increased to 32 sections with a final increase to 37. Moreover, to enhance POCA's deterrent effect, the penalty for corruption was increased to imprisonment for five years and/or a heavy fine. It is also reported that a person found to have engaged in corruption and who received money illegally had to pay the amount taken as a bribe in addition to any other punishment imposed by a court. Recovery of funds is a key component of anti-corruption reforms as perpetrators need to know that when they are caught they will have to return all they have stolen.
- **The Corruption, Drugs Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act (CDSA):** provides for the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds which a person convicted of corruption cannot satisfactorily account for. The Singaporean authorities should be commended for tightening controls to ensure seizure and forfeiture from those involved in corrupt activities. Singapore is another country that has managed to curb corruption largely due to the effectiveness of its dedicated anti-corruption agency. Poochaoren (2014:14) acknowledges that Singapore has been praised for effective corruption control due to the CPIB's capacity and scope of power – investigative and punishment. Hin (2011:98) states that an important aspect in fighting corruption is to take effective enforcement actions because the corrupt escape detection and investigation when tough laws are not properly implemented. Legislation like the CDSA makes the work of the CPIB easier as it is ammunition to deal with those that are involved in corrupt activities.

The implementation of ethics and anti-corruption initiatives seem to be also influenced by staff morale in some countries. Garcia-Andrade (2012:10) articulates that besides the establishment of the CPIB, the political elite in Singapore recognised that improving working conditions of public servants would also ensure successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms. There were three decisive steps that assisted with this approach. Firstly, government adopted a policy of ensuring competitive pay for its bureaucrats by periodically revising civil service salaries to keep pace with rising wages in the private sector. Secondly, government created the Service Improvement Unit which

was designed to measure, review, audit and assess the present level and speed of service provided by government departments and statutory boards to the community. Lastly, each government minister was instructed to form a departmental committee to review anti-corruption measures and to ensure that reasonable and adequate measures are taken to prevent corrupt practices. The issues that were deemed to cause low staff morale and operational issues in line departments were decisively addressed in Singapore. Failure to address these issues has a potential to cause nominal implementation of ethics and anti-corruption initiatives in a particular setting.

## **Georgia**

Georgia is one of the overall best performing developing countries showing continuous improvement in the CPI by moving from position 68 in 2010 to position 50 in 2014. It is important to mention that Georgia was ranked 124 in 2003 which means it has achieved a 74-place improvement since 2003. According to Chene (2011b:2) and Kupatadze (2012:28) the prominence of anti-corruption reforms in Georgia has its roots in the 'Rose Revolution' (also known as 'anti-corruption movements') sparked by, among others, a popular rejection of rampant corruption that forced the resignation of President Shevardnadze in November 2003. The implementation of successful anti-corruption reforms in countries like Georgia is associated with some key events in its history. Georgia seems to have used its revolution to emphasise the importance of adhering to ethics and anti-corruption legislation.

According to Schneiders (undated:7) the main driver of change in Georgia's anti-corruption initiatives has been the government which, among others, introduced various legislations, formulating an anti-corruption strategy and establishing anti-corruption bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Interagency Council to coordinate the work of the anti-corruption strategy, Di Puppò (2010:228) discerns that the Georgian government seeks to "contest the assumption that national governments are failing to combat corruption as Georgia is more interested in marketing its anti-corruption expertise to other transition countries, than in importing external anti-corruption tools". The government of Georgia is a classic example to other governments in the developing world that unwavering involvement in implementing ethics and anti-corruption legislation should always be the priority.

The quality and quantity of the public sector workforce is often neglected when failure to effectively implement ethics and anti-corruption legislation is analysed. Di Puppò (2014:111) reveals that anti-corruption reforms are closely associated with Georgia's ambition to strengthen its statehood and introduce a new mentality in the public administration through a new generation of non-corrupt young officials. As a result, Kupatadze (2012:26) states bureaucracy in

Georgia has been cut dramatically as the number of public sector employees was reduced by almost 50% and salaries of public servants increased roughly 15-fold. The authorities have offered competitive salaries to attract individuals, especially young professionals, who would usually opt for working for private business or international organisations due to better working conditions and better remuneration. Job cuts and increasing salaries requires decisive leadership as in some parts implementation will be resisted by sectors like labour federations.

Di Puppo (2014:111) argues that the government of Georgia's choice of reforms reveals the emphasis put on quick success and visibility. According to Chene (2011a:2) a complete overhaul of sectors that are perceived to be highly corrupt also contributed to the successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms as a competitive recruitment system brought in new employees. The focus on selected sectors without implementing the Big Bang Theory has worked in Georgia. The internal drivers in Georgia according to Kupatadze (2012:30) also included, among others, integrating an anti-corruption campaign in general liberalisation policies and for attracting more investment to a resource-poor country. Put differently, Chene (2011b:3) maintains that the government of Georgia's commitment to anti-corruption reforms can be seen as part of its efforts to create a friendly environment for investors. The intensifying of efforts to successfully implement ethics and anti-corruption initiatives can bring economic incentives as investors will bring foreign direct investment. Georgia has proven this statement to be true.

## **LESSONS LEARNT FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT**

The focus shifts to describing the key arguments or lessons learnt for the South African context as presented by the selected developing countries that have managed to curb the scourge of corruption. The intention is not to import a single strategy that has brought success in the selected developing countries but rather to discuss the suitability of certain propositions that could work in the South African context. The propositions which are based on the analysis of developing countries which have shown remarkable control of corruption are briefly discussed below to evaluate their application in the South African context.

### **Designing an implementation model for anti-corruption**

South Africa is often applauded for having comprehensive ethics and anti-corruption legislation in place to reduce opportunities for corruption. However, implementation thereof remains a challenge. According to Person *et al.* (2010:3)



a large number of researchers now agree that the overall failure of anti-corruption reforms is by and large the result of an implementation problem. Heeks and Mathisen (2012:1) state that mistakes attributed to the implementation of anti-corruption interventions include among others too few actors involved in the interventions, impact and ill-conceived time-frames, low level of long-term partnerships, and absence of indicators for measuring outcomes. The existence of anti-corruption legislation is, therefore, not enough if not supplemented by an effective implementation model. Graycar (2015:95) advises that in the implementation of policy both events and processes can be corrupted as often the financial gains to the individual and the loss to the government are not large, but trust is diminished and governance capacity compromised. Besides ensuring recovery of funds, an effective and impartial implementation model is necessary for the continuous legitimacy of government which ensures stability within a country.

The importance and significance of an effective implementation model is the nucleus of ethics and anti-corruption legislation. The research on international best practice recommends a well-designed implementation model that leaves no room for failure. When developing an implementation model for ethics and anti-corruption initiatives consideration should be given to Heeks and Mathisen (2012:15) who argue that “one valuable profile found on successful anti-corruption initiatives is the “hybrid” which straddles design and reality, by understanding something of both worlds: understanding both how to design and how to fit such design to actual experience from particular reality concerned”. As a result, the ITPOSMO model is highly recommended by Heeks and Mathisen (2012) for effective implementation of anti-corruption legislation or initiatives. The details are as follows:

- **I**nformation (both formal and informal)
- **T**echnology (mainly information technology)
- **P**rocesses (from individual tasks to broader business processes)
- **O**bjectives and values (covering formal strategies and personal goals, and the influence of informal institutional forces)
- **S**taffing and skills (quantitative and qualitative aspects of competencies)
- **M**anagement systems and structures (the formal aspects of organisation)
- **O**ther resources (especially time and money)

The design of the implementation model should further consider both internal and external factors that have a potential to hinder its application. Johannsen and Pedersen (2012:133) advise that employees have the potential to resist policy reforms and further report that according to Barker and Wilson (1997) implementation studies have repeatedly shown that expecting detachment or neutral competence in bureaucracies is not sufficient in implementing policy.

In this regard, Johnston (2012:474) cautions that reform forces “not only must contend with powerful, wealthy interests who are able and all too willing to defend their advantages and gains, but they also often do so in conditions of social fragmentation, distrust and weak social and political institutions”. Internal and external factors should be strictly considered when developing an implementation model for ethics and anti-corruption initiatives for South Africa.

## **Political will**

The international experience, particularly for developing countries like Botswana and Georgia that have impressively managed control of corruption, has proven the commonly held assertion that the implementation of anti-corruption reforms are bound to fail if not complemented by a strong political will. Heeks and Mathisen (2012:7) state that corruption is a political problem and demands political solutions, hence a more confrontational strategy. The significance of this is underlined by Abdulai (2009:392) who contends that “genuine political will in combating corruption goes beyond mere rhetoric or empty sloganeering as words must match deeds and there has to be the all-important display of leadership by example”. The importance and significance of political will is that consistent integrity and honesty from politicians is non-negotiable and politicians have to further ensure that anti-corruption laws are implemented regardless of an individual’s position, status, or political affiliation. Specifically, according to Holmes (2015) Singapore remains an important case study as its success is based on political will and effective governance.

The question that is often posed is whether it is in the interest of political principals to ensure effective implementation of ethics and anti-corruption legislation. Heeks and Mathisen (2012:1) affirm that “the reasons for the persistent failures in implementing anti-corruption reforms are multifaceted, but basic political economics holds the most salient overall explanation: few if any in a position of power and benefiting from corruption would like to see the opportunities for extraction reduced”. For politicians anti-corruption reform and plunder are antithetical. Fritzen (2005) in Poochaoren (2014:2) concurs with Heeks and Mathisen (2012) and further argues that relying on political will is unrealistic because politicians are often the culprits. The implications of involvement of politicians in corruption are enormous because according to Abdulai (2009:390) public servants may find little incentive as to why they too should not be corrupt when high-level political authorities are engaged in corrupt activities.

However, a valid counter-argument is made by Dahlstrom and Lapuente (2011:2) that the public sector should be separated from politics and that an isolated bureaucracy, in this sense, is less prone to corruption. The cornerstone

of such a proposition is “that the activities of politicians and administrators should be separated so that politicians dominate policy making, while administrators dominate implementation”. A question to ponder is whether in the context of South Africa where politicians (legislators) have managed to enact more than 17 pieces of ethics and anti-corruption legislation, the accusation that there is no political will still holds. As much as the blame is often directed to the administrators who fail in their responsibility to effectively implement the enacted legislation, politicians should also demonstrate through their actions support for the implementation of the ethics and anti-corruption initiatives.

## **Collective action**

According to Persson *et al.* (2010:10) under the “collective action theory, people engage in corrupt practices not because they morally approve them or do not understand the destructive repercussion for the entire society, but because most other people are also expected to be corrupt, making the short-term benefits of engaging in corruption greater than the costs”. A factor that has contributed significantly in most countries that have managed to impressively fight against corruption is encouraging citizens representing their different sectors to work collectively towards a common goal of decreasing the control of corruption. There are many ways that this could be done including by showing citizens the consequences of corrupt activities and the benefits that are being forfeited as a result of corruption. Rothstein (2014:741) says that the reason why people in corrupt societies, though condemning corruption, participate in corrupt practices seems to be that they understand the situation as a ‘collective action’ problem, where it makes little sense to be ‘the only one’ refraining from using or accepting bribes and other kick-backs. It is in this instance that Mungiu-Pippidi (2013b:103) is advocating for ordinary citizens to play the role of principals as this is where normative constraints on elite predatory behaviour should be articulated through collective action.

Person *et al.* (2010:3) note that “in the African context corruption rather seems to resemble a collective action problem, making the short-term costs of fighting corruption outweigh the benefits”. The significance and impact of collective action problems according to Johnston (2012:473) are particularly likely when, as is often the case, reformers justify the need to control corruption primarily in terms of the public interest. A lesson learnt, in this regard of collective action, is that for ethics and anti-corruption initiatives to be implemented effectively in South Africa, public servants in partnership with political principals and the general public, need to work as a collective in curbing corruption. The focus therefore should be to work with the justice system to severely punish those who have been convicted of corrupt activities.

Reducing the short-term benefits of being involved in corrupt activities must be the ultimate goal.

## **Dedicated anti-corruption agency**

Article 6(2) of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) requires the establishment of institutions to prevent corruption, and states:

*“Each State Party shall ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate which prevent corruption. Each State Party shall grant these bodies the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal systems to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary material resources and specialised staff, as well as the training that such staff require to carry out their functions, should be provided”.*

Article 6(2) is not specifically dictating that countries should have a single anti-corruption agency as it is stated that countries should ensure the existence of a “body or bodies” and further requires that countries should “enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their function”. However, Holmes (2015) opines for an introduction of a single independent anti-corruption agency instead of multiple agencies as it is an institutional change that can be introduced in countries with different cultures. The research on the international best practice has shown that countries like Botswana (DCEC) and Singapore (CBIP) have impressively managed control of corruption through the formation of single independent anti-corruption agencies. Quah (2006:177) argues that success of the anti-corruption reforms occurs where three conditions are met: comprehensive anti-corruption legislation is enacted, an independent anti-corruption agency is provided with sufficient personnel and resources, and the independent agency fairly enforces the anti-corruption laws. The research conducted by Mungiu-Pippidi (2013a:1281) suggests that “for the independent anti-corruption agencies to be successful they need to be complemented by equally independent and accountable judiciaries or they will promote selective repression”. Put differently, Hough (2013:99) contends that “countries should use the strong legal systems, high standards of regulatory quality and the strong cultures of voice and accountability to “bring in” or “beef up”, independent anti-corruption agencies”. The formation of a single independent anti-corruption agency should, therefore, be accompanied by strong ethics and anti-corruption legislation as well as a competitive judiciary system in order to guarantee the successful implementation of the anti-corruption reforms.

Is the creation of a single anti-corruption agency a prerequisite for successful implementation of ethics and anti-corruption legislation? An argument submitted by Quah (2006) is calling for the introduction of an independent anti-corruption agency. However, it should also be noted that in some instances a single independent anti-corruption agency is not necessary, as long as there are other institutions to ensure good governance. South Africa is an example of a country where there are multiple institutions responsible for fighting corruption. Like in the argument for a single anti-corruption agency, the existence of multiple anti-corruption agencies will not achieve the required goal of controlling corruption if these agencies are not supported with the necessary resources. Most importantly, Meagher (2004:94) in Charron (2008:8) reveals that a primary reason why the African anti-corruption agencies (with the exception of Botswana) have remained ineffective is due to “no structural independence or only partial autonomy” from the governments that established them. For example, Abdulai (2009:401) reports that financial dependency has seriously hampered the autonomy of most anti-corruption institutions because they need the executive branch of government to survive. The Public Protector of South Africa has been vocal in requesting additional funds so that she could effectively execute its constitutional mandate.

Is there a need for a single anti-corruption agency in South Africa? History informs that the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO – commonly known as “Scorpions”) in South Africa was disbanded under controversial circumstances. [Subsequently, Glenister has challenged this decision in a court of law requesting for its review]. Montesh and Berning (2012:136) assert that, although the demise of the DSO was caused by the DSO’s own mistakes as well as by government, the only way South Africa can succeed in fighting complex financial crimes is through the establishment of a strong single anti-corruption agency. Political commentators often cite lack of political will for the decision to disband the DSO. However, Sousa (2009:13) reminds that as public “funded bodies entrusted with the implementation of anti-corruption policies, anti-corruption agencies cannot act in a completely ‘independent’ way as they are expected to transform policy into action and, therefore, they share with the political class the onus of success or failure”. The political elite of any country stand to benefit from the success of effective implementation of anti-corruption reforms. It is therefore unimaginable that they can work against an effective anti-corruption institution.

There are strong views on the formation of multiple anti-corruption agencies. Khemani (2009:33) argues that no single institution can successfully eradicate corruption on its own as combating corruption requires a multi-faceted approach which strengthens all pillars of a national integrity system. It is in this context that Sousa (2009:19) states that if there is one lesson to be learnt

from the history of anti-corruption activity, it is that “there are no individual solutions but a cocktail of measures, no silver bullets but a mixture of successes and failures and no quick fixes but a long and hard learning process”. Anti-corruption agencies are an innovative institutional response to corruption, but they are not necessarily the panacea. The formation of a single independent anti-corruption agency is, therefore, a necessary but not a determining factor in implementation of ethics and anti-corruption legislation. The international best practice, though, has shown that developing countries like Botswana (DCEC) and Singapore (CPIB) have managed the control of corruption by forming dedicated anti-corruption agencies.

## **Collaboration with other sectors of society**

The government cannot fight corruption alone as other sectors of society have a vital role to play in this regard. Collaboration with other sectors in the fight against corruption remains a strong argument because corruption, as indicated by Graycar (2015:87), demoralises government and weakens the whole endeavour of policy formulation and its implementation but most of all it undermines trust and corrodes legitimate community expectations. The significance of collaborating with other sectors of society is also underlined by Mungiu-Pippidi (2013a:1282) when opining that corruption surveillance arrangements based on stakeholder participation could be organised for communities, public services, special funds, or special public budgets in the same way we organise neighbourhood watches when police are too corrupt or demoralised. In the South African context, the ineffectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), mandated to coordinate sectoral anti-corruption strategies, has significantly deepened public suspicions about the anti-corruption implementer’s genuine commitment to curbing corruption. Manamela (2015:4) acknowledges that government has not been able to make significant progress in reviving the NACF by strengthening and providing resources to ensure that it is functioning optimally. The South African Presidency has committed to enhance engagements with non-state actors to make certain that the goal of a fully functional NACF is realised.

## **CONCLUSION**

The article provided a brief overview of international anti-corruption best practice of developing countries successful in fighting corruption like Botswana, Singapore [a developing country at an advanced stage] and Georgia. The chapter acknowledged that the “general consensus holding among international

institutions like Transparency International (2006) and World Bank (2007) that corruption is the key reason for under-development and poverty as a result reducing corruption is thus not just a moral but also an economic imperative". It was, therefore, argued that developing countries could address developmental challenges that they are faced with if they can manage to curb corruption. The case for providing a brief overview on developing countries, as noted, is reasonable because the successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms by most developed countries were implemented while they were still classified as developing countries. The arguments presented revolve around designing an implementation model for anti-corruption, political will, collective action, a dedicated anti-corruption agency and collaboration with other sectors of society.

## NOTE

\* This article is based on the work of Mphendu Unathi who is a second year registered student for PhD (Public Administration) under the supervision of the Professor Natasja Holtzhausen. The registered title of the thesis which is not yet submitted for examination is: "Evaluation of the implementation of professional ethics and anti-corruption legislation: the case of Social Sector Cluster in the Gauteng Province".

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