

**CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CASES OF  
NIGERIA AND KAZAKHSTAN**

**by**

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## **ABSTRACT**

As an important tool of state- and nation- building, capital city relocation is a policy option that is currently considered in more than 30 states around the world, including South Africa. The project is especially appealing for post-colonial states. At its core, it involves a physical move of governing institutions to a new location – a city that either already exists, or is constructed specifically for the purpose of serving as a capital. The relocation is likely to affect political, economic and societal status quo within a state – including matters of national security. The latter is a sensitive matter for post-colonial states, but the link between capital city relocation and national security is not well understood.

The study develops a framework that analyses the capital city relocation - national security nexus, to assess the overall impact of the project, as well as the specific benefits and drawbacks for security. The framework relies on Buzan's five-sector approach to security, and employs it to develop a list of indicators to track changes to national security of the post-colonial states post-relocation. Hence this study aims to contribute to the strand of the Security Studies literature and to fill (in part) an evident lacuna on capital city relocation, by exploring the cases of Nigeria (1991) and Kazakhstan (1997) from a security perspective.

## **KEY WORDS**

- Capital city
- Capital city relocation
- Human security
- Kazakhstan
- Nigeria
- National security
- Nation-building
- Security
- State-building
- Post-colonial state

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
COHRE	The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
FCDA	Federal Capital Development Authority
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FRN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
KSSR (KazSSR)	Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SERAC	Social and Economic Rights Action Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1. Identification of the research theme

Capital city relocation, along with state- and nation-building, has been an important part of the establishment of postcolonial states. There have been national debates and grand projects on this issue in many countries – ranging from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan in Asia, through Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe in Africa, to Brazil, Argentina and Costa Rica in South America. Even in South Africa there is a debate on consolidating the executive and legislative centres currently divided between Pretoria/Tshwane and Cape Town, by moving Parliament to Pretoria (Dodds & Kamaldien 2014). However, over time only a few states have carried out actual relocation<sup>1</sup> and most projects have been postponed indefinitely. Nevertheless, two developments have drawn capital city relocation back into the public and academic domain. Firstly, rapid urban development, the integration of postcolonial states into the international system, and the growth of trade among countries have created new challenges for capital cities, especially in developing states. In addition, global warming has created new risks to some capital cities, a case in point being the increase in the frequency and intensity of floods that strike Jakarta, Indonesia (Kotarumalos 2010). Secondly, advances in communication and information technologies have significantly reduced the costs of capital city relocation (Corey 2004: 85-86). As a result, about thirty states are currently considering relocation projects, including South Korea, South Sudan, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia and the Russian Federation.

Another post-independence development affecting relocation is the change in (national) security perceptions. The broadening and deepening of security, in terms of ‘new security thinking’, provides the opportunity to re-assess the character, role and functions of a capital city and its location within the state. This necessitates a reconsideration of capital city relocation in a security context. At the core of this discourse is the reality that capitals (with a few exceptions) are the main cities within states. In most developing countries, those of Africa and Asia in particular, the capital is the most economically advanced and developed city. Also, apart from their administrative

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<sup>1</sup> The term *relocation* is forthwith, with some exceptions, used to denote *capital city relocation*.



status, they also serve as a symbol of the country; landmarks, museums and monuments of the capital unite the nation and give it a sense of history, belonging and identity.

The question of capital city relocation is currently also important for certain African and Asian postcolonial states. Most of the capital cities of these states were created by colonial administrations with little prior concern for history or culture, and were suited to serve the interests of the colonial powers. Furthermore, for many African states encompassing different ethnic groups within their borders, capital city relocation is a solution to a number of political, economic and socio-cultural issues that may lead to serious internal confrontations based on misrepresentation, remoteness and gaps in wealth distribution. However, any relocation project must account for the consequences of a geographical change and for the political stability and territorial integrity of the state. A new location might not have an impact on the external *status quo*, but it will certainly impact on the *status quo* within a state. Failure to take the internal aspects of capital city relocation into account will undermine the survival, integrity and prosperity of the state (Marlow 2011).

In light of the above, the aim of this study is to examine the relationship between capital city relocation and national security, with emphasis on relocation projects in Nigeria (1991) and Kazakhstan (1997). The study has a dual academic relevance. On the one hand, it is contended that it contributes to a sub-field of Security Studies seldom studied and that it adds to the theoretical understanding of the relationship between capital city relocation and national security. On the other hand, it contributes to the contemporary institutional research theme on capital cities, identified (amongst others) by the University of Pretoria. The practical relevance of the theme, along with the growing interest in capital city relocation on the part of a number of governments, emanates from the exploration of policy alternatives and the consideration of potential benefits and disadvantages if viewed from a security perspective.

## **2. Literature overview**

The overview of relevant literature focuses on three main themes respectively dealing with the discourse on capital cities; the process and patterns of capital city relocation; and the impact of capital city relocation on national security.

**(a) The discourse on capital cities:** The literature on capital cities is vast, yet most fall within specific disciplines such as politics, architecture, sociology, tourism or geography – each concerned with a narrow aspect or one of the following common sub-themes of a capital:

**(i) *The capital city as the central city:*** The literature agrees that, in essence, a capital city is a social community; i.e. a human settlement that occupies a central position in the country. This centrality is what differentiates capital cities from other cities (Alaev 1983: 182). Researchers approach this centrality in a number of ways. Gottmann and Harper (1990: 63) relate centrality to the political-administrative status of the capital city as a seat of government and a site of the concentration, administration and representation of political power. This function is fulfilled by placing government departments and ministerial portfolios and their respective buildings in the capital city. Quesnel (1993: 95-99) relates centrality to the capital city being a location of relations between the government of the host country and foreign representatives, thereby constituting a link to and a focal point of the state's international relations.

Several authors (e.g. Corey 2004: 45; Milroy 1993: 89; Nagel 2011: 8; Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009: 3-5) make a functional distinction between the capital cities of unitary and federal states. This distinction is best illustrated by Corey (2004: 45) who contends that capital cities in unitary states are usually 'primary' cities that play a pivotal role in the economics, demography and cultural life of countries, whereas those of federal states are often relocated away from economically dominant cities as a political compromise to play, as Milroy (1993:89) suggests, an exclusively political role with their economic, cultural and military functions being secondary.

**(ii) *The capital city as the primary city:*** The literature attributes various other functions to capital cities that confirm their status as primary cities. Von Beyme (1991: 15), for example, distinguishes between the political, economic and cultural functions of a capital city. Similarly, Paquet (1993: 271) views the capital as a socio-political forum; as a centre for the production and distribution of economic goods and services; and as a symbolic centre representing the values of the nation. In this regard the taxonomy of Jaskova (2008: 31) that distinguishes between capital cities as dominating, competing-dominating or functional centres, is useful. Dascher (2000: 374), in his study of capital cities, added to this by regarding most capitals as 'primate' cities that play a disproportionate role in the life of the state, compared to other cities. Not disregarding these attributes, other studies emphasised the economic and symbolic centrality of capital cities.

Several authors (e.g. Campbell 2003; Gottmann and Harper 1990: 81; Jaskova 2008; King 1993: 251-271; Krugman 1995; Milroy 1993; Quesnel 1993: 95-99; Reichart 1993; Rossman 2013: 268-277; Sutcliffe 1993) provide a comprehensive overview of, amongst others, the economic, financial, educational, innovation and infrastructural centrality of capital cities, along with a disproportional concentration of population. This body of literature also indicates reasons behind this centrality. For example, Dascher (2000: 376) relates the capital city's defining role in public spending and the public sector to its economic centrality; Reichart (1993) emphasises the attractiveness of capital cities to big business and links this to business risk mitigation strategies; and Jaskova (2008: 31) attributes the centrality to the multiplier effect of scientific, educational, trade and diplomatic servicing functions of the capital city. This is not to deny the colonial origin of most capital cities in the developing world. For example, as Nwafor (1980: 359) notes, they are relics of a colonial era that served the needs of colonisers and that structured socio-economic relations between the core capital city and the periphery beyond it.

The symbolic function of a capital city is the focus of several studies. For example, King (1993: 252-253) considered the capital city to be a product of nationalism, highlighting its role in uniting the nation and giving it a sense of belonging and identity. In the same vein, several authors (e.g. Anderson 1983; Campbell 2003: 16-17; Vale 1992) emphasised the importance of public architecture within capital cities in creating and shaping the symbolic identity of the nation. Vale (2014: 35) demonstrated the architectural link between capital city-building and nation-building with reference to the example of artificially created capitals. In contrast, Sutcliffe (1993: 195) considered the image creation through capital city architecture to be a 'manipulation' process beneficial to governing elites. Covell (1993: 276) was similarly critical by contending that the symbolism of a capital city goes beyond physical representation, and by noting that the capital and its symbolic structures often represented actual estrangement amongst the population.

**(b) The relocation of capital cities:** In his overview the Russian geographer Sergei Tarhov (2007) noted that 69 capitals had been relocated between the eighteenth and twenty first centuries (see the Appendix) and that 30 states have recently considered this option. This overview exemplified two themes, namely the discourse on and the patterns of this process.

**(i) *The discourse on the capital city relocation process:*** Tarhov (2007: 1) adopted a traditional approach to the process of capital city relocation by describing it as a physical transfer of political-

administrative functions from one city to another. The outcome is the establishment of a new capital located either in an existing city, or in a custom built new location. Recent works however, notably that of Krylov (2013: 69-71), adopt a different approach by distinguishing between the transfer of capital city status to another city and the process of decentralisation involving a partial relocation of particular administrative functions. In the latter case the state may end up with two or more capital cities that share governmental functions, or with a physical move of government institutions to suburbs, with the old capital city retaining its status.

In his discussion of capital city relocation, Zamyatin (2013: 24-28) drew attention to the political nature of this project, being driven by the desire of political elites to reshape the political landscape of the state. This contrasts with Rossman's (2013: 317) view that capital city relocation, as a geographic solution to economic and political problems, fits into the broader themes of state- and nation-building; a view supported by several other scholars (e.g. Corey 2004; Gordon 2002; Potts 1985; Salau 1977; Schatz 2003) who investigated specific cases of capital city relocation.

**(ii) *Patterns in the capital city relocation process:*** Several studies deal with the capital city relocation process in terms of common themes that include state development, nation-building and geographical inconvenience (or convenience). Firstly, concerning the theme of state development, one body of literature focuses on economic development and the improvement of administrative functions as the rationale of capital city relocation. This includes studies on relocation in Brazil (e.g. Moore 1982; Salau 1977; Stephenson 1970), in Malawi (e.g. Potts 1985), in Malaysia (e.g. Corey 2000), in Nigeria (e.g. Adebani 2012: 88; FRN Committee on Location of Federal Capital 1975; and Moore 1984) and in Kazakhstan (Wolfel 2002: 486-488). These studies are supported by that of Dascher (2000: 387-389) who focused on the positive link between and benefits of capital functions and economic prosperity. Similarly, Rawat (2005: 6-7) used the experience of several Canadian provinces (e.g. British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick) to link the socio-economic centrality of provincial capital cities to regional development. Likewise, Potts (1985: 183-184) compared the relocation of the capital city of Malawi to those of other postcolonial states (e.g. Brazil and Nigeria) and concluded that it was driven by the aim of balanced development, by a strategy of national economic development, and specifically by disparities between the economic development of rich and backward regions.

A second body of literature emphasises the administrative benefits of a more central location of the capital city. This view is best summarised by Nwafor (1980: 361-362) who noted that a central location could improve the administrative capabilities of governments in postcolonial African states. Gerasimenko (2013: 11), in a study on Russia, similarly concluded that apart from relocation leading to new transportation networks and contributing to socio-economic development of hinterlands, it would improve the administrative capacities of the state.

Secondly, and concerning the theme of nation-building, Schatz (2003; 2004) in his works on the link between capital city relocation and nation-building used the example of Kazakhstan to emphasise that postcolonial countries are often challenged by ‘cultural geography’, by a heterogenic ethnic composition and by a lack of a common nationhood. He contends that in response capital city relocation serves as a tool of political compromise and national unity, a symbolical tool of national identity, and as a tool of the ideological shaping of a nation (Schatz 2004: 120-122).

Thirdly and regarding the theme of geographical convenience/inconvenience, Rossman (2013: 231) noted that in cases where the location of a capital city creates inconveniences for the government – e.g. overpopulation, proximity to hostile territory, or a threat of a natural disaster – its relocation presents an alternative. His notion is supported by Murphey (1957) and Herbst (2000) who came to a similar conclusion in respect of the inconvenience caused by the old colonial capitals of decolonised states in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the theme of geographical inconvenience features in works on concluded and planned relocations. For instance, Stephenson (1970: 321) has referenced the geographical remoteness of Rio de Janeiro as one of the reasons behind the relocation of the capital to Brasilia. Similarly, the apparent motivation behind capital city relocation in Iran is current inconvenient geographical location (BBC 2009; Aljazeera 2013).

**(c) Capital city relocation and national security:** Despite the obvious importance of this topic, only a few works considered the problematic relationship between capital city relocation and national security. In this respect the following two perspectives are evident:

**(i) Capital city relocation in terms of traditional security thinking:** In terms of traditional security thinking capital cities are perceived as centres of gravity: that is strategically important referent objects of security that need to be protected in the case of a war (Heuser 2011: 75). In addition,

Toynbee (1970: 69) noted that capital cities (and their relocation) were used as strategic tools to control new territories during times of imperial expansion; an instrumental use that reflected changes in the geostrategic environment of states. Weigert (1956: 144-145, 148) similarly explains the collapse and fragmentation of the land based European empires during the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries – notably the Russian and the Ottoman empires – that forced the new states to adjust the location of their governments (and therefore capital cities) to their new borders and to new bordering states.

Accordingly, and amongst several other reasons, Rossman (2013: 99-113) in his overview of capital city relocation referred to the proximity of the capital city to the borders of the country and to external sources of threats. The same theme is also briefly dealt with in capital city relocation studies on Kazakhstan (e.g. Wolfel 2002: 495), Burma (e.g. Seekins 2009: 64), Nigeria (e.g. Olusola 1993: 40-41) and South Korea (Corey 2004). However, Rossman (2013: 216) is of the opinion that strategic and military rationales were more prevalent in previous centuries, arguing that contemporary states are motivated more by (non-security) domestic concerns. Yet, it should be emphasised that these security-related concerns relate more to external threats than to their internal security impact.

**(ii) Capital city relocation in terms of critical security thinking:** In contrast to the traditional approach the contemporary critical approaches provide a different perspective of the relationship between capital city relocation and security. These critical approaches, apart from broadening and deepening security respectively to non-military issues and referent objects of security other than the state and government, also emphasise aspects such as gender, the environment and socio-economic development (e.g. see Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010). Since the traditional notion of external threats of a predominantly military nature are no longer prevalent in some cases (especially in the states of Western and Eastern Europe), and since security remains a consideration, these alternative perspectives by implication introduce new dimensions to the capital city relocation-security nexus that cannot be ignored.

Recent literature, however, points to a lacuna and does focus on intra-state security. For example, Schatz (2004: 121-122) only briefly mentions the positive impact of relocation on the economic, political and physical security of the region to which the capital city was relocated. He nevertheless mentions the way in which the process of relocation can be instrumental for dealing with

separatism and political rivalry in ethnically heterogeneous states, thereby improving the security of the state. Seekins (2009: 64-68) in considering the relocation of the capital city of Burma similarly drew attention to the fact that a capital city as the primate city tends to be the centre of political opposition, social protests and civil unrest, thereby relating relocation to regime security. This rationale is also briefly discussed by Rossman (2013: 133, 174-176) in respect of the planned relocation of capital cities in Zimbabwe and Iran. Adebani (2012: 84-85), in respect of Nigeria in 1991, underlined the unifying role of relocation as a means of overcoming social and political conflict, thereby contributing to national security (Adebani 2012: 85). Gerasimenko (2013: 11-12), in contrast, highlighted the disadvantage that unless carefully planned, relocation can lead to state disintegration and the rise of secessionism.

To conclude, the discourse on and the process and patterns of capital city relocation are extensively covered by the literature. However, it is evident that the capital city relocation-security nexus is not a central theme and is only partially addressed in the literature. Where explicit, it is mainly dealt with in terms of traditional security thinking along with a more recent shift of emphasis to intra-state security. Critical studies of relocation in terms of new security thinking, that extends the security domain beyond the ambit of external military threats to state and regime security, are patently lacking. Hence this study aims to contribute to this strand of the literature and to fill (in part) an evident lacuna on capital city relocation by exploring the cases of Nigeria (1991) and Kazakhstan (1997) from a security perspective.

### **3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem**

Considering the practical and academic contextualisation of capital city relocation in the aforesaid sections, the underlying research problem and therefore the problem statement is that whenever security, let alone national security appears in a discussion on relocation, it does so as one of several reasons for (or justifications of) relocation and not in terms of the overall or national security impact thereof. The lack of this explicit link between capital city relocation and national security, the absence of a structured and theory-based body of knowledge on the subject, and the lack of a coherent analytical framework, validate this research problem.

Accordingly, the core research question in respect of the two case studies is: *To what extent does the relocation of capital cities impact (or not impact) on the national security of the states?* The following sub-questions focus the study:

- What is the rationale and corresponding benefits and disadvantages of capital city relocation?
- What constitutes security, more specifically national security, and what is the link and relationship between capital city relocation and national security?
- Does the underlying aim of capital city relocation, i.e. state- or nation-building respectively, lead to different security-related processes and outcomes or not?

In response to the main research question, the assumption and therefore the argument statement is that capital city relocation – as a tool of state- and nation-building – has an indirect rather than a direct impact on national security. To the extent that it impacts on the structure and fabric of a society, and the balance of political and economic power within a state, it is contended that the main influence of capital city relocation on national security is in terms of internal political, economic and social stability (i.e. on non-traditional concerns and non-state referent objects) rather than in terms of countering a potential or perceived external (military) threat to state and regime.

In light of the above, the following objectives guide the research:

- To develop a framework for analysis of the capital city relocation- national security nexus.
- To apply this framework to the cases of Nigeria and Kazakhstan in order to explore and explain the relocation-security relationship.
- To assess the research findings in order to determine the utility of the framework and the understanding it provides of the relocation-security nexus, and to make policy and research recommendations.

The study is demarcated in conceptual, time and geographical terms. Conceptually the focus is on capital city relocation and on national security (and related concepts). To the extent that this is a study in the security field, the latter is understood in terms of the interplay of various factors (of economic, societal and political nature). Furthermore, Buzau's (1991b) five-point national security framework is used as a foundation and the starting point of the analysis. The time frame of the research is linked to relocation in the two case studies, namely 1991 in Nigeria, and 1997 in Kazakhstan. However, to the extent relevant, references are made to historical origins. Therefore,



the timeframe incorporates the period of 1984-1991 for Nigeria and 1994-1997 for Kazakhstan, but also exceeds these periods for background, historical and analytical purposes.

Geographically the study focuses on the African example of Nigeria and the Central Asian example of Kazakhstan. While these states share a colonial history, they are significant for different reasons. Nigeria represents a case in state-building where capital city relocation was part of a political compromise to balance various regions and groups within a federal state. In addition, due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the Nigerian state and the clash of interests between rival groups or power centres, the capital city was relocated away from the rich Christian South and closer to the generally poorer Muslim North. Kazakhstan represents an example of nation-building in a unitary state. The Kazakh state is also heterogeneous with Kazakhs and ethnic Russians being the two primary ethnic groups. However, the ethnic configuration is not balanced as Russians form an ethnic minority primarily occupying the regions that border the Russian Federation.

#### **4. Research design and methodology**

This study, which is exploratory in nature, takes the form of a literature and document based analysis. A critical literature study of the sources, referred to in the literature overview, is undertaken to define and demarcate the core aspects of capital city relocation and national security. Based on this clarification and derived from Buzan's (1991b) typology, a conceptual analytical framework is developed and applied to the two case studies. In this respect Buzan's five security sectors are used, namely military, economic, political, societal and environmental security. The approach to the study is descriptive-analytical. It draws on new security thinking and it is representative of critical security studies. A qualitative, inductive methodology is used. The advantage of the qualitative method lies in the understanding it provides of the relationship between capital city relocation and national security. It also enables an analysis of the experiences of capital city relocations in the case studies; for an exploration of the results of capital city relocation; and for an assessment of the impact of capital city relocation on national security. Furthermore, although not a comparative study as such, it contains inter-state and historical comparative elements. This allows for the discernment of similarities and differences between the two case studies.

The study is based on a range of primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources include policy documents, speeches and communiqués related to capital city relocation in the respective

countries. The secondary sources include scholarly works and journal articles on relocation in the case-study countries. In addition, and where applicable, use is made of opinion editorials, media articles and policy recommendations in the public domain. In respect of Kazakhstan and in addition to English language sources, based on the fact that the author is a native speaker, use is made of original Russian language sources to provide more insight into and a broader understanding of this particular example.

## **5. The structure of the research**

As an introduction Chapter 1 clarifies the contextual and conceptual focus and scope of the study. It furthermore provides a literature overview, a formulation and demarcation of the research problem, a clarification of the methodology used and an indication of the structure of the research.

Chapter 2 provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for the study. It focuses on three aspects: the theoretical discourse on the capital city; the goals, rationale and attributes of capital city relocation; and the framework to analyse and assess the national security impact of relocation.

Chapters 3 and 4 cover the case studies on Nigeria and Kazakhstan. Each chapter provides a historical overview of the relocation decision, process, nature and outcome. The conceptual framework is applied to each case in order to analyse the security impact of relocation.

Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarising the case studies and evaluating the key findings. It concludes with policy recommendations and a future research agenda on capital city relocation.

## **6. Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the two dimensions of this research, namely capital city relocation and national security. The literature suggests that capital city relocation is a remedy for the inherent systemic problems that in particular plague developing states. By their nature capital cities play a significant role in the government institutions, processes and development of states; a better-planned geographical location might instigate economic development and improve administrative effectiveness. However, a project of this nature and scale undeniably has a collateral impact on the national security of states. The nexus between capital city relocation and national security represents a knowledge gap that informs this study, and also limits its scope and purpose. However,

before exploring the two case studies, a conceptual framework for analysis must be devised as done in Chapter 2.

## CHAPTER 2

# CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### 1. Introduction

An empirical study of the relationship between capital city relocation and national security requires a scientific methodology, particularly if the study is exploratory in nature. Under conditions where the literature on the topic is limited, as is currently the case, conceptual, theoretical and methodological clarity has a noticeable impact on research outcomes. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide the conceptual and theoretical basis for the subsequent chapters, i.e. the framework for analysis to be applied to the case studies. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sub-themes, each dealing with a particular conceptual-theoretical aspect. The first section contextualises and explores capital city relocation by clarifying its nature, scope and aims, as well as the underlying reasons behind such projects. The second section deals with the concept of national security. Apart from defining and demarcating it, this section also considers Buzan's (1991b) fivefold sectoral typology of security as a context and basis of this research. Finally, with reference to the capital city relocation-national security nexus, the last section presents an indicator-based framework for analysis to be applied to the case studies.

### 2. Capital city relocation: Principles and practices

The discussion of capital city relocation is divided into three parts: the general nature of the process; the general purpose thereof; and the main reasons therefore. Accordingly, the first part introduces the notion, defines the scope and meaning of capital cities, as a context for their relocation. The second part deals more specifically with the purpose of capital city relocation, especially to the extent that these are – in a developed and developing state context– related to state- and nation-building. The final part considers the so-called 'drivers' of capital city relocation, highlighting the reasons and goals policymakers aim to achieve in the process.

#### 2.1 The definition and scope of capital city relocation

Capital city relocation is understood as the physical transfer of governmental functions – complete or partial – to a different location that will serve as a new site of government, and related

governmental institutions (Schatz 2004: 111). The location of a new capital may be a new city (e.g. Brasilia in Brazil, or Abuja in Nigeria), built specifically for the purpose of hosting a government; an already existent city (e.g. Lilongwe in Malawi or Bonn in the former West-Germany); or even a satellite town close to the old capital (e.g. Putrajaya in Malaysia). In some instances – for example in South Africa, Georgia and the Netherlands – capital functions (i.e. executive, legislative or judicial) are divided between two or more cities (Tarhov 2007: 1). However, capital city relocation should not be seen as an arbitrary move of a seat of government; it is a specific and targeted policy tool that pursues particular objectives, often on the scale of a state and not merely of a city. In this regard the key to capital city relocation lies in the peculiar character of the capital city itself.

A capital city is the main city within a state by virtue of its political-administrative role (Gottmann & Harper 1990: 63). This centrality is loosely divided into three sections, each highlighting an important function that differentiates a capital city from other cities within a state, namely the administrative, the political and the symbolic functions (Von Beyme 1991: 15). Firstly, the main role performed by a capital city is administrative, illustrated by the concentration, organisation and representation of political power. In an institutional and physical sense this function manifests through government departments and ministerial portfolios, and their respective buildings, being placed in a capital city. Therefore, a capital city is at the core of a state's bureaucracy: it is a place where the information is gathered, policy decisions are made and the future of the country is decided (Gottmann & Harper 1990: 63; Von Beyme 1991: 15; Paquet 1993: 271). This distinguishing feature has far-reaching implications for a state, a capital region and a capital city.

For instance, in order to perform its administrative duties a government often requires additional supporting structures, such as research facilities and universities among others, to be present in its capital city. Therefore, capital cities often play a leading role in terms of science, education and culture. Furthermore, as the centre of decision-making, it is common for a capital city to be the focal point of the national transport system, the junction of the national communication system, the centre for processing and managing information, and the innovation hub of a state (Jaskova 2008: 28-31). A capital city is also a place of relation between the government of a country and foreign representatives, international organisations and multinational corporations. This characteristic makes the capital city a centre for production and distribution of economic goods

and services, and a centre of trade and commerce (Paquet 1993; Quesnel 1993: 95-99). In regards of the latter the capital city also benefits in economic terms. For instance, and compared to the rest of a country, the political-administrative role profits capital cities in terms of high public spending, better public services, better infrastructure and a high rate of public sector employment (Dascher 2000: 376). This is especially true for developing countries where a distinction between a capital city and the rest of a country in terms of quality of life is stark. Furthermore, private commercial and business entities prefer to set their headquarters close to the political core of the state, bringing high salary jobs and investment (Reichart 1993). Finally, the capital region also receives spill-over benefits related to the supporting structures of the capital city (Jaskova 2008: 31).

Secondly, capital cities also play an important role in a state's political existence. Due to the proximity of the government, better education and economic opportunities, capital cities tend to be more politically active compared to other cities. Therefore, political rallies and protests are more common in capital cities and political parties are especially interested in gaining support and winning the votes there. Consequently, any political regime, especially of an authoritarian nature, meets the toughest resistance in capital cities (Rossman 2013: 268-277).

Finally, the symbolic function of a capital city is also important. By its nature, a capital city is a product of nationalism; the capital city unites a nation and gives it a sense of belonging and national identity, substituting ethnic and local identities (King 1993: 252-253). Due to the proximity of foreign representatives and its role in international relations, a capital city is built and sustained to represent a collective image of a nation (Sutcliffe 1993: 195; Vale 2014: 35).

To conclude and compared to other cities, the majority of capital cities in the contemporary world are 'primate' cities – entities that play a disproportionately bigger role in the life of the state (Dascher 2000: 374). However, the dichotomy in the quality of life, income distribution, economic opportunities, access to public goods and education between capital cities and other cities is different for each individual state. Capital cities in developing countries play a much bigger role compared to developed states. Similarly, federal capitals differ from capital cities in unitary states (Campbell 2003: 8). As such capital cities are not homogeneous and a further distinction can be made along two different themes, respectively the form and the origin of the state.

Regarding the form of the state, capital cities in federal and unitary states perform different functions. In unitary states capital cities are often 'primate' cities that play an important role in the economic, political, social and cultural life of a country – an illustration of the centralised or unitary nature of the state (Corey 2004: 45). In contrast, capital cities in federal states are often relocated away from economically dominant cities, usually as a result of a political compromise. On the grounds of this distinction Milroy (1993) indicates that in the majority of federal states a capital has an exclusively political role (e.g. Washington in the USA and Canberra in Australia). He further states that it is common for these capital cities to occupy a secondary economic, cultural and military position in instances where political functions are detached from these functions (Milroy 1993: 89). Stephenson (1970: 329) supports this notion by arguing that Brasilia's location was supposed to underline the uniquely political and administrative role of the capital city, due to the fact that the new location is not suitable for the industrial development.

Regarding the origins of states, a further distinction is made between capital cities in previously colonised states and those in former colonial empires. This distinction can be attributed to the difference in state-formation of countries in the 'Global North' and the 'Global South'. For instance, the historical process of the formation of the Westphalian state – and the related notion of nationhood – shaped the status, role and functions of capital cities. Importantly, capital cities gained a 'national' status (Dijkink 2000: 65; Schatz 2004: 114-115). In contrast the majority of contemporary capital cities in the so-called and former Third World trace their origin to colonial rule. As such, it was a common practice for a main city of a colonised territory to be located on the coast or on a navigable river. These cities were also the main points of entry into the territory, and served as the main ports or transshipment points for goods and resources to be exported. Therefore, when these cities became the capitals of newly independent states, they often inherited an inconvenient location, geographical remoteness from the rest of the state, and related infrastructural and communicational difficulties (Nwafor 1980: 359; Salau 1977: 11).

In conclusion, capital cities play unique political, economic, social and symbolic roles within states. However, their functions, capacity and effectiveness depend on the form of the state (unitary or federal) as well as on the historical origin of the state. The latter, in particular, is important in understanding why some states choose to relocate a capital city and what the practical relevance of this move is as a policy alternative.

## 2.2 The purpose of capital city relocation

To understand the purpose of capital city relocation or to put it differently, the reasons why some countries choose to pursue relocations, it is necessary to consider the distinction between states that came about through a historical process of state-formation and post-colonial states that were created artificially. To begin with, Hay and Lister (2006: 4-5) define a state as an organised political community that exercises sovereign authority within a defined territory. The authority is exercised through the legitimate use of coercive power. Similarly, the *Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States* (1933) defines the state as having a defined territory and a government, but also stipulates a ‘permanent population’ as an important criterion of statehood. Accordingly, a political entity has to comply with five features to be deemed a state in a *de facto* sense: it must be sovereign; it must have an authority with the right to make decisions on behalf of a society (or nation) – an authority that must be recognised; it must possess the sole right to the use of legitimate force; it must be confined to defined territorial boundaries; and it must have a permanent population base that resides within the defined territory.

Apart from the above, the notion of nationality, as a shared national image that lies at the heart of the idea of a state, is also important. Whereas the essential features are indicative of a process of state-building culminating in the creation of a state, nationality has a direct bearing on the associated process of nation-building. In fact, the origin of many contemporary developed states can be traced back to nationalistic movements: the unity of people within a particular territory with shared traditions, culture and language. Gradually, on the basis of pre-existing nationhood or nation-building, these societies reached social and political equilibrium through a lengthy process of state formation. This includes the demarcation of borders, the development of common cultural and linguistic norms, the division of power and resources across the country and the establishment of a unitary centre of political power (and authority) within the state (Breuilly 1993; Guibernau 2013: 46-62; Keating 1997: 691-692; Tilly 1975: 636-638). However, it is important to note that before such states came to existence, the idea of a nation was already in place. For example, the shared German identity preceded the current Federal Republic and informed it – not *vice versa*. The same is true in respect of states such as France, the United Kingdom, Japan and even China. Thus, states from this stratum are nation-states where the state is preceded by its nation as the basis of the political unit (Buzan 1991b: 59; Guibernau 2013: 47-48).



Most contemporary states did not go through a process of nation-building followed by state-building<sup>2</sup>. On the contrary, most contemporary states are post-colonial states – a product of decolonisation where state-formation preceded nation-building. The nature of state-formation in most countries of Africa, the Americas and Asia was such that the borders of future states were created artificially, and the balance of power within these former colonial territories was tilted towards the interests and for the convenience of the colonial powers. This left them with an outward focus, satisfying the needs of colonial powers and empires (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001: 473-478; Nwafor 1980: 359). Post-colonial states bypassed the ‘natural’ process of state formation and inherited flawed state-systems on political liberation – ill-fitted for an independent existence. The location of cities, roads, railways and ports within these states exhibited an export-orientated and resource-extraction pattern, positioned for the convenience of colonial interests rather than for the purpose of effective internal administration and governance (Olukoshi & Laakso 1996: 7-40).

Furthermore, most post-colonial states are not nation-states. In the majority of cases the borders of these newly created states did not correspond with separate nations, but often united a number of nations within a state. This implied the bringing together of ethnic groups that neither chose nor agreed to a shared nationhood. It was also often the case that members of one ethnic group or tribe were now citizens of different states, separated by newly established international borders (Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001: 476-477). Therefore, when the process of decolonisation started, the basis for peoples’ national unity was not a shared cultural identity, but a shared identity based on the anti-colonial struggle (Breuilly 1993: 156-157).

To conclude, the majority of post-colonial states continue to suffer from inherited systemic flaws. As a result, these states have a lack of capacity to enforce order and to exercise control over their territories. This is attributed to several factors ranging from the inheritance of an inconvenient colonial structure of administrative control, to a lack of legitimacy: either due to the limited ability of government institutions to govern, or because of the rejection of the government on the grounds of ethnic enmity. Furthermore, social, racial and religious conflicts and the failure of state

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<sup>2</sup> There were only around 40 capital cities in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century; there are approximately 190 capital cities today (Tarhov 2007).

institutions can be attributed to a lack of a common national identity strong enough to unite different ethnic, social and religious groups.

In light of these flaws and the need to address the underlying issues, the new countries resorted to state- and nation-building projects. State-building is defined as a historical process of state formation influenced by various social, political and cultural factors (Thies 2004: 54-56). As a policy tool state-building represents a process whereby states improve their ability to function, maintain control and perform associated duties more effectively (Schatz 2004: 8; Whaites 2008). Nation-building refers to the creation of a shared national identity and image: either by means of cultural and linguistic assimilation, and/or by means of ensuring overarching public support for the political system in place (Brubaker 1995: 109; Schatz 2004: 8). Here the state creates an idea of a nation, confined to its borders, that overlap the different ethnic/tribal/racial identities (Guibernau 2013: 46-62; Linz 1993: 355-369). Considering the fact that the majority of contemporary states are not homogenous and not nation-states – the theme of nation-building is attractive as a tool to ensure domestic stability and social unity (Connor 1972: 320-322). Since this study focus on state- and nation-building in respect of the two case studies, the subsequent discussion is limited to the use of capital city relocation as a tool of these projects.

This use of capital city relocation as a policy tool of state- and nation-building is widely recognised. In fact, some of the early post-colonial states, for example the US, Canada and Australia, were amongst the first to use capital city relocation to cement political and social unity. In respect of all of these examples the state was divided by rival political/economic groups – e.g. the Confederates and the Union in the US, the British and the French in Canada, and Melbourne and Sidney in Australia. Their capital city relocation allowed the creation of an acceptable political consensus and these states succeeded in creating an idea of a nation, channelling the interplay of political and economic interests towards national self-determination, rather than internal rivalry (Corey 2004: 65-73). The relocation enabled the avoidance of a violence trap and the management of political conflict within prescribed institutional boundaries. For similar reasons, amongst others, Brazil's relocation of its capital city to Brasilia was aimed at mediating political and economic conflict between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. This was done by establishing a neutral administrative city in the geographical centre of the state, remote from existent political and economic centres of gravity (Stephenson 1970: 320-322). Finally, while capital city relocation

might also be to avoid a natural catastrophe – e.g. to relocate the capital city of Iran (Tehran), or an unfavourable geopolitical environment – e.g. moving West Germany’s capital to Bonn, state- and nation- building remain at the core of these projects. This necessitates a closer look at the reasons for capital city relocation.

### **2.3 The reasons for capital city relocation**

Whereas the purpose of capital city relocation pertains to the conscious and essential macro-level aim of state- and nation-building, the reasons for this particular action – consciously or unconsciously – manifest at a micro-level as immediate explanations and justifications (see Van Dyke 1969: 24-25). The main reasons for capital city relocation are best framed by Rossman’s (2013: 223-230) six-strategy classification. Five of these strategies are useful for this analysis, namely territorial compromise, multipolar integration, historical integration, economic integration and decentralisation. The remaining strategy, namely that of alternative positioning, refers to a historical process of capital city relocation that falls outside the scope of the cases considered in this study. These strategies are related to and can be grouped along the lines of purpose, namely state-building and nation-building strategies respectively.

State-building strategies are preoccupied with the idea of restructuring the state for the purpose of improving governance and to administer relations between the government and constituent units (e.g. provinces). This category includes the strategies of economic integration and the decentralisation of political power. Economic integration is an approach to mitigate economic unevenness in a country (Rawat 2005: 6-7). The argument and therefore the reason is that the relocation of a capital closer to subsidised and depressed regions may stimulate and speed up their development (Dascher 2000: 389). The decentralisation of political power is an approach to erode the localisation and therefore to limited the reach of political power. The argument and therefore the reason is that a more central location of a capital city would stimulate the development of new transportation networks; allow for socio-economic development of the hinterlands; and improve the administrative capacities and capabilities of the state and government (Gerasimenko 2013: 11; Nwafor 1980: 361-362).

Nation-building strategies concern the redefinition of the idea of a nation, i.e. to unify the nation, or to create a particular national identity within the confines of a state. Due to the nature of capital

cities and within the context of capital city relocation, most nation-building strategies are state-building strategies with nation-building features. This category includes the strategies of territorial compromise, multipolar integration and historical integration. Territorial compromise focuses on the conciliation of two or more ethnic/religious/economic communities within a state. The argument and therefore the reason for the relocation of the capital city is to move it to a neutral ‘border point’ between competing groups, as was done in respect of Washington in the USA, Montreal in Canada and Canberra in Australia (Corey 2004: 65-73). All three capitals are located on the border of distinct constituent regions.

Multipolar integration is a response to the absence of clearly defined boundaries between communities (or groups) within a heterogeneous community/nation having more than two poles of power. In this case the pivotal or borderline geographical location of the capital city plays a subordinate role. The argument and therefore the reason is that the solution does not lie in finding the geographical centre of the country, but to identify a city which is situated outside the core regions of the country that would satisfy all political actors (Rossman 2013: 226). Both territorial compromise and multipolar integration contribute to the creation of a new national identity. Aside from being an instrument of conflict management, capital city relocation in these instances advances national unity based on shared interests (Schatz 2004: 120-122).

Historical integration redefines national identity in terms of historical roots. The argument and therefore the reason is that a post-colonial state whose nation has been divided for a long time and/or has been torn from its cultural and historical roots, could overcome this predicament by placing its capital in an ancestral location (Rossman 2013: 227). This strategy was used with success in Mongolia (Ulan Bator), India (New-Delhi) and Sri Lanka (Colombo).

In addition to the aforesaid Rossman (2013: 231-235) identified three ‘negative’ strategies of capital city relocation. They are negative to the extent that relocation serves the particular interest of an incumbent government, thus they benefit elites and do not advance the purpose of state- and nation-building. Nevertheless, the relocation of a capital city will inevitably affect both the structure of the state and the image of a nation – even if conducted for other reasons. Finally, these three strategies are interrelated, to the extent that they are mutually supportive.

The first strategy concerns the marginalisation of political protests. Because a capital city often hosts the most politically active communities, a regime – to strengthen its hold on political power – may relocate it to a remote location where political activism is less prominent (Falola 2008: 135-136). This was the case in Burma where the capital city was relocated away from Rangoon, arguably to strengthen the regime’s grip on power against public uprisings (Seekins 2009: 65-69). The second strategy has the governing regime relocating the capital city closer to the ethnic homeland of the ruler (or ruling elite) in order to strengthen control over power and resources and to provide regime security. Arguably this was the reason behind the capital city relocation in Malawi (Potts 1985: 188) – from Zomba to Lilongwe, and Côte d'Ivoire – from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro (Rossman 2013: 234). The third is where the governing regime relocates the capital city to the territorial stronghold of one or more minority group(s). In this instance the relocation isolates or marginalises an activist ethnic majority or minority that is not similar to or does not form the basis of the titular nation. For example, the construction of Saint Petersburg in 1703 and the subsequent relocation of the capital city from Moscow was motivated in part by the desire of Peter the Great to secure new territories in the north (Rossman 2013: 234-235).

In conclusion, capital cities occupy a central place in the overall functioning of states, due to their centrality in the Westphalian model. However, a distinction exists between developed and developing states. Most developed states underwent a process of state-formation, set off by a shared national identity. In contrast, most contemporary states were artificial creations shaped by external powers. Furthermore, the geographical location of capital cities within these states is often inconvenient and does not mirror the geopolitical structure and character of these states. Consequently, many developing states suffer from administrative inefficiency, the inability to exercise effective control over the territory, and various social internal conflicts. One plausible solution to address these systemic problems is for developing states to pursue state- and nation-building by means of capital city relocation. Important political, administrative, economic and symbolic functions are associated with capital cities, while capital city relocation is believed to improve the imbalances in economic development, increase administrative efficiency and enhance national unity. However, in order to understand the link between capital city relocation and national security, the latter concept has to be clarified.

### **3. Security and national security: Select conceptual and theoretical aspects**

To determine the impact of capital city relocation on national security the latter has to be defined, clarified and positioned within the context of the contested concept of security. The first part of this section, as a point of departure, clarifies the meaning, nature and scope of security and related security risks and threats. The second part, as an extension that informs the understanding of national security, provides an overview of Barry Buzan's (1991b) typology of security. Based on the aforesaid, the third part clarifies the meaning, nature and scope of national security in the contemporary context of 'non-traditional' security thinking.

#### **3.1 The concept of security**

Security is commonly understood as the "absence of threats to acquired values" (Wolfers 1952: 485). These values that range from physical safety and economic welfare to autonomy and prosperity (Baldwin 1997: 13) are encapsulated in the Preamble of the United Nations (UN) Charter as the freedom from fear, from want and from human indignity. However, an examination of security as a concept or as a policy goal exemplifies the contested nature, non-uniformity and vagueness of its meaning. This is attributed to two aspects, namely the referent object of security – i.e. the entity being secured (a state, region or individual); and the scope of security – i.e. the range of problems that produce insecurity. A focus on a particular object of security would significantly alter the scope of security problems (e.g. juxtaposing those of a state and an individual) and the values that have to be secured (e.g. state sovereignty as opposed to human rights). In this regard the pre- and post-Cold War discourse on security becomes important to the extent that a distinction is made between 'old' or traditional security thinking and 'new' or critical security thinking.

Traditionally, security was associated with matters of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and external military threats (Ullman 1983: 129). This perspective makes the state the referent object of security, the central concern of security being the threat or use of military force by a state or against it (Snyder 2008: 35). It is also limited by the importance of military force to the issue at hand: if the issue lies outside of the scope of military action it is regarded as a matter of low politics and therefore not a security issue (Baldwin 1997: 9). This view was amplified during the Cold War by the threat of a nuclear war. As a result, security came to be defined in terms of the accumulation

of power and the ability to deter a military threat. It was treated as either the result of a state's ability to deter external military threats or as a consequence of peace (Buzan 1984: 110).

These pre-Cold War notions of security conveyed the essence of 'old' security thinking. For example, both Wright (1942) and Fox (1949: 70) emphasised collective security, diplomacy and 'world commonwealth' as prerequisites for security. Security was understood as the collective diplomatic effort of states and a by-product of international peace. Lippmann (1943: 51), in contrast, defined security in terms of the ability of a nation to win a war defending its core values, or to avoid a war without sacrificing them. Overall, the common theme was war: either the means of avoiding it or the means of winning it. War also constituted the biggest threat to the values and interests of states, the latter being the referent object of security and the basic unit of analysis.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War the risk of world war and the potential for nuclear conflict dissipated. Within this changed environment traditional security thinking was unable to explain, predict or deal with new issues that emerged (some having been suppressed by traditional security concerns), including poverty, hunger, international terrorism, transnational crime and global warming to name a few. While literature representing new thinking is vast in scope, its common theme is dissatisfaction with the limited scope of the traditional approach to security. Several scholars (e.g. Acharya 2001: 442; Booth & Vale 1997; Buzan 1991a: 431; Reed & Tehranian 1999: 35-36) re-examined security and deepened its object to include other levels and units of analysis (e.g. the individual, groups, the region or the international system). The argument was that a focus on a state as the referent object had a limited bearing on individual or communal security. It also failed to account for new insecurities in a globalised world that transcended state borders. Other commentators (e.g. Baldwin 1997; Booth 1991: 315-316; Job 1992: 12-13; Jones 1999; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 17-21; Ullman 1983: 133) broadened the scope of security by including issues outside the military sphere as security issues. The argument was that a narrow focus on military affairs precluded a critical reflection on other issues that impact on the survival and integrity of the state and its peoples, such as issues of global warming, gender, economic threats to security, the activities of crime syndicates and international terrorism.

In addition, some scholars (e.g. Acharya 1995. 1983/1984 and 1991: 257-260; Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 330-332; Frisch 2010; Jones 1999; Pettiford 1996) were critical of the Euro-centric approach to security and its preoccupation with military affairs and state-to-state warfare as sources of

insecurity. The argument was that most conflicts in the Global South are intra-state in nature (e.g. insurgencies, tribal conflicts and secessionist movements), while the source of insecurity is often non-military. For one, Ayoob (1983/1984: 44) argued that the process of state formation in developing states was artificial and rushed, resulting in weak state structures and a lack of national unity. This in turn created space for internal conflicts and different (compared to the Global North) security problems. Accordingly, Acharya (1995: 4-8) highlighted several sources of insecurity that fall outside of the traditional realm, namely poverty, underdevelopment, resource scarcity and weak socio-political structures of the state. Jones (1999: 99) also criticised the notion of the state as the main provider of security for people in the Global South, referring to instances of human rights abuse carried out by the states and governments against their own citizens.

Several scholars responded to new thinking by criticising it on a number of points. For example, Wirtz (2007: 339-342) points out a contradiction in the use of ‘security’ in relation to non-military issues, questioning the usefulness of military forces in dealing with non-military threats. Similarly, Paris (2001) questions the practical utility of deepening security to incorporate human security. While recognising the theoretical gains of challenging traditional views, he argued that human security is too broad and vague a concept to be useful for the policymakers (Paris 2001: 92). Importantly, Wæver (1995: 54) warned against branding every issue a security issue, arguing that this might lead to the securitisation of an issue, with government gaining control over it. Because security matters trump other issues, a government might claim extraordinary resources by branding an issue as a security threat. Moreover, the diversity of interpretations led some, including Booth (1991: 317), to question the usefulness of security as a concept and its utility as a tool of analysis. However, Baldwin (1997: 12) and Buzan (1984: 125) argued that the contested nature of ‘security’ should not be seen as an obstacle but rather as a research-specific conceptualisation.

Finally, the concept of security also determines what is deemed a security issue, risk or threat. To begin with, a security issue is a concern or a problem that exists within or outside a state that might impact on the referent object. In other words, it is an occurrence, a development or a condition that endangers the referent object – i.e. it creates insecurity. This could be an issue that intrinsically is a security issue – e.g. the need to secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state against the threat or actual use of external military force against it, or an issue that has been securitised – e.g. a non-security issue that has been politicised and thereafter securitised (Peoples & Vaughan-



Williams 2010: 4-6; Wæver 1995: 54). The existence of an issue within the confines of a defined security scope is characterised by a vulnerability, namely a situation that can lead to an insecurity of a referent object, its core values, and its features. Buzan (1991b: 113) argues that in practical terms the two concepts are interlinked: in order for a security issue to exist there has to be a vulnerability, and *vice versa*. Therefore, in order to deal with a potential insecurity, a state should either address the security issue, or eliminate the vulnerability.

The security issue itself can take two different forms, namely a security risk or a security threat. The difference between the two lies in the imminence of the danger experienced by the referent object, and the urgency to address this danger. On the one hand, a security risk is a potential future danger (or harmful eventuality) to the referent object, including a security issue or threat (Bernhardt 2004: 64). A security risk can be real, perceived or acceptable. In other words, a risk can indicate an objective danger to the referent object; a subjective perception of a potential danger; and/or a tolerable possible danger as a by-product of a chosen course of action (Vertzberger 1998: 19-20). On the other hand, a security threat is an immediate issue or a threat of an existential nature to a referent object of security (Krahmann 2005: 4-5). Therefore, while a security risk demands strategic planning and preparation, a security threat requires an instant policy response, with potential detrimental consequences to the survival of the state, a community, or an individual (Bernhardt 2004: 72-75; Hough, Du Plessis and Kruys 2008: 1-3).

To conclude, security refers to the absence of threats to acquired values. In the context of the Cold War and the danger of nuclear conflict, the threat was understood in terms of warfare, while security was understood as the ability of a state to avoid or win a war. The end of the Cold War allowed security specialists to turn their attention to issues previously marginalised by the threat of a nuclear annihilation – thereby broadening and deepening the scope of security to include new security issues and new referent objects. The revision of the concept was beneficial to the extent that it accentuated the security issues of the Global South – problems that undermined the security of states and people alike – and suggested new ways of dealing with these issues.

### **3.2 A typology of security**

As an exponent of the so-called Copenhagen School and of Critical Security Studies, Barry Buzan in his seminal work, *People, States, and Fear* (1983 and 1991b), broadened the concept of security

to align it with the realities of the post-Cold War world. Specifically, he touched on important themes that included the levels of security (individual, state and international system), the role of regional security, and emerging or new threats to security. Yet, whereas Buzan redefined and framed the concept of security, his ideas are not only relevant to the contemporary conceptualisation and operationalisation of ‘national security’, but his typology of security sectors also provides a basis to determine the scope of or what impacts on national security.

Buzan’s (1991b: 116-131) typology consists of five security sectors – namely the military, political, societal, economic and environmental sectors – each denoting a particular area of security concern and threats thereto. The **military sector** includes threats of a military nature –direct military actions undertaken by a hostile external actor against the state. This sector is representative of the traditional approach to security, being concerned with issues of military security, war and survival. The **political sector** involves threats to the core organisational stability of a state, including threats to governing institutions, national identity and ideology, i.e. the (political) fabric of a state. This sector is also representative of the traditional approach to security, being concerned with regime-related issues pertaining to the government and governance of the state. The **societal sector** comprises of threats to religion, culture and traditions, i.e. threats to ethnic and national identity. Here it is important to differentiate between a national identity – the overarching state identity (e.g. South Africans in South Africa), and local identities – unique ethnic identities found within a state (e.g. the Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana in South Africa). Both form part of societal security, considering that the former is also part of political security; and both are interlinked. In essence, societal security is understood in terms of a balance within a state, and the state and government’s ability to deal with different identities and cultures. Importantly, it is often a case that nation-building, while improving the overall security of the state, creates serious security problems within societal sector (Bandyopadhyay & Green 2008; Buzan 1991b: 122). This was the case in the former Yugoslavia (Schöpflin 2013: 172-204). The **economic sector** relates to the security of the national economy (i.e. the economic base of a state, as well as the national/local/grassroots economy). However, Buzan (1991b: 124) acknowledges the problematic nature of this sector as the “normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, aggressive competition and uncertainty”. Therefore, challenges, risks or threats to economic security are vague in scope and nature. They are dependent on the state’s own subjective perception of and the response of government and non-government decision-makers to these developments.

Furthermore, military security is dependent on economic security due to the budgetary and financial implications of an economy on military procurements and budgets. The **ecological sector** includes environmental threats such as atmospheric pollution, water pollution, desertification, deforestation and global warming. Although these mainly have implications for human security (the socio-economic sectors), they have the potential to become security issues in their own right (e.g. water security) that cause conflict. Although this sectoral division of threats to security groups common security issues together, Buzan (1991b: 113) contends that different states experience security problems differently (see Table 1)

**Table 1: Vulnerabilities and threat types**

		<b>Socio-political cohesion (SPC)</b>	
		<b>Weak</b>	<b>Strong</b>
<b>Power</b>	<b>Weak</b>	High vulnerability to most types of threat	Particularly vulnerable to military threats
	<b>Strong</b>	Particularly vulnerable to political threats	Relatively invulnerable to most types of threat

(Buzan 1991b: 114)

From the above it is evident that a powerful state (strong power) with strong socio-political cohesion (strong state), like the US, would perceive and experience insecurity differently than a less-powerful state (weak power) with strong socio-political cohesion, like Denmark, or than a weak state with weak power, like Angola<sup>3</sup>. Thus, while powerful and strong states are preoccupied with issues of armament and balance of power, the policy agenda of weak states is dominated by issues of socio-economic development, social instability and institutional weakness. For this study the aforesaid meaning and typology needs to be extended to the concept of national security.

### **3.3 The concept of national security**

Per definition and in general terms, national security represents a state-centric approach to ‘security’; it is used for the purpose of determining and denoting the security of a nation-state. However, similar to ‘security’, the notion of national security is contested and lacks definitional

<sup>3</sup>Buzan (1991: 96-97) refers to weak states as states that have weak socio-political cohesion; inversely, strong states have strong socio-political cohesion.

clarity. The problematic nature of national security is further complicated by the lack of agreement on the term ‘national’ and the progression from traditional to new security thinking. In traditional or realist terms the ‘state’ was equated to the ‘nation’, and its interests and core values had to be protected against external military threats (Walt 1991: 212-213). On contrary, concerning new thinking, the referent object of national security becomes several entities, namely a state, an ethnic group, a minority group, an eco-system, a region and/or the whole world. Similarly, the threats to these objects may range between external and internal, and non-military and military, with the state being a problem itself (see Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 7-8). The evolution of the thinking on national security attests to this.

Prior to the Cold War, Lippmann (1943: 51) defined national security as the ability of a nation to avoid or win war, while preserving core values. Similarly, Kennan (1948: 26) defined it as “the continued ability of ... (a) country to pursue its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers”. As such the pre-Cold War discourse focused on the military power of the state, and its role in preserving the freedom of choice in domestic and foreign policy. Yet, while this thinking was carried over to the Cold War, the conceptualisation of national security saw a gradual acknowledgement of non-military factors. A prominent shift occurred in the 1970s with the inclusion of international economy on the national security agenda (Mathews 1989: 162). For example, Louw (1978: 10-11) defined national security as the “the condition of freedom from external physical threat, which a nation-state enjoys”, while acknowledging the existence of unconventional security threats to the state that included, amongst others, the economy. Brown (1983: 86) adopted a similar approach by defining national security as the capability of a state to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity, defend its nature and institutions from external interference, and maintain its economic relations with other states. However, the security of a state itself remained narrow in military terms as physical security. Although some non-military threats were acknowledged, the threat of physical violence was prioritised by the virtue of its existential nature (Louw 1978: 10-11; Barber 1978 44-47).

The end of the Cold War and the erosion of traditional threats increased the salience of previously marginalised issues even though they did not (as a rule) pose an existential threat to the state. They did impact on people and state institutions, and compromised the stability and welfare of a state (Brauch 2011: 62-66). Some scholars, for instance Buzan (1983) and Ullman (1983), were among

the first to indicate this anomaly within the traditional national security rhetoric. Ullman (1983: 133) pioneered the redefinition of national security by emphasising non-military threats and the danger they may hold for the long-term quality of life for people living in a state. For him the military- and state-centric and exclusively external-oriented focus of national security could obstruct the impact of non-military and internal threats, and severely limit the policy space for effective response (Ullman 1983: 133-135). On a different level Buzan (1991b: 65) similarly revisited national security and defined it as the security of the physical base of the state, the underlying idea of a state, and the institutions that represent a state, in the process incorporating his fivefold typology of security sectors (Buzan 1991b: 19-20).

In particular, two aspects of the traditional approach were criticised, namely the referent object of national security and the threats to it. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War saw several scholars (e.g. Duffield 2001; Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993; Van Evera 1994) investigating national security issues that lay outside of the traditional realm. This brought issues of ethnic conflict and civil wars in developing states to the fore with the result that concerns about domestic stability and cohesion grew in prominence. For instance, Acharya (1995: 5) contended that internal security issues pertaining to the stability and survival of a state were always prevalent in the ‘Third World’, but were obstructed and/or suppressed by the Cold War rivalries. He furthermore argued that the peculiarities the ‘Third World’ required a different security approach than the ‘First World’. Jones (1999: 99) similarly argued that the military-centred, approach to security, being a construct of the Global North, overlooked internal security issues such as food and environmental security (i.e. human security concerns) that created threats to the physical safety and liberty of the people of the Global South.

On the other hand, some scholars (see Booth 1991: 315-318; Gasper 2006: 224-228; King & Murray 2001-2002: 588; Liotta 2002; Mutimer 1997: 82-83; Newman 2001) confronted the centrality of a state *per se*, questioning its usefulness as the referent object of security. In line with Critical Security Studies they promoted the notion of human security. Although not the focus of this study, human security has to be considered due to its relationship with and impact on the nature and scope of national security. In general terms, human security is defined as any sudden negative change to the daily life of a human, a community or a nation (UNDP 1994: 22). Accordingly, the referent object of security is vertically deepened to the humans, either individually or collectively, and

the scope of security is broadened to include non-traditional, non-military security issues, risks and threats. The problem, however, is the link and relationship between human security and national security. Either human security is an adjunct to and therefore separate from but supplementary to national security, or it is subordinate to and therefore a sub-dimension of national security. Although the literature is inconclusive and ambiguous, an inclination towards the former position is apparent (see Newman 2001: 249). If national security is seen as an over-arching concept inclusive of human security, as in the latter position, the suggestion is to subdivide it into two sections, namely that of state security (including regime security) and that of human security. In this respect the referent object of security (the state and humans respectively) is the distinguishing factor, reinforced by the state-centric and human-centric threats linked to each. For the purposes of this study, and in anticipation of the broader security impact of capital city relocation, the second position is adopted.

To conclude, the traditional approach to national security is limited and exclusionary, with the result that non-military issues are overlooked or marginalised by security agendas as is evident in the systemic and structural issues that the states of the Global South inherited upon independence (see Acharya 1995: 5; and Douma, Frerks & Van de Goor 1999: 7-25). Critical Security Studies offers a solution to some of these shortcomings although it often produces more questions than answers (see Paris 2004; and Wirtz 2007: 339-342). The aforesaid also confirms the contested and evolutionary nature and scope of security and national security. This has two implications for establishing a capital city relocation-national security nexus. Firstly, with reference to the extended scope of national security threats, relocation introduces a probability of impact only, and the relationship between it and national security is not deterministic. Furthermore, depending on the case studies, the possibility exists that some threats and impacts may not be evident at all. Hence, the typology needs to be used with circumspection. Secondly, because the goals of relocation are long-term, and threats are immanent in nature, capital city relocation is not an effective tool of threat management. Capital city relocation may impact, either negatively or positively, on the underlying issues, vulnerabilities, threats and long-term risks within the state. It can contribute to insecurity (by eroding security) or to security (by reducing insecurity) – not as dichotomous alternatives but as simultaneous outcomes. This justifies the development of an indicator-based framework to identify and assess the ramifications of capital city relocation on national security.

#### **4. The capital city relocation-national security nexus: A framework for analysis**

Before presenting the framework and explaining its components, it is necessary to clarify the nexus and its underlying assumptions, limitations and steps.

##### **4.1 National security and capital city relocation**

As indicated, capital city relocation is an instrument of state- and nation-building that is accompanied by related strategies and objectives. In this regard and firstly, capital city relocation is prevalent in but not limited to postcolonial states. Secondly, its rationale and impact is primarily of an internal nature. Thirdly, with this in mind and also considering the nature and scope of security, its link to national security should reflect the referent object of security and the spectrum of security problems. In the case of capital city relocation, the state is the primary referent object. Any smaller referent object would only represent a segment of the whole picture. Since the spectrum of security problems is best represented by Buzan's sectoral division of security, being the two traditional (political and military) security sectors and the three non-traditional (societal, economic and ecological) security sectors, the five-fold sectoral typology constitutes the building blocks of the analysis and assessment of the overall national security impact of capital city relocation. This impact depends on the changes (positive, negative or neutral) that occur within each security sectors. The fact that the state remains the main object of security across these security sectors is problematic as evidenced by the following sub-themes:

The first theme concerns the use of the national security concept in relation to developing states. Buzan (1991b: 102) noted the difficulty to identify an object of security in weak states in relation to external threats, while a focus on internal threats is similarly be misleading. Although security against external threats concerns the well-being of the nation-state, the lack of a common national identity within weak states makes it difficult to identify the object of security (Buzan 1991b: 102-103). The second theme concerns the involvement of non-state objects of security and the potential securitisation of non-security issues. In other words, how useful is it to employ the terminology of national security in relation to non-military security issues? Furthermore, would it not give the state an incentive to securitise problematic areas in an effort to protect the regime (see Wirtz 2007: 339-342; Wæver 1995: 54)? Finally, how suitable is it to use a state as a referent object of if the state (and government) is a source of insecurity (see Jones 1999)?

In response, it is important to note that capital city relocation as such is neither an instrument of national security policy, nor is it used exclusively for security purposes. Therefore, within this study the focus is on the security ramifications of relocation, these being a result, an outcome or a by-product of a policy option and not the rationale and objective of this option. This reduces the limitations of using weak (or developing) states as the referent object and of incorporating non-traditional security issues. Considering this and in respect of postcolonial (former Third World or Global South) states, attention turns to the relevant security sectors.

An array of threats to security characterise the combined (high-politics or traditional) political-military sector. These include civil wars, *coup d'états*, revolutions, secessionist movements, public revolts, violent protests and criminal insurgencies. Since a detailed examination of these threats fall beyond the ambit of this study, it suffices to note that these threats share a common source of insecurity – the underdeveloped character of the state and its colonial-inherited internal weaknesses (Douma, Frerks & Van de Goor 1999: 29-31). Therefore, the emerging challenges to the organisational stability of a state are attributed to a number of persisting vulnerabilities within other security sectors. Since most threats to developing states exist in the political realm, the vulnerabilities and risks within the other sectors are framed by their political impact.

In respect of the societal sector, security risks are divided into two sub-categories: intrastate migration and nation-building (Buzan 1991b: 122; Moore 2000: 26-27; Wæver 1993). Migration refers to the movement of people within a state, often in search of a better life. In countries with a heterogeneous ethnic composition, this often means an infringement by one or more ethnic groups on the traditional territory of another group, which could result in ethnic conflicts, violent protests and xenophobic attacks. This could lead to a threat of violent ethnic clashes, genocide or even a civil war (Buzan 1991b: 45; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001: viii). As for the nation-building, the concern refers to the suppression of indigenous ethnic identities. This aspect is problematic as, on the one hand, a common national identity improves the political security of a state; yet, on the other hand, a violent suppression might rebound in the form of a civil war or a secessionist movement. Therefore, the vulnerability of societal security is dependent on ethnic heterogeneity, the particularities of nation-building and the vulnerabilities and risks in other sectors.

Within the economic sector – to the extent that state and government has a responsibility to provide in the basic human needs, such as food, water, shelter and public services that include schools and



healthcare (UNDP 1994) – a delivery failure (eroding freedom from want) could result in political instability and conflict, not excluding revolutions, secessionism and criminal insurgencies. For example, Campante and Chor (2012) identified a link – especially amongst the youth – between unsatisfied economic prospects and revolution. Others have established a link between system induced resource scarcity and conflict in developing states (e.g. Acharya 1995: 5; Douma, Frerks & Van de Goor 1999: 7-25), including the rise of criminal activities due to poverty and a lack of opportunities. A general dissatisfaction with economic prospects, inequality and low quality of life may fuel existent grievances and lead to serious security risks and threats (Kim 2008; Stewart 2002: 342-343).

Finally, the environmental sector embraces a plethora of subjects that range from pollution and carbon emissions to the effects of the rising sea and temperature levels. The environmental impact of relocation is obviously determined and limited by the very nature of the project. The main focus is environmental degradation and people induced scarcity of resources, and the extent to which these phenomena cause migration, competition, conflict and violence. Vulnerabilities range from the depletion of (and access to) arable land, through access to water resources, to the overall state of the environment in a particular inhabited area. The impact of environmental security on state stability is especially apparent in developing postcolonial countries where it overlaps with poverty, inequality, government inefficiency and corruption (see Fearon & Laitin 2003; Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Le Billon 2001; Ross 2004). Bernauer, Böhmelt and Koubi (2011: 1-2), however, point to a lack of evidence linking environmental security and violence, arguing that environmental issues are not sufficient to cause physical violence. They contend that additional factors are required, including a weak economy, underdeveloped government institutions and ethnic or religious heterogeneity.

#### **4.2 Assumptions, limitations and steps**

The framework is based on the following assumptions: capital city relocation is a tool of state- and nation-building; the (re-)location, by its very nature, has a bearing on for the military, political, social, economic and environmental sectors of security; the impact of relocation relates to territorial reach, administrative effectiveness, developmental equality, economic prosperity, social development and environmental sustainability; and relocation, being linked to security issues, vulnerabilities, risks and threats, can contribute and/or compromise national security.

The framework is limited in the following ways: capital city relocation in this study is limited to developing states; national security is understood as the security of a state (incorporating human security), reducing the primary object of security to the state (and regime); the state nevertheless represents key values that transcend it as a mere political-judicial entity, and their security extends to the population. The latter justifies the inclusion of all sectors of security (military, political, economic, societal and ecological) in linking capital city relocation and national security.

Accordingly, the framework involves three steps: firstly, and by subscribing to its state- and nation-building purpose, to identify the reasons for capital city relocation, be they explicit or implicit and overt or covert. Secondly, and based on key security issues, vulnerabilities, risks and threats within the security sectors, the identification of indicators in the form of questions to be answered in respect of each case-study. Thirdly, to use these indicators to assess the impact (existing or non-existing, positive and/or negative) of capital city relocation on national security.

Finally, in assessing this impact, both the cause and effect of relocation must be considered. Cause refers to the instrumental use of relocation as a policy response to issues. In this respect the security sector cause becomes a purposive reason for (and therefore a justification of) relocation. The issue is whether or not relocation has an intended security effect (a positive impact) or unintended consequences (a negative impact). The effect and therefore the impact of relocation also relates to a situation where relocation was done for purposes and reasons ‘other’ than security, but where these have a residual impact (positive or negative) on national security.

### **4.3 The framework specifics**

In respect of each security sector questions are asked, along with concluding questions on the overall national security impact of the indicators. These (summarised in Table 2) are as follow:

**(a) Political indicators:** Political security is central to the existence and survival of a state as a political-juridical entity, and a capital city serves as a point of common interaction. The political indicators are:

- *Geopolitical location*
  - Where is the state located?
  - Which countries border the state?

- What is the nature of regional relationships?
- Where is the relocated capital city geographically positioned, relative to the country itself?
- *Constitutional features*
  - What is the form of the state and was this a relocation consideration?
  - Does the regime type influence relocation?
- *Policy change*
  - Does the relocation have the support of the public and if not, what is the response?
  - Does the relocation influence the regime's continuation or change?
  - Does the relocation enhance the legitimacy and capacity of the government (institutions)?
  - Does the relocation improve the provision of public goods and services or not?
- *Overall political impact*
  - Are there political reasons for relocation?
  - Does relocation change the political sector?
  - Do the political indicators have a direct, indirect or no impact on national security?

**(b) Military indicators:** Military security has an external orientation with the addition of internal aspects in developing countries. In respect of external orientation, the geostrategic dimension is an important consideration. The military indicators are:

- *Geostrategic location*
  - Is the state located in an area of geostrategic significance?
- *Relative power*
  - What is the relative status of the state in its region and in the world?
  - What is the relative military power of the state in its region and in the world?
  - Does relocation influence budget allocations for military security (increase / decrease)?
- *External relationships*
  - Are there territorial or other disputes between the state and its neighbours?
  - Are there external military threats, in particular from its region, to the state?
- *Internal relationships*
  - Are there internal security threats of a military or *quasi*-military nature to the state?
  - Is there manifest conflict that requires a coercive armed response?

- *Overall military impact*

- Are there military reasons for relocation?
- Does relocation change the military sector?
- Do the military indicators have a direct, indirect or no impact on national security?

**(c) Societal indicators:** Societal security relates to the security of patterns of communal identity and culture that influence social cohesion and the fabric (material and non-material) of society. The relevant social indicators are:

- *Societal location*

- What is composition of the population of the state (homogeneous or heterogeneous)?
- Where is the relocated capital city positioned geographically relative to sub-groups?
- Does the relocation elicit a response from majority and minority sub-groups?

- *Societal representation*

- Does the societal diversity of the relocated capital city correlate with that of the state?
- Do bureaucratic institutions within the relocated capital city represent societal diversity?
- Does sub-group response impact on conflict and in what manner?

- *Societal change*

- What migratory patterns does relocation produce?
- Do migratory patterns change in relation to the societal composition of the relocated capital city, or to overall migration in a state?

- *Overall societal impact*

- Are there societal reasons for relocation?
- Does relocation change the societal sector?
- Do the societal indicators have a direct, indirect or no impact on national security?

**(iv) Economic indicators:** Economic security pertains to the ability of the state to sustain the basic human needs of its population and it has serious implications as underdevelopment, poverty and economic inequality are among the leading causes of instability and violence in the developing states. The economic indicators are:

- *Economic location*

- What is the economic map of the country?

- Where is the relocated capital city positioned relative to the existing economic centres?
- *Economic conditions*
  - What economic vulnerabilities existed before capital city relocation?
  - Do economic considerations inform the decision to relocate the capital city?
  - What were the primary economic considerations?
- *Economic change*
  - Does relocation produce change in the new area, the region and/or the state?
  - Does relocation influence economic (in)equality in the state?
- *Overall economic impact*
  - Are there economic reasons for relocation?
  - Does relocation change the economic sector?
  - Do the economic indicators have a direct, indirect or no impact on national security?

**(e) Environmental indicators:** Environmental security concerns the impact of ‘green problems’ on the wellbeing of communities and the stability of the state. The environmental indicators are:

- *Environmental location*
  - Is the relocated capital city positioned in an environmentally sensitive area?
- *Environmental conditions*
  - What environmental vulnerabilities existed before capital city relocation?
  - Do environmental considerations inform the decision to relocate the capital city?
- *Environmental change*
  - Does relocation bring about environmental change in the old and/or new capital city?
- *Overall environmental impact*
  - Are there environmental reasons for relocation?
  - Does relocation change the environmental sector?
  - Do the environmental indicators have a direct, indirect or no impact on national security?

**Table 2: The national security impact of capital city relocation: A framework for analysis**

	POLITICAL SECTOR	MILITARY SECTOR	SOCIETAL SECTOR	ECONOMIC SECTOR	ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR
LOCATION	Geopolitical	Geostrategic	Societal	Economic	Environmental

<b>FEATURES &amp; CONDITIONS</b>	Constitutional features	Relative power	Societal representation	Economic conditions	Environmental conditions
<b>CHANGE</b>	Policy impact	External & internal relations	Societal change	Economic change	Environmental change
<b>FEATURES &amp; CONDITIONS</b>	Overall impact	Overall impact	Overall impact	Overall impact	Overall impact

In respect of each sector and across all indicators of the national security impact of capital city relocation, both their negative and positive impact is taken into consideration.

## 5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the capital city relocation-nexus as a basis for a framework for analysis that can be applied to the selected case studies. The content and findings of this chapter are by no means exhaustive and limited by conceptual and theoretical boundaries. Although several states around the world have indicated an interest in capital city relocation, this study is limited to two postcolonial developing countries. This is to differentiate these countries from relocation in developed and established states that has different rationales, dynamics and outcomes. Hence the former ‘Third World’ or Global South contextualisation in theoretical and practical terms.

The chapter was divided into four sections. The first examined capital city relocation as a policy option for state- and nation-building; an option most appealing to the developing states due to the structural and systemic problems they face. The second section dealt with the conceptual and theoretical complexities of security and highlighted changing perceptions over time. Importantly, it defined the spectrum of security concerns, from vulnerabilities to risks and threats. Furthermore, it also provided a brief introduction to Barry Buzan’s five-sector security typology. The third section narrowed the concept of security to that of national security and provided a brief overview of the scope and nature of the latter. The fourth section linked national security to capital city relocation, admittedly focusing on the state (and regime) as the referent object of security (albeit not excluding society and individuals subject to the state) and the conditions framed by the five security sectors (containing vulnerabilities and risks/threats). This provided the basis and

indicators of the analytical framework. These indicators, being representative and not exhaustive, provide a point of conjunction between capital city relocation and national security. This framework is henceforth applied to explore and explain the impact of capital city relocation on the national security of Nigeria and Kazakhstan.

## CHAPTER 3

### **CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

#### **1. Introduction**

The debates around the need to establish a new centre of national unity in the Federal Republic of Nigeria existed even before its independence. However, tribal and religious tensions have undermined a constructive discussion on capital city relocation and a preferred location. As a result, the actual move from Lagos to Abuja was conducted by an authoritarian regime, along with fears that the project was usurped in the interests of the government. This relocation nevertheless raised important questions, considering the problematic nature of the Nigerian political and ethnic landscape. Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to explain the capital city relocation in Nigeria and to determine its impact on the national security of the state.

To serve this purpose the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an historical account of the relocation from the former capital city of Lagos to the newly established Abuja and contextualises the analysis that follows. Section two employs the analytical framework (see Chapter 2) to determine the sector-based national security impact of this relocation. The third section is a concluding summary of key findings.

#### **2. The historical context of capital city relocation in Nigeria**

Capital city relocation in Nigeria had an underlying historical context that explains, in part, the rationale of the process. In fact, considering the state- and nation- building purpose of capital city relocation, the establishment of the Nigerian state itself created the need for the project. It is therefore necessary to explore the complex history of Nigeria, as it serves as a starting point for an assessment of the reasons behind and the impact of relocation. The first part is dedicated to the history of Nigeria and is limited to the conceptual and historical boundaries of the capital city relocation and the debates thereon. The objective is to outline the main vulnerabilities and risks that existed within the state. The second part is devoted to a brief sector-based overview of the reasons behind relocation, summarising the goals and expectations of the decision-makers.



## 2.1 The capital city debate in colonial Nigeria

Prior to its unification in 1914, the political entity now known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria consisted of two separate British protectorates, namely the Northern Nigeria Protectorate, and the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria – both founded in 1900. The Southern Protectorate came into existence after the British Empire defeated the kings of Yorubaland in the South – the home of Yoruba people, and the kings of the Delta states in the East – the home of Igbo people. By 1912 the Southern Protectorate incorporated most of the contemporary Southern and Eastern regions, with Lagos as the colonial capital city. In a similar manner, the British created the Northern Protectorate by conquest, incorporating amongst others the Sokoto Caliphate, the Kano Emirate and the Bornu Empire. The Northern Protectorate was the domain of the Hausa and Fulani people, with the capital city in Zungeru (Adebanwi 2012: 87; Falola 1999: 39-45). Overall there are approximately 374 ethnic groups<sup>4</sup> in Nigeria, with the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa being the largest (FRN 2013b: 2). These three groups constituted a mere 28 per cent of the population (Mustapha 2007: 3). The two protectorates were also distinct in religious terms, as the south of Nigeria was historically Christian and the north Muslim.

By 1912 the existence of two separate colonies was no longer economically and administratively beneficial to the British Empire. In economic terms the North was heavily indebted. Furthermore, Northern Nigeria was dependent on Lagos for the exportation of its goods and lacked essential export-related logistical and transportation infrastructure (Falola 1999: 68). For reasons of administrative, economic and financial convenience the British Colonial Office decided to incorporate the Northern and Southern protectorates into a single entity – the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914).<sup>5</sup> To this end, in 1912, Sir Frederick Lugard was appointed as the Governor-General to oversee the amalgamation. During this year, the capital city question was raised for the first time (Metz 1991: 37), producing two distinct views.

On the one hand, it was common practice to locate the capital city of a colony on the coast or a navigable river. The argument was that a port city allowed for convenient and easy communication between the colony and empire (Nwafor 1980: 360). The Colonial Office preferred Lagos as the

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<sup>4</sup> The terms *ethnicity* and *ethnic groups* are used due to the fact that Nigerians prefer to define themselves through their ethnic identity (Osaghae & Suberu 2005: 8).

<sup>5</sup> Henceforth the *dependency*.

capital of the future dependency. Lugard, on the other hand, insisted on a more central location. During his term as the Governor of the Northern Protectorate (1900-1906) he developed the idea of indirect rule<sup>6</sup> – a system of colonial governance that relied on local traditional leaders to exercise control over different regions of a dependency (i.e. to collect taxes, initiate and execute local laws, and administer a local judicial system) (Moore 1984: 168-169; Oduwobi 2011: 21-22). A more centrally-positioned capital city would allow convenient access to every corner of the Protectorate, improving the overall administrative capacity of the colonial government. Initially Lugard's viewpoint prevailed.

Irrespective, the relocation project remained incomplete. The construction of Kaduna started in 1913 to serve as the new capital of the Protectorate. Lugard's successor, Sir Hugh Clifford (1919-1925) disagreed with his predecessor's views on colonial administration in general and the capital city question in particular. Clifford insisted that Lagos remain the capital city due to its strategic coastal position and the presence of the basic infrastructure (Nwafor 1980: 359-360; White cited in Moore 1984: 168). Consequently, Lagos retained its status as the capital of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, while Kaduna became the regional capital of the Northern Region.

In many ways, the amalgamation was a decisive development that shaped the future of Nigeria as a state, and that engendered the debate over the location of the capital city. To begin with, the unification of the two protectorates was conducted for economic and colonial-administrative reasons. Further socio-political or cultural integration of the North and South was not envisioned. Lugard favoured decentralisation, as he believed that the two regions were vastly different and should develop in accordance with their unique requirements and needs (Falola 1999: 68-69). Clifford, in contrast, believed that a better administrative system would come from a stronger, more centralised government, based on Western values (Metz 1991: 36-37). He consequently favoured the Southern political elites, many of whom were Christian and had a European education. Furthermore, by 1922 the Governor-General adopted the new constitution of Nigeria (known as the Clifford Constitution) that created a legislative council for the Southern Region, effectively encouraging the growth of political activism in the South. No such provisions were made for the North (Falola

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<sup>6</sup> Indirect rule is a "system of local government that enables the British to govern Nigeria through indigenous rulers and institutions. Colonial officials would advise local rulers and minimize direct contact with the majority of population" (Falola 1999: 70). The system, developed by Lugard, was thereafter applied to all British dependencies in Africa.

1999: 70-74; Metz 1991: 37-38; Moore 1984: 167-168). As a result, the Northern elites felt excluded from the political-administrative processes and became wary of the Southern political and cultural influence (World Bank 2002: 4; Raifu, Owolabi & Folasayo 2009: 157).

In conclusion, amalgamation and the first relocation debate that followed precipitated the core social, ethnic and political problems of post-independent Nigeria. Both Lugard and Clifford recognised the ethnic, cultural and religious heterogeneity of the newly formed entity. Yet, the Colonial Office was not interested in addressing these issues beyond administrative convenience. Lugard regarded the dependency as two separate entities and promoted decentralisation; Clifford promoted centralisation and relied on Lagos elites, thereby creating ethnic and political conflict in the process.

## **2.2 The capital city debate in pre-independent Nigeria**

From 1948 onward the Colonial Office effectively administered a gradual transfer of power to the Nigerian government, as a pre-context and a precondition for independence. The constitutional reform of 1948 and the new 1951 constitution increased the power of local authorities across Nigeria. The changes provided for the establishment of the Regional House of Assembly and the Federal Parliament, as well as the specified nationalisation of the civil service. It also increased the role of the political parties by introducing nation-wide general elections, first held in 1952.

Unfortunately, the 1948 and 1951 constitutional changes also divided Nigeria along political lines – and therefore also along ethnic and religious lines – as each political party effectively fought for their narrow regional interest. Falola (1999: 81-92) provides an in-depth description of the political system of the time. The first of the three major parties, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), came into existence in 1944, to serve as the platform to unite the nationalistic movements and labour unions of Nigeria. However, from 1951 onward, the NCNC effectively became the mouthpiece of the Igbo people, with substantial support in the Eastern region of Nigeria and in the capital of Lagos. In the North, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was established in 1949 to represent the interests of the region, and to act as a counterweight to the Southern parties. The NPC managed to unite the North on the basis of Islamic values and ethnic nationalism, catering for the interests of the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. In particular, the NPC promised a secession of the North from Nigeria upon independence, and the

re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate that existed prior to British colonisation. Finally, the Action Group was created in 1951 to represent the interests of the Western region. Historically, the West was the stronghold of the Yoruba people. However, since the inception of the dependency, the West – and especially Lagos – became the destination of choice for migrants from other regions in a search of a better life.

It was around this time that the idea of a neutral location for the capital city resurged. The argument for capital city relocation was best summarised by an article in the *West African Pilot* – a prominent Nigerian newspaper – making a plea for an all-inclusive, politically and ethnically neutral capital city. The article proceeded to argue that a true Nigerian capital city should unify the country in an unbiased manner, and promote true national values (cited by Adebani 2004: 39-40). Although the Colonial Office for financial reasons advised against a capital city relocation project, the idea was widely supported across Nigeria at the time (Fourchard 2012: 71). It was believed that a new state would not cope with the financial burden of a relocation. This decision was reaffirmed during the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in London in 1953.

Despite serious political differences the attainment of independence remained a priority of the three main Nigerian political parties during the 1953 conference. By 1959 the delegates had agreed on a federal system that included four regions within the state, namely the Western, Eastern, Northern and capital regions, each with a wide degree of autonomy. Lagos retained its status as the capital city, being accorded a unique federal status within the state – effectively being a separate capital region. Furthermore, the initial administrative division of Nigeria followed historical outlines of pre-colonial kingdoms, prioritising the territorial claims of majority ethnic groups and further cementing ethno-political divide (Adebani 2012; Kastfelt 2006: 8; Metz 1991: 56-57). This set the stage for the 1959 General Elections and the independence of Nigeria on 1 October 1960. However, even upon independence the outcomes of the conferences (1953, 1954 and 1957) were perceived as temporary, aimed at speeding up the independence process rather than cementing the character of the state, as no political party was in full support of the independence agreements. For example, the status of Lagos remained contested and the bid of ethnic minorities to be politically represented by separate ethnic-based regions was rejected (Falola 1999: 93). Overall, the period after amalgamation was characterised by the rise of Nigerian nationalism and political consciousness. However, besides the anti-colonial movement, the post-independence

political landscape of Nigeria was divided along ethnic lines with political conflicts driven by narrow ethnic interest.

### 2.3 The capital city debate in post-independent Nigeria

After independence, the Nigerian political parties continued to pursue their narrow interests, relying on ethnic, religious and cultural differences to garner votes. The initial albeit brief democratic period was characterised by widespread ethnic violence, especially in the Western region and Lagos, as well as by corruption, pervasive poverty, lawlessness and tax avoidance (Falola 1999: 102). As a result, the post-independent federal system existed for only six years before the first *coup d'état* took place in 1966. Thereafter, during the period from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1999, Nigeria saw a sequence of six successful coups that cemented military control over the country for almost three decades (see Table 3). It is not surprising that the origins of many problems experienced by the post-independent Nigeria can be traced to the ethnic and religious cleavages that existed prior to liberation. These peculiarities of the formation and development of Nigeria created a need to address deep-seated systemic problems that perpetuated instability and conflict. Hence the 1979 capital city relocation project can be seen as one aspect of state- and nation- building in the attempt of the Nigerian government to create a more stable system.

**Table 3: Political rule in Nigeria, 1960-1993**

Period of rule	Head of State	Govt. Type	Ethnic Origin	How rule ended
1960-66	Balewa	Civilian	Hausa (North)	Attempted coup assassination.
1966	Ironsi	Military	Igbo (Soluth),	Coup /assassination
1966-1975	Gowon	Military	Angas/Middle Belt (North)	Coup
1976-1979	Mohamad	Military	Hausa (North)	Attempted coup / assassination
1979 – 1983	Shagari	Civilian	Fulani (North)	Coup
1984 – 1985	Buhani	Military	Fulani (North)	Colup
1985 – 1993	Babangida	Military	Nupe, Minority group in Niger State (North)	Elections results nullified in June 1993, stepped down in Aug. 1993.

(Somayeh 2011: 18)

On the national (state) level Nigeria inherited a disjointed ethnocentric political system unsuitable for the effective functioning of an independent state. The initial power-sharing structure of the post-independent federal system was skewed towards the interests of the Northern region, as regional parliamentary seats were dependent on population distribution and as the parliamentary majority had an influence on the Premier. This system encouraged zero-sum political competition that was intensified by narrow ethnic interests. In turn, this led to the weakening and underdevelopment of state institutions, as well as a further polarisation of the Nigerian society along ethnic and regional lines. The government was incapable of ensuring the rule of law, with political violence, administrative inefficiency and corruption plaguing the country (Falola 1999: 95-102; Metz 1991: 51-52). The administrative and political chaos of the First Republic (1960-1966) created a void in the political system, and culminated in a military takeover. In the period between 1966-1975 Nigeria witnessed three military coups and a civil war.

Continuing the trend that developed prior to independence, ethnicity underlined political affiliations and played a significant role in the instability that ensued. The first two coups as well as the civil war epitomised existing ethnic grievances, amplified by the ill-conceived and malfunctioning political system (Toyin 2015: 198). Beyond the realm of political competition, ethnicity and religion played a significant role in military coups. Throughout Nigerian history co-conspirators were often motivated and united by ethnic interests. For instance, Igbo military officers drove the first coup, while the countercoup that followed was a retaliation by Northern officers (Dummar 1989: 21-24; Jacob 2012: 15). This resulted in the widespread anti-Igbo pogroms across Nigeria – and especially in the North – which in turn led to the secession of the Eastern region and a subsequent civil war (1967-1970).

Following the 1975 *coup d'état* General Murtala Mohammed replaced General Gowon as Head of State. Upon coming to power, Mohammed attempted to re-establish constitutional order and drafted plans to reinstate Nigeria on a democratic path by 1979. In line with this goal the new government directed efforts towards state- and nation-building, by addressing administrative weaknesses and inefficiency, matters of corruption and lawlessness, and matters of economic underdevelopment and inequality. The need to reduce ethnic and religious tensions and to unite the nation was central to Mohammed's agenda (Metz 1991: 68-70). As part of the effort a panel was set-up to examine the possibility of capital city relocation, and to choose a suitable location. The

chosen site was in the approximate geographical centre of Nigeria, near the small town of Abuja (later renamed Suleja). On the Panel's recommendation, the Federal Military Government promulgated *Decree № 6* on 4 February 1976, creating the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) tasked with planning and developing the new city (COHRE/SERAC 2008: 16; Salau 1977: 16). Since Mohammed was killed in a failed coup attempt in 1976, his successor, Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, oversaw the creation of the Second Republic in 1979 and handed power over to the newly elected President Shehu Shagari. *De facto*, since 1976, Nigeria had two national capitals (Lagos and Abuja) sharing capital functions, with the initial date for the final move set for 1982. However, the capital city was not relocated until 1991.

During the 1979-1991 period Nigeria suffered the same problems as before. On a state level, state institutions of the Second Republic (1979-1983) were weak and corrupt, the government was inefficient and struggled to maintain the rule of law, and the political system was insecure and prone to instability. Furthermore, the political instability was underpinned and amplified by ethnic and religious grievances (Falola 1999: 165-172). Social and political problems, including corruption and underdevelopment across Nigeria, culminated in the coup of 1983, reinstating military control over Nigeria and postponing the completion of Abuja (Osaghae 1998: 161). The 1979-1991 period witnessed two successful and two failed coup attempts. Furthermore, in the 1980s, the rise of Christian conservatism and Islamic fundamentalism entrenched religion as an important part of the politics of Nigeria. Religious tensions led to violence and riots, most notably in the Kano, Kaduna and Yola states, with government unable to maintain order (Deegan 2011: 84-89; Falola 1999: 187-188; Ibrahim 1989: 65-81). The religious divide became deeper under the Babangida regime (1985-1993) – a northerner as the Military Head of State who was openly biased towards the Northern and Islamic agenda. The consequence was the failed military coup by Major Gideon Orkar in 1990, who criticised Babangida for his religious bias at the expense of the Christian South, and who promised to expel Northern states from the Federation.

The vulnerabilities and related risks of pre-1991 Nigeria were very much in evidence. Firstly, weak national cohesion and ethnocentric tendencies often led to ethnic and religious isolation and exclusion of some groups by another or others. Besides the competition between the three major ethnic groups, the minority groups were ignored altogether. This created a risk of violence, riots and conflict between different ethnic communities of Nigeria – of a political and communal nature

– as observed throughout the history of post-independent Nigeria. The number of successful and attempted military coups confirmed the existence of deep-seated social problems within the state, not least because of the role ethnicity played in political instability. Secondly, weak state institutions amplified societal conflicts, as the state was neither able to maintain the rule of law, nor capable of effectively distributing resources. Thirdly, matters of ethnic favouritism and corruption further amplified societal conflict by intensifying the scarcity of resources. In an environment with limited resources and no coherent system of fair redistribution, communities organise themselves along ethnic and religious lines against other communities, leading to conflict and violence. Overall, the lack of national cohesion, weak government and corruption were the three main vulnerabilities of the post-independent Nigerian state.

#### **2.4 The security-related reasons for capital city relocation in Nigeria**

The reasons for capital city relocation in Nigeria provide an indication of the spectrum of concerns and vulnerabilities that existed in Nigeria prior to the move. These reasons are divided into five groups, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental considerations.

**(a) Political considerations:** As envisioned in the relocation plan of General Murtala Mohammed, Abuja was supposed to provide additional security guarantees for the regime against a potential civil war, a military coup or other threats to Nigerian unity, thereby strengthening political stability and the position of the government (Olusola 1993: 40-41). The federal character of Nigeria also played a role in Mohammed's decision to relocate the capital city. Since independence the need for a small neutral city – akin to Washington, Canberra and Ottawa – was recognised by the policy-makers, political leaders and intellectuals alike. The city was supposed to be neutral in character and outside tribal and ethnic domains, as well as the economic centres. The city was also supposed to capture the heterogenic nature of population and the federal character of the state.

The need for regime security hastened the completion of the relocation project. For one, Shagari – a Northerner – attempted to finish Abuja prior to the second General Elections of 1983, as he felt threatened in Lagos by the political (and ethnic) opposition (Moore 1984: 174). On another occasion, on 22 April 1990, a group of predominantly Southern military officers occupied the Dodan Barracks – the military headquarters in Lagos – and attempted to overthrow the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The coup was generally supported by the population of Lagos (Metz



1991: 224). Albeit the coup failed, Babangida perceived the ethnic composition of Lagos and its centrality within Yoruba-dominated Western region, as a threat to his regime. Soon after the failed coup, a new presidential residence was constructed near Abuja, along with a finalisation of the official move by 1991.

**(b) Military considerations:** Traditional security played a limited role in the relocation considerations. Prior to relocation, Lagos' coastal position was raised as a potential vulnerability, as Nigeria lacked sufficient naval power to defend the capital. In this regard, concerns were raised with regards to two potential threats. Some commentators referenced the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, originating from the Delta region (Fiorelli 2014: 5; Murphy 2009: 112), while others noted the vulnerability of Lagos to a hypothetical foreign invasion (Olusola 1993: 19-28). Albeit matters of national security were not widely discussed in relation to the capital city relocation, the Panel emphasised that the new capital city "should not be easily destroyed by a foreign enemy" (Olusola 1993: 40-41).

**(c) Societal considerations:** Nation-building and the reduction of ethnic tensions were among the top priorities that informed the capital city relocation project and they dominated the relocation debates. As previously indicated, the geographic location of Lagos and the ethnic question as a focus of the relocation debate dated back to the pre-independence 1950s. Apart from the fact that Lagos was located on the geographical periphery of Nigeria, its lack of ethnic, religious and tribal neutrality was a key factor in the choice of a new location. Furthermore, Lagos was an ethnically contested city situated within the Yoruba land (Rossman 2013: 133-134). This situation fused social and political considerations as Lagos increasingly became an Igbo-dominated city in a predominantly Yoruba region (Fourchard 2012: 70). In response, the AG (Yoruba party) proposed to relocate the federal capital city but to keep Lagos as the capital of the Western region. The issue and discussion of relocation reappeared in 1972 under General Gowon – the Military Head of State (1966-1975) – as part of his attempt to review the constitution (Adebanwi 2012: 86). Gowon subsequently abandoned the idea.

The actual relocation project was only drafted in 1975 under the leadership of General Mohammed. To unite the state the new city was supposed to promote and strengthen 'Nigerian' values and national image, over local ethnic identities (General Mohammed 1975 cited by Nwafor 1980: 364). During his time as the Military Head of State, Mohammed took consecutive steps to strengthen

the unity of Nigeria. For one, he expanded the number of states to 19 to overcome internal ethnic imbalances by weakening the power of the ethnic groups. In this regard, Abuja played a major role as a tool of decentralisation: the city was seen as the centre of unity, located on ethnically-neutral land (Armstrong 1985: 73; Taylor 1988: 6). The centrality of its location also increased the accessibility of the capital city, which served as a symbolic representation of Abuja's neutrality and centrality (Ikoku 2004: 35). The centrality was also important as a symbolic gesture of reconciliation as most religious conflict occurred in the Nigerian Middle Belt, on the border between Christian and Muslim states (Kastfelt 2006: 10).

This time, however, the opposition representing the Yoruba elites opposed the relocation proposals. They believed it threatened the interests of the Western region and the Lagos elites, and saw it as an attempt by the Hausa (and the North) to consolidate power (Adebanwi 2012: 94). The project was similarly criticised by Christian organisations for attempting to “turn the new capital of Abuja into an Islamic city” (Falola 1999: 169). Some critics went even as far as to suggest that Abuja might become a symbol of the North-South divide, as the result of Northern influence on the planning, construction and management of the capital city project (Moore 1984: 174-175).

**(d) Economic considerations:** In pre-independence Nigeria, financial concerns of the Colonial Office contributed to the rejection of the relocation project (Fourchard 2012: 71). In post-independence Nigeria business interests in Lagos deterred the Gowon administration (1966-1975) from partaking in the capital city relocation project (Dent 1978: 135). Thereafter, under Mohammed's administration, the initial relocation plan coincided with and benefited from the oil-boom of the 1970s. As a result, economic considerations did not feature as prominently in the capital city relocation debate as previously (Ogunlesi 2014). However, the actual beginning of the project coincided with the 1979 oil crisis. In the context of the looming economic crisis, major public projects became means of enrichment for some top-level political figures (Falola 1999: 170). Corruption slowed down the completion of Abuja and the project came under criticism for wasting money in a time austerity was needed (Moore 1984: 175). By 1997 the added margin of the capital city construction was 25 per cent over the actual project cost (Moser, Rogers & Van Til: 1997: 37). Despite their negative impact the economic crisis of 1979 and the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1980s were nevertheless used to justify relocation based on the argument that the project would be economically beneficial and stimulate the economy.

**(e) Environmental considerations:** Primary among environmental considerations was the lack of long-term strategic planning for Lagos. The city was growing uncontrollably, with worsening traffic jams and slums spreading across the city (Nwafor 1980: 360-361). The inaptitude of Lagos to serve as the national capital was similarly captured by the FCDA (1979: 285), referencing a lack of a long-term strategic planning as part of the reason for the new capital city. Furthermore, Lagos' coastal position limited the expansion of the city (Ogunlesi 2014). Yet, some critics questioned the logic of creating a new capital city as the solution to the structural problems of Lagos (Adebanwi 2012: 91).

Overall, reasons for and attitudes towards capital city relocation were mixed. On the one hand, capital city relocation was linked to the pursuit of national unity, a debate theme dating back to the colonial era and underlying the historical importance of the issue. On the other hand, manifest ethnic and political considerations played a major role in capital city relocation – especially in terms of completing the project – and to some extent undermined the initial purpose of the relocation. Nevertheless, the considerations serving as the main drivers were ethnic contestation and conflict, political instability and the federal cohesion of Nigeria, matters that were not security specific but that related to the national security of Nigeria. These considerations, to the extent that they became reasons for relocation, arguably coincides with the perceived security risks and threats to the Nigerian state. Given this context, attention turns to the national security impact of capital city relocation in Nigeria post-1991.

### **3. The post-1991 national security impact of capital city relocation in Nigeria**

Based on the application of the framework for analysis, the national security impact of capital city relocation in Nigeria is divided into five sections, namely political, military, societal, economic, and environmental security.

#### **3.1 Political security**

Concerning its geopolitical location, the Federal Republic of Nigeria is situated in the West African region of the African continent. It shares borders with Cameroon, Chad Niger, and Benin, and has access to the Gulf of Guinea (Atlantic Ocean) on the south coast. Since the Nigerian economy is the largest on the African continent (\$481 billion) and the 22<sup>nd</sup> largest in the World (World Bank 2016a), it is a core country of and plays a pivotal role in the region. Accordingly, its regional

relations are characterised by economic, political and military cooperation through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria also plays an important role in Africa and actively engages with other African states directly and through the African Union (AU).

The capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, is located in the Federal Capital Territory, in the approximate geographical centre of the country. In accordance with the Nigerian Constitution the city is the official seat of the Nigerian federal government and the primary host of the three branches of power and their respective buildings, namely the House of Assembly, the seat of government, and the Supreme Court of Nigeria. As previously discussed, this location was informed by and based on constitutional considerations derived from the federal form of the Nigerian state.

To the extent that the relocation was the product and the implementation of a policy change on the capital city, the security consequences thereof are linked to the public response to capital city relocation, regime security, regime legitimacy and the impact on public goods delivery. To begin with, the initial response to the relocation was mixed. Opposition leaders perceived Abuja, being located in the historical North, as evidence of the growing Northern influence. In turn Northerners tended to view Abuja as ‘their’ capital city as opposed to that of the ‘Southerners’ namely Lagos. Additional concerns in the East emerged during the actual relocation, related to the open pro-Northern and pro-Islam political agenda of the Babangida regime (Rossman 2013: 133-134). Furthermore, various Christian organisations became wary of the Islamisation of the capital, and also of Nigeria, as Abuja was located in a predominantly Muslim territory (Adebanwi 2012: 97-98). Nevertheless, no violent protests followed and the status of Abuja has not been contested after the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1999.

The impact on the security of the regime is difficult to determine. As indicated, regime security was a driving factor behind the relocation decision. Nevertheless, popular protests across Nigeria forced Babangida to resign in 1993 after he failed to transfer power to the newly elected government. Apart from the elections, the unrests were also driven by deep political, ethnic and religious disputes related to the ‘divide and rule’ strategy employed by Babangida (Falola 1999: 183-193). The short-lived Third Republic lasted for less than three months and was overthrown in yet another military coup in 1993, led by General Sani Abacha. After eight years of ethnic and religious divide, politically motivated by Babangida’s regime, the country was once again split along ethnic and religious lines. Abacha – a northerner akin to Babangida – consolidated the role of Abuja as the

national capital as he saw the location of the new city as a means to secure his regime, especially in the face of political, ethnic and religious opposition based in Lagos (Adebanwi 2012: 97). The military coup of 1993 was the last major instance of political turmoil and governmental instability in Nigeria, as the Fourth Nigerian Republic was established in 1999. Furthermore, after the onset of the counter-terrorism war against Boko Haram in 2009, seven terrorist attacks were successfully carried out in the city killing more than 200 people (Council on Foreign Relations 2016; Eze 2013: 92-94). Therefore, considering the initial political instability upon the relocation, and the number of successful terrorist attacks, it is difficult to make a conclusive link between regime security and capital city relocation. Arguably, it can be said that the capital city has become more vulnerable and prone to threats and attacks. The Military Government nevertheless considered Abuja to be a source of greater security for the regime, in the face of political opposition from Lagos in particular.

The capital city relocation was supposed to increase the legitimacy of the government and decrease political and ethnic instability. However, since 1991 the legitimacy of the government has been successively undermined by two serious security threats in the east and the north, also considering that the situation deteriorated even further after the 1999 transition to democratic rule (Onuoha 2011: 3). In the east, the state of security deteriorated significantly after the 1990s with the emergence of secessionist movements, rebel groups and criminal organisations. On the one hand, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been active since 2004, engaging in guerrilla warfare and criminal activities against the Nigerian government and local petroleum operations. MEND operates in the Niger Delta, driven by economic inequality, poverty and perceived injustices related to the redistribution of the oil profits (Allison 2016). Furthermore, many oilrigs in the region are operated by international corporations but are owned by the Northerners (Premium Times 2013). The 'ethnic agenda' therefore serves as an additional motivating factor for the insurgency groups in the area (Amaize, Yafugborhi & Brisibe 2016).

On the other hand, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have resurged, once again promoting the idea of the secession of the Eastern Region from Nigeria. MASSOB, comprising predominantly of Igbo people, is driven by a perceived feeling of isolation and a lack of representation by Abuja (Duruji 2012: 540-544; Onuoha 2011: 85-92). Similarly, Boko Haram – a radical Islamic insurgency group dedicated to the overthrow of

the Nigerian government and the creation of a ‘pure’ Islamic state – has been destabilising the north of Nigeria since 2009 (Adesoji 2010: 100; Okoli & Iortyer 2014: 43-44). Although Boko Haram neither represents the interests of all the people in the North nor those of a specific ethnic group, the movement has its roots in the historical political and religious struggles between the North and the South, dating back to the late 1980s (Adesoji 2010: 96-98). Furthermore, although the core of the movement is motivated by religious agenda, most recruits join the movement for economic reasons being motivated by pervasive poverty, corruption and a lack of economic opportunities (Nchi cited in Okoli & Iortyer 2014: 43). It is evident that insurgencies in the east and north are motivated by similar factors: corruption, pervasive poverty and rejection of the role of the government in Abuja as their representatives.

Finally, concerning the provision of public goods and services, two observations are made. Firstly, the emphasis on regime security and the reduced legitimacy of the government and its institutions had a spill-over effect on and contributed to sub-optimal public sector goods and services delivery. Secondly and more importantly, corruption levels remained high. Although no pre-1997 comparative data is available, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2016b: 7) ranked Nigeria in position 136 out of 167 countries<sup>7</sup> in 2015. This represented little progress considering the fact that Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt country (out of 52 countries) in 1997 (Transparency International 1997: 8). Nigeria made little progress during the 1997-2015 period and the corruption index indicates a deterioration of the situation since 2013 (The Economist 2016; Transparency International 2016a). Amongst others the latter is due to the lack of political will to address the issue of corruption in Nigeria (Ogbeidi 2012: 21-22).

The overall impact of relocation on the political security of Nigeria is difficult to capture. On the one hand, Abuja has managed to encapsulate the essence of Nigeria, as the city is generally recognised as a truly national capital (as opposed to Lagos). It has also decreased tensions between political groups in the long term, being perceived as a neutral territory. Therefore, the relocation can be said to have strengthened the political security of Nigeria by removing the ‘ethnic’ question of the capital city from the agenda of political parties. Furthermore, Nigeria has avoided major political instability since 1993, and even the military regimes deemed Abuja to be more secure than Lagos. Nevertheless, the relocation itself had neither prevented the 1993 military coup, nor the

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<sup>7</sup> The Corruption Perception Index lists 1 as the best and 167 as the worst.

rise of insurgencies in the east and north – regions that were historically prone to insurgency. The relocation also had no proven positive impact on the provision of public goods and services and corruption has increased; a situation attributable to a lack of political will. To conclude, the relocation had not had a distinct negative impact on the political security; yet, it is difficult to conclusively assess the extent to which the security of regime and the legitimacy of the central government were strengthened in light of the security shortcomings post-relocation.

### **3.2 Military security**

Concerning its geostrategic location, Nigeria is situated in a region of major significance. The oil production and reserves in the Nigerian Delta makes the country the sixth largest oil exporter in the world, covering almost 5 per cent of the international market. Furthermore, Nigeria has access to the Gulf of Guinea in the south, which is an important maritime export route for oil from West and Southern Africa.

In terms of relative power and considering intra-regional involvement, Nigeria is a regional power of West Africa and the African continent and an emerging middle power in international affairs. No other state in West Africa matches Nigeria in terms of military capabilities, military equipment, size of the armed forces and military budget (Alli 2012: 15). Nevertheless, the Nigerian military expenditure is steadily rising – both in financial terms and as a percentage of overall government expenditure – peaking at N429 billion in 2016 (Federal Government of Nigeria 2016). The increase in military spending is the result of a growing list of internal security threats and cannot directly be linked to capital city relocation. It suffices to conclude, therefore, that relocation as such did not lead to a noticeable increase in military expenditure.

Regarding its external relations, Nigeria maintains good relations with neighbouring states although there are a number of on-going but minor border disputes with Cameroon, Chad and Benin. With regard to Cameroon, Nigeria used military force in 1993 to occupy the Bakassi Peninsula; a conflict later resolved by the International Court of Justice (Shelley 2013: 342). Nigeria maintains close inter- and intra-governmental relations with other members of ECOWAS, also at the military level. It actively contributes to and participates in multilateral peace missions in the region and on the continent. This includes a 70 per cent troop provision and an 80 per cent funding contribution to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Abubakar 2009:

195). There is currently no immediate or direct external military threat to Nigeria, also considering that the Global Conflict Risk Index<sup>8</sup> (2016) deems a regional war between ECOWAS members and Nigeria very unlikely. The main threats and manifestations of conflict are internal, posed by the Boko Haram terrorist activities, secessionist movements in the east, and the increase of piracy in the Delta and the Gulf of Guinea (Udo 2014). Since these situations require a coercive armed response, the Nigerian military is deployed in and actively involved in all of these unstable areas.

Abuja is not immune to or unaffected by these internal developments. On the negative side, the relocation of the capital city did not prevent the fall of the Third Republic due to the 1993 military coup. Furthermore, Abuja is located much closer to the centre of Islamic insurgency in the North of Nigeria, as opposed to Lagos, which creates additional security risks for the capital city. Since the onset of counter-terrorist operations in the North in 2010, nine successful terrorist attacks were carried out in the capital city (Onuoha & George 2016: 212). On the positive side and although piracy constitutes a security threat to Nigeria, Abuja is remote from and not directly affected by the Delta instability and Gulf piracy. The relocation in fact removed this threat to the capital city. Piracy was identified as a security risk to Lagos prior to relocation and even though the Gulf of Aden had surpassed the Gulf of Guinea in terms of reported piracy attacks per year by 2015 (Osinowo 2015: 1), it remains a threat that undermines the security of the city (Fiorelli 2014: 5; Murphy 2009: 113-114). Hence piracy would have constituted a more direct security threat had Lagos remained the capital. The relative insular location of the relocated capital provides it a measure of security. Inversely, the relocation did not directly contribute to and is at present not an immediate source of military insecurity.

Overall it is evident, also due to the fact that relocation was not driven by considerations of military security as such, that the capital city relocation to Abuja did not in a negative sense directly impact on the national security of Nigeria or create a particular type of military insecurity. It rather removed the threat of piracy to capital security. The current security risks due to internal instability, terrorism in particular, are not Abuja-specific but are intrinsic to being a capital city (evidenced, for example, by attacks on Washington, London, Paris, Madrid and Moscow). The relocation did

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<sup>8</sup> The Global Conflict Risk Index predicts the risk of a new conflict emerging in the next 1-4 years, based on a set of five data clusters, namely the political, social, economic, geographical/environmental and security dimensions.




not change the Nigerian military sector and the relocation-related indicators point to both a positive and a negative impact with an inclination towards the former.

### **3.3 Societal security**

The societal location of Abuja is significant considering that the Federal Republic of Nigeria is among the most populous countries in the world, home to more than 170 million people (World Bank 2016d). Furthermore, Nigeria is one of the most ethnically heterogeneous countries in the world (see Map 1). The 1991 capital city relocation from the predominantly Christian Yoruba stronghold of Lagos to the neutral territory of Abuja that is mainly inhabited by minority Muslim ethnic groups, has received a mixed public response. This societal location of the capital informs its societal representation, the two indicators becoming virtually indistinguishable.

On the one hand, akin to Ottawa (Canada) and Canberra (Australia), geographical centrality and political neutrality of the location of Abuja reflect the national aspiration for unity, pride and accomplishment (LeVan & Olubowale 2014: 387). Since the city is located in the geographical centre of Nigeria, its social location is equally removed from the strongholds of the three main ethnic groups. On the other hand, capital city relocation in Nigeria has to be understood in terms of the historical competition between the ethnic groups in the country. Upon relocation, Abuja was perceived as the ‘Northern’ and ‘Islamic’ city located within the Northern territory, with the process of relocation perceived to be an attempt to strengthen the Northern control over the country and to weaken Southern political aspirations. At the time the majority of the population professed Islam, including the ministers of the FCT and other public officials (Adebanwi 2012: 96-97). Thus, the bureaucratic institutions within the capital city did not fully represent societal diversity. Apart from the historical demographics of the FCT, this can also be attributed to the authoritarian regime of Babangida who oversaw the relocation and was notoriously biased towards the Northern region and Islam. Irrespective, the project has never been popular with the Christian sector, which considered the relocation to be part of the ‘Islamisation’ of Nigeria (Rossman 2013: 110). Although the controversy over Abuja has subsided, the city is yet to attain its goal of becoming a neutral point of social conjugation (Ikoku 2004: 37). It is also not fully representative of the societal diversity of Nigeria, the Northern ethnic characteristics prevailing.

**Map 1: Ethnic and religious distribution in Nigeria**



(Atlas of Nigeria in Ikoku 2004: 36).

The relocation did produce a measure of societal change, especially in respect of internal migration. Historically, the migration routes in Nigeria ran from the poorer North to the richer South – specifically towards the former capital, Lagos. The reason for this was predominantly economic: people were moving from poor and underdeveloped parts of Nigeria towards areas that presented (or were perceived to present) more economic opportunities (McCain 1972: 213-214).

**Table 4: Sense of community belonging across Nigeria**

Geo-political Zone	Assessment of Life satisfaction: Sense of Community Belonging				
	Sex of respondent		Place of residence		Total
	Male	Female	Urban	Rural	
North-Central	45.4	54.6	54.6	45.4	70.5
North-East	58.3	41.7	37.8	62.2	63.5
North-West	78.8	21.2	51.5	48.5	82.5
South-East	55.1	44.9	51.2	48.8	63.5
South-South	53.4	46.6	56.5	43.5	80.5
South-West	51.6	48.4	54.2	45.8	76.5
FCT	60.7	39.3	51.7	48.3	44.5
National Average	57.6	42.4	51.1	48.9	68.8

(UNDP 2016: 81).

The 2014 study by the World Bank indicated that 83 per cent of the migration is rural to urban, along with the movement from the (predominantly rural) North to the (more urbanised) South (McKay & Deshingkar 2014: 11-12). Although not neutralising or reversing these patterns, the relocation did redirect part of the flow towards Abuja, which had become a major centre for migration since it provided sufficient economic, financial and security opportunities (Bloch *et al* 2015: 28). The city is currently growing at a rate of 6 per cent *per annum* and is among the fastest growing cities of Africa (World Economic Forum 2016). However, the impact of migration on security has to be understood in the context of its economic and environmental impact. According to the UNDP report (2016: 75-78) Abuja is incapable of accommodating migrants and ill-planned to provide sufficient housing opportunities. In the context of human security concerns related to scarcity of resources, migration to Abuja leads to increased intra-ethnic tension, crime and violence. Furthermore, the inability of Abuja (as the FCT) to accommodate new migrants corresponds with increasing resource scarcity and competition, which suppressed significant increases in community belonging (see Table 4). What is significant is that urbanisation is accompanied by a higher than average sense of community, particularly amongst males but remarkably less so amongst women (UNDP 2016: 81). Although Abuja has gradually been transformed into a more cosmopolitan city, the ethnic and religious tensions remain and the government was not able to create or enforce the shared ‘Nigerian’ image (Fawole & Bello 2011: 216-217).

Overall, and even though societal considerations featured prominently as reasons, the impact of relocation on societal security is mixed. On the one hand, the capital city is located on neutral territory and its status as the national capital is not contested. From a societal point of view, the capital issue is no longer a source of conflict. On the other hand, the relocation neither removed the ethnic and religious issues from the political life of Nigeria, nor significantly reduced their conflict-inducing impact. Although the relocation created additional migration patterns, changing the societal sector to some extent, it did not reverse historical trends. Similar to Lagos, Abuja failed to integrate all the migrants, which intensifies social conflict. To conclude, ethnic and religious tensions continue to undermine the national security of Nigeria. Although not determinative, the societal indicators had a more noticeable and significant impact than those of most other sectors.


### **3.4 Economic security**

In respect of the Nigerian economic map and the position of the relocated capital to existing economic centres, it suffices to state that the economic location of Abuja – very similar to its political and social location – was not one of centrality to the extent of representing a core of the broader economic structure. Concerning economic conditions, Nigeria has a middle-income economy. The distribution of economic activity is not homogenous, with the South known for the oil and gas industry. The manufacturing sector and industrial production are predominantly located in the west of the country and the north is primarily agricultural. Although, as indicated, the Nigerian economy is currently the largest in Africa, the country lies in position 119 in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) *per capita* (World Bank 2016b). Recent data supports this poor showing and indicates a significant increase in below subsistence poverty levels from approximately 17 million people in 1980 to approximately 112 million in 2010. Almost 70 per cent of the population of Nigeria live below the poverty line and 55,6 per cent of Abuja’s inhabitants live in a state of absolute poverty (FRN National Bureau of Statistics 2010: 11, 23 & 26). A distinction can be made between the north and the south of the country, with the north being more impoverished (Nigerian Insight 2014). The poverty percentage is also higher for rural than urban areas (Rural Poverty Portal 2016).

Economic considerations, although not ignored, were neither prominent nor determinative in the Nigerian relocation debate, even though it is in principle accepted that relocation contributes to economic development, with poverty alleviation being a primary indicator of success. Irrespective

of not being at the center of the economic map and not being the main reason for relocation, the move to Abuja (along with societal change in migratory patterns) did produce some economic change. Since the capital relocation in 1991, Abuja has become an important economic centre of Nigeria with a GDP (2016) of approximately \$11 billion or \$2 500 *per capita* (JLL 2016: 5). In 25 years, Abuja has become the second most populous and the second most prosperous city in

**Map 2: Relative poverty across Nigeria, 2010**



(National Bureau of Statistics 2010: 24)<sup>9</sup>

Nigeria. Nevertheless, Lagos is still the centre of economic activity, responsible for 65 per cent of all economic activity in Nigeria and 20-25 per cent of the GDP (FRN Government of Nigeria 2016a; FRN Lagos State 2016b). Approximately 70 per cent of all companies were located in the South prior to capital city relocation, a trend that continues to this day, with the North of Nigeria lagging

<sup>9</sup> The lightness or darkness of the green colour correlate with the proportion of the population that is considered relatively poor.

behind in terms of economic development (Hamalai 1994; Mustapha 2007: 4). The reason is the lack of the required financial and physical infrastructure in the North (Adamu 2003).

In terms of its overall impact on economic security, also considering that although change was anticipated economic considerations were secondary, the relocation of the capital city has not had a major impact on development, inequality and poverty across Nigeria (see Map 2). This is not to say that the FCT and its immediate surroundings did not benefit, as has been indicated. The relocation as such was also not a major cause of human insecurity at an economic level. Overall, the relocation had a positive security impact, albeit limited. The Northern states, on average, remain disproportionately poor compared to the Southern states. This situation existed prior to decolonisation and capital city relocation has neither affected the equitability of development across Nigeria, nor helped to address the lack of infrastructure in the north. The impact of relocation on the economic security of Nigeria is mixed. Although contributing to development, especially closer to the North, poverty and economic inequality – in part due to economic growth in the FCT, remains a human security concern that has a detrimental effect on national security.

### **3.5 Environmental security**

The environmental location of Abuja, as far as could be ascertained, was not in an ecologically sensitive area and specific environmental vulnerabilities were not apparent. Apart from initially involving a small town in a remote rural area, also seen to provide opportunity for the creation of a new capital considering that the overpopulation of Lagos was a reason for capital city relocation. The decision to relocate was not informed by ‘green’ or environmental considerations. The reasons for relocation lay beyond the environment and the choice of a location was mainly informed by geographical centrality and political considerations. The impact on environment resided more in the domain of environmental change.

Throughout the primacy of Abuja as Nigerian capital, the city experienced significant growth in area and inhabitants, becoming the fastest growing city in Africa (Myers 2011: 8). However, the government was not sufficiently prepared to face the challenge of the growing population and, as a result, at least 65 informal settlements sprung up around the new city (COHRE/SERAC 2008: 22). The dwellers of the informal settlements constitute the majority of inhabitants, correlating with the fact that the standard of living of the majority of Abuja’s inhabitants is below the poverty

level (Onuba 2012). According to the latest statistical data, 32,5 per cent of Abuja's inhabitant struggle with access to food (FRN National Bureau of Statistics 2010: 23) while the city also suffers from water and power scarcity, and inadequate provision of sanitation (Abubakar 2014; Amba 2010). The capital city relocation did not address the human congestion problem in Lagos and has replicated the problem in Abuja.

The environmental concerns overlapped with and both impacted on and were affected by socio-economic security concerns. In particular, the core of this dynamic had to do with the relationship between land and people. As such the sectoral boundaries and separation are difficult to sustain, human security being the common denominator. Although the initial plan for the new capital in Abuja stressed the availability of land, displaced inhabitants were not appropriately compensated (Abubakar 2014). Some local communities were relocated to a satellite town, yet this town lacked basic infrastructure and was ill-planned and ill-managed by the government (COHRE/SERAC 2008: 50). The evictions were also handled by local tribal chiefs, which led to accusations of ethnic favouritism, corruption and the acceptance of bribes (COHRE/SERAC 2008: 42-46). Forced eviction also affected the informal settlements, affecting a minimum of 800 000 people (COHRE/SERAC 2008: 10). The manner in which the government addressed the issue of informal settlements, which also contributed to environmental degradation, gives little regard to human security and human rights of the people relocated (Amba 2010: 157-159).

Apart from the availability of territory, the issue of land for settlement and degradation commonly associated with urbanisation, the environmental indicators did not feature prominently and their impact was indirect in terms of human security rather than environmental security as such. Overall, the Southeast remains the most secure in terms of human security while the Northeast and the Northwest are the least secure. The Human Security Index rates FCT (Abuja) as having the lowest level of human security in Nigeria (UNDP 2016: 101-105, 117). Capital city relocation was neither successful in addressing the human security issue in Lagos, nor was it successful in addressing the human insecurity issue across Nigeria including Abuja. The Abuja project itself created insecurity for both the former local population – by forcefully evicting people with inadequate compensation along with allegations of ethnic bias – and the migratory workers who were not integrated into the city.

#### 4. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the impact of capital city relocation on the national security of Nigeria. The first part of the chapter created a context for capital city relocation and described the main vulnerabilities that existed in Nigeria. These vulnerabilities were juxtaposed against declared reasons and justifications in the public domain for or against the relocation project prior to the actual relocation. The chapter proceeded to analyse the impact of capital city relocation on national security in terms of the five sectors, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental. The findings revolve around the contrast between declared goals, perceived vulnerabilities and actual outcomes of capital city relocation.

It is evident that many of the state- and nation-related problems in Nigeria originated during the time of the colonial rule and stem from the unification of two culturally, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous colonial territories. The unification itself was for the administrative convenience of the Colonial Office, with little regard for the future of the new state. The colonial policies favoured Lagos elites over other ethnic groups, solidifying the notion of ethnic identity and tying it to politics. The outcome was a system of political parties was based on ethnicity. This was worsened by the absence of a dominant ethnic group in Nigeria. As a result, upon independence, Nigeria inherited a dysfunctional ethno-centric political system, where political parties and regime elites (including the rulers, the government and the military) were preoccupied with the narrow interests of their ethnic group rather than the nation as a whole.

The independent Nigeria opted for a federal form of state that was supposed to accommodate diversity but instead led to ethnic and religious violence, a civil war and nearly three decades of military rule. A number of vulnerabilities existed, contributing to the insecurity in Nigeria, namely a lack of social cohesion and unity, the weakness of state institutions, underdevelopment and a scarcity of resources, poverty and corruption. Recognising these problems, various rulers addressed these vulnerabilities with capital city relocation being one solution. Relocation was expected to increase political security and national cohesion, create a new image of national unity, remove the ethnic question from politics, and address the congestion and overpopulation problem in Lagos.

Based on the analysis of the Nigerian case study, it is concluded that capital city relocation had a mixed impact on national security. While relocation did not have a clear negative impact on four



of the five security sectors, most security objectives of capital city relocation were not achieved and old vulnerabilities remained unresolved. Firstly, although the initial reaction was mixed, Abuja managed to establish itself as an ethnically neutral capital city and was accepted as such. This was a positive development since Lagos was seen as first and foremost a Yoruba-city. The relocation did neither prevent the 1993 military coup, nor increase the legitimacy of the government, or subdued rebel and secessionist movements in the East and an armed insurgency in the North. The proximity of Abuja to the hotbed of instability in the North also had a negative impact on the security of the government, with terrorist attacks perpetrated in the city. Secondly, the overall impact on military security was also positive. Albeit interstate war in the region is unlikely, Nigeria lacks the naval capabilities to defend Lagos and the growing piracy problem in the Gulf. Abuja is equally distant from all parts of the country, providing a military and strategic advantage in case of war. Thirdly, the impact on societal security is also mixed. National cohesion was among the chief reasons for capital city relocation, but the levels of ethnic and religious violence have not decreased since the completion of the move. The migratory pattern that developed was inextricably linked to economic and environmental dynamics. Abuja is incapable of absorbing all the migrants and too ill-planned to provide sufficient housing. This enhanced intra-ethnic tension, crime, violence and a decreased sense of belonging. Fourthly, capital city relocation had a negative impact on economic security, given the context of expected growth and development outcomes, the amount of spent money and actual results. Furthermore, the example of Nigeria indicates that capital city relocation had a negligible impact on inequality and poverty reduction. Finally, the relocation did not resolve the congestion problem in Lagos. Although based on the availability of land, the government violated human rights and undermined human security in their interaction with indigenous population and informal settlements.

Overall, capital city relocation to Abuja did not have a significant positive impact on the national security of Nigeria, failing to address pressing vulnerabilities that undermined human security, considering the financial burden it placed on the country. The negative outcomes were also limited. Although not seriously compromising or eroding the national security of the country, the below expected and sub-optimal outcomes within each security sectors made no substantive contribution to the national and human security of the country. Attention forthwith turns to capital city relocation in Kazakhstan, an unlike case in some respects if compared to Nigeria.

## CHAPTER 4

### CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

#### 1. Introduction

Astana is the capital city and seat of government of the Republic of Kazakhstan since 1997. Interestingly, the name ‘Astana’, if translated from Kazakh, literally means ‘the capital’. The city is also unique since similar to Abuja it was for the most constructed from scratch to now house almost a million people (Kazinform 2015). This similarity of the two relocation projects, the fact that both states are *de facto* post-colonial (although Kazakhstan not in the Western-centric context) and their respective African and Eurasian locations, provide scope for comparison. Similar to the previous case study, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides an historical account of the relocation to Astana and contextualises the subsequent analysis. Section two employs the analytical framework (see Chapter 2) to determine the sector-based national security impact of relocation. The third section is a concluding summary of key findings.

#### 2. The historical context of capital city relocation in Kazakhstan


As a phenomenon related to state- and nation- building, capital city relocation has to be understood in the historical context of the particular state. Certain underlying conditions have to exist for policymakers and the public to consider capital city relocation. Consequently, a discussion of the security impact of capital city relocation is incomplete without understanding the motives, the context and the expectations related to the project. Therefore, the first part of this section provides an overview of the history of Kazakhstan with particular reference to the theme of capital cities. The second part contextualises the discussion with regard to existing security vulnerabilities that have either affected or may affect national security. The third and final part provides a brief overview of the debate on capital city relocation in Kazakhstan, to identify the overt and covert expectations that existed with regard to the project.

##### 2.1 Capital cities in the establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The Republic of Kazakhstan is located in the middle of Eurasia and is the ninth largest country in the world. The total population of the state is approximately 17,5 million people, with Kazakhs

and Russians being the two largest ethnic groups. The state shares border with the Russian Federation in the north and People’s Republic of China in the east, as well as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the south. Kazakhstan is an upper-middle income country, with a GDP of \$184 billion (CIA Factbook 2016; World Bank 2016c). About 70 per cent of the population profess Islam, with Christians (26%) being the second largest religious group in the country (Republic of Kazakhstan 2011: 24).

**Map 3: The settings of Kazakh clans**



(BRIF 1999)<sup>10</sup>

The history of the Kazakh state can be traced back to the collapse of the Golden Horde in the fifteenth century and the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate (XV-1847). The establishment of the state coincided with the appearance of the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’, describing the ethnic group that occupied this land (Ayagan 2015: 9). At its core, the state was comprised of nomadic tribes with

<sup>10</sup> ‘Small Zhuz’ denotes Junior Zhuz and ‘Great Zhuz’ denotes Senior Zhuz.

loose administrative and territorial boundaries. The Khanate consolidated three tribal groups under its banner, namely the Senior Zhuz, the Middle Zhuz and the Junior Zhuz – a societal division that plays a role in the political and social life of Kazakhstan to this day. In historical terms, each Zhuz can be understood as a tribal alliance of particular Kazakh clans, occupying a specific historical territory (see Map 3) (Laumulin 2016: 16-21). This specific tribal alliance system emerged around the seventeenth century as an administrative tool for territorial control. However, this socio-administrative arrangement has instead created a dysfunctional political system that weakened the unity of the state (Abzhanov 2015: 43-44). The loose hierarchy of the tribal administrative system created division and conflict, as the groups started to compete with one another for political control.

By the eighteenth century the Kazakh Khanate was weakened by internal conflicts. Pressured from the east by the Chinese Empire and from the south by nomadic tribes, the Kazakhs of the Younger (1731) and Middle Zhuz (1740) pleaded allegiance to the Russian Empire in exchange for security guarantees, while still retaining control over government functions (Bodger, 1980: 48). This development marked the beginning of the expansion of the Russian Imperial influence and the extension of its sphere of influence over the Kazakh nation-state. An important development that happened around this time concerns the *en masse* Islamisation of Kazakhs by the Russian Empire. Catherine the Great, the Russian Empress (1762-1796), believed that Islamisation would change the nomadic lifestyle of the population and allow for better control over the territory. Therefore, considerable efforts were made to introduce and popularise the religion among the Kazakh tribes (Laumulin 2016: 106). Another important aspect concerns the relationship between the Russian Empire and the Kazakhs. Although the Khans of the three Zhuz eventually recognised Russian authority over their territory, many families who had lost their land as a result of Russian expansion resisted the alliance (Laumulin 2016: 119). The chaos and violence that ensued undermined the Russian trade expansion strategy into the Central Asian region and threatened existing trade routes. As a result, to strengthen its rule, the Russian Empire has formally abolished Khanate rule in the Junior and Middle Zhuz by 1824, establishing direct control over the territory (Akiner 1995: 20-21; Olcott 1995: 44-53). The Senior Zhuz had closer ties with the Chinese Empire and managed to retain independence from the Russian Empire for another 20 years. Nevertheless, by 1847 Russia had established a complete control over what was formerly known as the Kazakh Khanate, which formally marks the end of the independent Kazakh state.

The Russian ‘Kazakh’ policy between 1700 and 1914 went through three main phases: the establishment of borders; the suppression and conquest of the territory; and administrative and economic colonisation. Regarding the latter, the 1889 decree by the Russian Empire aimed to encourage Russian peasants to immigrate to Kazakhstan to establish farmsteads, as a strategy for ‘russifyng’ the territory (Laumulin 2016: 126). The policy of populating pasturelands that interfered with the nomad routes of Russian peasants, the despotism of the Russian Colonial administration and the repressions carried out by the Russian military created a situation of ubiquitously concealed discontent, which gradually transformed into a state of permanent rebellion (Akiner 1995: 21-23; Olcott 1995: 83-89). The tension climaxed in the nationwide uprising of 1916 which coincided with the beginning of the Russian Revolution, and culminated in a short-lived independence of the Kazakh nation-state from 1917 to 1920.

In 1920 Kazakhstan became part of the Soviet Union (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics – USSR): first as the Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (1920-1925); then as the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (1925-1936) as part of the Russian Federal Socialist Soviet Republic (RFSSR); and finally, as the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (1936-1991). The early years of Soviet governance were directed at state- and nation- building in line with the communist ideology, and the greater ‘soviet’ vision. Soviet administrations across the state attempted to destroy the existent economic, societal and political structures, and substitute local ethnic identities with an overarching ‘soviet’ identity. In practical terms, the strategy took the form of mass executions, forceful nationalisation, mass imprisonments and forceful resettlements.

The first wave of anti-Kazakh repressions occurred in the 1920s at the time when the Soviet Union denied the existence of the Kazakh ethnic group<sup>11</sup>. The exact number of victims is unknown, but the approximate figure fluctuates between 850 000 and 1,5 million people. The second wave of repressions came in the 1931-1934 period, with approximately 1,5-2 million people dying from artificially created poverty and hunger. To put these figures into perspective, only about 6 million people lived in Kazakhstan in the early 1920s (Kydyralina 2013: 2-3; Zhumasultanova 1999: 18). The repression of the 1920s and the 1930s had a long-lasting negative impact on the Kazakh population, further aggravated by the various forceful resettlement programs executed by the

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<sup>11</sup> Kazakhstan was called the ‘Kyrgyz ASSR’, while Kyrgyzstan itself (nation-state of the Kyrgyz ethnic group) was part of the Turkestan ASSR.

USSR in the late 1930s and early 1950s. The period saw forceful evictions of hundreds of thousands of people who disliked the Bolshevik regime in other regions and who were relocated to Kazakhstan, with 21 GULAG labour camps operating in the country. Others were evicted to Kazakhstan as part of the ethnic-relocation programs aimed at diluting ethnically homogenous nations in Ukraine and the Baltic states (Kropachev 2010: 312-317; Zhumasultanova 1999: 19-21). Furthermore, the Soviet government executed the Virgin Lands Campaign in 1955 – as part of the vast agricultural reform program (1955-1965) – that addressed food shortages by cultivating unused land resources in Kazakhstan, the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. The program oversaw the further relocation of people, mostly Ukrainians and Russians, into the outlying territories (Esimova 2013: 1-5; Nursultan 2007: 85-90). As a result of these repressions and the influx of people from other regions, the Kazakhs population living in KazSSR dropped significantly from 57.1 per cent in 1926, to 38 per cent in 1939, and to 30 per cent in 1959 (Republic of Kazakhstan 2016: 8). Kazakhs remained a minority in their own state until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Another important aspect of the Soviet state-building in Kazakhstan concerns the capital city question. In his book, *At the Heart of Eurasia*, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev (2010) provides a detailed account of capital city relocations in Kazakhstan. Initially, the capital city of the Kazakh Khanate was located in Turkestan – an ancient city in the south of Kazakhstan. After the Soviet Union took control over the territory, Kyrgyz ASSR was governed from the Russian city of Orenburg, located on the border with Kazakhstan. The location of the capital city in Orenburg had an important historical reference, as, before the revolution, the city was the centre of Russian colonial administration over the Kazakh territory. Nevertheless, when Kyrgyz ASSR became part of the RFSSR as an autonomous republic, the capital city was relocated to Kyzylorda – an old Russian fort in the south of Kazakhstan. The move was dictated by administrative necessity, related to the changed status of the republic, since Orenburg was too removed from the rest of territory. Finally, administrative functions were relocated once again in 1929 to Almaty, which remained the capital of the KazSSR until the collapse of the USSR. Akin to Kyzylorda, Almaty was initially used as a military fortification by the Russian Empire, located in a mountainous region on a border with Kyrgyzstan. Also the city historically had a large Russian population (73% in 1959). Once again, reasons for the relocation were related to administrative convenience – the newly created Turkestan-Siberian Railway passed through the city – as well as

to difficult climate and economic conditions in Kyzylorda that undermined the future growth of the city.

## **2.2 Sources of conflict and instability in the Republic of Kazakhstan**

On 24 April 1990, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, was elected by the Supreme Council of the Kazakh SSR to be the first President of the Republic. Thereafter, following the events of 8 December that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan became an independent state on the 16 December 1991. Amid nation-wide celebrations, Kazakhstan inherited a number of acute social, economic and political problems, akin to other postcolonial states.

Upon independence, the 17 million population consisted of 40 nationalities of which more than 43 per cent were Russian and Ukrainian and only about 40 per cent were Kazakh (Zelenkov 2006: 182). In Almaty, in 1989, 57 per cent of the inhabitants were ethnic Russians and 24 per cent Kazakhs (Sadovskaya 2001: 42-48). This is significant considering the historical division between the industrial North and the agrarian South. The North historically had a high population of ethnic Russians (up to 70% of the local population) while the South was predominantly Kazakh (55-80% of the local population). These ethnic imbalances produced three problems.

Firstly, the Republic of Kazakhstan was the first Kazakh state. Although historians trace the Kazakh nationhood to the emergence of the Kazakh Khanate, the latter lacked many characteristics of the ‘classical Westphalian’ state due to the nomadic lifestyle of the people at the time (Rossman 2013: 199). Therefore, Kazakhs lacked the legacy of statehood in the pre-Soviet and colonial (i.e. Russian imperial and Soviet Union) contexts.

Secondly, at the face of the ethnic division there was a clash between the overarching and inclusive ‘soviet’ Kazakh identity and the ‘new’ Kazakh identity based on the historical ethnic group. This division created tensions among other ethnic groups, especially ethnic Russians, and prompting many to adopt other ethnic identities in line with their heritage. This posed security risks for Kazakhstan. A number of ‘frozen conflicts’ across the former Soviet Union re-emerged after its collapse, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Armenia/Azerbaijan), the Transnistrian secession in Moldova, and the violent rebellion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (against Georgia). Russia played an active role in each of these conflicts, supporting what was considered ‘pro-

Russian' forces (Hill & Jewett 1994). The concerns were not groundless as there was (and still is) an idea within the region and in Russia that the Kazakh North is historically a Russian territory. Various pro-Russian interest groups also raised the possibility of receiving autonomy within Kazakhstan (Zelenkov 2006: 163; Zolotuhin 2008: 172-177). A security concern therefore emerges about the proximity of the ethnically Russian North to the Russian border and the ethnic homogeneity of the region.

Thirdly, aside from the inter-ethnic conflict, Kazakhstan also witnessed sub-ethnic rivalry between the different tribe members of the Zhuz. This was particularly evident in Western Kazakhstan, the Junior Zhuz territory. The region is rich in minerals (especially oil and gas) and historically against central rule by other sub-ethnic groups (Zelenkov 2006: 139). Similarly, under conditions of poverty in Northern Kazakhstan, there is a risk that members of the Middle Zhuz support the regional aspirations for autonomy or secession (Schatz 2013: 18).

Similar to many other post-colonial states, newly independent Kazakhstan was challenged by state- and nation-building problems with the potential to undermine the security and prosperity of the state. These originated in the underdeveloped state- and nation-building that were artificially accelerated and related colonial legacies. An example of the latter was the location of Almaty, the capital city at the time, which was remote from the rest of the country for the administrative convenience of the Soviet Union and inconvenient for the independent Kazakhstan. Against this background a decision was taken to relocate the capital city in 1994.

### **2.3 The pre-1994 debate on capital city relocation**

On the 6 July 1994, the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan adopted *Resolution № 106*, formally approving capital city relocation from Almaty to Akmola (renamed to Astana in 1998). Unlike many similar projects, the new capital city was not constructed anew, but rather relocated to the smaller, already existing city of Akmola. The city had a population of nearly 300 000 people in 1989, 54 per cent of which were ethnic Russians and almost 18 per cent Kazakh (Sadovskaya 2001: 46). The construction (of required buildings, infrastructure and facilities) took two years to complete and the new capital city officially received its status on 10 December 1997. The following discussion of capital city relocation serves two purposes: to outline the reasons for the project and indicate to what extent these coincide with existing vulnerabilities.



**(a) Political considerations:** The political considerations were of an overt and covert nature. The overt objective was nation-building by the government of Kazakhstan. To begin with, Almaty is located in a remote mountainous region in the far south of the country. Hence geographical limitations restricted access to the capital city and limited the space for the capital city to grow. Apart from being less remote and having the potential for spatial growth, it was also contended that Astana would serve three goals: to serve as a symbol of the new Kazakhstan and its transition from the (totalitarian) Soviet legacy to a new democratic state; to serve as a centre of unity being more accessible to the people; and to serve as a symbol of Kazakh ambitions in the region as the geopolitical capital of Eurasia and Central Asia (Nazarbaev 2010: 77). Overall, the capital city relocation was intended to create a sense of renewal, a new start for the nation.

The covert objectives are related to the complex ethnic composition of Kazakhstan and the remote location of Almaty. Rubcov (1998), based on media space, noted that many commentators believed that capital city relocation was aimed at strengthening the position of Senior Zhuz, thus countering the separatist sentiments of the Russian-speaking population of northern Kazakhstan. Relocation was intended to consolidate Kazakh control over the territory, and weaken Russia's influence over the region. It was also to counterbalance the political ambitions of other tribes (Kopbayeva 2013: 802-804). Schatz (2003: 15) furthermore suggests that the move was aimed at isolating the old Soviet elites by creating a new system of governance and a new seat of government.

**(b) Military considerations:** Among the official reasons for the relocation from Almaty to Astana was the proximity of the Chinese border. This issue stems from the historical conflict between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, which had resulted in several violent border confrontations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, uncertainty prevailed on future Chinese strategy in Central Asia (Rubcov 1998; Schatz 2003: 16). The proximity of China as such thus undermined military security. Similarly, the proximity of Russia and the Russian sphere of influence (also on historical and ethnic grounds) were causes of concern.

**(c) Societal considerations:** Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new rulers of Kazakhstan challenged the Russian colonial heritage and influence. The Kazakh nation-building policy since the independence manifested in many areas: from granting a special status to Kazakhs among the general population (as a titular nation), through limiting the use of the Russian language and establishing Kazakh as the official language, to addressing the Russification of economic,

political and administrative structures and society as a whole (Aleynikov 2014: 369-370). Capital city relocation was thus seen in the broader context of growing Kazakh nationalism and greater tribalism. Albeit not the official position, some commentators noted two covert reasons for relocation. Several authors (e.g. Krylov cited in Rubcov 1998; Masanov 1999: 6) suggested that to radically change the situation in Kazakhstan the ruling elite had to direct the flow of migrants from rural areas in Southern Kazakhstan to the north, to increase the Kazakh population in the northern regions. Furthermore, the ruling elite (most from Senior Zhuz) tried to weaken and undermine the influence of the Middle Zhuz by placing the new capital city in their territory.

**(d) Economic considerations:** The strategy of economic integration and balanced development of the country's economic space was a reason for relocation. This objective involved the development of the national economy and the corresponding increased integration and development of territories and their population (Rossman 2013: 229). The President himself noted that capital city relocation was a mobilising agent to direct Kazakhstan towards modernity and development, while also stimulating less developed regions (Nazarbaev 2010: 75, 79).

**(e) Environmental considerations:** Amongst the official reasons for relocation, environmental considerations were among the most important. Nazarbaev (2010: 73-75, 78) advanced relocation as a measure to 'reanimate' the capital city: the infrastructure of Almaty was no longer capable of handling urban growth due to the limited space available in the mountainous city. Kopbayeva (2013: 801-802) expands on this topic by outlining four issues that contributed to relocation: the seismic activity in the region of Almaty and the high possibility of a destructive earthquake; pollution and the accumulation of toxic emissions, also considering that the Almaty landscape prevented smog from dispersing; overpopulation; and harsh environmental and climatic conditions.

To conclude, the overt and covert motives behind capital city relocation were aligned with the real and perceived vulnerabilities of Kazakhstan. As a tool of state- and nation-building, the capital city relocation promoted the ethnic Kazakh aspirations. At the same time, the move was to strengthen the power of the Senior Zhuz, and neutralise secessionist and rebellious movements in the rest of the country – especially the North. Furthermore, the move was to address environmental problems in Almaty, and equalise economic development across the state. Given this context, attention turns to the national security impact of capital city relocation in Kazakhstan post-1994.

### **3. The post-1994 national security impact of capital city relocation in Kazakhstan**

The discussion of the history of the Republic of Kazakhstan brought forth the centrality of ethnic and sub-ethnic conflict in the establishment and development of the state and nation. Although Kazakhstan did not share the Western colonial past of Nigeria, it experienced *de facto* colonialism having been subjugated and ruled by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Irrespective of being a post-Soviet ‘Second World’ country (Nigeria being a former ‘Third World’ country), Kazakhstan is a *de facto* postcolonial state facing similar security challenges and vulnerabilities as other decolonised or postcolonial states. As pointed out, it is similarly also confronted with the challenges of state- and nation-building. Based on the application of the framework for analysis, the national security impact of capital city relocation in Kazakhstan is divided into five sections, namely political, military, societal, economic, and environmental security.

#### **3.1 Political security**

The geopolitical location of Kazakhstan is pivotal in the Eurasian context. It is located in Central Asia between two major powers, China and Russia, it also borders on Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and it is a littoral state on the Caspian Sea. This means that Kazakhstan plays an important geopolitical role in the region and in the wider Eurasian area. The relationship with regional partners are formalised through organisational structures. For one, Kazakhstan maintain close economic and diplomatic ties with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union – a regional organisation that was envisioned as the competitor and partner of the European Union. Kazakhstan is also a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – a regional organisation collaborating on matters of economic regional development, regional security and political cooperation. SCO represents Kazakhstan’s neighbouring states (excluding Turkmenistan), with a number of other Eurasian states having observer status. In this regional context Astana is also situated in a central location that allows greater access to neighbours and beyond than the insular although larger Almaty. Being a unitary republic, and federations, Kazakhstan’s form of state was not a relocation consideration. The dominant party regime and the entrenched position of the president in national politics contributed to centralised decision-making that neutralised dysfunctional public, political party, ethnic and institutional contestation, as was the case in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Initially Nazarbayev's decision to relocate the capital was not popular and there was noticeable internal opposition to his decision across the whole of Kazakhstan. Critics pointed out that the financial situation in the country during this period was unfavourable for a project of such scale and for many outside observers, including the Russian leadership, the motivation and reasons for capital city relocation was not entirely clear. Furthermore, some observers were sceptical about Astana's geographical position and related benefits (Rubcov 1998). For instance, Shashkova (cited in Rubcov 1998) noted that the decision (of Parliament) was not univocal, as almost half of the parliamentarians did not support the relocation (for financial reasons). Nevertheless, despite these concerns and the fact that the decision was extremely unpopular in the mid-1990s, the majority of the citizens of Kazakhstan came to support the project (Alimbekova 2008).


Another aim of Nazarbayev's administration was to create a loyalty system based on clan ties in the country, amongst others to marginalise the old elites. Relocation allowed Nazarbayev to rally the new elite, the political weight of which increased due to the country's openness to foreign investment and economic growth. According to Schatz (2003), the capital relocation allowed Nazarbaev to reorganise the ruling elites without recourse to violence. Moving the capital to the north also allowed the regime to create a strong alliance with the Middle Zhuz, the group with the closest ties to the ethnic Russians, also to neutralise the influence of the Junior Zhuz whose territory had the greatest deposits of natural resources in Kazakhstan. In addition, the move strengthened the power of the Senior Zhuz, Nazarbaev's tribal group (Masanov 1999). Upon relocation, many of the public workers who were relocated to Astana were also from the Senior Zhuz, securing the control over the city and the government at large. Members of the Senior Zhuz also led the major oil-producing corporations in the country (Rossman 2013: 196). Political, together with societal and economic consequences of the capital city relocation contributed to the unity of the political and economic elites in the country. These developments confirmed the position of the regime despite the initial lack of popular support for the relocation that undermined its legitimacy. Although not bringing about significant political and constitutional change, the relocation initiative strengthened the position of the political regime and did not fuel and sustain political discontent compromising the political security of Kazakhstan.

Considering that the ethnic question and the threat of secession were important motivations for capital city relocation – the argument being that the relocation to Astana would neutralise the

Russian-speaking population in northern Kazakhstan – this security aspect is central. The symbolic status of the capital and the increased migration of ethnic Kazakhs to Northern Kazakhstan reduced the likelihood of successful secessionism (Kopbayeva 2013: 802-804). This outcome enabled the state and government to significantly reduce the probability and the very real threat posed by the pro-Russian separatists to undermine the security situation.

Concerning government capacity and the provision of goods and services, Kazakhstan – akin to many post-Soviet (and postcolonial) states – suffered from pervasive corruption after independence. The situation is slow to change because many anti-corruption tools work only formally, with no political will to address the issue. Between the 1999 and 2011 (see Figure 1), the Corruption Perception Index fluctuated with little to no improvement in the situation (Satpaev 2013: 5). Although not an explicit reason for relocation and having an indirect impact difficult to assess, it is evident that relocation did not address or resolve the corruption problem in Kazakhstan. The capacity and service delivery impact of the move to Astana basically remained unchanged.

**Figure 1: The Corruption Perception Index of Kazakhstan, 1999-2011**



(Satpaev 2013: 5)

The overall impact of relocation on the political security of Kazakhstan, although not decisive, is fairly evident. Considering that political considerations were central to the decision to relocate, the impact thereof was predominantly political in nature without compromising political security. As such the relocation did not change the sector. It is noted that most political objectives were met by the capital city relocation, coinciding with the serious vulnerabilities pre-existing in the society. As such, Nazarbaev managed to secure his regime by relocating the capital city from the territory of his tribal group – the latter being a focus of criticism – to the Middle Zhuz. Capital city relocation also managed to neutralise the risk of a rebellion in the Northern Nigeria. However, capital city relocation had not had an impact on the levels of corruption in Kazakhstan. Where the impact spilled over into the security domain, it was marginally positive considering the already strong and unchallenged regime type ruling the unitary republic.

### **3.2 Military security**

The geostrategic location of Kazakhstan is enhanced by the fact that it is situated between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, two economic and military powerhouses, with further access to West Asia and the Caspian Sea. Although having a large territory and natural resources (oil and gas in particular), Kazakhstan is a small power in global terms. Although considerably weaker than its two neighbours in the north (Russia) and the east (China), Kazakhstan is a regional power – more specifically an emerging middle power of the region. The country is furthermore located in a predominantly peaceful region, with a low propensity for conflict and war (Global Conflict Risk Index 2016). This peacefulness in part explains the underdeveloped and underfunded armed forces of Kazakhstan. Although the government allocates 1,2 per cent of GDP annually to military spending, approximately \$2 billion per year, the equipment in use by the Kazakh military is out-dated and their overall quality is low (Atabaev 2014). There is no clear link between budget allocations and the capital city, hence a mutual impact is not confirmed.

Concerning international relations, Kazakhstan supports close external diplomatic and military ties with the two regional hegemon and neighbouring states through the SCO structures. There are also no serious territorial disputes that produce manifest inter-state conflict. The state of the overlooked Department of Defence confirms the stability of the internal security environment and the general absence of coercive internal threats. Coupled with the diminished threat from China, a factor that played a role in justifying the relocation, the project did not have a decisive impact on

the military security of Kazakhstan and did not change the military sector. This near negligible impact on military security corresponds with the fact that military considerations, apart from the proximity of China, did not feature prominently in respect of the reasons for relocation.

### 3.3 Societal security

As indicated with reference to the history of Kazakhstan and the centrality of its ethnic composition in the process of state-building, the societal location of Astana is a security indicator with a noticeable impact. Albeit that prior to independence Kazakhs comprised less than 40 per cent of the national population, this proportion had grown to 63 per cent by 2009 (Republic of Kazakhstan 2011: 20). The change occurred as a result of direct measures undertaken by the government with capital city relocation being one. These measures addressed ethnic imbalance across Kazakhstan by promoting the Kazakh language and traditions, often at the expense of other ethnic groups. For example, ethnic Kazakhs were given preference in public sphere employment and public workers had to have a command of the Kazakh language (Zolotuhin 2012). Ethnic Russians also left Kazakhstan since 1991, with 70-80 per cent of all emigrants from the country being ethnic Russians (Savin 2011: 86). The reasons for the Russian departure were socio-political and cultural, with many expressing grievances about the structure of the contemporary Kazakh state (Zolotuhin 2012). Apart from the Russian response, and as indicated in terms of political security, the public response to relocation – at first negative and then positive – were not ethnic but across the board.

Similar patterns were observed in Astana with Kazakhs becoming the majority group, confirming a capital city state correlation. The city experienced continuous population growth, mainly due to migration from the rural south to the north. Rapid urbanisation demanded a corresponding expansion in metropolitan services, resulting in the influx of professional and unskilled labour. The transfer successfully neutralised secessionist aspirations in the region by diluting and reversing the original population composition and changing its ethnic setup through migration (Asanbaev 2010: 32-34; Sadovskaya 2001: 42-48). By 2016 the number of residents in the capital exceeded 800 000, most of whom were from the titular nation. In contrast to 1989 when ethnic Kazakhs only made up 18 per cent of Astana's population, the 2016 proportion was 75 per cent (Republic of Kazakhstan 2016).

Capital city relocation has also had an impact on intra-ethnic relations amongst the Zhuz. The relocation strengthened the position of the Senior Zhuz *vis-à-vis* the other two due to the fact that

Astana was located in the Senior Zhuz and most civil servants and public were from this tribe. This fuelled the isolation, marginalisation and even exclusion of the other two Zhuz: the Middle Zhuz had a historical connection with Russia due to the proximity of the latter and the historical migration trends in the region; the Junior Zhuz is rich in resources and has always tended to resist authority. By relocating the capital city to Astana, the Senior Zhuz managed to create a partial inclusive system, while maintain control by occupying the key government positions (Rossman 2013: 196). In summary, the aforesaid indicators provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the capital city relocation to Astana produced significant social change, albeit not change that compromised or threatened the societal security of Kazakhstan.

Overall, addressing ethnic disparity was among the main achievements of capital city relocation. The project had strengthened the intra-ethnic unity within the state and removed ethnic disparity in the north. However, while the state security was strengthened, the security of ethnic minorities was undermined – especially that of Russian ethnic minorities. Although not constituting a societal security or national security threat, it is a vulnerability that poses a serious risk that can lead to future radicalisation and violence.

### **3.4 Economic security**

In terms of its economic location it suffices to state that Kazakhstan is an upper-middle income country with an annual GDP of \$184 billion (2015). In terms of its GDP (current US\$) it is the second largest economy in the former post-Soviet space (World Bank 2016a). Since independence Kazakhstan has made significant advances in poverty reduction (see Figure 2). Its GINI coefficient has improved dramatically from 0.366 in 2001 to 0.278 in 2010 (ADB 2012: 2).


The capital city relocation project initially came under severe criticism for financial reasons, with many questioning the benefits of relocation for the economy and development. According to official estimates the capital city transfer came at the cost of \$2 billion from the state budget, and a further \$2 billion from private funds by 1998. These figures were questioned, as private companies invested additional \$5 billion in the construction of government buildings at the latter stage (Rossman 2013: 324).

Nazarbaev nevertheless managed to present the new capital as a shopwindow to attract investments and to project a post-Soviet image of the state. In 2010 Nazarbaev (2010: 77-78) confirmed that



the relocation was part of his vision for the post-Soviet Kazakhstan and that the project was supposed to attract development and economic growth not only to the region, but the state itself. Since 1997, as a result of significant economic growth, Astana attracted mainly ethnic Kazakhs workers from the south, which helped address the ethnic imbalance in the north. A measure of beneficial economic change can therefore be attributed to the relocation.

**Figure 2: Poverty levels in Kazakhstan, 2006-2010**



(ADB 2012).

In terms of its overall economic security impact and although the cost of Astana’s redevelopment and construction as a capital city was high, relocation undeniably contributed to the economic development of the state. The new economic growth point provided jobs for the local population and the unemployed in the south, and attracted additional investment to the country. It has also created more stable growth, as Almaty suffered from severe space and growth limitations. Astana was also easier to access than Almaty. Although not dramatically, the capital city relocation had a predominantly positive impact on economic security and as such did not compromise or pose a serious risk to the national security of Kazakhstan.

### 3.5 Environmental security

Environmental considerations played a significant role in the capital city relocation decision. After the relocation, the environmental problems in Almaty worsened, also being the fastest growing city in Kazakhstan. Local authorities were unable to find long-term solutions for its toxic smog,

uncontrollable industrialisation and pollution problems, brought on and enhanced by its geographic location (Kazhydromet 2016; Dzhumambaev 2014: 8-9). Astana, apart from generic problems associated with rapid urbanisation, was not located in an extremely sensitive environmental location and has not had an environmental security threatening impact. Suffice it to conclude that although the relocation did not alleviate the Almaty environmental risks as anticipated, it did not compromise the environmental security of the new capital region or of Kazakhstan.

#### **4. Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the impact of capital city relocation on the national security of Kazakhstan. The chapter covered the centrality and role of different capital cities in the history of Kazakhstan state-building, and the considerations for and debate on capital city relocation. This was followed by the exploration and explanation of the national security impact of the relocation with reference to the five sectors, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental security.

On independence Kazakhstan suffered problems similar to most postcolonial states, although less chronic. In addition, in 1989 Kazakhs were not the majority ethnic group within the state. Decades of the forced repopulation of the Kazakh North and repressions of the indigenous population created an ethnic imbalance with Kazakhs a minority in some regions. To address these issues, as a conclusion of the state-building of Kazakhstan and as a commencement of post-Soviet nation-building, the Kazakh government embarked on the capital city relocation project. The project had overt and covert objectives. The overt objectives were to address the pending environmental disaster within the old capital; to reposition the capital to suit the political ambitions and the intended national image of the now independent Kazakhstan; and to balance economic development across the state. Covert reasons related to the need to address the ethnic disparity within Northern Kazakhstan; to address intra-ethnic conflicts between the three Zhuz; and to isolate former Soviet-era political elites.

Kazakhstan achieved the majority of these relocation-related objectives. To begin with, Nazarbaev succeeded in reversing the ethnic disparity by building the state and capital around the titular nation. The government was also successful in preventing ethnic conflict in the North, and to strengthen the intra-ethnic relations within the Kazakh tribes. Furthermore, Astana managed to

attract economic growth and development, beneficial to the whole state. Therefore, the relocation of the capital city from Almaty to Astana had a positive effect on the political, economic and societal security of the Kazakhstan. Not only were most initial relocation objectives completed, but the project also addressed some of the vulnerabilities that existed within the state. Irrespective of it being the subject of initial widespread criticism, Astana was eventually accepted as the national capital of the Kazakh state. There were, though, unintended negative consequences, the marginalisation of ethnic Russian communities and their grievances towards the titular nation being a case in point. Furthermore, the capital city relocation had no impact on and did not reverse the environmental condition of Almaty. In fact, the problems in the former capital prevailed and the environmental situation in fact deteriorated. The military security impact of the relocation, due to its lack of prominence and having been underplayed, is negligible.

Overall, the capital city relocation to Astana on balance had a positive impact on the national security of Kazakhstan albeit of a narrow and limited nature. It only partially addressed pressing ethnic and economic, along with a considerable financial burden on the country. The extent to which the national security impact of capital city relocation in Kazakhstan was different or similar to that in Nigeria – considering that in principle both were postcolonial countries, that the purpose of relocation was that of state-and/or nation-building and that there was an overlap of security considerations and vulnerabilities - is assessed in the concluding evaluative chapter.

## CHAPTER 5

### EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The aim of this study was to explore and explain the impact of capital city relocation on national security with reference to the selected examples of Nigeria (1991) and Kazakhstan (1997). From an analytical but also a comparative perspective this was done by linking the considerations, reasons and justification of capital city relocation and to indicators of national security national security impact. For analytical convenience, the study relied on Barry Buzan's five-sector division of national security. By analysing the consequences of capital city relocation in Nigeria and Kazakhstan on each these security sectors individually and collectively, the relationship between the two variables was explored in practice.

Accordingly – based on the problem statement that security and national security only appears in relocation discourses a one of several reasons for (or justifications of) relocation and not in terms of overall national security impact – the research question addressed was: *To what extent does the relocation of the capital cities impact (or not impact) on the national security of the states?* This was supported by three sub-questions: What is the rationale and corresponding benefits and disadvantages of capital city relocation? What constitutes (national) security and what is the link between capital city relocation and national security? Does state- or nation-building as underlying aims of capital city relocation lead to different processes and outcomes or not? In response, the argument statement was that capital city relocation – as tool of state- and nation-building – has an indirect rather than a direct impact on national security; it predominantly impacts on internal political, economic and social stability rather than countering a potential or perceived external (military) threat.

To the extent that this study was exploratory in nature, its first objective was theoretical in nature and entailed the development of a concept-based framework for analysis of the capital city relocation-national security nexus. As a point of departure, attention was given to scholarly contributions in academic literature that indicated a link between capital city relocation and state- and nation- building. More specifically the use of capital city relocation to reduce ethnic tensions, improve administrative efficiency and promote equity in socio-economic development across the state was indicated. In this respect, it was noted that capital city relocation could unite a nation,

create a new national identity and increase social cohesion. This policy option is most appealing to postcolonial states due to the many structural and systemic problems faced by these countries as a legacy of their history.

The link between capital city relocation and state- and nation- building extends to the concepts of security and national security, as state- and nation-building shortcomings are the main sources of instability and security vulnerability in most postcolonial states. Therefore, capital city relocation, if aimed at addressing the development state and disjointed nation issues, is bound to impact on national security. However, especially in the context of juxtaposing new security thinking with traditional security thinking, it was noted that the use of the state-centric and militaristic use of the concept national security with the reference to postcolonial states is problematic. This is because the state- and nation-building shortcomings within the state transcend these narrow security and national security conceptualisations by vertically deepening referent objects of security and horizontally broadening the scope and range of security issues.

To this end, the conceptualisation was adopted that national security refers to the security of the state, but understood as the sum of security conditions (and the vulnerabilities, risks threats) contained in the five security sectors of political, military, societal, economic and environmental security. Based on this understanding of security and national security, a framework of analysis for the capital city relocation-national security nexus was presented. The framework included a number of question-based indicators of national security impact within each security sector. Although not exhaustive, these indicators represented a point of conjunction between capital city relocation and national security.

The second objective of the study was practical in nature and involved the application of this framework to the cases of Nigeria (from Lagos to Abuja) and Kazakhstan (from Almaty to Astana), in order to explore and explain the relocation-security relationship. The framework was applied to assess the impact of capital city relocation on national security in two case studies. In Nigeria, most of the state- and nation-related problems originated during the time of British colonial rule, and stem from the unification of two culturally, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous colonial territories. The unification itself was conducted for the administrative convenience of the Colonial Office and in the interest of the British Empire, with little regard for the future of the dependency, also its future as an independent postcolonial state. The colonial policies favoured Lagos elites

over other ethnic groups, underlying the notion of ethnic identity, and tying ethnicity to politics. Thus, upon independence Nigeria inherited a dysfunctional ethno-centric political system where political parties and the ruling elites were preoccupied with the narrow interests of their ethnic group, rather than the nation as a whole.

As a result, Nigeria inherited a weak state, and a disjoint heterogeneous society, prone to conflict and violence. The federal form of state and related political system lacked stability. A number of vulnerabilities was identified that contributed to insecurity in Nigeria, namely a lack of social cohesion and unity, the weakness of state institutions, socio-economic underdevelopment and scarcity of resources, poverty and corruption. Recognising the problem, Murtala Mohammed attempted to address the issues with capital city relocation being part of the broader strategy. Capital city relocation was expected to increase political security and national cohesion, create a new image of national unity, remove the ethnic question from politics, and address congestion and overpopulation problem in Lagos. After the death of Mohammed, Ibrahim Babangida – who also felt insecure in Lagos after a failed military coup attempt in 1990 – oversaw the relocation that started in 1991. In general, it is concluded that the relocation to Abuja failed to have a noticeable positive impact on the national security of Nigeria, failed to address pressing security vulnerabilities, undermined human security of the majority of people living in Abuja, and has put a significant financial burden on Nigeria. While relocation did not have a well-defined negative impact on four of the five security sectors, most security objectives of capital city relocation were not achieved, and old vulnerabilities, risks and threats remained unresolved.

A different outcome was observed in Kazakhstan. Upon independence Kazakhstan suffered from the similar problems as other postcolonial states, albeit less chronic. To begin with, by 1989 Kazakhs were not the majority ethnic group within their own state. Furthermore, decades of forced repopulation of the Kazakh North and repressions of the local population created an imbalanced ethnic environment where Kazakhs were a minority within some regions of their own state. To address these issues, in conclusion of state-building but as part of subsequent nation-building, president Nursultan Nazarbaev embarked on the capital city relocation project with Astana as the designated location. There were overt and covert aims of the project. Overt objectives included the need to address the environmental disaster within the old capital of Almaty; to reposition the capital to better suit the political ambitions and the intended national image of the now independent

Kazakhstan; and to equalise economic development across the state. Covert reasons related to the need to address the ethnic disparity within Northern Kazakhstan; to address intra-ethnic conflicts between the three Zhuz; and to isolate old Soviet-era political elites.

Kazakhstan achieved most of these objectives. To begin with, Nazarbaev managed to reverse the ethnic disparity by building the state around the titular (Kazakh) nation. The government was also successful in preventing ethnic conflict in the North, as well as to strengthen the intra-ethnic relations within the Kazakh tribes. Furthermore, Astana managed to attract economic growth and development, beneficial to the whole Republic. According to the study's findings, the relocation of the capital city from Almaty to Astana had a general positive effect on the political, economic and societal security of Kazakhstan. Not only were most initial relocation objectives achieved, but the project also addressed some of the vulnerabilities that existed within the state. Although the relocation initially attracted widespread criticism, Astana was accepted as the national capital and symbol of the unity of the Kazakh state.

In conclusion, capital city relocation does influence the national security of the state, as evidenced by both examples. In the case of Kazakhstan, the effect was mainly positive and beneficial or, inversely, did not compromise national security by creating new vulnerabilities, risks and threats. However, it can also have no or little influence, along with the full cost of the relocation often not disclosed but guaranteed to be high. Although having some positive or beneficial outcomes, the Nigerian example is illustrative of sub-optimal goal and objective realisation even to the extent of producing new vulnerabilities, enhancing existing risks or having a negligible effect. Irrespective, it cannot in the case of Nigeria be concluded that capital city relocation is a source of insecurity that seriously compromises or threatens the national security of the state. The difference between the two cases can, amongst others, be attributed to the ruler and/or the government of the day. Both Nazarbaev and Mohammed introduced capital relocation as an instrument of change. Both also combined the relocation alternative with other policies aimed at state- and nation-building and at addressing pressing societal issues. However, whereas Nazarbaev was able to oversee the conclusion of the project and shape its design and execution in accordance with his vision, Mohammed was killed during the early stages of the project. The burden of completing fell on his successors who did not always share his vision, or who pursued and implemented it with a different intent. Olusegun Obasanjo, his close ally, continued the project before the transition to a democratic

government. Shagari was preoccupied with the political and intra-ethnic struggles that had a polarising effect. The project was eventually completed by Babangida, whose personal security became a major consideration and justification of the relocation, rather than the unity and coherent identity of the state. Therefore, the capital city relocation under the Babangida regime did not coincide with expected reforms and anticipated benefits.

In summary and as key findings, the capital city relocation in Kazakhstan addressed the existent problems at the state and nation levels, and therefore had an overall positive effect on the national security of the country or (inversely) did not compromise it. Capital city relocation in Nigeria failed to effectively address most state and nation deficiencies, and did not or only partially succeeded in achieving the planned objectives. As a result, its impact on national security was varied, ranging from a marginal positive impact (in the political sector) to a qualified failure (in the socio-economic sector) to the detriment of human security. Although no causal relationship can be verified, it is concluded that part of the explanation for this lie, amongst others, in the following: the British colonial legacy in Nigeria as apposed to the Russian imperial/Soviet ‘empire’ legacy in Kazakhstan; the nation-building focus in Nigeria as apposed to the state- and nation-building focus in Kazakhstan; the concern for regime security and successive regimes in Nigeria as apposed to the regime stability and regime longevity in Kazakhstan; the federal form of state of Nigeria as apposed to the unitary form of state of Kazakhstan; the complexity of the Nigerian situation as apposed to the less complex Kazakhstan case; the predominantly societal and economic (mainly human security) focus of relocation in Nigeria as apposed to the strong political and societal (mainly state security) emphasis in Kazakhstan; and the relative regional instability of Nigeria as opposed to the regional stability of Kazakhstan. This can explain the reason why capital city relocation in Nigeria had almost no impact on the national security. In both cases, however, it is apparent that capital city relocation was not an end in itself but a means to an end; that it was a supplementary and supportive policy instrument of state- and nation-building rather than a stand-alone solution to state and nation problems; that security considerations did not cumulatively provide the main reason for and justification of relocation; and that the overall national security impact is insufficiently explained in terms of traditional/ and old security thinking, having transcended the latter to reside in the domain of critical and new security thinking. Although exploratory in nature, the analytical framework has succeeded in bridging the capital city relocation-national security nexus and demonstrated a utility if applied to practical examples.



As the final research objective, these findings provide the basis for the following policy and research recommendations:

At a policy level:

- A capital city relocation project should include a national security assessment, albeit not to the extent of securitising it.
- The project should be based on a supportive security strategy that includes all sectors.
- The security dimensions of the project should be located in, be subordinate to and be supplementary in respect of an overarching policy framework that contributes to state- and nation-building and that focuses on vulnerabilities, risks and threats.
- The project should not be used as a tool to deal with military issues or situations.
- The project should not be regime specific or regime bound.

In respect of a future research agenda:

- Dedicated comparative studies should be undertaken of like and unlike cases.
- The framework for analysis should be extended to enable the explanation of causal relationship between key independent (e.g. form of state) and dependent (e.g. geographical location) variables.
- As part of the current South African capital city discourse, a national security assessment should be done.

In conclusion, the study – through selected examples – explored, described and explained the link and relationship between capital city relocation and national security. It suffices to conclude that the link between the two variables was proved to exist and that it can be accommodated in and demonstrated by the application of a framework for analysis. In response to the first sub-question – *What is the rationale and corresponding benefits and disadvantages of capital city relocation?* – the finding is that both reason and impact are multidimensional; and that the outcome, being case study specific, is a mix of sector-bound benefits and disadvantages. In response to the second sub-question – *What constitutes security, more specifically national security, and what is the link and relationship between capital city relocation and national security?* – the finding is that in the context of capital city relocation both security and national security undeniably covers the five sectors as indicated and that they transcend state-centric and military accounts; that there is no deterministic

relationship between relocation and national security, this relationship being case study specific; and that the relationship and therefore the impact is predominantly indirect rather than direct. In response to the third sub-question – *Does the underlying aim of capital city relocation, i.e. state- or nation-building respectively, lead to different security-related processes and outcomes or not?* – the finding is that differences were apparent in the nation-building focus of Nigeria and the state-building and supplementary nation-building focus of Kazakhstan, but that these differences were of a sectoral and not an overall nature. In respect of the main research question, as it applies to the case studies considered – *To what extent does the relocation of capital cities impact (or not impact) on the national security of the states?* – the finding is that capital city relocation – as a tool of state- and nation-building – has an indirect rather than a direct impact on national security. The argument statement is confirmed, namely that the impact is predominantly internal and beneficial to political, economic and social stability rather than in terms of countering a potential or perceived external (military) threat to state and regime. In contrast to a simple move of government departments or of the legislature, executive or judiciary from one city to another, which may at most have a limited national security impact, that of capital city relocation is substantive albeit complex, multidimensional and for the most indirect.

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## APPENDIX

### Relocated capital cities of the world

Country	Old capital city	New capital city	Year
Afghanistan	Kandahar	Kabul	1772
Albania	Durres	Tirana	1920
Argentina	Buenos Aires	Parana	1853
	Parana	Buenos Aires	1860
Australia	Melbourne	Canberra	1927
Belize	Belize	Belmopan	1972
Bermuda	St. George	Hamilton	1815
Bhutan	Punakha	Thimphu	1955-1962
Bolivia	Sucre	La Paz	1899
Botswana	Mafikeng (South Africa)	Gaborone	1965
Brazil	Salvador	Rio de Janeiro	1763
	Rio de Janeiro	Brasilia	1960
Cambodia	Angkor	Phnom Penh	1434
Canada	Kingston	Montreal	1844
	Montreal	Toronto	1849
	Toronto	Quebec	1859
	Quebec	Montreal	1859
	Montreal	Ottawa	1866
China	Anyang	Chang'an	1046 BCE
	Chang'an	Luoyang	772 BCE
	Luoyang	Xianyang	221 BCE
	Xianyang	Chang'an	206 BCE
	Chang'an	Luoyang	25 BCE
	Luoyang	Beginning 6th dynasty No capital	220
	-	Nanking	317-582
	-	Xi'an	618-905
	-	Kaifeng	960
	Kaifeng	Hangzhou	1127
	Hangzhou	Beijing	1279
	Beijing	Nanking	1368
	Nanking	Beijing	1421
	Beijing	Nanking	1912
	Nanking	Beijing	1912
Beijing	Nanking	1928	
Nanking	Chongqing	1937	
Chongqing	Nanking	1946	
Nanking	Beijing	1949	
Costa Rica	Cartago	San Jose	1824

Cote d'Ivoire	Grand-Bassam	Bingerville	1900
	Bingerville	Abidjan	1933
	Abidjan	Yamoussoukro	1983
Cuba	Santiago de Cuba	Havana	1607
Denmark	Roskilde	Copenhagen	1443
England	Winchester	London	1066
Fiji	Levuka	Suva	1877-1882
Finland	Turku	Helsinki	1812
Georgia	Mtskheta	Tbilisi	1122
Germany	Berlin	Bonn	1949
	Bonn	Berlin	1998
Ghana	Cape Coast	Accra	1877
Greece	Nafplio	Athens	1836
Guatemala	Antigua Guatemala	Nueva Guatemala	1776
	Guatemala	Quetzaltenango	1839
	Quetzaltenango	Guatemala	1902
Guinea-Bissau	Bolama	Bissau	1941
	Bissau	Boe	1973
	Boe	Bissau	1974
Haiti	Cap-Haïtien	Port-au-Prince	1770
Honduras	Comayagua	Tegucigalpa	1880
Hungary	Esztergom	Buda	1256
	Buda	Pozsony (Bratislava)	1536
	Pozsony	Buda (now Budapest)	1784
India	Surat	Bombay	1687
	Bombay	Calcutta	1773
	Calcutta	Delhi	1912
	Delhi	New Delhi	1931
Indonesia	Yogyakarta	Bukittinggi	1948
	Bukittinggi	Jakarta	1949
Iran	Tabriz	Qazvin	1548
	Qazvin	Isfahan	1597
	Isfahan	Shiraz	1747
	Shiraz	Tehran	1789
Israel	Tel Aviv	Jerusalem	1949
Italy	Turin	Florence	1865
	Florence	Rome	1871
Jamaica	Spanish Town	Kingston	1872
Japan	Nara	Kyoto	794
	Kyoto	Tokyo	1603
Kazakhstan	Orenburg	Kyzyl-Orda	1925
	Kyzyl-Orda	Alma-Ata	1929
	Alma-Ata	Astana	1997
Korea	Gyeongju	Kaesong	935
	Kaesong	Seoul	1394

Laos	Luang Prabang	Vientiane	1545
Lithuania	Kaunas	Vilnius	1939
Malawi	Zomba and Blantyre	Lilongwe	1975
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	Putrajaya	1999
Malta	Mdina	Valletta	1568
Martinique (Fr)	Saint-Pierre	Fort-de-France	1902
Montenegro	Cetinje	Podgorica	1946
Montserrat (GB)	Plymouth	Brades	1996
Myanmar	Amarapura	Mandalay	1861
	Mandalay	Rangoon (Yangon)	1886
	Yangon	Naypyidaw	2006
Namibia	Otjimbingwe	Windhoek	1892
Netherlands	Hague	Amsterdam	1806
New Zealand	Russell	Auckland	1841
	Auckland	Wellington	1865
Nicaragua	Leon	Managua	1857
Nigeria	Lagos	Abuja	1991
Norway	Trondheim	Bergen	1070
	Bergen	Oslo	1299
Pakistan	Karachi	Rawalpindi	1959
	Rawalpindi	Islamabad	1971
Palau	Koror	Melekeok	2006
Philippines	Manila	Quezon City	1948
	Quezon City	Manila	1976
Poland	Gniezno	Krakow	1038
	Krakow	Plock	1079
	Plock	Krakow	1138
	Krakow	Poznan	1290
	Poznan	Krakow	1296
	Krakow	Warsaw	1596
Portugal	Guimaraes	Coimbra	1131
	Coimbra	Lisbon	1255
	Lisbon	Rio de Janeiro	1808
	Rio de Janeiro	Lisbon	1822
Russia	Moscow	Saint Petersburg	1712
	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	1728
	Moscow	Saint Petersburg	1732
	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	1918
Saudi Arabia	Diriyah	Riyadh	1818
Scotland	Perth	Edinburgh	1452
Solomon Islands	Tulagi	Honiara	1942
Spain	Toledo	Madrid	1560
	Madrid	Valladolid	1600
	Valladolid	Madrid	1606
	Madrid	Valencia	1936

	Valencia	Madrid	1939
Sri Lanka	Colombo	Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte	1982
Swaziland	Manzini	Mbabane	1902
Sweden	Sigtuna	Stockholm	1436
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	Dodoma	1974-1996
Thailand	Ayutthaya	Thonburi	1776
	Thonburi	Bangkok	1782
Tonga	Niutoua	Lapeha (Mua)	1200
	Mua	Nuku'alofa	1845
Trinidad and Tobago	San Jose de Oruna	Puerto España (Port-of-Spain)	1757
Turkey	Bursa	Edirne	1365
	Edirne	Istanbul	1453
	Istanbul	Ankara	1924
Ukraine	Chyhyryn	Baturin	1669
	Baturin	Gluhov	1708
	-	Baturin	1750-1764
	Kharkov	Kiev	1934
United States of America	Philadelphia	Baltimore	1776
	Baltimore	Philadelphia	1777
	Philadelphia	Lancaster	1777
	Lancaster	York	1777
	York	Philadelphia	1778
	Philadelphia	Princeton	1783
	Princeton	Annapolis	1783
	Annapolis	Trenton	1784
	Trenton	New York	1785
	New York	Philadelphia	1790
	Philadelphia	Washington	1800
<i>Confederate States of America</i>	-	Montgomery	1861
	Montgomery	Richmond	1861
	Richmond	Denville	1865
Uzbekistan	Samarkand	Tashkent	1930
Vanuatu	Havannah Harbor	Port Vila	1906
Vietnam	Hanoi	Hue	1802
	Hue	Hanoi	1882
Yemen	Sanaa	Taiz	1948
	Taiz	Sanaa	1962

(Tarhov 2007)

## SUMMARY

### CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CASES OF NIGERIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

by

Denys Reva

SUPERVISOR : PROF. A. DU PLESSIS  
DEPARTMENT : DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES  
DEGREE : MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between capital city relocation and national security, with emphasis on relocation projects in Nigeria (1991) and Kazakhstan (1997). The study has a dual academic relevance. It is contended that it contributes to a sub-field of Security Studies seldom studied and that it adds to the theoretical understanding of the relationship between capital city relocation and national security. The practical relevance of the theme, along with the growing interest in capital city relocation on the part of a number of governments, emanates from the exploration of policy alternatives and the consideration of potential benefits and disadvantages if viewed from a security perspective. Accordingly, the core research question is: *To what extent does the relocation of capital cities impact (or not impact) on the national security of the states?* Three additional sub-questions guide the study: What is the rationale and corresponding benefits and disadvantages of capital city relocation? What constitutes security, more specifically national security, and what is the link and relationship between capital city relocation and national security? Does the underlying aim of capital city relocation, i.e. state- or nation-building respectively, lead to different security-related processes and outcomes or not?

In response to the main research question, the study highlights an explicit link between capital city relocation and national security. In the absence of a structured and theory-based body of knowledge on the subject, and the lack of a coherent analytical framework, the study relies on the new security framework. The framework is based on Buzan's five areas of national security, namely the political, military, societal, economic, and environmental sectors. The study concludes

that the impact of capital city relocation on national security can be registered across all five security sectors. The outcome of capital city relocation is case specific, and depends on a number of variables, including leadership, overt and covert political agenda of the government in power, and the historical heritage, among other things. Furthermore, the impact of capital city relocation on national security is predominantly internal, and beneficial to political, economic and social stability, rather than in terms of countering a potential or perceived external (military) threat to state and regime. The impact on national security is also indirect and not deterministic. Overall, capital city relocation is likely to have an impact on national security, but the intensity and quality of the impact depends on the execution of the project, and other related variables.

The study suggests that a capital city relocation project should include a national security assessment, albeit not to the extent of securitising the project. The project should not be used as a tool to deal with military issues or situations, and should not be regime specific or regime bound. The project should also be located in, be subordinate to and be supplementary in respect of an overarching policy framework that contributes to state- and nation-building and that focuses on vulnerabilities, risks and threats.

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**FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**  
**RESEARCH PROPOSAL & ETHICS COMMITTEE**

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
Degree/Qualification: Master of Security Studies \_\_\_\_\_

Title of thesis/dissertation/mini-dissertation: CAPITAL CITY RELOCATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CASES OF NIGERIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

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November 11, 2016

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