The applicability of the European process of regional integration to the African context: An analysis of institutional and policy frameworks in the European Union and in the African Union

by

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January 2016
DECLARATION

I, Nubong Gabila Fohtung hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree at any other university.

Signed:........................................................................................................................

Date:.............................................................................................................................

Place:............................................................................................................................
Dedication.

To our children Ezra Fohtung, Carla Seipime and Charis Thandiwe and to a generation of ‘new Africans’ for whom a prosperous Africa that takes its seat at the table of nations shall not be an aspiration only but a reality.
Acknowledgement.

I am grateful to the Lord Jesus Christ who has sustained me and carried me through this research process. I want to specially thank my supervisor Prof Lorenzo Fioramonti for his dedicated attention to read, guide and provide invaluable input towards this research and for financially sponsoring my field trip to Addis Ababa and providing me a research home at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn). My gratitude to Professor Maxi Schoeman and the staff of the department of Political Science and International Relations for offering me a place to complete this programme. I would not have made it without the patient and loving support of my wife Barbara Nubong, who encouraged me in times of discouragement, suffered my absence during my travels for fieldwork and took care of the kids with dedication when I needed to concentrate on research. Sweetheart, your sacrifices have not been in vain, I pray you enjoy the fruits of your sacrifices to see this project through to completion. To my mother, for all the love, sacrifices and prayers, for believing in me from childhood I say thank you. You have been the angel sent to inspire me through life. To my mother-in-law and father in law, Mama Miriam and Daddy Ebenezer Ndaya, for all the prayers, support and encouragement, thank you. To my in-laws Dr(s) Amusa and Grace Ntatin, Dr(s) Ivan and Louisa Ndamukong and Emmanuel & Ruth Foyere, you have stood by us in the most difficult moments of our lives, we owe you all a debt of gratitude. To my siblings Vivian and Miriam and their spouses, especially to Ps Edwin Mukong, thank you for the prayers and for being a great support and blessing. To my colleagues at the European Union Delegation to South Africa, Ambassador Roeland Van De Geer, Richard Young, Kostas Berdos, Malado Kaba, thank you for encouraging me to embark on this project and for sharing your insights in the course of our many exchanges on Africa’s developmental challenges. To my colleagues at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Dr San Bilal, Ms Isabelle Ramdoo, Mrs Kathleen Van Hoove for sharing your wisdom accumulated from years of providing support to the EU- Africa partnership. To the French Embassy in South Africa, who sponsored my stay in Paris during a writing retreat at the Institut de Science Po, Paris to enable me write up and complete this work. To the staff of Science Po Paris, particularly Prof Christian Lequesne who was my host advisor at Science Po Paris, and graciously allowed me access to their postgraduate resource centre and rich library resources during my writing retreat in Paris. To the staff of the African Union Commission, who shared their insights with me,
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Abstract
A casual look at Europe’s and Africa’s experiences of integration suggests that they share certain similarities. Their respective institutional frameworks (Commissions, Parliaments and Councils) bear certain similarities and they share a similar policy objective of developing economic communities through the pursuit of market integration (the European Economic Community (EEC) following the 1957 Rome Treaty, and the African Economic Community (AEC) according to the 1991 Abuja Treaty). These noted similarities have generated a debate on whether or not the European experience of integration has diffused to and informed Africa’s practice of regional integration by its continental body the African Union (AU). This study brings a contribution to this debate by investigating a number of channels through which the EU experience of integration could have flowed to the AU, drawing from the policy transfer and diffusion literature. It investigates the process leading up to the adoption of the institutions and policy frameworks of the African Union in a bid to establish whether they were created in response to functional problems in Africa and independently from the EU experience or were a mere attempt to mimic and copy from the EU regional integration experience. Such an investigation is important because both the AU’s failure to meet its integration milestones and inability to make a meaningful contribution to the continent’s development haven often been blamed on failed attempt to replicate the EU’s integration success because it settled for a replication of the EU’s institutions and policies without paying attention to their applicability in the African Context.

This study thus formulates hypotheses to test for the diffusion of the EU’s experience to the AU by testing for evidence of the EU’s influence through the provision of incentives and conditionalities attached to financial and technical assistance to the AU. It also tests for lesson drawing and mimicry as possible actions from the AU that would encourage the diffusion of the EU experience. It applies a process tracing methodology to a diffusion analytical framework and proceeds through a consultation of the archives of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) both based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is complemented by interviews with AU and EU commission staff and other stakeholders identified as potential agents for diffusion.

The study found that notwithstanding recognition of the EU as a successful integration experience, there were no formal avenues of diffusion of institutional norms and practises that were programmed along with EU financial and technical assistance in the lifetime of the OAU/AU before the 2007 adoption of the JAES. It also found that the OAU adopted its institutions of integration as part of an effort to create an African Economic Community informed by the established best practice from around the world and looking to a number of institutional models, particularly that of the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). It also found that the EU’s experience may have only diffused to the AU indirectly through the mechanism of normative emulation. This is due to the fact that the EU integration experience has been dominant within the integration literature and has also significantly defined and informed the global best practice of regional integration. It finds that other factors are responsible for the failure of the AU’s integration efforts to attain their milestones or make a significant contribution to the continent’s development. This includes the absence of a culture of evidence based (backed by research) adoption of policies at the AU, like the absence of a cost-benefit analysis of the benefits of further integration to AU members states that could contribute
to increase their commitment to continental integration project. This would intend to push them to transpose continental commitments to national laws and development plans and provide more financial support to the AUC.

These findings point to the fact that the witnessed similarities between some EU and AU institutions and policy frameworks are not the result of the AU attempting to mimic the EU but much more a reflection of their joint subscription to a common orthodoxy of trade liberalisation as a means to prosperity. They share an ideological disposition and belief in the merits of (economic and political) integration for the improvement of the welfare of their citizens and as an avenue to exercise more influence on the global political arena. The EU by its success and experience over the years has significantly influenced the global understanding and practice of regional integration, from which the AU has drawn to determine its own processes. Which led this study to conclude that from this perspective the EU process of integration is both relevant and applicable to the African context.
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Acronyms

ACJ                African Court of Justice
ACM                African Common Market
ACHPR             African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ACP/EC            African Caribbean and Pacific/European Community
ACTHPR            African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AEC                African Economic Community
APPER             African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
APRM              African Peer Review Mechanism
ASA                Associated States of Africa
AU                 African Union
AUSP              African Union Support Programme
CA                 Constitutive Act
CFSP              Common Foreign and Security Policies
COMESA            Community of East and Southern African States
CSOs              Civil Society Organizations
EAC                East African Community
EC                 European Commission
ECB                European Central Bank
ECCAS             Economic Community of Central African States
ECSC              European Coal and Steel Community
ECJ                European Court of Justice
ECOSOC            Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS            Economic Community of West African States
EEC                European Economic Community
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<td>ESM</td>
<td>European Social Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Final Act of Lagos</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Agency for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millennium African Development Programme</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MRA</td>
<td>Mutual Recognition agreements.</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>New African Initiative</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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OEEC  Organisation for European Economic Cooperation.

PAP  Pan African Parliament

PSC  Peace and Security Council

QMV  Qualified Majority Voting

RECs  Regional Economic Communities

SACU  Southern Africa Customs Union

SADC  Southern African Development Community

SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programmes

SEA  Single European Act

SEM  Single European Market

TEC  Treaty Establishing European Community

TNC  Trans-National Cooperations

UEMOA  Union Economique et Monetaires Ouest Africaine

UN  United Nations

UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP  United Nations Development Programme

UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNESCO  United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA  United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF  United Nations Children Fund

UNITA  Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UN-NADAF  United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa

UN-PAAERD  United Nations Programme for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development

VAT  Value Added Taxes

WTO  World Trade Organization
WWII World War Two – Second World War

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Chapter 1

Research Background

1.1 Introduction

As countries around the world face the pressures of globalisation, they tend to look to regional cooperation and integration as a means of asserting their presence and influence in global politics and on the world’s economic stage. The contemporary concept of regional (economic) integration was popularised in the 1950s-1960s by political economists, in particular Jacob Viner (1950) and Bela Balassa (1961). They conceptualised integration from a trade liberalisation perspective to follow a step wise process in which countries pursued their economic cooperation through the establishment of free trade areas (FTAs), aimed at generating economies of scale, leading to customs union, established on the basis of a common external tariff, evolving into common markets, and further graduating into an economic union and possibly an eventual political union (Balassa 1961). From a market integration perspective and within the context of a globalising world economy, regional markets make it more likely for individual countries to reap the benefits of economic interdependence and compete on the global scene. For example, Europe’s resolve to create a single internal market was informed by their desire to be competitive on the world stage. Put in the words of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher:

By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a Europe-wide scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers emerging in Asia and elsewhere (Thatcher 1988: 6).

This response to the competitive pressures of globalisation has been one compelling reason why countries and groups of countries have sought to come together to define and pursue their
collective interests. Apart from this need to be internationally competitive, efforts at regional cooperation and integration have also been pursued out of security concerns. This was the consideration behind the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) following the devastation to continental Europe as a result of two world wars. The end of the Second World War (WWII), in particular, marked the dawn of a new era in the international political arena. Two main political issues emerged from this period that were to dominate the conduct of global politics for the following decades:

1. Security concerns over preventing the outbreak of another war in Europe and the management of a divided Europe between the East and the West;
2. Development concerns arising out of the poverty and inequality that marked the countries of the Third World (Axline 1994:8).

Countries in Europe and Africa responded to these changes in the global arena by taking steps towards the political and economic integration of their economies. In the case of Europe, they found themselves in a world dominated by rival superpowers (mostly the United States and the Soviet Union). Out of a longing to rebuild their devastated economies, they realised that they could no longer pursue their own short-term interests with little regard for the changing realities of the world’s political system and balance of power. The desire to supersede ruinous nationalism and ensure peace coupled with the need to provide economic welfare and geopolitical security caused the then founding nations of what is now the European Union (EU) to look to more cooperation and integration as a way of maximising their relative power and influence on the global scene (Gilbert 2012:2). For Africa, regional cooperation and integration was pursued out of a desire for unity among countries that had just gained their independence from European colonisation. Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, explained the need for African unity with the following words:
I can see no security for African states unless African leaders, like ourselves, have realized beyond all doubt that salvation for Africa lies in unity… for in unity lies strength and as I see it, African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialist and colonial exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually (Nkrumah 1963:145).

Nkrumah and the founding fathers of African unity firmly believed that a united Africa stood a better chance at influencing the course of its development and the nature of its engagement with the rest of the world. They argued that if Africa’s multiple resources were used for its own development, the continent would be among the most modernised in the world (Nkrumah 1965:2). The means by which Africa’s resources would be used for its own development, given its unique colonial past, was therefore to come from unity, self-reliance and collective action. Promoting collective self-reliance provided the initial rationale for regional economic integration in Africa. The association of regional integration with transferring components of sovereignty, as occurred in Europe, to a supranational entity cuts across the grain of post-colonial African politics (Bach 1999:181). Nkrumah as a promoter of African unity drew inspiration from the experiences of other regions in the world to advocate for a political union of African states with a centralized authority, which was to share certain competencies with the sovereign and independent African states. He argued in this regard that:

We have seen, in the example of the United States, how the dynamic elements within society understood the need for unity and fought their bitter civil war to maintain the political union that was threatened by the reactionary forces. We have also seen in the example of the Soviet Union, how the forging of continental unity along with the retention of national sovereignty by the federal states, has achieved a dynamism that has lifted a most backward society into a most powerful unit within a remarkably short space of time. From the examples before us, in Europe and the United States of America, it is therefore patent that we in Africa have the resources, present and potential, for creating the kind of society that we are anxious to build… I know that when we speak of political union, our critics are quick to observe an
attempt to impose leadership and to abrogate sovereignty. But we have seen, from the many examples of union put forward, that equality of states is jealously guarded in every single constitution and that sovereignty is maintained. There are differences in the powers allotted to the central government and those retained by the states, as well as in the functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary. All of them have a common trade and economic policy (Nkrumah 1963: 216).

Nkrumah’s vision for Africa’s unity greatly influenced continental efforts in the pursuit of regionalism. The issues he put on the table then, regarding both the benefits of collective efforts in the pursuit of Africa’s development and the creation and strengthening of a central authority overseeing a political union, are still as relevant today as they were in the 1960s. More than five decades later the ideals of African ‘unity’ have proven to be a challenging exercise. Yet African leaders have not stopped believing in the merits of cooperation and the pursuit of greater integration for the continent. This belief has also been motivated by their desire to consolidate the efforts of their small and fragmented economies with a view to enabling them to compete globally. The Africa that emerged from its colonial past saw the pursuit of cooperation and integration as a pathway to development and a means to consolidate its presence on the global stage. This motivated the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which set as its objective to promote cooperation and the harmonisation of the policies of its member states in a number of areas. For Africa, economic integration was seen as an important step towards industrialisation, the development of internal continental trade, and a reduction of her dependence and vulnerability to fluctuating overseas markets. Integration was also seen as a means of mobilising and maximising Africa’s scarce resources of capital and skills and as a means of forging the way to unity both politically and economically (Asante 1997).

Against this backdrop, it is clear that Europe and Africa have embraced the imperative of cooperation and regional integration for partly similar reasons. Both continents have also
adopted a number of policies and created institutions to drive the processes of integration in their respective continents. The integration processes from both continents also seem to share an ideological foundation based on the merits of economic interdependence. In this regard, trade specialist Peter Draper has suggested that Africa’s thinking in the field of regionalism is dominated by European conceptions in two areas: political and institutional. At the political level, the underlying rationale is rooted in the ‘liberal peace hypothesis’, which asserts that closer economic integration constitutes ‘ties that bind’ which act to restrain member states from engaging in hostile military actions against each other (Draper 2012).

Though Europe and Africa seem to share a common belief in the merits of integration and have moved ahead to create a number of similar institutions, there are a number of fundamental differences in their experiences and practice of integration. According to Olivier (2010: 27), Africa’s regionalism represents a mixture of “non-cumulative episodes of regionalisation”, which do not follow the linear process experienced in Europe and which are also “both political and economic, that is, state-led, developmental, and market-based, in terms of policies, practices and institutions.”

From politicians to journalists, through academics and civil society activists, African and European integration processes are often pitted against each other with the objective of highlighting how similar or different they are. This practice has also generated a debate on whether or not the European experience of integration has diffused to and informed Africa’s practice of cooperation and integration. Braun and Gilardi (2006) define diffusion as a process through which policy choices in one country/setting affect those in another country/setting. Dolowitz and March (2000) on their part describe diffusion as a process by which knowledge about policies and administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting are used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting. In this context, scholars have been called upon to provide evidence for
diffusion by testing if and how ideas and knowledge generated in one setting (in this case Europe whose integration has generated much theoretical literature in political science and international relations) can be proven to have influenced the integration practice (adoption of policies, programmes and institutions) in another setting.

A casual look at Europe’s and Africa’s experiences of integration suggests that they share certain similarities. In particular their respective institutional frameworks (Commissions, Parliaments and Councils) bear certain similarities and they also have similar objectives to develop economic communities through the pursuit of market integration: the European Economic Community (EEC) following the 1957 Rome Treaty and the African Economic Community (AEC) following the 1991 Abuja Treaty. This similarity has led some analysts to argue that, while Africa seems to have adopted European styled institutions of integration, there are fundamentally different conditions and realities prevalent in the two continents (Fioramonti 2012). Others argue that region building in Africa has been heavily constrained by “complex institutional blueprints formally adopted by regional organisations that pretend to emulate the experience of the European Union” (Bach 2013:91). Bach goes on asserting that the revival of regionalism in Africa has been paradoxically associated with the endorsement of institutional blueprints drawn from the European experience leading to the development of ‘thick’ institutionalism, while the “ambitious institutionalisation” processes prescribed are yet to be matched by prescribed transfers of sovereignty or the implementation of common policies (Bach 2013: 91). Haastrup (2013) maintains that the similarities between institutional arrangements in the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) could well be the result of policy transfers modelled around frameworks and practices that have become accepted internationally, as opposed to a deliberate attempt by the AU to adopt the EU model in Africa. Though laying emphasis on different aspects and perhaps offering different explanations, these
authors seem to agree with the notion that the European experience of integration has somehow
influenced Africa’s practice of regionalism.

But is there any factual evidence of whether the practice of integration on the African continent
is the result of a diffusion of the European experience? Ultimately, the importance of
determining whether or not the EU experience of integration has diffused to Africa lies in the
question of its applicability to the African context. This study sets out to answer these questions
with the objective of bringing some clarity to the debate concerning the link between the
European and African experiences of integration. In the rest of this chapter, I present some key
concepts (section 1.2), discuss the research problem (section 1.3), put forward my research
hypothesis (section 1.4), and outline the aims and objectives of the study (section 1.5) as well
as the methodology (section 1.6). Then I provide a description of the content the reader will
find in the rest of the dissertation (section 1.7).

1.2 Definition of Concepts

As states and non-state actors have embarked on various processes of regional cooperation and
have intensified their mutual interdependence in the past couple of decades, the very study of
regional integration and regionalism has grown in complexity and conceptual nuances. These
conceptual nuances are however informed by the definition and delineation of the concept of a
‘region’. Joseph Nye has provided one of the most traditional definitions of a region as “a
limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of
mutual interdependence” (Nye 1965: vii). Although such a definition satisfies most
conventional approaches to the study of regionalism, its focus on territorial continuity and state-
centric action is nowadays considered reductive, as regionalisation processes have grown more
and more nuanced, with important roles played by non-state actors (such as transnational corporations and civil society organisations) (Schulz et al., 2001).

The debate about the definition of ‘regions’ has often been extended to the distinction of several notions that symbolize different patterns and degrees of regionalism. The broad term ‘regionalism’ has been used in the literature to cover a variety of distinct phenomena, which Hurrell (1995:334) breaks down into five categories that are analytically distinct but collectively enrich the discourse around the theories and practices of contemporary regionalism. These distinctions have included the notions of regionalisation, regional awareness and identity, regional interstate cooperation, state-promoted regional economic integration and regional cohesion\(^1\). Regionalism in this context refers to cognitive or institutionalised (state-centric) projects, while regionalisation points to processes and to \textit{de facto} outcomes. Regionalism refers to ideas or ideologies, programmes, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project (Bach 2013: 92). Since regionalism postulates the implementation of a programme and the delineation of a strategy, it is often associated with institution-building or with the adoption of formal agreements. It accommodates an extreme heterogeneity of configurations, ranging from those involving the material organisation of transfers of sovereignty (regional integration) to cognitive and ideational projects (associated with the invention of regions and construction of identities within existing states). It is a more constrained concept than regionalisation which focuses on the build-up of interactions which may or may not relate to an explicitly asserted or acknowledged formal regionalist project. This makes regionalisation a more encompassing notion than regionalism because it takes into account processes driven by other stakeholders besides the state (Bach 1999:184). Regionalism

\(^1\) See Andrew Hurrell (1995a), ‘Explaining the resurgence of Regionalism in world politics’ for an in-depth discussion on varieties of regionalism.
can proceed from ideas or ideologies, programmes, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project. Regional integration on the other hand can proceed by means of formal regionalism arrangements and regionalisation outcomes. It is about states agreeing to live by common norms and values, the deepening of cooperation, the creation of common markets, the free movement of people in a region and ultimately the creation of a shared governance architecture with legislative and governance competencies over the region (Landsberg 2012:5). Regional integration thus factors in earlier definitions of regions that took into consideration elements like social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of common heritage), economic cohesiveness (regime type, ideology) and organisational cohesiveness (the existence of formal regional institutions) (Hurrell 1995a:333).

From a reflectivist’s perspective, regions can be seen as ‘constructs’, which are defined by discursive interactions at the political, economic and social level (Langenhove 2012). As such, regions are not predefined: they are subject to change over time, in line with the prevailing political, economic and social discourse taking place in each society (Acharya 2009). The range of factors that may be implicated in the growth of regionalism (formation of regions) is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historical dimensions. As Hurrell (1995b) argues, contemporary research reminds us that there are no ‘natural’ regions and definitions of ‘region’, while indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation. Some of these differences constitute the most significant disagreements between proponents of traditional regional integration theory (often dubbed as ‘old regionalism’) and advocates of ‘new regionalism’ (Hettne 2005).
Ernst Haas the founder of the neo-functionalist approach, defines regional integration as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (Haas 1958: 16). In other words regional integration is the process of transferring loyalty, expectations and decision-making power to a new, regional centre. By contrast, Karl Deutsch defined regional integration not as a process but rather a state of affairs: “[...] a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack” (Deutsch 1968: 192).

The early formalizations of regionalism introduced in the 1950s-1960s by political economists like Viner (1950) and Balassa (1961) viewed integration as a gradual process of economic cooperation following an inherent linearity in five concrete steps, beginning with the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), proceeding to a customs union, a common market, an economic union and a political union. (Balassa 1961). According to Walter Mattli, for instance, regional integration can be described as the outcome of the interaction between economic incentives and the quest of countries (and their leaders) to push for economic growth (and re-election) (Mattli 1999). While the promoters of ‘open regionalism’, see the drive for regional economic integration as a consequence of the expansion of neoliberal globalization, whereby countries have accepted the inevitability of the elimination of trade barriers (and, in theory, of the free movement of people) across national borders (Cable and Henderson 1994).

Cooperation and integration are deeply connected in the process of regionalisation, which may not lead to the formation of a political union but flows along a continuum that begins with some
form of political cooperation, possibly through the formation of some type of treaty. Political cooperation involves mutual policy arrangements among member states aimed at attaining common interests and objectives. Unlike a political union or federation, political cooperation does not necessarily require surrendering one’s jurisdiction to the central unit. While political cooperation amongst states may set out to ensure peaceful coexistence, friendship and solidarity, as well as mutual respect for national sovereignty, political integration towards the setting up of a federation or union may involve issues like the establishment of collective institutions, and the development and implementation of common defence or foreign policy (Biswaro 2011: 72). The concepts of economic and political integration tend to be sometimes used generically and referred to just as regional integration. There is no clear-cut delineating line in practise to determine at what point economic cooperation or integration gives way to political cooperation and integration as these objectives are often pursued congruently. However the objectives that cooperation parties set for themselves often point to whether or not their main focus shall be on economic or political cooperation or some combination of the two. In our study we will make use of the term regional integration and cooperation with the understanding that it contains elements of both economic and political cooperation and aims at the eventual creation of an economically and politically integrated region.

1.3 Problem Statement

The European and African experiences of integration have followed quite different historical trajectories and have been motivated by a host of different factors. Europe’s integration was born out of security concerns following the devastation that was caused by two consecutive global conflicts World Wars. This prompted six European nations to bring the resource that fuelled the war machinery (coal and steel) under one authority through the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). African integration, on the other hand, has been
driven by its quest for unity and cooperation amongst its independent member states that emerged out of a history of colonisation and dispossession. Notwithstanding these noted differences in their historical trajectory towards integration, they share a number of similarities that seem evident in some of their institutions and policy frameworks. At the institutional level, the African Union (AU) appears to have mimicked the EU forms particularly in their predilection for a specific institutional architecture (Draper 2012). It seems evident that a good degree of institutional ‘learning’ (and borrowing) from the EU characterised the shift from the OAU to the AU. Starting with the very name of the “AU”, which emphasises the idea of a “Union” (just like the shift in Europe away from the European Community to the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992), to its institutional setup, which is led by a Commission and a Peace and Security Council (PSC) as the two branches of the executive power and a Pan African Parliament.2.

A closer look at these two regional entities and their integration experience, however, highlights a number of differences in the integration trajectories. For example, the AU and its regional economic communities (RECs) have adopted an all-inclusive approach to membership (e.g. the AU includes all African countries, with the only exception of Morocco, which left unilaterally because of a dispute over the status of the Sahrawi Republic). By contrast, the EU proceeded gradually from a core of six countries to a series of enlargements, adopting a clear set of preconditions and incentives and striving to create an area of comparable economic development, common democratic values and comparable social standards.

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2 It must be noted, however, that the Peace and Security Council is made up of rotating members and it is therefore not entirely designed along the same lines as the European Council.
The similarities in their institutional architecture coupled with the noted differences in their trajectories and practice of integration have led some analysts to argue that some of Africa’s challenges of integration are the result of its failure to copy from the European experience of integration and/or its wrong application of the same. For Draper (2010), many African states do not have the capacities to manage development processes nor the ability to engage in complex institutional forms of economic integration as happened in the EU. Analyses of this nature implicitly assume that diffusion has occurred or is occurring from the EU experience to the African experience, but point out poor implementation as a problem: they create an expectation that should Africa get this process right, it will make a difference in both its practice and outcome of integration. For a continent whose integration experiences is said to suffer from many problems, including overlapping memberships, unfulfilled commitments, and unrealistic goals (Dinka and Kennes 2007; Draper et al., 2007; UNECA 2006 and 2008) the possibility of getting it right presents a glimmer of hope to the multitudes of Africans still waiting to reap the developmental benefits associated with economic integration. On the other hand being able to establish that Africa has not expressly (intentionally) attempted to emulate the European experience of integration and that diffusion has not occurred and is not occurring between the two regions, should help focus the attention on what its real challenges of integration are. Both outcomes would feed into the debate on the applicability of Europe’s experience to Africa because it will make it possible for policy makers to take charge of the diffusion process within the African context to make sure it is contributing to the objectives of their respective organisations. It is therefore important to bring clarity to this debate of whether or not Africa has drawn from the European experience of integration through the process of diffusion. Such clarity has implications for the management of Africa’s relationship with the EU, including through their strategic partnership. It also has implications for the African Union, its member states and the RECs, as they lead the process of continental integration. If the experience of
Europe is supposed to serve as an inspiration, it is important to understand its tenets so as to tease out only those elements that are applicable to the African context and reality. This consciousness has to be engrained in the thinking of EU and African policy makers and inform their approach to the management of their joint strategic partnership. Considering the historical linkages between the two continents and their ongoing trade and political partnerships, it is important to investigate the extent to which the European experience of integration has impacted upon that of Africa. Such an exercise will not only dispel the myth of Africa following the model of European integration, but will highlight the extent to which the current African experience is perhaps an inappropriate application of lessons from the European experience of integration.

1.4 Hypothesis Formulation

Jetschke and Murray (2012:175) argue that an increase in institutionalisation is the natural outcome of endogenous demand for more integration, either created by increased trade or as a common response to a collective problem. A response to this demand should lead to the creation of more institutions to solve perceived (and/or real) collective problems. The considerations behind this functional logic broadly define the null hypothesis of this study, which is that ‘the institutions and policy frameworks of the African Union (building from its predecessors) have been created and adopted independently from influence coming from the regional integration experience of the European Union, mostly in response to functional problems in Africa. Marsh and Sharman (2009:278) have argued that using diffusion as an independent variable in a regional/continental context would lead to the formulation of a null hypothesis that particular regional/continental arrangements reflect particular regional/continental circumstances or that even where pronounced similarities can be observed, these are independent reactions to
common shocks or trends (underlying domestic/continental factors), in which case no diffusion has taken place. This null hypothesis will in essence be answering the following question: “Is the African Union’s institutional development the outcome of a functional demand for these institutions or are they (at least partially) determined by diffusion from the European Union?”

The analysis and results that emanate from the investigation of this hypothesis should help determine whether the institutions adopted by the AU provide a good and feasible fit for the problems it is seeking to address and/or if there were any functional equivalent alternatives that could have been considered or were considered and rejected. Where the AU adopted EU-styled institutions in the presence of available functional alternatives more in line with the African ‘cognitive priors’, it can be safe to assume that this was the result of a process other than the informed desire to meet an identified need.

From an institutional perspective we looked out for signs of institutional adoption by the AU from the EU and made an attempt to distinguish the institutions that have been adopted or created in response to an identified need on the African continent independent from processes that occurred in the EU. This enabled us to make a distinction between those institutions whose adoption was driven by an identified functional need from those that could be a normative emulation from the EU through one of the mechanisms of diffusion or policy transfer.

Diffusion provides four main advantages for research of this nature:

i) The ability to study not only regional organisations as dependent variables (not only actions of EU examined).

ii) Its focus on local impact and agency (considers the role played by the AU and its predecessor in facilitating EU influence).
iii) Opportunity to study the influence of the EU across different contexts of leverage.

iv) The possibility to control for external influences.

Thus in our investigation of diffusion from the EU to the AU, we did not focus only on the actions of the EU but also on the actions of the AU both as a ‘passive’ recipient of EU integration promotion and an active agent of emulation. Using the diffusion approach through a process-tracing methodology made it possible to focus on processes and causal mechanisms and to incorporate these two avenues of action into our analysis. To do this effectively, we also formulated additional hypotheses designed to capture the action from the EU’s point of view and including hypotheses that stress and test for the role of the AU in actively seeking to emulate or adapt to the EU’s best practise examples of integration. We also tested the influence of the EU and its experience of integration on the African experience and trajectory of integration, following key literature (Borzel and Risse, 2009; Jetschke and Murray, 2012) stating that the EU would be informed by its experience of integration in defining its priorities and avenue of action in influencing integration in Africa.

Against this backdrop, a series of additional hypotheses were developed in the following four areas:

i) Incentives: conditionality and assistance.

Based on an understanding of conditionality to mean the connection of an objective in a specific area with incentives or punishments in a different area, it can be hypothesized that the principle behind such policies would be to influence the utility calculations of the African Union (and its predecessor the OAU) by connecting the pursuit of compliance with a certain policy to material or non-material benefits (positive conditionality) or sanctioning non-compliance (negative conditionality). The hypothesis thus defined can be formulated as such:
“H1a: The African Union’s decision to pursue a specific policy or institutional change has been driven by other objectives than the functional reasons in that specific area, and can be linked to an influence in some area of its relationship with the EU. “

This hypothesis was also used to capture the effect of technical assistance and capacity building measures (including Overseas Development Assistance, ODA) to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the AU, in its choice to pursue various policy actions or create and reform its institutions. Where such incentives have guided the actions of the AU in policy choices, programme selection or institutional reform we can thus test for the following hypothesis:

“H1b: The pursuit of a policy action, program or institutional change by the AU has been bound to the EU’s willingness to support the same”

These two hypotheses were used to investigate the impact of EU funding and related support on the AU’s policy choices, programmes and institutional frameworks, while taking care to control for the AU’s own processes of agenda setting and prioritisation definition. This second hypothesis was tested through the consultation of documentation of EU financial support to the African Union (and its predecessor the OAU), projects and programme support and interviews with AU and EU staff working at their respective commissions and the EU delegation to the African Union.

ii) Lesson drawing

In lesson drawing, we tested for evidence that the material factors (own considerations) and utility calculations of the African Union were decisive in policy enactment or institutional change by learning from the EU’s experience without the direct active involvement of the EU. This happens when the AU (or, previously, the OAU) decides to pursue a certain institutional
change or adopt a specific policy because of its assessment of the EU’s successful experience in administering the same. This is a form of diffusion that occurs because the EU experience is considered a normative model of integration leading to the diffusion of its practices to Africa with no specific contribution from them. Such a policy adoption and institutional change will be observed in the absence of direct incentives offered by the EU. From the forgoing, the following hypothesis was investigated.

“H2: Following an assessment of its own costs and benefits the African Union has pursued institutional change and adopted policy frameworks that it has judged as successful in the EU.”

iii) Persuasion

Norms are transferred through persuasion by convincing the recipients that those norms are the most appropriate ones to follow. In so doing the sender alters the preferences of the recipient. Such a change of preference occurs independent of the influence or use of incentives or coercion, but mostly as a voluntary action. As such we tested the motivation behind institutional changes that have already taken place, especially in areas that have been the subject of discussions or formal engagements with the European Union. We looked out for instances where reforms may have been discussed between the EU and the AU after which the AU changed its assessment of the utility of a specific policy or institutional reform in a manner that cannot exclusively be ascribed to a lesson drawing process. Persuasion is often a more difficult occurrence to test and its distinction from lessons drawing often difficult to make, nevertheless it is an important consideration in examining the multiple ways in which the EU may have influenced the AU’s integration process and experience. To test the occurrence of persuasion the following hypothesis was formulated and investigated:
iv) **Mimicry**

Mimicry is assumed to have occurred when policy makers and leaders in one organisation choose to imitate another organisation that enjoys a higher legitimacy, regardless of whether this is adequate for their own organisation’s function and context. This is the kind of ‘mimetic isomorphism’ popularised by DiMaggio and Walter (1983, 1991), who argue that isomorphic organisations legitimize themselves externally by imitating others rather than internally by fulfilling their tasks. An approach more recently highlighted by Fioramonti and Mattheis (2015), in their reference to the AU having borrowed visible institutional characters from the EU as a ‘bumper sticker’. To ascertain whether mimicry has occurred we looked for instances where the AU has adopted EU styled programmes, policies and institutions out of a desire to increase their legitimacy but failed to initiate own actions to effectively implement the same. We consequently investigated for the following hypothesis:

“**H4: The African Union has justified certain institutional changes and policy frameworks it has adopted by references to the EU. In addition there is a noticeable distinction between its public commitment to these institutional changes and policy frameworks and its practise from the beginning of their adoption.**”

These different hypotheses were investigated to establish whether there has been the diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU as a first step towards establishing the applicability of the EU experience to Africa. The aims and objectives that guided this investigation are outlined in the next section.
1.5 Aims and objectives

The aim of this study is to investigate the diffusion of Europe’s experience of regional integration to Africa and ascertain whether this may have led to the adoption of a number of similar institutions and policy frameworks. This has been done with the ultimate objective of contributing to the debate on the applicability of Europe’s integration experience to the African context. This aim was informed by the observation that a number of institutions of integration are shared between the two regions. Given these observed similarities and the fact that the treaty forming the African Economic Community was adopted more than three decades after the treaty forming the European Economic Community, also taking into consideration the long history and geographical proximity between these two regions and their continued economic and political cooperation in a number of areas, there are a number of avenues through which learning, emulation and lessons drawing could have taken place between the two regions. This led us to formulate a number of hypotheses to investigate both the actions of the EU as a promoter of regional integration and that of the AU (and its predecessor the OAU), as recipients of integration influence from the EU through the process of diffusion. It was our aim to build upon this set of assumptions and frameworks to investigate the real nature of the possible influence running from Europe to Africa’s experience of integration. In order to accomplish this, we set out to fulfil the following objectives:

1. To examine the European integration experience (particularly its history and resultant institutions of integration) with a view to identifying the different components that make up the edifice of European integration as a first step to ascertaining what lessons its experience may have to offer to other regional integration experiences around the world.

2. To analyse the African integration experience (including its history and adopted institutions of integration) in order to determine how the political and economic
evolution of Africa has given birth to its current regional architecture and the kinds of challenges it is facing in integration.

3. To compare the European and African regional experiences in order to ascertain the extent to which Africa is emulating/learning from the European experience, specifically to ascertain the extent to which the similarities in both experiences of integration has been as a result of diffusion from one to the other.

4. To assess the applicability of the EU experience to the African context with a specific focus on their respective institutional and policy frameworks.

This research aims to bring some analytical clarity in the scholarly debate on comparative regionalism, thus also informing policy analysis in the field with specific reference to the EU and AU experiences and processes of integration. By identifying what have been the important elements in European integration, the study will analyse the extent to which the same features have been present in the AU integration process. The adaptability of the European ‘success’ to the African experience is not as much an objective as is the identification of elements drawn from the EU experience that could possibly help drive African integration further.

Suggestions that the African Union is copying the European Union, has often been advanced and largely assumed by opinion markers, without a thorough examination of historical and political facts. By looking at the complexity of European integration and its relevance for Africa, this study also contributes to exploring a number of dynamics pertaining to regional integration, including the compatibility of market integration with social cohesion and the economic and social values underpinning different models of integration, which are very important to ultimately understand the extent to which Africa has been able to embark on a process of integration that more clearly responds to its needs and objectives.
1.6 Research Methodology

The methodological approach included the consultation of archives and officials reports as well as a series of interviews with possible ‘agents’ of diffusion. These included policy makers, bureaucrats and civil servants, researchers, academics and consultants working at think-tanks and research institutes. The research was conducted in two phases: a desktop phase and a field mission phase. In the first phase, I consulted the integration and diffusion literature making use of journal articles, books, reports and government publications on both the EU and the AU. This led me to the examination of the various treaties and legislations of both European and African integration. During this phase I was able to identify the key historical turning points and the theories that best explain them as well as the major institutions that were adopted and retained within the course of the integration process. This phase also guided me in the formulation of the research aims and objectives as well as the design of the questionnaire that I have used to conduct semi-structured interviews in the field.

In the second phase, I conducted interviews in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Lagos (Nigeria), Paris (France), Brussels (Belgium) and across South Africa. I interviewed staff at the African Union headquarters, the European Union Delegation to the African Union and the United Nation’s Economic Commission for Africa, all based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. I also consulted the archives of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and obtained reports from the EU Delegation to Addis Ababa. In Europe, I interviewed staff from the EU commission as well staff from the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), a Brussels-based think tank with a long experience of working on EU-Africa affairs. I also interviewed a number of academics and researchers working at Science Po Paris and Science Po Bordeaux, as well as some freelance consultants actively involved in the proceedings of both the EU and the AU as well as the various regionalisation processes unfolding in the continent (for a full list of the interviewees, please see ANNEX A). In this
investigation, I made use of a process tracing methodology in our investigation, which is an approach adopted by similar studies, including Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), Marsh and Sharman (2009) and Jetschke and Murray (2012). This methodology will be presented in Chapter 3, where I discuss the diffusion literature in more detail.

Ultimately, this research also relies on my personal experience as a public official working at the European Union Delegation in South Africa and as an expert working at ECDPM in Maastricht. The many conversations, first-hand exposure to the policy making of both the EU and the AU as well as the long-standing appreciation for regional integration I have had in the past few years constitute the hidden thread weaving the various sections of this study together.

1.7 Chapter outline

This first chapter has introduced the study, outlining the research problem and briefly mentioning the methodology the study has utilised. It has presented a definition of the concepts and has situated the study within the existing literature and set out the aims and objectives of the study as a justification for its relevance as a subject to be investigated. The next chapters are thus structured:

**Chapter 2 – Regional Integration in Europe**

This chapter presents an overview of the regional integration experiences of Europe. It discusses European integration from a political, economic social and institutional development perspective. In presenting the European Union experience of integration thus, it makes the case that European Integration can hardly be considered to be the fruit and outcome of the implementation of a single model and certainly not one that can easily be copied wholesale and transferred to another experience with completely different circumstances and dynamics. The chapter highlights the institutions that have been created as a result of Europe’s own integration efforts and the motivations that accompanied the creation of these institutions. In so doing this
chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent analysis and investigation of the different ways in which the European experience of integration could have diffused and/or influenced the African Union led process of integration on the African continent. Its treatment of Europe’s experience provide a justification of why it may be considered an authoritative enough model to be taken as a normative example of integration in other parts of the world including in Africa.

Chapter 3 – The African Union experience of integration

This chapter examines Africa’s efforts at promoting regional cooperation and integration on the continent and the challenges that have arisen out of this process. It presents the initial drive for continental integration within the historical context that preceded the call for African Unity against the colonisation of Africa. This move led to the formation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) as the pioneering body that has drafted and advanced a continent wide agenda for cooperation and integration. The chapter looks at the political and economic aspects of Africa’s integration by examining some of the treaties have guided this process, including the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja treaty and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. It concludes by examining the implementation challenges that have been witnessed in the promotion of regional cooperation and integration on the continent. The chapter thus lays a foundation for the investigation into Africa’s relationship with Europe and the context of a possible adoption of European style institutions and against the backdrop of an active continental integration agenda currently driven by the African Union.

Chapter 4 – The Evolution of EU- Africa relations.

This chapter presents the evolution of EU-Africa relations from a historical perspective, beginning with the commercial relationship that preceded European Colonisation of Africa, it briefly examines the different conventions that have governed EU-Africa relations in the post-
colonial area. It consequently briefly examines the two Yaounde conventions and the four Lome Agreements and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. It thus outlines the content of EU-Africa relations with the EU-ACP framework and briefly also examines the contemporary relationship between the EU and the African Union that was forged through the establishment of a Strategic partnership. It concludes by comparing EU and AU integration experiences in a bid to establish their similarities and differences. In acknowledging certain similarities between their institutions of integration the chapter makes a case for an investigation for diffusion to be carried out to determine if there has been any diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU.

Chapter 5 – An Investigation of Diffusion of Regional Integration: An Analytical Framework

This chapter presents the analytical framework that is used to investigate for the diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU. It provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on diffusion focusing on the mechanisms and agents of diffusion. It singles out the role of the EU as a promoter of regional integration through the provision of financial and technical assistance as a major conduit for its spread of regional integration to other parts of the world. It also presents the role of the African Union as an agent in facilitating the diffusion experience from Europe. The chapter goes ahead to propose an analytical framework within which a test for the diffusion of integration practices from the EU to Africa is conducted, using a process tracing methodology. It explains the process tracing methodology and indicates how it is used to investigate diffusion in our context.

Chapter 6 – Results and Discussion

This chapter presents and discusses the results from the application of our diffusion framework. It consequently outlines the findings from our consultation of the archives of the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. It also presents the responses we
obtained from the interviews. The questions asked can be divided into four broad categories: the success of the EU as a model of integration, the challenges inherent to Africa’s cooperation, the potential evidence of diffusion and the lessons to be gleaned from the EU’s experience of integration. From an analysis and the discussion of our results we are to establish that there has been diffusion from the EU to Africa in the form of normative emulation mostly informed by the view of the EU as a successful normative model of integration.

Chapter 7 – Applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African Union context

Building on the previous chapter, this section engages on the question of the applicability of the EU experience to Africa. It concludes that the EU experience would indeed be applicable to the African context, provided that the aspects are applied. The chapter also contains a summary of the main findings of the study and highlights the ways in which the objectives of the study have been attained. It also examines the policy implications of our results and proposes a few policy recommendations that if applied should ensure that the AU benefits from the EU’s experience of integration.

1.8 Conclusion

This chapter has served as an introduction to the rest of the thesis. It has presented the subject of the applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African context based on an examination of their institutions and policy frameworks within the literature of diffusion of regional integration. It has briefly highlighted the importance both Europe and Africa attach to the practise of cooperation and integration and also highlighted the number of objectives, policy frameworks and institutions that Europe and Africa share. This has included their shared believe in the benefits of market integration and stated objective of developing economic communities.
It has also highlighted the institutions that Europe and Africa also have in common including their respective commissions and parliaments. These similar institutions and policy frameworks have served as the basis for our investigation for the possible occurrence of diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to Africa which investigation we carried out first by revisiting the EU and AU experiences of integration from a historical perspective as contained in the next chapter.
Chapter 2
The European Union experience of integration

2.1 Introduction

The European Union and its integration experience continue to occupy a central place in the broader discussion on regionalism and approaches to regional integration. In public and policy debates, generic references are made to the EU’s institutional setup (characterized by a mix of supranational and intergovernmental institutions. In some cases, reference is made to the centrality of trade and the establishment of a common market. For others, by contrast, it is the social dimension (the so-called European social model) that have characterised European integration. For security specialists, instead, the European experience of integration has been characterised by the presence of external threats and the role of the transatlantic alliance in fostering further integration, in particular during the Cold War (Deutsch 1968). Those looking at the nuts and bolts of the actual policy convergence of the European polity would probably emphasise the gradualist approach endorsed by Jean Monnet, the principal architect of the early European integration, which has then become a key feature of the neo-functionalist school (Haas 1958). Federalists would, on their part, underline the role of charismatic and devoted leaders (Riker 1964), while liberal intergovernmentalists would argue that the integration of Europe was nothing else than a rational and self-interested bargain among governments, underpinned by clear economic incentives (Moravcsik 1993).

These different presentations of the EU’s experience of integration have not only affected academic research, but also its vocabulary and conceptual structures (Warleigh-Lack, Robinson and Rosamond 2011). By focusing largely on the European Union (EU), regional integration theories have sought to explain why and how the EU has pursued its integration project. Since
Europe continues to serve as an example and a reference to other integration experiences around the world, it is important to develop an understanding of the dynamics of its integration experience as part of the process of understanding its applicability to other regional contexts. Such an exercise makes it possible to the factors that influenced and guided Europe’s drive to integrate as well as the different components of its integration experience.

As Hurrell (1995a:338) has argued:

…regional integration/cohesion might indeed be based on several models; one might indeed be the gradual creation of supranational regional organisations within the context of deepening economic integration. A second model might involve the creation of series of overlapping and institutionally strong interstate arrangements or regimes. A third (perhaps visible in the current status of the European Union) might derive from a complex and evolving mixture of traditional inter-governmentalism and emerging supra-nationalism. A fourth might involve the development of con-sociationalist constitutional arrangements. Fifthly, regional cohesion might be conceived of in terms of a ‘neo-medieval’ order in which the principles of territoriality and sovereignty are replaced by a pattern of overlapping identities and authorities. Finally cohesion might be based on a strong regional hegemon which, with or without strong regional institutions, both policies the foreign policies of states within its sphere of influence and set limits on the permissible range of domestic policy options.

Europe has reflected these different aspects at different stages in its integration process. Its process of integration was birth upon the foundation of intergovernmental cooperation that saw the creation of both supranational and intergovernmental institutions and forums for the promotion of further cooperation and integration in a variety of sectors. This cooperation and efforts at integration in different sectors could be grouped under Europe’s political, social, economic, and institutional development experiences of integration. In a bid to elaborate on the European Union experience of integration, this chapter is further divided into five subsections. Section 2.2 focuses on the political aspects of European Union Integration while Section 2.3
and section 2.4 focus on the economic and social aspects respectfully. Section 2.5 looks at European Union integration and the resultant institutional development and section 2.6 concludes the chapter.

2.2 The political integration of Europe

In the early years of Europe’s integration, its leaders, writers and statesmen were haunted by the need for some kind of overarching political unity, rallying against incessant interstate rivalries that had resulted in a number of interstate wars and two World Wars. In searching for an antidote to war, one of the options considered was the need for a voluntary union of states that could draw on the heritage of a common European civilisation and would end cyclical retribution among European states in conflict (Ginsberg 2010:61). Different schools of thought have emerged within the fields of political science and international relations to explain and attempt to predict the course of European integration. These explanations have often succeeded to capture critical components of the European experience and have also been adapted and revised over time to take into consideration components that may not have been foreseen in earlier predictions. In seeking to understand the evolution of events in Europe, these theorists and policy makers have often given consideration to how national governments advance their domestic and national interests at the European level (inter-governmentalism) as against their drive to develop common European institutions that have a mandate to shape and influence what member states do (supra-nationalism). Some of the more prominent political science schools of thought for European integration are presented in Table 2.1 below, with a brief description of their main tenets, and their strengths and short comings.
<table>
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<th>Theory/Theorist</th>
<th>Key Explanations</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Shortcomings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federalism (1940s)</td>
<td>Transfer of sovereignty from state to Union. Preferred sectoral approach of functionalists.</td>
<td>Supranationalism seen as a cure for hypernationalism: EU is a quasi-federal polity.</td>
<td>Did not anticipate states will prefer intergovernmentalism over supranationalism.</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Altiero Spinelli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functionalism (1940s-1950s)</td>
<td>-Collective interests/actions that enhance human welfare build habits of cooperation among states and spur spill over of cooperation into new/related areas on a sector by sector basis.</td>
<td>Explained functional spill over from ECSC to EEC, and pooling of sovereignty to jointly achieve tasks; Europeanization process drives more integration.</td>
<td>Failed to anticipate staying power of national interests in EC decision making after the French empty chair crisis.</td>
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<td>- David Mitrany</td>
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<td>- Jean Monnet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neofunctionalism (1960s-1970s)</td>
<td>-National interests determine when and in which sectors integration occurs. -Integration is driven by key interest groups organised around across borders. -Functional spill over is neither automatic nor guaranteed. -There will be spillback as states clinging to national interests and sovereignty. Which puts brakes on expansion of integration into high-politics areas.</td>
<td>National interest infused into functional logic; Spill over occurs not automatically but as a result of specific interests. Road of integration is rocky. Spillback, however, is not the same as institutional immobilism.</td>
<td>Overemphasized institutions. Short changed staying power of national interests, import of international politics Underemphasized the importance of interstate bargaining/tradeoffs that influence integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ernst Haas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Leon Linberg</td>
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<td>- Stuart Scheingold</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Philippe Schmitter</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalism (1960s-1980s)</td>
<td>Governments pursuing national interests drive integration process. Functional spill over insufficient to explain/predict EC growth because it underemphasizes</td>
<td>Integration continues in functional areas but states retain sovereignty in foreign policy and defence.</td>
<td>Too quickly discarded aspects of functionalism that explained EC growth after empty chair crisis ended. Discarded impact of Europeanization on states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be gathered from table 2.1 above, the integration of Europe has been accompanied by considerable theoretical analysis. These different theories have collectively explained different aspects and phases of Europe’s integration experience and highlight the role played by some of its member states and political actors. Federalism anticipated the creation of a sort of ‘United States of Europe’ where power is distributed between Europe and nation state institutions, with a central authority that has sovereignty in selected areas such as defence, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary policy. Riker (1964) isolates two circumstances incentivizing statesmen’s interest in a federal bargain: economic expansion or an external (often military) threat. In the case of European integration both incentives seem to have influenced the decision of member states to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Functionalism advocated for institutionalised international cooperation, proffering a peace system in which routine cooperation to solve global problems might in time lead to a global political authority. The same principle when applied to cooperation at regional and sub-regional levels would proceed through the creation of institutions that have jurisdiction over nation states. However, functionalism did not accurately predict the eventual reluctance of member states to give total sovereignty over to centralised institutions.
Amongst the different political theories of European integration, neo-functionalism probably exercised the greatest influence. It was premised on a number of key principles, including the recognition of the importance of politics in regional integration, a liberal-pluralist conception of power, bargaining by regionally-oriented pressure groups, the notion of task expansion and spill over (tendency of regional groups to expand the scope of issues areas and to move from cooperation in ‘low politics’ to cooperation in high politics) and the notion of the political community as an end production of regional integration. (Acharya & Johnston 2007:4). The ‘organic’ or step wise creation of a ‘supranational’ entity is also the preoccupation of neo-functionalism. In its essence, neo-functionalism emphasises the mechanisms of technocratic decision making, incremental change and learning processes. It also attaches considerable importance to the autonomous influence of supranational institutions and the emerging role of organised interests. Neofunctionalists improved upon the functional perspective by arguing that the work of important political groups whose interest favour integration drive functional cooperation amongst member states. If they perceived their interests were advanced in one area of cooperation, they would be inclined to attempt more of the same in other related areas, the so called ‘neofunctional spill over’ (Ginsberg 2010:66).

For liberal intergovernmentalists however, Europe’s political integration has been the result of bargains struck between nation states, with specific geopolitical interests that militate towards a pooling of sovereignty in given historical circumstances. Liberal intergovermentalism thus focuses on governmental actors whose capacity for decisions is enhanced by supranational institutions designed for particular purposes and under the control of the actors who have created them (Moravcsik 1993). According to this school of thought, the political integration of Europe can be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices respond to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical
interdependence, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. Member states remain the drivers of the integration process, not the supranational institutions. Through the various combination of neo-functionalist and intergovernmental models, some observers have characterized the EU integration process as a mix of institutional leadership (the so-called ‘community method’) combined with the inclination to develop flexible mechanisms of implementation, often popularised through terms such as ‘variable geometry’, ‘Europe a la carte’ and ‘two-speed Europe’, whereby institutional advancements are achieved even when not all members are in agreement (Devuyst 2006).

Europe’s political integration has also been explained from the perspective of its quest for security. This has been captured in Deutsch’s concept of a ‘security community’, whereby regional cooperation and integration are modelled around the need to defend relatively smaller or weaker countries against a potential threat (Deutsch 1968). Similarly, Buzan (though from a neo-realist perspective) has attempted to describe the process of regionalisation as a ‘security complex model’, whereby relatively small states coalesce to strengthen their collective bargaining power and comparative advantage (Buzan 1989). It is quite evident that the purely realist conception of threat as ‘military’ may be very well expanded to also include economic and societal threats (McKay 1999 and 2001). At the same time, some may argue about the extent to which the ‘security’ component has been a defining feature of the European experience of integration since the EU has been rather sceptical of equipping itself with a fully-fledged military force. This has caused some scholars of European foreign policy to refer to Europe as a ‘civilian’ and/or ‘normative’ power, thus criticizing overly realist readings of the EU’s integration process (Duchene 1972; Manners 2002). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the process of regional integration in Europe was initiated as a conflict-prevention mechanism, as exemplified by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Moreover, the intimate link between the EU’s member states and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), which provided much of the security framework to Western Europe during the Cold War (and continues to provide a leading role today), appears to vindicate – at least in part – the security approach to Europe’s integration. Against foregoing, it can be concluded that the political integration of Europe has been the result of the pooling of mutual interest against a progressive bargaining away of national sovereignty in areas where the benefits of collective action are perceived to surpass the merits of functioning in isolation. It has also been the hand work of visionary and strong leadership committed to the cause of European integration and capable of mustering support from their domestic constituencies for the advancement of the joint initiative, plus the pivotal role of some member states, notably Germany and France.

It has not been without scepticism and resistance from some significant players (consider, for instance, the ‘empty chair’ crisis caused by French President De Gaulle or the tensions with Britain under Margaret Thatcher) but has been systematic, coordinated and implemented with determination. Europe’s political integration and the theoretical explanations can serve as guiding frameworks for the study of integration experiences in other parts of the world. Europe’s political integration experience offers an insightful contribution to the debate on the actors and drivers of integration. It contributes to the discussion about the role of nation states driving the integration process as well as the role of regional institutions reinforcing the same regionalisation agenda. Its experience suggests that integration requires leadership, enlightened intergovernmental cooperation, and a progressive and systematic transfer of sovereignty from national governments to a central authority with supranational responsibilities through the creation of institutions that can both manage intergovernmental relations while retaining a mandate to remain supranational in character and be sufficiently mandated to act on behalf of and in the interest of the common good. The integration of Europe has not only covered the
political aspect but has also involved an important social component, which is examined in the next section.

2.3 The social integration of Europe

The inclusion of social considerations in the integration of Europe is another component that makes its experience unique. The former president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was among the first to popularise the term ‘European Social Model’ (ESM) in the mid-1980s by designating it as an alternative to the American form of free-market capitalism. The inclusion of social policy in a region’s integration agenda is often aimed at promoting a socially acceptable standard of living for its population. Social policy would often deal with issues related to employment (including wages and unemployment insurance), the social welfare system (including issues like pensions, nature and quality of health care and coverage), education as well as the professional and geographical mobility of labour. In the case of European integration, Article 3(i) of the Rome Treaty made provision for ‘the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living’.

Beyond the Treaty of Rome, a social policy for Europe was further articulated in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty which amended the original text. The Preamble of the updated treat of the EU made the increase in the standards of living of the European population one of the key objectives of the regionalisation process. Article 2 includes a high level of employment and social protection as well as raising the standards of living and quality of life, while articles 48 to 51 encourage free mobility of labour among EU member states accompanied by a commensurate aggregation of social-insurance benefits. Subsequent articles of the same treaty encourage a coordination of efforts in the fields of education and vocational training and the mutual recognition of diplomas and other certificates of formal education.
The milestones in the development of the EU social policy have therefore been: the Rome Treaty, which founded the European Social Fund; the Single European Act, which introduced qualified majority voting in some social areas; the 1989 Strasbourg Summit, which adopted the Social Charter, or Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of workers; and a new Action Program. These milestones confirm the notion that the integration of Europe has also evolved along the path of an important social policy component. The basic idea behind Europe’s social approach to integration is the notion that economic and social progress ought to evolve together and economic growth combined with social cohesion (Jepsen and Pascual 2005:234).

In Europe’s focus on unemployment and social tensions, it placed emphasis on the creation of jobs and on the development of human resources and social dialogue as a means of reducing social conflict. Social dialogue is also institutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty, which empowers members to decide by simple majority voting on matters such as health and safety in the workplace, working conditions, information and consultation of employees, equal employment opportunities for men and women and integration of the unemployed into working life.

Europe has supported the administration of its social policy by making available a budget for it. To generate the revenue necessary for its social policy objectives, the EU initially depended on direct contributions from member states. Following article 200 of the Treaty of Rome, member states were expected to contribute according to their economic strengths, with France, West Germany and Italy initially paying the largest contributions. However, article 201 of the same treaty envisaged the gradual replacement of direct contributions by the community’s own resources, with the initial sources to come from the proceeds of the common external tariff, from agricultural import levies, and from Value Added Taxes (VAT). With the coming into force of General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the commensurate reduction in external tariffs, coupled with the increased agricultural self-sufficiency of Europe, these
initially foreseen sources of funding proved inadequate, leading to the introduction of a fourth source of funding from a percentage of each member state’s Gross National Product (GNP). This system has been pursued for the EU budget (not just its social programme) and has given the EU commission some financial autonomy through a well-resourced pot of funds to advance the integration agenda in a range of areas, including through the promotion of Europe’s social model and policy of integration.

This has been another distinguishing element of Europe’s social model, its foresight in identifying and making provision for the resources needed to promote its social integration objectives. It may be argued that the social component of Europe’s integration was initiated amongst countries that had already well developed systems of social protection for their own populations and labour markets. Viewed from this perspective, it is easily conceivable for them to include social policy considerations in the construction of a European governance architecture. By doing this, they are ensuring that they do not depend on centralized supranational institutions to promote social policies and practices that have not been owned and domesticated in the national policy space of their member states. Approaching their social policy in this manner was an important first step towards ensuring the mobility of labour within the community as identified as an earlier integration objective. In so doing the EU was ensuring, for example, that the rights of European workers will be protected at the European level as much as such protections are already enshrined domestically. Taking a step further to secure resources initially from membership contributions and eventually from EU level contributions ensured that these objectives will not remain at the level of rhetoric but that the institutions responsible for their implementation would have the means to discharge their given mandate. Efforts were not only made to ensure the protection of the European citizen at the continental level but to also spread and encourage balanced development between the more advanced regions and the less advanced ones. In approaching its integration from this perspective, Europe
sought to share the social benefits of prosperity and development to all its citizens. It did not only commit to these ideals but made available the resources to accomplish its social policy objectives. The integration of Europe has not just been a political project with important social policy considerations, it has also followed a certain economic logic, particularly for the creation of its internal market and European level coordination of trade policies. These and other economic aspects of Europe’s integration are discussed further in the next section.

2.4 The economic integration of Europe

Different economic schools of thought have attempted to document the extent to the integration of Europe has concurred with economic logic and theoretical predictions. The explanations offered have varied as have the justifications, resulting in the delineation of what could be classified as Europe’s experience of economic integration. This economic integration experience speaks of the specific policy initiatives undertaken by European policy makers to promote the economic integration of Europe. Guided by the logic of economic integration, the six founding nations set off to create a unified economic area in which firms and customers located anywhere in the area would have equal opportunities to sell or buy goods and where owners of labour and capital would be free to employ their resources in any economic activity of their choice within the designated area. They therefore took moves to institute the free movement of goods, services, people and capital. These concepts were initially introduced in the Treaty of Rome, which laid out virtually every aspect of the economic integration that Europe has implemented over the last close to six decades, from the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) to today’s European Union (EU) (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2009:49). The Treaty’s first articles established the European Economic Community and its
subsequent articles set out the main economic goals and integration objectives to be pursued by the original six members. According to article 2 of the treaty, EU member states were to follow a timetable for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, including the elimination of custom duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods. It further advocated for the establishment of a common tariff and common commercial policy towards third countries and the abolition between members’ states of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital and the adoption of common policies in the spheres of agriculture and transport.

The Treaty of Rome and its subsequent revisions (also known as the Treaty establishing the European Community, TEC) covered other aspects too, including the protection of competition in the common market, the institution of systems by which the economic policies of member states can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balance of payments remedied, the creation of a European Social Fund (ESF) to improve employment opportunities for workers and contribute to the raising of standards of living and the establishment of a European Investment Bank (EIB) to facilitate the economic expansion of the community by opening up fresh resources.

It is clear from the provisions of the Rome Treaty that the pursuit of economic integration has been a key pillar of European integration from the beginning. There has thus been a conscious effort to support gradual market integration and then opening up to higher layers of collective governance. Further economic integration was enshrined in the Maastricht treaty where member states relinquished their rights to the individual use of their monetary policy and committed to a coordinated use of their fiscal policies. Having established a European Central Bank (ECB) earlier; these provisions paved the way for the eventual adoption of a single currency, the Euro, by a majority of member states. The adoption of the Euro in January 1999 implied the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a major step towards the
completion of the Single European Market (SEM), giving up their economic and monetary sovereignty and adopting a common currency as per initial agreement of the early six EEC members at the Hague in 1969. The decision to create an EMU was justified by a number of factors including the fact that the initial six were traditionally very open economies. After barriers to trade as per the Rome Treaty had been eliminated and a customs union achieved, the members conducted the bulk of their trade amongst themselves and it was consequently expedient and cost effective for them to envisage reducing the risks associated with conversions of their different currencies in trade exchanges. This would have had the effect of reducing the transaction cost of doing business and increasing trade amongst the member countries.

Some economists have argued that Europe’s regional economic integration follows the ‘supply and demand’ principles of classical economics. According to Walter Mattli, for instance, Europe’s integration can be considered the outcome of the interaction between economic incentives and the quest of countries (and their leaders) to push for economic growth (and re-election) (Mattli 1999). As the world economy globalizes, regional markets make it more likely for individual countries to reap the benefits of economic interdependence and compete on the global scene. This consideration has been supported by the promoters of ‘open regionalism’, who see the drive for economic integration as a consequence of the expansion of neoliberal globalization, whereby countries have accepted the inevitability of the elimination of trade barriers (and, in theory, of the free movement of people) across national borders (Cable and Henderson 1994). Europe’s resolve to create a single internal market beyond the custom union was informed by their desire to make it competitive on the world stage. This economic consideration provided the necessary incentive for European leaders to move for the creation of an internal market with the elimination of impediments to free movement of goods, people and services. Europe’s drive for economic integration was consequently a strategic move to give the continent and their combined economies more clout in the international arena. This
relates to the standard arguments for economic integration that speak to the advantages of larger markets for reaping the benefits of economies of scale, the creation of a common internal market for Europe, coupled with the monetary integration of most of its economies under the EMU and the coordination of fiscal and macroeconomic policy by the European Central Bank presents a mature model in economic integration that other regions like Africa could learn from.

2.5 The European Union and its institutions of integration

Europe’s experience in the creation of institutions of integration dates back to the post World War II (WWII) era with the creation of the ‘Organization for European Economic Cooperation’ (OEEC). The OEEC was founded in 1948 to administer the US Marshall Plan to reconstruct post-war Europe. In the creation of the OEEC Europe sought to avoid Fascism, Nazism as well as nationalist protectionism, while establishing peace and prosperity through trade links. These aspirations gave rise to nascent forms of supranational institutional development through the promotion of progressive integration in strategic key sectors. The Schuman Plan (1950) foresaw limited sectoral integration but on a supranational basis to place the war-triggering sectors of coal and steel under the auspices of one authority, the so-called ‘High Authority’ (Gilbert 2012:9). It was an explicitly political proposal but followed a functional approach of economic integration though with wider political objectives. Following that, the Treaty of Paris (1951) ushered in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (formally founded in 1952) to realize a common market for coal, steel and iron ore for the six member countries, the then West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. By the time the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957 to formalize the creation of the European Economic Community, these six countries had over five years of supranational coordination in the management of a shared resources. Learning from this early experience, the founding
nations of European integration agreed to the creation of a number of institutions that would play both a supranational and intergovernmental role. There were five such key institutions that served as the foundation and building block of the EU’s institutional development. These included i) the Council of the European Union, ii) the European Council, iii) the European Commission. iv) The European Parliament and v) the EU Court of Justice.

These five major institutions, their nature and functions can be summarised in Table 2.2 below:

**Table 2.2 Functions and nature of Europe’s five major regional institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/Nature &amp; Date of Origin</th>
<th>Major Functions</th>
<th>Governance/voting mechanism/ and sample action.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission (1952).</strong></td>
<td>-Guards/enforces treaty &amp; oversees daily EU functioning. Represents EU abroad and negotiates, initiates/executes legislation &amp; budget. Issues reports, studies, regulations and directives. Oversees transposition of EU laws into national legislation. Manages the EU’s competition Policy.</td>
<td>Simple majority. Charged to bring to the European Court of Justice any member governments that fail to comply with treaty law, for example by not transposing EU agreements into national legislation within a reasonable time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council (1952)</strong></td>
<td>It Co legislates with EP; Decides policy in areas of security and defence; Approves budget with EP; Asks commission to conduct studies and submit proposals. Council has the power to pass European Laws, coordinate the general economic policies of the member states in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), to approve the EU budget jointly with the European Parliament and to conclude international agreements between the EU and other countries or international.</td>
<td>Unanimity, consensus, qualified majority voting (QMV). Constructive abstention. Enhanced cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organizations. It also takes decisions pertaining to Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP) and measures pertaining to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>European Parliament (1952)</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Transnational Co-legislator</strong></th>
<th>Co-legislates with council, Oversees EU bodies and approves budget together with council; Approves enlargement/associations; Confirms/censures commission. Asks commission to conduct studies/submit proposals and adopt reports.</th>
<th>Simple or absolute majority.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Court of Justice**<br>**Supranational Court** | Interprets treaties.  
Rules on treaty law.  
Ensures uniformity of EC Law. | Simple majority. |
| **European Council**<br>**Intergovernmental summit of Heads of Government/States**<br>**Plus council & commission presidents and Higher representative** | Sets broad guidelines, makes overarching decisions, offers strategic direction and impetus; breaks logjams. Delegates powers to EU bodies to reduce transaction costs.  
Nominates, appoints Commission and Commission President, Council Secretary General, High Representative, and Executive Board/President of the ECB. | Consensus.  
QMV on selection of European Council and Commission Presidents and on appointment of new commission. |

Source: compiled from Ginsberg (2010).

These institutions are made up of a combination of supranational and intergovernmental hybrid models of governance. The Commission, for example, is a supranational organisation while the Council is generally an intergovernmental forum. In allocating responsibilities to European level institutions, the EU made use of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ (a guiding principle within the EU to ensure that institutions do not take on responsibilities that national and sub-national governments can do better). This has been the principle followed to determine the distribution of competencies between national governments and European level institutions. It was
instituted in the Treaty of Amsterdam to ensure that decisions in areas that do not fall under the EU’s exclusive competences (such as health care and education) should remain at national level (Ginsberg 2010:143). Where competences remain with the EU, it is guided by the principle of ‘proportionality’ according to which the content or form of the action taken by the EU must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the treaty. As such it can be argued that “… the pendulum of European integration swings between member states, who retain and delegate sovereignty, and EU bodies, who cultivate their scope for agency” (Ginsberg 2010:144). This functions as a principal-agent relationship in which the one is mandated to act on behalf of the other along the lines of mutually agreed principles with delegated and shared responsibilities.

Overall the EU’s governmental system as a body seems closer to a parliamentary system where legislators from the European Parliament (EP) hold accountable the political appointees in the executive represented by the Commission. The Commission is thus answerable to the EP, which has a supervisory role vis-à-vis the Commission. By subjecting a supranational executive to an elected parliament, the EU has established a constitutional system of checks and balances where Commissioners attend EP sessions to reply to queries by MEPs and sometimes have to justify chosen policies (Ginsberg 2010:148). This has created a mix of institutions driving the integration process in ways that go beyond the mere execution of their individual contemplated mandate. As such the EU institutions have become leaders of integration in their own right (Laursen, 2003).

There are a number of factors that can explain the relative success of Europe at creating institutions to promote integration. A major consideration is the fact that the initial six countries involved in the integration process approached the process with experience and history in building other institutions of regional governance. Another critical lesson from the construction of Europe’s institutions of integration is the careful attention given to the management of the
sovereignty concerns of member states. Responsibilities have been carefully handed over to supranational institutions and principles (like subsidiarity and proportionality) outlined for these institutions to ensure that they’re not a replacement of member states but only an enhancer of effective cooperation. Sovereignty concerns are treated as legitimate from member states and their expectations carefully managed along the process of further integration. These are important considerations in institution building for other experiences in regional integration, especially for Africa whose experience in regional and continental integration has followed a slightly different path from that of the European Union but resulted in the creation of a number of similar institutions of integration as shall be examined in the following section.

2.6 Conclusion.

In the post WWII period, Europe has been a major example of regional integration amongst industrialised countries and has also received the major focus of academic attention (Axline 1994). Its prominence has been further bolstered by its drive to promote integration in other regions of the world through provision of financial and technical assistance. This drive has been informed by its desire to self-replicate and the need to legitimise its own international role to its member states and other actors in the international scene (Haastrup 2013:786). The combination of its integration promotion efforts and its dominance within the theoretical space has given it a leverage to influence the practice of integration in other regions including and particularly in Africa. This is due to the fact that the two regions trade significantly amongst each other, share geographical proximity and a colonial history. But the integration experience of Europe should hardly be understood as a single model because it has several components that are unique in themselves. These have been examined through the political, social and economic all lenses of European integration, An emphasis has also been placed on the fact that the integration of Europe has been accompanied by the creation of a certain number of
institutions. These are all the different components of Europe’s experience of integration that must be factors into any analysis that seeks to establish the extent to which such a diverse mix of unfolding integration reality could have influenced the practice and experience of cooperation and integration in another region. As earlier argued, the dominance of the European experience within the literature may have made it well known to the other regions but caution should always be exercised when making an argument regarding its diffusion to Africa as its history, motivation, incentives, and approach to regional cooperation and integration has been slightly different from the motivations and drivers of integration in Europe as shall be explained in the next chapter.
Chapter Three.

The African Union and regional integration in Africa

3.1 Introduction

Regional integration has been described as a process during which actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states (Haas 1958: 16). Though a very narrow definition of the broad concept of regional integration, it captures the essence of the motivation of nation states to engage and formalise different forms of cooperation amongst themselves. This is sometimes guided by economic, political or security considerations and results to new emergent forms of partnerships that leave them different from what they were before their move towards integration. The pursuit of regional cooperation and integration in Africa is an ongoing experiment that has its roots in the rich and complex history of the continent. This pursuit of this agenda has been alternatively motivated by both political and economic considerations. From a political perspective, it derives its origin from the pursuit of African unity against colonisation and apartheid in Southern Africa. African unity was pursued because of the feeling that Africa needed a strong continental body to articulate its views and protect its interests in international political and economic negotiations. From an economic perspective, African cooperation and integration was perceived as a means of overcoming the limitations of the small sizes of Africa’s economies and to derive the benefits of economic integration for continental economic development (Oyejide et al. 1999:30). This chapter examines Africa’s efforts at promoting regional cooperation and integration on the continent and the challenges that have arisen out of this process. Accordingly it is further divided into five subsections. In section 3.2 a historical account of Africa’s continental integration efforts is presented while section 3.3 presents the political and economic integration
of Africa. Section 3.4 examins the African Union and its institutions of integration while section 3.5 examines the challenges of regional integration in Africa and section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

3.2 The historical context of Africa’s integration

The desire to integrate African economies on a regional and ultimately continental basis has its roots in the Pan African movement which aimed at the unification of African forces against imperialism and colonial domination, recognized as an essential component of strategies of economic decolonisation long before the attainment of political independence (Asante 1997:32). The early actors of the Pan Africanist movement (particularly Kwame Nkrumah) have been credited with the actions that led up to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which – as the predecessor of the African Union (AU) – remains a central focal point around which analysis of Africa’s integration efforts is routinely undertaken. It is consequently a useful endeavour to follow the chronology of events from the activities of the Pan Africanist movement under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah leading up to the formation of the OAU in order to get the background and context around which Africa’s continental integration has evolved. This background and contexts paints an important picture of how the fight for the decolonisation of the continent and the end of apartheid in Southern Africa resulted in calls for greater African solidarity and unity for its progress and development. Colonisation had not been a uniform experience for all African countries and though most post-independence African leaders expressed support for and believe in African unity, they sometimes differed on how the same should be attained. Some countries approached the subject of continental cooperation and integration by building on existing structures and frameworks (for example monetary arrangement amongst former French colonies). This sometimes translated to divergent foreign policy stands on a number of burning issues on the continent as the newly
independent African countries formed their political alliances to respond to a Cold War context and sometimes aligned with the foreign policy position of their former colonial masters. This is the context around which the OAU was born and the foundation for Africa’s unity established. Some of the more significant events that occurred within the early years leading up to the formation of the OAU and the possible influence exerted on Africa’s integration efforts are summarily presented in table 3.1 that follows:

### Table 3.1 Significant historical events leading up to the birth of the OAU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates/Place</th>
<th>Events/Delegates</th>
<th>Decisions/Discussions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th to 19th October 1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalton Town Hall, Manchester</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958, November 23</td>
<td>Formation of the Ghana-Guinea Union. Initiated by Dr Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure of Guinea.</td>
<td>Assumed will be nucleus of West African Unity. Guinea had decided to cut ties with France, with devastating economic consequences and Nkrumah decided to step in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 01st May</td>
<td>Conakry Joint Declaration. Independence and unity with one flag, one anthem and one motto Signed by Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah</td>
<td>Intention to broaden basis of Union Make it nucleus of ‘Union of Independent states of Africa. Members to surrender portions of their national sovereignty in the interest of African community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th to 22nd April 1958</td>
<td>First Pan African Conference on African continent. Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Liberia, Morrocco and Ethiopia.</td>
<td>Self-determination of all African States as per 1945 congress. Expressed support for Algerian Nationalists at war with French Colonialism. Instructed their UN reps in NY to coordinate on all matter affecting Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra, Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© University of Pretoria
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Symbol of Political Will Overcoming Religion and Sahara Desert Divide.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| July 19th 1959 | Saniquellie meeting & declaration Ghana, Guinea and Liberia  
Formation of Associated States of Africa (ASA)  
Decision to hold Special conference of All Independent African States in 1960  
Non-independent states with a fixed date also invited, to work out a charter which would achieve their ultimate goal of unity among independent African States. |                                                                                                                                  |
Also attended by Nigeria, Cameroon, Somalia and Sudan  
Debate on form of African Unity, African Unity with political integration (led by Ghana & Guinea) and common platform to co-ordinate their efforts aimed at achievement of their common objectives (led by Nigeria & Liberia). |                                                                                                                                  |
12 states: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Malagasy.  
Former French West African & Equatorial countries  
Discussed developments in Congo-Leopoldville.  
Algerian War of Independence.  
Morroco’s claim on Mauritania.  
French Nuclear tests in the Sahara.  
Also discussed: basis for future common action for cooperative development in their respective states. |                                                                                                                                  |
| December 1960, Brazzaville, Congo | Brazzaville Group alias Union of African and Malagasy States (UAMS) formed.  
Set up commission to propose plan for economic cooperation and development.  
12 states from Abidjan:  
Guinea was absent have broken away from France as well as Mali haven separated with Senegal over the dissolution of the Mali federation.  
Supported French intention to hold referendum and round table to settle Algerian independence issue.  
Expressed support for President Joseph Kasavubu in his quarrel with then Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.  
Invited all African countries to rally behind Mauritania to gain access to the UN since independence from Morocco and veto by Soviet Union at the security council.  
Study & report on form of relationship to exist with EEC as well as international organisations of financial & economic character. |                                                                                                                                  |
| December 1960 – 5 days after Brazzaville Meeting | Guinea Conakry Meeting.  
President Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Modibo keita from Ghana, Guinea and Mali  
Announce Union of three free state aimed at promoting a common economic and monetary policy.  
Criticized Conclusions from Brazzaville meeting as likely to Jeopardize African Unity and strengthen neo-colonialism. Also condemned all |                                                                                                                                  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1961</td>
<td>Casablanca meeting convened by King Sidi Mohamed V of Morocco. Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Congo and Mali</td>
<td>Condemned Gen De Gaulle’s proposed referendum and round table conference on Algeria and expressed support to Algeria Provisional government to gain independence. Expressed support for Prime Minister Lumumba and urged UN to use force to end Katangese Secession. Described Mauritania as a Paupet State created by France from Southern Morocco and support Morocco’s move to regain the country. Constituted Casablanca group with a radical outlook, addressing the same issues as Brazzaville Group but disagreeing on every conclusion from Brazzaville. Casablanca group advocated for Political Union with joint military High Command whereas Brazzaville only interested in Basic Economic cooperation. Meeting committed itself to giving material and financial support to all nationalist movements fighting against colonialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 1961</td>
<td>Monrovia summit to attempt to reconcile Casablanca and Brazzaville divided and co-sponsored by Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia though Ghana and Guinea pulled out in last minute. Full Brazzaville Group + Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia and Liberia subsequently called the Monrovia group. Morocco refused to attend because of Mauritania</td>
<td>Endorsed the positions taken at the Brazzaville Summit on all the major issues.Outlined principles to govern relationship of African States including -Non interference in internal affairs. -respect for sovereignty of each state and inalienable right to existence. -promotion of cooperation based on tolerance, solidarity and good neighbourliness. Unity in aspirations and action from the point of view of African solidarity and political identity as against political integration of sovereign African States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1962</td>
<td>Lagos Conference</td>
<td>Adoption of charter for formation of an Inter African Malagasy State Organisation based on resolutions adopted in Monrovia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Boycotted by Casablanca group over the non-involvement of Algerian Provisional government. 
Monrovia Group Minus Libya and Tunisia plus Tanzania and DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22nd to 26th May 1963</th>
<th>Addis Ababa Summit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 independent States from both Monrovia and Casablanca groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of Organisation of African Unity, with a charter representing a compromise of both positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Biswaro 2011.

This sequence of events leading up to the formation of the OAU highlights a number of interesting factors that have shaped the pursuit of Africa’s integration agenda till date. As earlier argued and supported by the record of events presented in the table above, the pursuit of integration and Africa’s unity traces its ideological roots to the Pan Africanist movement and the call for Africa to unite in the fight against colonial rule. Nkrumah (1963) articulated this call for unity and integration with the following words:

Africa, it is frequently maintained is poor. Yet it is widely acknowledged that its potentials provide tremendous possibilities for the wealthy growth of the continent, already known to contain vast mineral and power resources. The economic weakness of the new African states has been inherited from the colonial background, which subordinated their development to the needs of the colonial powers. To reverse the position and bring Africa into the realm of highly productive modern nations, calls for a gigantic self-help programme. Such a programme can only be produced and implemented by integrated planning within an over-all policy decided by a continental authority.

By situating the call for African unity alongside the fight for decolonisation, Nkrumah was making a case that Africa could only emerge from its past of subjugation and develop its economies to be globally competitive through a common political authority. He was obviously influenced by his strongly socialist inclinations and appreciation for centralized planning, but his philosophy of ‘strength in unity’ has been a foundational consideration in Africa’s continuous pursuit of integration.
Another important consideration from this historical account is the fact that Africa’s colonial past and the fight for independence supplied the institutional and leadership foundation upon which the continental integration edifice was laid. The colonial administration in most countries endowed them with their first infrastructure and economic development projects, including agricultural estates that continue today to contribute towards the export earnings of some African countries.

The colonial administrators also often administered groups of countries together, which facilitated the pursuit of cooperation by these countries after their independence. The British colonial administration created common research institutions for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as common transportation systems, laying the foundations for future economic cooperation leading up to the formation of the East African Community (EAC). Similarly the French administration managed its territories under French Equatorial and West Africa, which eventually led to the formation of a monetary union amongst these countries post-independence. Though it was disintegrated at independence, the East African Community (EAC) has been reconstituted and is today one of the African Union’s most successful Regional Economic Communities (REC), a coherence which can be traced back to their shared colonial experience of cooperation. This was also facilitated by the infrastructural linkages (especially rail) created under the colonial administration. In the case of West African integration, the ‘West African Economic and Monetary Union’ (UEMOA in French) assembling a number of former French colonies in West Africa has evolved as a custom and monetary union within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A sort of integration arrangement (UEMOA) within another integration arrangement (ECOWAS) and often considered as more advanced due to its monetary integration which is clearly of colonial origin. In this instance, as has been argued in the case of EAC, the linkages that existed between these countries under colonial rule constituted a platform for the pursuit of cooperation and integration in their post-independence.
This approach to continental integration through the pursuit of piecemeal sub-regional cooperation was at variance with the views of other African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah who advocated for a unified continent under a centralized authority. Nkrumah criticised attempts to promote sub-regional cooperation on the basis of language and previous cultural ties and saw this as an open door for the influence of neo-colonialism.

The third significant element from the above historical account is the fact that African countries approached the subject of integration and unity from a divided perspective. This became evident as early as at the second conference of all independent African states that took place in Addis Ababa in 1960. At this conference, there were those in favour of pursuing African unity through a full political integration (led by Ghana & Guinea) and those who only wanted a common platform to co-ordinate their efforts and achieve their common objectives (led by Nigeria & Liberia). Those who believed in the need to proceed towards a full political integration before any advancement in the social and economic fields could be achieved came to be known as the Casablanca group (names after a meeting convened by King Mohamed V of Morocco in January 1961), while those who maintained that a slower institutional process, founded perhaps on sub-continental regional groupings, focusing on functional cooperation was better suited to promote Africa’s integration were later known as the Monrovia group (name given to the group of countries that attended the Monrovia summit of May 1961) (Olivier 2010). The Casablanca group adopted a more radical stance on Africa’s integration, pledging support to nationalist movements and advocating the creation of a political union with a joint military command.

The Monrovia summit in contrast adopted a more conservative stance on the principles that would govern the relationship of African states. They for example advocated for non-interference in internal affairs and the respect for the sovereignty of each state and their inalienable right to existence. The encouraged the promotion of cooperation based on tolerance, solidarity and good neighbourliness. These two groups did not only disagree on the pace of
integration but also had divergence of views on a number of crisis situations on the continent at the time (opinions were divided on the Congolesse Civil War, support for Patrice Lumumba against the Katangesse session, the independence of Mauritania from Morocco, the French nuclear test in the Sahara Desert, the Algerian War of Independence and perceived French interference in its former colonies). It was against this backdrop that a meeting was convened in Addis Ababa from the 22nd to the 26th of May 1963, attended by 32 independent African States to found the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with a charter that represented a compromise of the views of these two groups. This explains why the initial conditions set out for the continental integration project had to build into it elements that could be perceived as ‘anti-integration’. A compromise solution had to be reached that guaranteed the non-interference in internal affairs of other African states and the respect for sovereignty of each state and their inalienable right to existence. The promotion of cooperation based on tolerance, solidarity and good neighbourliness and the pursuit of unity in aspirations and action from the point of view of African solidarity and political identity as against political integration of sovereign African States. This is foundation upon which the pursuit of Africa’s cooperation and integration was built. From this background and foundation, African countries have initiated a number of additional initiatives aimed at the political and economic integration of the continent, as shall be examined in the section that follows.

3.3 The political and economic integration of Africa

From a historical perspective, there have been arguably four critical moments shaping the continent’s political and economic integration trajectory. This has been the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) in 1980, the adoption of the Abuja Treaty establishing the
African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991 and the establishment of the African Union in 2001, including the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The OAU charter and the Constitutive Act establishing the AU define regional integration as one of the anchoring ideals of African unity. The Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community spell out the economic, political and institutional mechanisms for attaining this ideal, while NEPAD has been defined as the overarching development framework for the region (UNECA 2004:1). Together these constitute the policy framework within which the continent’s integration is being pursued. They provide the context for fostering the political and economic integration of Africa driven by the African Union and its institutions. An examination of the contribution of these different initiatives to the advancement of the continental integration agenda shall be carried out in the subsections that follow.

3.3.1 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created to promote unity and solidarity amongst African States. It was intended to serve as a platform to coordinate the efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa (OAU, 1981). This greater cooperation amongst African states was to be achieved through the coordination and harmonisation of their policies in a number of areas particularly through the promotion of political, diplomatic and economic cooperation. According to Article 2 of the OAU charter, the purpose of the organisation was, amongst others: to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The main avenue for the accomplishment of these objectives was policy coordination and cooperation in a number of spheres including: political
and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and communications; educational and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation and cooperation for defence and security.

The aspirations towards greater cooperation were partly sidelined by the organisation’s preoccupation with the fight for the total liberation of the continent from colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. This remained a core objective that drove the OAU, from its inception in 1963 to 1975. During this period, the OAU was mainly concerned with (a) the inter-state conflicts that took place at the time, and (b) with political support to the struggle for eradicating racist and colonial rule in southern Africa (Bujra 2002). This gave the continental organisation a largely political focus in the first decade of its operation with less attention given to issues of economic integration.

The economic performance of African countries in the 1970s, and the persistence of conflict, poverty and underdevelopment after the first decade of the OAU’s existence accentuated by the 1973 global economic crisis convinced African leaders of the need to shift the focus of their continental coordination efforts towards the economic emancipation of the continent (Bujra 2002). This led to a number of meetings, seminars and brainstorming sessions organised both by the OAU and the United Nation’s Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). At the eleventh extraordinary session of the OAU council of ministers in 1976, the Kinshasa Declaration was made which recommended the free ownership and control of natural resources by ensuring permanent sovereignty of African countries, the establishment of multinational companies, the establishment of the African Common Market, the African Energy Commission, and the African Economic Community within a period of 15 to 20 years (Kouassi 2007:3). The concept of economic autonomy and collective self-reliance by African countries was promoted by the OAU as a development paradigm to be embraced for the continental integration project.
Integration (it was intended) would contribute to redress the continent’s underdevelopment and grant it a more significant place on the world stage.

This belief in the importance of collective self-reliance gave rise to the “Monrovia Declaration” in 1979, a commitment by heads of state and government to measure and lead reforms aimed at achieving national and collective self-reliance in economic and social development for the establishment of a new international economic order (OAU 1979). The declaration promoted the social and economic development and integration of African economies with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustainment. Leaders also committed themselves to establishing national, sub-regional and regional institutions that would facilitate the attainment of the objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment.

These statements of intent should be understood within the context of the continent’s history of colonisation that had left most countries with a weak economic base, dependent upon a few raw materials and struggling to be competitive on the global stage. With this declaration, African leaders gave the continental integration project an economic focus based on the principles of solidarity and mutual dependence. This was to be actualized through economic cooperation in a range of areas with an emphasis on the use of Africa’s resources for the benefit of its citizens. States also went ahead to articulate their vision of regional and sub-regional cooperation that would constitute the building blocks for continental integration. They consequently gave a task to the OAU secretariat to convene a meeting to develop a policy document on economic development and cooperation on the continent, which is what the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) became when it was drafted and adopted.

3.3.2 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

The LPA based its strategies on key principles aimed at building an alternative form of development for Africa. Accordingly, self-reliance was the corner pillar and basis of
development – at the national, sub-regional and regional levels and equity in the distribution of wealth at the national level became a fundamental objective of development. On the basis of these principles, the LPA gave primacy to the development of agriculture (first for food and then for export), industrialisation (to satisfy basic needs), mining industries (to recover total and permanent sovereignty over national resources and establish mineral based industries), human resources, and science and technology (Bujra 2002). Accordingly, the LPA encouraged the pursuit of three goals: namely, (i) high and sustained economic growth; (ii) transformation of the economic and social structures; and, (iii) maintenance of a sustainable resource base. Adedeji (2002) has argued that the LPA promoted a model of regionalism that involved six mutually interdependent processes:

- the integration of the physical, institutional and social infrastructure;
- the integration of the production structures
- market integration
- resolution of inter country conflicts and prevention of acts of political destabilisation;
- ensuring stability and security, both at nation-state and inter-country levels; and
- The creation of an enabling environment for initiative and enterprise as well as facilitating cross-border factor movements.

The Final Act of Lagos set out an implementation schedule for this plan of action in two stages of ten years each. African states thus committed themselves in the first ten year (1980-1990) period to:

- strengthening the existing regional economic communities and establishing other economic groupings in the other regions of Africa, so as to cover the continent as a whole (Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Northern Africa);
• enhancing sectoral integration at the continental level, and particularly in the fields of agriculture, food, transport and communications, industry, and energy;

• Promoting coordination and harmonisation among the existing and future economic groupings for a gradual establishment of an African Common Market.

During the second ten year period (1990 to 2000) they further committed to:

• taking steps for further sectoral integration through: harmonisation of their strategies, policies and economic development plans; promotion of joint projects, particularly in the abovementioned economic fields and the harmonisation of their financial and monetary policies;

• Adopting measures to establish an African Common Market and other measures that would lead to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the African Economic Community (AEC).

The Final Act of Lagos also detailed out a plan of action to accomplish these objectives and acknowledged that the starting point should be the strengthening of existing sub-regional economic groupings and the establishment of new ones where deemed desirable. To this end, they authorised the drafting of the treaty for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) whose aim would be to promote collective and accelerated self-reliant and self-sustaining development cooperation among the states and their integration in the economic, social and cultural fields. That treaty was subsequently signed in Abuja in June 1991 and is commonly known just as the Abuja Treaty (Adedeji 2002).
3.3.3 The Abuja Treaty

The Abuja Treaty, also known as the Treaty for the Establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC), was ratified in 1991 with the following objectives:

i) To promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development.

ii) To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilisation and utilisation of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-reliant development;

iii) To promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among member states and contribute to the progress, development and the economic integration of the Continent; and

iv) To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the AEC.

The treaty made provision for a gradual integration of Africa through the progressive incorporation of its existing regional economic communities (RECs). It recognized the coordination, harmonisation and integration of Africa’s RECs as a prerequisite to their serving as building blocks for the creation of an African Common Market by 2028. Under this Treaty the creation of a fully-fledged African Economic Community was set to be accomplished over a period of 34 years (1994-2028) in six stages, ending in an economic union with a common currency, full mobility of factors of production and free trade among the continent’s 53
countries (UNECA 2006). The objectives that were to be accomplished at every stage as well as the progress registered until recently are briefly presented in Table 3.2 below:

Table 3.2 Africa’s integration progress relative to Abuja Treaty objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Not Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Stage: (5 years)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>All 7 RECs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen RECs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (8 years).</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6 RECs</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate &amp; Harmonize activities &amp; Progressively eliminate tariff and non-Tariff barriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (10 years)</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOVAS &amp; SADC have set up FTA</td>
<td>CEN-SAD and IGAD still in the process of setting up FTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Area &amp; Customs Union in each REC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (10 years)</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>COMESA launched Custom Union 2009 EAC fully operational Custom Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Area &amp; Customs Union in each REC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (2 years).</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Custom Union.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (4 years).</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Common Market.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Stage (5 years).</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>In Progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Economic and Monetary Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNECA 2010.

Table 3.2 indicates that there has been progress in attaining the first stage objective of strengthening the institutional frameworks of existing RECs and creating others where they did not exist. There has also been progress in the second stage related to the coordination and harmonisation of certain activities and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, though not in all RECS. Some RECs are more advanced in the attainment of free trade areas, namely the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). COMESA and EAC have gone a step further and initiated the establishment of a Customs Union, whereas in the south the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has been operational for a long time (UNECA 2012:5). COMESA has managed to simplify its custom procedures and eliminated some non-tariff barriers (in particular import licensing), the removal of foreign exchange restrictions, and the removal of import and export quotas (UNCTAD 2009:14). Through these milestone objectives and pursuant of the objectives outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Abuja Treaty laid out the continental vision for economic and political integration. It marked a significant milestone in expressing a desired destination for African cooperation and, though progress and implementation challenges have been registered, it has nevertheless produced a map and set targets against which the progress of continental integration could be gauged. It also established the framework within which further cooperation and continental integration would be expected to deliver on Africa’s economic development aspirations. These targets remain today the yardstick often used to justify the lack of progress in Africa’s integration and, by proxy, the failure of integration initiatives to deliver on developmental promises.

The performance of Africa’s institutions of integration have traditionally come under scrutiny, mostly in relation to their contribution to the accomplishment of these objectives. The OAU, for example, was greatly criticized for being little more than a collaboration of governments of sovereign states that placed an unfair amount of emphasis on preserving and protecting their national sovereignty. An organisation that did not interfere in the internal affairs of its members, refrained from criticising the actions of other governments in public and showed no seriousness in the pooling of sovereignty (Landsberg 2012:6). These weaknesses in advancing a deepening integration agenda on the continent was coupled with the fact that the resolutions and programmes of the 1980s, as well as those passed in the 1990s, did not produce significant
results in improving the economic situation of Africa (Bujra 2002). In the decade following the adoption of the Abuja Treaty, given the persistent economic challenges witnessed by most countries on the continent, the integration agenda developed a new imperative for adopting a different political and economic orientation to the continent’s cooperation and this ushered in the birth of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

3.3.4 The African Union and NEPAD

The Organisation of African Unity was replaced by the African Union through a Constitutive Act of 2000, which also established the new blueprint for Africa’s socio-economic development – the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formally adopted in 2001. NEPAD represented a shift in paradigm from previous initiatives on the continent because it recognised the link between development on the one hand, and governance, democratisation, and peace and security as important pillars for the success of Africa’s integration project on the other. It also placed the challenge of poverty alleviation and addressing underdevelopment at the core of a ‘new’ Pan-Africanism in Africa (Landsberg 2008:208).

Both the African Union and NEPAD represented a fresh impetus towards the attainment of the objective of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028 (Mukamunana and Moeti 2005:95). Like its predecessor the OAU, the African Union (AU) was founded with the objective of achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states and accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. It also adopted the objective of promoting and defending African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples, encouraging international cooperation, and promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent.
The AU was meant to bring about a different political orientation to the integration process in that it moved away from some of the principles that had governed and guided its predecessor, the OAU, like that of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. This different political orientation is captured in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, which advocates for a common defence policy, popular participation in the affairs of the Union and the right to intervene directly in a member state country in the case of crimes against humanity and the right to intervene to restore peace and security in a member state at its request (Kouassi 2007:18).

The optimism that accompanied the birth of the AU prompted some observers (see Landsberg 2012) to talk about new ‘continentalism’, a policy revolution accompanied by the continent’s subscription to a new set of norms, principles, values, mechanisms and structures, different from those characterised under the OAU. This new wave of inter-African cooperation put the issues of development, governance, democratisation, economic growth, and peace and security firmly on the continental agenda (Landsberg 2012: 2).

The AU principles also departed from its predecessor by bringing a new focus on good governance and the protection of human rights. With these the AU set for itself the objective of promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance and promoting and protecting human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instrument (OAU 2000). Though embracing these new principles, the AU did not completely abandon some of the ones identified in the OAU as it sought to enhance institutional and policy continuity between the two institutions. Such search for continuity had earlier been captured in the Sirte Declaration of 1999, wherein African leaders committed themselves to establishing a union that will be in conformity with the objectives of the OAU Charter and to accelerate the process of the implementation of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) by inter-alia shortening the implementation periods set out in the Abuja Treaty and ensuring the speedy
establishment of all the institutions provided for in the treaty like the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and the Pan-African Parliament (Biswaro 2011:396).

The search for continuity meant that a number of legal instruments adopted under the OAU were carried over to the AU like the Cairo Declaration on the Mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the protocol on the relations between the OAU and the RECs (Kouassi 2007:18). In some regards, the founding of the AU represented continuity with the momentum that had been developed through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), albeit with the modifications of certain principles and concepts that were both relevant and in sync with the developmental challenges of the continent in the 21st Century, in particular its focus on development and growth.

NEPAD had the main objective to meet the challenge of eradicating poverty from Africa, through the establishment of a stable environment conducive to peace and security and the promotion of sustainable economic growth and development, in order to ensure the continent’s full participation in global political and economic affairs (Kouassi 2007:21). It has also been described as the continent’s ‘market driven, extra-regional partnership model’ depicting the extent to which it contrasts with the inward looking/self-sufficient developmental paradigms adopted in the 1970s and enshrined in the philosophy of the OAU (Ikome 2007:20). It is governed by a three-tier structure; an implementation committee (assembly of Heads of State responsible for implementation), a steering committee (representatives of members of the implementation committee) and the NEPAD Secretariat responsible for the coordination of NEPAD programmes. The responsibility for its implementation however remains with member states and in partnership with the private sector, civil society and the RECs, following the principle of subsidiarity. The secretariat facilitates the implementation of programmes by
(amongst others) mobilizing resources and political support, carrying out advocacy and promotion campaigns and promoting institutional coordination in programme implementation (Kouassi 2007:23). Some of its current flagship programmes include: the initiative on peace, security, democracy and political governance (under which the African Peer Review Mechanism falls), closing the infrastructure gap (promoting investment in infrastructure in energy, transport, water and sanitation including information and communications technology) and an initiative on human resources development including a reversal of the trend towards the brain drain. NEPAD therefore represents a new approach to the pursuit of Africa’s economic integration and development based on greater cooperation with the rest of the world and the inputting of more responsibilities to African leaders on issues of governance and accountability to their citizens.

The establishment of the AU undoubtedly generated new dynamism towards regional cooperation. It was founded amidst the realisation that the efforts of close to four decades of continental integration had not yielded much in terms of developmental benefits to the continent. At the time of the demise of the OAU and the birth of the AU, Africa was virtually imploding because of internal and external pressures, including conflicts, poverty, under-development and public health crisis like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS (Biswaro 2011:396). As has been argued by the 2009 Economic Development in Africa Report:

regional integration, when designed and implemented within a broader development strategy to promote economic diversification, structural changes and technological development, could enhance productive capacities of African economies, realise economies of scale, improve competiveness and serve as a launching pad for African economies’ effective participation in the global economy (UNCTAD 2009).
The pursuit of political and economic integration have not been dissociated from each other, somewhat reflecting the neo-functionalist belief that greater economic integration when accompanied by the creation of functional supranational styled institutions is going to lead to eventual political integration. This probably explains why Africa’s pursuit of economic integration has been mostly driven as a political process and accompanied by the creation of a number of supranational institutions. These institutions have been expected to both drive and manage the process of further integration of the continent and the most prominent among them are briefly examined in the next section.

3.4 The African Union institutions of integration

The pursuit of Africa’s unity and the integration of the continent has been accompanied by the creation of a number of institutions that are called upon to play a major role in the promotion of the further integration of the continent. These are the institutions identified by article 7 of the Abuja Treaty (1993) as the organs of the African Economic Community, which include: (a) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; (b) The Council of Ministers;(c) The Pan-African Parliament; (d) The Economic and Social Commission;(e) The Court of Justice;(f) The General Secretariat; and (g) The Specialized Technical Committees. When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) became the African Union in 2001, these organs became known as the organs of the union with a few new more additions. According to article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the organs of the union shall be: (a) The Assembly of the Union;(b) The Executive Council; (c) The Pan-African Parliament;(d) The Court of Justice;(e) The Commission; (f) The Permanent Representatives Committee;(g) The Specialized Technical Committees; (h) The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;(i) The Financial Institutions;
While these institutions are foreseen as part of the continental integration project, not all of them have been completely set up or are fully operational. However the role that they are expected to play in the continent’s integration project has been clearly articulated in a number of policy documents as summarised below:

i) **The Assembly of the Union** is the supreme organ of the Union and is composed of Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives. The powers and functions of the assembly are elaborated in its Rules of Procedures. In Rules 4(e) to (g), for example, the Assembly’s powers and functions include deciding on intervention in, and determining sanctions to be imposed on a Member State. Whereas in Article 9(1)(e) the Assembly can monitor the implementation of the Union’s decisions and ensure compliance by Member States, Rule 4(1)(b) provides that this can be done “through appropriate mechanisms”. According to Rules 33 and 34, the decisions of the Assembly fall into three categories – namely: (a) regulations; (b) directives; and (c) recommendations, declarations, resolutions and opinions. Regulations and directives are binding on Member States, whereas recommendations, declarations, resolutions and opinions, by contrast, are not binding. In general, the Assembly is mandated to determine the common policies of the Union, establish its priorities and adopt its annual programme; b) monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the Union as well as ensure compliance by all Member States through appropriate mechanisms; c) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; d) give directives to the Executive Council, the PSC or the Commission on the management of conflicts, wars, acts of terrorism, emergency situations and the restoration of peace (AU 2015). It also appoints the chairman of the Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and commissioners of the Commission and determine their functions and terms of
office. It also appoints and terminates the appointment of the judges of the Court of Justice and adopt the budget of the Union; it determines the AU’s policies, establishes its priorities, adopts its annual programme and monitors the implementation of its policies and decisions.

ii) The Executive Council is composed of ministers or authorities designated by the governments of members states. It is tasked with the responsibility of preparing the sessions of the Assembly and determining the issues to be submitted for decisions. It also promotes cooperation and coordination with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the African Development Bank (AFDB) and other African institutions and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). In performing these functions, it also determines the policies for cooperation between the AU and Africa’s partners, considers and makes recommendations to the Assembly on the Commission’s structure, functions and statutes and ensure the promotion of gender equality in all AU programmes (AU 2015). While the Assembly is the highest decision-making body of the AU, the Council is also empowered to coordinate and take decisions on policies in areas of common interest to Member States. Under Article 13, these areas of common interest to the member states include foreign trade; energy, industry and mineral resources; food, agriculture and animal resources, livestock production and forestry; water resources and irrigation; environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster response and relief; transport and communications; insurance; education, culture, health and human resources development; science and technology; nationality, residency and immigration matters amongst others. These encompass practically all the issues that the Union is seized with. In effect, both the Assembly and the Executive Council
appear to be co-decision making bodies. However, and in practice, the Assembly makes all principal decisions because the decisions of the Council are subject to its endorsement or approval before they can take effect.

iii) The Pan African Parliament (PAP) as an organ of the African Union is constituted according to Articles 5 and 17 of the Constitutive Act. Though contemplated as one of the organs of the AEC according to the 1991 Abuja Treaty, it was only inaugurated in March 2004. It aims to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by universal adult suffrage. At present it exercises advisory and consultative powers and currently has 230 Members. PAP representatives are elected by the legislatures of their member state, rather than being elected directly by the people. According to article 8 of the 2014 Protocol of the PAP, it is meant to serve as the legislative organ of the African Union, receiving determination from the assembly on subjects or areas in which it may propose draft model laws, though it may on its own make proposals on the subject/areas in which it may submit or recommend draft model laws to the Assembly for its consideration and approval. According to paragraph 2, of article 8, the PAP can also request the attendance of officials of the other organs of the African Union at its sessions to offer it assistance in the discharge of its duties; promote the programmes and objectives of African Union in Member States; receive, consider and submit opinions on draft legal instruments, treaties and other international agreements as may be referred to it by the Council or Assembly and liaise with National Parliaments or other deliberative bodies and the Parliaments of the RECs on all matters relating to the AU and regional integration in Africa.

According to article 3 of its protocol, it aims to a) give a voice to the African peoples and the Diaspora; b) facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and
objectives of the AU; c) promote the principles of human and peoples’ rights and democracy in Africa; d) encourage good governance, respect for the rule of law, transparency and accountability in member states; e) promote peace, security and stability, f) strengthen continental solidarity, co-operation and development, and build a sense of common destiny and facilitate cooperation among Regional Economic Communities in Africa and their Parliamentary fora. One of its key other functions is to encourage National and Regional Parliaments to ratify and integrate treaties adopted by the AU into their legal systems (AU 2015).

iv) **The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights** is a continental court established by African countries to ensure protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa. It complements and reinforces the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. It was established following Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (the Protocol) which was adopted by Member States of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998. The Protocol came into force on 25 January 2004 after it was ratified by more than 15 countries. It has currently been ratified by only twenty six (26) of the 54 member states of the AU. The court has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter), the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the states concerned. It consequently has a focus on the promotion of human rights and not on the interpretation nor enforcement of the treaties of the African Union.
v) **The Permanent Representatives' Committee (PRC)** is composed of permanent representatives of member states accredited to the African Union and other duly accredited plenipotentiaries of member states resident at the headquarters of the AU. It is established under article 21 of the Constitutive Act. Its powers and functions include the following: (a) to act as a liaison between member states and the Commission; (b) to exercise oversight over the Commission; (c) to facilitate and support the Executive Council in executing its powers and functions; and, (d) to participate in the preparation of the AU’s programme of activities. (AU 2015). It prepares the work of the Executive Council and act as its advisory body. It plays a key role of facilitating communication between the AU Commission and the capitals of member states. It also considers the programme and budget of the Union as well as administrative, budgetary and financial matters of the Commission, and make recommendations to the Executive Council. It also considers matters relating to the programmes and projects of the Union particularly issues relating to the socio-economic development and integration of the continent, and make recommendations thereon to the Executive Council. It can thus be considered the critical linkage established between the AU and its member states and the channel through which the member state governments participate in the running of the AUC.

vi) **The Specialised Technical Committees (STCs):** Article 14 of the AU Constitutive Act provides for the establishment of Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) across a range of thematic areas. These STCs are responsible to the Executive Council and are organs of the AU in accordance with article 5 of the AU Constitutive Act. The process of operationalising the STCs has been ongoing and, as of 1 September 2014, the functions of some STCs were being carried out by various
sectorial ministerial conferences. The objective of these committees will be to prepare projects and programmes for the Union and submit them to the Executive Council. STCs are also to ensure their supervision and follow-up the implementation of decisions taken by the Organs of the Union. They are also meant to ensure the coordination and harmonization of the projects and programmes of the AU and to submit to the Executive Council (either on their own initiative or at the request of the Executive Council) reports and recommendations on the implementation of the provisions of the Constitutive Act. The Constitutive Act initially provided for seven STCs but at its February 2009 summit meeting, the Assembly enlarged this number to 14 to make their structure and thematic focus consistent with AU Commission portfolios (see Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.227 (XII) adopted in February 2009 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).

vii) The African Union Commission: The Commission is the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the African Union. Among others, it represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council; elaborates, promotes, coordinates and harmonizes the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the RECs; ensures the mainstreaming of gender in all programmes and activities of the Union. The Commission is mandated, among other functions, in Article 3(2) to: Represent the Union and defend its interests under the guidance of, and as mandated by, the Assembly and the Executive Council; initiate proposals for consideration by other Organs; Implement the decisions taken by other Organs; Coordinate and monitor

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3 - See more at: http://www.au.int/en/ organs/stc#sthash.cmW3nw8p.dpuf
the implementation of the decisions of the Union in close collaboration with the PRC and report regularly to the Executive Council; Work out draft common positions of the Union and coordinate the actions of Member States in international negotiations; and, Prepare the Union’s Programme and budget for approval by policy Organs.

The history of the creation of institutions for African integration is a peculiar one because it reflects a pattern of doing things ‘the African way’. Grand plans, with grand designs that are decided upon and many years go by before implementation takes place. In the case of the Pan African Parliament, it was only inaugurated in 2004 and the protocol for its functioning ratified in 2014. It currently only plays an advisory role within the architecture of the organs of the Union. For the African Union to take more than two decades to set up an institution like the continental parliament, which is supposed to play a key role in driving the integration process is surely problematic for a continent waiting to reap the development benefits of its integration in better governance and improved welfare. This has also been the fate of the Court of Justice and of the financial institutions also foreseen in article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which though identified as important components of the integration project have not yet been fully set up. This raises the question of the amount of thought that actually went into the choice of institutions retained to drive the integration process of the continent and the exact model being pursued as well as clarity on the desired outcomes of integration sought after. It is exactly because of this reality that some analysts feel the African Union is probably just copying from the European experience of integration without taking cognisance of its own history and background and the suitability of its choice of institutions with the African chosen pathway of integration.

Whereas an appropriate institutional framework and infrastructure are the bedrocks upon which development at all levels – local, national, regional and continental is built. Without certainty
about the appropriateness of designated institutions, endeavouring to set up and make them functional can be an exercise in futility. How does an institution get to be funded adequately and organised to function optimally if its mandate is only vaguely defined. The question of adequacy and source of funding is critical to the ownership of the integration agenda by the AU member states and addresses the more fundamental question of the form orientation and integration vision currently being pursued by the AU. Seeking to resolve the question of funding without addressing the more fundamental questions surrounding the vision, the desired destination and roadmap (including the most suitable institutions to accompany the process) towards the accomplishment of the same may not prove a very fruitful exercise. This question of the funding and the functioning of the African Union’s institutions of integration (as a collective) is an important one because it also partly explains the little progress registered from 1963 when the OAU was formed and manner in which the continent’s integration agenda is currently being advanced. Activism may not necessarily be a sign of progress if the destination has not been agreed upon and clearly defined. Progress would be measured by effectiveness and efficiency and could be a function of a range of factors, including the proper conceptualising, design and the mandate given to the institutions. Conceptualisation would be deficient if inadequate attention is paid to understanding the nature of the problem being solved leading to the adoption of unsuitable institutions to drive the process of integration. It could also be the result of the failure to fully appreciate the realities of the contexts in which the perhaps well-conceived institutions ought to operate leading to a less than optimal outcome at the level of the implementation. Conceptualisation and design may be acceptably done but the institutions fail to adequately discharge their mandate due to a lack of capacity or funding or both. The former will raise the question of the effective functioning of a continental bureaucracy (which is influenced by organisation and technical capacity) whereas the latter will relate to the available of financial resources to discharge the mandates allocated to the continent’s
institutions. Without adequate attention being given to resolve these more substantive issues the functioning of the AU’s institutions of integration risks continuing with the same pattern of taking ad hoc decisions and setting up commissions to follow up implementation, setting up other commission to determine why the implementation did not go as planned and coming back a few years later to create new institutions and programmes to address the more pressing and emerging needs of the hour.

Resolving the question of creating appropriate institutions to manage and drive Africa’s integration should therefore be considered an important priority. Unfortunately the Constitutive Act of the AU is limited in this regard in that it does not specify what steps need to be taken to accelerate the political and economic integration of Africa. Neither does it provide clear and sufficient guidance as to the powers and functions of the various Organs, institutions and key players, nor the relations among them. Also, it does not contain an institutionalised mechanism for the promotion and management of Union affairs at national level. No provision is made in the Act for remedying or rectifying the prevailing and dominant inter-governmental tendencies carried over from the OAU, except by stating, in Article 33, that the Act shall replace the Charter of the OAU (OAU 2000). For the institutions of the African Union to deliver on their mandate of driving the integration process, they need to be clearly given this mandate and the accompanying authority and resources to do so. But this has not been the case up to now because the question of sovereignty pooling and sovereignty transfer was never seriously considered during the formation of the OAU or the transition from the OAU to the AU. There seems to be a long standing reluctance to create and empower supranational institutions that are well resourced and mandated to manage Africa’s integration process. Even with the creation of the AU, the member states do not yet seem ready to empower the continental institutions with supranational responsibilities over the integration process. In a 2001 report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the Lusaka Summit on the texts relating to the key organs of
the African Union and as part of the management of the Transition from the OAU to the AU, it was recommended in paragraphs (f) and (g) on the powers of the Assembly that it be called upon to facilitate the progressive pooling of the sovereignty of member states to be exercised by the Commission in the interest of the Union and to determine areas in which member states can entrust the Union with the responsibility of promoting their collective interests (OAU 2001). But these recommendations never made it through to the rules and procedures governing the actual functioning of the General Assembly. In a similar vein in paragraph 5, article 8 of the protocol of the PAP, the functions of the PAP are only limited to those allocated to it by the Assembly and the Council but the range of discretional activities allocated to it in paragraph 2 and 3 of the same article 8 do not extend to the assembly and council. Which essentially means that the PAP cannot institute an enquiry into the conduct of the assembly, court and council or their members. The Assembly of Heads of States currently remains the sole organ upon which all decisions reside, it is answerable to itself, not subject to scrutiny by any other organ and allows no other organ to drive the integration agenda beyond the mandate it has expressly delegated to them. This makes the AU and its institutions a model of intergovernmental cooperation governed by an Assembly of Heads of States whose activities are managed by a sort of secretariat called the AU Commission.

While there may be nothing inherently wrong with choosing to run the integration project in this manner, it however seems problematic because of the lack of clarity in approach that it communicates when all the other foreseen institutions have not yet been created and those already created are not sufficiently empowered or given a clear mandate to function. This is the background against which the gap between decisions and implementation gives room for the suspicion of mimicry. Mimicry has been described as the process of copying foreign models in terms of symbolic or normative factors, rather than a technical or rational concern with functional efficiency. This is when states or regional organisations adopt the practises and
institutional forms of ‘social leaders (states and regional organisations considered to be more successful/advanced) and perceived by others and themselves as being advanced, progressive and morally praiseworthy (Marsh and Sharman, 2009:272). The indication that this may be happening is often drawn from the noticeable gap between commitments and implementation of integration related decisions. According to this argument, integration models may be copied because of their appeal and a failure of implementation will be evidence that they were copied inappropriately even though implementation failure may also be the result of other contributing factors (like the lack of technical and financial capacity) in which case the use of poor implementation as an indicator of mimicry would be an erroneous conclusion. It is however likely that in the case of Africa there is a combination of factors at work which may explain the witnessed gap between integration commitments and implementation realities.

Africa has certainly come a long way in setting up institutions to advance the ideals of an integrated and united continent. It has certain registered progress in the accomplishing the OAU charter objectives of freeing the continent of all forms of colonisation and oppression but Africa is still a long way from attaining the objectives of economic integration (evidenced by the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC) and Common Market) and political integration (evidenced by the formation of an African Union government). What explains the lack of progress registered in attaining Africa’s integration objectives, notwithstanding the enthusiasm that accompanied the wave to end colonisation and move towards a united and prosperous African continent that uses its vast resources for the welfare and benefit of its people? Have there been critical and fundamental challenges experienced by AU member states that may have prevented the accomplishment of their integration objectives or were these objectives not well thought out or down outright unrealistic in the first place? Is there something fundamentally wrong with Africa’s current pursuit of continental integration? If yes what would that be and what possible solutions could make a meaningful difference in the attainment of its
integration and developmental objectives. The section that follows will attempt to provide some answers to some of these questions by highlighting some of the difficulties inherent in the pursuit and practise of regional cooperation and integration as has been on the continent for the past five decades.

3.5 The implementation challenges of regional integration in Africa

The story of regionalisation on the African continent is one in which political rhetoric and commitment to regional integration have not always been matched by implementation reality, as some of the objectives and targets have not been met (Olivier 2010; Draper 2012). Vanheukelom (2016:2) blames this ‘implementation gap’ between the promises and delivery of the African Union commission on its mandate on its ever expanding agenda amidst the constraint of limited resources, lack of leverage and the absence of political commitment from some of its key implementing partners. Akokpari (2008:106) has identified what he terms ‘structural bottlenecks’ that militate against effective integration in Africa, these include:

- The problems posed by multiple memberships of states in various regional organisations.
- Low levels of intra-regional trade coupled with the continent’s stronger trading relation with partners external to Africa.
- The prevalence of weak institutions, debt and conflicts.
- The tension between the states and regional organisations with respect to the preservation of their national sovereignty.
- Concerns over the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits from integration among states
- And the dangers of pursuing economic and political integration simultaneously.
While these have been extensively documented as noted bottlenecks in Africa’s integration process, it is not completely clear why these bottlenecks have persisted over many years notwithstanding the belief in the developmental benefits of integration for Africa. Their persistence suggests a fundamental problem with the conceptualisation and conduct of regional integration on the continent. This may be most evident from the continuous membership of AU member states to different sub-regional economic and political arrangements (Dinka and Kennes 2007; Draper et al. 2007; UNECA 2006 and 2008). This prevents states from fully committing to the objectives of regional integration and undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of regional formations. Furthermore membership in numerous groups exerts considerable material, financial and human resources pressures on states. For a region characterised by scarce resources and weak institutions, simultaneous implementation of conflicting policies in a bid to satisfy the demands of various groupings takes a devastating toll on participating countries (Akokpari 2008:100). This should be evident to the countries who persist with such arrangements and the AU has taken steps to address this situation by recognizing only eight of the many regional organisations that have been created on the continent. These are meant to serve as building blocks to continental integration, yet for the moment they seem to be more conscious about their sub-regional realities and priorities than they are about the continental project. This is perhaps because they are more economically connected and share more ties with the countries in their sub-region than with the rest of the continent. It becomes a challenging exercise to harmonise custom policies amongst the participating members that belong to a number of different regional economic integration arrangements at the same time. Countries therefore choose which regional arrangement to belong to not based on a preoccupation with the impact of multiple membership on continental integration but based on which arrangement best serves their immediate strategic interest and developmental aspirations. They consequently find themselves subscribing to multiple regional
organisations to derive the benefits that each may have to offer. Multiple membership though costly and disadvantageous becomes justifiable in the eyes of the AU member states when assessed through the lens of the pursuit of their strategic interests. It is surely not healthy for continental integration and consequently calls for the establishment of a continental integration agenda that sufficiently carters for the strategic interests of all participating member states that goes beyond the desirability and benefits of a united continent.

The same logic would apply to AU member states unwillingness to surrender the control of macroeconomic policy making to a regional/continental authority, or to face potential consumption costs that may arise from importing from a high cost member country, or to accept the unequal distribution of the gains and losses that may follow an integration agreement while discontinuing existing economic ties with non-members (Geda and Kebret 2007:359). Some authors like Oyejide et al., (1999) have argued that African integration schemes suffer from endemic implementation lapses because of a lack of political will to carry out agreed commitments in the face of ensuring loss of national sovereignty, absence of adequate technical and management expertise, expectation of loss of fiscal revenue on trade taxes, and uncertainty over the distribution of the gains and losses of integration. Though this may indeed be a question of the lack of political will, it certainly comes across as the result of the benefits of integration not being perceived as higher than its associated costs. Political expediency (for example responding to urgent domestic needs with scarce resources under pressure from a constituency that has given a developmental mandate within a specific electoral cycle) may be the reason why there is a lack of political will to implement regional and continental level commitments.

These implementation challenges have been coupled with a persisting divergence amongst the African ruling elites about the pace and pathway to be adopted for integration. For some time after its inception, the AU was (some would argue that it still is) caught in an internal debate regarding how to proceed with the integration process, somehow replicating the initial division
between the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups. There is no evidence of consensus about the polity being created through the current integration efforts and even much less clarity about the most suitable pathway to be adopted or the most appropriate institutions to be created to accompany this process. A plan to establish a union government for Africa was launched at the 4th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005. There the AU agreed to the proposals made by the Libyan government regarding the establishment of ministerial portfolios for the organisation. This proposal which had been made at the 6th ordinary session of the Executive Council of the AU recommended the establishments of the posts of an African minister of Transport and Communications and a minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs. This was intended to be a step towards harmonizing the transport and communications portfolios of the continent under one ministry and also to have a common defence and foreign affairs policy managed centrally. To follow up on this recommendation the AU set up a committee which later convened a conference under the theme the ‘desirability of a Union Government of Africa’. The conference came up with a number of key conclusions and recommendations. It acknowledged the need for an AU government made up of a union of the people and not just a union of states and governments. It however recommended that its creation must come about through the principle of gradual incrementalism; and that the role of the RECs as building blocks for the continental framework should be highlighted. Based on the findings of this conference the Assembly mandated the AU Commission to prepare a consolidated framework document defining the purpose of the Union Government, its nature, scope, core values, steps and processes, as well as an indicative road map for its achievement.

In July 2006 a commission led by former president Obasanjo submitted a detailed report to the Commission entitled ‘A Study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa’ to the 7th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in Banjul, Gambia. The study
identified 16 strategic areas that ought to be the focus of an African Union Government including: continental integration; education, training, skills development, science and technology; energy; environment; external relations; food, agriculture and water resources; gender and youth; governance and human rights; health; industry and mineral resources; finance; peace and security; social affairs and solidarity; sport and culture; a trade and customs union; and infrastructure, information technology and biotechnology (AU 2006:8). The study also noted that the design and functioning of a Union Government as a tool for integration would have far-reaching implications on the existing institutions and programmes of the African Union (AU 2006:14). A statement which can lead to the plausible conclusion that the current programmes and institutions have not been conceived and are not being implemented expressly with the objective of building towards this desirable union government. For a process that started in 1963 to still be speaking of the desirability of the fruit of political integration in 2006 (more than four decades later on) speaks of an initiative that has been undertaken and driven without an agreed upon destination nor broad consensus about how to proceed moving forward. This probably explains why the planned organs of the Union as foreseen in the Constitutive Act are taking forever to be established and those which have been established are underfunded and disempowered.

Since the submission of the report of the Union Government commission, not much seems to have been done in carrying their recommendations forward or in altering the functioning of the current institutions of integration to expressly start working towards the setting up of the union government. For Africa, political integration seems to be only an ideal that the AU member states aspire towards but do not yet seem ready to take the necessary steps to move decisively in that direction. It further suggests that the ghosts of the ‘Casablanca and Monrovia’ debates have not been completely laid to rest. Until recently headed by Libya’s former leader Gaddafi, a group of some 20 states have been supporting the plan of a strong political union. These
‘unionists’ are opposed by the ‘gradualists’, who prefer an organic or gradual development. The ‘gradualists’ are in general opting for a process where economic integration in sub-regional groups should eventually lead to African unification.

Some would argue there is consensus about the importance of an integrated Africa but only disagreement about how to achieve this objective. To other analysts however, the disagreements about the pace and model of integration as well as the poor implementation record instead, point to a more fundamental problem associated with the conception and design of the existing set of African regional integration schemes and institutions. McCarthy (1999) for example finds fault with both the conception and design of most of Africa’s regional integration schemes. He argues that integration was conceptually designed as an inward looking instrument of industrial development. In this context, the principal goal of integration and growth in intra-regional trade was for economic development and structural transformation through industrialisation; while the main role of integration was to aggregate the small individual economies into larger regional markets. Even though the formation of these larger integrated markets have remained elusive in most parts of the continent, this was a problematic approach to be adopted in the first place because though the ‘new’ regional economy would be larger than the individual economies, the combined markets would still not have been large enough to promote the high levels of industrial development promised by regional integration aspirations (Oyejide et al. 1999:7). As such the economies of scale argument for the promotion of regional cooperation would have made for larger and hopefully more competitive markets but would not have led to the large scale industrialisation and economic transformation that these countries were hoping to benefit from regional cooperation without a structural transformation of their own national economies.

In terms of the design, the apparent preference for formal trade and factor market integration meant that rather ambitious targets of regional integration were usually adopted. These have not often taken into consideration the unfavourable structural factors characterising Africa, such
as the competitive nature of primary production (including volatility of world market prices), small size, low per capita income, limited manufacturing capacity, weak financial sectors and a poor (interstate and intra-state) transportation and communications infrastructure. These structural difficulties produce economies that have little to trade with each other but are locked into a North-South trading relationship, a reality which has given rise to regional arrangements that have the lowest levels of recorded intra-regional trade of all integration experiences (McCarthy 1999:21).

Hartzenberg (2011) also blames the poor implementation of Africa's regional economic integration arrangements on the paradigm of linear market integration marked by step wise integration of goods, labour and capital markets, with eventual monetary and fiscal integration. Arguing that focussing on supply side constraints through a deeper integration agenda that includes services, investment, and competition policy (other than border issues like tariffs) may prove to be a more effective route for the promotion of integration. Motsamai and Qobo (2012) on the other hand identify three interlinked factors that limit regional integration processes in Africa and constrain its potential to be used as a vehicle for development in national economies, beneficial integration into the global economy and facilitating Pan-African Unity. These are centred on: institutions of governance including the structure of domestic politics, structural conditions of poorly developed economies and their dependence on one or two primary products, as well as the capacity to assert policy preferences in international economic relations.

These factors together explain why Africa’s integration efforts have thus far yielded less than satisfactory results and in most cases are indicative of specific actions that could produce meaningful results for Africa’s integration efforts. It is however unclear which of these challenges represent a significant enough pillar that could cause the huge turn around in Africa’s experience of integration. One question that needs however to be asked, is whether the pursuit of developmental regionalism is a feasible model for Africa and if there has been a precedence
of this approach to regional integration in any other parts of the world. The relevance of this question lies in the attribution of developmental roles to regional and continental institutions of integration without the necessary resources or political authority to perform in the related areas as expected. This unchallenged notion is what often leads to the conclusion that Africa’s efforts at regional integration for the last couple of decades has not contributed much to lift the continent out of its plight of poverty and underdevelopment, with the implication being simply that the practise of regionalism on the continent since the formation of the OAU in 1963 has not contributed in any significant way to its upliftment given the number of low income and poor countries that are still on the continent.

This is the background against which the gap between decisions and implementation gives room for the suspicion that Africa may be attempting to copy from (also known as mimicry) the European Union experience of integration without much success or thought of its suitability for the African context. Mimicry has been described as the process of copying foreign models in terms of symbolic or normative factors, rather than a technical or rational concern with functional efficiency. This is when states or regional organisations adopt the practises and institutional forms of ‘social leaders (states and regional organisations considered to be more successful/advanced) and perceived by others and themselves as being advanced, progressive and morally praiseworthy (Marsh and Sharman 2009:272). The indication that this may be happening is often drawn from the noticeable gap between commitments and implementation of integration related decisions. According to this argument, integration models may be copied because of their appeal and a failure of implementation will be evidence that they were copied inappropriately even though implementation failure may also be the result of other contributing factors (as has been argued in the case of Africa above) in which case the use of poor implementation as an indicator of mimicry may be an erroneous conclusion. It could also be the case that an attempt at mimicry is compounded by pre-existing structural deficiencies and
other challenges resulting in a compounded episode of implementation failure. Should this be the case in Africa, it raises the question (that often goes unanswered) whether the developmental promises of regionalism for Africa were to be fulfilled by simply making plans for progressive market integration (the creation of an African Economic Community) without and before the economic transformation of its economies. Whatever the case, the fact remains that Africa’s experience of regional integration has in many ways fallen short of the expectations of its citizens and failed to meet their developmental aspirations. Some of the ways in which its experience compares or contrasts to that of the European Union are examined in the section that follows.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented Africa’s experience of integration as a drive to promote its unity and pursue a self-reliant model of developmental regionalism. Africa’s integration efforts have repeatedly affirmed the logic of unity and integration as formulated in the Charter of the OAU (1963); the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, (1980); the Abuja Treaty,(1991); the Sirte Declaration, (1999), and the Constitutive Act of the AU, (2000). These instruments stand as galvanizing landmarks for integration in the face of Africa’s political and economic challenges. It has also in the process created a number of institutions and adopted major policy documents that have striking similarities with that of the EU, especially their policies on the formation of their respective economic communities and associated institutions of integration. But its history and motive for the pursuit of unity and integration is clearly different from that of Europe as have been its approach (unconditional access to membership). This unique historical context has not only informed its approach to continental integration but has significantly shaped its relationship with the EU over the years as shall be argued in the chapter that follows.
Chapter 4

The evolution of EU-Africa relations.

4.1 Introduction

The evolution of Europe’s relationship with Africa is one that well nested in the history of the collaboration and interaction between the two continents. This relationship has undergone several changes over the years and has evolved from one of asymmetrical benefits to one of a ‘shared vision and principles’ according to the joint Africa-EU strategy of the ‘Africa- EU strategic Partnership’. This relationship has evolved from the transatlantic slave trade, through colonisation, to decolonisation and the formation of trade relationships between the EU and a group of African Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP). The continental integration efforts of the European Union and the birth of the African Union has seen formal collaborative efforts established between the two bodies. These developments have created avenues for shared experiences and lessons drawing in region building. The European Union and EU member states as individuals have also provided support to Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs), through individual and bilateral agreements. There have therefore been a number of different avenues through which the evolving relationship between Europe and Africa has been accompanied by specific initiatives aimed at the promotion of regional cooperation and integration amongst African countries.

EU- Africa relations have continued to function at national and supranational levels simultaneously, ranging across the respective policies of individual member states to the European Commission initiatives on development policy, its declaration on Millenium Development Goals, the Cotonou Agreement, and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the European Commission and groups of African countries as well
as the EU’s Strategic partnership with the African Union as part of the EU’s Africa Strategy (Farrell, 2010:66). This aim of this chapter is to present a brief overview of the evolution of the EU-Africa relationship, from a historical and chronological context. It aims at setting the scene to better understand contemporary EU-Africa relations within the context of the different stages and phases of their interaction over time. A second objective of adopting this approach is also to highlight the instances in which this EU-Africa interaction has promoted region building on the African continent, as well as the extent to which Europe has been informed or influenced by its own integration experience in shaping its policies towards Africa. Accordingly this chapter is divided into five sub-sections. Section 4.2 examines the historical evolution of the EU’s relationship with Africa while section 4.3 discusses the EU’s relationship with the African Carribean and Pacific (ACP) groups of countries as it evolved from the Yaounde Conventions, through the Lome conventions to the Cotonou Partnership Agreements. Section 4.4 examines EU-Africa relationship in a contemporary context of the Joint Strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa and section 4.5 concludes the chapter.

4.2 The colonial context of EU- Africa relations

The relationship between Europe and Africa is one that has been going on for over five centuries. It has evolved along with the individual political and economic developments on both continents and continues in the same light. For Europe it has been an evolution that started with the Portuguese voyages of discovery, including the search for a sea route to India that led to the setting up of a number of trading posts along Africa’s Atlantic coast running from Senegal Down to the Cape. Other significant changes on continental Europe that affected its relationship with Africa included the discovery of the America’s and the establishment of plantations for the farming of tropical crops. The combination of these two factors gave birth to the
Transatlantic Slave Trade, which has also been described as the Triangular Trade in Slaves (TTS), where European ships collected slaves from Africa, shipped them to the Americas, transported the agricultural produce to Europe, processed them and brought back some finished products to Africa. The TTS attests to the notion that the earliest contact of Europe with the continent of Africa was for business and trade purposes, giving rise to some sought of mutually beneficial commercial relationship. Though it can be argued that this relationship has been asymmetrical in nature, it however remains the one relationship that put Africa on the map of global trade in a sense. Trade and commerce was the early focus because the voyages of exploration that preceded the coming of the Europeans was to find an alternative sea route to India and to obtain some luxury goods which had demand in the European market. Africa also had goods which appealed to the Europeans like gold, ivory, grain, spices and sugar which at the time were in high demand in Europe. As a result of this, certain strategic points on the African coast, especially the West African coastline were given names such as the ‘Grain Coast’, the ‘Gold Coast’ and the ‘Ivory Coast’ (Akinrinade & Falola, 1986:3). Eventually these products were exported alongside with slaves and by the beginning of the sixteenth century the slave trade had begun to overshadow all other trades.

The eventual abolition of the slave trade did not put an end to European commercial activities in Africa it only changed the nature and the focus of these activities. Two factors were responsible for the European decision to continue trading with Africa. First they had invested a huge amount of money in ships, hulks and castles, and they could not bear the thought of losing that capital investment. Secondly they found to their happiness that such articles as palm oil, ground-nuts, coffee, gum, rubber, cotton, timber and cocoa were in high demand in Europe (Akinrinade & Falola, 1986:11). They thus began to promote the production of these cash crops and exported them, just as they did with slaves. This form of more ‘legitimate trade’ was a carefully organised business enterprise, involving the growing of cash crops, the shipment of
the produce, and the importation of manufactured goods. Following the period after 1885 when the Berlin Conference partitioned Africa into colonies Germany, Belgium (mostly because of King Leopold II), Portugal, Italy, Great Britain and France emerged as the major European colonial powers, gaining control over a large number of African territories.

These metropolitan powers established a colonial pattern of exclusive relationships with local authorities, giving them control over trade with their colonies. The colonial territories represented major sources of supply of raw materials for European manufacturing industries as well as major market outlets for their exports of processed commodities (Sissako et al, 1998:7). The coming of multilateral corporations to Africa could also be traced to this era of ‘Legitimate Trade’. There was however serious competition amongst rival European traders and this started the drive to create spheres of interest for the Europeans out of the coastal areas and encouraged their further exploration of the hinterland areas of Africa.

European colonisation of Africa eventually happened because these traders often appealed to the rulers of the places with which they traded for protection and assistance and signed treaties of trade and friendship with them. Such treaties not only guaranteed trade monopoly for the traders, they also sealed the colonisation of the areas. Different reasons have been offered for this upsurge in the European drive to acquire territorial control over portions of land in Africa. One of the more popular explanations offered have been the economic motive of imperialism-the desire to acquire territories for the purpose of exploiting their raw materials and making them serve as markets for European manufactured goods as well as to serve as strategic locations in some instances (e.g. British Annexation of South Africa in 1815 because of a strategic location on the Sea Route to India) (Akinrinade & Falola, 1986:13). Other scholars have argued that there are three reasons that broadly explain the initial presence of Europe in Africa, first for the purpose of resource security as a source of strategic metals; second for
reasons of commerce, trade and influence and third as an arena for East-West ideological competition (Adisa & Agbaje 1986:130).

Since there were both strategic and commercial interests tied to the initial move by Europeans to come to Africa, it would be logical to assume that clamours for Africa’s independence would not have left these European nations indifferent to the threat upon their business and strategic interests. It is common knowledge that they consequently took strategic steps to preserve some of these interests while forging ahead to grant their colonies independence. Britain for example prepared her colonies for independence but managed to ensure that they put in place pro-British, liberal democratic leaders who soon became part of the ‘neo-colonial’ arrangement of the commonwealth. As a result, Britain remained the main trading partner, political overseer and principal investor in several of her colonies for several years after independence. She also signed bilateral defence pacts with some, in addition to a general Commonwealth understanding which obligated her to come to the aid of such territories in time of emergency (Adisa & Agbaje 1986:140). France on its part has maintained an organic relationship with her former African territories. For her they represent a significant sphere of influence, knotted together by a complex socio-economic and military ties. The strength of this linkage is underlined by two interrelated factors, namely close economic relationships and military co-operation agreements. As Adisa & Agbaje (1986:140) argue;

- Within the economic sphere, the francophone family is cemented together by the Franc Zone, French budgetary aids and the extent of trade relations. Most francophone states are members of the Franc Zone. The CFA Franc guaranteed by France is thus the currency of international transactions, while foreign exchange earned by exports is kept by the French treasury. This along with credits offered by France, gives the French metropole fiscal and economic control over its former African colonies.

It was this kind of strategic endeavours to consolidate the gains of the commercial relationship that existed between Europe and its African colonies that the post-colonial era saw the birth,
evolution and formalisation of a number of conventions and partnership agreements. The Yaounde and Lome Conventions as well as the Cotonou Partnership Agreements are examples that encapsulate the EU’s relationship with Africa in the post colonial era, as shall be briefly examined in the next section.

4.3 EU-Africa relations in the post-colonial era

Emerging from over several decades of Western European colonization, many newly independent Third World countries, especially the former British and French territories, whose economies relied heavily on colonial trade, looked at international trade as a means of helping them solve such problems as: (a) foreign exchange shortage, (b) over-dependence on a single export product and one foreign market outlet, (c) slow economic growth characterized by low productivity and high unemployment (Sissako et al,1998:6). On the part of the Europeans after the end of colonisation, the European Community (EC) and its member states established a framework for cooperation with the African countries, in large prompted by the European founding member states seeking to retain collaborative ties with former colonies while creating new arrangements for the conduct of (largely economic) relations with other newly independent African states (Farrell, 2010:65).

However, the shape and content of Europe’s relationship with the developing world and Africa in particular has significantly changed since the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957. Successive EU enlargements, differential rates of global development, the collapse of communist ideology in Central and Eastern Europe and the reorganisation of international trade under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have all contributed to redefining the European Union’s (EU) external relations with the Third World (Holland,2002,1). The establishment of the European Community with the signing of the Treaty of Rome presented a
problem for those European countries that had previously initiated various preferential trading and other arrangements with their former colonies in Africa. Under the treaty of Rome members were required to give each other free market access and to extend common commercial tariffs on trade with non-members. It was within this context of an evolving integration agenda amongst European countries and the desire to retain preferential links with former colonies that the decision was taken to establish a framework for cooperation between the European Community and the African Caribbean Pacific countries under the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreements. (Farrell, 2010:67).

The treaty of Rome included clauses to accommodate this changing reality (particularly articles 131 and 136). For example Article 131 of the Rome Treaty granted the former French, Belgian, and Italian territories in Africa, the status of Associated States (AT) to the Community for a five-year period. Thus granting preferential access to the European common markets to these African states under the Yaoundé Conventions. The Rome Treaty thus laid the groundwork for eliminating the colonial pattern of exclusive relationship between a metropolitan power and their colonies and opened up the possibility of a region to region diversification in terms of trade and investment. Though it seemed evident that the original signatories of the Rome Treaty still sought special arrangements for the matters that were of particular importance to them. These include considerations around political sensitive issues like agriculture for example and for a country like France the protection of its relationship with its colonial dependencies was also a priority. That is why on French insistence, provisions for ‘association’ for all dependencies were included in part IV of the Treaty of Rome, thereby creating a contractual-treaty based relationship that established the basis and rationale for the establishment of the Yaounde, and Lome conventions (Holland,2002:25). There were in total two Yaounde and four Lome conventions as shall be briefly examined in the following sub-sections.
4.3.1 The Yaoundé I & II Conventions.

In July 1963, the EC and eighteen African Associated States (AAS), formerly French colonies signed the Yaoundé Convention, which became operational on 1 June 1964. This first five-year treaty which is referred to as Yaoundé I expired on 31 May 1969, and was replaced by Yaoundé II which went into effect from 1 January 1970 to 31 January 1975. The Yaounde conventions were unique in that they were a comprehensive multilateral framework that created joint institutions between the European Community and the Associated States and Madagascar (collectively known as the EAMA group). The conventions linked a range of separate development policies under a single integrated approach covering financial Aid, technical assistance and training, trade preferences, investments and capital movements. (Holland, 2002:28). Accordingly, the EC agreed to eliminate progressively their custom duties on tropical products, not covered by their Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), exported by the AAS, and to impose, for a limited period, a Common External Tariff (CET) against similar commodities imported from other developing countries (e.g. cocoa, coffee, and bananas) (Sissako et al., 1998:8).

As such the Yaounde I conventions provided a multilateral platform that made it easier to adopt a ‘regional’ approach to addressing issues between the EC and these African countries and also arguably promoted some form of regional corporation amongst these African States. Yaounde I also saw the creation of three joint institutions of the association (the Council, the Parliamentary Conference and the Court of Arbitration). The Council contained one representative from each of the EAMA and Community member states, met annually and could issue binding decisions based on joint agreement. The Parliamentary Conference retained an advisory status while the Court was the final arbiter where informal procedures in the Council were unable to resolve disputes arising under the Convention (Holland, 2002:28). The first Yaounde convention expired in 1969 but its provisions were extended for another 5 years.
through the creation of a Yaounde II convention. The mainstay of both conventions was the progressive abolition of customs barriers; reciprocal duty-free access; abolition on quantitative quotas on exports and the extension of most favoured nation status to EC member states. The Yaounde II was, in principle, an extension of Yaounde I. However, some minor changes were brought to the trade provisions.

These two conventions have however been criticized for providing marginal economic benefits to the African states signatories. The impression was given that the Yaounde Convention states were just ‘suppliers of the residual market that the community producers could not fill and provided them only with a slight advantage over other developing countries. This was further compounded by the fact that the Yaounde convention was based on reciprocity. Its provisions lacked the necessary drive to alter the historical relationship and without the principle of non-reciprocity the charge of neo-colonialism was hard to refute since the majority of the associated states were part of the French Franc currency zone and the provisions of the convention tended to distort normal economic patterns of development (Holland, 2002:31). The challenges of the Yaounde conventions could be summarised to include ineffectual trading concessions, challenges with the disbursement of the EDF funds, the colonial basis for preferences and country selectivity, an emphasis on infrastructure aid and the absence of reciprocity. Attempts were made to resolve these challenges in subsequent treaties beginning with the Lome convention as shall be briefly examined in the next section.

4.3.2 The Lome Conventions.

The Lome conventions brought together seventy-nine countries in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) with the member states of the European Union in an institutionalized relationship that allowed the ACP group to sell their primary products in the European Union market without the requirement of granting reciprocal market access in return (Farrell, 2010:66). Alongside the
institutionalised framework for interregional cooperation embodied in the successive Lome agreements, the European member states retained their national policies towards Africa in general and in particular towards individual countries with whom they had special interests and agreements. The expansion of the EEC from six to nine members in 1973 brought an additional dimension to the organisation as regards its relationship with the Associated States and signatories of the Yaounde (I&II) conventions. As had been the case with the French during the formation of the EEC, the British assession to the EU was accompanied by its desire to preserve its privileged relationship with some of its former colonies and members of the British Commonwealth group. Thus the British took steps to protect and maintain their relations with Commonwealth developing countries while maintaining its membership of the EU.

This eventually led to an extension of the agreements entered into with the 18 signatories of the Yaounde convention to a number of Commonwealth Caribbean and Pacific States, thus giving birth to what is currently known as the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. During these negotiations, a simple extension of the Yaounde provisions was contemplated and explored but ultimately a specifically tailored and integrated convention was produced that sought to protect French sensitivities yet meeting British demands, in the process leaving the views of the concerned developing countries as of secondary importance in the decision making process (Holland, 2002:33). As a build up to the formalisation of this agreement, the European Commission addressed a memorandum that defined the parameters of the policy debates to be included in the final provisions of the Lome convention. In this memo the notion of membership eligibility was widened beyond former colonial dependencies and development assistance was

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4 Protocol 22 (annexed to Britain’s Treaty of Accession to the EU) provided 20 Commonwealth states with the opportunity to negotiate a long-term agreement with the European Community.

5 1972 Policy Memorandum to the Council of Ministers
extended and reformed; non-reciprocity became a core principle and paternalism was replaced by the concept of partnership (European Commission, 1973).

In the negotiations leading up to the signing of the final convention there were a number of contentious issues that needed to be resolved. The French initially opposed the inclusion of a clause of non-reciprocity while the Germans insisted on establishing an aid ceiling. More than anything else the deal breaker became the question of sugar that was to be abundantly supplied from commonwealth countries into a European market that already produced a surplus of sugar beet. As Holland (2002:34) argues, Sugar came to symbolize the level of support the UK was prepared to commit to its Commonwealth partners and the ACP made signing of any overall agreement conditional on this issue alone. Eventually compromise was reached on all outstanding issues and the resultant convention was signed on the 28th of February 1975 and came into force on the 1st of April 1976. Thus the EC-9 and 46 ACP states signed the first Lome Convention (Lome I), which covered the period from April 1976 to December 1980.

The second Lome Convention (Lome II) and the third Lome Convention (Lome III) were operational during the periods from 1 January 1981 to 28 February 1985, and from May 1986 to December 1990, respectively. ACP Membership rose from 46 states in 1975, to 68 by 1990. Unlike Yaounde II, the Lome Conventions went a step further by: (1) adopting the system of non-reciprocity requested by the AAS; (2) providing the AAS a greater access to the EC markets; (3) redefining the rules of origin; (4) granting a special protocol regulating sugar; (5) providing a special treatment for beef, rum and bananas. Thus, more than 99.2 percent of ACP exports originating in the ACP region (which includes 96% of agricultural exports) were allowed to enter duty-free and quota-free into the EC markets. However, only those commodities that were covered by Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were refused free access to the Community. (Sissako et al, 1998:9).
Under these Lome conventions, three principal institutions were also established, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers; the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Consultative Assembly. The Council was mandated to oversee the general scope of the convention’s work and to implement and review policies to attain its objectives. The Committee of Ambassadors acted more like a secretariat and assisted the Council in fulfilling its tasks. The joint consultative assembly was the largest of the three institutions and was composed of equal number of ACP parliamentarians and representatives from the European Parliament. The transition from Yaounde to Lome Conventions saw the abandonment of the Court of arbitration initially retained in the former. Perhaps, the most prominent trade provision of the Lome Treaty was the Export Earning Stabilization system otherwise known as STABEX, which was specially designed to help the ACP stabilize their earnings from primary and semi-processed exports to the EC region. STABEX is a legacy of the colonial past, especially British and French colonial policies, which were essentially aimed at stabilizing commodity prices. With UK support, sugar, whose major exporters to the EC are mostly Commonwealth countries, was given a special provision called the Sugar Protocol. Under this provision, the EC agreed to import from the ACP, at guaranteed prices, specific quantities of sugar negotiated annually. To assure stable supplies from the ACP, each state must deliver its sugar quota every year or risk the reduction of its quota.

Another innovation of the Lome I convention was the introduction of support for regional cooperation amongst ACP countries. Article 47.1 of the Lome I convention captures this as follows:

In the implementation of financial and technical co-operation, the Community shall provide effective assistance for attaining the objectives which the ACP States set themselves in the context of regional and interregional cooperation. This assistance shall aim to: (a) accelerate economic co-operation and development both within and between the regions of the ACP States; (b) accelerate diversification of the economies of the ACP States; (c) reduce the economic dependence of the ACP States on imports by
maximising output of those products for which the ACP States in question have real potential; (d) create sufficiently wide markets within the ACP States and neighbouring States by removing the obstacles which hinder the development and integration of those markets in order to promote trade between the ACP States; (e) maximize the use of resources and services in the ACP States. 2. To this end approximately 10% of the total financial resources provided for in Article 42 for the economic and social development of the ACP States shall be reserved for financing their regional projects.

Through this provision, EC gave practical expression to its intention of fostering and encouraging the efforts of the ACP States in the field of regional cooperation by setting aside special funds. The funds allocated to this policy by the Convention were of the order of 10% of the total financial resources to which is added the regional aid from the European Investment Bank (Focke, 1980:38).

The Lome I and II Conventions sought to take into account the criticisms and shortcomings of the Yaounde Conventions. Specifically it required no reciprocity from ACP states and did not stop them from trading with each other or other developed countries. It further imposed no political conditionalities and largely ignored the domestic politics of the signatory states and introduced a range of development assistance programmes as well as trade preferences arrangements. It however had a very marginal impact on the balance of trade between the ACP and the EU. Furthermore the convention had the peverse effect of promoting ACP dependency on raw materials as an export base in exchange for importing primarily industrial goods from Europe (Holland, 2002:39). Although the first Lomé agreement related primarily to trade cooperation, subsequent agreements were broadened in scope to include clauses on such issues as human rights; rule of law, economic, social and cultural rights; and governance. As Farrell (2010:69) argues:

This early example of European inter-regionalism contained both political and economic elements of the cooperation strategy, based upon a highly institutionalised and hierarchical network of relations to support political dialogue between two groups of countries with divergent economic structures, different levels of development, and varying systems of governance and capacities for governance. On the European side,
the EU was a tightly knit and increasingly integrated political community, a formal regional organisation with a supranational governance structure and one whose member states were able and willing to negotiate internally, identify common interest, and represent a unified position in external (economic) negotiations. In contrast the ACP was a loosely knit organisation of seventy-nine states, with no strong unifying ties or formal organisational structure, bound together by their evident weakness rather than their capacity for purposeful and joint action (or lack of actorship) (Farrell, 2010:69).

Accordingly, Lome III was negotiated amidst a further expansion of EEC commission membership with the accession of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 bringing the total of EC countries to 12 who at the time were negotiating with up to 66 ACP States. This new convention came with a new emphasis on thematic issues like climate, environment and health as well as the application of conditionality to EC support for ACP countries. Lome III like the previous conventions did not do much to improve the developmental backwardness of the ACP countries within the relationship. This did not change much under the Lome IV conventions either and its enactment within the context of the collapse of the Communist block in the 1990s meant the priority of the EC was changing to lay more emphasis on the Eastern and Central portions of Europe coming out of communist rule. These significant changes in the global political environment, coupled with Europe’s own expansion with the admission of new members from Eastern and Central Europe and its own commitment to develop its internal market along the lines of neo-liberal trade liberalisation principles mounted more pressure for it to review its relationship with the ACP group. It was within this background and following that steps were under taken to make certain changes on the framework that would govern EU-ACP relations after Lome IV. The mid term review of the Lome IV convention and the EU’s Green Paper process were the two watershed moments that marked a significant change in the EU’s relationship with ACP countries. There was some consensus that the past Lome trading regimes had failed to reverse the economic decline witnessed by ACP countries, hence the need
for a new approach in EU-ACP relations that would favour the development of these ACP countries. This gave rise to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement with certain innovative components introduced into the dynamics of the EU-ACP relations as shall be briefly examined in the section that follows.

4.3.3 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement

The Cotonou agreement was drawn up in response to pressures for a change in European preferential regime in the context of global trade liberalisation and in criticism of the long standing Lomé arrangements. Perhaps the greatest pressure for a change in the EU-Africa partnership came from the WTO with a rules-based trading system supporting a global open trading order. Previous EU-ACP arrangements were clearly in contravention of WTO rules which they offered preferential access to selected countries and discriminated against non-signatories to the agreement in contravention of the principles of multilateralism and the most-favoured nation clause embodied in the GATT/WTO (Farrell, 2006:21). The Cotonou Partnership Agreement therefore sought to address these inconsistencies with the global trading body while pursuing a poverty reduction and sustainable development agenda at the same time. Article 2 of the Partnership Agreement states that the partnership shall focus on reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objective of sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. It is articulated as follows:

- ACP-EC cooperation, underpinned by a legally binding system and the existence of joint institutions, shall be guided by the internationally agreed aid effectiveness agenda regarding ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results-oriented aid management and mutual accountability, exercised on the basis of the following fundamental principles:
- equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies: for the purposes of implementing the objectives of the partnership, the ACP States shall determine the
development strategies for their economies and societies in all sovereignty and with due regard for the essential and fundamental elements described in Article 9; the partnership shall encourage ownership of the development strategies by the countries and populations concerned; EU development partners shall align their programmes with these strategies;

- participation: apart from central government as the main partner, the partnership shall be open to ACP parliaments, and local authorities in ACP States and different kinds of other actors in order to encourage the integration of all sections of society, including the private sector and civil society organisations, into the mainstream of political, economic and social life;

- the pivotal role of dialogue and the fulfilment of mutual obligations and accountability: the obligations assumed by the Parties in the framework of their dialogue shall be central to their partnership and cooperation relations; the Parties shall work closely together in determining and implementing the necessary processes of donor alignment and harmonisation, with a view to securing a key role for ACP States in these processes;

- Differentiation and regionalisation: cooperation arrangements and priorities shall vary according to a partner’s level of development, its needs, its performance and its long term development strategy. Particular emphasis shall be placed on the regional dimension. Special treatment shall be given to the least developed countries. The vulnerability of landlocked and island countries shall be taken into account. Particular emphasis shall be put on regional integration, including at continental level.

With respect to the aspect of Regional cooperation and integration, it is covered by article 28 to 30 of the partnership agreement. According to the partnership agreement the ACP-EU cooperation shall aim to:

(a) Promote peace and stability, as well as conflict prevention and resolution;

(b) Enhance economic development and economic cooperation through the build-up
of larger markets, the free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, labour and technology among ACP countries, the accelerated diversification of the economies of the ACP States, the promotion and expansion of trade among ACP countries and with third countries and the gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy;(c) Promote the management of sustainable development challenges with a transnational dimension through, inter alia, coordination and harmonisation of regional cooperation policies. Other significant components of the partnership agreement in the area of support to regional cooperation and integration includes a commitment to support 1. In the area of stability, peace and conflict prevention, cooperation shall support through (a) the promotion and development of a regional political dialogue in areas of conflict prevention and resolution; human rights and democratisation; exchange, networking, and promotion of mobility between the different actors of development, in particular in civil society; and (b) the promotion of regional initiatives and policies on security-related issues, including arms control, action against drugs, organised crimes, money laundering, bribery and corruption. The partnership thus commits to support the participation of Least Developed Countries (LDC) ACP States in the establishment of regional markets and sharing the benefits there from as well as the implementation of sectoral economic reform policies at regional level, the liberalisation of trade and payments, the promotion of cross border investments both foreign and domestic, and other regional or sub regional economic integration initiatives, the mitigation of the effects of net transitional costs of regional integration on budget revenue and balance of payments; and infrastructure, particularly transport and communications and safety thereof, and services, including the development of regional opportunities in the area of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).

Trade liberalization accompanied by democratic institution building, was the new international context that the Cotonou Agreement as successor to the Lome agreements was obliged to recognize, acknowledge and ultimately embrace. This ushered in the Cotonou agreements as a
partnership agreement between the EU and ACP countries that emphasized the political aspects of the EU’s support to ACP country’s development. This was also accompanied by a renewed emphasis given to institutional capacity development, support to civil society, other non-state actors and the role of the private sector in advancing the development agenda of the ACP countries. (Holland, 2002:198). Within the context of the Cold War and emerging non-alignment movements, the earlier Lome Conventions were largely precluded from any overt political conditionality but the renegotiation of Lome IV coincided with German reunification and the collapse of communism in the East. These changes paved the way for political conditionality to become an essential element of a new approach to development issues. Broadly speaking, the Cotonou Partnership agreement brought a new emphasis on reciprocal trade liberalisation (dropping the non-reciprocity of the Lomé accords), with the specific proposal for regional economic integration agreements between the EU and groups of countries within the ACP on the one hand and on the other hand establishing regional integration among countries of the ACP bloc. These interregional economic integration arrangements have been commonly called the Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) (Farrell, 2010:70). Its adoption also came along with a number of changes to the management of EU-ACP relations. With Cotonou, it was established that aid allocation would be made conditional not only on recipient needs but also on their performance; new free trade agreements would replace the previous preferential trade regime after an interim period (2000-2007) while political dialogue would include issues that were not customary covered in previous agreements like peace and security, arms trade, migration, drugs and corruption (Carbone, 2013:4). Other innovative elements of this agreement included the further application of good governance as a fundamental element of the relationship and the responsibility and accountability of ACP member states in this regard.
The EPA’s broke with the Lomé tradition of treating the ACP countries as a unified block and pushed for negotiations with groups of countries with the view of creating regional economic agreements. In this regard six sub-ACP regional groupings were identified, four of which were from Africa as indicated in Table 4.1 below.

**Table 4.1 African Regional Groupings for EU-ACP EPA Negotiations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Cameroon, Central African Republique, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East African Community</td>
<td>Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southern Africa</td>
<td>Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Farrell, (2010)

At the time of its establishment, Poul Nielson the European Commisioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid described the Cotonou Partnership agreement as an agreement that will give a new momentum to the relationship between the ACP States and the European Union, representing an important component of international efforts aimed at promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. This was drawn up as earlier mentioned amidst the background of pressures from the global trading system and explains the agreements it contains on mutual trade liberalisation. Its endeavour to promote regional economic integration arrangements between the EU and ACP regions and amongst the countries within the region is truly innovative in the sense that it introduces a new dynamic to the already on going regional cooperation processes within these ACP regions, particularly in Africa. These economic
integration agreements also known as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) need to be compatible with WTO rules and requires the commitment of the signatory states to ensure liberalisation of trade affecting substantially all products and services, and covering all sectors. Notwithstanding the many innovative elements, this partnership agreement has come under some criticism particularly the component of the EPAs. The fact that the proposal focuses on engaging in negotiations with specific regions with the ACP poses a threat to the very existence of the ACP as an organisation itself. These EPA negotiations have been ongoing and in some cases have been pursued with regional groupings that donot constitute existing regional organisations in Africa, thereby posing a threat to the existing sub-regional organisations given the known challenge of multiple membership to regional organisation in Africa. A better approach would have been an effort to recognise the existing regional groupings within Africa and a concerted and coherent programme to foster deeper integration among these regional organisations which is already one of the declared objectives of the African Union (Farrell, 2006:21). Eventhough the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is the current framework within which the European Union interacts with ACP countries the majority of whom come from Sub-Saharan Africa, it has still gone ahead to establish a Strategic partnership with the African Union in the pursuit of a more continent wide policy towards Africa. This has been also described as the EU-Africa strategy and its tennets are briefly presented in the section that follows.

4.4 The Joint Africa- European Union Strategic Partnership.

In addition to an active pursuit of its relationship with the African countries within the EU-ACP framework, the European Union has also positioned itself to be a strategic partner of the African Union in the joint implementation of an EU-Africa strategy. This has been considered a real novel approach to EU-Africa relations since the dawn of the 21st century because it for the first
time proposes to pursue a comprehensive strategy that seeks to coordinate the efforts of all European Union member states and their related institutions in an effort to engage with Africa as a continent (going beyond the North Africa versus Sub-Saharan Africa divide) (Carbone, 2013:6). Since the 2000s, the EU has made efforts to forge a different relationship with Africa “in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation”, as was proclaimed in the Cairo Declaration adopted at the first EU-Africa summit in 2000. This has led to the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) – also referred to as the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership - at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007. The JAES aims for increased cooperation in eight thematic areas: (1) Peace and Security, (2) Democratic Governance and Human Rights, (3) Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure, (4) the Millennium Development Goals, (5) Energy, (6) Climate Change, (7) Migration, Mobility and Employment and (8) Science, Information Society and Space (Biando, 2015:5). This strategic partnership between the European Union and the African continent is built upon their shared values of the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the constitutive texts of both the African Union and the European Union.

According to the strategic partnership documents the purpose of their joint strategy is to take the Africa-EU relations to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels. Accordingly, the two organisations aim to forge a partnership governed by strengthened political dialogue, co-management and co-responsibility in their bilateral cooperation and towards global issues, burden-sharing and mutual accountability, solidarity and mutual confidence, equality and justice, common and human security, respect for international law and agreements, gender equality and non-discrimination and, not least, a long-term approach. (JAES, 2007:2)

They two partners have agreed to be guided by four main objectives as they build towards a long term partnership. Their guiding objectives and focus shall be to:
i) To reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern. Including through the strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges, in particular peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment.

ii) To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

iii) To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns such as human rights, including children’s rights and gender equality, fair trade, migration, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other pandemics, climate change, energy security and sustainability, terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and knowledge-based society issues such as ICT, science, technology and innovation.

iv) To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership, Africa and the EU will empower non-state actors and create conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Both sides will also promote holistic approaches to development processes, and make this Joint Strategy a permanent platform for information, participation and mobilisation of a broad spectrum of civil society actors in the EU, Africa and beyond.
In the area of trade and regional economic integration, the strategic partnership proposes to focus on the improvement of economic governance and the investment climate as essential elements that would build Africa's economic strength and allow it to move away from continuous donor support by rather finding its place in the global markets. In this regard, the development of domestic markets and regional integration were considered as key factors for the creation of larger and more integrated markets that, in conjunction with enhanced regulatory convergence, will help to attract investment, increase productive capacities and therefore foster sustainable economic growth and development (JAES, 2007:9). Taking this into consideration, it will be one of the priorities of the Africa-EU partnership to help Africa improve its productive capacities, move up the value-added scale and become less dependent on raw materials and simple processed products, which in the long term is the best way to avoid a deterioration of the terms of trade and participate in, and benefit from, the global economy. All these will be accomplished through this partnership by working together with other international partners to promote fair trade. It was also proposed that in order to achieve this, the key goals which will be pursued by Africa-EU cooperation on trade and regional integration will be:

(i) private sector development, supported by foreign investments, to strengthen the supply side of African economies;

(ii) the development and strengthening of physical infrastructure networks and related services, which are needed for the movement of persons, goods, information; and

(iii) Trade integration, which is essential to increase both South-South and North South trade flows.

To meet these objectives, a detailed action plan for 2008-2010 was adopted which included eight ‘Africa-EU Partnerships’ on peace and security; democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, MDGs, energy; climate change; migration, mobility and employment; science, information society and space. However, the initial implementation of
the first JAES action plan produced only cumbersome institutional frameworks meant to consolidate dialogue between the two parties, with a large number of meetings and technical activities often seen as the only indication of success (Carbone, 2013:8). The one area where the partnership seemed to be producing results was in the area of peace and security. The African Peace Facility (APF) funds three kinds of activities: Peace Support Operations, long-term capacity-building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and short-term peace-related activities under the Early Response Mechanism. In order to get funding for such activities, the AU or the RECs need to submit a request. This request is then considered by the EEAS, European Commission and the EU Council preparatory working groups. The EU’s Political and Security Committee needs to approve the intervention on its appropriateness. In general, the EU has been fairly comprehensive in its support to AU peace and security initiatives. It has supported all the peacekeeping missions of the AU to date as well as almost all elements of APSA (Biondo, 2015:17). As a partnership that only started in 2007 there has been too little time to form a comprehensive and conclusive assessment of the success of the EU’s joint strategic partnership with Africa. The European Parliament however carried out a first assessment after seven years of is implementation by commissioning a study in this regard. This study that came up with the following observation and recommendations concerning the partnership:

…the partnership has lost its political traction because of serious divergences on trade, international justice, governance and cultural cooperation. Refreshing the partnership is now necessary to rebuild trust and commitment. This will only be effective if the following conditions are met: clearly identified and sustainable political leadership and steering from both sides; alignment on African and European long-term continental and global strategies; clarification of the relevant and appropriate level of intervention (continental, regional, national) of JAES implementation according to the subsidiarity principle; available funds (including the Pan-African Programme) programmed according to the mindset of the joint strategy; functional and direct linkages with existing international, African and European decision making structures; available space for informal multi-stakeholder dialogue paving the ground for mutual
understanding and coalitions of the willing; stronger monitoring and oversight mechanisms on JAES implementation by parliaments, civil society and other relevant bodies. (European Parliament, 2014)

And so the EU-Africa strategic partnership and their joint efforts to work towards the attainment of their common objectives can very much be considered a work in progress. This strategic partnership like previous and ongoing initiatives have been implemented amidst the dynamics that are common to EU-Africa relations. The EU is increasingly trying to redefine its relationship with third countries and regions as partnerships. In this sense, the EU presents itself as a benevolent power that does not impose its will on countries with which it maintains economic and political relations. In Africa, the EU has emphasized its willingness to build a relationship based on equality from the outset, hence breaking with the donor-recipient relationship that emerged in the postcolonial period. This has traditionally been difficult given the colonial history and resulting dependency relations and because of the large economic and political power difference (Biondo, 2015:20). Perhaps in the current context of the EU-Africa strategic partnership there may be the possibility to eventually forge a real partnership seeing that the EU seems to be losing its monopoly power in Africa with the rise of other partners like the Chinese and their counterparts in the BRICS. The sum total of the EU’s interaction through the Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou Agreements add up with the objectives and priorities of the current Joint Strategic partnership to testify of a complex but evolving relationship between the two regions. While the Lomé convention attempted to incorporated some of Africa’s claims to special treatment under the international system, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement redesigned EU-ACP relations, following neo-liberal principles with the impact of redesigning the development strategies of various African states (Carbone, 2013:10). The difficulties posed by the EPAs have generated much criticism and eroded the goodwill accumulated over the years and affected the proper functioning of other aspects of the relationship, but the relationship has continued all the same and remains and open avenue for which both parties can pursue and attain their common interests. Their backgrounds and pathways to attaining integration and the
political thrust of their partnership shares certain similarities in expression but many more differences in form, principle and expression. Given this background of the different components of the EU-Africa relations as it has evolved, it would be interesting to pose and highlight what has been the differences in reality of their respective integration experiences. This will not only provide some contextual appreciation for their evolving relationship but will further lay the groundwork to ascertain the extent to which, given their evolving relationship, their experiences of integration may have influenced each other. This comparison shall be the subject of the next sub-section.

4.5 Europe and Africa’s comparative experiences of integration

Europe and Africa have followed very different pathways in the pursuit of regional cooperation and economic and political integration as already examined in chapters 2 and 3 and this has influenced the nature and evolution of their relationship as discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. Their two experiences, however, have evolved and resulted in the development of institutional frameworks that share some similarities in form but differ in some regards in their functioning and contribution to their respective integration process. Bach (2008:357) for example argues that the institutional architecture of the African Union (AU) departs from that of the European Union (EU) in so far as decision-making within the AU is still strictly based on intergovernmentalism, devoid of sovereignty transfers and clear-cut enforcement mechanisms. In this regard the AU is different from the EU in that its institutions are not yet endowed with supranational powers that would give substance to comparisons with the institutions of the EU, particularly with the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.

The apparent similarities but fundamental differences present a complex case of comparison but Fioramonti and Mattheis (2015) propose an integrated comparative regionalism framework
through which the experiences of Europe and Africa can be suitably captured. Their framework is unique in the sense that it takes into account the multidimensionality of contemporary regionalisms and identifies key dimensions derived from both traditional regional integration theory and new regionalism approaches. They identify a core group of key themes that are highlighted by old and new approaches to regionalism that they build into a framework for comparison. The identified processes include: the process of integration (which is seen as linear by traditional theories and fuzzy by new approaches), institutional structures (formal and informal), leadership (state-centric and diffused), membership (inclusive and exclusive), economic and social drivers (trade, market integration, and cultural/social cohesion), the pooling of sovereignty as opposed to the degrees of cooperation, as well as the territorial/socially constructed identity of a region. These are classified further into observable dimensions to include: the process of regionalization, institutional design, type of regional leadership, conditions for membership, approach to sovereignty, drivers (whether in the economic, political or social fields) and type of regional identity. The European and African experiences of integration can thus be compared on the basis of this framework as presented in the Table 4.2 below:

**Table 4.2 Comparison of Europe and Africa’s integration experiences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observable Variable</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>African Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional design</td>
<td>Mixed design and hybrid institutions combining intergovernmental and supranational roles</td>
<td>Preference for intergovernmental decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process of regionalism</td>
<td>Step wise and incremental, from formation of ECSC, to EEC + EURATOM to EC and then EU. Security to economic and eventual political union</td>
<td>From Political objectives (OAU), to Economic (LPA, AEC) back to a mixed (AU&amp;NEPAD).Building on RECS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of Membership</td>
<td>Exclusive and based on governance parameters of the</td>
<td>All-inclusive, voluntary and almost unconditional from start &amp; some governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach to sovereignty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Drivers (economic, political and social fields)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Type of regional Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental from six to 27</td>
<td>Trade driven with single market &amp; common currency, social policy &amp; political dimension.</td>
<td>Personal leadership but also – and more importantly – cooperative regional hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental cooperation, program driven (CAADP, AIDA, PIDA), moved from non-interference to non-indifference.</td>
<td>Political considerations with OAU, trade and market concerns with AEC but no social policy component</td>
<td>Strong individual leaders, but reluctant hegemons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Fioramonti & Mattheis (2015).

It is clear from the above table that the integration experiences of Europe and Africa have evolved differently. Going beyond symbolic resemblances in a few aspects, Europe and Africa embody two complex examples of regional governance, largely shaped by distinct logics. They may share a few generic similarities but are different in more ways. Both regions may have adopted the word ‘union’ and are led by a Commission and Council/s and each has a Parliament, but when one looks at the actual drivers, approaches, principles and modalities of regionalization, it becomes clear that neither Europe nor Africa followed clearly defined linear paths to integration and that differences are certainly more significant than similarities. In both Europe and Africa the threat to the wellbeing of their citizens was a factor that triggered the desire for more cooperation. Though admittedly, Europe and Africa adopted different routes to address the perceived threats to their security and wellbeing.

Though their methods and approach to greater cooperation and move towards integration may have been different, they both share the aspiration of improving upon the welfare of their citizens (through various forms of economic integration) and exercising a greater influence on
the global scene by collective self-reliance (Axline 1994). The similarities in their objective and aspirations seem obvious if one were to examine of the key policy documents creating their respective economic communities (Rome Treaty 1957 and Abuja Treaty of 1991). According to these treaties, both continents share a number of similar aspirations and approaches to their integration project. For starters, the agreements reached in each case are between the ‘High Contracting parties’ to form an (African/European) Economic Community. Both projects share the aspiration of improving the standards of living of their citizens (article 2 RT & article 4 AT) and to foster close (and peaceful in the case of the AT) relations among their Member States. They expressed their aspiration to form a common market thereby embracing trade liberalizations with the elimination of custom duties and all non-tariff barriers (including quantitative restrictions) amongst members. Both treaties also advocated for the establishment of a common market with a transitional period and to be put into effect in stages. They also each advocated for some form of social policy, with the RT adopting the European Social Fund for employment and an improvement in standards of living while the Abuja Treaty advocated for the adoption of Community Solidarity Development and Compensation (CSDC) funds which were in a sense similar to the European Regional Development Funds. From this cursory examination of the two frameworks for the development of economic communities in Europe and Africa, the similarities in aspirations, ideology and approach are evident. This sort of mirroring has occurred notwithstanding the noted differences in the historical trajectory and eventual practise of cooperation by the two. This justifies the suspicion of mimicry and/or the diffusion of Europe’s experience of integration to Africa which merits a further investigation. The fact that the Abuja Treaty of 1991 came more than thirty years after the Rome Treaty (957) suggests that the former may be an attempt to copy the latter, albeit with close to 30 years of adjusting for what has not worked and adapting it to the African reality. The similarities of their institutions of integration further lend credence to this consideration.
and have pushed some scholars to the point of assuming or declaring that the African experience is based on the European experience and/or Africa is attempting to copy the European experience of integration (see Babarinde 2007). Although Bach (2008:358) has argued that the AU emulating the EU model without strictly adhering to it should not be viewed as a flaw that impairs the future of the AU, it is worth establishing whether diffusion of integration experiences has taken place from Europe to Africa. This will be an important step towards establishing the extent to which the European experience is applicable to the African context. The format in which diffusion could have taken place would highlight both the channels and possible lessons that Africa may have drawn from the European experience but also make it possible to establish the lessons from Europe’s experience that could be most applicable to Africa. Their approaches to cooperation and integration may be different but they share a number of similar aspirations and have created a number of similar institutions and consequently can enhance each other’s aspirations through experience sharing and lesson drawing. A reality that is all the more important within the context of the establishment of the EU-Africa strategic partnership in 2007. This question of diffusion will be explored further in the subsequent chapters with the objective of testing some of the conclusions often arrived at after a cursory examination of the similarities in some EU and AU institutions of integration.

4.7 Conclusion

Africa and Europe have shared a long and sometimes complex history. Their relationship has over the years been governed by a number of different partnership agreements, beginning with the Yaounde and Lome conventions to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the current EU-Africa joint strategic partnership. It is worth mentioning that the institutions that were created under the first Yaounde convention and sustained under subsequent agreements bare some similarities with those that have characterised their individual experiences of institutions
creation in the pursuit of regional cooperation and integration. Their relationship has also evolved amidst the background of an intense integration process shaped and influenced by many dynamics and taking place in their respective continents. These internal processes on their respective continents have had a bearing and an influence on how they have each approached their relationship with each other. Their respective regional cooperation and integration experiences have evolved with important political, social, economic and institutional development dimensions some of which bear certain similarities. The paradox of a dissimilar integration and cooperation trajectories that has resulted in the creation of similar institutions of integration with remarkable differences in their functioning and contribution to the integration outcomes remains a puzzle that has attracted many explanations. By placing the institutions and policy frameworks of the EU and the AU side by side we have been able to establish that the many similarities between the European Union and the African Union are only generic in nature and deserve further investigation. There is therefore a possibility that the similarities between some of the EU and the AU institutions are mainly a case of ‘institutional isomorphism’ rather than a genuine adaptation of the key fundamentals of European integration. Should this be the case, it could have resulted from a kind of diffusion from Europe to Africa that perhaps missed out on certain core elements that could have made a difference in the implementation experience of Africa. A kind of diffusion of Europe’s experience to Africa that has not been applicable in the African context and failed to produce desirable results. This is why it is important to examine the possible pathways through which the experience gained in Europe could have influenced the African trajectory of integration and resulted in the creation of similar institutions. The next chapter presents an analytical framework for diffusion of regional integration which will be used to test for diffusion of Europe’s integration experience to Africa.
Chapter 5

Investigating the diffusion of regional integration: 
An analytical framework

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the integration experiences of Europe and Africa were presented from an historical perspective as well as the relationship that the two regions have shared over the years. It has been possible to establish thus far that Europe and Africa share not only a historical tie and geographical proximity but have both expressed believe in the importance of regional integration and its potential contribution to the improvement of the well beings of their citizens. This is the reason why the two regions have articulated similar aspirations to create economic communities. They have both embraced cooperation and regional integration as a means to attaining the welfare gains associated with market integration and as a means of exercising greater influence in the global arena. In addition to this, though their pursuit of cooperation and regional integration has evolved along different trajectories, they have none the less developed a number of similar institutions of integration. The similarity of their objectives and aspirations (notwithstanding their divergent historical trajectory) when viewed alongside the number of similarly named institutions suggests there may have been some diffusion of the EU experience of integration to the AU. This is the basis for which an investigation for the possible occurrence of diffusion from the EU to the AU is one of the objectives of this study. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to briefly examine the theoretical literature on diffusion with the objective of designing an analytical framework within which the diffusion of regional integration from the EU to the AU can be investigated. In order to accomplish this objective the chapter is divided into six subsections; section 5.2 examines some frameworks and mechanisms of
diffusion. Section 5.3 explores the role of the EU as a promoter of integration while section 5.4 looks at the agency of the African union in encouraging diffusion. In section 5.5 a process tracing methodology to investigate diffusion is presented and section 5.6 concludes the chapter.

5.2 Diffusion frameworks and mechanisms

There has been a growing body of literature focusing on mechanisms of policy transfer and diffusion. This literature has alternatively focused on lesson drawing, policy convergence and policy transfer and diffusion. Though making use of different terminologies, such studies have been concerned with the processes by which knowledge about policies and administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000:5). The mechanism by which this happens has been alternatively attributed to lesson drawing, mimicry, coercion, competition and emulation.

Mimicry indicates the process of copying foreign models in terms of symbolic or normative factors, rather than out of a technical or rational concern with functional efficiency. This is when states or regional organisations adopt the practices and institutional forms of social leaders (states and regional organisations considered to be more successful) and perceived by others and themselves as being advanced, progressive and morally praiseworthy (Marsh and Sharman 2009:272). Coercion relates to the transfer of policies that may be the result of conditionalities attached to aid, loans or foreign assistance packages. Since the transmission of norms or practises related to regionalism often require specific actions, the literature often treats the coercive mechanism as functioning alongside at least one of the others (Haastrup 2013:793).
There is more consensus within the literature on the three broad classes of diffusion mechanisms being: learning, emulation, and competition (see; Braun and Gilardi 2006; Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; Gilardi 2015).

Learning is a process where policies in one unit are influenced by the consequences of similar policies in other units. In other words, policy adoption in one unit is more likely if the policy has been successful elsewhere, where success is defined by taking the following three aspects into account: (a) the goals that the policy is designed to achieve, (b) the challenges of its implementation, and (c) its political support (Gilardi 2015:3). Learning is thus a voluntary and rational decision by a government or an international organisation (like the African Union in this case) to draw lessons from the experience in the implementation of similar policies from similar organisations/institutions (like the European Union) with the hope that this will produce similar, or more efficient and effective policy outcomes than the alternatives they have at their disposal (or have considered). Competition on the other hand could be seen as the result of globalisation where countries and regions strive to promote broadly similar investor friendly policies that increasingly have become acceptable as the international standards or norms. This would cause regional organisations to adopt policies that ensure that they remain relevant and competitive with respect to the actions of their contemporaries around the world.

The premise of an investigation of the applicability of the EU integration experience to the AU is based on the assumption that the EU’s experience of integration may have informed or influenced the AU approach to the pursuit of regional cooperation and integration. This may have occurred because of the dominance of the EU integration experience in the theoretical literature on integration or been the result of ‘traceable links of influence’ running from the EU’s integration experience to that of the AU. The visible similarities between some of their institutions (like the European and African Union commissions, as well as the EU Parliament and the Pan African Parliament) provides grounds for an investigation into the real nature of
the interaction between their respective experiences of integration, by identifying and
documenting evidence of diffusion.

The distinction between the transfer and diffusion of policy has not often been too emphasized
in the literature since the mechanisms of policy transfer and diffusion are hardly separable from
each other. Braun and Gilardi (2006), for example, argue that policy diffusion is a process
through which policy choices in one country-setting affects those in a second country-setting.
Where this leads to an adoption of similar policies in the second as have been enacted in the
first, a diffusion of policy can be assumed to have taken place, albeit in most cases taking local
realities into account. Marsh and Sharman (2009) address the transfer and diffusion distinction
by arguing that while the process of diffusion tends to emphasize the structure of flow, the
emphasis of policy transfer is the agency of flow. The relationship between structure and agency
is however dialectical (interactive and iterative) and any explanation of policy transfer/diffusion
needs to acknowledge this and examine how together they interact to produce outcomes. As far
as the relationship between the two concepts is concerned, some scholars argue that policy
transfer is a type of diffusion (Newmark 2002), while others see diffusion as a type of policy
transfer (Busch and Jorgens 2005). It seems evident therefore that these concepts are
overlapping and share a conceptual core and a complementary interest in a related class of
empirical phenomena (Marsh and Sharman 2009:271). This study therefore adopts the
perspective of treating policy transfer and policy diffusion as the same phenomenon without
attempting to make any distinction in the processes involved. The study also adopts the
approach of assuming that diffusion has occurred once evidence of policy transfer can be
established.

In adopting this approach, the transfer of policies from the EU to the AU will be investigated
and treated as evidence of the diffusion of the EU experience of integration to the AU. My
intention is to investigate whether one regionalisation experience has had an influence on the
other. This research has no ambition to dwell on capturing whether such influence occurred by policy transfer or by policy diffusion especially, as the agents and channels of the flow of influence would be the same. Where it can be established that the AU has adopted some policies that had been adopted by the EU in the course of its integration trajectory, it would serve as evidence of diffusion, thus working with the assumption that policy transfer is a form of diffusion, following Newmark (2002).

The similarities of some of their institutions of integration suggest that there could have been an attempt by one to mirror the other. Haastrup (2013:795) argues in this regard that the similarities between some of the institutions of the EU and the AU could well be the result of policy transfers that co-opt frameworks and practices that have been successful elsewhere for similar circumstances as opposed to a mere attempt by the AU to adopt the EU model in Africa. It is therefore important to identify what have been the mechanisms of transfer and/or diffusion of the European integration experience to the AU through the use of an appropriate framework of analysis. Such a framework should be able to provide clarity on the different mechanisms by which Africa’s interaction with Europe could have informed its choice of institutions and the trajectory of its regional cooperation and integration. The objective is to establish whether this interaction has given rise to the diffusion of norms and values as well as a transfer of policies from the EU to the AU in a traceable manner.

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have developed a conceptual framework for analysing policy transfer that seeks to answer important questions such as: Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process? What is transferred? From where are lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? How is the process of policy transfer related to policy success or failure? The responses to some of these questions are presented in the policy transfer framework in Table 5.1 below:
Table 5.1 A Policy Transfer Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why Transfer? Continuum</th>
<th>Who is involved in transfer?</th>
<th>What is transferred</th>
<th>Degrees of transfer</th>
<th>Constraints on transfer</th>
<th>How to demonstrate policy transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Mixtures</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson drawing (perfect rationality)</td>
<td>Lesson drawing (bounded rationality)</td>
<td>Direct imposition</td>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>Policies (Goals) (Content) (Instruments)</td>
<td>Copying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International pressures (image) (consensus) (Perceptions)</td>
<td>Bureaucrats Civil servants</td>
<td>Programmes Emulation</td>
<td>Past Policies</td>
<td>Reports (Commissioned) (uncommissioned)</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Externalities Pressure groups Institutions Mixtures Structural Institutional Conferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality (Loans) (Conditions attached to business activity) Political parties Ideologies Inspiration Feasibility (ideology) (Cultural proximity) (technology) (economic) (bureaucratic) Meetings/Visits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligations Policy Entrepreneurs/experts Attitudes/ Cultural value Language Statements (written) (Verbal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants Think Tank Transnational corporation Supranational institutions Negative lessons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extract from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)

The elements of interest in this framework and relevant to this study are the responses to the following points: what is transferred, what are the different degrees of transfer, what restricts/facilitates the transfer process and how the process of policy transfer is related to policy success or failure. In answering these questions, the framework presents an easy to use tool in applying a process-tracing methodology for the transfer of policy from the EU to the AU. As indicated in the table above, the framework breaks down the policy transfer process on a continuum, flowing from a voluntary transfer (mostly associated with lesson drawing) up to a
more coercive transfer, associated with direct imposition. It also considers a mix of the two approaches associated with pressure to accept internationally acclaimed norms and best practises and the conditionalities associated with support packages and loans. These are possible channels through which the EU experience could have diffused to the AU evidenced by the adoption of EU type policies and institutions by the AU. This may have also occurred through the channel of EU funded programmes for the AU to which some conditions may have been attached to their implementation/execution arrangements.

In identifying those involved, the framework singles out a number of possible agents whose activities ought to be closely examined. These include officials, bureaucrats and international civil servants involved in policy dialogues, as well as consultants, think tanks, transnational corporations (TNC) and (regional) supranational institutions. The contribution from these groups of agents (particularly consultants and think tanks) was particularly important in the context of this study because of the heavy reliance by AU’s institutions on external expertise.

The above framework identifies different policy aspects that can be transferred from one political system to another, including: policy goals, policy content, instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, attitudes and negative lessons. As part of the process of identifying the extent to which the EU experience has influenced the AU experience these different policy aspects would serve as indicators of evidence.

Borzel and Risse (2009) have also developed a framework that seeks to capture diffusion mechanisms under three major logics of social action, resting on certain assumptions about actors and their relations with social structure and institutions. Their framework provides five different mechanisms by which diffusion could take place in social interaction as is illustrated in Table 5.2 that follows:
Table 5.2 Mechanisms of diffusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social mechanism and underlying theory of social action</th>
<th>Promoters of ideas (senders)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion (Legal and Physical imposition)</td>
<td>Coercive authority, legal or physical force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of utility calculations (instrumental rationality)</td>
<td>(Positive and negative) incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation (normative rationality)</td>
<td>Promote ideas through providing an authoritative model (normative pressure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion (communicative rationality)</td>
<td>Promote ideas as legitimate or true through reason giving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation (indirect influence)</td>
<td>(Promote comparison and competition - strictly speaking this mechanism does not require the active promotion of ideas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Lesson–drawing (instrumental rationality).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Mimicry (normative rationality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Borzel and Risse (2009)

This framework differs from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) in that it makes a distinction between the social mechanisms underlying the theory of social action (means of transfer) and the agency of transfer/diffusion that it identifies as promoters of ideas (senders). Borzel and Risse (2009) highlight the roles played by the players within the two political systems as both promoters and recipients of ‘influence’ captured through the mechanism of policy diffusion. With the understanding that the process of transfer and also that of diffusion can be dialectical, there certainly will be value in utilizing both models in an integrated fashion. These two frameworks served as guides in the investigations of the avenues of influence from the EU’s to the AU’s experiences of integration. However, because the principal interest is the ‘applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African context,’ attention was particularly paid to the channel of emulation in the above mentioned framework.
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identify emulation as a form of policy transfer that results from international pressures (a mixture lying somewhere between voluntary and coercive transfer) through the agency (actions of) bureaucrats and civil servants. Borzel and Risse (2009) on the other hand consider emulation as an indirect influence that encompasses the concepts of lesson drawing and mimicry. Emulation assumes that a particular programme elsewhere may provide a standard for designing similar programmes in other locations. When local differences are taken into account, emulation can produce innovation and emulation can also be taken with the intension of improving the original model (Rose 1991:21). Lesson drawing (as an aspect of emulation) is about a transfer of policies from one context to another motivated by a dissatisfaction with events in the first instance rather than by a mere attraction to the success of these policies elsewhere (the region from where they are being transferred). Given an authoritative policy goal, lesson drawing seeks to use knowledge from other times and places to improve current programmes. The critical question in lesson drawing is whether a policy that is successful in one setting can be transferred to another and more so whether such a transfer would necessarily lead to or guarantee the success of this policy in the next context. In searching for policies that will work, policy makers are often driven by the functional need to dissipate dissatisfaction or solve a perceived problem. Meyers (2000:175) argues in this regard that ideas can become contagious under certain conditions like uncertainty, policy failure or dissatisfaction with the status quo. This leads actors to look for others policies and rules that have effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and could be transferable to their own context. Quite often, instead of seeking for new knowledge policy makers will default to the assurance of doing what has been done and has perhaps worked before or been effective elsewhere. It is this emphasis upon the applicability of the experience of one context (the EU) to the next (Africa or the AU) that distinguishes lesson drawing from mere information
gathering. At the end of the process what is required is knowledge that has been transferred because it was both generic and applicable (Rose 1991:20).

The question of policy transfer success or failure lies at the heart of the investigation of the applicability of the European process of regional integration to the African context, with the institutions and policy frameworks of the European Union and the African Union as units of analysis. The underlying assumptions are that the European process of integration led to the creation of certain institutions in the European Union and the adoption of certain policies which make the EU an example worth emulating. Furthermore, to the extent that this EU experience is considered a success worth emulating (by African policy actors), it creates a platform for policy transfer and diffusion to occur.

The applicability component of the investigation carries with it an implied intention of ascertaining the degree of success or failure of this hypothesized policy transfer process. The success or failure of the transfer of policy can be judged by the extent to which it helps the transferring body to accomplish its desired objectives. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identify three conditions under which policy transfer could lead to what they call an ‘uninformed transfer’, an ‘incomplete transfer’ and an ‘inappropriate transfer’. They explain these conditions in the following words:

Governments borrow policies, institutions with the expectation that this transfer will lead to policy success rather than policy failure. Of course, the underlying assumption is that policies that have been successful in one country will be successful in another. However, that is clearly not always the case…at least three factors have a significant effect on policy failure. First the borrowing country may have insufficient information about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is transferred: a process we call uninformed transfer. Second, although transfer has occurred, crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred leading to failure: we call this incomplete transfer. Third, insufficient attention may be paid
to the difference between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and borrowing country: we call this inappropriate transfer. (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000:17).

Applying their logic to the EU and AU integration experiences fits well with the question of the applicability of the EU experience to the African context. There is indeed in this case a possibility that the EU experience may not have been fully understood as it functioned and transitioned from the EEC to the EU and its associated institutions. In investigating whether there has been emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry) by the AU and ascertaining the extent to which it has been successful, it is important to first of all determine the critical elements of the EU success before proceeding to ascertain whether these elements were also transferred as part of the adoption of EU styled policies by the AU. As can be expected this will not be complete without taking into consideration the economic, social, political and ideological context within which the EU experience evolved and the emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry) may be taking place in the African context.

Rose (1991) represents an earlier framework for alternative ways of drawing a lesson that captures the different ways in which a transfer can be identified as having taken place as a first step to determining its success or failure. This framework is presented in Table 5.3 that follows:
Table 5.3 Alternative ways of drawing a lesson

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copying</td>
<td>Adoption more or less intact of a policy already in effect in another jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation</td>
<td>Adoption with adjustment for different circumstances of a policy already in effect in another jurisdiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybridization</td>
<td>Combine elements of policies from two different places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Combine familiar elements from policies in effect in three or more different places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Policies from elsewhere used as intellectual stimulus for developing a novel policy without an analogue elsewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Rose, 1991.

This model contains certain elements that enrich the policy transfer and diffusion discussion (like hybridisation, synthesis and inspiration). Hybridisation for example poses the challenge of distinguishing the ‘unique influence’ or the most significant influence that may explain the adoption of a specific policy by an organisation. It brings an important consideration to the investigation being carried out by this study because it opens up the door to the possibility that the AU could have been informed by more than just the EU’s experience in the adoption of its institutions and its conduct of regional cooperation and integration. This is a plausible possibility given the long standing relationship between the African Union (its predecessor the OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) for example. The UNECA is a United Nations agency which itself has a long history (from its days of the League of Nations) in supranational governance and institution building. It will seem logical to assume that the UNECA would draw from the UN experience and lessons if it were to make
recommendations to the AU regarding the setting up of institutions for the pursuit of regional integration and cooperation. Should this be proven, it will lead to the conclusion that the African Union is not just a failed attempt at copying the European Union (should this conclusion be reached) but perhaps the result of the implementation of lessons drawn and influences coming from more than just the European Union.

This question of different sources of possible influence adds to the dynamics of different mechanisms of influence and resultant interaction amongst the various options. Marsh and Sharman (2009:273) have argued in this regard that it is difficult to draw clear lines separating the operation of one diffusion/transfer mechanism from another and this makes empirical testing a difficult proposition. Different causal pathways may lead to the same result (multiple causation), small chance events may cause major changes (non-linear causation), and individual mechanisms may only produce changes when engaged in tandem with others (conjectural causation). This makes it necessary to (as much as possible) exclude all other possible avenues of significant influence as part of providing a meaningful explanation for what could be possibly considered the main or major influence. Indeed if the institutional similarities witnessed between the EU and the AU can be largely attributed to another organisation or institutional model then it proves that diffusion from the EU to the AU may not be exclusively responsible for these similarities as both integration experiences could have drawn from a normative model or simply share the same ideology and approach to integration. Should this be the case, then the key consideration ought to be the suitability of such a normative generic model for the African context and reality and the extent to which its assumptions and promises can be expected to realistically deliver upon the developmental promises of regional cooperation and integration for Africa. This would not take away the lesson drawing appeal of the EU experience given the advances it has made in accomplishing some of the objectives of regional integration but will certainly have to shift the debate away from how well the AU is doing at replicating the EU
experience to that of how are both experiences faring at implementing an ideologically similar model of integration and perhaps what lessons they can draw from each other in the process.

Borzel and Risse (2009) have treated lesson drawing as a form of emulation alongside mimicry. Lenz (2012) and Jetschke and Murray (2012) have however made a distinction between lesson drawing and what they have called ‘normative emulation’. Lenz (2012) makes three distinctions between lesson drawing and normative emulation, which are:

i) Lesson drawing occurs in response to a concrete functional problem to which (institutional) solutions are sought whereas normative emulation forms a reaction to situations of great uncertainty about means-ends relationships and ambiguous goals.

ii) Lesson drawing leads us to expect a process of thorough evaluation concerning the lessons that can be learned from the respective (EU) experience, observable for example by the organisation of expert consultations or the commissioning of scientific studies whereas normative emulation occurs in the absence of such studies/assessments.

iii) Lesson drawing ought to lead to functional equivalents of EU models given the diversity in political and institutional contexts in the EU whereas normative emulation should lead to the prevalence of wholesale copies.

Jetschke and Murray (2012:180) further argue that normative emulation can be distinguished from lesson drawing in instances where there is no evidence of a clear functional demand for the adopted institutions. This limits lesson drawing to the adoption of similar policies or institutions identified as haven solved identical/similar problems as those being experienced by the party drawing the lessons. According to this argument, where there is no evidence of the functional problem being resolved through the adoption of the ‘similar institution’, a case of normative emulation is considered to have occurred instead of that of lesson drawing. Building on this and the previous frameworks, this study develops an analytical framework to investigate
the diffusion of the EU’s experience of integration to the AU. The resultant framework is presented in Table 5.4 that follows:

Table 5.4: Analytical Framework for the diffusion of the EU integration experience to the AU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU and AU comparators</th>
<th>Indicators &amp; Variables</th>
<th>Evidence sought</th>
<th>Possible Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Frameworks</td>
<td>Policies. (Policy Goals Policy contents) Ideologies (norms &amp; values transfer)</td>
<td>Emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry).</td>
<td>Uninformed transfer Incomplete transfer Inappropriate transfer transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmes (Goals, content and instruments)</td>
<td>Emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry).</td>
<td>Policy programmes Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Frameworks</td>
<td>Institutional design (Goals, contents Ideologies (norms &amp; values transfer) Instruments)</td>
<td>Emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry). Hybridization</td>
<td>Uninformed transfer Incomplete transfer Inappropriate transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governance Mechanism (contents Ideologies (norms &amp; values transfer) Instruments)</td>
<td>Emulation (lesson drawing and mimicry). Hybridization</td>
<td>Uninformed transfer Incomplete transfer Inappropriate transfer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author

This framework can be used to examine some key avenues of possible influence running from the European Union to the African Union. These avenues of influence are enhanced by the actions of the EU as a promoter of regional integration and those of the AU as a recipient of
regional integration influence. The importance of rationalising our analytical framework under the actions of both the AU and the EU is further examined in the sections that follow.

5.3 The EU as a promoter of regional integration

The European Union perceives itself as a model for effective and legitimate governance to be emulated by other countries and regions. The Commission’s 1995 communication on the support for regional economic integration amongst developing countries remains a document of reference that contains the philosophy behind the EU’s approach and support for regional integration in other developing regions of the world. Their belief in the merits of and conditions under which regional integration can strive can be summarised from the following extract from that document:

…There are a number of factors that make regional integration easier including the degree of complementarity among the economies, the nature of geographic conditions including geographic proximity, and the similarity of the cultural and historical background… there are important preconditions and factors that affect the success of regional integration initiatives amongst these are political commitment, democracy, good governance, peace and security, rule of law and macroeconomic stability. In addition to these pre-conditions successful integration requires a market friendly economic environment, openness towards third countries, institutions which are sufficiently strong and have a clear mandate, adequate resources and political support….a flexible institutional framework, permitting progress at different speeds (“variable geometry”), broad participation by the private sector and civil society, and a set-up where responsibility for dealing with an issue is kept as close as possible to the population concerned (“subsidiarity”), can also be seen as critical ingredients for success as the EU experience shows (EEC 1995:5).

The EU has over the years taken these lessons into account as it has formulated different schemes and programmes in support for regional cooperation in developing regions including
in Africa. It has, however, argued that its efforts to promote and support regional integration among developing countries should not at all be interpreted as an attempt to ‘export’ the ‘European integration model’, arguing that there are clearly different approaches towards integration and economic development (EEC 1995:7). It recognises that the ‘European Model’ was shaped by the continent’s history and is not easily transferable nor necessarily appropriate for other regions. It however goes ahead to argue that:

On the other hand, to the extent that the European model of integration has become an unavoidable “reference model” for virtually all regional initiatives, the EU should share with other interested parties its experience on: improving the functioning of regional institutions, absorbing the adjustments costs originated by lowering barriers, and sharing the benefits from integration (EEC 1995:8, emphasis added).

Since its early days in the 1950s, the EU has shared its experiences with other developing regions and been influenced by its own experience in the formulation of its support programmes for regional cooperation amongst these countries. In its efforts to learn from its experience in supporting regional integration in third (non-EU) countries and regions, the EU has tended to heavily rely on external incentives (conditionalities) and financial and technical assistance (capacity building) to push its agenda (Borzel and Risse 2009:7). Given that the EU perceives itself as a model/example for effective and legitimate governance to be emulated by other countries and regions. It has developed an active policy approach in supporting and strengthening regionalism across the world. Its approach is said to be motivated by the desire to promote the development of genuine (intra-) regional economic and political cooperation (Borzel and Risse 2009:5). This consideration makes the EU not just a passive ‘propagator’ but an active role player in the promotion of the diffusion of its regional integration experience to other parts of the world.
It is common knowledge that the EU often attaches certain conditionalities to its disbursement of aid (like emphasizing on the promotion of human rights, the observance of rule of law and democratic principles and cutting aid when these principles are violated). These conditionalities though sometimes identified as universally acceptable development principles can be associated with the EU’s own integration experience. Conditionalities in general create a positive or negative incentive by acting on the cost benefit analysis of the potential actor/recipient, whereas capacity building by contrast provides target actors with additional resources to make informed and strategic choices. So it is important to look out for evidence of influence upon African actors/countries’ utility assessment through the use of positive and negative incentives from the EU in the form of conditionalities or related and associated instruments.

The EU also controls access to its market and utilises this access as an incentive for policy or regulatory adjustments by other countries in areas such as competition policy or intellectual property (Jetschke and Murray 2012:178). This is often done through Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) and trade agreements like the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbeana and Pacific countries. The primary objective is often related to the attainment of certain developmental objectives in the recipient countries or regions, including encouraging region building because of the benefits associated with it. Access to its markets is thus sometimes used as incentives for countries and regions to carry out certain reforms that are perceived as being development friendly and this philosophy also permeates the EU’s promotion of regional integration around the world.

In this regard, the EU often uses political dialogue and to a lesser extent conditionalities to influence the preferences over strategies and outcomes of target actors in favour of region building. It uses capacity building through technical and financial assistance to enable actors to adopt and implement the necessary policy changes. Conditionality and political dialogue can
be associated with the manipulation of utility calculations, socialization and persuasion, which all contribute to promote the diffusion of the EU’s regional integration experience to other region. These processes work well to bolster processes of emulation and lesson drawing by the beneficiaries of EU support in the domain of regional integration and cooperation. There are consequently a number of avenues through which the EU’s actions can lead to the promotion of the diffusion of its integration experience to the AU. These provide guidance to the investigation of the occurrence of diffusion through the framework summarised in table 5.5 below:

**Table 5.5 Framework to test for the diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diffusion Mechanism</th>
<th>Possible Instrument</th>
<th>Potential sources of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Legally binding agreements, with potential for sanction and retaliatory denial of access to markets and other negative incentives.</td>
<td>Treaties, Framework cooperation agreements, Trade Pacts, Conventions and Agreements between EU and AU, including Groupings of EU and AU Member States respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation of utility calculations</td>
<td>Conditionality, capacity building and technical assistance</td>
<td>Projects, Programmes and other financial support received from EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Learning</td>
<td>Political dialogue, capacity building and technical assistance</td>
<td>Reports from Political Dialogue and Technical assistance facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Political dialogue and Trade pacts</td>
<td>Reports from Political Dialogues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulation</td>
<td>Political dialogue and Conditionality</td>
<td>Reports from Political Dialogue and support programmes and projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Borzel and Risse (2009).

There are a number of mechanisms through which the EU’s integration experience could have diffused to the AU as a result of the actions of the EU in making this happen (whether actively or passively) through their promotion of regional integration as part of their development.
cooperation activities with the African Union and its member states. The above framework served as a guide in the formulation of the semi-structured interviews with EU and AU commission staff and also guided the information search that was carried out through the consultation of the archives and reports from both institutions. Through the archives search and through the interviews this study sort to establish whether there was any evidence of possible diffusion through the actions of the EU through an examination of the various avenues identified in the table above. This was done through an identification of the support programmes and financial assistance packages that have been provided by the EU (and its predecessor the EEC) to the AU (including the OAU). The objective was to establish whether the EU may have influenced the choices and decisions of the AU/OAU to adopt EU styled institutions, policies and programmes through the conditions it attached to its support programmes, and financial assistance, its provision of capacity building and technical experts to the AU.

The existence of this possibility would not be unique to the relationship between the EU and the AU as many of the mechanisms that are said to drive diffusion can be expected to exert a stronger influence in the developing world. It also seems logical that developing regions would be open to such influences because of their generally smaller domestic stock of capital and higher risk premiums, making them susceptible to a race to the bottom dynamic in attracting foreign investment. It is however worth mentioning that though the EU’s material support may change policy makers’ incentives for action, its provision has not always expressly been conditional upon the adoption of EU designed policies or EU typed regional institutions. Hence the effects of direct EU support on the processes of regional institutional change tend to be of a more diffuse nature in terms of institutional choice, affecting mainly the timing of institutional action, i.e. condition the demand side of institutional change (Lenz 2012:158). It remains nonetheless a worthwhile exercise to establish whether there is any evidence of diffusion from
the EU to the AU emanating from the EU’s effort in promoting its experience of regional integration into Africa. As an active promoter, the EU would have contributed to shape and guide the process as a joint effort with African actors (including the African Union and its predecessor the OAU) whose role as a recipient of integration influence would also be significant and worth examining.

5.4 African agency in encouraging diffusion

The role of Africa as a recipient of integration influence seeks to capture the independent actions of African actors (including member states and continental institutions of integration like the African Union) in the promotion of integration on the continent. Guided by the analytical frameworks of the previous sections, this study sought to determine the extent to which the African Union’s experience and trajectory of integration has been influenced by its interaction with the European Union (and its predecessor the EEC). This shall be done by looking for evidence of emulation, lesson drawing (instrumental rationality) and mimicry (normative rationality). Documenting evidence of socialisation (normative rationality) and persuasion (communicative rationality) would be particularly important in making the distinction between the AU as a passive recipient of influence as opposed to being the active driver of its integration agenda.

Socialisation describes the internalisation of international norms by actors so that they are acceptable to other members of the international society following a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that pushes actors to voluntarily seek to be normatively ‘good’. In internalising new norms and rules, these actors have to redefine their interests, so that it converges with those of other actors (Haastrup 2013:793). This is in line with Lenz’s (2012) argument of ‘spurred emulation’ wherein a series of scope conditions within the recipient/host territory facilitate the adoption of
in institutional models and changes conceived from outside. He identifies two scope conditions under which the gradual diffusion of the EU institutional models is expected to affect regional institutional change elsewhere. The first condition is the existence of a functional demand and the second is conditioned by domestic politics and power asymmetries between both sides. Lenz (2012:157) asserts that

“changes in external structural conditions need to combine with a major political or economic crisis that throws previous established practises into discredit and leads to institutional negotiations under conditions of high uncertainty in order to unsettle entrenched member state preferences…such situations creates a demand for institutional change by revealing a fundamental mismatch between existing institutional arrangements and functional needs.”.

This situation places policy makers before options of institutional choice and disposes them to look for solutions to some of the problems they face within their domestic constituencies. Following the logic of these arguments, the African Union would have sought to emulate the EU’s integration experience if its appreciation of Africa’s political and economic conditions generated dissatisfaction that could be attributed to the inefficiencies of its existing institutional governance systems of regional integration. This would have to be combined with an expressed belief in the role to be played by an appropriate institutional framework in promoting effective regional cooperation and integration and in the potential of regional integration to contribute to changing the economic and political condition of the continent. If these scope conditions are met and combined with a belief that the institutions of the EU have played a particular role in driving a ‘successful regional integration agenda’ in Europe, then the actors of the AU may take specific action to learn, draw lessons and emulate the example of the EU, including going as far as adopting their kind of institutional architecture.

There seems to be some evidence to suggest that this may have been the case for both the OAU and the AU. The failure to attain the integration objectives within the set deadlines of the Abuja
Treaty forming the AEC, coupled with the persistence of poverty, disease, conflicts, political and economic instability surely all contributed to create a functional demand for alternative approaches to the continent’s pursuit of continental cooperation and integration. This in some sense is supported by the fact that the OAU was heavily criticized for not doing much to improve the socio-economic conditions of most African States from its creation in 1963 up to the formation of the AU in early 2001. The OAU had a liberation and decolonisation focus for its first decade of operation and had little impact on redressing the continent’s underdevelopment. Dissatisfaction with this situation of underdevelopment created the functional need for the adoption of economic programmes like the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Abuja Treaty with specific institutions to drive the expected process of economic recovery. These institutions were known as ‘Organs of the Community’ according to chapter III and Article 7 of the Abuja Treaty. Some of the created institutions included: (a) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; (b) The Council of Ministers; (c) The Pan-African Parliament; (d) The Economic and Social Commission; (e) The Court of Justice; (f) The General Secretariat; and (g) The Specialised Technical Committees. These are the same institutions earlier identified as bearing certain similarities with some EU institutions, particularly the Pan-African Parliament and the General Secretariat (now the African Union Commission). There is therefore a sense in which a combination of dissatisfaction with the economic and political condition in Africa and a perception the EU’s success in creating institutions to drive its integration could have combined to drive the OAU/AU to want to learn from the EU’s integration experience.

On the other hand the OAU/AU could also have been transformed into an active promoter of diffusion of integration experiences from the EU and other regions of the world out of a quest for normative alignment to international norms through socialisation. This may be the case for example with the objectives built into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) through the setting aside of the doctrine of non-interference (in favour of the principle of non-
indifference) during the transition from the OAU to the AU. This is further supported by the fact that emulation does not require an active promotion of ideas but relies on indirect influences. It is based on the principle of competition (competitive isomorphism) that does not only entail the diffusion of ideas as normative standards for political and economic behaviour but also seeks to spread causal beliefs, (like learning from best practise) on how best to reach certain standards. This leads actors to borrow ideas in order to improve their performance (emulation) in comparison to others (Borzel and Risse 2009:7). Accordingly, the AU’s experience of integration could well also consist of a voluntary mimicry of the EU’s integration experience and informed by African actors understanding and agreement that the EU is a normative and authoritative model of international cooperation and integration. Where it can be established that this is the case it would explain the agency of the AU and its actors in promoting the diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to Africa. These are the considerations that informed the investigation of the actions of African actors as active promoters of the diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU. This was done with the understanding that any attempt at documenting the possible channels of influence running from the EU’s integration experience to that of the AU can surely not be a perfect science. However by making use of an analytical framework that is supported by the literature, it should be possible to generate results that can provide a meaningful explanation on how the EU’s integration experience may have diffused to the AU. This was accomplished through the use of a process tracing methodology that is briefly explained in the next section.

5.5 Investigating diffusion using a process tracing methodology

The methodology adopted by this study to investigate for diffusion is consistent with the approach adopted by similar studies investigating diffusion of regional integration (see
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), Marsh and Sharman (2009), Jetschke and Murray (2012). These studies have essentially proceeded through a combination of consultation of documents and interviews of relevant stakeholders. The documents consulted have included treaties, reports and minutes of meetings held in the course of the adoption of the policy frameworks and program suspected of having been the avenues and channels of diffusion. Following the example of these studies, there was a consultation of archives of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa both based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This study also followed the Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework to identify the stakeholders to be interviewed. These included bureaucrats and civil servants from the EU and AU commissions and from the EU Delegation to the African Union. Interviews were also conducted with staff from the UNECA and some consultants working on the EU-Africa relationship, academics and researchers working within think tanks that also specialise on the EU-Africa relationship and partnership. These were chosen haven been identified as agents through whom diffusion occurs and were thus included in our sample population.

The approach to the investigation followed a process tracing methodology that was informed by the various frameworks already examined above. The choice of the use of a “process tracing” methodology was motivated by the fact that it is expected to help identify the specific channels of influence which can eventually be targeted for policy action by the actors involved. Once it can be established that there has been diffusion and the agents and mechanisms identified, the same become targets of policy action and recommendations. Lee and Strang (2006:886) define the process tracing methodology in the following words:

> Process tracing research follows the spread of a policy or practice from one location to another. The approach permits inspection of the role played by external models, and inquiry into why and how a concrete instance of learning or mimicry occurs.
The application of this methodology proceeded through an identification of the possible channels of diffusion and the search for evidence that diffusion has taken place. For tracing to be possible, it was necessary to isolate as much as possible any other possible sources of influence that could have shaped the development of programmes and policies within the AU. The channels that were investigated and the processes that were followed is summarised in the diagram in Figure 5.1 that follows.

**Figure 5.1 Diffusion making use of process tracing methodology**

The above framework investigates the diffusion of the regional integration experience of the EU to the AU by isolating the influences that may have come from Europe and distinguishing
this from other possible influences. This entailed a focus on identifying what influence could be traceable back to Europe, being aware that there may have been other possible avenues for influence. Knowledge of the AU’s relationship and partnership with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) informed the choice to focus on them as respondents and an expected possible source of influence for institutional development and policy adoption by the OAU and AU. This was justified by the fact that the institutional arrangements of the UNECA (unlike other possible influences) brought together the member states of the OAU/AU and in some instances mirrored the institutions for the UNECA (a case in point will be the UNECA council of ministers which would have largely been attended by the same ministers attending the OAU council of ministers since all OAU member states were also UNECA members).

In my consultation of the OAU archives, I focused on reports of case studies and meetings that preceded the occasions in which the major policy documents (formation of OAU, adoption of LPA and Abuja Treaty) were adopted including the period when the OAU became the AU. My intention was to find out whether any studies were commissioned to inform the choices that were made to adopt these policies and programmes of the OAU and AU. I also wanted to establish if such studies examined and drew inspiration from the EU and its experience of integration and if other models of integration were also considered. I also checked the OAU/AU archives for reports of EU sponsored projects and programmes in order to examine the conditionalities that could have been attached to the support provided by the EU for evidence of diffusion of the EU’s integration experience. In the consultation of the UNECA archives, I checked the records of the meetings that occurred at the time of the adoption of the LPA, Abuja treaty and the conversion of the OAU to the AU to see what possible influence the UNECA could have exercised. At the EU Delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa and at the EU commission in Brussels we asked for reports that cover the EU’s relationship with Africa.
from the formation of the OAU, as well as evaluation reports of the EU’s support programmes to the AU and its predecessor the OAU. The results I obtained from our archives search and interview with stakeholders are presented in the next chapter.

In support of the process tracing methodology, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have demonstrated that diffusion can be used as both the dependent and the independent variable in any analysis. It can be used as a variable to explain policy change/innovation and its success or failure but it can also be used to explain under what circumstances diffusion should take place, which is an important consideration for the recommendations that emerged from the results of our investigation. In a somewhat similar argument, public policy field researchers have argued that policy transfer does not necessarily involve foreign institutions and practises being adopted in full but that hybrid combinations of outside and local knowledge in application are much more common (Marsh and Sharman, 2009:279). This is a limitation of the process tracing methodology that is also inherent in the investigation of diffusion. The assumption that diffusion influences may be of an exclusive nature is one that is difficult to prove. It also carries with it the presumption that policy choices are independent when they may be auto-correlated and thus be the result of multiple and sometimes not easily traceable influences. This notwithstanding, process tracing remains a reliable and practical methodology to investigate the influence of policy choices from one setting to another setting through identified mechanisms of diffusion and the actions of stakeholders involved in the process. It may not be possible to prove that the influence has been exclusive but it remains a valid framework from which to draw generic conclusions that could inform the discussion on the applicability of the EU’s integration experience to the African context. This should also lead to recommendations for both EU and AU policy makers on how their partnership can be conducted to enhance its impact upon the accomplishment of their jointly set objectives.
The view that regional organisations mimic others to conform to dominant templates of appropriate structure and behaviour is explicitly counter posed to the view that policy diffusion is a rational process involving replacing ignorance with knowledge to enhance functional outcomes. In an ideal world, one would expect the selection of policy choices and institutional frameworks to be continuously informed and shaped by the functional need generated from the situations in which these are meant to operate. However, the diffusion literature makes the argument that policy solutions developed in one integration context tend to move to others. This reality has implications for the success and applicability of these diffused experiences from one context to the other. This is the reason why it is important to establish whether or not the EU experience of integration has diffused to Africa and if this is indeed the explanation for the similarities witnessed between some of the EU’s and AU’s institutions of integration. The results obtained from this investigation would assist in answering the question of the applicability of the EU’s experience to the African context, which was the secondary objective of this study. The use of a process tracing technology made it possible for the first objective to be investigated and laid the foundation for the analyses related to the second. The results obtained from both exercises are presented in chapters four and five that follow.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the analytical framework and a process tracing methodology with which the diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU was investigated. The analytical frame developed to investigate the evidence of diffusion focuses on the role of the EU as a promoter of regional integration as well as that of the African Union as a recipient of regional integration influence. The importance of adopting this approach lies in the contribution it makes to the discussion about the applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African context. The results and analysis that emanate from applying the process tracing methodology to investigate for diffusion is presented and discussed in chapter four that follows.
Chapter 6

Results and Discussion

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has outlined a number of mechanisms through which ideas, policies and institutions diffuse. Having highlighted in Chapter 4 the ways in which the EU and AU integration processes have been different (although they share a number of similar institutions), Chapter 5 has made the case that the institutional similarities between the AU and EU could be as a result of diffusion experience from the EU to the AU. This can also be justified by the fact that regional organisations tend to adopt similar policies and institutions because they tend to learn from each other. Furthermore international organisations sometimes constitute channels that allow for the quick transmittal of ideas and knowledge, sometimes creating artificial demand for policies or acting as teachers of norms. At the same time other actors adopt policies and institutions because they want to become more like their role models (Jetschke 2010:17). Chapter 5 has outlined a number of mechanisms through which this type of diffusion could take place and presented an analytical framework to be used to investigate the possible occurrence of diffusion from the EU to the AU through a process tracing methodology. The results obtained from this investigation are presented and discussed in the rest of this chapter. The results have been derived from a consultation of the archives of the AU and UNECA for documentary evidence that point to diffusion from the EU to the AU. The consultation of the archives was complemented by interviews conducted with staff of the UNECA, AU and EU commissions as well as some academics, consultants and researchers working on EU-Africa relations. This chapter is further sub-divided into five sections. Section 6.2 presents our findings from the archives consultation, Section 6.3 presents the responses from the interviews conducted with the stakeholders while section 6.4 discusses the results based on the conclusions obtained from the previous three sections, and section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Findings from archives consultation

The consultation of the archives of the African Union was critical to apply a process tracing methodology to examine the circumstances that could have led to the adoption of a number of policies and institutions that bare certain similarities to those of the EU. In consulting the archives, attention was given to the minutes of meetings and reports compiled from when the OAU was formed to the time of the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Abuja treaty (1991) and the conversion of the OAU to the AU. This period runs from 1963-2003 and includes the timeframe from the birth of the OAU to the conversion to the AU. It was within this period that the OAU/AU adopted its key policies and decided upon the institutions that will drive the integration of the continent. By examining the decision making process around the adoption of these policies and institutions, it was possible to determine the actions that were undertaken leading up to the choice of certain policy options including the motivations behind these. Special attention was paid in this regard to the possible role of the AU in encouraging the diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU through its actions and decisions. The main objective was to test for any evidence of emulation of the EU. A secondary objective was to determine whether the witnessed similarities between some EU and AU policies and institutions was not the result of deliberate actions by the AU to solve its own identified functional problems.

Particular attention was paid to the involvement of the EU in the activities of the OAU and AU through the provision of financial support, capacity building and technical assistance. These avenues were identified in Chapter 5 as important channels for diffusion through the use of persuasion and the provision of incentives and conditionalities attached to financial support packages. They also capture the instances of diffusion through the agency of the EU as a promoter of diffusion. The information that was gathered for this aspect was double checked in interviews with EU commission and delegation officials and further verified through a
consultation of project reports from EU supported programmes. In addition to these, the
archives of the Economic Commission for Africa were also consulted because of this agency’s
contribution to the formation of the OAU and continuous support for the AU’s integration
agenda. Looking at the possible contribution of the UNECA was done as part of an effort to
isolate the ‘EU only’ influences from those that could have come from non EU sources. The
findings of the archival consultation will be reported below under the broad sub-headings of
the EU’s support for regional continental integration and Africa’s solutions to functional
problems of integration.

6.2.1 Diffusion through incentives and conditionalities from the EU

From consultation of the archives of the AU/OAU no evidence was found of programmed
financial support from the EU to the OAU/AU for the period 1963-2003. The first support
received from the EU for continental integration initiatives was a financial instrument to support
EU-Africa cooperation in the area of peace and security, the African Peace Facility (APF). The
APF was established at the request of African leaders at the African Union Maputo Summit in
2003. Through this instrument, the EU efforts has consisted in providing political backing as
well as predictable resources to African Peace Support Operations, capacity-building activities
as well as mediation activities at both continental and regional levels. Before the APF the EU’s
involvement with regional integration on the continent had been through its cooperation with
northern African countries making use of its neighbourhood policies and with sub-Saharan
African countries as part of the ACP group.

This means that for the full lifespan of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), there was no
formal cooperation with the EEC/EU. It was during this time that the institutional and policy
framework for Africa’s continental integration was developed. From the Lagos Plan of Action
through the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and its
associated institutions (similar as they are to those of the EU) there was no formal support
program from the EEC/EU that could have facilitated the diffusion of Europe’s experience of
integration through the use of conditionalities attached to any form of financial support or
technical cooperation. This therefore eliminates the possibility of persuasion, conditionalities
or incentives from being a source of diffusion leading to the adoption of the AU’s ‘EU-styled
institutions’ of integration as contained in the Abuja Treaty (1991) and the Constitutive Act
of the AU. It further eliminates the agency of the EU in exporting its model of integration to
Africa through the channel of its programmed financial support programmes. This however
only eliminates the possibility of diffusion that could have taken place through persuasion and
the use of incentives/conditionalities but does not eliminate the possibility of lesson drawing
through emulation, or of mimicry. In excluding any meaningful agency of the EU in the
adoption of policies, programmes and institutions of the AU before 2003, the responsibility for
the choice of institutions and related policies that were built into the Abuja treaty and the
constitutive act lie with the AU.

The avenues for diffusion through the agency of the EU were only created after the creation of
the African Union and the adoption of NEPAD. It was within this same period that the first ever
Africa-EU summit was convened in Cairo in Egypt in April 2000 to agree upon broad principles
of cooperation between the two continents. This first EU-Africa summit launched a
comprehensive framework for political dialogue between the EU and Africa and a plan of action
in a number of areas including regional integration in Africa and Africa’s integration into
the world economy focusing on trade, private sector development, investment, development
resources, industrial infrastructure, research and technology, debt and cooperation in
international fora. It also focused on human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good
governance and rule of law. Peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution as
well as sustainable development challenges and poverty eradication including health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking as well as culture were all included in this agenda.

The Cairo summit was the dawn of a new era in the EU’s relationship with Africa and this shift in focus and approach was strongly signalled in 2005 with the EU’s release of its communication to the council and parliament titled ‘EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development’. This 2005 EU strategy for Africa document had as its primary purpose to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent. It rationalized the EU’s involvement with Africa as a continent in the following words:

The EU Strategy for Africa will therefore, for the first time, address Africa as one entity. Under this Strategy, the EU will reinforce its dialogue with the pan African institutions. The strategy will also fully exploit the potential of the recently revised Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, together with the European Neighbourhood Policy. These agreements cover respectively the EU’s relations with sub-Saharan African countries, South-Africa and the countries of North Africa. (Com 2005:2)

It was against the background of this ‘shift in paradigm’ that the first Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was formulated and formalised in 2007. It was described as a partnership to be based on an Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives, one that strove to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity (JAES 2007:2). As such the formal involvement of the EU in the support of Africa’s continental integration is relatively recent (since 2005) when compared to the long history of the
OAU/AU’s efforts at promoting continental integration accompanied by the creation of a number of institutions to drive this process. This means that there are current avenues through which the EU’s experience of integration could be diffusing to the AU through its provision of financial support and technical assistance in the context of the Joint Africa EU strategic partnership. This has created formal channels for an exchange of experiences and possibly for Africa to gain insights from the EU’s experience. The channels created remain an opportunity for the future and should bring in a positive contribution to the continent’s current integration efforts.

6.2.2 Diffusion through African solutions for Africa’s problems

One of the objectives of consulting AU and UNECA archives was to obtain records of how decisions were taken leading up to the adoption of certain policies and the institution that bare similarities with those of the EU. The objective was to verify whether there were clearly identified functional problems that these institutions and policies were designed to resolve and also to establish whether the chosen institutions were retained as being the best out of many options considered or were simply retained because they had been used in other contexts (including in the EU) to solve similar problems. Tracing the process of decision making in this manner made it possible to establish whether or not diffusion from the EU was partly or wholly responsible for the programmes and policies (including the institutions) adopted by the OAU/AU. Finding that there was no evidence of diffusion from the EU would have meant that the institutions and policies that have been adopted by the OAU/AU (though similar to those of the EU) were adopted to solve a functional problem. In such an event, their similarity with EU institutions could mean that both the EU and the AU/OAU were faced with and trying to solve the same problems and hence ended up developing the same institutions - a sort of mere coincidence. This is supported by Jetschke and Murray (2012:175) who argue that an increase
in institutionalisation is the natural outcome of endogenous demand for more integration either created by increased trade or as a common response to a collective problem and that a response to this demand should lead to the creation of more institutions to solve their perceived (and real) collective problems. Following this logic this research set out to determine the following:

i) Whether the policies were adopted to solve an identified problem, if yes which one.

ii) Whether studies were carried out to determine the most suitable solutions to these problems and if the EU’s experience was considered a case to be studied.

iii) Whether any such study specifically considered what would be the most suitable institutional framework to be set up to address the identified functional problem, and

iv) if it did arrive at conclusions that recommended the adoption of the EU institutional model and framework.

With respect to the first concern it was found that the OAU retained a political mandate for the organisation to drive the agenda of liberating the continent from all forms of colonialism for the first decade of its existence. This is evident from the permanence of the fight against apartheid on the agenda items of the Heads of States summit meetings for over three decades. It was also found that the situation of economic underdevelopment and the fragile state of African economies caused a shift in the OAU’s focus from being purely political to include an economic mandate through the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action. The LPA was described as ‘Africa’s regional approach to the economic decolonization of the continent’ and sought to provide the long-term basis for its socio-economic restructuring and development (Adedeji 1984). So the functional need was Africa’s socio-economic condition and position within the global political and economic systems. This happened amidst the background of decolonization and the Cold War and the solutions that were found were a political drive for unity and
collective self-reliance amongst African states at the regional and continental levels (using Africa’s resources for its people).

Through the consultation of the archives it was possible to establish that the UNECA played a central role in driving the ideological debate for Africa’s model of developmental regionalism (UNECA 1977). The problem identified was underdevelopment and adverse economic performance and the solutions proposed were regional cooperation through collective self-reliance. There was therefore a clear functional problem being addressed and a number of studies were commissioned to propose solutions to the problems Africa was facing. Some of the reports produced as part of this process included ‘Africa’s priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990’ which later became the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), ‘The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AA-SAP)’, ‘The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s’ (UN-NADAF.1991).

Though these reports serve as evidence that there was a functional problem being addressed, no evidence was found of studies specifically commissioned to examine the EU experience of integration with the aim of drawing lessons from it in the period leading up to the adoption of the LPA and Abuja Treaty. There was a noted concern with the continent’s state of underdevelopment, a shared belief in the strength that lay in pursuing collective self-reliance and unity in the development of the continent but no evidence of actions taken to draw lessons from the EU’s experience through the commissioning of a study to examine the same. This could be justified in a sense by the fact that the OAU as an organisation had been established with a mandate to ‘free Africa from European colonisation’ and continued along the path of an anti-neo-colonialism agenda. According to Nkrumah (1965) the essence of neo-colonialism is
that a state which is subject to it is in theory independent and has the outward trappings of international sovereignty, whereas in reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. With Nkrumah being the first supporter of African unity and taking into consideration the role he played in setting up the OAU and his known anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial stance, it should come as no surprise that the OAU would not commission a study to learn any lessons from the European experience of integration in its early years. There was a kind of animosity between the two organisations that probably made it difficult to commission such a study of the European experience.

On the contrary, there was evidence of many studies conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and reports published to inform the OAU/AU’s ideological and policy positions and programmes. The relationship between UNECA and the OAU has been a long standing one and has certainly provided an avenue for the AU to be influenced by the institutional governance mechanisms and approaches of the UN as an international and intergovernmental organisation. With respect to the functional problem of underdevelopment identified as plaguing the African continent, the solution was found to rest in collective self-reliance. This motivated the adoption of economic and political cooperation and integration as the preferred path to follow to address the identified problem. However with respect to the institutional setup to adopt in the pursuit of regional cooperation and integration, it is likely that the OAU probably defaulted to the prevalent models of intergovernmental cooperation that were existing at the time. There were no studies commissioned to determine the most suitable set of institutions to promote Africa’s desire for collective self-reliance through cooperation and integration. This probably explains why some of the institutions retained as the organs of the AEC and AU have still not been set up more than half a century after the formation of the OAU.
If the OAU defaulted to adopting existing best practises of intergovernmental cooperation it would have still been opened to influence from the EU experience of integration given the Eurocentric nature of the integration literature as alluded to in chapter two. This would mean that should there have been any diffusion of the EU experience to the AU, it would have been indirect in nature. In other words, if the OAU/AU sought to draw lessons from global best practise and given that the EU has influenced global best practise by extensively theorizing on its model and experience of integration, then the AU would have indirectly drawn lessons from the EU experience. The implication of this is that the diffusion of the EU experience to the AU would have occurred through an indirect emulation of the EU as a global normative model of integration. The conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that the OAU/AU adopted certain institutions because they were globally associated to experiences of regional cooperation and integration around the world. Since there evidence indicating that the EU’s experience has been the global reference for integration, its influence has certainly extended to the OAU/AU as well. This finding is consistent with the institutional and governance architecture of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs). They are each governed by some forum of Heads of States, all have some council of ministers below this forum of Heads of States and various sub-committees to address cooperation on a sectoral basis. These findings from the consultation of these archives were corroborated by the stakeholders that were interviewed in the different institutions. The responses from these interviews are presented in the next section.

6.3 Analysis from interviews

Actors and stakeholders are important players in the diffusion process because they implement their organisations’ objectives through programmes guided by certain policy objectives. This is the reason why a number of European and African officials working at the African Union Commission and European Union Commission respectively were interviewed. Respondents
were also drawn from the European Union Delegation to the African Union as the implementing agency currently responsible for the management of the Joint Africa Europe Strategic partnership (JAES). Experts from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and academics and consultants that have worked on African integration, the European integration and/or the EU-Africa relationship as it has evolved over the years, were also interviewed.

Talking to European and African stakeholders was considered an important exercise because of the role and potential contribution they play as agents of diffusion. Members of this group (particularly the staff and former staff from the European Commission and the AU Commission) would have been active agents for diffusion through the policy papers they drafted, study and mission trips they or their predecessors would have taken part in and also in explaining (in some cases) from a position of their institutional memory how they approached the subject of this investigation in the course of the performance of their duties. The experts also provided guidance for the archives consultation and supplied a number of important documents that contained some answers to some of the questions related to the objectives of this study. These respondents were asked four groups of questions. The interviews were structured in a manner to guide the discussion towards answering the research questions while leaving room for them to point to aspects they consider relevant for the study from their experience.

An important premise for the occurrence of diffusion through the agency of policy actors and key stakeholders is their own appreciation of the EU’s experience based on personal knowledge and experience. As such diffusion of the EU experience to the AU is expected to occur if the African stakeholders involved in the management of the integration process view the EU as a normative and authoritative model of integration and consequently take steps to emulate the EU
experience. Informed by this background and context, the respondents were asked for their appreciation of the EU integration experience and also asked about the lessons they think the AU experience of integration could and should perhaps learn from the EU experience. These questions were asked under the following broad headings: i) Europe as a successful model of integration, ii) Evidence of diffusion in EU-AU relationships, iii) Challenges to effective cooperation in Africa’s integration iv) Lessons from EU experience for Africa’s integration. Some of the answers provided by the respondents are presented in the subsection below:

6.3.1 Europe as a successful model of integration

In describing the integration of Europe as a normative model for integration experiences around the world it was sought to test the extent to which the European experience is viewed as a success amongst practitioners both in Europe and in Africa. Respondents were consequently asked if they agreed with the notion that Europe has been a successful integration experience and to point out what they would consider as indicators of success according. This question intended to capture the potential disposition of EU agents to promote regional integration informed by their perception of the success of the EU experience. It also intended to single out the willingness of African agents to act as diffusion agents for the EU experience driven by their assessment of its success. While this question could not capture the historical context that could have led to the adoption of certain institutions within the OAU/AU, it nevertheless can serve as an indicator of agreement with the chosen institutions that bare certain similarities with that of the EU. It shifts away from trying to establish whether the EU’s experience informed the choice of the adoption of these institutions and centres the debate on the relevance of these institutions in the on-going pursuit of continental cooperation and integration. Should the EU and its institutions be found to be a successful model to emulate, it will lead to the conclusion that irrespective of how the AU came to the point of selecting EU styled institutions, its current
group of policy makers believe these institutions are suitable for the continental integration agenda and should be maintained. A further implication of this would be that African policy makers should therefore make use of the avenues that have been created for formal engagement with the EU following the JAES to have control of the diffusion of the EU experience moving forward in order to ensure better outcomes of their existing programmes, plans and initiatives. In other words, should there be consensus around the success of the EU experience and its suitability to the African context, then contemporary efforts should be channelled towards gleaning the most appropriate lessons from the EU experience to advance the AU’s cooperation and integration agenda.

As could be expected, the majority of the respondents from both Europe and Africa considered the EU as a successful integration experienced based on the fact that it has developed functional institutions and the ability to legally enforce its decisions and ensure the compliance of its member states. Europe is thus a normative model of integration because of the unique characteristics of its integration model. It is not a federation but a group of sovereign states that have decided to share certain aspects of their sovereignty through the creation and empowerment of a number of common institutions to drive the process of integration. It has and manages its own budget and has extended legislative power to enforce, monitor and implement the decisions of its members (Interview 21). Apart from the strength of its institutions and their role in driving the process of further integration, Europe is succeeding in its vision to promote peace, prosperity and democracy. Its success at promoting peace is judged from the fact that there has been no outbreak of war on continental Europe since the end of World War II. It has created a framework where smaller countries (like Belgium and Latvia) can be protected from the aggressive behaviour of larger countries (like Germany and France) by creating institutions where the interests of the large and small countries are taken into account. It has also succeeded in the spread of democracy by creating a framework for the
transformation of the former Eastern European countries to become more democratic nations. Through the conditions of assertions it presents to EU membership, countries like Greece and Spain could only join after getting rid of their military rulers (Interview 18). As an engine of shared prosperity, reference was made to a World Bank report that refers to ‘Europe as a Convergence Machine’. According to this report

Economic growth has helped Europe rise from the devastation and misery of World War II to unprecedented wealth, technological sophistication, and the world’s best quality of life. Since the war, Western Europe’s output has tripled and Eastern Europe’s doubled. The European Union, itself an unprecedented achievement, is in many ways the world’s largest economy. European societies have developed market-based systems combining high levels of economic activity with equity and social inclusion (Gill and Raiser 2012:72)

The same report refers to Europe as the “lifestyle superpower” by having the highest standard of living with millions of people flocking to Europe to see their economic miracle. Thus the economic resurgence of Europe from long years of war and the growth and prosperity it has enjoyed for the last couple of decades can be used as an indication of the success of its integration project.

There were other reasons offered to justify the widely held view of the success of the European experience. From the perspective of some of our African respondents the EU experience was considered relevant for Africa because it had succeeded to bring together countries at different stages of development and progressed on a piecemeal basis to form a core group of economically successful countries (notwithstanding the recent crisis in countries like Greece,
Spain and Portugal). It is also a successful example of political integration because it has been able to craft an adaptive model that incorporates elements of market integration and social cohesion. It has also succeeded to reduce national disparities between its member states and to consolidate democratic regimes. It has further been able to increase and maintain the level of inter-regional trade to around 65% and (though increasingly challenged), has forged the creation of a European Identity (Interview 15). Some respondents went as far as arguing that Europe did not only represent a normative model for Africa by virtue of the lessons its experiences can offer, but its continuous success provided some intangible impetus to Africa’s integration. In this regard and commenting on the recent Greek crisis they argued that “the EU is a psychological and natural inspiration to Africa’s integration and a Greek pull-out from the EU will not be good for Africa because it will erode the political capital for integration in Africa” (Interview 11). According to this argument Europe remains a good example of what integration can do for a people and a continent although they conceded that this does not necessarily mean the European experience is a good example of the path that Africa needs to take. They argued that at the time of the establishment of the African Union, Europe was a functioning model of a political union that serves economic objectives that the AU aspired to and could offer a number of lessons for the journey the AU was embarking upon.

Respondents were mostly unanimous in considering Europe as a successful experience of integration and all but one thought that Europe should continue to be a normative model of integration to other experiences around the world. The one respondent who argued against the normative role of Europe in the spread of integration insisted that notwithstanding its own success, the European experience should not be used as a template in Africa because Regional Integration is an interactive complex process that is very context specific. Those aspiring to integrate their regions should draw lessons from a number of different experiences (including
from Europe and elsewhere in the world) but should ultimately chart their own course to their own defined destination (Interview 20).

This notwithstanding, there was broad consensus amongst the respondents in considering the European experience of integration a success principally because its institutions of integration were functional (sufficiently funded, empowered to handle specific competencies and legally empowered to enforce their decisions) and playing a prominent role in driving the project of further integration in Europe. Europe’s experience is also considered successful because of its contribution to the promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy. These conclusions reinforce the belief in the normative power of Europe as a promoter of regional integration in Africa. Once the practitioners largely believe that the European experience has something to offer other experiences of integration around the world (including in Africa), it creates an acceptable justification for the diffusion of its experience to Africa through the agency of both European and African actors involved in the promotion of cooperation and integration in Africa. This can happen on the one hand through the agency of the European Union to promote integration based in the European experience in its engagement with Africa and on the other hand on the agency of the African Union in drawing lessons from the European experience. In this regard, the platform provided by the JAES ought to serve as an avenue for lessons to be drawn from the EU that may be applicable to the African context.

6.3.2 Evidence of diffusion of integration from Europe to Africa

With this set of questions we sought to identify the channels through which diffusion could have taken place from Europe to Africa. This was accomplished by testing for evidence of diffusion that has occurred through the various channels identified within the literature as discussed in chapter three. Respondents were therefore asked from both the EU and the AU for examples of AU programmes, policy frameworks or institutions whose creation and/or
sustenance has been because of significant funding support from the EU. The researcher was particularly interested in the EU’s provision of capacity building support and technical assistance programmes since these were identified as a principal channel for the diffusion of integration experiences through the conditions attached to it. Respondents in the AU were asked whether EU support was critical for the adoption of or success in AU programmes or institutional reform and about the mechanisms the AU has set up to prevent EU support from influencing agenda setting and prioritization definitions at the level of the African Union. Participants were also asked for their views on the institutional similarities between some AU and EU institutions and particularly if there was any evidence at the time of the adoption of the AU institutions of any traceable influence coming from the EU experience. In the search for a traceable influence, it was hoped that studies would be found that may have been commissioned at the time to examine integration experiences of Europe that could have led to the adoption of these EU styled institutions within the AU. Respondents were also asked to indicate if there were any other indicators (apart from the similarities in the institutions) that suggest the AU was copying from the EU and what in their experience explained the dichotomy between the rhetoric and implementation of Africa’s integration objectives.

From the responses obtained, there was consensus that the integration experience of Europe must have influenced the African integration experience in different ways at different stages of its development. As one respondent argued:

“If we go back to when the Abuja treaty was adopted, the Model of Europe came in very handy both at the technical level and at ministerial level. That was not surprising because the European model has been in a way very successful notwithstanding the challenges it has been facing in recent years. If you have a model of integration that has brought together countries at different levels of development. And if you talk about an integration model that has been achieved at a piecemeal basis. A core group of countries championed the process of dealing with the challenges that Europe faced at the time particularly that of security. So it is very true that the European Union has been a successful model of integration that the AU has been looking at but this is not limited to the AU, other regional organisations like ASEAN ,
CARICOM all look up to the EU to learn from its experience. It is however our responsibility to ensure that we do not just copy and paste but we re-engineer what we perceive to be the main elements of the EU’s success.” (Interview 11).

There was however disagreement with the notion that the AU was copying the EU. This disagreement was accompanied by suggestions that the witnessed similarities in some of their institutional and policy frameworks was not the result of the AU attempting to copy the EU but much more a reflection of their joint subscription to a common orthodoxy of trade liberalisation as a means to prosperity. Those who upheld this position argued that the approach of economic integration following the Vinerean linear model had become ideologically dominant and countries that had proceeded to embrace this methodology of economic cooperation and integration had developed a certain number of institutions to accompany it. This means that the adoption of certain institutions (the ones that bare certain similarities with EU institutions) following the treaty creating the African Economic Community (Abuja treaty) was done out of the realisation that these institutions were good for an economic community for the whole continent (Interview 13). Leading the conclusion that Africa was not necessarily trying to emulate Europe but subscribing to a certain approach to regional cooperation that shared an ideological origin, background and foundation with Europe (Interview 15).

As a further defence against the notion of Africa copying from Europe, it was argued that Africa has a longer history of the implementation of Vinerean style integration than Europe does. The example was taken of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which was created in 1910 long before the 1957 treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community. If the argument of Africa copying from Europe lay exclusively on the sequence and timing of their adoption of certain institutions and policies that look similar, then it could indeed be argued based that Europe copied from Africa and not the other the way round. (Interview 13 & 14).
As different regions of the world have a long history of establishing regional cooperation of different kinds, it would not suffice to witness the similarities between the policies and institutions of two regional organisations and on the basis of the timing and sequence of their adoption conclude that the one is copying from the other.

The notion that the implementation lapses witnessed in Africa’s integration agenda do serve as evidence of a failed attempt to copy from the European experience was also challenged. It was argued in this regard that the implementation challenges inherent in Africa’s integration experience (including the setting up of its institutions) can be attributed to the fact that not much thought or research was undertaken to ascertain the suitability of these institutions to Africa’s context and realities of integration. The great diversity of its economies, their differential endowments and levels of development should have triggered an investigation into the suitability of these institutions for Africa’s governance even before their adoption. The fact that it was a political decision to create accompanying institutions identified as the organs of the community means that no conscious effort was made to ascertain whether they will be suitable or not in helping Africa accomplish its desired integration objectives. It is one thing to identify the state of underdevelopment and believe in the merits of economic and political integration to make the difference and another thing to determine how such economically and politically diverse economies should attain the desired integration. Such a contextual definition of the functional problem to be addressed should have been accompanied by a thorough assessment of the most suitable institutions to accompany the processes of political and economic integration.

It is also possible that the promoters of these institutions could have been driven by the functionalist expectation that their creation was going to drive and be self-reinforcing to the integration project but there was no evidence to suggest this from the input of our respondents.
They instead noted the significant difference between the AU and the EU because the institutions of the European Union are sufficiently funded (they run their own budget), have exclusive competencies (have been empowered by members) with supranational authority and have legislative power to both monitor and enforce EU decisions and legislation unlike those of the AU (Interview 21). These differences bring into question the notion that the AU is attempting to copy or replicate the experience of the EU. The argument that the differences between the funding and functioning of EU and AU institutions and their respective capacities to implement their integration agendas is evidence of a failed attempt to copy the EU is not supported by the chronology of events leading up to the adoption of these AU’s institutions of integration.

Through the consultation of archives and complemented by interviews with the relevant stakeholders from both institutions, it was possible to establish that there was limited or no formal contact between the EU and the OAU when the Abuja Treaty (and its institutions) were adopted. The EU did not collaborate or prepare a financial package for the OAU because it was considered a political organisation fighting for the liberation of Africa with no clearly articulated development agenda or focus (Interview 18). There was however cooperation within the same period with the RECS and support provided through the various EU-ACP frameworks and agreements. This means there were no formal avenues of diffusion of institutional norms and practises that could be programmed along with EU financial and technical assistance in the lifetime of the OAU. The implication of this is that there is consequently no evidence of the EU’s institutional influence upon the institutional and policy frameworks of the OAU and the AU by means of EU agency before the 2007 adoption of the JAES.

There is however evidence of a huge intellectual and ideological influence from the Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) as an organ of the UN systems as both the OAU and African
Development Bank were created with the support and direct involvement of the UNECA. Put in the words of the UNECA officials:

“Established in 1958 the main mandate of the UNECA is to promote regional integration and the socio-economic development of Africa. So regional integration has always been one of the pillars of the research and advocacy of the UNECA. You will agree today that Regional integration is one of the key development priorities of the continent. There was a time when the OAU had more focus on political issues because of its focus on decolonisation, and while the OAU focused on that the UNECA kept the light of integration going, including supporting the establishment of a number of the Regional Economic Communities. Once the war on ending decolonisation ended and African leaders started looking ahead, the UNECA was part of this process, and participated in the drafting of the Lagos Plan of Action, the drawing up of the Abuja Treaty, including up to recently the drafting of the new framework document Agenda 2063. So UNECA has been closely involved in shaping the continent’s regional integration. On the question of whether this has been modelled along the European model, I will say yes and no. Yes because we have this linear approach of moving from a Free Trade Area along to customs union and eventually to form a common market and an economic community like the EU. …. and also to the extent that there are some integration institutions like the African Central Bank, the Pan African Parliament that were conceived after the example of the EU … from that perspective you can say the model seems to be the same but the one difference is that Europe started with a few countries and expanded as members added, but Africa has started with the regional economic communities and building up, but the RECS are small replicas of the linear model and have integration institutions that also reflect the EU institutional architecture, so there is that difference between the integration process of Europe and that of Africa” (Interview 3).

As per this argument, the UNECA also was directly involved in the setting up of a number of Regional Economic Communities with governance mechanisms similar to those adopted as organs of the AEC. In the case of COMESA, the UNECA convened a ministerial meeting of the then newly independent states of Eastern and Southern Africa to consider proposals for the establishment of a mechanism for the promotion of sub-regional economic integration. The meeting, which was held in Lusaka, Zambia, recommended the creation of an Economic
Community of Eastern and Central African states. An interim Council of Ministers, assisted by an interim Economic Committee of officials, was subsequently set up to negotiate the treaty and initiate programmes on economic co-operation, pending the completion of negotiations on the treaty. Once finalised the interim structures became permanent. These recommendations and influences came as no surprise as they reflected the institutional set up and function of the UNECA itself as an organisation, leading to the possible conclusion that the UNECA had a more influence on the formation of institutions in the OAU/AU by direct institutional contact than the EU.

It was also possible to establish that the avenues for diffusion (as contemplated in the literature) were only created after the JAES and decision to support the African Union as an institution was taken. Since then activities have been multiplied and have mostly been built and based on the EU experience. A number of studies have been commissioned and national and regional seminars held on different aspects of the EU experience. Examples include EU-AU studies on trade facilitation. There have been discussions on the management and sequencing of reforms and on the functioning of the internal market. These have been done in the form of seminars on the functioning of the EU’s internal market with the help and support from EU commission colleagues working on the internal market (Interview 7). The AUC intends to learn lessons from these exchanges to inform its current drive towards the formation of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). With respect to the mechanisms put in place at the AU to filter the lessons drawn from the EU and prevent possible conditionalities attached to on-going support from influencing the AU’s integration agenda, it was established that the EU tends to share its experience in the context of its dialogue and series of exchanges with the AUC but the AUC decides on what to take on board. Both EUD and AUC agreed that the decision lay with the AUC on what experiences from the EU to embrace or adapt to the African reality on an ongoing basis (Interview 9). Through its African Union Support Program (AUSP I&II) the EU has also
provided funding for technical staff and a significant training support which has at times entailed staff exchanges between the two commissions. The AU viewed this exercise as a useful opportunity to learn from the experience of Europeans with a long institutional memory and involvement in EU integration processes to bring an insider perspective of what happened in Europe after they signed the treaties (Interview 11).

There is also evidence of experience sharing in the current EU-AU relationship, through high level political dialogue between the two parties. The purpose of these contacts is to share experience and not to attempt to replicate the experience of the EU because of the noted fundamental differences between the two processes. As one EU official explained,

> “what we have learned in the course of the years is that we have done integration in a certain way, we have sequenced reforms and have developed our internal market, but this does not mean the EU’s way is the only way, so when we talk with our African partners we share experiences on how reforms can be carried out, for example, we have recently shared experience on how to create an internal market, bearing in mind that the EU’s internal market is still a work in progress, but the EU’s experience is all the more useful to the AU today as it aims at creating a continental free trade area (CFTA)…. We have in this regard organised a series of workshops in different regions in Africa and we made sure the colleagues from Commission’s internal market department were present to share the EU’s experience”

The emphasis of the interaction between the EU and AU commissions at the moment is therefore on experience sharing and learning from each other in the true spirit of partnership. It is clear to current staff in both the EU and the AU commissions that their integration trajectories have been different in significant ways. Whereas the EU expanded from a core of 6 to 27 countries, the AU is integrating with all 53 African countries and building up from the RECs. Aware of this reality the AUC staff see the EU support as catalytic and aimed at building capacity within the AUC while they remain fully in charge of defining their policy orientation and implementation, guided by their strategic plans (which goes through a rigorous review
process) and is derived from the framework of the Abuja Treaty. One AUC official emphasized this point in the following words:

“There is no question that the EU has been instrumental in supporting the programs of the AUC’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), however the assumption might be that just because they have funded those frameworks the African common position should then be aligned to be exactly in line with what the EU is doing or believes is Correct and that is not true. We have an understanding that when they provide support for programs it is for building Africa’s capacity to pursue Africa’s own agenda and interest. Through our dialogues with the EU we may learn about certain initiatives and approaches that they have, and then we have an opportunity to look at them criticality, and to determine whether they are useful to us or not, I cannot sit here and say to you we are adopting the EU model of integration, ours is driven by the Abuja treaty, we have the Lagos Plan of action, we have continental policies and priorities which preceded the EU program support. So the understanding has been that the frameworks were adopted and agreed and we see the EU as a partner to assist us to implement what we are doing.

“(Interview 7).

To emphasise this point, they further argued that the AUC has established and continues to establish partnerships with a wide range of partners. Arguing that Africa does not have to be inspired by Europe alone, as there are other models that offer other lessons and present other opportunities. The AU now embraces the vision of Africa forming partnerships with many other partners, reflecting the current global reality of living in a multipolar world.

Excluding any major diffusion of the EU experience to Africa between 1963 and 2003 leads to the conclusion that the OAU probably adopted its institutions of integration as part of an effort to create an African Economic Community following the established best practice from around the world. The chronology of events lends no credence to the possibility of major influence from Europe through the actions of the EU to export its model of integration to the AU. No evidence was found of traceable and direct link from the EU to the OAU/AU that resulted in the adoption of its institutions or the development of its policy frameworks. This eliminates the avenue of diffusion from the EU to the AU being the result of its actions or direct contact with
the OAU through the programming of its aid and financial assistance. This conclusion is supported by the examination of the historical evolution of the EU-Africa relationship from the establishment of the OAU till date. There is rather evidence of the institutional influence of the UNECA through the establishment of contacts that are also identified in the diffusion literature as the traditional channels of diffusion. This leads to the conclusion that the EU’s interaction and influence over the continental integration process is more recent (after 2007) and ongoing but is occurring within a competitive context of the AU forging partnerships with other players and being driven by its strategic objectives in the development of its priorities. It was also possible to establish that the implementation lapses of the Abuja treaty integration timetable for the creation of an AEC is not the consequence of a poor or improper application of the EU experience of integration. The majority of the stakeholders interviewed were of the view that Africa is facing a number of different challenges that prevent it from advancing as desired with the promotion of cooperation and the further integration of the continent. Some of the major challenges identified are examined in the section that follows.

6.3.3 African integration experience and challenges to effective cooperation

The literature has often decried the poor record of Africa’s integration experience judging from two prominent parameters, namely its inability to meet its integration targets (milestones built into the Abuja Treaty) and its failure to contribute in a significant way to address the under development challenges on the continent, judged from their persistence long after the creation of the OAU. There is often no thorough assessment of whether or not these milestones were realistic in the first place and if African countries should realistically have been expected to meet them. Having said this, it ought to be concerning that the AU has sustained a habit of making commitments and not fulfilling them. This concern was brought to respondents to give their assessment of the continental integration process, the basis of their assessment and to point
out the most significant obstacles to effective cooperation and integration on the continent. This question was informed by the fact that the founding charter of the OAU outlines the objectives of the organisation as being to promote harmonisation and greater cooperation amongst member states in political, diplomatic, educational, cultural, scientific, economic, defence and security spheres. Respondents were requested to point out if any progress had been made in promoting cooperation in these areas and what African countries needed to do to make cooperation more effective in the various sectors as identified.

It was possible to establish from the responses that not much progress has been made in the promotion of effective sectoral cooperation on the continent. There is instead a tendency of the continental body to multiply different programmes (reported 32 major programmes at one stage) to address a whole range of issues making implementation a nightmare and the tracking of progress near impossible (Interview 3). This has partly been blamed on the difficulties inherent in trying to promote cooperation amongst so many diverse countries and economies at the same time. The differences amongst the countries involved are just too many - different levels of development, different geographical attributes, sometimes different political systems and ideological dispositions (especially during the cold war era). This diversity increases the challenge of finding common grounds for sectoral cooperation at the continental level and probably explains more than any other consideration the implementation difficulties common with a number of continental initiatives. The consequence of this is that many normative decisions are taken at the level of the African Union but the persistent challenge lies with incorporating those continental decisions into the respective national development policies. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that unlike the EU, the AU has not been given the legislative power to enforce continental decisions at the national level. This is another reason why the AU may not be able to immediately adopt the EU approach given the absence of equivalent institutions and legal frameworks (Interview 21).
Another challenge to effective cooperation is the absence of a culture of evidence backed policy formulation. The research and analysis that goes into the adoption of policy frameworks and the development of programmes seem to be very thin and probably explains the lack of progress that is registered in the course of implementation. In this regard, a number of the respondents argued that the principal reason why implementation of continental integration and cooperation objectives are slow is because no studies have been conducted to clearly demonstrate what member states stand to benefit from further integration. For integration to register progress the AU needs to carry out a cost benefit analysis of integration and the implication for each country involved. No serious studies have been conducted to demonstrate in empirical terms and making use of figures the benefits of integration. Member states need to be convinced of the benefits of cooperation and integration in measurable terms and need to see the added value of cooperation. The benefits of more cooperation and integration should be quantified and monetized for specific countries as well as the indirect benefits. This will make it easier for each country to discount their options in the pursuit of continental integration and could serve as the first step towards setting up a kind of regional cohesion funds to compensate the losers from the integration process. It will also form the basis for a meaningful cooperation because all the countries involved will be clearly aware of the stakes associated with the respective partnerships they are forming. This point was emphasized as being important for the case of continental integration given that similar studies have been conducted to extensively demonstrate the benefits of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) for the regions and the countries that sign up to the agreements.

Faced with capacity constraints at the national levels, the member states of the AU are often caught up between their stated commitments to the continental integration process and the realities of their current trade relations. The consequently end up making the decisions that will ensure better market access for their products and guaranteed export earnings, even if this
means dishonouring their engagements to the continental process. Evidence based policy making will help to provide member states with the tools they need to count the economic cost of their political commitments to the continental project and should increase the number of political decisions that make economic sense and is in the best interest of the progress and development of the member states. Related to the importance of evidence based policy making is the need to emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of decisions to assess progress, identify constraints and attempt to address challenges on an ongoing basis. The AU will benefit from paying more emphasis on the monitoring and implementation of existing commitments before taking on new commitments in order to check the predisposition to embark upon a high number of programmes and projects with very low levels of implementation.

Another challenge associated with the first two is the question of the financing the African Union. The financing question has three dimensions, relating to the financing of the African Union, its organs and institutions including the RECS, the creation of funding mechanisms to facilitate the integration process (financing of cross border infrastructure projects) and the setting up of solidarity funds to compensate for the loss of fiscal revenue for participating member states. The absence of adequate financial resources to fund the integration project at national, regional and continental levels is a serious impediment. In this regard, the ability of the EU commission to manage an adequately resourced budget has played a significant role in the contribution it is bringing to the European integration project (interview 21). Integration and cooperation being a complex process needs a functioning and well-resourced and equipped bureaucracy to manage it. There is need for highly technical competencies that ought to be procured and organised within various departments and the whole bureaucratic apparatus needs to function efficiently. In this regard the AU needs to secure funding for its institutions, programmes and projects in order to be able to drive the continental integration agenda effectively. The realisation that its projects budget is currently still largely externally funded is
troubling and the initiatives it is currently undertaking to consider alternative sources of financing (through the Obasanjo commission) is commendable.

Another challenge to effective cooperation identified by the respondents is the lack of ownership of Africa’s integration process at the local level within AU member states. One respondent described this as the absence of local champions at the national level who own and drive the agenda of continental cooperation and integration. The participation deficit by African citizens to the continental integration program contributes to delay the transfer of sovereignty from member states to the continental institutions. There is need for a conscious effort to make the continental institutions and programmes known and legitimate before the citizens. This requires the adoption of a bottom up as well as a top bottom approach. The value added of the AU and its initiatives needs to be clearly demonstrated and its activities streamlined following the principle of subsidiarity according to which action must be taken at the most appropriate level (Interview 17). An increase in ownership of AU programmes should also lead to their inclusion in national development programmes and plans. This will reduce the predisposition to adopt new programmes with every new crop of leaders that come with the political cycles of member states. African integration has been driven by big men who promoted certain big ideas which subsequent leaders did not find as priorities. It is currently the experience that ideas come and go with individuals, condemning the integration process to be a repetitive circle of start-ups and exploration of grand ideas. This observation ties with the argument that African integration thus far has been an elite and leadership driven process a bit distant from the people. This means the citizen do not take ownership of the process and it consequently cannot be deepened and broadened (Interview 3).

There is also a need to coordinate the various efforts on the continent and rationalise the different interests of member states towards the pursuit of a common and single agenda. This is accentuated by the problem of limited human resources, amidst high ambitions with big goals.
It further imposes coordination challenges within the departments in the AUC (mandate for trade and continental integration are handled by Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Economic Affairs with some roles allocated to NEPAD) and between the AUC and the RECS. This situation has an implication for the contributions of member states to the budget of the AU as they already contribute to the RECs who in most cases articulate strategic objectives that are closer to the realities (and cost benefits analysis) of the member states. This problem is compounded by the weak linkage between AUC and RECS and further complicated by the problem of multiple membership. AU member states join RECS for different reasons, some economic, some political and some historical linkages and it is still not clear to the AUC how to rationalise the RECS, deal with the issue of multiple membership and reduce the duplication of efforts. The relationship between the AUC-RECS needs to be revisited to make it streamlined and more efficient, this is particularly important because these are supposed to be the building blocks of continental integration.

The challenges to effective cooperation and further integration in Africa at the continental level are indeed numerous and multifaceted. The call to strengthen the institutions with both financial and technical resources holds a promise to significantly improve the implementation outcomes of Africa’s integration project, but for this to happen the process needs to be increasingly owned by the citizens of Africa through the development of local champions and national constituencies within AU member states. These are some of the aspects highlighted by the respondents on the challenges the AU faces in advancing effective integration and cooperation. Addressing these should make a difference in the effectiveness and efficiency of the AU in its efforts to promote further cooperation and integration. Though it is not seeking to replicate the EU experience in Africa, given the noted differences in their history and contexts, some of the respondents were of the view that the AU can still benefit from the EU’s experience in a number of areas as examined in the section that follows.
6.3.4 Lessons for Africa derived from the European integration process

Respondents were requested to identify the lessons that the AU’s integration experience could possibly draw from the EU’s process and experience of integration. Some of the main lessons they proposed were the following:

- The principle of solidarity in funding was highlighted as an important lesson to be considered by the AU. It was argued this can be done through the establishment of the equivalents to the EU’s social cohesion funds. To serve as a mechanism that promotes integration by compensating losers from the integration experience. This will also encourage all countries to participate in a meaningful manner.

- The transfer of sovereignty to the central supranational institutions is also an important lesson to be gleaned from the EU experience. The distribution and management of competencies between the member states and the supranational institutions following the principles of subsidiarity is a model worth emulating. AU member states could for example share competencies with the AUC on foreign policy but transferred competencies to the AUC on trade. The choice of departments to be brought under AUC competencies need not be the same as in the EU but the principle none the less should remain relevant in Africa intends to pursue a deep integration agenda. Following the principle of subsidiary and given its developmental mandate the AUC could be given competencies over sectors like education, health or tourism. This could serve as low hanging fruits to consolidate cooperation leading towards deeper integration while negotiations on the more complex and politically sensitive (trade, economy & defence) are engaged building upon the lessons learned from the pursuit of cooperation in less sensitive sectors.

- Africa may also learn from the role of cooperative hegemons in European Integration. African integration could be driven by a coalition of willing countries. This is often
cited as the major difference between the EU and the AU and has sometimes been proposed as the possible pathway which large economies in Africa could follow. There are some elements of this in the formation of NEPAD where five economies are taking the lead (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt). In the example of Europe a core group of six countries decided upon and developed the ‘EU acquiesce’ and subsequent enlargement was on a negotiated basis. This is an option worth considering given the witnessed complexity of driving the agenda for all 53 AU member states at a time.

- Africa can learn also from the EU’s application of the concept of variable geometry in the application of integration protocols and the attainment of associated objectives. This point was also made to defend the argument that Europe did not follow the linear model of integration strictly. This approach is also evident through the two speed integration approach adopted by the Euro group and Non-Euro group countries pursuing integration as an incremental process of consensus building around specific sectors or issues giving member states options to opt out on some policy choices.

- It is also important to mobilize the private sector to participate in the integration process. The role of the private sectors in the promotion of integration was identified as the one area in which the AUC is seeking to draw lessons and experiences from the EU. This was described as the challenge of having the private sector at the table as opposed to on the table (involved as opposed to being talked about) and it fits into other ongoing discussions regarding the participation of the private sector in Africa’s political processes (Interview 11).

- Africa can also learn from the EU the importance of the transposition and domestication of continental level commitments to the national level. In this regard the EU has made EU law superior to national laws in its member states in certain areas. Why and how it
adopted this approach could be a good lesson for African integration. Respondents reckoned this would be an important accomplishment because legal certainty promotes business across borders and should therefore be encouraged for the whole continent.

- The promotion of greater citizen participation in the process of Africa’s integration is also an important lesson from the EU’s experience. Currently there seems to be a top bottom approach in Africa driven by the Heads of States and by summits as opposed to a people’s driven process with their knowledge and participation. Integration must be seen to be relevant to the people of Africa. One area that could bare direct relevance relates to the free movement of people and citizens and if this can be facilitated at the continental level and with the assistance of the AUC then citizens will relate more and this will boost their engagement more.

- Like the case of the ECSC African integration can be organised around something of common interest like the development of infrastructure and creation of corresponding linkages. This will be a move to adopt an approach of focusing on things that matter to the citizens economically, around which they can come together and pursue their common interest. Share something that will make sense for growth and jobs amongst Africans and this growth can be created by connecting the countries in strategic sectors (Interview 19).

These recommendations and lessons drawn from the EU experience constitute the true test of the applicability of the EU experience to the African integration process. The fact that the two integration experiences both seek to improve the standing of their respective organisations on the global scene is a shared aspiration, however the paths that they have adopted to attain their objectives as well as the constraints that they face are different. Their aspirations may be similar but their paths have been different. The respondents demonstrated a consciousness of this reality but still believed that the AU could draw lessons from the EU’s experience. This seems to
agree with the findings of the archives search and feedback from the interviews. The implication of these conclusions on the objectives of this study are analysed and discussed in the next section.

6.4 Discussion of Results

From the previous sections it has been possible to establish that there no evidence of the direct involvement of the EU in promoting its model of integration to the AU in a manner that could have influenced their decision to adopt certain EU styled institutions. Interviews with EU officials confirm that the absence of a clear developmental mandate and the political nature of the OAU was the principal reasons why the EU did not engage with nor financially support the OAU as an organisation (Interview 18). The implication of this historical reality is that when the organs of the African Economic Community (AEC) were built into the Abuja Treaty, there was no direct and traceable influence from the EU on the choice of institutions that were retained to promote Africa’s continental integration as foreseen by the diffusion literature. A consultation of the UNECA archives however revealed that the format of institutional operation adopted must have benefitted from the institutional influence of the United Nations System. Precisely Resolution 188(IX)\(^6\) of 1969, organises the member states of the UNECA (who at that time were all independent African States) to be collaborate through an institutional architecture that comprised of a council of ministers (of finance, economy and planning), a technical committee of experts and an executive committee. Feedback from our respondents which we confirmed by further archives’ consultation confirm that the UNECA was also instrumental in the formation of a number of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (particularly COMESA (1965)) who also retained a similar institutional governance architecture.

\(^6\) http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/12760/Bib-53919.pdf?sequence=1
Furthermore, the fact that the administrative budget of the UNECA was financed from the funds of the United Nations (according to article 16 of Resolution 671A (XXV) (and given the role the UNECA has played as the ideological driver of African integration) suggests another possible avenue from whence diffusion of formats of intergovernmental cooperation could have taken place. Haastrup (2013:790) supports this possibility by arguing that that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) derive their design inspiration from their UN equivalents (Peace and Security Council and UN’s Economic and Social Council respectively) notwithstanding their similarities (at least in name) with the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).

This lends more credence to the conclusion that the OAU/AU has most likely benefitted from influences from a number of different directions in the choice and development of its institutions. While there is limited evidence to suggest a direct influence from the EU through its financial and technical assistance programmes, the influence from the EU as a normative model of regional integration cannot be completely discounted. The chronology of events however supports the possibility that the EU could have served as a reference model to the AU without being directly involved in influencing the AU’s choice and selection of institutions.

This seems a plausible conclusion because some of the Article VII institutions of the OAU founding charter of 1963 (Council of Ministers, General Secretariat) and some Article VII institutions of the Abuja Treaty of 1991 (Council of Ministers, Pan African Parliament, Court of Justice and General Secretariat) bare certain similarities with the Article 4 institutions of the 1957 treaty of Rome (An Assembly (European Parliament), council, commission, court of justice) and the Article 4 institutions of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (European parliament, Council, Commission and Court of Justice). A reliance on the chronology of events alone does not really prove diffusion in itself and in addition to that the similarity of the institutions
between the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the 1992 Maastricht treaty should actually suggest that the Maastricht Treaty drew inspiration from the Abuja treaty that was adopted a year earlier - a conclusion that a lot of researchers would find absurd notwithstanding their application of a similar logic or methodology as evidence that the AU is mimicking the EU in its integration efforts. One of the respondents (in defence of the direction of the AU mimicking the EU version) made reference to the long duration of the Maastricht negotiations, suggesting in the process that the details of the texts were in the public domain and must have served as an inspiration to the AU’s adoption of the Abuja Treaty (Interview 18).

The diffusion literature adopts two measures as part of its analytical toolkit to identify instances in which diffusion is suspected to have taken place. It tends to focus on the timing of the adoption of particular policies and institutions, that is, the clustering of decisions (see Elkins & Simmons 2005 and also Meseguer 2009) as well as on the similarity of the policies or institutions to be adopted, without assuming that the institutions or policies embody the same functions in new contexts (Jetschke 2010:10). Applying this logic to the example of the Maastricht and Abuja treaties should lead to the conclusion that there may have been diffusion from the AU to the EU. This will have to be complemented however with evidence of studies commissioned by the EU to study the institutional architecture of the AU and perhaps by financial support from the AU to the EU. Given that it is highly unlikely that this could be the case, it however highlights the limits of the chronology of events and similarities of institutions approach/argument in determining the existence and direction of diffusion from one regional organisation to the other.

The OAU/AU probably drew inspiration from the EU in developing its institutional architecture but this was done independently of any formal contact between the two institutions and also without the agency of the EU in promoting its model and experience of integration to the AU by means of its developmental assistance or programmed aid.
This leaves the only possible avenue of diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU to come from the OAU/AU’s appreciation of the EU as a normative model of integration and from the fact that the two share an ideological disposition around the merits of (economic and political) integration for the improvement of the welfare of their citizens and as avenue to exercise more influence on the global political arena. This is more in support of the argument that policy solutions developed in the context of regional integration diffuse from one regional institution to the other (Jetschke 2010:5). In other words, regional organisations look to other regional organisations to find solutions for the functional problems they may be facing. This is the likely justification under which diffusion could have occurred from the EU to the AU using the avenue of lesson drawing and/or emulation. Following Lenz (2012) distinction between lesson drawing and normative emulation it seems reasonable to conclude that normative emulation may have characterised the earlier part of the EU-Africa relationship while lesson drawing seems to be a more recent and ongoing experience, especially after the establishment of the Joint Africa-EU strategic partnership and the support programmes (AUSPI &II).

The facts in favour of an early normative emulation possibility are gathered from the lack of a formal relationship (through programmed financial support) to the OAU at the time of its adoption of institutions that bare certain similarities with those of the European Union. The lack of strong evidence of expert consultations or commissioned studies examining the two experiences around the time they adopted their respective institutions also supports the case for normative emulation being responsible for institutional similarities. In addition the apparent failure of the concerned institutions to develop into functional equivalents (interpreted as playing a similar role as in the EU but taking into consideration the specifics of the African context) also points to some evidence of the absence of a wholesale copy of the EU styled institutions. To emphasize the functional dissimilarity between these ‘similar institutions’ it can be argued that whereas the EU commission is a supranational body driving the EU integration
with exclusive competences in a number of areas and the Court of Justice interprets and enforces EU laws over member states, there are not real equivalents in the AU context since the AUC is still largely an intergovernmental coordination body with little to no legislative power and the African Court of Justice is still in the process of being set up (Interview 21). The same can be said for the functioning of the EU parliament and the Pan African parliament which are not functional equivalents in their respective unions when judged from their current contribution to the ongoing integration process. These reasons added to the above mentioned considerations, prove a case of normative emulation possibly explaining the earlier years of continental integration and of lesson drawing probably happening within the current context of the Africa-EU strategic partnership. Based on these conclusions, the true picture of the diffusion of the EU’s experience of integration to the AU can be summarised as in Table 6.1 that follows:

Table 6.1. Evidence of diffusion of integration from EU to the AU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diffusion Mechanism</th>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Results &amp; Evidence</th>
</tr>
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| Coercion            | Legally binding agreements, with potential for sanction and retaliatory denial of access to markets and other negative incentives. | • EU-ACP agreements are legally binding. From Yaoundé, Lomé I, II, III, IV & Cotonou.  
                      |                                                                             | • Possible indirect influence on OAU/AU through RECs.                               
                      |                                                                             | • No evidence of direct influence on OAU/AU institution creation & shaping before 2007. |
| Manipulation of utility calculations | Conditionality, capacity building and technical assistance. | • No evidence of direct influence on AU before 2007                                  
|                     |                                                                             | • Avenue created with JAES, AUSPI & AUSPII. Possible Lesson drawing ongoing.        
|                     |                                                                             | • AU dependence of external funding creates a possible avenue.                     |
| Social Learning.    | Political dialogue, capacity building and technical assistance              | • Ongoing through Political Dialogue and Technical assistance and staff exchanges in the context of JAES. |
| Persuasion          | Political dialogue and Trade pacts                                         | • Ongoing through Political Dialogue and Technical assistance and staff exchanges in the context of JAES. |
As presented above, there is no evidence of the use of coercion by the EU as a tool for the diffusion of its integration experience to the AU. Additionally, the EU has not had the opportunity to cause the manipulation of the utility calculations of AU decision makers through the use of conditionalities attached to financial support programmes, technical assistance or capacity building initiatives. There has been however opportunities for social learning to occur for some form of persuasion (to adopt integration best practices) through the ongoing political dialogues, technical assistance programmes and staff exchanges currently going on within the framework of the JAES. These conclusions help to bring clarity to the debate on the diffusion of regional integration from the European Union to the Africa Union. It excludes the other possible avenues by presenting evidence of the possibility of normative emulation before the adoption of the JAES and of ongoing lesson drawing as a possible avenue of ongoing diffusion. The policy implication of an ongoing diffusion process is the fact that AU policy makers ought to have clarity of what lessons they are looking to draw from the EU experience of integration. The JAES has chosen the pillars of human rights, democracy, peace and security as the cornerstones of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the AU. These are important components of Africa’s development agenda but the forum also provides a platform for other priorities to be put on the table. There will be instances of conflicting agendas’ elements that they may have to deal with at the EU-AU dialogues. The AU for example has developed an ‘African Industrial Development Agenda’ (AIDA) as a framework of African industrialization as a top priority for the AU to pursue a development industrialization agenda but the EU has not been prepared to support AIDA. The AU and EU also seem to have conflicting policy
perspectives on the African Mining Vision and the EU’s Raw Materials Initiative which seems to contradict Africa’s commodity based industrialization (Interview 7). Though these AU programmes would work better if they received support from the EU and other donors but they seem to be at variance with EU priorities and/or interests on the continent. The result of this has been the AU’s search to diversify its partnership base to include emerging countries like China, India and Turkey. This suggests that the real story of the EU’s interaction with Africa’s continental integration agenda as driven by the AU is still to be written. The fact that the AU and its member states have an increasing number of partners also changes the nature of the EU’s interaction with the AU and presents an opportunity for a more meaningful partnership based on experience sharing and lesson drawing. This brings to the centre the question of the relevance and applicability of the EU’s integration experience to the African context. This ought to be seen not from the perspective of how well Africa has learned from the experience of the EU thus far but from that of which lessons it ought to be drawing from the EU given the current avenues opened up through the JAES and how applicable will these lessons from the EU experience be for its context. A few important considerations in this regard are discussed in the next chapter and followed by a number of policy considerations to be factored in by the AU in the management of its ongoing relationship with the EU.

6.5 Conclusion

The question of the diffusion of the integration experience of the EU to the AU is an important one because it feeds into the discussion of its applicability to the African context. This chapter has made use of a process tracing methodology to test for the evidence of diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU through a number of diffusion mechanisms identified in the literature. The results were obtained from a consultation of the AU and UNECA archives and from interviews with relevant stakeholders and indicate that there has been indeed diffusion
from the EU to the AU through normative emulation. It has been demonstrated that diffusion through the instrumentality of conditionalities and incentives often attached to financial and technical assistance programmes did not occur in the first 40 years of Africa’s continental integration project. The only diffusion that could have occurred within this period could possibly be related to the role of the EU as a global normative model of integration. There have however been financial flows to continental integration since 2004 and formalised in 2007 with the adoption of the Africa-EU Joint Strategic Plan. This has created an avenue for further diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU and makes a more valid case for questioning what would be its applicability to the African context. To be fully applicable, Africa would have to deal with its other identified challenges of cooperation as it manages its relationship with Europe through its strategic partnership. This will entail teasing out from the European experience the elements that could help it with its integration project given its noted challenges. This will be examined in some detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 7

Conclusion: Applicability of European process of regional integration to the African context

7.1 Introduction

Having established through the earlier chapters that the EU and AU experiences of integration share certain similarities that could be evidence of diffusion of the EU experience to the AU, the previous chapter presented and discussed the results of the investigation of this possibility. The aim was to establish any evidence of the diffusion of the EU experience of integration to the AU, and to establish the format in which this diffusion could have possibly occurred given the different mechanisms of diffusion that were discussed in Chapter 5. So far, it has been possible to conclude that there could have been normative emulation in the earlier part of the EU-Africa relationship while lesson drawing may be on going within the current context of the Joint Africa-EU strategic partnership and related support programmes (African Union Support Programmes I and II). The facts in favour of an early normative emulation possibility were established from the lack of a formal relationship (through programmed financial support) to the OAU at the time of its adoption of institutions, policies and programmes that bare certain similarities with those of the EEC/EU given that the EU’s main channel of engagement with the continent was within the framework of the EU-ACP group. At the same time, there are no traceable links to prove that the EU’s experience directly influenced the adoption of certain key institutions of the OAU at the time they were adopted eventhough the same cannot be said of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) given the support received from the EU through subsequent programming of European Development Funds earmarked for the support of regional cooperation at the sub-regional level.
There is also currently a wide open avenue in the context of the Africa- EU joint strategic partnership for the experiences of the EU to inform the practice of cooperation and integration by the African Union, and for both organisations to engage in experience sharing. With this in mind and based upon the lessons identified as forming a part of the EU experience in the previous chapter, this chapter presents a summary of the findings of this study and undertakes a discussion on the applicability of Europe’s process of integration to the African context. Accordingly section 7.2 shall present a summary of the findings of this study while section 7.3 shall address some policy implications with related recommendations of these findings. In section 7.4 a reflection on the applicability of the EU integration process to the African context shall be presented, while section 7.5 will conclude the chapter.

7.2 Summary of Findings

The aim of this study has been to look for evidence of diffusion of integration from the EU to the AU through an examination of their common institutional and policy frameworks. The evidence of diffusion has enabled us to build a case for the applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African context. To accomplish the objectives of this study, a number of hypotheses were set up to capture the agency of the EU in the promotion of integration and that of the AU in facilitating the process of diffusion from the EU to the AU. By using the diffusion approach through a process tracing methodology it has been possible to focus on processes and causal mechanisms of diffusion and to obtain results that have helped in reaching certain conclusions based on the mentioned hypothesis. This section discusses some of the findings as they relate to the hypotheses of the study.
7.2.1 Diffusion through financial assistance and technical support

One of the main objectives of this study was to look for evidence of diffusion from the EU to the AU through the channel of EU financial assistance and technical support to the OAU/AU. The assumption of this test was that the EU will be informed by its own integration experience in programming its support for regional integration to the AU/OAU. This should result to it attaching certain conditionalities to its financial assistance with the aim of influencing the OAU/AU in its choice of policies and institutions of integration. To test for this possibility, the following two hypotheses were formulated:

i) “H1a: The African Union’s decision to pursue a specific policy or institutional change has been driven by other objectives than the functional reasons in that specific area, and can be linked to an influence in some area of its relationship with the EU. “

ii) H1b: the pursuit of a policy action, program or institutional change by the AU has been bound to the EU’s willingness to support the same.

These hypotheses were used to capture the effect of the EU’s technical assistance and capacity building support on the OAU/AU’s choice of policies and institutions. These were used to test for the impact of EU funding and related support on the AU’s policy choices, programmes and institutional framework, while controlling for the AU’s own processes of agenda setting and prioritisation. The results obtained from a consultation of the archives of the AU/OAU established that there was no programmed financial support from the EU to the OAU/AU between the periods running from 1963-2003. This implies that for the full lifespan of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (37 years) there were no financial cooperation agreements between the OAU as an organisation and the EEC/EU. As has been examined in chapters 4, within this period, the EU’s involvement on the continent was more centered towards the provision of support to African Union member states that were also part of the Africa Carribean and Pacific (ACP) groups of countries. Subsequent envelops of European
Development Fund (EDF) earmarked specific funds for support to regional organisations to which these ACP members belonged and other initiatives aimed and promoting regional cooperation amongst them. This could have been another channel through which the EU’s experience could have filtered back to the AU’s integration process, given that the EU support ACP member countries and their regional organisations that were eventually recognised as the building blocks of the African Union. The RECs are closely integrated with the AU’s work and serve as its building blocks. The relationship between the AU and the RECs is mandated by the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act, and guided by the: 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU; and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa.

There is no systematically documented information of the role the RECs have played in influences African Union processes and hence it was not possible to establish the extent to which their interaction within the EU-ACP framework and support for regional cooperation and integration from subsequent envelopes of the European Development Fund may have impacted upon their input into AU integration processes. This is an avenue of possible diffusion of the EU’s integration experiences to the African Union that merits further investigation as it was not adequately investigated in the course of this study. If however one were to take into consideration the notion that AU-RECs relationship are only being recently formalized, with the MOU only finalised in 2008, it seems plausible to assume and to conclude that the EU’s influence may not have been significant, if at all, in the AU’s decision to adopt policies and institutions that bare certain similarity to those adopted in Europe. In addition to this, the fact that the financial contributions from the EDF were not expressly directed to the OAU or the AU also eliminates the possibility of persuasion and the conditionalities or incentives attached
to financial and technical assistance from being a source of diffusion of the EU’s integration experience to the AU before 2003.

This finding should lead to the rejection of the above formulated hypotheses and place the responsibility for the choice of institutions and policies on the OAU/AU independent of all direct and traceable influences from the EU/EEC. It also leads to the observation that an avenue of diffusion has been created since the adoption of the JAES in 2007. This is a possible avenue for the diffusion of the EU experience to the AU through the EU’s support programmes. It was also found that through its African Union Support Programmes (AUSP I&II) the EU has provided funding for technical staff and a significant training support which has at times entailed staff exchanges between the two Commissions. This is a useful opportunity to learn from the experience of the EU through the staff exchanges to bring an insider perspective of what happened in Europe after they signed the treaties (interview 11). Diffusion could consequently be taking place and the AU has an opportunity to make the EU’s experience relevant and applicable to its context by applying the lessons from Europe that will help it advance its agenda.

7.2.2 Diffusion through Lesson drawing

Lesson drawing from the EU by the AU was to be proven by establishing the extent to which the policy choices of the AU had been the result of its assessment that it faced certain problems similar to those faced by the EU in which case the solutions developed in the context of the EU experience could be adopted to its context. This was a search for proof of ‘evidence based decision making, judged by the existence of commissioned studies that assessed the problems and challenges of Africa’s integration and recommended alternative courses of actions to be adopted. In diffusion terms, this meant testing for evidence that the AU’s own considerations and utility calculations were decisive in policy enactment or institutional change. This would
mean the AU commissioned studies to examine integration experiences from around the world, including a focus upon the EU’s experience with the purpose of drawing certain lessons that could be relevant to its own context and realities. This would mean the AU’s decision to learn from the EU’s experience is voluntary and motivated by a desire to solve a clearly identified functional problem. The evidence of diffusion from the EU to the AU in this instance will be some proof that the African Union (or OAU) decided to pursue certain institutional changes or adopt EU styled policies and institutions because of its assessment of the EU’s successful experience in administering the same. Such a policy adoption and institutional change will be observed in the absence of direct incentives offered by the EU. To test for this possibility the following hypothesis was formulated and tested.

\[ H_2: \text{Following an assessment of its own costs and benefits the African Union has pursued institutional change and adopted policy frameworks that it has judged as successful in the EU.} \]

This study found that the institutions and policies adopted by the AU that bare certain similarities to those of the EU were adopted because they were considered international best practise and not expressly because they had been successful in the European experience. This conclusion was arrived at because no evidence was found of any studies having been commissioned to examine the EU’s integration experience with the aim of drawing lessons from it. Though the majority of stakeholders both from Europe and Africa considered the EU a successful integration experience, there was no evidence found of any efforts by the OAU/AU to intentionally learn from the EU’s experience. It is only now within the JAES framework that studies are being commissioned and exchange visits carried out to learn from the EU experience on how to make these policies work in Africa. The success of the EU’s experience was therefore not a deciding factor in the OAU/AU’s choice of institutions. This suggests that lesson drawing and attempts to emulate the EU experience are related to current initiatives and were non-
existent during the era of the OAU and therefore leads to the rejection of the above mentioned hypothesis.

7.2.3 Diffusion through persuasion and transfer of norms

Norms are transferred through persuasion by convincing the recipients that the former are the most appropriate to follow. In so doing the sender of the action changes the preferences of the recipients. Such a change of preference occurs independently of the influence or use of incentives or coercion but as a voluntary action. For increased accuracy the effect of persuasion is better judged from instances where the proposed institutional change resulting from the act of persuasion has already taken place. To test the occurrence of persuasion the following hypothesis was formulated and tested:

i) \( H_3: \) The AU has pursued institutional change or adopted certain policy frameworks after making changes in its assessment following its interaction with the EU.

It was found that the nature of the political dialogue between the EU and the AU in the context of their JAES makes it a possible avenue for persuasion to occur. Respondents were however adamant the relationship is among ‘peers’, with little room for the EU to ‘impose’ norms and values on the AU. It was further found that there are useful avenues for persuasion to occur, though there are no policy frameworks or institutional changes that can be attributed to the fruit of the EU’s interaction with the AU. The respondents generally felt that this space useful to share experiences, but not to attempt to replicate the experience of the EU because of the noted fundamental differences between the two processes. AU Commission staff see the EU support as catalytic and aim at building capacity within the AU, though they remain fully in charge of defining their policy orientation and implementation, guided by their strategic plans in the framework of the Abuja Treaty (Interview 7). This is one of the areas that are open for future
research to develop both methods and tools that will track the changes of the AU’s appreciation of norms and values that translate to the adoption of specific institutions and frameworks as a result of its ongoing interaction with the EU. By establishing that there was little formal institutional interaction between the EEC/EU and the OAU/AU the possibility of transfer of norms or persuasion was inevitable limited or non-existent before the early 2000s. This possibility has, however, been formalised through the frameworks of the JAES after 2007.

7.2.4 Diffusion of integration through mimicry

Mimicry is assumed to have occurred when policy makers and leaders in one organisation choose to imitate another organisation that enjoys a higher legitimacy, regardless of whether this is adequate for their own organisation’s function and context. To ascertain whether mimicry has occurred instances were looked for where the AU has adopted EU styled programmes, policies and institutions out of a desire to increase their legitimacy but failed to initiate own actions to effectively implement the same. In order to establish this possibility, the following hypothesis was tested.

i) \( H4: \) The African Union has justified certain institutional changes and policy frameworks it has adopted by references to the EU. In addition there is a noticeable distinction between its public commitment to these institutional changes and policy frameworks and its practise from the beginning of their adoption.

The case of mimicry was a little more complex to prove because Africa’s integration has well documented cases of decisions taken but not implemented. In this case it was important to ascertain whether African countries’ failure to implement their integration commitments was sufficient proof of and the result of mimicry or could be attributed to other factors. It was found
that normative emulation probably explains the similarities in certain institutional frameworks between the EU and AU. No references were however made to learning from the EU nor studies commissioned to study its form that could have led to the OAU/AU’s adoption of EU styled institutions.

It is therefore possible to conclude that the adoption of certain institutions (the ones that bare certain similarities with EU institutions) following the treaty creating the African Economic Community (Abuja treaty) was done out of the realisation that these institutions were good for an economic community for the whole continent (Interview 13). Africa was not necessarily trying to copy from/mimic Europe but subscribing to a certain approach to regional cooperation that shared an ideological origin, background and foundation with Europe (interview 15). It was also found that though its implementation lapses (gaps) were a possible indication of mimicry there were other explanations of difficulties inherent in Africa’s integration experience. It was particularly found that the approach it has tended to adopt in the setting up of its institutions has not been after undertaking research to ascertain the most suitable forms of institutions to adopt. It was further found that in its practise of integration, Africa has a high predisposition to set up institutional structures to address problems, so it sets up structures and adopts programmes without much background efforts invested to ascertain their relevance or ability to address the problems these institutions are foreseen to address. The result of this is that its institutions take long to be set up and when they are set up go through a period of limbo in self-definition and seeking for relevance. The EU was actually criticised for promoting this culture through its continuous funding of programmes and institutions whose existence continues to depend on external funding, demonstrating a lack of ownership which is partly explained by the fact that the processes involved in their set up were not well thought out in the first place. The elements that may suggest there is mimicry is confirmed by the absence of a culture of evidence backed policy formulation. The research and analysis that goes into the adoption of
policy frameworks and the development of programmes seem to be very thin when judged from the lack of progress that is registered in the course of implementation. It was also reported that the principal reason why the implementation of continental integration and cooperation objectives are slow is because no studies have been conducted to clearly demonstrate to AU member states what they stand to benefit from further integration. When this culture extends to the adoption of institutions and policies it suggests indeed that there may be a culture of mimicry. It was however not possible to ascribe this to mimicry alone since there were other noted challenges to Africa’s integration that could explain the difference between commitments and implementation. It was therefore not possible to reject the hypothesis of mimicry but also not possible to establish that mimicry was the sole explanation for the lapse between integration commitments and implementation.

7.3 Policy implications and recommendations

The historical relationship between Europe and Africa and their geographical proximity has created a platform for their development to be often viewed together and often in a comparative light. This has been the case of the processes of regional integration as currently managed by both the EU and the AU commissions. The similarities of a number of their institutions are sometimes cited as evidence of a possible diffusion of integration experiences taken from the EU to the AU. A close examination of their respective integration trajectories from a historical perspective has proven that there has been a limited number of channels through which lesson drawing (as a form of diffusion) could have taken place before the establishment of the Joint Africa strategic partnership in 2007. It has been demonstrated that the EU is still largely held as an authoritative example of integration, giving it a normative role in the spread of regional integration to other regions of the world including Africa. It has also been proven that a case of normative emulation could explain the similarities of the institutions that were retained during
the treaty forming the African Economic Community and maintained under the Constitutive Act of the African Union and that lesson drawing is still taking place within the context of current EU-AU interactions. A channel has been created for this through programmed financial support (AUSP I&II) and the political dialogue occurring as part of the JAES. Arriving at these conclusions has been important because it has brought clarity on the implementation lapses that have often been associated with a failure to learn from the EU experience of integration. On the basis of this, the following recommendations seem pertinent for the AU if it is to learn from the EU’s experience of integration and to improve upon its contribution to the advancement of Africa’s further integration:

a) The question of financing of the AUC and its activities of integration is a very important one. It speaks to the issue of ownership of the continental agenda and the means and capacity to drive the same. There can be no real continental integration if the institutions and programmes of the AU continue to be supported by donors. This is one lesson that Africa can surely learn from the EU, to fund its own integration process by funding the institutions of the AU. In this regard the experience of the EU can be useful in three ways; the financing of the African Union, its organs and institutions including the RECs, the creation of funding mechanisms to facilitate the integration process (financing of cross border infrastructure projects) and the setting up of solidarity funds to compensate for the loss of fiscal revenue to participating member states. Without addressing this question of funding, the absence of adequate financial resources to fund the integration project at national, regional and continental levels will continue to remain a serious impediment to progress on Africa’s continental integration. Its current ongoing initiatives to look for alternative sources of funding (the Obasanjo Commission) should be encouraged.
b) The question of the lack of ownership of Africa’s integration process at the local level within AU member states also needs to be addressed. This has been described as the problem of the absence of local champions at the national level who own and drive the agenda of continental cooperation and integration. The participation deficit by African citizens to the continental integration program contributes to delay the transfer of sovereignty from member states to the continental institutions. There is need for a conscious effort to make the continental institutions and programmes known and legitimate before the citizens. This requires the adoption of a bottom up as well as a top bottom approach. The value added of the AU and its initiatives needs to be clearly demonstrated and its activities streamlined following the principle of subsidiarity according to which action must be taken at the most appropriate level. Most African countries currently have their relationship with the AU managed by their ministries of foreign affairs which is different from the EU’s approach of having offices and delegations even within their member states. The AU and its member states need to consider options of increasing AU visibility within African countries in a coordinated, standardized and branded manner, so as to bring the agenda closer to the people.

c) The question of transposition and domestication of continental initiatives into national laws needs to be addressed. An increase in ownership of AU programmes should also include their inclusion in national development programmes and plans. This will also help reduce the predisposition to adopt new programmes with every new crop of leaders that come with the political cycles of member states. Africa’s integration seems to be currently driven by strong leaders who promote certain big ideas which subsequent leaders may not find as priorities. As such, some ideas come and go with individuals, condemning the integration process to be a repetitive circle of start-ups and exploration.
of grand ideas. This observation ties with the argument that African integration thus far has been an elite and leadership driven process a bit distant from the people who consequently do not take ownership of the process and it therefore cannot be deepened and broadened. (Interview 3). The EU experience could serve as an example in this instance to the effect that continental integration is best driven by institutions and as such institutions should perhaps be created and mechanisms found to harmonize and enforce the culture of including continental level commitments into national laws.

d) A conscious effort needs to go into calculating the benefits of integration and communicating this to member states. African integration needs to go beyond the idealism of unity and grand projects of Pan-Africanism to costing the implications of integration for the sake of informed decision making. Such costing will also provide a basis for the kind of compensation fund that needs to be set up similar to the EU’s cohesion funds. This means the size of the fund can be determined and those that stand to gain from further integration encouraged to contribute towards it and/or play the role of providing the public goods for integration as countries like France and Germany are doing for European integration. Without an assessment of the costs and benefits and an identification of the potential losers and winners it makes setting up of such a mechanism a speculative initiative that is likely to face the same fate as the many other initiatives that have been promoted for Africa’s integration.

e) Related to the point of costing the benefits of integration is the promotion of the culture of evidence based policy making as a means of helping the AU member states with the tools they need to count the economic cost of their political commitments to the continental integration project. This should also provide clarity on the kind of
institutions Africa needs to drive its integration process, how such institutions need to be set up and funded and what amount of transfer or pooling of sovereignty needs to take place. Again, while Europe moved from six to 27 and Africa is moving with 54, it cannot just be assumed that the institutional models and approaches that have been adopted in the one context will automatically be applicable to the other. The AU needs to promote a culture of evidence based decision making informed by research to determine for example what kind of parliamentary system to adopt for the Pan African Parliament and what role this parliament will be called upon to play in continental decision making.

f) A final and very important point ought to be the promotion of a culture of monitoring and evaluation of decisions and programmes to assess progress and determine constraints on an ongoing basis. The AU needs to pay more emphasis to the monitoring and implementation of commitments before taking on new commitments in order to stem the predisposition to high numbers of programmes and projects with very low levels of implementation.

7.4 Applicability of the European process of regional integration to the African context.

The question of the applicability of the European process of integration to the African context has been treated throughout this study by focusing on the integration experiences of the European Union and the African Union. The question of the applicability of the EU experience of integration to the African Union’s drive for continental integration is an important one because it seeks to establish whether the conditions under which the institutions and policy frameworks adopted to drive European integration may or may not be transferable and
adaptable to the African integration experience, taking its unique context into consideration. An examination of both integration experiences found them to be different in a number of important ways. This makes the question of the transferability of institutions and policy frameworks quite complex. The institutions of the EU and the AU are not particularly comparable unless in instances where they share similar sets of norms. For the institutional framework that has emerged out of the EU integration experience to be applicable to the African integration process, a number of factors and conditions need to be taken into consideration. The institutions ought to have been set up to address more or less the same functional problems, in which case the learning created by the experience of the EU could appropriately be applicable to the AU. This goes beyond the mere considerations of how to run a functional bureaucracy, akin to saying how do we get the AU Commission to be administratively and technically as functional as the European Commission. It speaks to the format of cooperation that the member states of the respective organisations have chosen to adopt as part of their drive towards integration.

The European Commission and the European Parliament present some apparent similarities with the AU Commission and Pan African Parliament. The European Commission functions as a supranational organisation with certain exclusive competencies (like in trade and foreign policy) and continues to share some other competencies with its member states. The choice of competencies shared and handled by the Commission has been negotiated over the years by EU member states who by empowering the commission as a supranational organisation were essentially entrusting the responsibility of guardian and enforcer of the treaties to the commission. African integration has however not followed the EU example of the transfer of certain exclusive competences to the AU commission, holding back to the near absolute sovereignty of its member states and failing to transform the AU Commission to a fully functional supranational institution with power to enforce its own decisions upon member
states. This study has found that this situation is partly because of the apparent failure to demonstrate the benefits of further cooperation and integration to the member states in economic terms beyond the political appeal of a united Africa. As one of the respondents argued, political decisions may be taken for their symbolism and appeal but implementation by member states is often accompanied by a real cost benefit analysis of what they stand to gain/lose taking into account their trade and economic configuration and circumstances. (Interview 13). There is need for a convincing case to be made about the benefits of a strengthened and empowered AU Commission in attaining the ideals of an integrated, united and prosperous Africa.

The decision to transfer more sovereignty to the AUC has to be evidence based and a case made for what the member states stand to benefit from this process, perhaps in better coordination, coherent representation and cost cutting associated with running a single bureaucracy to handle certain matters of continental interest and importance, instead of having a multitude of government departments having to coordinate their efforts to handle the same. There is certainly a case to be made for the benefits of supranationalism in the functioning of Africa’s institutions of integration and such a case needs to go beyond the fact that this has been the approach adopted by the EU. For the AU, it needs to go beyond the compromise achieved between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups and settle the ideological question of how the AU shall achieve the polity it aspires for in seeking political unity as per objective 2 of the AU’s Agenda 2063. An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance. A clarification of the kind of political unity Africa seeks is important in order to determine the most suitable institutions to drive that process and the amount of their sovereignty member states need to transfer to centralised institutions. In some regards, the EU experience in managing cooperation between sovereign countries could well be applicable to the African context.
Furthermore Africa’s pursuit of market integration using the building blocks of the RECs and its stated objective of forming a common market further suggests that it is like the EU also guided by certain elements of the linear model of step wise integration. The experience of the EU in developing its internal market and integrating its economies surely has a number of lessons to offer the African integration experience. The implementation of the principle of solidarity to compensate losers from the integration process is a principle from the EU that could be applicable to the African experience. This aspect of the EU experience should be applicable in the African context as long as they can generate the statistics of the gains and losses associated with further cooperation and integration of member states at the level of the RECS and at continental level. The availability of accurate data will make it possible to design a compensation mechanism that is attractive enough to act as an incentive for member states to participate in the process. Such a mechanism could be similar to the EU’s social and regional cohesion funds and the AU could draw inspiration on how such mechanisms are funded and managed. Once it is possible to establish which economies would gain more from the further integration of the continent and it is also possible to quantify these gains in monetary terms, then the economies that stand to benefit more can be motivated to contribute towards this mechanism.

The same argument is applicable for the roles of the European Court of Justice to enforce European level decisions at the level of the member states. The experience of Europe has suggested that a centralized authority enforcing the decisions taken at continental level can make the integration process evolve faster. It has also demonstrated through the ECSC the potential benefit of managing shared resources under a common authority. Though it was done in the context of the prevention of further conflicts, it however represents a model of how integration can be enhanced through the management of shared resources. Africa has a number of resources that run across borders, from shared water resources to mineral and natural
resources that run across the borders of a number of countries. Setting up institutions to manage these resources would create opportunities to build trust which is an important ingredient for cooperation and further integration.

The European experience represents a number of tangible ways (as discussed above) in which further integration in the African context could be achieved. It has a wealth of experience in accomplishing a number of the objectives of market integration that Africa has set for itself but the fact that these African processes are questionable in design and intent makes it challenging to make a full case for the applicability of the European experience to Africa. From a historical perspective Europe is still very much an experiment in economic and political integration though one that has registered progress in a number of distinctive areas. The fundamental difference between Europe’s evolution from 6 to 28 countries through a process of conditional expansion makes it different from integration in Africa in very many meaningful ways. Africa is in essence pursuing a model of developmental regionalism (seeking development through regional integration) and this makes its approach to regionalism an experiment that cannot be really informed by the European experience. Africa cannot look to the EU for inspiration of how to lift 54 mostly developing, primary resource based, unindustrialized economies with as divergent governance and institutional cultures to attain development and economic transformation through integration because that has not been the EU’s experience. However the opening up of Europe to the countries of Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War represents a scenario that could be of interest for African integration. A number of these countries had to undergo post-war reconstruction and be transformed into vibrant democracies that are experiencing economic growth and share the wealth aspirations of belonging to the European Union. This could serve as a model of how prosperity can be shared and the development experience of Africa built around the success of a number of striving economies like South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya. These are no equivalents to the European
examples of France, Germany, Italy and the UK but suggest that integration can be a channel for the management of shared prosperity moving from a core group of countries setting and living up to higher standards of governance and expanding to neighbouring countries to bring them into the fold.

In general, the EU experience is a rich reservoir of how the AU could address some of the challenges it is facing in the pursuit of the agenda of African integration. It is up to the AU to determine which aspects of the EU’s experience is relevant to its context and to determine what lessons to draw from the EU in order to advance its own integration agenda. The AU may want to examine how the EU has solved the problems similar to the ones it is facing (funding, compensation of losers from integration, enforcement of decisions, legitimacy and overcoming the democratic deficit etc.), in order to draw some lessons or emulate the EU experience in a manner that fits its context, available resources and realities. Only in so doing will the experience of the EU be useful and applicable to Africa’s continental integration.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is the fact that there are certain elements of the EU’s experience that are relevant and could be applicable to the AU, particularly its approach to promoting solidarity and cohesion amongst its member states, setting up funds to compensate losers from the integration process and also transferring certain competencies to its supranational institutions who in turn contribute to hold member states accountable and to drive the integration process. These lessons have been made possible in the context of the EU by the financial autonomy of the supranational institutions as well as their ability to legally enforce their decisions. Adopting these approaches to Africa’s continental integration will certainly increase the functional efficiency of its centralized institutions of integration like the commission. For this to happen the AUC will first need to get the question of its funding right and also go ahead to obtain an expanded mandate (acquire more competencies) from its member states. Such an expanded mandate and increased funding from member states is unlikely to
happen unless there is sufficient evidence generated in support for Africa’s integration and the role to be ascribed to the AU as well as the benefits to be accrued to member states from further continental integration. This will bring clarity on the intended outcome of Africa’s integration and a definition of the kind of polity the continent intends to achieve. The lack of a culture of evidence based decision making that has led to the adoption of a number of policies and institutions is a serious limitation in this regard. The route the EU has taken is a viable possibility for Africa but Africa needs to determine whether that will be the most suitable option to assist it in the attainment of its developmental objectives as set out in Agenda 2063. Apart from this broader consideration for a strategic direction, the EU remains a viable model for the functioning of a supranational bureaucracy and can surely offer useful lessons for Africa’s experience of integration. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to argue that the EU process of integration, the experiences and learning that have resulted from the same are applicable and can offer very many lessons to the African context of integration. It is upto the stakeholders and drivers of African integration to determine which lessons to glean from the EU process in order not to ‘re-invent the will’ of integration practice in areas where the EU experience can offer useful lessons to Africa.

7.5 Conclusion

The relationship between the Europe and Africa has been long and complex. It has evolved through more difficult phases and it is ongoing within the framework of Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and ACP group of countries and also within the Africa-EU joint strategic partnership (The JAES). Their respective experiences of integration have been different though they have adopted a number of similar institutions. This study has sought for evidence that these similarities are the fruit of diffusion of integration experiences from the EU
to the AU. After examining a number of different possible avenues of diffusion it was concluded that there has indeed been some diffusion of the EU experience through the avenue of normative emulation within the period leading up to the establishment of the JAES. It was further noted that the main avenue of the EU-ACP relationship that could have influenced the AU’s actions through the instrumentality of the Regional Economic communities was not expressly investigated because of the relative newness (adopted in 2008) of the AU-RECs MOU of operation notwithstanding the OAU/AU’s commitments to use RECs as the building blocks of African integration. We found no evidence that these RECs could have been instrumental as a constituted body in shaping the AU’s choice of policies and institutions and it was even much more difficult to ascertain if any such influences could have been derived from their interactions with the EU with the EU-ACP framework and corresponding conventions and partnership agreements. This is an element definitely worth exploring further and as a result our findings currently only indicate that current avenues for more diffusion through lesson drawing have now been opened up through the RECs in the context of their EU-ACP interactions and directly with the African Union in the context of the Joint Strategic Partnership. In the case of the JAES these avenues are being currently formalised through forums created for political dialogues and the capacity building as well as through staff exchanges programmes promoted between the African Union Commission and the European Union Commission staffs.

These results are supported by the argument that policy solutions developed in the context of regional integration do diffuse from one regional organisation to the other. In other words, regional organisations look to other regional organisations to find solutions for the functional problems they may be facing. This is the likely justification under which diffusion could have occurred from the EU. It has however been argued that the AU needs to base its decision to (not follow) the EU example on evidence derived from a commissioned study on the most suitable institutions to drive its integration agenda. This is important because, unlike the EU it is
currently running a sort of ‘voluntary intergovernmental organisation’ with an inclusive almost unconditional membership. Its trajectory is in this regard different from that of the EU and it will be logical to assume that it is facing some problems that were not exactly experienced by the EU. This the reasons why the AU cannot default to just copying solutions developed by the EU without taking its own context and realities into consideration. It must promote a culture of evidenced based decision making, promote a culture of monitoring and evaluation of decisions, find mechanisms to transpose continental decisions into national laws and development programmes, promote the ownership of its programmes at the level of its member states and resolve the question of financing of both its institutions and programmes. These are all lessons that can be drawn from the experience of Europe, which if applied should be applicable to the African context, it will certainly promote the efficiency of existing AU institutions and ensure that they are contributing to the continental integration agenda in a meaningful way.

There is no doubt that Africa stands to benefit from being a united, integrated and prosperous continent. As Nkrumah argued in the 1960’s, Africa cannot mobilise its current and potential resources without concerted effort, put in his own words:

If we develop our potentialities in men and natural resources in separate isolated groups, our energies would soon be dissipated in the struggle to outbid one another. Economic friction among us would certainly lead to bitter political rivalry, such as for many years hampered the pace of growth and development in Europe. (Nkrumah 1963:218).

The paradox of this statement made in 1963 is the fact that at the genesis of the conceptualisation of African Unity, Europe was the example not to follow. As Nkrumah put it:

Europe, by way of contrast, must be a lesson to us all. Too busy hugging its exclusive nationalisms, it has descended, after centuries of wars interspersed with internals of uneasy peace into a state of confusion, simply because it failed to build a sound basis of political association and understanding. Only now under the necessities of economic stringency and the threat of the new German industrial and military
rehabilitation, is Europe trying-unsuccessfully- to find a *modus operandi* for containing the threat. It is deceptively hoped that the European Community will perform this miracle. It has taken two world wars and the break-up of empires to press home the lesson, still only partly digested, that strength lies in unity (Nkrumah 1963:216).

To their credit, Europe has proven Nkrumah’s scepticism wrong as the European Community that later became the European Union has through more than five decades of systematic cooperation contained the outbreak of another war on continental Europe and developed an advanced and prosperous society. This serves as evidence that integration and unity holds promise of benefits for Africa and that the experience of Europe can offer many meaningful lessons for Africa’s pursuit of continental cooperation and integration. Europe has not only proven that integration is possible but has also demonstrated through its experience that there are certain approaches that work and that should be given serious consideration by the AU while taking contextual realities into account. The AU needs to give serious consideration to the development of appropriate solidarity models for African integration. While it may not at this stage have the resources to channel towards the compensation of less developed member states who suffer from the consequences of deeper integration, it must look for other innovative avenues to pursue cooperation and encourage the solidarity principle in its integration endeavours.

The experience of Europe further suggests that the promotion of lower level cooperation is an important prerequisite for higher level economic and political integration. Africa needs to learn to successfully cooperate before it can aspire to be deeply integrated to the extent of the formation of a political union. It can resolve for example to pursue systematic cooperation in a single sector like tourism, standardize an African wide tourism experience, agree upon an African wide tourism visa and even issue an African wide tourism currency (and call it the ‘Nkrumah’) to be used by Africans and all those coming from outside of the continent for a
short touristic stay in any country on the continent. The learning that it would be accumulated from this standardization experience, the management of the visa and travel regime and the use of this parallel currency exchangeable with all other national currencies could constitute the building blocks for a full blown economic and monetary union with the free movement of people and goods.

Europe, notwithstanding its noted advances in integrating its economies and promoting the free movement of people within the Schengen countries is today faced with a huge problem of migration that is testing their systems and a commitment to their agreed upon principles. This says integration is not a project that is resolved once and for all, it’s a learning experience that will present new challenges that require further improvements and adjustments. It still holds the promise of delivering enormous benefits for the many poor and under privileged populations in different countries in Africa. For Africa’s integration to deliver on its development mandate, it must adopt a realistic, innovative, pragmatic and informed policy adoption and implementation approach to integration. The experience of Europe remains an important reference of what has (not) worked in other contexts and the African Union can draw many important lessons of how to push its integration agenda forward. One such lesson should be the pursuit of an African continental integration that makes economic (and possibly business sense) to the countries involved to provide the kind of incentives for them to go beyond the political rhetoric of affiliating to a ‘grand Pan-Africanist agenda of unity’. The benefits of integration should be clearly demonstrated in the proposed initiatives for countries adherence to be enthusiastic and voluntary. This will contribute to reduce the compliance deficit in commitments taken towards continental integration and help push its agenda forward. It has been possible in Europe, cooperation and integration has been successfully pursued in other parts of the world and it is therefore possible in Africa.
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# Annexure A

## List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name/Position</th>
<th>Interview Number/Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union Commission (AUC) Head Quarters- Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
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</table>
| AUC-Department of Trade and Industry | Treasure Maphanga  
Director of Trade and Industry | Interview 7  
22/05/2015 |
| AUC-Department of Trade and Industry | Hussein Hassan  
Head of Industry Division  
Trade and Industrial Policy Expert | Interview 2  
19/05/201 |
| AUC-Department of Trade and Industry | Batanai Clemence Chikwene  
Trade Policy Expert | Interview 12  
28/05/2015 |
| AUC-Department of Trade and Industry | Tarana Loumabeka  
Trade Expert | Interview 5  
21/05/2015 |
| AUC-Department of Economic Affairs | Amadou Cisse  
Senior Policy Officer | Interview 13  
29/05/2015 |
| AUC-Department of Economic Affairs | Islam Swaleh  
economic integration expert | Interview 10  
27/05/2015 |
| AUC-Department of Economic Affairs | Manasseh Ntaganda  
Senior economist | Interview 11  
28/05/2015 |
| Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA | Stephen Karingi  
Direction Regional Integration and Trade Division | Interview 8  
25/05/2015 |
| UNECA- Joint Secretariat Support office (JSSO) | Christian Georges Diguimbaye  
Co-coordinator Joint Secretariat Support office  
AFDB-UNECA-AUC | Interview 3  
20/05/201 |
| UNECA- Joint Secretariat Support office (JSSO) | Guy Ranaivomanana  
Technical Advisor JSSO | Interview 4  
20/05/2015 |
| EU Delegation to African Union | Anna Burylo  
Head of Operations Section | Interview 1  
18/05/2015 |
| EU Delegation to African Union | Marci Di Benedetto  
Attache-Trade expert | Interview 9  
26/05/2015 |
| European Union Commission-Brussels | Phillippe Jacques | Interview 17  
15/07/2015 |
<table>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization and Details</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charge de Mission, Development Du Secteur Prive, Commerce, integration regionale</td>
<td>Francoise Moreau</td>
<td>Head of Unit, Africa-EU Partnership, Peace Facility</td>
<td>15/07/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Commission-Brussels</td>
<td>Kostas Berdos</td>
<td>Administrator, Unit 5 Communications and Transparency</td>
<td>16/05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Commission-Brussels</td>
<td>Koen Doens</td>
<td>Director, East and Southern Africa and ACP Coordination</td>
<td>17/05/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics, Researchers and Consultants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant to AUC and Academic</td>
<td>Prof Fajana</td>
<td></td>
<td>02/06/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro of Political Science, University of Lagos, Former AUC staff and current consultant to AUC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Prof Daniel Bach</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science Science Po Bordeaux, France</td>
<td>10/07/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Prof Christian Lequesne</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science Science Po Paris, France</td>
<td>09/07/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Walter Kennes</td>
<td>Former EU Commission Staff and Currently independent consultant.</td>
<td>16/07/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Center for Development policy Management – ECDPM</td>
<td>Kathleen Van Hove</td>
<td>Senior Policy Officer, Regional Integration and Institutional Relations</td>
<td>17/07/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC- Consultant on Agenda 2063</td>
<td>Oumar Seck</td>
<td>Key Finance Expert in drafting Agenda 2063 document</td>
<td>22/05/2015</td>
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Annexure B

List of interview questions

Section A: European Integration

1.1 Would you consider the European experience of integration as a success or a failure and why? (What are your indicators for success or failure and why the choice of these indicators).

1.2 What would you consider the distinctive characteristics of Europe’s integration?

1.3 What are the drivers of European Integration in your view? What drives European Integration?

1.4 What lessons could Europe’s experience of integration offer to other experiences of integration around the world?

Section B: African Integration

2.1 Would you consider Africa’s experience of integration as a success or a failure? And why? (What are your indicators for success or failure and why the choice of these indicators).

2.2 The African Union (and its predecessor the OAU) were founded to promote the coordination and harmonization of member states policies in the following areas:

i) Political and diplomatic cooperation;

ii) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;

iii) Educational and cultural cooperation;

iv) Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;

v) Scientific and technical cooperation and

vi) Cooperation for defence and security.

The AU in recently celebrated 50 years of existence, to your knowledge and from your experience
a) What progress have they registered in promoting sectoral cooperation amongst African countries?

b) Have they been successful in the accomplishment of these objectives? Please explain.

c) What in your opinion are the obstacles to effective cooperation amongst African member states of the African Union in the sectors identified above?

d) Do you think these objectives were realistic then? Are they relevant today? How should African economies proceed in the promotion of sectoral cooperation that should be the building blocks of effective cooperation?

2.3 Have there been any institutional changes or policy frameworks adopted by the African Union based on their (AU) judgement of the EU’s successful experience in administering similar actions as a best practise.

2.4 Africa’s institutions of integration that emerged out of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Abuja Treaty and maintained with the creation of the African Union have certain striking similarities with certain EU institutions, is this evidence that the founding fathers drew their inspiration from the EU.

Section C: European and African Integration

3.1 In what ways are the African and European integration processes similar and/or different?

3.2 Some authors have argued that Africa’s integration experience has been an attempt to copy/mimic the European Union experience of integration:

a) Would you agree or disagree with this statement and why?

B1) Agree: what are the indicators/elements that suggest this is taking place and would you consider this a voluntary or an involuntary process and why?
B2) Disagree: What are the elements/indicators that suggest Africa’s integration is a standalone project, chatting its own course.

b) Apart from the similarities in certain institutional frameworks are there any other variables or indicators that suggest the African Union is trying to mimic the EU experience of integration.

c) Do the AU and EU have any similar policies or policy frameworks that suggest they share or aspire to certain common norms and values? Which policy frameworks for which norms and values?

3.3 What explains the dichotomy between the public commitment to and actual practise when it comes to the creation and strengthening of some of the organs envisaged in article 7 of the constitutive Act? For example only 26 out of 54 member states have ratified Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

3.4 What lessons should Africa actually be learning from the European Experience of integration in your view? Please explain.