

# **A Revaluation of Tolerance and Toleration**

A Selective Incorporation of Classical Conceptions of Tolerance

by

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to revitalise and revalue a currently disregarded conceptual field of tolerance, and explores the prospect of it - and its respective practice (toleration) - satisfying Nietzsche's criteria of life-affirmation and flourishing. The project of revaluation undertaken within this dissertation entails an evaluative re-appraisal and a critically selective incorporation of the particular concepts of tolerance and toleration once highly esteemed during the Hellenistic period. This inquiry centres on the axiological, ethical and psychological perspectives on tolerance and toleration, whilst investigating their compatibility within a Nietzschean valuation. Considerations of a few overlapping epistemological perspectives which are apposite to the aforesaid are articulated. Including the effects on the affective and cognitive accompaniments to toleration, possible formulations of tolerance that undermine life-affirmation and flourishing are also considered from a meta-ethical perspective. In order to do so, a critical analysis of the incorporated aspects of tolerance and toleration is conducted in relation to resentment and *ressentiment*. The primary questions I address are: 'what is it to tolerate?', 'how would tolerance and toleration read within a Nietzschean valuation?', 'what are the psychological - i.e. affective and cognitive - intricacies of tolerating and how do they feature in its procedure?', 'what kinds of psychological attachment does one qua human being create in connection with the entities one tolerates?' and 'are there possible psychological dangers regarding tolerance and toleration that a Nietzschean valuation can help identify?'

**KEY TERMS:** Philosophy, Psychology, Nietzsche, Stoicism, Tolerance, Toleration, Perspectivism, *Ressentiment*, Ethics, Value Theory

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Confronted by an overwhelming uncertainty of the future, impotence towards the past, and a ceaseless investigation the ebb and flow of significance within that grand cosmic scheme, all human endeavour - including communal endeavour - seems to take on the character of absurdity. Albert Camus, one of my philosophical inspirations, believes that the only way to deal with such disorienting absurdity is to face it head-on. In other words, to face it head-on we should take heart in the fact that, at least, we are not alone in our revolt against the absurd and our toleration of fate (for 'everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole'). Without doubt, the somewhat *Sisyphusian* challenge of completing a philosophical dissertation was made surmountable by the constant care and support I received from family, friends, and colleagues, besides the endurance, patience and tolerance the endeavour itself has taught me. Though the nature of writing does incline one towards solitude, I had the fortune of always being in good company. Although I cannot here mention all who played a part, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to some which have been keystones in the accomplishment of this project.

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# Introduction

Pleas for tolerance have come to the fore in the vocabulary of ethical and political discourses in the 21st century, being espoused and advocated by most normative frameworks including the UN and international conventions (Brown 2006: 12). Conversely, tolerance particularly as political discourse has been severely criticised recently for its tendencies to perpetuate irreconcilable differences in the form of subject identities, establishing the liberal West as moral hegemon, obfuscating bourgeois Protestant norms behind a facade of neutrality and legitimating intolerance of, and resentment and aggression toward non-liberal forms of politics. In acknowledgement of these criticisms, the aims of this dissertation are modest; it explores the possibility of situating tolerance within a Nietzschean valuation. Such a framework shifts the emphasis of tolerance back to the tolerating being - rather than those who ought to be tolerated or the authority advocating tolerance. More details on what this framework entails will be provided below.

To conceptually distinguish between tolerance as a procedure and tolerance as theory, purpose (*telos*), virtue or value, I shall refer to the former as toleration. This split between the practice of toleration and the theory of tolerance is based upon Nietzsche's distinction between procedure and purpose<sup>1</sup> (2007: II, 12). Nevertheless, tolerance and toleration constantly inform each other and do not necessarily follow upon each other in a linear fashion; e.g. practice as the application of theory, or practice as inspiration for theory. Instead of theory leading to practice or vice versa, taken from Foucault, "practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another" (1977: 206). That is to say, tolerance and toleration inform each other via an intermittent relay between them (and other related practices and theories). Despite not being rigidly demarcated, this distinction nevertheless emphasises the (human) being and his or her relationship to tolerating insofar as it draws out and refines - with Nietzsche's particular emphasis on *praxis* - the question 'what is it to tolerate?'

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter 2 for an elaboration on this distinction.

This dissertation aims to revitalise and revalue a currently disregarded conceptual field of tolerance, and explores the prospect of it - and its respective toleration - satisfying Nietzsche's criteria of life-affirmation and *flourishing*. The project of reevaluation undertaken by this dissertation entails an evaluative re-appraisal and a critically selective incorporation of the particular concepts of tolerance and toleration once highly esteemed, in order to further ascertain whether it can potentially contribute to contemporary (tolerance) discourse and practices (of toleration). Whether or not said concept of tolerance can be selectively incorporated within a Nietzschean valuation, I argue, is contingent upon its *non-dogmatic* underpinnings, which preclude predisposing its adherents to *ressentiment* (see below).

Including the effects on the affective and cognitive accompaniments to toleration, possible formulations of tolerance that predispose one to *ressentiment* will also be considered. I do so by critically comparing such possible formulations with Nietzsche's conceptions *ressentiment* and Ure's perspectives on resentment. Therein I claim that continuous applications of what I call *denying* toleration do significantly predispose its practitioner to *ressentiment*. Lastly, the psychological dangers of *ressentiment* upon formulations on tolerance (and toleration) will also be spelled out.

This inquiry centres on the axiological<sup>2</sup>, ethical and psychological perspectives on tolerance and toleration, whilst investigating their compatibility within a Nietzschean valuation. Nevertheless, considerations of a few overlapping epistemological perspectives which are apposite to the aforesaid will also be articulated. The primary questions I shall address are: 'what is it to tolerate?', 'how would tolerance and toleration read within a Nietzschean valuation?', 'what are the psychological - i.e. affective and cognitive - intricacies of tolerating and how do they feature in its procedure?', 'what kinds of psychical attachment does one qua human being create in connection with the entities one tolerates?' and 'are there possible psychological dangers regarding tolerance and toleration that a Nietzschean perspective can help identify?'

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<sup>2</sup> Axiology pertains to the study of value(s).



The revaluation project, whilst addressing the above questions, more specifically entails *carving out* a concept of tolerance and toleration for a Nietzschean valuation. 'Carving out' here is used to denote analysing and selectively incorporating ideas, notions, tenets, doctrines or concepts from one canon and implementing them in another whilst juxtaposing, critiquing, refuting, exposing and refining them in the process. Although not engaged in as often today, such attempts at disentangling and critically considering particular ideas for incorporation - despite not incorporating the entire philosophy - were ubiquitous in philosophical discourses of the ancient West. Some philosophers like Cicero - one of the primogenitors of tolerance - became known as Syncretics (see chapter 1) because of their propensity (and talent) for bringing together positions from various different schools of philosophy.

In order to *carve out* tolerance and toleration for a Nietzschean valuation, I historically trace<sup>3</sup> their emergence back to the ancient Western context; specifically the Hellenistic era. Closer investigation shows that there are considerable intersections between these ancient philosophies - particularly Stoic ethics - and Nietzsche's philosophy regarding the conceptual material for tolerance and toleration. On account of this historical examination I revive some facets of ancient notions specifically on tolerance and toleration that are disregarded in contemporary tolerance discourse in general, including discourse particular to Nietzsche's philosophy, which yet promise a fruitful contribution to both.

This dissertation methodologically proceeds from a perspectivist approach. Nietzsche formulates the perspectivist methodology in *The Genealogy of Morals* as follows: "[t]he only seeing we have is seeing from a perspective; the only knowledge we have is knowledge from a perspective. The more emotional affects we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more complete our 'idea' of this thing, our '*objectivity*,' will be" (2007: Ess 3, ~12 '*italics added*'). Suffice it to say for now that perspectivism amounts to surveying and juxtaposing many distinct yet interrelated perspectives - which includes a variety of different affects and cognitive

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<sup>3</sup> See below for the methodology regarding this historical examination.

considerations - on tolerance and toleration. More details will be provided when this aspect of the methodology becomes the focus of the discussion in the second chapter.

The second facet of the methodology that will be implemented in the first chapter pertains to a conceptual history of tolerance and toleration. Although much more limited in breadth and scope, the conceptual history implemented borrows a lot from Nietzschean *genealogy*, which will be outlined for clarification. A *genealogy* is a historical technique wherein articulations of the emergence of practices and concepts are questioned and exposed by means of an account (Nietzsche 2007: preface, 4). This account entails the scope and breadth of (probably conflicting) power relations within an outlined time period, instead of making attempts to resolve or conceal these conflicts in line with some or other ideology or political orientation.

A Nietzschean *genealogy* in particular does not attempt to uncover the origin (*Ursprung*) of a concept, practice or event in order to discover its kernel of Truth<sup>4</sup> or the one True articulation thereof; for such an attempt is based on an erroneous assumption that the original concept or practice should be accorded a higher status since it must be the one True concept or practice. In line with the *perspectivist* methodology outlined above, Nietzsche conversely argues that a *genealogy* entails tracing the origin (*Herkunft*) - i.e. the line of descent - for the sake of elaborating on, instead of reconciling, the rich multiplicity of (possibly conflicting) perspectives with which the same concept or practice has been examined over time (2007: III, 12).

Nevertheless, a Nietzschean *genealogy* does place emphasis on a practice's earliest conceptions as they "can still be disentangled, as well as changed" and thereby "undergo a shift in value" (2007: II, 13). In line with Nietzsche's wariness and criticisms of teleological thinking, my interpretation reads that within a practice's earliest conceptions discriminating between the purposes (*teloi*) and practices - which comprise a concept - is less difficult. That is to say any purpose (*telos*) which

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<sup>4</sup> See chapter 2 for an elaborate distinction between 'Truth' and 'truth'. Suffice it to say that 'Truth' capital 'T' pertains to claims towards and adherence to an absolute value.

might have been associated with said concept is less difficult to disentangle from its practice, since over time certain prevalent purposes and practices become so intertwined that disentangling them does not only appear severely difficult, but that these prevalent purposes become (mistakenly) perceived as forming an indispensable part of the practice. In turn, focusing on a practice's earliest conceptions makes it easier for the *genealogist* to enrich current discourse by juxtaposing more (possibly conflicting) perspectives and purposes onto its practise, in order to undermine this mistake and allow contemporary discourse to envision viable purposes, which the currently prevailing status quo may potentially (and inadvertently) obscure. Such an approach emphasises discernment between tolerance and toleration, which will facilitate the *carving out* process in the second chapter. Consequently, a Nietzschean *genealogy* also places a higher premium on etymological clues than other *genealogies*. Lastly and most importantly, it also places a greater emphasis on praxis - in this case toleration - as practices according to Nietzsche are longer lasting or more congealed than the purposes and ends ascribed to these practices (ibid.).

Due to the spatial limitations of this dissertation, the depth of the *genealogy* will unfortunately not be as exhaustive. Given the limited amount of surviving texts within the Hellenistic era, the conceptual history presented below does not place as much emphasis on the (possibly conflicting) perspectives on tolerance and toleration at specific points in time as is wont. Moreover, emphasis is placed on the history of concepts at the expense of a thorough account of the contextual aspects - i.e. the conditions of possibility - for tolerance and toleration. I would definitely recommend future researchers undertaking endeavours towards a more exhaustive *genealogy* which focuses exclusively on the historical perspectives on all aspects of ancient tolerance and toleration, as such attempts - to my knowledge - have hitherto not been made. Nonetheless, I am confident that the conceptual history presented herein is sufficient for the overall purposes of this dissertation.

The first chapter entitled *The Emergence of Tolerance (and Toleration)* pertains to tracing the emergence of the ancient conceptions of tolerance (and its guidelines on practice - toleration), alongside the ethical and psychological components that had

accompanied their articulation. The emphasis and scope is limited to a conceptual history of tolerance and toleration encompassing the Hellenistic era within ancient Greece and Rome. Chapter 2, entitled *Carving out Tolerance for a Nietzschean Valuation*, critically analyses the intersections between early Nietzsche and Stoicism and the contrasts between later Nietzsche and Stoicism. As the title suggests, it does so with a specific emphasis on *carving out* tolerance and toleration for a *Nietzschean Valuation*. This chapter also expounds an apologia of Stoic ethics as concordant with Nietzschean thought; particularly focusing on the much disputed passions as *life-denying* - i.e. un conducive to individual *flourishing* - and how Stoic ethics circumvents 'absolute morality'. These passions (and other affects), insofar as they serve as psychological analgesics, also bear relevance to tolerance and toleration. Subsequently, I expound my agreement with later Nietzsche on his criticism of Stoic metaphysics, epistemology and teleology. Lastly this chapter supplants the aforesaid aspects of criticism by correlating Nietzschean Sceptical and *perspectivist* approaches. The third and last chapter entitled *The Perils of Tolerance and Toleration* considers the cognitive and affective features of resentment and *ressentiment*, situating *ressentiment* and certain instances of resentment as passions. It further entertains the possibility of certain (*life-denying*) forms of tolerance and toleration associated with resentment and *ressentiment*, including an outline of the potential perils - not only for the tolerated entity, but particularly for the tolerating human being - such forms may engender.

The entire dissertation revolves primarily around concepts - and in many cases their *genealogical* lineage - interspersed throughout Nietzsche's works; especially *D*, *GS*, *BGE*, *GM*<sup>5</sup>. The most pertinent literature in chapter 1's ancient Hellenistic conceptions of tolerance and toleration pertains to Cicero's *Stoic Paradoxes*, Diogenes Laërtius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* and Sellar's *An Ethics of the Event*. Initially Epictetus' discussions in *Discourses* and *Handbook* will be considered in chapter 2; the latter of which Nietzsche often refers to and admires in his early

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<sup>5</sup> For ease of reference to Nietzsche's works the following abbreviations will be used: *D* – *Daybreak*, *EH* - *Ecce Homo*, *GS* – *The Gay Science*, *BGE* – *Beyond Good and Evil*, *GM* – *The Genealogy of Morals*, *TI* - *Twilight of the Idols* and *KSA* - *Kritische Studienausgabe*.

works. Lastly Jessica Berry's work that critically compares Nietzsche's philosophy and ancient Pyrrhonian Scepticism entitled *Nietzsche and the Ancient Sceptical Tradition* will assist in critiquing the Stoic doctrines which are not feasible for a Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration. In the last chapter I draw on enriched perspectives from Ure's *Resentment Ressentiment*, Reginster's *Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation* and Masterson's *The Concept of Resentment*.

In sum, the chapter outline satisfies the overall aims of this dissertation by first providing a conceptual history of tolerance and toleration, re-vitalising viable aspects thereof for a Nietzschean valuation and lastly endeavouring a critical enterprise of potential forms of tolerance and toleration which may undermine *flourishing*. In so doing, the primary questions posed will be addressed.

# Chapter 1: The Emergence of Tolerance (and Toleration)

From engineering, medicine and botany to politics, computer science and psychology, tolerance is arguably one of the most wide-spread yet most at variance of topics (Brown 2006: 3) - from pharmacology where tolerance may refer to the reduced effect of a drug on a subject after repeated use, to engineering where tolerance may refer to the amount of weight a bridge can sustain before incurring structural damage (Brown 2006: 26-27). However, during the Hellenistic period tolerance - *tolerantia* - had quite a particular sense in which it was used: namely grappling with pain.

During the research phase of this conceptual history, a particular concept is continuously mentioned in conjunction with tolerance and toleration (*tolerantia*); namely the term *apatheia*. Conversely, the concept of *apatheia* is scarcely recognised today, save for a few classics scholars and those here astute enough to etymologically link the term with apathy. The motivation for including *apatheia* within this conceptual history is that it informs one of the underpinning doctrines and philosophies wherein the concepts tolerance and toleration came about, in addition to informing one of its practice. This concept will be used throughout this dissertation to emphasise the therapeutic emphasis the Hellenistic philosophical schools and Nietzsche placed on philosophical enquiry.

A possible reason why the concept of *apatheia* has fallen out of contemporary favour in matters concerning tolerance and toleration revolves around the Hellenistic philosophical schools' particular prioritisation of *eudaimonia* - i.e. a life well lived in the absence of psychological disturbance (see below) - above political considerations of freedom; particularly human rights<sup>6</sup> (see Brown 2006: 9, 17, 22, 33,

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<sup>6</sup> Political debates regarding these considerations pertain to whether what is Good, or what is Right should be prioritised (Sandel 2010: 20). The aforementioned forms part of the primary distinctions between ancient and contemporary forms of political organisation (ibid.).

35 & 49). This enquiry will simultaneously trace the emergence of *apatheia* in order to flesh out and elucidate this prioritisation. Another reason for doing so is that Nietzsche himself in the 19<sup>th</sup> century espoused this ancient prioritisation, which will prove a valuable enrichment for discussion in the second chapter.

The aforementioned brings the dissertation to the etymology of '*apatheia*' and '*tolerantia*,' which will be outlined as a complementary springboard and segue to its history. The term '*apatheia*' appeared in ancient Greek works as early as Aristotle, where he considers for example in the *Nicomachean Ethics* whether a life without any passion is worth living<sup>7</sup> (1999: 25-28). '*Apatheia*' consists of 'a', a prefix meaning 'without' and the plural for '*pathos*'. Deriving from the verb '*paschein*' meaning 'to suffer,' 'to undergo,' or 'to experience,' '*pathos*' was considered - at least from the post-Socratic era to late antiquity - primarily to be a passive, or reactive state or condition (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'πάσχειν'). '*Pathos*' has a number of English translations: 'suffering', 'disease', 'pathology', 'affliction', 'misfortune', 'feeling', 'emotion', 'affect', 'that which happens to affect a person', and 'passion'<sup>8</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'πάθος'). However, we should be wary when we use the sense of 'emotion' or 'feeling,' as its parlance does not relay the afflictive, effusive, disturbed and agitative aspects which the ancients, such as Chrysippus, Zeno of Citium, Cicero and Epictetus, associated with *pathos* (see Laërtius 1925). Moreover, a passion may entail some aspects that are not associated with emotion, for example the passion of desire (*epithumia*)<sup>9</sup>. Regardless, the passions, however it was construed during the Hellenistic era, seems to be that which should be overcome and extirpated.

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<sup>7</sup> Jessica Berry, in her endeavour to *genealogically* trace the concepts of *apatheia* and *ataraxia*, maintains that both can be traced further back to the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus' concept of *euthumia* (2011: 142 & 157-158 & 164-165). However, such an investigation would take this dissertation beyond its scope. For further reading, please see the aforesaid reference.

<sup>8</sup> The Greek plural for *pathos* is '*pathe*' or '*patheia*' (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'πάθη'). Given the scope of this dissertation – particularly the psychological (cognitive and affective) aspects of tolerance and toleration - emphasis will be placed on translations pertaining to 'suffering', 'affect', 'passion' and psychological 'pathology'.

<sup>9</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'ἐπιθυμία').

*Apatheia*, in turn, would be a state - or as in the majority of philosophic cases a state of mind - without passion (Laërtius 1925: 217). From here we can derive a proto-concept of the word; namely *apatheia* construed as a state of mind or a disposition without passion. As we shall see, what exactly this disposition entails and what is considered a passion depends on the philosopher or ancient philosophical school in question. Other words associated with *apatheia* may also provide us with some clues; 'equanimity', 'apathy', 'indifference', 'calm', 'unagitated', 'undisturbed' and 'imperturbability' (see Cicero 2005: IV, 12-14). The associations, namely 'apathy' and 'indifference' will later be qualified.

The Latin word from which 'tolerance' and 'toleration' derives appears for the first time as a substantivisation of the Latin verb '*tolerare*' which translates as 'to bear', 'to endure,' 'to put up with,' or 'to suffer.' Still today the verb 'tolerate' can be articulated correspondingly in these senses of the word within most if not all Anglophone nations, with the later addition of 'be capable of continued exposure to a drug etc. without adverse reaction,' 'recognize and respect (rights and beliefs of others)' and 'permit the presence of or allow (an activity) without opposing or prohibiting' (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'tolerate'). The substantivisation, '*tolerantia*' was articulated by Cicero in a lesser work which he had written in 46 BC; the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*<sup>10</sup> (Cicero 1948 IV, 27). This work is the earliest remaining which refers to the noun '*tolerantia*.' *Tolerantia* was primarily considered a virtue (Forst 2013: 38-39). As Cicero's conception is infused with Stoic and Syncretic doctrines, I will elaborate upon Cicero's '*tolerantia*' in the section entitled *Cicero's equanimous embrace of tolerantia*. In order to scaffold a proto-concept, we need to consider the passage from which *tolerantia* is articulated. Cicero asks his readers and listeners "shall the wise man's soul be conquered and overcome, hedged as it is, as if by a wall, by greatness of counsel, contempt of human affairs, toleration of fate (*tolerantia fortunae*), and finally by every virtue, when it can't even be driven from the state?... Surely you will deny that" (1948: IV, 278).

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<sup>10</sup> The term 'paradox', from the Greek '*paradoxon*' originally denoted a statement contrary to accepted opinion. Cicero in this work wishes to address and defend Stoic assertions which were deemed in his day to be contrary to popular belief, rather than denouncing Stoicism as a paradoxical philosophy (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'paradox').



Although Cicero does not explicitly examine *tolerantia* in this passage, he nevertheless provides us with some clues as to its proto-conceptualisation. Along with its etymology, we can build scaffolding for the concept. Firstly, toleration - as substantivisation of the verb 'tolerate' - entails somehow putting up with entities, foreseen or unforeseen, which befall one's lot. Secondly, toleration seems to involve suffering, hardship or at least discomfort somehow engendered by said entities. Thirdly, according to Cicero, man's soul will not be overcome and conquered during toleration vis-à-vis fate. Take note that fate here for Cicero - and for most Stoics - is construed simply as the order of material causes in the Cosmos; it implies that fate is not supernatural intervention, but rather the outcome of physics<sup>11</sup> (Sellars 2006: 170). Despite its metaphysical connotations, the last mentioned provides us with a link - albeit a flimsy one at this point - with *apatheia*. If it could be established that the passions are at least among those which can possibly overcome the soul - i.e. render one's mind disturbed - then a clear link would be established insofar as maintaining a state of *apatheia* would also form part of tolerating. That is to say toleration would be a conceptual offshoot of *apatheia*, applied in particular conditions as outlined above. This will be my task.

In order to trace out the historical context and situate what may seem to be a peculiar combination of concepts, I juxtapose the developments of *apatheia* leading up to *tolerantia*. I start with the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope and then move to the later Hellenistic schools of ancient philosophical thought which are most commonly associated with the concept; namely Stoicism and its Syncretic renditions.

## I: The unconventional yet undisturbed Cynics.

Around 390 BCE, Athens was still in almost complete ruin in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians had suffered defeat 14 years prior against the allied Spartans and Persians. The mainstay of their economy and military power, i.e. their trade ships and fleet were decimated, thereby ending the Golden Age of

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<sup>11</sup> See also Cicero's *On Divination* (Cicero 1997: I, 126).

Athens. The remaining Athenians who surrendered were left with almost nothing. Eleven years after the Socrates was sentenced to death for corrupting the youth, and for impiety, he was considered a hero - as the first intellectual standing by his principles even when it meant a certain death. Ever since, glory and honour was not only reserved for the courageous warrior. Recalling Socrates' teachings, the remaining Athenians realised that the vanity and greed they associated with profuse prosperity and dogmatic adherence to convention had stifled their caution against their sworn enemies (Thucydides 1974: VI, 12 & VIII, 48). As a result, a new empire of reason dawned, with Socrates as champion. The particular philosophers who were inspired by Socrates that are of concern here is: Plato, Diogenes of Sinope, Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus and Cicero.

Socrates asserted that "there could hardly be a man who would not wish to do well", and to do well is to achieve *eudaimonia* (Plato 1997: 278e6); translated as a life well lived, happiness, well-being, or *flourishing* (Blackwell 2004: s.v. '*eudaimonia*'<sup>12</sup>). Etymologically the word '*eudaimonia*' pertains to '*eu*' denoting 'good' and '*daimon*' denoting spirit; the compound denoting a good spirit accompanying a person (ibid.). The emphasis on *praxis*, as with Nietzsche<sup>13</sup>, is again gleaned here by Socrates' assertion. Socrates himself thought that reason was this good spirit which fosters well-being. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, what exactly constitutes *eudaimonia* has perennially remained moot.

According to a Cynic and Stoic interpretation of Socrates via Plato in *Euthydemus*, the possession of material goods is neither necessary nor sufficient for *eudaimonia*<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See also (Liddle & Scott 1983: 'εὐδαιμονία').

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche himself claims that "rounded men, replete with energy and therefore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action – being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence *eu pratein* takes its origin)" (2007: I, 10); *eu pratein* denoting 'doing good', 'doing well', or 'succeeding' (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'εὖ' & 'πράττειν').

<sup>14</sup> This interpretation, called the sufficiency thesis, has been contested by scholars such as Thomas Brickhouse, Nicholas Smith and Naomi Reshotko; the latter of whom argues that there is no textual support that explicitly states that Socrates thought that there was a logical connection between virtue and *eudaimonia*. Nevertheless, one can deduce a nomological connection. In effect, she concludes that while material goods are neither necessary nor sufficient for virtue (or virtuous conduct), this does not extend to *eudaimonia*. In line with the delimitations of this paper's scope, these considerations will not be explored. However, for the

(Plato 1997: 281d & 281e & Laërtius 1925: 13 & 143). For the now destitute Athenians, this provided solace and remedy to their situation, and *pathos*, which persuaded them to master instead the regions of the mind with reason (*logos*). The new enemies, which needed to be subjugated, were the passions; at least for those ancients inspired by Socrates (Laërtius 1925: 5).

The most prominent figure of Cynicism would certainly be Diogenes of Sinope. Although he was not a direct student of Socrates, he became an enthusiastic follower of his principles, to the point where Plato dubbed him “Socrates gone mad” (Laërtius 1925: 55). Like Socrates, Diogenes chose a life of poverty, doggedly maintaining that the possession of material goods is neither necessary nor sufficient for *eudaimonia* (Laërtius 1925: 73). Diogenes’ argument can be outlined by means of a simple syllogism. P1: There are poor persons who are in a state of *eudaimonia*. P2: There are rich persons who are unhappy, or miserable. C: The possession of material goods is neither necessary nor sufficient for *eudaimonia*. On the contrary, as will be considered later, certain kinds of attachment - for example those fuelled by the passion of desire<sup>15</sup> - to material goods may even undermine *eudaimonia*. When Diogenes wasn’t begging he advocated his philosophy in Athens’ marketplace (*agora*) in exchange for food or money, or simply provoked persons into thinking.

The word ‘Cynic’ (*kynikós*) in Greek is translated as ‘dog-like’ (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘κυνικός’). Since Homeric times, dogs were associated with shamelessness. The Cynics were notorious for such behaviour and considered shamelessness<sup>16</sup> (*anaideia*) a virtue. Diogenes was often seen in Athens urinating, defecating and masturbating in public, sleeping in tubs, feeding off scraps thrown disdainfully to him at banquets, fawning on those he begged from, yelping at those who wouldn’t give him anything and biting the ankles of those he considered bad (Laërtius 1925: 63).

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purposes of this paper, the Stoic interpretation that material goods are neither necessary, nor sufficient for *eudaimonia* will be assumed, as much of Cynic and Stoic thought pertaining to *apatheia* and *tolerantia* hinges upon this interpretation. For further reading, see Reshotko (2001).

<sup>15</sup> See (Laërtius 1925: 83)

<sup>16</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἀναίδεια’)

Like good guard-dogs who protect their territory, Diogenes carefully safeguarded the principles of his philosophy and never strayed from it. The Cynics' furthermore expressed aversion to convention (*nomos*) (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'νόμος'). '*Nomos*' denotes 'custom', 'convention', 'law', or 'anything assigned or apportioned' (ibid.). Conventional conduct, as Diogenes perceived it, referred to uncritical adherence to popular opinion, an appetite for wealth and material comforts, a preoccupation with status or fame, adulation for the Greek gods, unreflective conduct in line with norms of his day, and with the laws (Laërtius 1925: 27, 41, 73 & 75).

The term 'cynic' today pertains mainly to the negative aspects of ancient Cynicism. Contemporary cynicism is associated with a state of mind characterised by a general distrust of others' motives. A contemporary cynic may have a general lack of faith or hope in the human species. "The cynic perceives persons motivated by ambition, desire, greed, gratification, materialism [in the non-philosophical sense], goals as vain, thereby rendering happiness as unobtainable or ultimately meaningless and therefore deserving of ridicule or scorn" (Navia 1996: 1 'brackets added') These characteristic, although rendered meaningless, nevertheless is considered to be the concealed motivating factor of all human beings (ibid.). The negative aspect here focuses on mistrust for humanity in general, which especially includes convention. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, such proverbial mistrust implies misanthropy; i.e. a hatred of mankind in general. The belief that all human beings have an innate and therefore incurable tendency towards the above characteristics usually accompanies contemporary cynicism (ibid.).

However, the ancient Cynics, like Diogenes, were by no means hateful misanthropes as the term implies today (Navia 1996: 104-105). Instead, they thought they could cure and actively sought to cure what they perceived as *pathos* that convention engendered, which had spread throughout the Athenian polis (Navia 1996: 139-140). The first step for the cynics, according to Navia, was to inoculate themselves - here I'm using 'inoculate' to mean both 'introduce an idea or attitude into the mind of' and 'immunise' - against the infection of convention by means of relinquishing all attachments thereto and returning to Nature (ibid.). For the Cynic, the overarching

goal or *telos* is to live in accordance with Nature<sup>17</sup> (*kata physin*). 'Nature'<sup>18</sup> (*physis*) here is adopted from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* meaning firstly "the original constitution or tendency that a man has without involving human intervention, in contrast to what results in him from law or convention (*nomos* - νόμος)" (1999: 4). Secondly it means a man's inherent function or the end to which he tends (*ibid.*). Lastly, Nature also pertains to the totality of things in the universe. Navia avers that, given the lack of remaining fragments from Diogenes' works, that it would be "hardly possible to make a convincing case for the presence of a clear idea of... what he meant by 'nature'<sup>19</sup> and 'reason'" (1996: 108). The task for the Cynic is to cultivate this Natural tendency, from what Navia can gather, is solely to satisfy the needs of the body by means of habit, in order to achieve the appropriate Natural end (1996: 112). Conversely, this entails eschewing any political or conventional constraints.

To conduct oneself virtuously for Aristotle, Diogenes and the Stoics later was to live in accordance with Nature (Navia 1996: ix). Virtue (*arête*) or moral excellence pertains to a disposition to choose and act (Blackwell 2004: s.v. 'virtue'<sup>20</sup>). The principle means to do so for Diogenes was not a mean state between deficiency and excess relative to a person as it was for Aristotle, but rather striving for self-sufficiency<sup>21</sup> (*autarkeia*) (Laërtius 1925: 81). Later scholars, particularly the Romans, described this mean state between deficiency and excess as *metriopatheia* - translated here as moderation of the passions; this in contrast with *apatheia* (Dillon 1983: 508-509). Self-sufficiency pertains to having no one, except oneself, who dictates the course of one's life (Navia 1996: 28). That is to say a state of

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<sup>17</sup> See Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'κατά', 'φύσις' & 'φύση').

<sup>18</sup> See (Bunnin & Yu 2004: s.v. 'Nature').

<sup>19</sup> In light of Antisthenes' - the father of Cynicism and Socrates' pupil - claim that "there are many gods, but in Nature there is only one", Navia deduces that a clear distinction between convention and Nature can be drawn from this. Whereas convention pertains to relativity and contingency, Nature on the other hand reveals what is one and universal (1996: 61). The tragic flaw regarding Diogenes' Cynicism, according to Navia, is that it leaves undefined the positive ideal which should replace convention (1996: 112).

<sup>20</sup> See also (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'αρετή').

<sup>21</sup> See also (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'αὐτάρκεια')

independence and self-governance which entails the willingness and ability to dispense of possessions, wealth, honours, positions and pleasures, in addition to not being indebted to anyone (ibid.: 69).

The cardinal vice for Diogenes and other Cynics was *typhus* or *tuphos*<sup>22</sup>. Etymologically the word related to ‘to make a cloud of smoke’ or ‘to consume something with fire and smoke’ (Navia 1996: 139). Mythologically the word can be compared to Typhon, the smoke-producing, darkness-creating and tempest-brewing monster (ibid.). The word ‘*typhus*’ was also implemented in Hippocratic medical terminology to designate delirium caused by high fever (ibid.). Subsequently both bacterial infectious diseases typhus and typhoid fever owe their names to the Greek root; wherein the sufferer suffers from delirium and mental confusion among others. Other connotations with *typhus*, which pertain more to the mind<sup>23</sup> (*nous*) - which will from here on out be called *tuphos* for to distinguish it from the physical illness - conveys ‘being shrouded in conceit and folly’ and ‘being stupid or mindless’ (Navia 1996: 140). The person affected by *tuphos* for the Cynic “is one whose mind has been made obscure and dense by his own uncontrolled desires and his own senselessness, and, above all, by the pernicious influence of the social and political world [i.e. convention] of which he is part” (ibid. ‘square brackets added’). The *pathos*<sup>24</sup> of *tuphos* is one the Cynics - particularly Crates - sought to cure insofar as they considered themselves physicians of humanity (ibid.).

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<sup>22</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘τύφος’)

<sup>23</sup> Although there is not sufficient remaining evidence that clearly shows that the Cynics thought of *typhus* as a mind-related *pathos*, we can still deduce it affects one’s ability to reason since stupidity is one of its symptoms. In turn, their conception of the mind (*nous*) – taken from Aristotle – pertains precisely to one’s ability to reason (see Laërtius 1925: 73). Suffice it to say that we can establish that *typhus*, from here on *tuphos*, as the Cynics used the term, pertained mainly to the mind (*nous*).

<sup>24</sup> Take note that from the few remaining doxographies and pseudepigraphical Cynic letters, the term *pathos* occurs very rarely (Aune 2008: 59). By implementing a critical comparison with Stoicism, considering these letters, outlining the Cynic philosopher Teles’ stance where he states that the passions are disturbances contrary to *eudaimonia*, the Cynic aversion to pleasure (*hêdonê*) which was later considered a passion by the Stoics, Aune concludes that it is likely that passions in general were considered vicious and contrary to reason and Nature; however with the remaining texts the evidence provides only meagre support (2008: 64). Peculiarly enough, Aune does not consider *tuphos* which the Cynics were adverse to. *Tuphos* was considered a *pathos* by earlier ancient physicians from who they borrow the term (Navia 1996: 139). Along with the claim

On pleasure, Diogenes maintained that despising pleasure (*hêdonê*<sup>25</sup>) is more pleasurable than the pleasures derived from the enjoyment of material goods (Laërtius 1925: 73). Pleasure (*hêdonê*), despite an explicit connection due to lack of remaining texts, was also likely considered a passion (Aune 2008: 64). Contempt for pleasures, in contrast to rendering the pursuit of pleasure as the path towards happiness, protects one from becoming dependent upon the material good in order to maintain the pleasure, thereby preventing the mind-related suffering in the absence of that good (Navia 1996: 69). One thus remains self-sufficient, in accordance with virtue, in line with Nature, thereby attaining *eudaimonia*.

In order to maintain self-sufficiency, the Cynics ascetically practiced to remain in a state of indifference (*adiaphoria*<sup>26</sup>) (literally ‘not through carrying’) towards the temptations of convention (*nomos*) and its practices (Navia 1996: ix & 94-95 & 140). Indifference here most closely pertains to a state of being unaffected. In order for one to achieve indifference, one must abstain from indulging in the perks and luxuries that material comforts afford, and avoid blindly conforming to the precepts and prescriptions dictated by convention.

These practices involve both the mind (*nous*) and the body (*soma*)<sup>27</sup>. Regarding the body, one has to train it to sustain the pains engendered by the vicissitudes of life in accordance with self-sufficiency, without any temptation to fall back on convention (Laërtius 1925: 70). Regarding the mind, one has to learn to extirpate the appetite for material goods. Appetite was considered a passion by the Stoics, but the remaining

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that the Cynics considered themselves physicians of humanity, it stands to reason that they - like most other Hellenistic schools of philosophy - sought to cure *pathos* (pathologies) of their time, of which passion is included. Taken from the *Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, Sheffield & Warren write: “Frequently, Cynic self-mastery is so complete as to be characterised as the absence of passions (*apatheia*) (Ps.Diogenes. Ep. 5, 12, 21, 29, 47, 50; Dio Chr. 9.12; Epict. *Dis* 3.22.13; Julian *Or* 6.192a). While these characterisations might be conflating the Cynics with the Stoics, it is not hard to think that Diogenes too genuinely favoured freedom from passions, since Cynics are so often represented loudly deprecating erotic love, fear of death, and pleasure” (2013: 402-403).

<sup>25</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἡδονή’)

<sup>26</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἀδιαφορία’)

<sup>27</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘νους’ & ‘σώμα’)

textual evidence only suggests that appetite should indeed be renounced by the Cynic<sup>28</sup> (Navia 1996: 69 & 155). Not only was the gratification of an appetite considered vicious, but even more so the appetite itself (Navia 1996: 72). In extirpating appetite, the cynics thought, we can achieve a state of indifference; literally translated from *adiaphoria* as ‘we don’t carry the burden’. Living a virtuous life, for Diogenes, thus demanded strength in both body and mind. He undertook a life-long regimen of distinct physical and mental ascetic<sup>29</sup> practices.

Among the physical ascetic practices implemented by Diogenes, recounted by Laërtius, was that of walking barefoot in the winter, hug snow covered statues and sleeping in a tub outside (1925: 27). Although Diogenes does not explicitly develop a notion of tolerance, there were manifold considerations attributed to him on how to deal with pain and hardship (Navia 1996: 69). However, such preparatory training resembles much more closely what the ancient Greeks called *karteria*, which is predominantly translated as ‘endurance’<sup>30</sup> (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘καρτερια’). Its associated words, *karteros* denotes ‘strong’, ‘staunch’, ‘brave’ and ‘courageous’, whereas *kartera* denotes ‘valiant deeds’, and lastly *karteros orkos* which denotes ‘master of oneself’, ‘steadfast’, ‘persevering’ and ‘obstinate’ (Liddle & Scott 1983: 349-350). According to Navia, endurance entails “a willingness to accept pains and suffering”, like Hercules, who “suffered so much without ever complaining or seeking to minimise pains” (ibid.). From Diogenes above we can gather that ‘endurance’ connotes a rather active, primarily body-related ascetic practice in order to enure oneself to hardship in general (Laërtius 1925: 27). Today, we often see on sport adverts the buzzword ‘endurance’, but seldom do we see ‘tolerance.’ As with most if not all ascetic practices, Diogenes’ endurance has an intimate relation to withstanding pain; here as a result of and during self-imposed physical activity.

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<sup>28</sup> The Cynic in question who articulated this was Antisthenes (see above for citation).

<sup>29</sup> Ascetic translates to *askēsis* in ancient Greek, denoting ‘exercise’ or ‘training’ (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἀσκησις’). See also ‘*askein*’ denoting ‘to work’ (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἀσκεῖν’).

<sup>30</sup> ‘Endurance’ derives from the Latin ‘*indurare*’ meaning ‘to harden’ (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. ‘endure’).



With regards to the Cynic disposition in relation to the hardships engendered by fate, that can for now be roughly construed as an intimate relation to withstanding pain which is not self-imposed, Laërtius reports that “all the curses of tragedy, Diogenes used to say, had lighted upon him...” Lighted upon here is a phrase meaning ‘be allotted to somebody as part of their role or by assignment’ (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. ‘light<sup>3</sup>’). “[H]e claimed that to fortune he could oppose courage, to convention nature, to passion reason” (1925: 41). When asked what he gained from philosophy, he replied: “[t]his at least, if nothing else - to be prepared for every fortune” (Laërtius 1925: 65).

Once immune to the enticements of convention by way of indifference, one can start immunising others by teaching them the Cynic philosophy, or setting oneself up as an example for others, thereby not remaining apathetic or careless towards the vicious. At least, this is what Diogenes did, for which this beggar is still remembered roughly 2400 years later.

Let’s take stock of this section. Firstly, the Cynic indifference (*adiaphoria*) to convention in order to prevent contracting the passion of *tuphos* does betray a stark similarity to the proto-concept of *apatheia*. In order to sustain such indifference the Cynic needs to cultivate the virtue of self-sufficiency. Ascetic practices pertaining to the body and mind are necessary to maintain self-sufficiency. As a secondary virtue these ascetic practices concern the cultivation of endurance (*karteria*) - which entails accepting the accompanying pain thereby persevering. Cultivating endurance allows us to firstly enure us against foreseen and unforeseen hardships engendered by fate and secondly allow us to more effectively and courageously grapple with these hardships as part of our allotment. As another secondary virtue, the proto-conception of tolerance and toleration drawn from Cicero seems to fit neatly with grappling with hardships that fate engenders. Firstly, it fits insofar as suffering or hardship is involved. Secondly it betrays a relation to fate understood as encroaching circumstances, entities etc. that befall one’s lot. Thirdly, the preparation done, i.e. ascetic practices, betrays the possibility that one may succumb to the pressures of such hardships somehow. In the case of the Cynics, this would be succumbing to the passion of *tuphos*.

## II: Stoical endurance in the face of fate

Almost eighty years later, 301 BCE, Zeno of Citium was teaching and pioneering Stoic doctrines in the agora of Athens at a place known as the *Stoa Poikile* (painted porch). This period is commonly referred to as the early Hellenistic period (Green 1990: 8). Due mainly to Alexander the Great, Greco-Macedonian colonies have stretched to the Near East, Middle East, and Southwest Asia; all the way to modern day India. This form of colonisation was remarkably different from those in the eighth to sixth centuries BCE insofar as the colonised persons weren't considered barbarians. Barbarians had been thought to lack reason (*logos*), since they were not able to speak Greek properly, and therefore they and their cultural practices were considered inferior and foolish (Green 1990: xvii). We can easily imagine the foreigner Diogenes, for whom Alexander had great respect after their famous encounter, attributing to the aforesaid Greeks the passion of vanity (*tuphos*) as a result of their ethnocentrism<sup>31</sup>. In contrast, the Greco-Macedonian Empire fused its own cultural practices with those of the colonised. In so doing, it is likely, though not certain, that Zeno assimilated Eastern philosophic ideas; such as from Mesopotamia, Persia, India, Babylon. Most notably Greco-Buddhism. A profusion of budding philosophical schools were founded during this period.

The students at the *Stoa Poikile* became known as Stoics as a result of the location at which they conveyed their ideas (Laërtius 1925: 117). Prior to founding the school of Stoicism, Zeno had been an avid student of the Cynic Crates, who in turn had received his training from Diogenes (Laërtius 1925: 113). Zeno was more Academic than the Cynics, insofar as he imitated Plato's Academy by dividing philosophy into three areas of study; namely logic, physics and ethics (Laërtius 1925: 149). Due to time and scope limitations, the emphasis will principally be on Stoic ethics. Zeno had

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<sup>31</sup> Diogenes of Sinope, as his name suggests, was not a Greek citizen. When inquired as to where he hailed from, he replied that he was a "citizen of the cosmos" (Laërtius 1925: 65). Diogenes heaped scorn upon the social practices that benefitted a person as a result of citizenship or status and disadvantaged the person with a lack thereof; claiming that such practices formed part of convention (Laërtius 1925: 41). Take note that any non-Greek person residing in Athens could at any time be sold into slavery, which eventually befell Diogenes himself (Laërtius 1925: 77).

often attended all the different philosophical schools that the hub of Athens had to offer; among others the Academy, the peripatetic school, the Epicureans, the Megarians, the Pyrrhonists, the Cyrenaics, and of course the Cynics.

Following Cynic virtue ethics, Zeno maintained that *eudaimonia* can only be achieved through the correct application of reason. By doing so we act in harmony<sup>32</sup> (*armonia*) (or in agreement) with Nature (Laërtius 1925: 195); actions in accordance with Nature were called *kathēkonta*<sup>33</sup> which translates to ‘befitting actions’, ‘appropriate behaviour’, or ‘proper function’. Virtue<sup>34</sup> follows by “being the *telos* to which Nature guides us” as self-sufficient beings (ibid.). Correspondingly, virtue is a rational disposition or state of mind that fits with Nature. Nature and convention was also considered as opposing factions, which in turn renders *befitting* actions as those that are in line with Nature and contrary to convention. Taken from the Cynics, Zeno also thought that the Stoic ought to be indifferent (*adiaphoria*) towards convention (Laërtius 1925: 65 & 207).

According to Cicero, Zeno considered the passions (*pathē*) as “a disturbance of the mind repugnant to Reason, and against Nature” (Cicero 2005: 137). For Zeno, the passions were felt inner contractions or expansions which are accompanied by judgements<sup>35</sup> (Sorabji 2000: 2). In contrast with Zeno, Chrysippus<sup>36</sup> maintained that the passions are themselves judgements (Sorabji 2000: 34). Expanding on Zeno’s account, Chrysippus further argued that a passion contained two judgements; one regarding the object(s) of the judgment and whether they are inherently good or evil, and the other regarding an impulse on how to react (Sorabji 2000: 33). Zeno argued

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<sup>32</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘ἁρμονία’).

<sup>33</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘καθήκοντα’ or ‘καθήκον’ singular)

<sup>34</sup> See also Cicero for his analysis on Zeno (2005: 175-177). His philosophical works are of the few remaining documents still in existence on Stoicism.

<sup>35</sup> Sorabji notes two exceptions: in the case where the passions of pleasure or distress were felt, the judgements were considered as part of the contractions and expansions (Sorabji 2000: 34). Take note that ‘judgement’ and ‘evaluation’ will be used synonymously.

<sup>36</sup> Chrysippus was the pupil of Cleanthes, whom in turn was the pupil of Zeno (Laërtius 1925: 283 & 287).

that the accompanying judgements of passions go against one's "own true and better judgement" (Sorabji 2000: 7). Chrysippus in turn asserted that the aforesaid judgements are rather false judgements, which became the predominant perspective for subsequent Stoics (ibid.). Here we can glean a link between Stoic epistemology and ethics insofar as the passions, that are considered bad, betray false judgements; particularly with regards to the content of the judgement (what the judgement is about). This tenet is important to note as it becomes a recurring theme when Nietzsche's complex relationship with Stoic thought is analysed (in order to *carve out* ancient tolerance and toleration for a Nietzschean valuation). Chrysippus also insisted that all the impulsive aspects of the passions are excessive (Sorabji 2000: 44 & 60). When constructing the Stoic's - particularly Zeno's - relation to the passions, Cicero formulated the passions as agitated and effusive movements which disrupt the soul's equanimous composure, thereby preventing reason from function (2005: III, 4-7). From this outline of the passions, distinctions between four attributes of a passion can be made: it entails excessive, agitated and effusive contractions, expansions and impulses; it consists of an ethical dimension both insofar as passions are bad and its 'badness' epistemologically corresponds to its accompanying judgement, it's disobedient to reason, unnatural, and it entails a false judgement.

From the above, one can glean a Socratic and Cynic influence on the Stoical relation to material goods. According to early-Stoic ethics, particularly Zeno's, material goods such as wealth are neither good nor evil, but rather fall under a class called indifferents<sup>37</sup> (*adiaphora*) (Laërtius 1925: 149 & 209). Important to note here that the ascription of 'indifferent' does not pertain to material goods' inherent qualities - i.e. the Nature (third sense) of the good - but rather indicates a particular disposition towards material goods. This extended to other objects<sup>38</sup> such as life, health, beauty,

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<sup>37</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'αδιάφορο')

<sup>38</sup> This does not contravene the ontology most of the Stoics advocated, as these objects are capable of acting upon, and being acted upon. This criterion, for most Stoics, still renders these objects as existing bodies (*sômata*). Many Stoics also conceptualised non-existing entities, which they called incorporeals (*asômata*). These incorporeals, although have a diminished reality and do not exist, still subsists (*huphistanai*). For example the past and future subsist. For an elaborated argument, see Sellars (2011: 184-186).

strength, fame and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like (ibid.). However, the early Stoics were not in complete agreement as to which objects ought to be considered as indifferents. These indifferents call for the state of mind of indifference (*adiaphoria*) mentioned earlier, insofar as they (or their absence) ought not affect (or infect) us with passion. In turn one's *eudaimonia* remains intact and is not compromised by the presence or absence of that object. When attaching the judgement 'good' or 'bad' onto an indifferent object, the person renders himself liable to the passions insofar as indifferent's presence or absence, according to the Stoics<sup>39</sup>, now directly affects his or her *eudaimonia*. However, as mentioned earlier, one's *eudaimonia* ought not to be affected by material objects; also called externals. Conversely, all of the Stoics held that a virtuous character and reason are always good and vicious character and the passions are always bad (Sorabji 2000: 7). Laërtius mentions the following:

The term 'indifferent' has two meanings: in the first it denotes the things which do not contribute either to *eudaimonia* or to misery, as wealth, fame, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy without having these... In quite another sense those things are said to be indifferent which are without the power of stirring inclination or aversion... (Laërtius 1925: 209-211)

In line with the Delphic oracle's maxim 'know thyself' and the Socratic focus on the mind, the emphasis for Stoic ethics in general shifts from the ethical Nature of external objects as such (including the body) to the kinds of mental disposition and attachment(s) in relation to those objects (Cooper 2005: 178 & 211). In other words the ethical focus is not on the objects, but rather how rational beings ought to form attachments to those objects and how to remedy any passionate attachments. According to the Stoics, when a judgement is made that an object is bad, the corollary is that the badness is then perceived as a property of the object itself (Cooper 2005: 180-181). What is causing a passionate response is not the 'badness' or 'goodness' of the object itself, but instead disposition - of 'badness' or 'goodness' -

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<sup>39</sup> Among others, Zeno and Chrysippus. One of the few Stoics who disavowed the theory of indifferents was Aristo of Chios (Sorabji 2000: 170).

associated with the object (Laërtius 1925: 217 & Cicero 2005: 134). Therefore, to attribute good or bad to an indifferent would be bad, since it renders one vulnerable to the passions. Hereby the Stoic ensures that he or she does not render his or her *eudaimonia* dependent upon presence or absence of external objects which are - for the most part - beyond his or her control.

Why do the Stoics distinguish between two types of indifferents? Contrary to the Cynics, Zeno maintained that despite the ethically neutral disposition towards indifferents, these objects can still have value inasmuch as they facilitate the Natural impulse for self-preservation (Laërtius 1925: 217). In other words these objects can instrumentally be a means to the good if reason is intact; however they can also be a means to the bad when the excessive passions incite our judgements. The **object** in turn is thus rendered ethically secondary to its relevant **objective** (Cooper 2005: 187 & 190). In other words, for the Stoic, an objective judgement is a judgement with a *befitting* objective. Therefore, Zeno maintains, we can still have preferred and rejected indifferents, insofar as the objective pertaining to these indifferents entails *befitting actions*; i.e. their preference or rejection facilitates self-preservation. These preferred or rejected indifferents still have value associated with/attached to them by a rational being, and therefore do not imply a state of carelessness or negligence vis-à-vis the object. This encompasses the first type. The second type of indifferent is indeed associated with a contemporary understanding of indifference; i.e. apathy and carelessness.

As beings qua reason, the Stoic is able to extirpate the passions by overriding them with objective judgements. Since the value judgements that necessarily accompany the passions - according to Stoic logic - are exclusively opposed to reason, they are considered false. The sage (or wise man), who can be said to embody the ideal towards which the Stoic strives, is thought to be without any passion; hence he is thought to be in a permanent state of *apatheia* and incapable of making false judgements.

Another important consideration for the Stoic is how to grapple with the passions and their accompanying judgements, once he or she has become self-aware (*sunaiathanesthai*)<sup>40</sup> - or conscious - of them. The Stoic recommended that one remains indifferent (in the second sense) towards such passions by feeling them without assent (*propathēia*) (Graver 2007: 85-101). The term 'feelings without assent' (*propathēia*) is commonplace in Stoicism, to the point where Graver calls it "textbook Stoicism" (ibid.). This aspect of Stoicism is important insofar as he, instead of chastising himself for thinking passionate thoughts, simply refrains from assenting to the (false) judgement. Such a disposition towards the passions once having entered consciousness, as will later be shown, is also crucial for Nietzsche's notion of *amor fati* and for staving off the *life-denying* and painful symptoms of *ressentiment*.

Zeno identifies four primary passions; namely appetite/lust/desire (*epithumia*), fear (*phobos*), pleasure/delectation (*hêdonê*) and distress/mental agony/grief (*lupê*)<sup>41</sup> (Laërtius 1925: 217 & Cicero 2005: 132-134). These are also subcategorised and include among others resentment, pity, hatred, misery, sorrow, vanity, envy, spite, rage and anger (ibid.).

Contrary to popular stereotypes of Stoicism, most, if not all Stoics did not subscribe to a stolid and detached approach to life (Cooper 2005: 187). In fact, the early-Stoics maintained that the sage will experience *eupatheia*<sup>42</sup>, which can be translated as 'good feelings'<sup>43</sup> or 'good ways of feeling' (Laërtius 1925: 221 & Cicero 2005: 132-134). According to Zeno and Chrysippus, every primary passion, save for 'distress',

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<sup>40</sup> See Sorabji (2000: 39-41) for an explication of consciousness as the Stoics conceived it.

<sup>41</sup> See Liddle & Scott (1983: s.v. 'ἐπιθυμία,' 'φόβος,' 'ἡδονή,' 'λύπη').

<sup>42</sup> See Liddle & Scott (1983: s.v. 'εὐπάθεια').

<sup>43</sup> See Cooper for a detailed elucidation of this translation (2005: 214).

has its respective *good feeling* (Cooper 2005: 192). They are wish/will (*boulêsis*), caution/circumspection (*eulabeia*) and joy/gladness (*chara*)<sup>44</sup>.

In order to critically compare the passions with *good feelings*, a common objection against Stoicism needs to be addressed. If *good feelings* are tempered passions, are the Stoics not merely returning to Aristotle's moderation of the passions (*metriopatheia*)? If so, this casts serious doubt that the Stoics are actually striving for *apatheia* proper.

The dominant Stoic counterargument hinges upon Aristotle's claim in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that material goods are necessary for *eudaimonia* (1999: 127-137). If material goods are indeed necessary for *eudaimonia*, it follows that certain material goods are not indifferents, but good. According to Zeno, by attributing certain material goods as good would lead to impassioned states, which are bad. The peripatetic may counter that if these passions were moderated in accordance with reason, then all is well. However, the Stoic would argue that although some cases of *eupatheia* and *metriopatheia* seem similar, they are based on completely different attachments. Whereas the peripatetic would arguably attach the goodness to the object and (for argument's sake) the objective, the Stoic attaches it to the (rational) objective (Cooper 2005: 187 & 190). This entails having the understanding that whether or not one accomplishes the objective is not entirely within one's control - i.e. just because one wants something doesn't imply that one is entitled to it - but it also relies on external factors governed by Nature (ibid.). The best response for the Stoic is to wish for his/her fate woven by Nature, instead of feeling moderately miserable, sorrowful, or resentful. Therefore, the Stoic maintains, one ought not risk one's *eudaimonia* by making it liable to contingencies beyond one's control and by attributing 'good' or 'evil' to certain external objects.

Furthermore, contrary to an interpretation of Aristotle, most Stoics - like Chrysippus and Zeno - assert that some passions are excessive from the outset and therefore have neither a corresponding moderate degree nor *good feeling* which is fitting

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<sup>44</sup> See Liddle & Scott (1983: s.v. 'βούλησις,' 'εὐλάβεια,' 'χαρά').



(Cooper 2005: 192). For example distress. There is no moderate amount of distress or envy that would be reasonable. Underlying both are false judgements; viz. that *eudaimonia* depends upon keeping or having that specific external object. According to the Stoics, Aristotle can be criticised for either not making exceptions to certain passions which should not be experienced in moderation, or not elaborating enough on his claim that *eudaimonia* depends upon material goods (see Cooper 2005: 134).

Inspired by Cynic thought, one of the virtues that Zeno espouses is endurance (*karteria*), which Laërtius outlines as such: “endurance [i]s a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast<sup>45</sup> to, what not, and what is indifferent” (1925: 200-201). Sorabji maintains that Laërtius, when writing about Crates the Cynic and later Zeno of Citium, used the term ‘*karteria*’ as a substitute for ‘*apatheia*’ (2000: 197). Unfortunately Sorabji does not provide support for this claim. However, despite the aforesaid, one can establish an intimate relation. When deciding what to hold fast to and what to consider as indifferent, grappling with pain is usually not part of its execution; perhaps with the exception of acute indecision. ‘Endurance’ as a virtue pertains to *how* we are to hold fast excellently and how to enure oneself, which only reflectively - i.e. by means of judgement or reflection - entails deciding what the best means of grappling with the particular pain in question would be. *Apatheia* on the other hand pertains to how one can proceed without succumbing to the passions, which indeed reflectively entails *what* we are to hold fast to and what is indifferent. Endurance (as virtue) implies *apatheia* insofar as only that which would not incite the passions is can be considered virtuous for the Stoics; that which would incite the passions is exactly that which one should be indifferent<sup>46</sup> to.

Earlier in his work, Laërtius mentions that Zeno “showed the utmost endurance” (Laërtius 1925: 139). Immediately after this remark, Laërtius cites a poem attributed to Zeno:

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<sup>45</sup> The archaic phrase ‘hold fast’ pertains to the senses ‘continue to adhere to’, ‘persevere’ or ‘hold on’ (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. ‘hold’)

<sup>46</sup> ‘Indifferent’ here may be applicable to both the first and the second sense of the term – mentioned earlier - as Laërtius conceptualised it.

The cold of winter and the ceaseless rain  
Come powerless against him: weak the dart  
Of the fierce summer sun or racking pain  
To bend that iron frame. He stands apart  
Unspoiled by public feast and jollity:  
Patient, unwearied night and day doth he  
Cling to his studies of philosophy.  
(Laërtius 1925: 139)

This poem, cited to demonstrate Zeno's utmost endurance, seems remarkably dissimilar to the endurance that is attributed to Diogenes; i.e. endurance as withstanding pain during ascetic practices. Despite using the same Greek word for 'endurance' that he attributed to Diogenes the Cynic, the emphasis in the poem quoted to corroborate Zeno's endurance has shifted away from endurance as ascetic training; with the exception perhaps of the last two stanzas (see Laërtius 1925: 138). There is a shift insofar as Laërtius - citing the poet - does not only describe a routine of premeditated physical exercises as he did with Diogenes, but rather a mental exercise in relation to external forces engendering (physical or mental) pain.

To summate: from the outline of Stoic ethics provided, we can gather that this mental exercise, endurance, entails holding fast to an *indifferent* state of mind, without attaching agitated passions and their accompanying false judgements to the external force; whatever object(s) it is perceived to be. The aforesaid is held fast even under extreme duress or physical pain. Such a state would be what early Stoics like Chrysippus<sup>47</sup> and late Stoics like Epictetus called *apatheia*, or freedom of passion (Sorabji 2000: 187). This does not altogether exclude formulating value judgements, which may/necessarily accompany *eupatheia*; the key difference is that the judgement is formulated with an equanimous and composed state of mind. Maintaining the virtue of endurance among others sustains *apatheia* for the Stoic inasmuch as we do not succumb to the pain by resorting to the passions; like distress or misery for example. This mental exercise, or perhaps more accurately,

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<sup>47</sup> Due to the fact that only fragments of Chrysippus' texts survive, we only know that Chrysippus had used the term according to Posidonius' account – a later Stoic flourishing about 100BCE (Sorabji 2000: 106 & 196). What is more from Posidonius' account is that Zeno advocated that one should be "free of *pathē*" (ibid.).

mental engagement - since the vicissitudes of life (or fate) such as extreme heat or cold are not the objects of a training simulation anymore - entails a possible distinction between endurance and toleration. That is to say only the second sense of endurance (*karteria*) attributed to Zeno, as I will argue in the next section, applies to tolerance and toleration.

### III: Cicero's equanimous embrace of *tolerantia*

Chrysippus' pupil Diogenes of Babylon was one of the three Greek philosophers from the dominant schools<sup>48</sup> that were sent to Rome to appeal a fine imposed on Athens in 155BCE of hundred talents for sacking Oropus (Laërtius 1925: 88). Middle-Stoicism is usually marked by Panaetius - Diogenes' pupil - who had introduced Stoicism to the Roman Republic in 139 BCE. This period is associated with the intellectual dominance of middle-Stoicism, mainly due to Cicero, Diogenes of Babylon, Poseidonius and Panatius. The Stoic doctrines had much more appeal to the Romans<sup>49</sup> than Platonism and Aristotelianism. One explanation for this is that the doctrines of Stoicism are more closely related to the *mos maiorum* (Roman ancestral custom) of the time. For example the *mos maiorum* advocated endurance (*indurare*) training, self-control and self-sufficiency which fell under *disciplina*; they also advocated an equanimous state of mind in the face of adversity called *gravitas*, and they maintained that the Roman man should be able to distinguish between what is good, evil, useless, shameful, or dishonourable which fell under *virtu* (see Cicero 1991: I, 130). However in contrast with early Stoicism and Cynicism, the *mos maiorum* advocated *dignitas*, which entailed public service to the Roman state, reputation, honour, prestige, respect and esteem.

In keeping with the *dignitas* of the *mos maiorum*, most middle-Stoic Romans criticised the shamelessness and hermitic lifestyle purported by many Greek early-

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<sup>48</sup> The Platonic Academy, the Aristotelian peripatetics and the Stoics.

<sup>49</sup> The Roman intelligentsia were well versed in ancient Greek and most forms of ancient Greek philosophy, especially after 146 BCE when the Greek peninsula came under Roman rule. To be 'cultured' was considered to be able to speak both Greek and Latin.

Stoics and Cynics. Instead, many Roman Stoics sought to reconcile the opposition between Nature and convention by implementing a top-down approach. The top-down approach entailed systematically replacing the norms and laws of convention with norms and laws in accordance with Nature by being active in society and cultivating one's own status and reputation. Politically speaking, they largely succeeded, due in large part to Cicero's political influence and work in *De Legibus* in which he conceptualised the term 'natural law' (*lex naturalis*).

During Cicero's early twenties he often visited Rhodes to attend Posidonius' - the pupil of Panaetius - lectures (Cicero 2004: 6-7). Cicero later named one of his works *On Duties (De Officiis)*, which was also the title of Panaetius work (Cicero 1991: xviii-xix). Here he sought to imitate Panaetius' style, sometimes to the point of borrowing from him without any major alterations (ibid.).

In 49BCE Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, committing a legally proscribed action forbidden to any army-leading general (Cicero 1991: xxxii). The proscription protected the Roman Republic from a *coup d'état*. In turn, Caesar's military action had unleashed a civil war which would last for five years. Caesar and Cicero had never been on good terms, due in part to Cicero's eloquent victory defending Quintus Ligarius against accusations of treason by Caesar and not wishing to join the first Triumvirate of which Caesar was part. Cicero favoured Pompey and the Republic. Subsequently, Cicero spent his time either writing philosophy at his villa in Tuscany, or joined Pompey's staff in Illyria (ibid.). For the remainder of the civil war, during the time that Cicero wrote all of his philosophical works, the Roman Republic was in a state of constant upheaval. Between the evenly matched Caesarean army, and the Roman Republic's military spearheaded by Pompey, no one was sure what the outcome would be. But more pertinently, no one - not even the most powerful - was sure whether he would live to see another day.

A series of troubling events befell Cicero around 46BC: his undignified exile a few years earlier from the first triumvirate; fleeing the Republic with which he held himself to be in allegiance, due to the upheaval of civil war; the death of his daughter Tullia in childbirth (ibid.). He realised that despite wielding a degree of political power and influence few persons have ever since enjoyed, there were still forces beyond his

control which could painfully affect him at any time. In the course of these events, he sought solace in intense study, writing, contemplation, and application of philosophic doctrine. Within these writings Cicero articulates *tolerantia*.

Before I start addressing Cicero's term *tolerantia*, a distinction between two stages of Stoicism will be outlined which may explain why Cicero did not simply use 'endurance' '*indurare*'<sup>50</sup> - the Latin for '*karteria*' - or its inflections like his Stoic predecessors for both ascetic physical training and mental engagement in relation to external forces. This distinction will also prove useful in the next chapter as two distinct forms of tolerance and toleration is made manifest by means of this perspective.

John Sellars, a contemporary philosopher on Stoicism, distinguished between the Human Stoicism and Cosmic Stoicism. Human Stoicism pertains to the prevailing interpretation of Stoicism as "heroic endurance" in the face of a hostile external world (Sellars 2006: 164). The Stoic always responds with valour irrespective of the foreseen and unforeseen obstacles between him and accomplishing his objective. A rigid boundary here is drawn between the individual and *fate* (ibid.). The Human Stoic pulls back into the mind to look for freedom and *eudaimonia*, as he has neither physical freedom<sup>51</sup> nor full control<sup>52</sup> over Nature (Sellars 2006: 164). Sellars associates Seneca, Lipsius and Hegel's interpretation of Stoicism in *Phenomenology of Spirit* with Human Stoicism.

The Human Stoic conceives of suffering, sickness and misfortune as an inevitable part of life. His task is to prepare himself for such occasions by continually reflecting upon such possibilities (Sellars 2006: 163). Although some misfortune could not

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<sup>50</sup> '*Indurare*' in Latin means 'to harden' or 'to inure oneself'. (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'endure'). From '*durare*' meaning 'to last' and '*durus*' denoting 'hard' (ibid.).

<sup>51</sup> The Stoics were soft determinists (Sellars 2006: 160-161). However, the Stoics did allow for certain freedoms that were within our control (see Epictetus 1983: 1.1-3).

<sup>52</sup> This is also one of the reasons the Stoics like Chrysippus amongst most others advocate *apatheia* toward the indifferents as outlined in the previous section: if we render our *eudaimonia* contingent upon external objects that are for the most part beyond our control, then – according to the Chrysippus – one is bound to be unhappy when the object is not present for example.

have been foreseen, one should as Seneca puts it “take on a noble soul worthy of a good man, thereby courageously enduring chance (*fortiter fortuita patiamur*) and being in harmony with Nature” (1969: 107.2). If one cannot amend the misfortune, then one must then endure it (Sellars 2006: 163). An important part of enduring for the Human Stoic is the distinction made between the individual and *fate* insofar as the inevitable suffering, misfortune, etc. - and whatever entities it may entail - can still, among other affects, be shown contempt for (*contemnere*), despised, *rejected*<sup>53</sup>, or objected to - along with the judgements that necessarily accompany the *eupathe* of contempt or desposal (ibid.<sup>54</sup>).

With regards to Cosmic Stoicism the boundary between the individual and the *fate* of the Cosmos<sup>55</sup> - denoting here the ‘order of the universe’ - is overcome (ibid.). “For the Stoics the only truly free being is God, identified with Nature, for only God encounters no opposition” (ibid.). Whereas Human Stoicism engenders a perspective that *fate* can obstruct the fulfilment of one’s objectives, the cosmic perspective bears no tension between the individual and *fate*. Sellars claims that assuming a cosmic perspective “is thus always only *relative* to the perspective of a particular finite mode of being” (ibid.). This claim is important insofar as assuming a cosmic perspective is within one’s control, and Nietzsche’s methodology of perspectivism, the latter of which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Sellars associates Cosmic Stoicism with Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Nietzsche and Deleuze; particularly focusing on comparing these ancient Stoics’ remedies with Nietzsche’s notion of *amor fati*<sup>56</sup> and Deleuze’s notion that ethics can only amount to not being unworthy of what happens to us (ibid.). He curiously provides a quote from

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<sup>53</sup> ‘Rejected’ in the sense of a rejected indifferent, rather than a preferred indifferent or indifference in the second sense.

<sup>54</sup> See also (Seneca 1969: 107.3)

<sup>55</sup> See Liddle & Scott (1983: s.v. ‘κόσμος’).

<sup>56</sup> I shall return to this notion in the next chapter as it is an important consideration for carving out an Nietzschean valuations of tolerance and toleration.

Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods* in order to further elucidate the procedure of Cosmic Stoicism.

The various limited modes of being may encounter many external obstacles to hinder their perfect realization, but there can be nothing that can frustrate Nature as a whole, since she embraces and contains within herself all modes of being (Cicero 1997: 2.35).

In order to assume a cosmic perspective, the task becomes to align one's will with *fate*. In order to do so, one has to wish for whatever happens to happen, however painful the circumstances might be (Sellars 2006: 164). Moreover, it entails "a welcoming of what comes to pass by chance, free from any desire to change or rebel against one's situation - 'accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself 'different'" (Sellars 2006: 165). Such a perspective affords the Stoic a means of grappling with pain engendered by fate, by way of welcoming it. However, take note that 'welcoming' here should not be treated as synonymous with 'approval' or 'endorsement'. Ure clarifies by asserting that the cosmic perspective is Stoic indifference (*adiaphoria*) that amounts to "a refusal to judge all that comes to pass" (2009: 78). As a result, nothing can frustrate one as everything that happens is in accord with Nature as a whole.

Even though this distinction between Cosmic and Human Stoicism is a recent one, the debates surrounding it can be traced back to the early Stoics on the point whether *eudaimonia* derives "exclusively from individual agents' reason (Human Stoicism), or whether it also involves a conscious and deliberate harmonization of their own actions with the purposes of the Nature (*koine physis*) (Cosmic Stoicism)" (Ure 2009: 81 'Greek translations added'). That is to say this distinction in general was formulated in order to emphasise the intersection between cosmic determinism and the place for human freedom - what is within our control - within such a perspective (Ure 2009: 81).

The connection with Human Stoicism on the one hand and Cosmic Stoicism on the other is that both represent two distinct stages of progression within Stoic philosophy, which further entails two distinct ways of grappling with pain engendered

by *fate* (Sellars 2006: 165). According to Sellars the Human Stoic, although an avid follower of Stoic principles, has not yet mastered them to the point that they have “transformed his habitual beliefs and dispositions” (ibid.). The Cosmic Stoic is not an apprentice anymore and has fully incorporated the Stoic principles into his habitual beliefs and dispositions. That is to say that the Cosmic Stoic is the more mature of the two inasmuch as he (or she) is able to assume a cosmic perspective and view the world through Nature’s eyes, thereby avoiding the passions (*apatheia*) - which could have resulted otherwise. This suggests that resorting to (conscious) evaluations or judgements about a situation may - at times - not be the most prudent option for the Stoic. Another insight - that forms part of the Stoic doctrine - is that one’s judgements as such and its accompanying affects<sup>57</sup> are - at times - a source of unhappiness<sup>58</sup> (misery or languishing); every so often instead of the represented entities within the cognitive content of the judgement. Although I do agree with Sellars that attaining a cosmic perspective within Cosmic Stoicism is a sign of a mature Stoic - and can contribute to *flourishing* as Nietzsche conceives it - I shall argue in the next chapter that toleration from a cosmic perspective is not the only viable form of toleration. In order to prelude this argument, Seneca’s endurance (*indurare, pati, patiamur*) - under the rubric of Human Stoicism - will also be explored.

Seneca’s endurance (*indurare*) is similar to Laërtius’ articulation of Zeno’s endurance (*karteria*) insofar as it is a means of grappling with pain engendered by *fate* without resorting to the passions. As such I wish to subsume Seneca’s endurance as one possible form of toleration precisely on account of its grappling with pain engendered by *fate*. I thereby nevertheless maintain a distinction between toleration and endurance by claiming that endurance is grappling with pain as a result of self-imposed ascetic practices; as I have demonstrated earlier with Diogenes. The reason for subsuming Seneca’s endurance as part of toleration is that it affords judgements and evaluations - and their accompanying *eupathe* - about one’s *fate*

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<sup>57</sup> ‘Affect’ is used to denote any emotion within the entire spectrum of emotion, whether a passion or no.

<sup>58</sup> See Cicero (2005: 59 & 1991: V, 32.95).



and the possible entities perceived to have engendered the pain, which may contribute to one's *eudaimonia* and facilitate survival. This aspect may perhaps prove valuable inasmuch as the tolerated entity is taken into account. An account of tolerance seems insufficient if evaluations or judgements during toleration about the tolerated entity are completely (and wilfully) ignored. The potential pitfalls entail the possibility of judgements accompanied by affects such as mentioned; contempt and despisal. For example if we advocate tolerance and toleration today for a certain race, can we allow for the affects of contempt and despisal to accompany said toleration? These considerations will be addressed in the next chapter. Let us return to Cicero and whether he can indeed be considered a Cosmic Stoic, which will explicate Cicero's *tolerantia*.

The only reason, I aver, why Sellars does not include Cicero as one of the adherents of Cosmic Stoicism - despite providing the above quote from Cicero to explain the cosmic perspective - is because Cicero wasn't a Stoic proper. Cicero also didn't consider himself a Stoic, despite adopting a considerable amount of Stoic thought in his philosophy (Cicero 2004: x-xv). Cicero was an adherent of Academic Scepticism, which at the time was promulgated by the New Academics (ibid.). Proponents of this form of scepticism doubted that certainty could be achieved. Nevertheless, these Sceptics still acceded to and rejected claims based on probability (*probabilitas* - a word Cicero coined) or likeness to truth (*veri simile*) (Cicero 2004: V, 76). This stood in opposition to the epistemological ascendancy to certainty of the Stoics which they called *katalêpsis*<sup>59</sup>; denoting 'grasping' (Laërtius 1925: 153 & 173-177). As Cicero held views from New Academic Scepticism, Stoicism and other schools, the term Syncretic or Eclectic is usually applied to him (Zeller 2014: 273). Syncretism entails the harmonisation of different schools of thought (ibid.). Despite Cicero's disagreement with the Stoics on epistemological grounds, these considerations do not affect the overlap between Cosmic Stoicism and his notion of *tolerantia*.

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<sup>59</sup> The Stoics said that one ought not to assent to everything which is perceived, but only to those perceptions which contain some special mark of those things which appeared (see Sorabji 2000: 49). Such a perception then was called a *kataleptic phantasia*, or comprehensible perception (See Liddle & Scott 1983: 'φαντασία καταληπτική'). The *kataleptic phantasia* is that which is impressed by an object which exists, which is a copy of that object and can be produced by no other object.

It is within the conception of Cosmic Stoicism that I propose to trace another form of toleration in relation to fate (and in contrast to endurance as ascetic practice). In volume four of his work *Stoic Paradoxes* entitled ‘Every Fool is Insane’, Cicero argues that the sage is never overwhelmed during times when the vicissitudes of life yield misfortune (1948: IV, 278). In other words the wise never succumb to agitated passions such as misery, distress, resentment etc. and always maintains a state of *apatheia* or equanimity. Cicero further lists examples of situations when we are most vulnerable to the passions: during contempt of human affairs, or when pitted against a seemingly insurmountable obstruction among others or during the “toleration of fate” (*tolerantia fortunae*) (1948: IV, 278 ‘Italics added’). Even though both imply a state of *apatheia*, toleration is different from ascetic practices entailed in the endurance attributed to Diogenes. With toleration, as far as Cicero’s writings are concerned, the painful impact comes not as a result of physical activity implemented as a routine, but rather from external (and oftentimes unforeseen) forces imputed to *fate*. Conversely, Cicero seldom, if ever, uses the term *indurare*, the Latin verb underlying the noun of ‘endurance’ or any of its inflections within his philosophical works (Perseus Digital Library<sup>60</sup> 2008). Despite Cicero’s seldom use of the term *indurare* or any of its inflections, many English translators translate ‘*tolerantia*’ and its inflections as ‘endurance’ or ‘to endure’ etc. (see Cicero 2004 & 1991). Seneca, on the other hand, talks often of *indurare* and its inflections most often in the sense that denotes physical activity (Perseus Digital Library 2008).

*Tolerantia*, in line with all the above criteria, rather falls under the rubric of Cosmic Stoicism, despite Cicero’s Syncretic leanings. It falls under this rubric since epistemological concerns regarding his Scepticism are marginal to the ethical concerns surrounding *tolerantia* and Cosmic Stoicism<sup>61</sup>. For one, *tolerantia* for Cicero entails an attempt to nullify the tension between the external and the internal

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<sup>60</sup> According to the Perseus Hopper; a website specifically designed to search the entire archive of ancient texts for particular words or phrases. In turn, it catalogues the results first according to the texts, then the places within the text. It also provides one with the amount of matches or ‘hits’.

<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, these marginal concerns become a crucial point what exactly constitute the passions. This point will be addressed thoroughly in the next chapter when the passions are considered in line with the epistemology (or meta-epistemology) of Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

forces. The cosmic perspective, in line with Stoic and Ciceronian Syncretism, considers all events as fated in accordance with the rational order of Nature; even ones which happen to be painful (pain being cast not so much as an evil, but as an indifferent). The task for the Cosmic Stoic or Ciceronian Syncretic also becomes to align one's will (*prohairesis*<sup>62</sup>) with Nature (Cicero 1997: II, 35). In turn one potentially spares oneself any additional agitated passions, which may render one unhappy or miserable. By doing so, one thereby maintains *apatheia*. In the words of the (Cosmic) Stoic Epictetus, "my wish is always for what actually comes to pass" (1944: IV.7.20). By tolerating what fate throws at one during times of misfortune also prevents one from succumbing to passionate state, besides preventing one from attributing spurious judgements to the objects perceived as engendering the pain.

In *On Moral Ends* Cicero neatly ties in *apatheia*, *tolerantia* and the cosmic perspective by expanding on *tolerantia* thus:

So we see that life becomes completely disordered when we err through lack of knowledge, and that wisdom alone will free us from the onrush of appetite and the chill of fear. Wisdom teaches us to tolerate the slings of fortune lightly, and shows us all the paths that lead to tranquillity and peace. (Cicero 2004: II, ~46)

In this passage Cicero makes clear that he also seeks to avoid the passions. The personification of 'wisdom' here alludes to what the sage would do and teach to his/her students. 'Tolerate' here is pitted in relation to external forces subsumed under fortune/fate. 'Slings', pertains to the pain oftentimes engendered by fate within Nature. And 'lightly' pertains to the absence of passions and spurious judgements during toleration. The paths to tranquillity and peace connote the serenity of the state of mind of *apatheia*, despite the possible physical pain undergone.

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<sup>62</sup> See (Liddell & Scott 1983: s.v. 'προαίρεσις'). '*Prohairesis*' in some contexts is also translated as 'moral character', 'volition', 'choice', 'intention', or 'moral choice' (Seddon 2005: 228).

In *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero criticises the early-Stoics - with the exceptions of Zeno, Aristo and Pyrrho - for not recognising that pain should be considered an indifferent, and not an evil.

I maintain that men are moved far more than is due by its [pain's] false appearance and representation, and that all the pain that actually falls to their lot is tolerable (*tolerabilem*). This then is established among all, equally the learned and the unlearned, that it is the part of brave and large-minded men, of those who are self-possessed and have risen above human vicissitudes, to tolerate (*toleranter*) pain without yielding to it; nor was there ever anyone who did not think the man who thus suffered worthy of praise. Is it not then disgraceful either to fear the approach or not to hear the presence of toleration (*tolerantia*) which is both demanded of the brave and praised when it is exhibited? (Cicero 2005: II, 70 'emphasis added')

In both these examples we see Cicero trying to persuade the reader to reconcile his/her will with the *fate* of Nature by tolerating the pain caused by external processes without succumbing to the agitated passions, despite these external processes not being part of the original objectives outlined by the rational agent. 'Rising above human vicissitudes' connotes the cosmic perspective insofar as the cosmic perspective precludes any judgement about the variations of circumstance affecting the human being and his distinctly human affairs. Therefore, I conclude that Cicero's *tolerantia* pertains to assuming a cosmic perspective in order to maintain *apatheia* as a means of grappling with pain engendered by fate. The praise that Cicero thinks is due to a person that tolerates such pain bespeaks of the moral excellence or virtuousness for successfully assuming such a perspective. It is clear here that Cicero considered *tolerantia* a virtue. *Tolerantia* further seems to fall under the cardinal virtue of courage or bravery, given Cicero's mention of it in the passage above; similar to Zeno who also considered endurance (*karteria*) forming part of courage.

Three years after writing *Tusculan Disputations*, when the civil war was drawing to a close, Cicero was found and decapitated by Marc Antony's soldiers (1991: xv). From speculative anecdotes, his last words apparently have been: 'there is nothing proper about what you are doing, soldier, but do try to kill me properly'. Irrespective of its veracity, his alleged last words do highlight starkly an equanimous disposition in the face of dire misfortune, afforded by the cosmic perspective and *tolerantia* he embraced.

## IV: Recapitulation and Conclusion

Cicero's writings on *tolerantia* evince a marked distinction from endurance (*karteria*) conceived as grappling with pain as an immediate by-product of performing ascetic practices - mind or body. Conversely, they bear a striking resemblance to endurance (*karteria*) conceived as grappling with pain as a by-product of foreseen or unforeseen external forces. I introduced Sellars' contemporary distinction between Human- and Cosmic Stoicism in order to distinguish two forms of grappling with pain engendered by *fate*, both of which I subsumed under toleration. The one form under the cosmic perspective pertains to refraining from assenting to any judgement whatsoever and the other pertains to making judgements which are not excessive; i.e. those judgements which are not accompanied by the passions, but rather *eupathe*. These two forms of grappling with pain will be analysed thoroughly in the next chapter in order to determine whether it can be selectively incorporated into a Nietzschean valuation.

Inspired by the earlier Stoics, Cicero's writings include the first (remaining) articulation of tolerance and toleration; namely *tolerantia*. Subsequently I demonstrate how Cicero's implementation of *tolerantia* forms part of Cosmic Stoicism, despite Cicero's Syncretic leanings. During this demonstration I also indicated how *tolerantia* for Cicero<sup>63</sup> was a means to ensure *apatheia*<sup>63</sup> by grappling

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<sup>63</sup> Cicero had more than one Latin translation for *apatheia*. He used '*tranquillitas*' (tranquillity), '*quietus*' (inner peace), '*constantia*' (equanimity), and '*perturbationibus vacuus animus*' (being emptied of passions) (see Sheridan 2012: 342-343).

with pain without succumbing to the passions. Another important and recurring concept throughout the conceptual history is indifference (*adiaphoria*). In different senses this concept pertains to refraining from attributing good or bad to externals as part of its Nature (as an inherent quality), refraining from any judgement whatsoever, and feeling but not assenting to a passion once one has become conscious (*sunaisthanomenoi*) of it. The above are the primary concepts which will be analysed in the next chapter when *carving out* a Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration.

## Chapter 2: *Carving out* Tolerance for a Nietzschean Valuation

The focus, as the chapter title suggests, shifts in this chapter towards *carving out* a Nietzschean conception of tolerance and toleration from the conceptual history regarding ancient conceptions of tolerance and toleration. Although Nietzsche did not explicitly formulate a conception of tolerance or toleration specific to grappling with pain, he often writes about the intricacies human pain and suffering, besides providing perspectives on grappling (well) with pain and suffering - the *sine qua non* of ancient tolerance and toleration - within his works.

Insofar as considerations of grappling well with physical or psychical pain is concerned, given the persistence of experiences of pain and also the prevalence of psychological disturbances arising from traumatic<sup>64</sup> incidents (PTSD<sup>65</sup> for example), it is clear that considerations of tolerance and toleration pertaining to grappling with aforesaid pain, at least at face value, are still relevant and topical.

What is important to briefly note are some contrasting aspects to the contemporary focus on toleration. In certain philosophical and political schools like the liberal and egalitarian traditions<sup>66</sup> the emphasis on tolerance and toleration pertains to voluntary respect as a result of recognising in one another - qua citizens within an “ethical community” - as moral-political equals as far as rights and liberties are concerned, despite acknowledgement of divergent and incompatible conceptions of the “good and true” (Forst 2004: 316). Toleration for Forst would ensue from *objecting* to a practice of the good - for example attending mass on Sundays - yet refraining from *rejecting* the practice - for example burning down a church - as such a form of

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<sup>64</sup> The term ‘trauma’ derives literally from the Greek denoting ‘wound’ (Stevenson et al. 2011: s.v. ‘trauma’).

<sup>65</sup> Post-traumatic stress disorder.

<sup>66</sup> See (Forst 2004 & 2013) and (Rawls 1971 & 1993).

*rejection* would *reasonably* infringe upon the churchgoers' - qua citizens - rights and liberties (see Forst 2004: 317). The emphasis on grappling with (physical and psychological) pain - at least when the pain is not voluntarily undergone - regarding tolerance and toleration has been downplayed to the extent that such an approach is considered - at least by Forst - as not relevant to tolerance at all, but rather relevant to considerations of the virtue of endurance (see Forst 2004: 315 & 2013: 37). Whether or not certain kinds of *objections* themselves entail (psychological) pain which may undermine *flourishing*, I maintain, remains a worthwhile consideration within and beyond the liberal and egalitarian schools. This concern will become clear in this chapter and the next. Nevertheless, the aim of this dissertation is not to claim that the aforesaid particular conceptions of toleration are not toleration proper<sup>67</sup>, but instead - similar to the different purposes and procedures attributed to endurance (*karteria*) two millennia ago - open up tolerance and toleration to many different, even possibly conflicting perspectives that may enrich our current discourse and contribute to *flourishing*.

Rather, this dissertation - particularly this chapter - endeavours to selectively incorporate the ancient conceptions of tolerance and toleration discussed in the previous chapter within a Nietzschean valuation. It will do so by analysing these ancient conceptions' metaphysical, epistemological and in particular ethical underpinnings. During the late 1870's Nietzsche developed an interest in Stoicism, particularly Stoic ethics, which is reflected in his early work *Daybreak*<sup>68</sup>. In this work, he takes up Epictetus' advice on how to tolerate pain, among other Stoic tenets, for his project of life-affirmation and *flourishing* (Ure 2009: 69). Conversely, in his later works from the early 1880's onwards, he came to criticise many of the fundamental Stoic principles; some of which he initially espoused (see Ure 2009: 72-73). Of most relevance to this dissertation are those principles regarding *indifference*, one's relationship to the passions, Stoic metaphysics and Stoic epistemology. It is

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<sup>67</sup>I do plan on formulating a thorough critique of liberal and egalitarian conceptions of tolerance and toleration on another occasion. However, due to limitations of scope of this thesis, such a critique would take the analysis too far afield; into political discourse.

<sup>68</sup>(see Nietzsche 1997: ~18, ~54, ~76, ~114, ~115, ~131, ~133, ~137, ~251, ~256, ~354, ~402, ~411, ~546)



instructive to compare the early and later works of Nietzsche in an attempt to reveal his later reservations about some of the Stoic principles and to investigate the implications these may hold for a Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration.

In this chapter, I will first elaborate on the distinction between tolerance (as purpose, value and theory) and toleration (as procedure and practice), so as to be able to *carve out* the place of a distinctive notion of tolerance in Nietzsche's thought. I shall then turn to Nietzsche's axiology, explaining the shift from tolerance as virtue to tolerance as value. In the process, I shall highlight the parallels between Stoic doctrines and Nietzsche's early works with regard to tolerance and toleration. Entailed in these parallels are issues concerning philosophy as therapy, the correlations between *eudaimonia* and *flourishing*, attachments to external objects, judgements or evaluations as accompanied by affects, judgements or evaluations as sources of unhappiness and psychical pain, judgements or evaluations as sources of ethical attachments to objects, one's relation to *fate*, eternal recurrence and *amor fati*, indifference, judgements accompanied by passions as false, exaggerated and effusive, Human Stoicism and the question as to how one ought to grapple with vulnerability. In a second step, Nietzsche's aversion towards certain Stoic doctrines, articulated in his later writings, will come under the spotlight; this aversion pertains, for example, to the eradication of the passions, to Stoic metaphysics considered in accord with Nature vs. Dionysian affirmation, to Stoic epistemology asserting judgements accompanied by passions to be false, to Cosmic Stoicism, and to *amor fati* cast as Stoic indifference. In order to elucidate the grounds and perspectives on which Nietzsche, in his later writings, casts aspersion, I will adduce some considerations from ancient Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Finally, the critical comparison will yield a formulation of tolerance and toleration within a Nietzschean valuation.

## I: Tolerance and Toleration

In the following excerpt from *GM*, Nietzsche differentiates between two aspects, the procedure and the purposes, of punishment. The focus here will not be on punishment, but rather on the aspects of punishment that Nietzsche differentiates. These aspects will then be extrapolated to tolerance and toleration respectively.

Returning... to punishment, we have to differentiate between two aspects of it: first its relative duration, the way it is carried out, the action, the “drama,” a certain strict sequence of procedures and, on the other hand, its fluidity, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation linked to the implementation of such procedures. In this matter, we can here assume... [by analogy]... that the procedure itself will be somewhat older and earlier than its use as a punishment, that the latter was only injected and interpreted into the procedure. (2007: II, 13)

Nietzsche cautions his readers that when a purpose, end or *telos* of a procedure is established, one is not making a discovery of what is inherent in said practice as teleological thinkers such as Aristotle thought. Instead, one is either uncritically assuming a framework of meaning already embedded into the procedure, or one is (wittingly or unwittingly) creating and influencing its ‘meaning’ or purpose in accordance with one’s own “needs”, “desires” and “interests” (Nietzsche 2007: *ibid.* & III, 12). Extrapolating the above aspects of punishment to tolerance and toleration, attempting to understand tolerance and toleration solely by reference to purposes, according to Nietzsche, is misleading as it potentially neglects the numerous historical transformations and frameworks of meaning with which the procedure has been imbued hitherto (*ibid.*). An acknowledgement of such transformations and frameworks are exactly what is required for perspectival *objectivity* (Nietzsche 2007: III, 12). Attempting to understand tolerance and toleration solely by reference to purposes is also deceptive as it downplays the more stable and durable procedural aspect - in this case toleration - in favour of the more volatile expectations creatively introduced into the procedure. Nietzsche is not averse to embedding purposes within procedures; but his critical hackles are raised when one prevalent purpose is considered privileged at the (*a priori*) expense of all others; and when the purposes

embedded with procedures come to be seen as a discovery; as though this or that purpose is part of the *essence*<sup>69</sup> or Nature of that procedure (2007: Preface, 6).

A Nietzschean valuation - one that pivots on perspectivism and *genealogy* - highlights a practice's earliest conceptions as they "can still be disentangled, as well as changed" and thereby "undergo a shift in value" (2007: II, 13). In line with Nietzsche's wariness and criticisms of teleological reasoning, my interpretation reads that within a practice's earliest conceptions, differentiations between the purposes (*teloi*) and procedures - which constitute a concept - is less difficult to discern. That is to say any purpose (*telos*) which might have been associated with a particular concept is less difficult to disentangle from its procedure, as those purposes have likely been changed or transformed since, thus rendering the contingency and dispensability of those purposes in relation to the procedure more salient. Over time certain prevalent purposes and practices may become so intertwined that disentangling them does not only appear very difficult, but that these prevalent purposes become (mistakenly) perceived as forming an indispensable part of the practice (*ibid.*). In turn, focusing on a practice's earliest conceptions makes it easier for the *genealogist* and historian to enrich current discourse by juxtaposing more (possibly conflicting) *perspectives* and purposes onto its practice. These (possibly conflicting) purposes serve both to undermine the mistake of assuming that certain purpose(s) form a necessary part of the *essence* of the procedure and to allow contemporary discourse to envision alternative yet viable purposes, which the currently prevailing conceptions may potentially (and inadvertently) obscure.

A Nietzschean valuation crucially places greater emphasis on the procedures - in this case toleration - not because as they are longer lasting and more congealed than the purposes and ends ascribed to these practices, but rather insofar as the actual application of those procedures - the *praxis*<sup>70</sup> - is what contributes most to

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<sup>69</sup> See below in section three where this dissertation focuses on later Nietzsche's criticism of Stoic metaphysics and epistemology for more details on the concept of *essence* and mistaking created values for discovered values.

<sup>70</sup> The ancient Greek noun '*praxis*' - translated as action - etymologically derives from the verb '*prattein*' denoting 'to do' (Bunnin & Yu 2004: s.v. 'action').

*flourishing* (ibid.). Following this approach, this chapter will not articulate tolerance in terms of a sole purpose that excludes all others. Instead, it homes in on the enrichment of the conception of ‘tolerance’ by ‘disentangling’ it from the Stoic and Syncretic virtue ethics and *carving out* its procedure for a Nietzschean *valuation*.

If teleological reasoning as outlined above is considered the *sine qua non* of virtue ethics, then it follows a Nietzschean *valuation* cannot be rendered as part of virtue ethics for reasons stated above. However, as will be made clear below, Nietzsche did indeed incorporate a considerable of ancient discourse into his own.

As Nietzsche mentions in the above passage, such ‘disentangling’ ‘changes’ the ‘meaning’, in this case tolerance, and thereby undergoes a ‘shift in value’. This ‘shift in value’ betokens the revaluation of tolerance and toleration. In order to assess what these ‘shifts in value’ would entail for tolerance, one would need to explicate what values and valuations entail.

## II: Values, Evaluation and Tolerance

Dries, commenting on Nietzsche’s axiology, affirms that “[v]alues are necessary for life, and the practice of evaluating needs to continue, as life itself is nothing but continuous *Werthschätzen* [value estimation]: ‘the value of life lies in the valuations’” (2010: 34). In *GM* Nietzsche even goes so far as to state that evaluation has become so prevalent for a human being that it comprises the bulk of our thinking (2007: I, 8). In this regard values and evaluation cannot be delimited to one sphere such as epistemology, ethics, economics or aesthetics, but rather envelops among others all spheres of life insofar as values are informed by the “needs”, “desires” and “interests” of the person evaluating those spheres (Nietzsche 2007: ibid. & III, 12). This leads to the question ‘why is it necessary to have values such as tolerance?’

What makes this question challenging yet understandable is that throughout his works, Nietzsche articulates multiple perspectives on value and evaluation. Evaluation entails *inter alia* setting prices, devising equivalences, making judgments and ascribing true’, ‘false’, ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ to objects, actions and judgements (the last-mentioned in a reflexive manner) (2007: I, 8). Values also serve as means

to expedite our current deliberations by lessening and simultaneously rank-ordering the intricacies of - and (creatively) enforcing order upon - a situation (Dries 2010: 36).

Although values are not of a psychological origin (*Herkunft*), but rather a physiological one, they do form a crucial part of the *perspective* - i.e. the “affects”, “needs”, “desires” and “interests” - of one qua living organism who espouses them (Nietzsche 2007: III, 12). Values do not only signal the norms, prescriptions and standards with which one measures objects, ideas, concepts etc., but also rank objects, descriptions and phenomena as more or less appealing; hence the term ‘valuable’ (Reginster 1997: 284). The strength of a value corresponds to the strength of the attachment (*Verbindlichkeit*) to an object, idea, concept, event etc., whereas the strength of the attachment corresponds to the extent of commitment (Dries 2010: 36). Apart from the host of affects a value may entail, commitment also pertains to the purpose(s) and meaning(s) ascribed to the respective value - at least for the human animal - in addition to the habitual *praxis* of its procedures (Nietzsche 2007: I, 10). Overall, values are important insofar as they facilitate one’s survival, and - for the purposes of this dissertation - contribute towards one’s *flourishing*. However, some values according to Nietzsche - prevalent ones at that, at least in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when he wrote - neither appear to facilitate survival nor contribute to *flourishing*<sup>71</sup>: “the value of these values themselves must first be called into question” (2007: Preface, 6).

A valuation can be construed as a cluster of values which have become associated with each other by means of repeated juxtaposition (Nietzsche 2007: I, 7). In the first essay of *GM*, for example, Nietzsche outlines a host of values associated with the ‘knightly-aristocratic’ or good/bad mode of valuation; he also outlines a host of values associated with the ‘priestly’ or evil/good mode of valuation (ibid.). A ‘revaluation’ is a (quasi-Syncretic) evaluative re-appraisal and critically selective incorporation of particular concepts and values within a particular valuation. A revaluation as

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<sup>71</sup> See the section below for more details on Nietzsche’s notion on *flourishing* and its relation to the ancient concept of *eudaimonia*.

described in *GM* bears a somewhat negative connotation: the adherents of the priestly mode of valuation - the mode that Nietzsche criticises for its tendencies towards *ressentiment* - re-valuate the knightly-aristocratic mode of valuation by inverting the latter (2007: I, 7): the good = noble = powerful is turned into good = low = powerless and evil = noble = powerful. However, Nietzsche himself endeavoured a revaluation in an unfinished work entitled *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values*. Although, this dissertation is more modest with its aims - only a revaluation of tolerance and toleration - it nevertheless endeavours towards a revaluation. Therefore a revaluation is not necessarily a misguided enterprise.

Ancient notions of 'tolerance' and 'toleration', particularly Stoicism, show an understanding of 'tolerance' as virtue. Tolerance as virtue is framed by virtue ethics. Tolerance as value, in contrast, does not presuppose a teleological conception of objects, concepts, phenomena etc., although it may entail such a conception (provided that such purposes are not considered *essential* to its respective procedure). Moreover, tolerance as value does not necessarily presuppose a particular valuation; it encompasses a much broader constellation of articulations and discourses regarding tolerance and toleration which include virtue-ethical considerations of tolerance, even those which may not be consonant with Nietzsche's criteria of life-affirmation and *flourishing*. The particular *valuation* this dissertation *carves out*, of which tolerance as value forms part, does indeed endeavour to render satisfy Nietzsche's criteria above.

In this light the above considerations of value, tolerance qua value, besides encompassing one's purposes for toleration, lessens and orders the intricacies of situations in which toleration may be conducted. Therefore tolerance and perspectives thereof (and therefrom) are necessary insofar as the procedure of toleration cannot be enriched without it. Assuming for now that toleration qua grappling with pain can facilitate one's survival and contribute to one's *flourishing* just as much today as two millennia ago; tolerance in turn potentially becomes a worthwhile value to be questioned and enriched.

Now that a background of Nietzsche's axiology and the distinctions between virtue and value pertaining to tolerance has been outlined, the *carving out* process from Stoic *tolerantia* can commence.

### III: A critical comparison of Nietzsche and the Stoics.

Nietzsche, echoing the ancient Crates the Cynic, considered himself a cultural physician (1997: ~52). He supported Schopenhauer's attempt to re-emphasise the therapeutic strands of philosophy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; exemplified among others by Hellenistic schools of philosophy. These therapeutic strands of philosophy entail the assumption that the primary task of philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy and even epistemology is to provide consolation for mortality, vulnerability and suffering (Ure 2009: 61-62). Despite repudiating much of Schopenhauer's philosophy in his later works, Nietzsche still retained this aspect of his thought throughout his works. According to Ure, Nietzsche's thought concurs with that of the Hellenistic philosophers - particularly of the Stoics - on the importance of philosophy as therapy, and of the contested<sup>72</sup> purpose (*telos*) of *eudaimonia* (2009: 62).

Nietzsche agrees with Socrates that an active life - i.e. doing well (*eu prattein*) - is important (and valuable) (2007: I, 11). However Nietzsche seldom, if ever, mentions *eudaimonia*. Conversely, he often mentions the *flourishing* (*Gedeihen* or *Glück*) of "higher men" as, for instance, in the case of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who predominantly espoused *eudaimonism* (Nietzsche 2007: prelude, 3 & I, 7). The German term '*Glück*' is often translated as 'happiness', similar to what we have seen with the Greek '*eudaimonia*'. Nietzsche himself lauds the ancient Greek and Roman noblemen for being "rounded men, replete with energy and therefore necessarily active", extolling them for the values which underpin the judgement "that happiness (*Glück*) should not be sundered from action - being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence *eu prattein* takes its origin)" (2007: I, 10); *eu prattein*

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<sup>72</sup> 'Contested' insofar as what constitutes *eudaimonia* is moot and depends on the *eudaimonistic* philosophy espoused.

denoting ‘doing good’, ‘doing well’, or ‘succeeding’ (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. ‘εὖ’ & ‘πράττειν’). Nietzsche, for his part, sought a philosophic therapeutic model based in *praxis*, which would contribute to *flourishing*.

However, what exactly constitutes *eudaimonia* - and for that matter its connection with *flourishing* - is a moot point. Suffice it here to point out that Nietzsche supports the Hellenistic philosophical schools’ particular prioritisation of *eudaimonia* - i.e. a life well lived, with the emphasis on *praxis* in the absence of psychological disturbance<sup>73</sup> - but nevertheless eschews its teleological dimensions as mentioned. The conjecture seems plausible that Nietzsche explicitly refrained from using the term ‘*eudaimonia*’ in order for his *valuation* not be confounded with teleological and metaphysical associations of virtue ethics in general, and instead used ‘*flourishing*’ to designate the predominant purpose of his philosophical therapy. However, in other significant respects, *flourishing* and *eudaimonia* are the same. One particular point of debate of crucial relevance for this dissertation is the characteristic eradication of the passions (*apatheia*) entailed in *eudaimonism*. Based on an expansion of Ure’s argument regarding Nietzsche and *apatheia*, the contention of whether Nietzsche indeed espoused *apatheia* will be examined in great detail; the expansion entails considerations of whether Nietzsche in his later works (such as *GM*) also criticised philosophers, conceptions etc. based on the same criteria as those which constitute the passions (at least with regards to the passions as construed within one or other ancient Hellenistic philosophy). In order to flesh out what *flourishing* exactly entails as regards *perspectives* on tolerance and toleration qua grappling with pain and suffering, the question which will be addressed in this chapter is ‘what kinds of pain and suffering contribute to *flourishing* and what kinds undermine it?’

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<sup>73</sup> At this point a caveat is warranted. ‘Psychological disturbances’ as used in this dissertation pertain solely to psychological pathologies resulting from certain kinds of judgements accompanied by affects which undermine *flourishing*. In turn, this excludes psychological disorders which lie outside this delimitation; e.g. neurodevelopmental disorders and neurocognitive disorders among others. Which disorders those exactly are, out of those for example stipulated within the *DSM V*, lie far beyond the scope of this dissertation. At the end of this chapter and in the next, I shall focus on one specific “mental disturbance” or type of “ill-constituted *soul*” with an emphasis on tolerance and toleration: those which are caused by *ressentiment* (Nietzsche 2007: I, 12 & III, 20).



‘Pain’ here denotes specific instances of unpleasurable states of tension, whereas ‘suffering’ as noun denotes *perspectives* on pain in general. The verb ‘to suffer’ denotes ‘experiencing pain’. Nietzsche elaborates differentiated perspectives on suffering. In some passages<sup>74</sup> he criticises contemporary scholars (including Schopenhauer), religions and the vast majority of people for imbuing life with a *fundamental character of suffering*, which undermines *flourishing* (1997: ~52). Ure interprets Nietzsche’s misgivings as follows:

...the suffering we frequently experience as vulnerable, natural creatures [is evaluated by certain dominant strands of metaphysics and religion] in such a way that it can only be relieved through the faith or hope in the possibility of transcending the natural world. By constructing a metaphysical world that is free of the "defects" of this world they simultaneously console by interpreting suffering as a bridge to another world, but they do so only by conceiving this-worldly existence itself as beyond redemption. (Ure 2009: 63)

Such an evaluation of suffering does indeed provide consolation - in the form of a psychical analgesic - for the sufferer. That is to say that Nietzsche is not critical of the metaphysicians and religious because they do not in fact offer consolation to sufferers, but rather that these consolations are accompanied by certain evaluations and judgements<sup>75</sup> which prospectively contract an even worse malaise than the original suffering it sought to cure (ibid.). Correspondingly, the ‘defects’ of this (external) world, along with suffering, become judged as *evil* (or inherently bad) (1997: ~338 & 2002: ~225). Nietzsche criticises such evaluations for fostering an avoidance of all suffering to the point of inaction and idle contentment, and for

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<sup>74</sup> See also in *BGE* (Nietzsche 2002: 225).

<sup>75</sup> Another point which attests to Nietzsche’s Stoic assumption that judgements as such can be a source of pain is one passage in *Daybreak* entitled "Thinking about illness!?" To calm the imagination of the invalid, so that at least he should not, as hitherto, have to suffer more from thinking about his illness than from the illness itself? That, I think, would be something! It would be a great deal! Do you now understand our task?" (1997: ~54). This passage in his early works may also provide us with support as to how Nietzsche came to adopt a Cosmic Stoic perspective in what he called *amor fati*.

cultivating an unpleasurable hatred towards all these defective *evils* perennially perceived as plaguing this world (ibid. & 1997: ~411).

Insofar as tolerance and toleration is intimately tied to grappling with pain and considerations of suffering, at least according to the *valuation* I wish to *carve out*, the possibility of (consolatory) articulations of tolerance and implementations of toleration, which may not contribute to *flourishing*, merits close investigation. For now, fleshing out Nietzsche's *perspectives* on pain and suffering, and its ties to the Hellenistic therapies will be addressed.

In line with the Hellenistic therapies, specifically Stoicism, Nietzsche concedes that one's own judgements of the world (and their accompanying affects) could be a source of unhappiness, misery or languishing (i.e. that which undermines *flourishing*) (ibid.). In his self-appointed role as cultural physician Nietzsche seeks to alleviate (certain kinds of) suffering, including the suffering engendered by what he considers to be botched therapies - and the corresponding evaluations of the world (such as those which espouse a *fundamental character of suffering*) - (Ure 2009: 63). Even so he also embraces other kinds of suffering: the kinds that have been "the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so far... The tension that breeds strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and courage in enduring (*Ausharren*), surviving, interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness... weren't these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of great suffering?" (Nietzsche 2002: ~225).

Instead of considering Nietzsche's ambiguous stance towards suffering as contradictory, I would tend to view it in terms of the Stoic claim that suffering ought to be evaluated as an *indifferent*. Similar to the Stoics, Nietzsche cautions against attributing *evil* - or good for that matter - to external objects<sup>76</sup> like suffering as such. As suffering is an *indifferent*, it can either diminish or contribute to one's *flourishing* depending on the judgements and affects one attributes to it. Particular instances of

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<sup>76</sup> According to predominant strands of Stoic ontology, suffering *per se* is an external object and as such should be treated as an indifferent (see Sellars 2011: 187-188).

suffering, i.e. experiences of pain, can be *preferred*, *rejected* or *affirmed* - referring here to the forms of toleration outlined in the previous chapter - depending on specific contingencies. In an aphorism in *Daybreak*, Nietzsche criticises the value of pity/compassion<sup>77</sup> (*Mitleid*) by explicitly contrasting it with Stoic *indifference*<sup>78</sup> (1997: ~133). What is revealed with regards to tolerance and toleration is the possibility that one's judgements and accompanying affects on suffering and one's own or another's pain profoundly influence one's value of tolerance and implementation of toleration. The critique of pity/compassion is also instructive, as it brings to light the relation to Stoicism found in Nietzsche's early writings, and to the Stoic evaluation of the passions in particular.

Nietzsche devotes numerous aphorisms - twenty-six<sup>79</sup> to be exact - expounding the "dangers" of compassion (1997: ~18). In aphorism 133, Nietzsche analyses encounters with other persons suffering, asking "why we feel pain and discomfort in common with someone" suffering (1997: ~133). Nietzsche offers his readers a few possible *perspectives*: such encounters create an awareness of one's impotence (owing to possible judgements pertaining to external objects - *indifferents* - beyond our control which can bring about suffering), they engender a diminution of one's honour in the eyes of others, they indicate possible danger, or they serve as a painful reminders of human vulnerability and fragility in general (*ibid.*). 'Feeling pain and discomfort in common with someone' suffering is thus not, for Nietzsche, a matter of selfless consideration for others; on the contrary, he argues, we are responding "very strongly" to self-interest (*ibid.*).

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<sup>77</sup> '*Mitleid*' literally translates to 'suffering with'. This paper acknowledges that there are some differences between what is meant by pity and compassion, especially between Schopenhauer's conception and Nietzsche's; both translated from the German '*Mitleid*'. However, for the purposes of this paper, only Nietzsche's conception will be articulated and therefore 'pity' and 'compassion' will be treated as synonymous. Sometimes, for example in *Nachlass*, Nietzsche uses the term '*Mitgefühl*' which is usually only associated with compassion (Nietzsche 1999: 9[1]). However the exact same criticisms regarding pity (*Mitleid*) he also extends there towards '*Mitgefühl*'.

<sup>78</sup> See also (Ure 2009: 68).

<sup>79</sup> See (Nietzsche 1997: ~18, ~77, ~78, ~79, ~91, ~113, ~115, ~132, ~133, ~134, ~135, ~136, ~137, ~138, ~139, ~142, ~146, ~172, ~174, ~274, ~289, ~329, ~383, ~423, ~467, ~560). I am indebted to Ure for drawing my attention to early Nietzsche's critique of compassion.

The possibility remains, according to Nietzsche, that one can assuage the pain by averting one's gaze and disengage from the encounter, despite the continuation of the pain experienced by the other person (ibid.). This point, which also features in Stoic (and Sceptic) doctrine, is raised in order to demonstrate that compassion is not a necessary consequence of encountering another person suffering; it is also contingent upon the values, judgements and evaluations attributed to such an encounter. That is to say, it is misleading to invariably call the pain (*Leid*) experienced in such situations compassion (*Mit-leid*). The person suffering in the course of encountering the suffering of others may not be demonstrating compassion (*Mitleid* - 'suffering with'). This implies that this person is - at least unwittingly - attempting to relieve his own pain and not necessarily (or solely) the pain (*Leid*) perceived to be experienced by others. Similarly, Nietzsche concludes, our own pain and the tendency to be relieved from it - what he calls "an *impulse to pleasure*" - is what stirs us toward compassion (ibid.). However, Nietzsche makes clear that a "decision", a judgement and its accompanying affect is what transforms our pain (*Leid*) at the sight of pain into compassion (*Mit-Leid*) (ibid.). Take note that Nietzsche here is not advocating that one ought to disregard those who are suffering, but rather advocates that assisting those perceived to be in pain is not an utterly selfless act<sup>80</sup>.

The corollary here for tolerance and toleration is that the 'decisions', judgements, their accompanying affects and their underlying values of those judgements are also important for a Nietzschean *valuation* on grappling with pain. Forst provides a cogent articulation of tolerance as a *normatively dependent concept*, which reads that tolerance is dependent upon other values and principles to provide the impetus for implementations of toleration<sup>81</sup> (2004: 314). For example, whether one tolerates another entity or not depends not only on our already created judgements regarding tolerance, but also other normative values such as (in)justice, (dis)respect,

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<sup>80</sup> See also (Nietzsche 2007: I, 1-2 & II, 18).

<sup>81</sup> Take note that Forst does not consider tolerance itself a value, but rather "an attitude called for by other values and principles" (2004: 314). Conversely, I maintain that tolerance should be considered a value insofar as it *per se* also informs our implementations of toleration.

(in)considerateness, (un)kindness, wisdom/foolishness, (in)temperance, *amor fati* etc.

In aphorism 137, Nietzsche continues his discussion on compassion. Here he advises the sufferer to view his own situation and painful experience vicariously through the eyes of the observer, rather than advising the observer to vicariously “imbibe” the experiences of others as if he himself is the sufferer, as tends to be the case with compassion (1997: ~137). Such a *perspective* is required, says Nietzsche in his early writings, in order to assume the equanimity that is needed for both the sufferer and observer to assess the situation “more in accord with reason and the will to rationality”; thereby cultivating a disposition which is more conducive to excellent *praxis* (ibid.). Soon afterwards he claims that compassion entails “exaggeration and excess” (*Übertreibung und Ausschweifung*), which echoes Zeno’s, Chrysippus’ and later Epictetus<sup>82</sup> articulation of what the passions entail (ibid.). Ure maintains that the category of passion Nietzsche is alluding to in *Daybreak* is the passion of distress/mental agony<sup>83</sup> (*lupê*), echoing Epictetus<sup>84</sup> analysis of compassion/pity (Ure 2009: 71). Presumably as a prelude to his critique of pity/compassion, Nietzsche lists a few passions:

Anger (*Zorn*), hatred (*Hass*), love (*Liebe*), pity (*Mitleid*), desire (*Begehren*), knowledge (*Erkennen*), joy<sup>85</sup> (*Freude*), pain (*Schmerz*) - all are names for extreme states (*extreme Zustände*): the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us... These extreme outbursts - and even

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<sup>82</sup> For Epictetus’ explication of the passions see (Epictetus 1944: 3.2.3).

<sup>83</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, the passion of distress has no corresponding *eupathe*. Therefore, according to Stoic logic, *indifference* in the second sense should rather be implemented. However, I argue later, based on Seneca’s philosophy, that one can also experience such affects, like grief and sorrow, without *assenting* to the accompanying judgements.

<sup>84</sup> For Epictetus’ critical stance on compassion see (Epictetus 1944: II.17.26, II.21.1, II.21.6, III.22.13 & IV.1.4).

<sup>85</sup> Not to be confused with the ancient *eupathe* ‘joy’ (*chara* - χαρά). Given that early Nietzsche considered joy (*Freude*) a passion, it much more likely responds to the passion pleasure/delectation (*hêdonê*). Melissa Lane (2007: 49-50) cogently addresses this point.

the most moderate conscious pleasure (*Wohlgefallen*) or displeasure (*Missfallen*), while eating food or hearing a note, is perhaps, rightly understood, an extreme outburst - very often rend the web apart, and then they constitute violent exceptions, no doubt usually consequent on built-up congestions: - and, as such, how easy it is for them to mislead (*irre zu führen*) the observer! No less easy than it is for them to mislead the person in whom they occur... Our opinion of ourself (*Meinung über uns*), however, which we have arrived at by this erroneous path (*falschen Wege*)... is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character... (1997: ~115).

Like the Stoics, particularly Epictetus, Nietzsche associates the passions with 'extreme states'. Nietzsche also implements tenets of virtue ethics when he mentions how our opinions or judgements of ourself construct our *character*<sup>86</sup>. Contrary to Aristotle's ethics of *metriopatheia*, Nietzsche indicates that even 'moderate conscious pleasure' could be 'extreme outbursts', i.e. *impassioned* states (ibid.). In the passage quoted above, pity/compassion is listed as one of the extreme states or passions. Closely following Epictetus (1944: III.22.61) and other prominent Stoics like Zeno and Chrysippus, Nietzsche claims that the passions can mislead (*irreführen*) us toward an erroneous path (*falschen Wege*) (ibid.). Epictetus and other prominent Stoics like Zeno and Chrysippus - as mentioned in the previous chapter - claims the same<sup>87</sup> (Epictetus 1944: III.22.61). (1997: ~35). For Ure, it is clear that

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<sup>86</sup> Aristotle, a proponent of virtue ethics like the vast majority of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers prior to late antiquity, called these judgements "states of *character*" or dispositions (1999: 25) Aristotle defines 'states of character' as "the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions" (ibid.).

<sup>87</sup> However, one may argue that the claim stating that the passions may mislead toward an erroneous path is not the same as claiming that the judgement accompanying the passion is false. Although this may be the case, in an early aphorism entitled '*Feelings and their origination in judgements*' early Nietzsche does claim that certain "feelings" may entail a false judgement. See also Nietzsche (1997: ~99) where he associated false judgements with 'feelings'. Important to note that when later Nietzsche and his critical stance against Stoic epistemology is addressed in a later section, what is considered false is not the (conscious) *content* of the judgement, but rather the *kind of attachment* underlying the judgement. Although this distinction is subtle, I maintain that it is a crucial distinction that sets later Nietzsche apart from the Stoics. Given early Nietzsche's utter endorsement of Stoic thought in *D*, it is not clear to me that he had been aware of this subtle distinction when writing his early works, despite the possible ambiguity in above quoted passage.

Nietzsche in his early works saw as his task qua cultural physician to eradicate the passions and their accompanying false judgements, so as to “prevent ourselves from adding to our suffering or setbacks the agonizing thought that what we are suffering is an evil or injustice” (2009: 68).

Besides the eradication of the passions, the following aphorism tellingly informs the reader as to why Nietzsche considers Stoic ethics of a higher rank than a morality of pity:

*Said to be higher!?* You say that the morality of pity is a higher morality than that of Stoicism? Prove it but note that 'higher' and 'lower' in morality is not to be measured by a moral yardstick: for there is no absolute morality. So take your yardstick from elsewhere and watch out!" (1997: ~139).

Nietzsche praises Stoic ethics for circumventing the ‘extreme states’ engendered by appealing to ‘absolute morality’. Gleaned from Nietzsche and Ure, any claim judged to possess an absolute and unconditional status is a ‘faith or hope’ in the possibility of transcending the contingencies of the natural world; the claims judged to possess an absolute and unconditional status is the ‘construction of a metaphysical world that is free of the defects of this world’. For early Nietzsche and the Stoics mentioned, this construction amounts to attributing ‘good’ or ‘evil’ to the *indifferents* and mistaking this attribution for a discovery of the *essence* of the *indifferent*. However, this point will be thoroughly analysed in the last section. Fortunately, Nietzsche also provides an aphorism narrating through the *character* of the sufferer how he attempts to circumvent the passions when experiencing intense pain.

In this aphorism Nietzsche talks about the endurance (*Ertragen*) of suffering (*Schmerz*)<sup>88</sup> - particularly in contrast to compassion - although he does not conceptualise the term. Nevertheless, Nietzsche over the course of *Daybreak* does

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<sup>88</sup> The passage reads “[t]hey [men without pity] are, in addition, mostly more accustomed to the endurance of pain (*Ertragen von Schmerzen*) than are men of pity; and since they themselves have suffered, it does not seem to them so unfair that others should suffer. Finally, they find that being soft-hearted is painful to them, just as maintaining a stoic indifference is painful to men of pity” (Nietzsche 1997: ~133 ‘brackets added’).

provide us with enough clues on grappling with pain and suffering to formulate one. The aphorism entitled ‘*On the knowledge acquired through suffering*’ begins with articulating the high value of “minds” that “remain undisturbed” during “dreadful and protracted torment” for the “acquisition of knowledge” (1997: ~114). This statement, in an inverted form, echoes Cicero’s description of the passions as “disturbances of the mind” (2005: 137). Nietzsche’s aforesaid claim precisely amounts to *apatheia* insofar as it entails an equanimous disposition without passion; i.e. an undisturbed mind (see also Epictetus 1944: I.4.27-28 & IV.3.7).

Subsequently, Nietzsche maintains that those who suffer “intensely” perceive all things “in a new light”; with a “terrible coldness” (1997: ~114). By this he means that one’s perception of “things” is bereft of the vibrancy, affection, charm, glamour, luxury, embellishment and ostentation which usually accompany a healthy perspective (ibid.). Nietzsche maintains that this coldness or “sobering-up” in light of the experience of pain serves to alleviate the pain (ibid.). That is to say the resulting ‘cold’ perspective in service of alleviating pain forms part of a (physiological) function of life-preservation. In this passage, worth quoting at length, Nietzsche explains:

He [the sufferer] thinks with contempt (*Verachtung*) of the warm, comfortable misty world (*Nebelwelt*) in which the healthy man thoughtlessly wanders; he thinks with contempt of the noblest and most beloved of the illusions in which he himself formerly indulged; he derives enjoyment (*Genuss*) in conjuring up this contempt as though out of the deepest depths of Hell and thus subjecting his soul (*Seele*) to the bitterest suffering (*Leid*): **for it is through this counterweight that he holds his own (*hält Stand*) against the physical pain (*physischen Schmerz*)** - he feels that this counterweight is precisely what is now needed! With dreadful clear-sightedness as to the nature of his being, he cries to himself: ‘for once be your own accuser and executioner, for once take your suffering (*Leiden*) as the punishment inflicted by yourself upon yourself! Enjoy (*Geniesse*) your superiority as judge; more, enjoy your wilful pleasure (*Belieben*), your tyrannical arbitrariness! Raise



yourself above your life as above your suffering, look down into the deep and the unfathomable depths!' Our pride (*Stolz*) towers up as never before: it discovers an incomparable stimulus in **opposing** (*gegen*) such a tyrant as pain is, and in answer to all the insinuations it makes to us that we should bear witness against life in becoming precisely the advocate of life in the face of this tyrant. In this condition one defends oneself desperately against all pessimism; that it may not appear to be a consequence of our condition and humiliate us in defeat. The stimulus to justness of judgment has likewise never been greater than it is now, for now it represents a triumph over oneself (*Triumph über uns*), over a condition which, of all conditions, would make unjustness of judgment excusable (*entschuldbar*) - but we do not want to be excused (*entschuldigt*), it is precisely now that we want to show that we can be without guilt (*ohne Schuld*). (1997: ~114 'brackets and emphasis added')

Beside engaging with the analysis of tolerance and toleration in relation to this aphorism, this aphorism will serve as a motif for the influence of Stoicism on Nietzsche and how it reveals to the reader aspects of the Nietzschean *valuation* and also provide a glimpse as to how toleration functions with its *normatively dependent* values. Above Nietzsche exclusively focuses on grappling with pain or suffering psychically - similar to the Stoics - where he emphasises the cognitive and affective components that he considers to accompany it. By using the *power of three*<sup>89</sup> Nietzsche repeats 'contempt' thrice, which is telling of what he thinks the dominating affect is during intense pain for the sufferer; and also which aspect of this passage is the most important. Given that Nietzsche was plagued by bouts of grave illness throughout his life, it is plausible that he is also philosophising out of personal experience. The potential judgements that accompany this contempt pertain to

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<sup>89</sup> The rule of three or power of three is a writing principle that suggests that things that come in threes are funnier, more satisfying, or more effective than other numbers of things. The Latin phrase, '*omne trium perfectum*' (everything that comes in threes is perfect, or, every set of three is complete) conveys the same idea as the rule of three. (Propp 2010:74).

external objects (*indifferents*) - subsumed under *fate*; the ‘misty world’ (*Nebelwelt*<sup>90</sup>) of the healthy man and its capacity for charming contentment. When these external objects are other human beings, I shall refer to them as ‘uncongenial entities’<sup>91</sup>. The term uncongenial entity is here construed as a living object evaluated or judged as foreign, hostile, threatening, vexing, terrible, dangerous, pathetic, wretched, deplorable, erroneous, or objectionable. The uncongenial entity does not necessarily have to be a human being. Nevertheless, in the next chapter emphasis will be placed on uncongenial entities who are human beings<sup>92</sup>. Afterwards the sufferer’s contempt and judgement is directed at the illusions of the *Nebelwelt* in which he himself has indulged. An inward turn here becomes manifest as the progression of contempt proceeds. It is not other healthy men in general for whom the sufferer shows contempt, but his former healthy self<sup>93</sup> as well for his having harboured these illusions.

From his contempt and its accompanying judgements, the sufferer derives pleasure (*Genuss*), whilst simultaneously “subjecting his *soul*<sup>94</sup> (*Seele*) to the bitterest pain

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<sup>90</sup> ‘*Nebel*’ translates to ‘fog’ or ‘smoke’. Perhaps Nietzsche here is alluding to the ‘smoke of the mind’ or ‘vanity’ (*tuphos*) that Aristotle and Diogenes the Cynic referred to.

<sup>91</sup> I construe uncongenial here in the vernacular sense as ‘unpleasant to be with’ or ‘evoking displeasure’ (see Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. ‘uncongenial’).

<sup>92</sup> The decision to place emphasis upon persons was inspired by Freud’s statement in *Civilisation and its Discontents*, suggesting that the greatest source of pain for a human being today comes from other human beings (Freud 1929: 8).

<sup>93</sup> In the next aphorism, Nietzsche calls this ‘self’ the ego (*das Ich*), which should not be confused with a static identity that causes one’s personality, attributes, characteristics etc., but rather the ego – put succinctly - is the accumulation of the construction of one’s own character (1997: ~115).

<sup>94</sup> What Nietzsche means by the ‘soul’ will be articulated below in the section on metaphysics. Suffice it to say that one perspective of Nietzsche’s that is relevant to our discussion here is that the *soul* - within a Naturalistic framework - is a “social structure of the drives (*Triebe*) and affects (*Affekte*)” (2002: 12). In other words the *soul* pertains to the psyche or mind-related matters, but does not function independently of the body and is not situated on a different ontological plane (similar to the Stoic conception of the *soul*).

Another tenet that Nietzsche shares with the Stoics is that he is an adherent of Naturalism (1997: viii, xii, xiii & xxiii). Also see (Poellner 1995: 138-149). Contrary to many materialists, Nietzsche - at least in the early and later work considered - was well-disposed toward a “hypothesis of the soul” (2002: ~12). However he had fundamental problems with an atomistic perspective on the soul which entails that the soul is “something indestructible, eternal, as a monad” (2002: ~12). Instead he claims that “the road to new forms and refinements to the soul hypothesis stands open: and such conceptions as ‘mortal soul’ and ‘soul as multiplicity

(*Leid*)” (ibid.). The first consideration in the aphorism pertains to the sufferer: by having recourse to contempt and its accompanying judgements, he recovers some pleasure (*Genuss*). The word ‘pleasure’ (*Genuss*) here is used, rather than ‘joy’ (*Freude*) which Nietzsche renders as a passion or ‘extreme state’. Nietzsche here intimates that our judgements or evaluations of physical pain exert an influence upon the extent towards which we experience overall pain. That is to say judgements about pain can either exacerbate our physical pain by adding psychical pain, or they can serve as a psychical analgesic. Important to note here that this claim goes beyond Stoic tenets insofar as the Stoics did not claim that (certain) affects serve as analgesics<sup>95</sup>. The corollary is that, for Nietzsche, the contempt and its accompanying judgements (within one’s control) serve as an analgesic to the intense physical suffering undergone. In this way, the sufferer can ‘hold his own (*hält Stand*) against the physical pain’. The German ‘*hält Stand*’ is literally translated as to ‘to withstand’ or ‘to hold up whilst standing’. A few sentences later Nietzsche explicitly uses ‘*ertragen*’ to refer back to the means articulated earlier by which the sufferer ‘hold(s) his own’ (1997: ~114).

The way Nietzsche describes enduring (*ertragen*) here resonates with the one sense of endurance (*karteria*) articulated in the previous chapter; i.e. as grappling with

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of the subject’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and emotions’ want hence forth to possess civic rights in science (ibid.). With ‘mortal soul’ he intimates that the soul dies with the body. The Stoics had overlapping stances on the soul. The soul, according to Sellars’ take on the Stoic ontology, was considered a *body* since it was capable of “acting and being acted upon” (Sellars 2011: 186-187). Nietzsche and the Stoics thus considered the soul not a static object situated within non-naturalistic realms, but rather as a changeable entity that somehow influences our drives and emotions.

<sup>95</sup> For a comparison, see also Epictetus’ *Handbook* where he asserts “[r]emember, it is not enough to be hit or insulted to be harmed, you must believe that you are being harmed. If someone succeeds in provoking you, realize that your mind is complicit in the provocation” (1983: ~20). As Ure also comments on Nietzsche’s therapy in general; a “cognitive reorientation” can potentially allay the extent towards which one experiences psychical and physical pain (2009: 63). Although the Stoics did claim one succumbs to unhappiness, misery or languishing when that assenting to the passions, they nonetheless did not claim that the passions or the *eupathe* can serve as analgesics.

pain/suffering engendered by *fate*<sup>96</sup>. It echoes what Sellars outlines when he speaks of Human Stoic Seneca's endurance:

For, Seneca reminds Lucilius, life is not a delicate thing; rather, it is a journey in which one will meet grief and sickness. These cannot be avoided but they can be despised (*effugere ista non potes, contemnere potes*)<sup>97</sup>... For Seneca, whatever happens is something that must be endured (*indurare, pati, patiamur*) rather than welcomed... The acts of fortune are not something to be willed, but rather something to be suffered. (Sellars 2006: 163)

The translation of 'despised' stems from Seneca's use of '*contemnere*' which could just as easily have been translated to 'held in contempt', since the Latin '*contemnere*' is the root of 'contempt' (see Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'contempt'). The rigid boundary between the sufferer and *fate* is conceptually - albeit perhaps unconsciously - maintained. Although Ure does not at all mention Nietzsche's aphorism ~114, he later - owing to Epictetus' unmistakable influence on Nietzsche and Nietzsche's own depiction of Epictetus in *Daybreak*<sup>98</sup> elsewhere - ascribes the epithet 'Human Stoic' to both Nietzsche (in his early writings) and Epictetus (2009: 68-69). Insofar as this conceptual boundary is maintained, the pain not being a result of ascetic practice (*askesis*) and that the judgements and accompanying affects serve to grapple with pain, the sufferer is indeed implementing one form of toleration outlined in the previous chapter. This form of toleration I shall call *withstanding* toleration, on account of its resistance against fate whilst maintaining *apatheia*.

After Nietzsche's outline of enduring (*ertragen* - past tense '*ertrugen*') - i.e. *withstanding* toleration - in the lengthy passage above, the sufferer makes yet

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<sup>96</sup> Although Nietzsche does not specify the source of the intense suffering, he does mention sickness (*Krankheit*), which can be attributed to *fate* (1997: ~114).

<sup>97</sup> See (Seneca 1969: 107.3)

<sup>98</sup> Nietzsche ambiguously depicts Epictetus as a "self-sufficient man within a universal enslavement who defends himself against the outside world and lives in a constant state of supreme bravery" (see 1997: ~546).

another inward turn. With ‘dreadful clear-sightedness’ the sufferer, instead of perceiving himself as the victim of Nature’s *fate*, now vicariously conceives of himself to be the aggressor; he becomes the substitute for *fate* itself. Why would the Human Stoic sufferer do so? By way of this vicarious substitution the sufferer recovers more enjoyment (*Genuss*) out of this odious experience, according to Nietzsche. Instead of resorting to compassion, both Nietzsche and Epictetus advise that one should perceive one’s precarious situation from an observer’s perspective; more specifically an observer who has nothing at stake in the situation<sup>99</sup> (Nietzsche 1997: ~137 & Epictetus 1983: 26). The ideal observer for the Stoics would be *fate* (or Nature) itself, due to its indifference. The vicarious substitution allows the sufferer to ‘raise himself above his life and above his suffering’. In turn, the sufferer grapples psychically with the pain by means of *withstanding* toleration.

Despite the vicarious substitution, the concomitant tension between the two still remains insofar as rigid boundary is still maintained. The sufferer is still ‘opposed’ to ‘such a tyrant as pain is’; hence the reason why he fights the pain by means of substitution. Earlier on in the passage Nietzsche provides his readers with what I interpret to be a caveat: although the affect of contempt and its accompanying judgements do (temporarily) alleviate the ‘intense suffering’, the price one pays for that is rendering one’s soul, mind or psyche liable to the ‘bitterest pain’. Nietzsche explains what he means by this in an earlier passage entitled *The Morality of Voluntary Suffering*:

The pleasure (*Genuss*) of cruelty: just as it is reckoned a virtue in a *soul* under such conditions to be inventive and insatiable in cruelty... Consequently it is imagined (*denkt*) that the gods too are refreshed and in festive mood when they are offered the spectacle of cruelty - and thus there creeps into the world the idea that voluntary suffering (*freiwilliges Leiden*), self-chosen torture, is meaningful and

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<sup>99</sup> This comparison between Nietzsche and Epictetus was originally made by Ure (2009: 69-70). The Stoics have a long tradition of vicariously imagining themselves as motes - looking through the eyes of Nature (or *fate*) - understood here as a personified physics (see Seneca 1932: 25-26).

valuable... for to practise cruelty is to enjoy (*geniesst*) the highest gratification of the feeling of power (*Machtgefühl*)... The more their spirit ventured on to new paths and was as a consequence tormented by pangs of conscience and spasms of anxiety, the more cruelly did they rage against their own flesh, their own appetites (*Gelüste*) and their own health - as though to offer the divinity a substitute pleasure (*einen Ersatz an Lust zu bieten*) in case he might perhaps be provoked by this neglect of and opposition to established usages and by the new goals these paths led to. Let us not be too quick to think that we have by now freed ourselves completely from such a logic of feeling! Let the most heroic *souls* question themselves on this point (1997: ~18).

Nietzsche clarifies that contempt for oneself, among other forms of self-directed cruelty, elicits pleasure (*Genuss*) as explained earlier. Such is an example of *withstanding* toleration given the criteria mentioned. With regards to values not a lot can be said about tolerance but only toleration's *normative dependent* values; in this example the value of suffering. Nietzsche mentions that the suffering resulting from self-cruelty was not (ethically) considered vicious by the ancients - he mentions the Greeks in particular - insofar as suffering was rendered valuable as a form of amusement for the gods (*ibid.*). He further adds that it gratifies the 'feeling of power' (*ibid.*). It does so, I would argue, insofar as self-directed cruelty places the sufferer (vicariously) in the dominant position; whereas holding contempt for *fate* would not elicit such a feeling (*Gefühl*), since *fate* - and whatever particular entity or entities are represented thereby - is then perceived as being in the dominant position. To imagine the gods - as substitute (*Ersatz*) - enjoying (*genießen*) this wretched spectacle is for Nietzsche to enjoy one's own suffering vicariously.

The term 'voluntarily' here requires some clarification. In light of early Nietzsche's indubitable Stoic influence, I interpret 'voluntary' (*freiwillig*) here as pertaining to what is *within one's control*; in this case the affect of contempt and the judgements accompanying it. In line with Stoic thought, early Nietzsche's articulation lends itself to Epictetus' claim that instead of focusing on external objects (the *indifferents*) that

are deemed *beyond one's control*, one should instead focus upon “conception, choice, wish, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing” (Epictetus 1983: 1.1-3). Resorting to contempt is *within our control* - i.e. voluntary - inasmuch as it entails ‘conception’ which pertains to judgement and ‘aversion’ which pertains to the affect of contempt. Nevertheless, the ‘voluntariness’ (as a *faute de mieux*) of the sufferer’s contempt does not necessarily imply that he is consciously aware of the analgesic qualities of this affect, or of *withstanding* toleration. Furthermore, despite this possible lack of conscious awareness, *withstanding* toleration is also voluntary inasmuch as it is initiated by voluntary affects and accompanying judgements (which are tense enough for analgesic qualities to manifest<sup>100</sup>).

Paradoxically, Nietzsche incisively notes that the more the sufferer voluntarily indulges in what can be called this psychic analgesic - by means of *withstanding* toleration - the more cruelly he had to treat himself to attain the required effect. That is to say, the more the sufferer resorts to the pleasures of self-contempt to (temporarily) relieve the (physical) pain, the more (psychical) pain he needed to inflict upon himself; *inter alia* by means of affects and their accompanying judgements. The corollary is that as the tension increases, the likelihood of “exaggeration and excess” of the affects and their accompanying judgements increases (1997: ~137 & ~559). Nietzsche explicitly mentions this corollary when he asks whether those who resort to affects and their accompanying judgements to the “farthest stretch... not acquire something exaggerated and distorted precisely because there is too much tension in them?” (1997: ~559). The ‘exaggeration and excess’ is precisely what is entailed in the passions. This, I think, is what is meant by Nietzsche when he claims that this means of tolerating pain - i.e. *withstanding* toleration - subjects the sufferer’s *soul* to the ‘bitterest pain’; the *soul* here understood as the psychological makeup of ‘drives, judgements and affects’.

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<sup>100</sup> In *GM* Nietzsche claims that ‘great affects (*große Affekte*)’ have analgesic qualities (2007: III, 15). The term ‘great’ should not be considered as denoting ‘very good’, but rather from the German ‘*groß*’ denoting ‘large’ or ‘big’. The only factor that Nietzsche mentions that we could use to distinguish ‘large’ and ‘small’ affects, is by their intensity (see 2007: I, 10).

As Cicero mentions when he first articulates *tolerantia*, one is also most vulnerable during the contempt of human affairs (1948: IV, 278). Insofar as Cicero also considered the passions vicious, I maintain that this is exactly the vulnerability that he is referring to: when the sufferer resorts to the affect of contempt, it facilitates the alleviation of physical pain via *withstanding* toleration, but only at the cost of tensive psychological pain. As the tension increases either from the physical pain from *fate* or from more intense 'doses' of contempt, the more vulnerable the sufferer becomes to the passions. Therefore resorting to *withstanding* toleration, although not accompanied by the passions, carries with it psychological risks.

The initial contempt for human affairs, prior to becoming abused, would not necessarily be exaggerated or excessive since the initial intensity of pleasure (*Genuss*) thus afforded would be sufficient to counteract the physical pain (*physischer Schmerz*). Only when harsher self-cruelty is required to extract the required extent of pleasure does one only become more vulnerable to the passions. However, it is worth reiterating that succumbing to the passions is not only contingent upon the extent of tension, but to a much greater extent the kind of judgements accompanied by the affect used to counteract the pain. Therefore there is still space for *withstanding toleration* and contempt as a *eupathe*, as the Stoics suggest, despite the psychological risks involved.

Nietzsche further claims in the aphorism that endurance (*withstanding* toleration) entails the 'stimulus to justness of judgement' which 'would make unjustness of judgement excusable (*entschuldbar*)' (1997: ~114). The choice of the word 'excusable' (*entschuldbar*) highlights an ambiguity. Nietzsche does not clarify what he means by this. Ure - while not focusing on this particular aphorism - provides us with a possible *perspective* from which I shall derive a few interpretations. In outlining Sellars' conceptualisation of Human Stoicism and endurance in order to correlate them with early Nietzschean thought, Ure makes the following observation: by relinquishing the passions and their accompanying false judgements of external objects or events, one also spares oneself the pain accompanying the idea that suffering is an evil or injustice; i.e. more specifically the notion that the sufferer himself has been wronged (2009: 68).



One plausible interpretation of 'excusable' here is the sense of 'capable of being overlooked'. It may imply that the sufferer strategically overlooks the (possible) 'unjustness' (or injustice) that is read into the situation in order to spare himself the psychological pain caused such a judgement and its accompanying affects; i.e. sparing his *soul* from this 'bitter pain'. This would also diminish the likelihood of succumbing to the passions since - on top of the physical suffering - the further increase of tension as a result of the affect and judgements, which can render the affect exaggerated and excessive, is now circumvented.

Another plausible interpretation that could be connected with the first one reads 'excusable' as 'free from blame'. Here the sufferer prevents himself from blaming. However, Nietzsche mentions that the sufferer does cry to himself that he should be his own 'accuser'; later he mentions that 'we do not want to be excused'. In line with Stoic thought, this interpretation lends itself to Epictetus' claim that instead of focusing on external objects that are beyond one's control, one should instead focus upon "conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing" (1983: 1.1-3). In turn, the question then becomes 'free from blaming whom or what'? If the sufferer is to refrain from blaming himself, the only other party remaining is *fate*. A Stoic perspective can make sense of not blaming *fate*. But first a sharp distinction must be made between holding someone (or something) in contempt and blaming someone (or something). Blame implies that one holds the other party accountable insofar as that party must somehow atone for what they have done<sup>101</sup>. Blame then may be accompanied by the affect of contempt, as blame is a particular form of judgement. However, as Nietzsche also mentions, contempt does not as a matter of course imply blame (or vice versa), since its accompanying judgement may take different forms (or valuations) (see 2007: II, 4 & III, 15). Insofar as blame is prevented, the sufferer renders himself less likely to succumb to the passions and thereby refines and sustains the *praxis* of *withstanding* toleration. The implications entail that, apart from the criteria mentioned, the limit of *withstanding* toleration is drawn by succumbing to the passions.

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<sup>101</sup> The implication is that holding a party responsible is itself a form of responsibility that the blaming party or someone in their stead takes.

Thus, in light of both these insights provided by Ure, one can caution that blame<sup>102</sup> towards external objects beyond our control should be at least temporarily *suspended* in order to sustain *withstanding* toleration during intense suffering. It must be *suspended* lest one becomes more vulnerable to passions such as anger, impassioned resentment<sup>103</sup>, frustration and wrath.

Nietzsche's last sentence in the extract requires some attention, as it may provide us with some relevant points for the next chapter on tolerance and *ressentiment*. He notes that the sufferer and his readers with like minds "want to show that we can be without guilt (*ohne Schuld*)" (1997: ~114). In light of the interpretations above this statement can be construed as 'without the inclination to blame oneself' or 'overlooking someone (or something) that could be perceived as accountable'. However, given that the sufferer does act in the capacity of 'accuser' towards himself, doesn't he then stand the same chance of succumbing to an impassioned state on account of the tensive blameful judgements about himself? A careful examination of Nietzsche's claim, with the assistance of Cosmic Stoic thought, reveals that the risks remain; the sufferer's *soul* is still subject to the bitterest pain. It is on account of these risks that Sellars claims that the Human Stoic approach - particularly towards endurance (*withstanding* toleration) - is insufficient. He maintains that "the Stoic beginner [the Human Stoic] continues to grit his teeth in the face of

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<sup>102</sup> Particularly in relation to *fate*, the Stoic considers the event during which he holds contempt as in accord with Nature. However, Nature - at least where Natural processes like natural catastrophes are concerned - should not be blamed, since everything that is in accord with it is reasonable and therefore cannot be unjust. For example blaming a rock after one has stubbed one's toe against it would be considered irrational. Only with regards to other rational beings that are capable of Stoic freedom - i.e. those things within our control - does blame qua the virtue of justice become relevant (and necessary). An important caveat that Epictetus provides on blame states "[n]ever praise or blame people on common grounds; look to their judgements exclusively. Because that is the determining factor, which makes everyone's actions either good or bad" (1944 IV.44). However, from the remaining recordings of his lectures, Epictetus advises his pupil to lead a mainly blameless life. In the *Handbook* he argues that the Stoic sage would never need to blame anyone: "[b]ut if you have the right idea about what really belongs to you and what does not, you will never be subject to force or hindrance, you will never blame or criticize anyone, and everything you do will be done willingly" (1983: I.4). Although I think that Epictetus' last consideration of blame is inordinate, what he makes clear is that blame should be imputed carefully.

<sup>103</sup> The last chapter deals with resentment and Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment* in great detail. Therein a thorough analysis of this affect - and its accompanying judgements - will be provided, in addition to how the psychological symptoms of *ressentiment* constitute as Nietzsche claims the "greatest danger" (2007: I, 12).

harsh fortune” (2006: 165 ‘brackets added’). This expression of Sellars pertains to the pain of endurance (*withstanding* toleration) - along with the contempt in this case resulting from the rigid boundary between the sufferer and *fate* - which is ‘subjected to the *soul*’; i.e. psychological pain or self-cruelty which - as an analgesic - runs the risk of degenerating into an impassioned state if abused.

Moreover, the other interpretations of ‘*ohne Schuld*’ denotes ‘without guilt’. This is why Nietzsche emphasises that the sufferer only perceives from the point of view of the aggressor - i.e. the accuser - in a vicarious fashion... and not as the culprit, or victim for that matter. Assuming that accusation is synonymous with blame, can the sufferer blame himself by judging the things within his control without immediately feeling guilty? If that is the case, as Nietzsche intimates, for how long? By *suspending judgement*, the sufferer avoids the psychical pain accompanied by feelings of guilt, thus sparing the sufferer - at least temporarily - of its tension. By *suspending judgement* I mean refraining from evaluation and making judgements *in toto*, or at least (conscientiously) not assenting to any evaluation or judgement that may enter consciousness.

The above suggests that Nietzsche, even in his early works, was - at least to a small degree - aware of the vulnerability that endurance (*withstanding* toleration) renders us liable to. Admittedly, the previous chapter mentioned that Sellars portrayed Epictetus and Nietzsche as Cosmic Stoics. Why then are they portrayed here as Human Stoics? The reason for that, I would argue, is that Nietzsche depicted the progression of the sufferer as an amateur Stoic maturing<sup>104</sup>, along with the concomitant transformations of his judgements and affects. This consideration becomes important for a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance insofar as the Cosmic Stoic implements a different form of toleration. Support for the claim will be provided in the next section which will primarily focus on the second part of aphorism ~114.

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<sup>104</sup> However, one should take note that later Nietzsche did not think that the sufferer was maturing toward Cosmic Stoicism, but rather maturing beyond Stoicism (see below).

With regards to Epictetus there are clear indications in his works - written down by his student Arrian of Nicomedia - that he shunned any form of affect remotely similar to anger, even contempt (1944: I.18.6-11). In a passage entitled *Don't be Angry with Wrongdoers*, Epictetus - somewhat facetiously I assume - provided his argument against pity per se: even the vice of pity is preferable to contempt when attributing judgements towards wrongdoers, i.e. those who commit injustices (ibid.). Although Epictetus does not explicitly formulate a concept of tolerance, he does provide a sufficient perspective on tolerance<sup>105</sup> (*anochís*) in order to formulate one from his Stoic doctrines (see Fiala 2003: 156-157). Epictetus does use endure(ance) (*karteros* - *karteria*) in the first sense and in the second as identified in the previous chapter (see 1944: I.2.32 & II.16.12-14). However, the way in which he instantiates the second sense is similar to the way in which he uses tolerance (*anochís*) (1944: I.6.38-42 & 1983: 10, 20). A subtle difference can be drawn: endurance in the second sense is used more often in relation to harsh conditions (*fate*), whereas tolerance is used in relation to overcoming our own passions, others' "abusive" or negative opinions of us and grappling with the pain it entails (1944: IV.1.141 & 1983: 30). However, Epictetus also uses these terms interchangeably at times. Both of these subtle distinctions will be subsumed under the rubric of *em-bracing* toleration. *Em-bracing* toleration is firstly chosen to distinguish it from *withstanding* toleration. Secondly, the term *em-bracing* denotes 'welcoming' akin to what the cosmic perspective entails; the '*brace*' part of the word denotes 'readying and preparing oneself by becoming steadfast towards something unpleasant or painful'. That is to say *em-bracing* pertains to bracing oneself for something unpleasant or painful by welcoming it.

One aspect is clear in Epictetus' remaining works: when he speaks of tolerance and endurance, the predominant credo is that one should *suspend judgement* and assume a cosmic perspective<sup>106</sup>. That is to say during toleration we should adopt a

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<sup>105</sup> See Liddle and Scott (1983: s.v. 'ἀνοχή'). *Anochís* in particular denotes 'a holding back, stopping, esp. of hostilities' or 'long-suffering, forbearance' (ibid.).

<sup>106</sup> See (Epictetus 1944: II.19.26 & IV.7.20 & Fragments.20 & 1983: 8, 20 & 30). See also Sellars' outline of Epictetus' Cosmic perspective (2006: 164-165).

state of *apatheia* without *eupatheia* and the accompanying judgements; i.e. indifference in the second sense - where any indifferent is concerned. [MOVE ->] Nevertheless, in the passage on anger, Epictetus does state that one can have contempt for oneself - for example when one is tempted to assign 'good' or 'bad' to indifferents - insofar as it is directed at that which is within our control (1944: I.18.12). This may be one of the reasons why Nietzsche, when speaking from the sufferer's perspective in his early writings, promptly redirects his contempt to himself. Nietzsche articulates the sufferer's temptation to resort to the passions - which is based on considering external objects 'good' or 'bad', as exemplified in one's 'desperate defence against pessimism' (1997: ~114). However, this aspect of Epictetus' thought<sup>107</sup> can still be considered forming part of Human Stoicism, particularly *withstanding* toleration - insofar as it entails *apatheia* with *eupatheia*.

#### IV: From *withstanding* toleration to *em-bracing* toleration. Nietzsche's Stoic progression and beyond.

Later in aphorism ~114 Nietzsche reveals a twist in the narrative of the sufferer. To quote him:

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<sup>107</sup> With regards to Epictetus one has to bear in mind that he never brought ink to paper. Similar to Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic, both of whom he venerated, he only imparted his wisdom via oral teaching. The proficiency of his pupils ranged quite widely, for which he prepared different "modes" of philosophical discourse (1944: III.23.33). As part of his pedagogy Epictetus first gauged the aptitude of his pupil(s) in order to determine from where he should start. Although he did not distinguish between Human and Cosmic Stoicism, it is likely that some advice given – for example having contempt for oneself when tempted to resort to the passions – would not be necessary for the more advanced Stoic. It would not be necessary, not because of the complete absence of temptation as regards the wise man (the Stoic ideal), but rather that the advanced Stoic has already learned to be indifferent – in the second sense - to such thoughts without having to reprove himself by means of *eupathe* such as contempt. Hence the advice given by Epictetus regarding contempt may only have been conceptual scaffolding to get the amateur Stoic into the habit of only focusing upon the things within his control. Afterwards the scaffolding can be removed if the aforementioned has been mastered. Such an interpretation fits the progression perspective on Human and Cosmic Stoicism, in addition to explaining why Epictetus at times seems to provide advice that appears more akin to Human Stoicism. Section 5 of the Handbook explains this clearly: "So when we are frustrated, angry or unhappy, never hold anyone except ourselves – that is, our judgements – accountable. An ignorant person is inclined to blame others for his own misfortune. To blame oneself is proof of progress. But the wise man never has to blame another or himself" (Epictetus 1983: 5).

We experience downright convulsions of arrogance (*Hochmuth*). - And then there comes the first glimmering of relief, of convalescence (*Genesung*) - and almost the first effect is that we fend off the dominance (*Übermacht*) of this arrogance: we call ourselves vain and foolish to have felt it - as though we had experienced something out of the ordinary! We humiliate our almighty pride (*allmächtigen Stolz*), which has enabled us to endure our pain (*Schmerz ertragen*), without gratitude, and vehemently long for (*verlangen heftig*) an antidote to it: we want to become estranged from ourself and depersonalised, after pain has for too long and too forcibly made us *personal*. 'Away, away with this pride!' we cry, it was only one more sickness (*Krankheit*) and convulsion! We gaze again at man and Nature - now with a more longing (*verlangenderem*) eye: we recall with a sorrowful (*wehmüthig*) smile that we now know something new and different about them, that a veil has fallen - but we find it so refreshing again to see life in a subdued light and to emerge out of the terrible sobering brightness in which as sufferers we formerly saw things and saw through things. (Nietzsche 1997: ~114).

In the first part of this extract Nietzsche tells his readers about how the sufferer - now exchanged for the pronoun 'we'<sup>108</sup> - comes to conceive of his arrogance (*Hochmuth*) as something to be fended off soon after its own analgesic effect kicks in (*ibid.*). One interpretation reads that this arrogance is the overweening pride that stems from the pleasurable 'feeling of power' which the vicarious substitution for the dominant position affords the sufferer.

Another plausible interpretation reads that certain judgements accompanying contempt would result in pride (*Stolz*): when contrasting ancient aristocratic contempt with slavish (impassioned) resentment, Nietzsche explicitly notes in *GM* that the

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<sup>108</sup> The use of 'we' in Nietzsche's writing has been a much debated topic. One interpretation is that Nietzsche is using the royal 'we' to refer to himself, or 'we' here pertains to like-minded individuals such as himself. In this passage both senses can be applicable since – as argued - Nietzsche did aspire to the virtue of endurance.

“affect of contempt” entails “looking down from a superior height” (2007: I, 10). In the following section he mentions how these ancient aristocrats took pride (*Stolz*) in their “indifference to and contempt for security, body, life, comfort” which entails a “hair-raising (*entsetzliche*) cheerfulness and profound joy in all destruction”; even their own (2007: I, 11).

This interplay between arrogance (*Hochmuth*) and pride (*Stolz*) Nietzsche outlines, provided the Stoic influence, bespeaks of the sufferer becoming cognisant of teetering on the threshold between *eupathe* and passion. Adopted from Diogenes the Cynic, the Stoics also distinguished between the *eupathe* of pride and the passion of arrogance (see Laërtius 1925: 133). As the intensity of pain increases on the one hand as a result of the intensity of the affect itself, and on the other hand the analgesic effect (and presumably also other physiological functions pertaining to regeneration) reaching the point of experienced convalescence, the shrewd sufferer realises that the ‘pride’ he was feeling along with its accompanying judgements is just another sickness (*Krankheit*) or disturbance more accurately referred to as arrogance.

Nietzsche explicitly mentions here - although he does not use the word ‘tolerance’ (*Toleranz*) - that this ‘arrogance’, including contempt and its accompanying judgements, is what aided the sufferer in *withstandingly* tolerating his pain. Three possible *perspectives* can be identified as to why this pride is overweening in the particular case of the sufferer: the first is that it has already fulfilled its function, i.e. it has already alleviated the pain to an adequate extent. The second is that the painful cruelty by means of self-directed contempt and its accompanying judgements has become too ‘personal’. That is to say, the sufferer further wishes to estrange himself from the escalating psychical pain that is entailed in the vicarious pride felt by holding himself in contempt. Since the sufferer is both the accuser and the accused, maintaining only the perspective of the accuser becomes more burdensome over time as the tension increases and the conscious awareness of his own ‘personal’ shortcomings - and the potential responsibility that goes along with it - concentrates. Thirdly, the sufferer perceptively realises that there is nothing special about experiencing pain as to warrant any pride whatsoever (after its overcoming by

means of *withstanding* toleration). In other words, the sufferer perceptively realises that the experience of physical pain and its overcoming by means of affects like contempt and pride is not a rare or rarefied phenomenon, nor is it an extraordinary feat; at least for the (mature) Stoic. Fourthly, and perhaps most plausibly from a Stoic *perspective*, the sufferer may have realised that his 'pride' is accompanied by judgements that have attributed a good to indifferents; for example the attribution that suffering (or self-cruelty) is good.

As a result of these realisations, it dawns on the sufferer that he now is confronted by a similar sickness; the passion of arrogance similar to the passion *tuphos* that Diogenes the Cynic was criticising. By staving off the physical pain by means of contempt, the same problem re-emerged; only this time psychically (alluding to the pain and disturbance of the *soul*). *Withstanding* toleration proves at times inadequate to deal with the sufferer's suffering inasmuch as it allows for the *eupatheia* which may, as in the case of this example, only exacerbate the extent towards which we suffer, rendering one more vulnerable to the passions. Beyond *withstanding* toleration, the task becomes one of grappling with this suffering in a less personal way, i.e. not taking it personally, not engaging in self-contempt (*despectio sui*) without resorting to yet another analgesic in the form of judgement and affect (see Nietzsche 2007: II, 8-10 & III, 18). Such realisations and the prospective tasks it reveals in turn bespeaks of a refinement of the value (or virtue) of tolerance.

Nietzsche provides his readers with a clue regarding how to proceed. He uses the verb 'to long for' (*verlangen*) and later he personifies the eye of the sufferer as 'longing' (*verlangenderen*). In this context, 'to long for' connotes an earnest wish. This wish is directed at the alleviation of the psychical pain engendered by self-cruelty. Nevertheless, the sufferer knows now that he cannot resort to affects and their accompanying judgements since that is what engenders the psychical tension and pain.

Instead, the sufferer gazes wishfully at both man and Nature - alluding here to the conceptual boundary between the two - in light of this new insight. In the same sentence, Nietzsche mentions that a veil has fallen. This veil represents the rigid boundary conceptually drawn between man and man, man and Nature. Or perhaps



better phrased: between the human being and other beings, between the human being and Nature.

Without the veil the tension within one's *soul* - on each side of the boundary - subsides. In turn the psychological pain allays. However, this can only be accomplished - somewhat paradoxically one might add - by *suspending judgement* and its accompanying affects. The reason for this is that judgements and their accompanying affects are themselves a source of tension. During bouts of 'intense physical suffering' or (as Nietzsche phrased it in *GM*) when the *protective instincts of a degenerating life*<sup>109</sup> set in, it behoves the sufferer to (voluntarily) *suspend his judgements* and thereby spare himself the psychological pain engendered by the tense judgements; even including those accompanied by *eupatheia*. In turn, the sufferer perceives life in a 'subdued light'; i.e. one without (assenting to any) judgement<sup>110</sup> (see Nietzsche 2007: III, 13).

A few ostensible objections can be raised against the interpretation given above. Firstly, Nietzsche mentions not one, but two affects that accompany the new gaze with which the sufferer perceives man and Nature. Firstly, there is 'longing' (*Verlangen*) that pertains to the *eupatheia* 'wish'. Secondly, Nietzsche mentions 'sorrowful' (*wehmüthig*), deriving from 'sorrow' or 'grief'. Regarding the first, Nietzsche's articulation echoes Epictetus' cosmic perspective<sup>111</sup>; "my wish is always for what actually comes to pass" (1944: IV.7.20). If the sufferer gazes at man and Nature with a longing eye instead of a contemptuous one, the sufferer wills exactly

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<sup>109</sup> This concept will be considered in more detail in the next chapter, as these instincts are also evaluated as playing a significant role with regards to *ressentiment* and the *ascetic ideal* by Nietzsche. Suffice it to say for now that these instincts conservatively function so as to "prevent further injury" in line with self-preservation (Nietzsche 2007: III, 13)

<sup>110</sup> What is subdued is precisely judgment as such, due to a psychological 'hemming in capacity' (*Hemmungsvermögen*) for - what Nietzsche in his later writings called - *forgetting* (*Vergesslichkeit*) (2007: II, 1). What is important to note is the subtle distinction here between *suppression* (*Unterdrückung*) and *forgetting*: whereas *suppression* entails a forceful expulsion of judgements or evaluations from consciousness, *forgetting* entails *em-bracing* or *affirming* the judgement whilst refraining from *assenting to* it (see Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: s.v. 'suppression').

<sup>111</sup> In the *Handbook* Epictetus reiterates this sentiment: "Do not seek events to happen as you want, but want events as they happen, and your life will flow well" (1983: 8).

that which is currently happening to him. There is no tension any more between himself and Nature; *que será, será*. Judgement as such is not necessary any more to make it so.

The term 'wish' from both Epictetus and Nietzsche above is misleading inasmuch as it can also pertain to *eupathe*. As Ure asserts however - whilst borrowing from Epictetus - the cosmic perspective is exactly "taking up a Stoic perspective of indifference, or a refusal to judge all that comes to pass" (2009: 78). Furthermore, in a similar passage, Epictetus swaps the word 'wish' for the word 'will' (*prohairesis*) when he teaches that one must be "learning to will that things should happen as they do" (1944: I.12.15)<sup>112</sup>. Based on Epictetus' pedagogy (see footnote above), the possibility remains that the sufferer - who for the first time progresses from Human Stoic to Cosmic Stoic - initially passes a wishful judgement in order to shift his perspective to a *cosmic* one. Nevertheless, during a cosmic perspective no judgement is possible; *apatheia* without *eupatheia* - indifference in the second sense.

The second objection is more difficult to address, since sorrow as a form of grief or distress has no corresponding *eupathe*<sup>113</sup>. However, in the line of thought I am pursuing, the sorrow experienced by the sufferer is a form of *catharsis*. Although this concept allows for a variety of interpretations, the one most relevant to Nietzsche's example is *catharsis* as purgation. According to Lucas, *catharsis* in this context features as a psychical process whereby "the human *soul*... is purged of its excessive passions (*pathemátôn kátharsin*)." (1923: 24 'italics added'). Adopted from Aristotle, the concept was originally used in medicine to denote the evacuation of waste matter such as menstrual blood (ibid.). However in *Poetics*, he extrapolated from the application of *catharsis* to matters of the *soul* or psyche. Adding to the

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<sup>112</sup> See also (Epictetus 1944: I.12.17)

<sup>113</sup> John Cooper, a contemporary scholar on Stoicism, formulates a robust argument on the inclusion of a corresponding *eupathe* to the *pathe* of grief/distress; namely wistful regret (see Cooper 2005: 194-195). Due to the limitations of scope, this point will not be elaborated upon. Suffice it to say that such a *eupathe* may contribute to one's *eudaimonia*. Even so, the problem above remains as the sufferer cannot have recourse to a *eupathe* during a cosmic perspective.

problem is that Aristotle's concept of *catharsis* seemingly does not correspond with both the Stoics and Nietzsche's early writings particularly with *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Unfortunately a detailed analysis of the *catharsis* would take this dissertation too far afield. Suffice it to say that the possibility remains that passions such as arrogance and *eupathe* such as contempt (and their accompanying judgements) can be purged by means of *catharsis*. Such purgation entails a sudden release of the tension which accompanied these passions. The release in turn elicits a counterpoising affect, experienced for example as grief or sorrow, whereby their accompanying judgements - now conscious - are not *assented to*<sup>114</sup>.

Applying the above to Nietzsche's passage on the sufferer, the sufferer realises that the 'arrogance' or 'vanity' that he experiences is just 'one more sickness' or *pathe*; i.e. just another passion. This insight, realisation or 'new knowledge' elicits a wish for an antidote to his arrogance. The *suspension of judgement* leads to the diminishing of its accompanying affects, and with it, an abrupt release of psychical tension. What is vain has now been purged. That is to say, *catharsis* has taken place. The *catharsis* according to my interpretation facilitated the 'falling of the veil', i.e. the rigid boundary between 'man and Nature'. All that is left is sorrow, which the sufferer now *feels without assent*.

All in all, the above amounts to the cosmic perspective through which the sufferer now wishfully gazes. Without judgement, all that remains is willing that which comes to pass. Conversely physical suffering, viewed from a cosmic perspective, does not vanish. Epictetus adds a mitigating consideration: one cannot be harmed (1983: 1, 20 & 48). Nevertheless, Epictetus is only referring to psychical harm (disturbance(s) of the *soul*), and not physical harm. Physical pain may still be present; however, since it is considered *beyond our control* - our bodies are also considered *indifferents*

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<sup>114</sup> What Seneca draws upon to make this argument is what Margaret Graver calls 'feelings without assent'. This term 'feelings without assent' (*propathēiai*) is commonplace in Stoicism, to the point where Graver calls it "textbook Stoicism" (2007: 85-101). The logic of *feeling without assent* derives from the notion that the affects and their accompanying judgements are *within one's control*. Such *control* allows one not to choose which affects and judgements enter consciousness for example, but rather allows one the choice of whether one *assents* to them or not after having entered consciousness.

- we need not concern ourselves with it (with respect to judgement) when assuming a cosmic perspective. The only remaining concern we have is sustaining our will for it, besides all else that transpires. From within a cosmic perspective, *em-bracing toleration* becomes the operative procedure provided the experience of (intense) physical pain.

The high value of tolerance, similar to aspects of virtue qua excellence, with respect to *em-bracing toleration* lies in the difficulty of sustaining such an indifferent disposition - in the second sense - to one's pain and suffering. In his later works in which he expands on his version of the cosmic perspective (*amor fati*), Nietzsche claims that the (instinctual) inclination of the 'human animal' is quite contrary to such an indifferent disposition (see 1989: 'Why I Am So Wise', 6). The inclination is rather bent towards it resorting to 'great affects' inasmuch as they serve as an analgesic. An indifferent disposition is so difficult that Nietzsche devised a thought experiment in order to facilitate the shift in *perspective*.

This cosmic perspective features in Nietzsche's later works in those instances where he develops the concepts of eternal recurrence and *amor fati*. In an unpublished note written in autumn 1881 Nietzsche associates *amor fati* with Epictetus (1999: 9:15[55]). The doctrine of eternal recurrence had already been espoused by the ancient Stoics. Nietzsche speculates that this doctrine may have already been conceived of by Heraclitus (1989: "The Birth of Tragedy", 3). The Stoic rendition of the doctrine of eternal recurrence forms part of their cosmology and metaphysics insofar as they believed that the cosmos - or universe - was initially comprised only of fire, whereupon it eventually condensed into matter. However, the universe will ultimately return to its original form and repeat itself eternally; in exactly the same order as the first. In other words the Stoic believes that he (or she) will be born, live exactly the same life and die *ad infinitum*.

In his last early work, *The Gay Science (GS)*, Nietzsche asks his readers to imagine a scene wherein a demon whispers the notion of eternal recurrence into their ears. Such a thought, he avers, would either "transform" or "crush" one, depending on whether one would say yes or no respectively to living the same life over and over (1974: ~341). However, the belief that the universe in fact eternally recurs is not

relevant to Nietzsche's renewed use of the concept (Ure 2009: 74). Nietzsche adduces eternal recurrence as a thought experiment<sup>115</sup> whereby one might "transform [his or her] way of being, living and seeing" (ibid. 'brackets added'). That is to say, the thought experiment facilitates a radical yet curative shift in *perspective*. Upon replying in the affirmative, this thought experiment according to my interpretation ensures that the sufferer does not *assent to* the judgements accompanied by sorrow, thereby sparing the sufferer from the passion of distress or regret.

According to Hadot, the Stoics considered physics - etymologically related to the Greek '*phusis*'<sup>116</sup> denoting 'Nature' - as part of their ethical application of the cosmic perspective (2004: 136). The reverence of physics, conceived as the rational laws of Nature which govern the occurrence of events, entails for the Stoic "a spiritual exercise [that] leads the philosopher to give loving consent to the events which have been willed by that reason which is immanent in the cosmos" (ibid.). Inspired by the Stoics, Nietzsche likewise conceives of *amor fati* in this oft-quoted passage: "My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be other than it is; not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity. Not merely to endure (*ertragen*) that which happens of necessity... but to love it" (1989: "Why I Am So Clever", 10). Admittedly, his conception does indeed bear a striking resemblance to Epictetus' cosmic perspective; wishing or more accurately willing for what comes to pass. In light of this aphorism I maintain that Nietzsche here is alluding to the distinction between *withstanding* toleration and *em-bracing* toleration. Insofar as the sufferer's contempt has been described as part of enduring pain, *withstanding* toleration is operative. Conversely, shift one's *perspective* to 'love' for that which happens of necessity - i.e. *fate* - precisely implies dissolution of the boundary between 'man and Nature'; that is to say willing that which comes to pass without judgement or without *assenting to* any judgement. Provided Nietzsche's assumption

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<sup>115</sup> For further reading on critical comparisons between Nietzsche's notions of eternal recurrence and *amor fati* with Stoicism see (Hadot 2004: 198).

<sup>116</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'φύσις').

that grappling with pain is involved, such a shift in *perspective* amounts to crossing over from *withstanding* toleration to *em-bracing* toleration. Despite not grappling with pain by means of ‘great affects’ like contempt, *em-bracing* toleration nevertheless grapples with pain inasmuch as it precludes augmenting the possible and painful tension that these affects and their accompanying judgments entail. The difficulty (and excellence) lies here not in overcoming physical pain by means of ‘great affects’, but refraining from *assenting to* any possible judgement that may enter consciousness - for one is not *in control of* which judgements enter consciousness - whilst willing the physical pain that *fate* has engendered. This willing is what Nietzsche means when he talks of life-affirmation; saying ‘Yes!’ to the vicissitudes *fate* and contingency in general (1974: ~276). In light of Nietzsche’s *amor fati*, I conjecture that *em-bracing* toleration does correspond to a Nietzschean *valuation* subsumed under the value of tolerance. However, before I can conclude such a stance, Nietzsche’s later criticisms of Stoicism must first be addressed.

In *GS* where the first (published) articulation of *amor fati*<sup>117</sup> occurs, Nietzsche had already begun to voice his misgivings about Stoicism; in the form of mordant criticisms (1974: 12, 306 & 326). While still inspired by the Stoics in much of his thought, his unpublished notes suggest that even prior to the writing of *GS*, roughly 1881, his affinity with Stoicism was loosening (1999: 9:15[55]). Nietzsche in his articulations became particularly critical of the Stoical project of eradicating the passions, thereby relinquishing his erstwhile support of Stoic *apatheia*. It was not at all a matter of considering such a project impossible to fulfil; rather, Nietzsche’s critical distancing arose from his sense that Stoic *apatheia* did not contribute to what he considered a life well lived; i.e. to the individual’s *flourishing* (Ure 2009: 62 & 72). The renunciation of *apatheia* by Nietzsche is arguably the one of the most important distinctions between his aim of *flourishing* and the ancients’ aim of *eudaimonia*. Nietzsche articulates his criticism of the Stoics’ attempt to rein in the passions in the following terms:

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<sup>117</sup> In an earlier published work *GS* one finds Nietzsche’s first (public) articulation of “*Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: someday I wish to be only a Yes-sayer.” (1974: ~276).

*Soul-doctors and pain.* - All preachers of morals, and all theologians, share one bad habit: they all try to talk people into thinking they are in a very bad way and need some severe, final, radical cure. And since humanity has for centuries far too eagerly lent its ear to these doctrines... so that they are now only too ready to sigh and find nothing good in life and make sad faces together, as if life were really quite hard to *endure (auszuhalten)*... Talk of pain and misfortune always strikes me as *exaggerated (übertrieben)*, as if it were a matter of good manners to exaggerate (*übertreiben*) here while deliberately keeping quiet about the fact that there are innumerable palliatives (*Linderungsmittel*) against pain, such as anaesthetics (*Betäubungen*), or the feverish haste of thoughts, or a restful position of the body, or good and bad memories, intentions, hopes, and many types of pride and sympathy (*Stolz und Mitgefühl*), which have nearly the same effect as anaesthesia (*Anästheticis*) - and at the highest degrees of pain, unconsciousness automatically takes over. We know quite well how to trickle sweets onto our bitternesses, especially onto the soul's (*Seele*) bitternesses... What fantasies about the inner 'miseries' of evil (*bösen*) persons the preachers of morals have concocted! How they have even *lied* to us about the unhappiness (*Unglücke*) of passionate (*leidenschaftliche*) people! Yes, 'lied' is here the proper term: they knew very well about the superabundant happiness of this type of person, but kept a deathly silence about it, since it constituted a refutation of their theory on which happiness (*Glück*) arises only with the annihilation of passion (*Vernichtung der Leidenschaft*) and the silencing of the will!... is our life really so painful and burdensome that it would be advantageous for us to trade it for a fossilised Stoic way of life? Things are *not bad enough (schlecht genug)* for us that they have to be bad for us in the Stoic style (Nietzsche 1974: ~326 'Italics in original translation').

Clearly the preachers of morals to which Nietzsche refers to here are the Stoics insofar as they claim that people who have recourse to the passions are unhappy. Instead of the passions that are exaggerated - from which one should liberate oneself, as Nietzsche remarked in his early writings - the exaggeration now stems from the way in which the Stoics (and other theologies and therapies) present the world: firstly, by overstating the severity of suffering, and secondly, by presuming that those who have succumbed to the passions must be unhappy (understood here as misery or languishment). The overstating of the severity of suffering pertains to *the fundamental character of suffering* outlined earlier. Two further points can be deduced from this: such a presentation of the world implies that the world is much harsher and more uninviting than it really is and that the 'soul-doctor's' palliative is the only effective remedy which can liberate one from suffering (or at least certain forms of it). In so doing, Nietzsche's later writings frame the Stoics as those who deliberately conceal numerous forms of psychological palliatives, which may presumably be effective (and by extrapolation life-affirming).

Among these palliatives are the passions. In his later writings, Nietzsche elaborates on his non-Stoic perspective on analgesic affects: it is not only *eupatheia* that can serve as an analgesic (or anaesthetic) - and by extrapolation the judgements and affects accompanying *withstanding* toleration - but also the passions (*pathe* or *Leidenschaften*) as the Stoics conceived it. This would entail, in one probable interpretation of Nietzsche's passage, the charge that the Stoics deliberately concealed the analgesic qualities of the passions. These concealed analgesic qualities, following Nietzsche's argument here, can also be life-affirming insofar as it can contribute towards one's *flourishing*. The corollary being that the Stoic assertion that *apatheia* is necessary for *flourishing* does not hold. This would partly explain why Nietzsche, in his later writings, claims that the passions (as the Stoic conceived it) may contribute to *flourishing* - or what Nietzsche considers *eudaimonia*. The implications on such a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance would entail that life-affirming toleration accompanied by the passions is possible, which possibly renders this Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance and toleration insufficient. This Nietzschean *valuation* may be insufficient insofar as *withstanding* and *em-bracing* toleration only takes into account affects which are not passions.



As will be elaborated in the next chapter, I do agree with Nietzsche that the Stoics neglected the analgesic effect the passions also offer. Insofar as the passions afford an analgesic effect, toleration accompanied by the passions is also possible. Although I agree, contrary to the Stoics, that toleration accompanied by the passions is possible<sup>118</sup>, I have caveats about Nietzsche's claim that the passions can be life-affirming. To elucidate these caveats, more analysis is required of Nietzsche's criticism of the Stoic philosophy. In the next section, I expound and focus exclusively on Nietzsche's criticism of Stoic ethics. However, as will be made clear, the cornerstone of these caveats hinge upon the epistemological focus of the 'false' judgments which accompany the passions. In other words, the cornerstone of my reservations rest upon how exactly the passions are construed. In the next section I expound Nietzsche's criticism of Stoic metaphysics and epistemology in order to clarify the Nietzsche's subtle albeit still ancient shift in what exactly is considered 'false' about the judgements accompanied by the passions (*Passion* or *Leidenschaft*) - as claimed by Nietzsche himself in *GM*.

In an aphorism appearing in his later writings, Nietzsche puts forward the idea that pleasure and pain (*Lust und Unlust*) are intertwined insofar as "whoever wants as much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the other" (1974: ~12). He then proceeds to criticise the "fossilised" Stoics for diminishing both pain and pleasure in their therapeutic pursuit of diminishing pain by means of extirpating the passions (ibid.). Nietzsche claims - citing Goethe - that if one wishes to "jubilate up to the heavens" one "must also be prepared to 'grief unto death'" (ibid.). In an unpublished note in his later writings, Nietzsche definitively states that such a diminishing of both pain and pleasure leads to *life-denial*<sup>119</sup> insofar as it "eliminates any inclination to excitement" to the point of inaction or "needlessness" (1999: 9:15[55]). Nevertheless Nietzsche's articulations, insofar as he recommends *amor*

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<sup>118</sup> That is to say I argue that impassioned toleration, although possible, cannot be *life-affirming*. If the passions can be resorted to, then the Nietzschean *valuation* espoused must somehow account for a form of toleration which goes beyond *withstanding* and *em-bracing* toleration. This will be done in the next chapter.

<sup>119</sup> In other passages in his later work, Nietzsche often uses the term *nihilism* as the inevitable outcome of *life-denying* values and *valuations* (see Nietzsche 2007: I, 12 & II, 21 & III, 14 & 24).

*fati* both in his early and later works, betray an awareness that leading an impassioned life renders one susceptible to “being tormented by fear, paralyzed by the agonies of grief, disturbed by anger and vengefulness” according to Ure (2009: 73). As an alternative therapy to alleviate these torments, Nietzsche’s later writings continue to offer a version of eternal recurrence and *amor fati* (see above). Thus we can say, in a nutshell, that Nietzsche’s later writings take on board the Stoic therapeutic model insofar it affirms *fate* - i.e. willing what comes to pass. However, contrary to the tenets espoused in Nietzsche’s early writings, Nietzsche above claims that affirming *fate* does not entail a complete eradication of the passions (*apatheia*).

Ure argues that Nietzsche’s later writings fail to move beyond Cosmic Stoicism, particularly with regards to *apatheia*, particularly in relation to the achievement of *amor fati* (ibid.). Ure’s argument focuses primarily on Stoic ethics. In other words, Ure maintains that Nietzsche neglected to see how *amor fati* is contingent upon “achieving a certain kind of indifference”; particularly towards that which we might at other times have considered unjust (Ure: 2009: 74). Ure’s critique of the abandonment of Stoic ethics in Nietzsche’s later writings illuminates those aspects of tolerance that would be suitable within a Nietzschean *valuation*. The enquiry starts with the Stoical notions of eternal recurrence and *amor fati* as they feature in Nietzsche’s later writings.

Nietzsche’s *amor fati* is considered in recent Nietzsche-scholarship as a form of Cosmic Stoicism (see Sellars: 2006 & Ure: 2009). Even in Nietzsche’s early work, the cosmic perspective comes to the fore in his description of the sufferer; this perspective entails the notion of endurance (*withstanding toleration*) tending to what I have termed *em-bracing* toleration in experiencing pain. In his later work, *GM*, Nietzsche adduces the example of the Russian fatalists whom he compliments for “submit[ing] to punishment as one submits to an illness or to a misfortune or to death, with that stout-hearted fatalism without rebellion through which the Russians, for example, still have an advantage over us [contemporary] Westerners in dealing with life” (Nietzsche 2007: II, 15 ‘brackets added’).] At a later stage, Nietzsche’s conception of *amor fati* echoes Epictetus’ Cosmic Stoicism, clearly derived from

Stoic thinking. The question arises as to whether eternal recurrence and *amor fati* can serve as a therapeutic alternative to Stoicism, whilst retaining the passions? More specifically, would implementing *em-bracing* toleration be a viable option for a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance if the passions, as Nietzsche claims here, are endorsed? The answer to this question hinges upon the possible interplay between formulating judgements and *amor fati*.

My analysis here follows Ure's contention that *apatheia* is required at least during *amor fati* and that Nietzsche, in his later writings, did indeed fail to take into account the impossibility of *assenting* to the passions during *amor fati*. If and when, in addition, physical pain is experienced, *em-bracing* toleration cannot entail the passions or their accompanying judgements.

In instances for which Nietzsche affirms *fate*, or *the love of fate*, the boundary between the individual and Nature is dissolved by means of *suspending judgement* - thereby precluding any *eupathe* or passions and the psychical pain engendered; one would align one's will with whatever *fate* holds for one *hic et nunc*. Nietzsche's version of eternal recurrence points towards such an achievement insofar as affirming entails "saying yes to" "every pain and every joy" as though it will be repeated *ad infinitum* (1974: ~341). According to Ure, this can logically be achieved only by assuming a perspective of indifference in the second sense or "a refusal to judge all that comes to pass" (2009: 78). That is to say, grappling with pain during *amor fati* can only be achieved by means of *em-bracing* toleration. Perhaps a few objections will suffice to outline the intricacies of the argument.

"If I am to affirm the repetition of everything, how can I object to something I take to be heinous?" (ibid.). A sharp distinction between affirmation and objection is drawn in this formulation of the question posed by Ure. 'Objection' implies the presence of judgement(s), whereas affirmation does not. The same distinction - albeit with more subtlety - can be drawn between affirmation and endorsement, whereby the latter implies judgement; this time in a more favourable light. Following Ure's argument, an objector may defend the claim that affirmation and objection/endorsement are not necessarily mutually exclusive: affirmation does not revolve around indifference, but rather a revaluation of the pain currently experienced. This revaluation is

underpinned by the doctrine that suffering, in transforming our judgements, is instrumental to “self-enhancement and creativity” (ibid.). ‘Self-enhancement and creativity’ would then contribute to individual *flourishing*. That is to say that eternal recurrence and *amor fati* - and by extension *em-bracing* toleration - would cognitively, entail revaluing one’s own judgements to fit with the aforesaid means rather than *suspending judgement*. The fitting can for example entail that the current pain experienced - and perhaps also suffering - is good instrumentally insofar as it judged as making the sufferer stronger. However, Ure rebuts this interpretation since eternal recurrence and *amor fati* affirm events irrespective of any instrumental good. By extrapolation he also rebuts the notion that pain or suffering is good; be it inherently or instrumentally. His reasoning goes that one must (eventually) even affirm events which have solely undermined one’s *flourishing*; for example a traumatic event such as a car accident that subsequently led to suffering from PTSD. To apply Ure’s thought to this dissertation’s concerns; *em-bracing* toleration within a Nietzschean *valuation* under the rubric of tolerance cannot entail judgement *tout court*.

Another objection Ure addresses, attempts to turn the table on the distinction between affirmation and objection/endorsement of *amor fati* (2009: 79): since affirmation is not objection, one can affirm the practice of slavery, for example, in addition to affirming one’s disapproval of it in the course of *amor fati*. Ure incisively uncovers the contradiction that appears here: “For to want the return of our disapproval of a terrible event is also to want the return of precisely our assessment that made us not want the event to happen even once, let alone again and again” (ibid.). In other words, willing the return of one’s disapproving judgement is akin to the contradictory act of willing the return of event (which incurs the disapproving judgement), whilst simultaneously willing the disapproving judgement that entails *not* willing the return of the event. Moreover, willing the return of one’s judgement(s) of disapproval or objection recalls the associated affective turmoil and psychological pain, which is precisely what the psychological therapy of *amor fati* is supposed to

circumvent<sup>120</sup>; namely 'being tormented by fear, paralyzed by the agonies of grief, disturbed by resentment, anger and vengefulness'.

It is in that sense that I agree with Ure's critique of Nietzsche's later writings: Nietzsche failed to recognise that *amor fati* and the thought experiment of eternal recurrence can only be assumed by means of the indifference afforded by *apatheia*. By inference, *em-bracing* toleration can only be adopted by *suspending any judgement* during experiences of pain. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Nietzsche may still be in favour of the passions in instances which do not warrant a cosmic perspective. This suggests that Nietzsche would want to give free rein to the passions as conceived by the Stoics in instances not covered by *amor fati*. In a later work, Ure also notes this possibility in no unclear terms:

Stoic pantheism and ethics establish the conditions necessary for those who seek refuge in stillness or statue-life immobility to counteract the pain and tumult of the passions. Nietzsche implies that Stoicism *causes* this disease [an irritability at all natural inclinations or drives] by condemning natural inclinations as the product of erroneous judgements... it caters to and creates individuals who are too weak and fearful to live through their passions, and in doing so it eliminates one of the key sources of species' enhancement: the passions (see 2016: 301-304 'brackets added')

In order to verify Nietzsche's express endorsement of the passions, homing in on the ethical distinctions between *eupathe* and the passions may provide some clarification. Where affects are concerned, the Stoic recommends *apatheia with eupatheia*; i.e. judgements that do not hinge upon attaching (absolute) 'goodness' or 'badness' to external objects, but rather affectively consider those objects as

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<sup>120</sup> I use 'circumvent' here – as opposed to resolve - as I do not think that *amor fati* serves as a cure or as a way of resolving or devaluing one's already valued objections (and accompanying affects) concerning certain events. *Amor fati*, according to my reading, only serves to (temporarily) alleviate the symptoms in order to avoid exacerbating the psychical malady or prevent future maladies. For more detail on the notion of resolve, see the next chapter.

indifferents. Such judgements may entail disapproval, objection, approval or endorsement and their accompanying *eupatheia* insofar as the indifferent perceived to engender the pain is either *rejected* or *preferred*. By inference, *withstanding* toleration is adopted by the Stoic during experiences of pain<sup>121</sup>. The corollary here is that Nietzsche, by endorsing the passions is implying that one can attach 'good' or 'bad' to external objects. The question immediately arises: attaching 'good' or 'bad' in what sense; instrumentally or intrinsically? It is clear that Nietzsche would not consider the attribution of an intrinsic good as life-affirming insofar as its unconditional quality appeals to an 'absolute morality'; its circumvention is precisely the reason why Nietzsche in his early works praised the Stoics. Nietzsche in his later works was also scathingly critical of appealing to notions such as intrinsic goodness (see 2002: ~108). This leaves the possibility of Nietzsche advocating the ascription of instrumental goodness or badness to the indifferents.

Nietzsche's stance on the passions in his later work echoes his own advice that one should go 'beyond good and evil' or 'absolute morality' (as his previous work by that title also elaborates on). However, from a meta-ethical *perspective*, he mentions that going beyond good and evil does not necessarily imply that one should go beyond - i.e. renounce - good and bad (2007: I, 17). The good/bad valuation to which Nietzsche is referring pertains to an aristocratic mode of valuation characteristic of the ancients: the ancient Greeks (pre- and post-Socratic up until late antiquity) and the ancient Romans who espoused a virtue ethics (2007: I, 17). In his later writings, Nietzsche outlines what affects and cognitions the good/bad person - i.e. a person espousing the 'good'/bad' *valuation* depicted in *GM* by the *characters* of the blond beast, warrior and nobleman - has towards those whom he considers bad. Here it is important to note that Nietzsche explicitly focuses only on the attribution of 'good'

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<sup>121</sup> This claim comes with a condition that the situation warrants the virtue of tolerance. For example if neutralising that which is perceived to engender the pain is not *befitting* or feasible. See (Forst 2004) for an elaboration on the limits of tolerance/toleration. Take note that the Stoics, similar to Aristotle, did not think that a single virtue is *befitting* for all situations. Sometimes an attempt to *neutralise* the pain by taking action – in particular taking a conative approach instead of a cognitive approach – would contribute most to one's *flourishing*, which does not as a matter of course imply being intolerant. Unfortunately, due to the scope of this thesis the limits of tolerance/toleration will not be analysed in-depth.

and 'bad' in relation to "*character traits*"<sup>122</sup> (2007: I, 5). 'Bad' here is associated with 'low', 'common', 'weak', 'unfortunate', 'wretched', 'miserable' and 'unhappy' (2007: I, 10). The bad is conceived as a "subsequently-invented pale, contrasting image" to what is 'high-minded', 'unconventional', 'strong', 'fortunate', 'gay', 'cheerful' and 'happy'<sup>123</sup> (ibid.).

Although Nietzsche here seems to go beyond Stoic ethics by endorsing attributions of 'good' and 'bad' to particular external objects *beyond one's control* - i.e. other people - he nevertheless ascribes such an ethics to those ancients he seems to ethically distinguish himself from. A close consideration of Epictetus' thought reveals that he does make an exception with regards to the attribution of 'good' or 'bad' to objects not *within our control*; this exception is - perhaps coincidentally - also particular to other people's *characters*.

For the ruling principle (*hêgemonikon*) of a bad person cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances. [E]xamine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether in externals or in the will (*prohairesis*). If in externals, do not name them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or constant, or brave or free: do not name them even human beings, if you have any judgment. (Epictetus 1944: II. 22. 25-27)

Epictetus makes clear that one can attribute 'good' and 'bad' to another person, but only insofar as it is a matter of ascertaining whether the judged person attributes 'good' and 'bad' to externals (indifferents), or to the will (*prohairesis*); that is to say judging a person's *character*. Insofar as one's *character* is able to be developed or cultivated, as virtue ethicists in general aver, 'good' and 'bad' does not imply that such a description pertains to an intrinsic quality of the judged person's *character*. If

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<sup>122</sup> Nietzsche does mention that these ancients to whom he attributes the good/bad *valuation* sometimes ascribed superiority to other traits not relating to *character*, such being 'rich' or a 'possessor' of land. However, he claims that such ascriptions are not relevant to his undertaking in *GM* (ibid.).

<sup>123</sup> The concept of *eudaimonia* comes to mind here.

'good' and 'bad' is attributed in any other way to other people, then such an attribution would betray an impassioned attachment for the Stoics. Nevertheless, this instrumental attribution of 'good' and 'bad' does not as a matter of course prescribe a particular attitude or comportment towards the judged person. The option remains for the Stoic whether he wishes to help those bad persons by means of Stoic therapy (*preference*), or avoid them (*rejection*), or simply be indifferent towards them (*indifference* in the second sense). These options are contingent upon what is most befitting (*kathēkon*) provided what is *within our control* in relation to the circumstance (*praxis*). In general, Epictetus advised his students to either "ignore" those they considered bad or to bring those to him for counselling (1944: I.18.11-12 & I.15.1-8). If Nietzsche is advocating the attribution of an instrumental good in relation to other people, then this does not yet amount to the passions.

In his later writings, Nietzsche focuses on the affect of contempt (*Verachtung*) of the 'good' person pointed to the 'bad', as outlined in the First Essay of *GM*. The cognitive aspect that he associates with contempt is that "of looking down from a superior height" (*ibid.*). In contempt, Nietzsche avers, the image (*Bild*) of the 'bad' person is somewhat distorted or falsified. He further quips that the (resentment stemming from) *ressentiment* coming of the 'bad' person pointed to the 'good' person is even more distorted and falsified. The contempt of the 'good' person entails "too much carelessness (*Nachlässigkeit*), too much taking lightly (*Leicht-Nehmen*), too much looking away (*Wegblicken*) and impatience (*Ungeduld*)" for it to "transform its object [in effigy (*in effigie*)] into a real caricature and monster (*eigentlichen Zerrbild und Scheusal*)" (*ibid.* 'brackets added'). Further on, Nietzsche explicitly uses the word 'indifference' (*Gleichgültigkeit*) to describe these ancients' disposition towards security, body, life and comfort (2007: I, 11). The 'good' person "shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others" by not taking his enemies, accidents and misdeeds seriously for very long (2007: I, 10). He can "endure (*hält aus*)" enemies for whom there is nothing to hold contempt, but much to honour (*ehren*) (*ibid.*). Here Nietzsche is alluding to other 'good' people who may hurt or impede another 'good' person, since these 'good' people do not shy away from active competition and rivalry amongst their peers. If later Nietzsche supports the passions (*Leidenschaft*), as he also ascribes it to these ancient aristocratic men,



then one would be hard-pressed ascertaining it in consideration of the ‘good’ person’s contempt, his indifference towards the ‘bad’, or his endurance (*Aushalten*) (ibid.).

A further line of enquiry reveals that Nietzsche often mentions and supports affects that could be translated as passions. One possibility is indicated in Nietzsche’s description of the good/bad person’s cruelty; more specifically his “terrible cheerfulness and depth of pleasure” (*entsetzliche Heiterkeit und Tiefe der Lust*) when performing cruel deeds (Nietzsche 2007: I, 11). Another possibility is fear (*Furcht*): in *GM*, Nietzsche mentions that one - even the good/bad person - might be justified to fear the *prehistoric warrior* or *blond beast*<sup>124</sup> and by implication, the violent political history of the West. Shortly afterwards, he asks if one would not rather prefer fearing (*fürchten*) whilst simultaneously admiring (*bewundern*)<sup>125</sup> than be repelled by the sight of the “ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned” - i.e. the bad - who “[swarm] in the foreground” today (ibid.).

Conversely, Nietzsche - as he did in *D*<sup>126</sup> - criticises Schopenhauer’s pessimism and focuses on his anger (*Zorn*) directed at sexuality, claiming explicitly that Schopenhauer succumbed to the passions:

Above all, we should not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer, who treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman. that “*instrumentum diaboli*”), needed enemies in order to keep in good spirits; that he loved bilious, black-green words, that he scolded for the sake of scolding, out of passion (*aus Passion*); that

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<sup>124</sup> According to later Nietzsche, the *blond beasts* or *prehistoric warriors* were the pioneers of the good/bad valuation, who – by means of cruelty – founded the state (2007: II, 2-4).

<sup>125</sup> The etymology of ‘fear’ relates to the Old English *fæar* pertaining to ‘calamity, danger’ and *færan* ‘frighten.’ It is also related to Germanic origin with words like ‘*gefahr*’ meaning danger or threat. Interestingly, ‘fear’ also pertains to ‘reverence’ or ‘revere’ from the Latin ‘*revereri*’, ‘re-’ expressing intensive force and ‘*vereri*’ meaning ‘to fear.’ (Stevenson et al. 2011: s.v. ‘fear’ & ‘revere’)

<sup>126</sup> Apart from aphorism ~114 on the sufferer see (Nietzsche 1997: ~561).

he would have become ill (*krank*), become a pessimist... (2007: III, 7)

In this passage wherein Nietzsche criticises the philosopher *character* - exemplified by Schopenhauer - for his *life-denying* dispositions and *valuation*. Although Nietzsche uses the English or more likely the French term for 'passion' - both deriving from the Latin '*passio*' - the context in which he uses it is the exact same sense of 'disturbance' as that which the Stoics used it. Insofar as Nietzsche uses the term as a means of criticism, he seems to endorse the Stoic ethical framework which it implies. In a passage shortly thereafter, Nietzsche criticises the priest *character* for his *life-denying* dispositions and *valuation*:

The ascetic priest is the incarnate desire to be different, to be in a different place, and indeed this desire at its greatest extreme, its distinctive fervour (*Inbrunst*) and passion (*Leidenschaft*); but precisely this power of his desire is the chain that holds him captive... there is no doubt of that - he is *the sick animal (kranke Thier)* (2007: III, 13).

Although Nietzsche here uses the German term for passion (*Leidenschaft*) this time, one gleans a similar sense in which he uses 'passion'; to denote a disturbance. Subsequent passages, wherein Nietzsche criticises the New Testament and modern science also echo similar sentiments from Nietzsche about the passions<sup>127</sup> (see 2007: III, 22-24). "science today has absolutely no belief in itself... where it still inspires passion (*Leidenschaft*), love, ardor, and suffering (*Leiden*) at all, it is not the

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<sup>127</sup> See also the preface where he criticises Schopenhauer for succumbing to the passions (Nietzsche 2007: Preface, 5). One exception in which Nietzsche uses the 'passion' (*Leidenschaft*) in a different context is where he praises the noblemen for being filled with "life and passion" (*Leben und Leidenschaft*). However, Nietzsche's focus on the noblemen pertains to their active life, and therefore happy life. 'Passion' in this sense, I interpret, can be more accurately translated as 'enthusiasm', 'exuberance', 'zest' or 'gusto', since here is no mention of 'illness', 'disturbance' or 'malady' (*Krankheit*). I do think Nietzsche, at least in *GM*, may well be criticised for his ambiguous usage of the concept '*Leidenschaft*'. However, provided Nietzsche's often intentional ambiguous usage of terms, it may well be that Nietzsche sought to distance himself from other associated tenets of Stoicism, which will later be analysed.

opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latest and noblest form of it... the passion of a great faith (*Leidenschaft des grossen Glaubens*) (ibid. III, 23).

Despite the ambiguities in Nietzsche's later writings on 'passion' and affects which might be construed as passions, his predominant usage of 'passion' (*Leidenschaft* or *Passion*) as sickness or disturbance (*Krankheit*), besides his characterisation of the good/bad valuation - of which the Stoics form part - does echo the Stoicism, specifically Stoic ethics, much more so than undermining it. In juxtaposing the aforesaid with the critique of Stoicism that Nietzsche's articulates in his later writings - insofar as it diminishes pleasure and pain and petrifies and 'paralyses' the Stoic to the point of inaction - the possibility remains that the target of Nietzsche's critique is its amateur form; namely Human Stoicism.

Sellars' conception of Human Stoicism corresponds in important respects with the critique of Stoicism articulated by Nietzsche in his later writings. Sellars claims that Human Stoic endurance (*withstanding toleration*) ultimately is "an attitude... of resignation" in the face of a (perceived) hostile external world (2006: 163). Bear in mind that he does qualify this statement by quoting Lipsius that "one should suffer that which one cannot amend" (ibid.).

All in all, the Human Stoic's disposition for Sellars betrays a failure to adequately conciliate (*armonia*) him or herself with the vicissitudes of *fate*. The immense forces of Nature towards which the Human Stoic is hostile eventually become perceived and judged as too overwhelming. As mentioned, the human being is most vulnerable when tolerating - *withstanding toleration* - and feeling contempt for *fate*; especially if the pain is intense. Nietzsche articulated the idea that pain and tension are proportional. As the depiction by Nietzsche of the sufferer suggests, when pain becomes too intense, the analgesic effect of pride or contempt that *withstanding toleration* affords must be augmented to counteract it. However, the augmentation of these 'great affects' also entail an increase of psychical tension which subjects the *soul* to the bitterest pain. Instead of progressing towards adopting a cosmic perspective, the Human Stoic he sustains pride or contempt, rendering him not only liable to the passions, but possibly prone to weariness and inaction. Irrespective of whether the Human Stoic succumbs to the passions, his failure to conciliate himself

with *fate* via a cosmic perspective (*amor fati*), as Nietzsche notes in his later writings, subsequently subjects him to a certain “heaviness and weariness” (1999: 9:15[55]). His weariness in turn diminishes the impetus to action, influencing the Human Stoic to minimise his pains and joys.

If possible, any further undertaking should be avoided so as to not exacerbate his pain. In turn, this avoidance diminishes activity for the Human Stoic, as his aversion toward *fate* accretes. The indifferents become more frequently *rejected* than *preferred*. The Human Stoic successfully avoids the probable pains that accompany the pursuit of one’s ambitions, but at the cost of the probable joys - and wisdom from such experience; not only of its achievement, but also stemming from the activity itself. Finally, the Human Stoic becomes indifferent in the second sense to most externals; seeking only that which would provide him or her comfort and security whilst minimising risk and danger. The Human Stoic’s failure to shift his *perspective* to a *cosmic* one proves to be exhausting and enervating as a result of the additional tension engendered by the *eupathe*. The aforesaid reveals the languishing or unhappiness Nietzsche mentions in *GM* on the inactive life (see 2007: I, 10).

However, one may question at this point the extension of Nietzsche’s criticism of inaction to Stoicism as such; particularly towards the Cosmic Stoics. Although pain and tension are proportional, and although intense suffering (also intense joy) renders us more vulnerable to the passions - including certain passions on which Nietzsche’s later writings cast aspersion<sup>128</sup> - the intensity of an affect, or the intensity of the pleasure or pain accompanied by an affect, is not at all what distinguishes the passions from the *eupatheia* for the Stoics. Claiming that one ought to ‘jubilate up to the heavens’ and ‘grieve unto death’<sup>129</sup> does not as a matter of course imply that one has surpassed the threshold of *eupathe* and is now experiencing passion. The Stoics were emphatic in their insistence that one should not conflate their ethics with

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<sup>128</sup> For example later Nietzsche mentions in *GM* that the ascetic ideal, which is the seat of *ressentiment*, springs forth from the “instincts of a degenerating life” (2007: III, 13). See chapter 3 for my argument, based on Reginster’s elaborations, stipulating that impassioned resentment as a result of *ressentiment* is a passion.

<sup>129</sup> Provided of course that grief is experienced *without assent*, since it has no corresponding *eupathe*.

Aristotle's; especially with his stance on *metriopatheia*. The criterion for passions for the Stoics is ascertained not by its tensive excess or deficiency in relation to a golden mean. Rather, it is the kind of attachments that one makes to external objects by means of judgement or evaluation; even the kind of attachments made to external objects such as people (see above) entail caveats which allow the Stoics to circumvent the passions. In other words: whether or not the affect is 'agitated', 'effusive' or 'excessive' is not contingent upon its intensity - although the intensity can render one more vulnerable to the passions - but rather the kind of *judgements* brought to bear on the affect; whether they attribute 'good' or 'bad' to indifferents, or whether they render one's *eudaimonia* liable to things *beyond one's control*.

In contrast to Nietzsche's critique Stoic philosophy in general - particularly Stoic ethics - as a *life-denying* philosophy insofar as it leads to inactivity and passivity, Stoicism is predominantly a practical philosophy (Laërtius 1925: 231). The emphasis of Stoic philosophy amongst almost all of the Stoics is practice, action and practical wisdom (*praxis*)<sup>130</sup> (ibid.). The affects were primarily considered an assent to an impulse towards - or as a result of - action. Sorabji puts it thus: "[t]hey [the Stoics] say that what stirs impulse<sup>131</sup> (*hormē*) is nothing other than a motivating (*hormētikē*) appearance of what is of itself appropriate (*kathēkontos*)" (Sorabji 2000: 33 'brackets added'). If these affects, particularly those considered in relation to action, along with their accompanying judgements, were primarily implemented in order to absolve one from taking responsibility for one's own survival, the corresponding disposition would likely be viewed as is one of cowardice. The 'petrified', 'stone-like' and 'statue-like' Stoic of impassive inaction whom Nietzsche criticises in his later writings, turns out to be either a straw man, or an amateur Stoic, or a field of Stoicism other than ethics.

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<sup>130</sup> Laërtius comments of Zeno thus: "For if a man be possessed of virtue, he is at once able to discover and to put into practice what he ought to do. Now such rules of conduct comprise rules for choosing, enduring (*karteria*), staying, and distributing; so that if a man does some things by intelligent choice, some things with fortitude, some things by way of just distribution, and some steadily, he is at once wise, courageous, just and temperate" (1925: 231).

<sup>131</sup> See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. "Ὀρμή"). The Latin translations '*impetu*', '*motivus*' and the word for emotion '*emovere*' also share the same root, which implies 'movement' (Lewis & Short 1879: s.v. '*impetu*', '*motivus*' & '*emovere*').

The implications for life-affirming toleration are that *withstanding* toleration alone cannot be sufficient for *flourishing* within an encompassing Nietzschean *valuation* regarding the value of tolerance. At certain times, *em-bracing* toleration must be implemented. Secondly, life-affirming tolerance is contingent upon the kind of judgements one *assents to* during toleration and by extrapolation the *normatively dependent* values, more so than it rests upon whether or not one is in fact tolerating. Another corollary here is that a person espousing the value of tolerance in accordance with a life-affirming Nietzschean *valuation* would not simply surrender to every misfortune that *fate* engenders by only tolerating it, depending on the circumstance and what is deemed befitting, such a person would also consider other values which may be rather espoused (provided that it is within his or her control). Sometimes, rather than implementing toleration and acting cognitively, other conative actions which discharge the affects *externally* (for example walking away from or counteracting that which engenders pain) can also be viable.

Nietzsche's critique reveals another potential pitfall within the (Cosmic) Stoic philosophy. If one wishes to always live according to Nature - and to do so entails being utterly indifferent - one should at least try to - permanently assume a cosmic perspective at the expense taking any judgement or action whatsoever. This (radical) perspective on Cosmic Stoicism would undermine other tenets of Stoicism, for example the emphasis on action; and also the entire rationale for *eupathe*. Being utterly indifferent in the second sense cannot be the ultimate *telos* of Stoic philosophy, nor can it be the aim for Nietzsche's own concept of *amor fati* insofar as it entails a cosmic perspective. That is, if Nietzsche's first conception of *amor fati* stating "[a]nd all in all and on the whole: someday I wish to be *only* a Yes-sayer" is to be taken as broadly as it seems to suggest, then it implies permanent indifference (1974: ~276 'emphasis added'). The dissolution of this self-defeating paradox must lie in the adoption of a cosmic perspective as a temporary psychological therapeutic strategy in a state of vulnerability to disturbance (*Krankheit*) (including pity and *ressentiment*), or with respect to the past over which one has no control. In Nietzsche's words, one should only assume a cosmic perspective as a life-affirming response to the *protective instincts of a degenerating life*, instead of resorting to pity, *ressentiment* and the *ascetic ideal* governing it (2007: III, 13).

For a general theory of tolerance this implies that *em-bracing* toleration can also not be the only feasible (or life-affirming) form of toleration. If (conscious) judgement is necessary at times, as it appears to be for the human animal, then the *eupatheia* are necessary (possibly in addition to the passions as the Stoics conceived it from an epistemological perspective). Nietzsche's earlier notion of endurance (*Ertragen*), *withstanding* toleration, also comes into consideration, provided that the judgement ensures *eupathe*. Another possibility is afforded by *withstanding* toleration; evaluating those who are tolerated. Any theory of tolerance, even within a Nietzschean *valuation*, must allow for evaluations of what or who is tolerated: it may not only be prudent to engage in evaluation (at times) for the tolerator in terms of facilitating survival and *flourishing* - to assess potentially life-threatening situations, but also for the tolerated entity; i.e. the uncongenial entity.

At this point a recapitulation all the major points addressed in this section is warranted. The *amor fati* of Nietzsche's later writings logically presupposes the following: Stoic *apatheia* and *em-bracing* toleration during the experience of pain; his endorsement of the good/bad valuation - in line with Stoic thought particularly regarding the affect of contempt and endurance (or what I have called *withstanding toleration*); his explicit and predominant use of 'passion' qua disturbance in his later works in order to criticise those who appear to have *life-denying* dispositions; his criticism of the intensity of an affect being a determining factor as to whether the affect is a passion; his criticism of Stoicism leading to inactivity and *life-denial*.

In light of the above analysis, I conclude that later Nietzsche was in fact not moving beyond Stoic ethics in particular. The corollary being that toleration accompanied by the passions<sup>132</sup>, if it can be called toleration at all<sup>133</sup>, would be a *life-denying* form of toleration which the value of tolerance within the Nietzschean *valuation* I am *carving*

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<sup>132</sup> See the next chapter for an in-depth analysis of toleration accompanied by the passions.

<sup>133</sup> The ancients writing on tolerance, like Cicero, maintained that 'toleration' accompanied by passions is not toleration at all, but rather misery (see 2004: V.32.95 & 2005: 59). Conversely, Nietzsche may have astutely pointed out that the Stoics have (either wittingly or unwittingly) neglected the analgesic effect of 'great affects', which is plausibly also the case with the passions. The possibility of impassioned toleration will be explored in the next chapter.

out cannot endorse. Both *withstanding* and *cosmic* toleration, originally conceived by the Stoics (albeit under different names), correspond with Nietzsche's early and later articulations - relating to the issue of grappling with pain. Nietzsche's endorsement of grief can be explained by the Stoic notion of *feeling without assent*<sup>134</sup>, in spite of its probable intensity. The Stoic emphasis on *praxis* undermines Nietzsche's claim that the (entirely possible) eradication of the passions would amount to an inactive and *life-denying* life. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's criticism still applies to the amateur Human Stoic insofar as he becomes exhausted and enervated from the tension of the *eupathe* being constantly resorted to.

Insofar as the ethical considerations of the passions are concerned, it seems that plausible counterarguments can be made to the various veins of Nietzsche's rebuttal of eradicating the passions - i.e. *apatheia* - as necessary for *flourishing*; with the criterion here that the construal of 'passion' is conceived by the Stoics. Nietzsche's own ambiguous use of the term 'passion' in *GM* also seems to suggest that Nietzsche has not completely distanced himself from the value of criticising others for succumbing to the passions; or at least a particular *life-denying* version of it. If Nietzsche has in fact distanced himself from the task of eradicating the passions (*apatheia*), which has acute implications for a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance and toleration, then other possible avenues must be resorted to; if only briefly.

In the following section the focus shifts slightly more to tolerance than toleration. The Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance and toleration I am *carving out* has as of yet predominantly focused on the axiological, psychological and ethical aspects. However, in order to provide a sufficient framework for the value of tolerance, the emphasis shifts to other fields of Stoicism - particularly metaphysics and epistemology - which I maintain cannot be included within a Nietzschean *valuation*. Such a brief shift will also serve to clarify why Nietzsche in his later works - aside from his misgivings about Stoic ethics and his seeming application of Stoic ethics in *GM* - was so adamant to disassociate himself from Stoicism, in addition to providing

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<sup>134</sup> The next section and the following chapter clarify in more detail how Nietzsche himself endorses the application of *feeling without assent*.



a coherent springboard for the critical comparison between tolerance, toleration, resentment and *ressentiment* in the next chapter.

## V: Beyond Stoicism: Nietzsche's dose of Scepticism.

This section examines point by point the metaphysical, teleological and epistemological tenets of Stoicism which underpin Stoic ethics and proceeds to *carve out* those which do not correspond with a Nietzschean valuation. To reiterate, the *carving out* process selectively and incisively incorporates the ancient conceptions of tolerance and toleration discussed in the previous chapter - by analysing their metaphysical, epistemological and in particular ethical underpinnings - within a Nietzschean *valuation*. In this particular section, the *carving out* process will entail mostly tenets and conceptions which will be jettisoned as it does not cohere with a Nietzschean *valuation*. Particular emphasis will be placed and great care will be taken to only regard tenets relevant to tolerance and the upshots that such *carving* might have on its conception.

Ancient Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius advocate a cosmic perspective - and adopt *em-bracing toleration* modelled on responses to the experience of pain - to the extent of being in accordance with Nature. That is to say, adopting a cosmic perspective would be the most rational and *befitting* thing to do, since it is in harmony with the necessarily and providentially ordered Cosmos.

In *BGE*, worth quoting at length here, Nietzsche most pertinently addresses his criticism of the Stoic conception of Nature as providentially ordered:

So you want to live "according to Nature?" Oh, you noble (*edle*) Stoics, what a fraud (*Betrügerei*) is in this phrase! Imagine something like Nature, profligate without measure, indifferent (*gleichgültig*) without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference (*Indifferenz*) itself as power (*Macht*) - how could you live according to this indifference? Living - isn't that wanting specifically to be something other than this Nature? Isn't living

evaluating, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different (*Anders-sein-wollen*)? And assuming your imperative to “live according to Nature” basically amounts to “living according to life” - well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be? - But in fact, something quite different is going on: while pretending (*vorgebt*) with delight (*entzückt*) to read the canon of your law in Nature, you want the opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride (*Stolz*) wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto Nature - yes, Nature itself - you demand that it be Nature “according to Stoa” and you want to make all existence exist in your own image alone - as a huge eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism! For all your love of truth (*Liebe zur Wahrheit*), you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to have a false (*falsch*), namely Stoic, view of Nature, that you can no longer see it any other way, - and some abysmal piece of arrogance (*Hochmuth*) finally gives you the madman-like hope (*Tollhäusler-Hoffnung*) that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves - Stoicism is self-tyranny - Nature lets itself be tyrannized as well: because isn't the Stoic a piece of Nature? . . . But this is an old, eternal story: what happened back then with the Stoics still happens today, just as soon as a philosophy begins believing in itself. It always creates the world in its own image (*schaftt immer die Welt nach ihrem Bilde*), it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the *causa prima* (2002: ~9).

Nietzsche astutely points out that perpetually being like Nature - i.e. from the perspective of Nature being indifferent in the second sense - precludes any judgement or evaluation and, by extrapolation, any considerations of justice, purpose, preference, mercy, etc. A second plausible perspective on Nature that Nietzsche criticises in his later writings, is that ‘living according to Nature’ (*kata physin*) amounts to ‘living according to life’; for him, this perspective amounts to the

all-encompassing imperative of living according to what is possible. This imperative is too broad and thus too nebulous to be of any worthwhile guidance - at least within a naturalistic framework - and moreover, it cannot be counteracted in any case. This merits the question: why bother making an imperative out of living according to what is possible if life cannot be according to anything else? All in all, Nietzsche wishes to problematise the Stoic metaphysical doctrine that (rational) human beings can ascertain and distinguish between what is Natural and unnatural - and by extension 'good', 'bad', 'True' and 'False' - by appealing to Nature, if Nature is understood as what is indifferent or what is possible. That is to say, Nietzsche is charging the Stoics with succumbing to a form of the naturalistic fallacy<sup>135</sup>.

For the question of 'tolerance', this implies that the argument 'because it is in accordance with Nature' is not a sufficient answer to the question as to 'why should one tolerate?' since Nature qua indifference or possibility is too nebulous to justify<sup>136</sup> why one should or shouldn't tolerate. That is to say, a theory of tolerance appealing to Nature as grounding for toleration is not suitable for a Nietzschean *valuation*<sup>137</sup>.

Upon examining the shared espousal of the procedure of the cosmic perspective - *amor fati* - between the Stoics and Nietzsche, Hadot incisively notes that there is an "abyss" between them as to the purpose(s), or lack thereof, ascribed to it (2004: 145). Whereas the Stoics conceived a providential ordering of Nature as underpinning the cosmic perspective, Nietzsche saw an affirmation of Dionysus

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<sup>135</sup> The Stoics here may well be accused of the naturalistic fallacy – i.e. the is-ought problem - insofar as given the way the natural world is, in what sense can we say that it ought to be different based on those facts?

<sup>136</sup> This includes a critical stance against considerations of *grasping* or a *special mark* which signal Truth (*katalêpsis*).

<sup>137</sup> The existentialist J.P. Sartre would also argue – in a similar vein - against appealing to Nature, as it would be a form of *bad faith* (Sartre 2003: 94). The notion of bad faith refers to the misguided idea that we are defined by the roles – for example the role that Nature has given us - with which we associate prior to its performance, instead of us actively shaping the role *during* its performance (ibid.). The emphasis, according to Sartre, should rather be placed on *action* as self-making and transcendence, rather than the *essential* features – like human Nature - which purportedly govern our action.

insofar as the cosmic perspective entails affirming or saying “‘yes’ to irrationality<sup>138</sup> and the blind cruelty of life” (ibid.). Dionysus, although deified by Nietzsche, does not stand for one god, but as Van Tongeren notes “a name for, or a personification of, the plurality itself” (2000: 301). Nature for Nietzsche (perpetually) is - or perhaps more accurately ‘becomes’ - a struggle (Van Tongeren 2000: 202). Here Nietzsche follows Hericlitean cosmology of flux that is neatly summed up by Laërtius as “[a]ll things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things (*ta hola*)<sup>139</sup> flows like a stream” (1925: 8).

Conversely, Stoic ethics is underpinned by a teleological conception of Nature, which bespeaks an *essential*<sup>140</sup> and ahistorical purpose or *telos* inherent in Nature. This teleological conception of Nature is what Nietzsche - and the ancient Pyrrhonian Sceptic - called *dogmatism*, which he relegates to a “disease” or ‘disturbance’ (*Krankheit*) (1979: 86 & 2002: preface). Nietzsche’s endorsement of the cosmic perspective rather refrains from assuming and, what is more, explicitly criticises a teleological conception of Nature<sup>141</sup>, or for that matter a teleological conception of any objects or phenomena within Nature. Perpetual flux and struggle undermine a static end, thereby also precluding privileged and knowledgeable access to such an end. Yet Nietzsche does not advocate a renunciation of conceiving or pursuing (contingent) purposes or ideals, as they inform one’s ‘evaluating, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different’. But he cautions his readers about the underpinning of such purposes and ideals; more specifically, the kind of underpinning and the attachment it implies.

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<sup>138</sup> ‘Irrationality’ here can loosely be construed as ‘lacking certainty or powers of understanding’ (Ure 2009: 75).

<sup>139</sup> Also translated as ‘the whole’ (see Liddle & Scott 1983: ‘τὰ ὅλα’).

<sup>140</sup> ‘Essence’ pertains to the fixed and unchangeable attribute or set of attributes that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. Essence is contrasted with contingency (see Bunnin and Yu 2004: s.v. ‘essence’).

<sup>141</sup> For an analysis of the concept of purpose, see also (Nietzsche 2007: II, 12).

‘Purpose’ (*telos*) for Nietzsche entails a sign that something or some procedure has been embedded with “the character of a function”, which may be at odds with other purposes for the same procedure (2007: II, 12). Alternatively, an ideal can be construed as a conceived model of excellence to be striven towards, which reflects the cultivation of one’s own *character* (Nietzsche 2007: II, 18). According to Nietzsche, having an ideal implies that which it is not - i.e. its contrast - insofar as it requires that which it is measured against. That is to say an ideal carries with it that which it negates. For example one can conceive of the ideal of being tolerant, but not without simultaneously implying its contrast; being intolerant or being intolerable. With regards to purposes, multifarious purposes - e.g. peaceful coexistence, *kata physin*, the establishment of a cosmopolitan society or serving justice - can be subsumed under tolerance which may pertain to the same procedure; i.e. *embracing* toleration or *withstanding* toleration. The problem for Nietzsche arises when one purpose or ideal is given the status of being immaculate and beyond reproach - i.e. ahistorical and *essential* - at the expense of all other competing purposes and evaluative engagement with them (2007: Preface, 6).

In the quoted passage above Nietzsche mentions that the Stoics are self-deceptive or perhaps dishonest insofar as they claim and believe to know ‘Nature’ (*physis*) as it is in-itself<sup>142</sup>. The crux of the deception lies in the perspective that to have access or to know reality in-itself - i.e. ‘Nature’ per se - appears to be impossible, or at any rate is not based on how things appear. That is to say the appearance of perpetual struggle or flux seems to undermine any non-contingent knowledge required for access to Nature *per se*. It follows that claims that do indeed assert such non-contingent knowledge must be a form of deception; i.e. they must be ‘false’ (see below for more details). According to Nietzsche, what the Stoics are doing instead is imputing their own (created) ideals, purposes and ethics to Nature, thereby fallaciously deriving an ‘ought’ from what ‘is’. That is to say Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of (wittingly or unwittingly) misrepresenting the *creation* of an ideal world or absolute standard - called Nature - with which to judge and evaluate this world and

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<sup>142</sup> Also see (Van Tongeren 2000: 222-224).

other people, as a *discovery* of that ideal. Instead of representing Nature only as the totality of (seemingly conflicting) forces operating within this world, Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of transgressing certain epistemological limits - i.e. what human beings can know - firstly by founding an ideal upon Nature, or more precisely the one and only ideal towards which one should strive (insofar as all other ideals would become rendered unnatural), and secondly framing Nature as a foundation for their ethics.

An analogy might clarify this: when on a ship, Nietzsche avers, the Stoics mistake the helmsman for the stream upon which the ship sails (ibid.). The helmsman might steer the ship in alignment with the purpose of reaching a particular port; however there is no guarantee - by virtue of the ship's ostensible Nature - that it will reach the destination envisioned by the helmsman, or for that matter that the ship is only made for sailing. Firstly, this does not imply that the ship's sole purpose is reaching ports, or even transport or sailing for that matter. The ship can just as successfully be used as a storage container, shelter, or firewood without ever sailing. Secondly, just because a ship is propelled by certain forces - i.e. the stream - in a particular direction, does not as a matter of course imply that these forces are executed in accordance with an end. The purpose-driven behaviour and ideals are solely enacted by the helmsman and imposed upon the ship in the process of steering it. Likewise, what the Stoic judges to be Natural is a kind of *order* imposed upon himself, others and Nature; i.e. they are the helmsmen steering the ship. However they mistake this *order* for a discovery of how things should be based on how things *essentially* and *necessarily* are; i.e. this *order* is instead attributed to the stream on which the boat inevitably must sail.

In *GS*, Nietzsche argues that the natural world - i.e. 'this world' - does indeed operate out of necessity; however necessity cannot be conclusively confirmed to operate in alignment with an absolute *telos* or in accordance with the Nature - i.e. *essential* properties - of objects in the world, but rather by following the expenditure of forces (1974: ~360). Conversely, as briefly mentioned when distinguishing tolerance from toleration, purpose-driven behaviour for him is limited to living organisms actively imposing order upon the natural world. Take for example grounds

for tolerance by reason that toleration is in accord with Nature. This reply fallaciously appeals to an authority beyond reproach, at the expense of any other premise, purpose, or evaluations pertaining to toleration. If the Stoic indeed provides alternative premises pertaining to toleration, then one would be hard-pressed as to why one would additionally require appealing to *essence* or Nature at all in order to warrant one's position.

As opposed to *dogma* Nietzsche, according to Berry, did support a form of Scepticism<sup>143</sup> similar to Cicero's thought; more specifically an ancient form (see 1997: ~335). Unlike Cicero's Academic Scepticism in conjunction with Stoic ethics, Nietzsche's Scepticism is more characteristic of Pyrrhonism (Berry 2011: 10). Unfortunately, due to the scope of this thesis, delving into the differences between Academic Scepticism and Pyrrhonian Scepticism, subtle or overt, would take us too far afield<sup>144</sup>. Where Nietzsche's Scepticism is concerned, only the most relevant aspects to tolerance and toleration will be briefly mentioned<sup>145</sup>. Berry avers that here are forms of Scepticism that Nietzsche does not subscribe to; for example the Sceptic who doubts to the point of not taking action, or the Sceptic who renounces the endeavour for justification as futile, or the Sceptic who concludes that things are, by nature, inapprehensible and therefore not worthy of further investigation (2011: 34-36). That is to say Nietzsche did support a form of Scepticism which undermines the claims of many modern sceptical positions that seek to "establish, *a priori*, that reason is impotent and knowledge is impossible" (Berry 2011: 12).

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<sup>143</sup> This can be attested in a passage from *Antichrist* among others: "Make no mistake about it, great spirits are Sceptics. Zarathustra is a Sceptic. The vigour, the freedom that comes from the strength and super-strength of spirit proves itself through Scepticism. Where basic issues about value or lack of value are concerned, people with convictions do not come into consideration. Convictions are prisons" (Nietzsche 1924: ~54). According to Berry, neglecting or framing Nietzsche's thought as anti-Sceptical "simply strains interpretive credibility too much" (2011: 10). In order to distinguish between ancient and modern forms of scepticism, I shall capitalise the former to denote Nietzsche's strand; e.g. 'Scepticism'.

<sup>144</sup> For a further reading or a critical comparison between schools of ancient Scepticism, see (Hankinson 1995) and (Bett 2000).

<sup>145</sup> For an in-depth analysis on the intersection between Nietzschean thought and Pyrrhonian Scepticism see Jessica Berry's *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition*.

Conversely, similar to Pyrrhonism, Nietzsche's Scepticism simultaneously pertains to the following: it enquires about human beings' seemingly innate tendency to seek truth or certainty, it enquires about the limits of knowledge - i.e. what we can know (see above), it seeks to explain why suspending (*dogmatic*) judgement or refraining from *assent* to such judgements contributes to *flourishing* and is free from psychological disturbance (*apatheia* or otherwise), it formulates a critique of *dogmatism* and those sceptics who cease further investigation after declaring the natural world *essentially* 'inapprehensible'<sup>146</sup> (see above and below) (Berry 2011: 35). Take note that suspending judgement connotes here a different sense in which Ure uses it when analysing *amor fati*. To further clarify the suspension of judgement - used here without italics - is applied in cases, according to Berry, concerning the essences or Nature of things<sup>147</sup>; i.e. not in the sense of refraining from *assenting* to any judgements whatsoever, but rather refraining from *assenting* to conclusive judgements or claims about reality in-itself or Nature as such (Berry 2011: 61). The corollary being that sustaining enquiry (and curiosity) requires suspending judgement on the whole and never settling the matter conclusively<sup>148</sup> (Berry 2011: 36).

By contrast, *acquiescence* - as a *faute de mieux* - in the latter case concerns how one qua human being responds to the way(s) things *appear*; take note *appearance* here is not restricted to perception, but forms part of cognition as well (Berry 2011: 84-85 & 103 & 198). The latter case more generally corresponds to the methodology this dissertation implements - i.e. *perspectivism*: the more 'eyes' and 'affects' one can train on the same object, the more complete one's idea or objectivity would be of

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<sup>146</sup> "The Greek verb *skeptesthai* means "to inquire" or "to examine" and is a cognate of *skeptikos*, which eventually came into English as 'sceptic'" (Berry 2011: 36). See also (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'sceptic'). Sextus Empiricus, an influential ancient proponent of Pyrrhonism, claimed that the kind of Sceptic that pronounces that 'Nature is fundamentally inapprehensible' also succumbs to a form of *dogmatism*, which is called *negative dogmatism* (2000: I, 1-4).

<sup>147</sup> See also Nietzsche's passage in *On Truth and Lie in an Nonmoral Sense* when discussing the intraspecies similarities and differences: "For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the *essence* of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond to the *essence* of things: that would of course be a *dogmatic* assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite." (1979: 86 'Italics added').

<sup>148</sup> The sustaining of enquiry can also be evinced in the following sections of *GS* and *BGE* (see Nietzsche 1997: ~2, ~151 & ~319) and (Nietzsche 2002: ~210).



the object (Nietzsche 2007: Ess 3, ~12). What is required is nothing less than a reevaluation of what one thinks about knowledge and truth, whilst simultaneously exposing the *pathos* of *dogmatism*.

Although most of the aspects of the value of tolerance with respect to the methodology have already been outlined, what a Sceptical *perspective* firstly - I maintain - elucidates what exactly about the judgements accompanied by the passions are considered 'false' for Nietzsche in his later works. Secondly, what a Sceptical *perspective* clarifies - as a prelude for the next chapter - is the need for a critical *evaluation* of potentially *dogmatic* forms of tolerance and toleration.

The above critical *evaluation* can be subsumed under the value of tolerance within a Nietzschean *valuation* insofar as it establishes a 'rank-order' and prioritisation of *perspectives* on tolerance and toleration. The rank-order is relative to the *perspective* of the evaluator and not based on the *essence* or Nature of the content of the *evaluation*. In this light, different *perspectives* on tolerance are not equal in terms of value; although all are valued by means of critical *evaluation*, some are more highly valued while some are of a lower value by the person evaluating. For Nietzsche *evaluation* necessarily entails such a 'rank-order' insofar as it *appears* that one can *prefer* one over another and that such discrimination is crucial for survival and *flourishing*. Therefore both Pyrrhonian Scepticism and a Nietzschean *valuation* avoid the charge of relativity understood as every normative ethical theory must be treated equally because on a meta-ethical level there is no absolute standard to adjudicate which theory of the good is better. By inference, the *raison d'être* of tolerance and the need for toleration is not evinced by a recognition that all divergent conceptions of the good are equal<sup>149</sup> inasmuch as they are incommensurable, and therefore must be respected by means of toleration. Nietzsche does not at all have a problem with the *apparent* incommensurability of certain values (of the good or of tolerance), but rather the kinds of judgements derived from it. Such conceptions of the good by means of the value of tolerance and its implementations of toleration are precisely

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<sup>149</sup> For an elaboration of Nietzsche's argument against the "dogma of the 'equality of men'" see (1974: ~120). For Nietzsche's argument against contractarianism see (2007: II, 17).

for Nietzsche of a low value insofar as the judgement stating that equality is judged as *essentially* following from incommensurability; such judgements are *dogmatic*.

The Pyrrhonists' insist that their Scepticism does not form part of an epistemology that proclaims doctrines, theories and hypotheses, but is rather a critical enterprise which "aim is not to propound positive views of its own but to discredit those of the dogmatists" (Berry 2011: 123). The corollary of Scepticism qua critical enterprise is that it does not subvert (possibly conflicting) non-dogmatic philosophies, such as among others existentialism, pragmatism, phenomenology, some postmodernist methodologies and a Nietzschean *valuation*, but rather functions as an auxiliary in the form of a critical tool for said philosophies and its practitioners among others. Nietzsche himself declares in *GM* that what spoke to him was "an ever more corrosive Scepticism" against "the passion (*Leidenschaft*) and concealed contradiction" of "the value of the 'unegoistic', the instincts of pity, self-abnegation" and "self-sacrifice", which are "deified and projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became... 'value-in-itself'... which say "No to life" (2007: Preface, 5).

This critical enterprise will be rigorously implemented in the next chapter on tolerance, toleration, resentment and *ressentiment*. Suffice it to say here that the value tolerance and the forms of toleration outlined in this chapter are not based on the discovery of the True or original tolerance and toleration, but rather a creation of value (tolerance) based on how phenomena (toleration) *appear* in (cognitive) practice.

Regarding Nietzsche and the passions, Berry claims that Nietzsche does not adopt a Sceptical position for "academic or theoretical or epistemological reasons", but rather to enrich his task as cultural physician to facilitate *flourishing* and maintain "psychological health"; i.e. "free from psychological disturbance" (2011: 14 & 36). The task of the Pyrrhonist, like most other Hellenistic philosophers, is curative. As the Pyrrhonist and physician Sextus Empiricus mentions Sceptics are "philanthropic and wish to cure by argument, as far as they can, the conceit (*oĩisi*) and rashness (*propeteia*) of the *Dogmatists*", which they considered a passion (*pathos*) (Empiricus 2000: III, 280 'Italics added'). When cured of *dogmatic* thinking, the person is thought to be in a state of tranquillity (*ataraxia*) (Berry 2011: 40). Take note that *ataraxia*

does not form part of the normative - i.e. prescriptive - framework of the Sceptics insofar as it forms part of a purpose inherent in human nature, but rather a descriptive one based on *appearances* (Berry 2011: 101). That is to say that, based on *appearance*, tranquillity serendipitously ensued when Sextus eschewed *dogmatic* thinking, rather than tranquillity being promulgated as the *essential* purpose for human life in general.

The notions of *apatheia* and *ataraxia* are closely related and often used interchangeably by the ancients; for example Cicero's use mentioned in the first chapter (see Sheridan 2012: 342-343). Often the use of this concept or term would depend more on the ancient school of philosophy in question than what *praxis* it conceptually pertains to: many ancient philosophers did not want their particular approach toward being free from disturbances or equanimity to be confounded with associated concepts and doctrines of other schools, and therefore conceived of different terminology (*ibid.*). The Epicureans and Pyrrhonists used *ataraxia* whereas the Stoics used the term *apatheia* for 'freedom from disturbance'. Suffice it to say that when these concepts were not treated synonymously by the ancients, the most noteworthy yet subtle distinction would follow that *apatheia* denotes the absence of passions or disturbance, whereas *ataraxia* can be said to denote the feeling of calmness or tranquillity that ensues as a result of *apatheia* (see Berry 2011: 164). Berry conducts a detailed *genealogical* investigation of both the said concepts and traces it back to the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus; specifically his concept of *euthumia*<sup>150</sup> (2011: 133-173). Berry (2011: 143) adopts Laertius' construal of *euthumia* as a cheerful "state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other passion (*πάθους*)" (see Laertius 1925: 455 'italics added'). Berry, similar to the ancients, also wishes to disentangle the doctrines associated Epicurean *ataraxia* - i.e. tranquillity must be accompanied by pleasure or absence of pain - and Stoic *apatheia* - i.e. that *apatheia* is teleologically in accordance with Nature - from the tranquillity (*ataraxia*) the Pyrrhonists advocated by rather using Democritus' *euthumia* (2011: 133-173).

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<sup>150</sup> See Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. 'εύθυμία').

Subsequently, she proffers a cogent argument that Nietzsche himself supported *euthumia* by emphasising the cheerful disposition of Sceptical enquiry - alluding here to a *Gay Science* Nietzsche advocates in his titular work. This cheerful disposition (*euthumia*) precludes both the passions of “jealousy and envy and malice” stemming from *ressentiment* (Berry 2011: 166) and the ‘conceit and rashness’ of the *dogmatists* - with regards to the latter particularly criticising the Stoics (see Berry 2011: 164-165). I wholeheartedly agree with Berry that Nietzsche does support a form of being free from disturbance; however I maintain that *apatheia* - although liable to be confounded with associated Stoic doctrines to which it is not inextricably tied - still suffices as that which Nietzsche would support.

In the lengthy passage quoted above, later Nietzsche imputes the Stoics with succumbing to arrogance (*Hochmuth*) as a result of their ‘love of Truth’ (*Liebe zur Wahrheit*), which prevents them from acknowledging any other *perspective* than their own view of Nature (see also 2007: III, 25). The consequence of such *dogmatic* adherence to their metaphysics and epistemology in turn leads to an impoverishment of *perspectival objectivity* and the ‘tyranny’ of only one *perspective*. Nietzsche in his later works extends his criticism to the priest, philosopher, and scientist *characters* for their arrogance (*Hochmuth* and *Eigendünkel*) as a result of their “self-contempt of mankind”<sup>151</sup> (see 2007: I, 4-6 & III, 25). The ‘sickness’ (*Krankheit*) of arrogance was also evinced in early Nietzsche’s passage in *D* on the sufferer (see above), to which a cosmic perspective was the response which allowed the sufferer to (temporarily) convalesce. Nietzsche’s aphorism bears a striking similarity with the Sceptics’ project insofar as he wishes to ‘cure by argument’ the conceit - i.e. arrogance - and rashness of the *dogmatists* by exposing its *dogmatic* underpinnings; i.e. the abject values and *valuations* upon which the (passion of) arrogance is based.

An arrogant disposition, according to Berry, stems from an “unhealthily disproportionate need for security and stability” (Berry 2011: 39). The *dogmatist* presumes that tranquillity (*ataraxia*) and certainty can only be achieved after an enquiry has been settled once and for all (ibid.). In the meantime the *dogmatist* is

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<sup>151</sup> This term will be explained and demonstrated in the next chapter.

highly suspicious and contemptuous of his own (and others') "interests and prejudices, desires and affects, and the particular colour they lend to his perceptual and cognitive experience" insofar as truth is presumed disinterested and falsity is presumed interested (Berry 2011: 114). However, as Nietzsche notes the acquisition of "knowledge" is contingent upon and influenced by the knower's interests, affects etc. in addition to the context in which the object of enquiry is perceived (2007: III, 12). In spite of the *apparent* conflicting *perspectives* regarding what Sextus calls "unclear objects of enquiry" - e.g. Nature as such or the *essence* of a thing<sup>152</sup> - the *dogmatists* either consider themselves (pretentiously and presumptuously) to be in possession of infallible Truth or knowledge regarding that object, or remain in a perturbed and agitated state - i.e. the passions - until the enquiry has been deemed settled (Empiricus 2000: I, 13). Instead of possessing infallible Truth or knowledge - for such an ultimate standard or criterion<sup>153</sup> does not *appear* to be available to human beings in order to ascertain such an acquisition - Nietzsche claims in the passage on the Stoics above that what is possessed is more akin to a grandiose, overweening and transgressive feeling of certainty (see also Berry 2011: 39).

One plausible interpretation reads that later Nietzsche seems to accuse the Stoics - quite problematically given his ostensible antipathetic stance on the passions (*Leidenschaften*) - of succumbing to the passion of arrogance or conceit; in a very similar fashion to Diogenes the Cynic's passion of *tuphos*<sup>154</sup> and Sextus Empiricus.

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<sup>152</sup> I do concede that the interpretation of Sextus' 'unclear objects of enquiry' as only pertaining to claims of Nature as such or reality in-itself, is not without dispute. This interpretation, namely the urbane interpretation, is often opposed to the broader rustic interpretation which takes 'unclear objects of enquiry' to mean any object that one has *assented to*. The urbane interpretation affords the Sceptic *acquiescing to* knowledge and belief (as noted above), but refrains from settling conclusively on these beliefs and claims about Nature as such. See Berry for an analysis of the rustic and urbane interpretations and their objections (2011: 42-44).

<sup>153</sup> See (Nietzsche 1979: 86)

<sup>154</sup> Although Sextus does not use the impassioned concept '*tuphos*' to denote 'conceit', a warranted claim can be established that what he has in mind is not much different from what Diogenes the Cynic meant with the term. Timon, who was Pyrrho's protégé, adopted the term from Diogenes and used it as invective against Zeno of Citium's Stoicism: "To this we can add that Timon's writing shows a clear debt to Cynicism, which would make excellent sense if Pyrrho already felt a connection with the Cynics. *Tuphos*, "vanity" or "humbug," is a common term of Cynic invective, and Timon appropriates it; besides using it of Zeno of Citium (Laertius 1925: 133 & 517), he turns it around and, as we saw, gives Pyrrho the supreme compliment *atuphos*, "without

Arrogance is a passion insofar as it undermines both the suspension of (*dogmatic*) judgement and further investigation, subsequently leading to inaction (Nietzsche 2002: ~10). More importantly, Nietzsche criticises the kind of judgement that is accompanied by arrogance - i.e. claims to Nature as such.

Arrogance and its accompanying *dogmatic* judgements are therefore considered *life-denying* and un conducive to *flourishing* by later Nietzsche: a later passage in *BGE* where Nietzsche marks a difference between vanity (*Eitelkeit*) and arrogance (*Dünkel*) he states that the vain person tends to uncritically assent to others' opinion of them, whereas the arrogant person has an idea of his own self that is largely independent of and not influenced by others (2002: ~261). That is to say the arrogant person is not predominantly moved by the thoughts or opinions of others, but rather his own. Nietzsche, talking in the first person for the arrogant (*Dünkel*) man, has few caveats before arrogance can contribute to *flourishing*: provided that he keeps in mind that "I can be wrong about my own worth" and "I can still enjoy other people's good opinions" (ibid.). The reasons the arrogant (*Dünkel*) man can still enjoy others people's good opinions is that those people are loved and honoured, "their good opinions confirm and reinforce my faith in my own good opinion of myself, perhaps because other people's good opinions are useful or look as though they could be useful to me, even when I don't agree with them" (ibid.)

This arrogance (*Dünkel*) seems to echo Stoic ethics insofar as one ought to be *indifferent* to one's reputation - i.e. the opinions of others and their repercussions - insofar as it is considered *beyond one's control* (Epictetus 1944: I.15.3 & II.2.10). However, this distinction between vanity (*Eitelkeit*) and arrogance (*Dünkel*) in light of the 'self-deception' and arrogance (*Hochmuth* and *Eigendünkel*) Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of becomes noteworthy.

When arrogance (*Dünkel*) exceeds the point of admittedly self-created ethical values and ideals, toward re-presenting such values and ideals (wittingly or unwittingly) as

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vanity"..." (Bett 2015: 154-155). Sextus himself uses the term '*hupatuphos*' denoting 'partly free from vanity' (Sextus 2000: I, 224). See (Liddle & Scott 1983: s.v. '*οἰήσεως*' & '*προπέτειαν*' respectively).

*dogma* - i.e. a “fully-worked out, justified theory” (see Sextus 2000: 56) - Nietzsche critically applies his ‘corrosive Scepticism’. In sections where he addresses this - including the lengthy passage quoted above - Nietzsche does not call it arrogance (*Dünkel*), but rather arrogance (*Hochmuth*) (see 2002: ~10<sup>155</sup>, ~204, ~270 & 1979: 79-80). All the aforementioned sections expose claims, values and ideals portrayed as *dogma* as a desperate attempt by a weary *soul* to stop investigating and presumptuously bask in the feeling of certainty. If the dogmatist purports his *dogma* unwittingly - i.e. not being aware that he or she is misrepresenting created values as discovered values - then based on Nietzsche’s construal of vanity (*Eitelkeit*) the person is credulously assenting to *dogmatic* judgement(s). The vain person does not sustain enquiry as required for the Sceptic. If the dogmatist purports his *dogma* wittingly - i.e. being aware that he or she is misrepresenting created values as discovered values - then he or she is “dishonest”<sup>156</sup> insofar as he or she is deliberately concealing other (possibly conflicting) perspectives which may also contribute to *flourishing* (1997: ~110). The latter for Nietzsche is at odds with the spirit of enquiry of a *gay science* and perspectival *objectivity*. The aim of this dissertation is to ‘cure by means of argument’ the ‘conceit and rashness’ of *dogmatic evaluations* of the value of tolerance. This will be established and demonstrated in the next chapter, as falling under the rubric of what Nietzsche considered ‘tolerance out of weakness’.

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<sup>155</sup> Section 10 of *BGE* is also a very important section as it also supports the claim that Nietzsche implements the critical enterprise of Scepticism. For example: “in rare and unusual cases, some sort of will to truth might actually be at issue, some wild and adventurous streak of courage, a metaphysician’s ambition to hold on to a lost cause, that, in the end, will still prefer a handful of “certainty” to an entire wagonload of pretty possibilities. There might even be puritanical fanatics of conscience who would rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something. But this is nihilism, and symptomatic of a desperate soul in a state of deadly exhaustion, however brave such virtuous posturing may appear... By taking sides against appearance and speaking about “perspective” in a newly arrogant (*Hochmuth*) tone, by granting their own bodies about as little credibility as they grant the visual evidence that says “the earth stands still,” and so, with seemingly good spirits, relinquishing their most secure possession (since what do people believe in more securely these days than their bodies?), who knows whether they are not basically trying to re-appropriate something that was once possessed even more securely, something from the old estate of a bygone faith, perhaps “the immortal soul” or perhaps “the old God,” in short, ideas that helped make life a bit better...” (Nietzsche 2002: ~10).

<sup>156</sup> See also (Berry 2011: 105).

Although the Cosmic Stoic may have extirpated or averted the passions successfully in line with kinds of judgements about what is 'good', 'bad' and 'evil', a similar danger here remains for them regarding kinds of judgements of what are 'true', 'erroneous' and 'false'. Similar to the Stoics who considered *assent to the (dogmatic) judgement* that 'good' or 'evil' inherently resides within objects or phenomena as erroneous (and bad), Nietzsche also concurs. Conversely, Nietzsche also considers the *dogmatic judgement* that 'Truth' inherently resides within objects or phenomena, insofar as one qua human being has privileged access to the Nature of the object or phenomenon, as erroneous for the Sceptical reasons mentioned above. This explanation also harks back to the deciding factor as to whether later Nietzsche did indeed prescribe the passions as a means to *flourishing*. Since later Nietzsche advises against one adopting the kinds of judgement - i.e. *dogmatic* and 'absolute' *moral judgements* - which are the *sine qua non* of the passions according to the Stoics themselves, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that Nietzsche indeed prescribed them as life-affirming psychical analgesics which would contribute to *flourishing*. In moving beyond Stoicism, Nietzsche, instead of prescribing the passions, expanded his criticism of the passions beyond moral concerns so as to include epistemological concerns as well. The only concern remaining would be as semantic one: explaining why Nietzsche used names for affects which are usually considered passions; e.g. using 'fear' instead of 'caution'.

An important ramification of Nietzsche's criticisms of Stoic epistemology and metaphysics regarding their ethics is that the judgements accompanying the passions - specifically what the judgements are about or the content - are not necessarily inherently false (or False). The Stoic doctrine that all passions are accompanied by false judgements itself would be *dogmatic* inasmuch as it presupposes that the Nature of the objects or phenomena which the judgement is about must necessarily *not* possess the qualities that the judgement claims it has. The passion that accompanies such a *dogmatic* stance is arrogance. That is to say such a doctrine presupposes privileged access to the Nature of these objects or phenomena in order to rule in *and* rule out what exactly that Nature is.



As gleaned from Nietzsche's criticism of Stoic metaphysics and epistemology, Nietzsche does not shy away from considering erroneous the *dogmatic* Stoic ideal pretended as a reflection of Nature. However, Nietzsche's concern is not epistemological - with truth as such or its denial - but rather psychological - the arrogant, dogged, fractious and uncritical faith in truth's value<sup>157</sup> and its foolproof attainability (Nietzsche 2007: III, 24). Upon analysing Nietzsche's proto-genealogical speculations in *TL* and *D* about the "enormous error" of gender assignments of all things in certain languages - e.g. German - Berry notes that this 'error' does *not* pertain to "thinking this or that is masculine or feminine by nature when in fact they are not" (2011: 58). If this were the case, then Nietzsche himself would be guilty of simply replacing one *dogmatic* judgement or *dogma* with another (Berry 2011: 44). Instead, the 'error' is made when arrogantly re-presenting that which is merely "arbitrary, useful<sup>158</sup>, or conventional" as a fundamental insight into the *essence* or reality of things (Berry 2011: 58); considering that it is not *apparent* that an ultimate criterion or a "correct perception" is available for one to adjudicate the latter (Nietzsche 1979: 86).

Rather, the 'error' that the passions - in the Sceptical sense - betray does not pertain to what the accompanying judgement is about - descriptions objects and phenomena - but instead pertains to the attachment made to those descriptions; i.e. kind of judgement that is made - a *dogmatic* judgement. Nietzsche goes so far as to state that even judgements whose content is later considered false can be life-affirming, provided that it is not underpinned by *dogmatic* judgements. So as to whether Nietzsche was for or against the eradication of the passions depends on which aspect of its accompanying judgement is false. If it is the content of the judgment, as the Stoics claim it to be, then Nietzsche is against the eradication of the passions. If it is the kinds of judgement, as the Pyrrhonian Sceptics claim it to be, then Nietzsche is for the eradication of the passions. The latter is the interpretation that this

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<sup>157</sup> See also (Berry 2011: 55).

<sup>158</sup> Given Nietzsche's stance on suffering articulated earlier, 'useful' here is implemented not so much in a utilitarian sense, but rather a pragmatic one.

Nietzschean *valuation* adopts in order to critique a certain *dogmatic valuation* of tolerance and toleration accompanied by impassioned affects.

*Dogmatic* attachments to judgements, as my interpretation of Nietzsche's critical enterprise reads, result in succumbing to the passions which hinder *flourishing*. The corollary being that proceeding from the presumption of having attained Truth<sup>159</sup> must necessarily be erroneous. Espousing a disinterested *dogmatic* philosophy, science or framework of beliefs renders one prone to inaction (as outlined in the previous section) - minimising both pleasure and pain to the point of 'eliminating any inclination to excitement'. If one perceives oneself as to be in the possession of Truth and has dismissed *a priori* all competing perspectives as inherently false (or False), then curiosity and the inclination to enquiry - scientific or otherwise - diminishes; similar to Nietzsche's critique of teleological reasoning (see Berry 2011: 39). The weariness associated with inaction in turn is detrimental to *flourishing* and life-affirmation; for Nietzsche such philosophies are instead *life-denying* based on the above criteria.

Contrary to the Stoic epistemological position, if *withstanding* toleration is implemented, the accompanying *eupathe* does not as a matter of course imply that the accompanying judgement - what the judgement is about - is True concerning the external force or uncongenial entity perceived to engender the unpleasure. On account of Stoic *dogma* of *kata physin* and their doctrine of *katalepsis*<sup>160</sup> the content of the judgement - what the judgement is about which may entail uncongenial entities - is *erroneously* thought to be True given the experience of *apatheia*. Whether or not the content of the judgement is considered true or false is irrelevant with regards to whether one is implementing *withstanding* toleration or an impassioned version of toleration. It is only the kind of judgement which is the crucial factor when ascertaining an impassioned disposition.

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<sup>159</sup> Truth (capital 'T') pertains to *essential* and ahistorical knowledge of an object in-itself or reality in-itself.

<sup>160</sup> Whereas the Academic Sceptic would assent to the doctrine of *akatalepsy*; the doctrine that Nature is inapprehensible, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic claims that one should suspend judgement on such claims (Berry 2011: 34-35). See also (Little & Scott 1983: s.v. 'ἀκαταλαμβάνειν')

Briefly mentioned earlier, Nietzsche notes that in the course of contempt, the image (*Bild*) of the 'bad' person is somewhat distorted or falsified (*der Fälschung*) (2007: I, 10). In the good/bad *valuation*, the 'bad' person can be considered an uncongenial entity. Provided the sufferer's little consideration of possible uncongenial entities, the reasons for the distortion lie not at all in the kind of judgement nor its content, but rather in the carelessness (*Nachlässigkeit*), taking lightly (*Leicht-Nehmen*) and looking away (*Wegblicken*) entailed in contempt (ibid.). If perspectival *objectivity* is enriched by the variety of perspectives one can attribute to the same object or phenomenon - or similar objects and phenomena - the carelessness entailed in contempt does not contribute much to *perspectival objectivity*. Insofar as the contemptuous person (e.g. the sufferer) is reluctant to attribute any *perspective* at all to the (*uncongenial*) entity, the contemptuous person's *perspectival objectivity* remains impoverished with regard to said entity. Since the contemptuous person's *perspectival objectivity* is impoverished, the image (*Bild*) of that entity is somewhat distorted or falsified (*gefälscht*). It is clear that this 'falsification' does not pertain to the content of the judgment, nor the kind of attachment in this case, but only to the strength of the attachment (*Verbindlichkeit*).

The affect of contempt and the *withstanding* toleration this 'great affect' affords in grappling with (possible) physical pain, provided that it and its accompanying judgements do not contribute much to *perspectival objectivity*, does not imply that contempt is a passion or that *withstanding* toleration is ill-advised from the methodology this dissertation espouses. Insofar as such an advocated implementation seems to undermine proper enquiry and neglects the uncongenial entity, it merits consideration. Nietzsche stridently maintains that the value of truth and its *praxis* of enquiry is only one value among many other possibly conflicting values<sup>161</sup> (2007: III, 12). Although this dissertation (and I) values truth insofar as it is an enquiry into the value of tolerance, sometimes in practice, other values like tolerance takes precedence over the value of truth by means of implementing toleration in order to facilitate *flourishing*. The sufferer, instead of being neglectful

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<sup>161</sup> See also (Berry 2011: 11 & 137).

towards the uncongenial entity and undermining the Nietzschean *valuation* espoused, is rather ensuring that he does not resort to kinds of judgments about the uncongenial entity based on *dogma*; those for example accompanied by passions such as *ressentiment* (impassioned resentment), which according to Nietzsche further transforms - by means of 'more serious' falsification and exaggeration - the uncongenial entity into a "caricature and monster" (2007: I, 10). The risks entailed in contempt would nonetheless be underestimation which undermines *perspectival objectivity*, but is much less grave and severe for the sufferer (and the uncongenial entity insofar as his or her *character* is not misrepresented). A *perspectivist's* stance, which this thesis advocates as forming part of the Nietzschean *valuation*, therefore does not undermine this dissertation's endorsement of *withstanding* toleration.

## VI: Recapitulation and Conclusion

The upshots of Nietzsche's Sceptical *perspectivist* philosophy for tolerance and toleration within a Nietzschean valuation are the following:

Tolerance underpinned by *dogmatic* judgements or *dogma* - among others the Stoic *kata physin* - would be erroneous inasmuch as it is based on claims which transgress the boundaries of what can be known; i.e. contingent *perspectives* and values created in light of *appearances*. Moreover, such *dogmatic* judgements are accompanied by the passions insofar as they are *life-denying* and impoverish *perspectival objectivity*. Conversely, toleration free from *dogma* and imbuing toleration with non-dogmatic purpose(s) under the rubric of tolerance is not nugatory since an absolute foundation is precluded. Moreover, all *evaluations* of tolerance qua theories of the good are not of equal value owing to their (possible) incommensurability; this also includes the *normatively dependent* values of toleration. Not only should the plurality that formulations of toleration usually advocate - for instance toleration of *apparent* differences between people - be affirmed<sup>162</sup>, but the plurality of purposes - sometimes conflicting - should also be

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<sup>162</sup> See the earlier section on *amor fati* for a discussion on Nietzschean *affirmation*.

imbued within tolerance as such insofar as it enriches *perspectival objectivity*. Nevertheless, the affirmation of the plurality of purposes does not necessarily imply an informed or facile endorsement of all these purposes.

In the process of *carving out* tolerance and toleration from Stoic thought to a Nietzschean *valuation*, a few viable (and perhaps vying) purposes were provided in this chapter. These are tolerance for the purpose of *flourishing*, tolerance for the purpose of grappling with pain and suffering in a life-affirming manner, tolerance for the purpose of recognising and coming to grips with *fate*; i.e. external forces and uncongenial entities affecting one yet are (possibly) beyond one's control, tolerance for the purpose of disabusing oneself of (or maintaining detachment from) the passions or psychological disturbance (*apatheia*), and tolerance for the purpose of evaluating and subsuming the 'why', 'what', 'where', 'when' and 'how' of toleration. These purposes - among possible others - are what comprise a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance. The qualities and value of tolerance within a Nietzschean *valuation* lie in its life-affirming potential for grappling with the inevitable and *necessary* pains of life, without exacerbating one's lot by means of the passions and its *dogmatic* judgements. Even though resorting to the passions and may serve as consolation in the form of a psychical analgesic, its repeated use leads to *life-denying* inaction. The overuse of *eupathe* during intense experiences of pain for similar reasons may also render one more vulnerable to the passions, for which a cosmic perspective (*amor fati*) via *em-bracing* toleration is indicated.

The *carving out* process also critically selected and jettisoned tenets of Stoicism to the point where tolerance and toleration within a Nietzschean *valuation* moves far beyond the confines of Stoic philosophy. Stoic ethics - with particular focus on the passions - was incorporated into the Nietzschean *valuation* this dissertation espouses insofar as it corresponds to the *perspectivist* methodology and sheds light on life-affirming articulations of tolerance and implementations of toleration. The passions (and their criticism) were extended to entail not only ethical concerns, but also metaphysical and epistemological concerns. This shift entails going beyond the Stoics' interpretation of the passions as accompanied by false content of the judgement, towards a focus on the false kind of judgement as conceptualised by the

ancient Pyrrhonian Sceptics. The passions (*Passion* or *Leidenschaft*), as gleaned from Nietzsche's use in his early work *D* (on the absolute morality of 'good' and 'evil'<sup>163</sup>) and later work *GM* (on the epistemology of the *ascetic ideal*), betray the *dogmatic* judgements, values and *valuations* which necessarily accompany them. This was done by means of a depiction of Nietzsche narrative of the sufferer and a thoroughgoing 'disentangling' of imbued Stoic values regarding tolerance underpinning the procedures of toleration. Conversely, Stoic metaphysics and epistemology, with clarification by means of the critical enterprise of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, has been jettisoned insofar as it appeals to an absolute foundation - i.e. a teleological conception of Nature - which undermines the openness to contingency required for *perspectival objectivity*. Tolerance in a Nietzschean *valuation* therefore allows one to remain open to investigation in general, scientific or otherwise, by never settling 'unclear objects of enquiry' conclusively by way of *dogmatic* judgements, values and *valuations*. Such a Sceptical and *perspectival* openness also includes considerations of tolerance (and by extrapolation toleration) itself.

Both *withstanding* toleration and *em-bracing* toleration as procedures, *carved out* from the Stoic philosophy, correspond to a Nietzschean *valuation* insofar as they can be implemented in life-affirming ways that contribute to *flourishing*. The crux lies in the word 'can': as demonstrated with the Human Stoic, although he does not (necessarily) succumb to the passions, his weariness and enervation leads him to a life of inactivity. Therefore the possibility remains that freedom from the passions (*apatheia*), although necessary for *flourishing*, is not sufficient for *flourishing*. Conversely, adopting invariably a cosmic perspective precludes the impetus for action which is entailed in the affects and their accompanying judgements; this can also undermine *flourishing* for similar reasons; inactivity. The possibility remains that there are other forms of toleration, depending on the kind of judgements and accompanying affects, which can also be *life-denying*. The next chapter homes in on such a possibility by critically comparing tolerance, toleration, resentment and *ressentiment*.

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<sup>163</sup> See the aphorism entitled *To think a thing evil means to make it evil* in *D* (Nietzsche 1997: ~76).

# Chapter 3: The Perils of Tolerance and Toleration

Now that tolerance and toleration has been *carved out* from the Stoic canon and has been situated within a Nietzschean valuation, the matter at hand shifts towards a more critical enterprise; particularly towards forms of toleration which would potentially undermine the Nietzschean aim of *flourishing*. The previous chapter schematised that which would undermine *flourishing* under the rubric of tolerance qua value; namely the passions and their accompanying *dogmatic* judgements underpinned by namely *dogmatic* values and *valuations*. Although it has done so, it has not yet considered what its ramifications would be with regards to toleration.

Cicero's initial quasi-Stoic conception of *tolerantia* stated that any *impassioned*<sup>164</sup> means of grappling with pain cannot be considered tolerance or toleration proper, since tolerance and by extrapolation its procedure (toleration) is limited to what is virtuous (Cicero 2005: 59 & 2004: V.32.95). Contrary to Cicero's claim and in light of Nietzsche's claim that the passions also have analgesic qualities, this chapter analyses certain impassioned means of psychically dealing with pain that, I shall argue, can be considered part of tolerance and toleration despite such means being *life-denying*. Even though these *impassioned* means of psychically dealing with pain are considered part of tolerance and toleration, they should nevertheless be attributed a base value inasmuch as such means are *life-denying* in accordance with a Nietzschean *valuation*.

In light of Nietzsche's, Masterson's, Ure's and Reginster's perspectives on resentment and *ressentiment*, this chapter draws out the potential albeit at times precarious relations between tolerance, toleration, resentment and *ressentiment*. As

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<sup>164</sup> The term 'impassioned' will be used here to denote the presence of the passions as conceived by the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, which as contended in the previous chapter forms part of the Nietzschean *valuation* this dissertation espouses.

with the treatment of tolerance and toleration hitherto, emphasis will be placed on the axiological, ethical, cognitive and affective aspects of resentment and *ressentiment*.

The outline of the chapter is as follows. The principal characteristics and distinctions of resentment and *ressentiment* will be explicated. The former will be outlined by reference to Ure's articulations on moral and socio-political resentment<sup>165</sup>. *Ressentiment* additionally entails an aggravating preoccupation with hostile and painful affects which according to Nietzsche serve as 'narcotics', the *repression* of certain judgements or evaluations, vengefulness, a sense of inherent impotence, envy, and the *primacy of negation*. Outlining the *primacy of negation* will demonstrate how the values and valuation entailed in *ressentiment* become "inverted" (Nietzsche 2007: I, 10). I will assess whether the affects and their accompanying judgements pertaining to resentment and *ressentiment* are passions. Early Nietzsche's narrative of the sufferer that was analysed in the previous chapter is taken up again and will be considered in light of one who feels (or re-feels) resentment and *ressentiment* in order to flesh out its links to tolerance and toleration. In so doing, other forms of toleration - what I call for the sake of convenience *denying* toleration (and potential implications on tolerance) - will be established. Having established this, I will conclude with an outline of the potential *life-denying* perils entailed in *denying* toleration.

What is important to note as a prelude is that Nietzsche did not consider *ressentiment* as an affect, but rather a painful and habit-forming "illness" (*Krankheit*) which encroaches upon the affects (especially resentment); its symptoms entail a radical mutation of how values are created, how affects are experienced and the kinds of judgements one *assents to* (2007: Preface, 5-6 & I, 10-11 & III, 15). Although the festering symptoms of *ressentiment* cultivate a psychological disturbance - which he calls *bad conscience* - Nietzsche repeatedly insists that the causes of *ressentiment* are physiological (2007: II, 11 & III, 13-15). This point is crucial for distinguishing between resentment and *ressentiment* and will be explored

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<sup>165</sup> Provided the *perspectivist* methodology, there may be more forms resentment may take. However, due to limitations of space and scope this chapter will only focus these two.



in relation to tolerance and toleration insofar as psychologically grappling with pain is also implicated.

Before analysing resentment, a caveat is in order with regards a Nietzschean *valuation* of resentment. Ure, I think on a warranted basis, criticises Nietzsche for clouding the issues concerning resentment and *ressentiment* by solely considering both in terms of *life-denying ressentiment* (2015: 607). That is to say in *GM*, wherein Nietzsche first conceptualises *ressentiment*, he only addresses *ressentiment* and does not explicitly distinguish between resentment and *ressentiment*. Although an in-depth enquiry of whether Nietzsche in his writings did support certain expressions of resentment would take this dissertation too far afield, this dissertation - with the aid of Ure's analysis of resentment and *ressentiment* and conclusions reached in the previous chapter - demonstrates that feeling the affect of resentment is not always symptomatic of an underlying disturbance of *life-denying ressentiment*. Moreover, feeling resentment does not always imply an impassioned disposition accompanied by *dogmatic* judgements.

Ure further criticises Nietzsche for misconceiving legitimate forms of socio-political resentment - which will be outlined below - as *life-denying ressentiment*, and attributes this oversight to his radical aristocratic politics and the mistaken "biological degeneracy" Nietzsche saw in such forms (2015: 607-608). Unfortunately, an analysis of Ure's critique will take this dissertation too far afield into the sphere of political philosophy. Suffice it to say that for a delimited consideration of the psychological, ethical and axiological implications resentment and *ressentiment* has on tolerance and toleration, these concerns are marginal. When these concerns, for example consideration of biological degeneracy of all socio-political resentment, overlap with this dissertation's endeavours, acute clarification will be provided based on conclusions reached in the second chapter.

## I: Resentment

Keeping to the format of the first chapter, this chapter will start with the etymology of 'resent' as it provides the reader with additional perspectives on resentment and

*ressentiment*. The etymology of ‘resent’ pertains to the French frequentative prefix ‘re-’ and ‘sentir’ denoting ‘to feel’<sup>166</sup> (Masterson 1979: 157 & 158). From this verb Nietzsche derived his conception of *ressentiment*, which is the substantivisation of the French ‘ressentir’. Furthermore, resentment is a hostile affect felt (or re-felt) as a result of an actual or imagined harm done (Masterson 1979: 157). Resentment primarily entails affective and cognitive components; however, on some rare occasions, it does also have conative - i.e. action and expression based - implications (ibid.). It is triggered by a painful experience felt, felt again or relived in the mind (ibid.).

Resentment is considered a modality of anger, hate, revenge, spite and envy; it may insidiously manifest itself as any one or combination of these reactive attitudes. In contrast to the aforesaid affects of anger etc., resentment is not expressed directly or openly: it is exceptional insofar as its expression is usually (consciously or unconsciously) inhibited by the person experiencing resentment. In other words, the potential actions and/or utterances - i.e. the conative aspects - that would result during the expression of resentment are usually not performed, but inhibited. Consequently, resentment usually does not strongly impact on the particular objects and entities - e.g. an uncongenial entity - resented; when it is expressed, it is almost always in an indirect - i.e. circuitous, surreptitious or pernicious - way (see Nietzsche 2007: I, 10). While its full expression is inhibited, the affect is sustained, resulting in protracted feelings of resentment. Moreover, the inhibition of the expressive component may likely render these affects toward that entity *unresolved*.

The reason as to why unexpressed affects remain unresolved, from a Nietzschean valuation, is that once a value and its associated affects and cognitions have been separated from its conative – i.e. action and expressive component – via inhibition, the value nevertheless remains intact. In turn the underpinning force or “instinct” driving the value does not simply disappear, but is rather redirected (see Nietzsche 2007: I, 10 & II, 16). During the redirection of resentment, the *uncongenial entity* is chastised only in effigy. Since such redirection is painful, Nietzsche does emphasise

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<sup>166</sup> See also (Ure 2015: 603).

that it enhances memory (2007: II, 5 & 15). As a result, occasions of resentment are better remembered; thereby also contributing to the likelihood that resentment will be re-felt. Apart from expressing an affect *externally* as a means of resolving it, Reginster also examines other ways of *internally* (or psychologically) resolving them. The means of *internally* resolving them necessarily implies transforming, eschewing, or replacing the values which underlie the affect and its accompanying judgements. Briefly put, these ways are by means of resignation and reflective revaluation and *ressentiment* (Reginster 1997: 287). Resignation entails consciously giving up on the pursuit of one's underpinning values associated with the affect, whilst nevertheless leaving intact the underpinning values; i.e. the high estimation of the pursuit of said values (ibid.). Reflective revaluation entails "abandon[ing] the values which we are unable to realise"; for example realising via reflection that the evaluations and underpinning value accompanying the affect not worth pursuing, or not possessing the quality we once thought it had (Reginster 1997: 288). Considerations of *ressentiment* will be analysed in detail in the ensuing sections.

The *unresolved* quality of resentment renders a similar experience - i.e. the likelihood of re-feeling resentment - probable during subsequent encounter<sup>167</sup>. At the onset of resentment, anger is the predominant affect it assumes; as resentment remains *unresolved* and is re-felt - in duration or at intervals - it likely takes on other mentioned modalities.

Contrary to contempt construed by Nietzsche as 'looking down from a superior height', resentment more accurately pertains to 'looking up indignantly from a nadir' (Ure 2015: 600). Ure distinguishes between two forms of resentment which will be examined; namely moral resentment and socio-political resentment. Although Ure analyses the affect of resentment with a particular focus on its political implications - i.e. communicating indignation against normative breaches or injustices as a form of restorative justice - an adequate treatment of its ethical, affective and cognitive aspects is also provided (Ure 2015: 599-600).

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<sup>167</sup> The encounter may entail the physical presence of the uncongenial entity, or being reminded of the uncongenial entity.

Moral resentment, according to Ure, pertains predominantly to “relatively enduring” anger resulting from what is judged and perceived to be “intentional, undeserved harmful acts or slights” by “moral agents”; or what I have called uncongenial entities (2015: 599 & 606). Apart from perceived harmful actions, the attitude of the uncongenial entity - mostly either contempt or indifference, claims Ure - is what fuels moral resentment (ibid.). Unfortunately Ure does not explain what he means by ‘attitude’, but from the text I gather that it broadly pertains to an intricate combination of the ‘moral agent’s’ character, disposition, comportment, expression and values (see Ure 2015: 600). The morally resentful person<sup>168</sup> considers himself being dishonoured or disrespected in light of the actual or imagined ‘harmful act or slight’ (2015: 599 & 606). Cognitively, moral resentment is usually accompanied by an expectation of good-will by the uncongenial entity towards the morally resentful person and the evaluation that the uncongenial entity is somehow accountable for his or her actions (ibid.). That is to say that moral resentment entails blame and accusation. Moral resentment, as the name suggests, carries with it (implicitly or explicitly) a norm that is perceived or judged to be transgressed by the uncongenial entity (ibid.). Ure, influenced by Hume’s and Adam Smith’s conceptions of resentment, delimits the above ‘acts or slights’ to “discrete instances of recognizable moral harms committed by individual moral agents” (2015: 606) or what I have called ‘uncongenial entities’. As Ure implies, the morally resentful person - contrary to the cognitive aspects associated with contempt - conceives of him or herself as the victim of a harmful act or slight, instead of figuring vicariously substituting him or herself in the role of the aggressor, or holding him- or herself in contempt (see Ure: 2015: 600, 602, 607, 608 & 609).

Reginster, foregrounding the axiological aspects of moral resentment, maintains that morally resentful persons do not consider the values which underpin the *attitude* and ‘acts or slights’ of their respective uncongenial entities as valuable; i.e. of a high value (1997: 296). Although the morally resentful person may consider such values and the uncongenial entity(s)’ corresponding acts or slights powerful or potent

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<sup>168</sup> By morally resentful person I do not mean to ascribe a quality or property of the person’s character or *essence*. Instead the term simply pertains to an individual currently experiencing or feeling *moral* resentment.

(looking up) enough to be able to harm them (from a nadir), they judge them to be morally debased (indignation) (ibid.). That is to say the values that underpin the affect of moral resentment and its associated judgements and cognitions are dissimilar to the perceived values, whose corresponding acts of slights are being judged as indignant<sup>169</sup>. Ure explicitly adopts and expands on Reginster's claim here, viz. that 'envy', 'vengefulness' and 'spite' modalities - and their underpinning values - associated with other forms of resentment and especially *ressentiment* are absent when feeling moral resentment; only the 'anger' and perhaps 'hate' modalities are effected (2015: 600 & 604).

Instead of pertaining to a particular uncongenial entity and 'discrete instances' of harm(s), socio-political resentment is felt (or re-felt) by groups and/or individuals as a response to "collective and systematic injustices" (Ure 2015: 599 & 606). The 'discrete instances' have been generalised by the socio-politically resentful person to (overt and/or institutionalised) prejudice and/or discrimination (ibid.). Psychologically, the attachment - albeit a hostile one - made during socio-political resentment is not restricted to an uncongenial entity, but rather radiates out towards the perceived culpable institutions, groups, ideals, parties, traits, characteristics and other associations among others which particular uncongenial entities are thought to represent (Ure 2015: 606). This phenomenon, at least in certain psychological discourses, has been called the *horns effect* (Nisbett & Wilson 1977: 250-256).

Although Masterson does not distinguish between different forms of resentment, he explains the aforesaid phenomenon in the following way. As more attachments are made during socio-political resentment, likely as a result of *unresolved* affects (on a psychological level) and oppressive or adverse circumstances (on a political level), the affective associations expand beyond the particular uncongenial entity<sup>170</sup>.

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<sup>169</sup> Although somewhat unclear at the moment, this point is important for later comparisons with *ressentiment* evaluation.

<sup>170</sup> As Masterson notes "...it [resentment] becomes more and more detached from the specific reason and tends to radiate out in all directions attaching itself to anything in any way associated with the original cause of the hatred such as his class, his religion or his views and require[s] complicated analysis to disclose the connection" (1979: 159 'brackets added').

Pursuing a complicated analysis of this phenomenon - whether on a political, therapeutic or a theoretical basis - would take this dissertation too far afield. Suffice it to say that when resentment is re-felt and remains *unresolved*, the affect (and all its potential modalities) spreads beyond the character and particular values of the uncongenial entity to any other possible association with the uncongenial entity or its representative.

The possibility remains that moral resentment, if not *resolved*, may also render the *horns effect* more likely, but does not extend as far as collective or systematic injustices. For example the *unresolved* moral resentment towards an uncongenial entity who has worn a cricket cap, renders it more likely - but does not guarantee - that entities wearing a cricket cap will be resented in the near future; or will at least be viewed less favourably. However, this does not as a matter of course imply the perpetuation of institutional discrimination or injustice; nor does it imply the representation of institutional discrimination or injustice by cricket cap wearing entities.

To decide whether moral or socio-political forms of resentment are passions, one would have to consider their accompanying judgements; specifically whether the kind of judgement is *dogmatic*. From an ethical perspective, this will entail establishing that the morally resentful person or the socio-politically resentful person has *assented* to an evaluation of the uncongenial entity's *attitude* - i.e. 'acts or slights' - as inherently (or *essentially*) bad; i.e. evil<sup>171</sup>. This *dogmatic* judgement must also grant the uncongenial entity a capacity for accountability. The analysis of resentment/*ressentiment* presented by Ure (2015) does not focus on its relation to the passions. Nevertheless, his outline of resentment/*ressentiment* provides some indications, which could be extended by a comparison with contempt addressed in previous chapters of this dissertation.

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<sup>171</sup> The distinction between 'bad' from 'evil' I use here pertains to whether the kind of judgement underlying the attribution of 'bad' or 'evil' is *dogmatic*. That is to say someone who is judged inherently, irredeemably and unconditionally bad is judged as evil.

As the term suggests, moral resentment clearly entails an ethical dimension insofar as the morally resentful person judges the respective uncongenial entity as transgressing a norm; the act or slight and the perceived values underpinning them are in conflict with what the morally resentful person values in other persons. By contrast, due to the ‘carelessness’ and ‘taking lightly’ entailed in contempt, in addition to the other resistances the sufferer demonstrates - e.g. vicarious substitution, redirecting the contempt upon himself - against judging the respective uncongenial entity as inherently bad, one can safely conclude that contempt is predominantly of the kind of *eupathos*. Although the contemptuous sufferer may evaluate the respective uncongenial entity as bad, this judgement of character does not extend to the point of assenting to the claim that the uncongenial entity, its acts or slights, or the suffering thus caused, are evil.

Ure provides plausible reasons for endorsing moral resentment; with the conditions that it is - at least - indirectly expressed and properly modulated (2015: 600). These reasons entail that moral resentment provides a way for individuals to “legitimately assert their dignity and self-respect”, to call for recognition and respect, to restore wounded honour and to facilitate “identification and protection of shared norms that regulate social and political relationships” (Ure 2015: 599-600). Ure goes on to demonstrate how moral resentment can manifest itself in indirect expression, and thereby modulate such resentment. Moral resentment towards the respective moral agent - i.e. uncongenial entity - can be “placated or overcome” *externally* by means of “communicative measures that successfully restore the sense that they [morally resentful persons] are held in public esteem and can therefore trust the normative order” (ibid. ‘brackets added’). The distinction that I use here between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ respectively pertains to whether an affect – resentment in this case - and its accompanying judgements are resolved cognitively or conatively. Such modulation pertains to the extent to which such affects becomes *resolved* insofar as these affect becomes *externally* - i.e. conatively - expressed, thereby drastically diminishing the likelihood that it will be re-felt.

However plausible Ure’s reasons may be for politically endorsing moral resentment, they do not clearly indicate whether moral resentment is to be considered a passion

or *eupathos*<sup>172</sup>. Nevertheless Ure, by drawing upon Nietzsche's meta-ethical critique of the evil/good *valuation*, explicitly warns the dangers of ascribing as *evil* what the noble and pagan cultures considered good (or *preferable*) - "power, success, beauty, health strength etc." (Ure 2015: 604-605). Moreover, Ure makes clear that moral resentment does not entail such an ascription. Although Ure has some reservations about how Nietzsche implements his naturalist project, he does support Nietzsche's critical project of "de-deify[ing] nature, eliminating... all teleological assumptions or explanations as metaphysical hangovers" inasmuch as he claims that "we do not want our defense of resentment to rest on a hidden or implicit teleological assumptions..." (Ure 2015: 601-602). Insofar as teleological assumptions and metaphysical hangovers entail an appeal to the unconditional or absolute, and that the evil/good valuation rests on such assumptions, a plausible claim can be made that moral resentment does not entail *dogmatic* judgements and is therefore a *eupathos*.

At this point a crucial caveat is in order. For similar reasons as the sufferer's contempt outlined in the previous chapter, feeling moral resentment renders one more vulnerable to succumbing to the passions. These reasons entail (all forms of) resentment being 'great affects' - i.e. affects intensely felt - which are accompanied by judgements and underpinned by values (moral or otherwise); resentment draws a rigid boundary between the resentful person and the uncongenial entity or *fate*; feeling resentment engenders intense psychological pain<sup>173</sup> in addition to possible tension as a result of physical pain from actual harm done. Moral resentment therefore, although not a passion, renders one more vulnerable to them for the same reasons as contempt.

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<sup>172</sup> The possibility remains that *moral* resentment, even though warranted on a political level and perhaps for the species in general, would always be detrimental to individual *flourishing*.

<sup>173</sup> That is to say resentment, like contempt, is not a pleasurable affect to experience. As Nietzsche stated it in aphorism ~114: "...he takes pleasure (*Genuss*) in conjuring up this contempt as though out of the deepest depths of Hell and thus subjecting his soul (*Seele*) to the bitterest pain (*Leid*): for it is through this counterweight that he holds his own (*hält Stand*) against the physical pain (*physischen Schmerze*)..." (1997: ~114). In *GM* Nietzsche also makes a similar argument for every "great affect" including resentment, which will be articulated in more detail in the next section (see 2007: III, 20).



I would go so far as to claim that moral resentment and socio-political resentment renders one even more vulnerable to succumbing to the passions as contempt. Although Ure focuses primarily on socio-political resentment,<sup>174</sup> he leaves open (but does not address) the possibility of moral resentment not being modulated and expressed (Ure 2015: 600-601). In Nietzsche's narrative, the sufferer holding contempt consciously refrains from blaming or accusing the uncongenial entity. The sufferer - wittingly or unwittingly - spares himself the psychological pain engendered by the tension caused by the cognitive orientation of blame. With regards to resentment in general, the overall pain is compounded by the additional tension of blame. Inasmuch as the overall tension is increased, the person of resentment becomes prone to the passions.

Moreover, by means of vicarious substitution, the sufferer avoids - at least temporarily - conceiving of himself as the victim of injustice. In the form of resentment that is akin to *eupathe*, the self-conception of victimhood does not have moral significance insofar as victimhood itself is considered good or bad, but would be more accurately described as *indifferent*. Nevertheless, as the tension increases so does the likelihood of succumbing to the passions, which implies that the likelihood of associating *dogmatic* judgements with victimhood also increases. The *dogmatic* judgements for instance can manifest themselves in the association of victimhood with "powerlessness", "weakness" and "incapacity", whereupon being the victim is considered on par with 'being good' or 'being virtuous' (see Ure 2015: 602). Insofar as the resentful person succumbs to the passions, the less likely it is that the resentment will be *externally resolved* (or as Ure calls it 'modulated'). The probability of re-feeling resentment during a subsequent encounter is thereby increased.

Socio-political resentment can be a *eupathos* for reasons similar to those motivating moral resentment stated above. Provided that collective and systematic injustices are much more pernicious and entrenched within the fabric of a possibly oppressive

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<sup>174</sup> Although Ure does not outline these risks entailed in socio-political resentment along the lines of the Stoic ethics I have *carved out*, he nevertheless avers that the *socio-politically* resentful person is more vulnerable to succumbing to *ressentiment*; or what Ure calls *ontological ressentiment* (2015: 608-609).

society, its (surreptitious or overt) procedures and the psychological and physical harm it causes will likely be repetitious. Such recurring harm and the looming implication that the institution(s) still wield power, according to Ure, “directly tap into fundamental insecurities and reinforce the sense of impotence” in the socio-politically resentful person (Ure 2015: 608). Apart from the above risks associated with socio-political resentment, Ure also delves into how the socio-politically resentful person risks “reversing” and “falsifying” their values by associating victimhood with ‘being good’, in addition to socio-political resentment manifesting as other modalities apart from anger and hate (Ure 2015: 605 & 608). Before I turn to the implications of an important albeit *life-denying* shift in the socio-politically resentful person’s values and its impact on the modalities of resentment, I wish to expand on resentment as accompanying affect of toleration.

## II: The analgesic effects of resentful toleration

Notwithstanding the possible physical pain engendered by the uncongenial entity, resentment itself - as briefly noted similarly to the affect of contempt - is a painful affect. Another aspect linking contempt to resentment lies in their analgesic effects in particular. In proximate passages in *GM Nietzsche* viscerally puts it thus:

To wrench (*ihre Fugen zu lösen*) the human soul (*Seele*) from its moorings, to immerse it in terrors, ice, flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure (*Unlust*), gloom (*Dumpfheit*), and depression (*Verstimmung*) as by a flash of lightning. What paths lead to this goal? And which of them do so most surely? Fundamentally, every great affect (*grossen Affekte*) has this power (*Vermögen*) ... anger (*Zorn*), fear (*Furcht*), lust (*Wollust*), revenge (*Rache*), hope, triumph, despair, cruelty... to awaken men from their slow melancholy, to hunt away, if only for a time, their dull pain (*dumpher Schmerz*) and lingering misery

(*zögerndes Elend*)... (Nietzsche 2007: III, 20)<sup>175</sup>. “[T]he sufferer (*Leidende*)... vents (*entladen*) his affects (*Affekte*), actually or in effigy, for the venting of his affects (*Affekt-Entladung*) represents the greatest attempt on the part of the suffering to win relief (*Erleichterung*), anaesthesia (*Betäubungs-Versuch*) - the narcotic (*Narcoticum*)... to deaden pain (*Qual*) of any kind... [A] desire to deaden pain by means of affects (*Betäubung von Schmerz durch Affect*)” (2007: III, 15).

In these passages Nietzsche claims that ‘great affects (*grosse Affekte*)’ have analgesic qualities. The term ‘great’ should not be considered as denoting ‘very good’, but rather the German ‘*gross*’, denoting ‘large’ or ‘big’. The only factor that Nietzsche mentions that we could use to distinguish ‘large’ and ‘small’ affects, is their intensity (see Nietzsche 2007: I, 10)<sup>176</sup>. That is to say that all affects intensely felt, like ‘anger’, ‘revenge’ etc., have an analgesic quality, despite the tension they themselves may engender<sup>177</sup>. Resentment, in its modalities of ‘anger’, ‘revenge’, ‘envy’ and ‘spite’, emulates these other great affects; however, it does so besides the additional tension engendered by the inhibition of its expressive and conative components. Therefore, it would be plausible to state that resentment would be a more potent analgesic than any of the other great affects; yet it is more precarious for the exact same reason.

The term ‘venting’ (*Entladung*) that Nietzsche uses here requires clarification. Affects like anger, when vented ‘actually’, pertain to its direct expression along with the possible conative components. This direct expression entails discharging anger directly at the respective uncongenial entity(s) immediately or soon after its

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<sup>175</sup> See also Scheler’s outline of resentment and *ressentiment* wherein he talks of the “unpleasant or even painful sensations” which “accompany every affect” whose “outward expression is blocked” (1972: 71).

<sup>176</sup> In this passage, where Nietzsche conceptualises *ressentiment*, he also mentions how happiness “in those whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering” manifests as a “narcotic” and as “slackening of tension.”

<sup>177</sup> For an explanation of this ostensible paradox, please refer back to chapter 2 where the analgesic qualities of contempt were outlined.

manifestation. Although such affect has an analgesic effect, whether or not the uncongenial entity may subsequently alter one's *attitude*, the expressive and conative components principally contribute to (*externally*) *resolving* the affect. This claim is based on Nietzsche's insistence that the judgements, their accompanying affects and their underlying values "should not be sundered from action" (ibid.). It satisfies<sup>178</sup> the (ethical) duties and obligations (within our control) - whatever they may be - associated with the value in question.

Exceptions to the analysis of contempt outlined here occur when the expression or action components are effectively prevented from being expressed by an uncongenial entity, by institutions, by the *morality of custom*<sup>179</sup> or by any other circumstances subsumed here under *fate*. An exception of another kind pertains to the affect of contempt and the indifference it entails: the sufferer "shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others" by not taking his enemies, accidents and misdeeds seriously for very long<sup>180</sup> (ibid.). He *withstandingly tolerates* the uncongenial entities for which he holds contempt. The sufferer in Nietzsche's narrative holds contempt for three entities: for the 'misty world' (*Nebelwelt*) in which the healthy man thoughtlessly wanders'; for the noble and beloved illusions in which he formerly indulged; and lastly, for his own *character*. Insofar as the analgesic effect affords the sufferer pleasure from holding contempt for these entities, the sufferer must be 'venting' this affect in effigy. Venting the great affects in effigy does not

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<sup>178</sup> As briefly mentioned the *soul* (*Seele*) for Nietzsche consists of drives (*Triebe*) and affects. These drives serve to spur one on towards action and are satisfied when their 'strength is discharged (*entladen*)' (see Nietzsche 2002: ~13). Similarities with Stoic psychology aside, it is clear that these drives - at least from a Nietzschean valuation - are only fully satisfied when their expressive or conative components are enacted.

<sup>179</sup> The *morality of custom* entails customary obligations and restrictions initially made possible by physical coercion and punishment, which eventually forged societies (see Nietzsche 2007: II, 2). It represents the constraints one finds in every society; for example laws that prevent violence, unrestrained sexual conduct etc. In turn, such conditions - which most of us find ourselves in today - many of our drives and affects are effectively prevented from expression. In turn they become inhibited - i.e. repressed (see below) - by those who live under the *morality of custom*. Contrary to the Hobbesian social contract, where primitive human beings living in the state of nature devised an agreement not to harm one another which formed the first societies, Nietzsche argues that the primary force that precipitated the transition from the state of nature to living in a society was intraspecies violence, cruelty and enslavement.

<sup>180</sup> For more examples Nietzsche provides in *GM*, see the second chapter on the Russian fatalists, or see (Nietzsche 2007: II, 15).

necessarily imply that the affect is (directly or indirectly) expressed, or that the underpinning value's conative component has been performed. This point is important for the critical comparison between resentment and *withstanding* toleration.

Insofar as the resentful person - whether moral resentment or socio-political resentment - vents his anger, hatred, spite, or envy on the uncongenial entity in effigy, he is also gaining pleasure from the analgesic effect afforded by this great affect. Since the resentful person is in effect grappling with pain, the resentful person is *tolerating* when venting his affects in effigy. This may entail (partially) alleviating the pain arising from the physical harm engendered by the uncongenial entity, or the pain that the uncongenial entity's psychical representation evokes.

Since resentment, can be vented in effigy either as *eupathe* or passion, it remains unclear how a passion can be subsumed under *withstanding toleration*. The simple answer is that it cannot. However inasmuch as resentment as passion vented in effigy<sup>181</sup> does serve to grapple with pain, it is a form of toleration. I shall call this form *life-denying* toleration, for several reasons which tie in with the life-affirming Nietzschean *valuation*.

For Nietzsche, *denial*<sup>182</sup> means "saying 'No!'" to what is "outside", to what is "different", to what is "not itself" (ibid.). *Denial* does not as a matter of course imply *life-denial*; what render it so are the *dogmatic* judgements and the passions accompanying it. A critical analysis of a passage in *BGE* can serve to clarify the links between the judgements and the passions entailed in the process.

We do not object to a judgement just because it is false (*Falschheit*); this is probably what is strangest about our new language. The question is rather to what extent the judgement furthers life,

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<sup>181</sup> Resentment actually - i.e. indirectly - expressed would then *resolve* the affect by means of satisfying the drive, thereby precluding toleration qua the psychical grappling with pain.

<sup>182</sup> See also (Nietzsche 1997: ~103).

preserves life, preserves the species, perhaps even cultivates the species; and we are in principle inclined to claim that judgements that are the most false (*falschesten Urtheile*) (among which are the synthetic *a priori* judgements) are the most indispensable to us, that man could not live without accepting logical fictions, without measuring reality by the purely invented world of the unconditional (*Unbedingten*), self-evident (*Sich-selbst-Gleichen*), without a continual falsification (*beständige Fälschung*) of the world by means of the number - that to give up false judgements (*falsche Urtheile*) would be to give up life, to deny (*Vereinung*) life. Admitting untruth (*Unwahrheit*) as a condition of life: that means to resist (*Widerstand leisten*) familiar values (*gewohnte Werthgefühle*) in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that dares this has already placed itself beyond good and evil (Nietzsche 2002: ~4).

Nietzsche's apparently deliberate ambiguity concerning 'falsity' and 'untruth' may strike one as somewhat perplexing; however it can be clarified by the Sceptical perspective outlined. Similar to what was established in the second chapter, Nietzsche here claims that whether a judgement - or more precisely the content of the judgement - is false does not imply that the judgement is not valuable insofar as it may nonetheless contribute to *flourishing*. The term 'false' can be interpreted as 'not able to be unconditionally established' or perhaps 'not in accord with how things *appear* from this *perspective*'. Nietzsche uses the personal pronoun 'we' to designate like-minded thinkers: viz. those who have placed themselves 'beyond good and evil'. The like-minded thinkers, including Nietzsche himself, consider that the most false judgements (*falschesten Urtheile*) are those logical fictions pertaining to unconditional and self-evident Truths; i.e. *dogma*. That is to say, the most false judgements are *dogmatic* judgements for Nietzsche. These most false judgments are indispensable to (albeit spurned by) the like-minded thinkers inasmuch as Scepticism is a critical enterprise; its "aim is not to propound positive views of its own but to discredit those of the dogmatists" (Berry 2011: 123).

In contrast with the 'we', Nietzsche further claims that man - or perhaps more accurately 'the common man'<sup>183</sup> or *dogmatist* - could not live without the continual falsification (*beständige Fälschung*) of the world. The common man, having succumbed to these 'logical fictions', instead of juxtaposing more (possibly conflicting) *perspectives* to their claims, predominantly and continually endeavours to falsify - i.e. declare all competing perspectives to be False merely by virtue of being in contrast to their Truth. That is to say, Falsity is not established on the basis of the merit of in-depth investigation of the claim in question, but is rather perfunctorily deduced from its and ostensible dissimilarity with the *dogmatist's* Truth. Such falsification in the quest for Truth, besides being in contrast to *perspectival objectivity*, entails primarily *denying* other perspectives by branding them as False. Although Nietzsche does not provide reasons in this aphorism, he does maintain that such an endeavour based on *dogmatic* judgements is *life-denying* insofar as it primarily<sup>184</sup> says 'No!' to what is 'outside', 'different' and 'not-itself'. In other words, it says 'No!' to most of this world<sup>185</sup> and to life itself insofar as most others (even other *dogmatists*) do not assent to the same *dogmatic* claims - such as moral principles, for example.

Nietzsche further claims that the *dogmatist* is extremely reluctant to relinquish his clingy attachments to his false judgements (*falsche Urtheile*) - i.e. *dogmatic judgements* about what is unconditionally false (False) - as though based on the *dogmatic* judgement that without an irreproachable foundation life itself is *denied*. This will be demonstrated below by considering resentment as passion and as *denying toleration*.

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<sup>183</sup> Later in *BGE* Nietzsche explicitly equates the common man with being a *dogmatist* (see 2002: ~43).

<sup>184</sup> What is 'primarily' entailed in *dogmatic denial* will be further elucidated by Reginster's concept of the *primacy of negation* in the next section. In this section it suffices to denote 'for the most part'.

<sup>185</sup> For more insight into this claim, see the *modes of Scepticism* outlined at length by Sextus Empiricus (2000: I, 35-179). Also see Nietzsche's outline of 'all the world' in *GM* where he takes it to mean 'all opponents to the particular manifestation of the evil/good *valuation* in question' (2007: I, 8).

To be able to admit untruth (*Unwahrheit*), Nietzsche claims, would allow 'us' to resist the familiar (common) yet *life-denying* values and thereby place ourselves 'beyond good and evil'. 'Admitting untruth' here involves sceptical *suspension of judgement*; i.e. refraining from *assenting to dogmatic* judgements - i.e. Truth or Falsity - regarding 'unclear objects of investigation', such as those related to the question as to how things inherently and unconditionally are (and are not). 'Admitting untruth', based on all the *apparent* discrepancies and forms of diversity, is the concession that one does not seem to have privileged access to unconditional truth, or the *essence* of things, or the ultimate purpose qua Nature of things. In *BGE*, in particular, Nietzsche focuses his critique on *dogmatic* moral judgements, which he subsumes under evaluations of 'morality' and 'good and evil' (in contrast with 'ethics' and 'good and bad').

Resentment as passion under the rubric of *denying* toleration would follow the same pattern of continual falsification; i.e. *life-denial*. If the *morally* resentful person evaluates the uncongenial entity's *attitude* - particularly his or her conduct, acts or slights - as evil, there must exist an autonomous Subject<sup>186</sup> that can be held unconditionally accountable for its conduct. Entailed in such a moral judgement is saying 'No!' to what is 'outside', 'different' and 'not itself'; i.e. *denying* the *attitude* of the uncongenial entity. Insofar as the uncongenial entity's *attitude* is judged evil, he or she would reasonably be expected to admit his/her transgression, or cease such an *attitude* for now and in the future, or apologise, or make amends to the resentful

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<sup>186</sup> This claim is exemplified by Kant's and Hegel's conception of the autonomous Subject, which cannot be influenced or determined by an outside force such as *fate*. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. An interesting critical comparison can be made between the deontological ontology of the autonomous Subject and the Stoic ontology of the *hêgemonikon* (or perhaps Nietzsche notion of the *sovereign*); i.e. the ruling faculty of the mind (see Epictetus 1944: II. 22. 25-27). Whereas the Subject cannot be influenced, the *hêgemonikon* can be influenced, since all that *exist* for the Stoic can be acted upon. A subtle yet crucial distinction can further be made. The adherent of Subjective ontology would consider the thoughts that enter consciousness as *their* thoughts insofar as their Subjectivity for which they are accountable produced the thought. Therefore they are accountable – and perhaps should feel guilty - for any *evil* or False thoughts that enter consciousness. By contrast for Nietzsche and most Stoics – e.g. Seneca – it is beyond one's control which thoughts enter consciousness; only after thoughts have entered consciousness can we exert control over them. Consequently, what is bad is not *having dogmatic* thoughts, but rather *assenting* to them. This, I think, is the main reason why Nietzsche is very critical of modern notions of freedom and autonomy. This is probably why Nietzsche claims that consciousness is man's "weakest and most fallible organ", as it *apparently* remains susceptible to the incursion of *dogmatic* judgements beyond one's control (2007: II, 16).



person; this would show the respect and recognition the resentful person deserves as a matter of course. However, the problem lays not so much with the expectation of the impassioned resentful person, but rather with the unconditional guarantee of its fruition without actively taking responsibility for *holding* the uncongenial entity accountable. The impassioned resentful person either judges the attempt at expressing or enacting resentment as an *evil attitude*, since it oftentimes involves resorting to conduct similar to that of those judged as *evil*; or the impassioned resentful person expects the uncongenial entity to autonomously realise his/her own transgressions, since the onus of all responsibility and accountability is considered to be on him or her. Meanwhile the impassioned resentful person continues to resent the uncongenial entity. This amounts to *denying* toleration. Instead its expression and its conative components are inhibited by the resentful person, thereby increasing the likelihood of re-feeling impassioned resentment and the psychological pain it entails. Upon a subsequent encounter the resentful person will likely *deny* the uncongenial entity in a similar fashion.

Important to note here is that the Stoic criterion deciding whether the impassioned resentful person is effectively restricted by external forces (*fate*) or not, is superseded by the *dogmatic* judgement. The Stoic sufferer, in other words, would - whether *withstandingly* or *em-bracingly* - tolerate the inevitable *fate* affirmatively as being in accordance with Nature<sup>187</sup>, whereas the Nietzschean sufferer would affirm the inevitable *fate* as part of Dionysian *necessity* by assuming a cosmic perspective - despite not necessarily endorsing it (see Ure 2009: 79). When it is not inevitable - i.e. when the Stoic or Nietzschean is not physically restrained by external forces - the Stoic and Nietzschean should express their affects as *eupathe* or take action. In the mode of *denying* toleration, the resentful person continues to *deny* not only the

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<sup>187</sup> Although the Stoic judgement ultimately rests on a *dogmatic* metaphysical *valuation* of Nature, the Stoic sufferer – as demonstrated in the previous chapter - does manage to (temporarily) stave off *dogmatic* judgements of *denial* toward the *uncongenial entity's attitude*, or *character*, and *fate*, thereby sparing himself the psychological pain entailed in impassioned resentment. Although the rigid conceptual boundary between man and *fate* is held by the Human Stoic, he does not *dogmatically deny* his inevitable *fate*; i.e. what is currently happening to him. As a result of *affirming* his current predicament he focuses – or should focus - only on that which is within his control: *withstanding* it courageously. Whether the Stoic, Human or Cosmic alike, is able to relinquish the passion of arrogance without relinquishing his metaphysics and epistemology I sincerely doubt.

uncongenial entity's *attitude*, but also the *necessity* of his/her *fate*. However, based on the *dogmatic* judgement that it is immoral to express his or her resentment or to take action, or expecting the uncongenial entity to independently realise his/her transgressions, the resentful person neglects that which is within his control: namely "conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing" (Epictetus 1983: 1.1-3). The matter of whether the resentful person, in the mode of *denying* toleration, is able to express his or her resentment, or whether he or she can take action or not, becomes irrelevant, since doing so is (mistakenly) perceived as not part of their (moral) responsibilities.

Neglecting what is within his/her control, the impassioned resentful person not only judges that the uncongenial entity is causing the physical pain; he/she also causes the impassioned resentful person to feel resentment<sup>188</sup>. Nietzsche also distinctly and emphatically points to this neglect by stating: "The man who [is]... forcibly confined to the oppressive narrowness and punctiliousness of custom, impatiently lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated *himself*" (2007: II, 16 'brackets and italics added'). Despite the possibility of actual oppressive circumstances or societal confines, the cause of the psychological pain accompanied by 'great affects' such as resentment in addition to the inhibition of its expression is not found in external forces, but is rather *internal to* and within the control of the impassioned resentful person. Such neglect is a further contaminant of associated *dogmatic* judgements.

By means of the 'fictional logic' entailed in *dogmatic* judgements, the person of impassioned resentment conceives of him/herself as 'good' within this evil/good *valuation* by virtue of not choosing to adopt an *evil attitude* or doing *evil* deeds. In a frequently quoted controversial passage in *GM*, Nietzsche depicts the 'fictional logic' of the evil/good *valuation* in analogy with the birds of prey and the lamb; he goes to great lengths criticising *dogmatic* judgements and *valuations* which bespeak the

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<sup>188</sup> As mentioned in the first chapter on Stoic ethics: what is causing a passionate response is not the 'badness' or 'goodness' of the object (or *uncongenial entity*) itself, but instead prior value judgements – of 'badness' or 'goodness' - associated with the object (Laërtius 1925: 217 & Cicero 2005: 134).

aforesaid neglect of what is within our control, in particular the autonomous Subject, for facilitating what he here calls this “fiction” and earlier “a falsification” (Nietzsche 2007: I, 13).

When the oppressed (*Unterdrückten*), downtrodden (*Niedergetretenen*), outraged (*Vergewaltigten*) exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence (*rachsüchtigen List der Ohnmacht*): "let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble, and just" - this, listened to calmly (*kalt*) and without previous bias (*ohne Voreingenommenheit*), really amounts to no more than: "we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing *for which we are not strong enough*" but this dry matter of fact, this prudence of the lowest order... has, thanks to the counterfeit and self-deception of impotence (*Falschmünzerei und Selbstverlogenheit der Ohnmacht*), clad itself in the ostentatious garb (*abwartenden gekleidet*) of the virtue of quiet (*stille Tugend*), calm resignation, just as if the weakness of the weak - that is to say, their essence (*Wesen*), their effects, their sole ineluctable, irremovable reality (*Wirklichkeit*) - were a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed (*That*), a *meritorious* act. This type of man *needs* to believe in a neutral autonomous "Subject" (*Subjekt*) (ibid.).

Nietzsche makes clear in this passage how the ‘fictional logic’ of *life-denial* is applied to value-creation: the impassioned resentful person claims that he is good since he does *not* do *evil* or present an *evil attitude*. His values of ‘goodness’ are based on the *dogmatic* judgement that *denies evil-doers*, or those who present *evil attitudes*. In the mode of *denying* toleration, the impassioned resentful person *denies* the reality - i.e. the *fate* - that befalls him/her, in addition to *denying* the potential responsibilities of holding the uncongenial entity accountable. He/She does so by *falsely* revaluing

his inaction as a virtuous and freely chosen deed; 'turning the other cheek' so to speak.

In the subsequent section Nietzsche mentions how by means of this revaluation, the "golden-sounding ring of virtue", is "counterfeited" by the "forger's skill" (Nietzsche 2007: I, 14). This statement becomes explicable in terms of the aspects of virtue ethics that Nietzsche plausibly seems to endorse throughout his works, particularly Scepticism and Stoic ethics. Virtue here is said to be counterfeited insofar as its cognitive expression - as opposed to conative expression - imitates ancient and noble virtues; whether the virtue is temperance, wisdom, courage, tolerance, patience, endurance, humility, or justice. On the contrary, such 'counterfeit' 'good deeds' are based on the passions and the *dogmatic* judgements accompanying them, thereby undermining the virtue ethics underpinning most ancient aristocratic philosophers' admonitions regarding the *eudaimonia* subsumed under the good/bad *valuation*.

If one were to listen to these exhortations 'calmly' (*kalt*)<sup>189</sup> 'without bias' (*ohne Voreingenommenheit*), Nietzsche says, one would ascertain the weakness underlying such words. 'Calmly' here presumably denotes the *apatheia* espoused by most ancient aristocratic philosophers. 'Without bias' can be taken to denote 'without *dogma*', considering Nietzsche's concurrent criticism of *dogmatic* concepts such as Kant's unconditionally free, autonomous *Subject*<sup>190</sup>.

A caveat is in order here with regard to 'the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged' who 'exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence' to whom Nietzsche is referring here. In other sections Nietzsche subsumes 'the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged' under the term 'slave', in contrast to the 'master' or 'nobleman' espousing aristocratic values (2007: I, 5-6). In adducing the term 'slave', Nietzsche does not

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<sup>189</sup> '*Kalt*' is the German word for 'cold'. Nevertheless, it makes sense if 'coldly' pertains to 'unaffected by the emotions'; namely the passions.

<sup>190</sup> Based on Nietzsche statement regarding 'sole ineluctable, irremovable reality' that the 'oppressed, downtrodden, outraged' *deny*, his criticism of Kant's autonomous *Subject* seems to pertain to its utter neglect of the contingencies of *fate* and *necessity*.

refer to a socio-political position, to socio-economic class, or to disenfranchised and disadvantaged peoples or groups - although the designation 'slave' may happen to coincide with those; instead, he emphasises that "the case that concerns us here" in *GM* is the type of *character*<sup>191</sup> espoused (ibid.). This means that Nietzsche is not criticising 'the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged' for not being strong enough to prevent such adversity, nor the mere fact that they are 'oppressed, downtrodden, and outraged'. Instead, he is criticising them insofar as they display a particular "*character trait*": the *character* (the slave) is one who portrays the evil/good *valuation*, which in turn is underpinned by *dogmatic* values (ibid.). Epistemology and metaphysics aside, the manumitted slave Epictetus is counted among the 'master' aristocratic ancient philosophers, based on all the *character traits* of the *character* 'noble master' outlined in *GM* (see Nietzsche 2007: I, 10). Elaborating on what is within our control, Epictetus explains that what is "not up to us are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing... Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men" (Epictetus 1983: 1.1-3). Epictetus warns us here that misconceiving what is within our control as something beyond our control (*assenting* to such judgments and their accompanying affects) and misconceiving the *indifferents* as things good or evil (the uncongenial entity's acts or slights), would result in succumbing to the passions and adopt a slavish *character* towards those *indifferents*. The slavish trait is to render one's *eudaimonia* or *flourishing* docilely dependent upon objects beyond one's control.

An important consideration for this dissertation are those 'slaves' who 'counterfeit' the 'ring of virtue' of tolerance; those who effectuate *life-denying* toleration and justify it as virtuous under the banner of tolerance. Their 'love' for the other - i.e. for the uncongenial entity - in the name of respecting diversity under the banner of tolerance stands revealed by Nietzsche as a means to vent their hatred and impassioned

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<sup>191</sup> Reginster, to whom I owe gratitude for this insight, adds in a footnote that "[t]he socio-political predicament of the agent who exemplifies a character-type might (but need not) contribute to his developing a character of that type. A slave from the socio-political standpoint might well develop a noble character" (1997: 285).

resentment in effigy (2007: I, 8). The repercussions of *denying* the uncongenial entity would (quite paradoxically) undermine respect for diversity insofar as the person of impassioned resentment *tolerates* what is considered beyond the pale of what is considered just.

One of the repercussions of this kind of resentful tolerance is that of associating victimhood with “powerlessness”, “weakness” and “incapacity”, whereupon being the victim and effecting *denying* toleration is considered on par with ‘being good’ or ‘being virtuous’ (see Ure 2015: 602). The person implementing *denying* toleration, by *assenting* to a ‘fictional logic’, may think: ‘to be intolerant of the intolerant would be doing the exact-same evil as that perpetrated by the no-good evil-doer who arouses my indignation. Let me instead be good by staying put and being tolerant.’<sup>192</sup> Another risk follows: as the impassioned resentment remains *unresolved*, the more *dogmatic* judgements come to be associated with the uncongenial entity or the institutions that the uncongenial entity represents. By possible means of the *horns effect*, the contagion may spread to uncongenial entity’s *facticity*<sup>193</sup>; for example the collectivity - the class, gender, race, or ethnicity - with whom he/she is associated.

### III: The *ressentiment* of the tolerant priest and slave

If *denying* toleration is so *life-denying* and (impassioned) resentment itself is so unpleasant, then why are those who effectuate it so reluctant to extirpate the underpinning values and their ensuing *dogmatic* judgements and passions? The reason given by Nietzsche is that resorting to these passions has become a consolation by virtue of their analgesic effect. That is to say, the passions are an

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<sup>192</sup> A thorough analysis of this ostensible paradox would take this dissertation too far afield. For further reading I suggest Rainer Forst’s article entitled *The Limits of Toleration* (2004).

<sup>193</sup> I borrow this term from Sartre, whom in turn adopted it from Heidegger, which pertains to contingent facts (*being-in-itself*) about or another, for example one’s race, class, place of birth, one’s occupation etc. (Sartre 2003: 84-85). Although such facts although they may influence one, they do not determine one’s values and consequently one’s conduct (*being-for-itself*). The risks Sartre also outlines the tendency to misconstrue the values one creates about one or another’s *facticity* as being inherently caused by the *facticity*. For example associating evil deeds, such as criminal conduct, with the *facticity* of being black. The (*dogmatic*) mistake here is that one’s blackness does not cause one to steal, or become a criminal.

addictive psychological narcotic; it numbs and deadens - if only for a while - the physical and psychological pain. From a cognitive perspective, the passions banish the unpleasant tension of uncertainty based on the “unhealthily disproportionate need for security and stability” from which the *dogmatist* suffers (Berry 2011: 39). In his/her *dogmatic* fear of uncertainty and transformation<sup>194</sup> (see Berry 2011: 142-156), the *dogmatist* clings onto his/her *dogmatic* judgements about what is evil, good, True, or False.

From a physiological perspective, Nietzsche argues that such resorting to impassioned resentment, the accompanying *dogmatic* judgements, *denying* toleration, and the creation of passive and ‘impotent’ values, can be (somewhat paradoxically) explained by the ‘human animal’s’ instinct for self-preservation; or what he calls *the protective instincts of a degenerating life*. These *instincts* “[indicate] a partial physiological obstruction and exhaustion against which the deepest instincts of life, which have remained intact, continually struggle with new expedients and devices” (Nietzsche 2007: III, 13). In other words, the physical and psychological pain experienced has reached a point of exhaustion and fatigue. Subsequently, these *instincts* are (unconsciously) effected to struggle against any further pain to facilitate the human animal’s continued existence. Manifested consciously as re-felt impassioned resentment, the narcotic effect is afforded by *denying* toleration as an expedient solution. The repercussions, however, entail the swelling of *dogmatic* judgements and the creation of a *valuation* - the evil/good *valuation* - of passive and ‘impotent’ values.

However, the narcotic effect - similar to narcotic drug abuse - entailed in re-felt impassioned resentment also deadens the impetus to action; it further distorts judgement insofar as it undermines *perspectival objectivity* when the value of truth is pertinent. Impassioned resentment operating by means of ‘continual falsification’ becomes the dominant affect through which the world is perceived, at the expense of

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<sup>194</sup> Sextus Empiricus writes: “[w]hen they lack what they believe to be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason and measure, and in fear of change and they do anything so as not to lose what they believe to be good (2000: I, 27).”

other affects. Nietzsche claims that “[t]his alone, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of *ressentiment*, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects” (2007: III, 15). However, such a means of consolation only exacerbates the physical and psychological malaise that it sought to cure (Ure 2009: 63). The narcotic effect of *denying* toleration, mobilising the *protective instincts of a degenerating life*, only temporarily alleviates the symptoms and not the physiological cause. The more the person resorts to *denying* toleration, the more violent and vicious the resentment becomes in order to attain the desired narcotic effect<sup>195</sup>. The more violent and vicious the resentment turns, the more tense and painful the experience. The more intense the psychological and especially psychological pain experienced, the more likely it will be to reach the point of exhaustion and fatigue which in turn elicits the *protective instinct of a degenerating life*. *Ressentiment* manifests itself when the impassioned resentful person (consciously or unconsciously) resorts to such ‘great affects’ in order to deaden pain.

Nietzsche does not claim that the *protective instincts of a degenerating life* inevitably cause *ressentiment*. They can also act as causes of other physiological processes. Nietzsche adds a qualifying condition in psychological terms: there is a subtle distinction between “the desire to deaden pain by means of affects” and “the desire to prevent further injury” (2007: III, 15). Although similar in the function of conservatively preventing pain, “the desire to prevent further injury” does not set about preventing pain by means of affects. The Russian fatalist<sup>196</sup> in *GM*, and the sufferer who in *D* are adduced by Nietzsche to exemplify the “the desire to prevent

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<sup>195</sup> Perhaps it would not be inaccurate to state that such a person build up a physiological tolerance for the affective narcotic.

<sup>196</sup> In *EH* aphorism 6 entitled ‘Freedom from *ressentiment*’ Nietzsche claims “If anything at all must be adduced against being sick and being weak, it is that man's really remedial instinct, his fighting instinct wears out... Against all this the sick person has only one great remedy. I call it Russian fatalism, that fatalism without revolt which is exemplified by a Russian soldier who, finding a campaign too strenuous, finally lies down in the snow. No longer to accept anything at all, no longer to take anything, no longer to absorb anything---to cease reacting altogether. This fatalism is not always merely the courage to die; it can also preserve life under the most perilous conditions by reducing the metabolism, slowing it down, as a kind of will to hibernate, Because one would use oneself up too quickly if one reacted in any way, one does not react at all any more: this is the logic. Nothing burns one up faster than the affects of *ressentiment*... *Ressentiment* is what is forbidden par excellence for the sick - it is their specific evil - unfortunately also their most natural inclination. (Nietzsche 1989: ‘Why I Am So Wise’, 6).



further injury” without mobilising affects: The former “submitted to punishment as one submits to an illness or to a misfortune or to death, with that stout-hearted fatalism without rebellion through which the Russians, for example, still have an advantage over us [contemporary] Westerners in dealing with life” (Nietzsche 2007: II, 15 brackets added). This manifestation amounts to *em-bracing* toleration of the cosmic perspective that Nietzsche calls *amor fati*.

In the impassioned resentful person succumbing to the addiction of *ressentiment* - i.e. in the case where the re-feeling of impassioned resentment and *denying* toleration has become the primary manifestation of the *protective instincts of a degenerating life* - *ressentiment* takes on subtle albeit crucial distinguishing features.

Conceptualising *ressentiment* in *GM*, Nietzsche maintains that:

The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values (*Werthe gebiert*): the *ressentiment* of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds (*denen die eigentliche Reaktion die der That versagt ist*), and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge (*imaginäre Rache*). While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation (*Ja-sagen*) of itself, slave morality from the outset says ‘No!’ to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this ‘No!’ is its creative *deed* (*schöpferische That*). This inversion of the value-positing eye (*Umkehrung des werthesetzenden Blicks*) - this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself (*nach Außen statt zurück auf sich selber*) - is of the essence (*gehört eben*) of *ressentiment*: in order to exist, slave morality always first (*immer zuerst*) needs a hostile external world (*Gegen - und Assenwelt*); it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all - its action is fundamentally reaction... one should remember that, even supposing that the affect of contempt (*Affekt der Verachtung*), of looking down from a superior height (*Überlegen-Blickens*), falsifies the image of that which it despises (*Bild des Verachteten fälscht*), it will at any rate still be a much less serious

falsification than that perpetrated on its opponent (*bei weitem hinter der Fälschung zurückbleiben wird*) - in effigy of course (*in effigie*) - by the submerged hatred, the vengefulness of the impotent (*Ohnmächtigen*)... The "well-born" felt themselves to be the "happy" (*Glückliche*); they did not have to establish their happiness artificially (*künstlich*) by examining their enemies (*Blick auf ihre Feinde*), or to persuade (*einzureden*) themselves, deceive (*einzulügen*) themselves, that they were happy (as all men of *ressentiment* are in the habit of doing (*zu thun pflegen*))... the impotent, the oppressed, and those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering, with whom it appears as essentially (*wesentlich*) narcotic (*Narcose*), drug (*Betäubung*), rest, peace, "sabbath," slackening of tension (*Ausspannung*) and relaxing of limbs, in short *passively*<sup>197</sup> (*passivisch*)... Ressentiment itself, if it should appear (*auftritt*) in the noble man, consummates (*vollzieht*) and exhausts (*erschöpft*) itself in an immediate reaction (*sofortige Reaktion*), and therefore does not poison (*vergiftet*): on the other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent... In contrast to this, picture "the enemy" (*den Feind*) as the man of *ressentiment* conceives (*concipirt*) him - and here precisely is his deed (*seine That*), his creation (*seine Schöpfung*): he has conceived "the evil enemy (*den bösen Feind*), "the Evil One," (*den Bösen*) and this in fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought (*Nachbild*) and counterpart (*Gegenstück*), a "good one" - himself! (Nietzsche 2007: I, 10)

Despite the analysis of *denial* entailed in *denying* toleration and of affirmation entailed in *withstanding* and *em-bracing* toleration, the distinction between the 'noble' *character's* and the 'slave' *character's denial* in the course of resentment remains underemphasised. From the passage quoted above one can glean that evil/good

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<sup>197</sup> 'Passive', both in English and German, has the same etymological roots as 'passion' (see Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. 'passion' & 'passive').

values are principally created in 'reaction' to what is considered evil. Nietzsche states that evil/good values start with a 'NO!' - which is what their creative *deed* consists in (ibid.). Moreover, he claims that 'slave morality always first (*immer zuerst*) needs a hostile external world' (ibid.). How is this hostile external world considered 'first' or 'primary'? What distinguishes the sufferer in the case of *withstanding* toleration - who also initially presupposes a hostile external world - from the sufferer in the case of slave morality?

According to Reginster the evil/good valuation is centred on the *primacy of negation* (1997: 295). This notion merits unpacking as it is one of the most notable albeit subtle distinctions between the good/bad and evil/good *valuation*; it provides much clarification on the intersecting relation between *denying* toleration, the 'inversion' of values, and *ressentiment*. Elucidating this relation, I propose to adopt Reginster's approach to expand upon and clarify these distinctions regarding *negation*. The analysis of the *primacy of negation* will also serve as a springboard for introducing the other aspects - i.e. symptoms - of *ressentiment*; namely the resentment modality of envy and vengeance, repression, a constitutional sense of impotence, *ressentiment vis-à-vis* the evil/good *valuation*, and self-deception. In the process of this analysis, will the implications for tolerance and toleration will be drawn out.

Reginster argues that what makes the *denial* or *negation*<sup>198</sup> 'primary' cannot simply be temporal priority or the priority of practical reflection (1997: 295). In some instances, good/bad persons can be just as affirming by first considering the bad values they deny, to then reassure themselves of the superiority of their already established values. With regard to practical reflection, Reginster notes that it "cannot proceed without presupposing some standard of value under the guidance of which it is conducted" (ibid.), meaning that we cannot reflect upon certain values without considering them from a certain *perspective* which is already laden with value<sup>199</sup>. In other words, reflection (or evaluation) entails the juxtaposition of already established

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<sup>198</sup> These two terms, similar to Reginster's use of them, will be treated as synonyms (see Reginster 1997: 295).

<sup>199</sup> This insight forms the sine qua non of Nietzsche's *perspectivism*.

values with other (possibly newly considered) values, for the latter to be endorsed, amended or denied. In that sense, *negation* necessarily presupposes already established values *with which to negate*; conversely, already established values can only be negated by the introduction of other (possibly newly considered) values. Since both the good/bad and evil/good *valuation* requires already established values with which to negate, both these *valuations* involve a similar prioritisation of practical reflection and hence cannot stand as the distinguishing feature of the *primacy of negation* (ibid.).

Instead, Reginster asserts that the *primacy of negation* lies in a primacy of *motivation*. What drives the evil/good valuation, he maintains, is “not an affirmation of new values, but only the desire to deny older ones” (ibid.). ‘Desire’, insofar as it is based on the *dogmatic* judgement - appealing to “universal validity” (ibid.) - can be considered a passion, namely *desire (epithumia)*. However, his claim raises some concerns: if the evil/good value creation starts with a ‘No!’, then what are the already established values *with which* it rejects, in order to create these new nay-saying values? Moreover, if the good/bad person creates radically new values, this implies that he or she also does so *with* already established values. The difference between these valuations emerges when one considers *which* values provide the impetus for value creation (Reginster 1997: 296).

When creating values, the good/bad person relies on already established values to create and affirm new ones. Conversely, when creating values, the evil/good person *primarily* relies on established values to deny and negate ‘outside’ values. According to Reginster, the already established values upon *which* the evil/good person relies are paradoxically the very values he/she seeks to *deny* (ibid.). In order to verify this claim, one has to look into the peculiar corollaries of the process of the *primacy of negation*: it seems to require the implicit endorsement of established values in order to *deny* them. Let’s take the example of toleration and the value of tolerance of the impassioned resentful person and extend it to *ressentiment*. ‘Intolerance’ obtains in the case where the perception of an uncongenial entity’s *attitude* or an institution represented by an uncongenial entity’s *attitude* is conceived as having transgressed the boundaries of what is just or good in the terms of tolerance. The term ‘intolerant

act' is construed here as an *attitude* which is considered to transgress the boundaries of what is just or good in the terms of tolerance. 'Intolerance'<sup>200</sup> and 'intolerant act' are here construed intentionally vague in order to emphasise that what is judged as intolerance - and what is judged as tolerance - is contingent upon the *perspective* informed by the established values of the agent; in this example an agent feeling or re-feeling impassioned resentment. In line with Ure's focus on resentment and *ressentiment*, the *normatively dependent* value of justice will be used when relevant.

Upon encountering (or re-feeling) an incident of *intolerance*, the impassioned resentful person operating in terms of the evil/good *valuation*, who considers *intolerance* an evil, condemns the uncongenial entity or institution represented by an uncongenial entity's *attitude* for it in effigy. If one follows Reginster's claim here, then it is precisely the aroused *desire* for committing what is considered by the impassioned resentful person an *intolerant act* which provides the impetus for its *negation*.

Reginster's claim does not imply that the noble *character* or good/bad person must endorse (or disapprove of) tolerance at all times, i.e. unconditionally. The difference here is that the good/bad person, when *negating intolerance*, does not do so from a perspective which affectively entails a *desire* for committing what is (unconditionally) considered by him or her an *intolerant act*. Perhaps he or she does so in order not to get distracted from other reflections and values, or perhaps he or she holds the uncongenial entity in contempt in a similar fashion as the *withstanding* toleration of the sufferer, or perhaps he or she 'shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others' by demonstrating what Nietzsche calls genuine 'love of one's enemies', or perhaps he or she wishes to exercise his or her virtue or value of tolerance by implementing *em-bracing* toleration in order to affirm his or her superior

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<sup>200</sup> Although consideration of the limits of tolerance is beyond the scope of this dissertation, suffice it to say that establishing a *perspective* of intolerance within the Nietzschean *valuation* espoused here would entail the intricate task of determining whether an *uncongenial entity's attitude*, or the institution's *attitude* that the *uncongenial entity* represents stem from the passions and *dogmatic* judgements. To take a crude example: the oppression of black people justified by the *dogmatic* judgement that the *facticity* of blackness somehow 'causes' black people to be inferior.

means of grappling with pain. Finally, as Nietzsche mentions in the passage quoted above, when *ressentiment* 'appears'<sup>201</sup> in the noble *character*, he or she consummates it exhaustively through immediate reaction. In this way, *ressentiment* and any possible form of resentment becomes promptly suspended or *resolved*<sup>202</sup> either *internally* or *externally*; i.e. *inter alia* through reflective reevaluation (see footnote above), *vicarious substitution*, *withstanding* or *em-bracing* toleration if the situation is deemed beyond one's control, or taking action (to avoid, attack, express one's grievances) (see Reginster 1997: 292).

In the case of the evil/good person, the *primacy of negation* further implies that a particular reflexive dimension is at work here. Not only is the evil/good person negating the uncongenial entity's *intolerance*, the evil/good person is simultaneously drawing on his/her own *desire* for committing *intolerant acts*. Impassioned resentment here takes on the modality of revenge; the resentment is no longer directed toward restorative justice, but rather toward deriving pleasure from harming the uncongenial entity (in effigy). The reflexive aspect of negation is successful insofar as outward expressions of *intolerance* - committing *intolerant acts* - are inhibited by the impassioned resentful person, yet *internally* the rampant *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* continues to provide the impetus for its external negation; i.e. resentfully condemning the *intolerance* of the uncongenial entity. Nietzsche and Reginster crucially demonstrate that this *desire* to commit the *denied* act relies on the (implicit) endorsement of its underlying value (Reginster 1997: 302). Thus, the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* relies on the (implicit) endorsement of the value of *intolerance* in order to *deny intolerance*. In turn, the impassioned resentful person considers the successful inhibition to commit *intolerant acts* as 'his deed' (*seine That*), thereby 'passively' (*passivisch*) relishing in the delectation of judging himself as 'being good' in contrast to being evil. 'Being good' here pertains to 'being tolerant'

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<sup>201</sup> The German '*ihm auftritt*' can also be translated as 'presents itself'; like an illness presenting itself by means of symptoms.

<sup>202</sup> This list of possible means of *resolution* is not meant to be exhaustive. I suspect there may be other possible means to *resolve* the affects in general or those engendered by *ressentiment* and other possible forms of resentment.

or tolerating. However, the pleasure afforded by this 'deed' is not pride, but rather - as Nietzsche calls it - "arrogance" (2007: I, 6 & III, 11). Similarly to the arrogance imputed by Nietzsche to Stoic metaphysics and epistemology, this arrogance is also based on *dogmatic* judgements.

Following Nietzsche's perspective, the newly created value, tolerance, is in effect simply an 'inversion' (*Umkehrung*) of the established value, *intolerance*, which is providing the impetus for its creation. This inversion under the *primacy of negation* effectively internalises the association of modalities of resentment, such as hate and revenge, as a result of the successful inhibition of the *external* expression of the established value - *intolerance*. In effect, toleration and considerations of tolerance are *primarily* employed to *negate* or *deny* others - mainly in effigy - for *externally* expressing evil *attitudes* and behaviour such as *intolerance*.

The successful inhibition of actually committing *intolerant acts* does neither imply that the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* is now *resolved*, nor that the (*dogmatic*) value of *intolerance* has been devalued; i.e. eradicated. Instead, as Nietzsche warns us, these values and affects continue to *internally* exert their influence - whether consciously or unconsciously - upon the impassioned resentful person. The impassioned resentful person continues to *deny* the *intolerant acts* entailed in the *attitude* of the uncongenial entity by venting his/her *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* in effigy. The impassioned resentful person vents this *desire* by 'compensating with an imaginary revenge', i.e. by imagining committing *intolerant acts* directed at the uncongenial entity.

This 'continuous falsification' renders it probable that the impassioned resentful person re-feels his/her resentment and recounts the accusations, even in the absence of the uncongenial entity. As the pain becomes more intense, the impassioned resentful person in a desperate state seeks '*spiritual*'<sup>203</sup> guidance' from

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<sup>203</sup> Nietzsche himself uses the term spirit '*Geist*' in *GM* as the intellectual counterpart of the *soul*. In the first aphorism of the preface, Nietzsche metaphorically states that "...our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are constantly making for them, being by nature winged creatures and honey-gatherers of the spirit" (2007, Preface, 1). Whereas the *soul* pertains to the 'drives and affects', the *spirit* pertains to their

those who have imparted or have embraced similar values and *valuations*, namely the ‘spiritual leaders’ of the evil/good *valuation*. These ‘spiritual leaders’ are epitomised by the *character* of the “aristocratic” albeit “sickly” priest (Nietzsche 2007: I, 6). The “less severely inflicted” impassioned resentful person discloses his resentment to the priest: “I suffer: someone must be to blame for it” (Nietzsche 2007: III, 15-16). In response the priest, the shepherd, replies: “Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it - you alone are to blame for yourself!” (ibid.).

The priest, on Nietzsche’s interpretation, does so for two reasons: “to render the sick to a certain degree harmless” and to “exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance and self-overcoming” (ibid.). The means of doing so is by imposing a framework of meaning - i.e. a “*valuation*” - upon the desperate sufferer (Nietzsche 2007: III, 11). This framework entails a systematic psychological encroachment of the evil/good *valuation* in accordance with a sole and ostensibly irreproachable ideal, namely the ascetic ideal. Although it has multiple and discrete manifestations which may at times even oppose one another - similar to two possibly opposing but nevertheless *dogmatic valuations* - the ascetic ideal broadly encompasses the systematic devaluation and demonisation of all that is becoming, transitory, conditional and contingent, in favour of that which is static, permanent, unconditional and transcendental (ibid.). Nietzsche describes the ascetic ideal as “aspirations to the beyond” and “world-denying”; striving for a “metaphysical faith” in an “inverted world”, an “other world”, and in the “absolute value of Truth” (ibid., II, 24 & III, 11 & 24). What *appears* for Nietzsche to be the case for “our world” is rather the cosmology of Heraclitean *flux*<sup>204</sup> which he sometimes facetiously calls

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accompanying judgements. Consequently, the *soul* and *spirit* are what informs the *self*; ‘*das Ego*’ (see Nietzsche 2007, III, 12).

<sup>204</sup> Heraclitean cosmology of *flux* is summed up by Laertius as “[a]ll things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things (*ta hola*) flows like a stream” (1925: 8). In *EH*, written after his late work *GM*, Nietzsche writes: “I have looked in vain for signs of it [Dionysian philosophy] even among the great Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries before Socrates. I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy... The doctrine of the “eternal recurrence”... might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa has traces of it, and the Stoics



‘unconditional flux’; a Dionysian emphasis on all that is becoming, transitory, conditional and contingent (2007: III, 24).

The priest *character* imposes his *ascetic ideal* and exploits the slave *character* through a “reinterpretation of suffering as feelings of guilt, fear or punishment” (2007: III, 20). Following Nietzsche’s narrative between the priest and slave *characters*, one might well imagine that the priest’s admonishment further entails an incrimination, ‘you are to blame, since your suffering must be a form of divine punishment for past transgressions in your life’. A more secular - perhaps also more contemporary - version would read, ‘you are to blame, since your past and current *attitude* towards the uncongenial entity is fraught with evil and *intolerance*. Do you think that is what is entailed in respecting diversity and justice? You should be ashamed of yourself!’

Nietzsche claims that such ‘reinterpretation’ is “brazen (*kühn*)<sup>205</sup> and false (*falsch*) enough: but one thing at least is achieved by it, the direction (*Richtung*) of *ressentiment* is altered (*verändert*)” (2007: III, 15). The first part of the quote tell us what renders the priest’s harsh admonishment ‘brazen’ - i.e. bold and without any shame or guilt - and false. Important to note here is what precisely Nietzsche thinks is ‘false’ and ‘sickly’ about the priest: what is false is not the content of his judgement - i.e. that there is something *morally* or *ethically* questionable about *intolerance* - but rather the *kind* of judgement its content implies, namely a *dogmatic* judgement and *valuation*. Reginster repeatedly insists that Nietzsche’s critique of ‘the value of *moral* values’ in *GM* does not relate to “the value judgements themselves”, but the “psychological state of the agent whose value judgements are born out of *ressentiment*” (Reginster 1997: 283-284 & 296 & 302). The links between *ressentiment* and *dogmatic* judgements/*valuations* arise from the psychological symptoms of *ressentiment*: *ressentiment* as an addictive physiological illness manifesting itself as re-felt impassioned resentment and the accompanying *dogma*. What is ‘false’ about the priest is his own adherence to *dogmatic* values and

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inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus” (1989: ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, 3 ‘brackets added’).

<sup>205</sup> The English term ‘keen’ also has its etymological roots in the German term ‘*kühn*’, denoting ‘clever’, ‘brave’ and ‘daring’ (Stevenson *et al.* 2011: s.v. ‘keen’).

*valuations*; in this case, it entails the formulation of *intolerance* in accordance with the evil/good *valuation*.

A subtle yet crucial mistake, characteristic of *dogmatic* judgements and *valuations*, is made by both the priest and the slave *character* (in contrast with the noble *character*): the *ethical* or *moral* problem does not in the least relate to *having* evil or bad judgements, but rather to *assenting to* them. In other words, the mistake the slave and priest *characters* make, following Nietzsche's Sceptical critique of the autonomous Subject, is to presume that *having* evil judgements - i.e. the fact that an evil thought has entered consciousness - as a matter of course implies a transgression (an evildoing) is being committed by the free Subject (the evildoer), for which he is accountable. In contrast, the noble *character*, for example the Stoic, maintains that he is not in control of the kind (or content) of the judgements that enter his consciousness. Instead, he is only in control of whether he *assents* to them or not. The slave does *assent* to the *evil* judgement (the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts*) insofar as he *primarily* depends upon it to ascribe himself as 'good'. Nevertheless, both the priest and the slave confound *having* an evil judgement with *assenting to* the evil judgement. Although the priest *character* does exploit the slave, he is not aware of this mistake he himself makes. Therefore, the priest himself is also 'sick'. He is also suffering from *ressentiment*<sup>206</sup> - in particular from impassioned resentment against the noble *character*. Nietzsche claims that sufferers of *ressentiment* "need to believe" in a metaphysical and *dogmatic* concept akin to the autonomous Subject because it provides another means for 'deadening pain by means of affects' for the slave and priest alike (2007: I, 13). Insofar as both the priest and slave chastise themselves for *having* evil thoughts accompanied by 'great affects' based on *dogmatic* judgements and values (see below), the priest here also suffers from *ressentiment*. For the priest, it additionally provides the means of benefitting from, instituting, and wielding control over the slave.

Returning to the slave *character*, the priest's harsh admonition convinces him that *having* the recurring yet inhibited *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* must be due to a

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<sup>206</sup> This claim will be made clear below.

*moral* fault within himself for which he ought to feel *morally* guilty<sup>207</sup>. Being accountable has little if anything to do with actually addressing the uncongenial entity's evil *attitude* as a matter of restoring justice, but rather is reinterpreted by the priest as feeling *morally* guilty about oneself. This reinterpretation is the means of exploiting the psychological disturbance of the passions that Nietzsche calls the *bad conscience*. Subsequently, the consciousness of every resentful *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* by the slave is followed by the "joy (*Lust*) in persecuting (*Verfolgung*)" himself by means of the 'great affect' of *moral* guilt (Nietzsche 2007: II, 16). Instead of being *resolved*, the slave *character's* resentment is vented upon himself. In effect the priest succeeded in 'altering the direction of *ressentiment*'. *Ressentiment* is clearly still manifest as it 'deadens pain by means of affects' - that is, by means of the 'joy of persecuting' oneself on the basis of *moral* guilt. This holds implications for *denying* toleration: grappling with pain continues, however the object of the slave's impassioned resentment - what he is *primarily denying* - is not the uncongenial entity but rather his (*intolerant*) *self*; his *ego* (*das Ich*). However, this self-evaluation accompanied by *moral* guilt is underpinned by *dogmatic* values akin to an autonomous Subject, which is considered accountable for *having* evil thoughts (see Nietzsche 2007: II, 18).

The *desire* for committing *intolerant acts*, in light of the priest's admonition, becomes *internalised* according to Nietzsche; i.e. the instincts that do not become "discharged outwardly turn inward" (2007: II, 16). The first step in the slave's *internalisation* process was venting impassioned resentment in effigy upon the uncongenial entity; the second step is venting it upon *himself*. However, the *moral* guilt does not eradicate its underpinning value - i.e. evil/good *tolerance* (*inverted intolerance*) - nor does it *resolve* the tensive affects for the same reasons outlined in the analysis of the *primacy of negation*; the very value (*intolerance*) paradoxically remains the

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<sup>207</sup> Although a moot point under Nietzsche scholars, the assumption this dissertation espouses is that guilt can both manifest as *eupathe* and passion. Guilt only becomes impassioned when it is underpinned by the evil/good valuation; hence the term '*moral* guilt' I adopt from Reginster's article entitled *A Genealogy of Guilt* (see Reginster 2011). Hence *moral* guilt is based on the passions. For further reading on how one possibly may feel (ethical) guilt without the passions, see (Nietzsche 2007: II, 14-15). For further reading on the bad conscience see (Zamosc 2011).

impetus for its own *denial*. Feeling *moral* guilt also only allows the slave a temporary relief from the physical and psychical pain; it produces a narcotic effect, whilst entrenching - by means of (bad) habituation - both the *moral* guilt and psychical pain's underlying physiological cause - *ressentiment*.

A peculiar phenomenon occurs upon the re-feeling of *moral* guilt; the slave eventually becomes oblivious to the judgement pertaining to the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts*. This phenomenon is what Nietzsche calls *repression*. A caveat is warranted here: 'repression' has been often the choice of translation for multiple terms used by Nietzsche, for example '*zurückgetreten*', '*Hemmungsvermögen*' and '*zurückgedrängte*'. Nietzsche, at least in *GM*, seldom uses the terms '*Verdrängung*' and '*Unterdrückung*' - terms more properly referenced to Freud's psychoanalytic concepts of repression and suppression, respectively (Laplanche & Pontalis 1988: s.v. 'repression' & 'suppression'). Although there may be some interface between Nietzschean and Freudian 'repression', given that Freud was influenced by Nietzschean thought, this dissertation assumes that Nietzschean *repression* is distinct.

Unfortunately Nietzsche does not elaborate a concept of *repression*; however, he does provide the reader with enough articulations of its procedure to formulate a perspective. Outlining these articulations, I shall adopt Reginster's axiological perspective. "*Repression* as Nietzsche appears to understand it, is the ultimate compromise of the person who values a desire, believes he is unable to satisfy it, but neither (reflectively) abandons its value nor resigns himself to his impotence" (Reginster 1997: 290 'italics added'). To clarify what this 'compromise' entails, particular traits of the slave *character* will be elaborated. Since the slave still *assents* to the value of *tolerance* - i.e. *inverted intolerance* - insofar as it underpins the inhibited *desire* to commit *intolerant acts*, the impetus for the *desire* must still be present when re-feeling the affect of *moral* guilt. The concept of satisfaction (*Genugthuung*) I also adopt from Nietzsche and Reginster; namely satisfaction

(*Genugthuung*) occurs when a wish or *desire*<sup>208</sup> is ‘outwardly discharged’, whereby it becomes *resolved*. In turn the satisfied person experiences pleasure in the process (see Reginster 2007: 303). This pleasure is not only a result of the release of the tension that the wish or *desire* psychically entails (besides the tension entailed in the physical exertion in carrying it out), but also perhaps of the sense of the accomplishment.

Another possible form of satisfaction can be inferred based on the analgesic qualities of ‘great affects’. A ‘great affect’ - e.g. a wish or *desire* - can be vicariously albeit partially satisfied (*befriedig*) in the process of venting it in effigy; this process Nietzsche calls sublimation (*Sublimierung*)<sup>209</sup>. In contrast to satisfaction and vicarious satisfaction vented actually (see previous footnote), vicarious satisfaction vented in effigy does not become *externally* (or *internally*) *resolved* insofar as its underpinning value continues to exert its influence. That is to say the affect is not ‘outwardly discharged’ by means of action or expression, nor is it suspended or *internally resolved*. To vicariously satisfy the *desire* to commit an *intolerant act* requires him to be *intolerant* - i.e. vent his resentment upon the uncongenial entity in effigy. Committing *intolerant acts* also requires him to be *intolerant*. Both forms of satisfaction require him ‘do’ evil. The only means left for the slave to implement his value of tolerance is to find another means of vicariously satisfying it. The only means left is to *primarily deny intolerance* within himself.

According to Nietzsche, this tension is temporarily relieved albeit not *resolved* when the slave ‘joyously persecutes’ himself through of *moral* guilt. However, his ‘more poisonous’ preoccupation with his ‘intoxication’ renders him blissfully incognisant of - and temporarily incapable of - the physiological *perspective* on *ressentiment* that

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<sup>208</sup> The terms ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ should not here be confused with psychoanalytic terminology, for example Lacan’s distinction between ‘wish’ and ‘desire’. Instead these terms pertain closely to Stoic and Sceptic distinctions between *eupathe* and passion respectively.

<sup>209</sup> In contrast to Nietzsche, Freud later described this phenomenon as the psychological defence mechanism of displacement (*Verschiebung*), whereas sublimation (*Sublimierung*) only pertains to displacements which are directed at cultural development; towards “higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological” (Freud 1929: 79-80). The conjecture here, inspired by Reginster, is that not all forms of vicarious satisfaction (*Befriedigung*) are necessarily bad, provided that they become *internally* or *externally resolved*.

Nietzsche outlines: the pleasurable yet narcotising relief that is afforded by *moral* guilt is nonetheless still underpinned by the evil/good value of *tolerance*; namely *inverted intolerance*. The *dogmatic* judgement pertaining to the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* becomes in effect systematically replaced *in toto* by the *desire* to *deny intolerant acts* or *attitudes*. To use a botanical analogy, although the stem of the weed - i.e. a *dogmatic* judgement - has been extirpated, its roots - i.e. its underpinning *dogmatic* value - has not been eradicated. Nonetheless, 'great affects' of redirected impassioned resentment - i.e. *moral* guilt - remain the means to attain a *vicarious satisfaction* (in effigy) of the *desire* to *deny intolerant acts* or *attitudes* until the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* has completely been *repressed*.

The compromise articulated by Reginster - or perhaps more aptly the compromising compromise - characterising the *moral* guilty position of the impassioned resentful person, pertains to not only to his own values - namely tolerance, by vicariously yet unwittingly satisfying his *dogmatic* value of *inverted intolerance* - but also his *character* (or what Reginster calls his "psyche") (1997: 284). I would want to add a corollary to this articulation of the compromise: the 'joyous persecution' entailed in the vicarious satisfaction of the *desire* to *deny intolerant acts* (or *attitudes*) is also a form of *denying* toleration; in this case *denyingly* tolerating oneself. The slave feeling *moral* guilt is 'indeed' implementing (*denying*) toleration insofar as it is a way of grappling with pain. The slave even does so in the name of the value of (evil/good) tolerance. The *life-denying* implications of the *dogmatic valuation* and *ressentiment* render such an (evil/good) value of tolerance and its ensuing (*denying*) toleration 'bad' in the sense of undermining *flourishing*.

The following hypothetical scenario can be visualised to ensue: Racked with *moral* guilt, the despairing slave implores the priest: 'I am doing everything you said and I am still in agony! What am I still doing wrong?' The priest, in line with Nietzsche's account of the priest's *innocent* remedies<sup>210</sup>, responds: 'The abnegation process of expiation, amends and restitution takes a long time. You must wait and be patient. At least you are now on the path of the good and tolerant. In the meantime, abstain

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<sup>210</sup> See (Nietzsche 2007: III, 18-19).

from unsettling yourself by avoiding evil and avert too much thinking about it. Rather keep up your attention to workaday tasks, doing good deeds by helping those around you and consulting me often.’

Returning to the slave *character*, by means of the inculcation of *moral* guilt, the *desire* to commit *intolerant acts* is entirely precluded from entering consciousness; it remains as an unconscious and physiological - i.e. instinctual<sup>211</sup> - means to prevent the psychical pain that its conscious awareness would cause. Psychologically, much to the relief of the slave, he (mistakenly) conceives the absence of this *desire* as having atoned for this particular evil - *intolerance*. However, the successful *repression* of the slave *character's* evil *intolerant* desires paradoxically leaves him without the now habituated means to narcotise himself through ‘great affects’ such as resentment and guilt. The slave, subject to the priest’s ‘innocent’ remedies and his own inhibition and *repression*, feels empty inside and stuck in a rut; or in Nietzsche’s terms, he feels “petty displeasure (*Unlust*), gloom (*Dumpfheit*), depression (*Verstimmung*)” and “discontent (*Verdruss*<sup>212</sup>)” (2007: III, 19-20).

The slave returns for another consultation with the priest about his leaden weariness. The priest’s final remedy, the ‘guilty means’, incites an “orgy of feeling” in his community (or congregation) (ibid.). The priest might well address ‘his flock’ with such oratory: ‘Being of similar beliefs, my flock, we are facing a vicious and evil threat by the name of *intolerance* in our society! Just look at the dismal state of the world today! Just look at the *intolerance* of that particular group of evil people in power; those impudent and immodest aristocratic ‘noblemen’ who are robbing us of our happiness! Their elitist influence stretches to more than meets the eye. Even in this morally and spiritually excellent place where we are gathered, there are those among you riddled with *intolerant desires*! I see it every day. You are the ones allowing the enemy to pervert our society’s ideal. We ought to show these evil-doers the good, not by evil deeds, but by tolerating. For they too will be judged one day

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<sup>211</sup> This reference is to the *protective instincts of a degenerating life*.

<sup>212</sup> The word ‘*Verdruss*’ can also be translated as ‘frustration’, ‘dejection’, ‘dispirited’, ‘demoralised’ and ‘listlessness’.

and they will pay for their *intolerance!*' The 'orgy of feeling' that the priest re-evokes in his community here is resentment against the priest's own uncongenial entity: the noble *character*. This allows for the despondent slave *character* to once again revel in the narcotic effect afforded by these 'great affects' - either *moral* guilt or impassioned resentment with modalities of revenge, hate, spite or anger. Meanwhile the slave's *ressentiment* is further aggravated by this 'remedy'. However, it is only a matter of time before the slave once again requires another dose of the priest's quack remedy.

After the vicious cycle of impassioned resentment and *moral* guilt reaches its lowest ebb, the slave, groping for an absolute solution for his incessant suffering, stumbles upon a particular judgement that evokes one of the most potent narcotic effects of all. This (*dogmatic*) judgment finds expression in the slave *character's* reasoning, along some of the following lines, that 'there must be something evil within *myself* beyond my own control that is causing my unremitting agony. This evil must come from an inherent or inherited defect afforded by that which is becoming, transitory, conditional and contingent. Therefore there is nothing to feel guilty about, since it isn't my fault.' Nietzsche mentions the Judeo-Christian doctrine of *original sin*<sup>213</sup> committed by Adam and passed on to his progeny as an example of a last-ditch yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reverse the direction of *ressentiment* (2007: II, 21).

Nietzsche, and with him Reginster and Ure, see a notable aspect of the illness of *ressentiment* in the slave's and priest's desperation or defeat in relation to the uncongenial entity; this is considered by them as evidence for the "constitutional impotence"<sup>214</sup> of the slave and the priest (Nietzsche 2007: I, 6). However, the slave's and the priest's unsuccessful attempts at reversing *ressentiment* does alleviate the

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<sup>213</sup> Some denominations, such as Calvinism/Protestantism, maintain that guilt is also inherited along with original sin. However, other denominations such as Roman Catholicism denies that we inherit guilt, only the "the darker impulses toward evil because of the effects of Original Sin" is inherited (Wuerl & Stubna 2004: 68-70). The point being here that there are multifarious interpretations of this doctrine, however, the overarching similarity is that we inherit a predisposition or proclivity to commit sins.

<sup>214</sup> See also (Reginster 1997: 286) and (Ure 2015: 604-605 & 608).



psychical pain accompanied by *moral* guilt, since there is nothing for them to feel *morally* guilty about any more; they hold their unhappiness and misery to be due to evil factors (mistakenly) judged beyond their control. The slave *character*, in his 'constitutional impotence', sustains his high estimation of the value (of tolerance), but gives up on its satisfaction (Reginster 1997: 287).

The slave could be visualised to say to himself: 'All this evil *intolerance* I have harboured for the uncongenial entity is actually due to me being an inherently evil person. I wish that I weren't such a sickening failure, so that I could be as tolerant as the priest. Or at least I wish I were *more* evil, so that I could also just do what I want, like those indecent uncongenial entities. But I know for a fact that it is not only they who don't deserve all those things I desire, I don't deserve them either. It is better for me just to expect the worst and do as little as possible, so as not to harm others with the evil curse that has been inflicted upon me.' Underlying such (*dogmatic*) judgments, even in the form of self-deprecation, is the envy modality of resentment (2007: I, 11). As *moral* guilt subsides, the impassioned resentment gradually returns, albeit without the *repressed* desires; only the *denial* of those desires remains.

Envy likely becomes the next evil the priest points out to the slave; it follows the same *repression* process until only its *denial* remains - as vicarious satisfaction in effigy.

For his part, the priest, while also convinced of his constitutional impotence, does not give up on the satisfaction of his (*inverted*) value. Although the priest also suffers from *ressentiment*, the aristocratic trait of his *character* allows him to doggedly refuse the resignation which commonly follows from self-acknowledged constitutional impotence (as outlined for the *character* of the slave) (Reginster 1997: 286). Instead, the priest secretly insists that he is actually the one entitled to the rewards, benefits, honours and offices, not those noblemen<sup>215</sup> currently in power (ibid.: 288). This is

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<sup>215</sup> Another probability is that the priest's impassioned resentment based on his *ressentiment* is also (or instead) directed at other priest *characters* espousing a contrasting manifestation of the ascetic ideal. This probability follows from Nietzsche's claim that the predominant *valuation* today - not only I think in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when Nietzsche wrote - is the evil/good *valuation* informed by the ascetic ideal (2007: I, 16).

based on the priest's undisclosed, evaluation of himself as inherently superior to other human beings. Another possibility is that priest judges himself deserving of these rewards etc. for all the 'good' he has 'done' for *his* community; ensuring that it does not devolve in evil chaos and uncertainty by maintaining *the* 'righteous' order. Or the priest may, by a 'fictitious logic' emanating from the *primacy of negation*, judge the noblemen as undeserving of the rewards accruing to them, based on their putative evil acts or *attitudes*, which in turn implies that he, the priest - as a good person - is actually deserving of them. The implication of all the above possibilities is that the priest - albeit in a manner different from the slave - secretly *desires* and covets the rewards he sees accruing to the noblemen. In that sense, the priest, too, also resorts to the envy modality of (impassioned) resentment.

The modality of envy for the priest is a passion to the extent that it is accompanied by the *dogmatic* judgement to which he is inherently entitled; alternatively, he considers that his good deeds as a matter of course render him deserving of what his uncongenial entity has. Ure argues that the modality of envy or envious *desire* - and its later *repression* in a fashion similar to the *desire* for *intolerance* - is a factor that clearly distinguishes *ressentiment* from moral resentment and from socio-political resentment (Ure 2015: 604-605). Reginster's axiological perspective on moral resentment provides further grounds for the distinction made by Ure. Since the values *with which* the morally resentful person *denies* the uncongenial entity are not the very same (*inverted*) values he judges the uncongenial entity espousing, there is no basis for the morally resentful person to be envious. The correlation of the possible good fortune of the uncongenial entity and his bad values neither implies a causal connection, nor does it logically imply that the morally resentful person's possible unfortunate circumstance is a result of his good values, or his inherent evilness. Only the uncongenial entity's values conceived as informing its *attitude* and actions are judged as debased by the morally resentful person (Reginster 1997: 296). The *socio-politically* resentful person also has no basis for envying any aspects - be it values or good fortune - of the institution that the uncongenial entity in question represents. Ure maintains that insofar as these institutions fail to uphold the ideals of justice and ethical values that the *socio-politically* resentful person espouses, the emphasis is only on restoring justice - redressing the slights and

injuries done; “it does not entail that we compare ourselves with them [moral agents aka uncongenial entities] and judge [that] they are the beneficiaries of undeserved good fortune” (2015: 604 ‘brackets added’). Like the dissimilarity between the values held by the morally resentful person and his uncongenial entity, the good fortune of the institutions which the uncongenial entity represents is irrelevant to the socio-politically resentful person insofar as the correlation of good fortune and (judged) bad values does not reflect an inverse correlation (or causal relation) between his own values and socio-economic circumstance.

Aside from the possibility that the uncongenial entities may have been beneficiaries of undeserved good fortune as a direct result of injustice(s) committed by them, what matters to the person of *ressentiment* is not so much how the good fortune came about, but the mere fact that the uncongenial entities are beneficiaries of it and he or she is not (see Ure 2015: 605). By extrapolation, the person of *ressentiment* - particularly the priest character - judges himself deserving of or entitled to that exact same good fortune by virtue of being a good person. The reason for this is that underlying the person of *ressentiment*'s envy are the exact same albeit inverted values he or she attributes to their uncongenial entities. The ‘fictional logic’ entailed in the *dogmatic* judgement accompanied by envy is that there is an inverse correlation (or causal relation) between the extent of fortune one possesses or enjoys and the values one espouses. Insofar as one is ‘impoverished’, ‘a victim’, ‘powerless’, ‘weak’ and ‘incapable’ one must be ‘good’, inasmuch as one is ‘wealthy’, ‘a perpetrator/dignitary’, ‘strong’ or ‘capable’ one is ‘evil’. However, the envious *desire* may also become *repressed* since *desiring* and coveting - as it is also considered evil in the *valuation* of the priest (ibid.).

With the covetous aspect of the passion of envy and its accompanying judgements fully *repressed*, what remains is its imaginary albeit pernicious levelling of the uncongenial entity. The emphasis on restoring justice is downplayed in favour of the spiteful pleasure gained from demeaning the uncongenial entity; for example slandering them in their absence. The sufferer of *ressentiment* is more interested in *denying* their “power, success, beauty, health, strength and so on” by demonising such *characteristics* as evil (Ure 2015: 605). Apart from the pleasure that the sufferer

of *ressentiment* derives from such envious *denial*, he does so in order to unconditionally establish the good as “impotence, failure, ugliness, sickliness, weakness and so on”, and the further pleasure afforded by the passion of arrogance (ibid.). These considerations support Ure’s contention that envy is a distinguishing factor of *ressentiment*, in comparison to moral resentment and socio-political resentment. The person of *ressentiment*’s conceived inherent evilness serves as a constant reminder to himself that he’ll never be ‘poor, humble, or chaste’ enough to be worthy of any deserts or entitlements that - according to him - ought to be conferred upon a good person.

This contrasting combination of judgements pertaining to *slavish* constitutional impotence and *dogmatic* aristocratic judgements leads the priest to the judgement that his (evil/good) values - among others tolerance - unconditionally do not have the potential to wrest the rewards, benefits, honours and offices - which he envies - from those in power. Nevertheless, the priest

...in opposing their enemies and conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the *most spiritual revenge*. For this alone was appropriate to a priestly people, the people embodying the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness (Nietzsche 2007: I, 7)

That is to say that the priest still continues to *vicariously satisfy* his *repressed desire* for revenge, envy, spite, hatred etc. by means of a revaluation of their own, and their uncongenial entities’ - the noblemen’s or perhaps other priests’ - values. This revaluation, in accordance with the priest’s version of the ascetic ideal, systematically devalues and demonises all that is becoming, transitory, conditional and contingent, in favour of that which is static, permanent, unconditional and transcendental. If the priest is revaluating other priests’ *dogmatic valuations*, then he *primarily denies* that which is *dogmatically* considered ‘good’ by the other priests, and demonises it as evil. The influence - or perhaps more aptly stranglehold - that the priest already exerts upon his community becomes the engine for his ‘spiritual revenge’ or vicarious satisfaction.

Nietzsche (and with him, Reginster<sup>216</sup>) emphasises that much to the surprise of the priest, given his low expectations of his own values, his ‘spiritual vengeance’ turns out to be largely successful<sup>217</sup> (2007: I, 9 & 16). The priest’s success not only comes from the rewards etc. conferred upon him by his ever growing community, but also from the actual defeat of the predominance of the noble *character*.

Returning to the successful ‘spiritual vengeance’ of the priest, many of the noblemen were overcome by the movements of *ressentiment* - ‘slave revolts’ as Nietzsche calls them - provisionally directed at them by the priest. Some noblemen might even have been persuaded - by the priest - that they are not deserving of their station as a result of their *evil acts* or *attitudes*.

Nietzsche identifies the reasons as to why his radical revaluation - i.e. the evil/good *valuation* - is so influential. Unbeknownst to the astonished priest, these reasons pertain to the physiological aspects of *ressentiment*. Insofar as *ressentiment* entails the (bad) habit of - an addiction to - resorting to ‘great affects’ in order to narcotically deaden pain, considerable resistance to (possible) treatments is probable; to the point where even the (hypothetical and non-priestly) therapist or physician comes to be judged as evil. Although Nietzsche does claim in *EH* that one can “free” oneself from *ressentiment* through shifting one’s *perspective* to *amor fati*<sup>218</sup>, he also insists that “we may not even suppose that the instinct of life contemplates or intends any sort of cure” (2007: III, 16). These ostensibly contrasting claims are puzzling. I read them as indicating that although one can stave off *ressentiment* - as the noble

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<sup>216</sup> See also (Reginster 1997: 297 & 302).

<sup>217</sup> Nietzsche, exemplifies this defeat of the “aristocratic nobles” of the ancient Roman republic by the “nation of *ressentiment par excellence*” Judea; i.e. the Jews (ibid.). A caveat is in order here that based on his emphasis on *character* that Nietzsche’s critique here does not amount to anti-Semitism insofar as Nietzsche does not *primarily negate* the values of Judaism as such; later in *GM* Nietzsche extols the *Old Testament* for finding in it “great human beings” and a “heroic landscape” (2007: III, 22). Nietzsche’s critique, as emphasised, focuses only on movements lead by the priest *character apparently* informed by the ascetic ideal possibly underpinning the *dogmatic* judgements ensuing from espousing *dogmatic* values. The possibility remains that *non-dogmatic perspectives* and values can be derived from the Torah for example, which as a *perspectivist* or Sceptic one should not dismiss out of hand.

<sup>218</sup> See (Nietzsche 1989: ‘Why I Am So Wise’, 6).

*character* does by 'exhausting itself in immediate reaction' - one cannot become permanently immune to it. Insofar as one remains vulnerable to the passions, one cannot be 'cured' of *ressentiment* once and for all. Possible techniques for staving off *ressentiment* outlined in the previous chapter are - but are not limited to - *withstanding* or *em-bracing* toleration under a Nietzschean *valuation* of tolerance.

Another reason for its fast-spreading ubiquity, apart from the influence of the priest, is the 'self-discipline' and 'self-surveillance' that the slave *character* imposes upon himself by means of *moral* guilt, among other factors. The priest does not need (extensive) resources and physical strength to enforce his control over the slave, since the slave takes over the role of enforcer. The other perhaps more plausible reason is that the ascetic ideal provides an answer, a "meaning" - albeit a mistaken one - to the question 'why do I suffer!?' (Nietzsche 2007: III, 28). In other words, the painful psychical tension evoked by the uncertainty of the vicissitudes of life is alleviated - but at a great cost. The task for the Sceptic and for Nietzsche is not to provide the ultimate answer to such a question, but to rather focus on creating life-affirming values to face uncertainty and 'this world' of possibly conflicting *appearances* in spite of possible physical pain. In turn, one remains psychologically undisturbed by *dogma* and accompanying passions (*apatheia*); i.e. one's 'soul is not subjected to the bitterest pain'.

This undisturbed disposition affords one an acknowledgement of the inexhaustibility of one's knowledge and the affirmation of occurrences of unforeseen or unwanted circumstances, yet without the (mistaken) evaluation that these circumstances beyond one's control necessarily undermine one's *eudaimonia* or *flourishing*. The corollary being that the absence of psychological tension renders less likely - but does not necessarily circumvent - the inactivity followed by 'leaden exhaustion'. Therefore, although *apatheia* and the means to sustain it - e.g. *withstanding* and *em-bracing* toleration - are necessary for *flourishing*, it is not sufficient insofar as it does not guarantee an active life.

## IV: Recapitulation and Conclusion:

This chapter homed in on the perils of tolerance and toleration by considering the potential *life-denying* evaluations and their ethical, axiological and psychological ramifications. It did so by explicating the distinction between, and the principal characteristics of resentment and *ressentiment*. The principal criterion for the distinction between *life-denying* and *life-affirming* evaluations and implementations of tolerance and toleration was found to lie in the answer to the question as to whether the accompanying affects and judgements were passions accompanied by *dogma*. Certain manifestations of resentment, i.e. moral resentment and socio-political resentment, do not necessarily imply *life-denying* passions and accompanying *dogma*. However, the dangers that were identified with regard to the affect of contempt and *withstanding* toleration, are also applicable to moral and socio-political resentment: these dangers render one more vulnerable to succumb to the passions.

Following Nietzsche's perspective on how 'great affects' such as resentment also serve as psychical analgesics which facilitate - at least temporarily - grappling with pain, the links between tolerance, toleration, resentment and *ressentiment* were established. By expanding Nietzsche's depiction of the sufferer, slave, priest and nobleman *characters*, we can distinguish *life-denying* evaluations and implementations with regard to tolerance and toleration: toleration is accompanied by the passions and *dogmatic* judgements when tolerance is underpinned by *dogmatic* values and accompanied by *dogmatic normatively dependent* values and *valuations*. The form of toleration implied I called *denying* toleration inasmuch as it entails *primarily denying* the *uncongenial entity* which is tolerated.

Reginster's notion of the *primacy of negation*, evinced in the priest and slave *characters*, reveals the links between *denying* toleration, *ressentiment*, and *life-denying* values and *valuations* of tolerance. In the light of this reading, *ressentiment* emerges as a physiological and *life-denying* illness (*Krankheit*) encroaching upon the affects (especially resentment), to the point of rendering them impassioned (in accordance with the ancient Pyrrhonian Sceptic construal of the passions). The symptoms of *ressentiment* entail a radical mutation in the way in which values,

particularly those related to 'tolerance', - are created, how affects are experienced, and what kinds of judgements one assents to.

Even though the priest and slave *characters* may endorse the value of tolerance, with the potential of respecting diversity and acknowledging the plurality of (moral or ethical) values, the *life-denying* aspects of tolerance, underpinned by the evil/good *valuation* and *ascetic ideal*, quite conversely augment the rigid boundary between the aforesaid *characters* and those who do not subscribe to similar manifestations of the *ascetic ideal*; i.e. their respective *uncongenial entities*. Moreover, the *life-denying* value of tolerance and implementations of *life-denying* toleration - as symptoms of *ressentiment* - undermine the slave and priest *characters'* own *flourishing*. Despite the astonished priest's success in overcoming his/her *uncongenial entities* - the noblemen - and possibly attaining the envied deserts or entitlements, the illness of *ressentiment* has effectively eroded the possibility of *satisfying* the *inverted* values which have provided the impetus for the priest's success<sup>219</sup>. Insofar as the *satisfaction* of the priest's values is precluded, the priest's own *flourishing* can never be realised, thereby leaving the priest with dissatisfaction about 'this world', and with life in general. As a result of the slave's self-ascribed constitutional impotence, the *satisfaction* of the values he or she continues to deem worthwhile is abandoned. In turn, the slave's *flourishing* is also undermined.

All in all, the passions and their accompanying *dogmatic* judgements, in particular those which initiate *denying* toleration, should not be *assented to*. The underpinning *dogmatic* values of such judgements - at least where *normatively dependent* values are concerned - forms part of the evil/good *valuation* which one should leave behind. However, this does not imply that *having dogmatic* judgements is bad; it only implies that *assenting to* them is, in accordance with a Nietzschean (good/bad) *valuation*. *Dogmatic* judgements about tolerance should not be *assented to* as *dogmatic* values of tolerance and *valuations* which include tolerance only serve to undermine *flourishing*, thereby augmenting the rigid boundary between the tolerator and his respective *uncongenial entity*.

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<sup>219</sup> This insight was also adopted from Reginster.



# Conclusion

In the preceding pages I addressed the primary question ‘what is it to tolerate?’ chiefly from axiological, ethical and psychological perspectives. What prompted me toward this question was the apparent richness of differing lifestyles and the seemingly inevitable conflict they engender, in combination with a (somewhat morbid) curiosity about with pain and suffering; particularly how to grapple (well) with both. In order to satisfy this curiosity, I established certain aims which facilitated the composition of this dissertation. Inspired by both Nietzsche’s endorsement of *praxis* or the active life and his genealogical emphasis on a practice’s earliest (remaining) conceptions, I traced the concept of tolerance back to Cicero’s *tolerantia*. Although implementing a rigorous genealogy would be too vast for a master’s thesis, I nevertheless sought to schematise a conceptual history of tolerance and toleration within the Hellenistic West. Provided Nietzsche’s intricate albeit interest-piquing Stoic influence, I gathered that to revitalise and revalue the insights gained from the conceptual history would be edifying; not only to address the primary question (regarding tolerance and toleration), but also to contribute to recently budding scholarship on the classical Hellenistic influence on Nietzsche’s philosophy. As the *carving out* process germinated, I systematically yet painstakingly gained more clarity about what Nietzsche was so critical about throughout his work. I gradually became aware that Nietzsche’s critical enterprise could be extended to certain (*life-denying*) conceptions of tolerance and toleration.

The conceptual history presented here highlighted the Socratic influence on the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, particularly with regard to *eudaimonia* with its emphasis on the subjugation of the passions. The remaining Hellenistic philosophical fragments, the ancient Cynics (most prominently among them Diogenes of Sinope), the Stoics (most prominently among them Zeno) and the Syncretics (most prominently among them Cicero) also conceptualised *eudaimonia* along these lines. Six intertwining concepts were highlighted: *apatheia* (without passions or equanimity), *pathos* (passion or pathology), *eupathos* (good feeling) *adiaphoria* (indifference), *karteria* (endurance or tolerance) and *tolerantia* (tolerance). These

concepts provided criteria for explicating ancient tolerance and toleration, understood in terms of the capacity to effectively grapple with pain engendered by forces beyond one's control (*fate*) without succumbing to the passions. Distinguishing between Human and Cosmic Stoicism, we could identify two forms of toleration - namely *withstanding* and *em-bracing* toleration. *Withstanding* toleration entails grappling with pain by resorting to *eupathe* - i.e. affects and accompanying judgements which refrain from evaluating indifferents as (inherently) good or bad. *Em-bracing* toleration entails grappling with pain by refraining from *assenting to* any judgements - i.e. suspending judgement - thereby sparing oneself the additional tension that *assenting to* affects and accompanying judgements may engender. Tolerance in turn pertains to the virtue governing these forms of toleration. The caveat entailed in Cicero's proto-articulation of *tolerantia* offered a further criterion for assessing the role of *withstanding* toleration. In the course of the contempt of *fate*, Cicero cautions, one is more vulnerable to the passions. It thus appears that *withstanding* toleration cannot account for an encompassing analysis of ancient tolerance. At the same time, Cicero's caveat regarding *withstanding* toleration provides a springboard for conceptualising possible *life-denying* forms of tolerance and toleration which undermine *flourishing*.

Tolerance and toleration were revisited and revalued in the second chapter. The first step involved expanding on Nietzsche's distinction between purpose and procedure. Following this distinction, the argument extrapolated from tolerance as virtue to tolerance as value, while jettisoning teleological associations and broadening the scope to contain non-virtuous (and even vicious) considerations that fall under its rubric. By this procedure, tolerance was rendered viable for a perspectivist methodology taking into consideration a multiplicity of desires, needs and affects. Considering Nietzsche's endorsement of Stoicism in his early works - particularly the writings of Epictetus - numerous overlapping tenets were brought to light: the therapeutic emphasis on philosophical enquiry, the need to align one's will with *fate*, the aims of *eudaimonia* or *flourishing*, *apatheia* in the Stoic sense of the passions (*patheia*), refraining from 'absolute morality' by not attributing 'good' or 'evil' to indifferents, the decision of what is within one's control, Stoic epistemology,

endurance (*Ertragen*) - i.e. *withstanding* toleration - and proto-conceptualisations of *amor fati* and *em-bracing* toleration.

In his later works, however, Nietzsche became increasingly critical of Stoic philosophy. This apparent reversal required close analysis, in order to ascertain the repercussions of this critique for a Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration. It turned out that although Nietzsche was primarily critical of Stoic metaphysics, cosmology and epistemology, there were still repercussions for later Nietzsche's meta-ethics compared to Stoic ethics. These repercussions concerned whether Nietzsche in his later works continued to endorse the ideal of *apatheia* and, if so, how the construal of the passions would read with regards to epistemic status of its accompanying judgements (especially considering Nietzsche's renunciation of Stoic epistemology). Whether or not an affect is impassioned is not contingent upon the falsity of the content of the judgement, as it is for the Stoics; it is rather contingent upon the kind of judgement - i.e. the *dogmatic* attachment underlying the judgement - akin to the ancient Pyrrhonian Sceptics' perspective on the passions. For a Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration, as undertaken in this dissertation, this entailed that Stoic metaphysics, cosmology and epistemology needed to be jettisoned and replaced by Nietzsche's perspectivism, along with the mobilisation of a Sceptical critical enterprise against *dogmatic* judgements, values and *valuations*. Articulations of tolerance and implementations of toleration could indeed be *life-affirming* even if the content of the accompanying judgements can be shown to be false - as long as toleration is not underpinned by *dogmatic* judgements and values. The revaluation of ancient tolerance and toleration undertaken in this dissertation proceeded by systematically *carving* these notions *out* and selectively incorporating them into a Nietzschean valuation.

Influenced by a reading of Berry's work *Nietzsche and the Ancient Sceptical Tradition* (2011), I explored the critical enterprise of Scepticism discernible in Nietzsche's later writings as a springboard toward a critique of *life-denying* forms of tolerance and toleration which undermine *flourishing*. The last chapter introduced the concepts of resentment and *ressentiment* in order to discern *life-denying* forms of tolerance and toleration. Inspired by Ure's clarification of the distinctions between

resentment and *ressentiment* in *Resentment/Ressentiment* (2015), I was able to identify feelings of resentment in the forms of *eupathe* and passion, depending on the kind of judgements accompanying the affect. Forms of resentment felt as *eupathe* were analysed in terms of moral resentment and socio-political resentment. The risks entailed in re-felt moral and socio-political resentment were established by critically comparing these affects with contempt: one is more likely to succumb to the passions if the affect is not *resolved*. Nietzsche's insight that all 'great affects' serve as analgesics, similarly to the contempt felt by the sufferer, provided the link between resentment and toleration (2007: III, 15).

When the resentful person succumbs to the passions whilst grappling with pain, *withstanding* toleration is likely to mutate into *denying* toleration. Although *denying* toleration, due the passion's analgesic effect, also grapples with pain, such means of grappling with pain was shown to be *life-denying*, as it has deleterious repercussions for the impassioned resentful person's values, evaluation and *flourishing* (in addition to their respective uncongenial entities insofar as they are misrepresented via *dogmatic* evaluations). By briefly focusing on the analgesic effects of impassioned resentment and Nietzsche's perspectives on its physiological underpinnings, such forms of impassioned resentment were shown constitute a psychological symptom – stemming from a budding illness of *ressentiment*. Although *ressentiment* is an illness, its symptoms engender temporary pain relief: it mobilises *the protective instincts of a degenerating life* struggling for survival with new expedients.

Reginster's notion of the *primacy of negation* offers a way of demonstrating how values became 'inverted'. In the process, values are not created to *affirm fate* or enriching one's values, but rather in order to *primarily deny* the *uncongenial entities* considered to engender the pain. Such *denying* toleration alongside the *primacy of negation* was elucidated by expanding on Nietzsche's narrative of the priest and slave *characters*. The ensuing argument showed how tolerance as value becomes inverted (and corrupted) when adduced as self-deceitful pretext to *vicariously satisfy* a repressed *desire* to be intolerant during *denying* toleration. This value of tolerance, it turns out, is actually underpinned by the (inverted) value of intolerance.

Taking its cues from Ure's and Reginster's axiological elaborations, the argument presented here focuses on the modality of envy as factor distinguishing between *ressentiment* and resentment qua *eupathe* (see Ure 2015: 604-605). Although the priest suffering from *ressentiment* may come into possession of all the envied wealth, offices and honours he considers himself deserving of, or entitled to, the values that actually impelled the priest's success can never be satisfied. The priest, in turn, is bereft of satisfaction in this life and is left to *vicarious satisfaction* in the 'world beyond this one'. All in all, *life-denying* tolerance and *denying* toleration undermine *flourishing*, in addition to subverting the purpose of respecting diversity and the possibility of conflicting (non-dogmatic) theories of the good.

I hope that the work of this dissertation, in revitalising and revaluing ancient Hellenistic perspectives on tolerance and toleration, will enrich current discourse on tolerance and practices of toleration. How to effectively grapple with pain and the vicissitudes of *fate* without succumbing to psychological disturbance is, I think, a crucial consideration which may contribute not only to endurance discourse, but also to tolerance discourse. Perhaps a therapeutic approach to inquiries into tolerance and toleration may not only enrich its discourse, but also promote individual (and perhaps species) *flourishing*. Moreover, I hope that it furthers scholarship on Nietzsche - not only on the issues of tolerance and toleration, but more generally, in contributing perspectives on Nietzsche's complex relationship with ancient Hellenistic thought.

Unfortunately, due to the limitations of scope, many aspects of tolerance and toleration could not be included. The limits of tolerance pertaining to the boundaries between tolerance, intolerance and intolerability, await further exploration. Another consideration emerging from a Nietzschean valuation concerns tolerance and toleration in relation to the conscience. One of the questions that remain is whether *em-bracing* toleration is a conscientious procedure, or whether *denying* toleration forms part of the *bad conscience*. In light of Ure's critique of Nietzsche's radical aristocratic politics, another consideration worth pursuing pertains to the implications of this revaluation of tolerance and toleration from a political perspective. Considering Nietzsche's notion that values and valuations characteristic of the

priest's and slave's are predominant in contemporary societies - or at least in Nietzsche's life and times - the question arises: to what extent are our predominant contemporary notions of tolerance and toleration also corrupted by *life-denying* values and valuations? Hence, a critical comparison of revalued considerations of tolerance and toleration with contemporary notions of tolerance and toleration may also prove a worthwhile research endeavour.

What it is to tolerate well, therefore, not only concerns means of grappling effectively with pain engendered by fate, but also extends to means of ensuring that uncongenial entities are not misrepresented 'as caricatures or monsters' via *dogmatic* evaluations during toleration. What it is to tolerate should not be about deriving a narcotising pleasure out of blamefully venting 'great affects' like impassioned resentment onto uncongenial entities, but instead what it is to tolerate should be about cultivating excellent values (tolerance), inuring oneself to (inevitable) pain, not *assenting to dogmatic* judgements, maintaining psychological health (*apatheia*), modulating moral or socio-political resentment and facilitating flourishing. To tolerate is not simply a form of impotent resignation or cowardice concealed behind a façade of virtue, nor is it purely about objection without taking action, but it can also be a sign of courageous strength when affirming one's current situation engendered by the (foreseen or unforeseen) vicissitudes of fate.

Although Nietzsche did not conceptualise tolerance or toleration, he clearly outlines a perspective on tolerance (*Toleranz*) - influenced by Goethe's maxims<sup>220</sup> on tolerance - in one of his late works *TI*. I conclude with this perspective on tolerance, which I think aptly alludes to the *life-affirming* Nietzschean valuation of tolerance and toleration this dissertation has established (and its critical endeavour to liberate one from *life-denying* unhappiness, misery or languishing, the passions, *ressentiment* and the ascetic ideal).

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<sup>220</sup> Goethe himself formulated two maxims in *Maxims and Reflections* worth outlining which plausibly informs Nietzsche's perspective: "We would rather tolerate a difficult person than suffer one who is insignificant" and "[t]olerant should, strictly speaking, be only a passing attitude: it should lead to appreciation." (2010: ~25 & ~877).

Goethe conceived of strong, highly cultivated people, adept in all things bodily, with a tight rein on themselves and a reverence for themselves, who can dare to grant themselves the whole range and richness of naturalness (*Natürlichkeit*), who are strong enough for this freedom; the people of tolerance (*die Menschen der Toleranz*), not out of weakness, but out of strength, because they know how to turn to their advantage what would destroy the average type; the people to whom there is no longer anything forbidden except weakness, whether it be called vice or virtue. . . Such a liberated spirits stand in the midst of the universe with a joyful (*freudiger*) and trusting (*vertrauender*) fatalism (*Fatalismus*), with faith (*Glaube*) in the fact that only what is particular (*Einzelne*) is reprehensible (*verwerflich*), that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole (*Ganzen*) – he no longer denies (*verneint*). . . But such a faith is the highest of all possible faiths; I have baptized it with the name of Dionysus (2005: ~49).

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