DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO THE
SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2015

by

ROBIN MICHAEL BLAKE

A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree

MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES

in the Department of Political Sciences
    Faculty of Humanities
    University of Pretoria

Supervisor:
    Professor Anton du Plessis

August 2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is dedicated to my wife, Michelle.

In addition, I also acknowledge the contributions of the following:

Professor Anton Du Plessis, my supervisor. Words do not adequately express the extent of my appreciation. My sincere thanks for sharing your deep wisdom and wide experience with me.

Major General Gordon Yekelo, former Commandant of the South African National Defence College, for his enthusiasm and interest.

Vera Plint and Zelda Green for library support.

Karen Mullan for editing.

And finally my family and friends, in particular the runners, for their encouragement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identification of the research theme ................................................................. 1
1.2 Literature overview .......................................................................................... 2
1.3 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem ..................................... 6
1.4 Research methodology ..................................................................................... 8
1.5 Research structure ........................................................................................... 8
1.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 10

## CHAPTER 2: THE DEFENCE DIPLOMACY - CONFLICT PREVENTION NEXUS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11
2.2 From preventive diplomacy, through non-coercive defence diplomacy, to confidence-building measures .............................................................. 11
   2.2.1 Preventive diplomacy .................................................................................. 12
   2.2.2 Defence diplomacy ..................................................................................... 14
   2.2.3 Non-coercive defence diplomacy ................................................................. 19
   2.2.4 Confidence-building measures .................................................................. 21
2.3 From conflict, through conflict development, to conflict prevention .............. 23
   2.3.1 Conflict structure ....................................................................................... 23
   2.3.2 Conflict development .................................................................................. 25
   2.3.3 Conflict prevention .................................................................................... 27
2.4 The defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus: a framework for analysis ... 32
2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 36

## CHAPTER 3: THE POLICY CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FROM 1994 TO 2015

3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 37
3.2 Foreign policy context ...................................................................................... 38
3.3 The Department of Defence policies on defence diplomacy ............................ 40
CHAPTER 4: THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FROM 2011 TO 2015

4.1. Introduction

4.2. South African involvement in pre-manifest conflict with specific reference to SADC

4.3. The operationalisation of South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015

4.3.1. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report 2011/12

4.3.2. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence & Military Veterans Annual Report 2012/13

4.3.3. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report FY2013/14

4.3.4. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report 2014/15

4.4. Assessment of the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy until 2015

4.5. Conclusion
CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................... 79

5.1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 79
5.2. Summary ............................................................................................................... 79
5.3. Key findings and evaluation ................................................................................. 80
5.4. Recommendations ................................................................................................. 83
5.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 86

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 88

SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 98

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Military approaches and tools ................................................................. 12
Table 2: The defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus: A framework for analysis ................................................................. 34
Table 3: The operational context of South Africa's defence diplomacy involving SADC member states, 2011-2015 ................................................................. 76

Figure 1: Life history of a conflict ......................................................................... 13
Figure 2: The Hourglass Model: Conflict transformation, settlement and containment 30
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Bi-National Commission (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C SANDF</td>
<td>Chief of the South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADSP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence-building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISM</td>
<td>International Military Sports Council <em>(Conseil International du Sport Militaire)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJAX</td>
<td>Combined Joint African Exercise (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBMs</td>
<td>Confidence- and Security-building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Defence Committee (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISC</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence Sub-Committee (SADC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFR</td>
<td>Defence Foreign Relations (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAD</td>
<td>Defence International Affairs Division (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESALO</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern African Liaison Office (CISM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETD</td>
<td>Education, Training and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo <em>(Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTS</td>
<td>International Cooperation, Trade and Security (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRPS</td>
<td>International Relations, Peace and Security (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Interstate Defence and Security Committee (SADC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Commission on Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPCDS</td>
<td>Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTSF</td>
<td>Medium Term Strategic Framework (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCACC</td>
<td>National Conventional Arms Control Committee (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCAGS</td>
<td>Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace-support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAF</td>
<td>South African Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN</td>
<td>South African Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMHS</td>
<td>South African Military Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (<em>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDF</td>
<td>Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identification of the research theme

The research theme is situated within the context of preventive diplomacy, the brainchild of a former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Dag Hammarskjöld. This particular approach to peace and order in the international system did not have an enthusiastic following during the Cold War but regained post-Cold War prominence under another Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his 1992 Report, *Agenda for Peace*, he defined preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 5). Moreover, Boutros-Ghali (1992: 6-7) highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy in reducing tension before conflict arises, using a range of activities including Confidence-building Measures (CBMs). Accordingly Lund (1997: 37) insisted that activities associated with preventive diplomacy must take place “in vulnerable places and times”. Although Lund added early warning to preventive activities, George (2000: 15) cautioned that incipient crises are often ignored until there is escalation to a major catastrophe or widespread carnage. Both commentators nevertheless agree that preventive diplomacy is aimed at inhibiting conflict with the added caveat that timing and location are critically important.

Cottey and Forster (2004: 15 & 27) support Boutros-Ghali’s notion of preventive diplomacy by extending conflict prevention to include defence diplomacy and point out that some countries amongst others the Argentine, Brazil, the United States (US), the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Romania, have used defence diplomacy for conflict prevention purposes with some measure of success. Despite this consensus on the efficacy of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention important facets thereof require deeper investigation to establish how it contributes to prolonging cycles of peace and preventing or shortening cycles of violent conflict. The relevance of the study resides therein that it links defence diplomacy and conflict prevention to determine when and how defence diplomacy makes a meaningful contribution to conflict prevention. Therefore the aim of the study is to explore and explain how defence diplomacy contributes to conflict prevention with specific reference to a

1.2 **Literature overview**

That defence diplomacy has utility in preventing conflict is not in question. What is in question is *how* (in a descriptive-analytical sense) and *when* (in an exploratory sense) defence diplomacy can contribute to conflict prevention. The rationale is that too narrow a focus on coercive defence diplomacy involving military intervention has limited value in preventing conflict. Hence the subsequent emphasis on its non-coercive use, that is evident from an overview of relevant literature.

The literature overview is divided into two sections. The first examines literature on the core and related concepts of defence diplomacy and conflict prevention and their relationship within the diplomacy - military nexus of foreign policy instruments. Its purpose is to explore the conceptual - theoretical basis of an appropriate framework for analysis. The second covers the South African use of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention with reference to both the official policy framework and operational context thereof.

(a) **Conflict prevention and defence diplomacy:** There is an abundance of scholarly literature on conflict and conflict management with the inclusion of conflict prevention. A seminal contribution is that of Mitchell (1989), *The Structure of International Conflict*, a study that comprehensively explores and analyses the phenomenon. The gist of this work is that conflict originates in a situation brought about by goal incompatibility, is enhanced by psychological conditions which culminate in attitudes, and manifests in deliberate behaviour to force an opponent to relinquish or alter their goals – a conflict triad that also underpins the development stages of conflict, namely incipient, latent and manifest conflict. Conflict is deemed inevitable and pervasive to the point that eradication is unlikely, thus necessitating ongoing conflict management. Accordingly, as one of several conflict management processes, activities for conflict prevention are enduring even in the face of peaceful conduct.

To this can be added the work by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. In the context of their Hourglass Model (2011: 14) conflict prevention is seen as a means of forestalling violent conflict before it starts.
book argues that political responses have the highest degree of latitude during the initial stages of conflict development, but reduce as conflict progresses thereby confirming the importance of timing. Before becoming violent, the dimensions of conflict are conflict transformation and conflict settlement. By implication defence diplomacy activities, including those related to non-coercive defence diplomacy, must be synchronised with these aspects. This safeguards incipient conflict from escalating into latent conflict by the elimination of differences and contradictions before polarisation occurs.

Using UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s definition as a point of departure, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 125) also argue that prevention involves deep or light prevention. Deep prevention aims to address the root causes of conflict such as economic grievances while light prevention is aimed at inhibiting existing conflict from turning violent, entailing mediation, CBMs and crisis management. CBMs have particular relevance to light prevention. As noted by Glaser (n.d), they are of significance since they prevent or resolve uncertainties among states to avert the intentional or unintentional escalation of hostilities. They can include formal or informal, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, military or political, and state-to-state or non-governmental measures.

To this the contribution of Nathan (2013) on how preventive diplomacy and confidence-building can prevent intra- or interstate disputes or tension from escalating into violence or be used to limit the extent of violence if escalation occurs, is added. Although emphasising coercive diplomacy, the works of Jakobsen (2013) and George (2000) are also useful. They, in a cautionary manner, identified the limited utility of this impelling form of diplomacy in the post-Cold War environment, namely being a high risk option that decreases the likelihood of success. Their suggestion to use positive incentives instead, is therefore important.

The concepts of preventive diplomacy and defence diplomacy are also exhaustively covered in academic literature. In particular the work of Lund (1997), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, provides a systematic analysis of the concepts, tools and methods for preventing conflict using military and non-military approaches. As such, this contribution provides a point of departure and a context for defence diplomacy. Although defence diplomacy (including coercive defence diplomacy) is not a recent phenomenon, it is a niche area that has only been explored in depth since the
ending of the Cold War and it is a theme covered by wide ranging and diverse academic literature (see Fetic 2014: 14). Therefore, in order to focus this study, specific attention is paid to defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. In their seminal work, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, Cottey and Forster (2004) argue that defence diplomacy plays a role in preventing conflict by pursuing approaches to peace through various activities. However, they neither posit their argument in a theoretical construct for conflict prevention nor do they consider defence diplomacy from a coercive - non-coercive perspective.

Rolfe (2015), however, made this link by indicating that although defence diplomacy is employed to develop trust and constructive relationships, it also contributes to conflict prevention and resolution. He nevertheless fails to elaborate how defence diplomacy contributes to preventing conflict. Du Plessis (2008: 89, 92 & 96-97) proposes a wider continuum for defence diplomacy and suggests it ranges from the “pacific-persuasive” to the “violent-coercive” for achieving policy objectives. His article points out that defence diplomacy involves the use of military personnel for conflict prevention and resolution and furthermore argues that conflict prevention engages former or potential enemies to establish and sustain cooperative relationships built on trust, transparency, common interests, altered paradigms, defence reform and cooperation. Hence the conclusion that Rolfe and Du Plessis agree that defence diplomacy when used for conflict prevention should be non-belligerent; pacific-persuasive; grounded in trust; based on common interests and constructive relationships; transparent and defence reform and cooperation inclined.

The literature confirms that non-coercive defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention – involving light prevention to transform circumstances, attitudes and behaviour by introducing CBMs during conflict transformation and settlement – or for purposes of preventing the escalation of omnipresent incipient and latent conflict, requires continuous attention. However, the existence of a lacuna on the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus is evident. This necessitates a concept-based theoretical framework that explains how non-coercive defence diplomacy is effectively used for preventing conflict especially when CBMs are introduced to inhibit the escalation of incipient and latent conflict into manifest conflict.
South Africa’s use of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention: A survey of previous and related research indicates that South Africa’s defence diplomacy, more so for purposes of conflict prevention, is under-researched (arguably even non-existent) and under-theorised. South African foreign policy and the implementation thereof, especially the African Agenda regarding the use of Peace-support Operations (PSO) is extensively covered by Shaw and Cilliers (1995), South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa Volume 1; Cilliers and Mills (1995), Peacekeeping in Africa Volume 2; Southall (2008), South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa; and Shillinger (2009), Africa’s Peacemaker Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation. However, the same cannot be said about South African defence diplomacy. Here literature and research is singularly lacking, with the exception of Edmonds and Mills (1998), Beyond the Horizon: Defence, Diplomacy and South Africa’s Naval Opportunities; Du Plessis (2008), Defence Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa; and Liebenberg (2014), South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy: Leadership, Context, Choices and Challenges in a Changing Africa.

After the 1994 elections South Africa was re-admitted to the international community. This enhanced the profile of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to new levels with a concomitant requirement for defence diplomacy. However, neither the Parliament approved South African White Paper on Defence, 1996, nor the South African Defence Review, 1998, made mention of defence diplomacy. Hence the Minister of Defence, Mr M.G.P. Lekota, directed that the 1996 Defence White Paper and 1998 Defence Review be updated to make provision for the changed strategic environment (RSA DOD 2004a: 6). However, defence diplomacy was once again conspicuously absent in the strategic guidelines, dubbed the Parys Resolutions, which provided overall strategic direction for the Department of Defence (DOD) (RSA DOD 2007: 8). Indeed, the DOD conducted defence diplomacy without endorsement by the 1996 Defence White Paper or the 1998 Defence Review.

However, Annual Reports issued by the DOD from 2000 onwards include a wide range of activities associated with defence diplomacy, which were also conducted without a formally and explicitly stated policy or strategy in official documents. As the South African Department of Defence 2002/2003 Annual Report noted: “The conduct of SANDF and DOD activities influencing the defence foreign relations environment are not integrated and co-
ordinated. This impacts directly on the ability to exert influence in the field of defence diplomacy and military foreign relations” (RSA DOD 2004a: 55).

In contrast to the absence of an explicit reference to defence diplomacy in the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review, the Defence Secretariat Strategic Plan for the fiscal years 2011/12 - 2015/16 (hereinafter the 2011 Defence Secretariat Plan) emphasised the link between defence diplomacy and foreign policy – by using military instruments non-coercively for purposes of strategic defence cooperation – as a “particular type of diplomacy in a democratic South Africa” (RSA DOD 2011a: 35). Moreover, the Plan highlighted the absence of a defence foreign relations strategy to buttress “qualitative defence diplomacy activities”, but did not specifically identify non-coercive defence diplomacy as a means to prevent conflict (RSA DOD 2011a: 36).

The South African Defence Review 2015 – which replaced the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review, – was approved by the executive (Cabinet) and the legislature as a comprehensive 20 year strategy to be implemented over four cycles of the five year Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF). In contrast to its predecessors, the 2015 Defence Review specifically identifies defence diplomacy and conflict prevention as long-term strategic objectives for promoting strategic influence by fostering, broadening and deepening defence relations to prevent conflict (RSA DOD 2016: vii, 7-2, 7-3). Therefore suffice to conclude that there is a literature and documentary basis on South Africa’s defence diplomacy, including its use – for purposes of conflict prevention – but, there is obviously scope for further research in this field.

1.3 Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

To the extent that the aim of this study is to conduct a strategic analysis of South Africa’s use of defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention, as framed by the 2015 Defence Review, the underlying problem is that South Africa’s use of this instrument in its approach to conflict management is under-theorised and under-emphasised. This problem leads to two inter-related research questions. Firstly, what is the link and relationship between defence diplomacy and the prevention of conflict? Secondly, how is or can defence diplomacy, as a supplementary form of preventive diplomacy, be strategically aligned with the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention use? In response to these questions it is argued that
by systemically linking it to conflict prevention as an approach to peace, defence diplomacy – as articulated in the 2015 Defence Review – can prevent conflict from escalating into a manifest form if used non-coercively and if specifically targeted at incipient and latent conflict.

Accordingly, this study has the following objectives:

- As a theoretical framework, to clarify and explain the nexus between defence diplomacy and conflict prevention as a grounded theory of non-coercive defence diplomacy using CBMs.
- As a policy framework, to analyse the DOD policy and the 2015 Defence Review that provide the context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy as an instrument of conflict management, more specifically of conflict prevention.
- As an operational framework, to analyse whether and if so how non-coercive defence diplomacy was utilised by the DOD for conflict prevention between 2011 and 2015.
- As a prescriptive framework, to evaluate the research findings and to make recommendations for implementing relevant aspects of the 2015 Defence Review concerning the use of non-coercive defence diplomacy for conflict prevention.

The study is demarcated in a conceptual, geographical and time context. At a conceptual level the key constructs are defence diplomacy and conflict prevention situated within and contextualised by diplomacy and conflict. The geographical focus and therefore the unit of analysis is South Africa with specific reference to its defence policy and the 2015 Defence Review. However, since defence diplomacy reaches into the international sphere, the operationalisation thereof extends in a concentric manner from the Southern African region, through the African continent to the rest of the world. For the purpose of this study – due to limited scope and geospatial convergence – the Southern African region, institutionally framed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is the main locus of the operational context of South Africa’s conflict prevention defence diplomacy. The time frame of the study is from 1994 to 2015. The period from 1994 to 2011 provides the historical and contextual background to South African defence policy and the conduct of defence diplomacy. The period from 2011 to 2015 covers the advent of non-coercive defence diplomacy and culminates in the 2015 Defence Review and its initial implementation (or aspects thereof).
1.4 Research methodology

Concerning the research design a critical literature-documentary study is undertaken. The study’s approach is embedded in traditional security thinking, hence the emphasis on a strategic analysis (mainly representative of neo-realism). Although primarily descriptive-analytical, the study is also exploratory in nature since it focuses on a lacuna in the literature and a practice that is arguably under-researched and under-theorised. The research method firstly involves a qualitative analysis of literature to ground a theory of non-coercive defence diplomacy for conflict prevention. Secondly, a single non-comparative study of a descriptive-analytical nature, using the inductive method, is conducted.

Use is made of primary documentary sources of an official nature available in the public domain, such as the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review; DOD Annual Reports from 2010 to 2015; the 2011 Defence Secretariat Plan; and transcripts of Parliamentary debates on the annual Defence Budgets in particular. However, the core document of this study is the 2015 Defence Review. Unstructured interviews with experts supplement the documentary sources. Secondary sources, to develop the said framework for analysis and to shed light on South Africa’s policies and use of defence diplomacy, include books, journal articles, research reports and media reports.

1.5 Research structure

The research is structured in a conventional manner and framed by five chapters that present an introduction, a theoretical framework, the case study analysis and a concluding assessment.

Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter identifies the research theme, provides a literature overview, identifies and demarcates the research problem, explains the research methodology and indicates the structure of the research.

Chapter 2: The Defence Diplomacy - Conflict Prevention Nexus: A Framework for Analysis. The point of departure of this chapter is the link or nexus between preventive diplomacy and defence diplomacy. This is followed by an analysis of conflict prevention, paying specific attention to its focus on incipient and latent conflict. Within this context non-
coercive defence diplomacy is highlighted, to ground a theory on its CBM-related activities that prevent the manifestation and escalation of conflict. The chapter concludes with the presentation of a conceptual framework for the analysis of the South African case study.

Chapter 3: The Policy Context of South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy from 1994 to 2015. This chapter entails a two-fold thematic analysis. The first theme involves a retrospective analysis of DOD policies on or related to defence diplomacy for conflict prevention from 1994 to 2015, with specific emphasis on 2011 and the Defence Secretariat Strategic Plan for the Fiscal Years 2011/12 – 2015/16, that first mooted and heralded in non-coercive defence diplomacy. The second theme involves an analysis of defence diplomacy as envisaged in the 2015 Defence Review to determine the extent to which it is emphasised. The chapter concludes with a summary of the aspects to be taken into account when using non-coercive defence diplomacy for conflict prevention.

Chapter 4: The Operational Context of South Africa’s Defence Diplomacy from 2011 to 2015. This chapter covers the operational context of non-coercive defence diplomacy as framed by official views and policy documents. It is a snapshot analysis and assessment of defence diplomacy activities reported in official documents from 2011 to 2015. As demarcated (see Section 1.3) the main locus of this operationalisation is the Southern African region institutionally framed by SADC. The purpose is to determine whether or not these activities are non-coercive and aimed at conflict prevention. The chapter concludes with a summary of the aspects to be taken into account when using non-coercive defence diplomacy and confidence-building measures to prevent an escalation to violent conflict, as envisaged in the 2015 Defence Review.

Chapter 5: Evaluation and Recommendations. This chapter serves a two-fold purpose. Firstly, it summarises and evaluates the research finding in order to assess the extent to which the research objectives were realised, the research questions were answered and the research thesis was verified or falsified. Secondly, it makes policy and operational recommendations for the use of non-coercive defence diplomacy by the DOD to implement and support the 2015 Defence Review, and suggests areas of future research.
1.6 **Conclusion**

Based on the aforesaid identification of the research theme, the literature overview, the identification and demarcation of the research problem, the indication of the research methodology and the structure of the research, attention is forthwith given to conceptual and relational dimensions of the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus. The objective is to clarify the core and related concepts and to develop a theoretical framework to describe and explain the South African case study.
CHAPTER 2

THE DEFENCE DIPLOMACY - CONFLICT PREVENTION NEXUS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 Introduction

Defence forces are transforming to meet the exigencies of an ever-changing international environment by perpetually seeking better ways to protect society from violent conflict. In this quest defence forces use diplomacy in their defence foreign relations – or vice versa foreign policy actors use military means for diplomatic purposes – as one way of preventing conflict. As a result and across the world, the military-diplomacy linkage features prominently in security and defence policies and strategies. Furthermore, and as an extension of this, defence diplomacy and conflict prevention also receive considerable attention along with the near axiomatic acceptance that defence diplomacy is useful and effective in preventing conflict. In further examining this, it is germane to question how and when defence diplomacy can contribute to conflict prevention.

The aim of this chapter, based on a critical review of relevant literature, is to develop a framework of analysis that not only describes and explains the defence diplomacy - conflict nexus and its conceptual foundations, but that can also be applied to South Africa as a case study. In sequence the chapter and its main sections describe and explain preventive diplomacy and its link to defence diplomacy; clarify and analyse the concept of conflict prevention also considering its focus on incipient and latent conflict; and concludes with a summative framework for the South African case study.

2.2 From preventive diplomacy, through non-coercive defence diplomacy, to confidence-building measures

Diplomacy has both niche and functional applications, leading to different designations and extensions thereof, some of which are relevant to this study. In this context preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy, and non-coercive defence diplomacy are examined in the following sub-sections.
2.2.1. **Preventive diplomacy**

Used for the first time in a 1960 Security Council report on South Africa by the former Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, preventive diplomacy was accorded limited prominence during the Cold War (Djibom n.d: 7). After the Cold War it re-emerged under another Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, who in his *Agenda for Peace* defined preventive diplomacy as “action (including CBMs) to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 5, 6-7). Nathan (2013) also emphasises the importance of confidence-building to prevent intra- or interstate disputes or tension from escalating into violence or to be used to limit the extent of violence if escalation occurs. Similarly and as the preferred alternative, Jakobsen (2013: 254) and George (2000: 16) emphasise the use of positive incentives to prevent conflict and by implication confirm the constructive impact of CBMs in preventive diplomacy. In contrast they caution against the use of coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War environment as it has limited utility and a decreased likelihood of success.

**Table 1: Military approaches and tools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Approaches</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restraints on the use of armed force.</td>
<td>Arms control regimes (including monitoring).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBMs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-aggression agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preemptive peacekeeping forces for deterrence and containment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demilitarised zones, safe havens and peace zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms embargoes and blockades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-offensive force postures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military-to-military programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat or use of armed force.</td>
<td>Deterrence policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security guarantees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining or restoring local or regional balances of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use or threat of limited shows of force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Lund 1997: 203)

For it to be effective, Lund (1997: 37) suggests that preventive diplomacy and related activities are required at specific locations at the right time based on early warning. But George (2000: 15) warned that crises are often ignored until it is too late. By expanding on
the work of Hammarskjöld and Boutros-Ghali on preventive diplomacy, Lund and George concur that the timing and location of the activities are critically important, hence the need for early warning, and that these activities should be of a non-coercive nature. Furthermore, Lund (1997: 37) points out that preventive diplomacy involves activities which include diplomatic, political, military, economic and other instruments for preventing a situation from becoming violent. Specific military approaches and tools are associated with preventive diplomacy (see Table 1). On the one hand, it is evident that the preemptive use of peacekeeping forces to deter and contain; demilitarized zones, safe havens and peace zones; arms embargoes and blockades; deterrence policies and security guarantees; maintaining or restoring local or regional balances of power; and the use or threat of limited force are essentially coercive, and therefore, of limited utility. On the other hand, arms control regimes (including monitoring); CBMs; non-aggression agreements; non-offensive force postures; and military-to-military cooperation are non-coercive. However, their use to prevent conflict is seldom mentioned. To redress this Lund (1997: 38) posits that conflict develops through three stages, namely an early, mid and late stage (see Figure 1). Significantly and therefore emphasising conflict prevention, he argues that conflict prevention directed diplomacy takes place during the early stage of conflict when there is unstable peace.

**Figure 1: Life history of a conflict**

![Life history of a conflict](image)

(Lund 1997: 38)

Lund (1997: 39) is also of the opinion unstable peace exists when “(t)ension and suspicion among parties runs high but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A ‘negative peace’ prevails because although armed force is not deployed, the parties perceive one
another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities”. In unstable peace it is clear that measures to prevent conflict depend on the ability to identify the causes of tension and suspicion for designing appropriate responses which reduce enmity. In this way CBMs have particular value as a response to the causes of enmity as they intend to establish trust and certainty between parties to the conflict. While preventive diplomacy is relevant during unstable peace, it is also appropriate during stable peace which Lund (1997: 39) defines as “wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g. trade) within the context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in nonviolent, more or less predictable ways”. During this stage of unstable peace differences emerge and it is therefore fitting to initiate activities, such as the establishment of military-to-military cooperation, to eliminate or reduce differences.

This section describes preventive diplomacy as an over-arching concept, emphasising the importance of non-coercion and confidence-building as alternatives to coercion. It examined the role of the military within this context and identified the use of defence-related tools within the life history of a conflict. Subsequently, attention turns to the role of defence diplomacy within the context of preventive diplomacy.

2.2.2. Defence diplomacy

Diplomacy is no longer the sole preserve of foreign affairs ministries and is undertaken by most government departments in support of advising, shaping and implementing foreign policy to manage inter-state relations and relations with other actors (Barston 1997: 1). Diplomacy also has a broader context that includes, amongst others, ‘dollar diplomacy’, ‘oil diplomacy’, ‘governance diplomacy’, and ‘resource diplomacy’ (Barston 1997: 1). As an additional form of ‘specialised’ diplomacy, defence diplomacy can be added.

Scholars (as well as countries) differ in their conceptualisation of defence diplomacy, often referring to military diplomacy instead. Mohan (2012: 2), however, makes a sensible distinction by defining defence diplomacy as “activities undertaken by the entire defence establishment, including its civilian bureaucracy and the research and development establishments”, and military diplomacy as “interaction and exchanges between the uniformed services”. In contrast to the narrower meaning of military diplomacy, defence
diplomacy is a broader and more inclusive concept. As such it refers to the practice whereby any member of a defence establishment who has official contact with a counterpart defence establishment or international organisation, establishes, broadens or deepens defence relations, including preventive diplomacy, in support of foreign policy objectives.

Although the origins of defence diplomacy are rooted in history and the concept was used during the pre-1990 era (albeit in a different context), the term returned to the international relations and military lexicon during the 1990s when defence forces re-examined their roles in a post-Cold War environment. Examples of countries that embraced defence diplomacy include the US, France, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Singapore, Indonesia, and New Zealand. It found particular traction among European countries for establishing relationships based on trust and mutual confidence with former communist bloc adversaries; supporting broader European integration; and forging cooperative security relationships between the US, Canada and Eastern and Western European countries (Blank 2003). Notably, its utilisation marked a shift away from a narrow Cold War focus of forging alliances against a common enemy to a wider focus for improving relations with former or potential enemies; promoting civil-military relations and security sector reform; assisting defence forces to transform after conflict or political change; supporting regional peacekeeping initiatives; and fostering regional relations for conflict prevention (Cottey & Forster 2004: 69). However, the contemporary appeal of defence diplomacy is complicated by a particular concern that it risks depiction as “an expedient catchall label” (Tan & Singh 2012: 226) and as a consequence is subject to both positive and negative critique.

Proponents of defence diplomacy are of the opinion that it is the most efficient way of preventing conflict as it forestalls countries from becoming adversarial (Bearman 1999: 40). Bisley (2014: 13) contends that defence diplomacy has three potential benefits, namely it reduces tension; it assists with crisis management by preventing escalation; and it facilitates information flow which enhances mutual understanding of interests and capabilities. Cottey and Forster (Cottey & Forster 2004: 77) indicate that by preventing conflict it makes a long-term contribution to a cooperative and stable international order. Tan and Singh (Tan & Singh 2012: 228) add a regional perspective to defence diplomacy by using the example of the Southeast Asian regional defence forums and institutions such as the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus. These associations provide strategic depth; afford constructive engagement; facilitate an understanding of the strategic cultures of member states; improve the understanding and management of regional relations; and promote the sharing of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts and PSO. The proponents of defence diplomacy generally agree that it has a utility value in preventing conflict and fostering stability, especially by reducing tension, preventing issue escalation and promoting mutual understanding. However, most commentators countries are silent on how defence diplomacy specifically assists in preventing conflict.

Defence diplomacy is not without detractors. White (2014: 10) dismisses the concept as little more than a public relations exercise by defence forces to reassure society of their security during times of peace. Since defence diplomacy involves the military, he specifically cautions against the assumption that it works better than other forms of diplomacy. He rejects the idea that “plain-speaking military men … can resolve differences and build trust and understanding where civilian diplomats and politicians become mired in half-truths … (that) military men have more in common … (and) find it easier to see the other side’s point and view … (and that) any strategic differences that arise between countries result from misunderstandings which only need to be cleared up by soldierly plain-speaking for the problems to go away. None of these are true. They are myths” (White 2014: 10-11). Yet, despite his criticism he acknowledges that defence diplomacy can achieve results in certain situations and appeals for a pragmatic approach because, as Bisley (2014: 14) warns, it has limitations in regions characterised by entrenched and ongoing political cleavages. In his assessment of the relationship between NATO member states and Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, Bearman (1999) contends that it is “naïve” or “misleading” to suggest that conflict can be prevented by military-to-military contacts built through defence diplomacy as today’s friend may be tomorrow’s foe. In her critique of the 1998 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) Strategic Defence Review (SDR), Hills (2007: 47 & 49) identifies flaws of defence diplomacy, in particular its linkages to Security Sector Reform (SSR). She emphasises that successful defence diplomacy must be integrated with programmes of other government departments and with other policy instruments for conflict resolution. In addition she stresses that defence diplomacy can be a source of friction between government departments over competition for scarce resources (Hills 2007: 51). A further consequence of defence diplomacy is that it could lead to tension as a result of inclusion and exclusion (Bearman 1999). Leahy (2014: 16) also points out that defence
diplomacy requires time but does not always yield results while Taylor (2014: 5) insists that its benefits are nebulous and difficult to quantify. The detractors are sceptical of the utility of defence diplomacy (also for conflict prevention) and warn that there are inherent pitfalls. These include that it cannot assure the endurance of friendly collaboration; it may exacerbate conflict; it creates unrealistic expectations; it is time consuming; and that its results are difficult to discern. However, with prudence and insight, it is possible to overcome these pitfalls.

Despite the views of proponents and detractors, defence diplomacy is used for country-specific purposes. In 1993 the Australian Minister of Defence linked the need to engage regional nations, maintain relations with alliances and confirm a commitment to international peace and security to Australia’s defence (Fris 2013: 12). However, it was the German Ministry of Defence who in 1994 recognised that ‘military-political’ cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries was a core mission to detect and resolve conflict before it escalated to military confrontation (Fris 2013: 10). Defence diplomacy similarly featured as a core mission in the UK’s 1994 SDR in which it was defined as the provision of “forces to meet the varied activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.” (quoted by Fris 2013: 14). Canada followed the UK’s example by adopting defence diplomacy as official policy in 2005, describing it as a defence tool for shaping the international environment to contribute to stability by building relations (Fris 2013: 18). In the 2012 Spanish defence diplomacy plan (Kingdom of Spain 2012: 18), defence diplomacy is described as “(t)he various international activities based mainly on dialogue and cooperation, carried out bilaterally by the Ministry of Defence with our allies, partners and other friendly countries to promote the accomplishment of defence policy objectives in support of Spanish foreign policy”. These international activities include conflict prevention; security sector reform; and reinforcing security and defence capabilities. Whereas Canada and Australia are ambivalent regarding defence diplomacy for conflict prevention, the UK and Spain specifically link defence diplomacy to conflict prevention. The comprehensive description thereof by Germany emphasises the importance of detecting and resolving conflict before it escalates and places former enemies foremost in the integrated military-political context. The German approach astutely positions conflict prevention at the center of defence diplomacy and is, indeed, an ideal benchmark.
Diplomacy has bilateral and multilateral modes, promotes sound relations between states and, by extension, prevents crises and conflict (Zartman 2012: 90). Multilateral and regional diplomacy shapes contemporary diplomacy (Barston 1997: 5). As Tan and Singh (Tan & Singh 2012: 224) note, challenges to security have become so complex that no state can deal with them unilaterally, underscoring the significance of multilateral diplomacy. Based on their assessment of the contribution of defence to Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture, in that it advances intra- and extra-regional cooperation in the ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), they argue along with Barston in favour of multilateral and regional diplomacy (Tan & Singh 2012: 226). Defence diplomacy must similarly include multilateral and regional dimensions as an adjunct to bilateral defence relations and the associated activities.

Defence diplomacy activities vary considerably and span a wide range. Included are bilateral and multilateral contact between military and civilian officials; the appointment of defence attachés or advisors; the conclusion of defence cooperation agreements; the training of defence and civilian personnel, including the deployment of training teams and other experts; the provision of expertise and advice on defence-related matters; the conducting of ship visits and other military related exchanges; the conducting of training exercises; and providing military equipment and technical expertise (Cottey & Forster 2004: 7). Concerning the provision of military equipment, Tan and Singh (Tan & Singh 2012: 227) observe that it expands influence in recipient countries, confirming Kissinger’s (quoted by Gleijeses 1999: 231) comment that “contrary to what my colleagues at Harvard have been teaching for 10 years, history shows you get much more influence with military sales than with economic aid.” Arms sales bring stability to bilateral defence relations in the long term. However, from a multilateral perspective they become more complex as the security dilemma increases, mistrust is fueled and suspicion is aroused. It is therefore crucial that arms sales and the provision of military equipment are handled with circumspection and that CBMs are used specifically to avoid conflict escalation.

To reduce their diversity, activities associated with defence diplomacy can be grouped into four categories. These relate to: direct military-to-military contact – adopted by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a vehicle for CBMs – to build understanding and trust; promoting democratic transition; enhancing interoperability; and supporting hard-security objectives (Anon 1999: 43). It is contended that the wide range
of defence diplomacy activities identified by Cottey and Forster and by Tan and Singh (see above) are all related to military-to-military contact and therefore have a direct bearing on CBMs and conflict prevention.

It is concluded that bilateral and multilateral defence diplomacy and related activities can be used for preventing conflict but not in isolation from the political and foreign policy objectives of government. Results are also questionable when there are deep and entrenched political differences or cleavages between the countries involved. More importantly, defence diplomacy is not an all-encompassing panacea for preventing conflict as its utility is restricted to defence-related areas. While defence diplomacy has a general connotation, its utility in conflict prevention must sharpen. Hence the subsequent clarification of non-coercive defence diplomacy and related activities.

2.2.3. Non-coercive defence diplomacy

Defence diplomacy, as previously defined and explained (see Section 2.2.2), has a generic meaning and accepted usage. Depending on the literature and official documents used, but particularly considering the South African focus of this study, an additional typology is required. The essence of this is the distinction that is made (or implied by related concepts) between what is termed ‘coercive defence diplomacy’ and ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy’. Per definition and in terms of its ‘normal’ use, it could be argued that defence diplomacy is intrinsically non-coercive and nothing else. Hence, a non-coercive (and therefore also coercive) qualification would be superfluous. As such, ‘defence diplomacy’ (without the qualifying adjectives) would be distinguished from and contrasted with ‘coercive diplomacy’ that is not only intrinsically coercive but also involves the use of military means in the form of armed force (albeit in a qualified context and with very specific aims in mind). Since official South African policy documents implicitly allude to a coercive-non-coercive dichotomy by explicitly using the concept ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy’(RSA DOD 2011a: 35) – thereby implying the existence of the polar opposite of ‘coercive defence diplomacy’ but without defining it – this distinction and the use of the term non-coercive defence diplomacy require clarification.

Although not the focus of this study but to explain the coercive-non-coercive dichotomy, it needs to be pointed out that coercive diplomacy, is a common theme of security
literature (see amongst others Fetic 2014; Jakobsen 2013; and George 2000). In this respect coercive diplomacy is defined as the use of threats and limited force to resolve crises and violent conflict without resorting to all-out war (Jakobsen 2013: 241). Considering the South African use of the term ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy’ as an opposite of ‘coercive diplomacy’, as well as the absence and lack of definition of coercive defence diplomacy, the inference is that the latter is a terminological extension of coercive diplomacy as in ‘coercive (defence) diplomacy’ or coercive defence diplomacy. Although a nuanced difference could arguably be made between coercive diplomacy and coercive defence diplomacy – depending on context and purpose – with the latter being more inclusive of a wider range of coercive armed force and more extensive in purpose than coercive diplomacy as defined, coercive defence diplomacy and the problem of definition falls outside the ambit of this study.

The point being made is that the weakness of coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War environment (apart from being a high-risk policy option that may have unintended consequences) is that it has limited utility without an assurance that the further escalation of conflict may be averted or that conflict may de-escalate. Hence the suggestion that conflict prevention and the use of positive incentives are more desirable. In this respect Cottey and Forster (2004: 27) suggest that defence diplomacy plays a positive role in preventing conflict by supporting political commitments for cooperation; fostering common interests; promoting cooperation between defence forces; and demonstrating transparency to limit misunderstandings. However, they neither posit their argument in a theoretical construct for conflict prevention nor make a distinction and consider defence diplomacy from a coercive and non-coercive perspective. Using the argument of Jakobsen and George that coercive diplomacy has limited utility, it is therefore contended that coercive defence diplomacy likewise has restricted efficacy and that the alternative of non-coercive defence diplomacy deserves consideration.

Du Plessis (2008: 89-90) argues that diplomacy is a vehicle for implementing political, economic, cultural (propaganda) and military techniques and, when used in the military context, these range from non-coercive (non-violent) to coercive (violent) methods (in the situational context of both cooperation and conflict). In terms of this typology he implicitly provides proof of the existence of non-coercive defence diplomacy (also not excluding coercive diplomacy) to influence and persuade. However, an overview of literature reveals very little related to non-coercive defence diplomacy. Apart from an
unpublished article by Almeida Silva (2015: 6) in which he recognises that non-coercive defence diplomacy does not involve the deterrent use of threats or the impelling use of force to build relations between states, substantive research is lacking.

Although used but not comprehensively explained in terms of the South African context and considering the limited literature on it, it is concluded that non-coercive defence diplomacy is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and integrity, and non-violent methods and that it entails convincing, persuading, negotiating or behaving in a manner that serve common interests, supports mutual political commitments and promote defence cooperation. As such it includes conflict prevention and focuses on former or potential adversaries (and not on current opponents in an adversarial relationship), as well as on existing or potential allies and partners. Non-coercive defence diplomacy is an alternative to the use of force and to coercive diplomacy. It establishes, nurtures and expands defence ties to change situations, attitudes or behaviour, and it engenders trust and confidence using positive incentives such as CBMs.

2.2.4. *Confidence-building measures*

Reducing the likelihood of conflict between states hinges on the creation of confidence (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 7) and the use of CBMs in situations where there is a lack of a shared understanding of the conflict and of a need to promote mutual interests (Herbert 2014: 4). CBMs are based on transparency and involve verifiable activities that establish predictable behaviour to prevent, manage and resolve crises between states that have the potential to escalate into violence (Wolff n.d: 1). Behaviour modification, in particular, is signified by the use of CBMs by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre 2012: 11). In this respect CBMs are used to specifically address, prevent or resolve uncertainties among states to avert an intentional or unintentional escalation of hostilities (Glaser n.d.). This use includes activities that are formal and informal; unilateral, bilateral and multilateral; military and political; and state-to-state and non-governmental (Glaser n.d.). As indicated, Boutros-Ghali, Herbert and Glaser all acknowledged that CBMs can prevent conflict by establishing a shared understanding of the conflict itself, support common interests and may have a military dimension. When defence diplomacy is used in the context of CBMs to prevent conflict, it focuses on
similarities rather than on differences. In this way misunderstandings are clarified and uncertainties are reduced, thereby diminishing the potential for conflict.

Herbert (2014: 3) distinguishes between two types of CBMs that prevent conflict escalation, namely military/security CBMs and humanitarian, social and cultural CBMs. Both, in line with the OSCE viewpoint (OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre 2012: 10), can be used in all phases of a conflict cycle. However, Wolff (n.d: 1) cautions that the use of CBMs is dependent on and therefore varies in accordance with the time frame. In the short term they are designed to prevent conflict escalating into violence; in the medium term they promote trust through increased contact; and in the long term they pave the way to meaningful and sustainable conflict settlement. Specifically, CBMs become relevant against the backdrop of defence cooperation and involve security-related activities which build confidence, hereinafter referred to as Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

Most defence forces undertake various activities (that also overlap with defence diplomacy) to promote defence cooperation. Since these activities fall outside the realm of warfighting and combat operations, and mainly take place during periods of relative peace and stability, they collectively can be construed and operationalised as CSBMs. These activities include entering into formal agreements; conducting exercises; providing training; high level, working and ship visits; holding seminars; intelligence exchanges and early warning information dissemination; establishing common doctrine and procedures; deploying defence attachés; procuring or supplying armaments and technology; providing HADR; sports and cultural exchanges; and even prisoner exchanges. Similarly the OSCE (2011) also operationalises the following categories of what it terms CSBMs: annual exchange of information; defence planning; risk reduction; military contacts; prior notification of certain military activities; observation of military activities such as land, air and naval exercises when the force level exceeds 13 000 troops; the exchange of annual calendars of military activities; constraining provisions, such as placing a limit on the number and sizes of exercises by countries; measures to ensure compliance and verification with the provisions; regional measures for security cooperation such as agreements that promote transparency; and reducing the risk of military conflict. In this respect Lund (1997: 203) concurs with the OSCE by arguing that CBMs are among a number military tools to prevent conflict, similar to the opinion of Ackermann (2003) that CBMs have specific utility in what she terms ‘operational prevention’ (a shortened and synonymous term for ‘light prevention’).
In concluding the aforesaid coverage of defence diplomacy and related concepts and of CBMs and CSBMs in particular, it is noted that Cottey and Forster (2004: 79) do not include and therefore do not consider confidence-building to be part of defence diplomacy. In contrast Indonesia uses CBMs as a specific type of defence diplomacy, thus validating the notion that defence diplomacy can be utilised for building confidence (Laksmana 2011: 82). While the OSCE document does not refer to the use of defence diplomacy, the commonalities between defence diplomacy and CBMs lie in their overlap and similarities rather than in their distinction and differences. When used non-coercively, defence diplomacy builds confidence and contributes to conflict prevention.

Defence diplomacy, as used by many defence forces, is glibly linked to conflict prevention without explaining its contribution to the latter. As indicated in the preceding sections, the nexus between the two concepts is complex. Hence the pre-requisite to provide an understanding of conflict and conflict prevention, also to further align it with non-coercive defence diplomacy.

2.3 From conflict, through conflict development, to conflict prevention

Conflict, being a human phenomenon, has distinctive features and also exhibits a particular development path. Being systematically dysfunctional and harmful, conflict has to be terminated or managed. Since the former is seldom achieved, the latter is imperative. Depending on the nature, scope and stage of conflict, different strategies and approaches are available to manage it. One of the most important approaches, also in the context of this study, is conflict prevention. However, conflict prevention needs contextualisation and explanation. Based on its systematic structure and inclusive scope, the seminal contribution of Mitchell (1989) – albeit supplemented – is used as the basis of the subsequent conceptual-theoretical framework to contextualise and explain conflict and its prevention.

2.3.1 Conflict structure

Although conflict and cooperation are inevitably present in inter-state relations, an exclusively conflictual or cooperative relationship is rarely encountered. Conflict is also neither the same as competition, nor is it synonymous with coercive or violent behaviour. Moreover, the absence of conflict (or violence) does not mean the prevalence of peace
These assumptions are myopic and limiting as conflict is a reality which plays out continuously. Conflict has ongoing relevance even in the face of ostensibly peaceful conditions.

According to Mitchell (1989: 16) conflict has a triadic structure that embodies three inter-related components namely a conflict situation; conflict attitudes and perceptions; and conflict behaviour. He cautions that conflict may be present without overt indications of the three components, implying that a seemingly peaceful relationship could be misinterpreted when it is, in reality, tense and antagonistic (Mitchell 1989: 49). This structure is briefly explained to provide an understanding of conflict, conflict development and conflict prevention.

Mitchell (1989: 17) and Wallensteen (2012: 15) concur that a conflict situation is present when two or more parties perceive they have mutually incompatible goals. The incompatibility lies in differing values, perceptions of scarcity, or limited material goods (Mitchell 1989: 18) and is a central theme in conflict dynamics and analysis (Wallensteen 2012: 36 & 57). Since goal incompatibility is inevitable in inter-state relations, discordances must be identified during dialogue to establish a context for preventing conflict and to identify appropriate responses to modify behaviour.

Conflict attitudes and perceptions are psychological conditions which exacerbate both the conflict situation and conflict behaviour. Conflict attitudes are common patterns of expectation and emotional orientation that inform the perceptions accompanying a conflict situation. Emotional orientation includes feelings of anger, mistrust, resentment, scorn, envy or suspicion. These perceptions unfold in stereotyping, cognitive dissonance or prejudice. (Mitchell 1989: 28-29).

Conflict behaviour in a conflict situation entails actions to force an opponent to abandon or modify their goals (Mitchell 1989: 29). Wallensteen (2012: 58) crucially points out that parties modify their behaviour to take on a destructive or constructive dynamic. Actions do not have to be coercive, thereby affirming the utility of non-coercion as acceptable conflict behaviour. Non-coercion centres on behaving, convincing or negotiating to secure an opponent’s goal abandonment or modification. In this way attitudes
accompanying a conflict situation together with the associated behaviour are constructively influenced.

Mitchell (1989: 54-55) emphasises that the three components are interrelated and cannot be evaluated in isolation as attitudes affect behaviour and situations; behaviour affects attitudes and situations and situations affect attitudes and behaviour. This interrelationship has two noticeable implications (Mitchell 1989: 62-63). On the one hand, it may lead to a widening of conflict which means that the existing parties take up new issues; new parties come into being and take up existing issues; other parties are drawn into the conflict; or new issues emerge (Mitchell 1989: 56). On the other hand, conflict escalation could occur when parties embark on a mutually destructive process of increasing the levels of coercion or violence by applying threats or physical action. This may also include an increase in the numbers involved and the commitment of additional resources (Mitchell 1989: 60-61). Escalation leads to changes in conflict attitudes, notably to hostility, mistrust and aggression. These changes may cause goal modification and adaptions in conflict behaviour, all of which feed into conflict spirals and cycles.

The structure of conflict is important since it provides a basis for conflict development in the sense that its components are integral to the stages of conflict escalation (and de-escalation). Similarly and being aligned with approaches and methods, these components are also a focus of conflict management and of conflict prevention in particular.

2.3.2. Conflict development

Conflict development exhibits two dimensions, namely distinct stages and also spirals and cycles. Mitchell (1989: 50-51) contends that – preceded by a cooperative stage when parties have complementary goals – conflict develops through three stages, namely incipient conflict, latent conflict and manifest conflict. These stages are respectively characterised by a conflict situation, conflict attitudes and conflict behaviour. Stemming from a preceding cooperative stage, circumstances – and therefore a conflict situation – arise when goals become incompatible, irrespective of whether or not this is recognised by the parties. This stage associated with a conflict situation brought about by goal incompatibility is that of incipient conflict (Mitchell 1989: 50). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 13) refer to this as the emergence of differences.
When parties acknowledge the existence of mutually incompatible goals and consider alternatives, conflict moves to the next stage of latent conflict. This acknowledgement, although sometimes explicitly articulated and verbalised, commences when the parties develop attitudes and perceptions about goal incompatibilities. This stage, associated with conflict attitudes and perceptions about the conflict situation, is that of latent conflict (Mitchell 1989: 50). Lund (1997: 39) identifies a similar stage, denoted as unstable peace. This is characterised by tension and suspicion with violence either absent or sporadic (see Figure 1). An equivalent stage is identified by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 13), characterised by contradiction and polarisation.

The final stage occurs when a party takes identifiable action towards achieving its goals while simultaneously forcing the adversary to abandon or modify its own (Mitchell 1989: 50-51). This stage when conflict behaviour is added to the other structural components of conflict – i.e. when all are simultaneously present – is that of manifest conflict. Mitchell (1989: 50) adds a caveat to manifest conflict, called suppressed conflict, which occurs when conflict behaviour cannot develop because of an adversary’s overwhelming coercive power. For the purpose of this study the first two stages of conflict, namely incipient and latent conflict, are the dominant albeit not the exclusive loci and foci of conflict prevention. The view of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 123-4) that the latitude for political and other options will decrease unless preventive action is taken, justifies the positioning and alignment of conflict prevention with these development stages. Key to conflict prevention is that the parties admit that a conflict situation and conflict attitudes and perceptions about the underlying goal incompatibilities exist, in order to permit the joint consideration of and agreement on future behaviour and prevention options.

Despite the escalating development of conflict, Mitchell (1989: 51) is adamant that it will not always develop sequentially through all stages; it may remain suppressed during the incipient or latent stages. Here the warning of Hill (2001: 324) that preventing conflict during the incipient stage holds the danger that it may suppress conflict rather than resolve it, is especially germane to actions related to the development of conflict. Mitchell (1989: 52) also observes that the inter-connectedness of the structure and the development of conflict as well as the emergence and involvement of new issues and parties, impact on perceptions and attitudes. This adds to the complexity of conflict resolution, emphasising that straight forward one-dimensional solutions are unlikely. Nonetheless, restricting conflict to a pre-manifest
stage is of cardinal importance as it will prevent degeneration into a vortex of spirals and cycles.

Apart from the stages, conflict development is also characterised by spirals and cycles. Mitchel contends that conflict behaviour causes patterns of action and reaction. For example, coercion is met with counter-coercion and increased aggression while cooperative behaviour sparks a collaborative process accompanied by reward exchange and positive attitudes. As a result parties to a conflict mirror-image each other when, for example, militant factions in opposing parties become more prominent and adopt hardline positions. Although cooperation is less likely than coercion and hostility – it is easier to harm than to do good – either way action - reaction and mirror-imaging leads to malign or benign conflict spirals. Moreover, failing to recognise action - reaction and mirror-imaging will inevitably reinforce a spiral, leading to trigger events that initiate cycles of conflict with behaviour that is progressively more harmful and coercive than the previous cycle. In particular he warns of the danger that malign spirals resulting from serious goal incompatibilities are particularly disruptive since they rapidly escalate and delay or complicate de-escalation (Mitchell 1989: 63 & 66-68).

In each cycle conflict behaviour is progressively more harmful and coercive than in the previous cycle. Therefore conflict cycles could be self-perpetuating. They also often repeat at different times over new issues that result from unresolved or subliminal issues such as ongoing hostility and mistrust (Mitchell 1989: 66-68). This observation confirms the importance of ongoing conflict prevention, even in the face of pacific relations between international actors, implying that conflict management must counteract any manifestation of hostility or mistrust.

2.3.3. **Conflict prevention**

For analytical purposes it is necessary to clarify and explain conflict prevention as such, and to take note of conflict prevention responses. Conflict prevention is fraught with pitfalls and misconceptions but, as Hill (2001: 315) notes, it is a “common thread which holds the (international) system together as it shows how interests and ideals can be yoked to each other”. In this context Lund (1997: 32) observes that a “precise definition is needed if the
heightened interest in preventing conflict is to produce policy guidance and a meaningful assessment is to be made of its promise and limitations.”

The definition of conflict prevention is contested and considering its omnipresence in international relations, this predicament may not be preventable. As Alger (2009: 312) notes, the challenge is not to prevent conflict but rather to develop procedures for distinguishing between disruptive (or violent) conflict and constructive conflict. For the purpose of this study, conflict prevention means preventing an escalation to violent confrontation involving the use of military force. Conflict prevention therefore occupies a very specific position in the broader context of conflict. Based on, and aligned with his conflict development model, Mitchell (1989: 256-257) postulates that the conflict management process constitutes conflict avoidance during incipient conflict; conflict prevention during latent conflict; and conflict settlement or conflict resolution during manifest conflict. Processes and techniques directed at incipient conflict to inhibit the development of a conflict situation, therefore to avoid the development of contentious issues and goal incompatibility, constitute conflict avoidance. Processes and techniques directed at latent conflict to prevent disruptive and destructive conflict behaviour, therefore to address conflict attitudes and perceptions over recognised goal incompatibility, constitute conflict prevention. Processes and techniques directed at manifest conflict to settle or resolve conflict, therefore to halt conflict behaviour and by mutual agreement to remove the source of conflict by addressing incompatible goals and hostile attitudes, constitute conflict settlement or conflict resolution.

Although explicitly directed at latent conflict, conflict prevention by implication focuses on the goal incompatibility that belies the conflict situation and is therefore also linked to incipient conflict. On the one hand, international conflict avoidance has preventive implications to the extent that it inhibits the development of widely shared, over-arching or ‘super-ordinate’ goals; goals that not only preclude narrow interests but that also increase cooperation amongst adversaries by uniting them around a common purpose (Mitchell 1989: 261-262). On the other hand, the avoidance of malign goal incompatibility is an act that prevents conflict from progressing to a new level or even entering a next cycle. Furthermore and as indicated below the processes of conflict prevention do not restrict it to an incipient threshold but also extend it into the domain of manifest conflict.
Conflict prevention involves one of two processes (Mitchell 1989: 263-264), namely to prevent disruptive or undesirable behaviour associated with a conflict situation from arising; or once conflict is manifest, to restrict conflict behaviour to acceptable activities within well-defined parameters. These processes are respectively conflict suppression and conflict regulation. Conflict suppression includes the use of deterrence, threats of force and coercion. Conflict regulation involves the use of recognised and accepted rules, legal processes or even limited war to regulate conflict.

Although inter-related and mutually supportive, conflict regulation can be achieved by introducing an acceptable settlement or by creating non-disruptive values (Mitchell 1989: 265-268). Settlement procedures, based on and instituted through rules or laws, define the nature of permitted conflict behaviour – if, when, against whom and by whom used. As such the progression of conflict from latent to a manifest stage is permitted but regulated to avoid disruption and destruction. The creation of non-disruptive values does not involve the institution of values to remove conflict or to ensure withdrawal in the face of conflict but rather involves the use of social conventions to prevent the pursuit of disruptive or destructive conflict (Mitchell 1989: 268).

Although conflict prevention includes conflict suppression through the use of deterrence, threats and coercion involving armed force, these means are at odds with the non-coercive diplomacy focus of this study. Hence conflict suppression is not pursued any further and the emphasis is on conflict regulation. Conflict prevention in its regulatory form, whether framed by the broader context of conflict avoidance or in its intrinsic context, requires and is associated with particular responses. To identify and position these conflict prevention responses, use is made of the different (contra Mitchell 1989) but overlapping way that Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011) contextualise conflict prevention in terms of their Hourglass Model.

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 123-4) see conflict prevention as a way of forestalling violent conflict before it starts. Their Hourglass Model (see Figure 2) shows that political responses have the highest degree of latitude during the initial stages of conflict, but reduce as it progresses (within the broadening-narrowing contours of the hourglass. The timing of responses, however, is extremely important. Before it becomes violent, the
alternatives are to transform the conflict (through conflict transformation) or to settle the conflict (through conflict settlement).

An initial response (recommended by Lundt 1997: 41) that corresponds with the moral, legal and institutional imperatives provided by international settlement norms, international law and international organisations, and that is appropriate during times of unstable peace, is to use defence diplomacy as a technique to prevent actual or potential disputes from escalating into confrontation or violence. Considering the aims of defence diplomacy and to ensure that incipient conflict does not escalate into latent conflict (or even that latent conflict does not escalate into manifest conflict), defence diplomacy activities (see Section 2.2.2) must be synchronised with conflict transformation and conflict settlement. These activities must also be based on principles that require behaviour which serves common interests; supports mutual political commitments; promotes cooperation in the defence environment; and assists in modifying conflictual behaviour by building confidence. To the extent that these activities are used to eliminate differences and contradictions before polarisation occurs, to address goal incompatibility and to encourage constructive behaviour, dialogue and CBMs are essential (Wallensteen 2012: 37; Mitchell 1989: 30-31). However, to reduce the possibility of an escalation into violence, these defence diplomacy activities must not prejudice conflicting parties.

Figure 2. The Hourglass Model: Conflict transformation, settlement and containment.

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2011: 14)
Since conflict prevention using preventive and defence diplomacy constitutes at most involvement and at least intervention, this intrusive nature and scope of prevention requires clarification. Using UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s definition, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 125) argue that prevention can be deep or light. Light intervention in the form of mediation, CBMs and crisis management is aimed at inhibiting existing conflict from turning violent, whereas deep intervention prevents protracted social conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2011: 125 & 132). Wallensteen (2012: 281 & 295) distinguishes between structural and direct forms of prevention with the former aimed at removing the causes of conflict and the latter aimed at reducing or eliminating violence. Irrespective of the terminology used, there is consensus that conflict prevention responses in the realm of non-coercive defence diplomacy, including CBMs, are light and direct as the purpose is to prevent an escalation into violent confrontation.

As a broader context of these conflict prevention responses, and as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 127 & 129) contend, it is also necessary to consider the implications of the relationship between a particular conflict and other conflict formations. Conflict formations are interlinked and present at the international, national and sub-national levels. Therefore, local and regional conflicts have an international context that bestows a conflict prevention role on international organisations. This includes the need for an early warning capacity – a crucial element of conflict prevention – to identify which conflicts have the potential to become violent or to determine whether there are indications that a particular conflict is moving towards a violent phase (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2011: 132-133). In this regard, the use of defence diplomacy for gathering early warning information on conflicts must not be underestimated.

In conclusion, defence forces need to continually transform and adapt to meet the exigencies of a changing international environment characterised by cycles of relative peace and violent conflict. Protecting society against violent conflict requires a two-pronged approach that entails prolonging cycles of peace while shortening cycles of violence. This in essence is conflict prevention. To enable the analysis of the South African case study it is necessary to provide a summative framework, with the inclusion of defence diplomacy activities, of the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus.
2.4 The defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus: a framework for analysis

Defence diplomacy and conflict prevention interact against the backdrop of what Barston (1997: 200) describes as a complex and evolving relationship between diplomacy and security. Although considered a peaceful endeavour, diplomacy in its current context is often concerned with violence and conflict by “reducing friction or oiling the wheels of bilateral or multilateral relations” (Barston 1997: 1-2). In this way defence diplomacy, irrespective whether bilateral or multilateral, assists in conflict prevention by reducing hostility, tension, antagonism and disagreement.

Although defence diplomacy is not a recent phenomenon, it is a niche area that re-emerged after the ending of the Cold War. Despite consensus on the efficacy of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention this relationship is not always incorporated into a framework for analysis as in the case of Cottey and Foster (2004). This link is more explicit in the work of others. For example, Rolfe (2015: 1) is of the opinion that although defence diplomacy develops trust and enhances constructive relationships, it also contributes to conflict prevention and resolution. Based on a wider conceptualisation, Du Plessis (2008: 89 & 92) provides a framework that contextualises the use of defence diplomacy as part of peace strategies and conflict prevention. Hence Rolfe and Du Plessis agree that defence diplomacy is used for conflict prevention, to the extent that it is non-belligerent; pacific-persuasive; grounded in trust; based on common interests and constructive relationships; transparent; and defence reform and cooperation inclined. Some facets of this nexus, however, require investigation to determine how defence diplomacy contributes to cycles of peace and prevents cycles of violent conflict.

Defence diplomacy for preventing conflict manifests at various levels in a number of ways. The utility of these levels and ways lies in allaying fears and suspicions of former or potential enemies which have their origins in historical perceptions, political differences or tangible disputes such as territory or maritime zones (Cottey and Forster 2004: 15-16). This means that defence diplomacy, in a bilateral or multilateral mode, must be coordinated and employed at the national strategic, strategic, operational and tactical levels when dealing with and preventing conflict. The suggested framework for analysis (see Table 2) has preventive diplomacy for conflict prevention as its primary point of departure. Accordingly, defence diplomacy is positioned as a means (i.e. a particular type of diplomacy) within the process of
preventive diplomacy. In addition, the emphasis is specifically on non-coercive defence diplomacy during periods of pre-manifest (i.e. incipient and latent) conflict, although with the inclusion of a qualified preventive role in respect of manifest conflict.

In this respect, non-coercive defence diplomacy establishes, nurtures and expands defence ties to change (conflict) situations, attitudes or behaviour to engender trust and confidence, and it relies on the will of the parties to acknowledge and resolve differences associated with pre-manifest conflict. However, it is not without preconditions and this requires certain considerations. Emotional orientation towards partners and allies must be trusting, pacific, credible, collaborative and transparent. Discordant goals are inevitable in international relations implying that non-coercive defence diplomacy using confidence-building to modify behaviour must be ongoing. In essence, it calls for pragmatism rather than idealism. It cannot be used in all circumstances, it is not a blanket solution, it does not replace coercive defence diplomacy, and it is unlikely to be effective when there are clear or entrenched political differences between states. All defence diplomacy activities must support political objectives and be crafted in such a way that they do not incite or stimulate incompatibility. Therefore, they must focus on commonality and congruence to ensure that behaviour remains within mutually agreed boundaries for preventing an escalation to violent confrontation.

Non-coercive defence diplomacy can therefore play a role by altering conflict perceptions, reducing anger and resentment while CSBMs can reduce mistrust and suspicion. In the context of defence diplomacy responses and activities, CSBMs are classified into four sequential categories, namely bilateral and multilateral dialogue; the conclusion of agreements; information exchange; establishing defence ties at diplomatic level; and providing tangible substance to undertakings by participating in defence cooperation programmes. It is, however, of crucial importance that activities in support of non-coercive defence diplomacy are synchronised to prevent disputes from arising before conflict intensifies and becomes violent. This means that specific activities are used at specific times and at specific levels for specific purposes. With the inclusion of these categories a concept-based framework for analysis that bridges the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus is produced (see Table 2):
Table 2: The defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus: A framework for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Stages</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-coercive Preventive Diplomacy Framework</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stable Peace</strong></td>
<td>Conflict prevention is aimed at preventing escalation using bilateral and multilateral light intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g. trade) within the context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in nonviolent, more or less predictable ways.” (Lund 1997: 39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unstable Peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Tension and suspicion among parties runs high but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A “negative peace” prevails because although armed force is not deployed, the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities.” (Lund 1997: 39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-manifest Conflict: Incipient and Latent Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incipient Conflict. Conflict situation when goals become incompatible but are not recognised by the parties (Mitchell 1989: 50).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent Conflict. Conflict attitudes and perceptions develop when parties acknowledge the existence of mutually incompatible goals and begin considering alternatives, conflict moves to the next level, latent conflict (Mitchell 1989: 50).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manifest Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict behaviour exists. Prevent conflict from progressing to the next level or entering a next cycle by restricting conflict behaviour to acceptable activities within well-defined parameters (Mitchell 1989: 263).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-coercive Defence Diplomacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discordant goals are inevitable in international relations implying that non-coercive defence diplomacy using confidence-building to modify behaviour is ongoing. Activities must support political objectives, must not incite or stimulate incompatibility, must focus on congruency, and must ensure that behaviour remains within mutually agreed boundaries which preclude violence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence Diplomacy Conflict Approaches</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Avoidance to Prevent an Escalation from Incipient to Latent Conflict</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Regulation to Modify Behaviour using CSBMs to Prevent an Escalation from Latent to Manifest Conflict, and to Prevent Manifest Conflict Escalating into Spiral and Cycles.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Identify goal incompatibility or emerging differences. | • Bilateral and Multilateral Defence Dialogue  
  - Conducting high level and working visits.  
  - Servicing and monitoring defence cooperation agreements.  
  - Establishing and participating in formal structures for bi- and multilateral defence consultations at regional, continental and international level. |
| • Identify and pursue complementary goals. |  
| • Establish common values and interests. |  
| • Pursue broader objectives of cooperation and trust. |  

© University of Pretoria
- Support mutual political commitments.
- Ensure expectations are kept within reasonable limits.
- Promote transparency by revealing intent and capability.
- Allay anger, mistrust and suspicion.
- Change perceptions.
- Use light prevention to keep incipient conflict within acceptable levels according to agreed parameters.
- Eschew coercion as an alternative to prevent a malign conflict spiral.

### Bilateral and Multilateral Defence Agreements
- Deliberating, agreeing, concluding, signing, and ratifying Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation.
- Deliberating, agreeing, concluding, signing, and ratifying nonaggression agreements.
- Deliberating, agreeing, concluding, signing, and ratifying arms control agreements (including monitoring).
- Establishing mechanisms for dispute resolution.

### Defence-related Information Exchange
- Facilitating information flow concerning intelligence or early warning.
- Exchanging information on troop movements, armament procurement and other activities.
- Establishing communication hotlines.

### Establishing and Maintaining Defence Ties at Diplomatic Level
- Appointing defence attachés or advisors.
- Appointing specialist advisors for specific activities.

### Conducting Bilateral and Multilateral Defence Cooperation Programmes
- Training defence and civilian personnel, including the deployment of training teams and other experts.
- Providing military equipment and technical expertise.
- Conducting ship visits and other military related exchanges.
- Conducting training exercises.
- Joint patrolling and ceasefire monitoring.
- Hosting cultural and sports events.
- Supporting HADR.
- Hosting conferences, and seminars on issues of mutual interest.
2.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter, incorporating a critical literature review, was to develop a framework of analysis on the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus and its conceptual foundations for application to South Africa as a case study. In sequence a description and explanation was provided of preventive diplomacy and its link to defence diplomacy; of conflict, conflict development and conflict prevention; and of a concluding summative framework. Four main findings were made. The first is that the conceptual variables (e.g. defence diplomacy and conflict prevention and their related concepts) are contested; that they present a problem of definition; and that for the descriptive-analytical purpose of this study it was necessary to settle on stipulative meanings and accounts. The second is that the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus is seldom theorised as such. In the literature a theorising of the one or the other is evident but, importantly, each implicitly making provision for and linking to the other. The third – related to the second – is that defence diplomacy is not usually theorised from a non-coercive perspective and that this requires clarification, particularly when considering its utility along with CSBMs for preventing conflict. Hence the summative framework that makes the explicit link. The last is that apart from a changing operational context, defence diplomacy and conflict prevention are also subject to change and indeed changes over time. Based on these considerations, and within the broader context of the framework for analysis, an exploration, description and analysis is subsequently provided of the South African use of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention.
CHAPTER 3

THE POLICY CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
FROM 1994 TO 2015

3.1. Introduction

Although South Africa’s post-1994 dispensation was marked by a sense of euphoria and optimism associated with the collapse of apartheid, complex foreign policy choices concerning the future lay ahead. The new government had to establish, in the minds of the region, the continent and the international community, a South Africa which had broken from its turbulent past by transforming itself into a trustworthy agent of peace and stability. Furthermore, this had to be done on a continent characterised by conflict that ranged from unstable peace through instability to war. In this context it was inevitable that the country would be drawn into peace support initiatives, including preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention because of its successful transition to democracy; its status as a continental power; and its moral obligation to repay support received during the liberation struggle. South Africa’s conflict prevention role and use of preventive diplomacy was, however, fraught with risks associated with perpetuating a hegemonic status and narrow self-interest.

The policy context for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention is evident in numerous official DOD publications which were located within the broader foreign policy framework provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and its successor, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The post-1994 domain of defence diplomacy and conflict prevention involved establishing ties with new partners, including former enemies; and maintaining, deepening and broadening existing partnerships for fostering long-term bilateral and multilateral defence ties. Therefore, the time frame from 1994 to 2015 provides an opportunity to assess DOD policy.

The aim of this chapter, with reference to DOD policy since 1994 and the 2015 Defence Review, is to explore and describe the policy context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy as an instrument of conflict management, more specifically for conflict prevention. The chapter covers the foreign policy context of DOD policies on defence diplomacy; the significance of the year 2011 which heralded non-coercive defence diplomacy.
diplomacy; the framework for defence diplomacy provided by the 2015 Defence Review; and, in conclusion, the key findings.

3.2. **Foreign policy context**

Despite principled intentions, South Africa’s post-1994 involvement on the African continent should be viewed against an enduring desire for “global recognition as Africa’s leading state” (Alden & Schoeman 2013: 112). In this quest, preventive diplomacy by the DOD supported South Africa’s aspiration for continental leadership by following the foreign policy direction of the Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma administrations. These aspirations reflected specific foreign policy preferences and particular leadership styles which were further complicated by changes in circumstances on the continent (van Nieuwkerk 2012: 85). This evoked a range of responses, confirming the existence of pre-manifest conflict on the continent.

Under the Mandela administration from 1994 to 1998 the foreign policy approach was unilateralist and based on normative principles, in particular on human rights. This approach asserted South Africa’s ‘morally superior attitude’ in its engagement with African countries (Southall 2008: 3-4; van Nieuwkerk 2012: 86). The consequences were a tarnished image with Nigeria over the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995; a failure to broker peace between Sese Seko and Kabila in Zaire in 1997; an inability to convince Kabila and rebels based in Uganda and Angola to enter into negotiations; and a failure to halt the 1998 intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Southall 2008: 4; Gwexe 1999). Moreover, the SANDF involvement in the post-election Lesotho crisis of 1998, albeit under the auspices of SADC, ignited concerns among African countries of a resurgent hegemonic South Africa (Selinyane 2008: 78). A particularly damming indictment was continued support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) by South African mercenaries, weapons dealers and contraband smugglers, a trend which forced the Angolan government to exclude South Africa from negotiations to end the conflict (Southall 2008: 4-5). While there were successes and failures during the Mandela era, it is nonetheless evident that prevailing instability and threats to peace on the continent inevitably involved South Africa.

During the Mbeki administration from 1998 to 2008 the foreign policy emphasis shifted to multilateralism in an effort to reverse the negative perceptions of South Africa...
associated with the former administration (Southall 2008: 5; van Nieuwkerk 2012: 86). Despite South Africa’s best efforts to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe, Mugabe viewed Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ with suspicion and mistrust (Southall 2008: 5). On a more positive note Mbeki was instrumental in transforming the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU); strengthening ties between South Africa and Nigeria; and making constructive contributions towards resolving conflicts in Burundi, the DRC, and Sudan (Southall 2008: 5-6). The results were arguably better during Mbeki’s term with conflict-related involvement in 17 African countries, namely Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe (van Nieuwkerk 2012: 86). The involvement of South Africa addressed a range of political and security challenges and issues, and included the use of preventive diplomacy to deal with conflict.

Zuma was elected president in 2009 and international engagement, contrary to expectations that there would be a break from the approach adopted by the Mbeki administration, continued along the same policy direction initiated by its predecessor (Masters 2012: 25; Landsberg 2014: 159, 161). In particular the approach to African conflict resolution was sustained with a preference for inclusive negotiations based on non-confrontation, accommodation and mediation; an approach, described by Landsberg as representing “a remarkable degree of continuity” (Landsberg 2014: 159). The DRC, the Sudan, Burundi and Zimbabwe remained on South Africa’s conflict resolution agenda while Zuma himself moved to defuse tensions between South Africa on the one hand and Angola and Nigeria on the other hand.

Since 1994 the policy approach to conflict prevention of the three administrations for the most showed coherency and consistency. This approach included the following commonalities, namely the peaceful resolution of conflict, multilateralism, and the PSO-use of the military in a peacekeeping and post-conflict role. The policy context from an international relations perspective remained mostly unaltered, implying that DOD policy for defence diplomacy could evolve in a stable foreign policy environment.
3.3. **The Department of Defence policies on defence diplomacy**

Similar to and aligned with foreign policy, the South African defence and defence-related policies developed in what can be termed a generational and phased manner. In this respect, the policies were articulated in and framed by key policy documents denoting the official position.


Concerning conflict prevention, the 1996 White Paper emphasised that this was primarily a political and not a military responsibility, and stressed that prevention, management and resolution would take place bilaterally or under the auspices of a multilateral international or regional organisation (RSA DOD 1996: 13,17). The White Paper highlighted the advantages of common security arrangements which, amongst others, would facilitate the implementation of CSBMs to peacefully resolve inter-state conflict (RSA DOD 1996: 14). Moreover, to establish confidence and stability, CSBMs would be pursued multilaterally in SADC security and defence forums to promote transparency, ease mistrust, and avert misunderstandings (RSA DOD 1996: 14). Measures would include the exchange of information on defence budgets, force structures, modernisation plans and deployments; the consideration of threat perceptions informing force structure and modernisation; the establishment of a regional arms register; the notification and observation of military exercises and other activities; the implementation of verification procedures; the setting up of
a communications network (including hotlines); and the introduction of implementing procedures to deal with extraordinary military incidents (RSA DOD 1996: 14-15). Additional CSBMs in the 1996 White Paper included the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening posture to build confidence and positive relations, as well as the intention to sign the AU multi-lateral non-aggression pact (RSA DOD 1996: 15). The 1996 White Paper dealt extensively with CSBMs for preventing conflict in a bi- and multilateral policy context but defence diplomacy was neglected and remained under-utilised.

The 1996 White Paper made provision for a Defence Review, approved by Parliament in April 1998. In the 1998 Defence Review the policy-makers recognised the shift in relations with South Africa’s neighbours from enmity to amity and committed the country to strengthening common security arrangements, defence cooperation and the use of CSBMs within the SADC framework and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (RSA DOD 1998: 7). Conflict would be resolved using bilateral diplomacy or multilateral diplomacy under the auspices of an international or regional body, as it was government’s resolve to first and foremost prevent conflict and war (RSA DOD 1998: 7). The Review also introduced an unusual concept, namely ‘confidence-building defence’, to underscore the defensive posture of the SANDF not to threaten its neighbours (RSA DOD 1998: 9). However, similar to the 1996 White Paper, the Review perpetuated the policy direction dearth concerning defence diplomacy but comprehensively addressed regional conflict prevention, paying specific attention to SADC.

Whereas the 1996 White Paper set the policy context for conflict prevention by noting the positive change in regional relations, the importance of regional ties and acknowledged the utility of CSBMs, the 1998 Defence Review highlighted multilateralism and the role of international institutions with SADC as the forum for resolving conflict. The concept of ‘confidence-building defence’ supported by a non-threatening defence posture gave tacit recognition to the role of preventive diplomacy, specifically aimed at preventing disputes from arising. By implication this required a South African involvement in the management and resolution of conflict.

Both the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review confirm South Africa’s intention to establish a reputation as an agent for peace and stability that had broken from its past. However, the absence of a specific reference to defence diplomacy in both policy
documents implied that conflict prevention was neither seen nor implemented as an all-encompassing concept. Moreover, policy linking defence diplomacy and CSBMs was not forthcoming as there was a lack of conceptual clarity, implying that the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus (explained in Chapter 2) only narrowly applied. At this point mention is made, albeit diachronically, of a March 2004 decision by the DOD executive management to update the 1998 Defence Review (RSA DOD 2007: 8). Yet again, in the strategic guidelines dubbed the *Parys Resolutions*, that framed this initiative, no specific mention was made of defence diplomacy (RSA DOD 2007: 8). Apart from the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review (and later the 2004 Resolutions) not rectifying the lacuna, it also meant that the DOD did not align defence diplomacy with the two policy documents. As a consequence – with the exception of CSBMs – a defence diplomacy and conflict prevention link was omitted in down-stream policy documents, the most notable being the 2002 Military Strategy.

### 3.3.2. The 2002 Military Strategy

The *South African National Defence Force Military Strategy* of 2002 (RSA DOD 2002) (hereinafter the 2002 Military Strategy) identified three military strategic objectives over a ten year time frame. One of the objectives, namely promoting security, included tasks supporting military foreign relations; with the latter defined as “attachés, own personnel attending courses, foreign students attending own courses or any other activity that will enhance the peace and security-building measures between countries” (RSA DOD 2002: 5-6). HADR was included in this military strategic objective, but this was considered as an operation in support of peace (RSA DOD 2002: 6). The military strategic objective, promoting security, included strategic positioning and entailed a mission-based approach for proactively establishing “a sound security environment, supported by political and military foreign-relations actions” (RSA DOD 2002: 9).

Clear policy direction concerning the strategic use of defence diplomacy in support of the objective of, promoting security, was not included in the 2002 Military Strategy. This opened three strategic policy gaps. The first was the dedicated focus on the utility of military foreign relations to promote security. This implied an emphasis on the broader notion of military foreign relations, thereby omitting a specific and narrower reference to defence diplomacy as a strategic way (or method) of preventing conflict. The second gap, linked to
the first, concerned a lack of appreciation for the prevalence of pre-manifest conflict. This meant an over-emphasis of manifest conflict directed PSO (e.g. peacekeeping) for promoting regional and continental security. In doing so, the strategy was based on the assumption that the SANDF would be employed for preventing manifest conflict or, in the context of preventive diplomacy, to prevent the spread of already existing manifest conflict. The 2002 Military Strategy, therefore, excluded the SANDF from explicitly committing the use of defence diplomacy for preventing conflict in its pre-manifest stages. The third gap, linked to the second, concerned a lack of attention to the use of regional and continental institutions, mechanisms and CSBMs as strategic means of (or resources for) conflict prevention. The counter-argument could be made that defence diplomacy is implicit in military foreign relations and also that PSO per definition include (or do not necessarily exclude) the preventive use of defence diplomacy directed at pre-manifest conflict. However, the fact remains that this strategic and peace-oriented use of defence diplomacy was not explicitly indicated in the 2002 Military Strategy.

The 2002 Military Strategy, with its inherent flaws concerning defence diplomacy and conflict prevention, was used without amendment or update to support the DOD Strategic Business Plans from 2003 to 2013 and in this way the three strategic policy gaps were perpetuated and remain unresolved to this day.

3.3.3. The Strategic Business Plans

The South Africa DOD Strategic Business Plans, issued in the name of the Minister of Defence, covered a three-year period of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), consisting of an in-year and two successive years. These DOD plans, with a strategic review of South Africa’s international environment as point of departure, stipulated ministerial guidelines for the in-year. These covered (military) strategic focuses, priorities, missions and objectives, as well as defence activities and outputs. Amongst others, these plans specifically referred to defence diplomacy and positioned it within the presented strategic framework. To further clarify the present policy context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy, framed by the 2015 Defence Review, these plans must be considered along with other policy documents and official statements from 2003 to 2013.
In the *South African Department of Defence Strategic Business Plan FY2003/04 to FY2005/06* (RSA DOD 2003) (hereinafter the Business Plan), military diplomacy (and not defence diplomacy) was indicated as a secondary defence output (RSA DOD 2003: 16). It was described as the placing and controlling of military attachés, the preparation and servicing of MOU and the participation in regional and international defence structures such as the SADC ISDSC (RSA DOD 2003: 16). With the increased involvement of South Africa in conflict prevention it was noted that the SANDF would be required to play a larger role in PSO (RSA DOD 2003: vi). This also considering that the Minister of Defence, Mr M.G.P. Lekota, identified the promotion of regional security as a ministerial priority, laying emphasis on collective defence for the SADC region as well as DOD participation in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (RSA DOD 2003: 3). The force employment strategy (of the SANDF) expanded on the Minister’s intent by emphasising that the sub-region (SADC) would be the primary focus of the SANDF in order to enhance ‘peace and prosperity’ (RSA DOD 2003: 11). Apart from a vague reference to a ‘fresh approach to sub-regional defence’ involving ‘specific (but unspecified) key partners’, no details were given on how this would be achieved (RSA DOD 2003: 11). The inclusion of military diplomacy in the 2003 Business Plan was the first policy pronouncement following the adoption of the 2002 Military Strategy. However, the *South African Department of Defence 2002/2003 Annual Report* lamented: “The conduct of SANDF and DOD activities influencing the defence foreign relations environment are not integrated and co-ordinated. This impacts directly on the ability to exert influence in the field of defence diplomacy and military foreign relations” (RSA DOD 2004a: 55). This comment confirms that although policy guidance on military diplomacy was forthcoming, it was absent in the strategy. Moreover, the 2003 Business Plan omitted CSBMs but specified the following activities, bilateral and multilateral dialogue; bilateral and multilateral agreements; and defence ties at diplomatic level. While SADC was identified as the focus of and forum for the activities, conflict prevention was not addressed, thereby perpetuating the narrow focus of the 2002 Military Strategy. This implied that the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus was not explicitly addressed from a policy perspective as the emphasis remained on the conduct of PSO – thereby confirming the exclusion of defence diplomacy as such during pre-manifest conflict prevention.

In the 2004 Business Plan the Minister of Defence replaced the military strategic mission of promoting ‘security’ with promoting ‘peace and security’, described as the
“external deployment of forces that enhances regional stability”. He also identified a single ministerial priority related to defence diplomacy, namely the promotion of regional security which included post-conflict reconstruction (RSA DOD 2004b: 2). Of note in the Plan was a terminological policy shift that was made from military diplomacy to defence diplomacy. However, no reasons or explanations were provided for this change (RSA DOD 2004b: 5). Defence diplomacy nevertheless remained a secondary output but, in contrast with the 2003 Plan, the scope and content was broadened to include the deployment of defence attachés; the preparation and servicing of MOU; and the involvement in defence structures of the UN, AU and SADC (RSA DOD 2004b: 5). In comparison with the 2003 Business Plan, the SANDF force employment strategy was broadened and presented as three stages: the first stage entailed a multinational approach focused on empowering sub-regional structures to foster security; the second stage included an interdepartmental approach to improve cooperation; and the final stage involved a shift from supporting the South African population to promoting regional security, so as to stabilise and secure the region and to reduce the possibility of external aggression (RSA DOD 2004b: 10). The 2004 Business Plan marked a policy shift in the military strategic outcome from a narrow focus on promoting security to a broader one of promoting peace and security. Support for diplomatic initiatives by government and the importance of regional security correlated more closely with preventive diplomacy. The plan for the first time referred to defence diplomacy rather than military diplomacy – signifying the adoption of a broader concept – but it remained a secondary defence output. The 2004 Business Plan was, however, singularly lacking in policy direction concerning the use of defence diplomacy to prevent conflict which would ultimately enhance regional security.

The 2005 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2005) emphasised collective continental and regional security and, out of 22 Ministerial guidelines, ten were devoted to either defence diplomacy or conflict prevention (RSA DOD 2005: 4-5). They included the prioritisation of existing MOU; the development of a foreign military cooperation plan in line with DFA priorities; the strengthening of multilateral organisations such as the UN, the AU and SADC security structures in terms of their strategic positioning; the involvement in an early warning system to prevent or reduce potential conflicts; and the creation of a nodal point in the DOD for coordinating regional activities (RSA DOD 2005: 4). Burundi, the DRC and Angola were specifically targeted for conflict resolution. Defence diplomacy, however, remained a secondary output, and was unaltered when compared with the 2004 Business Plan (RSA
DOD 2005: 7). In the same Plan there was a modification of the second military strategic objective by changing it from ‘promoting security’ to ‘promote peace, security and stability in the region and on the continent’ (RSA DOD 2005: 9).

Compared to previous plans the policy direction on regional security was more detailed in the 2005 Business Plan and included the alignment of foreign military cooperation with DFA priorities, implying support for foreign policy objectives. Information exchange for early warning to prevent or reduce the potential for conflict was the first policy pronouncement linked to the prevention of pre-manifest conflict. Moreover, bilateral and multilateral dialogue and agreements; and the establishment and maintenance of defence ties at diplomatic level were features of the plan. The 2005 Business Plan also provided the most comprehensive policy guidance concerning defence diplomacy since 2003 but the absence of conflict prevention and the use of CSBMs remained.

The 2006 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2006) outlined the ministerial strategic guidelines. Amongst others these were: to promote peace, security and stability in the region, the continent and the globe; to create a nodal point for the region; to implement the SADC strategic indicative plan; and to ensure defence cooperation and assistance (RSA DOD 2006: 3). The Departmental medium-term strategic focus entailed support for the government’s continental diplomatic initiatives and the promotion of regional security with peace missions and post-conflict reconstruction (RSA DOD 2006: 3). However, in a departure from earlier plans, the 2006 Business Plan no longer distinguished between primary and secondary defence outputs and in this way gave equal status to each output. Defence diplomacy, previously a secondary output, was now placed on an equal footing with the other outputs (RSA DOD 2006: 6). The military strategic objective for the region and continent remained unchanged (RSA DOD 2006: 9). The force employment strategy highlighted the increasing involvement of the SANDF in supporting foreign policy, specifically regarding military-cooperation and in this context SADC together with specific – but unnamed – countries were identified as key partners for improving regional peace and prosperity (RSA DOD 2006: 11).

The 2006 Business Plan is remarkable for the change in policy concerning the status of defence diplomacy as a departmental output. By placing defence diplomacy on the same level as other outputs, its strategic importance was acknowledged. It was given more momentum in the on-going support for government diplomatic initiatives for regional security, post-conflict reconstruction and military cooperation with key partners. Policy
guidance in this plan shows an incremental correlation with the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus but the latter continued to be a gap in policy guidance.

In the 2007 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2007) the Minister of Defence, Mr Lekota, contended that South Africa’s economic prosperity and security was linked to the stability of the region and that the theatres of conflict on the continent were the context for the SANDF’s involvement in peace-keeping missions (RSA DOD 2007: vii). In the combined foreword the Secretary for Defence, Mr J.B. Masilela, and the Chief of the SANDF (C SANDF), General G.N. Ngwenya, identified “strategic defence cooperation advanced by defence diplomacy initiatives” – supported by multilateral organisations such as the AU and SADC – as an outcome (RSA DOD 2007: ix). In this way policy guidance linking defence diplomacy in support of regional and continental strategic cooperation for stability was for the first time forthcoming. The 2007 Business Plan mentioned that the DOD accepted responsibility for strengthening the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at all levels (RSA DOD 2007: 1). These objectives supported government diplomatic initiatives to contribute to global continental and regional security (RSA DOD 2007: 3). The priorities dealt extensively with promoting regional and continental peace, security and stability by: participating in AU peace and security structures; assisting in post-conflict reconstruction; participating and contributing to SADC defence and security structures; supporting the implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP); and promoting of regional and continental collective security (RSA DOD 2007: 4). Concerning SADC participation the following activities were listed: building strong bilateral relations with all regional partners; developing common doctrine; enhancing interoperability; participating in multinational exercises; exchanging information; sharing civil-military relations (CMR) experiences; and providing education, training and development (ETD) opportunities to members of international armed forces. The strategic focus of the plan was to promote regional security by participating in peace missions, to conduct foreign military relations and to support the government’s diplomatic initiatives in Africa (RSA DOD 2007: 6). Defence outputs included defence diplomacy, defence attachés, servicing defence-related MOU, and participation in SADC and AU defence structures (RSA DOD 2007: 7).

By comparing the 2007 Business Plan with the 2006 Business Plan, it is evident that defence diplomacy, conflict prevention, management and resolution are key themes in the former, providing clearer policy direction for conflict management. The official viewpoint
on defence diplomacy summed up by Mr Lekota as Minister of Defence, was that the DOD was required “to play an increasing role in the international arena of defence diplomacy and military foreign relations”, adding that “(d)efence is a function of diplomacy” (Lekota 2007). He went on to note that “(t)he impact of military diplomacy brings it into contact with the political dimension” (Lekota 2007). In this way the departmental context of defence diplomacy was highlighted but its purpose and relevance, specifically regarding conflict prevention, was not mentioned. The 2007 Business Plan provided policy guidance concerning the following CSBMs: bilateral and multilateral dialogue; bilateral and multilateral agreements; information exchange; establishing and maintaining defence ties at diplomatic level; and conducting cooperation programmes. It is evident that the 2007 Business Plan provided the most comprehensive policy guidance for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention since 2003 and also marked a fundamental policy shift by acknowledging the role of the DOD in conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, an explicit and definitive policy link – that of connecting defence diplomacy with conflict prevention – remained elusive.

In the 2008 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2008) the Minister of Defence noted the role of the DOD in the establishment of the SADC Standby Brigade and the ongoing DOD engagement with regional counterparts in Africa, and their bearing on the AU and NEPAD security objectives for promoting security, peace and stability (RSA DOD 2008: v-vi). The strategic focus of the DOD included, amongst others, regional security promoted through military foreign relations and support to government diplomacy (RSA DOD 2008: 3). The Secretary for Defence also noted the department’s role in promoting continental and regional peace and security; the increase in DOD defence representation; and the requirement to increase military training opportunities provided to members of international armed forces (RSA DOD 2008: vii). In the strategic overview he stated that there would be an organisational change to the structure of the Defence Secretariat with the establishment of the Defence International Affairs Division (DIAD). The purpose was to “provide better direction to the DOD’s defence diplomacy effort” (RSA DOD 2008: 2).

However, for the first time the priorities for FY2008/09 did not include defence diplomacy or conflict prevention (RSA DOD 2008: 4). In the 2008 Business Plan policy guidance for the establishment of the DIAD under the Secretary for Defence marked a change in the overall coordination and responsibility for defence diplomacy. By placing the division
under the Defence Secretariat, the over-arching DOD responsibility for defence diplomacy, hitherto vague, was now rectified. This meant that policy and direction for defence diplomacy would be coordinated at the highest level but it is remarkable that the plan did not specify policy guidelines in this regard.

The 2009 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2009), released in the name of a newly appointed Minister of Defence, Ms L. Sisulu, remarked that the DOD would continue promoting peace, stability and security on the African continent and in the SADC region by providing HADR as well as post-conflict reconstruction and training (RSA DOD 2009: v). The Acting Secretary for Defence, Mr T.E. Motumi, mentioned the increased emphasis on defence diplomacy to project foreign policy, in particular the DOD’s engagement strategy for sub-Saharan Africa and beyond to promote peace, stability and security (RSA DOD 2009: ix). Defence diplomacy was, however, absent in the priorities but remained as a defence output in the same guise as previous plans (RSA DOD 2009: 27). Of particular note was a point in the Strategic Overview that a defence foreign relations strategy would be developed to inform the DOD’s international commitments (RSA DOD 2009: 1). The strategic focus realigned the DOD to promote peace and security by building confidence in the SADC region and the continent (RSA DOD 2009: 15). This required constructive dialogue to foster sound defence diplomatic relations in support of government foreign policy (RSA DOD 2009: 15). Another focus area was that the SANDF would be deployed in international peace missions in support of the government policy on peaceful conflict resolution (RSA DOD 2009 15). The 2009 Business Plan detailed the role of the DOD in enhancing South Africa’s diplomacy through the International Relations Peace and Security Cluster (IRPS) cluster by participation in exercises, post-conflict reconstruction and development (RSA DOD 2009: 16); pledged continued DOD support for the IRPS theme of “contributing to peace and stability in Africa”; but noted that the theme would change to “continued South African contribution to African peace and security” and that SANDF deployments would continue under this theme (RSA DOD 2009: 16). As a function, defence foreign relations – defined as a shared responsibility between DIAD and Defence Foreign Relations (DFR) – would devolve into a marketing strategy and plan; a foreign relations strategy; and a defence foreign relations capability and service informed by legal instruments (RSA DOD 2009: 51-52).

The 2009 Business Plan brought defence diplomacy sharply back into focus as a way of engaging sub-Saharan Africa to achieve a condition of peace, stability and security.
Moreover, in a departure from previous plans, confidence-building for promoting defence ties, specifically with SADC member countries, was also included as an over-arching activity. Political direction would be provided by the IRPS cluster which meant that DOD defence diplomacy would be aligned with foreign policy objectives. The 2009 Business Plan also introduced a crucial policy change concerning the command and control of defence diplomacy by merging the DIAD (under the Secretariat) and DFR (under C SANDF) for implementing defence diplomacy policy and strategy.

The 2010 Business Plan (RSA DOD 2010), in its strategic overview, cited the DOD defence diplomacy role in international affairs (RSA DOD 2010: 8). It also referred to South Africa’s seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with a concomitant DOD role in conflict resolution (RSA DOD 2010: 8). The 2010 Business Plan, for the first time, included defence diplomacy, as a component of the strategic approach, to promote a prominent role in global diplomacy to support the government’s strategic vision of a “better life for all” (RSA DOD 2010: 13-14). In this respect the DOD, through the DIAD and DFR, supported the government’s MTSF Strategic Priority 8, Pursuing African advancement and enhanced international cooperation (RSA The Presidency n.d.) by strengthening regional mechanisms for peace and security in Southern Africa and on the continent (RSA DOD 2010: 14). Although diplomacy was viewed as an “antithesis to war fighting”, defence diplomacy would make a key contribution to the government’s foreign policy agenda (RSA DOD 2010: 13). In this respect defence diplomacy included participation in bilateral and multilateral forums to enhance mutually beneficial defence relations by seconding suitably qualified and experienced officers to ensure effective responses to continental challenges. Furthermore, defence co-operation agreements were key CSBMs with most African states (RSA DOD 2010: 13). The DOD’s medium-term strategic focus was to ensure peace, security and confidence-building in the SADC region and on the continent. This included constructive dialogue to nurture sound defence relations as well as support for government initiatives to peacefully resolve conflict (RSA DOD 2010: 21). As a defence output defence diplomacy included the deployment of defence attachés, the servicing of MOU and participation in the UN, AU and SADC security structures (RSA DOD 2010: 34).

The 2010 Business Plan provided additional policy direction by building on the 2009 Business Plan. In addition, the former had to accommodate two important developments
which impacted on defence diplomacy and conflict prevention: the Minister of Defence was appointed as chair of the IRPS cluster and South Africa was accepted as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Both developments reshaped the DOD policy approach to defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. In particular the depiction of diplomacy as an antithesis to war provides evidence that the DOD had explicitly rejected coercive defence diplomacy. Clearly, this new approach to defence diplomacy favoured CSBMs, in particular cooperation agreements, as the preferred approach to establishing, maintaining and broadening defence ties. In essence, and for the first time, the 2010 Business Plan positioned defence diplomacy in a non-coercive context and integrated CSBMs into it as a means of enhancing defence cooperation to prevent conflict. The only shortcoming was a lack of synchronisation with pre-manifest conflict.

The 2011 Defence Secretariat Plan (RSA DOD 2011a) further emphasised the link between defence diplomacy and foreign policy for strategic defence cooperation using military instruments non-coercively as a “particular type of diplomacy in a democratic South Africa” (South Africa 2011: 35). It also indicated the absence of a defence foreign relations strategy to buttress “qualitative defence diplomacy activities” but did not specifically pinpoint non-coercive defence diplomacy for preventing conflict (South Africa 2011a: 36).

The 2010 Business Plan was not followed by further business plans. However, in 2013 the DOD released the Department of Defence (DOD) Executive Authority’s Overarching Annual Strategic Statement for 2014 (hereinafter the 2014 Overarching Strategic Statement) (RSA DOD 2013b) which confirmed in its strategic overview that the SANDF’s non-aggressive defence posture would be supported with defence diplomacy for building confidence and collective security (RSA DOD 2013b: 5). This would be achieved through mutually beneficial relations that promoted stability in the regional, continental and international environments. The subsequent 2014 Overarching Strategic Statement went on to state that relations and by implication defence diplomacy, would undergo realignment following the pending approval of the Defence Review, and a DOD Foreign Relations policy and strategy (RSA DOD 2013b: 5). In this regard defence diplomacy and conflict prevention were neither identified as strategic priorities for FY2014/15 nor was diplomacy and conflict prevention emphasised as a strategic focus area for inclusion in the follow on to the 2010 Strategic Plan, the Department of Defence Planning Instruments for 2015 to 2020 (2015c) (hereinafter the 2015 Planning Instruments).
The DOD Business Plans covering the period from 2003 to 2010 bring to the fore incremental policy changes concerning defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. Starting in 2003 there was a narrow focus on military diplomacy, a secondary defence output, which was restricted to the deployment of military attachés, the servicing of bi- and multilateral agreements and arrangements for regional security. Conflict prevention was singularly linked to PSO and not to defence diplomacy as such. In the following years first military and thereafter defence diplomacy was gradually integrated into policy and strategy. The first step was taken in 2005 with the re-designation of military diplomacy to defence diplomacy. This aligned the 2005 Business Plan as well as successive Business Plans closer with the current meaning and application of the concepts, and was accompanied by an amendment of the related military strategic objective to include regional and continental stability and early warning.

Although the plans made provision for PSO in pursuit of peace and security, the under-emphasis of conflict prevention as such, along with CSBM, remained a short-coming. The 2007 Plan, for the first time, added the DOD responsibility for conflict prevention, management, and resolution and identified a comprehensive range of activities implicitly related to confidence-building. In a move to rectify a long-standing shortcoming concerning the overall coordination of defence diplomacy policy and strategy, the 2008 Strategic Plan placed the responsibility under the Secretary for Defence with the establishment of DIAD which meant defence diplomacy would be controlled and directed at the highest level. Moreover, the 2010 Strategic Business Plan implicitly defined defence diplomacy as non-coercive, linked to conflict prevention, and involved the use of CSBM.

Business Plans were discontinued in 2011. Policy guidance, specifically concerning defence diplomacy, appeared in the 2014 Overarching Strategic Statement and the follow on document, the 2015 Planning Instruments. It is, nonetheless, of note that the anticipated approval of the 2015 Defence Review would set the new context for the way forward.

3.4. The defence diplomacy-related policies from 2015

In the 2015 Defence Review the policy context and guidance for a comprehensive strategic trajectory for a time frame spanning 30 years is mapped out. The 2015 Planning Instruments (RSA DOD 2015c), issued in the name of the Minister of Defence is a follow-on to the 2015
Defence Review and includes strategic overview for the DOD strategic plan with outputs for the timeframe from 2015 to 2020.

3.4.1. **The 2015 South African Defence Review**

An update of the 1996 Defence White Paper and 1998 Defence Review was undertaken by a Defence Review Committee, established on 5 July 2010 by the Minister of Defence. The *South African Defence Review 2014* was subsequently approved by the South African government (the Cabinet) on 20 March 2014, underwent further amendment and was released as the *South African Defence Review 2015* (hereinafter the 2015 Defence Review). The process for updating the Review involved extensive domestic consultations with ministries, government departments, civil society, experts, the DOD as well as international regional and continental organisations.

The 2015 Defence Review is a comprehensive 20-year strategy for implementation over four cycles of the MTSF. As a replacement of the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review, its primary aim is to “restore South Africa’s defence capability” (RSA DOD 2016: 9-14). Its implementation is grounded in five strategic planning baselines running concurrently with a five-year MTSF. These baselines, expressed as planning milestones, are: Planning Milestone 1 (MTSF 0). *Immediate and directed interventions for arresting a decline in critical capabilities*; Planning Milestone 2 (MTSF+1). *Rebalance and reorganise the defence force*; Planning Milestone 3 (MTSF+2). *Create a sustainable defence force for ordered commitments*; Planning Milestone 4 (MTSF+3). *Capability enhancement to meet nascent challenges in the strategic environment*; and Planning Milestone 5 (MTSF+4). *Defence against insurgency or a limited war* (RSA DOD 2016: 9-14 - 9-15). As a policy document the 2015 Defence Review was extremely comprehensive with a wide-ranging scope. Amongst others and to the extent relevant to this study, it provided policy direction for South African defence diplomacy. Accordingly it is argued that it presents a strong case for defence diplomacy to prevent conflict, based on shared values, respect for regional institutions and mechanisms, and the use of CSBMs.

The Review adopted a triple layered approach to defending South Africa, namely a first layer to influence the international security agenda through integrated diplomacy efforts which support national objectives; a second layer to safeguard South Africa and its national
interests; and a third layer which encompasses the defence and protection of the country’s people, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity (RSA DOD 2016: 3-10). Both Gibbs (2016) and Sendall (2016), who were involved in the Review drafting process, concur with the opinion that defence diplomacy and its first and second layers correlate with the prevalence of incipient and latent conflict while the third layer will come into being only when manifest conflict, in the form of a direct threat to South Africa, takes root.

The 2015 Defence Review specifically identified defence diplomacy as a defence capability to prevent and resolve conflict, along with a strategy that focuses on national priorities and engagements to foster long-standing relations with key African countries and strategic partners (RSA DOD 2016: v-vi, 9-10). Regional peace and stability is a particular requirement associated with South Africa’s strategic environment and the country has had a long-standing commitment to playing a leading role in conflict prevention with the SANDF making a contribution in this regard. According to the Review, peacetime political and economic conflict is at the lower end of the inter-state conflict spectrum and is managed by negotiation, mediation and arbitration (RSA DOD 2016: 2-2, D-19). The Review provides a consolidated scenario for inter-state threats and identifies peacetime political and economic rivalry between South Africa, African and non-African countries as a source of conflict but it recognises ‘military diplomacy’ as an instrument to deal with this scenario (RSA DOD 2016: 2-2, 2-27 - 2-28, D-19, D-20). It is, however, pointed out that this particular use of the term military diplomacy is incorrect and that defence diplomacy is more appropriate. This notion is supported by the view of Sendall (2016) who confirmed that defence diplomacy will be used to support the overall diplomatic effort by the South African government. The Review, therefore, not only refers to defence diplomacy, but positions it in the broader policy context of the pursuit of African peace and security and the need for conflict prevention.

Preventing conflict, according to the Review, entails peaceful means to enhance cooperation and collaboration concerning matters related to security and requires a national ability to peacefully reduce, defuse or resolve the potential for conflict or disputes with political or diplomatic means (RSA DOD 2016: 3-11). To prevent conflict the Review stresses the value of defence diplomacy to promote strategic influence, in particular by fostering, broadening and deepening defence relations to prevent conflict (RSA DOD 2016: v-vi, 7-2, 7-3). In this way the strategic agenda is advanced by maintaining strategic bilateral relationships; engaging in international security issues; participating in multilateral security
processes; establishing collective security mechanisms; and maintaining representation in international defence and security institutions (RSA DOD 2016: 3-11).

According to the 2015 Defence Review the DOD will fulfil its constitutional mandate by accomplishing four strategic goals that are subdivided into a total of 13 tasks (RSA DOD 2016: 9-10). Defence diplomacy and conflict prevention is included in Goal 3, namely promoting peace and security. Under this goal there are two tasks namely, Task 8: Promoting strategic influence, and Task 9: Contributing to peace and stability.

Task 8 involves defence diplomacy for purposes of shaping the multilateral security agenda; pursuing multilateral objectives; capacitating multilateral institutions; developing regional and continental partnership; and participating in selected bilateral mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict (RSA DOD 2016: 7-2). This task is executed with a future defence diplomacy strategy based on policy guidance for deploying defence personnel in multilateral security institutions; pursuing multilateral security objectives; providing bilateral military assistance to other countries; prioritising defence attaché deployment; enhancing defence cooperation; exchanging information; supporting defence industry; and engaging strategic partners on defence-related matters (RSA DOD 2016: 7-2 - 7-3). Additional elements of the strategy include multilateral security, regional and continental partnerships, relationships beyond Africa, and defence industry cooperation (RSA DOD 2016: 7-5 - 7-6).

Task 9 includes intervention under grave circumstances: peace missions and post-conflict developments, such as post-conflict reconstruction of the security sector, regional humanitarian and disaster relief and general military assistance missions (RSA DOD 2016: 7-7). This task is clearly linked to measures during manifest conflict and its after effects and will not be further pursued in the study.

The Review emphasises the use of CSBMs as a means of ensuring transparency to promote collective confidence and stability. In this respect CSBMs include the following: defence and security agreements and cooperation; intelligence cooperation and exchanges which include a regional communications network, a crisis hotline and procedures for dealing with unscheduled or unusual military incidents; consultations on threat perceptions, defence budgets, force structures, modernisation plans, cooperation, visits and troop deployments;
military assistance, education and training; military exercises; HADR; procurement of common defence systems and technology; and collaboration in the implementation of the AU and SADC maritime security strategies (RSA DOD 2016: 7-6). The Review, although indicating the substance of CSBMs, failed to express their utility during the stages of pre-manifest conflict.

As a future roadmap, it pointed out that the 2015 Defence Review may be a potential source of pre-manifest conflict involving South Africa and SADC member countries for the following reasons: firstly the vital interest, thus “(e)nsuring the security of … external strategic resources and infrastructure such as minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof” (RSA DOD 2016: 3-7); secondly, the right to intervene unilaterally to protect South Africa’s interests, a right reserved in cases where there is a lack of capacity or will by the host nation (RSA DOD 2016: 3-12); thirdly, the intention to use forward-basing on the continent (RSA DOD 2016: 10-3); fourthly, the development of an expeditionary capability (RSA DOD 2016: 10-7); fifthly, government support for export of armaments, technology transfers and joint ventures even if there is assurance that such support is subject to export and non-proliferation legislation and policy (RSA DOD 2016: 15-9); and finally, the creation of an intervention force from Milestone 1 through to Milestone 5 which will be used, amongst others, to protect vital national interests (RSA DOD 2016: 9-20). It is therefore clear that the 2015 Defence Review may in itself be a source of pre-manifest conflict and that mitigation, in the form of CSBMs, must be included in policy guidance.

The 2015 Defence Review, on the one hand, corrects three shortcomings in policy guidance for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention that were not previously evident in the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review. Firstly, the Review acknowledges the crucial role of defence diplomacy in preventing conflict; secondly, it gives tacit recognition to the presence of pre-manifest conflict (described as peacetime political and economic rivalry); and thirdly, it provides a policy context for ‘military diplomacy’ to prevent the escalation of conflict. Furthermore, it identifies CSBMs activities to create collective confidence and stability. The Review, on the other hand, exhibits two shortcomings. These are, firstly, the absence of clear policy guidance concerning non-coercive defence diplomacy for conflict prevention; and secondly, its silence on the
employment of CSBMs during Milestones 1 to 5 as it is contended that the 2015 Defence Review could be a potential source of pre-manifest conflict.

3.4.2. The Department of Defence Planning Instruments from 2015 to 2020

The 2015 Planning Instruments, as a policy document, follows on the 2015 Defence Review and is located within Milestone 1, namely to: Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through critical and directed interventions (RSA DOD 2016: viii). The Planning Instruments are directed at the achievement of two government MTSF outcomes, namely Outcome 3, All people in South Africa are and feel safe and Outcome 11, Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world. In particular Outcome 11, has implications for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention, since it describes the enabling political cohesion in the Southern African region required for peace, stability and security (RSA DOD 2015c: iii).

South Africa’s prevention and resolution of conflict comprises an integration of diplomatic and military means. Therefore, the capability renewal guidelines for the period 2015 to 2020 include the enhancement of defence diplomacy (RSA DOD 2015c: 20). In this regard the defence diplomacy is aimed at fostering “long-standing relations with key African states and other strategic partners”; relations, which are aligned with the 2015 Defence Review and the DOD foreign relations policy (RSA DOD 2015c: 20). To this end the Chief of DIAD is responsible for the subprogramme to formulate and provide policy advice on the conduct of defence foreign relations and defence diplomatic engagements, and to ensure that these relations and engagements are consistent with foreign policy (RSA DOD 2015c: 48). In summary, the 2015 Planning Instruments provide policy guidance for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention during and for the implementation of Milestone 1 of the 2015 Defence Review.

3.5. Assessment of the policy context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy until 2015

By applying the framework for analysis (see Section 2.4 Chapter 2) on the aforesaid exploration, description and explanation of the policy context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy for conflict prevention between 1994 and 2015, an assessment is made of the correlation between the selected theoretical dimensions and the case study.
(a) **The peace-conflict spectrum:** Ongoing pre-manifest conflict involving South Africa and certain SADC member countries, namely Angola, Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe confirms that the peace-conflict spectrum included a hue of unstable peace. It is however, contended that the SADC region was mostly characterised by stable peace, implying that incompatible goals, although present, were not recognised as an impediment to regional peace and stability. It is therefore assessed that the peace-conflict spectrum was largely peaceful but that this ostensibly pacific state did not negate the requirement for ongoing defence diplomacy and/or or efforts aimed at preventing conflict.

(b) **The centrality and utility of defence diplomacy:** Defence diplomacy, as an instrument, was initially absent in policy guidance and strategy and was neither central nor was its utility recognised. This was, however, incrementally rectified as policy evolved by beginning in a narrow form, military diplomacy, followed by the adoption of defence diplomacy. In the strategic realm, specifically regarding military strategy, defence diplomacy was neither incorporated as an instrument in its own right nor as a means of preventing conflict. This limitation has never been rectified and exists to this day. As far as strategic planning is concerned, defence diplomacy was initially on the fringes as a secondary output which was also rectified over time when it was finally acknowledged as a defence output with the same status as the other outputs. It is therefore concluded that although defence diplomacy eventually became central in policy, it remained a broad concept until it was finally narrowed to non-coercive defence diplomacy including CSBMs.

(c) **Policy on defence diplomacy responses for conflict prevention:** While defence diplomacy and conflict prevention are linked in a policy-context, the DOD has perpetuated the world-wide trend of superficially linking the two (see Section 2.2). In this respect the early warning requirement, while addressed, serves a limited purpose if it is not acted upon with defence diplomacy. This means that defence diplomacy, if indeed used during pre-manifest conflict, has limited utility and is unlikely to be successful if it is not synchronised with pre-manifest conflict to prevent an escalation from incipient to latent conflict. In addition, the all-important requirement for timing is also not addressed in policy. It is therefore concluded that policy on the use of defence diplomacy for preventing conflict is inadequate.
3.6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter, incorporating a descriptive literature review, was to analyse the official policy context of DOD defence diplomacy and conflict prevention from 1994 to 2015. In sequence South Africa’s foreign policy over the same period was broadly described to serve as a setting for a retrospective analysis of DOD policies up to and including the 2015 Defence Review. Five main findings were made. Firstly, pre-manifest conflict was prevalent in SADC dictating the need for policy concerning preventive diplomacy, supported by defence diplomacy, to prevent a conflict escalation. Secondly, the policy context from 1994 to 2015 for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention initially provided limited direction due to conceptual shortcomings and strategic incoherence. Thirdly, the 2002 Military Strategy did not address the utility of defence diplomacy and was not adapted to support the Strategic Business Plans from 2003 to 2010. Fourthly, the Strategic Business Plans from 2003 to 2010, the 2015 Defence Review and the 2015 Planning Instruments all have an inherent shortcoming in that defence diplomacy, specifically non-coercive defence diplomacy, is not harmonised with conflict prevention, and specifically the use of CSBMs for preventing an escalation from incipient to latent and manifest conflict. Fifthly, the 2015 Defence Review and 2015 Planning Instruments provide policy direction and strategic guidance for the next 20 to 30 years and include a more focused policy context for defence diplomacy. However, neither of the two notable deficiencies, namely the lack of defence diplomacy policy synchronisation with the patterns of conflict; and the use of non-coercive defence diplomacy with CSBMs are adequately addressed in a policy-specific context. Based on and framed by the aforesaid policy context, the next chapter explores the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015 to determine the manner in and the extent to which non-coercive defence diplomacy was undertaken.
CHAPTER 4

THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
FROM 2011 TO 2015

4.1. Introduction

The operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy is evaluated from 2011 to 2015 using the DOD Annual Reports supplemented by official publications. Whereas the policy context was traced back to 1994, the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy – although evident since the end of apartheid-era – is considered from 2011. The reason is that 2011 saw the introduction of non-coercive defence diplomacy as DOD policy. This operationalisation is embedded in the policy context as described, the 2015 Defence Review in particular, but also constrained by the shortcomings thereof.

Since the aim of the chapter is to explore the operational context and its alignment with the 2015 Defence Review, it covers the prevalence of pre-manifest conflict that dictates the diplomatic response, specifically in the SADC region; the DOD approach to non-coercive defence diplomacy; and a chronological-thematic analysis of the operational context with reference to the implementation of policy directives. In particular, emphasis is placed on the use of regional institutions and mechanisms supported by CSBMs to prevent conflict escalation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of this operational context in terms of the framework for analysis.

4.2. South African involvement in pre-manifest conflict with specific reference to SADC

Conflict remains a reality which plays out continuously thereby emphasising the ongoing relevance of conflict prevention even in the face of ostensibly peaceful conditions. Firstly and in the case of South Africa, as Lalbahadur (2015: 6-8) points out, perceptions of mistrust and unease related to the country’s past linger on. This despite the attempt of the South African government to eschew hegemony by pursuing multilateral political and military relations based on “consensus-driven regional politics” to build trust and legitimacy. She also warns that South Africa’s political approach has not succeeded in fully allaying concerns
over its economic dominance of SADC; a situation viewed as self-serving and hegemonistic. South Africa’s assertive economic behaviour is therefore at odds with its benign political and military behaviour and this potentially fuels conflict.

Secondly, as pointed out by various scholars, certain activities by South Africa inadvertently contribute to conflict in the SADC region and on the continent in general. For example, fifteen years ago, Hamill (2001: 30-32) contended that the SANDF’s emphasis on conventional threats to South Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity promotes insecurity among SADC member states, especially in the light of its then military superiority. He also argued that the selling of arms by the SA defence-related industry to countries of the region and the continent was another potential source of tension and insecurity (Hamill 2001: 34-35). In her recent analysis, Lalbahadur (2015: 12) comments on the positive image of South Africa’s continental peacekeeping operations but warns of perceptions among African diplomats that the country can do more by “building and promoting structures to improve the level of security in Africa.” Accordingly South Africa, along with its economic dominance, is seen to be doing only what is necessary and is not deemed to be making a convincing contribution to conflict prevention in this respect.

Thirdly, as Brosig and Sempijja (2015: 2-4) indicate, potential conflict is generated by what arguably are principled actions. A case in point is the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) that created divisions among AU member states. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt withheld support for the initiative due to fears concerning South Africa’s dominance. To this is added the “controversial role of SADC countries”, including South Africa, in the deployment of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the resource rich DRC, an act perceived to be driven by self-interest.

Finally, even South Africa’s attempts to promote cooperation and mitigate conflict, and its preference for the settlement of disputes by negotiation are subject to misgivings. In accordance with its African Agenda and in support of continental peace and security, South Africa was involved in conflict mediation in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, the DRC and the Comoros. South Africa’s devotion of considerable attention to regional security and stability and its contribution to peace and the resolution of conflict, are respected by African diplomats. However, a point of concern is a lack of clarity concerning decisions to intervene militarily in some countries while overlooking others (Lalbahadur 2014; Lalbahadur 2015;
11). It is therefore in retrospect contended that the conduct of defence diplomacy took place in a situation marked by pre-manifest conflict, thereby justifying the need for non-coercive defence diplomacy to prevent its further escalation.

4.3. The operationalisation of South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015

Despite the current dearth of information on non-coercive defence diplomacy, South Africa appears to be one of only a few countries that has officially designated and embraced non-coercive defence diplomacy in its policies for strategic defence cooperation (RSA DOD 2011a: 35). The operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy, including its implementation, is analysed from 2011 to 2015 in terms of relevant aspects of the framework for analysis. However, in considering South Africa’s defence diplomacy approaches, emphasis is placed on conflict regulation rather than conflict avoidance.

Although conflict avoidance remains a theoretical option to prevent the escalation of incipient conflict into latent conflict, it functions at the psychological level of conflict attitudes and perceptions. Apart from being intangible, problematic to identify and difficult to measure, conflict avoidance is implicit in most, if not all, defence diplomacy activities. Inversely, South Africa’s defence diplomacy embraces and enhances the principles also articulated in its policy content as previously indicated – that reduce goal incompatibility and the hardening of conflict attitudes and perceptions. In particular, South Africa’s defence diplomacy – also in terms of its operationalisation – is used to establish common values and interests; allay suspicion, mistrust and anger; identify complementary goals; pursue trust and cooperation and to eschew coercion. Suffice then to reiterate that being a diplomatic instrument, albeit one using military capabilities, defence diplomacy represents an approach to and is a means of conflict avoidance. In this respect it is used in a constructive manner, not to be associated or confused with a counter-productive denial strategy where conflict is purposively avoided by ignoring it. Conflict avoidance elements and principles being implicit in defence diplomacy, thus necessitates an analysis of the South African case study in terms of conflict regulation.

In turning to conflict regulation, it is a conflict prevention approach aimed at modifying behaviour to prevent latent conflict from escalating into manifest conflict, as well
as to prevent latent conflict from escalating into conflict spirals and cycles that sustain the conflict at higher levels of intensity and frequency. The operationalisation of South Africa’s defence diplomacy in this respect is considered with reference to three aspects, namely institutions, time frames and response categories.

At an institutional level, particularly in the bilateral mode, defence diplomacy is primarily of a trans-departmental nature. Accordingly diplomatic interaction is mainly equilateral with counterparts and peer group office bearers. In both the bilateral and multilateral modes additional architecture comes into play. At this point a clarification of the CSBM in a South African context is necessary. Of particular note are the various forums for defence dialogue and cooperation. These are the Bi-National Commission (BNC) chaired by the South African President (or an appointed representative) with Ministers of government departments (including the DOD) and senior officials in attendance; the Joint Commission on Cooperation (JCC) is chaired by the Minister of DIRCO (or an appointed representative) with Ministers of government departments (including the DOD) and senior officials in attendance; the Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security (JPCDS) is specifically for countries contiguous to South Africa and is chaired by the Minister of Defence (or an appointed representative) with senior Departmental officials in attendance; and the Defence Committee (DC) is chaired by the Secretary for Defence (or an appointed representative) with senior departmental officials in attendance (Gibbs 2016). Concerning legal instruments, South Africa concludes written treaties, governed by international law, with states or international organisations. This includes conventions, protocols, declarations and agreements. The following are used by the DOD, namely the Agreement which may be bilateral or multilateral and is content specific but less formal than a treaty or convention; the Protocol which is an ancillary instrument linked to a treaty but is not an addendum or annexure; the MOU which declares common principles of policy and can be jointly or unilaterally released by the parties; and the Implementing Arrangement which is an ancillary instrument to an original instrument that is politically and morally – not legally – binding (RSA DOD 2000: 2-3).

In respect of time frames and response categories, successive financial years from April of the in-year to March of the following year are considered with reference to defence diplomacy activities and CSBM. The latter aspect includes defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence-related information exchange, defence ties at the diplomatic level and
defence cooperation programmes. Being less substantive and overlapping, and for the purpose of this study, defence information exchange is integrated and discussed as part of defence dialogue.

4.3.1. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report 2011/12

In her foreword to the Department of Defence Annual Report 2011/12 (RSA DOD 2012b) the Minister of Defence, Ms N.N. Mapisa-Nqakula, affirmed the DOD’s support for government foreign policy initiatives to promote continental peace through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, leading to increased regional and continental defence cooperation (RSA DOD 2012b: iii). In his introduction the Secretary for Defence, Dr S.M. Gulube, highlighted South Africa’s ratification of UN, AU and SADC protocols which demonstrated the country’s commitment to international peace, security and stability (RSA DOD 2012b: v).

(a) Defence dialogue: Bilateral dialogue consisting of high level and working visits as well as the servicing and monitoring of defence cooperation agreements took place with several SADC member states, namely Angola, Botswana, DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The forums used were the BNC, JPCDS and the DC. In particular, the Minister of Defence held consultations with counterparts from Botswana, the DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2012b: 4-5). SANDF hosted incoming visits from Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2012b: 56). DOD participation in bilateral inter-governmental dialogue included the RSA/DRC BNC as well as the RSA/Tanzania inaugural DC meeting in June 2011; the RSA/Mozambique DC meeting in August 2011; the RSA/Botswana JPCDS in October 2011; the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS during October to November 2011; the RSA/Mozambique JPCDS in November 2011; and the RSA/Namibia JPCDS in November 2011 (RSA DOD 2012b: 48-49, 51).

The RSA/Botswana JPCDS, in particular, is an example of a CSBM that facilitates military-to-military cooperation, training, technical cooperation and joint border operations involving the defence, public and state security sectors for cooperation and the exchange of information (RSA DOD 2011b: 12). The strengthening of bilateral defence relations between South Africa and Mozambique paved the way for military-to-military cooperation to combat cross-border crime and to eradicate piracy, thereby contributing to SADC peace and stability (RSA DOD 2011c: 12). In response, the Minister of the Mozambican National Defence, Mr
F.J. Nyusi, stated that high-level interaction was crucial to “committing to agreements…and learning from another (sic)” (RSA DOD 2011c: 13). The Namibian Minister of Defence, Major General (ret) C. Namoloh, in his address to the RSA/Namibia JPCDS alluded to the role of South Africa and Namibia in the SADC context and described their contributions to regional peace and stability as prerequisites for economic growth (RSA DOD 2012f: 14).

In May 2011 multilateral discussions involving the DOD, DIRCO, Namibia and Mozambique took place on the issue of maritime boundaries (RSA DOD 2012b: 48). C SANDF, General S.Z. Shoke, also complimented the SANDF’s role in preparing a SADC Maritime Strategy which aimed to curb piracy off the shores of Mozambique and Tanzania (RSA DOD 2012b: vii, 23). A meeting of the SADC Defence Sub-Committee took place during May 2011 when member states were persuaded by South Africa to develop and adopt a strategy to curb piracy in SADC waters (RSA DOD 2012b: 49). In addition, C SANDF hosted the ISDSC conference for Chiefs of the armed forces of SADC states to discuss regional security matters, including piracy (RSA DOD 2012b: 56).

Regional and continental multilateral dialogue took place in SADC context. The ISDSC Operations Sub-committee and ISDSC Telecommunication Information Workgroup met concurrently with the Chiefs of Defence and the ISDSC Plenary meeting in May 2011; and the Ministers Committee of the Organ held their meeting in June 2011. In the health sector, the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) hosted a Southern African International Law on Armed Conflict course for SADC states mid-year and also played a leading role in coordinating regional programmes during the SADC Military HIV and AIDS Conference in Angola during September (RSA DOD 2012b: 83). During the latter half of the year the SADC Defence Standing Committee and State Security Standing Committee met in July 2011; the Minister’s Committee of the Organ held an Extraordinary Session in August 2011; and the ISDSC Logistics Workgroup held a meeting in August 2011 (RSA DOD 2012b: 100). The SADC Annual General meeting of the Military Health Workgroup was held in October 2011; the Defence Intelligence Sub-Committee (DISC) met in November 2011 and the ISDSC Chiefs of Defence held an Extraordinary meeting in December 2011. The latter meeting considered the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) resolutions of May 2011 which charged member states to renew efforts to prevent and resolve conflict on the continent. In their response, the SADC Sub-Committee on Defence acknowledged the need for tangible actions concerning the prevention, management and resolution of conflict (RSA
In the following year the ISDSC Ministers of Defence held an Extraordinary meeting in January 2012; and the ISDSC Telecommunications Information Workgroup and the ISDSC Logistics Workgroup held meetings in March 2012 (RSA DOD 2012b: 100).

At the Extraordinary Session of the SADC ISDSC in January 2012 the South African Minister of Defence, Ms L. Sisulu, declared that the occasion provided an opportunity to reflect on regional and continental peace and security unpinned by governance, human rights, the rule of law as well as economic and social development (RSA DOD 2012e: 18).

(b) **Defence agreements:** South Africa concluded bilateral and multilateral defence agreements with Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. These were, in June 2011, a *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Conduct of Combined Maritime Patrols within the Territory of the Republic of Mozambique*; in August 2011, the *Terms of Reference between South Africa and Angola*; and in December 2011 a *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on Maritime Security Cooperation*; and in February 2012 a *Memorandum of Understanding Between Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania Concerning the Combating of Piracy, Drug Trafficking, and Criminal Activities by Conducting Combined Maritime Exercises and Operations for Interdiction and Search* (RSA DOD 2012c: 16; RSA DIRCO 2016).

(c) **Defence ties at the diplomatic level:** Maintaining defence ties at diplomatic level continued with the posting of 39 defence attachés and advisors at missions in Africa and further afield, with the inclusion of the re-opening of offices in Swaziland and Lesotho (RSA DOD 2012b: 31). Regarding SADC member states, South Africa had resident military representatives in Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and non-resident representation in Malawi (RSA DOD 2012b: 98). In addition, South African military representatives were also deployed to the UN, the AU and SADC (RSA DOD 2012b: 98, 102). Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles were the only SADC member countries where the DOD did not have representation.
(d) **Defence cooperation programmes:** Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation using CSBMs in the SADC region focused on military assistance, PSO and multinational exercises. Bilateral defence cooperation programmes centered on military assistance operations in Tanzania and the DRC (RSA DOD 2012b: 24). Concerning the latter, two separate operations were conducted by the SANDF in the DRC: the first, a UN/AU mandated PSO in eastern DRC; and the second, the deployment of specialists to assist the DRC armed forces with the development of a military strategy and plans (RSA DOD 2012b: 56). Multilateral defence cooperation programmes included exercising air power in support of SADC HADR. The exercise, *Ex BLUE CLUSTER*, took place in South Africa during August 2011 and involved the air forces of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2012b: 76). The Chief of the Botswana Air Force, Major General P. Segokga, described the exercise as a success saying it would help “erode mistrust” between SADC countries by building trust at the tactical level (quoted by Engelbrecht 2011). The second Combined Joint African Exercise (CJAX) during September 2011 involved SADC countries for purposes of planning and coordinating a multinational PSO to establish durable peace and prevent a recurrence of violence (RSA DOD 2011e: 18-19).

Multilateral naval cooperation included an exercise during third quarter of 2011, *Ex INTEROP EAST*, a maritime patrol, interdiction and diving exercise off the Tanzanian coast with participation by Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2012b: 79). Another maritime interdiction exercise was held at Senga Bay (Malawi) during September 2011 involving Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2012b: 79). South Africa also hosted a Southern African International Law of Armed Conflict course in October 2011, attended by health care practitioners from the armed forces of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe (RSA DOD 2011d: 25). Although at a domestic level but with international implications for conflict and conflict prevention, control over the sale of South African armaments by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) was improved with the preparation of regulations for promulgation and implementation in April 2012 (RSA DOD 2012b: 3).
4.3.2. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence & Military Veterans Annual Report 2012/13

The Department of Defence & Military Veterans Annual Report 2012/13 (RSA DOD 2013a) confirmed that the responsibility for DOD policy and strategic direction concerning bilateral and multilateral defence engagements within the foreign policy framework was a DIAD responsibility (RSA DOD 2013a: 45). In his introduction the Secretary for Defence, Dr S.M. Gulube, alluded to the on-going strengthening of defence relations with strategic partners in support of foreign policy as a means of ensuring the security of the country (RSA DOD 2013a: v). This was achieved by reinforcing participation in the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) cluster to ensure that the DOD remained aligned with policy prescripts pertaining to regional and continental peace and security (RSA DOD 2013a: vi).

(a) Defence dialogue: Bilateral dialogue consisting of high level and working visits as well as the servicing and monitoring of defence cooperation agreements took place with several SADC member states, namely Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The forums used were the JCC, the JPCDS, the Operational Border Forum, and the DC. DOD participation in bilateral inter-governmental dialogue included the RSA/Angola DC inaugural meeting in June 2012; the visit to Namibia by the SANDF Chief of Logistics and Military Police members in July 2012; the RSA/Malawi JCC, the RSA/Botswana JPCDS in September 2012, the RSA/Namibia JPCDS and RSA/DRC BNC in October 2012; the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS in November 2012; and the RSA/Mozambique Operational Border Liaison Forum in March 2013 (RSA DOD 2013a: 5, 46, 102-103). High level visits by C SANDF took place to Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (RSA DOD 2013a: 54). Defence cooperation in the health sector continued with visits to South Africa by delegations from Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique (RSA DOD 2013a: 85).

SADC multilateral dialogue involved working visits, attending meetings of the working groups and standing committees. These included the SADC Secretariat visit by C SANDF in April 2012; the SADC meeting to discuss the SADC rapid deployment capability in April 2012, the SADC Personnel Work Group meeting in April 2012, the SADC Aviation Standing Committee, DISC, and Technical Steering Committee meetings in May 2012; the SADC Defence Sub-Committee meeting in June 2012 (RSA DOD 2012d: 12); the
meeting of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security cooperation (OPDSC) in July 2012; the ISDSC meeting in July 2012; the SADC Summit in August 2012, the SADC Logistics Work Group meeting in August 2012, the SADC Extraordinary ISDSC meeting in September 2012; the SADC Annual General meeting of the Military Health Service Group held in October 2012; the SADC DISC meeting in November 2012; the SADC Technical Committee meeting in December 2012, and the SADC Special Forces Training Conference in December 2012; the SADC Maritime Standing Committee meeting in February 2013; and the SADC Troika Summit in March 2013 (RSA DOD 2013a: 46-47, 102-103).

The June 2012 meeting of the SADC Defence Sub-Committee was held to discuss security matters against the backdrop of ongoing continental conflict and the committee reviewed the security situation as well as mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of regional and continental conflict (RSA DOD 2012d: 12). At the same meeting it was acknowledged that South Africa had played a leading role to end conflict in the SADC region and that this had earned the respect of the members states (RSA DOD 2012d: 12).

(b) **Defence agreements:** South Africa, under the auspices of DIAD, negotiated, facilitated and drafted two agreements. These were in December 2012 the *Implementation Arrangements Between the SANDF and Namibian Defence Force Concerning Cooperation in the Field of Training*; and in February 2013 the *Implementation Arrangement Between the SANDF and FARDC for Training Recruits and Personnel* (RSA DOD 2014: 46).

(c) **Defence ties at diplomatic level:** Maintaining defence ties at diplomatic level continued with the posting of 40 defence attachés and advisors at missions in Africa and further afield (RSA DOD 2013a: 59). Resident and non-resident military representation in SADC countries, the UN, the AU and SADC remained unchanged, as reported in the 2011/12 Annual Report (RSA DOD 2013a: 59).

(d) **Defence cooperation programmes:** Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation using CSBMs in the SADC region focused on military assistance, PSO and multinational operations. Priority continued to be given to anti-piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel as formalised in the tripartite agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania (RSA DOD 2013a: 21). Moreover SANDF participation in the DRC UN PSO continued (RSA DOD 2013a: 68). Operational border liaison forums were held with
Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in July and September 2012 (RSA DOD 2014: 102). The third CJAX, *Ex UHURU*, took place in South Africa in September 2012 to develop an understanding of the joint, multinational and interagency environment amongst SADC countries for planning and coordinating multinational PSO and to manage the wider aspects of conflict (RSA DOD 2012a: 28). In the following year, HADR was provided to Mozambique during flooding in the central regions of the country in January and February 2013 (RSA DOD 2013a: 68).

### 4.3.3. RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report FY2013/14

The *Department of Defence Annual Report FY2013/14* (RSA DOD 2014) covered the use of defence diplomacy in support of foreign policy under the direction of the DIAD. In his introduction the Secretary for Defence, Dr S.M. Gulube, highlighted the DOD’s defence diplomacy in South Africa’s foreign policy. In this respect defence engagements included visits, hosting and attending BNCs, servicing defence cooperation agreements and MOU (RSA DOD 2014: xi).

(a) **Defence dialogue:** Bilateral dialogue included high level and working visits to conclude defence cooperation agreements and to sign MOU; to service and monitor agreements; and to attend and host BNCs, JPCDS, and DC meetings. Dialogue continued with several SADC countries including the RSA/Lesotho Joint Bilateral Coordinating Commission in May 2013; the RSA/Botswana JPCDS in June 2013; the RSA/Botswana DC midterm review and the RSA/Malawi DC in August 2013; the RSA/Mozambique JPCDS and a trilateral meeting involving the Chiefs of Defence of South Africa, Tanzania and the DRC in September 2013; the RSA/DRC BNC in October and November 2013; the RSA/Namibia inaugural BNC, the RSA/Angola DC and the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS in November 2013; and the RSA/Lesotho Operational Border Liaison Forum in December 2013 (RSA DOD 2014: 1-2, 110-111). The Minister of Defence also attended meetings to discuss defence cooperation with Mozambique in September 2013 and with the DRC from October to November 2013. Bilateral meetings between South Africa, Angola and Namibia took place in March 2014 (RSA DOD 2014: 112).

SADC multilateral dialogue involved working visits, attending meetings of the working groups and standing committees, the ISDSC, the OPDSC. These included the
ISDSC Communications and Information Systems meeting in May 2013; the SADC Legal Workshop and ISDSC meetings in May 2013; the SADC Summit and the SADC Maritime Work Group meeting in June 2013; the SADC Ministerial meeting in July 2013; the SADC Summit in September 2013; the SADC Annual General meeting of the Military Health Service Group held in October 2013; the SADC Defence Chiefs meeting in October 2013; and the SADC Summit in March 2014 (RSA DOD 2014: 110-111).

(b) **Defence agreements:** In April 2013 an agreement was signed on the establishment of a Joint Logistics Support Committee between the SANDF and the Namibian Defence Force (RSA DOD 2014: 111).

(c) **Defence ties at diplomatic level:** Maintaining defence ties at diplomatic level continued with the posting of 43 defence attachés and advisors at missions in Africa and further afield (RSA DOD 2014: 62). Resident and non-resident military representation in SADC countries, the UN, the AU and SADC remained unchanged from what was reported in the 2011/12 Annual Report (RSA DOD 2013a: 59).

(d) **Defence cooperation programmes:** Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation using CSBMs continued in the SADC region and encompassed military assistance, PSO, and multinational operations and exercises. In this context the SANDF involvement in the UN PSO in the DRC continued as well as a UN-mandated FIB deployment, also in the DRC, under a separate mandate (RSA DOD 2014: xii). *Ex BLUE ZAMBEZI* was held in Angola in July 2013, attended by air force delegations from Angola, South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The purpose was to conduct a multinational humanitarian relief exercise (RSA DOD 2014: 66). Priority continued to be given to anti-piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel, but Tanzania withdrew in 2013 leaving South Africa and Mozambique to continue the operation (RSA DOD 2014: 3). An anti-piracy exercise, *Ex OXIDE*, was conducted in the Mozambique Channel from August to September 2013 involving the South African and French navies as well as officers from Tanzania and Mozambique (RSA DOD 2014: 62, 73). The Chief of the SA Navy (SAN) hosted the South African Joint Air Defence Symposium on military and industrial participation in September 2013 that was attended by Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia (RSA DOD 2014: 73); and the RSA/Lesotho Operational Border Liaison Forum in December 2013 (RSA DOD 2014: 112).
4.3.4. **RSA defence diplomacy: Department of Defence Annual Report 2014/15**

According to the *Department of Defence Annual Report 2014/15* (RSA DOD 2015b) defence diplomacy and related activities took place in support of DOD Outcome 1: Element – *Promotion of peace, stability and security in the RSA, the SADC region, the African continent and the world* (RSA DOD 2015b: 61). The Report endorsed the role of defence diplomacy, specifically the signing of defence cooperation agreements, that was conducted under the auspices of the ICTS cluster with the Minister of Defence and Secretary for Defence as leading roleplayers (RSA DOD 2015b: ix, 2, 52). Mention was also made of the leading role played by South Africa in the establishment of ACIRC with the SANDF preparing its interim operational capacity to be in place by 30 September 2015 and its full operational capacity by 30 November 2015 (RSA DOD 2015b: viii).

(a) **Defence dialogue:** Bilateral dialogue, consisting of high level and working visits as well as the servicing and monitoring of defence cooperation agreements, took place with several SADC members states. These included the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS in May 2014 when the Zimbabwean Minister of Defence, Dr S. Sekeremaye, paid tribute to the role played by South Africa in maintaining “geo-political stability, peace and security development in the region and on the continent” (RSA DOD 2015e: 19); the RSA/Botswana BNC held in November 2014 (RSA DOD 2015b: 140); the bilateral discussions with Zimbabwe in December 2014 (RSA DOD 2015b: 140); the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (USDF) visit to South Africa to discuss the establishment of a self-sustainable military village in January 2015 (RSA DOD 2015a: 15); and the RSA/Zimbabwe JPCDS in March 2015 (RSA DOD 2015b: 139).

Multilateral dialogue with SADC member states included the SADC Extraordinary Defence Sub-Committee Meeting and the ISDSC Communications and Information Systems meeting in April 2014; the ISDSC Human Resource Work Group in May 2014; the SADC Defence Sub-Committee meeting in June 2014 and the International Conference of the Great Lakes (ICGLR)/SADC Heads of State and ministerial meeting in June 2014; the SADC Extraordinary Defence Sub-Committee meeting in July 2014; the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit and the ISDSC Logistics Working Group in August 2014; the SADC Chiefs of Defence Forces Troika involving South Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe from August to September 2014; the SADC Organ of the Troika plus troop
contributing countries and the DRC senior officials meeting on the disarmament of the FDLR in September 2014; the SADC Extraordinary Defence Sub-Committee, DISC and the SADC Operational Sub-Committee meetings in September 2014; the SADC Standing Maritime Committee planning work group and the ICGLR/SADC Summit in October 2014; the SADC Military Health Service Workgroup meeting attended by a SAMHS delegation in October 2014 (RSA DOD 2015g); the SADC Troika Chiefs of Defence Forces meeting and the SADC Extraordinary Defence Sub-Committee in November 2014; and the SADC Operational Sub-Committee meeting in December 2014 (RSA DOD 2015b: 3, 139).

(b) **Defence agreements:** South Africa concluded three agreements. These were with SADC on an Agreement amending the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in August 2014; with Angola and the DRC on a Tripartite Mechanism between the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in October 2014; and an Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Zambia concerning Defence Cooperation in February 2015 (RSA DOD 2015b: 3; RSA DIRCO 2016).

(c) **Defence ties at diplomatic level:** Maintaining defence ties at diplomatic level continued with 43 defence attachés and advisors posted at missions in Africa and further afield (RSA DOD 2015b: 75). Resident and non-resident military representation in SADC countries, the UN, AU and SADC remained unchanged from that reported in the 2011/12 Annual Report (RSA DOD 2013a: 59).

(d) **Defence cooperation programmes:** Multilateral defence cooperation using CSBMs in the SADC region continued in June 2014 with a joint SADC riverine exercise, *Ex NYAMINYAMI*, in Zimbabwe. It involved Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana attended by the Chief of the SAN, Vice Admiral M. Hlongwane and a DOD delegation (RSA DOD 2015b: 94); and the Special Forces force preparation exercise, *Ex LEGAE*, that was held in Angola from August to September 2014 (defenceWeb 2014). In addition anti-piracy operations continued in the Mozambique Channel (RSA DOD 2015b: 4), as well as PSO in the DRC where South Africa trained more than 9 000 recruits for the fledgling DRC armed forces (RSA DOD 2015b: xi). Military assistance, in the form of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), was provided to SADC countries by the SAN (RSA DOD 2015b: xi). HADR to the Mozambique government during flooding in the Zambezia Province took...

4.4. **Assessment of the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy until 2015**

By applying the framework for analysis (see Section 2.4 Chapter 2) on the aforesaid exploration, description and explanation of the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy until 2015, an assessment is made of the correlation between defence diplomacy and the prevention of conflict in the form of conflict avoidance and conflict regulation.

(a) **Defence diplomacy:** Defence diplomacy covers a broad range of bilateral and multilateral activities involving both military and civilian members of the DOD. Although South Africa’s defence diplomacy had regional, continental and international dimensions, SADC was accorded priority status since regional peace and stability served the interests of the country as well as those of SADC member states. The defence diplomacy framework adopted by the DOD utilised non-coercive bilateral and multilateral light intervention with CSBMs to promote cooperation. This contributed to maintaining pre-manifest conflict within limits, thereby avoiding a malign conflict spiral and contributing to regional stability. Regional stability was recognised by the Namibian Minister of Defence, Mr N. Angula, during the 2014 Namibian Defence Appropriation Bill who noted that “(o)ur neighbourhood is friendly” (Republic of Namibia Ministry of Defence 2014: 10). This stability and peaceful co-existence were amongst others achieved through defence diplomacy, especially through the avoidance of coercive methods and the pursuance of complementary goals, values and interests. The latter included regional and continental peace and security unpinned by the promotion of governance, human rights, the rule of law as well as economic and social development.

(b) **Defence diplomacy, conflict avoidance and conflict regulation:** References by senior officials to the stability of SADC and the amity between members states at bilateral and multilateral defence dialogue as well as other engagements, all attest to conflict avoidance and the absence of conflict escalation. In this respect the operational context of
South Africa’s defence diplomacy supported conflict avoidance by promoting common values and principles, creating cooperative conditions, modifying attitudes and perceptions, and regulating behaviour by pursuing mutually beneficial goals. Conflict regulation within the ambit of defence diplomacy indicates that use was made of CSBMs including defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence diplomatic ties and defence cooperation programmes for purposes of conflict regulation (see Table 3). Bilateral engagements took place with Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe and involved regular defence consultation over a broad spectrum of issues. At multilateral level, SADC consultations were held frequently through high level and working visits to service and monitor the implementation of agreements. Defence diplomatic ties with the SADC headquarters in Botswana were maintained, as well as with the majority of SADC member states. The SANDF also participated in numerous multilateral cooperation programmes including the training of defence and civilian personnel in South Africa and in the DRC; the HADR in Mozambique; the hosting of seminars and conferences; the facilitation of training exercises; the joint patrolling of the Mozambique Channel to conduct anti-piracy operations; and the deployment of training teams in the DRC.

The 2011 to 2015 summary of the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy, involving SADC member states in particular (see Table 3) provides evidence that the non-coercive activities were aligned with light prevention, specifically with CSBMs.

It is evident that the most prominent activities were defence dialogue followed by the ratification of agreements. This confirms the adoption of a diplomatic-legalistic approach using diplomacy as communication (and negotiation) embedded in international law. Apart from corresponding with the tenets of South African foreign policy in pursuit of peace and security, this also conforms with moral imperatives (prescribed by the UN Charter and the Act of the AU) of non-aggression and peaceful settlement. Also evident, but aligned with policy, was the increase in multilateral (and corresponding decrease in bilateral) dialogue. Moreover, defence ties at diplomatic level remained constant and supported defence diplomacy and foreign policy initiatives. This is also indicative of extending the reach of the diplomatic instrument of foreign policy to security, defence and military matters, and *vice versa*, thereby enhancing the utility of both the military and diplomatic instruments. Defence cooperation programmes were mainly focused on conducting exercises and PSO which, apart from their intrinsic military value and increased use, were aimed at and gave substance to
promoting transparency and fostering collaboration between armed forces. The increased anti-piracy involvement, irrespective of the implicit deterrent and coercive nature thereof as a justifiable military response to a manifest threat, exerted diplomatic suasion and influence through ‘gunboat diplomacy’, a naval presence and a ‘show of the flag’. The peace dividends of these operations therefore ranged from enforcement action, through conflict suppression to conflict prevention. Clearly these programmes supported and advanced the basic aims of defence diplomacy (see Chapter 2), including improving relations with former or potential enemies; promoting civil-military relations and SSR; assisting defence forces to transform after conflict; buttressing peace support initiatives by also enhancing peacekeeping capabilities; and fostering co-operative regional relations.

Table 3: The operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy involving SADC member states, 2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Regulation to Modify Behaviour using CSBMs</th>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>2011 to 2012</th>
<th>2012 to 2013</th>
<th>2013 to 2014</th>
<th>2014 to 2015</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Dialogue:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Ties at Diplomatic Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Cooperation Programmes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Piracy Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Liaison Forums</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences and Symposia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Concluding assessment: As initially indicated (see Chapter 1) the intention was to establish a link between defence diplomacy and the prevention of conflict, and to consider the alignment of defence diplomacy (activities) with the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention use. At a theoretical and policy level (see Chapters 2 and 3 respectively) the link between defence diplomacy and conflict prevention was established. The operationalisation of South Africa’s defence diplomacy further confirms and sustains this link. Regarding the subsequent consideration of the 2015 Defence Review alignment with
conflict prevention and the use of defence diplomacy (activities), the latter is considered first. Based on the exploration of its operationalisation and the aforesaid summative assessment, the inference is that South Africa’s defence diplomacy (activities) is directed at and used for conflict prevention in the following manner:

- At the level of incipient and latent (i.e. pre-manifest) conflict, bilateral and multilateral defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence information exchange, defence ties and defence cooperation programmes are used by defence forces to pursue complementary goals; to foster common interests; to pursue cooperation; and to promote transparency. It is, however, contended that during incipient conflict defence dialogue, defence agreements and information exchange are more important and that during latent conflict defence ties and defence cooperation programmes must tangibly regulate conflict through behaviour modification. Table 3 shows that the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy with SADC members states is predominantly defence dialogue, agreement and information exchange orientated which is implicitly linked to the mitigation of incipient conflict. In the same manner, the relatively low frequency of defence cooperation programmes indicates a limited mitigation of latent conflict.

- At the level of manifest conflict a combination of bilateral and multilateral defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence information exchange, defence ties and defence cooperation programmes must be employed to prevent an escalation into violent conflict. At this time establishing and maintaining communication channels is paramount.

4.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to conduct an exploratory analysis of the operational context of DOD defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015. In sequence the prevalence of conflict on the African continent, in particular pre-manifest conflict in the SADC region was examined; followed by a description of the DOD approach to non-coercive defence diplomacy and the operational manifestation thereof through defence diplomacy activities and CSBMs. Four main findings were made. Firstly, that defence diplomacy was used non-coercively. Secondly, and linked to the first, that non-coercive defence diplomacy was effected by utilising CSBMs. Thirdly, the maintenance of defence cooperation contributed to the non-escalation of pre-manifest conflict. Fourthly, that the operational context of South Africa’s
defence diplomacy provides a basis for the evaluation of and recommendations on the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention effectiveness.
CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

The aim of the study was to conduct a strategic analysis of South Africa’s use of defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention, as framed by the 2015 Defence Review. The fundamental research problem justifying the South African case study is that the use of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention is under-theorised and under-emphasised. In response and to direct the underlying study, two inter-related questions were asked. The first concerned the nexus of defence diplomacy and the second the strategic alignment of defence diplomacy with the 2015 Defence Review to extend the conflict prevention use of this instrument. The argument defended was that by linking defence diplomacy to conflict prevention as an approach to peace, it can be used to prevent the escalation of conflict into a manifest form if used non-coercively and if specifically targeted at incipient and latent conflict.

5.2. Summary

The study was conventionally structured with five chapters. The first two chapters provided an introduction to and a theoretical framework for the study, followed by two chapters devoted to the South African case study. The final chapter, therefore, presents a concluding evaluation and makes policy and research recommendations.

As an introduction to the study, the first chapter identified the research theme by indicating the source and context of the study; provided a literature overview to justify and ground the study; identified and demarcated the research problem with the research questions and argument in response; explained the research methodology with specific reference to the research design and the approaches to and methods of study; and outlined the structure of the research. Based on an extended critical review of literature, the aim of the second chapter was to identify and clarify the relevant conceptual variables involved, and to use them as elements of a framework for analysis. In essence it described and explained the conceptual foundations and dynamics of the defence diplomacy - conflict nexus, for application to the
South African case study. The chapter contextualised non-coercive defence diplomacy by relating it to preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy and CSBMs, in the process explaining its nature and scope. Similarly, it contextualised conflict prevention by relating it to the structure and development of conflict. In conclusion a summative framework was constructed to reflect the alignment of indicators of conflict avoidance and conflict regulation (i.e. conflict prevention) with defence diplomacy activities.

The aims of the next two chapters – based on primary sources denoting official South African perceptions and policies on foreign policy, defence policy, defence diplomacy, peace support and conflict management – were to describe the policy context and the operational context of South Africa’s use of non-coercive defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention. At a policy level and in order to contextualise the 2015 Defence Review, it was necessary to retrospectively and chronologically chart defence diplomacy in DOD policy since 1994. This culminated in an analysis of the 2015 Defence Review. At an operational level attention turned to the implementation of South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy. Similarly based on official sources, an exploratory account was provided of the prevalence of pre-manifest conflict, particularly in the SADC region; the DOD approach to non-coercive defence diplomacy; and the extent to which defence diplomacy activities and CSBMs, within the response categories of defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence diplomatic ties and defence cooperation programmes, were directed at conflict prevention. In conclusion both the policy context and the operational context were assessed in terms of the framework for analysis.

5.3. **Key findings and evaluation**

In respect of the theoretical dimensions and also considering the problem of definition, the conceptual profusion and the framework for analysis, four findings are made. The first is that the conceptual variables (i.e. defence diplomacy, conflict prevention and related concepts) are contested; that they present a problem of definition; and that for the descriptive-analytical purpose of this study it was necessary to settle on stipulative meanings and accounts. The second is that the defence diplomacy conflict prevention nexus is seldom theorised as such. In the literature a theorising of the one or the other is evident but, importantly each makes provision for and links to the other. The third – and related to the second – is that defence diplomacy is not specifically theorised from a non-coercive perspective. Considering its
South African use and its utility along with the CSBMs for preventing conflict, this requires clarification. Hence the summative framework that made and clarified the links. The last is that apart from a changing operational context, both defence diplomacy and conflict prevention are subject to change and indeed change over time.

Regarding the policy context of South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy, as articulated and formalised in official policy documents, five findings are made. Firstly, pre-manifest conflict was (and remains) prevalent in the SADC region in particular, dictating the need for policy on preventive diplomacy supported by defence diplomacy, to prevent conflict development and escalation. Secondly, the policy context of defence diplomacy and conflict prevention between 1994 and 2015 initially provided limited direction due to conceptual shortcomings, strategic incoherence and limited coordination with foreign policy. Thirdly, the 2002 Military Strategy did not address the utility of defence diplomacy and was never adapted to support the Strategic Business Plans from 2003 to 2010. This deficiency was to some extent rectified in some policy frameworks. Fourthly, the Strategic Business Plans from 2003 to 2010, the 2015 Defence Review and the 2015 Planning Instruments did accommodate defence diplomacy and in principle they relate to the pursuit of peace and security and also to conflict prevention. However and importantly, all have an inherent shortcoming in that defence diplomacy, specifically in its on-coercive form, is neither harmonised with conflict prevention nor aligned with the use of CSBMs for preventing a conflict situation from escalating to latent and manifest conflict. Fifthly, and in contrast to the preceding policy frameworks, the 2015 Defence Review and 2015 Planning Instruments do provide more coherent policy direction and strategic guidance for the next 20 to 30 years and include a more focused policy context for defence diplomacy. However, neither of the two notable deficiencies, that is the lack of defence diplomacy policy synchronisation with the development stages of conflict and the alignment of non-coercive defence diplomacy with CSBMs, are adequately addressed in a policy-specific context.

Regarding the operational context of South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy and its implementation through defence diplomacy activities and CSBMs, four findings are made. Firstly and in line with the intrinsic pacific nature of diplomacy and preventive diplomacy, defence diplomacy was mainly used in a non-coercive manner. This non-coercive use was further enhanced by the fact that the defence diplomacy activities used in response to conflict situations are intrinsically non-coercive. The exception is the anti-piracy
operations that are a borderline case (similar to the coercive aspects of PSO-related military deployments and operations, as well as coercive diplomacy), that does not fall within the ambit of this study. Secondly, and linked to the first, non-coercive defence diplomacy was implemented by using CSBMs, measures that by their very nature create trust and confidence and ameliorate tensions arising from goal incompatibilities. Thirdly, bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation was maintained, thereby contributing to the prevention of pre-manifest conflict escalation in the Southern African region in particular. Fourthly, the operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy provides the basis for recommendations on the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention effectiveness.

Based on these findings an evaluation is made of the contributions and omissions of the 2015 Defence Review. Having been the primary focus of the study (albeit retrospectively contextualised in a policy and operational context), the Review is assessed in terms of its alignment with the non-coercive defence diplomacy tenets and activities reflected therein. The contributions of the 2015 Defence Review is that it:

- corrects three shortcomings concerning policy guidance for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention precipitated by the 1996 Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review. Firstly, the Review acknowledges the crucial role of defence diplomacy in preventing conflict. Secondly, there is tacit recognition of the prevalence of pre-manifest conflict (which the Review describes as peacetime political and economic rivalry). Thirdly, it positions defence diplomacy to prevent an escalation of pre-manifest conflict through the use of regional institutions and mechanisms supported by CSBMs.
- identifies CSBMs to build mutual trust, enhance collective confidence and create stability, and implicitly correlates these CSBMs with the defence diplomacy activities identified in the framework for analysis. The latter, although not categorised in the 2015 Defence Review, constitutes bilateral and multilateral conflict prevention responses (for both conflict avoidance and conflict regulation) in the form of defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence diplomatic ties and defence cooperation programmes.

As omissions the 2015 Defence Review does not

- provide clear policy guidance concerning the overall use of defence diplomacy for conflict prevention; or
• utilise defence diplomacy for conflict prevention with CSBMs from Milestone 1 to 5.

These omissions are, amongst other, addressed in the recommendations.

5.4. **Recommendations**

The recommendations cover the policy and operational context to strengthen the 2015 Defence Review as well as to present a future research agenda.

In the policy context the following recommendations are made:

• Specific policy measures should be adopted to mitigate against the 2015 Defence Review (and its implementation) as a potential source of (regional conflict). During engagements, especially when implementing the Milestones where defence diplomacy is presently notably absent, these measures should deliberately promote common values, encourage cooperation and engender trust. The 2015 Defence Review holds the risk that it is a potential source of conflict since it explicitly identifies South Africa’s national interests and confirms its resolve to secure them by unilateral intervention if circumstances offer no alternative. The Review furthermore affirms the intent to use forward-basing to support operations on the continent; to actively promote domestic defence-related industries and the export of armaments; and to develop an expeditionary and intervention capability. Although it could be counter-argued that this resolve and intent serve benign purposes – considering the underlying commitment of South Africa, as expressed in the Review to non-aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputed and peace support – conflict-inducing alter-perceptions of a malign intent cannot be excluded.

• The policy context provided by the 2015 Defence Review and the 2015 Planning Instruments should explicitly recognise the use of non-coercive defence diplomacy through regional institutions and mechanisms supported by CSBMs. For clarity and systematisation this should include the categorisation and sequencing of CSBMs in the descending order of defence dialogue, defence agreements, defence information exchange, diplomatic defence ties and defence cooperation programmes. The categorisation and sequence should also continually be evaluated against policy-specific considerations that include transparency and reciprocity; conditions for cooperation; and the interplay between bilateral and multilateral defence relations. Therefore, to manage differences and to prevent conflict spirals, non-
coercive defence diplomacy should receive specific attention to build defence relations; should be linked to the identification and reduction of goal incompatibility; and should be used within the agreed parameters of mutually accepted settlement regimes. Existing early warning systems should also be improved to ensure that DOD policy remains pro-active and that escalation is prevented by subjecting conflict to the confines of transformation and settlement.

- DOD policy should provide guidance to an identifiable conflict prevention strategy which has regional peace and stability as its end-state; multi- and bilateral non-coercive defence diplomacy as its strategic way; and CSBMs as its strategic means. The primary focus of this strategy should be SADC member states, although not excluding the remainder of the African continent and the AU. The requisite is that this strategy be aligned with the development stages of conflict, specifically with pre-manifest conflict. Since the timing of CSBMs is crucial the strategy should be continuously pursued and regularly adapted, even in the face of seemingly peaceful relations.

- The 2015 Defence Review should align the DOD defence diplomacy strategy with the conflict prevention strategy. The framework for analysis (see Chapter 2) provides a basis for this. The implementation of the defence diplomacy strategy should include an annual revision of activities for the business plans and annual reports.

- The 2015 Defence Review should provide clear policy direction to rectify the existing strategic policy gaps, namely the narrow focus on military foreign relations to promote security; the under-emphasis of pre-manifest conflict; and the use of regional institutions and mechanisms supported by CSBMs. Additionally, the revision and update of the 2002 Military Strategy as envisaged in the 2015 Defence Review should make greater provision for the utilisation of defence diplomacy, specifically non-coercive defence diplomacy for the purpose of conflict prevention. To accommodate the above it is also recommended that the military strategic objective, ‘promoting security’, be modified by replacing ‘supporting military foreign relations’ with ‘non-coercive defence diplomacy for preventing conflict with CSBMs’ – with the focus of main effort concentrated on the SADC region.

In the operational context the following recommendations are made:

- The requirement for early warning is crucial and should include the indicators of incipient, latent and manifest conflict. In addition, reasonable expectations of peaceful change should be created by reducing the possibility of violence and avoiding regional
sensitivities. This will allow the synchronisation of CBSM-related defence diplomacy with the indicators of pre-manifest conflict and the timely identification of specific activities at specific times at specific levels for specific purpose, in order to prevent conflict.

- Defence diplomacy should be planned and executed in accordance with country specific bi- and multilateral defence cooperation plans coordinated by DIAD. These plans must be drawn up with clear cognisance and appreciation of pre-manifest conflict, along with the adoption of specific CSBMs for mitigation.

- The development of defence diplomacy and conflict prevention courses within the DOD should be prioritised. In particular, the curriculum of the Security and Defence Studies Programme presented at the South African National Defence College requires amendment to include defence diplomacy and conflict prevention. Moreover, consideration should be given to developing a short inter-departmental learning programme on defence diplomacy at the same institution. This will ensure that a DOD defence diplomacy capability is created and maintained within the broader departmental context.

Concerning a future research agenda on the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus, the following recommendations are made:

- Theoretical research to extend the understanding of the parameters and indicators of non-coercive defence diplomacy. This includes the differences between and overlap of non-coercive and coercive defence diplomacy, the transition of the one to the other, and the implications of this transition.

- Applied research to further the implementation of the defence diplomacy aspects of the 2015 Defence Review and the 2015 Planning Instruments. In particular, this should include the monitoring and measuring of the effectiveness and efficiency of this instrument in conflict prevention. This could include hypothesis-based empirical research on the measurement of defence diplomatic effect; and the causal relationship between and the correlation of defence diplomacy and conflict prevention.

- Comparative research, with the inclusion of South Africa, that extends beyond the SADC region.
5.5. Conclusion

The aim of the study was to conduct a strategic analysis of South Africa’s use of defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention, as framed by the 2015 Defence Review. The aim was achieved by developing a framework for the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus; applying it to the South African case study in a policy and operational context; and thereupon formulating research findings and recommendations for the 2015 Defence Review.

Based on the research problem, two questions were asked. Firstly, what is the link and relationship between defence diplomacy and the prevention of conflict? Secondly, how is or can defence diplomacy, as a supplementary form of preventive diplomacy, be strategically aligned with the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention use? In response to the first question it was found that defence diplomacy, if used non-coercively in a multilateral context with CSBMs, regulates the conflict situation (in terms of goal incompatibility), conflict attitudes and perceptions and conflict behaviour, and therefore prevents conflict escalation by keeping it within the bounds of pre-manifest conflict. In response to the second question it was found that South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy, at both a policy and operational level, was and still is partially aligned with the framework provided by the 2015 Defence Review (also considering preceding policy developments).

The utility of non-coercive defence diplomacy for preventing an escalation in conflict was verified by exploring the policy and operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy. By applying the framework for analysis on the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus to the South African case study, it was established that the DOD policy context for defence diplomacy from 1994 to 2015 was pursued in a stable foreign policy setting which had a predilection for the peaceful resolution of conflict and was framed by an identifiable DOD policy context. The DOD policy context was, however, initially vague as it failed to advocate defence diplomacy, referring instead to CSBMs. This resulted in a policy void which extended into the strategic realm, specifically the 2002 Military Strategy, which had a myopic focus on military foreign relations. This shortcoming has never been rectified. However, the Business Plans from 2003 to 2013 show an incremental convergence with the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus but it is emphasised that there is an ongoing absence of defence policy synchronisation with the stages of pre-manifest conflict. Moreover, the purposive use of non-coercive defence diplomacy did not feature as such in the
2015 Defence Review. Continuing with the South African case study and considering the operational context of DOD defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015, the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus revealed that there is evidence to inductively ground a theory that non-coercive defence diplomacy prevents an escalation in pre-manifest conflict.

In conclusion, the policy context confirmed the link between defence diplomacy, more specifically non-coercive defence diplomacy with CSBMs, and conflict regulation; whereas the operational context provided evidence that non-coercive defence diplomacy subscribes to common values and principles, creates conditions, modifies attitudes and perceptions, and regulates behaviour that collectively prevent the escalation of pre-manifest conflict. These findings and limitations provided justification for recommendations concerning the 2015 Defence Review as a policy tool to direct and implement defence diplomacy for conflict prevention.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


© University of Pretoria


Republic of South Africa (RSA), Department of Defence (DOD). 2015d. Exercise AMANI AFRICA II to be held in South Africa. SA Soldier, April 22(4): 13.


SUMMARY

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2015

by

Robin Michael Blake

SUPERVISOR : PROF A. DU PLESSIS
DEPARTMENT : DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEGREE : MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES

Most, if not all defence forces across the world make use of defence diplomacy and some, including South Africa utilise defence diplomacy for conflict prevention. However, the theoretical underpinnings concerning the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus are inadequate as is the concept of non-coercive defence diplomacy, a policy term first mooted by the South African Department of Defence in 2011. In addition, the South African Department of Defence recently released the South African Defence Review 2015 which maps out the strategic direction for the next two to three decades. The 2015 Defence Review addresses, amongst others, policy guidance for defence diplomacy and conflict prevention.

The aim of the study was to conduct a strategic analysis of South Africa’s use of defence diplomacy for purposes of conflict prevention, as framed by the 2015 Defence Review. This was achieved by developing a framework for the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus; applying it to the South African case study in a policy and operational context; and thereupon formulating recommendations for the 2015 Defence Review. The research problem is that the use of defence diplomacy by South Africa as an approach to conflict management is both under-theorised and under-emphasised. This raises two questions. Firstly, what is the link and relationship between defence diplomacy and the prevention of conflict? Secondly, how is or can defence diplomacy, as a supplementary form of preventive diplomacy, be strategically aligned with the 2015 Defence Review to extend its conflict prevention use?
In response to the first question it was found that defence diplomacy, if used non-coercively in a multilateral context with CSBMs, regulates the conflict situation (in terms of goal incompatibility), conflict attitudes and perceptions and conflict behaviour, and therefore prevents conflict escalation by keeping it within the bounds of pre-manifest conflict. In response to the second question it was found that South Africa’s non-coercive defence diplomacy, at both a policy and operational level, was partially aligned with the framework.

The utility of non-coercive defence diplomacy for preventing an escalation in conflict was verified by exploring the policy and operational context of South Africa’s defence diplomacy. By applying the framework for analysis on the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus to the South African case study, it was established that the DOD policy context for defence diplomacy from 1994 to 2015 was pursued in a stable foreign policy setting which had a predilection for the peaceful resolution of conflict and was framed by an identifiable DOD policy context. The DOD policy context was, however, initially vague as it failed to advocate defence diplomacy, referring instead to CSBMs. This resulted in a policy void which extended into the strategic realm, specifically the 2002 Military Strategy, which had a myopic focus on military foreign relations. This shortcoming has never been rectified. However, the Business Plans from 2003 to 2013 show an incremental convergence with the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus but it is emphasised that there is an ongoing absence of defence policy synchronisation with the stages of pre-manifest conflict. Moreover, the purposive use of non-coercive defence diplomacy did not feature as such in the 2015 Defence Review. Continuing with the South African case study and considering the operational context of DOD defence diplomacy from 2011 to 2015, the defence diplomacy - conflict prevention nexus revealed that there is evidence to inductively ground a theory that non-coercive defence diplomacy prevents an escalation in pre-manifest conflict.

In conclusion, the policy context confirmed the link between defence diplomacy, more specifically non-coercive defence diplomacy with CSBMs, and conflict regulation; whereas the operational context provided evidence that non-coercive defence diplomacy subscribes to common values and principles, creates conditions, modifies attitudes and perceptions, and regulates behaviour that collectively prevent the escalation of pre-manifest conflict. These findings and limitations provided justification for recommendations concerning the 2015 Defence Review as a policy tool to direct and implement defence diplomacy for conflict prevention.
KEY WORDS

coevasive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures, conflict, conflict prevention
defence diplomacy, diplomacy, non-coerceive defence diplomacy, preventive diplomacy,