> as particular as the one analysed by Adorno, and which has its roots in exactly the same soil as the European crisis that Adorno deciphers, namely the dialectics of the Enlightenment… In the name of protecting identity, the identities of communities were destroyed, for example by "social engineering" dislocations. In numerous laws the interests of the individual had to yield to a particular group's interest. This is South Africa's own dialectic of the Enlightenment, which spreads the stench of Auschwitz through the world without the gas chambers or crematorium of Auschwitz. This is what still has to be understood in South Africa, especially by the Afrikaner (Snyman 1985, xi–xii).[17]

A few months later P. W. Botha announced the state of emergency.

A lot would have to be said to present the exact profile of these three quite different examples in the context of their work of origin and to situate them in respect of the ambient political context. However, it is fair to claim that despite being rooted in Western traditions of thought, there is more than mere uncritical mimetic behaviour here and it would be unfair to declare that it was foreign to the place for which it was written. This is arguably as strong as the counter-evidence against a blanket accusation of Western philosophy as instrument of (neo-)colonialism gets. Obviously three anecdotes do not suffice to salvage so many decades of problematic practice. But they do testify to the possibility of putting the *ambiguity* of the Western heritage to good use.

But how strong is this point really? Someone may well concede that some moments of Western philosophy are less catastrophic than others, but still consider this only as a relative good of a practice that should, as a whole, be condemned as an illegitimate imposition. The broad name for evoking the insufficiency of even its best moments could be "liberalism". None of the three authors I cite above would accept this label, but they would fall under it in the broad sense used by Biko ([1978] 2004, 51, 89–90). Arguably all (political) philosophy practised by white authors during the years of apartheid who were explicitly against apartheid policies would be categorised as "liberal" by Biko. To make the point of the ambiguity of this heritage I would therefore have to go along with the sceptic's critique of "liberalism" and see if this ambiguity of tradition is testified to in the work of African thinkers. I again use three somewhat anecdotal examples, from three different generations.

In his foreword to the collected writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede, A. P. Mda explains that Lembede "rounded off his education by earning an M. A. in Philosophy" (Mda 1996, xv). Mda refers here to the studies that culminated in Lembede's dissertation entitled *The conception of God as expounded by or as it emerges from the writings of great philosophers from Descartes to the present day*. The full dissertation is not included in the collected writings, but according to the publication note accompanying an extract from the dissertation, these "great philosophers" discussed by Lembede include some ancient Greek philosophers, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and William James (Lembede 1996, 105). Mda reminisces:

> While he was studying and preparing for his thesis for his M. A. degree, we were staying together in Orlando East. We had extensive discussions because he was studying the philosophers from Descartes to the present day. Now that was very fortunate for me because he used to invite me to take part in discussing some of the issues raised by the philosophers. Very often we took opposite positions…And after explaining to me so and so stood for this and that, he would make a reference to some book. He read to me, and I would read myself. Then we would discuss issues that he wanted to go deeper into. He invited me to take a certain line, an opposite line, so he could give me a chance to go deeper (Mda 1996, xv).

My point here is not focused on the dissertation text itself, for nothing in it distinguishes Lembede from a Western philosopher. The point is rather Mda's account of the reception of those Western philosophers by himself and this articulate Africanist (also see Edgar and ka Msumza 1996, 21ff.

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17 I had the great fortune of being Snyman's student in the mid 1990s. In his lectures on modernity and the Enlightenment he taught his students that every attempt at assessing these big sociocultural developments has to engage with Adorno's ([1966] 1973, 357–358) arguments for claiming that Auschwitz exposed the fact that Western culture is garbage, built on shit. Consequently, I struggle to understand what people are speaking about when they reduce Western philosophy to a long, uninterrupted ode of self-congratulation.

especially): it is not an account of two victims, but of two eager students engaging with stimulating material on their own terms.

A generation later, Steve Biko, in "Fear – an important determinant in South African politics", argued that white South Africans were collectively guilty of the miserable situation of blacks—not on the basis of any existing law, but on the basis of "metaphysical guilt", that is, the guilt of those who could have prevented crimes, but did not. Biko draws this concept from Karl Jaspers, whom he cites (Biko [1978] 2004, 78).[18] Elsewhere, in "Black souls in white skins", Biko again draws on Jaspers' idea of metaphysical guilt (this time, however, without naming him) and the point is similar: since white people collectively tolerate the injustice inflicted on black people, they are collectively guilty of this metaphysical guilt. This reference to Jaspers is all the more significant if one notes that Biko, on the same page, rails against (liberals') "ill-defined philosophical concepts that are both irrelevant to the black man and merely a red herring across the track", adding that "[w]hite liberals must leave blacks to take care of their own business while they concern themselves with the real evil in our society—white racism" (Biko [1978] 2004, 23). The conclusion is clear: Jaspers' philosophical concept is not ill-defined, is relevant to black people, and is no red herring; taking recourse to Jaspers' notion is a legitimate way for Biko (and Fanon[19] and others) to concern himself with the real evil in society.

At the beginning of the new millennium, Mabogo More submitted a thesis in which he denounces the relative absence of philosophising on race as in itself a manifestation of racism, and sets out to make his contribution in the spirit of Africana existentialism, following with Gordon the lines connecting Fanon, Biko and Manganyi. For current purposes, it is the way he goes about achieving this that is of interest. He tackles this task in his *Sartre and the problem of racism* by identifying his central objective as investigating "how Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy can be useful in understanding the problem of racism" (More 2005, 1). More's study is a rich exploration of diverse components of the problem of racism. He summarises the unifying structure as follows:

> This study will, therefore, map out the theoretical articulation of the problem of racism in Sartre's major philosophical texts and his application of this framework to concrete existential situations. Put differently, the goal is to reconstruct Sartre's ontology to the concrete ontic issue of racism. We shall, in doing this, advance the thesis that Sartre, in his popular political, literary and social writings, employs a theory of antiracism which attains its reflective grounding in his philosophical works (More 2005, 17).

Furthermore, in Chapter 6 of his study, he devotes much energy to trace the reception of Sartre in Fanon, Biko and Manganyi. In short, More's project says as much about the potential of (some parts of) Western philosophy to be of real importance in the South African context as it does about Western philosophy as a violent imposition.

As in my previous series of examples, precise historical and biographical information may be brought to bear on these anecdotes to contextualise, complexify and/or relativise their significance. However, I do not anticipate that such work would deny that aspects of Western philosophy have long been recognised by black South Africans to be stimulating, useful and important, and could be mobilised for entirely legitimate causes, despite their Western origin. And this is the point I am steering towards: not making an impossible case for the innocence of Western traditions of thought,[20] but the fact that those traditions are recognised by significant African intellectuals as ambiguous and that making use of the positive side of that ambiguity is not an accidental part of the very practice of their African thought.[21]

18 The text in question is Jaspers's (1946) reflection on the "question of German guilt".

19 I do not know if Biko ever read Jaspers—it is possible that he learned about Jaspers from Fanon ([1952] 1986, 89, n. 9)—but I do not believe that this changes my point.

20 My three examples are not intended to be a plea for the inevitability and perhaps superiority of Western philosophy. I explicitly reject Position (A). Recognising the ambiguity of the material in question is quite different from a colonialist "assumption that theory is produced in the West and the aim of the academy outside the West must be to apply that theory" (Mamdani 2016, 81).

21 My point in the discussion of ambiguity is *neither* to declare illegitimate the quest for pure forms, e.g. of African philosophy, as cultural strategy (I have expressed my support for it in writing, see Wolff [2013]), *nor* to advocate mixing of traditions as the *only* legitimate and good philosophical practice in South Africa.

If Western philosophy has an ambiguous history and potential, and if that ambiguity is echoed by the positive appropriations of parts of it by African philosophers who are convincing critics of Western thought, then the task ahead—supposing we take African philosophy as our default setting—is to determine what the benefits would be of still including Western philosophy in our curriculum (a part of this case has been made by the positive half of the ambiguity) and what could be done to strengthen the positive contributions thereof (against the negative possibilities). This entire argument could obviously be developed from the side of African philosophy too, and it seems plausible to expect that it would show up similar forms of ambiguity.

Note 2: On "decolonisation"

One of the key concepts by which people try to capture the task of improving institutions in the former colonies is "decolonisation". This is a major issue—for some even the heading under which this entire question should be dealt with. Here I can focus only on a few ideas, aimed at enriching the question of ambiguity.

Consider first, the most elementary meaning of the term "decolonisation". When imperial powers subjected other regions of the world to their power, they colonised them. To undo this colonisation, these regions had to be de-colonised, that is, do away with the imposed power. A decolonised state is a state that has got rid of colonial rule. Or is it? Post-independence life abounds in experiences of continued influence coming from the former colonising powers, even when those powers are not actively promoting that influence. Thus, it is not only territories and populations that can be colonised, but all aspects of life, up to and including the mind.

In a sense, it is easier to undo the imposition of foreign rule than to do away with the other elements of colonial heritage. The state of the university and curricula is an eloquent example of this. How can one decolonise the university without keeping in mind that the university as we know it is itself part of the colonial heritage? Strictly speaking, "decolonising" the university requires doing away with universities. Likewise, to decolonise a curriculum does then not mean to replace Western philosophical content with African philosophical content, because the entire social-institutional construction of curricula (cf. Question 2 above) is part of the colonial heritage. Decolonising curricula would mean abolishing curricula and re-institutionalising non-university practices of education in their place. Thus far, I have not heard anybody making a case for decolonising universities and curricula in this sense even if this is precisely what a radical critique of (neo-)colonisation ultimately amounts to.

We seem to be stuck with the fact that decolonisation cannot be exhaustively practised, or that even the fiercest critics of the colonial heritage do not want to take the notion of decolonisation to its logical conclusion. This is a nasty fact about history: it cannot be undone completely. It therefore appears that calling for institutional change on the basis of an *unqualified* rejection of the entire colonial heritage must be hypocritical.

I maintain that the only intellectually honest way to continue with the very important task of critiquing the colonial heritage, is to understand "de-" of decolonisation in terms of the ambiguity (as I have explained it above). Correspondingly, de-colonisation should entail the abolition of parts of the colonial heritage, but this has to be underpinned by an assessment of the ambiguous potential of that heritage. The "de-" of decolonisation would further also refer to liberating the colonial heritage as far as possible of harmful effects and deploying the remaining heritage in the service of that emancipatory project. Biko decolonised philosophy in the way he deployed Jaspers; Snyman

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The difference between me and disciples of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986) lies in the fact that they elevate the purity of the own—*both* against the purity of the oppressive other (the empire) *and* against forms of "bastardisation" of ambient culture—to the exclusive legitimate form of postcolonial cultural strategy. I argue that recognising mixing accommodates everybody's free choice of cultural strategy, including quests for purity; by contrast, pursuing purity as the exclusive and ultimate value cannot tolerate such mixture. Therefore, the following remark by Fanon does not apply to me: "Some have been surprised by the passion invested by the colonised intellectuals [like Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o] in their defence of a national culture. But those who consider this passion exaggerated are strangely apt to forget that their own psyche, their ego, are conveniently safeguarded by a French or German culture which has proved itself and which nobody disputes" (Fanon 1965, 209; translation modified). Besides, I reject with equal vigour similar exclusive quests for purity in Western culture and philosophy.

Regarding the diversity of cultural strategies Olúfémi Taiwò (2010) is much more perspicacious (see especially his introduction).

decolonised philosophy in the way he deployed Adorno. Decolonisation then may entail partial consent to or appropriation of the heritage against which it is directed.[22]

But such a practice of decolonisation needs to be informed by normative reflection. We now turn to one aspect of such reflection.

Question 3: What is relevance?

One of the criteria that people apply in assessing the quality, as well as the legitimacy, of curricula is relevance.[23] In this, philosophy is not alone, and the situation in South Africa is not unique (Mamdani 2016). Two dimensions of the current debate about relevance are (a) the frequent identification of relevance with Africanisation, and (b) the frequent equation of relevance with immediate applicability. While I affirm relevance as a criterion for curricula, it is not always that clear what the term means.

(a) In current debates one often hears that Africanisation, understood as the replacement of Western philosophical course content with African philosophical material, is called for to improve and guarantee the relevance of courses. This raises the question of whether African philosophy in a course programme is a sufficient condition to qualify the course content as relevant. Since it is evidently possible to make of Western philosophy a practice-foreign, sterile intellectual exercise (in Africa as much as in Western countries), would it not be fair to assume that one could do the same with African philosophy?[24] It is plausible to maintain that no form of philosophy is "relevant" by definition. What then qualifies a curriculum as relevant?

I would like to suggest that the question of relevance is so closely related to the one on ambiguity that I can safely recycle the examples from Question 2 in this context. Using the question of pressing political questions as reference, I have in each case implicitly applied the requirement of relevance: the six last authors cited did not only write things that were true or insightful, but things that were relevant to their context.[25] Only because I anticipated that any reasonable reader would grant the legitimate relevance of the work of these authors could I make the case that the colonial philosophical heritage and recent Western importations were ambiguous. Biko could take advantage of Jaspers because he could show how Jaspers was relevant to his argument on extra-judicial guilt; similarly Snyman's work on Adorno was relevant to analysing the identity violence of the apartheid system. This suggests a number of implications:

- It follows that it is judicious not to consider Africanisation (defined as purifying a curriculum from Western influence) as a criterion for relevance. Instead, we should first determine what Africanisation is in the light of the criterion of relevance: Africanisation should not be understood as mechanically swopping one body of work for another, but as a demanding intellectual work of (re-)deploying whatever cultural goods we have access to, to the advantage of solving the pressing questions of this continent, one of which is decolonisation.[26] Most profoundly we want to know if the material presents a plausible likelihood of clarifying a non-trivial part of our living reality. By the way, this means that we should not reduce relevance to sociopolitical issues, as if Africans have to go on an intellectual diet prohibiting them from philosophising about technology, animal ethics, aesthetics, belief, scientific models, etc.
- Africanisation is then not something like a switch that is either turned on or off,[27] but rather a process of continuous confrontation of curriculum design with the questions relevant to people's lifeworld. For this reason, Africanisation does not stand for the implementation of a

22 The decolonisation of philosophy evidently goes much further than that; see for example, Wiredu (1998).

23 Many other considerations were tabled in the Nzimande report. For a critical discussion thereof, see Wolff (2013, part 1).

24 Consider, in support of this claim, Masolo's (1986, 176–180) reflections on the relation between philosophy and social reality.

25 The example of Lembede is somewhat different. A difficult question that arises here is on the relation between true or legitimate arguments and their relevance. Surely one would be able to grant the relevance of an argument (or at least of the intention thereof) even if one does not share the author's view.

26 Merely stating "lecturer X prescribed readings from Western philosophy" does constitute a sufficient argument to qualify what happens in that class as un-African or irrelevant. Likewise, noting that "lecturer X prescribed readings from African philosophy" is insufficient to qualify the course as relevant. Both statements on their own, remain strictly *under-determined*.

27 For instance by doing or not doing African philosophy (over against Matolino 2015, 408–409). Matolino's argument implies that it is impossible for a devout Hindu or Communist to be a real South African and that philosophy is incapable of immanent critique. More nuanced is More (2006).

specific content, but for a continuous quest for relevance, a quest of which the outcome is not known in advance.[28]

- In this sense, all African philosophy included in our curricula needs to be Africanised too.[29]

(b) Everything I have said above testifies to the fact that I am in favour of relevance as a criterion for the legitimacy and quality of curricula. I tie the first question on relevance to the second: applicability. But this makes the issue much more complex. We frequently hear relevance equated to immediate, even practical, applicability, but clearly university education is not necessarily designed for such immediate applicability. Immediate, practical application is not even a measure for teaching in engineering. The wager of much of university education is that the world needs, next to so many other valid and important forms of intelligence, also those forms which, through sustained attention to the underlying questions of fields of study, prepare the students for the longer-term work of problem-solving in diverse uncertain situations. This is true for philosophy too.

It may even be more true for philosophy[30] than for other disciplines. Is philosophy not precisely an intellectual practice of withdrawal from immediate urgency, that is, from direct applicability? Or to be more precise: even when it seeks to help people understand their world, philosophy exists by virtue of taking detours in preparation for its views. These detours may be very long. The relevance of philosophy cannot be measured by the way it comments on the newest news headlines alone (cf. also Masolo 1986, 178). For this kind of immediate applicability, other forms of human intelligence exist. The need for long detours seems to me to characterise all traditions of philosophy.[31]

However, it needs to be acknowledged that we embark on long detours at the risk of getting lost. It is true that the praiseworthy virtue of free and radical thinking, which characterises the best of philosophy can also be the lure which leads able philosophers astray into lands of reflection from whence we cannot recall them to our world with its joys and problems. I cannot see that African, Western or any other philosophers are immune to the risk of straying into irrelevance.[32]

Note 3: On students' reception

Quite regularly in debates about the curriculum, it is mentioned that students—here black students—in general have an experience of estrangement due to the course content. What is taught at university does not fit into what they learn at home, it is often said. But in my view this is *not necessarily* a problem. I remember very well, for instance, how some of my own classmates experienced the confrontation of the racism they had picked up at home with anti-racism at varsity—with salutary effect. If staunchly creationist students of biology are shocked by the theory of evolution, I sympathise, but do not see this as sufficient reason to change the biology curriculum. There are a number of reasons why, in philosophy too, students may have to deal with a tension between what they have learned at home and what they study in class.[33] These remarks are *not* intended to dismiss the reported experiences of some students. Such reports may be a way in which cultural bias in the curriculum is registered. My point is that there is no direct correlation between students' disorientation by study material and the illegitimacy of teaching such material.

A second, related, claim that is quite often made is that black students experience alienation and frustration when confronted with Western philosophy. Intuitively, I find this claim plausible. However, there is a problem. Over the last decade I have regularly requested student feedback by means of my home institution's pro forma lecturer evaluation instrument. This questionnaire gives students an opportunity to anonymously score a series of aspects of the lecturer's work (using

28 This point is very close to that offered by Serequeberhan (1994, particularly in Chapter 4). It also shares the spirit of Taiwò (2010).

29 Macamo (2009) points in a similar direction. Obviously I reject the idea that philosophical material could be considered relevant to students and society on the sole basis that the authors are celebrated Western academics.

30 The question of "applied" philosophies would have to be dealt with elsewhere.

31 The detours I have in mind are the spaces one is able to allow oneself to enter into preparatory reflection before returning to practise anew. This is a different issue from that addressed by Matolino (2015, 406–408) regarding the degree of abstraction and concreteness involved in thinking. It is very possible that thinking aimed at dealing with concrete or local detail requires as long a detour or suspension of practice as abstraction does (cf. Eboussi Boulaga 1977, 96–97).

32 One can share Ikpe's (2010) critique of narrow utility maximisation and the corporatisation of the university, without sacrificing the demand for relevance.

33 On alienation as part of postcolonial existence, see Irele (1992, 206–207). However, I suspend judgement on the "praise" he reserves for alienation.

a Likert-type scale) and to comment freely (qualitative feedback) on the entire experience of a course. Neither the qualitative, nor the quantitative part of the evaluation has ever indicated any disgruntlement with my course content (even when modules contained only Western philosophy). These questionnaires represent the opinion of hundreds of black students over the years.[34] These data directly contradict my intuitive acceptance of the claim. I conclude that in-depth social scientific research on this subject is required to clarify the matter.

Question 4: Can white lecturers be legitimate agents at South African universities?

At this point I would like to return to the opening lines of the article. One could recapitulate that the Mandela paradigm and the Biko paradigm represent a fundamental dispute of the meaning of the 1994 settlement. Implicitly, this dispute played a role in the argumentative alternatives unpacked in response to the first three questions. One particular implication of this dispute, for philosophy, to which I now turn, is that the legitimacy, with which the majority of our current lecturers may teach and even participate in these debates, is itself at stake.

The Mandela paradigm finds its classical expression in the Freedom Charter: "We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white…" (African National Congress 1955). This basic view of legitimate citizenship has been institutionalised in the Constitution. As long as this paradigm remains in force, and is generally consented to, there could be no objection in principle to "whites" teaching at the university. Only the *number* of white lecturers could pose a problem.

Opposition to this inclusive view has today regained public visibility. Often, those who question the Mandela paradigm do so with reference to Fanon. Some consider the post-1994 dispensation to be *nothing but* a masked continuation of apartheid and may appeal to Fanon: "The problem is clear-cut: the foreigners must leave. Let us build a common front against the oppressor and let us reinforce it with armed struggle" (Fanon 1965, 83). Others are a bit more lenient and are willing to recognise some difference between South Africa prior to 1994 and since 1994, in that they may at least concede that the former enemies may become "negros or Arabs" (Fanon [1961] 2002, 139; translation corrected), in other words, fight on the right side. But this would still mean that Biko gives the appropriate exegesis of this principle for our current context:

> Therefore we wish explicitly to state that this country belongs to black people and to them alone. Whites [the "clique of foreigners", [1978] 2004, 27] who live in our—who live in this country [have to live here] on terms laid down by blacks and on condition that they respect the black people (Biko [1978] 2004, 121).[35]

The cultural-political implications of this point of view is made explicit by Serequeberhan, when he states: "The settler cannot indigenize and remain a settler. His existence is innately parasitic. He is dependent on the mother country for his spiritual and historic legitimacy as a colonizer, and on the colony for his socio-economic existence and pre-eminence" (Serequeberhan 1994, 83). In short, with regard to white lecturers (and arguably other lecturers who may be considered insufficiently African), this stance advances the illegitimacy of their presence on their own terms and/or the requirement of assimilation to real African cultural standards (however this is defined).

The thrust of my article does not commit me to the task of declaring the winner between these two paradigms and I frankly admit that at this stage I do not see how to arbitrate this matter conclusively. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is impossible to write such an article without at the same time implicitly situating oneself in this debate. That I wrote from a position more congenial to the Mandela paradigm cannot be denied. In fact, to suggest some ways to deal with curriculum issues (as in Questions 1 to 3 above), I needed, at least for the sake of the argument, to keep the possibility open that the second paradigm is flawed. At the same time the Biko paradigm has the merit of clearly foregrounding two most fundamental questions underlying all reflection on curriculum development in our time, namely the question of what qualifies someone as legitimate to speak, and

34 Informal communication with students rather indicates that teaching in Western philosophy is experienced by many black students as a very valuable contribution to their reflective engagement with the world.

35 To do justice to Biko's point requires more discussion. Similarly, Lembede (1996, 91).

the question of the dominant narrative of our contemporary history in Azania. An approach to the curriculum that has no response to these questions is built on jelly.

Note 4: On unfortunate resonances

In this short note I would merely like to point out one consequence of following the Biko paradigm (without thereby giving sufficient reason to discard it entirely). The passionate spokespeople of this paradigm are often outspoken in their antipathy to the West. The flipside of this quest for self-sufficiency is that they do not sing for Western applause. However, often this posture is informed by a homogenous picture of the West. Seldom, if ever, have I heard any reflection on the significance of newcomers (Africans and others) to Western countries. A disparaging attitude towards the culture and political power displayed by Western states makes sense in this context, but it makes less sense to give no thought to the position of exiles, migrant workers, refugees or generations-old cultural minorities in those states. With the fate of such people in mind, the question of resonance is a factor to bear in mind for the sake of one's self-understanding, and should not be neglected.

It is true that nowadays the general population in the West seems to be becoming politically more conservative compared to a decade or two ago (see Boltanski and Esquerre 2014; Brumlik 2016), but these societies group together a plurality of political views that are not adequately captured by the general tendency. It would be extremely ironic if the discourse of the Biko paradigm would find its most audible resonance not in the parties and associations that struggle to improve the fate of minorities, but in the discourse of the extreme right-wing groups in the West. I am thinking here of resonances with the extreme right's essentialism and stereotyping of others, nativism, scape-goat thinking, humiliation of other forms of knowledge and the like. The recourse to mono-causal—racial—explanations of all social phenomena does not help to counter such resonances.[36] I do not wish to suggest that the Biko paradigm is a copy of a Western extreme right-wing ideology, but want to caution that we would overlook something important if we did not engage seriously with these unfortunate resonances.[37]

Conclusion

The ideas and arguments above contribute to a mapping of the argumentative options in the debates related to philosophy curricula in South Africa today. I have attempted to clarify some of their respective merits and implications, and to argue at some places for their limits.

This does not add up to a blueprint. Nor does it suffice to establish definitive practical directives for philosophy curriculum development. Rather, based on my current state of insight, the arguments above are intended to assist in continuous reflection on the philosophical questions underlying curriculum design. I would advocate a context-sensitive approach, but we urgently need to reinvigorate our planning with reflection on the underlying issues or stakes, as we work on the planning itself. The article reflects my conviction that curriculum design is still subject to great uncertainties. We have still to discover much of what "relevance" and "decolonisation" and "Africanisation" mean. I advocate an approach of learning through experimentation, review and debate.

My objective was to deal, albeit briefly, with some of the most important questions, but I have left out one other radical question: philosophy curriculum planning will remain disoriented in the absence of an understanding of what *philosophy* is and what it is able to do—socially, scientifically, politically, and personally.

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36 To give but one example of the derailing effect that mono-causal explanations can have, see Ramphele (1991).

37 My point is not foreign to the spirit of *questioning*, advanced with greater affirmation by Neville Alexander (1991).

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