Public Policy Management

Uganda’s Experience in Agricultural Extension Policies

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ABSTRACT

A major challenge developmental states face, is formulating policies which survive the test of time and remain relevant in organising and directing public business. The absence of sustainable policies has resulted in ineffective management of public resources and services. There are obvious problems associated with the absence of sustainable policies, but studies on public policy necessitate the examination of multifaceted challenges facing the policy management process. Notwithstanding the available literature on general problems concerning policy management in Uganda, this article utilises the experiences of the agriculture extension policy management processes to explore the possibilities of developing sustainable agricultural policies.

The agriculture sector in Uganda has had successive policy regimes and a number of issues can be raised regarding the sustainability of agricultural policies. This article argues that the sustainability of regulatory policies for agriculture requires appropriate harmonisation of political and technical expectations of those policies. Such policies will be effective and have a profound local impact. Through the literature review and interviews with donors and government officials, this article discusses the initiatives/processes undertaken by politicians and technocrats aimed at sustainable extension policies. The major questions are what is the politics underlying National Agriculture Advisory Services? How does politics shape the policy directions and implementation?

INTRODUCTION

Sustainability as a concept and its application to development is highly contested in the literature as what to sustain, how to measure it and when to sustain becomes an issue of debate. However, sustainable development is generally understood as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). It
could be argued that the contestation about the concept shows that there is a conflict of interest between the interests of the present and those of future generations, between human wellbeing and the protection of nature, between the rich and the poor, between local and global focuses and between technicists looking for technical solutions and humanists whose approach lies in looking at the messier realm of politics. Opschoor (2008:10) provides a practical focus of ensuring sustainable development by arguing that it involves expanding options by/for people now and in future thus bringing to the centre the aspect of people participation. It requires adapted patterns of production and patterns of consumption (life styles); adaptive/mitigative strategies (livelihoods); and adaptive and mitigating use of resources/technologies that enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.

Debates on sustainability have had a historical link with agrarian change, because farmers usually live and work in the local environment. Many developmental states regard agriculture as their engine of development. Thus several policies and resources are committed by government and other agencies to modernise, commercialise and professionalise agriculture to increase food security and sustained productivity. Often, however, these efforts are not sustainable. For instance, two billion people worldwide lack food security; 800 million are chronically malnourished; 50% of the earth’s habitable land is used for agriculture/livestock, but 90% is farmed unsustainably; 50% of the world’s original forest cover has been cleared and another 30% is degraded or fragmented; 500 million people now live in countries defined as water-stressed or water-scarce (by 2025: ± 3 billion); 70% of water used is used in agriculture, but 60% of irrigation water is wasted (Opschoor 2008:7). Often farmers are blamed for mismanaging the environment and reducing environmental productivity. Other factors include: the population pressure leading to environmental pressure, poor methods of ecosystem management, wasteful life styles of production and consumption and existence of policies and programmes that do not integrate principles of sustainable development (Opschoor 2008:15), yet in every state there is a policy management process to plan, direct and oversee public business so as to protect public welfare.

The policy making process in every state differ from policy to policy but commonly it involves four steps, initiation and definition, formulation and enactment, implementation and impact and evaluation (Bryner 2003:3). The failure of policies such as the Structure Adjustment Programmes and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers show that formulating sustainable policies for/in developmental states has been a challenge. But why have developmental states been challenged in formulating sustainable policies? The process of policy making is dependent on factors such as the capacity of public administration, legislative commitments of authority, resources to achieve the policy goal, and executive decisions concerning priorities and tradeoffs among competing concerns in implementing policies (ibid.). This article argues that developing sustainable policies, that is, policies that withstand the test of time, remain relevant in organising and directing public business and those that can expand people’s options and have a profound local impact are dependent on the harmonisation of political and technical expectations of given policies. In the event that political and technical expectations are not harmonised at the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation then their sustainability is challenged. This article examines how the political priorities in relation to those of the technocrats influence the sustainability of the agricultural extension in Uganda. The article bases its argument on data drawn from
secondary reviews and interviews with donors, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries and the National Agriculture Advisory Services officials.

GENERAL POLICY MANAGEMENT IN UGANDA

The public policy management process in Uganda includes; agenda setting; policy development; policy review; decision-making and approval; implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Uganda has an elaborate public policy institutional framework composed of four (the Executive Office, the Presidency, the Cabinet and the Parliament) institutions with complementary roles. Despite the elaborate policy management framework, Opio-Lukone (2004) maintains that the policy management processes face a number of challenges including:

- A lack of a formal policy agenda to ensure that policy promises in the manifesto and other presidential statements find their way into the budget and plans;
- the fact that Government’s fiscal plan is done by the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development which diminishes the Cabinet’s role in setting the priority policy framework;
- a high level of dependence on external funding which comes with conditions that may require new policies that may contradict the home grown policy preferences;
- the fact that the senior public official who serves the Cabinet (Secretary to the Cabinet) acts as the gatekeeper to the policy agenda;
- limited policy research and analysis which affect policy development and reviews;
- limited public consultations and a sometimes ad hoc manner of consultation;
- the problem that current government policies seem to elicit resistance/suspicion, mainly due to the reduced level of consultation and politics; and
- limited resources, corruption, and limited capacities among public administrators that, in turn, affect the implementation and evaluation of policies.

Overall the policy management process has experienced poor coordination, resulting in competing policies, a duplication of policies, underfunded policies and unanticipated budgetary demands (MoFPED 2008:109). Ugandan policy management has faced challenges of over yielding to external pressure, poor policy agenda for setting standards, limited use of research and over regulating (Opio-Lukone 2004, Kwesiga and Namisi 2006). The above factors make policies more unstable and uncertain. Although Opio-Lukone does not give further elaboration on the politics factor, politics greatly influences the sustainability of policies.

AGRICULTURE POLICY REGIMES AND PRACTICES

Agriculture is important for both economic development and poverty reduction (Akroyd & Smith 2007:2). In Uganda, agriculture contributes 44,4% of total GDP and accounts for over 90% of the country’s total export earnings. The majority of Uganda’s population (85%) draw their livelihood from agriculture (ibid.). Agriculture provides raw materials to many industries and is a source of employment. The past and present governments in Uganda have
developed policies to improve the performance of the agricultural sector. Most policies have focused on modernising agriculture. The current agricultural policies are guided by the new public management reforms, which emphasise the use of markets, competition and quest for efficiency, that is, output orientated policies.

The policy and institutional framework for agriculture in Uganda is provided by the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA). The PMA is part of the Government’s strategy to eradicate poverty through transformation of the agriculture sector. The PMA was principally a result of two factors: the connection of the policy makers with donors and the politics of the country. Discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) officials show that the design for PMA started back in the late 1990s when the Minister of Agriculture (Dr Specioza Kazibwe) mobilised technical officials from different ministries for a retreat, at which a plan to transform agriculture was hatched. This plan was presented to the donors. However, it was unacceptable, because it was conceived to be a shopping list of items with ambitious expectations. Although seen as a shopping list, its main focus on multifaceted nature of agriculture was carried forward in the subsequent designs.

Donors seem to have had a major influence in shaping the direction of the agricultural policies in the subsequent designs and their implementation. In the early 2000s, the Minister of MAAIF (Dr Kisamba Mugerwa) invited donor agencies and MAAIF technocrats to design the current PMA. The PMA was launched in 2001 as a multi-sectoral programme, the success of which would depend on the farmers having access to better roads, markets, communication and improved health and education services (Kisamba Mugerwa 2003). The basic premise of the PMA was to transform subsistence agriculture through improved technologies so that farmers would improve their productivity and generate surpluses. The PMA has seven pillars, namely agricultural technology generation and transfer; agricultural advisory services; rural financial services; primary education; agro-processing and marketing; sustainable natural resources utilisation; and rural infrastructure development (ibid.). The pillars under the PMA are partly informed by neoliberal policies of privatisation and other national interests such as the need to universalise education and add value to produce.

The drafting of the PMA and its approval in 2001 are said to have been successful because of two factors. First, the Minister of MAAIF at a time had close prior working connections with donor agencies. Secondly, this was a period prior to the 2001 election where the political slogan was to “modernise agriculture”. In order for the PMA to be successful, institutional reforms and strengthening processes were expected. Different ministries were to review, update, and/or formulate policies to guide the activities of agriculture in their respective ministries. Research and extension policies were to harmonise with the PMA principles and with the existing policy environment of decentralisation, privatisation and liberalisation. As such, new policies including the agricultural research policy, a fisheries policy, and a food and nutrition policy were developed and functional analyses were done by three ministries (MAAIF, MTTI and MWLE) and NARO and UCDA to align with new functions (MAAIF 2005). The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme was developed and approved by an Act of Parliament in 2001. The NAADS was mandated to “develop a demand driven, farmer-led agricultural service delivery system targeting the poor subsistence farmers” (Namara 2009:71). The NAADS is a 25 year programme aimed at increasing “farmer access to information, knowledge and technology for profitable agricultural production” (NAADS 2002). The politics of the NAADS is discussed in subsequent sections.
The agricultural sector has had other policies that have not been mentioned prominently in the literature and yet have influenced agricultural policy trends. For instance, hardly a year of implementation of NAADS had gone by when President Museveni initiated the Strategic Export Initiative (SEI) aimed at boosting production for export through distribution of the improved inputs. Thompson and Mandy (2008:10) show that the President initiated the SEI out of frustration that the economy was not moving as fast as anticipated. There was slow value-addition on exports thus limiting the country’s ability to take advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the EU’s “everything but arms” initiatives of 2001. The MAAIF officials attributed the President’s source of frustration to be the insistence of the donors to run the NAADS as an information and knowledge programme, yet agriculture needed a multi-faceted approach. President Museveni consulted with civil servants (research and extensionists) who developed SEI as a presidential initiative, funded by government and run by MAAIF despite its similarities with PMA. The programme ran for about three years and farmers were given seeds such as coffee, tea, cocoa and fish fries to promote export. However, Thompson and Mandy show that there was a significant overlap between SEI and PMA.

Again in 2005, the Minister of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), Dr Seruma, announced a New Rural Development Strategy (RDS) which would focus on distribution of agriculture fertilizers. The RDS was approved by Cabinet, although it did not take off. Thompson and Mandy (2008:11) attribute the birth of RDS to the reports that NAADS and PMA were utilising market mechanisms to deliver services, yet the majority of the poor farmers could not manage to compete in the market. Although the RDS was not operationalised, it was generally commended by NGOs as an appropriate move by government to bridge the inequality gaps and improve livelihoods of the poor farmers (Namara 2009). In 2006, the government hatched another policy called the “Bonabagagawale”, which is aimed at moving farmers away from dependence on low-input agricultural practices such as hand hoe to using more modern technologies. Still there is an overlap with the existing policies and programmes such as PMA and NAADS.

Thompson and Mandy (2008) attribute this kind of competing policy environment to two major political processes: first, there are a number of policies developed without consultation with technocrats and usually associated with elections. They highlight, for instance, that President Museveni is envisaging transforming the rural traditional society into a middle class one with a literate and skilled workforce by building master farmers in each sub-county. They argue that the political process in Uganda with an election every five years is not synchronised with the three year poverty reduction planning cycle. Secondly, there is poor communication between the MoFPED, which is responsible for budgeting as well as Poverty Eradication Action Plan development, and the Cabinet, which ideally is supposed to harmonise government policies. How do these dynamics affect the sustainability of policies? What are those expectations that are not often agreed upon?

THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE EXTENSION POLICIES

Extension is a critical component of agriculture; it helps to bridge the gap between the farmer and source of knowledge required to improve productivity. Often such knowledge is generated by research institutions and universities or even by the farmers’ own indigenous
knowledge and then transferred through extension services to those farmers who lack such information. Agriculture extension delivery in Uganda has seen a number of policy approaches and practices. Evidently the sustainability of these policies is influenced by the political priorities of the time. The table below shows the changes in extension service delivery mechanisms from the pre-colonial period to today.

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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Approach</th>
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<td>1898–1956</td>
<td>Extension by compulsion characterised by deliberate efforts by colonial government to promote production of cash crops using coercion tendencies enforced by chiefs to ensure supply of raw materials to colonial power and other industries. Farmers were provided with seeds and directed by chiefs and a few expatriate officials on how to grow the crop, conserve soils and own stores for food reserves.</td>
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<td>1956–1963</td>
<td>Extension through progressive farmers; farmers were identified and trained by extension workers to act as change agents in their localities. Progressive farmers were given technical advice, support in terms of input, and credit to improve their production. The assumption was that the progress of these farmers would have a multiplying effect for the neighbouring farmers.</td>
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<td>1964–1971</td>
<td>Extension educational methods, which emphasised professionalism through training and the use of appropriate methods through demonstrations, farmer field days and trials. Through the support of USAID a number of farmer education programmes (exchange visits, radio and television programmes, posters and leaflets) were used. Education of farmers declined owing to a period of turmoil, as government extension workers concentrated on selling agriculture input to farmers.</td>
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<td>1981–1991</td>
<td>The project approach, introduced after a period of political turmoil of 1971 to 1980 was intended to rehabilitate and restore basic services using extension programmes such as the Agriculture Development Project (ADP) and the South-west Agriculture Rehabilitation Project. Each government ministry or NGO had its own extension approach with lots of duplication and confusion.</td>
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<td>1992–1998</td>
<td>The unified extension approach was aimed at integrating and harmonising the use of scarce resources. Farm institutes for demonstration purposes and stock farms for breeding and multiplication purposes were established. Government employed highly skilled extension workers. A single extension worker was responsible for transfer of knowledge and technologies in all fields to groups of farmers in a given geographical area. This was affected by government policies of liberalisation and related public reforms of the 1990s. Districts lacked capacity to steer extension and compensate extension workers.</td>
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<td>2001–</td>
<td>The National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS), where farmers are lead players in extension service delivery. They demand and manage services together with local governments. Farmers and local governments are to contribute to the funding of the extension services. Government provides services through private service providers in line with farmers’ needs. Government extension workers are to be re-schooled and trained to become private service providers.</td>
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Source: Namara and Mugyenyi (2004)

Officials from the MAAIF maintained that agriculture extension has not been successful in Uganda with the exception of the extension by compulsion. People were forced to produce cash crops and have stores for food and there was evidence of increased production. The agriculture sector has had a weak policy, legal and regulatory framework characterised by
uncoordinated interventions which are not guided by a robust policy and legal framework and implementation system. The sustainability of these policies has been largely influenced by the politics of the time. This discussion focuses on the current extension regulatory framework of the NAADS to highlight the different initiatives/processes by politicians and technocrats aimed at having sustainable agricultural extension policies.

Politics of the National Agricultural Advisory Service policies

The NAADS is one of the components of the PMA intended to offer agriculture extension and advisory services (MAAIF 2000). Falling within the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, the NAADS represent a paradigm shift from the previously public financed and delivered extension provision to demand driven and private led advisory services (Namara 2009:71). NAADS has 12 Guiding Principles which include farmer empowerment; poverty targeting; deepening decentralisation; fostering participation; increasing institutional efficiency; privatisation; market orientated farming; commercialisation; gender mainstreaming; managing natural resource productivity; HIV/AIDS mainstreaming; and harmonisation to avoid duplication of services. NAADS is a political project and its Guiding Principles have political orientation and significance even though this is not openly discussed by technocrats. For instance, attaining farmer empowerment means more than farmers occupying institutional structures; it involves changing the structural inequalities which might not be the choice for government which needs to obtain faster results to retain the commitment of voters. It is not surprising that the empowerment activities focus on material gain rather than on shifting power relations (Namara 2009) (see Appendix 1). Despite the contradictions, some principles are useful. For instance, cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, and environment and gender issues are now discussed more frequently by agricultural technocrats than before. Participation has brought decision-making regarding implementation of extension services nearer to the farmers than before.

NAADS has been surrounded by uncertainties and ambiguities. At the time of writing, it came out that there has been no clear direction of the NAADS for the past two years because of unharmoised political and technical expectation. For instance, when asked about the direction of NAADS, one of the donors said:

*Which NAADS are you talking about? The current bunch of confusion? NAADS is confused, go to them they cannot tell you which NAADS they are implementing. They do not have an updated programme or policy design although they have already started their second phase of implementation.* (Donor Official)

The donor attributed this confusion to the tendency by politicians to hijack the programme and send mixed messages to the farmers and to the inability of the technocrats to say no to the political demands. The donors also noted that the problem with agriculturalists (technocrats) is that they do not focus on a wider picture of making agriculture competitive so that they are able to explain to different actors the guiding principles of NAADS. The officials from MAAIF maintained that NAADS is confused by donors who do not want to listen to what the farmers want and by the technocrats who just follow what donors want. Both politicians and technocrats have different expectations of NAADS.
NAADS Policy Priorities

From the discussion with the NAADS technical group, donors and MAAIF officials, three major policy priorities that have yet to be harmonised in the current “confusion” of NAADS can be cited. These relate to what kind of extension services should be given to farmers; which farmers should be targeted; and what approaches should be used and who should offer those services (see Table 2 below). Inherently, disagreement on these issues shows that there is no common agreement on the concept and practice of extension in Uganda among the politicians who make policies and the technocrats who implement the policies.

Table 2 Policy priorities and their assumptions

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<tr>
<th>Political direction</th>
<th>Assumptions/ arguments by politicians</th>
<th>Technocrats’ direction</th>
<th>Assumptions/ arguments by technocrats</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provide agricultural input to farmers</td>
<td>The people have said they need input. The electorate must be satisfied. The entire PMA has not yet started because of resource constraints yet input to farmers is needed now not later. NAADS has spent money on training for years and there are limited tangible results.</td>
<td>Spend money on providing knowledge and technology development regarding production</td>
<td>Once farmers acquire required agricultural skills, they will go to microcredit institutions, borrow money and buy input. The supply of input to farmers is not sustainable. Asking NAADS for input to farmers is asking the wrong agency. Let the entire PMA operate to enhance synergies.</td>
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<td>Work with model families; give them a substantial agricultural package; they will teach others to get out of poverty. These families should be selected by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) committees in the area.</td>
<td>If you spend money on groups you are scattering resources. A political groups approach presents to farmers with new dynamics of management where farmers spend most of their time managing conflict of interest</td>
<td>Work through groups and support technology development through demonstration sites hosted by few members of the group</td>
<td>Group approach will increase efficiency and availability of services to several people. The farmers’ groups are the right entities to select those model families.</td>
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<td>Politicians should be allowed to be part of the farmers’ organisation. If not they should be the ones to distribute the input to farmers.</td>
<td>The NRM political leaders should be in charge because other people may sabotage government programmes.</td>
<td>Politicians should not be members of the farmers’ forums even when they are members of farmers’ groups</td>
<td>Farmers’ forums are to enhance accountability; they are not a political caucus. Politicians may politicise the programme.</td>
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How is the situation being handled today?

Two compromises have been reached between political leaders and the technocrats. First, NAADS runs a two track extension service delivery system. On the one hand, NAADS delivers information, training and technology to farmers. This is in line with the NAADS Act
and is supported by donors through the basket funding. On the other hand, NAADS offers input to farmers through the Integrated Support for Farmer Groups (ISFG). This is likewise funded by donors but under the pretext of technological development. This is because giving input to farmers is seen by donors as a welfare approach. Secondly, NAADS offers input to the six farmers’ households as suggested by politicians and funded by government. The two track approach was assessed and it was found more feasible to deliver extension services, but it is a way to accommodate both government and donors’ demands.

Donors insist that NAADS funding is for training and technology development. Asked why donors are not supportive to the input strategy, the donor official said:

*It is not our mandate to design NAADS. As per our agreement with government, it is the role of the Micro-finance component of PMA to provide resources to farmers to buy input. [The] donors’ position is that our money will not be used to supply input, because it is not sustainable . . . The challenge is to ensure that our money is not mixed up in the government bag of inputs. You know government, they committed themselves that local governments would co-fund NAADS, go and ask them, how many local governments afford to reach agreed percentage?*

Local governments and farmers are supposed to co-fund NAADS; however, most local governments have been challenged by limited resources, with the exception of a few districts. This is partly because of the abolition of graduated taxation, which used to contribute significantly to local government revenues. Also farmers have been sceptical and barely comprehend the reason behind co-funding, because they are poor and they need to be helped by their own government instead of being asked to contribute. In 2006, the performance survey of NAADS shows a local government co-funding rate of 40,9%, that is, a total of 38,1% of the district achieved 100% of the co-funding and 20,1% of the sub counties achieved 100%, while 32,5% failed to achieve any co-funding (Kato & Kalyango 2007). Funding dynamics of the NAADS also contribute significantly to the stand-off between politicians and the technocrats. The second compromise has been on the selection of the six families. Politicians accepted that the six farmers’ households to receive comprehensive input should be selected by farmers’ forums rather than the NRM committees in the sub counties.

These compromises have, however, not harmonised the policy orientations and the intent of the programme. NAADS has continued to face implementation challenges and threats.

**Implications for Implementation**

The unharmonised policy expectations between technocrats and politicians have resulted in enormous criticism of NAADS for alleged inefficiencies and misuse of resources. During his county monitoring, President Museveni monitoring often puts NAADS officials to task to explain what NAADS has done and to provide public accountability. President Museveni is quoted as saying:

*Government realised 48b shillings last financial year and over 60b this financial year for NAADS programme, but there is nothing to show for it. If that money had been used to buy pigs for farmers they would not find enough food and instead feed on the people. Or if we had used it to buy birds, the number would overwhelm us. But you cannot see anything done. (Ssejjoba 2007).*
The Ministers for Agriculture, Major Bright Rwamiramira and Onek Hillary, and district/local government chairpersons such as Wakiso LC5 Chairman, Ian Kyeyune, expressed similar sentiments.

The other implication has been the untimely suspension of NAADS in the second agriculture season of 2007 when farmers needed the services. In the new Vision of 11 September 2007, it is stated that President Museveni has suspended NAADS funding until Cabinet decides on the way forward for the programmes. Of course, this has led to high level discussions among donors, technocrats and politicians, where an agreement was reached to continue the funding.

Even after NAADS funding was reinstated politicians seem not to have been satisfied with NAADS’s use of resources. There is insecurity among NAADS staff/technical officials because of threats of imprisonment and court cases. President Museveni has ordered the arrest of NAADS officials suspected of misusing NAADS money. For instance, some officials from the Namutumba district were arrested for having overpriced a walking tractor which they bought using NAADs’ money. In this case, the Minister for Agriculture, Aggrey Bagiire, was quoted as saying:

*NAADS has become a security issue. We are sick, tired and fed up of technical people stealing government resources. I know my boss will kick me to change Busoga but I will also have people to run the kicks to.* (New Vision, Monday 11 May 2009).

Donors also acknowledge that there could have been some misuse of funding within the programme. The donor official for instance noted that technocrats may be happy to handle the input purchases for farmers, because they could strike a bargain (make a difference) during that process.

Again the politicians are not only unhappy about the programme but have also questioned and discredited the professionalism of technocrats. President Museveni was quoted as stating: “How can a qualified NAADS coordinator contract out supply of cow dung.” This is despite the fact that the contracting out of service delivery is legally mandated by the NAADS Act. It sounds unprofessional to politicians to contract the supply of cow dung, which can easily be collected by farmers.

Overall, at the time of writing, there was no clear policy direction for agricultural extension in Uganda. NAADS and its technocrats are heavily criticised.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Both politicians and technocrats need to learn from the past experiences of agricultural policies and extension in Uganda and elsewhere in the world. There are models that have worked, for instance in Europe, that transformed subsistence agriculture into commercialised agriculture. One aspect of the European model has been the professionalisation of agriculture. Is it possible to professionalise every farmer in Uganda?

Technocrats need to appreciate that extension programmes are political in nature especially in Uganda where the largest numbers of votes are expected from farmers. Policy anywhere is a political issue. The political trends, approaches and priorities and their
implications to programmes such as NAADS need to be studied and incorporated in the design assumptions/risks and implementation policies. Thus, it is not only the agro-centric ideals that guide agricultural policies but also power and political concerns.

NAADS’s performance needs to be monitored closely so that divergences from the Act are reported and corrected. Policy performance management remains an area that needs attention in the public service. The question arises: Who should monitor divergence from regulatory policies in Uganda? Uganda should develop a consolidated and comprehensive agriculture policy. Uganda needs to develop a comprehensive policy on agriculture embracing the entire agricultural value chain.

REFERENCES


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<th>NAADS Guiding Principles</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Farmer empowerment – enabling farmers to have control over the provision of agricultural services through the creation and strengthening of farmers’ institutions. Empowerment is mainly seen as the attainment of individual socio-economic material gain. As Namara (2009) shows, the programmes is not orientated to changing social inequalities and/or causing relational power shifts. However, empowerment can be described as a buy in concept, for resource mobilisation and gaining commitment from farmers.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Poverty Targeting – NAADS mostly benefit the economically active people who have some assets, skill and knowledge (subsistence farmers), not destitute people or commercial farmers. Achieving poverty targeting requires poverty analysis. However, the political arm of government promotes universal targeting; in practice, universal mobilisation is achieved through radio but, in reality, the active poor benefits from the programme. Government will be happy because of universal mobilisation. but the technocrats will move with those farmers who are able to move. It is not surprising that there is limited information on categorisation of the poor farmers benefiting from NAADS.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Deepening decentralisation – involves making sub counties the lead local government organs in planning, implementation, funding, monitoring and evaluation of the NAADS programme so as to increase ownership of service delivery by the rural communities. This not only promotes government control of the programme but contradicts the conceptualisation that the programme should be controlled and led by the farmers. Namara (2009) shows how the political leader and technocrats at the districts sometimes overturn farmers' decisions in favour of technical or political orientations.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Fostering Participation – participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation involving continuous interaction of extension workers and farmers and enabling farmers develop the confidence to manage the NAADS processes. Participation can mean different things to different people; who should participate in which process? For farmers to actively participate in NAADS policies and their implementation requires intensive mobilisation, but at the same time there must be a balance between participation and other bureaucratic resources and trade off between more efficient ways of service delivery (Bryner 2003). Who is responsible for mobilising farmers (technocrats or politicians)? Effective participation requires long term engagement with stakeholders yet amidst the short term contractual nature of NAADS services. At the same time, the participation agenda has coincided with the good governance agenda thus bringing on board other actors including NGOs with new dynamics to manage.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Increasing Institutional Efficiency – requires defining new roles and functions of existing institutions to make them more responsive to the advisory services needs of the farmers and creating new organs to increase the effectiveness of farmer participation in the NAADS decision-making processes. It requires attention where decision-making regarding expected results and cost implication are based on objective analysis and where corruption tendencies will not inform the allocation and use of resources.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Privatisation – contacting out to the private sector and the provision of agricultural advisory services. This is in line with the government policy of moving away from direct service delivery. Contracting out public service draws on both theoretical and practical implications of managing services delivery. These relate to whether government has the capacity to supervise and oversee the contracts and private service providers have the expertise to effectively implement the programme. Contracting out meant the government had to have another policy to re-school the existing extension workers and pay them their retirement packages and also train them to become private service provider. Technocrats would lose their jobs, yet there was limited availability of potential skilled service providers. Government retained extension workers as NAADS coordinators yet with limited coordination skills.</td>
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### NAADS Guiding Principles

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<td>7</td>
<td>Market Oriented Farming – this framework is aimed increasing productivity and profitability through provision of market information and liking farmers to market research and to markets (both input and output markets). This assumes that there is production for the market. It ignores the land tenure system where the majority of the subsistence farmers own small plots of land with limitations in large scale farming. The technocrats argue that the synergies built through group and centralised enterprise selection would enable farmers to grow for the market. In addition to the context of poor land policies, there has been limited government investment in roads to enable access of produce to markets.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Commercialisation – gradual shifting of farmers from subsistence through market oriented production in the medium term and ultimately to commercial production in long term. It involves disaggregation of needs of different farmer types and having different approaches for providing them with agricultural advisory services. The argument by government is to promote commercial farming as quickly as possible, but the technocrats argue that it will be a gradual process.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Gender mainstreaming – making NAADS interventions gender responsive and gender focused such that both men and especially the women are uplifted. This is in line political commitment to mainstreaming gender issues and concerns into national socio-economic development agenda in the country. Changing gender relations is a power issue where NAADS alone could ideally not change the farmers’ household gender dynamics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Managing Natural Resource Productivity – transforming agricultural production and productivity without degrading the environment. This is aimed at enabling farmers manage agricultural activities while maintaining the productivity of natural resources for both the present and the future generations.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS Mainstreaming – making NAADS programmes responsive to the impact of HIV/AIDS involving working closely with an FAO programme and engaging district stakeholders in planning of mitigation strategies. With the possibility that people living with HIV/AIDS would most probably need treatment as their first priority, yet NAADS was not offering health services; also given that there is a possibility that PLWHIV/AIDS can be weak to use the hand hoe it would require different approaches rather than targeting the active farmer per se, yet NAADS is not a welfare programme per technical design. However, PLWHIV/AIDS are provided with free medication by the Ministry of Health. Why can it not apply under NAADS?</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Harmonisation – liaising with other agricultural development programmes funded by other donors so as to avoid duplication of agricultural activities, rationally utilising the public funds available for implementing agricultural related activities and enabling NAADS to roll out more rapidly by using other organisations. Given the funding insecurities among NGOs and other agencies included in delivering services, some agencies are sceptical about harmonising with NAADS approaches. Some NGO officials say that NAADS “will swallow their thinking and marginalise their programmes” as if they are competing with NAADS. Donors also continue to offer funding to such agencies for parallel programmes despite their NAADS funding.</td>
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