FROM DEFENCE DOCTRINE TO NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

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ABSTRACT

In describing Dutch security policy, the military model of levels of strategy is applied to the (civil) national security environment, followed by a discussion of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (2005) and the Netherlands National Security Strategy (2007), and by a comparison of the Dutch security documents with American and Russian security strategies. The current security priorities of the Dutch Cabinet are climate change, polarisation and radicalisation in society, and energy supply assurance. The Dutch strategy was drafted by the Ministry of the Interior. However, as a political or grand strategy, it should be drawn up by the Ministry of General Affairs of the Prime Minister, to avoid interdepartmental competition.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years the Netherlands has demonstrated an active approach in acquiring fundamental documents for its security policy. This article describes the development of the Dutch framework of security documents and discusses the current two key documents in particular. The article starts with some remarks on the theoretical basics of security policy related to the Dutch situation, followed by a description of the development and content of the Netherlands

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Defence Doctrine (NDD), which was published in 2005, and of the Netherlands National Security Strategy (NNSS), which was released in 2007. Based on the discussion of these two Dutch security documents, the scope of the article is enlarged by comparing them with each other and also with security strategies of the United States of America (US) and Russia. As a final point, some conclusions are presented on the development, content and value of the NNSS.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE DUTCH CONTEXT

The fact that a state cites the safeguarding of its continuation in a national security policy is broadly accepted in principle. The objective of this policy is to ensure sovereignty, territorial integrity, welfare and stability by taking political, economic, social-cultural and military measures. Each state has specific interests. The use of armed forces is especially determined by the perception of the extent to which these interests are threatened. The conversion of interests into objectives takes place at the highest decision-making level, namely the political or grand strategy level.

An alternative way of explaining this political strategy is from the perspective of security. From this point of view, national security policy encompasses all activities regarding internal and external security. In this case, grand strategy is the product of the views of the state concerning the optimal guarantee of its security. Taking into account the anarchical nature of the international environment, the state is confronted with a diverse and extensive set of threats. The aim of grand strategy is to identify these threats and to generate options to repel them. Because of the fact that the means of the state are limited, the political strategy is tasked to prioritise threats and their neutralisation. As a consequence of limited resources, the military instrument, for example, as one of the security mechanisms of the state, should be employed in the most efficient way in order to meet the objectives of the grand strategy. This conversion of interests into objectives is portrayed by the schematic presentation of the levels of strategy (see Figure 1). This model consists of five levels — which influence one another — the dividing lines of which are not completely determined.
At the top level the conversion of interests is described in terms of the aforementioned political or grand strategy. This is the level of the national government, at which economic, diplomatic, psychological, military and other political processes are generated in a co-ordinated and synchronised way. Military strategy is found at the next level. This is the level at which military authorities, such as a chief of defence staff or commanders-in-chief of the armed forces employ the military means to meet the political-strategic objectives of the state. These authorities command and control military operations from outside this theatre. At this level, which forms an integral component of political strategy, military doctrine that provides the guidelines of using military power, is found. The next echelon downwards is the level of operations. At this level armed forces and troops conduct joint military action to fulfill a military-strategic objective in a specific theatre of crisis or conflict. The operational commander has his headquarters within this theatre. This level of operations connects strategy with tactics. At the level of tactics military units perform actions to realise an operational objective. The lowest layer of warfare is the technical level, which contains actions of small units, sometimes even single servicemen or weapon systems, with the purpose of achieving a tactical objective.\(^2\)

The framework depicting the levels of strategy, which originates from military thinking, can also be applied to national security at large. For example, the schematic presentation (see Figure 1) shows the application of the model to a national security environment, using the means — instruments — that the government has available to accomplish its objectives. Similar presentations can be drafted to describe the authorities and the security documents at all levels.

Over the past decades the Netherlands has been confronted with a number of disasters — man-made as well as natural — which resulted in action in which a number of security departments and agencies operated together. These include:

— Natural disasters since the 1990s, including threat of floods, outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and bird flu;

— the crash of a large cargo aircraft in a residential area of Amsterdam in 1992;

— the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000;
**FIGURE 1: MEANS OF GOVERNMENT AND CORRESPONDING LEVELS OF STRATEGY**

- Political, military, economic and other instruments
  - Grand Strategy

- The armed forces, national police, public opinion and economic sanctions
  - Military/Civil Strategy

- Joint campaigns of interdepartmental units
  - Operations

- Military units, fire brigades, local police and medical services
  - Tactics

  - Technical Level
— the café fire in Volendam in 2001;
— preventive military action against terror attacks around tunnels in Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 2001; and

In addition to police, fire-brigades and armed forces, other departments and agencies have also become more involved in managing the consequences of these disasters. Furthermore, international influences, such as terrorism and climate change, have increasingly affected the national security of the Netherlands. From national developments — the growing need for co-operation between domestic security actors — as well as from international developments, it has become evident that internal and external security are interlinked. As a result of these disasters and international occurrences, Dutch security related departments, agencies and organs were forced to co-operate to a greater extent. To avoid duplication and to diminish uncoordinated and inefficient action, a security strategy — as the focal point of integral and comprehensive security policy — became indispensable. Such an all-comprising security document was to be the gathering centre of all internal and external security policy aspects; a governmental instrument for the devolution of policy to lower levels; and finally, a booster and beacon of security policy at all levels and for all security organs. However, before a national security strategy could be drafted, it was necessary to publish a defence doctrine.

3. NETHERLANDS DEFENCE DOCTRINE

Since the 1990s, especially due to the deployment of Dutch armed forces in a number of crisis management operations abroad, the need for an integrated defence doctrine increased. In its final report in April 2002, the advisory committee on the introduction of a joint high commander stated that joint operations were fast becoming the norm and that close, internal co-operation in such operations was so vital that an overarching doctrine was required. In order to meet this recognised need, it was proposed that a doctrine be developed for all the main tasks of the Defence Ministry, using the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) doctrine as a basis. The recommendation of this committee confirmed that doctrine was one of the instru-
ments available to the Chief of Defence (CDS) to fulfil his role as Corporate Operator. With the disappearance of the commanders-in-chief of the Services and their staffs, in September 2005, and due to the increased responsibility and authority of the CDS and the fact that operations are increasingly shaped by the joint deployment of Services, it was no longer possible to do without a defence doctrine. For this reason, the introduction of the NDD was highly expedient. In October 2005 the first copy of the NDD was presented to the Minister of Defence.

The publication of the NDD marked the progression to the next phase in the development of Dutch military doctrine, which until then was characterised by Service-specific doctrines. A defence doctrine was the missing link in the hierarchy of Dutch defence policy papers and Service-specific doctrine publications, and the NDD filled this gap. The NDD provides a 'doctrinal basis' from which various doctrine publications, for instance for the individual Services, will be drawn and developed. Furthermore, the NDD incorporates the most recent national and international doctrinal developments, for instance with regard to national security and the complexity of current international operations. Moreover, the NDD serves as a guide for operations undertaken by the armed forces as a whole and by the individual Services.

Therefore, as a link between defence policy and the conduct of military operations, the NDD indicates how the product of the Defence organisation contributes to Dutch security policy. This especially comes to the fore in the strategic entries of the NDD. For instance, as regards interdepartmental co-operation and the intertwining of internal and external security, the NDD notes that regarding internal security, Defence has a co-operation agreement with the Ministries of Justice and Interior and Kingdom Relations in order to provide military assistance to civil authorities in response to, for example, terrorism, disasters and the need for CBRN protection. On external security, the NDD states that in crisis management operations Defence acts together with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation in the reconstruction of countries. Similarly, the NDD also includes strategic entries on the international security situation, national interests, threats, and on foreign and security (military) policy (see Table 1). Thus, to a certain extent, the NDD served as a 'forerunner' of a Dutch national security strategy.
4. NETHERLANDS NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

During 2005 the Dutch government decided that it needed a national security document. In March 2006, during the annual debate on the Defence budget in the Dutch Senate, the Minister of Defence stated that a working group of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was investigating a national security strategy. In April 2007, the Dutch government approved the national security strategy and initiated its implementation. The NNSS was published in May 2007. The period up to 2009 will be used to roll out the working method, the introduction of which, in stages, is described in the 2007-2008 work programme attached to the strategy. From 2009 onwards, the working method will be applied across the full range of national security issues. As from 2009, the work programme is to be fully implemented.

The Dutch government has developed the NNSS to strengthen national security. By charting the various risks in collaboration with other parties, setting priorities and taking the necessary measures, the Government can ensure that the Netherlands is better prepared for threats such as flu pandemics and terrorist attacks. In order to be optimally prepared for various threats, the Cabinet has composed this strategy which places the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in a coherent framework. Central to this strategy is a 'joined-up, whole-of-government' approach to national security. The aim of the strategy is to protect society and citizens within Dutch territory against internal and external threats. National security is jeopardised when vital interests of the Dutch state and/or society are threatened to such an extent that this constitutes potential societal disruption. The major components of the NNSS are policy objectives, vital (intertwined) interests, threats, a working method and crisis control principles.

The responsibility for overseeing the strengthening of Dutch national security lies with the Government, which has mandated this task to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. As a result domestic security policy is the first priority. This is evidenced by the fact that the webpage on the NNSS of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations makes no secret of the prominence of in-
ternal security policy in this security document. This prioritisation is furthermore obvious from the fact that international security only covers two of the 36 pages of the document.

5. A COMPARISON OF DUTCH, AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SECURITY DOCUMENTS

Although the Netherlands is a small power, it is useful to compare Dutch security documents with those of major powers such as Russia and the US, especially with regard to major elements such as the international security situation, national interests, threats and security policies. For the purposes of this overview, use has been made of the national security and defence strategies of the US, Russia and the Netherlands, as well as of the NDD (see Table 1).

5.1 Netherlands Defence Doctrine versus Netherlands National Security Strategy

With regard to the international security environment, the NDD and the NNSS both emphasise the consequences of globalisation and the link between internal and external security. The two documents differ in respect of national interests. Because of the fact that the NDD, to a large extent, is a product of Dutch foreign and security concerns, it emphasises external, international security interests and objectives, for example, territorial integrity, rule of law, human rights and undisturbed trade. The NNSS also covers these interests but supplements them with domestic interests, such as the protection of living conditions and environment, the guarantee of public health, and internal, social and political stability. Since the NNSS covers all aspects of national security it is self-evident that — in contrast to the NDD — domestic interests are also taken into account.

A similar approach is visible in the description of threats in the two documents. The NDD focuses mainly on external threats, such as failing and rogue states, conflict between states, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Again, the NNSS also covers these threats — usually referred to as 'classical threats' — but adds domestic social-economic and natural threats, for example, the lack of digital security and the outbreak of diseases. In this respect, the
most outspoken entries of the NNSS are the future security priorities of the Dutch government. These three security priorities are climate change; the polarisation and radicalisation of society; and energy supply assurance.\textsuperscript{9}

These three priorities also have military dimensions, for instance the deployment of soldiers to reinforce threatened dikes; the deployment of military special assistance units against terrorists; and the protection of domestic energy pipelines and of international maritime energy routes by the armed forces. Similar to the NNSS, the NDD is also a 'living' and amendable document. These three security priorities were only partly dealt with in the current NDD, which was drafted in 2004-2005. A more recent policy document of the Dutch Ministry of Defence already takes into consideration these three emerging aspects of security policy.\textsuperscript{10} It may rightly be expected that the next edition of the NDD will encompass these three security priorities to their full extent, since in the hierarchy of security documents the NDD is subordinated to and hence should be derived from grand strategy, namely the NNSS.

Concerning the fundamentals and objectives of ensuring security, that is security policy, it should be noted that the NNSS adopts an approach that clearly originates from the military. In this respect, the NNSS mentions the following working method:

— Stage 1: Analysis of threats and risk assessment.
— Stage 2: Strategic planning (capabilities-based planning approach; setting of priorities by the Cabinet).
— Stage 3: Follow-up (Cabinet policy decisions, legislation, concrete measures).

The stages of the working method of the NNSS — threat assessment, followed by capabilities-based planning and subsequently policy measures — denote a typical military but surely justified way of thinking when it comes to determining security policy. The NNSS recognises that its capabilities-based approach, to cope with the diversity in threats, originates from the Ministry of Defence. According to the NNSS, this approach is also used by countries such as Canada, the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia to establish their strategic security policy.\textsuperscript{11} The NDD — being a doctrine and not a defence white paper — takes the military capabilities as fact, but
other than that also follows the line of first making a threat assessment and next explaining what measures (military operations) are available in order to achieve the military-strategic objectives. The same applies to the crisis control principles mentioned in the NNSS, which are as follows:

— All parties apply a common doctrine for all types of threats (namely a conceptual framework, information exchange, and the modular deployment of capabilities).
— Professional unity of command.
— Aligned decision-making procedures.
— Synchronisation of planning.
— Ensuring a common communication strategy.
— Multidisciplinary action, including joint exercises and training.

Similar to the working method, the contents of the crisis control principles — in particular by emphasising aspects such as unity of doctrine, unity of command, synchronised planning and joint action — also resemble a military approach. Similar principles of military operations are found in the NDD. In addition, the NDD underlines as a fundamental that the Government should apply its policy instruments — diplomatic, economic, financial, humanitarian and military — cohesively. Consequently, with regard to fundamentals and objectives, the NDD and the NNSS are consistent and complementary. However, in contrast with the NDD, foreign and security policies are depicted in a very limited manner in the NNSS. As previously indicated, the NNSS noticeably accords more weight to internal, national security policy.

5.2 American and Russian security strategies

5.2.1 The national strategies of the US

During the year following the 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington DC, better known as '9/11', President Bush launched his National Security Strategy of the United States of America (USNSS). The USNSS states as vital objectives of the security policy of the US:
— defeat of international terrorism;
— solution of regional conflicts;
— protection against weapons of mass destruction;
— promotion of global economic growth;
— promotion of democracy; and
— improvement of US security institutions.

In 2005 the USNSS, a security strategy positioned at the political-strategic level, was supplemented by one at the military-strategic level. In March 2005 the US Secretary of Defense presented *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.*[^15] This defence strategy, derived from the grand strategy, provides a more concrete content to US security policy. In this document, Secretary Rumsfeld describes the role of the US in the world, the international security situation, strategic objectives and their implications, as well as the capabilities which are necessary to execute the security policy. Comparing these two American strategies with the Russian grand strategy, it is surprising that with regard to viewpoints it is not the USNSS but the US defence strategy that corresponds with the Russian political strategy. The likely reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, from 1993-1997, Russia only had a military doctrine as the top level security document, at its disposal. Secondly, the military leadership has had much influence on the contents of the Russian grand strategy. As a consequence, this security document incorporates many military aspects.

### 5.2.2 The national security concept of the Russian Federation

In the Russian context, at the political-strategic or grand strategy level national security policy is laid down in the *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation* (NSCR). The current NSCR was approved by President Vladimir Putin in 2000. To a large extent the Russian national security thinking corresponds with the Western paradigm in this field. For instance, it also asserts that the state has military, diplomatic, international legal, information, economic and other instruments at its disposal in order to achieve its objectives.
Furthermore, Russia's grand strategy explains the interests of the country and ensures security against internal and external threats. From the NSCRF, as Russia’s primary security document, separate concepts and doctrines are derived to guarantee national security in all dimensions. The two major documents subordinated to the NSCRF are the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept. The Military Doctrine comprises the formal view on the nature of conflicts, the military build-up of the nation and the preparation and application of military power, in order to secure the vital interests of the state. The Military Doctrine is situated at the military-strategic level (see Figure 1). The Foreign Policy Concept is found at the same level, encompassing the measures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to achieve the objectives at the political-strategic level, as recorded in the NSCRF.}\(^{16}\)

### 5.2.3 A comparison

In addition to the individual discussions of the Dutch, US and Russian security documents, and in order to provide a better understanding of strategic thinking, a comparison of all four documents is useful. This comparison is made in Table 1. Since the structure of this comparison is derived from the Russian strategy, a description is given of the international security situation, national interests, threats and security policy objectives (ensuring security) respectively. According to this comparison, the following points should be noted. The 'centres of gravity' vary a lot per country. The reasons for this are evidently the different position of each state in the international arena, as well as recent developments in security. The US strategies of 2002 and 2005 are unmistakably connected to '9/11': the 'global war on terror' is the main point of focus in these documents. In the Russian strategy two aspects come to the fore. Firstly, it demonstrates a discontent with Western security policy, in particular of NATO and the US. Secondly, and related to the first, it shows a frustration with the collapse of the Russian (Soviet) empire and a strong desire to regain the lost status of a superpower. This desire to be recognised as a superpower is, for instance, expressed in the value attributed to nuclear arms. The Dutch documents, NDD and NNSS, recognise the fact that a small power is dependent on a stable international environment. However, they also put across the willingness
of the Netherlands to contribute to a stable international situation by applying military and other instruments available at the political-strategic level. More than the US and Russian strategies, the Dutch documents underline the linkage between and interdependence of internal and external security.

6. CONCLUSION

Russia, for four years, only had a military doctrine as a security document — after which in 1997 the first NSCRF was presented. Notably, the Netherlands have followed a similar route: the NDD was published first, in September 2005, followed by the NNSS in May 2007. It would be erroneous to state that the Dutch military have had such a decisive influence on security policy, as was the case with their Russian counterparts. However, the Dutch military, just as their colleagues from East and West, are trained in thinking in strategic levels, security templates and corresponding (military) action. Other non-military security actors lack such training and subsequently also a military-political mind-set. Therefore, it was not surprising that in the Dutch case as well, the military were in the forefront of publishing a fundamental security document. Since May 2007 the Netherlands has its own national security strategy, the NNSS. Thus, the missing link in the Dutch framework of security documents was installed. In comparison with US and Russian strategies, the Dutch one is rather abstract and not very concrete. This is due to the fact that such a document is new in the Dutch security policy setting. Moreover, as the NNSS states, until 2009 the strategy has to be implemented at all security levels and in all security departments and agencies, for which a Working Programme 2007-2008 has been added to the strategy.

It is the opinion — from an academic/theoretical point of view — that the conception of the NNSS has demonstrated one crucial mistake. This document was drafted by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Considering the levels of strategy, the NNSS is a document at the political-strategic level. Thus, as a grand strategy, the NNSS should have been drawn up under auspices of the Prime Minister, that is by his Ministry of General Affairs. The comparable American and Russian strategies affirm this conceptual approach; they were signed by respectively Presidents Bush and
Putin. Although the NNSS opens with a foreword by Prime Minister Balkenende, it remains a document of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

From a conceptual point of view the connection with this department has its risks. The Ministry of the Interior is one of the key departments which deal with security, the others being Justice, Foreign Affairs and Defence. In addition to these there are also second-line security actors such as the departments of Development Co-operation, Agriculture and Economic Affairs. As in the armed forces, where the different services — such as army, navy and air force — are in competition with one another, in particular for allocation of financial means, the same applies to the level of ministries. The departments of the Interior, Justice, Defence and Foreign Affairs have their own perspectives and their specific interests and corresponding objectives, which might be in conflict with one another. For instance, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations — by its nature — places more attention on domestic security than Defence and Foreign Affairs. The result of this is manifest in the NNSS, which emphasises national, internal security.

This overemphasis of internal security could have been prevented if the NNSS had been drafted at the political-strategic level, where it belongs, thus by the Ministry of General Affairs of the Prime Minister. In composing the security strategy, this department would, as expected, have acted in an objective manner between the key security actors, namely the ministries for the Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs and Defence. As a result the security strategy could have offered a more balanced view, instead of the prioritisation of domestic security by the current document. Hopefully, a next edition of the NNSS will be aligned with the conceptual thinking on the levels of strategy and, therefore, will be the product of the Prime Minister. Irrespective, the current NNSS — as a 'living' and thus adjustable growing document — provides the Netherlands with a vital security document which is of great importance to the successful implementation of an integral, comprehensive national security policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN, AMERICAN AND DUTCH SECURITY DOCUMENTS</strong>&lt;sup&gt;17)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL SECURITY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dominance in the international community of developed Western states led by the US. Efforts to weaken Russia's position politically, economically and militarily, as well as in other fields.</td>
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<td>• Attempts to ignore the interests of Russia in solving major problems in international relations.</td>
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<td>• Terrorism poses a threat to world stability.</td>
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<td><strong>NATIONAL INTERESTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strengthening Russia's position as a great power, as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world. • Developing mutually advantageous relations, especially with the member states of the CIS and Russia's traditional partners. • Defending Russia's independence, sovereignty and its state and territorial integrity.</td>
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<td><strong>THREATS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethno-egoism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism are reinforcing nationalism, extremism and ethno-separatism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The reduction of Russia's global political, economic and military influence.</td>
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<td>Stronger military-political blocs and alliances, and eastward expansion of NATO.</td>
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<td>Presence of foreign military bases and military contingents close to Russian borders.</td>
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<td>NATO’s use of military force outside its zone of responsibility without UN SC sanction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENSURING SECURITY: FUNDAMENTALS AND OBJECTIVES</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Overcoming the RF’s scientific, technical and technological dependence on external sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improving the system of state power of the RF, its federal relations, local self-government, the tightening up of law and order, and reinforcing the social and political stability of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Raising the military potential of the state and maintaining it at a sufficiently high level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defending the US against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Today the world’s great powers find themselves on the same side – united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The US will build on these common interests to promote global security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The country sets great store by a stable and peaceful international environment, for it is dependent to a large degree on good international relations and security institutions that function properly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• It is important in this respect to apply the various policy instruments that the Netherlands has at its disposal – diplomatic, economic, financial, humanitarian and military – cohesively.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• More coherence in the approach to national security.</td>
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<td>• Structural exchange of knowledge and information and alignment between public and private stakeholders.</td>
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<td>ENSURING SECURITY: FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES</td>
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<td><strong>ENSURING SECURITY: MILITARY SECURITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, after exhausting all other means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The RF must have nuclear forces for use against any aggressor state or coalition of states.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Co-operation within the CIS is an important strategic objective of military security.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Acronyms used:**
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN)
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
- European Union (EU)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
- Organization of American States (OAS)
- Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Russian Federation (RF)
- United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC)
- United States of America (US)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- World Trade Organisation (WTO)
REFERENCES


3. CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

4. For the questions that led to this reply, see http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9324000/1/jjvyvgh5ihkk7kof/vh94gacmiiekw/f=x.doc.


17. The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. The grouping of related entries as used here is for the purpose of clarity and does not necessarily correspond with the original documents.


