AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S OFFICIAL HUMAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS: 1994-2009, AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SANDF

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that this mini-dissertation is my own original work. Where secondary material was used, this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance with university requirements. I further declare that this mini-dissertation has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted for obtaining any qualification.

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Completing this study was an intellectually, physically and emotionally testing endeavour. I thank my Creator for helping me to keep the faith and to complete the race.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Africa, for her unwavering support and guidance throughout the journey. Words can never be enough to express my heartfelt gratitude for the indelible mark she has made in my life.

Thank you to Colonel R. Blake for his moral support and encouragement. A special word of thanks is also extended to my friends who provided invaluable counsel whenever I needed it.

Finally, I dedicate this mini-dissertation to my late grandmother, “Oumama” and mother “Tanta”. Their place in my heart is permanently engraved and shall never be erased.
ABSTRACT

South Africa adopted a human security orientation at the start of its democratic epoch in 1994. Human security is an approach to security which prioritises the protection of the people over security of the state. One of its central tenets is that security is best achieved through development as opposed to arms procurement. Against this backdrop, the principal objective of this study was to critically analyse and describe South Africa’s official perceptions of human security in the period 1994-2009, and their impact on the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

Three indicators were identified to respond to the research questions and objectives. The indicators are strategic defence posture, actual functions performed by the SANDF and civil-military relations in South Africa. Following an evaluation of these the main finding was that state security and human security were equally prioritised in South Africa’s official lexis but in praxis the impact made the operational functioning of the SANDF difficult. The analysis conducted in this study was enhanced by ideas from Critical Security Studies (CSS) which emerged as a response to the seemingly anachronistic realist assumptions which fuelled traditional security (studies) for much of the Cold War.

The qualitative-documentary study was necessary to contribute to an understanding of a phenomenon like human security. This is especially as South Africa’s official pronouncements and policy documents often make reference to human security principles while the lived daily experience for the vast majority of people is anything but secure.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACCORD  | African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ANC     | Africa National Congress
AU      | African Union
AUPSC   | African Union Peace and Security Council
CAR     | Central African Republic
CSS     | Critical Security Studies
DRC     | Democratic Republic of Congo
DoD     | Department of Defence
IDASA   | Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa
JSCD    | Joint Standing Committee on Defence
MRG     | Military Research Group
NEPAD   | New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO     | Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU     | Organisation for African Unity
RDP     | Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA     | Republic of South Africa
SSR     | Security Sector Reform
SST     | Security Sector Transformation
SADF    | South African Defence Force
SANDF   | South African National Defence Force
SADC    | Southern African Development Community
SONA    | State of the Nation Address
SDP     | Strategic Defence Package
UNDP    | United Nations Development Programme

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1. Identification of the research theme

The raison d'être of any government is the provision of security to the state and its people. Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa, government has promoted the notion of human security as the *sine qua non* of its (national) security obligations (Lekota 2008). However, Ferreira and Henk (2009:519) note limitations, particularly from the military perspective, in government’s efforts to operationalise the concept of human security.

Although no democratic government of South Africa has formulated a policy document expressly on human security, its underlying principles resonate with policymakers. For example, the 2014 South African Defence Review asserts that South Africa is “…stricken by chronic underdevelopment, inadequate health services and the attendant problem of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. These human security and development problems continue to impact negatively on the region [Africa] in the form of a range of non-military threats…” (RSA 2014:1_5).

The above statement, from a security-related document in the form of the 2014 South African Defence Review, provokes curiosity about perceptions traditional security institutions have of human security especially considering the developmental agenda of the state in South Africa. Consequently, the main theme of the study will be about official perceptions of human security in South Africa from the perspective of national government and the Defence sector. The latter encompasses the Department of Defence (DoD) as the arm of the policy concerned and the executing South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

South African public policy documents and official pronouncements often refer to human security or its principles, yet the daily lived experience of people tells a different story. This is despite security ostensibly being about and for the people (Schoeman 1998:41). According to Southall (2010:80-81), “…up to 40% of South Africans have minimal prospect of increasing their human security (access to enough food, housing, employment etc)…” This is due to looming crises in the interrelated domains of politics, economics, human security, and ecology.

Whilst Southall made his projection in 2010, this mini-dissertation will describe and analyse what has happened in the period 1994-2009 in the human security domain as perceived by government and the Defence sector. The sector is of interest because, as a result of the role it played during apartheid,
some blame can be apportioned to it for the human insecurity experienced in present day South Africa. Apart from the costly destabilisation policy in the Southern African region (Booth & Vale 1995:286), the South African Defence sector unduly influenced domestic political and security policymaking during apartheid (Esterhuyse 2010:3).

According to Rozborová (2013:2), human security can be employed by political actors in two distinct but related ways. One is praxis which refers to concrete political actions. Secondly, it is as lexis which simply refers to what is said (“speech acts”) or written about human security. Rozborová (2013:35) adds that when used as a political strategy, “human security has the power to shape political discourse, political decisions, and it can consequently become a component or a leading strategy of a concrete political action.” This is consistent with the suggestion by Booth and Vale (1995:291) that perceptions (possibly expressed in political decisions) about the world can shape subsequent actions.

Without necessarily focusing on the person of the president, the period under review will be divided, for analytical purposes, into the respective administrations of Presidents Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki (1999-2009). It should be noted that Mbeki’s government spanned two elected administrations, 1999-2009 (i.e. 1999-2004 and 2004-2009). Notwithstanding the fact that Mbeki’s second administration was unceremoniously terminated in September 2008 (Chikane 2012:17-45), the scope of analysis for this study extends to May 2009 when the official term of the government he had led came to an end. Conducting the analysis up to 2009 is also consistent with the aim of not limiting official human security perceptions to the person of the president but government broadly. The reason for looking at official to human security perceptions in the first 15 years of South African democracy under Mandela and Mbeki (1994-2009) is to draw lessons on security practice from the initial pioneers in the field. The present and future administrations can only benefit from such a contribution as they grapple with the question of the appropriate role of military in society.

In sum, this study aims to analyse South Africa’s official perceptions of human security for the period 1994-2009. The study will scrutinise the lexis as largely expressed by government and the DoD, in contrast to the praxis of the SANDF.

2. Literature overview

Human security is an eclectic concept with relations to such diverse academic fields as development studies, economics, politics and international relations. Unsurprisingly, human security scholarship has benefited from theoretical
insights of, inter alia, liberalism, global governance, constructivism and critical theory (Tsai 2009:30). In the context of the research questions to be posed, this study aligns itself with the critical theory approach even though this approach has divergent schools of thought (Mutimer 2008:57; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:23).

Specifically, because of the eclecticism of the concept of human security, the study will use the critical security studies (CSS) approaches associated with the Copenhagen and Welsh schools of thought. The rationale is that, as Kenkel (2005:172-178) claims, the new security paradigm (human security) in democratic South Africa was constructed with ideas from CSS. Some South African pioneers of this construction were from the Military Research Group (MRG) which was to some extent influenced by the ideas of Buzan from the Copenhagen School and Booth from the Welsh/Aberystwyth School. As Pretorus (2008:39) puts it, the MRG was “drawn from the MK Military intelligence and the anti-conscription movement, this group functioned as the unofficial policy-making body on security and defence for the African National Congress (ANC). They also contested the state-centric/military nature of security, but did so within the context of conceptions of Critical Security Studies developed in Copenhagen and Aberystwyth universities since the 1980s.”

The benefit of using a combination of approaches is that they complement each other in understanding the nature and practice of security. For example, Booth’s (2007:30) critical theorising might lead to understanding of prevailing structures and processes of security from outside while the securitisation theory associated with the Copenhagen school might be able to explain them from within (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007:12).

Academic security studies in South Africa were reportedly dominated by the defence establishment and state authorities before 1990 (Booth 2007:200; Kenkel 2005:173). Furthermore, Esterhuyse (2012:234) claims the civilian scholarly community had even less interest in defence-related research when the shift towards a human security posture commenced. This may explain the relative theoretical impoverishment of the field domestically. It may further be the reason for the paucity in human security scholarship. It is possibly responsible for scholars of South African security studies’ dependence on foreign theoretical perspectives like CSS.

In South Africa some of the key features of human security can also be found in literature which talks of the “security is development” thesis (Buur et al. 2007; Hellberg 2013) and “new security” thinking (Seegers 2010). A significant aspect of the literature is that scholars often apply human security analysis from a Southern African regional context rather than specifically to
South Africa. Perhaps the regional dimension is inescapably given the interdependent and transnational nature of contemporary security challenges. Thompson and Leysens (2000:9) list some of the critical human security analysis on the region to include the works of Booth (1994), Vale (1996; 1997) and Booth and Vale (1995; 1997). In addition, symposiums and working paper series have explored human security from a regional dimension (Cilliers 2004; Hendricks 2005; Mutschler, C & Reyneke, E 1998). Besides regionally oriented literature, one can also find works which focus on one of the seven sectors of human security identified by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994). Take McLean (2005) and Hendriks (2005) writing on health and food security respectively.

A study of official human security perceptions in South Africa has not been conducted. Hough and Du Plessis (2000) as well as Hough, Du Plessis and Kruys (2007) come close with their publications extrapolating official South African strategic and security perceptions between the years 1992-2000 and 2001-2007 respectively. However, they focus on broader strategic and security perceptions with only a passing reference to human security. Mlambo (2005) did a study on human security perceptions in South Africa, but it is from the point of view of tertiary students since democracy. This study will be distinguished by its dedicated focus on official perceptions of human security in South Africa.

3. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

Literature depicts human security as a broad and controversial concept which puts less emphasis on the role of the military and arms in security provision. Security should rather be measured according to the development and well-being of people (Bellamy & McDonald 2002:374; Cherubin-Doumbia 2004:3; Pretorius 2008:38). Successive governments of democratic South Africa and the DoD have in principle embraced human security but its practical manifestation remains problematic. The possible disjuncture between principle and practice, between lexis and praxis, will be evaluated by an assessment of three indicators.

Firstly, the strategic defence posture will be explored with regards to how the democratic government has used the SANDF as an instrument in its relations with other states on the African continent, especially in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. A motive for looking at the defence posture is because one of the leading principles of human security is its universal nature (UNDP 1994:22). This implies that those who subscribe to human security have to care about other people in the world irrespective of where they are. Such a perspective blends with South Africa's foreign policy whose priority and biased objective is peace, security, and prosperity in Africa.
The SANDF is one of the tools government uses to try to achieve the ambitious goal of security in Africa and the overall impact of this will be interesting to discern.

The second indicator is that of the functions performed by the SANDF. This line of inquiry is informed by a somewhat perennial question as to what ought to be the role of the military in society, especially in the context of a developing country with demanding socio-economic imperatives. Upon democratisation in South Africa debate on this issue was bifurcated along two camps, the “doves” and the “hawks” (Esterhuyse 2010:4-5; Vrey 2004:96). The former cohort wanted the SANDF to play a minimal traditional role as they advocated for defence budget cuts. On the other hand, the “hawks” wanted the traditional capacity of the military to be maintained presumably to safeguard state security. As a working definition, this study borrows from Hough’s description of state security. According to Hough (2003:8-9) state security is about protecting a particular territory, its independent sovereignty and institutions which regulate interactions of groups within the territory.

Given that human security is a notion with explicit normative undertones, the mini-dissertation will also assess as the last indicator, civil-military relations. A considered view is that where good civil-military relations exist this increases the likelihood of armed forces being used for what they were meant for, safeguarding the well-being of the state and its people without much sacrifice to other values of society. Huntington (1957:2) concurs as he points that, “nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks.”

With the setting above, the principal research question is: what impact did official perceptions of human security by the South African government and the DoD have on the functioning of the SANDF in the period 1994-2009? The preliminary response is: official perceptions of human security have made the operational functioning of the SANDF difficult as it struggles to reconcile its primary mandate with the developmental responsibilities implied by human security. Since it borders on operational capacity, the aforesaid indicator of actual functions actually carried out by the SANDF will be most pertinent in revealing if, and how, the military has contributed to human security in South Africa.

The main question raises two critical sub-questions. Firstly, what did official perceptions of human security mean for the priority given to state security by the SANDF? The preliminary response is: the SANDF prioritised state security ahead of human security.
The second sub-question is: was the nature of civil-military relations in South Africa enabling for the achievement of human security? The preliminary response is: The nature of civil-military relations in South Africa meant there was potential to operationalise human security.

This mini-dissertation has three principal objectives. The main objective is to analyse official human security perceptions in South Africa as seen from the perspective of government and the defence sector in the period 1994-2009. Secondly, it seeks to understand if the human security paradigm has created space for the SANDF to contribute to development in South Africa. The third objective is to inquire how human security relates to state security from an official South African perspective.

The study will be demarcated around the variables of human security, state security and civil-military relations in the South African context. The period of investigation is 1994-2009. Along with the symbolic birth of human security, 1994 is significant as it ushered in democracy and related humane (security) policies in South Africa. 2009 is momentous as the landmark year of the first 15 years of democracy in South Africa which gives just about enough time to assess human security perceptions and their impact on the SANDF.

4. Research methodology

This is a qualitative research study with a descriptive-analytical approach. Qualitative research studies have the advantage of allowing for in depth understanding of phenomena in their complexity (Burnham 2008:40). Furthermore, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:134-135), qualitative studies normally fulfil one or more of the following purposes: description, interpretation, verification, and evaluation. This particular study involves applying realist theory and two variants of Critical Security Studies (CSS) theory to describe, interpret, and evaluate the phenomenon of human security from an official South African perspective. An eclectic theoretical approach showing the movement from realist security thinking and practice towards the critical paradigm is used because the human security concept is itself eclectic and very complex. Consequently, ideas from different schools of thought can only serve to enhance the concept of human security. Ultimately, after all the data is collected and the analysis conducted, the study concludes by testing the validity of the assumptions as set above.

The study focuses on documentary data collection despite qualitative research having two other main categories of data sources, namely, observation and interviews (Henning 2004:5-6). Because the study looks at events retrospectively, observation will be limited to interpretation of how relevant actors translated human security perceptions into concrete actions.
Interviews have not been pursued because ideal respondents were not easily accessible considering that the main actors in South Africa are high ranking government officials (Jorgensen 2007:44-45). In addition, some key actors like former President Mandela and Defence Minister Joe Modise have died. Therefore, it is logical to look at the record of what the actors have said, written, and done with respect to human security.

Primary documentary and secondary literature sources are used as data sources for this document based study. Primary sources include publicly available official policy documents such as the South African Constitution, Legislation, White Papers, DoD annual reports, and the South African Yearbook. Public speeches and writings by government officials in the executive, the legislature and military bureaucracy are also used as primary sources. The UNDP (1994) report served as a vital primary source in establishing the framework within which human security is understood in this study and in the context of the post-Cold War generally. In addition, political party positions of the ruling ANC are also used to extract official perceptions. This is because security perceptions and related institutional arrangements in South Africa in the period 1992-2000 were influenced by policy stances of the ANC (Hough & Du Plessis 2000: Preface). Secondary source include scholarly books, journal articles including the official monthly journal of the DoD, SA Soldier, and other publications on the human security concept and related themes like (state) security and civil-military relations.

A deficiency with collecting data from mainly one source, as in primary documents for this study, is the possible lack of variety in the data while on the other hand Mouton (2001:150) has identified potential bias of the researcher as the main source of error in qualitative studies. These possible weaknesses will be mitigated by critically assessing published secondary sources with their divergent views. From these secondary sources, theories, facts, and insights will be used to analyse official human security perceptions in South Africa. As Henning (2004:7) alludes, theory can help in dealing with bias. This will enhance understanding of both the lexis and praxis of human security in South Africa.

5. Structure of the research

Chapter 1 introduces and gives context to the topic thereby serving justification the research. Based on a literature review centred on CSS and South African defence/security scholarship it will give the problem statement, pose research questions and provide plausible hypotheses or assumptions. The research design and concomitant methodology are also explained.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical construct whose purpose is to anchor and delineate the parameters of the study. CSS ideas are juxtaposed with the other main approach to security, the realist orientation, which seems to inform some government thinking, to advance the hypothesis that human security has not been so well operationalised in South Africa.

Chapters 3 and 4 have a similar structure of being sub-divided according to the three indicators: strategic defence posture, functions executed by the SANDF, and civil-military relations.

Chapter 3 focuses on President Nelson Mandela’s administration (1994-1999). It explores how a human security agenda was initiated by the new democratic dispensation through a range of normative arrangements. This was as South Africa transitioned from the state oriented apartheid to a human-centric democracy. Policy documents and official pronouncements will be scrutinised to understand how a preoccupation with the transformation of the military sector in the first few years of democracy may have affected the functioning of the SANDF.

Chapter 4 concentrates on President Thabo Mbeki’s administration (1999-2009). The chapter alludes to how the almost 10 years administration under Mbeki set about implementing, without much diversion, the strategic defence posture policy which had been formulated during Mandela’s tenure. Simultaneously, Mbeki’s vision of the African Renaissance meant the SANDF was increasingly deployed on the continent. The shift in focus towards the continent might have led to a misalignment in policy, functions allocated and budgetary allocations. On a positive note, although gaps existed in the system, during Mbeki’s administration civil-military relations had matured such that the SANDF could be relied on to comply and execute any given task. This increased the potential of the military to contribute to human security but such contribution was minimal due to the partial securitisation of non-military threats occupying the security agenda.

Chapter 5 is a conclusion. Guided by the research questions posed and the subsequent analysis of data collected, a final assessment and summary is made of South Africa’s official perceptions of human security over the 15 year period, 1994-2009, and their impact on the functioning of the SANDF. Responses to the research question posed are provided. The chapter also includes recommendations for future research and for South African policymakers.
CHAPTER 2
HUMAN SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

This chapter aims to outline a theoretical framework for the analysis of official human security perceptions in South Africa since 1994. It sets off with an illustration of the inadequacy of realist traditional security views which were dominant before the end of the Cold War. As it was during apartheid, South Africa is a good example of how state security without the security of the people within that state is unsustainable. After this background the chapter then exposits the contemporary security paradigm of concern with human security. The concept of human security has its critics and is often assessed from an array of theoretical perspectives. Having looked at some deficiencies of the concept of human security the chapter ends off with an account of two strands of CSS relevant to answering the research questions as posed. The two strands are securitisation theory and the CSS branch which equates security with emancipation.

The complex and contested nature of security, which is indirectly at the heart of this study, is apparent from the large body of literature available on the concept. Buzan (1991:7) shares this view as he labels security a “difficult concept”. As a derivative of the overarching security, human security, the main theme of the study, is equally complicated. It could be argued that human security is less understood because it is a relatively recent concept. Glasius (2008:32) says the term “human security” had been used before but it was the seminal UNDP published Human Development Report which popularised the concept in 1994. The concept has since served as a lodestar for academia, governments, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The UNDP (1994:3) elegantly pronounces:

For too long, the concept security has been equated with the threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, security from crime - these are the emerging concerns of security over the world.

The citation above shows human security is about a policy shift from security of the state to the security of the people and their development. From job security to crime, these and many more are the issues South Africa has
grappled with. At face value it appears like the emergence of human security significantly diminishes the utility of the military as an instrument for governments to achieve their security objectives. Security is now sought by attending to human needs and human rights through addressing multiple issues ranging from development, economics and democracy amongst others (Newman 2001:241). A scenario where the military has little value or is used for different purposes could have serious political and financial implications. It is therefore incumbent on this study, using South Africa as a reference point, to examine the operationalisation of human security. According to Newman (2010:78), the historical and social background in which the human security paradigm emerged, and traditional-militarised notions of (national) security eroded, is well documented. While it is not necessary to repeat this background here, in the interest of scholarly discipline and context, a brief synopsis of security thinking before “human security” is offered.

2. Traditional security views: before the end of the Cold War

Security is an evolving concept which can be defined according to the challenges of a specific time period and the approach to resolving these (Anum 2010:12). Krause and Williams (1997:36) concur that security is a historically variable condition as threats to it vary according to time and space. The time period during and before the end of the Cold War can generally be ascribed as one in which what may be called “traditional security” views and approaches dominated. For Buzan (1991:2) this time period, at least up until the 1980s, was characterised by security seen in national security terms and mainly divided between realist and idealist schools of thought. Ideas of power and peace respectively prevailed within the mentioned schools with security itself assigned an auxiliary role. This may be one of the reasons why security as a concept is shrouded in controversy and confusion.

A possible point of departure to demystify the concept of security in the traditional views of the Cold War epoch would be to locate where it belonged in disciplinary terms. This can be done by following Wyn-Jones (1999:94) as he deals with the nomenclature confusion by clumping the post-war mainstream approaches of security studies/strategic studies/ national security, and refers to them as traditional security studies. Realist inspired ideas dominated much of the traditional security studies’ literature. For example, Mutimer (2008:35) and Snyder (2008:3-4) allude to how strategic studies as a subfield focused on military strategy and the use of force by states to deal with external threats. Hence it can be said that strategic studies look at security through the prism of realist theories. The genesis of realism is a
philosophical tradition which characterises humans as evil and prone to violence and always trying to dominate each other. From these philosophical roots, realist academics inherited a similar approach. It is from social scientific theories of these academics that “debates over the theory and practice of politics [and security] have revolved.” (Lynn-Jones 2008:15).

One of the aspirations of realist theorists is to inform policy making through “objectively” generated knowledge, but Mutimer (2008:52-53) expresses concern with this. Theories by their nature make assumptions, analysis, evaluations and conclusions about the real world without themselves necessarily being of that world. The alleged problem is that the realist “scientist” makes predictions about the world and at the same time offers predictions to very same actors, including politicians and security actors, about whom the predications are about. Mutimer (2008:54) says this is what Giddens referred to as “double hermeneutic” which “informs much of the scholarship critical of realism’s study of security.” The insight by Mutimer can be taken to be a critique of the scientific-objectivist epistemology of the traditional approach to security. For his part Wyn-Jones (1999:95) admonishes the epistemologically statist perspective of traditional security studies as thus:

Statism is a view of the world that regards states – conceived in unitary and often anthropomorphized terms – as the only truly significant actors in world politics...The statism of traditional security studies is a product of the fact that the whole approach is itself based on the foundations of a realist understanding of world politics...Statism is one of the central tenets – if not the central tenet of all forms of realism. It is, however, open to criticism on both empirical and normative grounds.

Historical lessons, as in the South African apartheid state system, can be drawn to dispute statism on empirical grounds. The fundamental challenge is that statism can lead to insecurity. The notion of security according to the traditional perspective is tantamount to state security as national sovereignty and territorial integrity are paramount. In the traditional view the state is the final arbiter of security. Consequently, only the state has the capacity and authority to provide security to the people/citizens with its monopoly to use force (Anum 2010:12-13; Siko 2007:9-11). However, Buzan (1991:364) detects historical patterns which reveal a constant inevitable contradiction between individual and state security, between states and societal groupings. Unfortunately, by commission or omission, the state sometimes threatens and
causes insecurity for its own people (Buzan & Hansen 2009:25). This happened in apartheid South Africa when blacks were marginalised in terms of distribution of rights and welfare as well as governance and security. The end result was human insecurity for the majority.

It is common course how before 1994 the objective of the military in South Africa was to serve and protect the white minority of the population. For the majority of the population in South Africa and even in neighbouring countries, the apartheid state was a site of insecurity (Esterhuyse 2010:3). The realism which informed the South African government’s perception of security was costly as the regional destabilisation policy came with a price tag of $ 62.42 billion in the 1980s (Booth & Vale 1995:286). The case of apartheid South Africa is illustrative in exposing the empirical weaknesses of the traditional view of security and its realist assumptions might prove anachronistic for contemporary security challenges. The current security problematic is replete with complex and interdependent threats which no single entity, including the state, can solve on its own. Normatively, the case exhibits the potential inimical nature of the state, in particular the armed forces that operated with impunity in South Africa.

3. The contemporary paradigm of concern with human security

The disjuncture between a narrow, state-centric understanding of security and more humane, people-centric notions is generally recognised as the time around the demise of the Cold War. In South Africa specifically, the redefinition of security to include people’s needs happened in the context of changing security perceptions which challenged and changed defence thinking across the world at the end of the Cold War (Mandrup 2009:116). From a defence perspective, Heinecken (2006:27) affirms that the changing global environment has a tendency to affect “how militaries function, the services they provide and to whom.” It is in this spirit of “profound political and strategic consequences” that also had to do with the demise of apartheid that new security policies were formulated in South Africa (RSA 1996a:4).

While the end of the Cold War is a vital reference point of the disconnect between state-centric and human-centric understandings of security, the roots of the rupture have been traced to earlier periods by some scholars. Siko (2007:11) explicates that it was in the 1950s when Lasswell suggested a broader conceptualisation of security where coordination between arms, diplomacy, information, and economics would be necessary. Bajpai (2013:2)
explains how “the genealogy of the idea of human security can be related to, if not traced back, to the growing dissatisfaction with prevailing notions of development and security in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.”

Bajpai (2013:2-4) further narrates how a number of independent multinational commissions came with ideas which culminated in what was to be known as human security. Take for instance the problem of individual well-being and safety occupying the minds of those associated with the multinational World Order Models Project in the 1970s. And still in the 1970s the Club of Rome group identified poverty, environmental degradation, food insecurity, and marginalisation of youth amongst other issues troubling and causing insecurity for persons across the world. Two other independent commissions were instituted in the 1980s. One of these was the Willy Brandt chaired Independent Commission on International Development Issues. This commission looked at mankind’s inclination to survival not only through the traditional lens of peace and war, but also with respect to issues of world hunger, mass misery, and inequalities in the living conditions between the rich and the poor. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was the other commission of the 1980s which produced the famous Common Security report. While the report did not completely disregard the military component of security, it was also appreciative of how security can be threatened by challenges like poverty, economic inequality, and unemployment especially in the developing world.

Research by academic scholars, policy work of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and independent commissions like the ones mentioned above resulted in new thinking of security in the post-Cold War epoch. For instance, Anum (2010:14) identifies a turning point in this regard as the book titled “Peoples, States and Fear” by Barry Buzan in 1991. In the book Buzan cogently argues for the concept of security to include five sectors. These are the political, military, environmental, economic, and societal sectors. Later, the UNDP (1994:24-25) in its construction of human security was to similarly emphasise how security should not only be about the military as threats can come from six other sectors which include health, economic, food, personal, political, environmental and the community.

One of the signs that a democratic South Africa was to adopt a human centric approach to security can be found in policy proposals of a conference the ANC held as it anticipated taking over the reins of power. This was the conference jointly organised with the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for
South Africa (IDASA) in Zambia in 1990 under the theme ‘The future of security and defence in South Africa’. According to Nathan (1991:4-5), the thrust of the ANC’s policy proposals was anti-militarist as delegates had a sense that the envisaged defence force in democratic South Africa would have to strike a balance between its tasks and overall policy of government in socio-economic terms and other aspects. In the words of ANC executive member, John Nkadimeng, “the ultimate objective of our society should not be to build more barracks but more schools and hospitals. It should not be to manufacture more AK and R1 [rifles] but more tennis rackets and golf clubs. Not more tanks and Hippos [military vehicles] but more tractors and harvesters” (cited in Nathan 1991:5). Similarly, the reconceptualisation of security in South Africa was alluded to by Joe Nhlanhla in 1992. Nhlanhla (cited in Seegers 2010:272) who later became the Minister of Intelligence (1999-2000) in the cabinet of the ANC led government said:

The redefinition of South Africa’s security needs and the interrelationship between security of the state and that of the people must be seen in arriving at a new definition of national security. The security of the state depends on its ability to maintain its political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity…The security of the people depends on the satisfaction of their political, economic, cultural and social needs. The security of the state depends on the security of the people, and the security of the people depends on the security of the state.

It can be determined from the above citation that the ANC wanted to strike a balance between state security and people (human) security instead of prioritising one at the expense of the other. Nonetheless, the literature is largely in consensus about the shift from traditional, state-centric conception of security to more human-centric notions, and human security in particular. However, as with all novel ideas, human security has its critics. The next section looks at this aspect.

3.1 Critique of the concept of human security

It is critical to note for the record that for its part the UNDP (1994:24) identifies “freedom from fear and freedom from want” as the two main components of human security. In a similar vein, the UNDP (1994:23) asserts that human security means “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life — whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities.” The interpretation from this and further reading of the UNDP report reveals that freedom from fear focuses on physical security of people and that of the state. On the other hand, freedom from want emphasises meeting the basic socio-economic needs of individuals/people in such areas as health, education, and the environment, to mention but three. Bellamy and McDonald (2002:373) note that a lot of writers on human security insist on individuals and people being prioritised in terms of their security needs but that some scholars, like Thomas and Tow, are of the view that the state and international borders should be the primary focus. The current study is interested in whether the SANDF has contributed to either or both freedom from fear and freedom from want. Also to be assessed is whether the SANDF has prioritised human security or state security.

A leading criticism of human security is its alleged lack of a precise and analytically useful definition. For example, while Hough’s (2003:11) acknowledgement of human security has obvious merits he also notes that it has “been criticised for often being too vague and wide, and that virtually any type of threat or even discomfort could constitute a threat to human security.” It is unfair to single out human security for not having a precise and universally accepted definition as Buzan (1991:7) reasons that the problem of definitions is common in social sciences. Despite years of empirical and theoretical research concepts like power and justice still do not have absolute definitions and remain controversial.

Paris (2001:92) also criticises human security for being too broad a concept for policymakers to do anything with it. This is related to the critique of human security as being too difficult to operationalise for policymakers. Nonetheless, Glasius (2008:31) is of the view that it is possible and necessary to operationalise human security through a range of holistic policies and transformation of practices in several fields related to security. These fields include intelligence, military, developmental, and civil services. As already indicated, this study explores perceptions of human security by South African policymakers in the context of the country’s military.

It is not the intention of this study to delve too deeply into the semantics of what human security means as the generic description alluded to above will suffice. Like Wibben (2008:459-460) warns, “trying to fix the meaning of human security risks pandering to so-called experts who make decisions based on bureaucratic or institutional requirements (and generally involving
military solutions to ‘security problems’). Wibben (2008:460) reckons it is a better exercise to explore the politics of security and in that sense a brief exegesis of securitisation theory will follow below. Looking at the politics of security can assist in the evaluation, from a South African defence sector perspective of who has spoken of security for whom, on what security threats, and how these were resolved.

To explore the politics of human security might address a challenge identified by Owen. According to Owen (2010:48), “the literature on human security is contested on which humans are to be protected, when, and how, as well as what, precisely their security entails. This has led to a proliferation of definitions, numerous conceptualisations for categorising the literature, and to a proliferation of its use for widely varying purposes.” From a catalogue of uses for human security pinpointed by Owen (2010:43), this study looks at human security as a policy tool of government and as a critical tool to analyse and critique state power. The latter objective is achieved by use of ideas emanating from CSS.

4. A critical theory perspective of human security

CSS emerged as one of the bodies of literature opposed to the realism of traditional security studies and has since grown to have different branches which include the Welsh, Coppenhagen, and Paris schools. As far as Booth (2007:40) is concerned, “…there is an identity problem with respect to critical approaches to security: which school or individual is in or out of CSS? Students often talk of CSS as an ‘it’, but in reality there are enormous (and unbridgeable) gulfs between some of the approaches which are deemed to be ‘in’.” There are two broad views on what constitutes CSS according to Wyn-Jones (1999:ix). From one point of view CSS is a broad church which encompasses all the approaches to security opposed to traditional security studies dependent on narrow meta-theoretical assumptions associated with realism. “According to this view, CSS does not constitute a distinct approach in itself, but is rather a collection of disparate approaches whose central presumptions and concerns may well be mutually contradictory” (Wyn-Jones 1999:ix). The second view, which Wyn-Jones subscribes to, sees CSS as a distinctive theoretical project in its own right. For reasons already alluded to in Chapter 1 and further elaborated below this study aligns with the first eclectic approach.
At least one realist scholar has been honest enough to proclaim that “no single theory – including realist theories – can explain all details of international politics.” (Lynn-Jones 2008:22). It is not far-fetched to assume that the same applies with security theories as well. For this reason the study will not restrict itself to a single lineage of critical theoretical thought but would rather have the added advantage of benefitting from more than one school. Besides contending, theories can complement each other to depict the complete picture of the security domain. This enriches knowledge production and enhances understanding of security practice. Consider for example that on the one hand, realism can still be used to explain the behaviour of states. It can clarify why states continue to procure arms even in an era where non-military threats are more prevalent and imminent. Realist ideas like national interest might explain why the South African government purchased military hardware at an exorbitant initial cost of R 30 billion in the “arms deal” in 1998. This was at a time when socio-economic challenges of unemployment, poverty, and inequality posed more of an existential threat in the lives of the majority of South Africans than an armed incursion from a neighbouring state, say, Lesotho. On the other hand, the various strands of critical security studies with their human centric ideals can elucidate knowledge on “new security issues” affecting ordinary people at a micro-level on a daily basis.

The methodology of using a combination of theoretical schools to construct a conceptual framework is not new. Ken Booth (2007) uses this approach in his acclaimed book, “Theory of World Security”, by combining four traditions to establish a theory of world politics which leads him to a comprehension of contemporary security [and by implication human security]. The four critical traditions are the Frankfurt School, the Gramiscan and Marxists traditions as well as the critical international relations theory. The result is a critical theory of security which is simultaneously a theoretical commitment and a political orientation. Theoretically, Booth (2007:30) hopes “this body of ideas provides a framework for reconceptualising the ontology, epistemology, and praxis of security” and “as a political orientation it is informed by the aim of enhancing world security through emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels, including the potential community of all communities – common humanity.”

4.1 Securitisation theory and human security

The 1990s and post 9/11 world unveiled the interdependent nature of the concepts of security and development connected by the notion of human security. As Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat (2007:9-10) put it, “using the notion
of ‘human security’, for example, security has been ‘developmentalised’ in the sense that a number of basic human needs have been suggested as being indispensable for the survival of the individual.” Now, the broad nature of human security as a concept on its own makes it complicated and hard to define. Think of Paris (2001:92) as he frustratingly asks “if human security is all these things, what is not?”, as he combs through a number of laundry lists offered by various scholars regarding what they consider to be human security issues. By contrast, when national security is defined by statist and narrow militaristic terms it is easier to identify the enemy and security threats as well as mitigating strategies. The problem in South Africa as Hough (2003:1) contends is a lack of precise demarcation of what issue constitutes a national security issue, or when does an article of human insecurity get into the realm of national security to be treated with the urgency it deserves. Human security as a phenomenon under the auspices of the widened security agenda of the contemporary post-Cold War world can be analysed and understood using the securitisation theory.

The idea of securitisation emerged when a group of scholars became concerned with how the concept of security might be rendered useless by simply being appended to a long range of issues under the widened security agenda. The concerned scholars include Buzan, Waever, and others who worked with them at the Copenhagen School (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:75-76). Although developed to comprehend security from the point of view of liberal democratic Western states (McDonald 2008:577), the securitisation framework can be applied to South Africa too. This is because a glance through South Africa’s constitution indicates the country is modelled on liberal Western democratic states.

One way to understand how securitisation theory is relevant for this study is to read through Waever’s journal article titled “Politics, security, theory”. Waever’s (2011:466) exposition on the politics of securitisation highlights one of three different research areas as that where “it might be used to refer to empirical studies of political processes of securitisation and desecuritisation (knowledge about politics)”. In other words, the politics of securitisation/desecuritisation can generate knowledge on who does and resists securitisation on what, how and with what effect and so on. The focus in this study is on matters securitised, within a human security paradigm, by the DoD and SANDF and how this interplay pens out with other sectors of society from a civil-military relations outlook. This kind of analysis ought to further assist in the assessment of the research questions around operationalisation of human security and functions performed by the SANDF.
To extrapolate how all these dynamics play out it is necessary to know what securitisation is and how it occurs.

To be sure, securitisation has to do with speech acts in which persons of authority (usually politicians and government bureaucrats) identify an existential threat to a referent object and subsequently mobilise emergency measures to deal with the threat (McDonald 2008:567; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:76). Sjostedt (2007:238) gives examples of the extraordinary measure which could be instituted by the state as the use of violence, a veil of secrecy, and sidestepping normal public policy process. The spectrum of securitisation then involves a process wherein issues move from being non-politicised, to being politicised, and ultimately being securitised. Buzan and Hansen (2009:214) elaborate on the securitisation process as thus:

… a spectrum can therefore be defined ranging public issues from the non-politicised (‘the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision’) through politicised (‘the issue is part of public debate and decision’) to securitisation (in which case an issue is no longer debated as a political question, but dealt with at an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules).

The securitisation process cannot be an easy sequential process since it involves politicisation and by extension public policy. Anyone remotely familiar with public policy would know it is a contested terrain in terms of what should be its contents and how it should be implemented, or even the procedure it should follow. The policy process (with the analytically distinct but practically interdependent stages of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adaptation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation) should be seen as political phenomenon as it involves conflict between individuals, groups, and agencies who sometimes have opposing “ideas, interests, values, and information on public policy issues” (Anderson 2006:5). To strengthen the point about the political and contested nature of securitisation one can cite the controversy surrounding the renovations at the private residency of current South African president, Jacob Zuma. On the one hand, some members of the executive have come out in defence of state expenditure on renovations at Zuma’s private residency in Nkandla. For example, Minister of Public Works, Thulas Nxesi (2013) claimed that “South Africans would agree that the security of the head of state is paramount and non-negotiable. Accordingly, all our actions are aimed at ensuring national security.” In contrast, sections of South African (civil) society have challenged the contention of Nkandla renovations as being
a matter of “national security”. A public statement by the Right2Know (2014) campaign condemned the handling of the Nkandla matter by the security cluster ministers as an abuse to national security which pointed to a “trend towards more security-statist approaches” by government.

Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010:78-79) explain with more modality of how securitisation occurs. They tell that security starts with a “speech act” when a state representative speaks to an audience and represents some referent object as a “security” matter. This is a securitising move to which the audience listening to the securitising actor must agree for securitisation to succeed. A constructivist inter-subjective element is associated with securitisation in the sense that what a security actor presents as a security matter might not have any objective link, but the perception of the actor, to actual security threats. With the referent object in place, either military or non-military, the securitising actor then proceeds to mobilise state resources and undertake all necessary means to mitigate the perceived danger. Because securitisation implies certain actions, the functions executed by the SANDF will be scrutinised to see if they advanced human security and/or state security. From how securitisation unfolds as described, two facilitation conditions crucial for its success have been identified.

The one condition is that the securitising actor must have the social and political authority or wherewithal to convince an audience of the existence of an existential threat. For example, from a civil-military relations perspective, South African parliamentarians as the representatives of the people are empowered by the constitution to “speak” security. The second facilitating condition is that there must be a component of threat, danger, or harm with respect to the referent (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:79). It helps the process if the threat, danger or harm has historic ties. Notice that the securitisation process is dynamic and no one condition is sufficient on its own. For example, an authority with credentials to securitise will be able to do so in certain situations but not in others. Also, a historically security matter will not necessarily remain as such forever. The discursive construction of security offered by securitisation theory is without doubt useful as it has been applied to analyse human security related issues like “immigration, health, political dissidence and minority rights” (McDonald 2008:563). This interpretation makes it possible for securitisation theory to be relevant for the current study.

Through the reading of what has been said in speech acts (and even written statements) one can apply securitisation theory and detect those issues which
are or have been perceived as security threats by relevant authorities. Furthermore, the securitisation process as alluded to above suggests that once an issue has been conceived or constructed as a security matter then some actions are likely to be taken to mitigate the threat. In the context of this study, an application of the securitisation theory therefore will allow for an analysis to determine if differences exist between the lexis and praxis of human security in South Africa.

Save for being a useful analytic framework for the security analyst, securitisation theory is a valuable and powerful tool which government can use to lift a politicised issue into the realm of (national/state) security. Through the securitisation process, state resources can be mobilised to deal with issues affecting people expeditiously and with military precision. Professional militaries are generally known of effectively executing whatever tasks they are being given. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine the SANDF timely delivering infrastructure like roads and bridges to rural South Africa if all systems are in place. The South African government may have missed an opportunity to so use securitisation when 13 soldiers lost their lives and 27 were wounded during combat with Seleka rebels in the Central African Republic (CAR) from 22 to 24 March 2013 (Heitman 2013:6). Instead of explicitly framing the unfortunate incident as a matter of national security, the event was cloaked in a veil of secrecy. This left open a space for critics like Saunders (2013:154) to question the government’s decision to deploy the SANDF in the Democratic Republic of Congo on a more dangerous and offensive peace enforcement mission only six months after the CAR incident. Notwithstanding its positive characteristics, securitisation theory has some deficiencies which disciplined scholarly practice dictates should be interrogated.

Securitisation framework has certain analytic and normative weaknesses which can be exposed if one asks certain questions of the logic of the theory (McDonald 2008:568). How does a particular audience give consent for certain issues to be securitised? Where do those who have the right to ‘speak’ security get this right and how? To what extent are the alternative voices of security outside the recognised political authority silenced? These questions and the challenges they pose can perhaps be circumvented by considering the alternative conception of security advanced by the Paris School (another variant of the CSS). “For these theorists, security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only through specific speech acts that enable emergency measures” (McDonald 2008:570). As McDonald explains further, security
need not only be about speech act but it also has to take cognisance of those other security actors, say the media, who communicate security meanings without intent of strategic mobilisation of state resources. Such a conception would also allow for recognition of the cumulative everyday security practices like surveillance and border control by the military. Considering what is written about security, especially from an official government perspective, as opposed to only “speech acts” can also prove illuminating.

Furthermore, security is a context specific concept (Buzan 1991:16) which makes merely focusing on speech acts to be too narrow and negative. As McDonald (2008:574) asserts, “those in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security...become possible”. Hence to comprehend the securitisation agenda in South Africa it is vital to know the history and social dynamics of the country, its culture, identity, and national interests. For example, Jensen (2010:77-98), explores the security-development nexus in Cape Town after apartheid. Jensen argues that the nexus is context specific as embodied by the “war on gangs”. The balance of the nexus favoured security concerns over development because state officials stopped blaming apartheid as responsible for the insecurity and started to perceive residents, gangs in particular, as the problem. As part of his analysis into the nexus, Jensen looks at its political nature and also the historical legacies of state policies and practices under apartheid.

Another potential deficiency of securitisation theory is around the cardinal variable of referent object. McDonald (2008:574) criticises securitisation theory for its preponderant focus on the state, specifically the political elite and what they say, as opposed to the powerless and voiceless masses. Other modes of security thinking like post-structuralism and traditional security have a similar bias towards the state. McKinley (2013:118-134) speaks to the matter as he alleges that the ANC government has some oppressive practices akin to those of the beleaguered apartheid regime. To strengthen his argument McKinley presents as evidence the seemingly draconian laws like the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill and the Protection of State Information Bill that have been introduced by the ANC government. These pieces of legislation are directly related to the intelligence community but they might have an indirect effect on operations in the defence domain which is the focus of this study. McKinley also disapproves of the heavy handed manner in which the police have responded to service delivery and labour dispute protestors in a democratic South Africa. It is incumbent on this study to
investigate if similar restrictive and state biased legislation and practices have insidiously taken place from a defence sector perspective since 1994.

In sum, McKinley brought into focus a possible pernicious inclination to prioritise the state ahead of the people in democratic South Africa. This matter clearly needs further probing to establish the extent to which it is true. While securitisation theory can be criticised for being state-centric, the human security agenda which prioritises individuals and people in general can be advanced by a variant of CSS which takes security as human emancipation. This branch is also known as the “Welsh School” because prominent advocates like Ken Booth and Richard Wyn-Jones were based at the University of Aberystwyth in West Wales when they developed their ideas (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:18).

4.2 True human security: security as emancipation

An interesting version of CSS is of the kind lauded by Booth (1991:319) when he theoretically treats security and emancipation as two sides of the same coin. For Booth, the idea of emancipation should dominate thinking about security because as was seen in (Eastern) Europe in the 1960s and 1970s when themes of power and order took precedence the only thing achieved was military stability but not political stability as millions of people were oppressed. True security, which is tantamount to the absence of threats, can be achieved in an environment of emancipation. This is possible when people (as individuals and groups) are free not only of the constraints of war and the threat of war, but are also free of poverty, poor education, and political oppression amongst other such non-military threats. In this regard, the variable of strategic defence posture will reveal the extent to which the SANDF might have contributed to human security not only at home but in other countries on the continent.

Emerging strongly from Booth (1991:313-326) and his idea of emancipation is that at the interregnum brought about by the end of the Cold War was a prediction, which has mostly held true, of the decrease of interstate wars and a concomitant declining utility of force. Indeed, isolated events like Russia’s effective annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Biersack & O’Lear 2014:247-269) are a poignant reminder of why it is necessary to keep an army with capacity to defend the state if need be. But that cannot be the only preoccupation of defence forces given the large number security challenges countries have to manage. In light of serious capacity limitations and lack of resources, developing states like South Africa ought to be judicious with how they utilise
an asset like their military. This is as much a moral obligation as it is a practical imperative. Williams (2002:212) cautions against the inclination of developing states to have the principal responsibility of the military as security of sovereignty and territorial integrity and he proposes for this to be reconsidered. The viewpoint held by Williams is antithesis to South Africa's constitution which maintains that "the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and people" (RSA Constitution 1996:117).

In another incisive exposition, Williams (2001:57) argues that for a developing country like South Africa, the effective use of the military instrument can happen within the context of a broader human security policy framework in which there is political will in government, revised government policy and coordination of expanded defence efforts. Williams (2001:57-58) further elucidates that the relationship between defence and development can be interpreted in the following three ways:

1. Defence is an unnecessary luxury which takes the allocation of state resources away from vital socio-economic problems.
2. Although a non-productive expenditure and costly, defence is necessary in the context of political, geostrategic, and foreign policy considerations.
3. Defence can contribute not only to an environment which allows for development to take place, but it can also contribute to that development through some positive spill over effects.

Following from especially the last two positive interpretations and with an eye on the operationalisation of human security, this study thus adopts the definition of development used by Williams (2001:59). He describes it as “a wide-ranging concept referring to a marked and sustainable improvement in a country’s economic outputs, employment levels, political and social stability, psychological well-being and level of cultural and spiritual enrichment and harmony.” If development is understood in this manner, then certainly the SANDF had scope to contribute towards its attainment and ultimately ensure human security. By tracing what the SANDF has actually done since 1994 this study will be engaged not only in the exercise of ‘interpreting the world’. In true Marxian inspired CSS tradition the study will also be seeking to ‘change’ the world by perhaps proposing novel ways of practicing security in the concluding chapter.
Should the SANDF be found to have played an active and positive role in the struggle towards human security then that would be a validation of one of the key concepts in CSS. That is the “theory-practice nexus” concept which Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010:21) say is “the idea that theories of security inform security practices and vice versa.” It was mentioned already in chapter one that the new South African government of 1994 adopted defence policies of a human-centric nature as largely informed by theories emanating from the CSS inspired MRG. This study therefore has an interest in finding out if the new understanding of security effected meaningful change in the real world as observed from the security practices of the SANDF. This line of inquiry is interesting because one of the pillars of CSS is its objection to the military security of states which was previously dominant under the traditional approach to security (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:20).

If ever the SANDF were to play a part in development, then Booth’s vision of emancipation and (human) security might materialise. This would be as the SANDF provides not only a secure physical environment but also inputs into mechanisms to ensure people are free of those restraints like poverty and joblessness which hinder their full potential and ability to make life choices. China, Israel, and Senegal are some of the countries which make extensive use of their armed forces in operations other than war. These include reconstruction and development, internal stability and peace support operations (Williams 2002:213). The involvement of the military in other sectors of society must be done with circumspection because as apartheid South Africa notoriously demonstrated such participation could lead to a securitised society. Finally, the emancipation of people, and therefore their human security, can be enhanced in an environment where good civil-military relations are in place. A case can be made that with good civil-military relations in place the armed forces are unlikely to abuse their power and deliberately compromise human or state security. Also, with good civil-military relations the voice of the people can be heard and emancipation advanced, especially via meaningful participation of civil-society in the affairs of the defence sector.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to establish a theoretical framework which will make it possible to analyse South Africa’s official human security perceptions since 1994. As a point of departure the chapter delineated the somewhat discredited and anachronistic realist traditional security perceptions
which were dominant during the Cold War and before 1994 in South Africa. A major weak point of the traditional view of security was its fixation with military security of the state. In this conception security was tantamount to state security. However, in the period around the end of the Cold War there was a worldwide shift towards ‘new security thinking’ prioritising human security as opposed to only state security. This shift was led amongst others by academics aligned with critical theory, and more specifically CSS. The human security paradigm was also adopted by governments and intergovernmental organisations like the UN (see also Chapter 1). In the case of the new South African government that took office in 1994 the human security idea was adopted with the assistance of academics like those associated with a think tank called the MRG as well as civil society organisations like IDASA. Yet it is important to recognise that those idealists who embraced new security thinking in the form of human security and its democratic precepts faced some resistance from realist inclined thinkers. The antagonists included apartheid era veterans and some “hawks” in the ANC who wanted the strength of South Africa’s military to be maintained with traditional roles prioritised. In the end, the South African government thinking on defence policy was a mixture of influence from both sides of the debate as confirmed by Jordaan (2004:iii).

It was found that two strands of CSS most pertinent to answering the research questions as posed are securitisation theory and the branch which equates security and emancipation. Securitisation theory is relevant in that it can help in tracing what has been said (and written) about security and also trace possible measures to mitigate identified threats. In other words, securitisation theory can assist in the analysis of human security lexis and praxis in South Africa.

Since securitisation can be criticised for being state-centric to the potential detriment of ordinary people, it was found necessary to close this gap by also tapping into the second branch of CSS linked with emancipation. The latter branch is associated with the Welsh school and is categorically biased towards the well-being of individuals and people as it seeks meaningful change in their lives. To track the meaningful change the SANDF has potentially imposed, the study will in the following chapters look closely at its role in development. This will effectively be an analysis of human security and will be advanced by looking at the variables of strategic defence posture and actual tasks that have been performed by the SANDF. Assessing the variable of civil-military relations will reveal whether conditions were conducive for the attainment of human security.
CHAPTER 3
HUMAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS UNDER PRESIDENT MANDELA’S ADMINISTRATION: 1994-1999

1. Introduction

It could be argued that President Nelson Mandela laid the official foundation of South Africa’s human security paradigm when he historically addressed parliament as the first democratically elected president on 24 May 1994. Reference by the ANC to ideas of emancipation and freedom in such prescient policy documents like the Programme of Action (ANC 1949) and Ready to Govern (ANC 1992) suggests the liberation struggle was fundamentally about human security. For instance, the Programme of Action was devised in the context of a desire to overcome white domination and attain national freedom for African people. This was to be achieved by fighting for political independence as well as educational, economic, and cultural rights so as to increase the standard of living of the people (ANC 1949). Later on, the Ready to Govern document registered its disapproval over how for a number of decades the apartheid government militarised the state and society in its pursuit of security. Against this backdrop, the ANC promised the pursuit of security akin to human security in declaring the security agenda to be inclusive of political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions (ANC 1992). Clearly, Mandela’s parliamentary address was just officially endorsing what his organisation, the ANC, had been advocating for a long time.

Mandela (1994) said, “my government’s commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us to the pursuit of the goal of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear.” In identical language to that of the UNDP (1994:24), Mandela addressed two central components of human security, freedom from want and freedom from fear. It thus comes as no surprise when Ferreira and Henk (2009:503) find that South Africa is one of the countries that enthusiastically embraced the notion of human security from its inception in the 1990s as it was “infused” in domestic and foreign policy.

It is one thing to allude to human security precepts in speeches and policy documents but another to let these manifest in practice. The aim of this chapter is thus to analyse the connection between the lexical conception of human security and its impact on the SANDF from a practical point of view under Mandela’s administration. Analytically, the chapter has an outline dissected according to three variables. These are the defence posture adopted in 1994, the functions executed by the SANDF in fulfilment of its mandate as well as civil-military relations. Each of the three main subsections
will start off by establishing the link between the said variable and the concept of human security. Note that the subsequent chapter four, analysing the government of Mbeki, will follow a similar structure to this chapter by being divided into three variables. The link between the variables and human security will not be established in chapter four as it would have been done in this chapter.

2. South Africa’s strategic defence posture under Mandela

Human security is a concept that has been linked with foreign policy by some scholars. For example, Glasius (2008:33) notes that in 1998 Canada and Norway announced human security was going to be a key principle of their foreign policies moving forward. Such initiatives might have prompted Rosborova (2013) to conduct a study asking whether a foreign policy based on human security principles can contribute to peace. Rosborova (2013:35) comments that, “human security is a dynamic and practical policy framework to address wide spread and cross-cutting threats in a coherent and comprehensive manner through greater collaboration and partnership among governments, international and regional organisations and civil society and community-based actors.” If the assumption that foreign policy and human security are related is taken as valid, then it is possible to use strategic defence posture of country as variable to assess human security perceptions. This is because, as explained below, the high level concept of strategy is fundamentally about how government perceives and uses the military. In addition, as a powerful instrument at the disposal of government, the military is often used as a tool to advance foreign policy objectives and may also be used to pursue human security abroad.

The human security inclination to be concerned with security in foreign lands resonates with the traditional approach favoured not only by realist and neo-realist theorists, but also state authorities. Consider how the national security strategies of the US (2006) and the UK (2008) identify potential sources of physical insecurity for their own citizens as possibly rooted in failed and weak states (Beswick & Jackson 2011:8-9). Mandela (1994a) similarly identified the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a security threat for the rest of Africa. In this light the next section probes vital policy documents to understand the concerns of South Africa’s strategic defence posture. South Africa’s statement of intent, as represented by its defence posture, sets the scene for subsequent analysis of the tasks and functions performed by the SANDF.

It is necessary to clarify what it meant by strategic defence posture for purposes of this study before looking at South Africa’s policy documents and stance. Notwithstanding the fact that universally accepted definitions are uncommon in security studies, the then Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-
Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, offered a definition of posture. Simpson-Anderson (1997), presenting the annual policy review of the South African Navy at a conference organised by the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria, cited posture as “the combined strategic intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of a country, including the strength, disposition and readiness of its armed forces.” This definition is similar to Till’s (2008:95) description of strategy as the usage of the military by a nation state to achieve grand political objectives in war and in peace. According to Till, governments usually devise a grand strategy which uses the military in conjunction with other instruments like diplomacy and the economy. Consider also that it considered a norm for defence policy to be subordinate to government policy, including foreign policy (Cawthra 2003:47; RSA 1996a:4). Consequently, military plans and activities of the SANDF have to be consistent with, say, the economic development objectives of the South African government. This might explain the proposition, submitted in Chapter 1, which suggests that the SANDF is torn between its primary mandate and development responsibilities demanded by human security.

2.1 The policy framework of South Africa’s posture, 1994-1999

A good way to understand perceptions driving any organisation or country is to examine its policies and the remarks of its top executives. The most authoritative defence policies of the era under consideration include: the Constitution (RSA 1996), the White Paper on National Defence (RSA 1996) and the concomitant Defence Review (RSA 1998) as well as the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (RSA 1999). The latter document was compiled by the then Department of Foreign Affairs and the DoD with substantive inputs from parliamentary parties and civil society (RSA 1999:1). These seminal documents are commendable for the extensive consultative nature of their formulation. Kynoch (1996:450) even praises the 1995 draft of the White Paper on Defence for being “progressive” as it puts people atop the security agenda.

The conduct and posture of the SANDF is principally guided by section 200(2) of the Constitution. This article enjoins that “the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force” (RSA 1996:117). South Africa’s adoption of a fundamentally defensive posture was partly influenced by the policymaker’s desire to rid the country of its shameful past when it destabilised neighbouring states during apartheid. The de facto war of apartheid, “amongst other things left 1.5 million people dead, over 10 million displaced, approximately 20 million landmines, and a region [SADC] awash with small arms” (Williams 2000:77).
The foremost defence policy document during South Africa’s democratic transition, the White Paper on Defence, confirmed its overarching theme as transformation which was contextually rooted in three determining factors. These were the history of the armed forces in South Africa, the new strategic environment (internationally, regionally, and domestically) as well as the advent of democracy (RSA 1996a:7). In addition, transformation of the defence force was to be guided by 16 principles which mainly derived from the Constitution. The transformation principles were to have implications for the functioning and posture of the SANDF. Some of the salient principles earmarked to drive transformation were listed in the White Paper on Defence (RSA 1996a:7-8) as:

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural and needs of South Africa’s people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.
- The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.

In sum, national security in South Africa was to be sought by ensuring human security of South Africa’s people. This was to be achieved by a non-aggressive and collaborative approach to security and development with regional partners. The collaborative approach was reiterated in the White Paper on Peace Missions (RSA 1999). A core aspect of this White Paper relates to assisting people when conflict arises in foreign lands as critical to South Africa’s national interest. Because of its own negotiated settlement in ending apartheid the preferred mode of conflict resolution South Africa would use is negotiation. However, since each conflict has its own dynamics, in certain situations South Africa may have to send the SANDF on a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission (RSA 1999:5).

The rationale of treating each conflict on its merits might have led to South Africa behaving differently in different scenarios and consequently having a divergent defence posture. Diplomatic instruments like good offices and mediation as well as the military instruments have all been used in South Africa’s pursuit of peace and security on the African continent. But some have interpreted South Africa’s measured security engagement with Africa and the world as “without strategic context” (IISS 2013:489) and indicative of “schizophrenic” foreign policy (Bell 2007:17). To be fair to South Africa’s defence posture, strategic actions will naturally be inconsistent due to the contingent nature of the international political system and security dilemmas. Nathan (2005:361) concurs with this viewpoint as he contends that the problem in South Africa is in the sphere of strategy and not its “entirely
coherent” foreign policy. Indeed the South African government has been bold to proclaim that its foreign policy is shaped by its liberation struggle history and a biased desire for peace and security on the African continent (Ebrahim 2012:131; RSA 1999:20). Nothing is contradictory about these ideals which inform the country’s defence posture. The effect of this on the SANDF is that the broadened notion of security is a guide on how the South African government strives for peace on the continent with the military as a tool. In principle, South Africa’s defence posture was informed solidarity with the African continent. However, in reality, it is not always easy to act on principle. Consequently the next section gives an overview of the strategic milieu which may have influenced South Africa’s emerging posture under Mandela.

2.2 Strategic imperatives influencing South Africa's posture

The imperative to formulate policies suitable for a democracy during Mandela’s incumbency meant the SANDF was not utilised to maximum capacity, particularly in the regional and international spheres. This was due to a number of reasons. First, because of the absence of an integrated national security policy (Hough et al. 2007: Preface), military commanders were hard-pressed to produce a military strategy needed to execute the defence mandate.

Secondly, from a geostrategic and political perspective South Africa explicitly opted for a defensive and non-threatening posture so as to build confidence and encourage positive relationships with its neighbours in the region (RSA 1996a:20). A democratic South Africa had to be careful how it projected itself and was to be perceived on the continent given the track record of the erstwhile apartheid colossus (Landsberg & Monyae 2006:134; Nathan 2005:365). Thirdly, the changing nature of security discourse in the post-Cold War period determined South Africa’s defensive posture. According to Mabanga (2013:112-113), threat perceptions in South Africa shifted from exclusive focus on traditional (military) threats to incorporate non-traditional threats. Consequently, human beings in South Africa and elsewhere on the continent were taken as the referent object. The threats to the referent were perceived to be transnational in nature. These included “environmental destruction, the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, and cross border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms” (RSA 1996a:18). It therefore made sense for South Africa to pursue a common and collaborative security agenda which could increase human security not only for its citizens but for all people on the continent.
2.3 Manifestation of the strategic posture

South Africa’s defensive posture under Mandela meant the military was not going to be the first instrument of choice in the pursuit of the country’s foreign policy and security objectives. Also, Solomon (2003:8) notes that in favour of cooperative leadership South Africa eschewed “middle power leadership” which might have made regional neighbours apprehensive. Solomon explains that cooperative leadership is diffuse and seeks consensus amongst various stakeholders hence South Africa used dialogue and worked with Botswana and Zimbabwe to help resolve Lesotho’s constitutional crisis in October 1994.

It might be because of its defensive posture that Nathan (2004:7) found South Africa to have belonged to the “pacific” group as opposed to the “militarist” faction in the two polar extremes of conflict resolution within SADC. Nathan recalls that the latter faction consisting of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia responded to an appeal by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for military assistance in quelling a rebellion aimed at usurping power from President Laurent Kabila on 19 August 1998. As Chair of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe claimed the decision to assist the DRC by deployment of troops was taken under the auspices of SADC. However, the pacific faction led by South Africa and comprising of Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania pursued a diplomatic solution to the crises in the DRC when they convened an emergency summit in Pretoria on 23 August 1998. While the summit called by South Africa came out against military deployment in the DRC, Mandela later in September 1998 announced at a Non-Aligned Movement Summit in South Africa that his country was open to sending troops to the DRC, albeit only under the umbrella of the UN. The strategic turn-around was reportedly to ease tensions with Zimbabwe and to restore the unity of SADC. South Africa’s about turn, from initially being opposed to military intervention in the DRC to being amenable to the option, shows the difficulty of operationalising a strategic orientation.

South Africa’s strategic posture in relation to the DRC situation might suggest indecisiveness but it was different when it came to Lesotho. The South African government acted boldly and swiftly when it was called upon to intervene in a political crisis in Lesotho. The government moved with such haste to deploy the military that the decision seems to have caught some generals in the SANDF off guard as they later admitted to inadequate information and intelligence of the political situation in Lesotho (Barber 2004:115). In Nathan’s (2004:120) view, the military intervention was “riddled with strategic and operational errors” from a South African perspective. Errors may well have been committed but South Africa acted decisively nonetheless.
The crisis in Lesotho had been sparked by contested results of the elections held in May and culminated in a reported coup d’état in September 1998. Characteristically, diplomacy was South Africa’s chosen strategy when the trouble started in May 1998. South Africa reacted by sending a delegation comprising of Deputy President Mbeki, Minister of Defence Joe Modise, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo (Barber 2004:111). It was only when the situation became volatile that South Africa sent in the military in September 1998. Reportedly, on 22 September 1998, the day of the military intervention code named Operation Boleas, the armed South African forces first went to secure valuable water resources at Katse Dam and only later proceeded to handle mutineers and protesters in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho (Likoti 2007:257; Neethling 1999:2). Katse Dam is a critical component of the bilateral Lesotho Highlands Water Project which supplies much of the water to South Africa’s economically important industrial heartland of Gauteng.

According to Barber (2004:113) some political analysts and civil society representatives were of the view that South Africa intervened in Lesotho to advance its own national interests and regional hegemonic ambitions. This allegation is given credence by a thorny question which remains, why did the SANDF not deal first with the potentially life threatening situation in Maseru? Could it have been that South Africa’s national interests in the form of economic benefits accruing from the water project mattered more than the plight and lives of possibly distressed Basotho people? If that was the case then that is clearly irreconcilable with human security values which South Africa subscribes to. Human security is supposed to be an approach to security which prioritises people. Moreover, the freedom from fear component enjoins those with the means to ensure the physical well-being of the vulnerable, in this case the Basotho who might have been caught in the crossfire in the battle for power.

The sequence of events during Operation Boleas contradicts the moral obligation imposed by South Africa’s own undertaking to “participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples” (RSA 1999:20). On the other hand, the actions of the SANDF were perhaps consistent with an undertaking that South Africa will partake in peace missions if they advance its national interest (RSA 1999:19). The problem with national interest is that it does not always take human interests into consideration. Instead, national interest is a state-centric concept responsible for guiding state behaviour (Lantis 2002:92). For instance, history shows that national interest propelled the Cold War (Nye 1999:24). The follies of the Cold War and how it constrained human potential in certain parts of the world are well known. In spite of this, national interest and in particular the economic interest from Katse Dam seems to have influenced the actions of the SANDF in Lesotho.
In conclusion, the reluctance of the South African government to use the SANDF in both the DRC and Lesotho was consistent with its defensive posture orientation. Diplomatic initiatives were South Africa’s instrument of choice in conflict resolution. Furthermore, the cases of the DRC and Lesotho revealed the difficulty South Africa had in operationalising strategic principles since these sometimes clash with interests. Especially in the case of Lesotho, it seems South Africa’s principles of human security were in conflict with its other national interests. Irrespective of the means used resolve conflict on the African continent, the bottom line is that South Africa securitised regional stability as it recognised that internal disputes in one state may have spill over effects on neighbouring countries. Specifically, the South African government was of the view that “domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa’s long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region” (RSA 1996a:20). The idea of addressing poverty and pursuing reconstruction and development is compatible with human security thinking. Human security is, after all, fundamentally about addressing the root causes of human insecurity and conflict (Hendricks 2005:2). Clearly, from Mandela’s government there was a desire to achieve domestic and regional security by other means besides the military. This raises questions about the functions and tasks executed by the SANDF in the period 1994-1999.

3. Functions executed by the SANDF under Mandela

3.1 The policy debate on the role of the SANDF

The question around the functions executed by the SANDF is a perennial one about the role of the military in society. South Africa is not the only country to have grappled with this problem. Take the new British government instituting a substantive defence review as soon as it occupied office in May 2010 (Ritchie 2011:355). The objective was precisely to determine the role of the armed forces in British society, and ultimately the role of Britain herself could play in the pursuit of international peace and security. For the South African context, this debate can be characterised as the “primary-secondary role” debate (Vrey 2004:89). Primary tasks of the SANDF can be defined as those traditional military tasks any defence force performs. These include the defence of South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people (RSA 1996:117). Secondary tasks are any additional non-military tasks the defence force may be required to perform outside its primary function of protecting the country against external aggression (RSA 1996a:21). Examples of secondary tasks include “disaster relief, the provision and maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of South African citizens from high threat areas, protection of maritime and marine resources, and regional defence
cooperation” (RSA 1996a:24-25). A contextual background of the said debate is necessary because it influenced the functions actually performed by the SANDF.

Unsurprisingly, as South Africa was evolving into a democracy circa 1994, and given its divided past, the public policy agenda as to the future trajectory of the country was both conflated and contested. In the defence domain the contest was between two opposing schools of thought regarding the future role of the military (Esterhuyse 2010:4-5; Vrey 2004:96). The one camp was made up mostly of new and inexperienced government officials from the ANC. This cohort was inspired by idealism and liberal perspectives as they pushed for decreased military spending and for scarce resources to be redirected towards much needed socio-economic development. According to Esterhuyse (2010:4), the doves as the group was informally called had views “grounded in the peace studies movement, resulting in a strong emphasis on the so called new security paradigm in general and the notion of human security in particular.” Yet, it is crucial to note the difference of opinion in the ANC on the debate. As in any organisation, the leadership of the DoD had influence and power to steer the direction of the institution. The then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, as the political head of the DoD was a staunch “hawk” (Nathan 2005:370). Modise was convinced that South Africa had to buy weapons to protect herself and ensure prosperity (Kynoch 1996:446).

As a stalwart of the liberation struggle, it was surprising that Modise was in the same camp as his former arch-enemies. This is the second camp which wanted the SANDF to stay strong in its traditional military task of defending the state and they also advocated for the strong armaments industry to remain (Cawthra 2003:45; Esterhuyse 2010:5). The group was formed of bureaucrats from the previous DoD and old hands from the apartheid military. Even though they recognised that change was inevitable, they still had conservative views informed by realism. For example, as arms procurement discussions were started by cabinet in late 1998, Modise vouched for a “visionary” decision which will allow South Africa to participate in the competitive international arms industry (Dube 2015:2).

3.2 Impact of the policy debate on the SANDF

On a practical level, the outcome of the debate was a compromise between the contending views. In the first instance, the compromise was several documents reiterating that the “primary object” of the SANDF was to play a traditional military role (RSA 1996:117; RSA 1996a:7). Simultaneously, it was acknowledged that South Africa “is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat, and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short to medium term” (RSA 1996a:17).
question then is, if policymakers anticipated no external threat against state, what was the rationale of retaining the primary role of the SANDF to be defence against external aggression? In the end, the compromise position was that the SANDF could be deployed for secondary functions outside defence against external aggression when the need arose (RSA 1996:24). For Jordaan (2004:iii), the outcome of the debate on defence policy in South Africa was a compromise between realism and idealism since neither state or individual security was prioritised as more important than the other.

The area of defence budget is another demonstration of the contradictions of Mandela’s era. Mandela (1996) proclaimed, “as should be expected, the new political milieu has dictated that we scale down the resources allocated to the defence force…” Indeed the defence budget as a proportion of GDP had declined from 4.1% in 1988 to 1.4% by 1998 (Esterhuyse 2010:6). This was consistent with of the 1996 White Paper on Defence which recommended that some resources of the defence be redirected towards socio-economic priorities under the government’s flagship project, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (RSA 1996a:6-7). The prudent trend of defence budget cuts was reversed in 1999 when parliament approved the controversial Strategic Defence Package (SDP), colloquially the “arms deal” for an initial estimated amount of R 30 billion (Nathan 2005:369). Barber (2004:121) says the SDP included sophisticated weapons in the form of warships like surface vessels and submarines as well as fighter aircraft. Barber (2004:121) highlights that the controversy following the arms deal “reflected fundamental differences about the nature of threats to the society and the use to be made of the armed forces.”

3.2.1 Internal deployment of the SANDF

The SANDF was mostly used internally for so-called “secondary” tasks during Mandela’s tenure. Commendable examples of the SANDF playing its social part in 1996 include the South African Air Force (SAAF) saving 300 lives during floods while the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) provided medical services at provincial hospitals when there was labour unrest (Haefele 1998:53). Other secondary tasks in which the military acquitted itself well include supporting the police in fighting crime and political violence, assisting in voter registration and securing elections (Mandela 1994b; 1996; 1997). Three tables of statistics below from the SANDF Operational Division (in Haefele 1998:50-52) serve to illustrate the kind of contribution the military made when in fighting crime in the area of borderline protection. The statistics are a breakdown over a seven month period, 01 January -31 July 1997, with comparative totals for the corresponding period in 1996 also provided. Table 1 illustrates that the number of arrests by the SANDF involving illegal border crossings at eight South African provinces was
a sizeable 26 746. Table 2 shows the number of recovered illegal small arms in the categories of hand guns, home-made guns, AK 47 rifles and other rifles. Table 3 depicts other operational successes of the SANDF as in the arrests of criminals, confiscation of dagga and mandrax as well as the recovery of stolen cars and livestock. The potential social benefit accrued from the contribution of the SANDF in these operations is priceless in that they can avert organised crime and save lives and livelihoods.

**TABLE 1: ARRESTS BY THE SANDF INVOLVING ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS**

(1 JANUARY – 31 JULY 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N-Prov</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>E-Cape</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>N-West</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>N-Cape</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>5 985</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>3 138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>2 206</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2 314</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>1 675</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3293</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>1 264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 707</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>2 050</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3821</td>
<td>18 632</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 302</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26 746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2: ILLEGAL WEAPONS FOUND BY THE SANDF**

(1 JANUARY – 31 JULY 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hand Guns</th>
<th>Home made</th>
<th>AK-47 Rifles</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1 182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMPARATIVE PERIOD OF 1 JANUARY – 31 JULY 1996: TOTAL OF 26 961**

**COMPARATIVE PERIOD OF 1 JANUARY – 31 JULY 1996: TOTAL OF 1734**
TABLE 3: OTHER OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES (1 JANUARY – 31 JULY 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dagga (kg)</th>
<th>Confiscated value</th>
<th>Mandrax</th>
<th>Criminals arrested</th>
<th>Stolen cars</th>
<th>Stolen livestock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>4 120</td>
<td>R4 120 000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>6 428</td>
<td>R6 428 000</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>R1 500 000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>6 353</td>
<td>R6 353 000</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2 918</td>
<td>R2 918 00</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>1 745</td>
<td>R1 745 000</td>
<td>2 171</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>3 887</td>
<td>R3 887 000</td>
<td>1 142</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26 951</td>
<td>R26 951 000</td>
<td>3 803</td>
<td>2 692</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparative Period: 1 Jan – 31 Jul 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dagga (kg)</th>
<th>Confiscated value</th>
<th>Mandrax</th>
<th>Criminals arrested</th>
<th>Stolen cars</th>
<th>Stolen livestock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38 455</td>
<td>R38 455 000</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2 653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SANDF was able to perform well as indicated even though secondary tasks were never catered for in terms of organisational structure, resources and equipment (Esterhuyse 2012:235; Ferreira & Henk 2009:507). The claim by Esterhuyse (2012:235) that “very few of the South African military programmes can be considered as human security-related” is given weight by the policy statement that “inappropriate use of military forces in non-military activities is economically inefficient” (RSA 1996a:25). Nonetheless, the SANDF did perform secondary and human security related tasks using the unique capabilities and inherent collateral utility deriving from the primary capacity.

Fighting crime was particularly important and contentious for Mandela’s administration. Crime during this time remained “the greatest threat to individual security” and levels were “amongst the highest in the world” (Cawthra 2003:50). Mandela (1997) even identified criminal networks operating at some of the country’s commercial entry points as a threat to national security. While having previously acknowledged crime as a major security concern, Mandela (1999) also rejected the tendency by some people in the country to politicise the problem. Mandela (1996) had also earlier indicated that “the national effort to improve the quality of life of the people means also that each citizen and each community should enjoy security in the home, at work and in the street.” In other words, Mandela was saying if South African inhabitants were to be ‘free from want’ then this should be enjoyed in an environment ‘free of fear’. In the end, the issue of crime is an example of a ‘new’ security matter that was successfully securitised in South Africa. The issue was first politicised and then government authorities took the
emergency measure of deploying the army to mitigate the problem. Also, crime was so rife that it is not difficult to imagine sections of the population supporting the securitisation. The SANDF contributed to one aspect of human security, freedom from fear, by assisting in the battle against crime.

3.2.2 Limited external deployment of the SANDF

External deployment of the SANDF during Mandela’s tenure was limited to small specialist teams in support of UN missions. One of the reasons for this was practical feasibility or constraints (RSA 1999:24). Accordingly, with the exception of a number of specialist tasks like logistics and airlift, South Africa could not have provided troops to the UN or any other international organisation for a peace mission between 1990 and 1998. The government had recognised that its forces were not experienced enough to be part of peace missions hence as early as 1995 some members of the SANDF started to receive overseas training in preparation for possible external deployment in the future. It stands to reason that foreign deployment of the SANDF was impeded by on-going processes of professionalisation, transformation and integration. The focus back then, 1994-1999, was creating a single defence force with the legitimacy to represent the interests of all who lived in South Africa. In addition, systematic budget reductions along with deployment of the army to quell political violence and crime within the country made it difficult for the SANDF to deploy on external missions.

In addition to providing specialised teams for UN missions, the SANDF also undertook a number of humanitarian aid operations during disasters on the African continent. Heinecken (2002:73) notes the relief operations undertaken by the SANDF to include: humanitarian aid in the form of provision in medical supplies, food and clothing after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994-1995; recovery of victims of a sunken ferry in Lake Victoria, Tanzania in 1996; search and rescue operations following heavy snowfall in Lesotho in 1996; and flood relief operations in Mozambique in 1997 and again in March 1999. It is mostly specialised teams who were involved in these missions. Indeed Heitman (2003:19) was to argue later in general terms that to have its leadership role taken seriously South Africa will have to put some troops on the ground and at risk in security operations in Africa. However, as the biggest and most industrialised economy on the continent, South Africa should use its comparative advantage and focus on specialised roles like “airborne forces, inter-theatre airlift and sealift, combat helicopters, fighters capable of independent operation, patrol aircraft, and warships able to patrol for extended periods” (Heitman 2003:19).
3.3 The SANDF’s contribution (to freedom from want)

Unfortunately, successful securitisation did not happen with another important element of human security. This is the freedom from want element composed of socio-economic challenges facing ordinary people. Government did characterise socio-economic challenges like poverty, unemployment, poor education and housing amongst others as a security matter when it declared that they pose “the greatest threats to the South African people” (RSA 1996a:6). However, the securitising move was incomplete as security organs were not given extra resources or legal mandate to deal with these ‘threats’. Perhaps the securitising move was not complete because as Jensen and Buur (2007:45) highlight, political parties in the South African parliament agreed on the securitisation of socio-economic factors but could not agree on implementation strategies in mitigation. As Mabanga (2013:97) found, the role of security organs like the military in handling non-military threats was not properly defined in South Africa. The SANDF was therefore envisaged to play an indirect role if circumstances allowed. According to Haefele (1998:53), Minister Modise expressed confidence in parliament that the collateral utility of the SANDF in addition to good training and equipment would enable the military to discharge its secondary tasks. It becomes evident that in South Africa there was no systematic focus by the military on human security activities in such sectors as health, environmental, and food security. The little contribution by the SANDF in these sectors was indirect and ad-hoc.

Certainly, economic development, an important component of human security, is one area in which the defence sector stood to contribute to South Africa, and the Africa region at large. Consider that in 1997 the South African Navy contributed immensely to the protection of South Africa’s extensive maritime resources. According to Simpson-Anderson (1997), the Navy assisted with other government organs like the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism is patrolling the coastline to ensure maritime law enforcement and prevent illicit activities like pollution, piracy, and the smuggling of drugs and weapons. The defence sector was also an important force multiplier for South Africa’s economy. In a country with massive unemployment rates, it is surely a good thing that the state owned Denel and 700 private companies employed about 50 000 people, while the acquisition of weapons and associated equipment procured by South African security forces from the local arms industry totalled R2.663 billion in 1996/97 (RSA 1998a:309). Such high military expenditure is good to increase the industrial base and create more jobs for countries like South Africa with a relatively developed military industry (Muepu 1998:68).

Furthermore, the DoD helped with employment despite the 1998 Defence Review recommending that the armed forces be downsized to 70 000 from
about 90 000 (RSA 1998:102). While an argument can be made that personnel in the employ of the military are not necessarily involved in productive economic activity, it can also not be denied that those in the military earn a salary and provide for their families. This eases the welfare burden of the state. The military also has capacity to produce astounding citizens who can add to society in other capacities. As Muepu (1998:69) puts it, “the military elite produced by the armed forces are important agents of development and are asserted to be competent to address such varied development problems as inflation, land reform, democratic voting systems, infrastructure development, and national security issues.”

In a speech on the occasion of the South African National Defence Day, Mandela (1994) spoke of the imminent establishment of Service Corps aimed at social upliftment projects as well as equipping soldiers with life skills and advanced training. The Service Corps was eventually established in 1998 and its immediate responsibility was to provide vocational skills training to soldiers not absorbed into the SANDF during integration (Vuthela 2003:35). Later, when the integration process was completed, the Service Corps served to skill SANDF members who could be redeployed within the DoD or be efficient elsewhere in society. Some members of the community were also trained “in a type of outreach programme” (Vuthela 2003:35). Williams (1998:32) also notes that through the Service Corps and a number of projects in the literacy and health fields as well as road construction and water provision the SANDF had supported the RDP.

Government could have done more to construct socio-economic challenges faced by South Africa as security threats. This could have made it easier to mobilise resources and have the military play a more systematic role. As Williams (1998:33) argues, the military has superior organisational abilities and ought to be used more as a policy instrument of the state whenever other government departments are unable to deliver on their mandate. The South African government under Mandela was however reluctant to use the military systematically and to maximum effect. In fact, it was unequivocally put that “the government is disinclined to employ the SANDF in socio-economic development. Such employment blurs the distinction between the military and civilian sphere” (RSA 1996:25). Clearly, sensitivity around potential militarisation of society played a role and impacted on the way SANDF was used by government. The next section thus analyses the variable of civil-military relations in the context of the human security paradigm initiated by Mandela.
4. Civil-military relations under Mandela

Human security as a government policy tool is rooted in governance (Beswick & Jackson 2011:3). In turn, professionalism, a derivative of good governance, can be associated with the concept of civil-military relations (Huntington 1957:7). Moreover, “nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security” (Huntington 1957:2). Security institutions, including the military, if left unchecked have a tendency to act in an unprofessional and extrajudicial manner which in the end can leave them unwilling or incapacitated to provide security to the state or individuals (Ball 2004:511; Brzoska 2003:30). A state where security organs act above the law may ultimately wither into a failed or collapsed state. This is because so long as the people in a state are insecure it will be a fallacy to talk of real security regardless of the strength of the state security apparatus. Apartheid South Africa is quintessential in this regard, and transformation naturally had to happen when the democratic dispensation took over in 1994.

This process where state security institutions are reconstructed and restructured is known as Security Sector Transformation (SST) (Williams 2001:1-34). At its core transformation is about advancing the security of the people and safeguarding their emancipation. As Beswick and Jackson (2011:3) put it, “Security Sector Reform (SSR) [a concept used interchangeably with SST by Williams (2001:1-34)]...takes in a wide range of policy interventions aimed at establishing democratic control over security forces in order to ensure ‘human security’.” In other words, human security is only possible in an environment where democratic principles of accountability, transparency, professionalism, and responsible use of state power are observed for the benefit of the people.

The 1996 White Paper on Defence describes civil-military relations as “the hierarchy of authority between the executive, parliament, and the armed forces, and to civil supremacy over these forces” (RSA 1996a:9). This definition accentuates the inviolability of the principle civil supremacy over the armed forces. It is not surprising that this is how Mandela’s government viewed civil-military relations. As Esterhuyse (2012:231) notes, from a civil-military relations’ perspective, Mandela’s government was concerned about the still predominantly white SANDF. Yet, civil-military relations are not simply about mechanisms of civil control as they are equally about partnerships built between the military, political elites, and civil society (Ferreira 2007:248; Williams 2001a:6-12). Segell (2000:204) more satisfactorily says “civil-military relations involve a multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military men, institutions and interests on the other... it is the foundation
of the management of the use of armed force and the armed forces.” How the armed forces are used and managed can go a long way in determining whether they serve the security interests of the state and/or the people.

Cawthra (2003:38) observes that “acutely aware of the anti-democratic role played by the South African Defence Force (SADF), and the relative lack of civil supervision of security organisations during the apartheid period, the incoming ANC-led government went to considerable lengths to ensure not only that civilians had a security policy role, but also that control and supervision was strongly vested in democratic structures.” To ensure a situation in which the armed forces could be subordinate to civilian authority South Africa had to introduce governance policies which addressed issues such as institutional transformation; civil control, parliamentary oversight, and accountability; and management of the budget (RSA 1996a:9-10).

SST stands a better chance of being successfully implemented in a situation where strong Westphalian state structures are present (Egnell & Halden 2009:28). With regards to the military, according to Modise (1997) the government prioritised civil control via the Constitution (RSA 1996), and policy frameworks like the White Paper on Defence (RSA 1996a). The Constitution (1996:118) saliently confers the President of South Africa as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces and also importantly provides for the establishment of a civilian secretariat of defence. Furthermore, in the interest of transparency and accountability it is codified that parliamentary committees must be in place to exercise oversight over all security services including the defence (RSA 1996:117). More specifically, according to Modise (2004:47), the premier parliamentary committee dealing with Defence, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), was established in terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution. The committee is mandated “to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force and to perform such other functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the Force as may be described by law” (RSA 1993:150). These measures were put in place so as to transform the state and its institutions like the military to serve as the base on which development could thrive and security of the people ensured.

The monumental transformation process included integrating former enemies from statutory and non-statutory forces to establish a single defence force demographically representative of South African society, and according to Mandela (1996) was an invaluable symbolic illustration of state building. The integration process simultaneously increased legitimacy and professionalised
the SANDF. However, integration was not without its challenges. Problems included unfair treatment and racism experienced by former non-statutory forces as well as lapses of discipline (Modise 1997). The disciplinary problems were evident as soon as the integration process started in 1994. This was as thousands former non-statutory forces staged marches, protests, and handed over petitions at various military bases as they were frustrated by discriminatory practices during integration (Cock 1995:103). However, the political leadership like Modise and his Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kassrils, were assertive in their authority and declared that while they acknowledged problems with the bureaucracy of integration they were at the same time not going to tolerate racism and ill-discipline in the new Defence Force (Cock 1995:104; Modise 1997). At least towards the end of term of the first democratic administration, Minister Modise (1999) was confident to tell members of the diplomatic corps and media that tensions of the earlier period around 1994 had been allayed and the military was now “stable, loyal and professional, and have shown that they can get on with the job.”

Tensions between the political authority and the troops on the ground were not the only source of concern in the early years of democracy as there were bureaucratic pathologies within the DOD itself. Cawthra (2003:39-40) explains that following extensive deliberation the DOD settled on an administrative model known the “balanced model” wherein the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary of Defence remained on the same hierarchical level just under the Minister of Defence as the political head. Modise (1997) explained that under this model the Chief of Defence was responsible for the command of the SANDF and military advice to the department while the Secretary would be responsible for policy component. Amongst other reasons, this model was difficult to implement because civilian expertise on defence policy was lacking owing to the esoteric and exclusionary nature of military since the mid-1960s (Cawthra 2003:40).

A more positive aspect of South African civil-military relations in the aftermath of apartheid is the role that parliament, especially its energetic defence oversight committees, were able to play. Williams (2001a:17) attributes the robust nature of parliamentary oversight that was developing in South Africa to the mass based tradition that led to independence alongside the space afforded for civil society participation in national governance. According to Griffiths (2008:230-232), civil-military relations upon South Africa’s democratisation were taken so seriously that two parliamentary oversight committees were established. These were the JSCD and the Portfolio Committee on Defence. The former focussed on legislative matters regarding defence and to exercise oversight over the executive while the latter was to oversee transformation of the SANDF regarding its preparedness and morale, budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, and policy. Regarding
interrelationships the committees had with other stakeholders of the defence, Griffiths (2008:230-231) observes that the proportional representation electoral system in South Africa makes it likely that parliamentarians will tow the party line on policy issues. However, the committees, especially the JSCD dominated by ANC party bureaucrats, had political clout which ostensibly allowed for its independent functioning from the executive. On the other hand, initial relations between the committees and the bureaucracy in the military, especially the old guard from the SADF, were tense as the latter was not used to parliamentary scrutiny.

Civil society participation is another indispensable avenue of scrutiny of the armed forces in a democratic setting. While civil society can play a constructive role in ensuring desirable outcomes of defence policy, Williams (2001a:18-19) also warns that civil society can sometimes pursue partisan interests. It is therefore prudent that civil society motives, capabilities and representativeness be taken into cognisance when it participates as a stakeholder in civil-military relations. Mandela (1994) gave an early indication that under the ANC government civil society would be welcome to play a role in partnership with state institutions to construct a better South Africa for all. This made sense as scholars like Ball (2004:51) and Edmunds (2002:10) have stressed civil society as an important stakeholder of the security sector, and by extension, sound civil military relations. One area where civil society can play a role is in policy formulation. As an example, new and inexperienced South African policymakers received a lot of help from civil society in formulating defence and security related policies during the democratisation process (Cawthra 2005:97; 100).

Mandela added his voice to the policy role of civil society when he accepted the Africa Peace Award from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, a civil society organisation. Mandela said a continent wide network in which governments and civil society partner together to deal with the initiatives around conflict resolution, peace, and security was necessary. He continued that, “through such a continental network, we can strengthen Africa’s monitoring capacity, research on how to prevent and eliminate conflict, and impart the skills of mediation. This would draw on work of this kind that is already being done in many parts of Africa by research centres, universities and other institutions” (Mandela 1995).

Related to the policy use of civil society, another purpose it can fulfil is that of authenticating and legitimising solutions proposed to solve security and socio-economic challenges of people at grass root level. This is because genuine and effective civil society organisations have networks of skills, organisation and geographic reach which governments do not necessarily possess. This is to say civil society organisations can give a voice to the voiceless. Hearing the
marginalised is a small but significant part of true emancipation. It can ultimately lead to human security. This type of thinking is vital in critical theory which has the objective of depicting the world as it “really” is (Mills 2004:22). An important stakeholder like civil society might be indispensable in having a vision and true perception of the world.

South Africa did well by judiciously attempting to transform its military and other state institutions. As Brozoska (2003:13) and Fukuyama (2004:29) note, development theory long acknowledged strong and capable state institutions as indispensable for good governance, stability, and development. Governance is about efficient and effective provision of public goods (Edmunds 2002:3). It goes without saying that security is an indispensable public good since it allows people to live without fear and to enjoy government services. A transformed security sector with capacity to observe good governance and operate within the limitations of the law is very important in society. Human security becomes possible with a security sector that knows its limitations and sticks to its job.

5. Conclusion

This chapter examined and analysed the human security paradigm under Mandela’s administration, 1994-1999. This was a time epitomised by the transformation of South Africa into a democracy at home and conversion from a pariah to a paragon in international relations, particularly with neighbouring countries in SADC. Subsequently, South Africa started to pursue the ideal of human security, and many of its policy documents and public pronouncements by senior government officials were laden with principles sensitive to the needs of the people. Three variables were used to explore whether proclamations by government were matched by practice as carried out by the SANDF. The mixed outcomes should have been expected because transformation is not an easy process. The thinking and actions of the government and the SANDF reflected a combination of realpolitik considerations and human security ideals.

On the first variable of strategic defence posture, the South African government purported a defensive strategic posture as well as a principled preference of pacific means of conflict resolution on the African continent. However, the case of a military intervention in Lesotho and a turnabout regarding the use of peacekeeping forces in the DRC served to demonstrate that it is not always easy to act on principle given the exigencies of realpolitik in international relations. Perhaps this points to a weakness of humanitarian intervention based on human security. As Newman (2001:244) points, intervention is often based on vested national interests and is ad-hoc as there is no consensus on who, when, and how to intervene. Nevertheless, South
Africa under Mandela sought to achieve peace and security on the African continent based on the premise that the country’s own state security and human security could not be guaranteed so long as there was instability on the continent.

The second variable of functions and tasks performed by the SANDF served to demonstrate how human security can be achieved using the military. Firstly, when duty called, the army did well in ensuring freedom from fear in supporting the police to fight crime and curb political violence as well as border control. In addition, the SANDF responded to calls for help by other government departments such as when search and rescue missions had to be conducted during natural disasters, but because the freedom from want aspect of human security was partly securitised, the SANDF played only a limited developmental or economic role for example. Also, South Africa’s exorbitant procurement of weapons through the arms deal went against the letter of human security as conceptualised by the UNDP (1994). The clarion call by the UNDP is for security to be pursued through development rather than arms. The arms deal confirmed the status of the SANDF as an organisation primarily designed to protect the country against hostile enemies even though in practice ‘secondary’ tasks were performed. The arms deal also showed that while policymakers professed human security in their language, on the other hand they could not shake off the weight imposed by the responsibility to ensure state security. The politics around the arms deal, spanning both Mandela and Mbeki’s administration, will be discussed further in the next chapter in an analysis of evolving civil-military relations in South Africa.

Lastly, the variable of civil-military relations is one where little contradiction existed between lexis and praxis. South Africa’s largely successful SST process laid a good foundation for sound civil-military relations which stand any country in good stead in the pursuit of security. With the notorious role of the SADF in mind, the new government of Mandela prioritised civil control of the armed force. As such, civil-military relations were defined in a way that reflected a statist paradigm of hierarchy and authority but one which took into consideration contrasting viewpoints as indicated by willingness to work with civil society formations. With ultimate authority over the SANDF vested in the president, checks and balances were ensconced in the constitution so that parliament and its subcommittees could play an oversight role of how the armed forces are used. The broadly consultative nature of policy formulation in the period 1994-1999, and the substantive role of civil society in this led to “progressive” security policies. Thus the SANDF and DoD gained legitimacy and accountability of the military became a possibility. More importantly, as
Mandela had envisioned, security became a prospect for the people of South Africa to go along with the relatively assured state security.
CHAPTER 4

HUMAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS UNDER PRESIDENT MBEKI’S ADMINISTRATION: 1999-2009

1. Introduction

It is clear from the preceding chapter that South Africa, under the leadership of Mandela, laid the foundation upon which a people-centred society could be built. This translated in the government broadly embracing the notion of human security, including in the military-security domain. Towards this end, discernible changes could be noticed in the three critical areas of strategic defence posture, functions and tasks performed by the SANDF as well as civil-military relations. Moving from the premise that transformation is not an event but a process, this chapter aims to analyse the extent to which government built on the foundation laid by Mandela. This entails dissecting the aforesaid three areas under the government administration of President Thabo Mbeki, 1999-2009.

To recap, it can be noted from the previous chapter that transformation under Mandela was not perfect. Whereas government espoused human security principles in its proclamations, its actions were aligned with traditional modes of thinking as in the notion of national interest influencing the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. Upon democratisation in 1994 the government moved quickly to shed South Africa’s apartheid image of a pariah state and reincarnated its strategic posture to be of a paragon in defence and security matters. South Africa under Mandela earned the respect and trust of most in the neighbouring SADC region and the international community. The South African government was determined to be non-threatening to neighbouring states and its own people. This influenced the functioning of the SANDF. Notwithstanding the prevailing sentiment that it had to withdraw from domestic deployment and “township duty” (Esterhuyse 2012:231), the SANDF still performed some domestic functions. These included border control, fighting crime in support of the police and humanitarian relief operations. The latter were also performed abroad on the African continent in addition to small contingents deployed to assist UN peace missions. Lastly, in terms of civil-military relations, constitutional and institutional mechanisms suitable for a democracy were established. This provided for open, consultative, and transparent public policy processes which bode well for prospects of attaining human security. As Hough (2003:11) affirms, “human security is mostly
threatened in weak states, so that effective and democratic national institutions are a necessary first step for restarting human security.”

Against this backdrop, and using the three indicated variables, this chapter aims to present trends in official human security perceptions under Mbeki’s government. As set out in the introductory Chapter 1, the object of this study is to look broadly at official government perceptions of human security and not necessarily those of the person of the president. Moreover, the interim period following Mbeki’s departure from office in 2008 was not long enough to warrant a distinct analysis of the impact of official human security perceptions on the SANDF. Considering the preceding chapters and on the strength of the presentation in this chapter the study will be in position to conclude the analysis of official human security perceptions spanning a period of 15 years, 1994-2009. This will be done in Chapter 5.

2. South Africa’s strategic defence posture under Mbeki

2.1 Consolidation of strategic posture

The thrust of strategic and security thinking during Mbeki’s term was a build-up on Mandela’s foundation. Even the legislative pillar providing for the establishment of the SANDF, the Defence Act 42 of 2002, used as its basis principles from previous policy frameworks like the Constitution and the 1996 White Paper on Defence (RSA 2002:8). Prior to this legislation, the SANDF existed and functioned according to the prescripts of various legislative and policy frameworks. These included, inter alia, the Defence Act of 1957, the 1996 Constitution, the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review (RSA 2003:457). An indictment and perhaps indication of national security policy outcomes not accorded the seriousness they deserve is reflected by South Africa taking almost 15 years to institute another defence review from the last one in 1998. The norm in mature democracies is for a defence review to be undertaken every four or five years (Ritchie 2011:376). South Africa may be a nascent democracy but it needs to benchmark and aspire to the standards of the best if it wants to grow. Noting that between 2001 and 2007 an integrated national security strategy and policy was still missing, Hough et al. (2007: preface) capture the status quo with respect to security-defence policy in South Africa as thus:

Various components of policy and strategy are incorporated in official documents, statements and speeches without coalescing into a comprehensive national security policy and strategy that serve as a point of departure for defence policy, strategy and doctrine. Also, the official perceptions of the period from 2001 to 2007 lack a definitive thrust of security themes, initiatives and programmes of action.
However, collectively they do represent a measure of enlargement, consolidation and progression, although in an incremental and often repetitive manner. What is nevertheless evident is, firstly, an increasing emphasis of African strategic imperatives and the resultant proactive initiatives pertaining to peace support operations [PSOs]…

The two eras, respectively under Mandela and Mbeki, are linked as it can be found that policy positions charted during Mandela’s time impacted on the SANDF under Mbeki. As Nathan (2005:361) alludes, a certain foreign policy practitioner was of the view that “defence policy was like an ocean liner that should not change direction quickly and frequently.” Yet such rigidity can compromise effective use of the armed forces. Defence policy had envisaged South Africa making available one battalion group for peace support operations (RSA 1998:54). However, at some point in 2003 the SANDF had over 3000 troops in various peace missions in Burundi and the DRC as well as other commitments on the African continent (Heitman 2003:18). The defence policy was therefore out of sync with practice.

The iteration in South African defence policy is illustrated by Vrey’s (2004:89) application of Kuhn’s scientific revolution theory. According to the theory, once a major dramatic change, as in the end of apartheid, has occurred then it is subsequently succeeded by piecemeal, incremental adjustments. Vrey (2004:102) then reasons that it could not have been expected of South Africa’s strategic orientation to have fully matured after the epic political transition. Initially, the big shift in South Africa’s defence thinking involved a move from the apartheid regime’s Total Strategy towards a strategic culture embracing democratic precepts in 1994.

Right from the outset the democratic government led by the ANC chose a defensive military posture as opposed to the offensive orientation of the fallen apartheid regime. This defensive posture did not change even under succeeding government administrations led by Mbeki. South Africa’s choice of posture can be tied with the country’s desire for continental security, and human security in particular. As Lekotoa (2008a) said, “the adoption of a defensive posture has meant a full review of our activities right down to the content of the training of our soldiers. Members of the National Defence Force need to be equipped with skills which give them versatility in peacekeeping operations. Skills which once, back, they can also take into society, contributing to growth and development.” This means that South Africa wanted its military to contribute to peace, growth and development (human security in other words) instead of being a war making machine like in apartheid.
In the democratic dispensation the new SANDF’s strategic posture has been underpinned by three pillars: the traditional defence task against external threats; the pursuit of peace and stability on the continent and the world; and playing a supporting role to other government departments in service to the socio-economic needs and development of the people of South Africa (Hough et al. 2007:85). This posture shows policymakers’ comprehension of the broadened and deepened nature of security. Below the state the role of coordination with other departments in catering for people’s security by way of attending to their socio-economic needs was recognised, and above the state cooperation with international partners became vital for regional and global security (Vrey 2004:101). It could not have been expected then of Mbeki’s government to drastically depart from the normative ideals set up by the previous administration under Mandela.

2.2 The African Renaissance as a guide to South Africa’s posture

The grand vision of an African Renaissance was a defining feature of South Africa’s posture under Mbeki. Whereas Mbeki developed the vision into a rallying cry for Africa’s renewal, it was Mandela who first intimated the idea at an Organisation for African Unity (OAU) meeting in June 1994 (Baber 2004:124). Mandela (1994a) said, “where South Africa appears on the agenda again, let it be because we want to discuss what its contribution shall be to the making of the new African Renaissance.” Yet even before ascending to the presidency, Mbeki had also started articulating and advocating the African Renaissance. For example, as deputy president of South Africa, he gave a public speech under the theme “The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World” at the United Nations University on 9 April 1998 (Mbeki 1998).

In his address, Mbeki gave the historical, intellectual, as well as political and economic justifications of Africa’s revival. Politically, he spoke out against one-party states and military regimes as they did not allow for good governance Africa needed. Economically, he spoke of new economic policies some in Africa had introduced to attract investments, build infrastructure and move towards economic regional integration. He added that the issue of economic prosperity is one of the of elements of “genuine liberation of the peoples of Africa” which must bring “an end to the tragic sight of the emaciated child who dies because of hunger or is ravaged by curable disease because their malnourished bodies do not have the strength to resist any illness” (Mbeki 1998).

Mbeki’s exposition of the African Renaissance has elements of ensuring both freedom from fear and freedom from want for all Africans. In Shelton’s interpretation, Mbeki’s vision is rooted in the modern versions of Pan-
Africanism and Pax-Africana. Shelton (2004:4) explains that “Pax-Africana is best understood in terms of Ali Mazrui’s definition which suggests that true peace in Africa can only be assured by Africans themselves acting in concert” while “the promotion of Pan-Africanism implies greater unity through continent-wide political, economic, social, and cultural collaboration.”

According to Shelton (2004:2), South Africa’s cooperative inclination as symbolised by the African Renaissance found concrete expression in the reconfiguration of regional and continental security institutions. These include SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). Commitment to Africa’s security architecture had direct consequences for the SANDF. As Mbeki (2004) promised during the State of the Nation Address (SONA), South Africa was ready to contribute to the effective functioning of the AUPSC and this encompassed meeting its “obligations to the people of the DRC and Burundi” where the SANDF had deployed on peace missions. In the same vein of helping people, the Chief of the SANDF, General Nyanda, referred to the goodwill nature of South Africa’s posture. Nyanda (quoted in Neethling 2003:20) said, “there is also the factor of altruism – the notion of doing something for the common good of mankind as a matter of principle. Typically, the situations which lead to peace missions involve great human distress, suffering and injustice.” South Africa’s posture was thus about advancing peace and security, not war, in Africa. It was also about ensuring freedom from fear for the peoples of the continent.

It is important to note that after the calamitous peacekeeping mission of the United States in Somalia in 1992 and the bad experience of the UN in Rwanda between 1993 and 1996, the trend has been for conflict situations requiring peacekeeping missions to be resolved by regional and sub-regional organisations (Neethling 2003:22; Ostergard 2002:342). Moreover, organisations like SADC and the African Union (AU) are expected to deal not only with serious security problems but also with a myriad of socio-economic challenges which are a potential source of insecurity for their people. In this context, South Africa carved a role for itself trying to resuscitate and rejuvenate SADC and the AU in particular.

2.3 Regional cooperation as a driver of human security

Earlier policy documents like the Intelligence White Paper (1995) and the White Paper on Defence (1996) emphasised the importance of South Africa not having a threatening posture towards her regional neighbours. The pursuit of a cooperative security model which prioritises people was correctly on the agenda. For example, the Intelligence White Paper explicitly said, “new security thinking has the following key features…regional security policy [which] seeks to advance principles of collective security, non-aggression and
peaceful settlement of disputes” (RSA 1995:4). The White Paper on Defence further listed areas of concern on the ground in the region to include: underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, refugees, and environmental degradation (RSA 1996a:18). Most, if not all, of these socio-economic challenges and the security problems they can pose are so complicated, intricate, and interdependent that no single state can resolve them on its own. According to Esterhuyse (2010:17), while the DoD acknowledged this threat perception as human security oriented, there was inherent contradiction with the desire to maintain conventional defence capacity. With Mandela having set the policy agenda and identified the problems, it was left to Mbeki to grapple with how best to use the regional setting to find solutions.

The AU, launched in South Africa on 9 July 2002 to replace the OAU can be linked to Mbeki’s dream of the African Renaissance. Indeed South Africa takes credit for playing an instrumental role in the establishment of the AU and its organs which include the AUPSC amongst others (RSA 2008:254). Furthermore, then Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, emphasised the need to work strongly together in the SADC region given the interdependent nature of challenges (Ndaba 2005:16). While the focus on regional security institutions is understandable, they are not in themselves antidotes. On this note, Nathan (2004:22) observes that SADC had difficulty in establishing a fully functional and effective Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The problem was not in the structure itself but member states had incompatible interests and values impeding collective decision making and action.

Mbeki was president of South Africa at a time when the SADC region was enjoying rare peace and stability (Melber 2013:2-3). However, some structural fissures in SADC the organisation could lead to instability in the region. On one level, SADC is an organisation dominated by states obsessed with the traditional notion of national sovereignty while civil society and ordinary people are marginalised (Van Nieuwkerk 2009:99). Consequently, any policy outputs that SADC may produce run the risk of being illegitimate if the people are not involved in their formulation. Economically, individual SADC countries remained weak and vulnerable to external influence as they continued to rely on the export raw mineral resources (Lekota 2008; Melber 2013:9). This ultimately impacts on SADC the sub-regional organisation as member states do not have the financial means to contribute to its projects. Consider that in 2000 about 80% of SADC projects were funded by foreign sources (Elling 2004:15). Without economic emancipation and independence it is always going to be difficult for the region and Africa in general to determine its own destiny and realise developmental objectives. If SADC and Africa as a whole could have the political will to identify key strategies to be self-reliant by funding their own security and other needs, then that would be in line with
Booth’s (2007:250) idea of using emancipatory politics to overcome concrete situations.

Another possible structural weakness may be brought about by the signing of a memorandum of understanding to establish a militaristic SADC Standing Brigade. The MOU was signed by SADC countries in Lusaka, Zambia in August 2007 (SADC 2007; Mwanawasa 2007). Van Nieuwkerk (2009:111) cautions that this demonstrates a propensity to military solutions even though the regional block has accepted human security issues as the main challenge. By contrast, Vrey (2005:41-46) accepts a possible role for interoperable military forces in Africa, especially in the context of asymmetric ‘new wars’. These wars pose a direct threat to both individual and state security. Certainly, South Africa had already made an explicit commitment to participate in peace missions via overseas military deployment if needs be.

Taking cognisance of conceptual confusion around “peace missions” South Africa takes peace mission to be a generic term referring to a wide range of UN political and diplomatic initiatives, including military activities, aimed at conflict resolution (RSA 1999:6-7). The said initiatives under peace missions can encompass “preventative diplomacy”, “peace-making”, “peacekeeping operations”, “peace enforcement”, and “peace building”. Such a holistic strategic posture, inclusive of military and political instruments, stands a good chance against contemporary security challenges. Therefore, military mechanisms need not necessarily be a structural weakness because if constituted properly they could contribute to the physical security so vital for development. While South Africa’s leadership on the continent is unwelcomed in some aspects, when it comes to peacekeeping and other security matters, African states and politicians often call on South Africa for help (Schoeman 2000:56). Naturally, South Africa would be expected to play a significant role if the Standing Brigade was to materialise and this might put the SANDF under more strain.

Instead of the apprehension shown by Van Nieuwkerk (2009) at the thought of Standing Brigades, it would have been more reasonable to accept appropriately constituted regional military forces to contribute to human security as suggested by Vrey (2005). However, the experience of the SANDF as part of UN missions in the DRC showed that military intervention by itself was not a panacea to insecurity. From the 1990s, various peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions have not brought enduring peace to the DRC or alleviated the suffering of its people. A lesson from South Africa’s own experience of democratisation is that true peace is possible through a bottom-up approach. Citizen participation, civil society expertise, and political will of leaders were requisite ingredients if the DRC was to have peace and begin the long journey towards human security. Rather than being the lead act,
outsiders like South Africa and Western powers ought to have played only a specialised support role.

The idea that countries such as South Africa ought to portray a posture of leadership corresponds with Moller’s (2009:1) theory of regional hegemons. The theory posits that a regional power or hegemon with the capacity and willingness to lead is necessary for any continental or regional organisation hoping to address security and other problems in its theatre of operation. This theory can be associated with Holsti’s (1970:245-246) theoretical model of role conception. Similar to Moller, Holsti’s model is about perceptions political leaders have of their country’s role in international relations as well as what is expected of that particular country by others. An oversight of the arguments that certain countries should play a lead role on the back of their status is that this leadership disposition may actually be rejected. In fact, Melber (2013:3) relates that South Africa’s “high profile role” was not appreciated by all on the continent. Another problem with hegemonic and role conception models is that they are state-centric analytical models which privilege state and elite pacts. Networks and agreements between the powerful at state level, including intergovernmental organisations, have not necessarily provided security for ordinary people.

Given the ineffectual nature of regional organisations like SADC as indicated earlier, it is a good thing that South Africa did not commit all its strategic posture efforts in that direction. For example, just between 1 January 2006 and 31 March 2007 South Africa signed 15 multilateral and 109 bilateral agreements with a number of countries and multilateral organisations across the world (RSA 2008:288-293). The agreements cover a diverse range of areas including food security, the health sector, education, culture and defence. Such cooperation augured well for the attainment of human security not only for South Africa but for others in the international community. Importantly, all these commitments reflecting South Africa’s posture under the auspices of Mbeki’s African Renaissance initiative had implications for functions executed by the SANDF.

3. Functions executed by the SANDF under Mbeki

3.1 Rationale for South Africa’s peace missions

The previously inexperienced ANC government had grown in confidence and experience by the time Mbeki took office in 1999. ANC politicians in charge of government at the executive level and in the legislature had a better feel of the required domestic and foreign policies to take South Africa forward. It was understood that the SANDF could be used as a foreign policy instrument, especially in a peacekeeping capacity (Esterhuysen 2010:11). In 2003 cabinet
took a decision to withdraw the army from some domestic tasks like border security (Engelbrecht 2009). This decision might be taken as an indication of the then earmarked role of the SANDF in peace missions beyond South Africa’s borders.

As Table 4 below indicates, prior to 2003 the SANDF had modestly deployed members in the hundreds and less than a thousand. However, from 2003 to 2008 the SANDF deployed close to 3000 soldiers per annum in peace missions in Africa under the auspices of the AU and the UN. Sizeable deployments included missions in the DRC, Sudan, and Burundi. An overview of South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping operations during much of Mbeki’s government is shown by Table 4 below (Source South African Yearbook 2008/09:423):

### SOUTH AFRICA’S INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

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Also in 2003, during the SONA, Mbeki (2003) announced that the commando system was going to be phased out. The commando system involved part-time soldiers in the provision of individual and community security. Hence as Matanga (2003:11) reported, representatives from the farming community met with some ministers from the security cluster to register their concerns over the decision to stop the commando system. The evolution of tasks assigned to the SANDF is comparable to a new born first having to take baby steps before they could walk and run.

Having taken baby steps under Mandela and now with more peace missions on the horizon, the SANDF under Mbeki was certainly on the “march for peace” as Neethling (2003:20) put it. However, it is important to acknowledge some of the commendable work the SANDF did on the domestic scene before the 2003 phasing out began. Shelton (2004:32) explicates:

While the SANDF obviously cannot directly and effectively respond to all human security threats, arguably they can be effective in the following areas: contribution to fighting domestic crime through increased support for the SAPS (During 2001, an average of 895 soldiers per day were deployed to assist the SAPS)...; Illegal migration and transnational crime through enhanced border protection (In 2000 the SANDF apprehended 47 419 illegal immigrants, in the 2001 the figure was 47 400...  

“African solutions for African problems” is a philosophical slogan which the South African government did its best to bring to life under Mbeki by championing initiatives like the African Renaissance and the AU’s socio-economic programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). Nepad was born in September 1999 when the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Libya mandated President Mbeki and his Algerian counterpart, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to pursue the agenda of total debt cancellation with Africa’s external creditors (RSA 2003a:278-279). Following this initial mandate, Nepad evolved to a socio-economic programme with priority projects including infrastructure, agriculture, environment, tourism, health and human resources (Lekota 2008). The pursuit of peace and security in support

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of the African Renaissance and Nepad was consequently one of the military strategic objectives of the DoD (RSA 2005:64). Considering the historical fact of outside interference adversely affecting Africa’s development (Rodney 1973; Williams 2003:265), it made sense to pursue the African agenda through localised solutions.

A number of reasons explain why South Africa was expected to play a leading role in Africa’s renewal and quest for peace and security. One is the historical argument that fellow Africans stood in solidarity and suffered the consequences when South Africans faced the might of apartheid. Incumbent President Zuma alluded to this issue in a public address on South Africa’s foreign policy at the University of Pretoria. Zuma (2011) spoke of South Africa’s “solid fraternal relations with many African countries in SADC and beyond, which date back to the days of the liberation struggle, when South Africans were offered shelter and solidarity to dismantle colonial oppression and apartheid.” Post-apartheid South Africa is thus expected to return the favour and help in Africa’s quest for meaningful emancipation.

The second reason South Africa was expected to lead and help was borne out of the moral obligation rooted in its status as an economic powerhouse on the continent (Heitman 2003:18). Besides, the country’s future is intimately intertwined with that of the continent. As Mbeki (2002) pleaded at the opening of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the situation where parts of the globe are islands of wealth surrounded by seas of poverty is untenable. Mbeki added that human solidarity required that global prosperity be shared. Ostensibly, the reasoning is that economic development advances people’s freedom choice which ultimately impacts positively on human security. The realisation of human security will then have a ripple effect on state, regional, and global security (Hendricks 2005:3).

On a pragmatic level, it is logical how working together increases chances of success against any challenge people may face. The problem of human insecurity is clearly one of the primary challenges facing Africa in the post-Cold War period. This is visible in the struggle of ordinary Africans to survive. Their suffering is depicted all the time in the media, including the fairly recent trend of 24 hour news channels like CNN. For millions on the continent the reality of famine, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and poor education is their daily lived experience. These dehumanising conditions, affecting all states to varying degrees, increase competition for limited resources and are potential sparks that often lead to the inferno of conflict and instability.

The best possible way to solve these transnational challenges is to collectively devise transnational mechanisms. Hence, South Africa under
Mbeki demonstrated a preference to work under and restructure for efficiency continental intergovernmental organisations like SADC and the AU. South Africa also showed a willingness to work with NGOs in the pursuit of human security. It is perhaps in this spirit of collaboration that Minister Lekota mentioned that the International Committee of the Red Cross had been teaching humanitarian law at every level of the SANDF (Vuthela 2003a:15). Such training interventions must have been conducted with preparing for human rights-centred peacekeeping missions in mind. As Cherubin-Doumbia (2004:ix) points out, protecting human rights in terms of ensuring personal safety and security is one of the central objectives of human security. The White Paper on Peace Missions had also stated that “the role of civil society is acknowledged as a key element is securing the overall success of peace missions” (RSA 1999:27). The South African government’s willingness to work with civil society on peace missions shows its appreciation of the importance of cooperative work given the complex security challenges of the time.

3.2 The SANDF in peace missions and other operations

One of the ways South Africa hoped to advance the cause of human security was through participation in African peace missions. However, what public officials pronounced in speeches was not always easily implementable in practice. Consider the speech by then Deputy Minister of Defence, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, at an awards ceremony of cadets at South Africa’s Military Academy in Saldanha Bay on 09 December 2003. Speaking to the concept of “developmental peacekeeping” she spoke of the need for military personnel, equipment, structures, planning capability and training to be used to ensure human security not only in South Africa but on the continent as well. Madlala-Routledge (2003) elaborated that the SANDF must have an approach which “will ensure that the peacekeepers of the future will not only carry a gun, but also pick and shovel, chalk and duster, and negotiation and conflict resolution skills. As well as keeping the warring factions apart, they will help to rebuild infrastructure, improve health, education and governance and thus literally start rebuilding the country where they are deployed.”

Apart from normal post-conflict activities like SSR and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes (Lekota 2008), this study found no evidence of the SANDF systematically rebuilding infrastructure or improving the health and education systems where it had deployed. Such an undertaking would have been overambitious on the part of the SANDF given its resource and budget constraints as well as South Africa’s own dire backlog in vital indicators like income inequality as referred to by Solomon (2003:5-6) for example. A more practically tenable scenario would be of the kind Lekota alluded to on the occasion of the signing of a defence bilateral agreement with Benin. Lekota (2008b) said South Africa was ready to offer Benin military
skills in engineering which would enhance projects like building of schools and bridges in Benin.

South Africa’s collaborative effort in defence matters to ensure international peace and security is not limited to African countries as its two significant operations with Australia showed. According to Katzenellenbogen (2005:21-22), Operations Lariat I and Lariat II took place respectively in 2001 and 2003 when the navies of South Africa and Australia worked together to pursue and capture fleeing illegal fishing boats that had been operating on Australian territorial waters in the sub-Antarctic. Such operations are vital in securing the national economy of states which is critical for both human and state security. Also, the operations may well have been important on a politico-strategic level by easing diplomatic tensions between South Africa and Australia. The two countries had differed over the political crises in Zimbabwe which started in 2000 as well as the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Katzenellenbogen 2005:21). The détente facilitated by collaboration in the anti-poaching operations between South Africa and Australia had potential to extend cooperation in other areas. These include fighting transnational crime, curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and combating international terrorism.

Another area where the SANDF performed admirably, and where it would have had to work with other international partners, is in humanitarian disaster relief operations abroad. The most spectacular of these was Operation Lichi during which about 14 391 people’s lives were saved from massive floods in Mozambique in February 2000 (Jacobs 2001). The rescue mission included dramatic images of a mother, and the new born baby she had delivered on top of a tree with the help of SANDF personnel, being hoisted to safety (BBC 2000). In addition, South Africa formed part of the African Union Mission in Burundi with a mandate including the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, offering expert assistance with DDR processes as well as provision of personal security for returning political leaders. South Africa was appointed to plan and implement the mission on 3 February 2003 (Rademeyer 2003:14).

The trend of South Africa increasingly participating in humanitarian and peace missions beyond its shores can be taken as a function of the extended defence thinking (under the ambit of human security) which a number of scholars found had overstretched the operational capacity of the SANDF (Heitman 2003:18-20; Vrey 2005:44). For example, Heitman (2003:18) was surprised by the announcement from the President’s office on 13 August 2003 that South Africa was to send troops to stabilise the volatile political situation in Liberia. The announcement came at a time when the SANDF was under numerical pressure with troops already deployed in peace missions in the DRC (1 393) and Burundi (1 359 and due to increase).
All these major deployments of the SANDF in peacekeeping operations would have been in addition to ad-hoc and smaller contingent deployments here and there in collaboration with specific countries. For instance, 70 SANDF members were deployed to Mozambique to help with the destruction of unexploded ordinance devices in May 2007 and 85 members were sent to assist the Central African Republic with capacity building in September 2007 (RSA 2008:258;262). All these deployments added to the “operational overstretch” of the SANDF (Esterhuyse 2010:16). Assigning the SANDF on peace missions has implications for the defence budget. Take that Minister Lekota was of the view that the defence budget allocation of R 20.5 billion was not sufficient for the financial year 2003/04 (Mkhabela 2003; Vuthela 2003a:14). Besides the budget, expeditionary missions are a serious matter since they could involve loss of life as happened with six South African soldiers who died in an accident and another one reportedly killed by a sniper in the DRC in 2004 (Esterhuyse 2004; Hosken 2004).

One of the more contentious debates as South Africa was evolving into a democracy was around the primary versus secondary roles of the military. Lekota (2008) contended that a review of the distinction between primary and secondary functions had to take place in light of increased use of the SANDF in peace missions instead of deterring external military attacks. Williams (1999:7) found that one of the cogent arguments advanced in favour of defence forces adhering to primary roles was that this ensured good civil-military relations. Focusing on primary role limits chances for the military to be unduly politicised so goes the argument. However, having found cases where the military performed extensive secondary functions without being politicised, Williams (1999:77) was of the view that civil-military relations in South Africa had matured enough in the early years of the democracy that the defence force ought to be tasked with more non-traditional (secondary) roles. Cawthra (2003:53) agrees with the assessment of matured South African civil-military relations since it was inconceivable that the SANDF could play a “praetorian” role like in the past. Williams will have felt vindicated when, for example, Mbeki eventually allowed for the military to help the police in stopping xenophobic violence in May 2008. Mbeki made the reasonable decision despite opposition from groups like Lawyers for Human Rights who were concerned that such a move might securitize the environment or militarise society (SAPA 2008).

3.3 The SANDF on the domestic front

One of the mechanisms guarding against the militarisation of South Africa’s society is the principle of co-operative governance enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996:25). The Constitution provides for all organs of the state to work towards securing South Africans in such a manner that they do
not encroach in each other’s line functions. Lekota (2007) identified poverty and underdevelopment as the biggest threats facing the developing world, including South Africa. Accordingly, the SANDF as an institution designed for conventional war fighting only played a supporting role to other lead departments responsible for the range of challenges facing South Africa. For instance, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) was a government programme with the objective to halve poverty and unemployment in South Africa by 2014 (RSA 2007). According to the Director of Human Resource Planning at the DoD, Brigadier General Dries de Wit (in Vuthela 2006:28-29), part of the SANDF’s contribution to ASGISA was training and educating young people through the Youth Foundation Training Programme and the Military Skills Development Programme, launched respectively in 2001 and 2003. These programmes were meant to equip young people with skills so that they could be employable within and outside the SANDF.

Environmental issues are one of the critical components of South Africa’s broad security framework (Lekota 2008a). Consequently, the “environment is a strategic issue in defence, and is awarded a high priority in all dealings in the military sector” (RSA 2002a:461). In practical terms, this has meant the SANDF has been obliged to use the land in its custody for planning and executing military activities with long term implications for the country in mind. In addition to working with other stakeholders like the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism to come up with the Environmental Implementation Plan for Defence, the DoD in the interest of social justice correctly rationalised land under its custody to be used for non-military purposes. Some of the land was given away as restitution for land forcibly taken away from communities during apartheid (RSA 2002a:461). However to contribute to environmental security, the DoD has to work with stakeholders like communities, other government departments as well as domestic and international environmental experts. The SANDF Chief of Logistics, Major General Ntsibande (in Ndaba 2003:43), partly addressed this issue of cooperation when he said, “a military force as an instrument of government policy on security cannot discharge its obligations in terms of the environment in isolation. There are lead agents in government that set the pace and who are by virtue of their respective mandates responsible for directing the achievement of specific national environmental objectives.”

In a similar vein, Deputy Minister of Defence, Mluleki George (2007), in his Budget Vote speech referred to a Moral Regeneration conference, aligned with programmes government, organised by the DoD through the Chaplaincy. The conference was about HIV/AIDS awareness and its outcomes included other stakeholders like religious groups, NGOs, and educational institutions
undertaking to update their own awareness programmes. The bottom line here is that the DoD can only be effective by working with other stakeholders. It can only render assistance in a sector like health which is not its core competency.

4. Civil-military relations under Mbeki

According to Booysen (2001:131) and Brynard (2007:363-364), substantive policy formulation and related processes of governance were the emphasis of Mandela’s administration. The subsequent government of Mbeki focused on policy implementation and following earlier established procedures. Accordingly, the 1996 Constitution, a product of Mandela’s administration, endowed parliament and its committees as arguably the most important securitising actors in South Africa. Procedurally, parliament has oversight over all security services and their activities (RSA 1996:117). Indeed, by the time of Mbeki’s administration, the JSCD saw itself as being an active participant regarding all significant decisions taken by the Ministry of Defence (Schraeder 2001:237). Modise (2004:45), then chairperson of the JSCD, gives some anecdotal accounts of the committee exercising its responsibilities and taking military officials to task. One such occasion was in 2000 when the JSCD refused to pass on Conventional Arms Control Bill due to what it deemed as constitutional flaws. The committee held firm because, in its view, as the elected public representatives it was duty bound to determine South Africa’s partners on defence related trade and to make policy choices reflective of the aspirations of South Africans. This would also ensure that tools of coercion (weapons) entrusted to the defence force were not abused (Modise 2004:46).

It is worth noting that the raging controversy and divergence of opinion around the arms deal continued for much of Mbeki’s tenure. Ferreira and Liebenberg (2004:79) refer to the discontent of South African citizenry over the deal. Pretorius (2008:47) observes that while the media continued to cover the arms deal, opposition parties did not politicise the issue by placing it on the electoral agenda for the 2004 elections. However, lobbying organisations like Economists Allied for Arms Reduction using its hired proxy, Terry Crawford-Brown, mounted a concerted opposition to the deal and wanted some of the contracts cancelled (Jordaan 2004:24).

Contestation around the arms deal was so intense that President Mbeki saw it fit to address South Africans in a public broadcast on 19 January 2001 (Mbeki 2001). The President was scathing in his criticism of a state institution, the Special Investigating Unit headed by Judge Wilhelm Heath. The criticism was on the manner of Heath’s investigation into alleged corruption over the arms deal, specifically his refusal to release even to the President some of the
documents related to the investigation. Mbeki argued that the decision to purchase arms was based on an extensively consultative Defence Review process which had the support of all parties in parliament. Mbeki (2001) concluded that his government “will not submit to any demand” to default on its contractual obligations on the arms deal with other countries and international companies.

It seems that the South African government was very much going against the spirit of civil-military relations which would allow diverse and dissenting views on as important a matter as arms procurement. Government, through executive dispositions, chose guns even though as Ferreira and Liebenberg (2004:71-73) note it had ostensibly committed to socio-economic issues as the main security threat facing South Africa. The two are also disappointed that more expensive arms were procured and they lay the blame at the confusion of roles between parliament, parliamentary committees and the executive. By not successfully rejecting, reversing or seeking to amend the expensive arms deal(s), the JSCD failed the people of South Africa. As Ngoma (2004:101) intimates, the role of the legislature is to balance the needs of the defence sector with those of other sectors especially in peacetime when the latter should be prioritised.

Ferreira (2007:234) contends that good civil-military relations require mutual respect and accommodation between such important stakeholders as the public, politicians in parliament and the executive, civil society entities like the media and academia, and of course the military itself. Nevertheless, it seems that civil-military relations are inherently characterised by tension. As Le Roux (2003:165) indicates, military people are conservative with security information as it is always vulnerable to exploitation by foreign intelligence services. Civilians on the other hand are liberal when it comes to security information and regard secrecy as a “phobia”.

True to this characterisation, civil-military relations have been tenuous in South Africa. On one level, in the democratic dispensation relations between the military and government in the form of the legislature and the executive started to improve only in 1998. This was when the top leadership of the SANDF started to internalise the human security notion and being more amenable to government policy objectives following the resignation of discredited Chief of the Defence, General George Meiring (Pretorius 2008:46). Even though relations between civilian and military people had started to improve in 1998 they were by no means smooth in the years that followed. As late as 2007, Lekota (2007) informed parliamentarians during the defence budget vote debate that he had observed a certain level of resistance to civil control from the top leadership of the SANDF. Lekota did qualify that the scale of the problem is not very extensive as it was just something he
noted in isolated incidents. He attributed the problem to challenges that came with integrating armed forces from different operational cultures. In the same breadth, General Nyanda (2001:50) spoke of healthy civil-military relations in South Africa because he could cite many examples where he was often called to account to parliament. On another level, Modise (2004:50), as chairperson of the JSCD seems to have mistaken public participation in defence policymaking as a necessary nuisance limited by resource and time constrains. Another parliamentarian, Ngculu, while acknowledging the importance of civil society in ensuring effective oversight in defence matters was at the same time condescending. Ngculu (2003:186) was of the opinion that “most of the media in South Africa is not well informed, but that it is trapped in archaic paradigm of sensation and is scandal driven.”

Esterhuyse (2012:234) attributes sensational defence reporting to “dreadful” media-military relations. He alleges that most media enquiries on the defence force are not responded to by the Ministry of Defence and the SANDF who are committed to conceal any information that might embarrass government. In addition, Esterhuyse (2013:139-140) claims that most politicians in the ANC government were not versed on security matters as they have a “struggle mindset”. Accordingly, debate on defence matters in South Africa was dominated by those at the top echelons of military bureaucracy in the DoD, especially senior Navy and Air Force officers. This might be the reason why these arms of service were prioritised ahead of the Army and SAMHS when the SANDF was re-equipped through the SDP (RSA 2002:xiv).

It thus seems that the space for open and participatory civil-military relations was shrinking under Mbeki. Firstly, defence policy formulation digressed to be exclusionary under Mbeki in stark contrast to the inclusivity of the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). Consider how the South African Army’s Vision 2020 was exclusionary as it was formulated by a task team consisting of only seven Army officers (Vuthela 2006a:34). Extensive consultations with stakeholders like the public or academia was missing. The strategic Vision 2020 was launched by the Chief of the Army, Lt Gen Shoke, on 7 March 2006. It was meant to create by the year 2020 an Army that is robust, high-tech, self-reliant, responsive, and adaptive. To achieve this objective, the Army was to create a soldier capable not only in using a gun but also one who can engage in psychological wars and deal with human complexities (Vuthela 2006a:34-35). The Vision was noble but it might have been more sublime and authentic if the broad public had been consulted on the kind of Army it wants. Secondly, Griffiths (2008:237) observes that parliamentary oversight over defence had become “less vigorous” under Mbeki than it had been during Mandela’s government. This as the President and Minister of Defence appeared less frequently before oversight committees than had been the case in the first democratic government.
Griffiths (2008:230) also claims that, from a civil-military relations perspective, the executive dominated parliament in South Africa because the former has more expertise, especially when it comes to technical defence policy matters.

When South Africa transformed and integrated various military formations this was to create a professional corps so indispensable for impeccable civil-military relations. One of the good things during the integration process was the patience with which it was done. An illustration of this is how the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) deployed in South Africa on 13 June 1994 and only completed its mission almost a decade later on 31 March 2003 (Siyongwana 2003:16). BMATT’s initial mission was to assist with integration of seven different forces into a single SANDF. The mission was extended in 2001 to include training and advice with respect to Force Development and PSOs for the SANDF. As part of the exercise in SST, the BMATT was good in that it was not imposed on South Africans but merely sought to contribute to the objective of establishing a professional defence capacity that could serve the people of South Africa.

In as much as it is important to get input from outsiders, Williams (2003a:271) cautions against Western models of civil-military exported to African countries by mobile training teams like BMATT. Williams charges that a limitation of the Western model is that it does not explain diverse forms of civil control of militaries beyond those of a formal legalistic nature. Extralegal and informal networks of military control are a common feature in Africa for example. Furthermore, the model stresses the "apolitical" nature of a good military. Yet this does not exist in reality, even in those entrenched democracies of the West where the military sometimes makes political pronouncements and is involved in political processes (Williams 2003a:272-273). Against this background, what is required is not a straightjacket methodology of readymade solutions for civil-military relations in Africa because different dynamics are involved in different countries. As a minimum standard, what is needed is a theoretical approach using a combination of African and Western intellectual traditions “as evident in such disciplines as sociology, political science, international relations, state theory and the critical-reflective traditions developed in such schools of thought as the Frankfurt School, Post-Modernism and elsewhere” (Williams 2003a:279).

5. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the human security paradigm through the prism of the military sector under the stewardship of Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa. Three variables were assessed to help with the analysis of human security. Similarities and differences can be discerned between the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki in terms of the human security
perceptions of both administrations. The post-Cold War security milieu of non-military threats which confronted Mandela’s government was still in place by the time Mbeki came to power. Consequently, from a public policy and security policy perspective, Mbeki did not divert too much from Mandela’s footing.

In terms of strategic defence posture, Mbeki’s government used the clarion call for an “African Renaissance” as its guide. This was done as South Africa had rid itself of its pariah status and was seen as a non-threatening partner by many on the continent. Furthermore, whereas Mandela’s government had taken the first step of rejoining continental intergovernmental organisations like the AU and SADC, Mbeki took this a step further by advocating for their organisational restructuring for efficacy. While this approach of working towards a collective security setting made sense, certain shortcomings were exposed. The intergovernmental organisations are inherently weakened by member states themselves being weak and also clinging to traditional notions like national sovereignty. The intergovernmental organisations are therefore state-centric, leaving ordinary people on the margins. The conclusion drawn is that the common security vision Mbeki was pursuing will remain a dream so long as the people are not co-opted as active participants.

With regards to the second variable of actual functions executed by the SANDF it was found that there was a decisive break between the Mandela and Mbeki administrations. It is vital to take cognisance of the fact that the SANDF is a contingency based organisation (RSA 2002:xiv). It may therefore not be surprising to find a criticism that the SANDF under Mbeki had no strategic nuance as it was all over Africa and even domestically in some instances. Under Mbeki, the SANDF was increasingly used as an instrument of foreign policy to the point that it was overstretched. The SANDF was used as part of peace missions under the AU and the UN. The rationale was that bringing peace and stability on the continent will allow for development to take place. This could bring not only human security but also state, regional and global security. The SANDF acquitted itself well not only in peace missions but also in alleviating suffering at home and on the continent during humanitarian disasters. The SANDF was phased out from some domestic functions from 2003 but delivered each time it was called upon like assisting the police to curb xenophobic violence in 2008.

An argument has been made that militaries should stick to primary and traditional tasks of preparing for conventional warfare because this is good for civil-military relations. However, this paper argues that in the case of South Africa, a developing country with no imminent conventional threat, and where civilian-military relations have matured drastically there is no reason why the defence force cannot be utilised more for the so-called secondary tasks.
These tasks are what the armed forces are engaged with in any case. However, changing the mandate of the armed forces would have to be done with extreme sensitivity because of potential politicising and harm that could occur. Fortunately, in South Africa the military has professionalised well from the time Mandela took over right through to Mbeki’s reign. Civil control over the military is firmly exercised by the executive and the legislature even though weaknesses exist and mistakes have occurred. One such mistake was when the executive acting in concert with the legislature opted to buy expensive equipment through the arms deal even though a case could be made for socio-economic priorities. As a result of the need to bring peace in Africa and security at home, the military does have to be equipped. But this has to be done with a great deal of circumspection and prudence. Buy in from all stakeholders, including the public and civil society, is important in this regard. After all, security is about people. Sound civil-military relations are paramount for the achievement of human security. In South Africa this could be compromised by structural conflict of interests and tension between key stakeholders in the executive, parliament and civil-society as evidenced during Mbeki’s tenure.
CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

1. Summary

This chapter summarises and evaluates the research findings of the study in relation to the objectives as set out in the introductory Chapter 1. The principal objective of the research was to describe and critically analyse official human security perceptions in South Africa as seen from the perspective government and the DoD in the period 1994-2009, spanning the governments of Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.

Of particular interest was the impact the official perceptions had on the functioning of the SANDF. Put differently, the objective was to establish whether there was consistency between official South African human security perceptions, signified by what was said in speech and policy documents, in contrast to what was done in practice through the SANDF. Parallel to the principal objective, the study aimed to conduct an assessment of whether the SANDF contributed to either one or both cardinal aspects of human security. These are freedom from want (development) and freedom from fear (physical security and violence or the threat thereof). The third objective was to inquire how human security related to state security from an official South African perspective in the period under review.

A study of the relevant literature revealed South Africa’s adoption of the human security notion as a guiding principle for security policies and practices under the new ANC government in 1994. Chapter 1 set off the study by posing three questions in order to meet the research objectives. The research questions and related responses are referred to later in this chapter. Three indicators were identified as pertinent to answer these questions. The indicators were strategic defence posture, actual functions executed by the SANDF, and civil-military relations. The link between each indicator and the concept of human security was explained in Chapter 3 which was similarly structured to Chapter 4 according to the three indicators. Accordingly, three assumptions were made in response to each of the posed research questions. Synthesising the assumptions together, the main finding is that human security and state security had equal status in the government’s lexis while in praxis the impact strained the operational of the functioning of the SANDF. Ultimately, the SANDF prioritised state security ahead of human security.
Chapter 2 served as a theoretical framework of the study. It gave a synopsis from realist traditional security perceptions before the end of the Cold War and apartheid to the contemporary paradigm of concern with human security in South Africa and much of the world. Prior to 1994, security in South Africa was tantamount to security of the state pursued through narrow militaristic means. This state-centric security context turned out to be untenable on empirical and normative grounds. The military had been used as a repressive weapon against the majority of citizens in South Africa and also to destabilise neighbouring states in the Southern African region. Eventually, the apartheid state itself was under threat and crumbled coincidentally at the same time as the end of the Cold War. Since the struggle against apartheid was about emancipation, it is no surprise that the ANC, while it was waiting to assume power, promised a security agenda putting the people first and inclusive of socio-economic as well as environmental imperatives (ANC 1992; Nathan 1991:5)

Human security became popular at the end of the Cold War as realist assumptions of traditional security studies were increasingly questioned. However, realism was not rendered obsolete as the paper argues that policymakers continued to make some decisions based on realist considerations. Essentially, human security is about broadening and deepening the concept of security. Broadening recognised other sectors of security besides the military, and deepening acknowledged security referents above and below the state, especially people. The UN led the popularisation of human security as “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” In this regard, besides military security, the UNDP (1994:24-25) identified six other interdependent sectors of security to include: health, economic, food, personal, political, environmental, and community security. In sum then, human security has three cardinal characteristics. It is people centred, links development and security, and expands possible threats and actors whence security or insecurity can emerge (Hendrick 2005:1).

Regardless of being a normative concept as summarised above, human security was still criticised, especially for its lack of a precise definition. For some, like Paris (2001:92), human security was too broad a concept to be operationalised. The potential deficiency had implications for the SANDF since human security implies a shift from security through arms, the lifeblood of militaries, to security through development and addressing root-causes of insecurity. This is a gap the study tried to fill by examining the SANDF’s contribution to human security in South Africa.
Against an identified weakness of the ever expanding security agenda, a variant of CSS emerged to help with the understanding and management of the new security taxonomy (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010:75-76). Securitisation theory is a framework depicting how political authorities can speak ‘security’ to almost any referent for which a perceived existential threat or risk exists and consequent measures in mitigation are taken (McDonald 2008:567). In addition to the original formulation of the securitisation process which starts with a ‘speech act’, this study argues for securitisation that takes place via written language or security practices of state agents to be recognised. Although securitisation theory as an analytical framework has its weaknesses like being state-centric, it is still a powerful tool through which government can mobilise resources for the expeditious resolution of potential security threats.

Another strand of CSS relevant for this study is the one which equates security with emancipation. This variant found fertile ground with the ANC which sought a new meaning for security in South Africa. As already indicated, the struggle against colonialism and apartheid were after all about emancipation and a better life for all Africans. The reconceptualisation of security in the new South Africa can be drawn from the words attributed to two ANC stalwarts in Joe Nhlanhla and John Nkadimeng as quoted in tandem in Chapter 2. Nhlanhla, for example, spoke of the security of the people having to do with satisfying their political, economic, cultural, and social needs but that this could not be done without ensuring the security of the state. The caveat of the interdependent nature of state security and human security was to have significant ramifications for the SANDF because in addition to its primary mandate of securing the state it was also expected to contribute to human security and its attendant developmental imperatives.

As the passage in Chapter 2 by Nhlanhla indicates, South Africa’s new security perceptions aimed to strike a balance between state security and human security, instead of a narrow bias towards the state. This paradigm of incorporating people’s needs in the security agenda is in line with the CSS strand which equates security and emancipation and it counterbalances the state-centric securitisation theory to give an overall strong theoretical framework for the study. Similarly to human security, the emancipation paradigm recognises non-military threats like poverty, poor education and political oppression as the real causes of insecurity and social instability (Booth 1991:319; RSA 1996a:20). Consequently, true security can be achieved in an environment of true emancipation where political elites can hear the voices of the people.
It can be taken that the two versions of human security elucidated were accepted by South African authorities. Firstly, the securitisation notion of human security is the one that fits into the new security thinking of the post-Cold War era with its widening agenda. South Africa “broadened the concept of human security to include political, economic, social and environmental matters” (Lekota 2008a). Secondly, the emancipatory paradigm was also embraced, albeit implicitly. For instance, security was defined as “an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom…” (RSA 1996a:6)

With the introductory background and theoretical framework laid in Chapters 1 and 2, the study then set out to analyse the substance of official human security perceptions in Chapters 3 and 4. The scope of analysis was limited to the government administrations under Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki (1999-2009). These administrations were assessed respectively in Chapters 3 and 4, and were similarly structured according to the earlier mentioned indicators. For this reason, a synthetic approach to simultaneously summarise the findings of the distinct variables under each president is followed.

1.1 South Africa’s strategic defence posture under Mandela and Mbeki

The link between the governments of Mandela and Mbeki in terms of strategic defence posture is the latter’s implementation and consolidation of policies initiated by the former. The policies include the White Paper on Defence (RSA 1996a) and the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (RSA 1999). The second mentioned policy came at a ripe moment as it satisfied Mbeki’s appetite for peace and stability in Africa. Mbeki’s desire for security on the continent found practical manifestation in his championing of the African Renaissance and Nepad. It was sensible for South Africa to pursue these programmes through regional organisations like the AU and SADC because of the transnational nature of insecurity for both states and their peoples. Whereas the government of Mandela was content to rejoin the regional organisations, Mbeki’s administration went a step further to accelerate their restructuring and reform so they could have capacity to deal with the security and developmental challenges of the time. Yet the fundamental principle across the administrations led by both presidents remains that South Africa did not want to use its military to create insecurity for her neighbours on the continent. On the contrary, in Chapter 4, it was discerned from Defence Minister Lekota (2008a) how a defensive posture was preferred so much so that it was hoped that instead of mastering the art of
war soldiers could acquire skills to contribute to the growth and development of the country.

Furthermore, a number of other factors can be attributed to the policy choice of posture taken since Mandela’s time. Foremost, the geo-strategic and political environment in the Southern African region and globally changed drastically at the end of the Cold War. As a result, the utility value of the military in world affairs was expected to decline. This strategic milieu along a threat assessment that South Africa faced no conventional military attack from an external enemy justified the country’s defensive posture (RSA 1996a:18). In addition, the historical opprobrium of South Africa’s destabilisation policy in Africa demanded of the regional giant to assume a non-threatening posture with her neighbours so as to build confidence and encourage positive relations (Landsberg and Monyae 2006:134).

Also noteworthy is South Africa’s own negotiated settlement to democracy which resulted in a preference for pacific means of conflict resolution in lieu of military solutions. The White Paper on Peace Missions proclaimed that “the South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this strong national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts” (RSA 1999:19-20). Turning away from the militarism to achieve security was consistent with the UNDP (1994:24) articulation of how human security ought to be pursued. In this regard, the study found evidence, illustrated in Chapter 4, of how South Africa under Mbeki accelerated a strategic posture of emphasising security through regional cooperation and integration. The cooperative approach found expression in the African Renaissance which was fundamentally about sustainable socio-economic and political revival and emancipation of the continent (Mbeki 1998).

South Africa’s peace agenda, in such places as Lesotho and the DRC for example, was informed by a perception that her own security was threatened by instability in Africa. As the Minister of Defence, Lekota (2001), claimed, “conflict beyond our borders potentially impacts our security.” Lekota’s statement is an example of a state authority speaking “security” to an issue, this time conflict in other parts of Africa posing a potential threat to South Africa. It sometimes happens with securitisation that emergency measures, including ignoring public policy process, are taken to deal with an issue
(Sjostedt 2007:238). Foregoing normal procedure seems to have taken place with South Africa’s military intervention of Lesotho as some analysts questioned the legality of the operation (Likoti 2007:255). South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was therefore an illustration of securitisation. Similarly, Jorgensen (2007:37-62) finds that securitising moves were the basis of South Africa’s participation in peace missions in places like the DRC. According to Jorgensen (2007:59), these missions were undertaken to stem the flow of refugees into South Africa from conflict areas and also to create stability for economic growth which will mitigate the domestic problem of economic inequality and unemployment.

Ultimately, from Mandela’s epoch to Mbeki’s era, South Africa’s strategic defence posture was an evolution following a course of consolidation rather than a revolution. A significant distinction is that the SANDF under Mbeki was increasingly used in peace missions on the African continent to such an extent that it was almost overwhelming. Besides the economic self interest as insinuated above, South Africa participated in peace missions on altruistic and humanitarian grounds as former Chief of the SANDF, General Nyanda, was quoted in Chapter 4. More directly, South Africa realised that with the increasing “importance of human security over state security, it is unavoidable that humanitarian concerns will also be prominent in contemporary ‘peace missions’” (RSA 1999:8)

1.2 Actual functions of the SANDF under Mandela and Mbeki

Actual functions performed by the SANDF under both Mandela and Mbeki can be summarised by juxtaposing policy intent and reality, especially in terms of contemplated primary and secondary functions. The South African government categorically expressed that “the primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary” (RSA 1996a:21). This is despite a security threat assessment and forecast that the country in the short to medium term faced no immediate conventional military threat (RSA 1996a:17). The forecast proved to be accurate. As the evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 shows, under both Mandela and Mbeki, the SANDF’s functions were anything but defending South Africa against external military aggression. The so-called secondary functions dominated almost by default in the absence of an external military threat posed to the republic.
A prevailing sentiment for military withdrawal in some civilian tasks like township policing took root when South Africa democratised in 1994 (Drysdale & Hobday 1994:15). Nevertheless, the political and security situation in the fragile democracy led by Mandela required of the SANDF to undertake certain domestic tasks as highlighted in Chapter 3. In this regard, the SANDF raised its profile and legitimacy with the South African public when it transformed, embarked on a process of being demographically representative, and performed tasks to the benefit of the state and its people (Modise 1997). The tasks performed by the SANDF included: supporting the police in fighting crime inside the country and at the borders; assisting and securing the 1994 general elections and 1996 local government elections so that citizens could freely choose their political representatives; and maritime protection so vital for the country’s economic security (Haefele 1998:53; Mandela 1997; RSA 1996a:24-25). External employment of the SANDF during Mandela’s tenure was limited to small specialised contingents like logistical support on UN missions through the 1990s (RSA 1999:24). A number of humanitarian aid operations in emergencies on the African continent, and at home, were also undertaken in the period 1994-1999.

Chapter 4 revealed that from the time Mbeki took office in 1999 until 2003 the SANDF was still actively involved in some domestic functions, most notably border protection and fighting crime through the commando system. But even after 2003, the defence force continued to assist various government departments with their line functional responsibilities, including in support of socio-economic upliftment, when so required as per government regulation (RSA 2002b:13). Examples include, in a politically contentious move, the SANDF assisting in combating xenophobic violence in 2008 (SAPA 2008) as well as indirectly contributing to government's Asgisa programme which had the objective of skills provision and reducing employment (Vuthela 2006:29).

Shelton (2004:32) correctly notes that the SANDF cannot respond to all human security threats. Hence on an issue like environmental sustainability, the SANDF Chief of Logistics indicated that the DoD was willing to cooperate with the relevant lead departments (Ndaba 2003:43). Similarly, the DoD could only organise a successful conference on HIV/Aids awareness in conjunction with other stakeholders like educational institutions and religious groups as mentioned by the Deputy Minister of Defence in his 2007 budget vote (see Chapter 4).

Meanwhile, the government also had an outward political positioning as epitomised by the earlier mentioned African Renaissance. This was as the
expected peace dividend at the end of the Cold War did not materialise. Political instability and intrastate conflict were prevalent across the continent which led the DoD to have the pursuit of peace and security in Africa as one of its strategic objectives (RSA 2005:64). South Africa had already capacitated itself and the continental mechanisms to participate in peace missions (Nzo 1998). This led to the phasing out domestically to increase foreign capacity in 2003. So, from 2003 until the end of Mbeki’s administration in 2009, the SANDF had approximately 3000 troops deployed in various missions of the AU and UN at any given time (see Table 4 in Chapter 4). On these missions the SANDF undertook traditional peacekeeping activities like humanitarian aid, monitoring a ceasefire between belligerents and/or SSR initiatives as in Sudan and Burundi (Rademeyer 2003:14; Webb 2006). A careful appraisal of these activities will show that they largely have to do with the freedom from fear aspect of human security. South Africa would have been hard-pressed to contribute to freedom from want on the continent due to financial constraints. Consider that just the mission in Sudan with about 300 odd SANDF members sapped the SANDF budget by R 100 million in 2005 (Webb 2006)

1.3 Civil-military relations under Mandela and Mbeki

South Africa was a country in which security organs of state, including the military, imposed fear and operated with impunity during apartheid. This was as “governance was shaped by the imperatives of a national security doctrine with little respect for the rule of law” (RSA 2009a:3). The outcome of this was a militarised society with pervasive insecurity for the majority of citizens as evidenced in “high levels of violence and crime, economic decline, regional arms races, [and] destabilisation” in much of the subcontinent (ANC 1992). It is reasonable to infer that the apartheid regime did not necessarily subscribe to the notion of “freedom from fear” and therefore compromised the human security of some citizens. In contrast to security forces operating with impunity, and as indicated by the reference to Huntington (1957:2) in Chapter 3, those countries with a “balanced pattern of civil-military relations” increase their chances of achieving their quest for security. Normatively, this security ought to include the security of the people. The South African government concurs with this view as it stated that the “emerging national interest are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizen” (RSA 1999:20).

The need to transform security organisations was one of the preoccupations of government upon democratisation in 1994 (RSA 2009a:56). As the analysis
in Chapter 3 revealed, SST under Mandela’s administration necessarily had to take place in order for South Africa to have proper civil-military relations which were absent during apartheid. The transformation process was significant for three reasons according to one analyst (Kenkel 2006:6). Firstly, the cooption of the academic community and civil society formations in policy processes was a major coup as South Africa sought to establish a new and democratic security dispensation. In particular, as established in the literature overview in Chapter 1, think-tanks like the MRG was influential when it came to defence policy outputs and the redefinition of security in South Africa which incorporated a lot of CSS ideas (Jordaan 2004:28; Kenkel 2005:172-178). Also, the participation of civil society organisations like IDASA in shaping the future security orientation of South Africa cannot be over-emphasised. It can then be reasoned that this is how human security ideas were fused into public policy in South Africa, through theoretical insights of academia and input from broader society.

Secondly, SST was distinguished by the attention given to civil-military relations and security governance broadly. SST brought with it a series of institutional, legislative and policy processes meant to ensure civil control over the military and inculcate good governance in the defence sector (Modise 1997; RSA 1996:116-118; RSA 1996a). According to Fukuyama (2004:29), good governance is indispensable for state institutions to deliver on their mandate which in the case of the SANDF is to provide security to the people of South Africa and the state.

Lastly, the transformation process was commendable for the manner in which it was conducted. The nature of policies formulated was progressive as they put the people first and were laden with broad principles around human rights, civil control and guidelines for the integration of forces (Cawthra 2005:97; Kynoch 1996:450). Another prominent feature of SST is the exhaustive and unprecedented consultative nature of policy formulation as in, for example, the White Paper on Defence (RSA 1996a:2-3). However, Cawthra (2005:97) picks a trend of less consultation on policy formulation starting with the Defence Review (1998), the White Paper on Peace Missions (1999) and the Conventional Arms Control Bill (2000). Indeed, this study, in Chapter 4, showed evidence of lack of consultation with civil society and the public in the manner of how the Army’s Vision 2020 came about in 2006. The lack of consulting other stakeholders outside state institutions is against the spirit of sound military relations. As Ferreira (2007:248) and Williams (2001a:6-12) observed in Chapter 3, civil-military relations are more than just civil control of the armed forces.
Civil control over the armed forces, a leading objective of civil-military relations, was firmly established by the time Mandela left government in 1999. This was confirmed by Minister of Defence, Modise (1999) when he said the government was assured of the loyalty and professionalism of the military. However, getting to that state was not easy as challenges were encountered along the way. For example, racial tensions and disciplinary problems were experienced from amongst integrating members of the new SANDF but these were quickly nipped by the political leadership of Modise and his deputy, Ronnie Kasrils (Cock 1995:104; Modise 1997).

In contrast to the earlier years of Mandela’s administration, the government which came into being under Mbeki did not have to be overly anxious regarding the loyalty of the military. However, in Chapter 4 reference is made of the then incumbent Minister of Defence, Lekotoa (2007), alluding to innocuous and isolated incidents of resistance from the top leadership of the SANDF as late as 2007. In fact, it has been argued that the leadership of the SANDF started being amenable to the government’s grand notion of human security as early as 1998 following the unceremonious resignation of the Chief of Defence, General Meiring (Pretorius 2008:46). Although structures for good civil-military relations were instigated in the period 1994-1999, some gaps in the system showed during Mbeki’s reign. Perhaps this was because the transformation process was still on-going during Mbeki’s presidency as indicated by the presence of BMATT until 2003.

Some structural weaknesses were latent in South Africa’s evolving civil-military relations under Mandela and Mbeki. It was argued in Chapter 4 that constitutionally, parliament and the relevant sub-committees are possibly the most important securitising actors in South Africa because they set policy and have oversight over all security services (RSA 1996:117). However, Griffiths (2008:230-231) counterpoints that South Africa’s electoral system of proportional representation puts parliamentarians at the mercy of their political parties which hinders their oversight responsibilities, especially over the executive. Griffiths (2008:230) also points out that most parliamentarians in South Africa lacked the technical expertise on military matters. Again, it can be taken that this compromised the democratic political control of the armed forces which had to happen through parliament. It is therefore unsurprising that Jordaan (2004:19) found the executive to have dominated parliament over the defence policy and therefore how the SANDF was being used. Furthermore, it was found that the top executives in the military bureaucracy, especially the Navy and Air Force, were another dominating and influential role player in South Africa’s defence debates (Esterhuyse 2013:139). The
alleged dominance of the Navy and Air Force potentially explains why they were prioritised ahead of Army in the arms deal.

The narrative of the arms deal, detailed in Chapter 4, is illustrative in showing where the balance of power in civil-military relations lay in South Africa during the period under scrutiny, 1994-2009. It can be assumed that the military bureaucracy was in favour of the arms deal as this would have allowed the SANDF to perform its assigned tasks. Meanwhile, Mbeki (2001), as head of the executive, was adamant that his government was not going to renege on contractual agreements with foreign partners even if there were domestic calls for such a move. Those calling for some contracts under the arms deal to be cancelled included lobbying organisations like Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (Jordaan 2004:24). On the other hand, perhaps sensing the indifference of the South African public on defence matters, political parties did not place the arms deal as an agenda item for political campaigning, and thereby set it up for securitisation, during the 2004 elections even as the controversy dragged from the start in 1998 (Pretorius 2008:47).

In the final analysis, the study (in Chapters 3 and 4) found that civil-military relations in South Africa (1994-2009) typified by engagements between stakeholders such as academia, military bureaucracy, political elites in parliament and the executive, and the media were sometimes acrimonious and tense. Notwithstanding the tension, the most important element is that civil-military relations had matured as civil control over the armed forces was firmly established (Cawthra 2003:53; Williams 1999:77). If the military respected and acknowledged political authority then this bode well for the prospects of attaining human security.

2. Responses to the research questions

Three research questions were asked at the start of the study in Chapter 1. The aim of this section, as the study draws to a close, is to directly provide answers to the set questions using as the basis of contention the evidence contained in the summary above.

The first and main research question was: what impact did official perceptions of human security by the South African government and the DoD have on the functioning of the SANDF in the period 1994-2009? In response this study argues that official perceptions of human security have made the operational
functioning of the SANDF difficult as it struggles to reconcile its primary mandate with the developmental responsibilities implied by human security. The rationale of this response is as thus:

It is irrefutable that the new South Africa officially embraced the notion of human security. With people in mind, security was perceived as broadened and comprising of political, economic, social, and environmental factors (RSA 1996a:6). This reconceptualization of security was a departure from traditional assumptions under apartheid when state security was a priority. The democratic government came with an agenda of altering state policies to be biased towards all the people, especially poor and previously disadvantaged individuals (Cloete 2006:97). This shift in policy had implications for all government departments, not least of which was the SANDF which was put under strain in executing its functions.

A fundamental problem is that while the South African White Paper on Defence ideally and broadly defined security on the one hand, on the other hand “it reverted to the classical realist formula when it came to defining the primary role of the Defence Force” (Cawthra 2003:45). The intransigent stance that the primary function of the SANDF should be to defend the republic against an invisible enemy has limited the role the armed forces could have played in the development agenda of the state and thus ensuring human security for the people of South Africa. To emphasise the point, Barber (2004:121) highlighted that the arms deal was criticised for both the cost and type of equipment purchased. Conventional military weapons were bought even though it could be envisaged that the SANDF was going to be involved in operations other than war.

Admittedly, the collateral utility of the SANDF’s conventional equipment and training has proved useful in what are deemed secondary functions by South Africa’s officialdom (Lekota 2008a; Nyanda 2001:47). These include saving lives in humanitarian aid operations and peace missions in such places as Tanzania, Mozambique, Burundi, Sudan and the DRC (Heinecken 2002:73; Mbeki 2004). Domestically, amongst other tasks, the SANDF made a notable contribution fighting crime and quelling political violence in support of the police (Mandela 1997). Hough and Kruys (2009:4) allude that fighting crime contributes to both state and human security as it goes a long way to preventing internal strife, weapons proliferation, and terrorism. An argument can therefore be made that in fighting crime, saving lives in humanitarian operations and having a presence in conflict areas on the continent the
SANDF contributed positively to the freedom from fear aspect of South Africa’s human security agenda.

The SANDF has played a miniscule role with respect to the other side of the human security equation, the developmental or freedom from want aspect. Maybe the SANDF played such a minimal role because as Esterhuyse (2012:235) put it “human security [development] is not what armies are about.” In fact, the South African government categorically put it that it was “disinclined to employ the SANDF in socio-economic development” (RSA 1996a:25). In the end, when it comes to other UN identified sectors of human security like health, education, food, economic and environmental security, the SANDF played an ad-hoc, irregular role as legislation determined that the defence force can only be involved when so requested by other government departments (RSA 2002:13). To illustrate, Chapter 4 referred to two instances where senior DoD and SANDF personnel expressed how the military worked only to assist respective lead departments in the economic and environmental sectors. Clearly, the SANDF was limited in the developmental role it could play because it had to consider its primary mandate.

A related factor which adversely affected the operational functioning of the SANDF was South Africa’s strategic defence posture. This was particularly guided by the African agenda of South Africa’s foreign policy as expressed by the notion of African Renaissance (Mandela 1994a). Similarly to the notion of human security, the African agenda required of South Africa to be concerned with the security situation in African states. South Africa had securitised the security dilemma in Africa (Lekota 2001). Also, because of this role conception and expectations from many in Africa itself for South Africa to help where conflict arose (Schoeman2000:56), the SANDF was overloaded with tasks. This was exacerbated by the fact that South Africa’s preferred pacific means like mediation were not always suitable to deal with situations which could quickly escalate as happened in Lesotho in 1998. On top of foreign obligations in Africa, the SANDF also had domestic tasks demanding its attention (Nyanda 2001:55). South Africa’s military machinery was overworked to the point that Esterhuyse (2010:20) warned that the SANDF could end up serving no one if it tried to serve everyone. Part of the problem, also acknowledged by Minister Lekota (2001; 2002), was the misalignment between defence policy and the budget allocation. This ultimately adversely impacted the operational functioning of the SANDF.
Now for the second research question which was: what did official perceptions of human security mean for the priority given to state security by the SANDF? The response to the questions is that the SANDF prioritised state security ahead of human security. This argument is raised because of the following reasons:

Buzan (1991:364) claims that individual security and state security are inherently contradictory. This could be interpreted to mean that human security and state security will always be in competition. From another perspective, the UNDP (1994:24) insists that since the inception of the UN, security of the territory (state security) and of the people were given equal weight in principle. However, in reality, territorial security acquired through arms later dominated even though this was not necessary. As Joe Nhlanhla of the ANC was quoted earlier in this chapter, state security and people security are interdependent. The deduction is that one cannot exist without the other.

It is interesting to note that one of the constitutional principles governing national security uses the human security terminology of the UN that South Africans must be “free from fear and want” along inducting the SANDF to protect the territorial integrity of the Republic (RSA 1996:116-117). As the chapters through the study would show these principles were often emphasised by government officials in their speeches and indicate the generally equal measure with which human security and state security were held in South Africa. However, state security was a priority from the perspective of the DoD. Take General Nyanda (2001:48) referring to the constitution to make the point that while all government departments had the responsibility to ensure the well-being of the people of South Africa when it came to the military aspect (state security), the DoD was the lead department. Nyanda goes on to make the example that with its inherent capacity of engineering units and military health infrastructure the SANDF could only assist, respectively, the Departments of Health and Housing. Practically, for the period under review, 1994-2009, state security was almost a given as there was no external military threat to the Republic. This was ensured, amongst others, by the attention given to transformation of the SANDF so it could maintain its capacity to defend the Republic. Also, the decision to procure mainly conventional weapons in the arms deal illustrated the importance of state security for the South African government.

Efforts by the SANDF aimed at contributing to human security were mixed. Because it had the capacity to “react quickly and decisively in times of crisis
or disaster” (Nyanda 2001:48), the SANDF played a part mostly in ensuring freedom from fear especially in humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping. In fact, the increased use of the SANDF in peacekeeping was so significant that it compelled South Africa to “review the distinction between primary and secondary functions” (Lekota 2008a). The contribution of the SANDF in ensuring freedom from want was in part successful. A possible explanation is the partial securitisation of other sectors of security. South Africa’s securitisation is labelled partial because whereas non-military issues like poverty were important in terms of security perceptions (RSA 1996a:20), the government did not dedicate specific emergency measures or resources involving security organs. The best government could do in relation to the defence was that all non-military issues were to be dealt with using the “conventional” capability of the SANDF (Lekota 2008a). This left a resourceful tool like the SANDF only being used sparingly in developmental duties, particularly at home. In Africa, the SANDF often focused on traditional peace missions with the aim of keeping the peace in conflict zones. This known as negative peace as opposed to positive peace which addresses the root causes of conflict and insecurity (Harris 2004:10). Moreover, the SANDF took pride in the humanitarian aid it commendably rendered at home and abroad. But as the UNDP (1994:3) cautions, “short-term humanitarian assistance can never replace long-term development support.” Humanitarian missions in and by themselves are not sufficient to achieve human security.

Lastly, the third research question posed was: was the nature of civil-military relations in South Africa enabling for the achievement of human security? The reply to this question is that the nature of civil-military relations in South Africa meant there was potential to operationalise human security. The basis of this reply is as follows:

As soon as the new government was installed in 1994, the formal transformation process of the security sector which was to be long and judicious moved apace (Modise 1997). With respect to defence, several factors led to a largely successful process. These include:

- Politically fertile ground – the end of the Cold War, in geostrategic terms, saw a decline in the influence of the military for many governments in the world as their budgets were decreased (Booth 1991:314). This context along with the crumbling of the apartheid state meant the military in South Africa had to transform and work according to democratic prescripts (RSA 199a:4). As Heinecken (2006:1)
contends the military in South Africa had to adapt to these changes in its strategic environment or face the risk of being irrelevant to society.

- A locally driven process – the SST process in South Africa was mainly domestically driven with the assistance of local civil society (Cawthra 2005:97;100). Ostensibly, the locally propelled process made it possible to appreciate domestic circumstances like social and cultural aspects which might have proved important in the integration process of statutory and non-statutory forces as an example.

- Clear guidelines and principles – the Constitution clearly set out the security architecture of the new South Africa. Separation of functions, structures and control between different security organs of state, including the police and intelligence services, were explicitly spelt out in Chapter 11 of the Constitution (RSA 1996:116-122).

- Consultative policy process – Seminal policy documents like the White Paper on Defence (1996) were largely consultative in their formulation as input from a cross section of South African society was considered (RSA 1996a:3).

- Civil-military relations – Institutions like the executive, parliament and its oversight committees and a civilian Secretariat sharing tasks with the Chief of the SANDF served to ensure civil control of the military (Modise 1997).

Because of the cumulative effect of the above factors over the years, from 1994 through to 2009 and beyond, it became inconceivable that the SANDF could be a law onto itself and deliberately pose a threat to the state and its citizens (Cawthra 2003:53). Instead, the SANDF was found to be loyal to the government (Modise 1999) and could therefore be relied on to comply with all commands given by political authority. In the beginning, there may have been questions around whether the old guard from the SADF was going to be loyal to the new government but this ultimately proved to be of no consequence as the professionalism of many soldiers reigned. Furthermore, as per the Constitution (RSA 1996:117), the President or Minister of Defence could give any instruction and inform parliament of such. The SANDF would then execute the task, even beyond its primary functions, as long as it conformed to the laws of the country and international law. Hence the argument made is that there was potential to operationalise human security in South Africa from a defence point of view.

The deployment of the SANDF, even to achieve the lofty aspirations of human security, was well set with fool proof legal checks and balances in legislation and policy directives as set out above. It is just that the SANDF as a military
organisation was more inclined to provide state security and excel at activities contributing to freedom from fear than freedom from want.


Newman (2001:249) advises that research should deepen understanding of the changing nature of security with the ultimate goal of offering viable policy options for decision makers. Since 1994 South African policymakers have not shunned the research community during policy formulation. Ironically though, the latest significant defence policy, the South African Defence Review (2014), has been criticised by some scholars for its lack of broad public participation (Le Roux 2012:3; Mills 2011:3). Nonetheless, some defence policy deficiencies and concomitant operational challenges of the SANDF identified by scholars, and also highlighted in the current study, seem to have provided invaluable lessons incorporated by policymakers in the Defence Review (2014). Some of the key lessons learnt from security perceptions over the period 1994-2009 include:

- There must be broader role, beyond protection of national sovereignty, for the SANDF to play in South African society given the developmental state agenda of the country (RSA 2014:v). ANC Secretary-General, Gwede Mantashe, weighed in on this issue when he pointed out that South Africa should be thinking about how to utilise the engineering capacity of the Army which is one of the best in the country. In the same breadth, the ANC and its allies are reportedly of the view that youth programmes in the military could help alleviate some of the social ills in the country like alcohol and drug abuse (Nhlabathi 2015).
- The need for South Africa to balance its national interests and continental leadership role. This comprises appropriate use of the military capability which must be aligned with South Africa’s international status and strategic posture. This lesson was highlighted in a discussion paper by the four person committee that drafted the Defence Review (Meyer, Sendall, Gibbs and Keketsi 2013). The opinion piece was given in the wake of deaths of South African soldiers who had been deployed in the CAR in 2013 and was based on conclusions of draft South African Defence Review of the same year. The drafters underscore the importance of aligning the defence mandate, the growing commitments of the SANDF and budget allocation as the previous disconnect in these areas had “eroded” defence capabilities.
- Possibly to mitigate the erosion as referred to above it has been emphasised that defence policy must be regularly updated to ensure that it remains relevant and complies with legislative prescripts which
may dictate how government uses the armed forces (RSA 2014:0_6; Sisulu 2012).

- The SANDF recognised that its future operational success will be dependent on the quality of soldiers and civilian personnel at the Defence Secretariat and has therefore indicated that training, education, and development will be important going forward. Mills (2011:19) spoke to this issue ahead of the Defence Review being conducted when he gave ingredients of credible military capability as consisting of good equipment, good people and their training. Mills further reasons that without this formula, it is useless to acquire expensive equipment as happened with SDP. This is an invaluable lesson with regards to the actual functions performed by the SANDF.

- With regards to civil-military relations the Defence Review does not say enough for inferences to be made about lessons that may have been drawn over the years since 1994. Perhaps that is a validation of the argument made in this paper that although not perfect, South Africa’s civil-military relations are mature. A notable mention of civil-military relations in the Defence Review is when it is mentioned that future operations of the SANDF will be based on a Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Departmental, and Multi-National model (RSA 2014:10_3). This will also involve closer working relationship between the DoD and other organs of state as well as NGOs, and other private entities with the objective of improved civil-military relations. An identified gap in South Africa’s civil-military relations, which future defence policy might want to address, is the limited parliamentary oversight role over defence matters. Mandatory training for parliamentarians might be one of the interventions which could be instituted so that they, as the representatives of the people, could have the capacity to execute their role.

3.1 Recommendations for researchers

- In a similar fashion that scholars agreed that a re-conceptualisation of the concept of security was needed, researchers must now explore if they can redefine the principles governing the practice of politics. Although complete consensus is unlikely, some minimum level of common understanding is required for concepts like sovereignty, human rights and democracy because it is due to differences around these that a noble ideal like human security remains illusive.

- The contemporary post-Cold War world is characterised by egregious, multidimensional, evolving, and complex security challenges that affect real people more than they do the abstract state. Scholars are therefore duty bound to give constant research output parallel to the
changing nature of security, especially linkages between different sectors of security. For example, the current study was limited as it did not explore the exact nature of the relationship between dimensions like environmental and economic security. Security scholars will then have to engage in multi-disciplinary studies with experts from other fields for a holistic understanding of security.

- More universal theories that explain global social structures causing insecurity for the majority must complement the yet to be developed localised theories for specific regions like South Africa and Southern Africa. Western centric theories like the ones used in this study might not always be empirically and politically applicable to the non-Western world like South Africa. Indigenous and inward looking theories that explain how all local people, not only those in positions of power like politicians and military bureaucrats, understand the world cognitively and engage with their environment, are important. Variables like (strategic) culture, language, history, and images influence perceptions and ultimately security practice. If these variables can be intimately understood, then it might be possible to suggest alternative views and practices to the benefit of the people.

4. Conclusion

Human security is a complex phenomenon which the South African government has found difficult to operationalise. Good public speeches by government officials and policy frameworks on how to pursue human security are meaningless to the majority of South African citizens who still live in poverty, unemployment, and inequality more than two decades after democracy. These threats to human security do not only have domestic origins but have external roots as well. Consequently, to turn the tide against human security, South Africa will have to forge a nuanced alignment of domestic and foreign policy.

In relation and equally as important would be linking security and development policies such that human security is served. This will entail redefining the role of traditional security institutions like the SANDF in society so they can contribute more to the developmental agenda. Using an instrument like the SANDF to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state and thereby provide a safe environment conducive for citizens to thrive is but only one part of the equation. When all is said and done, security and human security in particular, is fundamentally about responsiveness, accountability, and transparency in governance. The people must come first in whatever government does.
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