MANAGEMENT OF SPOILER BEHAVIOUR IN THE MOZAMBICAN MEDIATION PROCESS (1990-1994)

by

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC        African National Congress
AU         African Union
CIO        Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation
DRC        Democratic Republic of Congo
FRELIMO    Frente da Libertação de Moçambique
GPA        General Peace Agreement
IMF        International Monetary Fund
MNR        Mozambique National Resistance
OAU        Organisation of African Unity
RENAMO     Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SRS-G      Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN         United Nations
UNOMOZ     United Nations Observation Mission for Mozambique
UNS-G      United Nations Secretary-General
USA        United States of America
ZANLA      Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ABSTRACT

Many ceasefires have failed to reach a durable settlement as a result of spoiling by parties who perceive the emerging peace as a threat to their interests. Creating long-lasting peace after a prolonged armed conflict is a complex process because durable settlements often depend on sustained third-party intervention from the negotiation stage to the implementation stage. Throughout the peacebuilding process the third party acts as a driver, helping the disputants to reach a negotiated solution. The success of the mediator is determined by various determinants, most importantly that mediation strategies must reflect the reality of the conflict, the expectations of the disputants and the ability to deflect spoiler tactics. Spoilers who deliberately derail the peace making (negotiation of an agreement) and / or peacekeeping (implementation of the agreement) processes is an important reason for the failure of most peace processes.

Mozambique emerged from a post-independent civil war and a peace making process characterised by third-party mediation. The first phase of the mediation process started in 1990 in Rome under the auspices of the church of Sant’Egidio and culminated in a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992. The second phase involved the deployment of the United Nations Observation Mission for Mozambique (UNOMOZ) peacekeeping force to oversee the implementation of the GPA. The mediation in Mozambique from 1990-1994 showed that the transnational network of the Roman Catholic Church provided a framework for peace making and it was acceptable to all warring parties because it maintained its credibility and moral legitimacy in this war-torn country.

Although successful, the Mozambican mediation process had its own challenges, including serious spoiler behaviour by parties within the process. The identification of spoilers and the determination of their motives, behaviour and tactics enabled the mediator to devise strategies for dealing with them.

Keywords: peace, peacemaking, mediation, mediator, Mozambique, Frelimo, Renamo, spoilers, spoiling, devious behaviour, UNOMOZ, Sant’Egidio
CHAPTER 1

1. Background to the study

The dismantling of the European colonial empires after the Second World War introduced an era of turbulence to many new states on the African continent. 1960 became the “Year of Africa”, as seventeen newly independent states joined the United Nations (UN) and former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan delivered his “Winds of change” speech to the South African parliament (Butler and Stockwell 2014). 196 was also the year of President Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at the UN General Assembly meeting on 23 September when he declared that it was time for the “complete and final liberation of peoples languishing in complete bondage” (Hume 1994:5). Indeed, decolonisation created a continent with a split personality which presented its new states to the world, but also experienced post-colonial violence in the form of inter-state wars and internal conflicts. Between independence and the middle 1990s the majority of the world’s most devastating civil wars and eighty violent changes of government occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (Bujra 2002:1). Political instability and internal strife in countries such as Somalia, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia created long-term fragile states, some of which eventually became failed states.

In this study, the broad framework is provided by mediation as a conflict resolution instrument and method of managing the crisis behavior that manifested in Africa after the end of the Second World War. The role and impact of spoilers in these mediation processes provide the micro focus of analysis. Mediation, one of the peacemaking methods mentioned in Chapter IV of the UN Charter, is an ancient method of dispute settlement in which conflicting parties seek and accept the assistance of an impartial outsider to facilitate dialogue aimed at reaching a peace settlement. However, during the Cold War, negotiation and mediation became the

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1 Mediation in the context of this study is limited to mediation as a conflict management strategy in international relations.

2 This study uses the terms “spoiler”, “spoiling” and “devious behaviour”, denoting spoilers as actors, spoiling as actions, and “devious behaviour” aimed at stalling a peace process. This is in line with Zahar's (2007:41) argument that the term “spoiler” is extremely subjective, since not all actors that display spoiling behaviour or devious behaviour can be termed spoilers, since spoiling is a contextual phenomenon.
official ‘track one’ channels of peacemaking between governments, while the involvement of international organisations and non-state actors became known as ‘track two’ diplomacy (Kriesberg 2007:34).

In the post-Second World War international system official mediators were involved in 255 of the 310 conflicts in the period 1945–1974 (Princen 1992:5) but peacemaking exercises not always create long-term peace as Newman and Richmond (2006a:1) contend, “Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years”. Indeed, mediation, the preferred instrument for the peaceful resolution of long-term conflicts, created its own challenges. A pattern developed with mediation processes followed by further fighting as happened in Liberia, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The challenge was met by a former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who prioritised conflict resolution in his 1992 report³. He identified a continuum of peacebuilding strategies starting with strategies such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding to be undertaken by the UN as part of its conflict resolution objective. In this report, Boutros Boutros-Ghali explains peacemaking as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”. He also describes peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned (United Nations Secretary-General 1992: par. 20).

Meanwhile, on the African continent the end of the Cold War also signified that Africa had lost its global strategic relevance, with mixed consequences. On the one hand, new conflicts emerged as was the case in Liberia and Somalia, but other long existing conflicts, such as those in the Southern African countries of Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, suddenly experienced breathing space. Mozambique, the

³ UN Secretary-General Report. 1992. A/47/277 - S/24111. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. This Report manifests the new assertiveness of the UN and the optimism that the UN can play the role of an actor in promoting international peace and security after the end of the Cold War.
focus of this study, experienced a drawn-out struggle for independence from Portugal, one-party rule after independence in June and a civil war from 1976 until 1992. Post-independence fighting broke out as the Frelimo government, supported by Tanzania and backed by the former Soviet Union, installed one-party rule and clamped down on opposition groups. Frelimo also supported the Frontline States and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa in their struggle against the white minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. A rebel movement, Renamo, founded and supported by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and later also South Africa, took up arms to destabilise Mozambique (Alden 1995:103; Hume 1994; Jett 1999; Rupiya 1998 and Vines 1991:1). More than a million people died in the civil war and approximately 5 million of the country’s population of 14 million was displaced by 1988 as Mozambican refugees fled to neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Robinson 2006:29). Mediation took place under the auspices of the Community of Sant’Egidio\(^4\) from 1990-1992, culminating in the signing of a General Peace Agreement (GPA) by the warring factions. Creating a durable peace in this conflict-ridden country required multidimensional mediation by mediators perceived to be fair and able to deal with hostile parties and spoilers.

2. Literature survey

The literature on mediation as a method of international conflict management will be assessed in terms of three aspects:

(a) Theoretical approaches to mediation
(b) Academic debates on spoilers, their motives and behaviour during mediation processes;
(c) The case study: spoiler behaviour in the 1990-1994 mediation process in Mozambique.

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\(^4\) The approach of the Comunità di Sant’Egidio /Community of Sant'Egidio was that war creates poverty (it is the "mother of every poverty") it is dehumanising and Mozambique desperately needed 'good offices' to facilitate negotiations (*Comunità di Sant'Egidio e la Pace*. 1990).
2.1 Theoretical approaches to mediation

Bercovitch and Houston (2000); Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999 and 2004); Hume (1994); Kleiboer (1996); Nathan (1999-2011); Smith and Smock (2008); Wall, Stark and Standifer (2001); Stedman (1997 and 2010), Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) and Zartman and Rasmussen (1997 and 2007) created an extensive body of literature on mediation over the last 25 years. They provide a valuable framework for the analysis of mediation as a process of conflict management and still investigate questions such as: What is mediation, which approaches and strategies provide best results and under what conditions will mediation result in long-term peace?

What is mediation? Berridge (2010:250) describes mediation in international conflict as “the active search for a negotiated settlement to an international or intra-state conflict by an impartial third party”. Bercovitch (2009:341) defines mediation as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law”. The two definitions complement each other and focus on the same elements being the disputants, who seek and accept the assistance of the mediator and an impartial third party to facilitate dialogue and suggest possible solutions in the context of a specific conflict resolution endeavor (Bercovitch and Langley 1993). Mediation aims to settle an international or internal conflict and can therefore take place between states, within states and between groups of states (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:25; Berridge 2010:237).

Bercovitch (1997) identifies four approaches to the study of international mediation, each with its own benefits. Prescriptive studies represent the first approach as it focuses on practical advice to mediators. The UN’s training manuals and reports such as the Report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities (2009 and 2012) are examples of prescriptive studies. Nathan (2010) also refers to the prescriptive approach when he observes that mediation has evolved as a professional discipline, bringing with it an array of factors such as skills, techniques, theories and a large body of research, which have made mediation more
focused. Nathan (2010) advises that international organisations should focus more on adopting a confidence-building approach and that “training, appointing, supporting and evaluating mediators” should be a priority.

The second approach focuses on the development of theoretical models of mediation. Stedman’s typology of spoilers serves as an example of this approach. This approach will be discussed in later chapters.

Game theory is a third approach to mediation where the requirement of a non-zero sum game, where everybody wins provides a framework for analysis. The advantages of an analysis of the mediation process based on game theory is that the main focus is on the relationship between the parties and the requirement that communication and trust must exist before mediation can be effective. In the fourth approach the focus is on empirical case studies aimed at creating guidelines for conflict resolution. The approach followed in this study, the (historical) case study approach, fits in with this approach. A fifth approach is presented by Nathan (2015:10-11) who links complexity theory to mediation and argues that mediation efforts already start at the civil war which forms a complex system to be managed by the mediator. Managing its complexity needs convincing “the components of the system of the need to change the system fundamentally, from one of war and instability to one of peace and relative stability”. This is a daunting task, but the mediator only has limited strategies and resources with the consequence that mediators need the backing of external actors in the form of inducements to change the minds of the parties. To avoid counter-productive results, mediators must have an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the conflict at hand and the resources available to the mediator.

In contrast, the strategies of mediators form the core aspect of two theoretical approaches to mediation identified by Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999:21) and Bercovitch (2011). The structuralist approach focuses on the mediator being aware that protagonists in a conflict have different motives and interests in the outcome of the conflict and that it is the main task of the mediator to structure the discussions of the parties. In this regard, the mediator then uses persuasion, incentive and
punishment to reach a negotiated settlement. The social-psychological approach forms the basis for the focus on five variables identified by Bercovitch (2011:110) who lists them as “personal, goal, role, interactional and situational” variables. The premise is that communication between the factions will give them the opportunity to discuss their differences, and understand each other which will eventually bring consensus. Mediators aim to create a dynamic, interactive communication process with the objective to change the perceptions and beliefs of the warring parties (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004:5).

Nevertheless, strategies related to both structuralist and socio-psychological approaches are crucial as mediators attempt to negotiate a settlement. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999:24) emphasise that mediators most often have to attempt resolving conflicts by dealing with both approaches simultaneously as disputants may differ on how they would want to solve the conflict. It often happens that only one party may perceive a conflict to be ripe for resolution which then pressures the mediator to coerce the other party to alter its perception of if and when to stop fighting.

Mandell and Tomlin (1991) contribute to the literature on mediation by creating a framework for the identification of the determinants of successful mediation. They distinguish between contextual determinants, comprising the nature of the conflict, the characteristics of the parties and the relationship between the parties and the mediator. In contrast, procedural determinants relate to the strategies of the mediator. Wallensteen and Svenson (2014: 2) also investigate the effectiveness of mediation and state that the body of literature on the topic of mediation “provides credible evidence of its effectiveness, although the particular conditions under which mediation is effective are still debated”.

However, Wall, Stark and Standifer (2001:386–387) identify gaps in the literature on mediation, which they consider to be either too descriptive or too theoretical. They also draw attention to the inefficiency of mediation literature in the areas of the methods and techniques of mediators while Haixia (2007:621) finds that much work still needs to be done in the area of the strategies of mediators. Nathan (2007)
contends that resolving latent and hidden frustrations, aggressions and fear is a demanding exercise and notes that mediation must be recognized for the complex process it is. It is both a science and an art, and can be derailed by many factors, such as the level of violence, the gap between mandate and capacity (Nathan 2007) and the deliberate spoiling tactics of a party involved in the negotiation process. One of the most important strategies to be employed by mediators is the identification and skillful management of spoilers.

2.2 Spoilers, spoiling and devious behaviour


Zahar disagrees with Stedman on the timing of spoiling and states that Stedman’s notion of peace processes resulting in spoiler behavior is inaccurate because spoiling often starts before the commencement of the peace process. However, Newman and Richmond’s (2006c:3-5) criticism is more deep seated as they strongly advise that caution should be taken in the treatment of “spoiling” (verb) and “spoilers” (noun) as concepts. They describe the analysis of the process of spoiling as subjective and loaded with negative connotations as it demands a distinction between two sides: “us” versus “they”, “good” (those who want peace) versus “bad” (those whose selfish interests demand that they obstruct or prolong the peace process versus those who are willing to make concessions).
But Newman and Richmond (2006:c:5) warn that openness should characterise studies on spoilers due to the difficulties involved in the identification of spoilers and their spoiling behavior. They list the complex nature of conflicts, the variety of internal and external actors involved in the peacemaking process and the underlying normative considerations involved in labelling a party, person or group as spoilers as the main reasons. As a result, Newman and Richmond 2006:5) find that “all parties have the potential to be spoilers: the phenomenon is more an issue of tactics, not actors”. They also distinguish between “spoiler behavior” and “devious behaviour” which occur when parties, who do not have the success of the process in mind, attempt to gain time, legitimacy or material benefits by stalling the process. They advise that a study of spoiler behaviour in a particular mediation process should be taken from an “inside-out” perspective which would assist in a better understanding of the motives and strategies of parties because “what an outsider sees as spoiling may be viewed by insiders as a legitimate attempt to shape a peace process or end it if it does not offer the potential for a satisfactory outcome in their eyes” (Newman & Richmond 2006c:6).

Simultaneously, Greenhill and Major (2007) and Pearlman (2008/09) argue that Stedman focuses too much on internal and external spoilers and that he underplays the motives of spoilers, their behavior and the structural impediments on the mediation process. Pearlman (2008/09:82) contends that spoilers are motivated by opportunities in “weakly institutionalized settings” where “…absence of laws to enforce procedures for collective decision making, not only are there multiple games of social choice, but their rules are in flux”. She instead, chooses the internal contestation model\(^5\) to study the motives of spoilers because it provides a framework for assessing the relationship between parties and allows opportunity to study how the parties compete for political dominance and leadership.

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\(^5\) Pearlman (2008/09:83) contends that this model provides a more open approach to how and why the parties decide to either participate in the negotiations and make compromises or choose to spoil. This decision is based on the benefits they expect to derive from their actions. In this model negotiation and spoiling then becomes mirror acts which diffuse the moral dilemma of choosing between who is right and who is wrong.
Nevertheless, Nathan (1998, 1999 and 2007) also focuses on the motives of spoilers but his analysis centres *inter alia* on the motives of rebels who spoil. He notes that the end of hostilities often forces rebel movements to derail peace talks because their power base is undermined and they lose their source of leverage against the regime when they enter into peace negotiations. They then find themselves in such a precarious position that they have no other option than to spoil.

On the other hand, in their study of the impact of asymmetric power relations between parties during mediations, Quinn et al. (2007:446) find that a pronounced power disparity between parties will motivate parties not to compromise and to search for a way out. They contend that while weaker parties will most probably be more motivated to fight for what it wants, stronger parties will be more inclined to act unilaterally and not to make compromises because they have the upper hand and they may perceive the mediator’s attempt to manage a fair deal as “…a stumbling block toward the achievement of total victory” (Quinn et al. 2007:446). The link between asymmetric power relations between parties in a mediation process and their attempts to derail the process is even more complex as Quinn et al. (2007:447) explain. They refer to by Zartman and Rubin’s (2000) view that symmetric power relations between the parties in the mediation process can be an even bigger stumbling block because they are more motivated to attempt to gain an advantage over their opponents, thereby derailing the process. What cannot be denied, as argued by Quinn et al (2007:447) is that when stronger parties make compromises, their motives to create peace can be seen as genuine and it is crucial that mediators as well as the parties involved understand the existing power balance between the parties as well as their expectations.

As alluded to in the discussion above and as strongly contended by Stedman (1997), the onset of the mediation provides a motive for spoilers to derail or stall the process, thereby turning the mediation situation into a “struggle arena” (Pearlman (2008/09:83) and the process into both an art and a science.
2.3 The mediation process in Mozambique

Ajello (1999); Bartoli (1999); Cabrita (2000); Christensen (2006) and Jackson (2005:6) provide an in-depth analysis of the mediation process in Mozambique. Two distinct phases were identified with the first phase taking place in Rome, Italy, under the auspices of the Community of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic Church movement situated in Italy. This phase lasted two years and provided “a rare example of synergism in international mediation”, according to Jackson (2005:6). The principal mediators in this phase were Archbishop Gonçalves of Beira, Marion Raffaelli (a member of the Italian Parliament) Andrea Riccardi (founder of Sant'Egidio) and Matteo Zuppi, a priest of Sant'Egidio. The mediation was somewhat unique with religious leaders using shuttle diplomacy and traditional mediation to play a crucial role in the process of peacemaking (Chingono 2014:31). The peacemaking process continued in the implementation phase with a Un peacekeeping force, UNOMOZ, overseeing the process. On 4 October 1992 Mozambican President and leader of Frelimo, Joaquim Chissano, and Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, signed the Rome Agreement/ the General Peace Agreement (GPA) thereby ending the civil war (Bartoli 1999:10).

As indicated, the GPA marked the culmination of the first phase of a dual-phase conflict resolution process that involved different types of mediators. This was followed by attempts from 1992-1994 to implement the GPA, a core aim of the second phase of the peace process. Implementation followed the guidelines of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (SMC). This Commission, established by the GPA to oversee the implementation of its decisions, proved to be crucial in the mediation process because it also had to prepare the country for a general election in 1994 (Bartoli 1999:12; Jackson 2005:11). Mediation during the first and second phases of the Mozambican peace process had its own challenges, including spoiler behaviour by parties involved in the process.

Spoilers who deliberately derail the negotiation process are an important cause of mediation failure. Studies by Chachiua and Malan (1998); Rupiya (1998); Kornprobst (2002); Bauer and Taylor (2005) Christensen (2006); Manning and Malbrough (2009) and Hanlon and Waterhouse (1994) provide details on the GPA signed on 4 October
1992 in Rome, Italy and the nature of the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. Christensen (2006) and Newman and Richmond (2006) also focus on the difficulties created by spoilers during the mediation process. The GPA and UN Security Council Resolution 797\textsuperscript{6} of 1992, form the background for an analysis of the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the peace process and also of the role in and impact of spoilers on the mediation process.

This brings us to a question asked by many scholars: How successful was the mediation process in creating durable peace in Mozambique.

3. **Formulation and demarcation of the research problem**

The main objective of this study is to identify spoilers in mediation processes. The aim is to identify spoilers, their motives and behaviour and how to deal with them timeously before they succeed. *The study motivates and explores the argument that early identification of spoilers and dealing with them appropriately before they derail a mediation process will contribute to human security on the African continent and prevent the re-occurrence of intractable conflicts.* The basic assumption is that negotiations after conflicts in Africa are usually fragile, rendering mediation very difficult, lengthy and complex due to several factors, including the impact of spoilers. Mediation in Africa can be further strengthened if appropriate measures are used to deal with spoilers in a peace process using various strategies.

The research problem can be expressed by means of the following research question:

**In an effort to improve the chances for successful mediation in Africa, what lessons can be learnt from dealing with spoilers in the Mozambican peace process of 1990–1994 to ensure that spoilers do not remain a challenge for conflict resolution in Africa?**

\textsuperscript{6} United Nations Security Council. 1992. Resolution 797 Adopted by the Security Council at its 3149\textsuperscript{th} meeting, on 16 December 1992. This report was preceded by a letter of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 9 October 1992 in which he advised on the status of the peace process and the need for an active role by the UN Security Council in the implementation of the GPA.
This research question can be broken down into the following six subsidiary research questions:

(a) Based on the assumption that spoilers are created by the peace process and that they spoil even before the signing of the peace agreement, who were the spoilers in the 1990–1994 mediation and peace implementation process in Mozambique?

(b) What motivated the spoilers and what were their tactics?

(c) How were they dealt with and by whom? Was it the mediator(s)? Did the mediator(s) use strategies to influence the spoiling behaviour? What forms of leverage were used?

(d) When is the best time to deter potential spoilers? Is it immediately following the commencement of the peace process, or after the mediation process has started?

(e) To what extent did foreign intervention impact on the behaviour of the mediator(s), the spoilers and the conflicting parties?

(f) Until when does spoiling continue? Does it continue even after the end of the implementation of a general peace agreement? In other words: how durable is a mediated peace process in the long run?

With reference to the first two subsidiary research questions, this study attempts to test the first basic assumption that spoiling is unavoidable because every peace process creates spoilers (see Stedman (1997). The study therefore aim to determine if the circumstances surrounding the Mozambican peace process created spoilers, and if so, the focus shifts to the type of spoilers and the locus of the spoilers.

The second basic assumption is that even if parties commit to peace, one group may still feel its interests have not been taken on board, this party may resort to behaviour that will delay or derail the peace process. This argument is in line with Newman and Richmond’s (2006c) view that all parties have the potential to become spoilers. In future, how should mediators deal with the fears and grievances of parties in a peace process? The third basic assumption is that every strategy employed by the mediator to detect spoilers and deter spoiling has its own unique
character and consequences and may not work well in another peace or mediation process. Counter-strategies may also vary, as it is possible to eliminate a mediator if he or she is a spoiler, bearing in mind that parties to the conflict should not be eliminated. The *fourth basic assumption* is that spoiling can even go beyond the mediation and implementation process if social integration is not priorities during the implementation phase.

This study analyses the motives and behaviour of the three parties in the Mozambican mediation process (Renamo, Frelimo and the mediators) as well as the involvement of external actors and the impact of foreign intervention. Therefore, the *fifth basic assumption* underlying question (e) is that external parties can be “critical supporters” of the mediation process, but that they can also be spoilers, “meddlers”. Linked to the issue of external involvement is the problem of foreign actors taking sides, as this may also derail the peace process. Financing a peace process is costly and can force foreign actors to set up deadlines which can also impact negatively upon the process itself.

This study also sets out to assess the *sixth assumption* related to question (c) concerning the different strategies that can be identified for dealing with spoilers, namely that the introduction of a new mediator was the most important strategy for dealing with spoilers in the Mozambican case.

The *seventh basic assumption* relates to question (f) which asks when spoiling behaviour ends. The underlying assumption is that a pattern of behavior exists before the first general election which is very difficult to change especially in political systems where change is not accommodated and where space is not created to accommodate previous enemies. In this regard, Alusala and Dye (2010:5) also refer to the issue of the reintegration of ex-combatants into society.

### 4. Research design and methodology

In order to align this research to the theme of mediation, paradigms and strategies that mediators can use to solve the conflict and achieve success are applied. The
theoretical framework of this study introduces the concepts used in analysing the research problem. The aim is to:

(i) Define spoilers in mediation processes and determine under what circumstances peace processes create spoilers;
(ii) analyse the motives and strategies of spoilers and to assess their impact on peace processes;
(iii) devise ways of managing spoiler behavior, and
(iv) propose variables on mediation strategies that would deter spoiler behaviour
(v) assess the long-term consequences of this mediation process in Mozambique.

For the purpose of this study, the object of analysis is the spoiler(s) and mediator(s) in the Mozambican conflict. The research covers the mediation process in Italy as well as the UN’s efforts to implement the peace agreement. The role and impact of regional state actors, such as Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and international actors such as France, Italy, Portugal, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), are also assessed. Particular attention is given to the role of a non-state actor, the Community of Sant’Egidio. As already mentioned, the peace negotiations and implementation of the GPA took a long time to resolve and the period covered stretches from 1990 to 1994.

The methodology employed is primarily qualitative, which entails the analysis of primary and secondary sources, documents and existing research material on the topics of mediation, the role of spoilers in the mediation process and the historical case study: the Mozambican mediation process of 1990–1994. A motivation for an historical case study can be found in the uniqueness of the Mozambican case, the 21 years that have passed since this “mediation miracle” and also Jacob Bercovitch’s (1986) view that “Single cases can provide a powerful impetus to the development of a general explanation as long as they are historically grounded and their description is not couched in purely idiosyncratic terms”.

The theory provides a framework for an analysis of spoiler types, their motives and strategies and ways to deal with them. Primary and secondary sources were used. No interviews were held with individuals, which mean that no ethical implications are
anticipated. The speeches made by mediators, leaders of the parties involved in the peace process, the UN Secretary-General and external role players, are analysed to shed light on the motives and actions of those involved in this peace process.

5. Structure of the research

This mini-dissertation is structured into five chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the research theme and of the relevant literature on mediation, spoilers and the case study. An important section in this chapter is the formulation and demarcation of the research problem, the objectives and scope of the study, the research design and methodology. The chapter also provides an overview of the literature on mediation, spoilers and the case study. An outline of the objectives and scope of the study forms part of this chapter.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework: Mediation and the challenge of managing spoilers/spoiling
In Chapter 2 mediation and spoilers are the two core concepts to be analysed. The main focus is an assessment of the role in and impact of spoilers on the mediation process, using Stedman’s model of spoiler behaviour. The chapter concludes with an assessment of strategies for dealing with spoilers.

Chapter 3: The Mozambican conflict and the mediation process
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the civil war in Mozambique and the 1990-1994 peace process. The main focus is on two aspects: the underlying causes of instability and conflict in post-independent Mozambique and the mediation process which culminated in the general election of 1994. Detailed attention is given to the involvement of (internal and external) actors, the role of the mediator during the peace negotiations and the attempts to implement the GPA to stabilise and demobilise the country.
Chapter 4: Dealing with spoilers in the Mozambican mediation process

Spoiler behaviour during the Mozambican mediation process is the main focus of Chapter 4. This chapter provides an analysis of spoilers, their motives and behaviour. The focus also falls on how the nature of the conflict, the mediation process and the behaviour of the mediator created spoiling opportunities. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the impact of foreign intervention on the behaviour on spoilers and the mediation process in general.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This Chapter provides an assessment of the research problem and critiques the role of the mediator(s) and spoilers during the Mozambican case study and the applicability of the theoretical framework used for analysing spoiler behaviour on mediation in Mozambique. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the durability of Mozambique’s mediation process and lessons learnt from the management of spoilers during this process. Potential gaps in the literature and recommendations for further research will form part of the conclusion.
CHAPTER 2

1. Introduction

In mediation, conflicting parties allow the assistance of a non-coercive and neutral third party aimed at signing and implementing a peace agreement. Hoffman (2009:204) points out that mediation is only successful in the long-term when it results in the creation of durable peace. The signing of a peace agreement is therefore only the first step, an indication of a temporary success so to speak. Mediation may take place between states, within states, between groups of states, and between and within organisations and individuals. In many cases mediators merely provide the place, a setting and communication channels (good offices) to create an opportunity for negotiations between warring parties (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:25). However, mediation is science and art, the management of complexity and an attempt to balance expectations, demands and concessions. Mediators must also know when spoiling takes place, who the spoilers are and how to manage them.

The main aim of this chapter is to identify and analyse spoilers in a mediation process, with particular emphasis on their role and their impact on the process. The chapter therefore provides an insight into who spoilers are, what their motives are and methods they use to spoil, and most importantly, at what stage they are likely to emerge; why they emerge; and how a mediator can identify them.

The chapter concludes with an assessment of strategies for dealing with spoilers and mediator’s requirements in terms of the strategies they use to deter any possible or potential spoilers. The point of departure for discussing spoilers is Stephen Stedman’s model of spoiler behaviour.
2. **Mediation**

This section provides a brief overview of the historical importance of mediation, the theoretical approaches to mediation, a typology of mediation and the requirements for successful mediation in the current international and African arena.

2.1 **The history of mediation**

Mediation as a process of conflict management has an honourable tradition and can be traced to conflict resolution in and between societies in ancient times. In Africa, with its tribal societies and extended kinship patterns, mediation was for centuries the chosen method to assist warring parties to reach a settlement. Ben Fred-Mensah (2008:142) observes that “Available evidence shows that mediation and diplomacy were the most popular conflict-handling forums in precolonial Africa”. The mediation roles of respected elders from within the warring factions depended on the traditions of the society, the particular circumstances of the conflict and the personalities of the leaders involved. Mediation in this context involved a range of strategies such as “pressurizing, making recommendations giving assessments, conveying suggestions on behalf of the parties, emphasizing relevant norms and rules, envisaging the situation if agreement is not reached, or repeating of the agreement already attained” (Ajayi and Buhari 2014:150).

Similarly, Gerasimova (2006:1) points out that mediation played an important role in everyday life in Ancient Greece and that it was referred to as ‘public arbitrage’, a process involving an arbiter who would assist the parties in resolving their disputes. The arbiter had the power to pass a sentence if an agreement could not be reached between adversaries. Gerasimova (2006:1) refers to evidence that the Chinese practised mediation as early as 2,500 years ago. For example, Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.) advised his fellow Chinese countrymen that the superiority of law through mediation is the best method of conflict resolution. Jönsson and Hall (2005:82) observe that “Mediation between polities reflected a practice deeply embedded within Chinese life, enabling crowded societies to continue in peaceful coexistence”. Gerasimova (2006:2-4) also refers to the role of religious scripts, more particularly
the Christian Bible which indicated mediation as the preferred method of resolving conflicts.

Furthermore, in medieval Europe the Pope claimed the role as primary mediator\(^7\), and Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) even insisted that the pope was the only “sovereign mediator upon earth” (Jönsson and Hall 2005:148). Evidence exist that ancient and medieval Italian city states used mediation as a way of solving conflicts (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:3). Nevertheless, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia heralded a new era characterised by the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, the consolidation of power by kings and the creation of independent states. The need for mediation as a conflict resolution tool increased tremendously due to the unstable nature of the international state system from 1648 until the post-Cold War era (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:3), Zartman and Touval 2007:437). During this time representatives of governments and of intergovernmental organisations took over as mediators. To date, mediation has been widely used although it has changed its dynamics and scope due to the complexity and uniqueness of each conflict (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:5).

Still, in today’s world the mediation process is a long-term form of conflict resolution. It denotes the management of complex and hostile (most often civil) wars in which the mediator attempts to facilitate, coordinate or manipulate (most often a combination of the three) the process. Protracted conflicts in Africa still force practitioners to focus on peacemaking methods, and more particularly mediation, to create durable peace in countries. Nevertheless, as indicated, ending civil wars through mediation has had mixed results, as many conflicts have remained intractable (Darby and Rae, 1999; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Hampson 1996; Kornprobst 2002; Nathan 1998 and 1999; Sorbo and Vale 1997; Zartman 1989).

*Who are the mediators in the conflict resolution in the international arena?* Mediators can be individuals, non-governmental organisations (civil society organisations) or international governmental organisations (IGOs). In reality, most mediation efforts

\(^7\) It should be noted that influential individuals, such as Hermann von Salza and Emperor Frederick Barbarossa also served as primary mediators (Jönsson and Hall 2005:148).
are made by IGOs such as the UN, the AU and other regional organisations, for example the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the case of Mozambique, a Catholic non charitable organisation, the Community of Sant'Egidio, facilitated the first part of the mediation process.

2.2 The mediation process

Mediation manifests in a triadic structure comprising two opposing sides (sometimes more), each with its supporters and the mediator, a third party who acts a buffer, a bridge and a facilitator, coordinator or even manipulator. Paffenholz (2001:123-124) identifies different mediation phases in the mediation process. The first phase, the preparation phase, is characterised by the agreement by the warring parties that a stalemate exist and that they need the assistance of a third party (mediator) to reach a mutually acceptable settlement. But when will the conflicting parties consider mediation as a policy option? Zartman (1889) and Zartman and De Soto (2010) refer to “conflict ripeness” and state that parties will consider mediation as an option when there is “conflict ripeness”, a “mutually hurting stalemate”, and when both parties realise and accept that there is no other way out. Pearlman (2008/09:81) criticises this “conflict ripeness” argument and states that it contains an inherent weakness because it “treats antagonists as unitary actors, and hence misses the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making”.

As indicated, mediation is dependent on the willingness of motivated parties to seek a peaceful solution. Bercovitch (1996:133) explains that mediation becomes important to the protagonists when the conflict is long or complex, when the parties’ own initiatives to acquire a settlement have reached an impasse, when neither party is prepared to suffer any further costs or loss of life and when both parties are willing to co-operate in order to end the stalemate. It is only when these factors prevail that a mediation process can be successful. Solomon (in Maundi et al. 2006:ix) agrees and contends that “the resort to mediation is typically done in the spirit of let’s cut our losses”, that is only after parties have realised that they have nothing to gain from continuing the conflict.
During the *second phase*, as identified by Paffenholz (2001:123-124) the third party provides ‘good offices’ and communication channels to facilitate negotiations. The negotiation phase is the *third phase* which manifests in (formal and informal) negotiations and ideally culminates in the parties making the necessary compromises. However, more often than not a game of deadlocks is played by one or all of the parties involved in the third phase of the process. The *last phase*, the post-agreement phase is also referred to as peacekeeping and comprises the implementation of a peace agreement (Paffenholz 2001:123-124). Merrills (2010:564) highlights the vulnerability of the mediation process and contends that “…the process of mediation is as effective as the disputants allow it to be and their attitudes are likely to be governed by their immediate situation”. Mediation styles and strategies applied during the mediation process are critically important and if unsuccessful, can give way to renewed conflict.

### 2.3 Typologies of mediation strategies

In this context, Touval and Zartman (2001); Princen (1992), Bercovitch and Houston (1996) and Quinn et al. (2007:444) distinguish between three types of mediation strategies based on the level of involvement and the behavior of mediators. *Mediators as facilitators* merely provide the logistical means as they set the agenda and collect information. Zartman and Touval (2007:445) refer to this first mediation style as *communication-facilitation*, which they explain in terms of mediators remaining passive throughout the process and exhibiting little control over the formal process of mediation. This function is often referred to as providing “good offices” and coincides with the second phase of the mediation process discussed above.

On the other hand, *mediators as formulators* contribute more substantively to the negotiation process. They structure the bargaining process as they formulate strategies and control the setting, agenda and rules. They suggest the linking, or de-linking, of issues and invent (and propose) alternative solutions, but they still are not authorised to pressure the disputants into decisions (Quinn et al. 2007:444).
The more aggressive style of *manipulative mediators* is based on the mediators’ ability to use resources to apply leverage. This type of mediator directly influences the parties in the process and as part of the solution, reminds them of their real objectives. Manipulative mediators promise resources, threaten withdrawal, or issue ultimatums (Wilkenfeld et al. 2003:283-284; Quinn et al. 2007:444-445). As indicated, when pursuing this type of mediation, the issue of leverage arises, with the mediator’s resources being the basis for leverage. The sources of leverage are mostly linked to the mediator and include persuasion, extraction, termination (withdrawal), deprivation and gratification (Zartman and Touval 2007:447).

The choice between mediation strategies is dependent on aspects such as the history, extent and location of the conflict, by the interests, objectives and mandates of the mediator as well as the relationship between the protagonists (Bercovitch 1997:139; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010:11). Bercovitch and Houston (2000:181) also include the mediator's characteristics and identity as important the rank and status of the mediator, previous interaction with the disputants, and the timing and initiation of the intervention and mediation environment. As such mediation becomes a reciprocal process, which is determined by and responsive to the environment and context of the conflict.

From the various explanations of mediation discussed above, it is evident that mediation revolves around three basic factors which are that mediation is requested by the warring parties to resolve their conflicts when they have exhausted all means of achieving peace (conflict ripeness). Mediation is a voluntary, non-coercive and impartial third party assists two or more parties to a conflict, to prevent or manage their conflict. Mediation mostly takes place on a neutral ground and is a long and non-exhaustive process of conflict resolution.

2.4 **Requirements for successful mediation in Africa**

In Africa intra-state conflicts still dehumanise, these conflicts kill millions and traumatisse generations of people, as was also the case when the Community of Sant’Egidio (1992) declared war the mother of poverty. Beardsley et al. (2006:57)
indicate that approximately 434 international conflicts both within and between countries took place between 1918 and 2008. Of these, 128 underwent mediation with some mixed results. The bulk of these conflicts occurred in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region. Over the past three decades mediation experts have laboured to end deadly conflict in Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe, with mixed results.

Scholars, such as Nathan (2015), Tieku (2011) and Hoffman (2009) list various requirements for successful mediation. These requirements can be arranged according to a framework of contextual and process variables as distinguished by Hoffman (2009:64) in his study of mediation in armed conflicts in Chechnya, Angola, Israel-Palestine and Bosnia. He argues that mediating a durable settlement depends on contextual and process variables.

*Contextual variables* refer to the past, present and future relationship of the protagonists. The better the past relationship between the conflicting parties, the easier it is for a mediation process to attain a durable settlement. In this regard, in any mediation process it is very important for the mediator to manage the relationship between protagonists so that hostility do not escalate. Hoffman (2009) further elucidates that this non-violent relationship is the first contextual variable and that it demands a cessation of hostilities. In this regard Hoffman agrees that in order to manage a conflict, the mediation process should have the flexibility to deal with new and recurring grievances that may lead to future and potential conflicts between the parties. Tieku (2011:1) also focuses on the relationship between the disputants and contends that the culture and political orientation of the disputants play an important role in the success of mediation. He argues that even though international organisations and renowned world leaders have been involved in the resolution of most African conflicts, there is little knowledge of the lessons learnt from such mediation pertaining to the role that culture and politics play in the process of mediation. Tieku points out that mediation effort have even collapsed due to the mediator’s ignorance of the most important factors of the environment in which the conflict is taking place. Netabay (2009:2) and Darby and MacGinty (2003:2) also list
the willingness of the conflicting parties to resolve their conflict through a third party and in good faith; addressing the major causes of the conflict; inclusion of all parties to the conflict and avoidance of use of force by the conflicting parties as basic requirements for successful mediation.

Balance of power is the second contextual variable important for the settlement of a durable peace. In this case Hoffman (2009:62) states that all conflicts results from a struggle for and uneven distribution of power by either party in a conflict. Therefore, peace will only prevail once the struggle for power has been resolved, as parties with equal power are likely to resolve their differences and make easy concessions, unlike those that feel that their power and recognition is marginalised. The struggle for a balance of power is therefore crucial in a mediation process, as balanced power will result into balanced agreements, and this helps to manage potential spoilers (Hoffman 2009:69). Wallensteen (2007:133) also lists equal distribution of power, participation, fairness and the security of actors through power sharing in the process. In this regard, a sustainable peace settlement must address the root causes of the conflict, involve all parties to the conflict and remove the security dilemmas of protagonists in the conflict.

The correct timing of a mediation initiative is the first process variable and is crucial for creation of durable peace. Hoffman (2009:69) also mentions that timing is crucial as it can lead to the failure or success of the process. Hoffman’s suggestions are also echoed by Kleiboer (1996:362) who maintains that timing is very important since conflicts undergo a cycle and therefore determining the appropriate moment is vital. Nathan (2005:71) also warns against mediators who merely focus on the settlement of a conflict and lose sight of the more important aim: to create a durable peace. Part of this is the need to find a quick-fix and results in impatience and failure. He argues that “mediators deployed by states and multinational organisations frequently focus more on the solutions to a conflict than on the process of peacemaking” Nathan (2005:71).

The mediator’s strategy, is Hoffman’s (2009:174) second process variable and is seen as being crucial in attaining durable peace, as some strategies are not suitable
for certain types of conflict. For example, Hoffman (2009:174) prioritises the directive strategy as the most effective type for armed conflicts. Nevertheless, it is also important to take into account who the mediator is. Khadiagala (n.d.) contends that mediation undertaken by Heads of State can have negative bearings on the outcome of the process as mostly, they are more pressurized for time and their own responsibilities at home. In this case they can become more insensitive to some salient features of the conflict. As a result, they want a quick-fix solution and tend to be more coercive and insensitive than facilitative and patient. They also tend to be unfamiliar with the principles and technicalities of mediation, which explicitly require mediators to be impartial, flexible, and understanding, to persevere, and to be facilitators and not owners of the conflict (Khadiagala n.d).

Yet, lack of resources (Khadiagala n.d) can also derail the strategies of mediators. As a result, international actors that fund the process have in most cases meddled in the process to advance their own interests. Nathan (2015:6) refers to the ‘galaxy of international ‘friends’, some of them genuinely supportive but others quite meddlesome and bothersome”. When this happens most mediators are reduced to mere spectators. Besides, the strategies of mediators are also dependent on the uniqueness of each conflict. Each mediator has private motives and reasons for mediating and therefore uses various strategies aimed at bringing the conflicting parties to an amicable solution (Nathan 1999; Wallensteen 2007; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010:7 and Zartman 2001). Mediators also vary in style depending on their mandate, which comprises a scope, method, mode and focus.

The last process variable discussed by Hoffman (2009:76) refers to the mediator’s experience. Hoffman argues that more experienced mediators will also be more successful because they have the ability to detect power imbalances between the parties and can then more effectively use leverage to keep up the pace of the mediation. Hoffman is aware, however, that conflicts are dynamic and therefore not all experienced mediators will yield a positive result (Hoffman 2009:76).
In his 2012 Report on mediation, United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, provides a comprehensive list of requirements for successful mediation. In his view consent among the parties, impartiality; internal and external support and the willingness to compromise to reach a durable settlement and seek peace through negotiations are main aspects. To achieve this, requires an effort that is well-supported politically, technically and financially, as without these factors mediation efforts do not yield the intended result (UN Secretary-General 2009:3).

Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) focus on the conditions under which mediation has brought failure or success and include the impact of changing global trends, practices and outcomes and geographical variations. Furthermore, past mediation efforts have shown that even biased mediators can bring about a lasting solution to a conflict if they have leverage and assistance from external parties.

As discussed, several factors may hamper the success of a mediation process, not least of all the actions of spoilers. External actors can derail or safe mediation processes, as will be discussed in the next section.

2.5 The involvement of external actors in mediation

When will involvement in civil conflicts and mediation processes be considered by external actors? Maundi et al (2006:17) indicate that in civil conflicts, states intervene to initiate or accept to mediate if the conflict affects their interests. The interests could be bilateral, economic, humanitarian and democratic. In his discussion of why peace settlements fail or succeed, Hampson (1996:19) explains that great powers have had a large bearing on the outcome of peace processes in Africa after the Cold War, by pressurising the warring parties to come to a compromise. In addition, the role of regional politics in most civil conflicts during peacemaking and peace implementation cannot be overemphasised because the success or failure of any peace settlement relies heavily on the prevailing power balance in a region. Hampson (1996:19-20) adds that in most cases regional powers or neighbours can

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block the peace process if they view it as a threat to their interests. In addition, they
can help foster peace if they perceive it to be to their advantage. It is therefore very
important for mediators to take into account the impact of interstate and regional
interests in the peace process.

According to Newman and Richmond (2006bc), there is a strong link between
external actors and spoiling in a peace process, most importantly donors and other
international entities that have a vested interest in the conflict. As Khadiagala (n.d.)
notes, one problem that has hampered the success of peace settlements is the
intervention of international donors, who fund such settlements. Mostly, those that
fund the processes, as mentioned earlier, want to control the direction and pace of
the negotiations. In such a case the mediators are reduced to mere spectators.
Khadiagala adds that such behaviour by the donors tends to favour one group over
the other and is therefore is likely to cause spoiling.

Spoilers can be inside or outside the mediation process, as determined by the
motives and capabilities of the parties directly and indirectly involved in the mediation
process. But, what is a spoiler and when is behavior a manifestation of spoiling?

3. Spoilers

It has been argued by Nathan (2007) that the mediation process is both an art and a
science, and that is even truer in the case of dealing with spoilers. As discussed in
Chapter 1, Newman and Richmond (2006c:4) prefer the term “spoiling”, to indicate
activities of actors both within and outside the peace process who are opposed to a
peaceful settlement. Similarly, those actors that join the peace process but are not
fully committed to finding a lasting solution are called “devious objectives”, because
they use the process to gain recognition, time or, material benefit or to avoid
sanctions. As such the term “spoiling” means that there are two forces, one in favour
of peace and one against peace. Newman and Richmond (2006c:4) further agree
that peace processes are very fragile as there is the potential of spoiling at various
levels. Spoiling may take place at any phase of the peace process, and all parties to
the conflict have the potential to become spoilers at one point or another during the peace process. But, who are the spoilers?

Stedman (1997:1) describes spoilers as entities, within or outside the peace process, who believe that the anticipated peace resulting from the negotiations threatens their authority, perceptions and vested interests. Spoilers can be managed by giving them what they want, changing their perceptions or punishing them (Stedman 1997:14). Therefore, correct diagnosis of spoiler types is crucial for the choice of an appropriate strategy of spoiler management by the mediator. Since they may be present during the process or when the agreements are not balanced, mediators must effectively manage the spoilers in order to create durable peace (Hoffman 2009:75).

3.1 The motives of spoilers and their impact on the mediation process

What motivates spoilers and when will they most likely revert to spoiling? As discussed in Chapter 1 different opinions exist on what motivates spoilers. However, spoilers usually resort to violence to obstruct attempts to achieve peace as explained by Newman and Richmond (2006a:3) “... there is a capacity for spoiling, in the broader sense, in all actors at different phases of the process”. Spoiling therefore can take place when individuals or groups feel mediation is only a breathing space for them, before they abandon the process and eliminate their next target. They prefer the ongoing conflict to the uncertainties of peace. To them, unconditional victory is the only acceptable option (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004:8–9). Wallensteen (2007), uses Stedman’s definition as a base and defines spoilers “as actors not interested in conflicts moving towards reconstruction.” By committing themselves to the peace agreements, parties are at risk from enemies who take advantage of the settlement; from frustrated followers who feel betrayed by the process itself; and those groups who feel they have been left out of the negotiation process (Stedman 1997:5).

In his explanation of spoilers, Stedman (1997) argues that their motives differ because some have short-term motives while others lust for power and are
insensitive to the potential consequences of their actions. Spoilers also vary in terms of the types of interests or goals they seek. Stedman divides these spoiler types into three categories, namely limited, greedy, and total. Limited spoilers seek specific or limited goals, which they do not believe the peace process can give them. Usually once those interests or demands are met, the spoiler behaviour ceases. Stedman (1997:11) selects greedy spoilers as individuals or groups whose goals expand or contract depending on what they think they can get, based on cost and risk calculations. Thus, greedy spoilers may behave like limited spoilers under some circumstances, and similar to total spoilers in other instances. Total spoilers, on the other hand, seek complete control over all relevant values in the conflict. They do not want to make compromises but instead pursue total victory, or solitary solutions (Ayres, 2005:3). Here, the implication is that total spoilers are radical, ideological and pathological, with non-negotiable goals. Any commitment to peace is tactical, and the only way to deal with them is by defeat and marginalisation. Of these types, spoilers not only make mediation difficult, but also pose a great challenge to the mediator.

To complicate matters even more, spoilers may change to a different type, for example moving from a total spoiler to a moderate one. According to Stedman (1997:182) and Zahar (2006:41), this depends on the location of the spoiler within the party itself. Is it the leader or the followers who spoil the peace process? If the leader starts spoiling, there is bound to be a change in the perception of the followers if the leader starts spoiling. However, sometimes leaders are reluctant to pursue peace processes due to fear of their followers’ resentment and attacks. Such leaders tend to protect their positions while at the same time derailing the peace process. Factors such as meddling by external actors can also motivate spoilers to start spoiling or to change their tactics.

3.2 Position of spoilers

Spoilers may originate from the internal or external environment. Stedman (1997:180) defines internal spoilers as people who commit themselves to signing the peace agreement but do not abide by the procedure of the agreement itself. An
example is the UNITA rebels in Angola, who signed a peace accord ending the country’s civil war, but later returned to war after they lost the elections. Internal spoilers join a peace process but then withdraw and block, lengthen or derail the process, Newman and Richmond (2006c:4) contend that spoilers can also be geographically apart from the mediation process but that they fully support other spoilers and become part of the spoiling faction in the peace process itself. Such parties may be states and diaspora groups.

*When are spoilers most likely to spoil?* According to the 2009 Report of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General 2009:9), spoilers usually strike when peace agreements are making progress. Therefore, internal divisions between the parties themselves or between the warring factions are inevitable, resulting in “hardline break-aways or factions of opposing groups to the process”. These spoiler groups usually have hidden agendas in their activities and may use the peace process to regroup or reorganise themselves when frustrated, internationalise the conflict or seek financial and material favours from an ongoing conflict which prolongs the peace process itself (Newman and Richmond 2006c:1). It has also been observed that if successful in their activities, spoilers breed devastating consequences, as was evident in the genocide by Hutu militias in Rwanda where having anticipated exclusion from power, the rebels felt marginalised, and deliberately planned the killings of the Hutu leaders (Stein 2001:194).

Internal spoilers use stealth as their strategy to spoil the process. Zahar (2006:41) argues that such parties can also use different incentives to incite violence against those that are not party to the peace agreement. These parties usually display some devious behaviour when the agreement has already been signed, and are always deceptive. She also maintains that these spoilers use the peace process to buy time and regroup their military power. Aggestam (2006:28) argues that insiders use mistrust and fear as their strategy. By doing so, they view with suspicion the actions

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9 This Report of the Secretary General was followed by the adoption of the first General Assembly resolution on mediation and the 25th of June 2012 Report (A/66/811) by the Secretary-General on “Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution”.
and intentions of the other party in the negotiation process and use threats as a strategy.

On the other hand, external spoilers are excluded or have isolated themselves from the mediation process and then purposefully use violence and threats to derail the process (Stedman 1997:180); Aggestam (2006:32). These groups, though peaceful in some cases, may join forces with other spoiler groups, in order to de-legitimise the peace process. External spoilers prefer methods such as assassination of those who are in favour of the process itself and massacres and in severe cases, may incite violence, knowing that it will breed violence in the end. In most cases, when violence breaks out it instils fear and uncertainty in the public about where the peace process is heading. A good example is the genocide in Rwanda after the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution’s obstruction of the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Ayres (2005:4) argues that external spoilers are easier to identify, firstly since inside spoilers will tend to pretend that they aren’t spoilers at all, thus requiring the analyst to measure the motivations of all parties to the peace process for signs of spoiler intentions. Outside spoilers are generally more open, both in their intentions and in their behaviour. Secondly, because of the difference in positions, outside spoilers are more likely to engage in devious spoiler activity such as violent attacks against civilians, use of terrorist tactics, and the like, unlike inside spoilers.

Aggestam (2006:32) concurs with Stedman (1997:179) and states that the successes of external spoiling rest on four pillars. Firstly, external spoiling works when the two factions find it difficult to implement the signed peace agreement, since it increases fear and uncertainty about the direction of the peace process. Secondly, spoiling becomes inevitable when leaders have publicly proclaimed that they will not go to the negotiating table, as it is seen as a weakness to negotiate when violence has erupted. Thirdly, spoilers who enjoy popular support in their acts of violence are also bound to abandon the peace process. Such spoilers, as Newman and Richmond (2006c:4) and Greenhill and Major (2007:8) argue, are difficult since they do not bow down to pressure to compromise. Lastly, it is argued that spoiling
activities threaten peace negotiations when the process itself is viewed as unfair and exclusive, involving very few parties who are in the conflict. The parties who are left out, are bound to feel frustrated and usually find means to derail the process altogether.

Nevertheless, both Aggestam (2006:24) and Ayres (2005:4) agree with Stedman that spoilers should be viewed as action based on situational rationality. Different types of spoilers (in Stedman's terms) may pursue spoiler strategies for different reasons. They all have one common goal, which is to sabotage or derail the peace process, to prevent a peace agreement from being reached, or to prevent its implementation once an agreement is signed. This is particularly true of outside spoilers, who by virtue of not being party to the peace process have little or no interest in its continuation or success and are bound to do whatever it takes to make the peace process fail completely.

4. Strategies of mediators dealing with spoilers

The success of the peace process depends on the strategies of the mediator to a large extent. If the mediator's strategy is weak, the likelihood of being overtaken by spoiler behaviour is very high.

In his 2009 Report UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon (United Nations Secretary-General Report 2009:9–10) provides insight into the strategies that mediators should use in order to prevent spoilers from derailing the peace process. The report indicates that it is necessary to determine whether the spoiler is located within the leadership or the constituents and to assess what motivates spoiler behaviour by leaders, because often leaders avoid implementing peace agreement for fear of reprisal from followers.

Stedman (1997:183) identifies three major strategies that can be used in dealing with spoilers. The first is through socialisation, which requires establishing rules of acceptable behaviour for the parties that commit or seek to join a peace process. These rules become the basis for judging the demands, legitimacy, and behaviour of
the parties. Socialisation is heavily dependent on the material and intellectual capabilities of the parties themselves. The material component involves a mixture of leverage and coercion, a “carrot and stick approach” aimed at rewarding good behavior and/or punishing bad behavior by spoilers. The intellectual aspect is focused on persuading the spoiler to adhere to the desirable behavior; that is, commitment to international law (human rights) and the rules of democracy (the winner takes it all). This strategy has its own limitations because it may benefit neither the mediator nor other parties in the case of a total spoiler (Stedman 1997:183).

Similarly, the second strategy can take the form of persuasion by coercion which happens when threats are used to deter spoiling. Coercion can simply be indicating to the spoiler that his involvement is unnecessary and that the peace plan will go ahead with or without him. The message is clear: the spoiler either joins the peace process or risk being left behind. In some cases the spoiler may need an international presence in the peace process and may be threatened by the withdrawal of the International presence if spoiling continues. Most often parties resist coercion and may just attend negotiations, but will resist making any commitments (UN Secretary-General Report 2009:10).

Inducement is a third strategy for the mediator and rests upon the mediator’s ability to address the concerns of spoilers by attracting them to join the peace process. In most cases spoilers may explain their behaviour by referring to the necessity for guarantees of protection and fairness. They may demand more benefits, justice and legitimacy or recognition of their position. Some of the demands may be not only legitimate but also costly for the mediation.

Stedman (1997:181) contends that when there are two or more spoilers in negotiating a peace process it becomes risky for the mediator. This is because the mediator’s strategy while dealing with one spoiler may not be a feasible strategy for another, and while weakening one spoiler on this side it may end up strengthening the other spoiler rather than weakening it. As earlier indicated both warring factions tend to mistrust one another and therefore usually want to demonise one another.
Stedman (1997:175) and Zahar (2006:41) maintain that these spoilers are motivated by their insecurity and fear and therefore seek to survive, so they resort to spoiling the peace process. It is a mediator’s role to exert authority so that a settlement can be reached and the warring factions made to settle for peace through disarmament or the constitution.

4.1 Analysis of spoiler debate

Although Stedman provides a comprehensive understanding of how to identify spoilers, their motives and how to manage them, scholars such as Greenhill and Major (2007:8) criticise his framework. They firstly argue that too much reliance on Stedman’s framework of spoilers “underestimates the considerable influence that structural factors put on the implementation of the peace process.” According to these authors, whilst not undervaluing the role of individuals in peace processes, the course of negotiations still determines the prevailing opportunity structure and the relative power of the warring parties once mediation has begun. In this regard, strategies that may discourage or indeed encourage spoiler behaviour should be identified. They argue that in reality, kinds of outcomes determine the type of spoiler that may emerge and not vice versa. Greenhill and Major (2007:8) also argue that Stedman’s definitions of spoilers as greedy or limited, or genuinely hard bargaining, remains problematic. To them, a spoiler is someone whose actions oppose the aims of the peace process.

Secondly, the spoiler model ignores potential spoilers by only focusing on those who are already spoiling and whose threats can be identified. Greenhill and Major (2007:9) argue that there are often weak actors capable of frustrating the implementation of peace processes. If the mediator ignores their capabilities and puts less focus on them, they may emerge and threaten the process. Thirdly, all spoilers are greedy in their perceptions, regardless of the degree to which they derail the process. Thus the degree of spoiler behaviour is a reflection of their perception of how they can change the situation and the risks involved. Greenhill and Major (2007:10) identify four scenarios in which devious behaviour poses a threat and thus negatively impact on the peace agreement. These four scenarios are the relative
power of the mandate of the conflicting parties, the enthusiasm of mediators, the willingness of the actors to accept the risks and costs incurred if they were to go back to the battlefield, and different policy preferences.

Zahar (2010:266) also opposes Stedman’s view of spoilers. According to her, and affirmed by Newman and Richmond (2006) and Mason (2008) fixed spoiler types do not exist. Zahar maintains that spoilers change their tactics and objectives as either their motivation to spoil or the perceived cost of spoil change. The “inside or outside” strategy that Stedman uses therefore relates more to the spoiler’s motivation and perception of the costs of spoiling. Zahar argues that the commitment of actors in the peace process to violence depends on the situation affecting their capabilities and their opportunity structure, which are two important aspects that determine the ripeness of a conflict or peace implementation. Internal spoilers emerge from those parties that are within the agreement but flout their commitments, whilst outsider spoilers are not part of the negotiation process. Inside spoilers are likely to engage in spoiler behaviour when they realise that their expectations are not being met (frustration, threats), whilst outside spoilers act when they view peace as a threat to their existence. In her argument Zahar (2006:41) adds that capabilities and opportunities also drive the extent of spoiling behaviour, as both spoilers look at the costs and risks of their intended action. In this regard, Stedman does not explain the causal effect and change in behaviour of spoilers.

The above indicates a strong link between mediation and spoiling in a peace process. Newman and Richmond (2006d:105) also indicate that all actors have a capacity to spoil and contend that “…in some ways spoiling is part of peace processes, as much as conflict is a function of social and political change”. Nathan (2009:11) states that mediation means more than signing a peace agreement, and goes way beyond the implementation stage. It is at this crucial time that spoilers emerge, as evidenced in the Angolan civil war, when Jonas Savimbi went back to war after signing a peace accord. Identifying potential spoilers and deterring them before they strike is the best way of managing them, so at this stage of implementation the mediator’s behaviour and the strategies that he or she employs in resolving a specific conflict remain crucial.
Pearlman (2008/09:81) criticises Stedman’s typology of spoiler types based on motives and not capabilities and also argues that Stedman’s typology is limited to how much spoilers want (limited, greedy and total) and not what they want. Pearlman (2008/09:82) also contends that Stedman omits to focus on spoiling opportunities due to asymmetric shifts in power created by the mediation process, and states “Power imbalances, however, do more than restrain or liberate would-be spoilers. They also shape their incentives for acting as spoilers in the first place”.

5. Conclusion

Several post-Cold War ceasefires and attempts at reaching permanent peace after civil wars and armed conflicts have been unsuccessful, resulting in protracted and costly wars. Resolving such conflicts through mediation has been problematic, as the process becomes wearisome. In some cases finding a lasting solution also becomes a mountain to climb, as a good number of such conflicts fail at the level of implementation and sometimes the process collapses within the first five years of implementation. However, the imperative to resolve such conflicts in a “sustained and sustainable manner” is something mediators must do (Newman and Richmond 2006c:2).

Mediation is a process that involves several players. The protagonists remain the main players and owners in the conflict. Mediation becomes crucial when the parties cannot resolve conflicts on their own and therefore require the services of a third party to help them reach an acceptable settlement without further resorting to force. According to Bercovitch (2009) the success of any mediation process depends on the willingness of the parties to negotiate and resolve their differences amicably. It is also determined by the strategies of the mediator and the ability of the mediator to remain in full control of the process and to offer punishment or rewards where necessary. In facilitating the mediation process it is very important for the mediator to identify spoilers, their motives and tactics. The ultimate goal is to have a peace settlement that is durable.
CHAPTER 3

1. Introduction

June 25, 1975, Mozambique’s independence day is aptly described by Robinson (2006:17) as “a pivotal moment in the country’s history; a pause between the crushing oppression of Portuguese colonialism and the devastating civil war that Mozambique suffered until the early 1990s”. Decades of neglect and exploitation before independence were followed by destruction and civil war after 1975. Peace negotiations with the assistance of mediators and the implementation of the GPA eventually provided the people of Mozambique the opportunity to live in peace.

The preceding chapter pointed out that to create a durable peace, mediators must aim to identify spoilers and deal with them either before they derail a peace process, or if impossible, minimize their impact during the peace process. Understanding the nature of the conflict, its causes and the motives and the motives of the protagonists provide the necessary background for understanding the complexity of the mediation process. Therefore, in this chapter the broad framework will be the history of Mozambique from early Portuguese involvement until the 1994 general election. Two themes will structure the investigation. The first focuses on the causes of instability and conflict in post-independent Mozambique. The aim is to determine if and to what extent Portuguese colonial domination, the nature of the liberation struggle and post-independent socio-political and economic challenges contributed to one of Africa’s longest civil wars. The second theme provides an analysis of the mediation process which culminated in two phases. The first phase, 1990-1992, ended with the signing of the GPA and the second phase, 1992-1994, focused on the implementation of the GPA.

This chapter assesses the premise that the civil war was the inevitable consequence of three elements: the particular nature and legacies of Portuguese colonialism, post-independent development challenges in Mozambique and instability in the Southern African region.
2. Mozambique: geographical location and physical features

Mozambique, a country located in Southern Africa, is bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the west, and South Africa to the southwest. The country’s vast coast line of approximately 3000 km also services its landlocked neighbours, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Mozambique is the second most populous country in the Southern African region and its population comprises ethnically mixed Africans with a smaller percentage of Indians and Europeans. Even though the Portuguese dominated Mozambique for more than five centuries, the country also has British, Indian and Arabic influences. These, coupled with the local traditions have shaped the economic and socio-political dimensions of the country (Naidu 2001:9; Phillips 2010:5).

Mozambique is divided in 10 administrative provinces with Maputo as the capital. Portuguese is the official language even though only approximately 6.5 percent of the population speaks Portuguese as their first language. 40 Percent speaks Portuguese as a second language with 53 percent speaking local languages (Rugumamu and Gbla (2003:15). This is a country rich in natural resources, particularly coal (an estimated coal reserve of 20 billion tonnes), hydropower and recently discovered mineral sands, oil and natural gas. However, no effective exploitation could occur before the end of the civil war. Green and Otto (2014:7) also refer to the expectations related to the recent gas developments on the coast of Mozambique and the benefits that the exploitation of these resources holds for this poor nation. (Green & Otto 2014:7).

This brings us to the history of Mozambique and the dubious honour of the Portuguese for being the first European country to establish trade bases on the African continent during the sixteenth century, and the last colonial power to leave. (Jenkins 2012:143).

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According to recent estimates the recently discovered gas reserves in Mozambique amounts to 127.4 billion cubic metres (Green and Otto 2014:7).
3. Colonial history and independence

Both Angola and Mozambique not only became independent in 1975 after a drawn out struggle against Portugal, but also experienced drawn-out civil wars after independence (Gupta 2009:97; Leão 2007:1). But what was the nature of Portuguese involvement in Southern Africa, when did it begin and how did it end?

3.1 Portuguese involvement in Southern Africa

From 1430-1760 a powerful empire, the Matapa, dominated a territory called Mwene Matapa (also referred to as Mwanamutapa or Monomotapa). At the time of the arrival of Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, in early 1498 the rival clans in Mwene Matapa possessed gold mines and dominated the lucrative trade network with Swahili merchants in gold and ivory (Udogu 2014: 97). In 1505 the Portuguese established their first trading post, Luanda on the southwest coast of Africa, forged alliances with rival kingdoms in the area and invaded Mwene Matapa in 1629. The discovery in 1544 of another bay on the southeast coast by Lourenço Marques eventually led to the permanent establishment in 1752 of a Portuguese settlement. The indigenous population traded in ivory with the Dutch, French and English long before the Portuguese invaded the bay. However, it was the slave trade that offered the Portuguese the opportunity to generate huge profits but when it was officially terminated in 1836, Portugal was left with poor, underdeveloped territories caused by its own greed and corrupt, ineffective administration (Hallett 1975:492). Nevertheless, the Portuguese were forced to retain territorial dominance and needed official recognition by the other European colonial powers to protect its influence.

Portugal’s opportunity for official recognition of its territories came in the form of the Congress of Berlin (1884-1885). Britain and France duly recognised Portugal’s

11 The Matapa dominated the territory extending from the Kalahari Desert to the Indian Ocean and from the Limpopo to the Zambezi rivers. This empire controlled continental trade routes. (Hallett 1975:488).
12 Luanda, capital of modern day Angola, was founded as São Paulo de Assunção in 1576. This area served as a trade post for the main export port for slaves (Jenkins 2012:143).
13 The bay was first named Lourenço Marques after the Portuguese discovery, became Mozambique’s capital in 1896, and was renamed Maputo in 1975 (Jenkins 2012:143-144).
claims but in return demanded that the country demonstrate an ability to control its Southern African territories. Unfortunately, this did not happen and Portugal instead opted to reap the economic benefits of its possessions and established sugar and cotton plantations and a textile industry in Mozambique (Rupiya 1998:10). Jenkins (2012:146) contends that “unlike other colonising powers, there was very limited engagement by the state in providing the indigenous population with schools, healthcare, infrastructure…”. However, Mozambique became an entry point for Portuguese settlers who eventually dominated all the economic activities in the urban regions (Jenkins 2012:144). The Portuguese government realised the opportunity provided by Mozambique for getting rid of its prisoner population and by the end of the Second World War approximately 27 000 exiled prisoners were also settled in Mozambique and most of them became farmers in the Zambezi valley. As a result, empires (large estates called “prazos”) of settler elites were formed and they controlled vast territories (Leão 2007:5; Udugu 2014:98 and Calvocoressi 2009:613). The settlers not only exploited the indigenous population, but also gave credence to Portugal’s assimilation policy. The end result was that the indigenous population found themselves in informal settlements in the cities and on settler land (Jenkins 2012:145; Fearon and Laitin 2005; Naidu 2001).

3.2 Decolonisation

Decolonisation revolutionised many African societies after the Second World War but Portugal, claiming its colonies to be Portuguese provinces, refused to consider their political liberation but events outside Mozambique directly contributed to the country’s independence. Meanwhile, the newly independent states of Africa not only became role models for the liberation movements in Portugal’s colonies, but also used their membership of the UN to agitate for the total liberation of all colonial territories. Not surprisingly, the UN General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions to force Portugal and Spain to let go of their territories. Therefore, on 14 December 1960 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and People (UNGA Resolution, 1514XV). Meanwhile, the independence of Portugal's colonies became a Cold War issue when the American President Eisenhower merely advised Portugal against alienating the liberation movements while President Khrushchev of the Soviet Union pledged his full support for all liberation movements (Funada-Classen 2012:207; Hume 1994:6).

Nevertheless, it was the internal liberation struggle, led by Frelimo, which began with an armed struggle on 24 September 1964. Frelimo was a Marxist-Leninist oriented national liberation movement founded in 1961 in Tanganyika by different groups fighting against Portuguese colonial rule (Alden 1993; Hume 1994:8; Phillips 2006:3). Its first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was an academic with outstanding leadership qualities. Frelimo held its first congress on 23 September 1962 during which it called for solidarity and unity in the fight against Portuguese colonialism (Funada-Classen 2012:242). Therefore, in 1964 Frelimo’s troops launched attacks on the buildings of the colonial administration, followed by guerrilla warfare and motivated by the ideal to unite and liberate the people of Mozambique. Even though Frelimo received support from China, the countries of the Eastern bloc and neighbouring Tanzania and Zambia, the road to independence was riddled with obstacles such as a shortage of weapons, internal divisions and the hostility of neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia (Funada-Classen 2012:242-244). In essence, internal divisions and ideological conflict in the Southern African rendered this an unstable and extremely poor colony (Funada-Classen 2012:266).

Zambia fulfilled a mediator’s role in 1973 during negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese government but the negotiations came to a halt when Frelimo’s requests for independence and to be recognised as the sole representative of the people of Mozambique were met with Portugal’s demands for a cease-fire and a referendum (Funada-Classen 2012:268). The overthrow of Portuguese President

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14 UN General Assembly. 1960. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (UNGA Resolution, 1514XV). Portuguese colonial rule was also singled out and severely criticised in General Assembly Resolution 1542XV and subsequent resolutions.

15 An area in eastern African historically known as Tanganyika that in 1964 merged with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later renamed the United Republic of Tanzania. Frelimo was formed in Dar es Salaam, erstwhile capital of Tanganyika (Encyclopedia Britannica).
Salazar during the 1974 Carnation revolution preceded the signing of the Lusaka Peace Treaty between Frelimo and the new Portuguese government in September 1974. Power was formally handed over to the Frelimo-dominated transitional government on June 25, 1975. Samora Machel, became the first President of the newly independent People’s Republic of Mozambique (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003 and Naidu 2001:9). The table was set for a one-party Marxist state under the leadership of Frelimo, the revolutionary vanguard. Leão (2007:5) notes that “the lack of political space in Portuguese politics precluded a political solution for independence, which led to armed struggle”. As was the case in many African countries, Mozambique’s decolonisation created an environment of violent change and social instability.

3.3 Independence

Motivated by a desire to gain total control of the nation, to stamp out the “remnants of the colonial bourgeoisie” and to punish his opponents, President Machel undertook the radical restructuring of the Mozambican society modelled on the policies of and practices in the Soviet Union (Machava 2011:598, 608-609 and Bartoli and Jebashvili 2005:3). Private property was abolished and the new government created a system of forced nationalisation. Those who broke the law were severely punished by being sent to re-education camps. The decision to maintain the unpopular Portuguese criminal and civil laws and to re-introduce flogging and the death penalty by firing squad was extremely unpopular and reminded the population of Portuguese atrocities during colonial times.

Furthermore, the inexperienced Frelimo government failed to establish an effective administrative system throughout Mozambique and instead asserted its rule over the citizens amidst political and administrative disarray (Rupiya 1998:12). The already frail economy deteriorated quickly as inexperienced Frelimo cadres, many of whom had little or no training and high levels of illiteracy, took over every aspect of society (Bartoli and Jebashvili 2005:4). The new government scorned many influential leaders and ethnic groups. Deposed chiefs in the colonial administration, medicine men (curandeiros) and traditional healers were ostracised, many of whom eventually
became Renamo supporters. Frelimo also alienated the Ndao, a popular ethnic group with ritual power and influential regional networks (Fearon & Laitin 2005:7). Religion and more particularly Christianity, was seen as sympathetic to the colonial masters, agents of the old, colonial society and enemies of the social revolution as “A luta continua”\(^\text{16}\) (Machava 2011:598).

In rural areas farm workers were angered and traditional authority undermined when the new government decided to replace private owned farms with state owned, collective farms and cooperatives and in 1983 adopted “Operation Production”, a programme which gave 50 000 impoverished city dwellers the opportunity to farm (Hume 1994:10). Bartoli 1999:6 posits that “Not surprisingly, passive resistance by peasants towards the new government policies accelerated the failure of the “grand” projects”. However, the government remained in full control of the land with the result that families could not reclaim their ancestral land (West and Kloeck-Jason 1999; Alden and Simpson 1993:118; Rugumamu and Gbla 2003; Fearon & Laitin 2005:7-8). Meanwhile, the food crisis which developed when food production came to a halt during the civil war when people fled to the cities, continued to create havoc in the rural areas (Jenkins 2012:147).

Unfortunately, even as the government tried to explain its harsh policies as an attempt to assist nation building and to unite the Mozambican people against internal and external enemies, its actions and policies became a chilly reminder of the harshness of the colonial era, a fact that only contributed to the failure of the regime to unify the country under the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Bartoli and Jebashvili 2005:3). It is important to note that class, ethnicity, religion and regional factionalism later on played vital roles in the civil war, as most of the leaders of the opposing sides came from two dominant clans, one from the south (Frelimo) and the other from central Mozambique (Renamo). The southern group’s intellectuals were

\(^{16}\)“A luta continua” translated as “The struggle continues” (Machava 2011:598).
favoured by Frelimo when awarding positions in government, a fact that caused dissent among the other tribes (Naidu 2001:13 and Rugumamu and Gbla 2003:68).

4. The Southern African region

The attainment of independence in Mozambique drastically changed the dynamics in the Southern African region as the Frelimo government, who advocated socialism and the liberation of the region, immediately established relations with the freedom fighters in the region. Liberation movements such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in what was then Rhodesia, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa found in the Mozambican government a staunch ally as it provided arms and shelter to assist their fight against white oppression (Manning and Malbrough 2009:79). The new Mozambican government therefore allowed ZANU to set up bases in Mozambique and it also severed landlocked Rhodesia’s route to the Beira harbor. In retaliation and bent on destabilising the new Mozambican government, the Rhodesian intelligence established and supported Renamo (Bartoli 2003:253).

Similarly, South African assistance to Renamo and the country’s attacks on ANC bases in Mozambique, Zambia and Lesotho further destabilised the region. Rhodesia and South Africa stood out as the aggressors who could not allow peaceful coexistence with its neighbours because it meant transformation in their own societies and therefore the demise of their minority governments. The adoption in 1978 of the “Total Onslaught” strategy by the South African government formalised the war between South Africa and most of its neighbours (Davies 1985:10). This strategy indicated the South African government’s acknowledgement of its isolation in the region and the need to fight for its survival. However, in the late 1970s the balance of power changed drastically in the region as the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 led to the final demise of the Rhodesian government followed

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17 This strategy was based on the assumption that South Africa, had to wage a military war to fight the onslaught of Marxist socialism (Davies 1985:10).

by elections in Zimbabwe in March 1980. Meanwhile, Renamo received long-term logistical support and troops from Rhodesia and South Africa and became a serious military threat to the government in 1983 after Zimbabwe attained independence. Thereafter the South African Military Intelligence Directorate’s took over the control of Renamo and increased its fighters from 500 to 8 000. Renamo was an important instrument in South Africa’s strategy to destabilise the region (Hume 1994:14; Naidu 2001:15; Levine 2006:6). When the Namibian referendum took place in 1989, South Africa remained the only remaining ideologically driven aggressor and the major cause of destabilisation in the region.

5. Civil war in Mozambique: 1975-1992

The chapter now briefly focuses on the strategies of two main antagonists in the conflict, Frelimo and Renamo, both products of regional maneuvering by dominant powers.

5.1 Frelimo

The product of the merging of three ethnically diverse movements, Frelimo was from the start plagued by a lack of solidarity that eventually spiraled into internal conflict. Two factions, each with its own ideological makeup, strategies and leaders existed. One faction, the southern group under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, advocated a radical revolutionary approach and socialism while the northern group, led by Lazaro Nkavandane, preferred a more elitist, capitalist approach (Hume 1994:8). In-fighting and the assassination of Mondlane on February 3, 1969 led to the appointment in May 1970 of Samora Machel as Frelimo President (Funada-Classen 2012:258-260; Hume 1994:8). Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia19 played an important part in uniting the various Frelimo factions into one liberation movement while the OAU recognised Frelimo as the only legitimate liberation organisation in Mozambique (Funada-Classen 2012:255; Hallett 1975:548-549; Manning and Malbrough 2009:72; Morgan 1990:608).

19 The role played by President Kaunda and his landlocked country in supporting Frelimo was very discreet due to his dependence on the Portuguese colonial railroad system of Mozambique (Leão (2011:8)).
5.2 Renamo

Renamo\(^ {20} \) was not based on a single ethnic group, neither was it considered to be a liberation movement with an identifiable ideological base. Internal grievances alienated many influential people in Mozambique against the Frelimo government. However, it was the ideological conflict between Marxism and white supremacy that provided external logistics for the emergence of Renamo (Leão (2007:9). To substantiate this view, Leão (2007:9) notes that the first leader of Renamo, André Matsangaíssa, fled Mozambique after being interned in a re-education camp after which he found support in Rhodesia. As stated in its manifest, “Renamo was founded to bring a new prosperous and free democratic era to post-colonial Mozambique” (Renamo 2004). However, it was clear from the start that Renamo did not have a coherent political strategy, as stated by Andrè Matsangaissa: “We are not interested in policy making … later we will have to work out politics but first communism must go from our country” (quoted in Robinson 2006:54). During the 1980s Renamo changed its tactics from conventional to guerrilla warfare and attacked civilians in rural areas, especially those that supported the government. Renamo’s attacks were intended to advertise its strengths, to instill fear and to intimidate its enemies. They focused on rural areas “to undermine the rural production systems on which Mozambique depended” (Rupiya 1998:13). Its brutality and terror activities earned Renamo the etiquette of the *Khmer Rouge of Mozambique* (Bartoli 2003:243; Hume 1994:14; Stedman 1997:208).

*But how much internal support did Renamo receive?* It is evident that those who were alienated and disgruntled by the Frelimo government’s anti-capitalist ideologies, disengaged from the government. They found themselves between two directly opposing forces, their new government and Renamo fighters who presented themselves as “counter-revolutionaries, claiming to be pro-Western and anti-communists determined to undo the political damage Frelimo had done to the country” (Udogu 2014:99). Morgan (1990:109) contends that Renamo not only

\(^ {20} \) Margaret Hall (1990) refers to Renamo as a “shadowy movement and ill-understood, save for its well-established genesis as a military artefact of the Rhodesians, then its transition in 1980 to South African patronage”.
received support from external forces hostile to the Frelimo regime, and that large sections of the rural population also supported the rebel movement due to the policies and strategies of the Frelimo government. Entire regions and ethnic groups in northern and central Mozambique backed Renamo because they felt marginalised by the domination of southerners within the Frelimo government. Morgan (1990:109) also lists particular unpopular decisions, such as the government’s forced collectivisation of the countryside, their removal of traditional chiefs and religious and ethnic persecution as reasons for support given to Renamo (Morgan 1990:109). Leão (2011:6) agrees and states that grievances seem to have contributed to the establishment of Renamo.

However, Robinson (2006:69) differs and states that “Renamo’s campaign may have appealed to some sections of the Mozambican population, but the Mozambican Civil War cannot be seen as a popular uprising against a hated government”. Rupiya (1998:13) also argues that because Renamo was formed in 1977 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) they never acquired the legitimacy they sought. Bartoli (2003:253) also posits that Renamo was perceived to be a puppet force, set up and sustained by external support, with no real political programme or intent to govern, and no domestic power base. Robinson (2006:66) quotes Alex Vines who states that “Although Renamo obtains some support from the Mozambican peasantry, most of this is obtained through terror and coercion”. Robinson (2006:110) contends that it is evident that Renamo’s guerrilla warfare only started in late 1978-early 1979, when supported by Rhodesian forces, guerilla fighters sabotaged Beira’s power and water supplies and the Mavuze hydro-electric power station (Machava 2011:605). By 1982 Renamo’s impact was felt as acute shortages of basic goods characterised life in Mozambique while Renamo kept on targeting transport links, health clinics and schools.

Yet, the issue of Renamo’s support in Mozambique remains deeply contested but the overall contention seems to be that Renamo lacked legitimacy because of its links to the Rhodesian minority government, its terror acts and brutality against the population and last of all, its lack of a proper political strategy. As stated by Hall (1990) Renamo “… relies on widespread forced recruitment, and behaves with
notorious brutality towards the civilian population”, but she also maintains that “it has indeed taken on local roots, despite its external origins and employment as a tool against Mozambique…”

6. The road to peace

The signing of the Nkomati Accord\(^\text{21}\) in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique was the first attempt to end the hostilities between the two countries (Rupiya 1998). The accord aimed to provide a win-win situation to both governments, as they undertook not to intervene in each other’s internal affairs (Erasmus 1984:15; Lundin 2004:6). This entailed that South Africa would cease to fund Renamo while the Frelimo government undertook not to harbor ANC forces in its territory. However, as it became evident that South Africa failed to fulfil its part of the bargain, the Mozambican government was forced to reconsider its options because it’s poverty-stricken and battle weary population demanded change.

Winds of change had now swept over Mozambique, the Southern African region and beyond, but Namibian independence and the end of apartheid in South Africa introduced a radical different regional environment. Indeed, the time for resolution of this conflict was ripe and opportunities for preliminary discussions between the Mozambican government and Renamo took place in neighbouring countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and also South Africa. Unfortunately mistrust and an unwillingness to give up their military action derailed the talks in October 1984 in Pretoria and in Nairobi in 1989 (Lundin 2004:6-7). However, after these preliminary discussions the attempts to get both sides together in Blantyre, Malawi in 1990 collapsed with the Renamo delegation accusing its opponent of plotting an assassination attempt on Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, on the eve of the scheduled talks (Alden 1993: 115,118).

Nevertheless, new global, regional and national realities more than anything else forced the two parties to the negotiation tables. Firstly, Joaquim Chissano, a more

\(^{21}\) The Nkomati Accord was a non-aggression pact signed between South Africa and Mozambique on 16 March 1984. (Erasmus 1984:1).
pragmatic leader, succeeded President Machel in October 1986 and introduced radical changes in the Frelimo government. President Chissano aimed to rally support for peace negotiations across the country and to rebuild public confidence in the government. Secondly, by 1986 the war, which was sustained by external financial support, became an unaffordable luxury. The Mozambican government lost out when funds from the Soviet Union and Central/Eastern Europe dried up due to their own economic meltdown, while the South African government also attempted to curb its financial support for Renamo. In addition, the end of the Cold War also meant increased Western aid to Mozambique conditioned by Mozambique embracing democracy and a market economy, as will be discussed later (Alden and Simpson 1993:113; Hoile 1994; Hume 1994:3; Manning and Malbrough 2009:79).

Thirdly, the Mozambican economy was in a crisis. Prolonged drought brought socio-economic hardships, combined with the infrastructural devastation caused by the fighting and internal economic mismanagement and the government’s war effort closed the door on any attempt to keep on fighting. Additionally, unlike Angola, Mozambique has left untouched its mineral resources since independence in 1975 and with external financial support drying up, the war became even more unaffordable. Rugumamu and Gbla (2003:14) indicate that the war destroyed more than 40 percent of the country’s agriculture, communications and administrative sectors. The transport corridors, built before the war and used by neighbouring countries, such as Malawi, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, provided the country with much-needed foreign exchange for economic growth but this dropped tremendously during the war (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003:15). In addition, since the war displaced many skilled workers, the government could not collect the taxes needed for the provision of social services. This resulted in high national debt and poverty and by the late 1980s Mozambique was one of the world’s poorest countries. Therefore, in 1987 the government was forced to introduce an Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP) which entailed structural adjustment programmes under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the economy still struggled by the beginning of the 1990s (Aguilar 1999:206) due to the drought and the collapse of the IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (Chachuia and Malani 1998:23; Kornprobst 2002:12; Manning and Malbrough 2009:87). The bottom line is
that the Mozambican government was forced to adopt capitalism and to begin with a
general discussion on the liberation of the economy and on peace.

Fourthly, President Chissano indicated his willingness to make concessions and
reform the Mozambican society. In September 1988, after announcing religious
freedom and the end of hostilities against the Catholic Church, the Pope visited
Mozambique. President Chissano also reconciled with the Ndau and offered them
representation in government. His visit to the US was followed by an offer of
unconditional amnesty to Renamo fighters. Renamo suffered equally from declining
external support due to reform in South Africa (Phillips 2010:9; Manning and
Malbrough 2009:79).

There were strong indications from both sides that a “hurting stalemate” has indeed
been reached (Gentili 2013:4). Lalá (2007:108). However, it was the Protestant and
Catholic churches in Mozambique who eventually succeeded in creating a pre-
negotiation phase characterised by church leaders visiting both parties to prepare
them for direct negotiations. One such meeting took place in Nairobi, Kenya in
February 1989 when a delegation of Mozambican Anglican and Catholic bishops met
with senior Renamo leaders (Lundin 2004:9). These church leaders provided the
necessary communication channels for the onset of direct negotiations under the
guidance of mediators.

6.1 Mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio

Initially the negotiations scheduled for Rome had no clear mediators because
Frelimo preferred direct talks, while Renamo insisted on a mediator and in the end
both parties agreed to use the observers as mediators (Community of Sant’Egidio
1992; Hume 1994:38) When the Rome peace talks between Frelimo and Renamo
finally began it took place under the auspices of the Catholic Society of Sant’Egidio,
a Vatican-linked charity.

Sant’Egidio was not a new name in Mozambique due to its historical links with the
government. Between 1976 and 1990, Sant’Egidio had engaged with the Frelimo
government to remove restrictions imposed on churches and religious leaders in Mozambique because of the government’s suspicion that the churches were loyal to the colonialists in the later years of the civil war. Sant’Egidio also provided humanitarian assistance to Mozambique and facilitated meetings between the governments of Mozambique and Italy, as well as the Holy See, on resolving the dispute between the church and government. Sant’Egidio also used its influence in Rome to promote the Mozambican culture (Bartoli 1999:255; Hume 1994:5; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998:3).

However, Sant’Egidio initially only offered their “good offices” for the mediation of the conflict but Archbishop Gonçalves’ participation in the official mediating team was based on his knowledge of Renamo and his contacts in Italy. The other mediators were Mario Rafaelli, a socialist parliamentarian representing the Italian government and two senior members of the Sant’Egidio community, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi. Renamo’s Raul Domingos and Amando Guebuza, Frelimo’s representative, led the first round of meetings from 8-10 July 1990 (Robinson 2006:317; Hume 1994:25; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998:8).

Even though the first round generated optimism after Frelimo’s announcement of the establishment of a multi-party democracy in Mozambique, the second, round which took place from 11-14 August, ended in deadlock when Renamo demanded the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops (Robinson 2006:317) During the Rome talks both sides indicated their commitment to end the conflict but the first three rounds of discussions did not give much hope of a successful ceasefire, as neither party was willing to abandon the military option. Talks almost collapsed when, in a bid to force the rebels into accepting their terms, the government lodged an offensive in Gorongosa, Renamo territory. Renamo retaliated by attacking civilian transportation carrying relief items, thereby putting immense pressure on the government.

The game of deadlock continued throughout the 12 rounds of negotiations that took place from July 1990 to 1992, when the peace agreement was signed. Gentili (2013:7) notes that “Up to the last day, when all the protocols had been signed, the leader of Renamo Dhlakham delayed his arrival in Rome threatening not to sign the
final conclusive Accord". It was the release of Nelson Mandela from a South African prison in 1990 which drastically changed the position of Renamo. Thereafter, President Mugabe agreed to contain Zimbabwean troops to the outside of Mozambique as demanded by Frelimo. Having won the trust of Renamo’s leader, Alphonso Dhlakama, President Mugabe continued to play a positive role in convincing Renamo to remain committed to the peace talks (Gonçalves 1998:25).

Fortunately, both parties trusted the mediators due to their past interaction with both parties at different stages of the conflict (Hume 1994:15). On the insurgents’ side, Sant’Egidio used its members based in Mozambique to reach out to those in war zones controlled by Renamo, and gained the trust of Renamo over the same period (Bartoli 1999:247). Another reason for the success of the first phase of mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio was that all parties to the conflict were involved and that Renamo committed to peace because they felt recognised as a party to the conflict (Svensson 2007:177).

The Rome talks were difficult and drawn-out and the mediators were also worried that innocent Mozambicans continued to suffer and die while the parties stall at the negotiation table. In addition, it was at evident that mistrust existed between the parties, but they later, under guidance of the mediators and the church leaders, became more flexible and confident. Perhaps the most difficult aspect was the government’s demand for an immediate solution to the problem without discussing the sensitive political issues that would guarantee the security of Renamo (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998:9).

Hume (1994:95) and Bartoli (1999:245) explain that because Sant’Egidio did not have expertise in traditional diplomacy and the low diplomatic profile of the mediators gave them very little leverage over the parties. They had no authority to confer diplomatic legitimacy on any agreement and very little authority to sustain the implementation of an agreement. As a result, they had to rely on the expertise of other parties and made it a point to include other players in the negotiations in order to give the process legitimacy. Therefore, several players provided logistical support and political guidance, among them the USA, Italy, Kenya and Zimbabwe. However,
the most notable role was played by the Italian government, who hosted the first phase of the negotiations in Rome between 1990 and 1992 and funded the implementation of the GPA. Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe chaired one of the meetings between Frelimo and Renamo in Rome aiming to bring a conclusion to the talks (Manning and Malbrough 2009:81). Finding a durable peace in Mozambique became a concerted effort by global and regional actors.

A GPA ending the country’s civil war, was signed in Italy on 4 October 1992 and consisted of seven protocols designed to address the formal resolution of the Mozambican civil war, the establishment of a new political system and the financing of post-conflict development (Ajello 1999:619; Chachuia and Malan 1998:19). This agreement provided for a firm ceasefire date; the concentration of Renamo and government forces in assembly areas; the withdrawal of Malawian and Zimbabwe troops who were guarding the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors; the demobilisation of government and Renamo soldiers who would not serve in a unified national defence force; the forming of new political parties, and the conduct of elections (Alden and Simpson 1993; Chachuia and Malan 1998; Bauer and Taylor 2005; Hanlon and Waterhouse 1994; Kornprobst 2002; Manning and Marlborough 2009; Rupiya 1998). In addition, a new constitution was unveiled in Maputo in 1991 that would allow multipartyism in the country and serve the country until its first general elections. The Constitution also allowed for guaranteed freedom of expression of religion and of the press, as well as the independence of the judiciary. Given the known reservations of several hardliners, Frelimo’s renewed commitment to multiparty elections was taken as a further sign that a full suspension of hostilities was imminent.

Seven protocols addressed the formal implementation of the GPA. Protocol I, signed on 18 October 1991, contained the basic principles which referred to the dismantling of the government and Renamo’s armed forces; the re-integration of some of the troops into a new, unified national army; the reform or disbanding of various government security forces and the restructuring of the police force. At the centre of

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the political settlement, and addressed in detail in *Protocol II* (signed on 13 November 1991) were the provisions for the formation and recognition of political parties. The latter were crucial for the establishment of a competitive multiparty democracy of majority rule. Basic political freedom, which included freedom of the press and media, the return of Mozambican refugees and the establishment of a National Elections Commission, were part of *Protocol III* which was signed on 12 March 1992. *Protocol IV* established rules for the formation of an integrated Mozambican defence force. The timetable for the conduct of the electoral process is addressed in *Protocol V*. In *Protocol VI* attention is given to the timetable for the nationwide cessation of the armed conflict, based on the framework provided by the Cease-fire Commission (CCF). *Protocol VII*, addresses the issue of funding of “the electoral process, emergency programmes and programmes for the reintegration of displaced persons, refugees and demobilized soldiers” made provision for financial support by donor countries (Protocol VII:1).

Equally important was the undertaking of both parties to accept the assistance of the UN “…in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, particularly the cease-fire and the electoral process” (United Nations Security Council 1992. S/24635). The UN peace mission to Mozambique, UNOMOZ23, was established on 16 December 1992 by Resolution 797 of the UN Security Council. The main task of the mission was to monitor the implementation of the GPA and its mandate ended on 9 December 1994 (Lalá 2007:110).

### 6.2 Peace implementation and UNOMOZ

Following the signing of the peace agreement, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 782 (1992) to mandate a mission to Mozambique to oversee the peace implementation. The team was led by Aldo Ajello, an Italian national and special representative of the UN Secretary-General. UN Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) entrusted UNOMOZ with a mandate to monitor the implementation of the GPA. The GPA required the UN to assist with six main tasks which entail

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23 Aldo Ajello (Italy): Special Representative of Secretary-General, Chief of Mission. Force Commanders: Major-General da Silva (Brazil) (February 1993 - February 1994) and Major-General Salam (Bangladesh) (March - December 1994)” (United Nations Archives and Records Management Section).
supervising the cease-fire; providing security for transport corridors; monitoring Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; coordinating humanitarian assistance programmes in the country, and providing assistance during the planned national election (Nuvunga 2007: 7).

Aldo Ajello held meetings with both government and Renamo in order to create rapport. However, UNOMOZ was constrained by numerous difficulties. An important problem encountered by UNOMOZ related to an aspect not addressed by the GPA, the issue of how to deal with civilian police during the DDR phase. The inflexibility of the timetable given to carry out the deployment of troops for demobilisation prior to elections also created problems. The DDR programmes also involved the reunification of the army by integrating 15,000 men from both government and Renamo into a new military (Alusala and Dye 2010:4). Other difficulties ranged from a manifest reluctance to co-operate on the part of the Mozambican parties, to bureaucratic mismanagement by the international community and a near collapse of the peace process in the first year (Alden 1995:103; Ajello 1999). Towards the end of the implementation phase, the process threatened to collapse when Renamo announced its withdrawal from the process citing imposition, bulldozing and betrayal by the government (Alden 1995:103; Ajello 1999:633).

Nevertheless, in spite of delays and other drawbacks, the UN was able to demobilise more than 80,000 troops and re-integrate them into the national army and completed its mandate with the holding of the country’s first democratic elections from 27 to 29 October, 1994. More than 88 percent of the Mozambican population participated in this election. Renamo only managed to win 44.8 percent of the parliamentary seats and Frelimo 55.2 percent. Renamo lost the nation’s first elections but did not violently contest the election results even though disarmament during the peace process was certainly imperfect.

Unfortunately, the seeds of future pockets of armed resistance which manifested in Mozambique in 2012 have already been sown during and after the 1992-1994 peace implementation phase. Two aspects stood out: the insufficient collection of weapons and the superficial integration of the “zones under Renamo’s influence” into a united
Mozambique (Lundin 2004:14). Alusala and Dye (2010:4) also refer to two underlying issues which later came back to haunt the Mozambican society. The first is that many of the ex-combatants became increasingly involved in criminal activities and the second the fact that “political instability persisted as a result of the continuing politicization of reintegration”. Alusala and Dye (2010:4) therefore questions both the methodology followed during the implementation phase and the degree of integration.

7. Conclusion

This chapter was structured in two main themes. The first theme focused on the historical background to the civil war and provided an assessment of its causes and consequences. In terms of this theme, it can be concluded that the nature of both Portuguese colonial rule and the liberation struggle created an unequal and poverty stricken society, fragmented by political in-fighting. The corrupt and ineffective administration of its colonies also contributed to the post-independence political, social and economic instability. Post-independent development challenges were also analysed and the conclusion can be made that the post-independence government was harsh, violent and unpopular in many circles, it was a government based on “ideology, morality, violence and punishment” (Machava 2011:593, 594). The instability of the Southern African region and the democratic deficit in neighbouring Rhodesia and South Africa had a profound impact on Mozambique. The two countries’ support of Renamo certainly contributed immensely to Mozambique’s civil war. It is also evident that the Cold War greatly influenced both the escalation and de-escalation of the civil war, as manifested in the ideologies of the protagonists.

In terms of the second theme, the mediation process of the Mozambican conflict, it was found that it was one of the most complex mediation processes in Africa, but that it was also a successful enterprise. As mentioned, more than one million people died in the Mozambican civil war and approximately one third of the population of 22 million, that is more than 4.5 million people, fled the country and sought refuge in neighbouring countries, thereby putting pressure on the security budgets of the countries concerned (Alden 1995:110; Manning and Malbrough 2009:80).
A combination of factors was responsible for Mozambique's successful long-term transition to peace and multiparty politics. First of all, the political changes which unfolded in the regional and international context mainly because external players also became involved in efforts to end the war and seek peace. International donors stepped in during the implementation stage to provide financial assistance to the government, Renamo and UNOMOZ. Secondly, the conflict passed through the phase of ripeness and mutually hurting stalemate by both parties. Although the process started without a clear mediator because neither party could agree to the other’s choice of mediator, and despite mutual mistrust, the mediation still progressed. Thirdly, despite various calls that mediators should have ample knowledge and expertise in order to mediate, the Community of Sant’Egidio was a non-state actor with limited diplomatic experience and insufficient power to make legitimate decisions (Bartoli 1999:258). Fourthly, the long-term relations between the Frelimo government and the donors who later on assisted in the transition from war-to-peace, also contributed to a peaceful transition (Manning and Malborough (2009:78).

As mentioned by Nathan (2009:11) attaining peace is a process and does not stop when the peace agreement has been signed, but continues all the way through the implementation phase. Stedman (2001:25) also argues that peace implementation is the most crucial and sensitive phase of the mediation process and notes that the number of failed peace processes in Africa have collapsed at the peace implementation phase, for example in the Great Lakes Region and Angola.

The next chapter discusses how mediators dealt with parties who spoil because they either want to stall the process, do not want to make concessions or want to force concessions from the other party.
CHAPTER 4

1. Introduction

There is consensus among scholars that every peace process creates spoilers and that a peace process involves more than mediation to get the parties to sign a peace agreement. The peace process extends all the way to the implementation of the peace agreement thereby creating durable peace. The process also involves compromise by the parties, managed by mediators who employ various strategies to manage the process. The mediators also identify spoilers and manage them before they derail the mediation process. However, it has been argued that many peace agreements fail at the implementation stage due to a number of factors, among them the actions of spoilers.

Spoiler behaviour during Mozambique’s mediation process is the main focus of this chapter. The objective is to determine whether spoilers were present during the mediation process and if that is the case, who they were, what their motives, behaviour and the consequences of their actions were. In order to provide a balanced analysis, the chapter discusses the key actors directly and indirectly involved in the peace process to determine their impact on the outcome of the process. The focus also falls on how the behaviour of the mediators and limitations they experienced influenced spoiling behaviour during peace negotiations. Further analysis is made of external players who in one way or another were connected to the parties to the conflict and the mediator. The aim is to assess their roles in, influence and impact on the peace process. The chapter concludes with a summary of lessons learnt from this case study and a discussion of the possible impact of foreign intervention on the behaviour of spoilers.

2. The Mozambican conflict and spoiler behaviour

In this section spoiler behavior during the Rome negotiations and the strategies of mediators to counteract their actions are discussed.
2.1 Spoiler behaviour during negotiations in Rome

Spoiling and devious behaviour exist more or less in every peace process and every party can one way or the other become a spoiler, depending on opportunities and how far they are willing to make concessions, as explained by scholars such as Greenhill and Major (2007), Stedman (1997:178), Newman and Richmond (2006b) and Zahar (2007). The issue is that they emerge at different intervals within the cycle of the mediation process, either when mediation is progressing or when a peace agreement has been signed. In the peace implementation of the Mozambican conflict the major players were the Frelimo government and Renamo. Both parties were inside parties to the conflict, both parties at one point or another showed some deviation behavior which could potentially derail the peace process.

The first spoiling behaviour by both parties occurred in Rome during the first phase of the mediation process. Alden and Simpson (1993:119) detect the emergence of traces of deviation by the parties during the third round of talks in Rome in November 1990, following the signing of partial ceasefire agreement that allowed for the cessation of hostilities. Spoiling behavior manifested as both parties refused to abandon its offensive towards the other due to the mistrust that existed between them. This was further worsened when, in trying to force Renamo to accede to the demands of the process through negative incentives, government launched its attack on the Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa, as indicated previously.

Renamo was indeed guilty of limited spoiling and Laurie Nathan’s (2011) insight into the motives of spoiling rebel movements comes to mind. Rebel parties tend to spoil when the regime gains power at the expense of the rebel movements who loses their leverage when they enter into negotiations. The peace negotiations provided the government time to win recognition for its attempts to negotiate with an enemy established under dubious circumstances and guilty of terrorising the population. While the government gained legitimacy and consolidated its position, Renamo’s spoiling can be explained as a consequence of the movement losing its leverage and its fear of being marginalised.
The government was also guilty of limited spoiling during the first phase because it did not perceive that the peace process will deliver peace. They therefore had to take matters in their own hands by forcing Renamo’s hand. In retaliation, Renamo, turned into a spoiler by applying violence to fight the government’s pressure. They attacked emergency relief convoys and trains transporting miners returning from South Africa on the Ressano Garcia and Maputo routes, and also destroyed power lines from South Africa which resulted in recurrent power outages. Renamo attacked communication routes and infrastructure, a strategy applied during the armed struggle.

It is clear that both parties struggled with accepting that there was no other way out, in other words, the issue of “conflict ripe ripeness”. Hume (1998:39) points out that both parties continued to blame one another for the stalemate of the joint verification commission. Renamo launched attacks on the important transport corridors of Tete and Nacala which linked Zimbabwe and Malawi. This violated the agreement that called for the cessation of hostilities and a country-wide ceasefire (Alden and Simpson 1993:113). As mentioned by Quinn et al. (2007:446) and discussed in this study (Chapter 1), the spoiling by the parties can be explained as a case of mediation where there is a pronounced power disparity between the parties which will motivate the parties not to compromise, but to search for a way out of negotiations. In this case Renamo, the weaker party, continued fighting, while Frelimo tried to act unilaterally by bulldozing, as happened in the second spoiling behavior.

The second spoiling took form when the government bulldozed the process, indicating that indeed, every party to the peace process has the capacity of spoiling. It would seem that throughout the mediation process in Rome, government was bulldozing its way through to a quicker settlement of the conflict. Mandated with the responsibility to protect its citizens, government did not want to waste more time on peacemaking but wanted a peace agreement as soon as possible. For example, the government introduced a new constitution in 1991 without consulting the rebels. Cutting out the party to the negotiations from deciding on a matter of great importance is a form of greedy spoiling. However, it backfired as people had lost
faith in their government due to the severe economic hardships the war had brought. A failed coup d’état also worsened the situation for Frelimo.

By employing delaying tactics and seeking sympathy after being cut out of the matter of the new constitution, Renamo again reverted back to threatening military action. Spoiling behaviour initially gave Renamo leverage and more power in the negotiations and they felt this would be lost once things began to move faster. They therefore wanted to stall, gain time and force more concessions from government and ultimately actively tried to undermine the power base of its opponent by destabilising the country (greedy spoiler). Alden and Simpson (1993:120) sum up that

“Renamo made it clear that it was in no hurry to bring an end to the war. While the talks proceeded at a pace virtually dictated by the rebels, their leadership continued to flirt with a return to the military option in the belief that it could extract substantial concessions from the government, and simultaneously further undermine popular support for Frelimo by contributing to the deteriorating socio-economic situation.”

This behaviour can partly be contributed to Renamo being more rebel movement than party, skilled in fighting as the “Khmer rouge” of Mozambique, known for its lack of political sophistication and negotiating skills and its reliance on foreign advisors for assistance in articulating policy documents (Alden and Simpson 1993:124). Renamo vowed never to be involved in politics and to leave politics to civilians after their victory but when they found themselves party to complex negotiations which would determine their future, they chose the old way out: fighting (Cabrita 2000:167). This is a pattern of behavior which would eventually continue long after the establishment of a democratic Mozambique.

Renamo tried to delay the peace process, but government also spoiled by refusing to recognise Renamo as a political party. Richmond (2006:68) stresses that issues of recognition and legitimacy are crucial if a peace process is to become meaningful but that a tug of war between former adversaries could lead to spoiling, as happened during the Mozambican mediation process.
2.2 Mediator strategies during the peace negotiations in Rome

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the mediators had no diplomatic status and parties questioning their legitimacy when they make ‘unpopular’ decisions during the mediation process, can be construed as manifestations of deviant behaviour by the parties. Mediators discovered in the course of the negotiation that the parties would do what they preferred by taking advantage of the weak operational framework provided by the mediators. Therefore, the mediators followed a strategy of creating synergies with other representatives of different interests and incorporating other state actors to assist where necessary (Bartoli 2003:258; Hume 1994:68). This is also a form of using leverage by attracting them to stay in the process. In this case, countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Portugal, South Africa and the USA provide the necessary logistical and financial support to the mediators. (The role of these foreign actors is discussed in detail later on). Synergies were also established with the UN, which later took up the implementation phase of the conflict. The mediator employed several strategies, starting with socialisation by putting moral pressure on the parties, reminding them of the reason for the mediation and encouraging them to unite to achieve peace and a durable settlement (Hume 1994:51).

2.3 Spoiling during the implementation phase: 1992–1994

The GPA, signed in October 1992, mandated the UN to oversee the implementation phase of the peace. One important consequence of the GPA was the demobilisation of soldiers from both sides and their re-integration into a national army. During this phase devious behavior manifested in the reluctance of both parties to demobilise and re-integrate (Ajello 1999:628). This can be explained by noting the deep mistrust between the parties. First to express mistrust of the government was Renamo’s Afonso Dhlakama, who told Aldo Ajello that he was ready to keep his men in the bush for as long as possible in order to preserve his bargaining power with the government (Ajello 1999:632). As Ajello explains, clinging to military power while trying to increase political power was ideal for Renamo but not a workable situation in the real sense, considering that the UN was operating under a strict schedule. On
the government side, demobilisation was also a problem because of the history of the Mozambican army. It had been one autonomous entity outside political control since independence. Therefore, convincing the army to demobilise was a significant problem. In addition, the government kept bulldozing the process while underplaying and even ignoring parts of the agreement which required government to fund Renamo in its transformation into a political party. This is where Newman and Richmond’s (2006) warning comes to mind. It is indeed more appropriate to be an insider looking out when determining spoiling behavior. The reality of the autonomous nature of the Mozambican army and the inability of government to exert the necessary control over the army motivated government in trying to bulldoze the process. Government’s behavior is therefore not necessarily an attempt at spoiling, but to play for time in order to gain control over the army. Nevertheless, government not allowing Renamo’s fears to be delayed by demanding a quick-fix while ignoring the agreement to financially support Renamo transformation into a party, proved to be counter-productive in the long run and is therefore spoiling behavior. However, Renamo’s insistence upon retaining its military power is also evidence of spoiling behavior. Still, the issue of power imbalances providing incentives for spoiling in the first place cannot be ignored when assessing Renamo’s behavior.

Another important sign of spoiling was when Renamo threatened to boycott the elections claiming electoral fraud by the government just a few days before Mozambique held its first-ever elections. Dhlakama claimed a document had been faxed to him detailing how the vote-rigging would be done, and therefore he could not participate in the elections (Ajello 1999:634). He also indicated that he had received a threat from the Frontline States that he should accept the result of the elections, and if he fails, they would invade Mozambique militarily. His final excuse was that he was convinced that the UN was now siding with government.

2.4 Mediator strategies

With respect to the first problem of demobilisation, UNOMOZ, now with full power to control the pace of the agreement, used various strategies to manage the devious behaviour by the two parties. First of all, in trying to address Renamo’s concerns, the
UN mobilised resources for Renamo to the tune of $17.5 million to help them demobilise and become a political party. In terms of the peace agreement, the government had been mandated to provide resources to Renamo to assist this process. However, because it was very difficult for government to fund its competitor and rival, government became deviant and refused to provide the funds as stipulated, thereby manifesting spoiler behaviour (Ajello 1999:633). Nevertheless, the mediator managed to find sources of funding for Renamo from the Italian government, South Africa, Scandinavian countries, the USA and Portugal. Ajello admits that Renamo’s decision not to stop hostilities was understandable under the circumstances, as time was running out and there was no measurable commitment from the government.

With regard to Frelimo’s reluctance to demobilise, the UN used a different strategy. The international community was used as an instrument to pressurise Mozambican President Joachim Chissano to order the army to demobilise (coercion) (Ajello 1999:634). Although the strategy worked for the mediator, it created reservations within Frelimo ranks in the form of resistance from Frelimo hardliners who tried to spoil the process (Stedman 1997:183). In this case, the UN as mediator used the strategy of persuasion by coercion to ensure implementation of the GPA. Why do supporters of a party refuse to mobilise? This refusal is an indication of spoiling behaviour by the supporters of the parties who are often not willing to make peace and cling to their military power because they fear being eliminated by the opposing party if they disarm. Stedman (1997:183-184) contends that fear is the main cause of parties’ reluctance to seek a peaceful settlement. Svensson (2007:180) adds that peace agreements give rebels some kind of recognition, legitimacy leverage or authority at the expense of government and its supporters. The latter then tend to cling to military power as guarantee.

The UN correctly diagnosed Renamo as a limited spoiler when Dhlakama followed a strategy of first delaying and then boycotting the elections. Aldo Ajello’s mixed approach of socialisation and leverage proofed to be appropriate. The UN showed sensitivity for Renamo’s fears and allowed the delay of the elections while providing Renamo with the necessary funds (leverage). This strategy also involved assuring
Renamo that its grievances concerning fraudulent activities prior and during the election will be sorted out. This strategy ultimately aimed to allow the former rebel movement time to accept the responsibilities of becoming a legitimate political party and to prevent serious spoiler behavior. However, the peace agreement gave the UN specific timeframes within which to establish peace and any further delay in holding elections meant more resources would be needed, which unfortunately were not available. Dhlakama, who feared for his own future position, his legitimacy as the leader of a party and the possibility that Renamo will not win the elections, became the centre of spoiler behavior when he boycotted the election. This time the UN Security Council tried to convince him to change his decision (Christensen 2006:12). However, when Dhlakama threatened not to accept the election results, the Frontline States threatened him with military action. This is a manifestation of persuasion by coercion with the assistance of external parties.

This brings us to the question: In an asymmetric relationship, where government acts unilaterally and the rebel movement fear for what they have lost, when will rebels accept peace? In his comments on when rebels commit to peace, Svensson (2007:177) stresses that in the post-agreement phase, rebels (the weaker side) will accept peace if the mediators act as guarantors for them. He also contends that mediators must manage the weaker side’s fear by providing assurances and concrete results. However, as it turned out, Renamo still demands a redistribution of wealth as has been happening since 1994. The mediators’ strategy worked for the moment, but Renamo still threatens to “return to the bushes” and refuse to accept the responsibility for its actions while the Frelimo government still acts as though it is the only role-player in Mozambique.

Therefore, in the Mozambican mediation process it is argued that spoiling manifested during the implementation phase in terms of actions by Renamo, when they first delayed then boycotted elections at the eleventh hour, they refused to demobilise and made demands aimed at delaying the process. Frelimo also spoiled by refusing to pay for Renamo’s integration as a political party into the political system, by bulldozing the process, by refusing to demobilise and by refusing to recognise Renamo as a political party.
3. External actors and the issue of spoiling behavior

External parties are often guilty of spoiling behavior when they meddle in the mediation and implementation process. The question was asked: *Did external parties attempt to spoil during the Mozambican mediation and implementation process?* In assessing the role of external actors and foreign intervention in the Mozambican peace process, not much has been discovered with regard to spoiling behaviour by any of the countries during the peace process. Suffice to say that, unlike the Angolan conflict, the mediation in Mozambique did not attract the attention of countries such as the USA who preferred to play a supporting albeit peripheral role. Bartoli (2003:260) argues that the synergies that existed between different actors contributed to peace in Mozambique. However, the end of the Cold War also contributed to the success because Africa, and more specifically Mozambique, was not ideologically important anymore. It is also evident that Mozambique’s case was different from Angola’s because Mozambique did not have mineral resources that would have ignited international attention and competition.

Bartoli, Civico and Gianturco (2009:8) acknowledge the assistance provided to Mozambique’s success story by a myriad actors who were directly and indirectly involved in the process. These actors played different roles as mediators, facilitators, guarantors’ observers and partners. The preceding chapters also discussed how several external actors played a role in this mediation process. These were countries that in one way or another fostered the achievement of peace in Mozambique: South Africa, Portugal, Italy, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Malawi and the USA. Apart from Malawi, the other countries provided financial support for the achievement of peace. The governments of Italy, Portugal, South Africa and the USA provided funds for the demobilisation and transformation of Renamo into a political party. Italy provided the setting because of the role played by the Community of Sant’Egidio. Bartoli, Civico and Gianturco (2009:8-10) posits that the successful mediation in Mozambique is attributed mainly to the supportive role of external actors who did not meddle in the process. The parties to the conflict fully owned the mediation and implementation process as managed by the mediators.
4. Mediator strategies, challenges and spoiling: a critique

In the two phases of the peace process, parties employed spoiling or devious behaviour mainly aimed at stalling, derailing or forcing concessions. Third parties mandated to resolve the impasse used various strategies. In this regard, the first point to note is that different strategies are employed for different spoiler groups or tactics. Aggestam (2006:23) argues that spoiling should be looked at in terms of situational rationality. This is to say that actors in a peace process behave according to the situation they are in, and spoiling also depends on the specific context of the conflict. However, she states that it is difficult to distinguish negotiating strategies from spoiling strategies as it is not easy to draw a line between intentional and consequential spoiling.

In Rome, when faced with deviational behavior, the mediator could not deal with it directly but invited another third party with legitimate powers to resolve the problem. On a number of occasions, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was invited to persuade both parties to adhere to the requirements of the negotiation (Hume 1994). Bartoli, Civico and Gianturco (2009:9) have described the Rome intervention as weak: “The third party did not have the capacity to forcefully influence either party or the process. This led to the parties committing to one another and the peace process because they were not forced into the peace process”. The parties therefore had the final say.

On the other hand, during the UN Mission, Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, had the backing and mandate to make decisions and when faced with deviation by both parties, immediately made decisions. For example, by deciding to use leverage on Renamo when it was necessary. An important factor worth mentioning is that mediators who have clear mandates are able to use their mandate without hindrance. Newman and Richmond (2006c:16) suggest that although inducement may be the best form of strategy to deal with a spoiler, it is very important for mediators to be cautious as sometimes resources from international donors may encourage the emergence of spoarsers. As Crocker, Hampson and Aall
(2007) argue, every mediator has an interest in the outcome of the peace process, without which they would not mediate.

Similarly, the leaders of the warring parties also proofed to be a challenge for the mediators because neither leader was able to make decisions on his own for fear of reprisals from his followers. One example on the government side is the resistance President Chissano encountered from the hardliners when he ordered demobilisation under pressure from the international community and the UN, meaning the decision he made was unilateral and not favoured by his followers (Ajello 1999:634). In the Renamo camp, Dhlakama did not have absolute political and military powers. He therefore usually consulted his commanders before making any decision for fear of being ousted if he acted unilaterally (Cabrita 2000:162). For mediators this is indeed a challenge, because if the mediators have no knowledge of where the resistance lies in a group, they may not be able to identify potential spoilers and find ways of managing them. By not adhering to the peace agreement requirements, the leaders feared for their positions from their followers, and this could cause spoiling.

5. Conclusion

The Mozambican case confirms that mediators have a special role in ensuring that parties reach a negotiated settlement. The strategies they use in each case are rooted in the specific case and may not be applicable in another scenario. It is also possible for different third parties to use different strategies, even if faced with a similar problem. As was the case in Mozambique, when both parties refused to demobilise, the mediator used coercion, socialisation and reward to manage the spoiling behaviour. For example, by giving Renamo what they wanted, the mediator prevented them from going back into the bush to continue fighting. So too, Renamo was socialised into the process, by transforming it from armed bandits to a political party. On the other hand, the third parties used coercion to force Frelimo and the government to demobilise, although there was resistance within the ranks of Frelimo. Knowing where the resistance is coming from is also very important, as it gives the mediator the chance to manage any potential spoiling before a peace process is derailed.
Another issue involves the impact of mistrust on the propensity of parties to spoil. In the Mozambican peace process, as in any peace process, the parties did not trust one another from the beginning and treated each other with great suspicion. In so doing they tended to deviate from the requirements of the agreement. As Alden and Simpson (1993:127) elaborate: “...the tortuous nature of the negotiations process itself (in Mozambique) points to the existence of a great deal of mistrust between the protagonists which will not disappear overnight, and which will always threaten to re-surface during the transition”. It is therefore the role of mediators role to ensure that parties stay on the path of peace. Hume (1994:51) agrees that as a manager of the process the mediator has a responsibility to ensure each party adheres to its commitment to the peace agreement, as mostly both parties do not want to make concessions and want the other party to agree to their proposals.

Finally, the supportive nature of foreign intervention is crucial in creating durable peace. Specifically, the Mozambican peace process provides insight into the complex interactions that underpin the link between effective leverage and support by outside actors during the peace implementation process. The structure and multifaceted nature of the mission gave UNOMOZ itself little effective leverage in some areas.

Considering the Mozambican peace process, it is evident that all external actors were for peace immediately the parties resolved to end the conflict. Countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe wanted peace because they are landlocked, and the number of refugees they (especially Malawi) harboured placed significant strains on their security budgets. In the case of Mozambique, unlike Angola where the USA funded one of the parties to the conflict, the USA only provided limited financial support but offered more technical and advisory assistance.
CHAPTER 5

1. Introduction

The case study of the Mozambican civil war and subsequent peace negotiations which led to a GPA in 1992 and general elections in 1994 provides a number of lessons regarding the role of custodians of peace and their strategies in managing spoilers in a peace process. The first objective of this chapter is to assess the management of spoilers in the Mozambican peace process from 1990 to 1994. A second objective is, from a 2015 perspective, to assess the durability of Mozambique’s peace process. A third objective is to critique the applicability of the theoretical framework used for analysing the effect of spoiler behaviour on mediation in Mozambique. The chapter concludes by identifying possible gaps in the literature and making recommendations for further research.

The end of the civil war in Mozambique was the final culmination of various events in Mozambique, in the Southern African region and in the global arena. Economic despair and the knowledge that they have reached a stalemate forced both the Frelimo government and the Renamo rebel groups to seek peace through negotiations.

2. Who mediated?

While President Chissano chose direct bilateral talks without the intervention of mediators, it was opposed by Renamo leader, Dhlakama, and in July 1990, after financial and logistical support by the Vatican and the Italian government, the two parties started with the first round of negotiation with the Community of Sant ‘Egidio as mediator.

Sant’Egidio provided “good offices” and eventually led the mediation process. However, the mediation in Mozambique was never a case of Track 1 or Track 2 diplomacy because while the former is limited to official governmental diplomacy, the
latter only refers to informal and unofficial diplomacy by a non-governmental organisation (in this case, the Community of Sant'Egidio). The Community did not act alone during the mediation process because some of its mediators were representatives of the Italian government and the Mozambican churches. The 1990-1992 mediation and subsequent implementation phase of the peace agreement in Mozambique is therefore a multi-track mediation according to Branco (2011:81, 88, 91) and “third party mediation coupling power diplomacy with confidence building facilitation” as noted by Gentili (2013:1). Branco (2011:91-92) and Jackson (2005:7) argue that unofficial mediation (Track 2 mediation) is insufficient in the case of high level peace talks, but Jackson argues that it does have benefits such as that unofficial mediators often create entry-level opportunities for mediation and that they gain the trust of the governments involved in the process because unofficial mediators cannot confer diplomatic status on a rebel group. However, it is difficult for unofficial mediators to control deviation by the parties because they have no powers to do so. They lack the mandate to use reactive and preventive measures to manage spoiler behaviour by the parties and this forces them to create synergies with other external actors.

The active involvement of leaders and governments external to the mediation process suggests that the Community of Sant’Egidio did provide “good offices” and a semblance of mediation, but that it was not in control of the process and also needed the assistance of external actors to prevent the process from derailing. On the other hand, it played an indispensable role due to its importance as a religious organisation. It also had the trust of both leaders and was the only entity with the necessary legitimacy that could manage the mediation process. Branco (2011:92) agrees when he notes that “Not only was most of the leadership of Renamo Catholic… but the leadership of Frelimo had many Anglican Church followers”. The Community therefore became the core group during the mediation process but multiple actors were involved which makes this what Branco (2011:92) describes as “a multi-track process in which the states played a decisive role”.

As seen from the case study of managing spoilers in Mozambique, spoiling or devious behaviour were found by both parties, Renamo and the Frelimo government,
at different stages of the process. Spoiling happens more often in the case of asymmetrical relations between the parties. Those who spoil do so because they fear the loss of their power base and are reluctant to abide by the tenets of the agreement. This was the main motive for spoiling behavior by Renamo as was the mistrust between the parties. As indicated earlier, when the parties mistrust one another, none are willing to make concessions because they fear being vulnerable to possible elimination by a stronger party. There is a strong link between the distribution of power and spoiling in the case of the mediation in Mozambique. Renamo was the underdog; it lacked legitimacy and support inside the country and knew that it did not have a chance to win a general election against Frelimo, the party which dominated the political process in a one-party state since independence. The mediator must therefore create a balance of power by acting as a guarantor to the weaker side. This could be done by providing leverage and resources to the weaker side. During the peace implementation stage, Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, was able to control Renamo because the UN under its mandate had the required financial resources to woo the parties to oblige (Gentili 2013:11).

Therefore, mediators who have enough resources or who have access to entities that can provide these resources are able to dissuade devious parties from spoiling the peace process (Jett 1999:77). Gentili (2013:14) notes that the mediation process in Mozambique was successful not only because it benefited from the end of the Cold War, but also “because the mediators were capable of negotiating a credible formula of conflict resolution and the implementation was achieved through innovative and capable stakeholders”. How did the spoilers try to derail the mediation process?

3. Violent vs non-violent spoiling

As the Mozambican peace process has shown, not all spoiling is violent. Some are non-violent, especially insiders; however, they are capable of derailing the peace process or slowing its progress completely and may later become violent as well. Non-violent spoiling may include tactics such as deliberately delaying the peace
process in order to buy time and seek recognition of some sort (Newman and Richmond 2006c:2). Some may employ delaying tactics as a way of showing their grievances. For example, most of the time when Frelimo deviated from the agreements or attempted to bulldoze the process, Renamo employed delaying tactics aimed at frustrating government. Renamo leader, Dhlakhama, constantly delayed his arrival for the signing of the protocols and even did so when the signing of the final Accord had to take place and it had to be postponed from 1 to 4 October 1990 (Gentili 2013:7). Mediators and custodians of peace should therefore be alert to identify such non-violent spoilers.

In terms of violence in the peace process, it should be noted that not all violence can be termed spoiling, as varying degrees of violence can be absorbed in the peace process. Therefore mediators should look out for violence that breeds spoiling.

4. Locus of the spoiler

A distinction is made in the literature between internal and external spoilers.

4.1 Internal spoilers

Regarding the locus of the spoilers, the study has shown that in most cases the activities of spoiling rest with the followers and not necessarily the leaders. (Yet, Renamo leader Dhlakama did show a propensity to spoil due to his fears of being eliminated, sidelined or stripped from his power as a leader). Leaders may have the urge to talk peace, but the supporters, who feel their interests are not being addressed in the negotiation and implementation stages, may force the leader to resort to violence or to express some devious behaviour that will eventually derail the peace process.

Both protagonists in the Mozambique conflict showed that they were unable to make crucial decisions for fear of the reaction of their followers. This was most evident during the implementation phase when supporters of both parties refused to
demobilize. A mediator should therefore be aware of the locus of the spoiler and where the influence to continue delaying the process is emanating from.

4.2 External spoilers

Another important aspect is the role of external actors and foreign intervention in creating durable peace. As with most conflicts, external actors in the form of donors, well-wishers and so on have funded peace processes with the aim of ending the violence. However, these donors can also be spoilers, when they fund peace processes they want to actors have a say in the direction the peace process is going. They have an interest in the peace that is being negotiated and may favour one group over the other.

Therefore, even though external actors can also spoil a peace process if they gain directly from the continuation of the war, the Mozambican peace process did not create any external spoilers, because all external actors were bent on creating peace in Mozambique and acted in good faith. An important reason for external actors not spoiling was that Mozambique, unlike Angola, was considered as not having mineral resources that could have compelled external involvement. It is also true that regional actors, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, knew that a durable peace in Mozambique could only benefit the region as a whole, but in the case of landlocked Zimbabwe, for example, peace also offered tangible benefits in the form of access to the sea.

Throughout the period of implementation the UN stood its ground and made sure that every deviation by the parties was dealt with most effectively. UNOMOZ was able to provide resources to prevent spoiling, and where necessary could provide warnings and threats of withdrawal in order to make the parties go ahead with the peace plan (Ajello 1999:437). This was possible because the UN had the required resources, a clear mandate for its operations, and a fixed schedule which acted as a guideline. The UN not only provided ONUMOZ, but also organised a conference for donors to obtain more funding to rebuild the country in Maputo (Branco 2011:91).
5. Critique of spoiler theories and possible areas for further research

The success or failure of any mediation process depends on a number of variables, among them the management of spoilers. Although the term “spoilers” has been used broadly in the literature, it has not captured non-violent spoiling. In other words, spoiling is most often seen as a violent aspect of a peace process, when in fact actors both within and outside the process can use non-violent means to derail the peace process altogether. There is a need for further research on non-violent spoiling and how mediators can detect it and what the motives are, and what strategies can be used to deal with them.

Another point of contention involves the nature of inside parties to the conflict and spoiling, specifically in internal conflicts similar to Mozambique’s where the disputants are government and rebel groups that have committed to peace. The available literature does not provide much about what mediators should do if the spoiler is the government, a sovereign entity with a legal personality in international law. In the case of a government deviating and being reluctant to oblige on important aspects of the agreement, what alternative strategies can mediators use to manage the spoiler besides using threats? In the Mozambican peace process, in both cases (during negotiations and peace implementation) the mediator used outsiders to pressurise the government to oblige. The question that may be asked is, what if the external actor is also a spoiler either working with or against government? Can the mediators handle such spoilers?

A question already asked in Chapter 1 is: When is spoiling done with? Does it continue even after the end of the implementation of the GPA? In other words: how durable is a peace process in the long run? The case of Mozambique gives a clear indication that spoiling activities are not only limited to peacemaking and implementation, but can continue to ruin a post-conflict political process. During the 1994 general election both Renamo and Frelimo manifested behavior contrary to the GPA. Their spoiling behavior was neutralised effectively by the mediators, but how durable is this peace?
6. The durability of Mozambique's peace process?

*How durable is the peace created by the Mozambican peace process of 1990-1994?*

The ability to hold free, fair, and above all in Mozambique's case, peaceful elections, is one of the first determinants to consider when assessing the stability of a country after a general peace agreement. The 1994 general election took place under the supervision of UNOMOZ and was considered to be peaceful and fair despite Renamo's allegations to the contrary. In December 1999 Frelimo again managed to win the majority of the Parliamentary seats (133 seats against Renamo’s 117 seats). Renamo’s support came from the central districts and because regions such as Nampula, Zambezia and Cabo Delgado had more registered votes, more seats were allocated to them. These regions were all Frelimo strongholds which meant that Renamo received less parliamentary seats than they perceived they deserved (Pottie 2000). Renamo therefore not only rejected the results, but also demanded a reform of the electoral system as happened with every general election thereafter. Renamo also used threats, as indicated by Pottie (2000), Renamo “now threatens to establish parallel administrations at the provincial level in the six provinces where it won a majority of the national seats”. This election clearly showed that the option to quit, to destabilise and to fragment still remains alive in Renamo circles.

Similarly, Frelimo managed to win the general election of 2004 by winning 160 Parliamentary seats against Renamo’s 90 seats (Ruigrok 2005:35). In this election, Frelimo not only managed to gain on its opponent, but also to win in provinces previously considered to be Renamo strongholds, while only 26.55 percent of the voters voted for Renamo. Ruigrok (2005:45) contends that “What is worth noting about the 2003 vote is that, once again, it took place in an environment of profound distrust between the major contenders”. This mistrust and hostility manifested in the now familiar recurring allegations of election fraud and corruption by Renamo.

Yet, Frelimo again managed to win 75 percent of the vote in the 2009 general election, thereby showing it strength particularly in the urban areas and southern
districts. This time Renamo only won 16 percent of the vote (compared to the 44 percent in 1994) and again showed that it struggles to compete in a democratic environment (Green and Otto 2014:14-15). The usual threats followed a pattern that has existed since the first general election of 1994. Then, in mind-November 2012 news reports broke of Renamo turning its back on peace by returning to its base camp in the Gorongosa Mountains in central Mozambique from where its members continues to wage a guerilla war against the government. Again, in late 2013 renewed fighting broke out between Renamo and government forces in the province of Sofala (ENCA 2014).

Not surprisingly, the fighting in Mozambique raised concern and unease in the Southern African region and the question was asked: Why? So many scholars found the Mozambican mediation process a resounding success, what happened? Alusala and Dye (2010:1,5) also ask whether the earlier attempts at reintegration of Renamo into the Mozambican society had indeed failed. They in particular refer to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes which were considered to be so successful that they were quoted as examples for other conflict-ridden societies. It is evident that rigid timetables for implementing peace agreements and the DDR programmes basically ignored the psychological trauma of war and the importance of social reintegration. Alusala and Dye (2010:5) explain that social integration not only takes time, but that it is often neglected because of the urgency of economic integration and development.

Yet, it is obvious from the discussion above that Renamo only seldom succeeds in playing peaceful politics but also that the basic characteristics of Mozambican society after 1994 contributed to Renamo’s actions. Opperman (2013) posits that “corruption, inequality, neopatrimonialism and a lack of political transparency which manifests in the absence of parliamentary debates” are main reasons for Mozambique’s unimpressive economic performance and political fragility. A winner-takes-all mode still exists as the majority of the population lives on S$400 per year even though the country has experienced a growth rate of 7 percent since 2008. The political style of President Arando Guebuza (President since 2004) adds to the criticism of the “centralization and exploitation of power” (Opperman 2013). In 2013
Alfonso Dhlakama (still Renamo’s President) blamed the Mozambican government for its failure to take its demands for electoral reform seriously as a main reason for its military actions. He also lists insufficient security force integration and an unequal distribution of wealth from mineral resources (Opperman 2013). Frustration and aggression at what Renamo refers to as the “unfair distribution of state resources” are linked to Renamo’s retaliatory attacks, according to Green and Otto (2014:14-15). Again, mistrust characterises the negotiations between government and Renamo. It is crucial, according to Alusala and Dye (2010:8-9) to introduce community based reintegration programmes where attention is focused on individuals and how they can contribute to society. This is quite the opposite of the UN peacekeeping mission’s focus on strategic and political issues when implementing peace agreements, as was the case in Mozambique.

Not surprisingly, remnants of the inadequacies in the 1992-1994 implementation of the GPA still take their toll. Accusations of the insufficient integration of the Renamo fighters in the Mozambican security institutions (army and police) before 1994 and ever since is a main reason for turning their backs on party politics, according to Renamo spokesman, Adriano Muchunga who declared that “The only way to stop us using weapons is to integrate our men into institutions that use weapons. In Mozambique that is the police and army” (ENCA 2014).

Nevertheless, in August 2014 Renamo and the Mozambican government have signed another ceasefire followed by a general election in October 2014. Frelimo won 144 seats of the 250 seats in the National Assembly (Times Live 2015). Again, Renamo refused to accept the election results and vowed to create a parallel government by uniting six of the eleven provinces with Dhlakana as President of central and northern Mozambique. This time the conflict will also involve control over Mozambique’s resources, particularly the large gas reserves recently discovered in Renamo dominated territory. Green and Otto (2014:21) warns against the consequences of rising expectations combined with distributional inequality and advises the Mozambican government “to ensure that the communities affected by resource extraction have a tangible stake in the exploitation of those resources” (Green and Otto 2014:17-18).
Alas, Mozambique is still suffering from pockets of resistance and remains fragile and underdeveloped, according to the UN Human Development Index which in 2013 categorised the country as number 185 out of 187 “low human developed” countries (Green & Otto 2014:17-18). Meanwhile, in 2015 the South African government offered to act as peace broker between Renamo and the government. Nevertheless, it is evident that Renamo does not have the intension to coexist peacefully in a democratic setting. Equally troublesome for Mozambique’s future stability is the lack of openness and democratic accountability on the side of Frelimo. Yet, Mozambique’s successful mediation still presents lessons for countries in predicaments similar to what Mozambique experienced between 1975 and 1994 which culminated in the mediation process of during the peacemaking and peacebuilding phases of 1990-1992 and 1992-1994 respectively. However, peacebuilding is an ongoing process which does not necessarily end with a peaceful general election. Consideration should have been given to a third phase of long-term peacebuilding after the first general election because rebel parties’ frustration with being neutralised can slowly manifest in more aggression and hostility, as happened in Mozambique. Indeed, post-conflict peacebuilding is a process, an art and a science.

7. Conclusion

In summary, a peace process is not a simple phenomenon as there is the potential for spoiling at every stage of the process. Spoiling is characteristic behaviour of parties both within and outside the mediation process, who perceive the anticipated peace as a threat to their interests. As argued, spoiling is a consequence of the peace process; any party can become a spoiler and spoilers differ in their motives, goals and strategies. They form part of both the contextual and the procedural determinants of a mediation process. Contextual determinants refer to the nature of the conflict and of the peace process while procedural determinants boil down to the strategies of the mediator and the process of peacemaking. Stedman’s typology serves to classify spoilers and manage their behavior. For example, limited spoilers are easy to deal with as long as their actions are non-violent and their goals remain
limited. But frustration and the perception that they will lose their power base, will force them to escalate their impact, thereby becoming greedy, as was the case of Renamo.

However, as noted by Newman and Richmond (2006c), scholars should remain open-minded in their analysis of spoiling behavior and motives. What is perceived to be spoiling behavior by outside analysts can in reality be behavior bent on stalling to ensure the support of the spoiler’s followers for participating in the peace process. By making a moral decision between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior analysts can miss the point.

In order to manage spoilers, mediators should be equipped with the necessary insights, expertise, tools (including a clear mandate), resources and the trust of the parties. Mediator experience is crucial, as mediators need to know who is spoiling, why and how and must also know when to use leverage and how to time decisions, events and actions against spoilers. Mediators must also use their experience to deter potential spoilers as well as make important decisions that maintain the momentum of the process. Much as the disputants are the owners of the process, the strategies of mediators are crucial. Mediators remain the driver of the process towards its success or failure. Early management of spoilers therefore contributes to durable peace in the continent.

Yet, the mediation process of the Mozambican conflict was one of the most successful and complex in Africa. Alden (1995:103) refers to the difficulties encountered during the mediation in Mozambique as “ranging from a reluctance to co-operate on the part of the Mozambican parties, to bureaucratic mismanagement by the international community”. The peace process also nearly collapsed during both the mediation and the implementation phases. Spoiling tactics include a failure by both protagonists to honour important aspects of the GPA, as discussed in detail in this study and based upon the contributions of scholars such as Ajello (1999); Hume (1994); Chachiua and Malani (1998); and Hanlon and Waterhouse (1994). The mediator(s) had to devise strategies to deal with the devious behaviour to prevent the derailing of the process (Ajello 1999; Christensen 2006). Despite a
myriad of problems encountered due to spoiler activities, the UN completed its mandate with the holding of the country’s first democratic elections in October 1994. When applying a framework on spoilers based on Stedman’s typology, the criticism of Greenhill and Majors (2007) and Zahar (2010) and the preliminary literature survey on the mediation process in Mozambique, it becomes evident that efforts were employed to stall and derail mediation during the process, either through spoiling or devious behaviour.

A combination of factors was responsible for Mozambique’s successful transition to peace and multiparty politics. First of all, the conflict passed through the phase of ripeness and mutually hurting stalemate by both parties. Although the process commenced without a clear mediator, because neither party could agree to the other’s choice of mediator, and despite mutual mistrust, the mediation still progressed. Secondly, despite various calls that mediators should have ample knowledge and expertise in order to mediate, the low-keyed approach of a non-state mediator, the Community of Sant’Egidio, supplemented by the involvement of expert diplomats and the support of the external community, was totally appropriate. Manning and Malborough (2009:78) also list the “timely intervention of the UN Observation Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) from 1992 to 1994” as a positive factor. Similar positive aspects were the good relations between the Frelimo government and the donors who later on assisted in the transition from war-to-peace as well as the events which unfolded in the regional as well as broader international context. Branco (2011:87) also adds the active involvement of the USA and Italy as well as the contributions of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Malawi as outstanding contributions to the peace efforts and adds that even France, Portugal and the United Kingdom obtained observer status to join the talks.

The objective of this study was to identify spoilers, their motives and strategies to deal with them effectively before they succeed in stalling or derailing the mediation process. The main argument was that managing spoilers timeously will contribute to peace and human security on the African continent.


