The Marikana Massacre: Seeing it All

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Introduction

On 16 August 2012, the Marikana massacre ruptured the South African political horizon, and the wound is still bleeding. During a clash between the police, security forces, and two rivaling mine unions—the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU)—participating in a wildcat strike, thirty-four miners were gunned down, and seventy-eight injured on the premises of the Lonmin platinum mine, at Marikana. The event has left indelible socio-economic and emotional scars on the already shaking South African landscape. While the dust may have settled on the actual arid landscape that witnessed the incident, political unrest, wage disputes and plummeting mining industry shares have become a daily occurrence in the aftermath of the event.

In terms of the visual complexes at work, the event poses pertinent challenges, not only to the South African audience, but also globally. The incident has been compared to the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960, in which sixty-nine people protesting against the passbook policies of the apartheid government were gunned down by the police. Over time, Sharpeville became an icon of resistance against apartheid rule, and while the Marikana massacre can be understood as a similar turning point in South African history, in this case the politics are complicated by new economic and class divisions. The ANC government turned security force guns on their own constituency—a scenario no one could have anticipated when Nelson Mandela became the first president of a democratic South Africa in 1994. Instead, the euphoria of the Mandela period has been replaced, principally on account of the Mbeki and Zuma eras, by a “national
mood slump” expressed through bouts of “critical dystopianism.” The critical mood of dystopianism translates into dissenting and competing viewpoints, or to be more precise, into dissenting scopic regimes. Scopic regimes are intrinsically contested terrains of ocular fields that compete in order to gain hegemonic dominance. The contemporary South African visual landscape is no exception.

This essay aims to expose or make visible the scopic regimes at work in representations that aim to interpret the Marikana event. In her analysis of visual imagery associated with the so-called War on Terror, Judith Butler offers “frame theory” as focusing lens: a frame is something that “implicitly guides interpretation” and organizes or structures our experiences of images. By utilizing “frame theory”, Butler demonstrates how visual apparatuses are employed to convey the loss of particular lives (e.g. USA soldiers) as grievable, while other lives (e.g. of Iraqi soldiers or civilians) remain invisible and are thus, by implication, not worthy of grief. In February 2013, a Mozambican taxi driver died in the Johannesburg area after being dragged behind a police van, and, as the perpetrators were taken to court, protesters waved placards enquiring: “What have we done to die like dogs?” Butler’s question of whose lives are worth grieving, in this case particularly in post-apartheid South Africa, resounds clearly in the background.

But frames can also be framed; in other words, the structure and processes of operation for framing should also be rendered visible. The frame itself needs to come into frame. Differently phrased: after “zooming in”, it may also prove useful to “zoom out” again in order to gain a broader perspective. Framing contemporary South African visual culture may illustrate how “a certain field of intelligibility that helps to form and frame our responsiveness to the impinging world” already guides interpretation in many instances. The uproar sparked, for instance, by The Spear (2012), a painting by Brett Murray based on a Russian propaganda poster that superimposes President Zuma onto Lenin with his genitalia exposed, captures the fragility of the South African democracy. The controversy zooms in on the clash of scopic regimes where appeals to uphold the freedom of expression collide head-on with “African morality, culture and the spirit of Ubuntu as well as nation building”.

Steven Dubin proposes that the transformation in South Africa after 1994 (not only nationally, moving towards a democratic society, but also finding its place amidst global trends) represents one of the “most dramatic anticolonial struggles” where these clashes or “culture wars” are exceptionally bountiful. In fact, culture wars are the “consequence of social change as well as political shifts and

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1Stobie, “‘He Uses My Body’: Female Traditional Healers, Male Ancestors and Transgender in South Africa,” 370.
3Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, 8.
4Ibid., 34.
5Mosomane, “Zuma Painting against Ubuntu, African Morality, Culture”.
6Dubin, Spearheading Debate, 3.
realignments”, and are by nature “protean” and “raucous”. Therefore, if we want to frame culture wars, it is best to understand them in terms of performance, Dubin suggests. Culture wars, such as Murray’s depiction of President Zuma, are “transsensational events” that travel across national boundaries, histories and cultures as they become globally relevant. By framing such events, we are attempting to delimit their spread and movement but also paradoxically providing the necessary focus to engage them meaningfully.

Similarly, Robin Wagner-Pacifici explores the “eventful trajectory” of historical events and how these lead to “diverse characterizations and interpretations”. It is impossible to fix a historical event such as Marikana into “one interpretive frame”, according to Wagner-Pacifici, because “events form, reform and deform” as different agents, narratives and accounts are folded over the scene. But just as frames cannot contain events, they can also not be avoided. Wagner-Pacifici proposes a theory of “the restlessness of events” to account for the “continuous transformations of events, as actions and interpretations unfold across time, space, diverse media, and variably receptive publics”. At the same time, Wagner-Pacifici’s theory of the restlessness of the event also takes into account the “discontinuous stopping points as events take recognizable shape as ‘entities’”. It terms of my working methods here, I seek to frame the events by focussing on specific scopic aspects and then to let the frame dissolve by reframing another viewpoint. Where the Marikana event begins or ends is impossible to determine as the event leaks and spills over time, space, and representations; “event framing is part and parcel of the continuing effect flows of events”.

Just as frames forms part of the restlessness of events by bringing certain regimes of seeing into focus, similarly Mirzoeff (2011) provides a context for decolonizing the genealogy of visuality, by highlighting the ways in which counter-visuality can rupture visuality’s hegemony. Modern visuality—“a discursive practice that has material effects”—aligns itself in a naturalized manner with power and authority. Mirzoeff challenges this coerced relationship, by claiming “the right to look” as a countervisuality. To grant the right to look is, he suggests, to democratize democracy. In other words, rather than to look away and be made invisible by the controlling politics of visuality, the right to look intersects with the right to be seen and provides a key to democratic politics. By claiming the right to look at events, images, and representations in current South Africa, even those images that, according to certain frames, should rather remain invisible or

7Ibid., 4–5.  
8Ibid., 6.  
9Ibid., 24.  
10Wagner-Pacifici, “Theorizing the Restlessness of Events,” 1353.  
11Ibid., 1356.  
12Ibid., 1371.  
13Ibid., 1371.  
14Ibid., 1354.  
outside the frame, my analysis aims to engage the democratic politics of
countervisuality. Naturally, by asserting such a premise, one is already framing inter-
pretation, and pretending otherwise would undermine the validity of the undertak-
ing. It is hoped that, by acknowledging the biased assumptions of claiming the right
to look, these predispositions may operate as enabling rather than debilitating in asking: “Who has the right to look?” and “Who has the right to be seen?”

Exploring the Marikana incident in terms of visuality can, among other things,
be seen to expose the volatile intersection of differing world views and technics of
vision. For instance, there is a marked difference between the official ANC version
(police reports) of events, and independent eyewitness reports, just as the view
from above captured via Google satellite paradoxically does not reveal all that was
visible during the event. In fact, I am arguing that in the Marikana incident,
powerful state instruments of visuality are countered by other perhaps more
subversive ways of becoming visible.

The reference to “seeing it all” in my title is meant ironically, as I do not pre-
tend to be able to reveal the truth or to uncover what “really happened” at Mari-
kana. Instead, my analysis works through selected representations of the event,
thus my own chosen frames, and explores how certain aspects remain invisible,
while others become glaringly obvious. Three scopic frames are used to interrogate
the event: the first aims to unmask “oversights”, both in terms of supervision and
omission during the event, whereas the remaining two deal more with inversions
of sight which bear on “foresight” and “insight”. In terms of oversight, the first
frame refers to the overseeing or invigilation of the event via instruments of
visuality or vision machines (e.g. satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs, and
helicopters) promising complete transparency. The second oversight comes in the
representations of the events as media spectacle, becoming part of a new mediated
hyper-visibility. The final oversight refers to the miners as subalterns, becoming
visible in a system that renders them invisible from the start.

The second cluster of the visual complex, namely the appeal to foresight, sur-
faces through the calling on a Sangoma (traditional healer) for muti (traditional
medicine) to render the miners invincible/invisible to the enemy. The third and
final cluster refers to artists Ayanda Mabulu’s Yakhal’inkomo—Black man’s cry
(2013) and Mary Wafer’s Mine exhibition (2012), aiming to provide some insight
into the unrepresentability of the event. By gaining insight into the event, through
artistic explorations, no attempt is made to render all visible, but in a more hum-
ble tone, it is acknowledged that in the plane of the visible, the invisible remains a
structuring force. It is therefore best to start the analysis with the powers of
supervision that oversee the event both in terms of vigilance and omission.

Creating sightless vision
Two days after the tragedy, the Farlam Commission of Enquiry was constituted to
review discrepant reports and claims. The images obtained via Google satellite
formed part of the evidence laid before the commission. The images captured via “satellite” were most likely fed via an UAV (either fixed to an aircraft or controlled via satellite) for the simple reason that UAVs provide higher resolution images at a lower cost than those created by satellite. The images were not sourced initially for “combat” purposes, but used by security forces to track and analyze the development of the situation. However, it is doubtful if anyone would argue that the end result of events cannot be likened to a war or that these images were not implicated in the “war of images”.16

The following aerial views were presented to the Farlam Commission capturing three scenes tracking the sequence of events (Figure 1). In the first scene, “The build-up” to the clash is clearly visible as the formation of opposing lines can be identified; the strikers, on the right, are moving forward from the hill behind the Wonderkop Hostel, while the nervous police force, on the left, is setting up a barricade of barbed wire between them and the strikers. In the next scene, “The reorganization”, over 1000 strikers move to the left in order to avoid the barbed wire, while the police try to disperse them with teargas and water cannons. Then in the last scene, “The stampede”, about 3000 strikers surge forward, and the police first use rubber bullets and then live ammunition from automatic guns and pistols.

The three consecutive scenes are interpreted by means of the supplied text, which provides a fairly unambiguous version of what can be seen. Although the progression of events appears indisputable when viewed from above, independent sources contest this conclusion with data from the ground about what has remained unseen. The Daily Maverick reports that many of the miners were shot at close range and crushed by police vehicles and “were not caught in a fusillade of gunfire from police defending themselves, as the official account would have it”.17 In fact, “[t]he majority of those who died, according to surviving strikers and researchers, were killed beyond the view of cameras at a nondescript collection of boulders some 300 meters behind Wonderkop”.18 According to the official

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16Mitchell, Cloning Terror. The War of Images. 9/11 to the Present, 3. I expand on this concept later on.
17Marinovich, “The Murder Fields of Marikana. The Cold Murder Fields of Marikana.”
18Ibid.
version, including the aerial views and testimony given during the Farlam Commission, the miners stormed forward into the police barricades and met with resistance. What remains unseen, however, is that many then turned left and fled to the Small Koppie behind Wonderkop where they were ambushed by police forces and gunned down. No visual material of these atrocities exists.

The Farlam Commission presented its recommendations to President Zuma on 31 March 2015, in a 660-page document, which was only released by the president on 26 June.\(^{19}\) The Commission’s findings and recommendations were steeped in controversy with Zuma holding the document back just too long to raise suspicions about his motives in doing so. In fact, after the event, the unrest still simmered and suspicions festered as key witnesses were killed under suspicious circumstances while others committed suicide.\(^{20}\) In this context, the UAV perspective seemingly provides a “cosmic view”\(^{21}\) from above, and the all-seeing eye of the drone acts as a solipsistic judging machine that apparently affords the commission the opportunity “to see it all”. As the independent reporter Greg Marinovich affirms: “Marikana is one of those few bitter moments in our bloody history that has been captured by the unblinking eye of the lens. Several lenses, in fact, and from various viewpoints”.\(^{22}\) The use of the drone view during the events does require some comment, since the use of drones for both counterinsurgency and assault by the US army in Afghanistan and Yemen and by the Israelis in Gaza has sparked debate and severe opposition in recent years.

The use of drones, also in the supposed benign role as instruments of surveillance, evokes “the asymmetry objection” because the outcome of war often hinges on who is visible and who remains invisible.\(^{23}\) Such asymmetric sovereignty of sight also provides biopower over those visible, and ultimately the power to decide “who may live and who must die”.\(^{24}\) The invisibility of the drone, as opposed to the tagging and tracking of the target, not only provides visual information asymmetrically, but also proves fatal, as the increase in drone eliminations/executions attests. To make contact means becoming visible,\(^{25}\) and visibility now more than ever means vulnerability, for the drone never tires or blinks. The world below is unswervingly recorded by the petrifying stare, as ominously suggested in

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\(^{19}\) In sum, the Commission made the following recommendations: the political figures implicated during the hearings, e.g. Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and former Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa, were exonerated. However the Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega’s fitness for office was questioned. Also those who committed the killings, both on the side of the police and the strikers, as well as Lonmin’s failure to protect employees, should still be investigated.


\(^{22}\) Marinovich, “The Murder Fields of Marikana. The Cold Murder Fields of Marikana.”

\(^{23}\) According to Jai Galliot: “The asymmetry objection essentially holds that the use of remote weaponry by one force, against another force without such technology, crosses some symmetry threshold making the fight intrinsically unfair and thus unjust”.

\(^{24}\) Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 11–2.

\(^{25}\) Although in the Marikana case the UAV can also choose not to see when there is too much to see.
the Gorgon Stare program for unlocking data and the Predator and Black Widow UAV models. Targets (combatants) and unidentified masses (non-combatants) are all transfixed into data. In the “war on terror”, the machine-vision endlessly drones to gain superiority in “the politics of verticality”. Horizontal geo-spatial strategies are now extended into vertical vectors, providing the operators of UAVs with an omnipresence previously unknown in warfare and surveillance. The predominance of sight is stressed in this onslaught, as millions of video-footage barrages the human operators removed miles away “in theater” trying to interpret and unravel the overflow of images. The over-compliance of images thus refers more to an “oversight”: an over-abundant spilling of low resolution footage.

The imperialism of vision, in terms not only of its superiority over the other senses (in Enlightenment discourse), but also its operative use in the construction and administration of empires, is well documented by Mitchell (2011) and Mirzoeff (2005, 2011). Empire building without visual control is almost impossible. In the case of the drone, control is similarly reduced to modalities of visuality as the “drone stare” dehumanizes and abstracts human beings from their contexts. In fact, “[b]odies below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and other allies on the network remain differentiated … at least culturally if not physically”. This distancing is also evident in the aerial views of the Marikana incident, where opposing factions become mere blips whose movements can be charted clearly from above. There is thus an implied distance between the drone pilot and the target, which apparently allows for guilt-free “impact”. The process of distancing “creates a disembodiment of war”, such that, for instance, soldiers being captured by a drone is rendered far more humiliating than surrendering to a fellow embodied soldier. Purportedly, “[n]ew machines make new warfare possible. By its very existence, the UCAV will create a kind of combat typified by hard against soft, machine against organism”. Considering the embodied consequences on operators and targets is useful in unpacking the human dilemmas of vision at a distance. If recent research on the impact of what drone operators see and experience daily is accurate, it may just be that no vision occurs at a distance, at least not phenomenologically or affectively. As Derek Gregory warns “[t]he death of distance enables death from a distance, and these remotely piloted missions not only project power without vulnerability—as the Air Force frequently asserts—but also seemingly without compunction.”

26Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation, 12.
27Reportedly drone surveillance missions can amass up to “16,000 hours of video each month”, 242. In addition “In December 2010, these squadrons logged their millionth hour piloting drones above Iraq and Afghanistan”, 332.
31Gregory, “From a View to A Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” 192.
pre-empted the disaster of distanced and automated “sightless vision” concurred through “vision machines”. For Virilio, there is no such thing as “fixed sight,” and consequently automated vision is a poor substitute for the complexity and duration of human vision that relies on memory, intentionality, motility, and mobility. Vision machines may replace us in certain high-speed operations, but they cannot “see or foresee in our place”.

However, as Gregory continues to demonstrate, aerial warfare is neither virtuous nor surgically clean, as commonly assumed, not even in the information era. In fact killing at a distance creates “a peculiarly new form of intimacy, at once collective and one-sided” as it spreads over networked screens, piercing both sides of the screen. As operators keep track of their targets visually, so after impact, “the ‘view from above’ and the ‘view from below’” are fused. In the face of another’s death, distance implodes, highlighting one of the paradoxes of drone warfare, namely “being at once distant and close, and the contradictory experiences drone warfare gives rise to as killing at a distance[,] paradoxically makes for a vivid experience for the individual seated in physical security in his control room, thousands of miles away from the ‘actual’ action.”

This results in the fact that drone operators suffer high, “possibly higher, rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [than] soldiers engaged in battle as a result of exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye.” By seeing too much, or seeing “previously unimaginable visualizations” with the aid of vision machines, drone operators are delivered into the realm of new visuality or what Mirzoeff terms “post-panoptic visuality”.37

Marikana was overseen by vision machines, vigilantly documenting the official version, although, as independent reviews show, some incidents were both blatantly overlooked and hidden from sight. Such oversight suggests that vision machines are not neutral in their application. As intimated earlier, the Marikana events were captured by several lenses and viewpoints from all over, meaning the event was visualized to the extreme. Post-panoptic visuality literally creates too much to see “by generating so many images and visualizations … no single instance could be decisive”. In the event of an oversupply of visual materials (too much to see), chaos ensues, leading to confusion, obfuscation and paradoxically “making the visible invisible”. In fact, over-exposure effects quite the opposite of “seeing all” or gaining insight: it amounts rather to a blindness akin to “sightless vision”. But the new vision machines not only instill a type of blindness

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33Ibid., 61.
34Gregory, “From a View to A Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” 206, 207.
36Ibid., 8.
38Ibid., 292.
39Ibid., 34.
amidst the over compliance of images; it also creates a spectacle or hyper-visibility through the ubiquitous flow of mediated images. It is to the hyper-visibility of the Marikana event as a media spectacle that I now turn.

New mediated hyper-visibility

As news broke of the clash between police forces and militant miners, the “Marikana massacre” (labeled such by The New York Times) quickly turned into a media spectacle circulating through global media, internet, cable and satellite news channels, independent agents, cell phone and video footage. Almost instantly images of the event were cannibalized by a network of visual systems and digested into a “new form of mediated visibility”. Visibility is thus a powerful political instrument that has gained prominence over the past decade, due to the ubiquity of new electronic communication media—all one needs is cell phone and a connection, it seems.

The complexity of new visibility is underscored by the circulation of media spectacles, such as the Norway bomber Anders Behring Breivick’s attack in June 2011 and the so-called London riots in August 2011, which has intensified “with unforeseen consequences … a transformative moment in contemporary politics”. Although media spectacles are inconsistent in their effects and may contribute to both disorder and transformation, Kellner concludes that the “[m]edia spectacle is a contested terrain on which progressive and regressive forces alike can intervene and provides a field for some of the key political issues and struggles of the day”. The “dark side” of the media spectacle is “the use of new media and social networking for organizing crime and thuggery, as in the UK riots, or promoting discourses and spectacles of hate, as in the Breivik case.”

This indicates that to become visible is not a panacea in itself, but a double-edged sword, which harbors both potential and risk, as Thompson also concedes. Images are by nature “infectious … viral … [and have] a vitality that makes them difficult to contain or quarantine”, argues Mitchell. That quality is now enhanced by “the combination of digital imaging and the spread of the Internet”, which have turned them into “a global plague of images”. Therein lies its complexity: the fact that no one institution or power is in control of who sees what means that new visibility is uncontainable and irrepressible. We are witnessing “struggles for visibility” as opposing factions and viewpoints vie for our attention. Mitchell aptly describes our time as “a war of images [fought] between radically different

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42 Ibid., 30.
43 Ibid., 24.
images of possible futures, [where at times] the war has been waged against images [and in other instances been fought] by means of images deployed to shock and traumatize the enemy”. 47 Images have become part of the collateral damage. How can we trust them again? Especially images of Africa that have always already been represented as “the antithesis of Europa and therefore of civilization”, as Chinua Achebe points out. 48 How are representations of Marikana used in the war of images and civilizations?

In terms of renowned photography theorist Ariella Azoulay’s proposal that photography calls us to participate in a “citizenry of photography” that is open and borderless, we might ask: how are the photographs of Marikana to be understood? For instance, do the award winning photographs by The Times photographer in South Africa, Alon Skuy (Figure 2), call us to engage in a “civil gaze” or “civil contract”, as proposed by Azoulay? 49 If, as Azoulay explains, the “civil gaze doesn’t seek to control the visible, but neither can it bear another’s control over the visible”, what becomes visible in Skuy’s images? 50 Or have they become just another casualty of the media hype created around events like these?

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49 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 93.
50 Ibid.
I want to propose, in alliance with and informed by Azoulay, that the photograph of the man (left above) who “waves his machete, a weapon that is of little use against semiautomatic weapons”, while staring confrontationally at the viewer, offers a counter-visuality. And instead of disappearing into hyper-visible oblivion, this “photograph bears the seal of the event itself” particularly when viewed next to the image of police scavenging the fallen bodies for signs of life, framed by Skuy as follows: “There’s no sign of resistance after the gunfire stops”. In my view, Skuy’s photographs can be more productively interpreted as an attempt “to anchor spectatorship in civic duty toward the photographed persons who haven’t stopped being ‘there’”. In other words, “the photographed persons address me, claiming their citizenship in photography, they cease to appear as stateless or as enemies …”. Even more significantly, “[t]hey call on me to restore their citizenship through my viewing”.

The complicated intersection of these struggles for visibility and recognition similarly manifested during the screening of the carnage at the Farlam Commission with some of the miners’ wives present. Some fainted, while others broke down and had to be excused and consoled after viewing what perhaps should never be seen—the killing of a loved one. Although the images have already circulated in the system of the spectacle, and were consumed worldwide by an audience that appears to have an insatiable appetite for “screens of violence”, for family members, the images foretold a dark future, one in which possibly the only bread-winner had fallen. They could not opt for the luxury of indifference (flipping channels on the remote) cultivated by an overflow of violent images, as they were affectively immersed in the onslaught of these images. For them, their loved ones have become “live anatomy” that has been sacrificed to the screens of live coverage, almost as if “offering the very presence of the event” to audiences everywhere.

Through the mediation of vision machines, first in terms of surveillance and secondly by turning the event into a hyper-visible spectacle, the act of overseeing is illuminated as blinding spectators – by producing too many images, and simultaneously immersing them in the frenzy of mediated over-visibility. There is another aspect of oversight that still requires exploration, namely the inadvertent omission of not seeing what there is to see. Although, the miners make their living hidden from sight underground, during the strike they ascended from the subterranean to place their plight in full view.

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51Skuy, Massacre at Marikana, n51.
52Ibid., 14.
53Ibid., n53.
54Ibid., 16.
55Ibid., 17.
56Ibid., 17.
57Virilio, Art and Fear, 40.
Resurfacing of the Subterranean

The recent Bench Marks Foundation report describes the conditions at the Lonmin platinum mine, the world’s third largest, as marked by “a high level of fatalities” and “appalling” living conditions. Life is short and difficult for Lonmin employees, of whom a third is comprised of migratory laborers from Mozambique, the Eastern Cape, and Lesotho. The question of migratory employment by the mining industry has been identified in the past as one of the most pressing socio-economic issues in South Africa, and the post-apartheid mining industry continues “operating with a model of migrancy that presumes workers without citizenship”.

For these miners, nothing has changed in the era after apartheid. Their plight remains invisible: first, regarding their vulnerable and marginalized position in terms of the globalized economy, but also in terms of their colonized heritage apropos the apartheid legacy that relegates them to being simply part of a migrant workforce. Because they do their work underground, they are also literally invisible and demoted to “the subterranean territory” controlled by “time clock[s] and punch cards” as their “days and nights are indistinguishable”, disappearing into day/night shifts. They are viewed as nothing more than “intelligent worms” that dwell and work in “ghost wards” or ruins in reverse. The subterranean world also leaves its imprint on their bodies, making escape almost impossible, for, even if they make it out alive, “mines are almost automatically conducive to early death [since] the years of breathing in dust will inescapably catch up to you soon after you have left the subterranean depths”. Achille Mbembe concurs that numerous studies have established the high death rates from pneumonia, tuberculosis and silicosis in the gold mines.

This is also true for the miners at Lonmin and, in particular, the rock drill operators who are “doing the toughest, most dangerous, most production critical, core mining function”. In addition, they are functionally illiterate (since the job does not require more), paid substantially less than their literate colleagues, and often support two households (one in the homeland and a second at the mine) to compensate for their “homeless” state. Buried in dead-end jobs with no career.

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58Bench Marks Foundation, vii, 74. Interestingly, the report was issued a week before the massacre (Thank you to the reviewer who pointed this out to me).
59In 2011 local communities in Marikana protested to demand employment for local communities (Bench Mark Foundations, 76).
61Breckenbridge, “Revenge of the Commons: The Crisis in the South African Mining Industry.”
63Ibid., 253.
66Mbembe, “Aesthetics of Superfluity,” 381.
67Hartford, “The Mining Industry Strike Wave: What are the Causes and what are the Solutions?”
prospects, they have become “the personification of all the worst features of low literacy skills [and] poverty driven migrationary labor.” Their existence has been reduced to “a form of death-in-life”, as Achille Mbembe describes plantation slavery but equally applicable to the rock drillers of Marikana who are treated as if they “no longer existed except as a mere tool and instrument of production”.

Meanwhile, Lonmin’s headquarters is located in London and, by continuing to make use of migrant labor, their social commitment to the local communities remains questionable at best. Like most “[m]ining corporations—often global in nature and scope”, Lonmin also “build[s] on (and sustain[s]) social divisions and colonial infrastructures in their organizing practices as catalysts for the division of labor”. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Lonmin, as transnational corporation (listed on the London Stock Exchange and Johannesburg Stock Exchange), behaves any differently than most “global operators”. This indicates that they are highly mobile and mainly unconcerned with the affairs of the local community because it is “just one locality among many, all such localities being small and insignificant from the vantage point of cyberspace—their genuine, even if virtual, home”. As soon as local communities pose problems, global operators tend to opt for another site. Naturally, mining platinum means the resources are site-specific and highly localized; this leads mining corporations to apply “modes of territorialisation and organizing [through] social processes and activities exerting pressures on individuals”:

One may very well argue that the global corporations and firms involved in resource extraction and exploitation build on the vestiges, and even on the spatial practices (space-making), of colonial practices—making these firms neo-colonial in nature.

The lines drawn between global and local, colonizer and colonized, can nonetheless only be drawn in the world of theory, since “the tangled and intertwined contents of human lifeworlds” actually contest these delimitations. For example, the entanglement of the local and global becomes evident in the Royal Bafokeng Platinum (RBPlat) mine, adjacent to Lonmin. Royal Bafokeng Platinum (a company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) is owned by the Bafokeng king, Leruo Molotlegi, and the royal family. On their website they claim to be “a community-based investment company whose growth uplifts and creates intergenerational wealth for the Royal Bafokeng Nation, a 100,000 strong Setswana-speaking

68Ibid.
71Bauman, Liquid Love, 102.
72Ibid., 98.
73Paquette and Lacassagne, “Subterranean Subalterns: Territorialisation, Deterritorialisation, and the Esthetics of Mining,” 244.
74Ibid., 257.
75Bauman, Liquid Love, 99.
community in South Africa’s North West province. However, in June 2013 it was reported that the local community took the royal family to task about their arrogance: “The communities from Luka, Kwa-Chaneng, Photsaneng, Thekwana and Bokamoso, among others, accuse their chief of attempts to dispose of the community’s mineral-rich land in favor of irresponsible mining operations that do not consider environmental depletion and sustainable livelihoods.” It would appear that the Royal Bafokeng’s welfare conveniently intersects with global interests and stands in direct opposition to local community concerns. Similarly, the clash at Lonmin met with opposing responses locally. This is perhaps most powerfully illustrated by the clash of interests between NUM and AMCU (to which most of the rock drillers belong), as union leaders refused to act on behalf of their members in lower ranks for fear of compromising their own comfortable positions. In addition, newly elected ANC deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, who serves on the board of Lonmin, sent an email before the shootings “demanding concomitant action” against the criminal activities of the striking miners. Local interests and global concerns are clearly interrelated, or as Bauman stresses; there are “no local solutions to globally generated problems”, and if any change is to be effected, the manner in which the two spheres are interlocked and constitutive of one another obviously has to be considered. This calls rather for a “reform of the existential condition” before any physical reforms can be undertaken, otherwise the dilemma will merely be perpetuated in different guises.

If the local and the global are deeply connected how is it possible to make “the cost of globalization visible”? This pertains particularly to the fallen rock drillers of Marikana, who spend their working days underground, hidden from view, and whose visibility is always already negotiated or overseen by global operators. It can be argued, however, that at Marikana the subterranean surfaced through “proletarian countervisuality” and claimed the right to be seen, by making the price of globalization glaringly visible to all who assert the right to look.

The act of oversight has yielded opposing interpretations in my analysis so far, by firstly associating oversight with supervision and the mediated spectacle, and secondly foregrounding the omission of certain viewpoints. I am able to assert in consequence that overseeing images of the event do not uncover or exhaust visibility. In fact, other forms of seeing, such as foresight, unlocks the event differently and may even provide preliminary insight.

76At RBPlat, a wildcat strike also erupted on 23 August 2012, but in contrast to the Lonmin tragedy, this strike took place without violent incident.
77Hlongwane, “Cyril Ramaphosa’s Marikana Email Batters ANC Heavyweight’s Reputation.”
79Ibid., 116.
Appealing to foresight

One of the most perplexing events, yet meaningful in terms of sight, that occurred during the tragedy and took a strange turn afterwards is the case of the disappearing Sangoma. The Sangoma or diviner acted as an accomplice by preparing a powerful muti—medicine from plants, animal materials and minerals—that would render the workers invisible and, by implication, also invincible to the enemy’s bullets. Traditional African healers provide patients with muti to heal disease and misfortunes, to assist with relational problems and, importantly, to protect warriors. One of the methods of intervention is through cuttings or umgaba, small incisions whereby the muti is infused into the body. Like the pharmakon, the workings of muti are ambiguous, as it has the potential to both heal and harm depending on their use. Therefore, if the intention is to beget evil, the outcome of the victim’s encounter with the taboo substances will be disastrous, whereas it may also be applied to gain prosperity and good fortune.

The Farlam Commission investigated the workers’ use of muti through cuttings on their bodies, while police video footage also shows a group of naked miners being prepared by the Sangoma, Alton Zikhuthele Joja, also known as Ndzabe, before 16 August. The footage shows the men being washed and sprinkled with a substance to protect them and render them bulletproof against the police’s weapons. During the investigation, the group of men anointed by the Sangoma have been identified as protected “warriors”. In this regard, other progenitors can be identified historically who similarly tapped into the “forces from the dead to protect the living” by creating a garde-corps or bodyguard.

The eighteenth-century African-born priest and resistance leader to French colonial rule in Haiti, Francois Makandal, provides an interesting point of comparison to the Marikana events. Makandal utilized “‘Vodou’, a spiritual means of understanding and controlling the relation of space, time and causality,” to resist colonial control by invoking a bodyguard of power figures or minkisi makandal. The invisible guards reportedly acted in Makandal’s interest and ruled the streets of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) with terror at night: “By the end of Makandal’s revolt, Saint-Domingue had two versions of visualized power in contestation with

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82Sangoma is Zulu word for a healer practicing ngoma, a traditional belief in the ancestors. However as Walwyn and Maitshoelo explain, “[d]iviners have different names in different regions of South Africa, depending on the dominant regional culture, including izangoma in Zulu, amagqira in Xhosa, ngaka in Northern Sotho and mungome in Venda, although the majority of South Africans refer collectively to this group of THPsas “sangomas,” 12.
83The substances used for the creation of muti may also include taboo substances such as human organs, see Ivey and Myers, “The Psychology of Bewitchment (Part I): A Phenomenological Study of the Experience of Bewitchment, n83.”
84Ibid., 57.
85Nhlabathi, “Marikana Muti Magic Allegations.”
86Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 68.
87Ibid., 68.
one another, European oversight and Caribbean second sight”. Similarly, the Marikana miners prepared for war not only physically, but also spiritually, by appealing to “second sight” (foresight), since the Sangoma’s muti not only heals in the material domain but also operates in the invisible realm, the dwelling place of the ancestors.

Although the importance of spirituality has, to a large extent, been overlooked in postcolonial research, recent studies attempt to rectify the omission. One of the reasons for the renewed interest in the spiritual or “occult” in post-liberation South Africa is the recalcitrance of the phenomenon, particularly in the Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces. Despite modernization and the supremacy of constitutionalism, which are usually understood as inhibiting factors to traditional rites and beliefs, the occult seems to thrive. Evidently, the modern and traditional, African socialism and neo-liberal capitalism, and, by implication, the global and local, cannot be treated as opposing or separate trajectories within most post-liberation African societies. Instead of the supposed opposition, Peter Geshiere suggests that it is more precise to “speak of the ‘modernity’ of witchcraft”, considering that contemporary practices of witchcraft flourish in many instances with the aid of “modern techniques and commodities, often of Western provenance”. Rather than being hindered by modernity, the occult is stimulated by it. The increase in the trade in body parts for muti purposes is a shocking consequence of the state of affairs.

Anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff attribute the increase in occult-related incidents to “a structural contradiction at the heart of postapartheid South Africa” linked to the inherent clash between the multitude of communities and traditions that are made to fit the universalizing ANC nation state. The increase of occult activities after liberation should, therefore, not necessarily be viewed as a retreat into traditionalism, but the Comaroffs insist that it is best attributed to creating new magical ways of coping with modernity and neo-liberal capitalism. Journalist Zoltan Scrivener graphically captures the opportunistic use of muti by car hijackers, for instance, to “make them invisible and protect[s] them against bullets”. Accordingly, the occult is

often a site of experiment and social invention, a site for the production of novel understandings of the world, indeed for making history anew; that technicians of the sacred-diviners, prophets, witch finders-regularly deploy the heightened

88Ibid., 69.
89The “occult” is used here to include “magic”, the “supernatural”, and “witchcraft”.
91See the incisive report published by Human Rights League, Mozambique entitled, “Trafficking body parts in Mozambique and South Africa” (2008) for the state of the trade of body parts between these two countries.
93Scrivener, “Carjacker!”
sensitivities of ceremonial occasions to distill order out of the ambiguous, inchoate forces that configure any social environment. Especially a troubled, changing one.  

The fact that the striking miners at Marikana consulted a Sangoma in their time of crisis should thus not come as a surprise. In an African cosmology, the so-called witch doctor has access to the unseen, and moves comfortably between the visible and the invisible realms. The strikers thus prepared their weapons against the vision machines of the global stratum from an invisible world governed by a local episteme. Guarded by the Sangoma’s inner vision (foresight rather than hyper-visibility), they resisted a system that reduces them to “machine boys” by putting their bodies—their last and only vestiges—into play. Arguably, from a rationalized and scientific perspective, this line of action can be viewed as incredibly shortsighted. Matereke and Mungwini assert that “[a]lthough this tradition may sound irrational to modern scientific thought, it remains an important part of how Africans relate with the world.” The real short-sightedness may be when attempting to interpret the visual complexes at work during the event, without taking into account the intersecting world views co-existing in this postcolonial present and, in particular, not acknowledging the belief “in the existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, that is home to spiritual beings with effective powers over the material world”.

Ultimately, the Sangoma paid with his life, perhaps once again analogously to the historical example of Makandal, who was burned after his audacious challenge to colonial rule in Haiti. In this instance, five unknown men gunned down the traditional healer in March 2013 before he could testify at the Farlam Commission. Although his medicine failed to render the strikers or himself invincible, his involvement suggests perhaps, however crudely, an attempt to make the cost of globalism visible. This is not a claim for an autochthony or unbridled African nativism, neither to propagate an “economy of sorcery” as the constituting moment of African suffering and victimhood. It is, however, to make the complexes of visuality visible or, in Butler’s terms, to bring the different frames into focus.

The use of magic (muti) creates “a counter to oversight”, because it appeals to other ways of “understanding and controlling the relation of space, time, and causality”. Magic sees differently. It conjures foresight by drawing on the past to see the future. However, magic should also be reminded of its delimitations by

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95 The term “machine boys” is derogatory as it refers to the lowest of the ranks in the mining industry, those who are rock drillers, who work the machines. Largely unskilled and stuck in this category, no career trajectory, because they do not have the skills and training to become miners (Breckenridge 2012).
“undoing itself” after countering oversight, otherwise it is at risk of being assimilated into the strategies of visual regimes and may regrettably be used as instrument against itself. There are, however, ways of gaining sight, or rather insight, which manages to resist the totalitarian incorporation of visuality. I argue that the art work and the photograph—understood as an event in itself—delivers us from oversight (both in terms of supervision and omission), precisely because it unravels over time and space.

**Gaining insight**

As suggested earlier, following Wagner-Pacifici, historical events are restless (unbounded, unstable) not only in terms of interpretations and meanings associated therewith, but also in the different shapes and representations they take. The Marikana event is similarly unstable when trying to frame the representations of the event. For instance, recent artistic interpretations engaging with the event provide yet another frame for interpreting the restlessness of the event. The representations provided through artistic media like paintings, photographs and sculpture, differ significantly from official representations via mapping, documentaries, and forensic photography. It is not difficult to trace a different event that has seeped into artistic media that stands in contrast to official and sovereign vision machines. The artist rather affirms a tradition of looking that is not necessarily obsessed with instantaneity, objective truth, or transparency. In fact, the artistic rendition is always already steeped in a vantage point, an embodied locus from which an event is interpreted. As such, the artistic encounter comes with all the baggage of human viewing, namely that “the physiology of sight depends on the eye’s movements, which are simultaneously incessant and unconscious (motility) and constant and conscious (mobility)”, which means “the most instinctive, least controlled glance is first a sort of circling of the property, a complete scanning of the visual field that ends in the eye’s choice of an object”.  

Vision machines provide data and documentation, but they do not invariably lead to insight. In fact, their probing is more akin to blindness, for it does not see as the human eye does, as a culmination of conscious and unconscious, past and present. Achille Mbembe encourages “reading (lecture) and writing (écriture) that would also be an esthetic of opening and encounter” and through which “the archives of the present” can be interpreted not only through “philosophy, economics, or sociology but also visual, sung, painted, and narrated texts”. It is still up to the human agent to rummage in the silence left in the aftermath of disaster through “the thickness of which the African present is made” in an attempt to come to some understanding.

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100 Ibid., 276.
An event such as Marikana is indeed thickly layered and open to representations that frame the scene differently also in terms of sight. The Cape Town artist, Ayanda Mabulu’s *Yakhal’inkomo—Black man’s cry* (2013) provides such a scene. The title loosely translates as “the bull bellows” or “the cow cries” and the painting was removed amidst controversy from the FNB Joburg Art Fair in September 2013, and then hung again. The huge painting sprawls over the canvas with Zuma (fully clothed this time)—the main protagonist—to the left, dancing and laughing while unsympathetically stepping on a miner’s head. In the center, another miner with bullhorns is struck down by a matador holding the South African flag (now downtrodden). As the miner stumbles, Zuma’s dog, an obvious reference to the police force and its compromised actions during the massacre, attacks from behind.

The event unfolds as a spectacle, with amazed onlookers (among others Britain’s Prince Charles and Queen Elizabeth) enjoying the view from the pavilion, while a photographer in the right-hand corner documents the events meticulously (a possible reference to David Goldblatt). Mabulu’s satirical painting creates a bloody stage, on which the follies and injustices of the Marikana drama are bluntly exhibited to the audience. It stands as visual activism and a voice of protest in an attempt to answer the silence or unrepresentability of the massacre.

In the aftermath of the event, after the dust has settled (literally and figuratively) what has remained is the landscape—the Wonderkop hill at Marikana. The place returned to silence after boring witness to the massacre, although it has gone mostly unnoticed throughout, except when mapped or charted in evidential reports. Yet, the landscape is an important element in the visual composite of events. It is a place to return to in remembrance, and although there is apparently nothing to be seen, it renders the incident visible. The Hill remains a site of pain and still bears witness to tragedy, as reports of suicides near the Hill keep filling newspapers.

As such the landscape is “unprepossessed” (Mirzoeff, personal communication), unassuming, and bears no obvious traces of the event except for the white crosses erected in memory. There is nothing to see and yet it is all too visible. In fact, at the time of the events, prior to the onset of the summer rain season, the landscape was particularly horrid—unsightly. The Hill has been renamed “Hill of Horror” or “killing koppie”, almost as if the landscape has become an accomplice in the disaster. On 16 August, the strikers congregated on the Wonderkop Hill that was swamped by striking workers, and, as they sat and waited, they chanted war songs, aggressively showing off their weapons by licking blades. The Hill became a living organism piled with rock warriors. Mary Wafer’s exhibition simply entitled *Mine* (11 April–18 May 2012) attempts to visualize the transformation of warrior to rock as she creates an esthetic opening for the tragedy to be re-interpreted. Wafer’s

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104 To view Mabulu’s painting visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_faobpYY0r8
105 In the article “Massacre at Marikana Sparks suicides near Lonmin Mine,” Franz Wild reports about the seventh suicide near the spot where police and strikers clashed.
work is based on photographs of the event. In this regard, Ariella Azoulay provides a means of thinking about the eventfulness of the photograph when she describes the photograph as an encounter that does not possess a single sovereign, stable point of view.\textsuperscript{106} Rather, for Azoulay, the photograph is the product of an encounter of several protagonists, mainly the photographer and photographed, camera and spectator.\textsuperscript{107} This is precisely because Azoulay understands photography as an event (very much as Wagner-Pacifici understands the historical event) that is not conditioned by its production. The meanings thus associated with a photograph is equally restless and unstable as it is “always in excess of and always bears a lack of relation to, each of its protagonists”.\textsuperscript{108} Azoulay also states that the “event of photography”, which she opposes to “the photographed event”, might take on various forms.\textsuperscript{109} The encounter’s outcomes are thus unpredictable, and Mary Wafer’s paintings can be viewed as such a response to the event of photography.

In Crowd I & II (Figure 3), the media images of the gathering crowd on the Hill are vaguely recognizable, but Wafer has abstracted the crowd and morphed them into the barren landscape. Wafer’s depiction of the crowd references the fin-de-siècle German artist Käthe Kollwitz in terms of style, by limiting her palette to black and white, and addressing the theme of the oppressed. Kollwitz most often depicted the plight of laborers, poverty and the effects of war on the powerless. Through her formidable style and the use of etchings and lithographs, in particular, human suffering became iconic in \textit{The weavers} (1898) and \textit{Peasant wars} (1908) series. The insight provided by the artist is the ability to encapsulate the experience by making it universal, without discounting the particular humanness. In Wafer’s case, the workers are no longer recognizable as human beings—the miners, mostly

\textsuperscript{106}Azoulay, “What is a Photograph? What is Photography?” 10.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 11.
rock drillers—are submerged into the slopes of the Hill. Human and barren environment blend into an impending force that wants to be taken seriously.

The transformation is completed in the paintings Rock I, II & III (Figure 4), where the slopes of the Hill fill the picture plane with a threatening avalanche of rocks—the plight of miners everywhere. It is almost as if the earth has spewed them from the subterranean nether regions through the “sarcophagus” of the mine shaft. Wafer stops just before the landslide of rocks completely overwhelms the viewer, but the insight she shares is fairly unambiguous. On this Hill, a tragedy occurred which implicates everyone—the global operators, the local communities, the ANC government, the accusers and the disavowers, both above ground and below.

What the art works allow for is a “longer” view through the act of “stepping back”—a view that benefits from hindsight. Wafer’s interpretation of the event does not promise a transparent view, or a final report, but rather a limited glimpse of a future landscape that may or may not unfold. In the tradition of the sublime, Wafer’s paintings confront the threshold between the visible and the invisible, what can be represented and what remains unpresentable. At the time of writing South African universities have just witnessed a very successful #FeesMustFall campaign by students countrywide—almost a landslide victory with President Zuma conceding in not raising student fees for 2016 with 6 percent. Perhaps Wafer’s insight already stirred this vision.

Conclusion

The Marikana event acts as a watershed moment in the South African political and economic landscape. The ways in which this event were depicted and interpreted reveal the contested nature of opposing and differing scopic regimes and active culture wars. The different scopic frames enabled the analysis to toggle between zooming in and out, hopefully allowing for a thicker layering of the visuality of the event.

If the event is viewed through the frame of oversight as surveillance and transparency, it turned out to be a major disappointment, for not only did the view from above not reveal everything, it also perpetuated the power inscribed in vision technologies. It left justice blind in many respects, because most deaths occurred beyond the controlling view. On the other hand, when the event became hyper-visible through new media technologies it also means aspects of the event could be turned into a media spectacle to be circulated in the network of screens to become a televised massacre.

What remains hidden and overseen, however, are the miners who frequent the subterranean to earn a living wage. In this event, the unseen irrupted and refused to disappear again as miners congregated on the Wonderkop Hill. The aid of second sight or foresight was called in through the sangoma who brew a muti to make the striking miners invincible/invisible. As silence broke again over the barren landscape, we turn to the artists to gain some insight into the painful event. Fully realizing that not all will be revealed and, in fact, perhaps the most significant aspects can only be hinted at.

Discloser statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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