Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Goal of Achieving Peace and Security:
The Case of the Congo Peace Process

By

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“What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits toward me?” (Psalm 116: 12). Words are not enough, I am eternally grateful to God. I am so thankful for His grace upon my life. Without Him I am nothing.

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Janelle Mangwanda

August 2015.
Declaration

I declare that Analysis of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Goal of Achieving Peace and Security: The Case of the Congo Peace Process is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Signed:

Janelle Mahele Mangwanda August 2015
Abstract

South Africa’s foreign policy has undergone changes in the last 21 years of its democracy. At the crux of the current government’s foreign policy orientation is the promotion and advancement of Africa by addressing key challenges that the continent faces. This foreign policy leaning, which is referred to as the ‘Africa Agenda’, has been at the centre of the country’s international dealings in recent years. The Africa Agenda encompasses many crucial elements for the development of Africa, one of which is the promotion of peace and security on the continent.

This feature is particularly significant given the fact that the continent has witnessed an extensive amount of conflict and wars in the post-independence period. One country in particular that has experienced continuous warfare is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Home to over 60 million inhabitants, the DRC lies at the heart of the African continent and was the scene to one of the bloodiest conflicts in modern African history. The country underwent an arduous Peace Process that brought about an end to almost two decades of conflict. In concert with the international community at large, South Africa played a role in bringing an end to the war in the DRC by being directly involved in the Peace Process. South Africa facilitated the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Peace Accord on 17 December 2002 which paved the way for the first democratic elections to take place in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006.

With reference to the Africa Agenda, this study aims to analyze what the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveals about South Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy in general and its peace and security goal in particular.

The study reveals that South Africa has pursued its African Agenda out of its inherent commitment and attachment to the African continent. In addition, the study reveals that by promoting peace and security on the continent, South Africa acknowledges the fact that socio-economic development on the continent is dependent on the existence of peace and stability. The study also highlights the fact that if South Africa wishes to continue to take credit for its role as ‘Africa’s Peacemaker’, foreign policy decision makers need to ensure that there is continuity both in the manner in which it implements its foreign policy as well as in its dealings with the rest of the continent.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANC  African National Congress
APSA  African Peace and Security Architecture
AU  African Union
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CLM  Congo Liberation Movement
COMESA  Common Market for East and Southern Africa
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO  Department of International Relations and Co-operation
DoD  Department of Defence
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry
EAC  East Africa Committee
EU  European Union
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
IBSA  India- Brazil- South Africa
ICC  International Criminal Court
IR  International Relations
MAP  Millennium Development Recovery Program
MNC  Multinational corporations
MPLA  Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola. (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NA  National Assembly
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<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>New African Initiative</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NCoP</td>
<td>National Council of Provinces</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola. (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WCAR</td>
<td>World Conference Against Racism</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1. Identification of Research Theme

South Africa’s foreign policy has undergone a major shift over the years. Under the apartheid regime the country’s policy was described as hostile towards outsiders. However, with the dawn of the democratic dispensation came an opening up in the country’s dealings with the international community, beginning with its immediate neighbours on the continent. Indeed, post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy identity has become increasingly pre-disposed towards working for a conflict-free continent and to supporting African unity and development. Thus throughout the post-apartheid era, South Africa’s policy makers have placed an emphasis on promoting the development and advancement of Africa. This has been encapsulated within a pro-African foreign policy which has as one of its prime objectives, securing peace and security in Africa. South Africa has expended effort in addressing Africa’s deep-seated and long-standing developmental and governance challenges (Rapoo 2007: 2). It is important that a country like South Africa, which strives towards regional stability, pays particular attention to peace and security during the formulation and implementation stages of foreign policy.

In contrast to the old South African government which was a destabilizing factor in the region that conducted military programmes, the new South African government is viewed as a peacemaker in Southern Africa and beyond. Indeed, since 1994 South Africa has sought to play an active role in building peace and security in Southern Africa and throughout the African continent. This is a remarkable shift in the history of a country that was previously considered as an outcast on the continent.

One of the main challenges to Africa’s development has been continuous conflicts which have had disastrous effects on the social, economic and political structures of many countries on the continent. During his time in office, Former President Thabo Mbeki...
articulated a strong commitment to facilitating a continental renewal through his use of the concept of ‘African Renaissance’ which included an emphasis on questions of peace and security (Alden & Le Pere 2004: 54). This was motivated by Mbeki’s view that socio-economic development in the continent is contingent upon the existence of a peaceful and stable environment. South Africa’s own peaceful transition to democracy has vested the country with a high degree of moral authority and prestige to play facilitative roles on the continent. As a result, one of the primary objectives of South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy has been to place peace and security as the cornerstones of African economic development (Alden & Le Pere 2010: 5).

One of the concrete manifestations of South Africa’s new found status as peacemaker can be seen in the role that South Africa has played in being at the coalface of conflict resolution in the Great Lakes Region and surrounding areas. So adamant is South Africa about peace and security on the continent that its role in the Congo Peace process goes back as far as 1996.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a central African country with a population of over 60 million people. A country with abundant natural resources, the Congo has fallen victim of what has become known as the resource curse because of past dictatorship and constant wars. The strategic and geographic position of the DRC in the heart of Africa is important as this makes war and instability within its borders a matter of concern for all those surrounding it (Adebajo 2008: 125).

South Africa’s intervention in the Congo since 1996 was a response to the call by the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (of which the DRC is a member), to contribute towards the resolution of the DRC conflict (Carayannis 2003). The intervention took on multiple forms at various stages of the Peace Process. Most notably, however, was South Africa’s facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which produced the Global and All Inclusive Agreement. Since then, South Africa has also been heavily involved in the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Development phase.

The objective of this study is to analyze South Africa’s Pro-African foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security in Africa using the DRC peace process as a case study.
Essentially, the study will seek to assess what the outcomes of the Peace Process tell us about the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of South Africa’s foreign policy.

2. Significance of Research Theme

The practical relevance and significance of this study lies in the fact that while much research has been done on the Africa Agenda, and the pursuit of this, there is limited research on how South Africa has implemented this agenda. Furthermore, whereas much ink has been spilled over South Africa’s role in the DRC peace process, there is a gap in literature regarding what this role reveals about South Africa’s foreign policy pursuits. The study thus sets out to examine South Africa’s current foreign policy direction and hopefully serve as a guide to South African foreign policy decision makers.

Given the scope of this study, a number of parameters need to be established. The study is located within the discipline of International Relations, and more specifically Foreign Policy Analysis. The methodological approach of the study draws largely on Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Analysis. Such a positioning is influenced by the fact that South Africa’s Africa-focused approach on peace and security in Africa is conceived as an integral part of its foreign policy strategy.

3. Literature Overview

In conducting this research, numerous sources have been consulted. These sources have provided information on foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, South Africa’s foreign policy principles as well as the Congo peace process.

Given that literature is extensively discussed in the subsequent chapters, limited overviews of the four main areas in line with the focus of this study mentioned above are provided.

3.1 Literature on the theoretical context of Foreign Policy

Considerable thinking and debate have been devoted to the question of definition of foreign policy. Whereas holders of the realist view of foreign policy consider it as state-driven, and largely about the pursuit of rational interests, thus suggesting that power is at the centre of this definition, the holders of the liberal view challenge the notion that the state is a
principal, unitary and rational actor. Instead they propound the view that there is a multi-
centric understanding to the conduct of foreign policy (Jackson & Sorensen 2007). As a
realist scholar, Frankel (1963) describes foreign policy as consisting of ‘decisions and actions
which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others’. Hill
(2003), a liberal scholar, views it not only as the prerogative of national states, but as ‘the
sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually, but not
always a state) in international relations’.

Similarly, the issue of the determinants of a state’s foreign policy has been the subject of
much debate, with one camp arguing that, in any given case, one of the two determinants is
more important than the other; and another camp, refuting this view and stating that the
domestic determinant and the foreign determinant make no sense without the other. The
latter view is championed by scholars such as Alden and Aran (2012) and Hill (2003) who
agree that foreign policy is the hinge of domestic and international politics. This means that
foreign policy lies in the gap between the domestic and the international, therefore
rendering them inseparable.

3.2 Literature on the theoretical context of Foreign Policy Analysis

The study of Foreign Policy Analysis constitutes a distinct area within the discipline of
International Relations. Its primary purpose is to understand the process of decision making
by the individual decision makers and the processes and conditions that affect the choice of
foreign policy (Holsti 1995). Here too, there is considerable debate about the different
approaches to study foreign policy analysis. The traditional approach to foreign policy
analysis which is based on rational actor assumptions highlights conventional assumptions
about foreign policy behaviour. This approach is directly linked to the state-centric theory of
realism which assumes the role of the state as rational and unitary. The underlying principle
of this approach is that states have clearly-stated foreign policies which are articulated
through a processes guided by predetermined goals. These policies, in addition, are taken
and the consequences are calculated in a rational manner (White 1989: 10-12).

This is in contrast to the comparative approach which is proposed as an alternative to the
traditional approach. This approach rebuffs the descriptive case studies offered by
traditionalists and the replacement of this method with scientific explanations of the driving forces behind the foreign policy behaviour of states. In its essence, this approach seeks to find factual observations and empirical generalizations in order to understand foreign policy decision making. At the core of this approach is the understanding that foreign policy decisions are the result of decisions made by a group of decision makers within the structured environment of the state and not as the response to an action by external stimuli. Scholars such as Snyder (1954) and Rosenau (1964) take to this approach.

A third approach, championed by scholars such as Neack et al (1995) and Hey (1995) is the critical approach. This approach challenges and addresses key aspects that first-generation behaviourists ignored. It draws upon the phenomena of class and class conflict, economic forces and the politics of dominance and exploitation produced by dependency relationships (Du Plessis 2006: 131). It brings forth alternative arguments on the table with regard to foreign policy analysis. Concepts such as alliance behaviour, security dilemmas, bargaining, hegemonies, core, semi-periphery and periphery relationships are critical points of discussion in this approach. In addition, this approach uses different methodologies to the two previously discussed and draws on many critical theoretical perspectives.

3.3 Literature on South Africa’s Foreign Policy Principles

Since the dawn of democracy, South Africa’s foreign policy principles have been inclined towards a commitment to:

- Human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and environmental circumstances conducive to these;
- The promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world;
- The principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
- International peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict;
- The promotion of Africa in global affairs (Henwood 1997: 6).
These commitments, particularly South Africa’s engagement with Africa, remain a priority. This interest in the continent took on a new dimension with former South African President Mbeki’s articulation of the concept of an ‘African Renaissance’ (Alden & Le Pere 2004: 54). African Renaissance refers to a new dawn, a rebirth for the continent in socio-political, cultural and economic areas. Consistent with this new imagining of the continent and in face of rampant destabilization and conflicts on the continent, South Africa has adopted the image of Africa’s peacemaker and has sought to be an agent of change on the continent in recent years (Landsberg & Kondlo 2007: 1). One of the key foreign policy goals of South Africa has become the achievement of sustained and sustainable peace on the continent.

This particular foreign policy goal has generated criticism from scholars, such as Fakir (2007: 1), who contend that because of its relative economic dominance, South Africa uses the afro-centred foreign policy as a cover-up for its hegemonic ambitions. Fakir asserts that the African Agenda may not be as altruistic as it appears and that through the agenda, South Africa seeks to promote its own long-term interests on the continent – namely the strengthening of the country’s position within the continent.

This position is rejected by scholars such as Schoeman (2003), who is convinced that South Africa is not a hegemonic power but, rather that it is an emerging middle power that has deliberately attempted to refrain from hegemonic behaviour and plays a pivotal role in shouldering responsibility for stability and order within its region. Adebayo’s (2007) position stands in the gap between the two arguments. He suggests that South Africa is neither the messiah striving to save Africa nor is it a mercantilist with hegemonic ambitions of overpowering the continent. He explains that Pretoria is simply an aspiring middle power seeking to punch above its weight in global politics. He goes on to say that by making strategic alliances with other countries, and because of its capability in providing technological and infrastructural resources in Africa, South Africa holds more clout on continental and international forums (2007).

South Africa’s focus on the African continent is reflected by the goal of achieving peace and security on the continent. In this regard, Sidiropoulos (2007: 7) is of the view that South Africa’s motivation for pushing such a foreign policy objective can be ascribed to two
reasons. The first is the country’s own experience in peaceful transformation from its deeply divided apartheid past to a peaceful democratic transition in 1994. The second is Mbeki’s vision of the African Renaissance which links security and development and puts the issue of continental peace on the table. Khadiagala (2009) supports this view by stating that Mbeki believed that conflicts in Africa perpetuate poverty and lack of development on the continent. This argument sounds true with the view of Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 20) who argue that non-resolution of conflict can be ‘dysfunctional for the system within which it occurs’.

3.4 Literature on the Democratic Republic of Congo Peace Process

In pursuing its foreign policy goal of peace and security, the South African government has been involved in numerous peace efforts in Africa. Not only did South Africa play a major role in one of the most complicated and important negotiations for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its interest and involvement in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo reflect its quest to find peaceful solutions in the Great Lakes region as well as in Africa as a whole (Carayannis 2003).

The importance of the geo-strategic position of the DRC in the heart of Africa is two-fold. Firstly, the presence of war and instability within the borders of the DRC poses a threat for countries surrounding it; and secondly, its position provides an opportunity for South Africa to carve out a leadership role in central Africa.

There are three phases that characterize Pretoria’s role in the peace process in the Congo. The first phase corresponds to the period in 1996 when Nelson Mandela attempted to mediate between incumbent President Mobutu and rebel leader Laurent Kabila on a South African ship. This effort was both inconclusive and unsuccessful as Kabila demanded that power be handed directly to him whereas Mobutu was unwilling to relinquish power. Mobutu was eventually ousted. The second stage involves negotiations that produced agreements such as the Lusaka Peace Accord, the Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC, the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC as well as the Global and All Inclusive Agreement signed in Sun City between members of the Congolese government, rebel groups and civil society. The third and final stage of South Africa’s involvement in the
DRC pertains to its post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts which were conducted in the aftermath of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement in 2002 (International Crisis Group: 2002).

All of the above literature only describes the process of foreign policy analysis and highlights South Africa’s foreign policy principles and its objective of peace and security in Africa. However, the literature fails to analyze this foreign policy goal in relation to a clear case study in which South Africa has exercised its role as a peacemaker on the continent. This dissertation intends to analyze South Africa’s foreign policy goal of peace and security in Africa and to investigate what this goal reveals about the peace and security aspect of its Africa-centred foreign policy.

4. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem

The study is formulated and demarcated in a concise manner.

4.1 Formulation of research problem

The search for peace and stability on the continent is at the center of South Africa’s foreign policy. However, the role that South Africa plays in promoting peace on the continent is taken for granted. What is often neglected are the kinds of challenges that arise and limit the effectiveness of the role that South Africa has defined for itself as a peacemaker on the continent. The case study of the DRC Peace Process is used to understand what these challenges are and what they reveal about the nature of South Africa’s foreign policy goal of securing peace and security on the continent.

Thus, the fundamental research problem embedded within the proposed study is therefore captured in the following research question:

- What does the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveal about South Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and security goal in particular?

Supplementary to the abovementioned research question, three subsidiary questions emerge:
• How does South Africa’s African identity play a role in the manner in which it views its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?
• How can South Africa strengthen its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?
• What lessons can South Africa learn from its efforts in achieving its foreign policy objective of peace and security in the DRC Peace Process?

4.2 Demarcation of research problem

In terms of demarcation, the research problem statement is demarcated in conceptual, temporal and geographical terms.

In terms of conceptual delimitation, the study will focus on foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. The conceptualization of these terms is addressed in the following chapter.

In terms of temporal delimitation, the study is limited to the period between 1996 and 2006 as it covers the start of the war, the entire peace process and the first democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In terms of geographical delimitation, the study is confined to the Great Lakes Region in Africa, with specific focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo which serves as the case study.

5. Research Design and Methodology

The methodological approach of this study is rooted primarily in qualitative research. This is primarily because foreign policy is a qualitative tool that states use to extend their domestic interests internationally. Measuring foreign policy articulation and implementation requires qualitative research methods, in the main. Further, the methodology chosen serves the purposes of the study because qualitative research seeks to understand the processes and the social and cultural contexts which underlie various behavioural patterns. It focuses on describing and understanding a particular phenomenon and is oriented towards analysing concrete cases in their temporal and local particularity (Flick 2002:13). Newman and Benz (1998: 3) contend that qualitative research is a naturalistic approach used when observing
and interpreting reality with the aim of developing a theory that will explain what was experienced. Qualitative research employs several methods for collecting empirical data. These include interviews, direct observation, the analysis of documents, and cultural records, the use of visual materials; and the use of personal experience.

Based on the above analysis, the study adopts the qualitative research method. The strength of this method is that it allows for the interpretation of the variable under study, which in this case is South Africa’s foreign policy objective of achieving peace and security on the continent.

The study is based on descriptive and explorative approaches which are best applied in qualitative research. A descriptive approach attempts to systematically describe a situation, problem or phenomenon. Such an approach presents an opportunity to reconstruct the ‘what is’ of a topic. On the other hand, the explorative approach is concerned with exploring the ‘why’ questions of research and contributes significantly to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research study (Maree 2007: 51).

Based on the qualitative nature of the proposed study, the research uses an array of both primary and secondary data sources. Key primary sources used here include South Africa’s Foreign Policy White Paper, government statements, official United Nations, African Union, and Southern African Development Community reports, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, the Lusaka Peace Agreement as well as Joint Bi-National Commission statements.

Also used in this study are secondary sources dealing with the thematic and conceptual analysis of South Africa’s African Agenda foreign policy and the Congo peace process which is found in books, doctoral theses, masters’ dissertations, opinion editorials, journal articles, commentaries and press releases, among others.

6. The structure of the research

This study is subdivided into six chapters:
The introductory chapter contains a discussion of the research problem, the aims and objectives of the research, together with the research questions that the study will address, based on the overview of relevant literature.

The essence of Chapter Two is a discussion of fundamental concepts and contextual issues underlying the study. The discussion will focus on foreign policy and foreign policy analysis as the fundamental concepts of the study. In terms of the contextual issues underlying the study, South Africa’s foreign policy principles and South Africa’s foreign policy objective of peace and security will be examined.

Chapter Three discusses the Africa Agenda as the main approach to South Africa’s foreign policy. The chapter will also discuss peace and security as one of the main objectives of this Afro-centric foreign policy.

The purpose of Chapter Four is two-fold. Firstly, the chapter presents the Congo Peace Process. Secondly, it discusses South Africa’s involvement in the peace process.

Chapter Five will assess what the outcomes of the DRC Peace Process reveal about the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of South Africa’s foreign policy on the continent, particularly with regard to peace and security.

Chapter Six concludes the study by summarizing the main points in the study and providing recommendations for future foreign policy focus on the continent.

7. Conclusion

The search for peace and security on the African continent is at the centre of South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy and is the main interest of this study. The articulation of such a policy, therefore, becomes an object of analysis. Such an analysis is important as it sheds light on how South Africa conducted its foreign policy.

The purpose of Chapter One has been to lay a foundation upon which the subsequent chapters will build on. The chapter identified the research theme and the significance of this theme. Subsequently, the study provided a limited literature overview of the context of
foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, South Africa’s foreign policy principles as well as the Congo Peace Process.

The formulation as well as the demarcation of the research problem was addressed and the key research questions that the study will seek to answer were identified. Finally, the chapter provided the structure of the research.

Chapter Two will explore the conceptual and contextual framework of the study.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

Chapter One provided a foundation for the study by formulating and demarcating the research problem. Chapter One also made reference to particular theoretical concepts which Chapter Two will seek to clarify.

Chapter Two serves the purpose of presenting the theoretical and contextual framework of the study. The theoretical concepts include ‘foreign policy’ and ‘foreign policy analysis’. The contextual issue underlying this study is South Africa’s foreign policy principles; with particular focus on peace and security. Chapter Two will also clarify the conceptualization of ‘peace’ and ‘security’.

This theoretical and contextual framework will be discussed with reference to South Africa’s foreign policy and should continue to be applied as such in the subsequent chapters to follow.

2. Foreign Policy

A concise definition of foreign policy has been a contested issue in International Relations for many years. In attempting to formulate an accurate meaning of this type of policy, it is important to consider the origin of the words ‘foreign’ and ‘policy’. The term ‘foreign’ originates from the Latin word ‘foris’ which means ‘outside’. ‘Policy’ refers to a purposive plan of action which includes elements of expectations, interests and objectives (Du Plessis 2006:123). Therefore, foreign policy refers to the dealings outside of a state’s borders (Tjemolane 2011: 19). The foreign policy of a state is therefore a channel through which it can express its interests, intentions and goals in relation to other states in the international arena.
However, while there are new theoretical interpretations in the field of International Relations, the term ‘foreign policy’ continues to be shaped by the conception offered by the realist tradition (Nieuwkerk 2006: 38). This is evident if you consider the views expressed by scholars such as Walter Carlsnaes, who views foreign policy as ‘those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy’ (Dunne, Hadefield & Smith 2008: 2).

Carlsnaes’ conception of foreign policy suggests that a country’s foreign policy cannot be detached from notions of strategy and action which embody goals, values and decisions which are flexible and vary over time (Dunne, Hadefield & Smith 2008: 3). Brian White offers a similar view, interpreting foreign policy as ‘that area of governmental activity which is concerned with the relationship between the state and other actors, particularly other states in the international arena’ (1989: 5).

Joseph Frankel (1963: 1), on the other hand, views foreign policy as ‘the decision and actions which involve, to some appreciable extent, relations between some states and others’. As such, a key point to note is that due to the fact that the policy is conducted outside of a state’s borders, its impacts cannot be predicted. Foreign policy relies on the interactions of other states. Therefore, at times it may be reactionary to another state’s actions within the international arena. Evans and Newham (1990: 123) are of the same opinion as Frankel (1985: 191) since they define foreign policy as ‘the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact’. Similarly, Russett and Star describe foreign policy as ‘the output of the state into the global system’.

In addition to its conceptualization, Du Plessis (2006: 121) contends that there are four common features of all foreign policy. Firstly, the act of conducting foreign policy is the reserve of the state or official government which concerns inter-state relations within the international arena. The second feature of all foreign policy is that it involves both actions towards the international environment as well as reaction to the actions of others in the
Thirdly, there is a wide array of systems of activities which produces decisions within foreign policy. A final feature is that one of the primary objectives of foreign policy is to create, control, adjust and alter external conditions or problems (Du Plessis 2006: 121).

Since foreign policy encapsulates the processes and means through which states actions and reactions are determined (Kamath 1990: 10), there are key factors or determinants which influence the formulation of foreign policy. There are broadly two main determinants of foreign policy: the domestic and the international. The domestic determinant of foreign policy refers to those factors which affect the state internally and include elements such as the size of a state’s territory, the geography of a state, the cultural and historical traditions as well as the leadership style or political regime type in the country. The external or international determinants of foreign policy refer to factors outside of a state which may influence foreign policy, for example, globalization (Alden & Aran 2012: 51).

It is important to note that both the domestic and the international determinants play a significant role in the formulation of foreign policy. Scholars such as Hill (2003) and Alden and Aran (2012) have addressed this matter.

According to Hill (2003), foreign policy is at the hinge of domestic and international politics. This means that it stands in the gap between the domestic and the international, and can therefore not be separated. Similarly, Alden & Aran (2012: 51) assert that foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic influences. Both scholars argue that domestic influences within the formal state structure play an important role, and are in some cases central in directly shaping a country’s foreign policy. With reference to international determinants, Hill (2003: 186) argues that the external environment remains central to foreign policy mainly because foreign policy cannot be regarded without the impact of changes in the global arena or actions from other states.

In relation to the subject matter of this study, the following section will look into the different theoretical perspectives that dominate foreign policy.
2.1. Theoretical perspectives of Foreign Policy

There are generally two main theoretical perspectives to understand foreign policy. The first theory is realism, which is an international relations theory used to explain the behaviour of states in the international arena. It is the pre-eminent and dominant paradigm that is employed to explain inter-state relations.

Realism is based on three main assumptions. The first is that the state is the most important actor in world politics because it is at the core of society and without it, life would be, as Thomas Hobbes puts it, ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Jackson & Sorensen 2007: 61). The second assumption is that the international system is characterised by anarchy. The consequence of anarchy is the basis of the third assumption; which relates to the notion that constant competition takes place between states to attain and maintain power in order to pursue and secure national interests which are the primary objectives of a nation in terms of economic, political, cultural and military advances (Jackson & Sorensen 2013).

The notion of national interest in International Relations has been used to explain the behaviour of states in a threatening global environment. There has been on-going debate and extensive discussion on the issue of what exactly constitutes a national interest since the term is often invoked to justify isolationist and pacifist policies and to justify interventionist or militaristic policies (Jackson & Sorensen 2007: 62).

According to the proponents of realism, due to the fact that the current international set-up is volatile and unpredictable, states never know when another state will strike. Therefore, according to realists, all states need to constantly be on the lookout and advance their interests as much as possible. Realist scholars go as far as to suggest that ‘national interests are the final arbiters in judging foreign policy and heads of states often make use of power and deception in order to achieve them’ (Jackson & Sorensen 2007: 63).

The second main theoretical perspective used to understand foreign policy is liberalism. This perspective paints a friendlier image of foreign policy in the international arena. A key assumption of liberalism is the belief in progress in the international arena (Steans et al 2010: 47). The fact that the international system has evolved to include transnational actors
such as international organizations is testament to liberalists that the system has progressed. Today, heads of states are subject to indictment by international criminal courts, which is an unprecedented phenomenon (Jackson & Sorenson 2013).

A second assumption of liberalism is the theme of cooperation and complex interdependence, which is strongly suggestive of how liberals see the regulatory and facilitating role played by institutions in international relations (Jackson & Sorensen 2013: 101). Cooperation takes place between states in order for them to try and resolve conflicts of interests and also to work together with NGOs, multinational corporations and institutions.

As such, in line with this study, a liberalist argument will contend that South Africa’s efforts under the auspices of the African Union and the Southern African Development Community were indeed necessary for the purposes of attaining mutual interests of peace for both South Africa and the DRC.

The following section will focus on the objectives that states have when making foreign policy.

2.2 Foreign Policy Goals

The foreign policy of a state directly expresses the goals that it wishes to achieve in relation to other states and other international actors. In pursuing certain goals, nation-states need to consider their position vis-à-vis the international arena, their capabilities as well as the moral possibility that they may have to manipulate other states in order to achieve these goals (Hill 2003: 39).

In light of the above, Holsti (1995: 84-108) highlights four general goals that states have when pursuing foreign policy.

- Security: The notion that states pursue foreign policy for security purposes is evident in the fact that most states, with a few exceptions, maintain military forces. It is understood that by establishing security within their borders, states are able to ward off threats coming from actors beyond their borders.
• Autonomy: When pursuing foreign policy, states seek to formulate and carry out domestic and external policies in order to defend their autonomy. The realist notion of ‘sovereignty’ which details the authority of a state to make its own decisions plays a role here. In an effort to maintain their autonomy, some states have gone to the extremes of building up their military capacity, increasing their economic strength and reducing reliance upon external sources.

• Welfare: When pursuing foreign policy, states also have the goal of improving the welfare of their citizens. The provision of social services, the minimizing of unemployment and the promotion of economic growth and efficiency form the basis of this foreign policy goal.

• Status and prestige: Finally, one of the goals that states have when pursuing foreign policy is to seek to maintain prestige and status within the international arena. Traditionally, this was manifested through the display of military prowess and might. Today, the equivalent of such prestige includes leadership in science and technology as well as visible symbols of industrialization.

The next section will detail the process of incorporating these goals in the foreign policy making process.

2.3 The Foreign Policy-Making Process

The process of making foreign policy is not an easy one. This is because foreign policymakers decide on the purpose, aims, objectives and formulation and execution of foreign policy all in the name of the state. The process is lengthy due to the fact that government is not a unified single entity and there are numerous actors involved in the process (Kamath 1990: 245).

There has been heated debate about key approaches of making foreign policy. The Expected Utility Theory, which is closely linked to realism, advocates the view that individual decision-makers are confronted by the need to choose between risky prospects by comparing their expected utility values (Mongin 1997: 1). Proponents of this theory argue that decision-makers seek to champion the cause of national interests because they are rational. Contrary to this theory is the Bureaucratic Politics Model Theory which argues that the state is not a
unitary actor and can therefore not make foreign policy decisions. Instead, rival bureaucracies within government, through bargaining and compromise, are able to influence the choice of foreign policy.

Knecht and Weatherford (2006: 706) categorize the foreign policy making process into five broad stages.

- **First Stage - Agenda-setting / Problem presentation:** At this stage, the primary focus of policy makers is to set an agenda on the possible areas on which foreign policy should be focused. This is followed by a clear identification of the risks and the opportunities involved in taking certain policy decisions.

- **Second Stage - Option Generation:** At this stage of the foreign policy decision-making process, options of different actions are taken by considering which are the most urgent and necessary actions to be taken.

- **Third Stage - Policy Decision:** This intermediate stage in the process is definitely one of the most crucial. At this stage, policy makers choose a decision after carefully weighing out the stakes involved.

- **Fourth Stage - Implementation:** After having deliberated on the different policy options and having made a decision, it is at this stage that the policy decision is implemented through the different actors that play a role in policy making.

- **Fifth Stage - Policy Review:** At this level, the foreign policy decision has been made and implemented. Once this has happened, a review of the policy is conducted. This leads to the critical decision of whether to continue to uphold a certain policy, to reconfigure certain policies or to all together abandon a particular policy.

It is important to note that the foreign policy making process is neither static nor is it always followed in this manner. Instead the process is dynamic and undergoes constant adaptation and refinement due to constant changes either in domestic and international circumstances or simply due to faults incurred by individual policy makers (Webber & Smith 2002: 49).
The policy making process is important and is carried out by important actors. In the context of South Africa, the following section will look into key foreign policy making actors who have shaped the country’s foreign policy in the last twenty years.

2.4 Foreign Policy-Making Actors

In the process of creating foreign policy, there are numerous stakeholders involved. The process is usually an elite-driven bureaucratic task which, depending on the structure, could have decisions concentrated in the hands of a strong president or a group of senior ministers (Webber & Smith 2002: 49).

In the case of South Africa, foreign policy actors include the President and Deputy President, Parliament, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Defence (DoD) as well as Civil Society.

2.4.1 The President and the Deputy President

The foreign policy of a state is undoubtedly connected to the President. Former US President Harry Truman once stated that ‘the President makes foreign policy’ (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 204). Given the calibre of Presidents that South Africa had in the early 1990s in the form of President Nelson Mandela and President Thabo Mbeki, this statement has proven to be true in South Africa’s case. The personalities of these two Presidents definitely played a role in the direction in which the country’s foreign policy was crafted in the first decade and a half of the democratic dispensation.

During his term as President, Nelson Mandela articulated a foreign policy that was heavily premised on human rights and the spreading of the gospel of democracy throughout the world. One notable example is the manner in which Mandela handled the case of Sani Abacha in Nigeria. At the time President Mandela had vowed that ‘strong actions’ including oil sanctions, would be put in place against Nigeria in order to ensure that democracy was attained in ‘the shortest possible time’ (Block 1995). In such examples, it is clear that Mandela shaped and determined the outcomes of foreign affairs.

However, whereas many applaud the leading role that Mandela took in foreign policy decisions during his time, to some critics, the Mandela years were characterized by the
personality cult surrounding him. Scholars such as Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004: 123) are openly opposed to the dominance of Mandela in South Africa’s foreign policy. These two scholars argue that, in having a ‘larger than life’ personality, much of the capabilities of other foreign policymaking actors, including the Department of Foreign Affairs (now Department of International Relations and Co-operation), Cabinet as well as Parliament were compromised. Indeed, Tom Lodge asserts that ‘Nelson Mandela’s cult is likely to long outlive its subject’ (Lodge 2002: 18). On the other hand, while Lodge’s view is not entirely devoid of merit, and it could certainly be argued that Mandela’s foreign policy choices were not fully coordinated, it should be remembered that the adulation Nelson Mandela enjoyed as President is a consequence of the role he played in the democratization of his country. He is rightly seen in South Africa and internationally as a freedom icon.

In contrast to Mandela whose foreign policy was mostly domestically focused, President Mbeki’s approach was to promote the country as a dynamic and reliable player on the global arena. Upon assuming office in 1999, Mbeki embarked on numerous foreign policy objectives which he promoted such as the reaffirmation and the strengthening of relations between South Africa and the US, the European Union and the African continent (Landsberg 2012: 4). With reference to Africa, as explained in the previous chapter, Mbeki was the pioneer of the ‘African Renaissance’ initiative which spoke towards the renewal of the continent by seeking African solutions to African problems. By forging the African Renaissance, Thabo Mbeki as President made it clear that South Africa indeed seeks to find African solutions for African problems. Given the active role that South Africa undertook in the Congo Peace Process (as will be discussed in Chapter Four), there is credit to the remark made by President Truman.

2.4.2 Parliament

The Parliament of South Africa is made up of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. At its crux, the purpose of Parliament is to represent the people of South Africa by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by passing legislations and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action. As such, the Parliament of South Africa has a constitutional duty in the process of government and is the primary
institution through which the public is able to express its views about foreign policy (Institute for Global Dialogue 2004).

It is crucial to acknowledge the role that Parliament plays with regard to foreign policy decision-making in South Africa. Parliament serves an important role in ratifying treaties and evaluating draft policy documents. It is at this point that Parliament plays a role in the formulation stage of foreign policy as it provides a premium platform for debates among committee members about the way forward of policies (Institute for Global Dialogue 2014: 23). Parliament also holds powers for the appropriation of funds and approving departmental budgets.

Of increasing importance in the democratic South African dispensation is the creation of the new multiparty Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, which is a specialist body of representatives that serve the purpose of ensuring that the oversight and review function is executed and that democratic procedures are followed.

2.4.3 Department of International Relations and Co-Operation

The Department of International Relations and Co-operation was known as the Department of Foreign Affairs until 2009. In the view of the new Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, the name change was motivated by the idea that the new foreign policy of South Africa would be ‘based upon the advancement of our domestic priorities at an international level’ (DIRCO 2009), and that it would stress the importance of international cooperation. Giving the department a new name suggests a new style and approach to foreign policy. There has however been some continuity in its foreign affairs focus in the last 21 years of democracy.

Although the international relations of a state are not exercised in isolation of other key departments, there is no doubt that the heartbeat of foreign policy in South Africa resides in the Department of International Relations and Co-operation. As principal advisor on foreign policy issues, the Department coordinates the implementation of South Africa’s international relations (Institute for Global Dialogue 2014: 24). As such, it sits at the nerve of communicating the country’s national interest through the use of ambassadors, diplomats as well as other officials.
The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation assumes overall responsibility for all aspects of South Africa’s international relations in consultation with the President and is tasked to formulate, promote, and execute South Africa’s foreign policy (Hill 2003: 53).

Hill (2003: 77) suggests that every Ministry of foreign affairs should perform three vital functions. The first function is routine information-gathering which involves gathering information on issues of importance to state interests. This is traditionally facilitated by representatives who are based in host countries abroad. However, the use of intelligence services has also facilitated this role.

Secondly, every foreign affairs ministry should perform the function of policy-making. This is done by sifting vast quantities of information and interpreting them in order to, amongst other things, predict the actions of other states in the international arena and to formulate policy options (Hill 2003).

The third function of every foreign affairs ministry is that of memory. This means the capturing of information in record-keeping systems. This is usually performed by diplomats.

The White Paper of South Africa’s Foreign Policy (2011) answers to this by stating that the Department and its Missions abroad carry out its mandate by:

• Aligning, coordinating, and managing South Africa’s international relations and related activities;

• Monitoring developments in the international environment, including the provision of early warning to political principals;

• Formulating foreign policy options;

• Protecting South Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

• Conducting economic diplomacy;

• Conducting public diplomacy;
• Establishing and managing structures and mechanisms for achieving foreign policy objectives;

• Managing development cooperation and partnerships;

• Advising on international law matters and acting as custodian for all South Africa’s international agreements;

• Providing consular services.

In line with this study, DIRCO has played a primary role in advancing one of its pivotal national interests which are embodied in Africa Agenda ideals. In the introductory section of its White Paper of Foreign Policy, it is stated that:

“Since the birth of democratic South Africa in 1994, the country has prioritised an Afro-centric foreign policy rooted in national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism. This resulted in major and ambitious African initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and support for the transition of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002” (DIRCO 2011).

To this end, the Department emphasises a commitment towards playing a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. This will be done by working together with the AU to discourage unconstitutional changes in governments. It will also continue to support AU and UN initiatives to find just and lasting solutions to outstanding issues of self-determination and decolonisation on the African continent. South Africa subscribes to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (DIRCO 2011).

While DIRCO possesses the mandate to directing the country’s international affairs, it does not work alone and has to work hand in hand with other critical Departments, including the Department of Trade and Industry.
2.4.4 Department of Trade and Industry

All matters regarding foreign trade and investment between South Africa and the greater international arena are dealt with by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk : 206). The core purpose of this department is to encourage foreign direct investment, to expand transnational commerce as well as negotiating trade deals with countries and regional blocs, to name just a few. In other words, it plays a strong role in the economic relations that South Africa has with other African countries (Schoeman 2007).

In this way, DTI also plays an important role in the crafting of South Africa’s foreign policy as many trade policies that are secured by the DTI will undoubtedly affect the general direction of South Africa’s foreign policy.

The actors involved within trade policy simultaneously affect matters which deal with the country’s economic development, exports as well as diversification and industrialization strategy. This Department is able to advise foreign policy decision makers about the manner in which decisions should be made concerning trade in South Africa. As such, it cannot be isolated in South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making process.

2.4.5 Department of Defence

The Department of Defence (DoD) has emerged as one of the pivotal actors in the foreign policy decision-making process in South Africa. With the recent spate of peace and security issues that have transpired in the last three decades both on a continental as well as international scale, the role of the Department of Defence has gained increased importance (Institute for Global Dialogue 2014: 25). Under the broad umbrella of the Department of Defence lies the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) which has contributed in the context of South Africa’s peace missions both regionally and continentally (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 206).

The growing number of inter-state conflicts and wars on the regional and continental levels has resulted in large amount of bloodshed on the African continent. The presence of DoD and military has become even more significant in the role that it plays in the operational

The South African military has contributed immensely in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development projects by providing assistance to war-torn areas and acting as a peace-keeping force in regions scarred by war atrocities. The South African National Defence Force commitment to the DRC was inscribed in three main operations. The first deployment, known as Operation Mistral, sought to support the MONUC mission in the Congo. This operation included a task force headquarters supported by a battalion group, engineer elements, logistics, medics and a military police unit. Supplement to this project was the deployment of forces in Operation Teutonic which saw the SANDF, together with the Belgian government, assisting with the reconstruction of the Congolese military (Heinecken & Ferreira 2012: 27). In 2009 the South African government approved the extension of the role of SANDF in the DRC to provide training of three rapid reaction battalions of the Congolese military forces under Project Thebe (Dlomo 2012: 57). Since then, South Africa has also been active in the intervention brigade (comprising of Tanzanian, South African and Malawian contingents) which helped the Congolese army expel the M23 rebels from Eastern DRC.

2.4.6 Civil Society

The role of civil society in the foreign policy decision-making process is often side-lined. Yet it plays an important role in providing insights on issues regarding foreign policy. Civil society in general refers to any non-state actor within a society including academia, business, labour unions, private media, churches as well as voluntary organizations (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 208).

Although civil society actors in general do not directly impact on foreign policy, they usually influence it through research publications and interactions. One example is the publication of a cross-section analysis of academic and other Non-Governmental Organizations interests which critically influenced the prioritising of the ‘South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document’ that had been released by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1996 (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002: 208).
Another example where civil society made an impact on foreign policy is the banning of anti-personnel landmines in South Africa as a result of the successful international campaign to ban landmines (Tjemolane 2011: 80). Similarly, civil society played a role in assisting in the prioritization of issues on the agendas of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as in lobbying for positions at crucial international conferences such as the World Conference Against Racism which was hosted in South Africa in 2000 (Le Pere 2002: 19). Considering these examples, there is no denying that while civil society remains on the periphery of foreign policymaking in South Africa, its role cannot be ignored.

3. Foreign Policy Analysis

The study of Foreign Policy is referred to as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Foreign Policy Analysis is embedded within the discipline of International Relations. As such, the study can be conceptualized as the study of how states manage and control their intentions and their external conduct and actions as opposed to their domestic policies (Jackson and Sorensen 2012: 223).

Foreign Policy Analysis also possesses a distinct normative impulse which is evident in its tendency to improve foreign policy decision-making in order for states to achieve better outcomes. As such, at the core of Foreign Policy Analysis is the search to understand the process of decision making by the individual decision makers.

As an offshoot of International Relations, it is argued that three paradigmatic works have significantly contributed to FPA and have been at its foundation:

- *Decision Making as an Approach to the study of International Politics* by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954).
- “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” by Rosenau (1964)
- *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Sprout and Sprout (1956)
At the core of these contributions is the emphasis on the importance of human beings who are key actors making national foreign policy. These contributions also highlight the importance of understanding foreign policy choices (Hudson 2005: 5).

In their work “Decision Making as an Approach to the study of International Politics”, Snyder et al (1954) highlights the point that, when considering the foreign policy process, scholars should not only focus on the nation-state level but also consider the actors and officials involved in the decision-making process.

Rosenau (1964) built on Snyder’s notion. In his work “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy”, he encouraged scholars to systematically develop the actor-specific theory. Rosenau explained that this is due to the fact that foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations.

Sprout and Sprout (1956) added another dimension into the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis by suggesting that the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system without reference to foreign policy undertakings is misguided. Sprout and Sprout (1956) suggest that in order to better understand undertakings, an in-depth look into the ‘psycho-milieu’ of the individuals and groups making foreign policy has to be done (Hudson 2005: 6).

Since its inception, the act of analysing foreign policy has been conducted using many approaches. The approach of Graham Allison seeks to analyse foreign policy by analysing foreign policy decisions. The explanation of Graham Allison’s foreign policy analysis is the focus of the next section.

3.1 Graham Allison’s Three Conceptual Models

In his book titled Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971), Graham Allison sought to assess the process of decision-making during the leadership of President Kennedy in light of the Cuban missile crisis which took place in October 1962.

Stemming from the information he gathered by observing the manner in which decision-making around this circumstance was made, Allison conceived three models that can be
used for analysing foreign policy decisions and the manner in which they are made (Vale & Mphaisha 1999: 95).

According to Allison, these Models also highlight what could possibly happen when groups in a government have to deliberate on foreign policy options (Allison 1971). While each model is based on different levels of analysis, it is required that all three models are used to obtain a complete understanding of any foreign policy decision (Vale & Mphaisha 1999: 95).

The first model is the Rational Actor Model which focuses on identifying actors that possess clearly defined goals and feasible options by which to achieve their goals. The key assumption of this model is the fact that government is viewed as the optimizing ‘black box’ actor in foreign policy decision-making (Allison 1971). This model advocates the view that government possesses complete information and processes this information in a rational manner. An advantage of this model is the fact that it places great emphasis on the relations and interactions between and among states. This model is also beneficial in times of crisis situations in which there is no time to evaluate foreign policy courses in detail. In such instances, the essence of decision is to choose between competing alternative options (Vale & Mphaisha 1999: 96)

The second model, the Organizational Process Model, is premised on the idea that the pursuit of policy is determined by the routine behavioural habits of the organization involved in the decision-making process. This model reflects the constraints that organizations place on decision-makers’ choices. This is because when faced with a decision, organizations usually draw on past experiences. At the crux of this model is the assumption that goals and objectives that states wish to pursue are well established. As such, this model relies on past experience and the standard operating procedures (SOP). These procedures are relied on as they enhance efficiency and performance. The main advantage of this model is the fact that it illuminates the important domestic political influences on foreign policy decision-making (Allison 1971).

The third of Allison’s conceptual models is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This model focuses on the key individuals who are situated in critical positions which allow them to have great influence in deciding on organizational action. The model also looks into the level
of conflict and cooperation present between various departments charged with decision-making and administration of foreign policy (Allison 1971).

The advantage of the Bureaucratic model is that it adds important detail pertaining to domestic politics. At the same time, this model helps explain the roles of key individuals in the decision-making process. On the negative side, this model is often difficult to study and analyse due to the numerous amount of variables, some of which are unknown (Vale & Mpaisha 1999: 97).

Overall, while Allison’s models play a significant role in explaining foreign policy decisions, they do not answer all the questions around foreign policy making process. Most notably is the fact that the Three Conceptual Models do not necessarily recognize the importance of actors that are outside of the state (including both domestic and international). This is a factor which will prove problematic in the analysis and evaluation of the Africa Agenda and the peace and security objective which will be discussed in Chapter Five.

The first half of this chapter has discussed the theoretical elements of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. The following section will look into the contextual issue of this study which is South Africa’s foreign policy.

4. Contextual Framework: South Africa’s Foreign Policy principles

The foreign policy of South Africa has to be understood in light of its current post-apartheid dispensation which is highly distinguishable from that of its dark apartheid era. Following the democratic transition, the new African National Congress government sought to transform its foreign policy so as to pursue a more ‘focused and effective’ foreign policy which would best reflect the new democratic era in which the country found itself in (South Africa Foreign Policy White Paper 2011: 6). This is in contrast to the isolationist, closed foreign policy that had been advocated by the apartheid government.

Henwood (1997) reveals that there has been much criticism directed at South Africa over the years for not having a coherent single document which codifies the country’s international policies. Instead, the objectives and articulations of South Africa’s foreign policy have been expressed in speeches and declarations made by the President of South

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Africa and the Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (formerly Department of Foreign Affairs).

To this effect, in 1993 ANC president Nelson Mandela articulated certain pillars upon which South Africa’s foreign policy would rest. These included the following:

- Issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;
- Just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;
- Considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;
- Peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;
- Concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy choices;
- Economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world. (Mandela 1993)
- These views were echoed in a parliamentary address in 1994, when Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo elaborated that the aim of South Africa’s foreign policy going forward would, amongst other things, include a commitment to:
  - The centrality of Human rights in international relations, with specific emphasis on the political, economic, social and environmental circumstances conducive to these. This principle was driven by former President Nelson Mandela’s stance on freedom and human dignity for all.
  - The promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world. During his term as President, Nelson Mandela was eager to put in place a foreign policy that would spread the gospel of democracy and human rights to Africa and beyond. He advocated the view that South Africa’s interests going forward were directly linked
to creating a peaceful and secure democracy at home and transferring this ideology to its African neighbours (Landsberg 2000: 108).

- The principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations.
- International peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict.
- The interests of Africa in global affairs (Henwood 1997: 6).

Notwithstanding the above statements, in 1994 the African National Congress published a comprehensive foreign policy document titled ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa’ (ANC 1994) in which seven principles which ought to guide the conduct of South Africa’s new foreign policy were stipulated. These included:

- A belief in, and preoccupation with, Human Rights which extends beyond the political sphere, but also embracing the economic, social and environmental spheres;
- A belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of human kind can only come through the promotion of Democracy, worldwide;
- A belief that Justice and International Law should guide the relations between nations;
- A belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive. Where this breaks down, internationally-agreed peaceful mechanisms to solve conflicts should be resorted to;
- A belief that our foreign policy should reflect the interests of the continent of Africa;
- A belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world;
- A belief that our foreign relations must mirror our deep commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South Africa (ANC: 1994)

South Africa’s Foreign Policy White Paper 2011 which highlights the purpose and objectives of South Africa’s foreign policy has echoed the above mentioned principles, highlighting once again key elements. These include:
• addressing shared challenges of underdevelopment;
• promoting global equity and social justice;
• working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world;
• and doing our part to strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation,
• reflecting the diversity of our nations, and ensuring its centrality in global governance

There has generally been continuity in the pursuit of these foreign policy objectives in the last twenty years of South Africa’s democracy, with an increased focus on the relations that South Africa has with the African continent and the country’s goal of achieving peace and security (Schoeman 2007: 96).

Due to the contestability of the concepts ‘peace’ and ‘security’, the section that follows provides a conceptualization of these concepts for the broad purpose of this study.

4.1 Peace and Security: A Conceptualization

The concept ‘peace’ is an elusive term that has yielded much discussion in international relations and peace studies over the years. According to Miller (2005: 55) ‘peace’ can be described as “a political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions”. This definition is linked to the view that several conditions need to be met in order for peace to be reached and maintained. Such conditions include the presence of a balance of political power among various groups within a society, legitimacy for decision makers and implementers as well as mutual understanding of rights and interests despite incompatibilities (Miller 2005: 55).

Another scholar who has written extensively in the field of peace studies is Johan Galtung who argues that ‘peace’ is a problematic concept. According to Galtung, there is a clear distinction between positive and negative peace. He posits that negative peace is simply the absence of war or physical violence (Galtung 1996). Positive peace, on the other hand, refers to the presence of conditions for political equality and social and economic justice. In
the view of Fast (2004), Galtung’s conceptualization is a holistic analysis of peace due to the fact that the conditions specified by Galtung acknowledge and challenge the structure conditions that exist in society that constrain people to achieve their full potential.

Similar to the concept of peace, the conceptualization of the concept of security cannot be defined in absolute terms. Generally, it refers to “a subjective state in which an individual or collective feels free from threats, anxiety, or danger” (Miller 2005: 55). Buzan (1981), however, is of the view that the concept of security is narrowly founded and needs to be defined in terms of specifications. The first specification is inscribed in the question, ‘security for who?’ which speaks to the object of security and can include the individual, the state and the international system. A second specification is the question ‘security for which values?’ speaks to the values which are to be included in the concept of national security.

This understanding of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ will be adopted for the broad purpose of this study.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide clarification on key concepts and key contextual issues which will be alluded to in this study. This was done by exploring the definition of Foreign Policy and its theoretical perspectives. It was noted that because international relations is a field with many contended conceptual frameworks, key concepts such as ‘Foreign Policy’ do not have fixed definitions. However, the all-inclusive definition by Carlsnaes’ of foreign policy as ‘those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy’ (Dunne, Hadefield & Smith 2008: 2) is generally accepted throughout the chapter.

In addition, it has been established that Foreign Policy comprises of four elements. The first is that its creation and implementation is primarily the reserve of official government. Secondly, foreign policy formulation is both a reaction to the international environment as
well as an action towards it. Thirdly, foreign policy involves numerous activities that culminate in decisions and actions. Finally, the prime objective of all foreign policy is to create, control, adjust and alter external conditions.

The chapter also distinguished the internal and external determinants of foreign policy. It came to the understanding that the two are inter-twined and that one cannot do without the other. The chapter also discussed the main theories of foreign policy. It highlighted that there are predominantly two main schools of thought in international relations; namely realism and liberalism.

The chapter also examined the processes of foreign policy making as well as the goals which states pursue when conducting foreign policy.

In addition, as it delved into the main theoretical underpinning of this study which is Foreign Policy Analysis, the chapter made reference to three paradigmatic works which have inspired this sub-field of International Relations. The chapter has then focused on Graham Allison’s Three Conceptual Models which are tools for analysing foreign policy decision making.

These Three Conceptual Models include the Rational Actor Model, Bureaucratic Politics Model and Organizational Model. The Rational Actor Model focuses on identifying actors that possess clearly defined goals and feasible options by which to achieve their goals. The second model, the Organizational Process Model, is premised on the idea that the pursuit of policy is determined by the routine behavioural habits of the organization involved in the decision-making process. The Bureaucratic Politics Model focuses on the key individuals who are situated in critical positions which allow them to have great influence in deciding on organizational action. These three Models are further discussed in the analysis in Chapter Five.

The third section of this chapter highlighted the contextual issue at hand, that of South Africa’s foreign policy principles. The chapter indicated that the principles that South Africa has articulated since 1993 continue to form the basis of its international dealings to date. These include, but are not limited to, addressing underdevelopment; promoting the
centrality of human rights and democracy, ensuring global equity and social justice; promoting peace and advancing the interests of Africa in global affairs. The conceptualization of peace and security as it relates to this study was also provided.

Over the last couple of years, increasing focus has been placed on South Africa’s relations with Africa and the role that South Africa has sought to play in promoting peace and security on the continent. It is upon this principle that Chapter Three will focus.
CHAPTER 3:

SOUTH AFRICA’S ‘AFRICA AGENDA’ AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT

1. Introduction

Chapter Two provided a theoretical and contextual framework for the study. The chapter was especially useful in highlighting the foreign policy principles that the current South African government aspires to. One such principle, which is at the crux of this study, is the promotion of South Africa’s interests with the African continent.

Since assuming power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) government has had the daunting task of seeking to establish strong ties with its African neighbours. Hence the need since 1994 to prioritise and promote the strengthening of relations between South Africa and the African continent.

The pursuit of this objective is referred to as the ‘Africa First Policy’ or ‘Africa Agenda’ (Landsberg 2014). According to South Africa’s current Foreign Affairs Minister, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, ‘the consolidation of the Africa Agenda is [now] South Africa’s priority (Landsberg 2010: 280).

In light of the above-mentioned observations, the purpose of Chapter Three is therefore two-fold. Firstly, the chapter aims to provide an understanding of the ‘Africa Agenda’. Secondly, the chapter seeks to delve into one of the core components of the Africa Agenda, which is the promotion of peace and security on the continent. This second objective of the chapter, which has also been highlighted in Chapter Two, will feed into the rest of the study as it is the focal point of the analysis that this study will undertake.
2. Background to the Africa Agenda

The contextual background of the ‘Africa Agenda’ is traceable to South Africa’s historical past. Speaking at the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Summit in Tunisia in 1994, Nelson Mandela stated that:

“When the history of our struggle is written, it will tell a glorious tale of African solidarity, of Africans’ adherence to principles. It will tell a moving story of the sacrifices that the people of our continent made, to ensure that intolerable insult to human dignity, the apartheid crime against humanity, became a thing of the past” (ANC: 1993).

Indeed it is true that during the liberation struggle against the oppressive white apartheid government, the African National Congress and other political parties were assisted both militarily and diplomatically by a group of southern African countries known as the Frontline States. In the words of Evans (1984), this organization represented a diplomatic alliance which was ‘fully committed to the anti-apartheid cause and the South African liberation movements’ (1984: 5). These countries included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Each country played a part in raising awareness of the undemocratic practices happening in Pretoria at the time (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002). Some of these countries even became adoptive homes for South Africans, including ANC exiles that sought refuge there (South African History Online: 2013). Therefore, it is arguable that the country’s commitment to Africa is rooted in national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism. It is also arguable that the Africa Agenda is simply a moral response by South Africa to the rest of the continent to ‘do right’ after all the years of cold relations that the apartheid government had with African neighbours. Irrespective of its motivations, the Africa Agenda has played out in a special relationship enjoyed between South Africa and many countries on the continent.

This is evident in the ambitious continental initiatives that South Africa has advocated in the last twenty years. This includes the formulation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an economic development program which is a strategic framework for Africa’s renewal which South Africa was determined to see succeed (Landsberg 2007).
So great were South Africa’s expectations of NEPAD that it sought to integrate the notions of NEPAD into the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) domestic socio-economic plan.

At the forefront of NEPAD’s objectives is the eradication of poverty in Africa and the placement of African countries and the continent as a whole on the path for sustainable development (NEPAD 2015). The nature of NEPAD’s institutional make-up is such that it would act as a system of accountability between African presidents towards continental development. NEPAD remains one of the notable marks of Former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s foreign policy conduits.

Another initiative that South Africa has encouraged within its democratic dispensation was the transition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002. This change came about as the result of rapidly changing global political environment and resulted in the formulation of more comprehensive objectives in the African Union (South Africa Foreign Policy White Paper: 2011: 7).

Due to the fact that the consolidation of the Africa Agenda has become the primary scene of South African activism, it is important to explore the various understandings surrounding it. This is the purpose of the following section.

3. Definition(s) and understandings

The Africa Agenda is embedded in the understanding that the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to Africa (Department of Foreign Affairs 2006: 8). However, while the term has been advocated since the 1990s by post-apartheid presidents as well as government officials, there has been considerable debate over what exactly the Africa Agenda consists of. Hence, multiple interpretations of the concept have emerged, revealing the different nuances of the term. These various interpretations will now be examined.

One interpretation of the Africa Agenda is predominantly rooted in a realist outlook and is posited on the potential economic interests that South Africa could gain through this Agenda. This understanding of the Africa Agenda is anchored on the view that, through such an agenda, South Africa is able to project its ambitions for continental economic leadership
by positioning itself as the gateway or intermediary between Africa and the rest of the world (Miti & Kilambo 2012). This immediately raises concerns that the Africa Agenda may not be as altruistic as it appears, given the fact that because of its relative economic dominance on the continent, South Africa is able to use the ‘Africa Agenda’ as a cover-up for its hegemonic ambitions (Fakir 2007).

Inasmuch as this interpretation of the Africa Agenda is economically motivated, the search for continental peace means success to all, according to Rapoo (2007). By providing ‘means’ through which this can be done, South Africa seeks to promote its own long-term interests on the continent by creating space to achieve its own, less obvious but critical, strategic goals (Fakir 2007: 2).

A different perspective of the Africa Agenda opposes this view; highlighting instead that Pretoria distances itself from the idea that its economic dominance is a basis for exploitation and manipulation on the continent. This perspective further suggests that South Africa is hesitant to assert its dominance on the continent, choosing rather to adopt a stance of partnership and cooperation by supporting the notion that “common approaches and collaborative strategies” (Fakir 2007: 2) by African countries should be used in dealing with Africa’s problems for promoting development, peace and the resolution of conflicts within the continent. Therefore, South Africa reassures its African neighbours of its willingness to work hand-in-hand with them to secure the development of all (Landsberg 2006: 8). It is for this reason that during the Mandela years, the Africa Agenda stressed “good neighbourliness” and “non-hegemonic” relations with fellow African states (Landsberg 2000: 15).

This interpretation of the Africa Agenda highlights the capabilities and ambitions that South Africa has for continental leadership. It is based on the role that South Africa has undertaken as the continent’s spokesperson and the defender of African interests. Landsberg (2000: 2) accurately describes this as an expression on South Africa’s part to be the ‘voice’ of the continent internationally. This is possible through numerous means, including diplomatically (for example, aspirations to represent Africa on a global forum such as the United Nations Security Council by becoming the first African country to have a
permanent seat), militarily (through the promotion of African Union-United Nations cooperation on peace support missions as well as the deployment of African troops to international peacekeeping missions) and economically (representing the continent on economic platforms such as BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) as well as IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa).

A third interpretation of the Africa Agenda is found in the South African Foreign Policy Monitor (March/April 2008). This perspective reveals that the term can refer to the manner in which South Africa prioritizes and pays special attention to issues such as conflict resolution, institution building, peace-keeping and governance (Miti & Kilambo 2012: 3). These issues are particularly important to South Africa and the rest of the continent because, according to South African foreign policy makers, Pretoria can only thrive continentally and internationally if the rest of the continent is stable and peaceful because conflict in one country has the power of destabilizing the entire region (Sidiropoulos 2007: 7).

Stemming from the above discussion, it is evident that there are multiple interpretations of the term ‘Africa Agenda’. However, it all boils down to the understanding that the agenda seeks to advance the social, economic and political well-being of Africa through promoting the interests of Africa as the primary concern of South Africa.

In this light, the following section will highlight the key features that characterize the Africa Agenda.

4. Key Features of the Africa Agenda

Having explored the various understandings of South Africa’s Afrocentric foreign policy, the study will now highlight the key elements and purposes that are embedded within the Africa Agenda.

4.1 Asserting South Africa’s African identity

The first key purpose of the Africa Agenda is to assert South Africa’s African identity. In the past, South Africa’s African identity had often been challenged due to the fact that the
apartheid government’s domestic and international policies tended to isolate the country from the rest of the continent. The sanctions that outside countries imposed on South Africa further led to the isolation of South Africa. As described earlier, it is only after South Africa achieved democracy that the country was re-admitted to global forums.

In adopting such a stance, South Africa wishes to reassure its African neighbours that it is part and parcel of the continent and is willing to work hand-in-hand with the rest of the continent as a friend and is not a bully. It is for this reason that the ‘Africa Agenda’ is centred on the identification and engagement of South Africa with the rest of Africa (Sidiropoulos 2007: 2).

Accordingly, South Africa now identifies itself as a part of the continent and undertakes to re-affirm its ‘African-ness’ (Sidiropoulos 2007: 2). One way in which South Africa is working towards boosting confidence of its pro-African objectives by providing ‘African solutions to African problems’ particularly with regard to peace-keeping and peace-building.

However, while South Africa has done its best to portray its African-ness, there are cases wherein the country’s loyalty to the continent has been questioned. One such case is with regard to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in which South Africa voted in favour of the authorization of air strikes in Libya during the reign of Colonel Al-Gaddafi as President. Although the country later went back on its vote, it was severely criticised for acting as ‘an imperialist weakest link to the African continent’ both domestically and continentally (Nibishika 2011).

On a social note, the spate of xenophobic attacks against African foreigners in South Africa in 2008 and more recently in early 2015 sparked outrage and raised scepticism regarding South Africa’s solidarity with the rest of Africa. While these attacks were targeted against foreigners living within South Africa, the consequences of these acts were felt throughout the continent. Interestingly, this social problem played out economically as South African businesses operating abroad on the continent were negatively affected. The case of the repatriation of South African employees of Sasol Ltd in neighbouring Mozambique speaks to the severity of the case at hand. Numerous other South African businesses such as MTN, Shoprite and Pick n Pay were also placed under tremendous pressure as the result of this
unfortunate development (Mail & Guardian 2015). This event undoubtedly tainted South Africa’s African identity and challenged the very essence of this Africa Agenda feature.

Similarly, on an economical note, authors such as Patrick Bond, continue to cast Pretoria as a sub-imperialist on the continent. Bond asserts that, due to its geographic positioning as well as its relative dominance as the economic power-house of the continent, South Africa acts as a door through which external powers are able to enter Africa for the purposes of looting both natural and financial resources (Bond 2006).

In contrast to this, the 2006-2009 Strategic Plan of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation emphasizes that the department is committed to promoting the vision of ‘a better South Africa in a better Africa and a better world’ (Department of Foreign Affairs: 2006). In addition, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane has repetitively articulated that the Africa Agenda remains central to [South Africa’s] foreign policy objectives’ (Landsberg 2010: 280). Therefore, while there are contenders to the idea that South Africa seeks to assert its African identity, there is certainly work being carried out on the part of the department to counter this.

It is evident that this feature speaks directly to one of the subsidiary questions raised in Chapter 1, which is: ‘How does South Africa’s African identity play a role in the manner in which it views its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent’? It can therefore be deduced that the country’s perceived African identity is central to its engagements on the continent as far as peace and security as well as socio-economic development is concerned.

4.2 Supporting and promoting socio-economic development within the framework of NEPAD and regional integration

A second key feature of the Africa Agenda is to support and promote socio-economic development within the framework of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and regional integration. The NEPAD rests on three prerequisites for the regeneration of socio-economic development (NEPAD 2015). These include: peace and security, democracy and political governance, and economic and corporate governance. As stipulated earlier,
South Africa’s Africa Agenda has regarded the promotion of socio-economic development plans which will pull African countries out of the depths of poverty as a matter of great importance.

To this effect, in 1999 the Millennium Development Recovery Program (MAP) was introduced by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria as a means of generating regional integration as well as development in the social and economic realms. However, due to some inefficacies within MAP, the New African Initiative (NAI) was later developed to supplement MAP (Institute for Global Dialogue 2014).

Consistent revisions of the program led to the formation of NEPAD which is founded on the values of democratic principles, governance and economic and corporate governance. As discussed earlier, NEPAD makes the link between Africa’s development and the resolution of conflicts and it also sets democratic and governance benchmarks for the continent as a whole. South Africa has assumed a leadership role in the promotion of NEPAD continentally.

Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of criticism against NEPAD, particularly from African states who believe that the plan is simply a neo-liberal project that has not entirely achieved its objectives. Other critics have even gone so far as to state that NEPAD is the ‘Africanisation of GEAR’ (Adebajo & Adedeji 2007), a point which, as alluded to earlier, is an attack against the benevolent objectives of South Africa on the continent.

Meanwhile, advocates of NEPAD still hold fast to the idea that through NEPAD, socio-economic development is possible. This is due to the fact that the plan calls on African states to strengthen accountability measures while at the same time calling on northern states to recommit themselves to participating in Africa’s vast development challenges (Landsberg 2011).

The Africa Agenda thus has the challenge to promote NEPAD amidst scepticism about the feasibility of its success.
4.3 Strengthening bilateral relations on the continent

Another key element of the Africa Agenda is to strengthen bilateral relations on the continent. This, according to Ngwenya (2012), is made possible through closer engagement with key ‘anchor states’ in different regions on the continent.

One key anchor state that South Africa has maintained bilateral relations with since the 1960s is Nigeria. Like the Front Line States, Nigeria fought against the apartheid regime and provided monetary support to black youth who were in the liberation struggle. Mazrui (2006) is of the view that, if well-coordinated, the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa has the potential to deliver important dividends for the continent’s development and stability.

In 2014 Nigeria surpassed South Africa as the fastest growing economy in Africa in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a point, which Sega and Lekaba (2014) suggest is a progressive example of what could happen if intra-African trade is encouraged. A bilateral agreement was signed between the two countries in 1999 and it resulted in the establishment of a bi-national commission which serves as a forum for exchange and dialogue for both countries.

Consequently, the economic and trade relations between the two countries have boomed over the last twenty years. South Africa has invested millions of rands in areas such as telecommunication (MTN), engineering, retail and banking. In terms of exports, South Africa has exported goods ranging from machinery to appliances, whereas, the bulk of Nigerian exportation to South Africa has been on oil (Ebegbulem 2013). This has resulted in an imbalance of trade in favour of South Africa wherein Pretoria emerges as having the upper hand. This is a position, which, scholars such as Bond believe, is the cause for inequality on the continent (Bond 2006). This also speaks to the notion highlighted earlier about South Africa’s hegemonic economic dominance. To this effect, Sega and Lekaba (2014) recommend that a balanced trade synergy is required for the acceleration of mutual growth.

Nonetheless, by strengthening its relations with other key states on the continent, South Africa is able to promote and fulfil this feature of its Africa Agenda.
4.4 Enhancing African unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the African Union

A fourth key objective of the Africa Agenda is to enhance African unity integration through the strengthening of continental institutions such as the African Union.

The African Union, previously known as the Organization of African Unity, has been established since 2001. South Africa played a key role in the process of transformation from OAU to AU. One defining feature of the newly revamped AU was the establishment and strengthening of organs which are meant to deal with maintaining peace and order on the continent.

In 2002 South Africa became the first country to chair the AU and has since put much effort in the maintenance of this continental body. In working jointly with the AU, the country has sought to promote integration through multiple means including economic, social and political alleviation with the member states by strengthening key institutions within the African Union such as the Assembly of the Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice and the African Court of People’s and Humans Rights (African Union 2015).

In an effort to address the issue of conflict on the continent, in 2002 the African Union established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which works towards promoting lasting peace and security on the continent. APSA is a structure which includes numerous components such as a continental Early Warning System, African Stand-by force, Panel of the Wise, Military Staff Committee as well as an African Union Peace Fund (African Peace and Security Architecture 2002).

One particular organ of the APSA, which is responsible for the maintenance of continental peace and security, is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Not only does South Africa serve as one of the top financial contributors to this newly formed organ of the AU, but the country has already served two terms on the Council.

As one of the most operational components of APSA, the Peace and Security Council has an objective to ‘provide collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely
and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ (Murithi 2012). The Council convenes regular meetings to discuss key issues pertaining to peace and security on the continent. In addition, the Council also considers potential crisis situations on the continent and sends fact-finding missions to trouble spots on the continent. In addition, the Council stands in the position to authorize AU interventions when necessary.

Therefore, the Africa Agenda promotes such institutions within the African Union in order to promote development and curb the number of conflicts taking place on the continent.

4.5 Strengthening regional integration and institutions, with special focus on the SADC and the Southern African Customs Union

South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy also takes note of the regional neighbourhood in which South Africa finds itself. As such, one of its core purposes is to strengthen regional integration and institutions. Regional development has become an important element of foreign policy as it is believed that South Africa cannot remain ‘an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty’ (Pahad: 2004). To this effect, under Jacob Zuma’s presidency, efforts to promote strong regional integration have resulted in the re-emphasis on the importance of political cohesion and good governance capacity within SADC (Habib 2009: 151).

One stream through which regional integration efforts are being exercised is through intra-African trade. The proposed Southern African Development Community (SADC) - East Africa Committee (EAC) - Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) tripartite trade negotiations are underway. The objective is to create an African Free Trade Area by the year 2017 (Ray 2015).

These key features of the Africa Agenda elements play an important role in making the agenda what it is. While they are equally important, the second section of this chapter will focus on the promotion of peace and security as one of the predominant purposes of this Agenda.
5. The search for Peace and Security on the continent

Africa has come a long way since the days of colonialism but is still faced with a myriad of challenges. One of the most prominent challenges currently facing the continent is conflict. This challenge is particularly prevalent in the Great Lakes region where a vast amount of conflicts have occurred leading to millions of deaths. Conflict has become particularly detrimental in the progress and development of African states because of the devastating effects that it has had on the social, economic and political fibres of affected countries.

The challenges that conflict pose in Africa are plentiful. Primarily, conflict results in millions of deaths across the continent and large scale of refugees and internally displaced persons. This is true because as an aftermath of war, natives usually flee their own country in search of peace and asylum in neighbouring states. The example of the post-electoral conflict in Kenya in 2007 which led to a mass exodus of Kenyan natives into neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Uganda is a case in point. A second challenge of conflict is the massive destruction of infrastructure, inefficient political institutions and collapsed economies that it brings. This challenge obviously has a domino-effect on different facets of life within a country: social, economic as well as political. Finally, conflict poses a challenge to Africa because of the large number of human right abuses that occur in the form of rape or the formation of child soldiers. In response to these challenges, the African Union Agenda 2063 aspires to a peaceful and secure continent by 2063 (African Union 2013).

Furthermore, as explained in Chapter Two, due to the fact that foreign policy lies at the intersection between the domestic and the international, it is clear that conflict in one area of Africa can have consequences in another. Thus the issue of peace and security plays a substantive role in the foreign policy of a state since it affects neighbours as well. It is important that countries that are striving for regional stability pay particular attention to peace and security during the formulation and implementation stages of foreign policy (Van Nieuwkerk 2012).

In an article entitled “Advancing South Africa’s Agenda through the African Agenda”, Fakir (2007) posits that one of the purposes of this agenda is to place stability and democracy as the cornerstone of African countries. As such, South Africa has undertaken a continental
leadership role in peace-keeping and development. Pretoria has been a pivotal actor in numerous continental conflict resolution efforts and continually commits itself to peaceful relations with fellow African states through the backdrop of the AU and SADC.

5.1 South Africa as Africa’s Peace Maker

South Africa has risen to be a peacemaker and agent of change in Southern Africa and beyond in the last two decades (Landsberg & Kondlo 2007: 1). South African foreign policymakers have made it clear that the presence of peace and stability on the continent fits into South Africa’s ‘national interest’ as it is believed that socio-economic and political development can only occur when a peaceful, stable environment is present. In accord with this, former Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad expressed the view that ‘the cornerstone of our foreign policy will be to end conflicts peacefully, to achieve a new world order that is more equitable and people-centred and to create conditions for sustainable development’ (Department of Foreign Affairs 2003). This is because ‘there can be no successful peace-building without socio-economic development and political and economic stability, and conversely there can be no sustainable development and political stability without a successful comprehensive peace-building initiative’ (Saloojee 2008).

During both their terms as Presidents, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki advocated the view that African states should work together to keep conflict at bay by encouraging the establishment of ‘strategic partnerships’ to promote peace on the continent. Nelson Mandela pursued a ‘good neighbourliness’ approach to peace and security as a means of assuring regional neighbours about its pacific intentions (Landsberg 2000: 15). Similarly, during his tenure as president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki articulated a strong commitment to facilitating a continental renewal through the concept of an “African Renaissance” (Alden & Le Pere 2004: 54). Mbeki’s vision of a revived Africa put the issue of continental peace and security on the table and this resonated throughout his time as president. Mbeki believed that conflicts in Africa are the perpetrators of poverty and lack of development on the continent. Therefore in his view, the resolution of these conflicts would eventually lead the continent to socio-economic development and political security (Fakir 2007: 3).
For this reason, South Africa is committed to international peace missions. This commitment is pronounced in the South African White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions which commits the country to supporting initiatives of the United Nations and the African Union for the purposes of preventing, managing and resolving international conflicts (DIRCO 2011).

On the continental level, the challenge of insufficient resources for peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction and development continue to plague the continent. It is upon this point that Habib (2009: 148) is convinced that South Africa is investing a lot of diplomatic and military energy into stabilizing and warding off conflict on the continent (Habib 2009: 148). On the regional level, South Africa chaired the SADC Organ on Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation in 2011 - 2012. During this time, much effort was placed on strengthening the synergy in peace and security processes at international, continental and regional levels.

The motivations behind South Africa’s newly adopted ‘peacemaker’ role are numerous. Sidiropoulos (2007: 7) states that one such motivation comes from the country’s own experience in the smooth and peaceful transformation from its deeply divided apartheid past to a peaceful democratic transition in 1994. As will be explained in the section to follow, South Africa has sought to ‘export’ its ‘model’ to the rest of the continent (Kroslak 2007).

A second motivation for South Africa’s new-found role as Africa’s peacemaker can be associated with Mbeki’s vision of the African Renaissance. This vision draws the link between security and development and puts the issue of continental peace on the table (Sidiropoulos 2007). Khadiagala (2009) offers the view that Mbeki believed that conflicts in Africa perpetuate poverty and lack of development on the continent. As such, during his administration, Mbeki emphasized the need for development and peace to go hand-in-hand.

A third motivation for which South Africa has become Africa’s Peacemaker is the fact that the country has the economic and military resources with which it could take up such continental responsibilities (Miti 2012). As the biggest economy on the continent, South
Africa undoubtedly has room for pursuing extensive ventures in terms of peace and security. However, South Africa has often insisted that it cannot carry the burden on its own and needs the concerted efforts of neighbouring countries to ward off conflict (Fakir 2007: 3).

5.2 South Africa Peace and Security Involvement in Africa through SADC and AU

South Africa has repeatedly pledged its commitment to participate and promote endeavours led by the African Union and the Southern African Development Cooperation to ensure peace on the continent.

In terms of military strategies, the South African government has undertaken to employ cautious defensive non-threatening military strategies grounded in the principles of deterrence and effective operation (Republic of South Africa 1995). With regard to post-conflict reconstruction and development on the continent, the South African government has stressed that this is a critical component of state-building especially in the aftermath of conflict.

The most widely supported non-military method in which Pretoria seeks to achieve peace and security on the continent is through negotiated settlements and inclusive governments. Pretoria has preferred to use the peaceful instruments of quiet diplomacy, (which, simply put, refers to discussing as problems with officials of another country without informing the media) (Graham 2004) or preventive diplomacy (which speaks to the prevention of disputes between parties) with its involvement ranging from a wide spectrum of roles, including the role of mediator, negotiator and/or facilitators of peace processes (Landsberg & Kondlo 2007: 8).

South Africa has been involved in the peace processes of countries such as Burundi, Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, amongst others. It is important to state, however, that the country’s tendency to siding with established governments or liberation movements due to its historical ties alluded to previously has resulted in a mixed record in terms of conflict resolution or peace processes on the continent in the last 20 years of democracy.
The case of former South African President Thabo Mbeki in the 2011 peace process in Cote d’Ivoire is a case in point. The African Union called upon President Mbeki to mediate the Ivorian crisis in December 2011 (Monnier & Bax: 2010). Mbeki seemed to be the best man for the job because of his past credentials as well as the fact that he had previously mediated in the country. Unfortunately, Mbeki’s role in Cote d’Ivoire was short-lived due to continuous allegations of his bias towards the Gbagbo regime, much to the dismay of opposition supporters.

In fact, the memories of how Mbeki allegedly blatantly supported the government in 2004 quickly resurfaced during his 2011 campaign to mediate. Previously, Mbeki was also requested by the African Union to mediate in the Ivorian crisis but achieved little progress to put in place a peace process between the feuding parties. During this earlier mediation, rebel groups who were Ouattarra loyalists seeking to topple Gbagbo’s regime accused Mbeki of being a ‘staunch supporter of Gbagbo’ (Independent Online: 2006). This example reveals how South Africa’s African Peacemaker role has sometimes been questioned.

Similar to the case of Cote D’Ivoire, South Africa’s approach of quiet diplomacy has also been criticized in the case of Zimbabwe. President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy generated a great deal of criticism from those who felt that he favoured President Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party, which, like the ANC is a political party firmly rooted on the ideals of national liberation (Alden 2002).

However, cases such as those in Burundi wherein South Africa sought to mediate the Arusha Peace Process by ensuring a ceasefire in the war-stricken country reveal a positive record of South Africa’s role as Africa’s Peace Maker. After the death of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere in 1999, Nelson Mandela became the main mediator of the conflict. Mandela’s role in the mediation proved useful as he and then vice-president Jacob Zuma, were able to convince the two armed parties, National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people – National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FLN) that were not present at the Arusha negotiations to join the process (Gasana & Boshoff: 2003). Although the path towards conflict resolution in Burundi was paved by Nyerere and Mandela, it was with the mediation
of Jacob Zuma in 2003, (having been appointed as main mediator of the conflict by the South African government to take over from Mandela), that a settlement between CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL and the government was reached. The aim of the negotiations was to seek to create a sustainable solution to the civil war by creating a power-sharing agreement between political and armed groups representing the Hutu and Tutsi communities that both parties could agree on. By December 2005 Zuma had successfully mediated a ceasefire agreement between the military, the Burundi government and all rebel groups which still stands today.

There are many other examples which reveal how South Africa has been successful in its search for peace and security. The role that the country played in the peace process in the DRC is one such example. This case study will be the focus of the next chapter. While peace and security is one of the strongest features of the Africa Agenda, ultimately, the search for peace and security on the continent is still on-going. The pursuit of such an objective requires more than just the effort of one country on the continent to embark on.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of Chapter Three was two-fold. Primarily, the chapter looked into the Africa Agenda as an expression of South Africa’s foreign policy. Secondly, the Chapter looked into the notion of peace and security as one of the primary objectives of the Africa Agenda.

The chapter revealed how South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is significantly different than that of its apartheid policy due to the democratic shift in 1994.

The chapter went on to discuss the contextual background of the Africa Agenda by highlighting the assistance of former Frontline States in the fight against apartheid as well as the moral obligation that South Africa has felt towards its continental friends ever since.

Furthermore, the expression of the ‘Africa Agenda’ was explained in line with its numerous and sometimes contestable understandings. Ultimately it was argued that the Africa Agenda takes into account numerous elements but comes down to the understanding that the social, economic and political well-being of Africa and the promotion of this is at the pinnacle of the agenda.
The chapter went on to highlight the key components and purposes of the Africa Agenda. One such feature is that of asserting South Africa’s African identity. The discussion surrounding this feature looked into how the South African government has purposively displayed its ‘African-ness’ by seeking to be the voice of Africa on international forums, for example vying for permanent-seat status at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to represent Africa. Ultimately, domestic troubles such as the recent spate of xenophobic violence against African foreigners on the continent have led many to doubt how ‘African’ South Africa truly is. Nonetheless, this feature is instrumental in answering one of the subsidiary questions raised in Chapter 1, which is: ‘How does South Africa’s African identity play a role in the manner in which it views its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent’?

In answering this question, it was noted that ultimately, due to the fact that South Africa sees its future inextricably tied to that of the continent, its relations with the rest of the continent are pivotal. In other words, because of its strongly felt connection with Africa, Pretoria is willing and able to pursue such a policy.

Besides this feature, the chapter also dwelt on other elements of the agenda such as enhancing African unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the AU. This is an important element as it feeds the notion of creating African solutions to African problems by solidifying the links between African states. Another key feature of the Agenda is supporting and promoting socio-economic development within the framework of NEPAD and regional integration. This is due to the realization that in order for socio-economic development to take place, it is necessary that a stable and peaceful environment exists.

The second section of the Chapter focused on the quest for peace and security as one of the most critical features of the Africa Agenda. This section firstly highlighted the need for peace and security in Africa and how conflict poses a challenge to the continent. Key points were made such as the fact that conflict leads to a destructive domino-effect on neighbouring countries that have to bear the brunt of war in other countries.
The section further went to discuss South Africa as Africa’s peacemaker. Four motivations for South Africa’s undertaking of this role were discussed. One such motivation is embedded in the fact that due to its smooth democratic transition, South Africa has been bestowed with respect by Africa which has allowed it to take a role in conflict resolution and peace processes on the continent.

The section continued to discuss the role that South Africa has had as Peacemaker on the continent under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. The different examples of South Africa’s interventions in countries such as Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi are only used to illustrate the fact that South Africa poses an extensive portfolio in the field of peace processes. These examples and more have largely promoted the country’s image as Africa’s peacemaker.

In line with the discussion in this chapter, Chapter Four will consider the case study of the Congo Peace Process and the role that South Africa played in this process as an expression of the country’s quest to achieve peace and security through the Africa Agenda. In so doing, the chapter will clearly illustrate how South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy in general, and its objective of achieving peace and stability, in particular, has been carried out in a specific country on the African continent.
CHAPTER 4:

CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA’S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

1. Introduction

Chapter Three served the purpose of addressing the conceptualization of the ‘Africa Agenda’, in general and its objective of achieving peace and stability on the continent in particular. The chapter revealed that this pro-African foreign policy that South Africa so openly advocates is an articulation of the country’s strong commitment to facilitating a continental renewal which involves working on strategies to address Africa’s deep-seated and long-standing developmental and governance challenges (Rapoo 2007: 2).

As highlighted in Chapter Three, one of the most pertinent issues facing the African continent to date is the issue of unending conflict. This is because conflict in one part of Africa is a matter of concern and a threat to the rest of the continent as it creates destructive ripple effects as far as development is concerned (Sidiropoulos 2007: 7). This is believed to be due to the fact that conflict perpetuates poverty on the continent, thereby hindering development. One of the defining features of the Africa Agenda is the promotion of peace, stability, security and post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa. Hence the need to prevent or to end conflicts at all costs.

This Chapter will answer one of the subsidiary questions raised at the onset of this study to examine the challenges South Africa faced in implementing its foreign policy and more importantly, what its role says about its quest to being Africa’s peace maker. The chapter will do so by comprehensively discussing the peace process and focusing on the role and involvement of South Africa in the Congo Peace Process.

In a sense, Chapter Four is a continuation of Chapter Three in that it zooms in on one of the most notable cases of South Africa’s efforts as African Peacemaker on the continent through regional engagement. It is within the context of the Congo peace process that an analysis of this component of South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy objective will be looked at. This dissertation intends to highlight the contribution of South Africa in the peace process in the
DRC and to investigate what this role reveals about the peace and security aspect of its Afro-centred foreign policy.

2. Overview of Country History

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is located in the heart of Africa and shares its borders with nine countries, namely Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan. It also covers two-thirds of the Congo basin forest. It is a country that boasts vast natural resources such as copper, cobalt, coltan, oil, gold, diamond and zinc, to name a few.

Congo’s tumultuous history can be traced back to its pre-independence period. In his book titled ‘King Leopold’s Ghost’, Adam Hochschild (1999) describes the then incongruously named Congo Free State, as a site of exploitation and conflict between King Leopold’s agents and the indigenous populations. Established as an aegis of the 1885 Berlin Conference, Zaïre (now known as the DRC) was actually a private property of the Belgian king who ruled it with an iron fist. Not only did he make a fortune out of rubber and ivory but his agents committed countless crimes to satisfy the King’s greed. Millions of Congolese who failed to deliver the rubber quotas had their hands cut off. When, after strong criticism of his ruthless and greedy rule, the king decided to bequeath his vast Central African empire to Belgium in 1906, the exploitation of the Congo continued for the purpose of enriching the Belgian state.

Congo’s colonial history, characterized by atrocities and authoritarian rule, did not end with the independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. While one would imagine the Congo to be one of Africa’s rare success stories, the country’s brutal exploitation since colonial rule has fallen victim to what has come to be known as the resource curse. Instead of being known for its abundant resources, the country is credited as being the theatre of one of Africa’s bloodiest conflicts.

The conflict in the DRC has involved over half a dozen African countries, either directly as combatants in the fighting, or indirectly as the consequence of the wars.
While there are many factors to consider when studying the case of conflict in the DRC, there are said to be three main causes for the constant bloodshed in this Great Lakes country. Firstly, the colonial legacy that left many to fend for themselves. Secondly, the corrupt and dictatorial regime of Mobutu which resulted in a disorganized and dysfunctional state. Finally, the spill-over effects of conflicts in neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Swart 2008: 82). These reasons, together with the gradual breakdown of the political, economic and social environment have set the country on a downward spiral for many years.

It is argued that the first Congo war had long been stirring before armed conflict actually took place (International Crisis Group 1999). Mobutu’s ascendance to power was the result of clashes between the coalition government of first Congolese president Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in the early 1960s. At the time Mobutu was appointed army chief of staff. Fractures within the coalition government resulted in misunderstandings between Lumumba and Kasavubu. However, because of his position of power within the army, Mobutu was able to influence the power struggle between the two post-colonial leaders. Ultimately, Mobutu sided with Kasavubu and supported the dismissal of the Prime Minister on charges of spreading communist influences within central Africa (International Crisis Group 1999).

After a short time another power struggle ensued, this time between President Kasavubu and his premier, Moise Tshombe. This time Kasavubu was not as lucky as he was soon afterwards overthrown in a coup orchestrated by Mobutu who would later declare himself president. Mobutu immediately called a state of emergency and presented his political party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution, as the only legal political party which all Congolese were obliged to join (International Crisis Group 1999: 3).

Like King Leopold, Mobutu ruled the country with an iron fist and was supported by Western powers that saw in him an ally against the communist bloc in southern and central Africa during the Cold War (Kabemba 2011: 102). As such, Mobutu enjoyed little to no interference from the West with regard to his modus operandi in ruling the country. His corrupt style affected every aspect of Congolese daily life. During his time as head of state,
kleptocracy, patronage and cronyism were the order of the day (Swart 2008: 87). His personality cult went so far that at its best, pictures and portraits of him were seen all over the country, and at its worst, television broadcasts saw him appearing as a god descending in clouds from the sky. This resulted in some sort of worship of the President, who the populace believed would pave a brighter future for all.

Not only was the public/private divide infringed by the Mobutu-mania, but the corrupt Zaïre state also controlled the formal sector of the economy. As such, resources that were extracted through corrupt means were often used to purchase political support from regional and ethnic affiliations rather than being invested into the country. In so doing, Mobutu acquired a vast amount of personal fortunes from Zaire, making it his own personal fiefdom (Swart 2008: 87). As a consequence, while Mobutu’s net worth was increasing, the economic reality for the majority of the population worsened.

In the 1970s and 1980s the formal economy was brought to its knees after Mobutu nationalised foreign-owned businesses and handed them to his cronies. The majority of the Congolese population was forced to rely on the informal economy for their subsistence (Kabemba 2011: 100). Economic difficulties, rampant corruption and the absence of basic service delivery and development led to the dysfunctionality and failure of the state. Once this happened, sentiments of disgruntlement and dissatisfaction began to surface leading Mobutu’s dictatorial rule to quickly spiral out of control as government loyalists began to second guess their allegiance to him.

In the early 1990s the ropes that previously bound Mobutu and the West together quickly began to tear. This was as a consequence of the dual impacts of the Cold War coming to an end leading to the collapse of the communist Soviet state and the wave of democratization and pluralism that began to sweep across the African continent (International Crisis Group 1999: 3). The West could no longer support the corrupt antics of Mobutu and shifted gear, placing their support towards governments such as that of neighbouring country, Rwanda that had begun introducing democratic principles. With this new turn of events, the Mobutu government rapidly lost its grip on power both at home and abroad. This triggered the alignment of internal and external actors to rise against the father of the nation.
The following section discusses the background of the two wars that took place in the DRC between 1990 – 2002.

3. Background to conflict

As a result of the events discussed in the previous section, the prospect of conflict in the DRC soon began to rise. In the east of the country a rebellion began to form due to the inflow of Rwandan Hutu perpetrators of the genocide who were fleeing the Tutsi government in Kigali (Kabemba 2011: 107). The inflow of Rwandan Interahamwe Hutus into Eastern Congo sparked the first Congo war.

At the same time, a rebel movement organized by veteran soldiers and civilians that sought to see the end of Mobutu’s reign began to form. In September 1996, a group of Rwandan militia attacked the camps along the Congolese border with the objective of eliminating the Interahamwe threat. The attack also constituted a blow against the Hutu-sympathizing Mobutu regime (Carayannis 2003: 239). Because of past vendettas, Uganda and Angola soon joined the Rwandan government in its objective of dismantling the incumbent Zairian regime.

In an attempt to disguise their actions from being a straightforward act of aggression against a sovereign state, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments sponsored the creation of an alliance of small and obscure exiled, anti-Mobutu, Congolese revolutionary groups who had long been against Mobutu’s regime and who were ready to engage in violent warfare. Laurent Kabila became the face of the rebellion and emerged as the principal spokesperson of the Alliance des forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) (International Crisis Group 2002: 2). Upon arrival in Kinshasa, Laurent Kabila declared himself president of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Congo.

Like Mobutu, Kabila was viewed by the populace as a national liberator who would reverse the pains of the past. Unfortunately, Kabila turned out to be as dictatorial as his predecessor; the only difference being that unlike Mobutu, Kabila stood against the exploitation of Congo’s natural resources by outsiders. This discredited him in the eyes of
the West and he quickly lost support from many former allies (International Crisis Group 1999: 8).

In July 1998, rumours of a planned coup and accusations that Kabila was turning into a dictator prompted Kabila to swiftly expel the Rwandan troops that had helped ensure his victory against Mobutu. Kabila accused the Ugandan and Rwandan forces of opportunism and self-enrichment (International Crisis Group 1999: 3).

A month later an announcement was broadcasted that a rebellion had broken out in the east of the country against Kabila. The rebellion which began in the Congolese province of North Kivu quickly spread to cover more than forty per cent of DRC territory, drawing in the armies of seven African countries and costing countless lives (International Crisis Group 1999: 1).

While the president had the backing of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad to fight against the rebels, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi fought on the side of the rebels. This act triggered the Second Congo war which would draw more than half a dozen nations in what has come to be known as Africa’s First World War (Reyntjens 2010).

Since the second week of the war, Rwandese rebels continued to inhabit Goma, the North Kivu capital, as well as Bukavu and Uvira in South Kivu. This enabled them to establish a foothold in Eastern Congo (International Crisis Group 1999: 2). There have been a reported 5.4 million deaths and an equal amount of displaced persons as the result of the war (International Rescue Committee 2007). Armed rebel groups fighting the Congolese army continue to terrorize citizens of eastern Congo. The consequences have been atrocities in the form of rape, amputations and the training of child soldiers.

A long series to stabilize the Great Lakes region soon took place. The section to follow will describe the Congo peace process in detail. In the subsequent section, South Africa’s involvement in this process will be documented.
4. The Congo Peace Process

In 2002, the Congo Peace Process which aimed to stabilize and bring peace in the Great Lakes Region was launched. While the process would ultimately bear fruits, it was a long and arduous one.

The importance of the geo-strategic position of the DRC in the heart of Africa is evident in that war and instability within its borders posed a threat for countries surrounding it (Adebajo 2008: 125). Because of the DRC strategic position, one can argue that the high level of complexity of the war in Congo has a direct correlation with the multiplicity of actors that have attempted to resolve the conflict in this country. The efforts of international actors such as the United Nations, European Union, Organization of African Unity (now African Union); the Southern African Development Community, states such as the United States of America, France as well as a number of individual personalities have been noted in paving the way for an end to the conflict (International Crisis Group 1999: 4). Numerous summits and ministerial consultations had been convened to deal with the Congolese case since the outbreak of the first war.

The first attempt to restore peace in this war-torn country began as early as 1996 shortly after the first war broke. Former South African President Nelson Mandela attempted to resolve the conflict by mitigating the tension between incumbent president Mobutu and rebel leader Laurent Kabila (International Crisis Group 1999). This intervention was motivated by the view that unless something was done, chaos in this central African country would have a destabilizing domino effect in the rest of the region.

The mediation took place aboard the SAS Outeniqua, a South African naval vessel docked at the Congolese port of Pointe Noire. Mobutu was grasping at the last straws of power and proposed a compromise which involved a cease-fire on the part of Kabila’s rebels and the creation of a transitional government that would prepare the nation for its first multi-party elections. Kabila was not interested in such an agreement, insisting, rather, that there was no other option for Mobutu but to cede power (CNN 1997).
The second war broke out a few months after Kabila came into power. The next steps for peace in the Congo came in the form of the Lusaka Peace Agreement which was signed in July and August 1999 (Lusaka Peace Agreement 1999). While the Lusaka Peace Agreement was primarily the result of regional effort, the behind the scenes role played by the United State of America’s envoy Howard Wolpe and the European Union’s envoy Aldo Ajello have been noted as being beneficial as they worked closely with the regional organization to find a solution (Carayannis 2009: 7).

This agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities between warring parties within 24 hours of signature. A key characteristic of the agreement was its emphasis on equal status for all parties as well as the election of an unbiased facilitator who would oversee the negotiations.

The Lusaka Peace Agreement also initiated that the segmented groups enter dialogue on the future prospects of the DRC’s politics (Malan & Boshoff 2002: 1). Three pillars underpinned the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Firstly, the agreement to cease hostilities and the terms upon which foreign troops would withdraw from the DRC within twenty-four hours of signature. Secondly, the agreement to the neutralization of armed groups operating in the DRC. Thirdly, an agreement on the rapid establishment of a national Inter-Congolese Dialogue aimed at discussing the future prospects of Congolese politics (Lusaka Peace Agreement 1999). After much consultation with the different parties to the conflict, Keitumile Masire, the former President of Botswana was assigned the post by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Malan & Boshoff 2002: 1).

Four weeks after the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, the war continued to wage as the main rebel group the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) refused to sign the deal since it had been split and both segments of the group demanded the exclusive right to sign the peace agreement (International Crisis Group 1999: 1). In September 1998 a series of meetings were held which resulted in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Union (EU) as well as the United States dispatching envoys to lead the peace process.
The next step in the peace process was the signing of two Memorandum of Understanding agreements. These agreements were signed between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda and Uganda respectively. The first was between the DRC and Rwanda in 2002 in a deal known as the Pretoria Accord, which was centred on the withdrawal of Rwandan soldiers from Congo. The second accord, the Luanda Agreement was signed between the DRC and Uganda and was also aimed at removing Uganda militia from the DRC. Once the deals between Congo and the external actors of the conflict were reached, the next step in the peace process would be the consolidation of the Congolese state (International Crisis Group 2002).

A series of negotiations known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) were held in order to get parties to the Congolese conflict to discuss issues pertaining to the country’s future. The dialogue welcomed non-violent political opposition of the government as well as civil society groups to join the discussion on how to build the future of the DRC.

Albeit the fact that Laurent Kabila had signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement binding him to all its regulations, the President was not in favour of the fact that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue bound all parties to equal status. In addition, Kabila refused to co-operate with the United States and accused Former Botswana President Keitumile Masire (an Anglophone) of being biased in favour of Uganda and Rwanda. In January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila assumed the seat of president and took steps to reboot the Lusaka Process (Carayannis 2009: 9).

Inter-Congolese Dialogue preparatory meetings were convened in Gaborone, Botswana, in 2001 to discuss the logistics of the talks. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was chosen as the location for the talks. However, after many deadlock talks as the result of unpreparedness and disagreements, the dialogue was moved to Sun City, South Africa, in February 2002 (International Crisis Group 2002: 4). Sun City proved to be disastrous as it failed to produce an agreement that all parties of the conflict could agree to. Masire’s role in the dialogue was criticized by observers in that due to his inability to speak French, he was unable to fully understand the underlying relationships between the negotiating parties. A point that had previously been argued by Kabila senior.
Initially the national Inter-Congolese Dialogue was scheduled to last 45 days after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. The core aim of the dialogue was the creation of a transition government that would lead the DRC to democratic elections in the near future (International Crisis Group 2001: 1). The dialogue also discussed details about the formation of a national army as well as the re-establishment of administrative as well as social and political infrastructure.

In a last minute attempt to salvage the talks, former South African president Thabo Mbeki was called upon to facilitate the negotiations. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue ultimately produced the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement which was signed in December 2002. The Global and All Inclusive Agreement brought together representatives of the government, Congolese Rally for Development (RCD-GOMA), Congo Liberation Movement (CLM), political opposition, civil society, Mai-Mai, RCD-N and RCD-ML to form a transitional government of national unity (Global and All Inclusive Agreement 2002: 2). The agreement stipulated that a ‘1+4’ transitional government would be formed which would be comprised of one acting president working together with four vice presidents.

The transitional agreement paid special attention to the realities between Kinshasa and Kigali and also ensured that the Mai Mai group (which had previously left out of the peace process) would be represented (Carayannis 2009: 11). This means that the newly formed government would be made up of the former government, former rebel groups, and the political opposition, with each constituent holding different governmental responsibilities until elections were to be held (Anstey 2006).

The interim period came to an end in 2006 when general elections were held and Joseph Kabila was elected president of the Republic. In 2011 a second presidential election took place in the DRC, extending Joseph Kabila’s mandate by another five years. Although the formal peace process ended with the holding of democratic elections, measures are still in place to monitor the situation in the DRC.

A focus on South Africa’s involvement in the peace process will be the objective in the section to follow.
5. South Africa’s involvement in the Peace Process

In 1996 South Africa responded to the call by the international arena to contribute towards the resolution of the DRC conflict (Makgetlaneng 2011: 152). Since then, South Africa’s involvement in the Congo Peace Process has formed a major component of its Africa Agenda and more particularly, its quest to achieve peace and security on the continent as discussed in Chapter Three. South Africa’s involvement has included a whole array of conflict management roles which include mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

As suggested in Chapter Three, a stable and peaceful DRC is a foreign policy priority for Pretoria. This makes the intervention of South Africa and its contribution both meaningful and visible (Malan 1999).

In harmony with the Southern African Development Community as a regional body, the African Union as a continental actor, the United Nations as an international actor as well as a host of other countries, South Africa was actively involved in the process of resolving the DRC conflict.

For the purposes of this study, South Africa’s particular involvement in the peace process will be discussed in three phases. The first phase occurs in the late stage of the armed rebellion against Mobutu’s regime led by Laurent Kabila. The second phase covers the duration of the peace agreement negotiations. The third phase is the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development stage in which South Africa continues to be actively involved in assisting the Democratic Republic of Congo.

5.1 Pre-Joseph Kabila Phase

South Africa’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo began in 1997 when a deadlock was reached between the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and President Mobutu who, despite his crumbling regime, refused to cede power. There was recognition on the part of South Africa and other surrounding capitals that the breakout of war in Zaire could possibly have spill-over effects in its own borders. Pretoria immediately responded to the
circumstances by appointing former South African President Nelson Mandela as the principal mediator (Carayannis 2009: 6).

In February 1997, the first talks between the Mobutu and Kabila camps brokered by South Africa and the United States of America failed. Three months later a subsequent meeting was scheduled aboard the SAS Outeniqua, a South African naval vessel docked at the Congolese port of Pointe Noire. This time, Mandela sought to negotiate a smooth exit for Mobutu (Cable News Network 1997). On the one hand, the incumbent leader proposed a compromise which involved a cease-fire on the part of Kabila’s rebels and the creation of a transitional government that would prepare the nation for its first multi-party elections. However, on the other hand, rebel leader Kabila sought complete power and would not negotiate. Ultimately, South Africa’s efforts proved ineffective as the two could not agree on a compromise (Cable News Network 1997).

According to Miti (2012: 30), the situation had not been adequately understood on the part of South Africa as they proved to have ignored key factors that spurred on the conflict. The first factor to consider is the fact that the war in the DRC represented an invasion of the country by Rwanda and its allies Uganda and Burundi with some support from Angola. Therefore the number of actors within the war was obviously a lot more than what met the eye (2012: 30). Miti also points out that, while mediating, Mandela ignored the fact that the military defeat of Mobutu’s army by the Rwandan alliance indicated that it was not ready to compromise the prospect of creating a government of national unity. In addition, the fact that Mobutu’s internal support had seriously declined since the Conference Nationale Souveraine in March 1991, suggested that there was little hope that the former colonel would be successful in maintaining his power (Miti 2012: 31). Taking these elements into consideration, Miti asserts that it is of no surprise that Mandela was unable to get the two foes to agree. Mobutu was ultimately ousted and fled in exile to Morocco where he later died in May 1997.

Thus, in the initial stages of the peace process, South Africa’s involvement, although valuable, was ineffective. The second stage of South Africa’s involvement in the Peace
Process was manifested in its interventions throughout the peace negotiations and the signing of peace accords. The following section will focus on this.

5.2 Peace Negotiations

The bulk of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process was evident during the peace negotiations. As the newly elected president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki strongly opposed the war in the DRC. Mbeki advocated a 10-point plan which was devised based on the notion of a negotiated settlement solution for this war torn Great Lake country. Four key provisions characterised this plan. Primarily was the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC. Secondly, the call for the establishment and deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Thirdly, the establishment of a Joint Military Command. Finally, the establishment of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Makgetlaneng 2011: 153).

The provisions stipulated above were incorporated into the Lusaka Peace Agreement which South Africa, together with a host of other countries acting under the capacity of the African Union, sought to broker peace (Lusaka Peace Agreement: 1999).

As mentioned earlier, the Lusaka Peace Agreement led to the signing of two agreements which sought the cessation of violence and the retrieval of armed groups from Congolese territory. The first agreement which was between Congo and Rwanda in 2002 in a deal known as the Pretoria Accord was facilitated by South Africa. The accord was centred on the withdrawal of Rwandan soldiers from Congo. The second accord, the Luanda Agreement, was signed between Congo and Uganda and was also aimed at removing Uganda militia from the DRC. Once the deals between Congo and external actors of the conflict were reached, the next step on the agenda was the consolidation of the Congolese state through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Misunderstandings between the various parties threatened to derail the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. To this effect, Thabo Mbeki was called upon in a last minute attempt to save the negotiations. Two plans were proposed by the South African leader. The first plan suggested that Laurent Kabila remain the national president during the transitional period. This proposition included the establishment of the High Council of the Republic which would
consist of Kabila, Jean-Pierre Bemba (leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo) and Azarias Reberwa (leader of the Rally for Congolese Democracy) and the Prime Minister to be appointed by unarmed political opposition. In this plan Mbeki also proposed the establishment of a special court to serve as the Constitutional Court, National Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission as well as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Makgetlaneng 2011: 157). In addition, this plan suggested the establishment of an independent defence force, security, intelligence and police services. Much to the fury of opposition parties (RCD, MLC, and other oppositional parties), Mbeki’s plan was rejected on the basis that it favoured the Congolese government.

The rejection of the first plan set in motion Mbeki’s second plan. After much revision, the second plan by Mbeki which suggested a presidency consisting of Kabila as president together with four vice-presidents made up of the opposition parties was accepted. These four political entities would have to supervise key government portfolios including economy, finance, politics, defence and security commission, the development and reconstruction commission as well as the social and cultural commission. Mbeki’s plan included a proposition that the National Assembly and the Senate exercise legislative and judiciary duties (Makgetlaneng 2011: 157). The establishment of five public institutions including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the High Authority of the Media, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and the National Human Rights Observatory which would support the transitional government was also proposed in the second Plan (Villa-Vicencio & Nantula 2005: 55).

The acceptance of Mbeki’s second plan saw the resumption of the negotiations in South Africa in October 2002. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue, although tumultuous, ultimately produced the Global and All Inclusive Agreement which South Africa facilitated. This agreement was signed in Sun City, South Africa between members of the Congolese government, rebel groups and civil society. The agreement established the transitional government which was to be in power until democratic elections were held (Global and All-Inclusive Agreement: 2002).
According to Ajulu (2008: 260), South Africa was highly committed to the conflict resolution process in Congo. As a final hope to salvage the peace talks, Mbeki’s intervention proved vital as his style and approach to the mediation was very hands-on and he was confident that a negotiated solution was possible.

Mbeki’s commitment throughout the process goes without saying. He was present at the adoption of the Constitution of the third republic by transitional Parliament in May 2005. On several occasions, Mbeki sent teams constituted of government officials and members of his office to the DRC to assess the situation and facilitate further progress. In fact, the first mission by newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Ms Dlamini-Zuma was to visit the DRC (Khadiagala 2009).

The Chapter will now look into the third phase of South Africa’s involvement in the DRC.

5.3 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development efforts

Two decades of war had devastating impacts on Congo’s infrastructural, economic, political and social fibres. Once the agreement was signed, the Peace Process entered another stage, that of peacebuilding.

An international follow-up committee was set up to monitor the democratic transition in the Congo. Members of this committee included the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the European Union, Angola as well as South Africa to ensure that the peace in the DRC would last (Khadiagala 2009: 75).

The third stage of South Africa’s involvement in the DRC is characterized as the post-election phase where Pretoria continues to assist in the reconstruction and development of the troubled central African nation. Key capacity building projects were outlined by South African technical task teams which have been implemented, albeit with some difficulties. These include:

5.3.1 Public Sector Reform

During the years of conflict, the Congolese public sector was ridden with corruption, making it impossible for good governance to reign. The reform of the Congolese public sector
involved many projects. One project which South Africa, together with the governments of Germany, Sweden and the United States of America pursued was the decentralization of government and public administration. The aim of this project was to restructure the state and mechanisms of governance in the Congo. Activities which had to be implemented in order to achieve this project included the development of three elements: an organic law, a vision, and a strategy for the DRC public service administration (Dlomo 2012: 50).

A second project that informed the public sector reform was the establishment of an anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework aimed to prevent, reduce and combat corruption (Dlomo 2012: 51). All stakeholders involved in the establishment of this framework were trained to increase organizational capacity within DRC institutions in order to manage and implement anti-corruption policies and programs. In addition, the project was informed by the insights from members of civil society, grass root non-governmental organizations as well as the business sector.

A third project underlying the public sector reform was diplomatic training of Congolese diplomats and ambassadors. This project also stretched to include the refurbishment of the Foreign Ministry building in Kinshasa. Of paramount significance was the establishment of the Diplomatic Academy which served to train diplomats and academics from both countries (Dlomo 2012: 101). Core teaching areas of the academy included areas such as conflict resolution and negotiation skills, South Africa’s foreign policy, management and leadership as well as mission administration. Besides the foreign ministry, numerous other South African government department representatives were posted at the South African mission in the DRC in order to train their Congolese counterparts on matters arising within the respective departments (Dlomo 2012: 54).

5.3.2 Security Sector Reform

After the conflict, Congo was in dire need of reform within its security sector. The military reform was broadly led by the United Nations and the European Union. South Africa undertook certain key projects which dealt with the revival of the state defence capacity. These projects involved three areas, namely: the development of a Master Plan by the South African Detachment for Integration and Training (SADAIT), Operation Teutonic as well
as Mission Thebe. All these areas were targeted with the intention of improving the very frail security sector inherited after the wars (Dlomo 2012: 55).

In addition to the military reform, the development of the justice and constitutional system within the DRC needed serious attention. The contribution of South Africa in this light gravitated towards the training of DRC magistrates, the establishment of information technology and relevant infrastructure as well as supporting legislative drafting and the development of a legal and constitutional framework (Dlomo 2012: 57).

Inclusive to this security sector reform was the reform of the Congolese police services. This project had a 5 year time span according to South African government. This project would involve the implementation of the project, the transferral of skills to Congolese and then exiting the project. The aim of this project was to strengthen the DRC police services as well as to render support and facilitation of the reform (Dlomo 2012).

5.3.3 Economic Development and Reconstruction

The result of being in the middle of Africa’s bloodiest war was a dainty and frail economy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As part of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development process, it was paramount that economic development and reconstruction be done in an attempt to stitch together the broken pieces of Kinshasa’s economy.

Within the context of this reform, South Africa undertook numerous projects which were implemented in the field of infrastructure, transport, energy and telecommunications to name a few. In line with the above-mentioned projects, feasibility studies were conducted by South African institutions such as the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporations (IDC). In addition, the inclusion of relevant South African government departments in establishing, regulating and monitoring business activities was a pivotal step in the process. The establishment of trilateral agreements between South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as traditional donors during the Post Conflict Reconstruction Development process have also opened partnership doors in the search for economic development and reconstruction (Dlomo 2012: 59).
Besides the above mentioned PCRD projects, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo established the Bi-National Commission in 2004. The commission serves as an annual forum for exchange and dialogue between South Africa and the DRC. This commission acts as a forum for both countries to engage in matters concerning economics and politics in pursuit of post-conflict reconstruction and development goals (South African Embassy Kinshasa: 2013).

In addition, the establishment of the United Nation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has seen the deployment of peacekeeping troops in the eastern provinces of the DRC. To date, South Africa ranks amongst the highest contributors of military deployed to the DRC.

While there is still much work to do in order to achieve peace and stability in the DRC, South Africa’s contribution to the creation of a national framework that potentially addresses unresolved problems within the DRC holds weight. The end result of South Africa’s efforts in this Great Lakes region has been the re-affirmation of the country as a peacemaker. To this end, many argue that South Africa’s efforts in the DRC were successful in that it led to elections which some say has resulted in a fragile democracy.

6. Conclusion

This Chapter has focused on explaining the DRC conflict, discussing the peace process and considering South Africa’s role in this process. The chapter was divided into three sections. The first section of this chapter provided the background of the conflict in the DRC. It highlighted the history of the DRC and also discussed the possible causes of the wars in the country.

The second section focused on the Peace Process in the DRC which was long and arduous and involved many starts and ends. This case study reveals the challenges and obstacles that South Africa faced in implementing its foreign policy because it put South Africa face to face with other international interests.

The third section of the chapter highlighted the particular role that South Africa played and continues to play in rebuilding the DRC. The intervention of South Africa was described in
three stages. The first phase is the period during which South Africa acted as a mediator between former President Mobutu and rebel leader President Laurent Kabila.

The second phase of South Africa’s intervention was throughout the peace negotiations. It is during this phase that South Africa worked in concert with a number of international bodies as well as special representatives to get the belligerent factions of the war to negotiate. It was because of the downward spiral of the peace process that South Africa intervened and brought a last minute turn-around in the negotiation process. Through the efforts of former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the warring parties agreed to sign the Global and All Inclusive Agreement which stipulated the establishment of an intermediary government which would later have democratic votes for the first time in the country’s history.

The third phase of South Africa’s involvement has been in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development phase. Through an array of projects in the public sector reform, military reform as well as economic reconstruction and development, South Africa has been putting measures in place. It has committed itself to assisting the central African country to get back on its feet.

The inauguration of the transitional government that led to elections which some say has resulted in a fragile democracy in the DRC has demonstrated the success of South Africa’s intervention. However, despite these efforts, the climate of relative insecurity prevailing in the east of the country continues to claim countless lives. Since the elections in 2006, Congo continues to face severe problems. The political situation in the Congo is still worrying since internal problems such as bad governance, the uncertainty related to the new cycle of elections as well as interference from external parties continue to influence national politics.

Chapter Five will assess South Africa’s interventions in the Peace Process in line with its Africa Agenda foreign policy. This will be done by looking at the key components of the Agenda mentioned in Chapter Three and measuring them against its role in the Congo Peace process as outlined in this chapter. As such, Chapter Five will seek to answer the main research problem: ‘What does the outcome of the DRC peace process reveal about South
Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy in general and its peace and stability goal in Africa in general?"
CHAPTER 5:

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PRO-AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is not simply to consider South Africa’s Africa Agenda foreign policy and the case study of the Congo Peace Process in isolation. Rather, the purpose is to bring these two elements together to find out what the outcome of the Congo Peace Process and the role that South Africa had in it reveals about how South Africa has conducted its Afro-centric foreign policy and its peace and security goal in the last twenty years of its democracy.

Taking into account the three previous chapters, the purpose of Chapter Five is thus to analyse and evaluate whether South Africa has measured up to its pro-African ambitions in general and its peace and security objectives in particular through its involvement in the Congo Peace Process. The analysis will draw upon Graham Allison’s three models of decision-making (1971), which, as described in Chapter Two, provide a framework by which one can analyse a foreign policy decision.

Ultimately, the thrust of the chapter will be to answer the main research problem as described in Chapter 1: ‘What does the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveal about South Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and stability goal in general?’.

The Chapter will answer this in three ways. Firstly, the chapter will place the study into context by highlighting why and how such a policy has been undertaken by the South African government. Secondly, an analysis of South Africa’s peace and security foreign policy decision in light of its involvement in the Peace Process will be done using Allison’s Three Conceptual Models. Finally, the chapter will evaluate the Africa Agenda by measuring South Africa’s involvement in the Peace Process against the set purposes of the Africa Agenda as stipulated in Chapter Three.
2. Rationale and implementation of Foreign Policy

As described in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, when considering the purposes or reasons for a particular foreign policy stance, it is important to consider the context of the international and domestic environment. This is because foreign policy lies at the hinge of these two environments (Hill 2003).

As discussed in the previous chapters, the Africa Agenda was born out of an acknowledgement of South Africa’s domestic and international setting.

The reason behind South Africa’s pursuit of a Pro-African foreign policy lies in its domestic and international experiences of the past and its current experiences now. One such goal is the ability to assert South Africa’s African identity on the continent. Sidiropoulos rightfully comments that in pursuing such a foreign policy, there is an intentional effort towards the re-affirmation of South Africa’s African-ness’ (Sidiropoulos 2007: 2).

Webber and Smith (2002: 80) correctly articulate that the implementation stage of foreign policy is crucial to an understanding of ‘the direction, the efficiency and the effectiveness of policy’.

According to Du Plessis (2006), there are generally four techniques or means used to implement foreign policy. These include: political, economic, psychological (propaganda) and military. It is argued that South Africa made use of all four techniques when expressing its Africa Agenda in the case of the Congo Peace Process.

Politically, the Africa Agenda was carried through in the case of the Congo peace process with the use of mediation and facilitation undertaken by South African presidents. As discussed in Chapter Four, during the power struggle between President Mobutu and rebel leader Laurent Kabila, former President Nelson Mandela intervened when the leadership of Mobutu was threatened by Laurent Kabila.

Mandela used a carrots and stick approach in an attempt to negotiate a smooth exit for the incumbent President Mobutu whose hold on power was loosening. Albeit the fact that the mediation was not effective, it displayed the use of an approach to pacific resolution of
conflicts. As highlighted in Chapter Three, negotiated settlements and inclusive governments are the modus operandi that South Africa employs for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Furthermore, once the second Congo war erupted in 2002, South Africa once again exercised political techniques in order to implement its Africa Agenda by facilitating the talks.

The political technique is also evident in President Mbeki’s 10-point plan, which was instrumental in getting the opposing parties to agree on the cessation of war. This plan was rejected but a revised plan which has come to be known as the ‘1+4’ plan was accepted and led to the formation of a Congolese government where one president co-existed together with four vice presidents. This led to the eventual signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement in South Africa.

A second technique of implementation, the economic tool, has become increasingly popular in conducting foreign policy (Du Plessis 2002: 129). This is particularly due to the fact that its application is often indirect yet its results are very often direct. Economic techniques include a wide array of forms ranging from economic boycotts or negative sanctions to economic aid or positive sanctions imposed on states.

In the context of the Congo Peace Process, economic aid was used. As described in Chapter Four, at one stage of the process, there was a serious difficulty relating to internal feuds which threatened to collapse the peace process. This resulted in a situation where the availability of locations for the talks came under question. When South Africa intervened, it accepted to host the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City and also agreed to fund 50% of the conference (Miti 2012: 32). The country also invested large sums of money into the first democratic elections. Similarly in the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Development phase, South Africa continues to financially contribute towards the reformation of key sectors in the DRC.

The psychological technique of implementation is indirect yet South Africa used it in order to persuade a number of domestic as well as international stakeholders of the possibility of
re-starting the peace talks which had threatened to collapse due to continuous misunderstandings and grievances (International Crisis Group 2002). Former South African President Thabo Mbeki was called upon and he proposed the plans which would later be accepted by all parties to the conflict in the peace process.

South Africa also made use of the military tool for the implementation of foreign policy, although not for the coercive use of force in the process of the war. Instead, South Africa used the military instrument through the dispatching of peace troops in the post-conflict and reconstruction development phase as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission (Kabemba 2007: 537).

A discussion on why such a foreign policy decision has been taken will provide information as to what the outcomes of the peace process in the DRC reveal about South Africa’s foreign policy goals in general and its emphasis on peace and security in particular. The overall analysis of this goal is best discussed in the context of Allison’s Three Conceptual Models.

3. Foreign Policy Analysis: Allison’s Three Conceptual Models

In his work entitled ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1971), Graham Allison sought to assess the process of decision-making during the leadership of President Kennedy in light of the Cuban missile crisis which took place in October 1962.

On the basis of his findings, Allison established three conceptual models for explaining what happens or what could possibly happen when groups in a government have to deliberate on foreign policy options. These models came to be known as the Three Conceptual Models. While each model is based on different levels of analysis, it is required that all three models are used together to obtain a complete understanding of any foreign policy decision.

As discussed in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, the Three Conceptual Models include the Rational Actor Model, which focuses on identifying actors that possess clearly defined goals and feasible options by which to achieve their goals. Secondly, the Organizational Process Model, which is premised on the idea that the pursuit of policy is determined by the routine behavioural habits of the organization involved in the decision-making process. Thirdly, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, which focuses on the cooperation
between the departments responsible for the decision-making and administration of foreign policy (Allison 1971).

By drawing on the insights of Alison’s Three Models of decision making, the section to follow will analyze South Africa’s Africa Agenda foreign policy and its objective of achieving peace and security on the continent, using the Congo Peace Process as a case study. The aim of the section will be to provide an analysis of what the outcome of the DRC peace process reveals about South Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and stability goal in particular.

4. Applying the Allison Models to South Africa

As described in the theoretical framework discussion in Chapter Two, Allison’s models seek to explain what happens when groups in a government meet, deliberate and recommend options concerning a foreign policy directive (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk 2002).

According to Allison (1971), the process of understanding foreign policy decisions can be formulated using a combination of the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model.

In the section to follow, these models are applied to the South African case.

4.1 The Rational Actor Model

As described in Chapter Two, the essence of the Rational Actor Model is to identify key actors in the foreign policy spectrum who have set goals and who make defined choices about how to achieve their goals. A key assumption of this model is that actors have complete information of the situation at hand. Furthermore, according to this model, actors have the challenge of making a choice between competing alternative options.

Applied to the case of South Africa, the Rational Actor Model identifies the South African government as the key actor and the country’s foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security in Africa in general, and in the DRC in particular, as its defined goal.
It is clear from the foregoing observations that there are three scenarios which South African foreign policy makers had to come face to face while pursuing its peace and security objective in the Congo Peace Process. Each scenario would have brought about its own consequences.

- South Africa could have allowed the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo to continue without any involvement.
- South Africa could have intervened militarily.
- South Africa could have involved itself in the peace process.

As described in Chapter Four of the study, the conflict in Congo involved over half a dozen African states. Similarly, its peace process was also characterized as an imbroglio due to the numerous stakeholders involved as well as the different complexities faced in the region.

In light of the various scenarios listed above that South Africa could have embarked on, had South African foreign policy makers decided not to intervene in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it may have led to various implicit or explicit consequences.

On the one hand, inaction on the part of South African foreign policy makers would have been regarded as a missed opportunity to promote its Africa Agenda ideals which South Africa would later regret. This is especially true with regard to the Agenda’s ideals to promote peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Leaving the conflict in the DRC to fester would have proved disastrous for the SADC region as a whole due to the domino effect that conflicts tend to have on regional neighbours.

On the other hand, inaction at this critical point in Africa’s contemporary history could have been translated as unwillingness on the part of South Africa to involve itself on the continent’s affairs. This comes after a long history of isolation by the apartheid government towards the rest of the continent. This would have echoed the views of Habib in Chapter Two who rightly points out that the country’s foreign policy was previously ‘regionally militaristic and globally defensive’ (Habib 2009: 148).

According to the second scenario, if South Africa had chosen to intervene militarily at this stage, there would also have been consequences. For instance, as a newly re-admitted
member in the global forum, an intervention in a militaristic manner would have sent shock waves throughout the continent. This is taken from the fact that the country had just rejoined the international community and had barely let go of the grips of apartheid which had had negative relations with the rest of Africa in the years prior to the democratic breakthrough. As the largest economic and military power in the SADC, a military intervention on the part of South Africa, would have, as in the case of Lesotho in 1998, resulted in the accusation by neighbouring states of South Africa’s arrogant hegemonic ambitions (Neethling 1999). A point which, as highlighted in Chapter Three, the current South African government shuns. This perception would later develop due to South Africa’s dominance in the continent and sub-region’s affairs.

Judging from these three scenarios, the rational choice for South Africa in this case was to intervene in the conflict and provide facilitation role in the peace process.

The third possible scenario, which is to be involved in the peace process, was implemented in numerous ways. This included the role of mediator played by Mandela to negotiate a smooth exit for Mobutu, the role played by South Africa in facilitating the Peace Process during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2002 and the role played by South Africa in the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Development phase through making use of the economic tool of foreign policy implementation by sponsoring the Congolese elections and working towards the transformation of key sectors within the Congolese state.

This scenario also brought forth its own consequences. On the one hand, it strengthened South Africa’s image as an African peacemaker on the continent. In so doing, it reinforced its commitment to promote and pursue an “Africa First” policy and express a desire to be the ‘voice” of the continent internationally (Landsberg 2000: 2). As Miti (2008) explains it, such an intervention proves that “there is the political will and commitment to engage in conflict resolution within the country’s leadership”.

Similarly, the fact that the Global and All Inclusive Agreement brought forth the first successful democratic elections in the DRC is also a point which endows the country with prestige. South Africa’s involvement also reveals that the foreign policy makers acted in a rational manner as it had pre-stated its goals and was now simply following through by
acting on its goals. This is contrary to its past experience as having an incoherent foreign policy (Nathan 2005).

Nonetheless, while this model is useful in identifying the goals that actors have, there are key defining pitfalls of the model. Primarily is the fact that the model simplifies the decision-making process. As such, with regard to South Africa, it incorrectly assumes that South Africa was the only actor in the peace process. In fact, as argued in Chapter Four, the high level of complexity of the war in Congo war has direct correlation with the multiplicity of actors that have attempted to resolve the conflict in this country. Numerous summits and ministerial consultations have been convened to deal with the Congolese case since the outbreak of the first war. Initiatives to restore peace have been undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (which became the African Union in 2001), the Southern African Development Community, the international Francophone community as well as a number of individual personalities (International Crisis Group 1997: 4).

A second pitfall of this model is that it assumes that the decision-makers were acting rationally or with complete information when deliberating whether or not South Africa should involve itself in the peace process.

Using the Rational Actor Model, the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveals that South Africa’s Africa Agenda in general is a rationally calculated expression of the country’s foreign policy which has been crafted by decision-makers who have considered the environment in which it finds itself.

This model also reveals the challenges that South Africa faces in situations in which it is not the only actor involved. It reveals the gaps that exist in the fact that South Africa may not have had all the information about the peace process and the interests that various stakeholders possessed.

Nonetheless, the Rational Actor Model also points to the fact that with regard to its peace and stability goal in general, South Africa is taking good caution to fulfil this goal through mediation, facilitation and investment in post-conflict reconstruction and development.
4.2 The Organizational Process Model

As discussed in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, this model is in contrast to the Rational Actor Model in that it rests on the understanding that governments are not the sole unitary actors in foreign policy making. Rather, the Organizational Process Model concedes that government works in cooperation with a number of other actors in making decisions (Allison 1971).

In addition to the above, a key assumption of this model is that policy decisions are not made using rational calculations. Instead, this model advocates the view that policy decisions are made by the routine behaviour of organizations involved in policy making. In the set-up of foreign policy, this implies the principles of continuity and change on the part of decision-makers in the formulation of foreign policies.

The question of continuity and change in the process of developing foreign policy in South Africa has been a subject of debate in the last two decades. Landsberg (2012) argues that there has been both continuity and change in the foreign policies of the Mbeki and Zuma governments in the last ten years.

When applying the Organizational Process Model to the foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security in Africa, it is clear that South African foreign policy makers have pursued a policy of continuity which is expressed in the manner in which the promotion of sustainable peace and security is emphasized.

South Africa has adopted the image of Africa’s peacemaker and has sought to be an agent of change on the continent in recent years (Landsberg & Kondlo 2007: 1). One of the key foreign policy goals of South Africa has become the achievement of sustained and sustainable peace on the continent. Concurring with this view, Nathan (2005: 364) rightly asserts that “Pretoria is convinced that pacific forms of conflict resolution are the most viable methods of achieving durable peace and security in the context of civil wars and similar crises on the continent”.

As highlighted in Chapter Two, in the aftermath of the apartheid dispensation, South Africa’s foreign policy principles have been inclined towards a commitment to international
peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict (Henwood 1997: 6). This echoes the publication by the ANC in 1994 of a comprehensive foreign policy document titled ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa’ in which the principle that “international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive. Where this breaks down, internationally- agreed peaceful mechanisms to solve conflicts should be resorted to” (ANC: 1994) was one of the guidelines stipulated to govern South African foreign policy.

There has been a strong degree of continuity in the approach of post-apartheid South African leaders with regard to peace and security on the continent. During the Mandela years, South Africa preached the gospel of democracy both on the continent and internationally. This goes back to South Africa’s Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process, which enshrined the values of democracy in South Africa’s political system and is seen as a mirror for conflict resolution on the continent (Miti 2008).

Similarly, during his term in power, Mbeki placed a great emphasis on the continental peace and security agenda. This took on a new dimension with his articulation of the ‘African Renaissance’ which had, at its core, the prerequisite of attaining peace on the continent which would allow for economic development to take place (Alden & Le Pere 2004: 54).

In the same vein with his predecessors, Jacob Zuma has sought continuity in the foreign policy approach towards Africa. During his term, ‘African strategies’ to promote ‘African Advancement’ has become a recurrent theme. This of course, borrows heavily from Mbeki’s ‘Africa Agenda’ notion as described in Chapter 3. According to the Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, ‘the new [South African] government will continue to work towards achieving a vision of Africa which is united, peaceful and prosperous’ (Nkoana-Mashabane 2009). In the same vein, the Minister has proclaimed that ‘the consolidation of the African Agenda remains central to our foreign policy objectives’ (Nkoana-Mashabane 2009).

As far as the case study of the peace process in the DRC is concerned, there is a high level of continuity in the manner in which Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have handled the different stages of the peace process.
From the onset, Mandela relied on peaceful negotiations to pave Mobutu’s exit and the establishment of the Kabila government. Unfortunately, as described in Chapter Four, the mediation was not successful. However, Mbeki picked up where Mandela left off and continued to push for a negotiated settlement in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which produced the Global and All Inclusive Agreement.

In the aftermath of the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement, the newly democratic Congolese state was in dire need of reconstruction of key sectors. It is at this point that the Zuma government would display continuity in its approach to peace and security in the DRC by using the South African-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC), the vehicle created by the Mbeki government to engage the DRC.

Therefore the implementation of projects related to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development is particularly addressed at rebuilding the Congolese state’s capacity within the police, security forces and state institutions (Landsberg 2012). This phase is currently underway under the Zuma government.

As far as analysing the foreign policy decision according to the Organizational Process Model is concerned, the outcome of the Congo Peace Process reveals the degree of continuity in which South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders have conducted foreign policy. To this effect, in response to one of the subsidiary research questions raised in Chapter One, South Africa can strengthen its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent and assert its commitment to the continent by pursuing a foreign policy of continuity.

In this way, the country builds credibility not only in its commitments towards pursuing its Africa Agenda but also in its role of pursuing peace on the continent.

4.3 Bureaucratic Politics Model

The Bureaucratic Politics Model sheds light on the degree of conflict and co-operation that takes place between various departments and individual decision makers that are in critical positions to influence policy decisions (Allison 1971).
Applied to the South African case, this model reveals that the directive on how to handle the peace process in the DRC involved competition for resources, attention and the right to frame the policy question by various departments.

For starters, the office of the President was instrumental in playing a role throughout the peace process. Key figures such as Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki played critical roles at different stages of the process. The choice of Mandela as mediator in the conflict between Kabila and Mobutu, and the role that Mbeki held during the peace negotiations speak to the power that key individuals have in orchestrating foreign policy decisions as well as convincing civil society and parliament that South Africa’s involvement in the troubles in this central African nation was important. Both leaders have been credited as being Foreign Policy Presidents who have been able to effectively direct the course of the country’s foreign policy.

In addition to the efforts of Mandela and Mbeki, at the ministerial level, the Department of International Relations and Co-operation, the Department of Trade and Industry as well as the Department of Defence each sought to frame the policy question with regards to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development phase of the peace process.

4.3.1 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)

As the main agent conducting South Africa’s foreign policy, DIRCO has undoubtedly been instrumental in the framing of the foreign policy decision with regards to peace and security in the Congo Peace Process.

Not only has DIRCO been powerful in advising about the manner in which South Africa was to engage in the process and the manner in which it was to implement this foreign policy objective, its role has also been evident in the critical PCRD phase.

One of the key focuses of DIRCO’s involvement in the PCRD process has been in terms of capacity building with particular emphasis on the training of diplomats. As described in Chapter Four, South Africa has set up a Diplomatic Academy which has trained more than 700 DRC diplomats to date (Department of Foreign Affairs 2015).
4.3.2 Department of Defence

The Department of Defence sought to frame the peace and security policy question throughout the Congo Peace process in terms of the support provided during the PCRD phase. Most notable of its efforts has been South African National Defence Force’s participation in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO).

In the aftermath of the Peace Process, the Defence Force played a pivotal role in the training of DRC military as well as supporting the Congolese government in the writing up of a Military Strategy (Department of Foreign Affairs 2015). In addition, bilateral ties have been strengthened between the two governments by means of the signing of a Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Furthermore, the South African government has pledged to continue giving support towards the formation of a strong and effective Congolese military force which is able to keep peace and security of the Congolese state at large.

4.3.3 Department of Trade and Industry

As another crucial actor in forging the foreign policy question of peace and security, the role of the Department of Trade and Industry in the Congo Peace Process could not be downplayed. The DTI has sought the right to frame the policy question in the PCRD phase of the Peace Process in attempting to improve the economic standing of the DRC which has had a staggering economy since the onset of the wars.

In recent years, the Department of Trade and Industry has organized yearly trade exhibitions in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. The aim of these trade fairs is to create opportunities for South African and Congolese business people to get to know one another and to create business opportunities for themselves.

The establishment of the Bi-National Commission has served to strengthen bilateral political, economic and technical cooperation between the two governments through exchange and dialogue in the PCRD phase (South African Embassy Kinshasa: 2013).
While this section has analyzed the peace and security foreign policy objective in particular, the section to follow will evaluate the Africa Agenda as a whole.

5. Foreign Policy Evaluation

As described in Chapter Four, the Africa Agenda has multiple purposes, each serving towards the advancement of the African continent.

Foreign Policy evaluation involves considering the consequences of foreign policy actions and assessing whether the goals were desirable and whether or not they were achieved (Du Plessis 2002: 134). This section will evaluate the goals of the Africa Agenda as highlighted in Chapter Three and measure whether it has been upheld during the Peace Process.

5.1 Asserting South Africa’s African identity

In this study, it is argued that South Africa has a strong perception of its African identity based on its historical past and the current dispensation. It is because of its self-perceived African identity that South Africa was able to actively involve itself in the resolution of a conflict which had pulled in over a dozen African countries and had left over 5.4 million dead and hundreds of thousands displaced (International Rescue Committee 2007).

The AU notion of providing ‘African solutions to African problems’ is a concept that has been debated in the last couple of years. It is arguable that its perceived African identity acted as motivation for South Africa’s involvement in the peace process. This has been made possible as highlighted in Chapter Three by the view that South Africa views itself within and an inextricable part of the continent.

However, while many could proclaim that South Africa asserted its ‘African-ness’ through its involvement, this does not mean that its African counterparts have bought into it. In fact, many African states viewed South Africa’s involvement as meddling, even going so far as to suggest hegemonic tendencies in its actions (Habib 2009). In this regard, critics have also insinuated that through its involvement, South Africa was not just asserting its African identity, but was using it as an opportunity to create means through which South African companies could infiltrate the Congolese market and covet its natural resources, particularly
mining companies who could, along with many other neighbouring countries and multinational companies alike, covet the DRC’s natural resources (Kabemba 2007: 537).

For the purpose of evaluating whether or not the Africa Agenda ideals have been upheld with regard to this particular case study, it is evident that South Africa has indeed met this purpose.

5.2 Supporting and promoting socio-economic development within the framework of NEPAD and regional integration.

While most have celebrated the creation of NEPAD as an outstanding African initiative towards the establishment of new partnerships and links with the rest of the industrialized world (Melber 2001: 2), critics of the project describe it as a ‘neoliberal initiative’ mostly tailored to South Africa’s assets and interests, at the risk of increasing regional and social disparities (Marthoz 2013).

The promotion of socio-economic development has been a major focus of DIRCO’s work since 2000 (DIRCO 2013). Yet, while the South African government supported and promoted socio-economic development during its involvement in the Congo Peace Process, it did not particularly do so in the framework of NEPAD during the Peace Process.

Instead, in concert with the African Union, South Africa’s approach to the socio-economic challenges in the Peace Process included getting the warring parties to agree to cease fire and ensuring that elections would be held in order to start the process of nation-building. The reforms in key sectors such as the public sector and security sector spoke towards the need to lay the foundation for socio-economic development.

5.3 Strengthening bilateral relations on the continent

In the process of its involvement in the Peace Process, bilateral relations on the continent were strengthened as South Africa did not act in isolation during the peace process. The country was part of a concert of African and international actors seeking to put an end to the war and to promote peace in the DRC. Initiatives to restore peace were undertaken by the Organization of African Unity (which became the African Union in 2001), the Southern
African Development Community, the international Francophone community as well as a number of individual personalities (International Crisis Group 1997: 4).

In the aftermath of the first democratic elections, the Bi-National Commission between the South African government and the Congolese government was created in 2004. The Commission marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the two countries and have strengthened bilateral relations in terms of economic, political and trade issues.

5.4 Enhancing African Unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the African Union

In an open address commemorating 19 years of South Africa’s foreign policy, Former International Relations and Co-operation Deputy Minister Ibrahim Ibrahim, stated that South Africa has played a key role in the establishment of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture, so that the continent now boasts the most elaborate security regime of any region (DIRCO: 2013).

The role that South Africa played in the Congo Peace Process was under the auspices of the African Union. As such, it received the mandate from the continental body and used these powers in order to harness continental integration and strengthen the AU institution. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of DIRCO has stated that ‘the strengthening of the African Union and its structures is a priority in deepening continental integrations’ (Nkoana-Mashabane 2015).

In terms of this Africa Agenda goal, it is therefore considered that South Africa met this objective in relation to the Congo Peace Process.

5.5 Strengthening regional integration and institutions, with special focus on the SADC and the Southern African Customs Union

South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo are both members of the Southern African Development Community. Thus, regional integration under the auspices of SADC played a key role in South Africa’s involvement in the Congo Peace Process.
5.6 Promoting peace, stability and security

South Africa has since the mid-1990s played an important role in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. There are various reasons for this, including the radical political shifts in key Great Lakes states, the relative decline of Western involvement within these states as well as the absence of a strong regional leader (Khadiagala 2009: 68).

As discussed in Chapter Four, South Africa actively fulfilled its Africa Agenda during the Congo Peace Process. This was done through a wide range of means, including mediation and facilitation. The impact of South Africa’s involvement was most felt during the peace negotiation phase in which, together with a concert of other actors, South Africa facilitated the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which produced the Global and All Inclusive Agreement. It is clear from its active involvement in the Peace Process that the promotion of peace, stability and security has and continues to play a central role in South Africa’s Africa Agenda foreign policy.

6. Conclusion

Chapter Five sought to analyse and evaluate whether South Africa has measured up to its pro-African ambitions in general and its peace and security objectives in particular through its involvement in the Congo Peace Process.

The purpose of this chapter was to answer the main research problem as described in Chapter 1: ‘What does the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveal about South Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and stability goal in general?’.

The chapter aimed to answer this question in three ways. Firstly, the chapter sought to reiterate why this African foreign policy has been pursued and how South Africa has implemented it. It was found that four tools have been used by South Africa to implement this foreign policy. These include political, economic, psychological as well as military tools.

The chapter then analysed the peace and security foreign policy decision by drawing upon Graham Allison’s Three Models of decision-making (Allison 1971), which, as described in Chapter Two, provide a framework by which one can analyse a foreign policy decision.
Each of Allison’s Three Conceptual Models (the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Model as well as the Bureaucratic Model) revealed aspects of the peace and security foreign policy goal that South Africa has been advancing in the last twenty years.

The analysis revealed that in general, South Africa made a rational decision in the manner in which it was involved in the Congo Peace Process and had counted the costs of not involving itself or of having involved itself militarily.

In addition, the analysis showed that South Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy possesses a high level of continuity in its approach over the years. This is due to the fact that over the years, the post-apartheid governments have taken on similar approaches to dealing with foreign policy and, in particular, peace and security on the continent.

Furthermore, the analysis revealed that actors such as the Department of International Relations and Co-operation, Department of Defence and Department of Trade and Industry each framed the foreign policy question based on the position in which they found themselves in.

Ultimately, the chapter found that the outcome of the Congo peace process reveals the importance that peace and security is given in South Africa’s foreign policy.

The third part of the chapter evaluated the Africa Agenda based on the purposes of the Agenda as described in Chapter Three. By measuring the Africa Agenda against the outcomes of the Congo Peace Process and the role that South Africa played in it, it was found that in general, South Africa has lived up to its Africa Agenda goals.

Chapter Six will summarize and conclude this study and provide recommendations for further research in the field of South Africa’s foreign policy, with a focus on its Africa Agenda.
CHAPTER 6: 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study has been to provide an analysis of South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security in Africa. The case study of the Congo Peace Process was used to show that South Africa is aware of its position on the continent, and is able and willing to exercise a role to ensure peace and security in Africa.

The practical relevance of the research lies in the fact that while much research has been done about South Africa’s foreign policy, very little has been said about its Africa Agenda approach. In addition, while research on the Congo Peace Process has been extensive, not much work has been undertaken on the relevance and effectiveness of South Africa’s role within the peace process in light of the country’s pro-African foreign policy stances.

The significance of such a study stems from the fact that it serves as an overview of South Africa’s current foreign policy direction. The study also serves as a recommendation for South African foreign policy makers by highlighting challenges that need to be overcome. Most importantly, the findings of this study are helpful to the extent that they can be used to inform foreign policy observers about South Africa’s foreign policy approach to Africa.

2. Summary

The thrust of this research was based on South Africa’s perceived intricately-linked identity with the rest of the continent as prescribed in an Afro-centric foreign policy that the country has pursued since the dawn of democracy in 1994 (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005).

The Africa Agenda, which serves as a framework for South Africa’s actions towards the continent, refers to the manner in which South Africa prioritizes and pays special attention to issues facing Africa. This type of foreign policy has been actively pursued by the country since 1994.
Given the challenges that Africa faces in terms of violence and conflict, there is an undeniable need for peace and stability on the continent. This, as discussed in Chapter One of the study, is due to the fact that socio-economic development cannot take place on the continent unless there is a peaceful and stable environment in Africa. Therefore, the pursuit of peace and security as one of the prime objectives of the Africa Agenda is the main focus of this study.

One of the concrete expressions of South Africa’s role as peacemaker on the continent was manifested in the role that it undertook in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Peace Process. Home to over 60 million people, this central African nation has been the theatre of Africa’s most deadly conflicts. The process to stabilize the country, and the region at large took over 10 years. The signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement, which South Africa helped to facilitate, marked the end of conflict in 2002.

In using the Congo Peace Process as a case study, the objective of the study has been to analyse South Africa’s foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security in Africa. In so doing, the study sought to assess what the outcomes of the Peace Process reveals about the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of South Africa’s foreign policy. Therefore, in other words, the case study of the DRC Peace Process is used to understand what these challenges are and what they reveal about the nature of South Africa’s foreign policy goal of securing peace and security on the continent.

To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated: What does the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveal about South Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and stability goal in particular?

In addition to the main research question, three subsidiary questions were asked:

- How does South Africa’s African identity play a role in the manner in which it views its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?
- How can South Africa strengthen its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?
• What lessons can South Africa learn from its efforts in achieving its foreign policy objective of peace and security in the DRC Peace Process?

The research problem statement as well as the subsidiary questions were demarcated along three delimitations: conceptual, temporal and geographical terms.

In terms of the conceptual delimitation, the study focused on foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. This was tied together with the term ‘Africa Agenda’, which, as discussed in Chapter Three refers to the search to advancing the social, economic and political well-being of Africa through promoting the interests of Africa as the primary concern of South Africa.

In terms of temporal delimitation, the study was limited to the period between 1996 and 2006. This is due to the fact that the first Congo war broke out in 1996 and the subsequent years saw the outbreak of the second war as well as the lengthy peace process. This period also includes the holding of the first democratic elections which South Africa also helped facilitate in the war-torn Congo.

In terms of geographical delimitation, the study was confined to the Great Lakes region of Africa, drawing its attention mainly on the case study of the DRC which is situated in central Africa. The importance of the geo-strategic position of the DRC in the heart of Africa is two-fold. Firstly, the presence of war and instability within Kinshasa’s borders poses a threat for countries surrounding it; and secondly, its position provides an opportunity for Pretoria to carve out a leadership role in central Africa.

The research design and methodology of the study was primarily qualitative research. Qualitative research, as described by Newman and Benz (1998: 3), is a naturalistic approach used when observing and interpreting reality with the aim of developing a theory that will explain what was experienced. The strength of such a method is that it allows for the interpretation of the variable under study, which in this case was South Africa’s foreign policy objective of achieving peace and security on the continent.

In addition, the study was undertaken using descriptive and explorative approaches which are best applied in qualitative research. A descriptive approach attempts to systematically describe a situation, problem or phenomenon. Such an approach presents an opportunity to
reconstruct the ‘what is’ of a topic. On the other hand, the explorative approach is concerned with exploring the ‘why’ questions of research and contributes significantly to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research study (Maree 2007: 51).

The data used in the study was gathered using primary and secondary sources. Key primary sources included South Africa’s Foreign Policy White Paper, government statements, official UN, AU, and SADC reports, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, the Lusaka Peace Agreement as well as joint Bi-National Commission statements.

Secondary sources dealing with the thematic and conceptual analysis of South Africa’s Africa Agenda foreign policy and the Congo Peace Process were found in books, doctoral theses, masters’ dissertations, opinion editorials, journal articles, commentaries and press releases.

The structure of the research facilitated the coherence of the study. In light of this, the focus of Chapter One was to give an overview of the study by raising the research problem as well as highlighting the aims and objectives of the research. In addition, the first chapter served to provide subsidiary questions to the main research problem which the study also answered in the subsequent chapters.

The essence of Chapter Two was to provide a discussion on the fundamental concepts and contextual issues underlying the study. Chapter Two is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the theoretical framework and the second section deals with the contextual framework.

In the first section of Chapter Two, the fundamental concepts of the study, which include foreign policy and foreign policy analysis, are discussed. It was noted that the contestability of the term ‘foreign policy’ means that its range of definitions can be extended as far as being described as ‘the decision and actions which involve, to some appreciable extent, relations between some states and others’ (Frankel 1963:1) to ‘the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact’ (Evans & Newham 1990: 123).

In general, for the purposes of the study, these definitions and others could be incorporated to understand that foreign policy is concerned with the actions and reactions of individual
states and also includes the processes and means through which these actions and reactions are determined (Kamath 1990: 10).

With regard to this, key theoretical perspectives of foreign policy were mentioned. The first, realism, which is the pre-eminent and dominant paradigm that is employed in international relations, is based on three assumptions. Firstly, that the state is the most important actor in world politics. Secondly, that the international system is characterised by anarchy. And thirdly, that states are motivated by national interests. The second theoretical perspective, liberalism, criticizes the first and points to the fact that states can and should work together to forge a peaceful environment for all to thrive.

In addition, the study also focused on the goals that states seek to pursue using foreign policy. These include security, autonomy, welfare as well as status and prestige. Notable for the overall discussion of this study is the goal of security.

The chapter also delved into the foreign policy making process and highlighted the five broad stages of foreign policy making. Although this process is not a static one, but one that undergoes constant adaptation and refinement, there are key stages that all foreign policy decision-making had to undergo. These include: the agenda-setting/problem presentation stage in which policy makers set the agenda on possible areas that foreign policy should focus on. The following stage, that of option generation, looks into the options of different actions which could possibly be taken. The third stage, that of policy decision, refers to the weighing out of stakes and the act of policy makers choosing a decision. The fourth stage, that of implementation, takes place once a decision has been made and is implemented through the various actors that play a role in policymaking. The final stage - policy review, takes place once the decision has been made and implemented. At this point of the process, a review is conducted to inform the decision-maker of whether to continue to uphold a certain policy, reconfigure or abandon a particular policy.

Furthermore, Chapter Two discussed the foreign policy-making actors in the context of South Africa. The President and Deputy President, Department of International Relations and Co-operation (previously DFA), Parliament, the Department of Defence, Department of
Trade and Industry as well as Civil Society were identified as important actors that play a role in defining and formulating foreign policy in South Africa.

Chapter Two further looked into Foreign Policy Analysis as the second fundamental theoretical conception. The three paradigmatic works of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954), (Decision Making as an Approach to the study of International Politics); Rosenau (1964) (Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy), and Sprout and Sprout (1956) (Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics), which significantly contributed to the foundation of Foreign Policy Analysis was highlighted.

Graham Allison’s Three Conceptual Models for decision-making was used as the main theoretical tool underpinning this study. Chapter Two explained each of the three conceptual models and highlighted the main assumptions of each model. This tool serves as the basis for the Chapter Five of the study in which an analysis of South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy goal of peace and security was conducted.

The Chapter went on to examine the contextual framework of the study. This section focused on the general foreign policy principles of post-apartheid South Africa.

The study revealed that as articulated by Nelson Mandela in 1993, South Africa’s foreign policy would rest on certain pillars, namely:

- That issues of human rights are central to international relations and extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;
- That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;
- That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide relations between nations;
- That peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;
- That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy choices;
• That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world (Mandela 1993).

Similarly, these principles were echoed in a parliamentary address in 1994 by Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo, stating that South Africa’s foreign policy principles include:

• Human rights,
• Justice and international law,
• International peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict,
• The interests of Africa in global affairs.

The Chapter revealed that these principles have been re-iterated in the South Africa Foreign Policy White Paper (2011).

A conceptualization of the terms ‘peace’ and ‘security’ were also provided in Chapter Two for the purposes of clarification of terms.

Whereas Chapter Two introduced the fact that Africa is one of the main focal points of South Africa’s foreign policy, the following Chapter would lay a solid foundation of what has come to be known as the ‘Africa Agenda’.

The purpose of Chapter Three was thus to focus on the Africa Agenda as one of the key elements of South Africa’s foreign policy as well as peace and security as one of the main goals of this foreign policy approach. The chapter dug deep into the ‘Africa Agenda’ notion and provided a clear understanding of this foreign policy approach.

The discussion on South Africa’s pro-African foreign policy was based on the literature available relating to Pretoria’s perception of belonging to the continent and its role in furthering the continent’s objectives. Together with official government publications found in the Foreign Policy White Paper and official publications and state addresses, the literature was also found in the works of authors such as Landsberg & Kondlo (2007), Bohler-Muller (2012), Rapoo (2007), Miti & Kilambo (2000), Adebajo (2009), Fakir (2007), Sidiropoulos (2007), SAIIA (2008), Landsberg (2000) & (2006) and others. These authors discuss South
Africa’s ‘Africa Agenda’ in detail and pay close attention to articulating the emergence and purpose of this agenda as it pertains to South Africa’s role within the African continent.

The first section dealt with the Africa Agenda in its entirety. A background of the Africa Agenda revealed that this foreign policy approach emanated from a historical past during which other African states helped the African National Congress to carry and discard the burden of apartheid. Many of these ‘Front Line States’ played a role in raising awareness of the undemocratic practices taking place in Pretoria at the time. Some of these states even became adoptive homes for ANC exiles and other freedom fighters.

The chapter then examined the definition and understandings of the Africa Agenda as this term has been highly debated in recent years. It emerged from the analysis that there have been various perspectives of the Agenda; the term has been interpreted in two ways. The first is that it refers to the manner in which South Africa prioritizes and pays special attention to issues facing Africa (Miti 2012). This includes issues such as conflict resolution, institution building, peace-keeping and governance. A second understanding of this agenda is that it seeks to project the capabilities and ambitions that South Africa has for continental leadership (Miti 2012). One such avenue is that of promoting peace and security on the continent. Overall, the Agenda refers to the understanding that through the agenda, South Africa wishes to advance the social, economic and political well-being of Africa. Notably, a discussion regarding the authenticity of the Africa Agenda was also recorded regarding speculations of hegemonic tendencies on the part of South Africa through the agenda.

The chapter also looked into important features of the Africa Agenda which are the key features/purposes that make up the Agenda. Six such features were identified.

By analysing the first feature, that of asserting South Africa’s African identity, it became clear that, through the Africa Agenda, South Africa seeks to re-affirm its ‘African-ness’ as described by Sidiropoulous (2007: 2). Secondly, the Agenda also seeks to support and promote socio-economic development in Africa within the framework of NEPAD and regional integration. This has been evident in the manner in which South Africa has taken a leading role in advocating and promoting NEPAD continentally as well as internationally.
A third feature of the Agenda is that of strengthening bilateral relations on the continent. This feature reveals the manner in which, through the Agenda, South Africa has sought to establish and re-establish strong relations with its African neighbours. This has produced fruit as evidenced by the number of Bi-National Commissions that have emerged between South Africa and numerous African countries.

The fourth feature or purpose of the Africa Agenda is to enhance African Unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance such as the AU. To this effect, South Africa has sought to strengthen key AU institutions which in turn help to enhance integration on the continent.

The fifth key feature of the Agenda looks into strengthening regional integration and institutions with a special focus on the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union.

The final feature of the Agenda, which forms the basis of this study, relates to the promotion of peace, stability and security in Africa. This feature is broadly discussed in the second section of the chapter.

The second section of Chapter Two pays attention to the peace and stability component of the Agenda. The importance that South Africa in placing on peace and security on the continent is corollary to the realization that in order for socio-economic development to take place, there is an undeniable need for a peaceful neighbourhood to exist.

While South Africa has been pushing the agenda of peace and security on the continent, its efforts have not gone uncriticised. There has been much debate about the motivation behind South Africa’s actions. While during the Mandela years, the Africa Agenda stressed ‘good neighbourliness’ and ‘non-hegemonic’ relations, many critics have asserted that South Africa is nothing but a regional bully and hegemonic power.

The study has highlighted the various motivations behind South Africa’s emphasis on peace. Firstly, the iconic status that former South African President Nelson Mandela contributed a great deal to spreading the gospel of peace and democracy on the continent. Secondly, South Africa’s own experience in smooth and peaceful transformation from apartheid
attesting to a peaceful democratic country was also a motivating factor. Thirdly, the African Renaissance vision of former president Thabo Mbeki found a strong foothold in the sense that it links security and development and put the issue of continental peace on the table. Finally, the fact that South Africa has the economic and military resources to uphold the continental responsibility of pursuing peace was a factor that cannot be ignored.

Subsequent to this, Chapter Three paid particular attention to the role that South Africa has played as an African peacemaker. It was noted that in the last 20 years, South Africa has been involved in numerous peace initiatives on the continent which sheds light on its objective of creating a peaceful and stable community in which favourable socio-economic conditions can improve for the benefit of all in Africa.

The support that South Africa offers to structures that promote peace was also highlighted. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is one such structure and it is revealed that South Africa is one of the top financial contributors to the APSA. Similarly, the study also revealed that South Africa has played a role in the regional body (SADC) and has chaired the organ on Defence, Politics and Security Co-operation during 2011-2012.

It is within the context of the Congo Peace Process that the analysis of the peace and security component of South Africa’s Africa Agenda was looked at in Chapter Four.

The Chapter was aimed at presenting the case study of the Congo Peace Process as well as discussing the role of South Africa’s involvement in the peace process.

In this regard, the chapter discussed the background to the conflict, the Congo Peace Process as well as South Africa’s involvement in the process. South Africa’s involvement can be divided into three stages: the pre-Joseph Kabila stage, the peace negotiations stage as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and development stage.

The chapter provided a historical overview of the DRC and the nature of the two conflicts that have taken place in this country. The dominance of the Mobutu regime and the power-struggle that ensued when Laurent Kabila attempted to overthrow Mobutu was explained. In addition, the chapter provided background information and detailed explanation regarding the reasons why the Congo Peace Process had to take place. In addition, the study
revealed the intricacies of the Peace Process which took place under the auspices of numerous stakeholders. It was revealed in the study that the Congo Peace Process underwent numerous challenges, one of which was exactly the presence of many stakeholders in the process which each pushed their own agendas.

The chapter looked into the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement and the three pillars that underpinned this agreement. This included the agreement to cease hostilities, the agreement to neutralize armed groups operating in the DRC, and the agreement on the rapid establishment of a national inter-Congolese dialogue.

The signing of the two Memorandums of Understanding between the DRC and Rwanda and Burundi respectively was also mentioned prior to discussing South Africa’s involvement in the Peace Process in the second section of the chapter.

The second section of Chapter Four focused on the three phases through which South Africa was involved in the Peace Process. The first phase, which is described as the ‘Pre-Joseph Kabila Phase’ deals with South Africa’s efforts in mediating between Mobutu and Laurent Kabila. This intervention took place prior to the start of the second war in the DRC. Although the mediation was not successful due to the fact that the opposing parties did not agree to a compromise, the act of intervention on the part of South Africa was a shadow of the things to come and the involvement that South Africa would have in the strenuous peace process.

The second phase discussed in Chapter Four is described as the ‘Peace Negotiations’ phase in which South Africa actively played a role in facilitating peace negotiations between the different warring factions. Under the auspices of the African Union and United Nations, many countries played a role in leading the DRC to peace. The specific role of South Africa in this process was clearly highlighted. This was in part fulfilled in the Lusaka Peace Agreement which South Africa, together with a host of other countries, contributed to broker peace under the capacity of the African Union. While its efforts in brokering this deal were minimal, the limelight of South Africa’s efforts came in the facilitation of the Global and all Inclusive Agreement during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which entered its final stage in Pretoria, South Africa.
Finally, the third phase of South Africa’s intervention, which is referred to as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development refers to the role that South Africa has played since the end of the conflict in the DRC. This has been evident in the identification and reform of key sectors in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those areas include the public sector, security sector, as well as economic development and reconstruction.

In terms of its public sector reform, the South African government has worked hand in hand with the DRC to reconfigure the public sector in order to create stability. One project which was established in the public sector reform was that of an anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework which aimed to prevent, reduce and combat corruption in the DRC. Such projects are intended to have long-lasting impact in the DRC.

In terms of the security sector, South Africa has undertaken key projects which deal with the revival of the state defence capacity. Projects such as the development of a Master Plan by the South African Detachment for Integration and Training (SADAIT), Operation Teutonic, as well as Mission Thebe, to name but a few, have gained momentum since their inception.

In terms of economic development and reconstruction, numerous undertakings in the field of infrastructure, transport, energy and telecommunications have been referred to.

In general, Chapter Four unpacked South Africa’s role in the Peace Process in entirety and provided important ground upon which Chapter Five would be based.

Chapter Five of this study was aimed at assessing what the outcomes of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo tell us about the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of South Africa’s foreign policy on the continent, particularly with regard to peace and security.

The chapter began by discussing the rationale of the foreign policy approach by echoing the views brought forth in Chapter Three. The study revealed that the reason for this particular foreign policy is due to the fact that South Africa identifies itself as part and parcel of the rest of the continent.
The chapter then explained how South Africa’s foreign policy has been implemented in the Congo Peace Process. It was argued that there are four techniques that South Africa had used to implement its foreign policy. These include political, economic, psychological and military techniques.

Politically, the Africa Agenda was carried out through South Africa’s mediation and facilitation in the Congo Peace Process. The economic technique came to play as South Africa invested financially in the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Development stage of the peace process. Psychologically, the indirect use of persuasion to get the different stakeholders of the peace process to re-start the already jostling negotiations went a long way as South Africa was able to reconvene the talks in Pretoria. As to the military technique, South Africa did not make use of coercive use of force. However, it played a role in the dispatching of peace troops in the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Development phase as part of the joint United Nations and African Union peacekeeping mission. More recently, it contributed troops to the Monusco-led intervention brigade which helped quell the M23 rebellion.

In the second section of Chapter Five, an analysis of the peace and security objective of the Africa Agenda by making use of Graham Allison’s Three Conceptual Models is made. These models are used in order to explain what happens when groups in a government meet, deliberate and recommend options concerning a foreign policy directive.

The Three Conceptual Models include the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. The study reveals that while each model is based on different levels of analysis, it is required that all three models are used to obtain a complete understanding of any foreign policy decision.

The Rational Actor Model analysis of South Africa’s peace and security foreign policy goal reveals that decision-makers were faced with three possible alternatives in light of the Congo Peace Process. Either they could have been inactive and uninvolved in the Process, or they could have decided to intervene militarily, or thirdly, they could have intervened peacefully.
The fact that South African decision-makers opted for the third option of the Rational Actor Model strengthened South Africa’s perception of an African peacemaker on the continent. In addition, the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveals that South Africa’s afro-centric foreign policy and its peace and stability goal in particular, is a rationally calculated expression of the country’s foreign policy. In addition, it is a foreign policy that has been crafted by decision makers who have considered the environment in which South Africa finds itself.

This model also reveals the challenge that South Africa faced in a situation in which it was not the only actor involved. It highlighted the gaps that existed in the fact that South Africa might not have had all the information on hand which resulted in foreign policy makers not having complete information.

The Organizational Process Model rests on the assumption that policy decisions are not made using rational calculations. Instead, this model advocates that policy decisions are made by the routine behaviour of organizations involved in policy making.

As far as analysing the peace and security foreign policy decision according to the Organizational Process Model, the outcome of the Congo Peace Process revealed the degree of continuity in which South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders have conducted foreign policy. To this effect, in response to one of the subsidiary research questions raised in Chapter One, it can be argued that South Africa has been able to strengthen its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent and assert its commitment to the continent by pursuing a foreign policy of continuity.

The Chapter further analyzed the peace and security foreign policy goal using the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Applied to the South African case, this model revealed that the directive on how to handle the peace process in the DRC involved competition for resources, attention and the right to frame the policy question by various individuals and departments. These departments included the Department of International Relations and Co-operation, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Defence as well as key individuals such as Former Presidents Mandela and Mbeki.
Chapter Five further evaluated South Africa’s Africa Agenda foreign policy by assessing whether the goals prescribed in Chapter Three were desirable and whether or not they have been achieved.

It is found that in light of its involvement in the peace process, South Africa has realized most of its goals that have been stipulated in the Africa Agenda. As a result, a recommendation has been put through that South Africa has to continue to follow such a stance so as to maintain legitimacy on the continent as Africa’s Peacemaker.

The conclusion given in Chapter Five is that South Africa’s Afro-Foreign Policy is a new and innovative approach to conducting foreign policy. The outcome of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo reveals that South Africa has followed through on its intended objectives, especially as far as peace and security on the continent is concerned. This reveals the importance that this component of the Africa Agenda has in the current democratic dispensation.

In general, this study serves as a guide for observers and foreign policy makers in South Africa as an overview of the Africa Agenda and its objective of achieving peace and security on the continent. Due to the demarcation stipulated in Chapter One, the study is limited in detailing the other elements of the Africa Agenda. As such, since not all of the elements or purposes of the Africa Agenda were as strongly emphasized as peace and security, further research on the other elements of the Agenda is encouraged.

This is necessary on two accounts. Primarily, is the fact that the consolidation of the Africa Agenda is a commitment that the South African government has undertaken for the conduct of its future of foreign policy; therefore, special attention has to be given to understanding the complexities of this Agenda. Secondly, future research on this topic is crucial for the dissemination of knowledge of the Africa Agenda and the provision of a holistic understanding of this Agenda.
3. Conclusion

As described previously, the study sought to answer three subsidiary research questions. The following conclusions can be articulated in the context of the research question and subsidiary questions of the study:

3.1 What does the outcome of the DRC Peace Process reveal about South Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and security goal in particular?

The outcome of the Congo Peace Process in light of South Africa’s Afro-centric foreign policy in general, and its peace and security goal in particular reveals a lot about South Africa’s foreign policy stance.

Firstly, it reveals that South Africa is finally beginning to have a coherent foreign policy that it wishes to pursue. This is in stark contrast to its position immediately after the fall of the apartheid regime in which the country’s foreign policy was described as ‘incoherent and lacking direction’ (Nathan 2005). The fact is that there is now an African focused approach to the nation’s foreign policy. Its outputs are now more easily susceptible to analysis as to whether or not the goals are being pursued.

In addition, the outcome of the DRC peace process tells us a lot about the kind of neighbourhood that South Africa finds itself in. The country is situated within the Southern African region and forms part of the regional body SADC. While it is a relatively peaceful region, the existence of war in SADC countries that are involved in regional conflicts puts a strain on other countries that are part of the regional bloc. This point has been raised in the discussion throughout the study. Because of the fact that as it is part of the region, South Africa has often had to bear the burdens of the region upon itself.

The outcome of the peace process also tells us that South Africa is a team player when it comes to conflict resolution on the continent. As indicated in this study, seeing that the peace talks risked collapsing, South Africa stepped in to ensure that a solution was reached.

Furthermore, this study has shed light on the peace and security dimension of the Africa Agenda. Unlike other foreign policy goals that states commit to but never bring to
actualization, the fact that the maintenance of peace and security on the continent is today a policy the country actively seeks to fulfil speaks to the continuity of this foreign policy approach.

3.2 How does South Africa’s African identity play a role in the manner in which it views its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?

South Africa’s self-perceived African identity is central to its foreign policy pursuits on the continent.

Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa continues to reaffirm its African-ness, the country is also ready to represent the continent on international fora such as the United Nations Security Council (wherein South Africa is vying for a permanent seat position).

Undoubtedly, the identity that South Africa has forged for itself as part and parcel of the continent is a crucial enabling factor which motivates the country to promote peace and security on the continent.

3.3 How can South Africa strengthen its foreign policy goal of achieving peace and security on the continent?

While it is impossible to strengthen a foreign policy goal, with regard to South Africa’s quest for achieving peace and security on the continent, the best means through which it can gain leverage in this regard is by establishing continuity in its pursuits. South Africa can continue to enjoy its ‘Africa Peacemaker’ status by continuing to pursue a pacific foreign policy with its African neighbours. South Africa must ensure that its actions are not contrary to its said objectives, but instead they should match.

3.4 What lessons can South Africa learn from its efforts to achieve its foreign policy objective of peace and security in the DRC peace process?

There are lessons that South African foreign policy makers can learn from its efforts in pursuing peace and security in the DRC Peace process.
Firstly, foreign policy makers can learn that not all conflicts are the same. The case in the DRC is highly different from other cases where South Africa has previously intervened. As such, South Africa should be able to position itself to fit particular cases, even those that require the concerted efforts of other actors. In so doing, South Africa does not have to bear the costs of peace processes on its own but can share the burden with other states, particularly African states who work in concert to provide ‘African solutions to African problems’. It is important to realize, however, that in cases where there is more than one actor involved in the conflict resolution process seeking a solution, it is important that there are no clashes between local and international actors as this could be detrimental both for the country in trouble as well as the peace process in itself.

Another lesson that South Africa can learn is that smooth co-ordination between various governmental departments is essential for overall achievement of peace and security goals. Therefore, the Department of International Relations should have strong connections with other essential departments such as the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Defence and other departments which, due to their capacities and functions, are able to facilitate different phases of peace processes across the continent.

Thirdly, South Africa can learn that in all peace processes, practical solutions have proven to be more important than theoretical desirables. Therefore, while it was important for the numerous summits surrounding the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to take place, the reality of the matter is that solutions that will eventually benefit the populace needs to be practical rather than theoretical.

Finally, for future purposes, South Africa should continue to build up strong capacity capable of implementing post-conflict reconstruction and development commitments which will assist other countries on the continent.


Sidiropoulos, E. 2007 B. *South Africa’s regional engagement for peace and security*. FRIDE.


