Measuring the quality of democracy in Ghana:
A comparative assessment of studies conducted by
Freedom House, the Economic Intelligence Unit, the
Ibrahim Index and the African Peer Review Mechanism
(between 2005 and 2010).

By

Ojima Salifu
04417720

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University of Pretoria

Supervisor: Professor Katabaro Miti

September 2014
Declaration

I hereby declare that the dissertation submitted for the *Magister Artium* degree in Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, apart from the help of the recognised is my own work and has not been formally submitted to another university for a degree.

Ojima Salifu

September 2014
ABSTRACT

The advent of democratisation saw the institutionalisation of electoral reforms which consists mainly of competitive, multiparty systems, universal adult suffrage and regularly contested elections. This type of democracy, being—largely “electoral” in nature, stresses the importance of electoral procedures or a minimalist conception of democracy. However, democracy in a broader sense or maximalist perspective extends beyond the realm of electoral proceedings and incorporates various political and socioeconomic variables. It is from this maximalist perspective of democracy that there has evolved studies on the “quality of democracy”, which aim to measure the democratic quality of a country beyond the point of democratisation. These studies are conducted by democratic assessments groups and are further divided into either quantitative or qualitative assessments for measuring the quality of democracy. Findings, methodologies and perspectives associated with these studies are often varied in nature, presenting different interpretations on the “quality of democracy”. Of particular interest for this research is the case-study—Ghana. Being the first African country to attain independence in 1957, its political trajectory had been marred by failed attempts to institutionalise democracy. But by the early 1990’s democratic eventually began to take root, making Ghana one of the best examples of democracy in the West African region.

The aim of this study is to first and foremost, attempt to come to a clear understanding of the term “quality of democracy”. Can a clear and workable definition of the quality of democracy be identified? Secondly, is to examine the different methodologies used to measure the quality of democracy. This is done by looking at how the measurements of the quality of democracy have been carried out by the various groups, primarily—Freedom House, the EIUID, the IIAG and the APRM. Thirdly, is to establish the applicability of the “quality of democracy” measurement to the African context by looking at how measurements have been applied in the Ghanaian context. The aim is to arrive at specific suggestions on how best to measure the quality of democracy in Africa by identifying the challenges faced by the current measures.
Acknowledgements

“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith” 2 Timothy 4:7

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And lastly, thank you to all my friends, you hold a special place in my heart.
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<td>Centres of Civic Education</td>
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<td>CHRAJ</td>
<td>Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice</td>
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<td>CIRI</td>
<td>Cingranelli-Richards</td>
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<td>CL</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
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<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Country Self Assessment Report</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>DVVSU</td>
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<td>Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Ghana National Association of Teachers</td>
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<td>GNFU</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GPRS</td>
<td>Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>Happy Planet Index</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IREEEP</td>
<td>Institut de Recherche Empirique en Economie Politique</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty</td>
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<td>LMIC</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>POA</td>
<td>Plan of Action</td>
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<td>QoD</td>
<td>Quality of Democracy</td>
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<td>QoL</td>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
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<td>QoR</td>
<td>Quality of the Political Regime</td>
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<td>QoSoC</td>
<td>Quality of the Society</td>
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<td>QoST</td>
<td>Quality of the State</td>
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<td>Single Spine Salary Structure</td>
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<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>VRP</td>
<td>Volta River Project</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

Since the 1990’s, democratisation,—understood as the “transition of non-democratic regimes to democratic systems of government” (Huntington 1991:15), has taken centre-stage in Africa. During this period, many African states were forced to institutionalise democratic forms of government due to pressures from western powers and the international community at large (Osaghae 1999:5). Democracy in this era, often took the form of electoral reforms such as the institutionalisation of “a competitive, multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage, regularly contested elections, conducted on the basis of secret ballots…, significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open campaigning (Freedom House 2008a). In this respect, many African countries were considered democratic. This however, constitutes Morlino’s (2004:10) definition of a minimalist conception of democracy which limits democracy to the realm of electoral procedures.

Democracy in its broader sense or maximalist conception should extend beyond the electoral system to include “high levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories (for example, class, ethnicity, gender) and increasing equality in social and economic outcomes” (Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens 1997:324). It is from the maximalist conception of democracy that there have evolved studies on the “quality of democracy” and the ranking of countries on a democratic scale by numerous think tanks.

1.2. Literature on the Quality of Democracy

The study of the quality of democracy has evolved over time and can be categorised into three main groups. The earliest group can be traced back to the early 1990’s and include: Vanhanen 1990:17-24 and Arat 1991:23-26 among a host of others. This group emerged in the wake of the democratisation process occurring in former soviet states and African countries and their assessments revealed the quality of democracy in these states. Most studies conducted during this era, provided a democratic dichotomy which highlighted whether a country was democratic or non-democratic.
The second group of studies—(Clapham 1993:423; Shin 1994; Jaggers and Gurr 1995:469-482; Sandbrook 1996:69-87; Diamond 1996; Collier and Levitsky 1997: 430-451; Osaghae 1999:5-28; Elklit 1999: 28-51) gained prominence between 1993 and 1999. These studies discuss the shortfall of the democratisation process which became seemingly evident in the new democracies that had emerged in the early 1990’s. While these countries had institutionalised the formal electoral requirements needed to qualify as a democracy, they lacked the substantive elements of a good quality democracy and were considered, “institutionally unconsolidated” (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:469). This phenomenon highlights the “fallacy of electoralism” that seemingly characterised the new democracies of this era (Elklit 1999:28).¹

The third group of studies—(Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2003; Diamond & Morlino 2004: 20-31; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 2005; Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2007; EIU 2008; Freedom House 2008a and Ibrahim Index 2009)—falling between 2000 and 2009, gained prominence in the new millennium and provide ways of determining the quality of democracy beyond the stage of democratisation. These studies focused on defining the term “quality of democracy” and measuring the quality of democracy. The main focus was on the elements that constitute the quality of democracy which include two factors. These are the political factors, consisting of the “quality of the political regime” and the “quality of the state” and the economic factors, consisting of the “quality of society and the “quality of life

Studies on the quality of democracy have further developed into either quantitative or qualitative assessments, conducted through the use of a democratic scale, indicators and scores used to rank countries on a democratic continuum. The goal of assessments is to award overall scores to a country, based on its democratic performance and to measure this position against others (Beetham 2004:2). The main studies on the quality of democracy have been

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¹ The fallacy of electoralism refers to the problem associated with “equating democracies to competitive multi-party elections” (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). This presupposes the existence of periodic elections as the sole basis for assessing the quality of a democracy. The problem lies with the fact that procedural dimensions, such as elections are often over-emphasised to the detriment of other non-electoral indicators of democracy (Lindberg 2003:122) . While elections may exist in theory, in practice, the electoral process may cease to be free and fair and exclude viable political opponents, thus failing to be democratic in its very nature. While this does not serve to underestimate the importance of the electoral process, it argues that elections alone represent a partial view of the state of democratic affairs.
carried out by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the Ibrahim Index and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and are relevant for the present study.

Freedom House provides annual global rankings on the quality of democracy (Haerpfer et al 2009:29; Samarasinghe 1994:25). The group is an independent think tank that advocates democracy by assessing the nature of Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) throughout the world (Freedom House 2008a). Assessments conducted by Freedom House are renowned within the media and academic circles for providing reliable analysis of freedoms in the world and have been cited numerousl y according to the web of science and Google scholar (Coppedge et al 2011: 248). Prominent academic scholars which include: (Haerpfer et al 2009:32; Samarasinghe 1994:25) continually use ratings provided by Freedom House to provide quality assessments on the extent of democracy throughout the world. Further to this, the group supplies annual reports of democratic trends throughout the world’s regions.

Another prominent assessment group within the context of this study is the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Index of Democracy which is produced by the Economist (EIU 2008:1). Since 2006, the index has provided global “snapshots of the current state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent countries” (EIU 2008:1). The index also provides a wider conception of democracy beyond the electoral field (EIU 2008:1).

The Ibrahim Index is another prominent group in the context of this study because it exclusively focuses on the quality of democracy in Africa. It is one among few studies to embark on assessments of this nature. The Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) which was founded by the Mo Ibrahim foundation in 2006 and is dedicated to assessing good governance— defined as “a set of societal institutions that fully represent the people, interlinked by a solid network of institutional regulation and accountability (with ultimate accountability to the people), whose purpose is to achieve the welfare of all members of society” (UNDP 2002:106), on the African continent (Mo Ibrahim 2008: 9).

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is instrumental in this study because it was adopted specifically for measuring the quality of democracy in Africa. Since its inception in

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2 The APRM is an initiative developed under the auspices of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that allows for African states to be evaluated by their peers. It is a “mutually agreed programme, voluntarily adopted by member states of the African Union (AU)” (APRM 2013).
2003, the APRM has provided voluntary assessments that “promotes and re-enforces high standards of governance” in Africa (Open Society 2010:2; APRM 2013).

1.3. Aims and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to first and foremost, attempt to come to a clear understanding of the term “quality of democracy”. Can a clear and workable definition of the quality of democracy be identified? Secondly, is to examine the different methodologies used to measure the quality of democracy. This is done by looking at how the measurements of the quality of democracy has been carried out by the various groups, primarily, Freedom House, the EIU.ID and the IIAG which all use quantitative measures to arrive at their rankings. There are also standards for the qualitative assessment of the quality of democracy, as provided by Baker (1999: 271-285); Beetham et al (2008:34); Diamond & Morlino (2004: 20-31). Thirdly, is to establish the applicability of the “quality of democracy” measurement to the African context by looking at how measurements have been applied in the Ghanaian context. The aim is to arrive at specific suggestions on how best to measure the quality of democracy in Africa by identifying the challenges faced by the current measures.

This study however needs to be integrated within the context of African realities due to the dismal accounts of the quality of democracy recorded on the African continent (EIU 2008:2). Ghana has thus been selected as the case study for various reasons. First and foremost, the country has been awarded impressive democratic scores by various rating systems for its overall democratic performance. In 2008, Freedom House (2008b) classified the country as having reached a superior standard of democracy by grouping it in its highest category—‘free’, while the Ibrahim Index (2009) assessed it in terms of good governance, ranking the country 8th from a list of 54 African counties. The country has been exemplary in showcasing the political will to sustain and also improve its democratic record. Nothing highlights this more than the country’s willingness to be the first African state to undergo the voluntary review process of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Upon signing of the MOU in 2003, Ghana completed the APRM’s base review in 2005 (APRM 2005: XI), making it the first from among a group of three other African countries— Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda to voluntarily accede to the process (Open Society 2010:2; APRM 2005:2-3).
The choice of Ghana as a case-study is not only influenced by its credible democratic achievements, but by the fact that its democratic trajectory had not always been a smooth one (Chazan 1988:93). Being the first African country to attain independence in 1957, its post-colonial history was marred by struggles to consolidate democracy, as a result of several intermittent years of military rule (Haynes 1993:451). It was only in 1992 with the establishment of the Fourth Republic that the military order became a bygone era, paving way for democratic transition (Boafo-Arthur 2007:1). However, it was not until 2000, that democracy began to take root in the nation. Ghana has since enjoyed democratic and constitutional rule and remains one of the few African countries to change leaders peacefully by democratic means (Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005:238).

Furthermore, Ghana’s current democratic position is particularly pertinent in the region of West Africa. This is attributed to the fact that it is located in a sub-region that is infamously known as the “coup d’etat belt of the African continent” (Olukoshi 2001:1). Since the post-independence era, there have been more than 40 successful coups and numerous attempts at toppling democratically elected governments in West Africa (Souaré 2006). This precarious trend inevitably threatens political stability in the sub-region. While Ghana was not spared from this spate of coups, as it experienced five of its own (Souaré 2010), during its infant stages of democracy, democracy later began to take root.

Presently, Ghana remains one of the few countries in the sub-region to maintain consistent democratic governance. Ghana’s position in this regard was duly noted by the United States President, Mr. Obama, who chose to visit the nation from a host of more than 50 African States, because of “its strong democratic record” (BBC News 2009). In a statement made by Press Secretary Mr. Gibbs, he stated that Ghana was one of the United States “most trusted partners in sub-Saharan Africa” and Obama’s visit would reiterate the importance of good governance in the region (Shear 2009). The nation has thus received laudable commendations for sound governance from both an international and local audience.

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3 The Fourth Republic represents the fourth handover to civilian rule.

4 West Africa is geographically defined as consisting of countries located in the western most part of Africa. These countries include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (United Nations 2010). A geopolitical definition constitutes the 15 countries, (with the exception of Mauritania and Saint Helena) that belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the sub-region’s Regional Economic Community (REC) (ECOWAS 2010). However, Souaré 2010 refers to the ECOWAS definition.
This choice of Ghana as a case study is thus justified on the grounds of its democratic credentials, as well as it being the first country in Africa to begin its democratic journey, which was initially characterised by tumultuous false starts which paved the way for an enduring democratic system. Ghana is now considered to embody one of the best democratic systems in the sub-region.

Using the selected studies as tools of analysis, the research focuses on democratic trends that occurred from 2000-2008, due to the political significance of this period. The year 2000 has been selected as the point of departure for this study because it signalled the first “turn-over test”. This represented the first time in Ghanaian history where power was successfully transferred from one democratically elected government to another (Freedom House 2002). In addition, the year 2008 marked Ghana’s second “turn-over test” or the point of democratic consolidation, symbolising a significant milestone in the country’s democratic trajectory.

The point of democratic consolidation is established when a country undergoes a “two-turnover test” with regards to multiparty elections (Huntington 1991:266-267). This stipulates that democratic power should have been successfully transferred twice since the transitional period. Consolidating democracy requires that the winners of the transitional elections lose a subsequent election and hand over power to the winners of those elections. Thereafter, those winners are defeated in a later election and concede defeat (Huntington 1991:266-267). This signifies that democratic norms are adhered to and deeply entrenched within the caucuses of all significant political actors (Diamond 1999:65).

1.4. Formulation and demarcation of the research problem.

The present study examines both the quantitative and qualitative methods used to analyse the quality of democracy. It seeks to establish a correlation between quantitative and qualitative assessments of the quality of democracy in Ghana, by identifying the extent to which quantitative studies (Freedom House, the EIUID and the IIAG) are comparable to measurements offered by the qualitative study conducted by the APRM. The present study’s expectation is that, since all four assessments measure the quality of democracy in Ghana, there should be comparable elements. However, due to the assessment being different in their
very nature there should also exist some differences, especially between the quantitative studies and the APRM.

This study evaluates two components of the assumption. First, to what extent are the Ibrahim Index and the APRM comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana? And second, to what extent do the EIU and Freedom House offer comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana.

The explanatory hypothesis to the first component of the assumption which seeks to compare the Ibrahim index and the APRM proposes that the two assessments differ substantially due to the fact that the assessments are quantitative and qualitative respectively. While the studies may be comparable to some extent, they differ significantly.

The explanatory hypothesis to the second component of the assumption which seeks to compare the EIU and Freedom House as comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana proposes that they are in fact comparable because they are both quantitative assessment and are most likely to produce similar findings.

The study defines the term “quality of democracy” and discusses the minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy. Also, the different factors of the quality of democracy are examined to highlight the two overarching political and economic facets that constitute the quality of democracy. Further to this, the quantitative and qualitative methods to measuring the quality of democracy are assessed to reveal the different ways the study of the quality of democracy has been approached. This allows the study to establish the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. A historical assessment of the quality of democracy in Ghana is then conducted to establish how democratic the country is. The study focuses on the post-independence era and highlights democratic milestones occurring during this era. Lastly, the study conducts a comparison of the four groups within the context of Ghana to reveal similarities and differences in their studies on the quality of democracy in the country. The research uses the assessments conducted by the four groups between 2005 and 2010. This timeline is significant and has been selected because it marks the era after the first democratic turnover in Ghana.
1.5. Methodology.

The present study uses existing literature on the quality of democracy. It utilises this to define the term “quality of democracy” and to compare the selected quantitative and qualitative measurements, which are then applied to the case study—Ghana. The study specifically uses data from the Ibrahim Index, Freedom House, the EIU and the APRM. The study then uses the identified democratic measurements to identify similarities, differences and discrepancies with regards to how the quality of democracy in Ghana is analysed. The study uses primary sources, secondary sources and other pertinent literature on the subject.

- Primary sources used are: Ibrahim Index, Freedom House, the EIU and the APRM. These four studies are of crucial importance to this study as they are basis for which comparison is made. Other primary documents include: official reports and statistics from the United Nations (UN) and its affiliates, as well as information obtained from Ghanaian governmental bodies.

- The secondary sources consist mainly of theoretical literature, which include: Andreev, Diamond and Morlino, Morlino and Baker, among others. These sources form the basis for the analytical framework and help conceptualise certain democratic lexicons as well as develop the analytical structure of the present study—in the quality of democracy.

1.6. Structure of the Chapters

This study is divided into seven chapters:

Apart from this chapter, there are six other chapters included in this study.

Chapter two defines the concept “the quality of democracy. It explores the minimalist and maximalist definitions of ‘democracy’ and assesses the strengths and weakness of both groups of definitions. It then focuses on the various quality of democracy factors which
include: the Quality of the Regime (QoR), Quality of the State (QoST), the Quality of Society (QoSoc) and the Quality of life (QoL).

Chapter three discusses the measuring of the quality of democracy. It defines the two main approaches to measuring the quality of democracy which include the: quantitative and qualitative methods. It then discusses the methods adopted by Freedom House, the EIU, the Ibrahim Index and the APRM in the measuring the quality of democracy.

Chapter four provides the historical context for analysing of the quality of democracy in Ghana. It documents Ghana’s political and socioeconomic trajectory from the post-independence period in 1957 to 2008. It focuses mainly on the ‘republics’ that emerged in an attempt to institutionalise democratic rule, as well as the intermittent military administrations that ruled during this period. It highlights various political and socioeconomic dynamics that contributed to the building of democracy in Ghana.

Chapter five provides a detailed analysis of the quality of democracy factors in Ghana’s fourth Republic. The chapter highlights the different aspects of the Quality of the Regime (QoR), Quality of the State (QoST), the Quality of Society (QoSoc) and the Quality of life (QoL), as found in Ghana, with a view to determining the overall quality of democracy in Ghana.

Chapter six conducts a comparative assessment of the different studies. These studies include: Freedom House, the Ibrahim Index, the EIU and the APRM. It provides detailed comparison, explanation and analysis of the findings of each study on Ghana. It also highlights similarities, differences and possible discrepancies among the different studies.

The concluding chapter seven provides an overview of the study. It critically evaluates the main findings of the study and offers suggestions and recommendations for future research. It discusses the summative findings of the study as well as the values and problems with assessments.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework of Analysis

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for analysing the quality of democracy. The chapter explores the minimalist and maximalist definitions of ‘democracy’ and assesses the strengths and weakness of both groups of definitions. The term ‘quality’ is also conceptualised with a view to discussing the various quality of democracy factors which include: the Quality of the Regime (QoR), Quality of the State (QoST), the Quality of Society (QoSoc) and the Quality of life (QoL). Using the four factors of democracy identified by Andreev (2005:9), the chapter discusses these four factors in order to provide a clear theoretical framework for application in the present study.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the contested nature of democracy and provides two prominent conceptions of democracy being the minimalist and maximalist definitions. Further to this, it defines the term quality which is used within the context of the present study. The second section identifies and discusses the four factors of democracy detailed in Andreev (2005). The present chapter provides a theoretical underpinning for measuring the quality of democracy, as a prelude for analysis conducted in the later part of the research.

2.2. Conceptualising Key Terms

2.2.1. Defining the Term “Quality”

The starting point for defining the quality of democracy is to first define the term “quality” itself. According to Morlino (2004:21) quality refers to three specific dimensions. These are: procedure, content and results (Diamond and Morlino 2004:21). The procedural aspect of quality requires that a product is produced in a controlled and exact manner, time and time again (Morlino 2004:12). When placed within the context of democracy, the procedural aspect of quality focuses on procedures to ensure the efficiency of laws, efficacy of the decisions made by government and accountability of elected officials to the electorate (Morlino 2004:12). The attribute of content relates to the structural characteristics of a
product i.e. design and materials etc. In the democratic sense, a quality democracy must ensure that the citizens, associations and communities enjoy a certain level of liberty and equality (Diamond and Morlino 2004:22). The last aspect of quality focuses on result; which is assessed by measuring customer satisfaction. This is not contingent on how a product is produced or its actual content (Morlino 2004:13), but rather on citizenry satisfaction with the workings of democracy.

‘Quality’ has also been construed as the degree to which a system fulfils certain democratic norms, like: representativeness, accountability, equality and participation (Lijphart 1993:149). Andreev (2005:2) comments that Lijphart’s definition is widely adopted in conceptualising the ‘quality of democracy’ because it is premised on prominent democratic principles and the extent to which the political system fulfils these principles.

2.2.2. Defining the term “Democracy”

The term democracy is a highly contested concept (EIU 2008:14). As such, there is no clear definition for the term democracy (Birch 2001:73; Saward 1998:8), which raises practical challenges with regard to the use of the term (Graham 2013:19). However, there exists two popular terms for conceptualising democracy. These are: the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ conceptions of democracy. The minimalist term can be traced back to the ideas of political scientist, Joseph Schumpeter’s and his modest position on democracy (Haerpfer et al 2009:26; Saward 1998:166-7). In its current form, the minimalist perspective outlines the importance of electoral procedures measured through the presence of: ‘universal, adult suffrage’, ‘recurring free, competitive and fair elections’, and ‘more than one political party’ (Morlino 2004:10). The underlining theory of the minimalist perspective highlights that a polity can be considered a democracy once its characteristic features allow for “formal voting equality” (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). Organisations such as Freedom House are often associated with minimalist definitions of democracy (EIU 2008). The problem with this approach is its association of multi-party politics with democracy. This is expressed as the “fallacy of electoralism” (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). Although minimalist definitions are much easier to operationalise (Przeworski et al 2000), they generally lack a high degree of conceptual validity because a number of important attributes are left out (Hegre 2012:2).
Despite the practical limitations of the minimalist perspective, there are advantages to its use. This is apparent in the initial stages of determining whether a country can be classified as a democracy or not (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). An advantage of the minimalist perspective is that it avoids ‘normative wrangling’ and ‘ideological inclinations’. Haerpfer et al (2009:26) argues that the minimalist conception avoids theoretical debates that would ensue in the adoption of more ‘fuller’ definitions of democracy. This is because fuller definitions are often laden with ‘normative’ prescriptions and ‘ideological inclinations’.

Second, the minimalist perspective avoids inclusion of many variables that are “causally related with democracy” (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). It is argued that a number of indicators particularly socioeconomic variables are not directly influenced by the presence or lack thereof of democracy forces (Rodrik 1997:15). As such causally related variables should be excluded from definitions of democracy (Haerpfer et al 2009:26). The third argument in favour of a minimalist perspective states that it allows for constructive reasoning in an attempt to decipher whether a democracy can be considered a ‘dichotomy or a continuum’ (Haerpfer et al 2009:26).

The maximalist definition generally construes democracy as a system that combines all the features of a minimalist conception, as well as “high levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories (for example, class, ethnicity, gender) and increasing equality in social and economic outcomes” Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens 1997:324). Campbell (2008:20) argues that minimalist conceptions of democracy contextualises it within the political system, while the maximalists’ refers not only to the political regime, but also the society, economy and environment, with the focus being, to understand the political system within its broader surroundings.

More recent conceptualisations of the quality of democracy have come to focus more on the political system in terms of its factors and variables. Yet still, there is no clear definition of the political system. Andreev’s (2005:9) attempt at defining the political system only states that most systems are characterised by the ‘quality of life’ (QoL), ‘quality of society’ (QoSoC), ‘quality of the state’ (QoST) and ‘quality of the political regime’ (QoR). Despite this, Andreev’s (2005) definition of the political system still provides the best comprehensive analytical tool for studying the different aspects of a democracy because it exhausts the political and socioeconomic attributes of a state. This makes for a workable framework of
analysis, which should be done within the context of the “overall quality of the democratic state and society” (Campbell and Sukosd 2002).

Given the attributes that characterise the quality of democracy, it can be surmised that the quality of democracy is made up of two basic elements, being: political and economic. The political elements encompass the state and regime, while the economic elements are made up of the individual and the society. These elements are captured by Andreev (2005) as factors of the quality of democracy. The table below displays the factors of the quality of democracy:

### 2.3. The Quality of Democracy Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of the state</th>
<th>Quality of the political regime</th>
<th>Quality of the society</th>
<th>Quality of life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial integrity and good relations with the state’s own neighbours.</td>
<td>Elected official.</td>
<td>Gender equality.</td>
<td>Guaranteed physical security and low levels of crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of law is established on all groups and territories.</td>
<td>A self governing polity.</td>
<td>Ethnic tolerance and cultural pluralism.</td>
<td>Absence of torture and low levels of imprisoned persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of ‘reserved domains’.</td>
<td>Free and fair elections.</td>
<td>High levels of educational attainment.</td>
<td>Relatively low level of unemployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of administrative centralisation.</td>
<td>Freedom of expression.</td>
<td>Low levels of child crime.</td>
<td>Good educational, health care and housing policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of corruption.</td>
<td>Alternative information.</td>
<td>Low levels of domestic violence.</td>
<td>Possibilities for self-realisation and social recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High GDP per capita.</td>
<td>Associational autonomy.</td>
<td>Number of theatres, museums and other cultural and educational institutions.</td>
<td>Relatively high real purchasing power parity (PPP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair system of recruitment.</td>
<td>… Polyarchy threshold …</td>
<td>Rich/poor ratio.</td>
<td>High-quality physical infrastructure, transport system and communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A predictable legal basis in most fields of political, social and economic life.</td>
<td>Balance of power (between these institutions).</td>
<td>Rural/urban population.</td>
<td>A uniform and unbiased application of the rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-civil society and cooperation and sponsorship.</td>
<td>A priori and a posteriori-accountability of decision makers.</td>
<td>Societal consensus on major domestic and international, social, political and economic issues.</td>
<td>Freedom of movement and residence (including outside the realm of the own polity).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Andreev (2005:9).
Given the quality of democracy factors displayed in the table above, it is important to further elaborate on each of the four factors that constitute the quality of democracy.

2.3.1. Quality of the State

Two main elements are at the centre of the Quality of the State (QoST). The first relates to the government’s control of its territory through the establishment of the rule of law on all its citizens and territory. The second issue concerns the existence of an operational administrative machinery which is referred to as a working and professional bureaucracy (Andreev 2005:9). These two elements determine the external relations of the state: “good relations with the state’s own neighbours” and the “state-civil and cooperative society relations” (Andreev 2005:9).

Others scholars such as Wolff (2005:5) theorise the QoST as the “ability to provide public goods across its territory to its population”. The provision of these goods and services generally extends to various domains of the state, including; security, rule of law, health care, education, transport and communication and the economic system. Similarly, Patrick (2006:29) considers “state strength to be the state’s ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood which include; physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management and social welfare”. State performance has also been conceptualised in terms of the ability of the state to provide security, welfare and legitimacy (Wolff 2005:5).

Traditionally, assessments on the QoST were limited to countries in conflict, as they were more likely than not to have a poor QoST. However, evidence shows that the QoST may also be studied in non-conflict zones. This change in approach has been highlighted by Wolff (2005:6) who argues that the QoST can be studied in times of peace by focusing on aspects of capacity and willingness of the state to provide public goods. These aspects should be present despite the type of political regime. The distinction between ‘capacity’ on the one hand and ‘willingness’ on the other is important due to the fact that some states may have the capacity but lack the willingness, while others may have the willingness but lack the capacity to provide political goods (Patrick 2006:30). In extreme circumstances, states may lack both capacity and willingness which would invariably hamper its performance and negatively affect the QoST. While the measurement of state capacity and willingness would be
instrumental in measuring the quality of democracy, the problem remains the use of indicators which reflect solely on the state and exclude democratic attributes.

Measurements of state strength generally focus on indicators that measure both capacity and willingness, with a view to determining the likelihood of a state experiencing ‘failure’, ‘fragility’, ‘weakness’ or ‘collapse’. A collapsed state is defined “institutionally to denote the crumbling of the state organisation and its effective replacement by private and sub-national bodies”, while a failed state is defined “functionally as the state’s inability to perform its key role of monopolizing the legitimate use of force within its territory” (Hague and Harrop 2010:72).

The absence or low ranking of failed state indicators invariably means that the quality of the state is thriving. This can therefore be used as a measure of the QoST. One of the most prominent measurements for the accessing the likelihood of state failure is the Failed State index. The index uses twelve indicators, which are “demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, de-legitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalised elites and external intervention” to assess the possibility of state failure (Foreign Policy 2013). Based on ranking obtained from the average of the indicators, countries are then categorised as either “alert”, “warning”, “stable” or “sustainable” (Foreign Policy 2013), which can then be used as a determinantal of the QoST. According to the Index’s 2013 report, the top 10 states most likely to experience state failure are in the African continent. This means that problems regarding state consolidation are most pertinent in the African region as compared to other parts of the world. (See Foreign Policy 2013 for compiled data on 178 states. Countries are ranked in the order of ‘most likely’ to ‘least likely’ to fail, with 1 being the worst possible case and 178 being the best).

While this is beneficial in the assessment of the character of the state, it falls short in directly measuring the quality of democracy. Another problem with the use of the QoST as a measurement procedure for the quality of democracy is that most of the indicators focus solely on political elements of the regime to the exclusion of important civil, economic and social indicators. More importantly, the use of the QoST assessment criteria does not directly

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5 The terms ‘fragile’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’ and collapsed are often used interchangeably by scholars to denote the same meaning.
measure democratic factors in a state. This is because many of the factors that influence the conditions for a good QoST may be found in both democratic and non-democratic settings (Linz and Stepan 1996:10). Conditions that weaken or consolidate the QoST may not necessarily be attributed to the state of democratic affairs in the country. It is therefore possible to highlight problems relating to the functioning of the state that have no bearing on the functioning of democracy. As a result, the quality of democracy may contribute to the functioning of the QoST without the QoST necessarily contributing to the quality of democracy. Since the two factors remain distinct and separate entities (Linz and Stepan 1996:11), it can be surmised that the QoST adds little value to the study of the quality of democracy.

2.3.2. Quality of the Political Regime

The term political regime appears to be used as an umbrella term for a type of political system (Alvarez et al 1996; Hsu 2008; Prezeworski 2006 and Smith & Ziegler 2007:102). It is also used interchangeably to mean “form of government, system of government or system of governance” (Munck 1996). The term has also been used to refer to a system of government which is distinguished by the degree of competition allowed in the system (Alvarez et al 1996).

A political regime incorporates two-dimensions. These include: the procedural and behavioural elements (Munck 1996; Skaaning 2006:11). The procedural dimension deals with the electoral process such as; governing rules or procedures that determine three following aspects. These include the number and type of actors who have access to the political arena; methods of access to the arena; and the type of rules (formal and informal) adopted in the drafting of public policy (Munck 1996). The behavioural aspect concerns the relationship between the established institutions and the people. This relationship includes; how actors respond to set rules and their acceptance and/or compliance of the rules of the game (Munck 1996). It is surmised that the procedural dimension concerns the electoral system and procedures, while the behavioural aspect relates to the relationship between the established institutions and the people. Authors such as Skaaning (2006:13) strictly define the political regime within procedural terms. Within these paradigms, a political regime is hypothesised as “an institutionalised set of fundamental formal and informal rules structuring
the interaction in the political power center (horizontal relation) and its relation with the broader society (vertical relation)”.

Given that a working definition of a political regime has been established (see (Munck 1996; Skaaning 2006:11), the term quality as it relates to a political regime can be conceptualised as the degree to which the performance of the political regime correlates with the established procedures and behaviours of the system. While this conceptualisation of the QoR might infer the performance of a regime in both democratic and non-democratic settings, the term quality is largely normative, with a strong incline towards democratic practices. In this regard, a good QoR is measured by the degree to which the system is a political democracy.

According to Smith and Ziegler (2007:110), democracy as a system of political governance is advocated because it provides a wider range of social benefits to its citizens than non-democracies. Another benefit of the democratic political system is that it has positive influences on social welfare (Smith and Ziegler 2007: 113). As a result of these normative ideals attached to democracy, the QoR is generally conceptualised in terms of the performance of democratic norms and principles. However, certain challenges exist with measuring the quality of democracy strictly within the confines of the QoR. The first issue relates to regime indicators which focus mainly on the stability and persistence of the regime, giving insufficient attention to social and economic indicators. Second, most studies of the quality of political democracy focus only on the democratic constitutional arrangement of the political regime to the detriment of other socio-economic factors.

2.3.3. Quality of Life

On a simplistic level, Derek et al (2009) defines the QoL as the overall “well-being of individuals and societies”. A more detailed definition specifies that QoL is “the extent to which objective human needs are fulfilled in relation to person or group perceptions of subjective well-being” (Costanza et al 2008:18). The overarching description of the concept as provided by Andreev (2005:8) highlights that the QoL is citizen-driven, with a focus on socio-economic aspects of a society. The common thread in these definitions centres on the individual as the vital aspect of the QoL. These different interpretations of the QoL reflect an inclusive approach to the subject, which takes into account the individual and other associated variables that contribute to the well-being of the individual.
Measurements of the QoL utilise a variety of methods. The most prominent of these is the Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1990. It measures life expectancy, education and GDP, to determine a person’s overall wellbeing (Rahman et al 2003:6). An alternate method is The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) which was developed by Morris David Morris in the 1970’s. It assesses life expectancy, infant mortality rates and literacy levels (Rahman et al 2003:5). Other methods include Dasgupta and Weale (1992) which measures GDP per capita, life expectancy, literacy and aspects of political rights and civil liberties; the Happy Planet Index (HPI) and the EIU index of quality of life.

Often enough, these attributes of the QoL may be found in countries that do not necessarily experience a high quality of democracy. It is important to highlight that the conditions for the QoL exist in both democratic and nondemocratic settings. A good QoL may have little to do with the country’s democratic policies but rather with public policy decisions made by the government. Linz and Stepan (1996:31) argue that the QoL is indeed a measure of the quality of a set of public institutions affecting the lives of citizens rather than democracy in itself.

Another problem with the exclusive use of the QoL approach in measuring the quality of democracy is its “multi-scale and multidimensional” viewpoint (Costanza et al 2008:18). QoL measures generally take into account all aspects of life that contribute to the general well-being of the individual. This raises questions surrounding the validity of such measurement procedures, since everything that pertains to human development could be a possible measure of well-being.

The use of QoL as a measurement for the quality of democracy is further complicated by the use of quantitative variables to measure QoL. Traditionally, QoL was measured by utilising variables such as GDP per capita or standard of living which may not necessarily reflect the state of the individual’s well-being (Rahman et al 2003:4; Berenger and Verdier-Chouchane 2006:1260). This approach over-emphasises value on quantifiable data to the detriment of non-quantifiable variables that may better measure the QoL.

Although various methods have been developed in a bid to define accurately and measure QoL, the main problems with available measurements remain their “inability to capture
diverse domains of QoL, arbitrary selection of variables, non-comparability of measures over time and space, and measurement errors in variables…” (Rahman et al 2003:2).

2.3.4. Quality of the Society

The Quality of Society (QoSoC) approach to measuring the QoD is citizen-driven with primary emphasis on societal procedures (Andreev 2005:8). The main focus here is the identification and attainment of social rights with specific emphasis on gender equality, education and poverty alleviation. Some of the determining QoSoC factors include; “gender equality; ethnic tolerance and cultural pluralism; high levels of educational attainment; percentage of university students; low levels of child crime; low levels of domestic violence; number of theatres, museums and other cultural and educational institutions; rich/poor ratio; young/old ratio; rural/urban population; a universal acceptance of the rule of law; societal consensus on major domestic and international, social, political and economic issues; an independent and vibrant civil society; a responsible and active political society” (Andreev 2005:9).

The QoSoC focuses on societal factors as indicative measures for the quality of a society. As such, the emphasis remains the well-being of society which helps determine the quality of the society. While the QoSoC predominantly uses societal factors, there is an inextricable link between the QoSoC and the QoL. This link correlates with the fact that both dimensions are citizen-driven (Andreev 2005). However, while the QoL focuses on the individual, the QoSoC focuses on societal aspects which may have an impact on the individual (Andreev 2005). The QoSoC thus features as a sub-category of the QoL, with the latter focusing on both social and economic aspects of general life. Given this, most theorists advocate the use of social indicators as a pre-determinant measure for assessing societal aspects of QoL (Riley 2011; Berger-Schmitt 2000; Kittiprapa nd; Diener and Suh 1997 and Dasgupta and Weale 1992). Some of these societal qualities include; equality, security, freedom and the structure of societal relations (Berger-Schmitt 2000).

Although not mentioned by Andreev (2005) as a possible societal indicator, GDP levels have often been used by some scholars as a measure of societal wellness. This premise is disputed by scholars such as; Riley (2011); Dasgupta and Weale (1992); de Leon and Boris (2010) and Stiglitz (2009) on various grounds.
Riley (2011) argues that instead of the use of GDP indicators, societal wellness measures such as; the environment, health, education and employment etc, are preferable points of departure because they assess material living standards in terms of “equity” and “sustainability”, while GDP based indicators are more concerned with immediate high macroeconomic levels as opposed to “equality”, “sustainability” or the “environment”. Another scholar Stiglitz (2009:1) notes that GDP figures do not give an accurate picture of the economy because statistically observations seldom predict the individual experiences of citizens. Moreover, the promotion of GDP levels can sometimes be at odds with broader or microeconomic and social development programmes. Here, reference is made to the promotion of policy goals such as reducing air/water or noise population, which may be at odds with GDP based growth (Stiglitz 2009:1). Although the policy itself is in line with social wellness goals, it does not promote GDP based advancements which are generally realised through increased levels of industrialisation—that adversely affects the air, water and noise quality in society. Because of this, GDP based growth is generally at odds with other societal wellness goals.

Due to the inadequacies of the GDP method, Dasgupta and Weale (1992:119); Berger-Schmitt (2000) and de Leon and Boris (2010) advocate the use of broader socioeconomic indicators which give holistic descriptions of the QoSoc. Dasgupta and Weale (1992:119) detail the usefulness of political and civil rights along with the socioeconomic dimension. They argue that while political rights and civil liberties indicators are rightly used in the discipline of political sciences, they are often excluded from QoL indicators which over-emphasise the socioeconomic dimension (Dasgupta and Weale 1992:119). Berger-Schmitt (2000) adopts a sociologist perspective to the topic by stressing the importance of societal factors in measuring the QoSoc. The argument follows that social cohesion—defined as “the interdependence between the members of the society, shared loyalties and solidarity (Jenson 1998b quoted in Berger-Schmitt 2000) is an importance prerequisite for assessing a society’s quality.

A strength attributed to the use of social indicators is that they are relatively objective. According to Diener and Suh (1997:193) these indicators are easy to conceptualise without relying on individual perceptions. Evidence shows that high levels of educational attainment are widely accepted as valuable and are also easily observed and measured. Hence,
educational attainment is an objective social indicator. Furthermore, it is possible to use these indicators in cross-country comparisons, over a period of time (Diener and Suh 1997:193).

Secondly, social indicators reflect broad-based normative ideals. In most societies, ideals like low levels of child crime and zero tolerance to domestic violence are considered valuable, notwithstanding the prevalent political arrangement—democratic or non-democratic, in the society. This means that social indicators are based on “widely shared values” in society and not on subjective human well-being (Diener and Suh 1997:194).

Despite this, there exist some challenges with the exclusive use of social indicators. According to Diener and Suh (1997:195) social indicators are fallible and are frequently plagued by “measurement problems”. This is due to hidden or ‘dark figures’ which may under-represent an indicator. For instance, in countries where domestic violence is underreported for fear of stigmatisation, such an indicator would capture low figures for the indicator, which makes it difficult to ascertain the true quality of the society in relation to domestic abuse. While social indicators are often thought of as objective, they may be affected by the fact that obtained data does not always reflect society’s reality (Diener and Suh 1997: 195).

Secondly, social indicators are affected by the “role of subjective decisions in selecting and measuring the variables” (Diener and Suh 1997:195). For instance, subjective interpretations may affect the measuring of the social indicator—gender equality, because of uncertainty in determining what constitutes equality. Questions abound regarding what percentage of women should be represented in parliament for a society to be considered equal. Furthermore, should representation only be restricted to parliament, to the exclusion of other public and private spheres. These questions thus present subjective-related challenges in the selecting and measuring of variables.

Regardless, the most beneficial approach yet in the use of societal indicators is espoused by Linz and Stepan (1996), who highlight the importance of institutionalising democratic values in society. Emphasis is placed on the development of a political and civil society which together helps deepen democracy. Linz and Stepan (1996:16) further conceptualise the concepts “civil” and “political” society as used in the literature. In this regard, civil society refers to “that arena of the polity where self-organising and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and
solidarities, and to advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan 1996:116). A political society is understood as “that arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus” (Linz and Stepan 1996:116). While both areas are of the utmost importance, civil society remains “invaluable” because of its ability to stimulate, ensure and consolidate democratic political reform (Linz and Stepan 1996:116). In many instances, civil society is a prelude to political society. This is because the actions of civil society groupings often pave the way for political reform, by putting pressure on the relevant stakeholders and political actors to change policies. A political society is also important because it creates the platform for contestation without which democracy would cease to exist. Since the QoD deals with the different aspects of democracy, Linz and Stepan’s (1996:113) approach to studying the QoSoC remains the most suitable. This is because they stress the inalienable nature of a “civil” and “political” society-culture in a democracy.

2.4. Conclusion.

The summary of this chapter alludes to the importance of analysing key theoretical concepts such as ‘quality’, ‘democracy’ and the ‘factors of democracy’ which are the focus of the present study. The term ‘quality’ is key to the establishment of a framework of analysis because use of other concepts hinges on the effective conceptualisation of the term ‘quality’—being concerned with procedure, content and results, such that the democratic expectations of the citizenry are met.

Second, is the term ‘democracy’ which is equally as important as the term ‘quality’, in establishing a theoretical framework of analysis. The elusive nature of the concept ‘democracy’ has created two main ways in which the term may be conceptualised —“the maximalist” and “minimalist” approach. Besides offering two different definitions, these two conceptions also have a significant bearing on the operationalisation of the term ‘quality’. This is because the minimalist definition looks at limited aspects of the democracy such as the electoral processes within the political regime, while the “maximalist” approach prescribes a more holistic paradigm, addressing the political system, as well as the state, society and life. The implication of these different conceptions is that the former offers a limited perspective of the quality of democracy, while the latter gives a richer and fuller
picture. While the quality of the political regime (QoR) (which is restrictive or minimalist in approach), is often used as the preferred measurement for determining the quality of democracy, in the present study, a maximalist approach is adopted because it provides an effective tool of measurement for determining the quality of the different factors of a democracy.
Chapter Three: Measuring the Quality of Democracy

3.1. Introduction.

As discussed in chapter two, democracy constitutes four different factors. Regardless, the quality of the political regime (QoR) is often used as the preferred measurement for determining the quality of democracy. Measures that focus on the QoR can be found in the workings of democratic assessments groups such as Freedom House (FH) and the Economic Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (EIUID) that compile global democracy indexes, as well as the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which focuses specifically on Africa. Besides similarities in the groups QoR focus-driven approach, they are split in terms of the approach adopted to measure the quality of democracy. Groups are divided along the lines of the quantitative and qualitative methods, with FH, the EIUID and the IIAG adopting the former while the APRM uses the qualitative approach.

In addition to the different quantitative and qualitative approaches adopted, democratic audits or key concepts and indicators are often used as tools of analysis to help adequately measure the quality of democracy. Without the application of these concepts, it remains an impossible task to measure the quality of democracy. Some of these key concepts can be found in the writings of Baker (1999:274) and Diamond and Morlino (2004:22).

The aim of this chapter is to examine the two main approaches to the study of the quality of democracy. In so doing, the chapter firstly discusses key concepts often used as tools of analysis in both quantitative and qualitative studies. This is important because it clarifies key terms often found in both approaches. Secondly, the chapter provides an overview on the quantitative approach, with a view to discussing and evaluating the three quantitative groups—FH, the EIUID and the IIAG, included in this study. And lastly, the chapter details the qualitative approach, as prelude to the discussion and evaluation of the APRM, which is the only qualitative study included in this research.
3.2. Conceptualisation of Key Terms.

An important tool of analysis in the study of the quality of democracy is a democratic audit which is often used as the basis for the evaluation of other key concepts or indicators. It is the basis for which democratic indicators come into effect because it guides and directs the study. Without a democratic audit, democratic indicators such as the rule of law, electoral competition, political participation, horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness as prescribed by Diamond and Morlino (2004:22), cannot be effectively measured.

3.2.1. Democratic Audit

At the centre of both quantitative and qualitative assessments, is the use of a democratic audit as an analytical tool, to determine ‘how democratic’ a country really is (Baker 1999:274). A democratic audit can be defined as the “systematic, qualitative assessment of the performance of a regime’s many parts, against agreed democratic standards” (Baker 1999:274). The objective of such an audit is not to establish whether or not a country is democratic, but to determine how democratic its various aspects are (Baker 1999:274). Altman & Perez-Linan (2002:87) express a similar view, arguing that the quality of democracy should not be a measure of which countries are more democratic or the level of democracy but rather, which countries perform better measured by stipulated normative standards. This approach pays attention to the various democratic components and assesses democratic quality based on its different aspects, rather than offering a single verdict.

Note that a democratic audit applies to both quantitative and qualitative studies of the quality of democracy. The only difference lies in the manner of data presentation for which one is compiled in a quantitative manner and the other is qualitative in nature.

3.2.2. Democratic Indicators

3.2.2.1. The Rule of Law

The rule of law dictates consistent application of the law. It is the most important aspect of a democracy upon which the other indicators rest and cannot function without (O’Donnell 2005:3). The rule of law states that laws must be unambiguous, clear, publicly known, universal, unwavering and non-retroactive and must be applied in a fair and consistent
manner by an independent judiciary (Diamond and Morlino 2004:23). Morlino (2004:15) stresses the importance of the rule of law as the benchmark of a democracy. The rule of law is the basis on which political and civil liberties are formally guaranteed, without which there is no reference point for the respect of these liberties. Its lack thereof will undoubtedly stifle any roots of democracy attempting to emerge.

3.2.2.2. Political Participation
The second dimension concerns the extent of participation in political and everyday life. The adult population should actively participate in democratic life through the mechanisms of voting, political parties and civil society organisations (Diamond and Morlino 2004:23), to ensure that they effectively influence the political process and enjoy the spoils of democratic governance.

3.2.2.3. Electoral Competition
Electoral competition is the third indicator identified by Diamond and Morlino (2004:23) and it is the primary indicator of a working political democracy. Free, regular and fair elections generally denote the presence of a vibrant electoral culture where competition is vast among different political parties (Diamond and Morlino 2004:23).

3.2.2.4. Vertical and Horizontal accountability
The concept vertical accountability is the fourth dimension covered by Diamond and Morlino’s framework. Vertical accountability refers to the responsibility placed on elected officials to answer to the electorate and constitutional bodies for their political decisions and actions (Diamond and Morlino 2004:25). Accountability of this nature runs upward and is an important agency in democratic life because it tests the responsiveness of the elected to the electorate (Schedler 1999:14).

3.2.2.5. Horizontal Accountability
Horizontal accountability is the fifth dimension. It deals with accountability within the body of the elected caucus. Accountability of this nature runs in a lateral way and stipulates that an arm of government be answerable to another one (Diamond and Morlino 2004:25). In this regard, answerability is regulated by state institutions bestowed with the necessary legal authority to sanction government officials for inadequacies and wrong doings (O’Donnell 1999:30). It checks and separates power “in the play between independently powerful branches of government” (Diamond 1999:35-36). Schedler (1999:14) argues that the relevant accounting state institutions have a two-fold responsibility of “calling into question” and
“punishing” questionable behaviour. The absence of horizontal accountability jeopardises a democracy because it increases the possibility of the elected acting with impunity and lack of regard thereof for the electorate. The importance of this agency in a democracy therefore cannot be overstated.

3.2.2.6. Freedom
Freedom is the sixth dimension and it can be defined as “the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centres of potential domination” (Freedom House 2008a). The agency of freedom covers an array of basic rights and liberties instrumental in an active democracy. Freedom focuses on essential civil rights such as; individual autonomy, security and privacy; freedom of thought, expression and information, as well as freedom of religion, assembly, association, organisation, and movement (Diamond and Morlino 2004:26). Freedom is justified on the basis that a democracy needs popular participation which can only be ensured by the protection of a set of basic rights (Beetham 2005:35). The importance of guaranteeing civil rights lies in the fact that a democracy without freedom would be paradoxical (Beetham 2005:35).

3.2.2.7. Equality
Equality is the seventh substantive agency of democracy. Political equality should ensure that every member of the adult population has an equal opportunity to participate and vote in public life (Rueschemeyer 2005:47). From a theoretical standpoint, democracy is premised on the basis of political equality. Yet so, certain social realities hinder the actualisation of political equality. This is because political equality is intrinsically linked to equality in the social and economic aspects of life. As such, extreme inequality therefore makes it difficult for people to have an equal chance at competing and participating in public life (Diamond and Morlino 2004:27). Writing on the subject of political equality, Dahl (1971:74) argued that a good democracy rests on the attainment of certain socioeconomic rights for all, including; education and economic freedoms, without which, it would remain implausible to attain political equality.

The need for achieving socioeconomic equality as a prerequisite for political equality has caused the re-definition of socioeconomic “goods” to “rights” (Diamond and Morlino 2004:27), so as to elevate its priority status on the national agenda and place an onus on government to expedite the achievement of this right by all groups of people in society.
The importance of political equality is invaluable. This is because when the majority of the population enjoy political equality, there is greater opportunity for citizen participation in public life, without which, politics becomes the domain of a select few (Rueschemeyer 2005:47). Furthermore, vibrant political participation which engages all ensures that public officials are accountable to the electorate. This is because, when people are equipped with the necessary socioeconomic tools (literacy and good health) they are more capable of demanding accountability from public officials and thus better informed with regard to influencing public policies.

3.2.2.8. Responsiveness

The last indicator is responsiveness and it covers an array of procedural and substantive issues. It occurs when a government “adopts policies that are signalled as preferred by citizens” (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999:9). Powell (2005:62) notes that a government is responsive when it is compelled to implement citizens’ preferences as a result of the democratic process. To trace the nature of responsiveness, one would firstly have to identify the extent to which the government has captured the various interests of citizens and articulated them into possible policy options offered by different political parties. Secondly, responsiveness highlights the extent to which the desires of the citizens are cumulatively expressed through the formation of policies. And thirdly, responsiveness is captured in the degree to which election mandates and commitments are converted into actual public policy, measured by outcomes (Diamond and Morlino 2004:28).

In actuality, responsiveness is an intricate process which is difficult to ascertain because citizens are generally unable to clearly articulate their interests; and policy makers tend to exercise their mandate in the selection of the “greater good” on behalf of the people which may sometimes include unintended trade-offs (Diamond and Morlino 2004:28). Because of this, responsiveness is a dimension often given little attention in democratic assessments. Nonetheless, it is an important dimension of the quality of democracy, which shows the effectiveness of the democratic process measured in terms of legitimacy, attitudes and sentiments extended by the people to government.

The above-discussed key concepts (often used as indicators) apply to both quantitative and qualitative studies on the quality of democracy. As such, they are often used in both types of
studies. These key concepts form important aspect of a democratic audit and are used to measure the quality of democracy in a state.

3.3. The Quantitative Approach

Quantitative assessments of the quality of democracy are conducted using a democratic audit scale, which measures the presence of an indicator or checklist question by assigning numerical scores for indicator or search questions. The overall score assigned to a country is usually the average of the indicator scores (Freedom House 2008a and EIU 2008). The goal of assessments is to award overall scores and rank a country based on its democratic performance and to measure this position against others (Beetham 2004:2). Assessments conducted by quantitative studies generally cover multiple countries and different geographic regions over an extended period of time (Samarasinghe 1994:26). Quantitative assessments often use qualitative and quantitative data such as figures and statistics to obtain quantitative assessments of democracy. Though the questions are qualitative in nature, information obtained is converted into quantitative data. Quantitative studies often utilise a vast amount of sources obtained from foreign and domestic news agencies, as well as non-governmental organisations, academics etc, for this purpose (Haerpfer et al 2009:32).

The main advantage of the quantitative method is that it is easier and quicker for a reader to analyse and understand information given and it also allows for comparison over an extended period of time. For instance, when reading a table or report that ranks countries in terms of their democratic performance, it is safe to deduce that countries with a higher ranking are more democratic than countries with a lower ranking. Also, coverage over an extended period of time allows for the tracking of positive and negative democratic trends in various countries. The table below summarises the main elements assessed by the three quantitative studies included in this study. Each quantitative study will then be discussed in more detail.
### Table 2: Quantitative Assessments of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories and sub-categories</th>
<th>Freedom House</th>
<th>Economic Intelligence Unit</th>
<th>Ibrahim Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Safety and Rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Electoral Process (QoR)</td>
<td>• Electoral Process and Pluralism (QoR)</td>
<td>• Rule of law (QoST/QoSoc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>• Political Pluralism and Participation (QoSoc)</td>
<td>• Functioning of government (QoST)</td>
<td>• Accountability (QoR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Functioning of Government (QoST)</td>
<td>• Political Participation (QoSoc)</td>
<td>• Personal safety (QoL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>• Freedom of Expression and belief (QoR)</td>
<td>• Democratic political culture (QoR)</td>
<td>• National Security (QoST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rule of Law (QoST/QoSoc)</td>
<td>• Civil liberties (QoR)</td>
<td>Participation and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (QoR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Participation (QoR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rights (QoR/QoL)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender (QoSoc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainable Economic Opportunity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable Economic Opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Public management (QoST)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Private Sector (QoST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Infrastructure (QoL)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Environmental and Rural Sector (QoL)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Human Development</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Poverty (QoL)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Health (QoL)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Education (QoSoc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The information in the table was extracted from data compiled by the (Freedom House 2008a, the EIU 2008 and the Ibrahim Index 2011).

#### 3.3.1. Freedom House (FH)

##### 3.3.1.1. Origin

Freedom House is an American think-tank established in 1941 which ardently supports freedom, human rights and civil liberties around the world. The organisation was founded by a group of prominent journalists, business leaders, academics and former government

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6 The respective indicators represent different QoD factors. As such, the QoD factor is placed next to the corresponding indicator in the table. Since Freedom House, the EIU and the Ibrahim index do not correspond indicators to QoD factors, it is achieved in the table by corresponding an indicator to a QoD factor. This representation is based on Andreev (2009)’s prescription of elements that characterise a particular QoD factor.

7 Some indicators may be grouped in more than one quality of democracy factor due to the overlapping nature of the indicator. In this regard, the indicator that pertains to the rule of law may also be grouped within the QoST and the QoSoc. Others such as certain “rights” may be grouped within the QoR and the QoL.
officials, in a bid to address two problems that characterised the period of the Second World War. Firstly, it sought to respond to the growing threat of totalitarian ideologies during the Second World War. Secondly it was created to stir public support for American involvement in World War II, during a time when isolationist politics were encouraged in the United States. The organisation’s founders believed that the spread of democracy was the only solution against the wave of totalitarian ideologies including Nazism and Communism in Europe (Freedom House 2014).

In the 1970’s Freedom House focused on the abuse of freedoms occurring in many parts of the Third World, including the rise of Marxist regimes and military juntas in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The group responded by initiating field-study research and analysis in crisis-areas affected. By 1973, the group had expanded its operations into the publication of *Freedom in world* —a yearly review on the global state of political rights and civil liberties. With the end of the Cold war, the group changed its focus to engendering freedoms and fostering the stabilisation of democratic institutions in new and weak democracies (Freedom House 2014).

Since 2001, Freedom House has become an influential and ardent “voice” on the topic of freedom in the world. Its reports are eagerly anticipated because it informs and provides government officials, journalist, academics and the public with an all-inclusive view of the “global state of freedom” (Haerpfer *et al* 2009:29; Samarasinghe 1994:25; Coppedge *et al* 2011: 248). Through its increasing global presence, the group has also managed to become a key lobbyist of US foreign policy, with Freedom House being chosen as the official source used in determining the “eligibility of a country for the Millennium Challenge Account”—a foreign aid initiative formulated to provide more aid to poor countries, on condition that they meet certain democratic criteria (Freedom House 2014).

### 3.3.1.2. Main focus

Freedom Houses study of the quality of democracy is based on an assessment of a range of political rights and civil liberties. In conceptualising the ideal of political rights, it is important to highlight that it (political rights), guarantees the rights of all people to freely participate in political life, which covers the right “to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organisations and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public polices and are accountable to the
electorate” (Freedom House 2008a). The second concept—civil liberties permits “freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state” (Freedom House 2008a).

As a point of departure, Freedom House provides a definition for the type of political system surveyed. The system is referred to as an ‘electoral democracy’ which can be defined as incorporating the following attributes “a competitive multiparty politics; universal adult suffrage; regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot security and the absence of massive voter fraud; and significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning” (EIU 2008:15). In so doing, Freedom House explicitly express that the minimum requirement for a democracy must fulfil the above stated criteria of an electoral democracy.

3.3.1.3. Procedure

Freedom Houses study is based on a checklist of 10 political rights (PR) (plus two discretionary) and 15 civil liberties (CL) questions. The PR questions are categorised into three groups, namely: electoral process (which has 3 questions), political pluralism and participation (4 questions) and functioning of government (3 questions). The CL are categorised into four groups, namely: Freedom of expression and belief (4 questions), associational and organizational rights (3 questions), rule of law (4 questions), and personal autonomy and individual rights (4 questions). Points ranging from 0 to 4 are given for each question, with 0 representing the presence of little or no rights or liberties, and 4 representing the highest. Consequently, the highest possible score that can be attained for political rights is a total of 40 points and 60 points for civil liberties. A rating of 1 through 7 which correlates to a range of total points is assigned for each country, with 1 reflecting the highest status of political rights or civil liberties and 7 the lowest. The sum points awarded for PR and CL determines the subsequent ratings of the status of Freedom in country. A total score ranging between 36 -40 for PR and 53 -60 for CL gives a rating of “free” or 1 for the rights and liberties index respectively, while a total score between 0-5 and 0-7 gives a rating of “Not free” (Freedom House 2008a). The table below reflects the scores that influence the subsequent PR and CL ratings.
Table 3: Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total score</th>
<th>PR rating</th>
<th>Total score</th>
<th>CL rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53-60</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44-52</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35-43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26-34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17-25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8-16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0-7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Freedom House 2008a).

The combined average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings determine the final status ranking of “Free” 1.0 to 2.5, “Partly Free” 3.0 to 5.0 and “Not Free” 5.5 to 7.0. Countries categorised as “free” are considered democracies, while countries classified as “partly free” and “not free” are considered semi-democracies and non-democracies respectively (Högström 2013:41).

Freedom House utilises a methodology formulated by prominent social scientists (Freedom House 2014). The survey analyses and ranks every country in the world based on a sequence of fundamental freedom indicators. With regard to the process of data collection, a panel of field experts collect the relevant information for the organisation (Haerpfer et al 2009:32; EIU 2008). These experts often travel to the various countries in order to conduct first-hand field research, which may entail interviews and other types of first hand data collection.

3.3.2. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (EIUID)

3.3.2.1. Origin

The EIUID is a product of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU 2013:2), a subsidiary of the Economist Group. The Economist was initially established in 1843, through the publication of the Economist Newspaper, which was used as a platform to further the cause of free trade. Since its early beginnings, the Economist has diversified its operations into a number of
different fields, including; politics, commerce and agricultural etc (The Economist Group 2014a). More recently, the Group has included a democracy assessment index as part of its operations, with the very first edition of the index published in 2007. The index measures the state of democracy in some 165 autonomous states worldwide and is set to continue in this manner of democracy assessment for the foreseeable future (EIU 2013:2). In recent times, the index has gained prominence due to its “extensive international reach” and information reliability, making it one of the world’s most prominent information sources on country risk analysis (The Economist Group 2014b).

3.3.2.2. Main Focus

The EIUID provides a “snapshot” of the state of democracy in some 165 autonomous states worldwide (EIU 2013:1). The Index covers five categories, namely: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture (EIU 2013:1). The EIUID five assessment categories are justified on the ground that free and fair elections are a “necessary” but an “insufficient” condition for a consolidated democracy (EIU 2013:1). Democratic consolidation should also entail a “transparent” and “efficient government”, as well as significant “political participation” and an engaging “political culture” (EIU 2013:1). These conditions are important to ensure that the state of democracy is continually being consolidated (EIU 2013:1).

Within the Index’s framework of democracy assessment, countries are classified as one of four types of regimes. These include; “full democracies”; “flawed democracies”; “hybrid democracies”; “authoritarian regimes” (EIU 2013:1).

3.3.2.3. Procedure

The EIUID assessments are based on a checklist of 60 indicator questions which fall into the five categories—electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture (EIU 2013:1). Ratings for each indicator are made on a three point scoring method, which stipulates 1 for a yes and 0 for a no. This captures the presence or absence thereof of the indicator with 1 representing its presence and 0 its absence. A 0.5 score is introduced to establish “grey areas” or midpoints. The score 0.5 is utilized when a yes (1) or no (0) is insufficient or problematic (EIU 2007).
Each category score is then summed up and converted on a scale of 0 to 10 to determine the category indexes. The overall score of democracy is the average of the five category indexes. The index scores are subsequently used to categorise a country within one of four regime types. Countries scoring between 8-10 are classified as “full democracies”; 6-7.9 “flawed democracies”; 4-5.9 “hybrid democracies”; and 4 and below are classified “authoritarian regimes” (EIU 2007).

With regard to the process of data collection, the EIUID has a panel of field experts that collect the relevant information for their organisation (Haerpfer et al 2009:32; EIU 2008). These experts often travel to the various countries in order to conduct first-hand field research, which may entail interviews and other types of first hand data collection.

3.3.3. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

3.3.3.1. Origin

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a governance index produced by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2007. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation was established in 2006, with the primary goal of enhancing change on the African continent, through the improvement of leadership and governance patterns. One of the ways through which the Foundation aims to achieve this objective is through the IIAG, which is described as the “most comprehensive collection of quantitative data on governance in Africa”. Working in partnership with field experts from leading African organisations, the IIAG offers yearly assessments on the state of governance in all African countries. Through this, the index provides a platform for stakeholders—“citizens’ governments, institutions and business” to measure service delivery and “policy outcome”, throughout Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2013).

3.3.3.2. Main Focus

The main focus of the IIAG is the assessment of the quality of governance in African states which can be defined as a process that is “… epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.” (World Bank 1994).
The IIAG assessment of the quality of governance is measured through the delivery of services, and political and socioeconomic goods (Ibrahim Index 2010). Through this, stakeholders are provided a platform to assess the provision of public goods, service delivery and policy outcome and identify important thematic governance areas in Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2013).

3.3.3.3. Procedure

IIAG assessments are based on four categories, which include; “safety and rule of law”, “participation and human rights”, “sustainable economic opportunity” and “human development”. These four categories are further sub-divided into 13 sub-categories, consisting of 89 indicators. The four categories and sub-categories are as follows: safety and rule of law (sub-categorised into: personal safety, rule of law, accountability and corruption and national security), participation and human rights (sub-categorised into: participation, rights and gender), sustainable economic opportunity (sub-categorised into: economic management, private sector, infrastructure and environmental and rural sector) and human development (sub-categorised into: poverty and health and education) (Ibrahim Report 2011).

The Index has been referred to as a ‘composite’ or ‘poll of polls’ because it uses data provided by 23 external institutions to rate the respective indicators (Ibrahim Report 2011). Some of its data providers include various reputable international and African sources such as; African Development Bank (AfDB), Freedom House, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Institut de Recherche Empirique en Economie Politique (IREEP), Bertelsmann Foundation (BF), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (HRDP) and the BF respectively for each indicator (Ibrahim Index 2012).

The Index’s assessment is produced after raw data on all indicators have been complied. Once this has been achieved, a mathematical formula is introduced to ‘re-scale’ or put the data on a ‘common scale’ of “0-100, for every indicator, for every country, for every year” (Ibrahim Index 2010).  

Scoring is achieved by the use of a complicated mathematical

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8 See (Ibrahim index 2010) methodology for a detailed discussion on the mathematical formula used to re-scale raw data.
equation which is as follows \[
\frac{xt - \text{Min}(X)}{\text{Max}(X)} \times 100.
\]
According to the method, “xt is the raw value for that indicator for a particular country in year t, and the Min (X) and Max (X) are the minimum and maximum values for that indicator over the whole period and for all the countries. The final result is subtracted from 100 where necessary, so that a higher number always indicated a better performance”. (Ibrahim Index 2010). The sub-category scores is determined by averaging the scores of its relevant indicators and the category scores is also determined by averaging the scores of the sub-categories. The overall index scores are ultimately calculated by averaging the scores of the four categories. The final ranking of countries is based on percentile performance, with 100 being the best possible score and 0 the worst, so that a country ranked 1st is numerically closer to the highest possible score of 100 than a country ranked 5th, 10th or 20th etc. Note that the higher the value, the better the level of governance, so a value of 100 is better indicating excellent levels of goods governance, than a value of 0 which indicates a complete deficit in levels of good governance (Ibrahim Index 2010).

3.4. An Assessment of the Quantitative Approach: FH, the EIUID and the IIAG.

3.4.1. Greater Variation of Democratic Ranking.

FH, the EIUID and the IIAG all utilise a system of democratic ranking that involves the grouping of countries based on democratic performance. In the case of FH, assessments are made on the basis of a “trichotomous measure of freedom, consisting of “free”, “partly free” and “not free” (Högström 2013:36). The EIUID’s assessment uses of an ordinal scale which categorises countries on the basis of one of four regime types—“full democracies (scores ranging 8 to 10)”; “flawed democracies (scores ranging 6 to 7.9)”; “hybrid democracies (scores ranging 4 to 5.9)”; “authoritarian regimes (below 4)” (Högström 2013:36). In the case of the IIAG, countries are ranked in order of percentile performance, with 100 being the best possible score and 0 the worst, so that a country ranked 1st is numerically closer to the highest possible score of 100.

Democratic scales similar to the ones used by FH, the EIUID and the IIAG allow for greater study with regards to the level and variation of democracy (Landman 2007:6). The advantage of the democratic ranking method adopted by the three groups is that it moves away from the
traditional dichotomous—“democracies” or “non-democracies” approach to incorporate more continuous measures of the QoD assessments. This allows for further analysis and deeper interpretation of the state of democracy in a country.

Another benefit of the democratic ranking method is that it allows for quick interpretation, understanding and analysis of quantitative democratic reports. For instance, when analysing a table or report that ranks countries in order of democratic performance, it is safe to deduce that countries with a higher ranking (this is largely dependent on the selected ranking method of the group) are more democratic than countries with a lower ranking.

Furthermore, democratic scales can be used for comparison over an extended period of time. This is because they are released annually and mostly cover various spatial areas (Landman 2007:6). Studies conducted by FH and the EIUID include a host of countries and territories in their surveys which allows for comparison between and among countries as well as longitudinal comparison of the same country or different countries over a period of time. Although the IIAG focuses specifically on countries within the sub-Saharan region, the survey still provides valuable insight with regard to comparison of different African countries in various Regional Economic Communities (REC). This allows for the tracking of both positive and negative democratic trends in different countries, over an extended period of time.

3.4.2. Operationalising Democracy

Although there is no general consensus on how to define and operationalise democracy, conceptualisation remains an important aspect when studying the quality of democracy (Högström 2013:38). Most democracy theorists agree that as a point of departure, a democracy should be a polity that fills political power through competitive and regular elections (Hegre 2012:1). As such, all three groups provide a point of departure to measuring the QoD. In the case of EIUID, the point of departure is an “electoral democracy” (See definition in 3.3.1.2.). The provision of a point of departure ensures that there is no room for conceptual confusion with regard to the concept being examined. This means that the state of democracy is assessed only in countries classified as electoral democracies and thus fulfils the requirements of that type of democracy. Countries outside this definitional bracket are therefore not included in the study. FH also follows the example of the EIUID by measuring
countries classified as electoral democracies. The IIAG measures the quality of governance (See definition of governance 3.3.3.2) and thus identifies the concept governance as its point of departure. In so doing, these studies express that the minimum requirement for a democracy should fulfil the standard criteria for electoral democracy and good governance.

3.4.3. Use of similar indicators

All three quantitative studies make use of similar categories and indicators. A close study of the categories provided by FH, the EIUID and the IIAG reveal significant similarities between the studies with regard to categories and indicators used. This overlapping nature of indicators is also identified in Haerpfer et al (2009:32). Some indicators present in all of the three selected quantitative studies include: the rule of law and participation. FH and the EIUID show further similarity with regards to categories as they both have classifications on civil liberties and functioning of government. These similarities in categories and indicators highlight the importance and unalienable attributes of certain democratic attributes in the study of the QoD. These attributes need be incorporated in order to reach valid and reliable findings.

While the use of overlapping indicators between the groups should produce comparable results, the disparity in findings often disproves this assumption. This highlights that the use of similar indicators (alone) does not necessarily produce analogous results. Attributes that influence overall democratic assessments often vary in scope and nature and may emphasize factors such as; the nature of checklist questions and coding methods etc.

3.4.4. Checklist questions

As opposed to just indicators (which is provided by the IIAG), FH and the EIUID actually provide checklist questions which help guide field researchers with regard to what information is necessary for data gathering, so as to effectively assess the different parts of the QoD. Although the two groups (FH and EIUID) utilise similar categories and indicators (see 3.3.3), there still exist significant differences with regard to the nature of checklist questions provided by the groups. A comparison of checklist questions complied by FH and the EIUID suggests that on average, the EIUID has a total of between eight to nineteen questions per category, which is in stark contrast to FH that has a mere three to four checklist
questions per category. At the risk of arguing from a superficial standpoint, it may be surmised that the EIUID offers more in-depth and detailed checklist questions than FH on the basis of the number of questions provided by the former. The disparity in the number of questions provided by FH and the EIUID also raises questions surrounding how comprehensive are the studies conducted by the two groups. As stated earlier, because the EIUID offers more checklist questions than FH, it is easy to argue that the former offers a more detailed and comprehensive account of the QoD than the latter.

A second issue relates to the nature and applicability of checklist questions. Because the present study, moves beyond a dichotomous analysis of democracy—is the country democratic or non-democratic and assess the QoD, checklist questions should be sufficiently detailed and comprehensive in this regard. Questions should therefore examine the institutionalised nature of democratic norms and values in society. In examining this issue, checklist questions complied by FH and the EIUID are examined so as to identify the applicability of questions to the category—political participation. FH’s assessment of political participation provides the following four questions:

- “do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?;
- is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?;
- are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?;
- do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?” (Freedom House 2012).

While the EIUID’s assessment of political participation includes the following eight checklist questions:

- voter participation/turn-out for national elections (average turnout in parliamentary and/or presidential elections since 2000. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age);
• *do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process?*;
• *women in parliament percentage of members of parliament who are women*;
• *extent of political participation (Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations)*;
• *citizens’ engagement with politics*;
• *the preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations*;
• *extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news*;
• *do authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation (EIU 2008).*

In assessing the applicability of questions provided by both groups, it is argued that while questions provided by FH may be limited in number—four questions, the questions remain substantially exhaustive in scope, highlighting the important role of multiple players free from elite control in the democratic process. Similarly, the EUID also probes the arena of public participation by engaging with concerns for multiple players, diversity of players (women in parliament), citizen engagement in the democratic process and the role of government in promoting active political participation. A comparison of questions compiled by FH and the EUID reveals that both groups provide questions that sufficiently gauge the extent of political participation, as it pertains to the QoD.

Furthermore, both groups move away from a dichotomous analysis of democracy because questions posed do not only aim to establish whether or not political opposition is permitted (whether or not political parties are banned), but delve further into the ideal of political participation by eliciting a wealth of information about the nature of political participation, through the assessment of factors that may complement or hinder competitiveness within the political space.

**3.4.5. Data collection**

As earlier stated, FH and the EUID have a panel of field experts that collect the relevant information for their organisation (Haerpfer et al 2009:32; EIU 2008). Here the collection of data is not outsourced but collected by the organisation concerned. This is different to the method of data collection adopted by the IIAG, which involves outsourcing data collection to a number of external organisations (see 3.3.3.3). While the method adopted by FH and the
EIUID is commendable because information obtained provides primary source data, the method selected by the IIAG is more meticulous in nature. This is because information used by the index is provided for by various organisations, thereby eliciting a wealth of information and enhancing methodological accuracy and reliability. The use of multiple information sources allows the organisation to gain access to different sources of data, which strengthens informational content of data provided. Outsourcing of data collection also allows for verification through public scrutiny and peer review. Furthermore, this method is credited for being heavily balanced—“a poll of polls”, which virtually eliminates any possibility of bias in the collection and interpretation of data.

3.4.6. Coding systems.

All three groups utilise various coding methods which are vital to the process of quantitative assessments within the study of the QoD. Coding methods carefully delineate formulas used to obtain numerical scores and ranking. Although, the groups differ with respect to the type of coding methods adopted—each group uses different statistical formulas to tally numerical scores obtained, the importance of this procedure remains invaluable to the quantitative process. In this respect, it is noteworthy to highlight the various methods used by FH, the EIUID and the IIAG.

A close examination of the procedure adopted by FH reveals that the group does not disclose its coding method. Besides its provision of PR and CL scores and the rating of 1 through 7 which corresponds to these scores (see 3.3.1.3), FH does not provide further detail as to how these scores of 1 to 7 are converted into a status of “free” “party free” and “not free”. Although, the group explicitly states that the combined average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings determine the final status of “Free” 1.0 to 2.5, “Partly Free” 3.0 to 5.0 and “Not Free” 5.5 to 7.0, it is difficult to ascertain the coding method used to identify the ‘combined average’ of PR and CL. This view is also reflected in Landman (2007:9) and Högström (2013:38), who argue that FH presents a rather vague coding method system, which generally makes it difficult to understand the conversion of data into numerical ranking figures.

The second group—the EIUID, makes use of a three-point scoring system (see 3.3.2.3), which provides for a simple and easy-to-follow formula for which raw data is converted into
a numerical ranking system. The conversion of category scores into a scale of 1 to 10, which directly correlates to the overall scoring of the four regime types: 8-10—“full democracies”; 6-7.9—“flawed democracies”; 4.5-5.9—“hybrid democracies”; and 4 and below—“authoritarian regimes” (EIU 2007), makes for a simplified coding method system, which allows for independent verification of scores provided and (even) replication of conducted studies.

However, the IIAG provides for a particularly cumbersome and complex coding method system. The method adopted by the index involves the use of a complicated mathematical equation—\([\frac{xt-Min(X)}{Max(X)}]*100\), to establish ranking scores (see. 3.3.3.3). Although the group clearly delineates the mathematical formula used to sum up indicator scores, the method adopted remains rather complex and even incomprehensible in the field of democratic studies.

While the point of this study is not to analyse coding systems, it can be argued that these different methods may be largely responsible for varied or (even) similar democratic assessments as provided by the groups. Although FH does not clearly detail its coding system and the IIAG does, both groups produced comparable quantitative assessments of the QoD in Ghana for the year 2008. The EIUID which seemingly has the most simplified coding system (given that FH coding method is not transparent) produced the most varied quantitative assessment of the QoD in Ghana, for the same year.

Given variation in rankings between the groups, it can be argued that coding systems play a central role in the final end product—ranking through 1 to 7; 1 to 10 or 1 to 100 (depending on the coding method), which determines the status or regime classification of a country. Some coding systems may attach more numerical value to certain indicators or categories, therefore giving those elements considerable influence in determining the final democratic rankings. On the other hand, others may place too little numerical weight to certain indicators or categories, such that these elements do not significantly influence the final process. Others yet, may apply equal value to all indicators and categories, providing for a more balanced ranking process. While, the analysis of coding methods is beyond the scope of this paper (as earlier stated), it remains invaluable to the present study to include the role of coding systems which continues to add value to understanding variations in democratic rankings.
3.4.7. Quality of Democracy Factors

In some cases, there may exist an overlap where a particular theme can be identified in more than one QoD factor.

All three quantitative studies—Freedom Houses, the EIU and the Ibrahim index assess the QoR as determinants of the quality of democracy. The QoR is primarily assessed through the electoral process which gives an initial indication of the democratised nature of the political regime. Often, the less democratised the regime is, the less political space for competition in the electoral process. The over-emphasis placed on the QoR is most likely due to western and conventional preoccupation with the dimension. Though it is the first quality control test depicting the nature of institutionalised democracy, it is seldom an indication of future continuance with democratic practices.

Within the QoL, both Freedom House and the EIU do not measure any aspects of this dimension. However, the Ibrahim Index measures six aspects of the QoL. These include—personal safety, rights, infrastructure, environmental and rural sector, poverty and health. Differences in the selection of QoD factors may possibly explain corresponding disparity between Freedom House, the Ibrahim index vis-à-vis the EIU. While the Ibrahim index emphasises the QoL factor as shown through selected measurement indicators, the EIU does not provide such a category. The QoST and QoSoc are also factors not sufficiently addressed in Freedom House and the EIU’s study of the QoD.

3.5. The Qualitative Approach

The second approach adopted in the study of the quality of democracy deals with the qualitative method. Qualitative studies involve the systematic analysis of empirical information. The primary difference between the qualitative and quantitative method lies in the manner of presentation. While quantitative assessments entail quantifying interpreted data, the qualitative approach employs a more descriptive-analytical style to studying the QoD. Qualitative assessments give an in-depth analysis on the state of democracy with respect to different aspects of the regime.
The qualitative approach to the measurement of the quality of democracy has been explored in the writings of Baker (1999:273-274); Beetham (1994:25-41) and Beetham et al (2008:5-318). These are discussed for conceptual clarification and as a prelude to contextualising the APRM within the framework of a qualitative study. The chart below summarises the selected democratic components espoused by the different scholars:

Table 4: Qualitative Assessments of Democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Baker</th>
<th>Beetham et al</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Components</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democratic Principles</td>
<td>Citizenship, law and Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Procedures</td>
<td>Representatives and accountable governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Ground Rules</td>
<td>Civil society and popular participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Outcomes</td>
<td>Democracy beyond the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Beetham (1994:25-41) a qualitative audit is realised through the creation of indicators or search questions that help show the extent to which a democratic standard is present. Democracy is not an “all or nothing” affair, but rather a comparative issue discussed in terms of “to what extent?” or “how far?” Democracy should therefore be assessed on a continuum basis that measures the degree to which democratic standards exist.

Baker (1999:275) contributes to the theory on quality, by crafting a guideline for measuring the quality of democracy. This involves distinguishing between essential components such as; democratic principles, democratic procedures, democratic ground rules and democratic outcomes. The first component—democratic principles are founded on standardised values of ‘popular control’ and ‘political equality’ which are the very essence of democracy (Baker 1999:275; Beetham 1994:28). Beetham (1997:1) defines popular control as “popular control over collective decision making and decision makers while political equality refers to equal right to share in such control”.

The second and third components refer to democratic procedures and democratic ground rules respectively. Democratic procedures is heavily reliant on democratic principles to be realised and refers to the *de jure* nature of practises such as the rule of law, freedom of

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9 Beetham, Carvalho, Landman and Weir (2008 5-318) are the authors of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2008 practical guide for assessing the quality of democracy.
expression, universal suffrage… accountability, responsiveness, accessibility of decision makers and impartiality in appointments, decisions and treatment” (Baker 1999:275).

Democratic ground rules refer to the *de facto* or empirical state of democratic procedures. The separation of these interlinked aspects (into democratic procedures and ground rules) displays the existence of possible discrepancies in the standardised provisions for the procedures and the actual practice of it. Reasons for likely inconsistencies range from societal values, to available resources needed for effective implementation (Baker 1999:275). Examples of democratic ground rules include voting systems to determine majority rule (with majority rule being the relevant democratic procedure and the choice of voting system being the democratic ground rule) or the relationship between the executive and the legislature to determine accountability of decision makers (Baker 1999:275). The last aspect relates to democratic outcomes and concerns the subsequent effect of democratic procedures and ground rules on the system. This is to ensure that essential democratic principles are realised (Baker 1999:275).

Beetham *et al* (2008:34) assessment of the quality of democracy focuses on four main dimensions. These include: citizenship, law and rights; representative and accountable government; civil society and popular participation and democracy beyond the state. Similarly to Baker, their assessment contains three main dimensions that should be assessed when determining quality. First, it studies the legal position of rules or formal procedures and then analyses how effective these rules and procedures are implemented in practice and last, it studies positive or negative indicators to identify trends that bolster or subvert democracy (Beetham *et al* 2008:34).

### 3.5.1. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

#### 3.5.1.1. Origin

The APRM is the brainchild of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), established by members of the African Union (AU) in 2001, amid international efforts geared towards addressing Africa’s developmental challenges (Gruzd 2009:5). Stir-headed by debates at the international level about the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the NEPAD initiative subsequently targeted poverty eradication, sustainable development and fostering Africa’s integration into the wider global economy (Bing-Pappoe
The realisation of these objectives was however contingent on financial assistance from the international community, of which assistance was inextricably linked to the conditionality of democracy and good governance on the continent (Bing-Pappoe 2010:3). As a result, African leaders committed to improve practises of “democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance” (Gruzd 2009:5), which was to be achieved (or rather engendered) through the framework of the APRM. The APRM initiative was premised on the AU’s official document of 2002, and contains four thematic areas of—Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (Bing-Pappoe 2010:3). However, only the thematic on Democracy will be discussed. The area covers the following objectives:

Table 5: APRM Democracy and Good Political Governance Objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Group</th>
<th>African Peer Review Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categories and sub-categories</td>
<td>Democracy and Political Governance Objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. prevent and reduce intra and inter-state conflicts;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. enhance constitutional democracy including periodical political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizens rights and the supremacy of the constitution;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. promote and protect economic, social, cultural and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. uphold the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective parliament;</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants;</td>
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<td>6. promote development and participation of civil society and the media;</td>
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<td>7. fight corruption in the public sphere;</td>
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<td>8. promote and protect the rights of women;</td>
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<td>9. promote and protect the rights of children;</td>
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<td>10. promote and protect the rights of vulnerable groups</td>
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Source: APRM 2005.

In assessing the APRM, a particularly difficult issue is the applicability of the term ‘peer’ to African states as used by the APRM. According to Mathoho (nd:2) peer review entails “the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states (peers), by designated institutions, or by a combination of states and designated institutions”. By virtue of this definition, all participation countries are considered peers because of membership to the International Community of States and the AU. Yet still, African countries differ significantly with regards to their respective democratic architecture. This makes the use of the term ‘peer’ rather problematic. For example South Africa and Ghana, both signatories to the APRM MOU, are considered to have well functioning democratic system,
even though the nature of democracy is undoubtedly different. These differences are resultantly due to a number of variables which range from the nature of ethnic and tribal cleavages to political turbulences in the respective countries. While African countries may be considered equal in terms of membership to the AU, their democratic architectures differ significantly. Although the use of the term ‘peer’ by the APRM does not have significant influence on the validity of the review process, it nonetheless raises a question about possible differences in interpretations that could arise among countries party to the review process. In this regard, how would African states reach a consensus about the attributes of a democratic state, amid competing and opposing views of the term democracy? (Turianskyi 2008:66).

Western involvement in the establishment of APRM process has also caused many critics to argue that the APRM might not be “an African solution to an African problem”. The premise is that that the process depends too heavily on external funding from western countries like the Group 8 (G8) (Mathoho nd: 5), which will significantly influence the review process resulting in a ‘donor dictated agenda rather than an “African negotiated agenda” (Mathoho nd: 5). Western interest in the review process was also highlighted by the G8’s response to a statement made by Thabo Mbeki in 2002, in which he indicated that the peer-review process was now to fall under the auspices of the AU instead of NEPAD. This change in APRM—NEPAD relationship would limit the influence of western players in the APRM process, due to the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention accorded to states. As the AU is an organisation consisting of independent states, it is a sovereign body and the principle of non-intervention applies to matters falling within this body. NEPAD on the other hand is not a sovereign entity. As a result of this re-shifted partnership, the G8 reacted and issued an ultimatum—that the $6 billion in aid to NEPAD was conditional on a NEPAD/APRM partnership (Edozie 2004:163).

Critics also highlight that the values championed by the APRM are the same principles espoused by leading western multilateral institutions such as the; World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which enables NEPAD continued donor support. Some argue that the drive for a NEPAD—APRM partnership is mainly championed by African leaders thought to be ‘friends’ of the West. There are also concerns that external players could manipulate the APRM as a punitive tool to sanction African leaders thought to be detractors of western ideals. In the past, the European Union (EU) has been used in a similar manner to promote a western based agenda, which was seen by the EU’s’ decision to impose sanctions
on Zimbabwe in 2002, which later resulted in the suspension of the country from the Common Wealth. Furthermore, mounting suspicion suggests that western influence in the review process could be a collective avenue through which donors impose punitive measures on Africa when leaders fail to reprimand their peers for flouting democratic ideals. Many argue that the G8 ultimatum was also tied to NEPAD’s unwillingness to sanction Zimbabwe’s violation of democratic principles (Edozie 2004:163; Mathoho nd: 5-6).

Be this as it may, some analysts’ highlight that international support in terms of financial assistance from western countries has actually enabled the APRM to offset annual pledges made but not honoured by participating African countries. Western countries have donated an estimated USD 13 million between 2003 and 2009, which has gone towards helping reviewed countries achieve prescribed APRM recommendations (Gruzd 2010:2).

While it is no secret that the APRM needs continued western funding, largely due to the inability of participating African countries to fund the process, there is urgent need to redefine the ongoing relationship between African and donor countries. This shift should address the wielding powers that donor countries supposedly enjoy, in terms of dictating the APRM agenda, as well as the commitment on the part of African countries to uphold the founding MoU. With this in place, the APRM process should become more ‘independent’ and dedicated to real change on the African continent as opposed to a bias, donor-driven agenda.

3.5.1.2. Membership of the APRM

Any AU member state may become party to the process through accession which entails the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding MoU (the initial MoU was first adopted in 2003 in Abuja, Nigeria), between the country and the APRM Forum (APRM 2014). This means that countries agree and accept to meet its “standards and requirements” with regard to the four stated thematic areas. As at January 2010, 29 African countries which represent 75 percent of the continent’s population have voluntarily acceded to the APRM process (Gruzd 2010:2). Of these countries, eight joined in 2003, fourteen in 2004, and two between 2008/9 (Bing-Pappoe 2010:3-4).
With regard to the voluntary nature of the review process, it is lauded because it respects the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic politics which is in accordance with the AU charter (Mathoho: nd 7). This is commendable, particularly in the African context because it allows flexibility of choice and encourages the participation of countries that would otherwise oppose, amid binding stipulations. The principle of the process is also valuable because it provides a framework for which African countries may choose to voluntarily conduct self-assessment in measurable ways and commit to improving their governance structures without threats from the AU (Bing-Pappoe 2010:3).

However, it does raise concern about the lack of enforcement mechanisms which is due to the voluntary nature of the process. The argument follows that the voluntary nature of assessments introduces a challenge which affects the value of the process. This is due to the fact that assessments lack enforcement mechanisms such as coercive power and punitive measures, needed to increase the effectiveness of the process (Turianskyi 2008:67). Recent history shows the need for effective reinforcement mechanisms in Africa, due to the prevalence of human rights violations, endemic corruption and other undemocratic practises (Turianskyi 2008:67). Also, the voluntary nature of the APRM reduces the effectiveness of ‘influence and persuasion’—as bargaining tools, because many African leaders may be reluctant or sceptical to criticise their ‘peers’, due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms (Mathoho nd: 7).

In as much as the voluntary basis of the APRM is frowned upon by some critics, there is value in the nature of the process. This stems from the presumption that African states want their countries to improve for the better. As such, most governments are prone to adopt provisions that will enable positive change take root in their respective countries. Whether these provisions are voluntary or otherwise, the need for positive enhancement is coercive enough to ensure that in the long-term, African states adopt the standards and requirements upheld by the APRM.

3.5.1.3. Procedure

The APRM framework entails four thematic areas. These are democracy and good political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance and socio
economic development. For purposes of this study, the dimension on democracy and good political governance will be the focus of discussion.

The APRM assessment consist four types of reviews (APRM 2003). The first type of review is referred to as the base review and it occurs 18 months after a country becomes party to the APRM process. The periodic review is the second type of assessment and it takes place every two to four years. The third form is ad-hoc in nature and may be requested by a participating country outside of the mandated review schedule. Lastly, Heads of States and government may call for an ad-hoc review in a participating country that shows early warning signs of political or economic upheaval (APRM 2003).

However, the present study focuses on the base review system, which is the most common type of review (mandated after the signing of the MoU) and the main focus of the APRM review system. The base review entails a five step review process:

**Stage one: Country Self Assessment Report (CSAR).** This involves a study of the ‘political, economic, governance and development’ landscape of the participating country (APRM 2003). A country support mission from the APR secretariat headed by a prominent person visits the participating country to liaise with authorities regarding “rules, processes and principles” of the APRM. The leader of the APR delegation then signs a MOU which reflects the conditions of the Country Review Mission (CRM). After this, the country commences the CSAR process which is based on the APRM questionnaire. The country is also required to develop a Plan of Action (POA) based on existing national policies and programmes. This self assessment process is to include broad-based participation from all works of life which includes civil society organisations and members of government (Open Society 2010:3-4).

**Stage two: Country Review Mission (CRM).** This involves a visit by the CRM to the participating country. Representatives from the CRM include persons from the APR secretariat and other APRM partners (Open Society 2010:4). The delegation is once again headed by a prominent person. The purpose of the visit is to hold discussions with various national stakeholders to determine whether the national assessment report was factually correct, technically competent, and reliable and free of elitist manipulation (APRM 2005: XI-XII).
Stage three: Country Review Report and modification of the POA. This stage involves the drafting of a report by the CRM. The report findings are based on information obtained during the CRM visit and independent sources. An important feature of this stage is that it requires consultations with the government of the participating country. Discussions are held for two reasons. Firstly, consultations help to “ensure the accuracy of information” provided. Secondly, it allows the government to respond to these findings and suggest solutions to identified problems within its national POA (APRM 2003). The government’s responses are attached to the final report.

Stage four: Conduct of Peer Review. In this stage the Country Review Report (CRR) and the country’s POA are submitted to other participating Heads of States and governments for final consideration (Open Society 2010:4). During this process, other participating countries may provide assistance and request donor support from the international community, should the reviewed country show the political will to address identified shortcomings. However, if the political will to effect necessary changes lacks, other participating countries can engage the country in question in “constructive dialogue” to achieve the desired objective (APRM 2003).

Stage five: Publication of the Report and POA. After consideration by the APRM panel, the report is presented at an AU meeting before public circulation. The process leads to the publication of three important documents, being the: County Self Assessment Report (CSAR); the independent Country Review Report (CRR) and the POA, which is the final stage of the review process (Open Society 2010:4).

One of the primary reasons the APRM is highly commended is due to the structure of its assessment which incorporates a host of different sources and contributors to the process. The main contributors to the process include: the APR secretariat, the CSAR, CRM, participating Heads of states and governments, the private sector, civil society, academics and various other stakeholders (Open Society 2010:4). Consultations with members of CSOs forms a significant part of the APRM review process\(^\text{10}\), as the review process calls for government to

\(^{10}\) Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are generally referred to as those groups, networks, and relationships that are not managed or organised by the state (APRM 2005: 5). They are autonomous bodies, independent of
engage with members of CSOs on multiple levels, so as to carry out an independent study of “its governance record” (APRM 2005: 5). The benefit of this type of interaction is that it opens up space for political dialogue between government and members of CSOs, particularly in cases where these CSO groupings are labelled “dissidents”. Furthermore, the process also provides a neutral platform for debate and discussion between government, CSOs and other NGOs. Together, these set of contributors provide insightful, balanced and a thought-provoking view of the nature of democracy. Each stakeholder brings a particular set of skills to the evaluation process, thereby serving to enrich the process and elicit the relevant information about the country.

Furthermore, the CRR provides for “comprehensive and frank”, assessments which may serve as early warnings for impending problems. Gruzd (2010:3) mentions that the CRR of Kenya and South Africa could have averted electoral violence in the former; and xenophobic attacks in the latter, if recommendations were implemented (Gruzd 2010:3).

Nevertheless, Turianskyi (2008:72-73) argues that the CSAR introduces a certain element of bias and possible manipulation. This stems from the fact that the government under evaluation is charged with the responsibility of developing a national POA in order to ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the process. Furthermore, the government populates “a list of stakeholders (government, private sector and civil society)” that are to respond to the APRM questionnaires. This process could possibly serve to enhance the interest of the government of the day, as the incumbent ‘reserves the right’ to include stakeholders that are friends of the government and unlikely to undermine the governments performance. This remains highly possible in spite of the APRM’s disclaimer claim that the—Mission ascertains “whether the national assessment process was technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation” (APRM 2005:XI-XII). Furthermore, since the process may act as a possible ‘screening room’ for aid and investment from the developed world, sceptics argues that this is enough of an incentive for government manipulation of the process.

government influence. Many formal and informal networks as well as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) form part of this network (APRM 2005: 5).
Concerns have also been raised about the nature of the self-assessment questionnaire provided to countries under review. According to a SAIIA (2006) report, questionnaires given to countries undergoing review are starkly different from those recommended by the technical expert team at the planning stage of the review process. Many ‘difficult questions’ (generally suggested by the technical team) relating to the balance of power in the political system, political rights and corruption were removed in favour of ‘soft’ issues not previously discussed with the technical experts team.

In responding to these claims, the APR secretariat highlighted the need to ‘soften’ various issues in order to make the questionnaire more favourable to all African countries not just those participating in the process. While the APR secretariat appears preoccupied with creating an incentive for all African countries to participate in the APRM review process, SAIIA (2006) points out that this comes at a cost to the integrity and objectivity of the entire process. Discussion of ‘soft’ issues excludes important political realities and reflects a largely superficial review process. Furthermore, it contributes little to the improvement of governance methods and democracy as a whole.

Another issue of controversy concerns the CRM draft report which is first discussed with the government under review (See Stage three: Country Review Report and modification of the POA). The purpose of this as argued by the APR secretariat is to ensure that information provided by stakeholders and collected by the team is an accurate reflection of the country’s realities. This also gives the government an opportunity to react to the findings and propose ways in which identified shortcomings can be addressed. However, Turianskyi (2008:73) argues that this allows the government ample leeway to dominate and manipulate the process, thus jeopardising the report’s objectivity and compromising the entire process. Also, since initial questionnaires are ‘softened’ to meet suitability requirements for African countries, final reports could undergo similar procedures so that they are ‘acceptable’ to all (SAIIA 2006).

Another issue with regard to the APRM procedure concerns the pace of review, which according to official documents should not take longer than six months to be finalised (APRM 2003). In reality however, the lengthy duration of the procedure proves cumbersome. In South Africa, the review process took two years, while in Mauritius it has taken the longest amount of time, commencing in 2004 and still not finalised by mid 2010 (Open Society
Possible reasons for variation in length of time may range from the willingness of the country being reviewed to cooperate with the CRM, to resource constraints on the part of the APR secretariat (Gruzd 2010:2).

Despite the initial slow pace of review, Gruzd (2010:2) argues that the time taken to complete the process is steadily improving. He argues that since the completion of Ghana’s review in 2006, four years after the inception of the APRM, the process has become more proficient. In 2006, two countries—Rwanda and Kenya were reviewed and in 2007, Algeria was reviewed (Gruzd 2010:2). In addition, four countries—Benin, Uganda, Nigeria and Burkina Faso and three other countries—Mali, Mozambique and Lesotho, were reviewed between 2008 and 2009 respectively, which suggests that the APRM has reached its half-way target with regards to the number of reviews conducted annually (Gruzd 2010:2).

The APRM has contributed to enhancement of the quality of democracy in Africa through its afro-centred and capacity building approach which has created an African platform for measuring the quality of democracy on the continent. This platform has enabled states measure the quality of democracy and governance in qualitative aspects, with a strong emphasis on democracy-capacity building. As opposed to western quantitative measures, that gauge democracies against each other with the aim of ranking countries in the order of democratic strength, the APRM aims to strengthen African democracies through its process. This is achieved through recommendations offered geared at highlighting as well as improving the quality of democracy. The APRM’s approach is the first of its kind in Africa aimed at enhancing the nature of good governance on the continent.

3.6. Conclusion

The quality of democracy can be measured using both quantitative and qualitative means, with both measures seeking to gauge the levels of democratic strength in a country. This is generally achieved through the use of a democratic audit which measures key democratic indicators to reveal the strength of democracy in the country.

Most democratic assessments generally utilise the quantitative method because information is presented in a concise manner which makes it quick and easy to analyse given data.
However, because this method is largely quantitative, it often fails to interpret the meaning of numerical ratings given for a specific country. The qualitative method is the least common method used, due to the fact that it requires exhaustive summaries and analyses of the quality of democracy. However, the method remains valuable because it produces a wealth of information. Further to this, it allows for democracy-capacity building, because the nature of investigations carried out offers recommendations geared at improving the quality of democracy in the country.

While both approaches are valuable to the study of the quality of democracy, it is important to make the qualitative approach the premise for a thorough investigation of the quality of democracy in a country, especially if the study is geared at offering recommendations needed to improve the quality of democracy in the state. Because of the low quality of democracy in many African countries, the qualitative method remains highly valuable on the continent, so as to achieve the two-fold goal of measuring the quality of democracy, and also providing recommendations that will help deepen the quality of democracy in Africa.
Chapter Four: A Historical Analysis of Ghana’s Long Path to Democracy.

4.1. Introduction

As stated in the concluding section of the previous chapter, many African countries are plagued by low quality democracies. Given this state of affairs, it is important to highlight, for purposes of thorough investigation, examples of thriving democracies in Africa. This is conducted with a view to measuring the quality of democracy and offering recommendations that will help deepen democratic politics in Africa.

With this in mind, Ghana has been identified as one of the few countries on the continent that serves as a beacon of democratic hope for Africa. Since 2000, the country has enjoyed steady democratic and constitutional rule and remains one of the few African countries to change leaders peacefully by democratic means.

This chapter provides a historical trajectory of the struggle for democracy in Ghana. It gives an analytical breakdown of political, economic and social events in post-independence years in Ghana, with a view to highlighting the struggles, and successes achieved in consolidating democracy in Ghana.

The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one focuses on the search for democracy from (1957-1992). This period covers the era directly after independence and focuses on the three republics as well as the intermittent periods of military rule. The section also identifies problems faced by the respective republics in the quest to consolidate democracy. Section two provides an overview of the transition to and consolidation of democracy between 1992 and 2008. This period covers the re-introduction of multi-party politics as well as democratic consolidation occurring in 2008. Of particular importance is the role played by Rawlings during the transitional phase and the transformation of the PNDC to a civilian party under the umbrella of the NDC.


In March 1957, Ghana became the first African state to attain independence from its British colonial power (Petchenik 1993:7). National elections held in 1956 ushered in a post-
colonial government formed, under the leadership of the Convention People’s Party (CPP). The new post-colonial government headed by Kwame Nkrumah was characterised by increased centralisation, the systematic elimination of opposition members, stifling of the media, corruption and economic problems (Drah 1992:17; Pellow and Chazan 1986:38). The culmination of these policies negatively impacted the state of affairs in the country and stifled the factors of democracy. While the country started off post-independent as a democratic state shown largely through the election of its first president—Kwame Nkrumah, it quickly spiralled into political oblivion. This was caused by abuse of power by the executive, suppression of political oppositions, stifling of freedoms (personal, media and press) and numerous military interruptions to the democratic experience that forestalled the democratic project.

In a bid to reverse the effects of Nkrumah’s policies, the military staged a coup, subsequently assuming political leadership of the country in 1966. The new military administration was headed by General Lieutenant-General Joseph Ankrah of the National Liberation Council (NLC). Attempts made by the new government to decentralise political power and reinstate previously curtained freedoms included; the appointment of civilian commissioners within the predominantly military structure and the reinstatement of press and speech freedoms. Although the NLC was instrumental in introducing fundamental changes to the political regime, the administration was plagued by allegations of corruption, resulting in the resignation of Ankrah. Ankrah was later replaced by Brigadier Afrifa, who subsequently supervised the transition to democratic rule (Business Ghana 2012).

The second republic was established in 1969 under the leadership of K.A. Busia of the Progress Party (PP). From the onset, the republic was plagued by many of the problems experienced in the first republic. Among these included; a weak political structure and economic mismanagement (Goldsworthy 1973:8-9). In 1969 the Busia’s administration’s abuse of executive powers was also shown through the failure of government ministers to comply with constitutional provisions, stipulating the disclosure of personal assets upon the assumption of political office and prohibited ministers from occupying other public or private office for remuneration purposes (Goldsworthy 1973:21; Ghana Districts 2006). The government’s abuse of power was highlighted by the fact that the government officers were unwillingly to comply with these constitutional provisions despite the fact that the necessary system of checks and balances were in place to constrain the executive, in this regard.
As a result, democratic rule was short-lived due to the intervention of the military in 1972. The new military regime established the National Redemption Council (NRC) which ruled under the leadership of General I. K. Acheampong. Similar to the NLC, the NRC reiterated concerns for political and economic stability as reason for military intervention in 1972. But unlike the NLC, the NRC’s government was made up mainly of members of the armed forces rather than “broad-based representation from various walks of life” which the army had promised would be a feature of its administration (Business Ghana 2012). This move remains a subtle yet important authoritarian feature of this administration. It sheds light on early attempts by the NRC to forestall the return to democratic rule. In a nutshell, the NRC lacked the internal democratic workings of the NLC which made for a quicker and much smoother transition to democracy in 1969.

By 1975, the NRC had become increasingly centralised which played out in the metamorphosis of the Council into a seven-man Supreme Military Council (SMC) I. The new governing body ruled from 1975-1978 and was once again headed by General I. K. Acheampong and several members of the armed forces. The Council faced a vast range of policy and governance problems attributed to increased centralisation; a harsh external economic climate; endemic corruption and unwillingness to hand over power to a democratically elected government. By 1978, SMC II had replaced SMC I as the country’s governing body. As a result, Lieutenant-General Akuffo replaced Acheampong as the new head of State. Amid these rapid political changes, resentment seethed among some members of the armed forces who criticised the government for not prosecuting members of the SMC I complicit in corrupt activities. Tensions eventually culminated in a coup which successfully toppled the SMC II and derailed democratic transition scheduled for 18 June 1979 (Business Ghana 2012).

A new government known as the—Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the chairmanship of Jerry Rawlings subsequently gained political power from June until September 1979. The AFRC was poised to rid the country of political abuse of power and corruption. In so doing, the Council launched a massive campaign against corruption both within the military and civilian divisions of government. However, the AFRC’s programme against corruption “lacked consistency” and was used mainly against individuals whose crimes consisted blatant acts of corruption. The draconian manner in which the AFRC executed its zero tolerance policy led to accusations of human rights abuses against the
government. Petchenkine (1993: 88) comments that many of the laws introduced by the AFRC to counter corruption were often in contravention to democratic ideals. The maximum penalty was often given to persons indicted on corruption charges. In so doing, the AFRC set an unprecedented record of human rights abuses. It ordered the execution of a number of former military officials—including the former head of state, General Acheampong—who was allegedly guilty of corruption (Petchenkine 1993: 87-88).

The third Republic was eventually established in September of 1979 under the administration of Hilla Limann. This third democratic experiment lasted only two years before it was overthrown by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in December 1981 (Petchenkine 1993:99). The new Council was once again headed by Jerry Rawlings, the former head of state under the AFRC regime. Rawlings justified his return to political power on grounds of political and economic mismanagement by the Limann administration. The PNDC promised sweeping political and economic reforms which were set to resuscitate Ghana’s ailing economic situation. This was to be achieved through the adoption of a comprehensive liberalisation programme which entailed ‘rolling back’ on public employment and the abolition of state controls on commodity goods. The PNDC sought to cut down on state expenses, encourage private capital and promote market forces (Boafo-Arthur 2006:259-260).

However, these policies remained largely unpopular and were criticised for being austere Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) or initiatives sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Boafo-Arthur 2006:261). Despite opposition to the SAPs, some of the successes of the PNDC’s economic policy included a 5.3 percent rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) levels by 1986, which enabled the government to pay of its United States Dollars (USD) $ 600 million debt (Shillington 1992:122). Although the economy enjoyed relative growth, microeconomic stability remained fragile as widespread poverty continued unabated. The effect of Rawlings economic programme also stirred tension between leftist elements of the PNDC and Rawlings (Shillington 1992:124). Relations between Rawlings and many trade unions associations also deteriorated as they argued that Rawlings had essentially betrayed the mantra of the revolution and abandoned its core idea which embodied a socialist vision (Shillington 1992:124). Despite local dissatisfaction with the PNDC’s Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), on the international level, the PNDC was praised for engineering an “economic miracle” and implementing Africa’s most
successful SAPs (Toye 1991:155; Anyemedu 1993). Credit for such an economic turn-around undoubtedly goes to Rawlings whose dedication and absolute approach to the implementation of SAPs was unprecedented in Ghana (Boafo-Arthur 2006:262). Rawlings adopted a “ruthless” approach, which included; “detaining trade unionists, academics and students or overruling or sacking anti-IMF politicians” in a bid to ensure that Ghana’s economic objectives were met (Martins 1991:242).

On the political front, Rawlings pursued a policy of decentralisation. The aim was to devolve political power and include the citizenry in the decision-making process. All tiers of society including; farmers, soldiers, workers, the rich and poor were to be involved and consulted in the decision-making process, to ensure that ruling was not the domain of a select few (Adedeji 2000:3). Decentralisation of governance was done at the local government and District Assembly (DA) levels. This granted local government more decision making powers and reduced the influence of political parties at the local government level (Crook 1999:114).

Rule under the PNDC and Rawlings lasted eleven years. Multi-party politics eventually resumed in the early 1990’s, ending a decade of the longest episode of military adventurism in the country. A factor that enabled the evolving democratic process in the post-1990 era was the PNDC’s role in enacting the 1992 constitution. The government drew expertise from various walks of life, including academics, politicians and big businesses which proved instrumental in developing a consolidated constitutional framework that continues to be the cornerstone of Ghana’s democracy; providing for an array of political rights, civil liberties and a host of other freedoms as well as institutional mechanisms that help safeguard democratic norms and values (Constitutional Review Commission 2009).

4.2.1. Abuse of Power

The first challenge to the quality of the political regime was the executive’s abuse of power. This pattern took root in the first republic and was shown through Nkrumah’s decision to ban all political parties and transform Ghana into a one-party state in 1960. This, despite the fact that the first republic constitution was adopted from the Westminster model of parliamentary government, which meant that it provided for the separation of powers between the offices of the head of state and head of government in a bid to prevent the abuse of power by either office, Nkrumah changed the constitution in 1960, which dissolved the existing separation of
executive office and vested power in one body, his office—being the office of the president. This in essence gave him unlimited executive powers which Nkrumah took political advantage of and effectively transformed the republic into a one-party state (Constitutional Review Commission 2009).

In 1969 the Busia’s administration’s abuse of executive powers was also shown through the failure of government ministers to comply with constitutional provisions that stipulated the disclosure of personal assets upon the assumption of political office and prohibited ministers from occupying other public or private office for remuneration purposes (Goldsworthy 1973:21; Ghana Districts 2006). The government’s abuse of power was highlighted by the fact that the government officers were unwilling to comply with these constitutional provisions despite the fact that the necessary system of checks and balances were in place to constrain the executive, in this regard.

4.2.2. Suppression of Civil Liberties

A second challenge to the quality of the political regime in the post-independent era was the use of political tactics to suppress civil liberties in a bid to limit the opposition. The Nkrumah administration essentially suppressed civil liberties, in an attempt to consolidate power at the centre. This was achieved through the enactment of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) of 1957 which prohibited the formation of organisations, parties and societies, along tribal, racial and religious lines (Boahen 1975:194). The Act thus limited “freedom of association” in society with a view to restricting the political space by preventing political opponents from forming political parties along interest lines. Although Nkrumah defended this policy by arguing that such groupings were ultimately the source of divisive ethnic politics (Petchenkine 1993:10), it is surmised that Act was passed to restrict the political space, thus affecting the quality of the political regime.

Another attempt by the Nkrumah government to suppress the opposition was seen in the form of the 1957 Deportation Act, which permitted the government to deport persons “declared by the Governor-General to be a person whose presence in Ghana is not conducive to the public good” (Omari 1970:52). While the act was targeted at non-Ghanaian nationals, it was seemingly used to oppress Ghanaian political opposition. The government made use of this Act to ensure that political opposition remained suppressed in the newly independent state.
and was contained in order to prevent fervent calls for a more democratic system of
government.

In 1958, the government continued in this manner of suppressing the opposition through the
enactment of another law—the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) (Petchenikine 1993: 10). The
Act permitted “the government to arrest and imprison for a period of five years persons
thought to be acting in a way that was deemed detrimental to the welfare of the state”
(Boahen 1975:194). This Act was intended for those posing a genuine threat to the security of
Ghana, but it was in fact used to quiet dissent, particularly: prominent political figures,
and parliamentary opposition (Shillington 1992:11). Boahen (1975:194) argues that the Act
stemmed from Nkrumah’s need to ‘check’ and restrict the activities of the opposition which
seemingly threatened the CPP’s power base. The PDA of 1958 may have also been used to
reinforce the ADA of 1957, of which the latter only prohibited the formation of organisations
along ethnic lines but did not attach punitive penalty for party formation along those lines.
The PDA was therefore an attempt by government to suppress the political opposition
through more coercive means which proved successful in suppressing the opposition as well
as civil society because members of these groupings desisted from publicly criticising the
Nkrumah administration. The Acts were used as ‘instruments of suppression’ (Petchenikine
1993:10; Birmingham 1998:86), because they formed the basis for which the post-
independent government was able to successfully suppress the activities of opposition, and
limit the public space to supporters of the Nkrumah administration.

The Busia regime also adopted a similar style of political suppression that had been employed
by the Nkrumah administration. The regime also passed an Act that was aimed at limiting
public dissention. The Industrial Relations Act (IDA) of 1971 was such a law passed, in order
to curtail the right to protest by trade unions. This law terminated the workings of the Trade
Union Congress (TUC) and branded their operations illegal (Goldsworthy 1973:17).

31 “According to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act; (a) Trade Union dues would be deducted from workers’
wages only with their consent and would be paid to their respective unions instead of to the TUC. The act guaranteed
individual workers’ rights to choose whether or not they wished to join a union and also gave the unions the right to
negotiate on their members’ behalf instead of through the TUC. (b) The Act allowed unions to come together in another
federation for the protection of their common aims, but also empowered the Registrar of Unions not to re-register unions
unless he was satisfied that their rules provided for free and fair elections of officers. (c) The Act included a 90-day cooling
off period which could be enforced in the event of a strike or threatened strike that might hamper essential services” Daily
Although the government responded by claiming that the law was established in an attempt to prevent a sweeping tide of trade union protests against wage freezes, it inherently denied the right of these organisations to protest against government policy, which remains an intrinsic part of a democratic culture. The problem with limiting the right to protest is that it may be used as a tool to suppress the opposition which threatens political participation and the ethos of a democratic culture.

Under the Busia regime, the government sought to curtail the public’s access to information through two main ways. Firstly the government ensured media censorship by controlling prominent media outlets such as the Ghanaian Times, the Daily Graphic and the Star (Goldsworthy 1973:19). And in 1972, the regime sanctioned the appointment of Busia as the Minister of Information, effectively limiting the public’s access to information

4.2.3. Administrative Centralisation

Extensive administrative centralisation was another challenge that hindered the effective institutionalization of democratic governance. Extensive administrative centralisation started during the Nkrumah tenure due to continual attempts to consolidate power at the helms. With this, power became increasingly centralised within the administrative structures of government. In order to achieve extensive centralisation, Nkrumah strengthened the CPPs organisational capacity by ensuring that the CPP intervened in the appointment of government officials at the local level— regional commissioners, district commissioners, and town or local development committees (Pellow and Chazan 1986:38). The CPP also created organisations such as the; Ghana Trade Union Congress (TUC), the United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC) and a number of women organisations that were ostensibly under its control and “tools” of its administration (Pellow and Chazan 1986:38). The ruling party’s strategy of organisational influence sought to ensure complete compliance with the policies of the CPP, as the party had clearly infiltrated all sectors, giving little opportunity for divergent opinions within bureaucratic settings or otherwise (Ryan 1970:150).

Political centralisation quickly extended into the economic sector as Nkrumah institutionalised a national policy of heavy state interference and nationalized key sectors in the economy (Pellow and Chazan 1986:41-42). The issue was not so much the developmental
plan enacted by the government but the aggressive and undemocratic management of the economy (Pellow and Chazan 1986:41-42).

However, the NLC chose a different path to extensive centralisation and aimed at centralising political power within its structures. The council “appointed seventeen commissioners of whom fourteen were civilian” in government (Business Ghana 2012). The appointment of civilian decision-makers within the predominantly military governance structure depicts the emergence of an important democratic feature within the quality of the state.

Despite this, the NRC appeared to reverse this emerging democratic trend, as Acheampong appointed several members of the military and police to occupy key leadership positions (Business Ghana 2012). This administrative decision remains a subtle yet important authoritarian feature of the NRC’s administration. In a nutshell, the NRC lacked the internal democratic workings that characterised the NLC and was thus responsible for a quicker and much smoother transition to democracy in 1969.

According to Rawlings, the PNDC administration would return decision-making power to the people. In so doing, all sectors of society—farmers, soldiers, workers, rich and poor were to be involved and consulted in the decision-making process to ensure that ruling was not the domain of a select few (Adedeji 2000:3). However, Crook (1999:121) argues that Rawlings actually aimed at strengthening the PNDC’s influence over local government rather than reducing it. In so doing, the system of decentralisation only helped to strengthen the PNDCs reign on political power, as the ruling party essentially controlled the affairs of the DAs through various means which ranged from the selection of DA members to the delaying of scheduled local government elections (Crook 1999:121).

4.2.4. Corruption

High level of corruption remains another important factor that hindered the effective institutionalisation of democratic governance in the post-independence era. The trend which began during the Nkrumah administration permeated throughout the three republics.

During the Nkrumah regime, the state became uncharacteristically corrupt as the CPP granted itself monopoly over the purchase of cocoa and other export cash crops, which enriched the private coffers of the CPP’s executive members (Kilson 1965:4). The government continually
justified its policies as part of socialism, which had become the official party ideology. In reality, the socialist rhetoric only served to prevent the people from challenging the pervasive nature of corruption that had plagued the state and immensely benefited Nkrumah and his supporters (Kilson 1966:5). The Limann administration was also plagued by corruption due to allegations of profiteering levelled against some government officials in the case involving the importation of products with foreign currency obtained from the bank of Ghana at extremely low rates, and re-selling them locally at exorbitant rates (Petchenkine 1993:103). These activities engendered an environment of mass dissatisfaction and social unrest, which threatened the state’s stability as massive protests spread in response to the unofficially ‘sanctioned’ corrupt practice by state officials (Petchenkine 1993:103).

Amid the growing threat of corruption to the persistence of the Ghanaian state, various military administrations attempted to improve this state of affairs through the introduction of a number of anti-corruption campaigns and programmes. The NLC established a National Courts Campaign Committee (NCCC) and Centres of Civic Education (CCE) to address the issue. However, the council itself was implicated in the very practice it sought to rid the country off, through the involvement of its chairman in corrupt practices (Business Ghana 2012). The AFRC launched a massive campaign against corruption both within the military and civilian structures of government. However, the AFRC’s programme “lacked consistency” which hampered the programme’s effectiveness (Petchenkine 1993: 87).

The PNDC was able to achieve some successes through the establishment of the National Investigation Committee (NIC) which was aimed at supporting the judicial system in the arbitration of justice. The Committee was tasked with investigating charges of corruption and other economic crimes (Shillington 1992: 120). Other Committees set up by the PNDC to assist in the fight against corruption, include; the Citizen’s Vetting Committee (CVC), the National Appeals Tribunal (NAT) and the Public Tribunal (Shillington 1992:120).

4.2.5. Strained relations with neighbouring states and the military

A factor that contributed significantly to the weakened quality of the state in the post-independent period was strained relations with neighbouring states and the military. In 1969, the Busia government enacted the Alien Compliance Order which severely affected the state’s relations with other neighbouring West African states. The policy required foreign
nationals without residence permits to register with the appropriate government authorities or risk deportation (Owusu 1972:57). As a result of this order, many foreign nationals were deported and relations between Ghana and some neighbouring states, such as—Nigeria, Togo, and Mali were subsequently strained, as these respective governments felt aggrieved by Busia’s decision to expel its nationals (Owusu 1972:57). Although the government’s decision to enact this law may have been informed by the need to restrict and contain the growing number of foreign businesses that were poised to overtake local ventures, it would later have serious repercussions for Ghanaian nationals living in Nigeria during the 1970’s who were equally forcefully expelled from the country.

Successive civilian governments also weakened the quality of the state through the maltreatment of military officers. The Busia administration strained relations with the military by publicly vilifying the body, when it (the military) raised an issue regarding the executive’s non-compliance with prescribed constitutional provisions (Owusu 1972:60). In response, the government accused by the military of plotting a coup d’etat against the administration which resulted in the dismissal of General A. Ocran—an ex-chief of Defence Staff and a number of other top level military officers (Owusu 1972:60; Le Vine 1987:171).

Paradoxically, Busia may have thought these actions were necessary to consolidate power at the centre and prevent the likelihood of another coup. In reality, these actions threatened the stability of the government’s political position in the country. Furthermore, the Busia government reduced annual allocation of funds to the army by 10 per cent and cut back on other military benefits. The Busia administration’s mistreatment of the military is considered the single most important factor responsible for strained relations between state and security forces between 1969 and 1972. The state of affairs between the two groups, further consolidated the military’s resolve to stage a coup and usurp political power from the ruling PP in 1972 (Owusu 1972:60).

The Limann government also engendered a similar smear campaign against the AFRC; accusing the council of corruption, theft and high treason. In a particular instance, the AFRC was accused of stealing an estimated US 23 million dollars which the council had itself recovered during its rule and had promised to transfer to the next civilian government (Shillington 1992:67). The Limann government responded by dismissing a number of high ranking military officials, connected to the AFRC. Other military personnel, including—Jerry
Rawlings, were accused of planning a coup and instigating acts of subversion against the government (Nugent 1995:43; Shillington 1992:68; Petchkine 1993:96). While the Limann government may have thought these actions helped consolidate its power, it instead caused alienation between the armed forces and government, thereby setting the political scene for another military usurpation of political power.

4.2.6. Socioeconomic Issues

Economic factors played a significant role in hampering the institutionalisation of democracy in the post-colonial era. This was largely caused by failed developmental and socioeconomic investment opportunities in society.

During the first republic, Nkrumah aimed to improve the level of physical infrastructural development in the country through the development of a state-led project that was to run from 1963-1970. Under this plan, the Volta River Project was to be built, with the primary aim of driving the process of industrialisation in the country (Birmingham 1998:63). However, due to poor planning and implementation, the VR project actually drained the newly independent state of its meagre financial resources, resulting in the accruement of debt that was to remain an Achilles heel for future governments (Birmingham 1998:63). While Nkrumah’s grandiose idea of a high-quality infrastructure and transport system would have tremendously improved the quality of the society, the failed project possibly worsened the plight of the people, as state revenue was most likely reapportioned towards debt repayment of the failed project, rather than for economic investment.

The state of education was another contentious issue, particularly under the Busia administration. This was caused largely by the Busia administration’s decision to revoke the Students Loan Scheme (SLS) in 1972 that had been established under the first Republic in which government committed to the payment of university tuition and the granting of student loans (Ghana Districts 2006). Although the government’s new stance on education was likely informed by the harsh economic climate which forced decision-makers to prioritise macro-economic stability over the demand for free tertiary education, the decision adversely affected the quality of education by causing a drop in the number of registered university students.
Under the Busia administration, inflation levels had much semblance to the Nkrumah era. Because the Busia government inherited an accumulated debt of USD $800 000 000 from the NLC and the Nkrumah administration before it (Goldsworthy 1973:10), which subsequently reduced the country’s purchasing power parity (PPP). Government tackled the debt problem by allocating a quarter of the annual budget towards debt repayment (Goldsworthy 1973:10). However, its economic problems were further complicated by the continuous fall in the price of cocoa, which caused Ghana’s revenue from cocoa products to fall from 40% in 1965 to 28% in 1971 (Owusu 1972:55). In a bid to halt the worsening economic crisis, the PP government introduced a national wage freeze, amid rising inflation levels (Goldsworthy 1973:17). Furthermore, the PP made a decision to devalue the national currency (cedi) by 50 percent against the dollar from—$ .98 to $ .55, in order to control inflation and stimulate new growth which caused production levels in the industrial sector drop (Owusu 1972:56; Ghana Districts 2006).

Similar to previous administrations, the Limann government failed to secure an economic turn-around. Despite the regime’s efforts at rehabilitating the rural sector through the establishment of a two-year plan-crash agricultural program, food production actually dropped between 1979 and 1981 (Petchenkine 1993:72). During the Limann administration, food prices rose 12 to 15 times higher in 1981 than in 1971 (Petchenkine 1993:72). Inflation levels rose by 100 percent in 1981 and GDP dropped by 8.7 percent (Petchenkine 1993:72). The extraction of raw materials fell by 8.4 percent, while the production of cocoa fell from 250 000 tons to 247 000 tons between 1979-1981 (Petchenkine 1993:72 &102; Shillington 1992:72).

The NLC introduced a number of reforms initiatives, which included the devaluation of the cedi, in a bid to stimulate economic recovery (Tsikata 1999:9). As opposed to the NLC, the NRC worsened the economic situation by prematurely revaluing the local currency which raised growing debt levels and led to an increase in inflation rate from 9.6 percent in 1971 to 77 per cent by 1977. Tsikata (1999:10) argues that neither the NRC, the SMC I nor SMC II was successful in rescuing the ailing economy. Rather, the military regimes largely re-introduced and ‘intensified’ many of Nkrumah’s failed policies.

The PNDC attempted to stimulate economic recovery by institutionalising some largely unpopular fiscal policies. Backed by the IMF and the World Bank, Rawlings embarked on
SAPs which entailed thorough liberalisation of the local economy by ‘rolling back’ on public employment, encouraging private capital, and promoting market forces, most notably in the abolition of state controls on fixed cocoa prices (Boafo-Arthur 2006:260). Austerity measures were generally targeted at the urban and public sectors, while the rural sector received financial aid geared at stimulating the local economy. As a result, economic liberalisation benefited agriculture in the rural areas as the sector experienced a boost in infrastructural development. However, urban dwellers bore the cost of reform programmes occurring in the rural areas and endured the high cost of living caused by a devalued cedi (Adedeji 2001:6). All in all, economic indicators showed that overall GDP levels increased by 5.3 percent in 1986, which enabled the government, pay off its US 600 million dollar debt (Shillington 1992:122).

4.2.7. The Role of the Military

The most prominent challenge to the establishment of democracy in the post-independent era remains continuous military interjections which tended to suspend democratic constitutions and prevent the democratic architecture from taking root in the country.

This was shown through the 1966 coup led by the military in which the constitution was suspended and all executive and legislative powers vested in the office of the NLC. Similarly, in the coup of 1972 the second republic’s constitution was also interrupted by a coup staged by the NRC. And similarly to the NLC, the NRC vested executive and legislative power in its ruling council, which hampered devolution of political power (Constitutional Review Commission 2009).

The SMC I attempted to ensure continued grip of political power by purposefully forestalling a return to democratic politics. The council advocated for the continued existence of military rule in the country as seen through its decision to establish a Union Government (UNIGOV)—a collaboration between the military, police and civilians, which was not reflective of society’s broader interests (Business Ghana 2012). While the Council attempted a compromise by including civilians in UNIGOV, its actions may be interpreted as an attempt to hold on to power amid calls for a transition to democratic rule. Furthermore the AFRC which had overthrown the SMC II was also accused of forestalling the democratic process.
because it lacked a concise political vision for the country and remained unclear about the timeline for the return to democratic politics (Petchenkine 1993:86).

Furthermore in December 1981, the enduring democratic process of the third republic was once again interrupted as a result of a coup staged by the PNDC.

The military was also accused of civil liberties and committing gross human rights violations. It is important to mention the NLC which was accused of gross human rights violations because of the government’s decision to publicly execute military officers that previously staged an unsuccessful coup (Business Ghana 2012). The AFRC was also accused of human rights abuses, largely due to the regimes draconian laws which issued the maximum penalty to persons found on the wrong side of the law. In this manner, the AFRC set an unprecedented record of human rights abuses, by executing a number of former military officials—including the previous head of state, General Acheampong—who was found guilty on corruption charges (Petchenkine 1993: 88).

Even within the largely undemocratic backdrop of the various military administrations, there existed some traits of democratic practices that helped ensure the transfer of power to the civilian administrations. This was largely seen through the appointment of civilian committees for reasons of power-sharing; the drafting of democratic constitutions and the removal of some civil liberties restrictions.

With regard to the appointment of civilian committees, The NLC was exemplary. This was shown through the council’s decision to democratically appoint a constitutional committee with a view to returning power to a democratically elected government in the future. The Committee which was headed by a civilian Chief Justice was appointed to draft a new constitution for the republic (Business Ghana 2012). The NLC also took steps to establish a new independent Electoral Commission (EC) which was also chaired by a civilian committee. It is also important to note the role played by the NLC in drafting the second republic’s constitution which was subsequently enacted in August 1969. The new document re-introduced constitution safeguards that had been abolished under the Nkrumah regime. Some of these provisions include; the separation of the executive office into offices of the—president and prime minister and three separate arms of government which consisted of the executive, legislature and judiciary (Constitutional Review Commission 2009). Furthermore, the legislature fell strictly within the purview of the national assembly, without executive
interference, while judicial functions continued to be administered by the judiciary. The NLC thus played a crucial role in facilitating the birth of the Second Republic which ensured the re-establishment of democratic governance in the country (Business Ghana 2012).

The SMC II also showed similar political will (as seen in the NLC administration) to return power to a democratically elected government. While the SMC I had presented UNIGOV as the ‘only model’ for a “civilian” government, the SMC II acknowledged the impracticality of this model. The new government subsequently unbanned political parties in 1979, signalling its commitment to the democratic process. This was a significant development as political parties were no longer excluded and could freely participate in the political process. The SMC II also set a timeline for national and presidential elections, thus making important political head-waves in the re-introduction of democratic politics (Business Ghana 2012).

Another military regime which fostered a return to democratic governance in the third republic was the AFRC (which had overthrown the SMC II). The administration played a crucial role in the supervision and adoption of the 1979 constitution. According to the new constitution, adopted under auspices of the council, power was to be vested in the office of a single executive, being—the president, while legislative powers were held in parliament (Constitutional Review Commission 2009). The judiciary continued to function separately without interference from the executive or legislature. Since the office of the president engulfed all executive powers, the constitution limited the powers of the executive through various means. Some of these constitutional safeguards include: a clause that prevented the president from dissolving parliament or calling for new elections before the end of the stipulated term; the removal of the president through a vote of no confidence passed in parliament; and the creation of a new parliamentary sub-committee which was responsible for making recommendations on all matters of government policy, thus limiting executive interference (Petchenkine 1993:93).

These democratic constitutions (the second and third republic) as drafted under the auspices of the military administration were set (at least in theory) to limit the excesses of the political elite and prevent the abuse of power by the executive. As such, the constitutions generally ensured a clear separation of power between the three branches of government and emphasised on the independence of the judiciary, all in a bid to safeguard the democratic ethos of these republics.
With regard to the area of civil liberties, the NLC was exemplary in effecting modest reforms. This was seen through the NLC’s decision to re-instate previously curtailed press and speech freedoms, which was later followed by the release of PDA detainees that had been detained under the Nkrumah administration (Business Ghana 2012).


The transition from authoritarianism to multi-party democracy was marked by the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, won by Rawlings and his new party the NDC. Rawlings had once again assumed political leadership of Ghana but under the civilian umbrella of the NDC. Boafo-Arthur (2006:264) comments that the NDC was largely reflective of the PNDC, due to the ‘new’ party’s style of leadership which embodied many authoritarian features of the old regime. During the 1992 elections, the NDC was accused of purporting various electoral irregularities, which gave the incumbent party undue advantage and compromised the legitimacy of the entire process. Some of the problems identified include: an ineffective EC which provided outdated voter roll; claims of election rigging and bloater registrations (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:107; 105).

The next election held in 1996 was an attempt to restore the legitimacy of the democratic process (Jeffries 1998:190). Electoral reforms were subsequently embarked upon, which paved the way for the establishment of a new EC. The Commission compiled a new voter registration roll; trained election officials and party agents; redesigned electoral equipments and educated the public, with a view to achieving greater election transparency and ensuring voter trust (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:109).

Although Rawlings and the NDC were re-elected in 1996, the general consensus among opposition parties was that the elections were more competitive than the 1992 process, because opposition political parties enjoyed equal footing with the incumbent NDC (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:115). There were however, some allegations of electoral fraud committed by the NDC, in some rural areas. Instances of voter bribery and underage voting— children as young as 15 years were seen voting, threatening to compromise the legitimacy of the entire process. Allegations of a monopolised state media—used to further the electoral goals of the
NDC which was in breach of Article 55, sections 11 and 12 of the 1992 constitution; and a largely ineffective electoral commission—unable to reprimand the activities of the NDC, were also matters of concern (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:115).

With the 2000 elections, power was successfully transferred from the NDC to the leading opposition party—NPP, which was headed by John A. Kufuor. These elections were considered both free and fair, in stark contrast to the 1992 and 1996 elections (Smith 2002:519). Moreover, it marked the first time in the country’s political history were power was successfully transferred from one democratically elected government to another. This signalled the first milestone in the consolidation of democracy (See Huntington 1991:266-267). These events highlight the changing nature of the democratic process in Ghana and the willingness by political stakeholders to accept the “rules of the game”.

The 2008 elections marked the country’s fifth national elections since its return to multi-party politics in 1992. These elections were of particular importance because power was once again successfully transferred from one political party to another, marking the second or “two-turnover” test and the point of democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991:266-267). During this period, power was transferred from the NPP—who had won the 2000 and 2004 elections, to Rawlings’ NDC (Freedom House 2009). The nature of democratic consolidation occurring in Ghana is pertinent within the context of a precarious regional backdrop, marred by post-election violence in Kenya (2007), Zimbabwe (2008) and fraudulent elections in Nigeria (2007). Whitfield (2009:622) highlights that despite the political odds; democracy was successfully consolidated in the West African country which continues to be exemplary in this regard. The deepening of democratic consolidation highlights that the democratic process is accepted by all significant stakeholders as the only legitimate political game (Diamond 1999:65)

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12 Section 11 mandates that “The State shall provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media.” Section 12 stipulates that “all presidential candidates shall be given the same amount of time and space on state-owned media to present their programmes to the people” (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:121).
4.4. Conclusion.

Ghana’s journey to democratic rule depicts a tumultuous historical trajectory, punctuated by periods of military adventurism. Even within the phases of democratic governance, the system failed to persist, largely due to economic mismanagement, personalistic rule, corruption and the repression of political rights and civil liberties. These factors largely influenced and weakened the quality of democracy in Ghana during the post-independence years. However, after three republics, numerous military interventions, and years of political and economic mismanagement, the quality of democracy began to take root in Ghana. This was largely due to the establishment of the fourth republic in 1992. The early phase of this republic marked the re-institutionalisation of democratic practices and norms that had been obliterated by years of political obscurity.

To effectively study the quality of democracy in one of Africa’s most thriving democracies, it is important to conduct a historical overview of the political, economic and social events that paved the way for the successful consolidation of democracy. This historical approach helps to contextualise current day democratic happenings, with a view to measuring the quality of democracy in the country. This approach also helps to identify the factors of democracy that helped to either weaken or strengthen democratic politics during the formative years of democracy in Ghana. As such, it allows for effective analyses of identified factors of democracy in Ghana post-1992, which will be conducted in the next chapter.

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter discussed Ghana’s historical trajectory and highlighted the struggle to consolidate democracy in the post-independent years, as well as the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1992. This historical approach also helped provide an overview of the quality of democracy factors post-1992 that either weakened or strengthened democratic consolidation in Ghana. Given this, it is now important to closely examine identified quality of democracy factors, which constitutes measuring the quality of democracy in Ghana.

The current chapter provides an analysis of the quality of democracy factors between 1992 and 2010. This assessment is conducted with a view to: firstly, highlighting the different aspects of Ghana’s system and secondly, identifying the strongest and weakest elements of Ghana’s democracy. In order to achieve this, the quality of democracy which is influenced by political (QoR and QoST) and socioeconomic (QoSoc and QoL) factors will be assessed. The quality of democracy factors will measure different aspects of the post-1992 structure, in an attempt to assess the quality of democracy in the areas of the political regime, state, society and life.

5.2. The Quality of Democracy Factors

The quality of democracy factors are divided into four distinct categories, being the state, political regime, society and life. However, several indicators overlap into more than one category. In the category—QoST, the rich/poor can also be used as a measure for levels of unemployment. Also, fiscal flexibility and predictability includes measures that determine the purchasing power parity (PPP). Furthermore, the rule of law is listed as an indicator under the QoST (The rule of law is established on all groups and territories) and the QoL (A uniform and unbiased application of the rule of law). Given the repetitive nature of indicators listed in more than one category, it becomes redundant to repeat these indicators in the various categories. As such, the study will group similar indicators under the indicator that best applies to it, so as to avoid unnecessary repetition.

With regard to assessing the quality of democracy factors, the 1992 Ghanaian constitution forms the legal backdrop for conducting this study.
5.2.1. Quality of the Political Regime (QoR)

The importance of the QoR in measuring the quality of democracy is stated in (2.3.2.). As such, the QoR is measured through the presence of the following aspects, “elected official; A self governing polity; free and fair elections; a democratic constitution; freedom of expression; alternative information; associational autonomy; …polyarchy threshold….; institutional format: executive; parliamentary/semi-presidential/presidential; legislature: single-/double-chamber; legal system: an independent judiciary; existence of an ombudsman; party system; and independent and transparent media and information regime; Balance of power (between these institutions); horizontal accountability; a priori and a posteriori- accountability of decision makers; responsiveness of the rulers; regime’s stability and persistence” Andreev (2005:9).

5.2.1.1. Elected officials

Chapter 7, article (50) of the Ghana constitution makes provision for elected officials (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d). This aspect of the QoR is importance because it displays that the democratic ethos is implemented because the public space provides and allows people to be voted into public office as opposed to being appointed or assuming political positions. Since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, public officials, particularly those assuming the highest office in the land, have been official elected through a formal voting system which has seen five consecutive elections being 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012.

Constitutional provisions for elected officials also show commitment to constitutional democracy which remains promising in Ghana. The role played by elected officials is highlighted with regard to their commitment to the democratic process which has (among other things) ensured a successful transition from authoritarianism to a constitutionally-backed democracy (Prempeh 2006:1288). This commitment by elected officials is particularly noted in the swiftness with which Vice President—John Dramani Mahama was sworn in after the untimely demise of President—John Atta Mills in July 2012 (Sithole 2012:5).
In many African countries, the demise of a serving President has often resulted in violent political upheavals, despite clear constitutional provisions on the transfer of power (Sithole 2012:5). Upheavals of this nature are generally linked to succession struggles about who should assume power. This was the case in Malawi in April 2012, where the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika lead to a contentious power struggle and attempts at constitutional subversion. Similarly, the demise of Ethiopian Prime Minister—Meles Zenawi led to concerns for political stability in the country (Sithole 2012:5).

However, in Ghana, the transfer of power was smooth, timely and conducted with impressive constitutional integrity. Doyle (2012) notes that in previous time, such power vacuum would have created space for military adventurism. But, this was not to be the case in Ghana. Instead, the handling of the first death of a sitting President, continues to reiterate the stability of Ghana’s institutions and its commitment to democratic ideals (The Economist 2012). This is a measure of how the democratic process has become institutionally entrenched as the norm (Doyle 2012), which is not always the case in other African countries.

5.2.1.2. Self-Governing Polity
Chapter 2, article (4) of the Ghana constitution indicates that the country is a sovereign entity. The importance of domestic self-governance ensures that the national government can make choices on behalf of the people who elected them and are therefore not constrained by external actors, which increases legitimacy of the government and state at large (Chalmers 2013:4). A 2008 (the year of the second democratic turnover see. 1.3) Afrobarometer survey, captured that most Ghanaians approve of the performance of the president and rated the ruling NPP government very highly in many aspects of service delivery, including healthcare and education (Afrobarometer 2008:2). This highlights the importance of a self-governing polity in terms of acceptance and legitimacy from its people.

5.2.1.3. Free and Fair Elections
Section 7 makes provision for representation of the people through the process of elections. (See 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.7) for a discussion of the importance of electoral competition and political equality.

Ghana’s electoral process has also been hailed as the hallmark of Ghana’s democracy (Sithole 2012: 3). This is due to the fact that the country’s electoral process is largely devoid of the irregularities that plague many African countries. Since the re-introduction of multi-
party elections in 1992, the electoral experience has been largely peaceful, consistent and timely. While the electoral process has not always been this smooth, the revamping of the defunct electoral system in 1992 renewed the credibility of the process (Sakyi 2012). The smoothness of Ghana’s electoral process remains the primary reason for the successful nature of the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 elections respectively.

Although the 1992 elections were considered a landmark event in the return of multiparty politics in Ghana, allegations of electoral irregularities threatened to derail the ensuing process. In protest to Rawlings presidential victory, the main opposition parties including—the NPP, National Independence Party (NIP), People’s National Convention (PNC) and the Heritage Party (HP) staged a boycott of parliamentary election scheduled to hold in December 1992 (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:106). Rather than achieve the desired outcome of possibly forcing the EC to call for new presidential elections, the oppositions actions actually helped consolidate the NDC’s political power. This is due to the fact that parliamentary elections went ahead as scheduled which paved way for the NDC’s landslide parliamentary victory, winning the party 189 out of a possible 200 seats (Haynes 1993:451). The NDC’s continually dominance of the political landscape, came at the cost to opposition parties who were not granted a ‘level playing’ political field. These actions by the NDC threatened to hamper the unfolding democracy process. The QoR during the post-1992 elections was characteristically democratic in terms of its de jure nature but however lacked the de facto requirements of a working democratic polity.

The next election held in 1996 was an opportunity to strengthen the ongoing process, provide a level playing field for all opposition parties and consolidate the QoR in Ghana. However, the process failed to live up to the democratic benchmark, as a number of issues pertaining to incumbency advantage hampered the fairness of the electoral process. An important difference identified in the 1996 process was that elections were considerably freer than the 1992 process but lacked credibility on grounds of fairness (Gyimah-Boadi 1999:115; Jeffries 1998:191). Another significant difference between the two processes was the fact that the losers of the 1996 elections conceded defeat and accepted the results of the elections in a more conciliatory manner (Jeffries 1998:191). This demonstrates improved political will on the part of stakeholders to legitimise the democratic process.
The 2000 elections was a landmark event in Ghana’s history as it signalled the ‘first turnover’ test. The elections were considered both freer and fairer than the 1992 and 1996 processes. Despite this, there still existed claims of a flawed electoral system, characterised by ‘bloated voter register’—a discrepancy between eligible voters as provided by the national census versus the list of registered voters on the voter register list and the ‘buying’ of political opponents which saw a number of NPP members floor-cross to the NDC (Smith 2000:624; Gyimah-Boadi 2001:61). Although the 2000 process was not without its problems, it signalled an attempt to rectify democratic irregularities and strengthen the QoR.

Furthermore, the manner in which the December 2012 elections was handled, confirms the premise of continued democratic consolidation in Ghana. International observers called the country’s sixth national elections, “free and fair” (The Guardian 2012). According to reports, voting was carried out peacefully, with voter turnouts reaching a high of 80 percent (The Guardian 2012). Election results declared the ruling NDC’s candidate—John Dramani Mahama the winner, with an estimated 50.7 percent of the votes. The leading opposition leader—Nana Akufo-Addo, representing the NPP obtained 47.7 percent in the close election race (The Guardian 2012).

Though international observers credit the elections as “free and fair”, the opposition questioned the legitimacy of some of the votes which they argue was compromised by technical problems with the voter identification machines. NPP officials claim irregularities such as over-voting and the voting of people not registered under the new biometric finger verification system, enabled the ruling party to rig the elections (The Guardian 2012). The opposition argued that if the 1.3 million extra votes cast were withdrawn from total votes counted, this would assure victory to their candidate—Mr. Akufo-Addo (BBC News 2012a).

In response, the ruling party defended its victory, claiming that the opposition’s allegations were baseless but rather informed by their desire to return to power. Former Nigerian President—Olusegun Obasanjo, who headed the ECOWAS election observer team also refuted these allegations, noting that although there were problems with the system, it was not significant to alter the outcome of the results (BBC News 2012b).

Amid these circumstances, the NPP refused to concede defeat but lodged a petition with the Supreme Court, in a bid to nullify the election results (BBC News 2012b). The NPP Presidential candidate defended his decision to take the matter to the Supreme Court by
stating this would ensure “that the Electoral Commission is accountable to the people of Ghana and the Supreme Court is seen by all as the ultimate arbiter of electoral grievances and disputes” (BBC News 2012b).

Darko (2012) commends the opposition’s commitment to constitutional democracy which displayed itself in their decision to challenge the election results through the legal channels, rather than resorting to the more prevalent “jungle forms of protestation” often seen in Africa. This shows that democracy is not only consolidated at the higher party echelons, but also at the local grass-root levels. It is important to highlight the consolidation of democracy at this level, as members of the local grass-roots are often the perpetrators of violent election-driven street protests. Neighbouring Ivory Coast was victim to this plight when a disputed election result in 2011, quickly spiralled the country into a protracted violent conflict (The Guardian 2012). Events occurring in the electoral realm signify the enduring state of the quality of the political regime which is continually being strengthened by a consistent, competitive and inclusive democratic process.

5.2.1.4. A Democratic Constitution
Since the adoption of the 1992 constitution, Ghana has been lauded for its move towards constitutionalism (Prempeh 2006:1288), which continues to be the cornerstone of Ghana’s democracy. Chapter one, articles 1, 2 and 3 makes provision for the supremacy, enforcement and defence of the constitution, respectively. Article 1 clause (2) specially indicates

- “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 14).

This clause identifies the supremacy of the constitution which remains the main legal document of reference in the state. Further stating that, any law which is not in line with provisions stated in the constitution ceases to have legitimacy. The constitution also provides for a Bill of Rights—a host of political, economic and social rights, civil liberties and a host of other freedoms. The provision for a Bill of Rights is considered a crucial aspect of the document as it is designed to safeguard and protect the rights of all citizens (Constitutional Review Commission 2009).

Of particular importance with regard to the democratic nature of the 1992 constitution is the provision for a two term presidential term limit, as outlined in Chapter eight, article 66, clause (2). According to the clause,
Gyimah-Boadi (2008:5) commends the architects of the 1992 constitution for including the clause; and the Rawlings administration, for exercising constitutional restraint with regards to this clause. Rawlings decision to step down in 2000 after serving the stipulated two terms is hailed as one of the few examples of honourable departures by African presidents (Vencovsky 2007:16). Similarly, John Kufuor of the NPP also stepped down in 2009 after serving as president from 2000-2008. Most importantly, credibility should be awarded to the relevant political stakeholders who have consistently upheld and adhered to the clause. Vencovsky (2007:16) argues that the problem with prolonged presidential tenures is that it allows for increased centralisation of power, accountability deficit and deeper filtering of patronage networks. The practice of unhindered power alternation in Ghana has thus helped consolidate the evolving democratic process as power alternation continues to be a vital attribute of a democratic polity (Vencovsky 2007:16).

5.2.1.5. Freedom of Expression and Alternative Information
Chapter five, article 21(a) makes provision for freedom of speech and expression in society, while article 21 (a) and Chapter 12 make provisions for media freedom in the state. Article 21 (a) guarantees

• “freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 25).

The guarantee provided in chapter five article 21 (a) is further enhanced and elaborated upon in chapter twelve, articles 162 -165.

In practice, dedication to alternative sources of information has been seen through the presence of multiple privately-owned radio stations and independent media outlets that operate freely in Ghana (Freedom House 2009). The state of media freedom in Ghana is reflected by the ample workings of its electronic and media print media. Media coverage is generally robust, but the internet and blog sites have provided a wider platform for open and free discussion which has at times been critical of governments’ policies, calling on ruling parties to effect change (Freedom House 2009). Furthermore, the fact that there are no political restrictions to internet access has helped broadened the platform for the expression of diverse political opinions. According to the Centre for Educational Technology (2007:22) in August 1995, Ghana became the second country in sub-Saharan Africa to enjoy full
internet access. By 2002 the National Communication Authority (NCA) had granted operating rights to 52 internet service providers, although only 10 were in service (Centre for Educational Technology 2007:22). The only constraint to internet expansion has been the shortage of functional dial-up phone lines and not state censorship (Centre for Educational Technology 2007:22). In 2007, the number of internet users was at an estimated 609,800, given population figures of 21,801,662 (Centre for Educational Technology 2007:23).

Besides existing constitutional provisions on media freedom, Ghana has remained sensitive to the need to change some of its constitutional provisions in line with the underpinnings of a liberal democracy. The revised “Freedom of Information Act” (FIA) in 2002 which succeeded in repealing the ‘law of libel’ was a step in this direction. The Act seeks for the promotion of an open society by establishing frameworks for combating corruption and ensuring transparency and good governance (Freedom House 2009). Sithole (2012:3) points out that this is an imperative building-block in the strengthening of democracy in Ghana.

5.2.1.6 Associational autonomy
Chapter 5 article 21, clause (d) and (e) makes provision for freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Clause (d) guarantees:

- “freedom of assembly including freedom to take part in processions and demonstrations”
- “freedom of association which shall include freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations national and international for the protection of their interest” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 25).

In practise, although associational autonomy is guaranteed by the constitution, less than nine percent of Ghana’s formal work force is unionised, under the national trade union umbrella of the Ghana Trade Union Congress (TUC). This is largely due to weak organisational capacity caused by financial and human resource constraints as well as lack of knowledge in the informal work force about formalised union structures (Osei-Boateng and Torgbe n.d 130-131). Despite these limitations, Ghana’s work force (particularly teachers) was however able to affirm their constitutional right in 2006/07, in their capacity as the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) and the Ghana National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT) by demonstrating against unsatisfactory pay (ICFI 2006).

5.2.1.7. Institutional arrangement/ A system of territorial organisation and concentration (unitary/federal/devolved)
The country’s institutional arrangement takes the form of a unitary state, run by a central government (UNICEF 2011:17). Government consists of an executive headed by a democratically-elected president with a maximum of two, four year terms, an elected parliament and an independent judiciary (UNICEF 2011:17). The institutional arrangement is set up to ensure that power remains in the hands of the people. Chapter two, article 4, Chapter one, article 1 and article 3 (1) states that:

- “the sovereign state of Ghana is a unitary republic…” of which the “sovereignty of Ghana resides with the people of Ghana…” and that
- “parliament shall have no power to enact a law establishing a one party state” respectively (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 15 and 14).

Due to Ghana’s political history, it is safe to surmise that the institutional arrangement which is purported by the 1992 constitution is poised to avert future coups, dictatorial governments and one-partyism, with a view to promoting a government that embodies the principles of democratic power-sharing between the three arms of government. The institutional arrangement also bears in mind lessons learnt from past constitutions; 1957, 1960, 1969 and 1979, and integrates elements from British (parliamentary democracy) and American models of government.

Further to this, Chapters eight, ten and eleven of the constitution makes provision for the separation of power between the three arms of government— the executive, legislature and judiciary respectively. While Chapters eighteen—Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, twenty—decentralisation and local government, twenty-two—chieftaincy and twenty-three—Commission of Inquiry are all institutions established to safeguard democratic values and norms within the political system.

**5.2.1.8. Balance of Power.**

Government excesses and possible abuse of power may be kept in check through consistent adherence to Chapters eight, ten and eleven of the constitution respectively which makes provision for the separation of power between the three arms of government— the executive, legislature and judiciary. Executive power is vested in the president who may exercise these powers in accordance with constitutional provisions, while parliament has “representational, legislative and oversight” responsibilities referendum (Constitutional Review Commission 2009). Further to this, judicial independence is also guaranteed by constitutional provisions.
However, in practice, power is extremely centralised in the office of the executive and thus the ruling party which blurs the lines the balance of power between the three arms of government (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:3). Of particular importance is the powers given to the president in Chapter eight, article 70 with regard to the appointment (in consultation with the Council of State) of the: the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and his Deputies; the Auditor-General; the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, and other members of the Electoral Commission etc. The challenge with the vast range of powers of appointment given to the president, is that it limits the separation of powers between the office of the presidency and other public institutions because it leaves room for the conflict of interest in the appointment of public official which compromises the legitimacy of the appointment process (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:3). Also, inadequate legislative oversights of presidential powers allow the executive to by-pass parliament, and make appointments without prior legislative approval (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:3). Executive interference in the judiciary is also echoed in public sentiment, as revealed in a survey which found that 73 percent of the public felt that the executive impeded the workings of the judiciary (The Chronicle 2008).

5.2.1.9. Responsiveness of rulers
Chapter one, article 1 of the 1992 constitution states that:


However, in practice government has failed to address some pressing issues within the political system. These issues concern the electoral process and particularly, the bloated status of voters registers roll; violence and intimidation during elections and the use of state resources by the incumbent ruling party (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:2).

Despite the prominence of these issues, neither the NDC nor the NPP has committed to addressing these challenges to the electoral system. Instead, the problems that plagued previous elections have worsened, with voter registration still uncertain. Also, there is lack of clarity about electoral rules which is worsened by insufficient voter education, thereby affecting the extent of responsiveness by rulers, as perceived by the electorate (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:2).
5.2.1.10. Regime’s stability and persistence.
Despite initial false starts occurring between, 1957 and 1990, the advent of the fourth republic has proved to be the most enduring phase of democratic governance yet experienced by the country. During this phase, the quality of the political regime has been continually strengthened due to a number of factors: the 1992 constitution; the electoral process and continued commitment to constitutional democracy.

5.2.2. The Quality of the State (QoST)

The importance of the QoST in measuring the quality of democracy is stated in (2.3.1.). As such, the QoST is measured through the presence of the following aspects, “Territorial integrity and good relations with the state’s own neighbours; the rule of law is established on all groups and territories; absence of ‘reserved domains’; a system of territorial organisation and concentration (unitary/federal/devolved); degree of administrative centralisation; low levels of corruption; High GDP per capita; a fair system of recruitment; a working and professional bureaucracy; A predictable legal basis in most fields of political, social and economic life; Fiscal flexibility and predictability; State-civil society and cooperation and sponsorship.

5.2.2.1. Territorial integrity and good relations with the state’s own neighbours
According to Chapter six, article 35, clause (2) of the1992 constitution:

- “The State shall protect and safeguard the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ghana…” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 31)

Further to this, Chapter eight, article 73 provides for the conduction of international affairs in line with agreed upon international norms that are in Ghana’s domestic interest

- “The Government of Ghana shall conduct its international affairs in consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interest of Ghana” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 46).

In line with this political constitutional objective, Ghana, since the early 1990’s has enhanced its “national interest” and safeguarded its “territorial integrity” through its involvement in peace-keeping and peace-making within the ECOWAS sub-region. Of particular importance, is the role played by Ghana in peacekeeping operations during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts in the 1990’s. During the long-lasting peace process that endured over 14 years, Ghana continued to play a leading role in finding lasting solutions to the protracted
conflicts (Birikorang 2007:2). In this regard, Ghana was part of a “consultative group”— the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), established by ECOWAS in 1990, consisting, Guinea, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which was tasked with enhancing peace and security within the sub-region. Further to this, Ghana was also part of the five country ECOWAS team that positioned troops in Liberia before its actions were sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Birikorang 2007:2). Of specific mention, is the role played by former President Jerry Rawlings who brokered a number of peace agreements in the sub-region between 1994 and 1995.

Since 1990, Ghana has engaged positively with its neighbours, particularly within the context of peacekeeping and peacemaking through the forum of ECOWAS. This has strengthened Ghana’s territorial integrity as a stable state capable of deploying troops when the need arises. Also Ghana has enhanced its relations with neighbouring ECOWAS states which continue to see the country as a partner in ensuring peace and stability within the region. This continues to gain the country the trust and respect of other states (within and outside the sub-region) and international acclaim as a “peace-maker state” existing within an extremely volatile region (see discussion in 1.3.).

5.2.2.2. The rule of law/ A universal acceptance of the rule of law/ Uniform and unbiased application of the rule of law

Since the inception of the 1992 constitution, Ghanaian courts have enjoyed greater autonomy. Article 127 (1) stipulates that:

- “the Judiciary shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority in the exercise of judicial power in terms of judicial function, administrative responsibilities and financial administration” (The Chronicle 2008).

Article 127(2) of the 1992 constitution also makes provision for the Judiciary’s independence from the legislative and executive branches of government (The Chronicle 2008). The article states that:

- “neither the President nor the Parliament nor any person whatsoever shall interfere with judges and judicial officers or other persons exercising judicial power, in the exercise of their judicial functions,’ and that all state organs must accord the courts such assistance as they may reasonably require to protect their ’independence, dignity and effectiveness’” (The Chronicle 2008).

However, it is believed that the executive tampers with the judicial process through the role played by the president in the appointment of court judges and the discretionary budgetary
powers the office of the president has over the judiciary’s budget (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:7). These claims are supported by lack of resources within the judiciary which has contributed to poorly paid judges being susceptible to bribes thus compromising the integrity of the rule of law (Freedom House 2008b). Public opinion also holds that the social or political standing of person(s) involved in a case may have a significant bearing on the outcome of that case which negatively affects the standing of the rule of law (The Chronicle 2008).

Since 2010, there has also been a very public disagreement between the judiciary and the ruling party, in response to unfavourable court rulings against the incumbent. While this dispute may be seen in a positive light as it highlights that the rule of law is operational, it also raises some questionable issues. This is because supporters of the ruling party generally oppose unfavourable court rulings by holding protests at court houses, which causes the intimidation and fear of judges. The judiciary has also been victim to fierce public scrutiny and has further to this, experienced budget cuts (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:7).

5.2.2.3. Absence of ‘reserved domains’

Due to Ghana’s political experience with military adventurism, the 1992 constitution provides the legal framework against the presence of reserved (whether military or otherwise) domains operating with the state. In this regard, Chapter eight, article 83 provides for the establishment of the National Security Council which is presided over by the president, vice-president and ministers of foreign and interior affairs as well as the heads of other security (military, intelligence, and police) departments in the state. Also, article 83, clause (a) explicitly mandates that the functions of the council includes, among other things:

- “considering and taking appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 48).

Further to this, article 85 states that:

- “no agency, establishment or other organisation concerned with national security shall be established except as provided for under this constitution” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 49).

The importance of the National Security Council lies with its role in the prevention against the establishment of ‘reserved domains’ which is achieved by two main ways. Firstly, it ensures that the military is answerable to the political executive (through the council forum), which limits the risk of the military usurping political power from a civilian regime. Secondly, it provides a platform for cooperation (which was absent from previous republics) between both the civilian and military divisions of the state, with the aim of working together.
to ensure peace, security and stability in Ghana. Thirdly, the civilian-military partnership ensures that military has an important, yet politically monitored role in the state, even in times of peace, so as to prevent the military from once again acquiring ‘just cause’ for the usurpation of political power.

While there is generally little to no risk of the presence of ‘reserved domains’ from the military, an increasingly number of vigilante movements have assumed responsibility for providing security within various communities. A survey conducted revealed that there were more than 1000 cases of vigilante-style justice reported in 2007. These incidents are largely due to the inadequate nature of policing and public perception of the state ineffectiveness at curbing violent crime (Gyimah-Boadi 2010:12).

However, the risk posed by these vigilante groups in creating ‘reserved domains’ that threaten peace and stability in the state remains relatively low. This is because the interest of these groups is primarily security within their various communities. Also, the groups generally lack the financial and organisational capacity to evolve into a ‘reserved domain’. Lastly, popular aversion to military (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:8), or any other form of government besides democratic rule within society makes these groups most unlikely to become ‘reserved domains’.

5.2.2.4. Degree of administrative centralisation

The country is made up of ten regions, each with its respective Regional Coordinating Council and 170 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The District Assemblies are further grouped into Urban, Town and Area Councils and then Unit Committees (UNICEF 2011:17). In this regard, the District Assembly is the “highest political authority in the district and has deliberative, legislative and executive powers” (Kuusi 2009). Chapter 20 of the constitution makes provision for decentralised and local government in the form of District Assemblies. Chapter 20, Article 254 further qualifies the nature of decentralisation by stating that:

- “Parliament shall enact laws and take steps necessary for further decentralization of the administrative functions and projects of the Central Government but shall not exercise any control over the District Assemblies that is incompatible with their decentralized status, or otherwise contrary to law” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 97).

Other legal basis for decentralised government includes:
The aim of Ghana’s decentralised structure is to devolve power to governance structures closer to the people, thus giving the people more power in the decision-making process (Kuusi 2009).

However, the practice of decentralisation faces numerous challenges largely due to inconsistencies in the constitution and local law, executive appointment of DA officials’ and executive interference in the workings of the DA.

Firstly, the practice of devolution is often hindered by the vagueness within legal frameworks which on the one hand, may give power to a DA while another legal document maintains those same powers within the purview of the central government (Kuusi 2009). Furthermore, while the constitution clearly delineates decentralisation within governance structures, it does not clearly define how powers are to be transferred from the central government to local government structures (Kuusi 2009).

Secondly, the DA’s independence is hampered by presidential appointee of 30 percent of the members of the assembly and the District Chief Executive who are all appointed by the president (Kuusi 2009). This may cause a conflict of interest between the executive and local governance structures, causing undue political compromise in the decision-making process of the local government.

Thirdly, it is argued that the DA’s autonomy is often jeopardised by political interference from the central government. This is largely seen in DA planning projects where chief officers or heads of the planning team, report to the central government, instead of the people who are the actual beneficiaries of the projects (Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom 2010:87).

As such, although Ghana’s constitution provides for the devolution of political power between the central and local government, there are often inconsistencies between the legal framework that provides for these powers and the actual practice of it.
5.2.2.5. Low levels of corruption

Chapter 18 makes provision for the establishment, appointment and functions of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and its officials. The CHRAJ consists of—“a Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice; and two Deputy Commissioners for Human Rights and Administrative Justice” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 90).

The CHRAJ is important with regard to the prevention of corruption because Chapter 18, Article 218 (a) mandates the body to:


Clause (e) of article 218 also provides the Commission with the powers to:

- “investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public moneys by officials and to take appropriate steps, including reports to the Attorney-General and the Auditor-General, resulting from such investigations” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 90).

Further to this, other anti-corruption measures have also been adopted by the state since 2001 in an attempt to strengthen constitutional frameworks for addressing corruption. Some of these include:

- the introduction of civic education: such as “strident sermonising and purification” against corruption particularly by religious leaders;
- the creation of the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) (a national division of Transparency International);
- the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in 1993—to address criminal offences of an economic or financial nature and;
- a ‘zero tolerance policy’ towards corruption (APRM 2005:33).

Despite these efforts, corruption remains an endemic problem in the state. The problem of corruption was highlighted in 2007 when two members of parliament from the NDC and NPP were embroiled in corruption cases (Freedom House 2008b). Opposition parties are also known to level accusations of corruption against the ruling/incumbent party. In 2007 the NDC accused the Kufuor administration of corruption and nepotism in the appointment of cabinet ministers (Freedom House 2008b).

The extent of the problem has equally been captured by the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index of 2007 which ranked the country 69 out of 180 countries surveyed (Freedom House 2008b).\(^{13}\) Despite this, Ghana’s continental ranking remains

\(^{13}\)1 being the least corrupt and 180 being the most corrupt.
rather low compared to its global ranking, with Ghana ranking 8 out of 52 African countries surveyed (Transparency International 2007). This discrepancy between global and regional ranking of corruption perception indicates that while Ghana is considered rather corrupt on a global scale, on a continental scale, the country’s corruption levels are considerably lower. This is most likely due to the pervasive nature of corruption in other African states. Yet still, a truly democratic society should rank lowly with regards to both global and continental corruption measurement scales.

While corruption still remains a problem in the state, some positive gains have been made. Since 2009, a number of ministers, including the health and sports ministers were forced to resign due to corruption allegations levelled against them (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:9). Furthermore, in 2010, the SFO was changed to the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), in order to gain more legitimacy as the former body was criticised for being a political tool of oppression used by the incumbent party against the opposition. However, it is yet to be established whether the new body will be more “independent or effective” than the previous one (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:9).

5.2.2.6. High GDP per capita

According to Chapter six, article 36, clause (2) of the 1992 constitution:

- “The State shall, in particular, take all necessary steps to establish a sound and healthy economy...” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 32).

In line with this economic constitutional objective, Ghana’s economic profile has consistently improved since the early 1990’s. The NPP—Kufuor led government cautiously managed the economy, bringing about consistent growth levels and macroeconomic stability (Gyimah-Boadi 2008:3). In 2006, annual growth levels reached a high of 6.2 percent and inflation rates dropped from 20 percent to 10 percent in 2007 and from 15.4 percent in 2009 to 6.1 in 2010 (Gyimah-Boadi 2008:3; Owusu 2009). Also, Ghana’s GDP per capita increased by an estimated 200 percent and doubled between 2000 and 2010.

The strong cedi has also contributed to a strengthened economy and higher GDP levels which has remained stable for a number of years. The stable national currency has boosted

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14 “Gross domestic product (GDP) is the value of all goods and services provided in a country by residents and non-residents. This corresponds to the total sum of expenditure (consumption and investment) of the private and government agents of the economy during the reference year” (WHO Factsheet 2010).
economic predictability and enabled the government to embark on long-term poverty reduction programmes, including—the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) which is targeted at transforming Ghana into a ‘Lower Middle Income Country’ (LMIC) by 2015 (UNICEF 2007:2). The initiative is divided into two phases known as (GPRS I) 2002-2004 and (GPRS II) 2006-2009 (UNICEF 2007:2). The country’s economic profile has shown considerable dexterity, making it one of the few countries in the sub-region to maintain high and consistent economic growth levels over the past few years.

5.2.2.7. A fair system of recruitment and a working and professional bureaucracy

Chapter 14, article 190 of the 1992 constitution makes provision for the establishment of an array of public service offices in Ghana, including the Public Service Commission (PSC) etc (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 82). Further to this, article 194, clause 2 (a) states that the PSC shall consist of:

- “a chairman, a vice-chairman and three other members who shall be full-time members of the Commission…”

The president of Ghana is tasked with the responsibility of appointing the heads of public offices as indicated in article 195, clause 1:

- “subject to the provisions of this constitution, the power to appoint persons to hold or to act in an office in the public services shall vest in the president, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing council of the service given in consultation with the Public Services Commission” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 84).

Also, the PSC needs presidential approval to effect any changes needed so as to improve its efficiency in the delegation of its duties.

- “The Public Services Commission may, subject to the approval of the President, make regulations by the Constitutional instrument, for the effective and efficient performance of its functions under this Constitution or any other law” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 84).

The constitution makes provisions for the workings of a professional bureaucratic system, in the form of the PSC, but the effective functioning of this system is increasingly hampered by the fact that the PSC needs prior approval from the president, rather than parliament to effect changes within the Commission. Further to this, the president is responsible for making appointments to the Commission of both the chair-person and vice-chair-person and other

15 The income status of a country is determined by its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. The middle income band has been subdivided into two categories by the World Bank. Lower middle income countries fall within the band of $996 to $3 945, while upper middle income countries range between $3 946 to $12 195 (World Bank 2011).
high ranking officials. While the PSC (which is also responsible for the civil service) is suppose to be independent as stipulated by the constitution, in reality, the practice of presidential appointments to the Commission hampers transparency and ensures that civil service positions are not always merit based (Gyimah-Boadi 2010:12). The problem of the president appointing members of the PSC was particularly seen in the Mills-NDC government which in a similar fashion as erstwhile governments, viewed the chairpersons and boards of all state councils as “political appointees” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4). As such, these constitutional provisions negatively affect the workings of the PSC as it threatens the independence and integrity of the bureaucratic system.

Also, there is increasingly concern that the civil service is becoming increasingly politicized, with bureaucrats “aligning themselves with political parties” and displaying open “partisan political activity (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4), which is in violation of the constitutional public officers code of conduct (Gyimah-Boadi 2010:12). According to the Chapter 24, article 284:

- “A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal interest conflicts or is likely to conflict with the performance of the functions of his office” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 106).

This problem has particularly worsened under the fourth republic, because the idea of a “professional nonpartisan public bureaucracy with politically neutral officials” working in the interest of the country rather than the incumbent party has been replaced with “a politicised bureaucracy” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4).

However, in other instances, the government has tried to ensure public sector reform through the Single Spine Salary Structure (SSSS), in a bid to synchronise the public sector salary structure system. Although the initiative has been met by fierce opposition by those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and challenges caused by bureaucratic red-tape, the government has persisted to ensure a complete overhaul of the salary structure system (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4).

5.2.2.8. A predictable legal basis in most fields of political, social and economic life.

From a legal base stand-point, the constitution is the official document that provides for an array of political, social and economic rights as mandated in Chapter five, articles 12 to 30.
Under these provisions, educational, economic, women and children’s rights are guaranteed. The constitution therefore remains the legal point of reference for the provision of political, social and economic rights in the state.

5.2.2.9. Fiscal flexibility and predictability/ Relatively high real purchasing power parity (PPP)  

According to Chapter six, article 36, clause (1) of the 1992 constitution:

• “The State shall take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed…and to provide adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment…

In this regard, the recent discovery of oil fields in Ghana is an added advantage to the country’s economic profile, which is set to boost fiscal flexibility and predictability, propel GDP levels to over 20 percent (Green 2008:7) and provide “adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment” ” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 32)

Added income from oil production will afford the country a significant degree of fiscal flexibility, which will enable job creation and improve the means of livelihood available to the people. Furthermore it will allow a shift in government policy-making from growth driven policies to more ‘softer’ issues of social spending. Fiscal flexibility will also help the local economy better absorb cyclical market shocks, thus safeguarding economic sustainability in the country.

5.2.2.10. State-civil society and cooperation and sponsorship/ An independent and vibrant civil society.

Chapter five, Article 21, clause (e) guarantees freedom of association:

• “freedom of association which shall include freedom to form or join trade unions or other associations national and international for the protection of their interest” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 25).

Further to this, the constitution guarantees the promotion of an “independent and vibrant” society as found in chapter six, article 37 clause 1 of the 1992 of the document. It outlines the State’s social objective to the people, as:

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16 Fiscal flexibility refers to the “ability to control and adjust cash receipts and payments to respond to adversities and opportunities” (Koornhof 1988:13-14).
1) “The State shall endeavour to secure and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of freedom, equality, justice, probity and accountability…” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 33).

Agencies such as the National Commission for Civic Education are also mandated by the constitution to promote this value. Chapter 19, article 233 states the functions of the said Commission, which include:

“(d) to formulate, implement and oversee programmes intended to inculcate in the citizens of Ghana awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 93).

In line with this provision, civil society is generally free from state scrutiny and play significant roles in identifying issues and providing support towards social, economic and political developments (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4). Further to this, some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in partnership with government have provided assistance in the formulation of important legislations, including: the Whistleblowers Protection Act and the Persons with Disabilities Act (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4).

However, these civil society groupings continue to play a minimal role in impacting political governance and economic policy. This is largely due to Ghana’s outdated NGO regulatory structure which has failed in the past 20 years to enact a new NGO legislation, because government and CSOs have been unsuccessful in reaching a comfortable agreement between “regulation” and “interference” in their activities. Failure to appropriately regulate the NGO sector has caused the development of partisan and unregistered NGOs, often involved in public partisan politics. As such, the NGO sector is becoming increasingly politicised, with some political actors smearing the genuine interests of NGOs through public “vilification, intimidation and branding” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:4).

5.2.3. The Quality of Society (QoSoC).

The quality of society during the post-independence era was marked by government’s inability to provide a number of societal goods. This affected the well-being of society which in return weakened the quality of the society. However, in the post-2000 era government has
made significant strides in improving the quality of the society and reversing societal ills caused by maladministration in the pre-1992 era.

The following issues will be discussed with regard to the post-1992 societal structure: Gender equality; ethnic tolerance and cultural pluralism; high levels of educational attainment; percentage of university students; low levels of child crime; low levels of domestic violence; number of theatres, museums and other cultural and educational institutions; rich/poor ratio; young/old ratio; rural/urban population; a universal acceptance of the rule of law; societal consensus on major domestic and international, social, political and economic issues; and an independent and vibrant civil society.

5.2.3.1. Gender equality and low levels of domestic violence.
The 1992 constitution provides for an array of stipulations geared toward the protection of gender equality in society. These include Chapter five, article 12 clause (2):

- “Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in this chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 19).

Further to this, Article 17 clause (2) states:

- “A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status”. (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 21).

Also, Chapter six, article 35, clause (5) indicates that:

- “The State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 32).

Further to this, Chapter six, article 35, clause 6 (b) highlights that:

- “The state shall take appropriate measures to—achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public offices” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 32).

Also chapter five, article 27 clause (3) states that:

- “Women shall be guaranteed equal rights to training and promotion without impediments from any person” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 28).

Further to this, Chapter six, article 36, Clause 6 states that:
Although the government incorporates significant constitutional guarantees to improve the plight of women, the lack of a holistic framework/section in the constitution geared towards addressing the intricacies of mainstreaming gender issues hampers the realisation of this objective. This is because society lacks an adequate gender framework which can be used to ensure that guidelines and gender sensitisation objectives are met.

Another challenge with regard to achieving gender balance is the over-representation of women in the informal sector and low level positions in the formal sector but under-represented in high governance positions. In 2005, only 19 of the 200 Members of Parliament (MP) in Ghana were female. This problem is increasingly exacerbated by the lack of political will and a structured gender-balanced affirmative action policy (APRM 2005:3). Also, women experience societal discrimination particularly in the rural areas and are often victims of domestic violence, which fosters dominant patriarchy structures with society (Freedom House 2008b).

However, government has made some attempts to improve society’s gender balance structure. One of the ways Ghana has reiterated its commitment to gender equality was seen through its appointment of Georgina Theodora Wood, the first woman to serve as chief justice for the Supreme Court since 2002 (Freedom House 2008b). Yet still, the government needs to improve its stance on gender parity by enforcing a mandatory 40 percent representation of women at all levels of governance and ratify the African Union Protocol on Women’s Rights which would provide an effective strategy for promoting and protecting women’s rights in Ghana (Wildaf Ghana 2006).

The government has also achieved significant success in the area of discrimination against women. In this regard, the banning of female genital mutilation in 1994 and the placement of a prison sentence for person(s) who perform the operation, has gone a long way in addressing the spate of gender discrimination—sexual violence against girls (Freedom House 2008b). Furthermore, the government proposed in 2007, that the law be revised so as to punish
anyone, including family members who give permission for the procedure (Freedom House 2008b).

5.2.3.2. Ethnic tolerance and cultural pluralism
The 1992 constitution promotes ethnic tolerance as indicated in Chapter five, article 17, clause (2); Chapter six, article 35, clause (5). Further to this, Chapter 7, article 55, clause (4) states that:

- “Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 38).

Constitutional support for cultural pluralism is also promoted in the 1992 document and is found in Chapter five, article 26, clause (1):

- “Every person is entitled to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the provisions of this constitution” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 27).

Further to this constitutional mandate, Chapter six, article 39 makes provision for the state to incorporate aspects of cultural life into the national and societal life of the country (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 34).

Although divisive ethnic politics has the potential to affect society’s wellbeing in various negative ways—a source of conflict driven by particularistic ethnic politics, it has proved the opposite in Ghana. The country which is largely multiethnic experiences little discrimination exclusively linked to ethnicity (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:7).

While there exist a trend of ethnic voting which may possibly impede the prevalent democratic ethos, because it limits access to political office by ethnic minorities, ethnic tolerance remains high in Ghana. The practice of “ethnic block voting” has become a prominent feature in the Volta (the NDC stronghold) and Ashanti (NPP stronghold) regions in clear contravention of constitutional stipulations (see above), which in theory is counterproductive to the democratic process. The trend is even said to be a contributing factor in explaining the existence of the dominant two-party system prevalent in the Ghanaian political system (Nugent 2001:2). However, the issue has failed to garner political exploitation so as to develop into a full blown ethnic-driven security issue. On the contrary, the quality of society continues to consolidate. While there are many explanations for this nature of ethnic tolerance, amid competing interests, Hulterström (2007:7) argues that ethnic
affiliations do not necessarily cause violent ethnic clashes. In many cases, ethnic affiliations may be durable, peaceful and even open to democratic politics. This has so far proven to be the case in Ghana, where diverse ethnic groups continue to coexist peacefully.

5.2.3.3. High levels of educational attainment and percentage of university students

Chapter five, article six makes provision for adequate and fair educational rights for all. Clause 1 of the article stipulates the following:

- 1) “All persons shall have the right to equal educational opportunities and facilities and with a view to achieving the full realisation of that right—
- a) basic education shall be free, compulsory and available to all;
- b) secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free education;
- c) higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular, by progressive introduction of free education;
- d) functional literacy shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible;
- e) the development of a system of schools with adequate facilities at all levels shall be actively pursued” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 27).

This constitutional guarantee is further supported by a constitutional mandate in the 1992 document that puts an onus on government towards the realisation of educational rights. Chapter six, article 38, outlines this directive:

- “1) The State shall provide educational facilities at all levels and in all the Regions of Ghana, and shall, to the greatest extent feasible, make those facilities available to all citizens.
- 2) The Government shall, within two years after Parliament first meets after the coming into force of this Constitution, draw up a programme for implementation within the following ten years, for the provision of free, compulsory and universal basic education.
- 3) The State shall, subject to the availability of resources, provide—
  a) equal and balanced access to secondary and other appropriate pre-university education, equal access to university or equivalent education, with emphasis on science and technology;
  b) a free adult literacy programme, and a free vocational training, rehabilitation and resettlement of disabled persons; and
  c) life-long education” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 34).

In line with its constitutional mandate, the government of the post 2000 era has attempted to correct the legacy of the displaced educational policy through its adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) \(^{17}\) of which the second objective is to achieve universal free primary education. So far, the country has successfully abolished school tuition at the

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\(^{17}\) The MDGs are a global vision that consists of eight time bound objectives. These include halving the proportion of people living below the poverty line, improving access to primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating and reversing the trends of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and promoting global partnership for development between developed and developing countries by 2015. It has been ratified by over 189 countries (UNDP 2010:3).
primary level and remains the only West African country to have achieved this goal (UNICEF and World Bank 2006:4). This has seen a significant 16 percent increase in the number of new enrolments which is likely to increase child literacy levels in the country (UNICEF and World Bank 2006:4), with a view to erasing the past legacy of low adult literacy levels.

However, adult illiteracy continues to be a problem in society. This is most likely a carry-over effect of the displaced educational policies put into effect by the Busia administration. As a result of this, many adults remain uneducated and unable to effectively participate in the political process. In 2007, the national adult literacy level was at 57.8 percent (Centre for Educational Technology 2007:12), which is a matter of concern that limits the degree of political participation among some members of the adult population.

### 5.2.3.4. Low levels of child crime

Chapter five, article 28 details the right of the child. Here, a child is defined as an individual under the age of eighteen years (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 28). Of particular importance are certain provisions made in Article 28:

- 1 (d) “children and young persons receive special protection against exposure to physical and moral hazards;”
- 2) Every child has the right to be protected from engaging in work that constitutes a threat to his health, education or development; and
- 3) A child shall not be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or Punishment” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 28).

Other national legislative framework addressing child protection, include:

- the 1998 Children’s Act and
- the 2002 Child Rights Regulation (UNICEF 2009:4)

While Ghana has achieved considerable developments in strengthening the legal framework for child protection, it is yet to establish a comprehensive domestic framework for the welfare of the child. As a result of this, problems arising with regard to child protection are generally addressed on an “issue-specific basis” Also, there exist huge discrepancies between the law and practice (UNICEF 2011:7).

The problem of child crime in the country is caused mainly by a lack of formal education, skills and family support which increases risk of vulnerability faced by children and comes in the form of “abuse”, “violence” and “exploitation” (UNICEF 2011:26). Females are at a
particularly higher risk because they are exposed to “commercial sexual exploitation”. While there is limited data on the extent of the problem, figures suggest that an estimated 33 000 children live on the street in Ghana and of these, the majority are girls, which further increases the problem posed by these risk factors (UNICEF 2011:26).

Another problem is the practice of child labour which according to a 2003 survey highlights that 39 percent of children aged 5 and 17 years are involved in some form of “economic exploitative activity”, which range from unpaid family workers to *kayayee* (head porters) and the *trokosi* system (ritual servitude) etc.

Child trafficking also poses another challenge in the country because it is driven by high levels of poverty and lack of opportunities in rural areas. Children are generally trafficked from poor rural areas to more affluent urban areas for purposes of exploitative economic labour (UNICEF 2011:26).

5.2.3.5. **Number of theatres, museums and other cultural and educational institutions.**

The 1992 constitution makes provision for the incorporation of cultural aspects from all regions to be helmed into the social fabric of the country, which is recognised as an important tool for “national integration and development” (National Commission on Culture 2004:8). Ghana has more than 50 ethnic groups and linguistic groups dispersed along eight main groups, of which the largest are the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe and Ga-Adangbe (UNICEF 2011:17-18). The common values of these groupings represent” the country’s collective national identity (National Commission on Culture 2004:7). As such, Chapter six, article 39 mandates the State’s cultural objectives to its people, as:

- **“1)…the State shall take steps to encourage the integration of appropriate customary values into the fabric of national life through formal and informal education and the conscious introduction of cultural dimensions to relevant aspects of national planning.**
- **(2) The State shall ensure that appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an integral part of the growing needs of the society as a whole; and in particular that traditional practices which are injurious to the health and well-being of the person are abolished.**
- **(3) The State shall foster the development of Ghanaian languages and pride in Ghanaian culture.**
- **(4) The State shall endeavour to preserve and protect places of historical interest and artifacts”** (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 34).

In line with this, government under the auspices of the National Commission on Culture, released a document on the State’s cultural policy in 2004, designed to promote “unity in diversity” (National Commission on Culture 2004:3). Government’s commitment to preserve cultural aspects of society is seen through its partnership with civil society groupings,
business organisations and traditional chiefs in the implementation of cultural policies and programmes.

Further to this, a number of cultural institutions have been earmarked for preservation as these agencies foster the continued promotion and development of Ghanaian history, tradition and culture in society. Some of these institutions include:

- “Regional and District Centres for culture;
- Ghana Museums and Monuments Board;
- W.E.B. Du Bois Memorial Centre for Pan African Culture and;
- Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park” etc (National Commission on Culture 2004:15).

Furthermore, government’s commitment to improved education was displayed in 2011 through the construction of two more public universities to supplement the previous number of universities that stood at 25 (Kokutse 2011).

5.2.3.6. Rich/poor ratio// relatively low levels of unemployment

The state of societal well-being also deals with the rich/poor ratio in society which can be determined by unemployment levels among other things. Chapter five, Article 17 of the 1992 constitution makes provision for the:

- “a) for the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational imbalance in the Ghanaian society” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 21).

In this regard, the post-1992 government has addressed the rich/poor divide by focusing on job creation. Higher employment levels have thus helped reduce the poverty rate and shrink the divide between the rich and poor, with poverty levels falling from 51.7 percent between 1991/92 to 40 percent in 1998/99 and 28.5 percent in 2005/06 (Gyimah-Boadi 2008:3; Holder 2012). Government has also taken necessary steps to expand job creation in the agricultural sector because three in five Ghanaians depend on agricultural produce for sustenance (Holder 2012). In so doing, the government has invested in the industry through the adoption of a consolidated agricultural development plan targeted at enhancing greater productivity in the sector, with a view to further reducing the rich/poor ratio. Agricultural returns have so far been successful, making Ghana one of the top five agricultural producers in the world. Figures show that at 2005/07 food production per person was 80 percent higher than the 1981/83 levels (Holder 2012).
However, many Ghanaians still face high levels of poverty. This is largely due to a range of factors, including economic, social and environmental shocks that cause the levels of poverty to fluctuate. As a result of this, the poverty rate dropped from 23 percent in 1991/92 to 4 percent in 1998/99 but rose to 11 percent by 2005/06. Also income inequality levels rose by approximately 20 percent from 1990 to 2005.

5.2.3.7. Young/old ratio.
Chapter six, article 37 of the 1992 constitution makes provision for social objectives which relate to the protection of the rights of the youth and the elderly. The provision stipulates that:

- 2) The State shall enact appropriate laws to assure——.
- (b) the protection and promotion of all other basic human rights and freedoms, including the rights of the disabled, the aged, children and other vulnerable groups in development processes.
- (3) In the discharge of the obligations stated in clause (2) of this article, the State shall be guided by international human rights instruments which recognize and apply particular categories of basic human rights to development processes.
- 6 (b) provide social assistance to the aged such as will enable them to maintain a decent standard of living. ” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 33-4).

Since the 1960s, Ghana has experienced a significant population sprout, with population rates doubling every 25 years. Current population figures estimate that the total population is about 23.5 million people, with the youth accounting for 50 percent of this figure (UNICEF 2011:17). While Ghana is largely considered to be a youthful society, reduced birth and death rates have also caused an increase in the population size of the elderly (Mba 2010:2). Current figures estimate that the elderly account for 7.2 percent of the entire population, making Ghana one of the few country’s with the highest population of elderly people in sub-Saharan Africa (Mba 2010:2).

Although new constitutional and national frameworks exist, which are geared towards the protection of the rights of youth, these rights often face weak enforcement, “lack of clarity about mandates for social welfare services, low staff capacity, weak coordination and limited funding” (UNICEF 2009: 4).

18 “The concept elderly or old refers to a category of adults who have attained advanced ages, 60 or 65 years”. Within the context of the developing world, the term is used to refer to persons aged 60 years and above, due to lower life expectancy rates than in the developed world (UNFPA 2013:iii).
With regard to the elderly, government has made some attempt to address the needs of the ageing as seen through the adoption of the National Ageing Policy (NAP) in 2010—which contains the main prescriptions of the Madrid Plan of Action. The Madrid Plan of Action was adopted by the UN Assembly in 2002, to address growing international concern about the plight of the elderly worldwide. The main aspects of the Madrid plan delineate the needs of the elderly as: “health, nutritional status, living arrangements and conditions as well as better access to amenities” (UNFPA 2013:iii). However, besides the NAP, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that government has adopted a comprehensive social care programme for the elderly, who continue to be marginalised in social and economic policy discussions in the country (Mba 2010:2). As such, many elderly persons have “inadequate and insecure income in the absence of extended family support” (Mba 2010:2).

5.2.3.8. Rural/urban population.
Chapter six, article 36, clause 2(d) makes provision for the state to undertake:

- “even and balanced development of all regions and every part of each region of Ghana, and, in particular, improving the conditions of life in the rural areas, and generally, redressing any imbalance in development between the rural and the urban areas” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 32).

Despite constitutional guarantees with regard to “even and balanced development” in all regions, large economic disparity between the north and south parts of the country persist, a contentious issue which if not adequately handled could form the source of a resource-driven conflict in the state. According to gini-coefficient determinants19, between 1992 and 2006, income inequality increased by a slight margin from 36.3 to 39.9 percent in the south but rose more significantly from 38.1 to 42.6 percent in the north (Holder 2012). Figures show smaller income gaps present in the south as compared to the north. These disparities can be attributed to the uneven nature of pro-poor programmes available in south but visibly absent in the north (Holder 2012). Other factors contributing to sustained levels of economic disparity between the south and the north include—insufficient investment in agriculture, post-independence political neglect and erratic weather patterns in the north (Holder 2012). The resulting effect of these differences has been higher levels of migration to the south and rural vulnerability and persistent poverty in the north.

19 a measure for determining income inequality distribution (Takayama 1979:747).
The problem is set to worsen as new statistical analysis estimates that poverty levels are set to drop in the south by 2030 but will still exist in the north; affecting approximately two fifths of the population. Also, the increasing rate of urban poverty, particularly in Accra due to mass migration from rural areas poses another set of challenges. This disparity between poverty levels affects Ghana’s overall economic profile because growth at the national level does not reflect the economic realities at the micro-level which creates a distorted view of economic life. Furthermore, economic imbalances of this nature often provide a platform for ethnic strife which threatens societal cohesion (Holder 2012).

5.2.3.9. Societal consensus on major domestic and international, social, political and economic issues.

Local attitudes towards social, political and economic issues are largely mixed in Ghana. This is because on the one hand, the country has made significant developments with regard to an array of issues. However, on the other hand, Ghana continues to struggle to consolidate these achievements.

Politically, Ghana is lauded as a “beacon of democracy” in Africa (see 1.3; 5.2.1.1. and 5.2.1.3). However, the country is increasingly plagued by “excessive patronage”, delayed political promises—government is yet to pass the Freedom of Information Bill of 2012; an increasingly powerful executive and corruption within the civil service (Economist 2013). These shortcomings need to be adequately addressed so as to strengthen “Ghana’s admirable, yet fragile democracy” (Economist 2013).

Economically, Ghana remains West Africa’s biggest economic success story. Ghana’s economic agenda has achieved modest success as poverty levels have reduced from levels of 40 percent in 1998/99 to below 30 percent in 2007 (Gyimah-Boadi 2008:3). However, rising inflation levels—(above 13 percent); a widened budget deficit (which grew from 4 to 12 percent last year); increased electricity, water and food costs (which has reduced the “real value of wages”); youth unemployment; as well as the depreciated value of the cedi and the price of gold (Economist 2013), threatens to undo Ghana’s economic success story. Although recent oil explorations (which grew the economy by 14 percent in 2011 and 8 percent in 2012) is poised to provide a much needed economic cushion from the effects of these external shocks, a third of Ghanaians still live on less than 2 US dollars a day (Economist 2013). Moreover, there is growing concern of a mass exodus of skilled workers (particularly
nurses and teachers) to developed countries, if salary wages do not keep afloat with inflation rates (Economist 2013).

Government has acknowledged the social impact of the current climate as noted by President John Dramani Mahama. The President argued that his biggest task is “to change the attitude of people, to give them back optimism—they’ve become too cynical and distrustful of politicians and public servants” (Economist 2013). In so doing, the president mandated the establishment of a new code of ethics (Economist 2013). However, civil society and the opposition argue that in line with the President’s rhetoric, he should “clean” the political scene of disingenuous remnants from the old regime (the Rawlings era) who continue to dominate the reins of power (Economist 2013).

5.2.4. The Quality of Life (QoL).

The following issues will be discussed with regard to the post-1992 quality of life framework in Ghana. These include: guaranteed physical security and low levels of crime; absence of torture and low levels of imprisoned persons; relatively low level of unemployment; extensiveness and efficacy of social welfare; good educational, health care and housing policies; possibilities for self-realisation and social recognition; relatively high real purchasing power parity (PPP); high-quality physical infrastructure, transport system and communications; clean environment; uniform and unbiased application of the rule of law; Low mortality rates of children and adults; freedom of movement and residence (including outside the realm of the own polity).

5.2.4.1. Guaranteed physical security and low levels of crime
Chapter five, article 18, clause (2) guarantees physical security. It stipulates that:

- 2) “No person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of his home, property, correspondence or communication except in accordance with law and as may be necessary in a free and democratic society for public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 22).

Despite this constitutional provision, crime is considered a serious problem in Ghana’s urban areas, which is due to high incidences of robberies. While government has responded through various means, including the use of police check points, and claim that crime rates have reduced, the lack of reliable crime data makes the corroboration of these claims difficult
Furthermore, the actions of vigilantes, “land guards”—“private security employed by wealthy property owners to guard immovable property, and ruling party foot soldiers—who often demand material compensation for their support during elections, continue to threaten the state of physical security in Ghana, as their actions often lead to serious injury, assault or the death of their victims (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:5), thereby hampering the overall quality of life in the country.

5.2.4.2. Absence of torture and low levels of imprisoned persons
Chapter five, article 15 guarantees “respect for human dignity”. It stipulates that:

- “(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.
- (2) No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or detained, be subjected to—
  - torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
  - any other condition that detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity and worth as a human being” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 20).

Since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, there has been a significant improvement in the protection of basic human rights. However, reports highlight the practice of torture and physical abuse by police officials of suspected violent offenders, in clear contravention of constitutional stipulations. Further to this, detention without trial is commonplace, with detainees accounting for 29.7 percent of the entire prison population in 2008 (a figure which increased from 22 percent in 2003). The CHRAJ has also reported on the violation of prisoners rights relating to “bedding and medical care” (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:5).

National prisons are largely overcrowded and many prisons incarcerate some 14 000 inmates which by far exceeds the official capacity of 8 000. In light of this, government has embarked on a Justice for all programme, with a view to addressing the problem of prison congestion and improving the quality of life in prisons (Gyimah-Boadi and Brobbey 2012:5).

5.2.4.3. Extensiveness and efficacy of social welfare

Chapter six, article 37, clause (1) of the 1992 of the document outlines the State’s social responsibility to its people.
In the post-1992 era, the State has adopted long-term poverty reduction strategies in the form of social welfare programmes and national plans of action, such as—the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), targeted at transforming Ghana into a ‘Lower Middle Income Country’ (LMIC) by 2015 (UNICEF 2007:2). The initiative is divided into two phases known as the GPRS I (2002-2004) and the GPRS II (2006-2009) (UNICEF 2007:2). Besides the GPRS I and II, other programmes include—the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP)—a bi-monthly stipend for poor households.

Since 2003, the government increased social spending packages to 6.9 percent of its total GDP, which was 2 percent higher than the 2001 quota. By 2005, an estimated 24.5 percent of total government expenditure was being spent on social programmes, in order to assist with Ghana’s poorest of the poor (Hughes 2005:85).

However, despite government’s continued commitment to improved quality of life, socioeconomic vulnerability caused by various economic, social and environmental shocks still pose a serious challenge (Holder 2012). While government has taken the necessary steps to ensure a decent standard of living, primarily through social welfare net programmes, the rising cost of living continues to hamper progress. Also, social welfare programmes such as the bi-monthly stipend for poor households only apply to the poorest of the poor, accounting for only 65 000 households in the country (Holder 2012).

5.2.4.4. Good educational, health care and housing policies/ high-quality physical infrastructure, transport system, communications and a clean environment

Chapter six, article 34, clause (2) makes provision for the right to “good health care” and the “right to education”. The Clause stipulates that:

- (2)“The President shall report to Parliament at least once a year all the steps taken to ensure the realization of the policy objectives contained in this Chapter; and, in particular, the realization of…the right to good health care and the right to education”. (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 31)

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20 The income status of a country is determined by its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. The middle income band has been subdivided into two categories by the World Bank. Lower middle income countries fall within the band of $996 to $3 945, while upper middle income countries range between $3 946 to $12 195 (World Bank 2011).
In line with outlined constitutional social objectives, government has embarked on a national education and health care plan. The programmes include the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), the Education Capitation Grant (ECG) and the Schooling Feeding Programme (SFP) which are initiatives launched to address various social welfare needs (Holder 2012).

However, the lack of access to these facilities continues to hinder reach of these social goods, because less than half of the population has access to these facilities (UNICEF 2011:22). Also, most health care facilities are located in the south and urban areas and are sparsely located in other regions (UNICEF 2011:22). Furthermore, these options are only viable on condition that GDP levels remain significantly high, in order to finance these programmes.

**5.2.4.5. Possibilities for self-realisation and social recognition**

While the 1992 constitution provides for “self-realisation and social recognition” through constitutional social rights, the realisation of these rights are continually hampered by the lack of a comprehensive national framework and plan of action to achieve these objectives. See societal challenges highlighted in (5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.6).

**5.2.4.6. Low mortality rates of children and adults.**

The 1992 constitution makes provision for the right to “good health care” (see 5.2.4.4.) which helps in preventing high child and adult mortality rates. As such, adult mortality rates have experienced a steady decline since the 1990’s. According to a report released by Index Mundi in 2008, adult male mortality rates have reduced from maximum levels of 304.28 in 1997 to a minimum figure of 249.86 in 2011 (Index Mundi 2013). Similarly, adult female mortality rates have also reduced from maximum levels of 267.68 to minimum estimates of 219.92 in 2011 (Index Mundi 2013).

The Index also reveals that child mortality levels have dropped steadily over the past two decades. Figures show that male mortality rates have reduced from 78.30 in 1988 to 38.00 in 2013.

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21 Adult mortality levels are determined by the “probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60—that is, the probability of a 15 year old dying before age 60, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates between those ages” (Index Mundi 2013). Child mortality rate is the “probability of dying between the exact ages of one and five if subject to current age-specific mortality rates” (Index Mundi 2013). Mortality levels are calculated by the number of deaths in every 1,000 persons of the specific demographic per given year. (Index Mundi 2013).
2008, while female mortality rates also experienced a steady decline, reducing from 79.40 in 1988 to 28.00 (Index Mundi 2013).

A possible explanation for the drop in both male—female, child—adult mortality rates is increased government spending on health care. According to a 2010 World Health Organisation (WHO) factsheet on Ghana, the state spent 7.2 percent in 2000 and 8.3 percent in 2007 of its GDP on health care (WHO Factsheet 2010). This significantly exceeds amounts spent on health care by neighbouring West African countries such as; Ivory Coast (5.3 percent in 2000 and 4.2 percent in 2007); Togo (4.8 percent in 2000 and 6.1 percent in 2007) and Burkina Faso (5.1 percent in 2000 and 6.2 percent in 2007) (WHO Factsheet 2010). These figures show a higher and steady increase of total GDP expenditure on health care in Ghana, as opposed to other West African countries, and particularly Ivory Coast, which experienced a decline. Increased healthcare spending has enabled the establishment of programmes such as the NHIS (see 5.2.4.4.), which has helped to improve healthcare facilities and the overall quality of life.

5.2.4.7. Freedom of movement and residence (including outside the realm of the own polity).

Chapter five, article 21, clause (1) g, guarantees the right to “freedom of movement”. It stipulates that:

- (1)”All persons shall have the right to—…
- (g) freedom of movement which means the right to move freely in Ghana, the right to leave and to enter Ghana and immunity from expulsion from Ghana” (Business and Financial Laws of Ghana n.d: 26).

Ghana is a signatory to the ECOWAS treaty of 1975, which is geared at “removing national barriers to economic intercourse within the sub-region” (Ladan 2009:3). The treaty makes provision for the “abolition between member states of obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital”. The ECOWAS protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment of 1979 further stipulates that “community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member-states”22, on condition that a community

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22 “For the purpose of the Dakar Protocol, a community citizen is defined as any person who is a citizen of any member state of the community.” (Ladan 2009:4).
citizen entering into any member state may do so for a period not longer than 90 days, would be permitted to enter the member state country free of visa requirements (Ladan 2009:4).

In line with national and sub-regional legislation, freedom of movement is generally granted and respected in Ghana. However, there have been a few occasions where Ghana has restricted freedom of residence within its territory. Between 1984 and 1985, Ghana ordered the expulsion of ECOWAS community citizens not in possession of valid papers. Further to this, in 1996 Ghana refused entry (even for refugees) to Liberian combatants fleeing civil war in their country (Ladan 2009:5).

5.3. Conclusion

As indicated in the study of the quality of democracy factors carried out in this chapter, Ghana’s democracy is thriving and highly consolidated. While certain facets of the country’s democracy are stronger than other, the overall picture, depicts a high level of democracy operating in Ghana.

Politically, Ghana is lauded as a “beacon of democracy”. However, the country is increasingly plagued by “excessive patronage”, delayed political promises—government is yet to pass the Freedom of Information Bill of 2012; an increasingly powerful executive and corruption within the civil service. These shortcomings need to be adequately addressed so as to strengthen “Ghana’s admirable, yet fragile democracy”.

Economically, Ghana remains West Africa’s biggest economic success story. Ghana’s economic agenda has achieved modest success as poverty levels over the past decades. However, rising inflation levels; widened budget deficit; increased electricity, water and food costs; youth unemployment; as well as the depreciated value of the cedi and the price of gold threatens to undo Ghana’s economic success story. Although recent oil explorations is poised to provide a much needed economic cushion from the effects of these external shocks, a third of Ghanaians still live on less than 2 US dollars a day.

Socially, Ghanaians enjoy a peaceful and stable coexistence, as the level of education and infrastructural development has risen and there exist high levels of ethnic tolerance and cultural pluralism in society. However, insufficient gender equality because of the lack of
policy implementation; high levels of child crime (particularly with regard to economic exploitative labour); a widening rich/poor versus urban/rural gap; and insufficient policy response to the young/old ratio etc may pose a problem in the future.

Although Ghana’s political architecture is democratically consolidated, the ripple effect of economic problems may pose a dangerous threat to peace and stability in the country. The rising levels of inflation and youth unemployment should be addressed to prevent a reverse of democratic trends and milestones in Ghana. Also, social ills such as the lack of gender parity and high levels of child crime should be addressed to ensure that spoils of democracy are enjoyed by all, as opposed to a privileged few.
Chapter Six: The Quality of Democracy in Ghana: A Comparative Analysis of Freedom House, the Economic Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism.

6.1. Introduction.

This chapter is a comparative analysis of studies conducted by FH, the EIU, the IIAG and the APRM on the quality of democracy in Ghana. Chapters four and five provide the context for the present chapter. This is because chapter four identifies important historical events that helped set the building-blocks for democracy and chapter five assesses the factors of democracy in Ghana. These factors are often used by studies to assess the quality of democracy in a country.

The aim of this chapter is to conduct a comparative analysis of the different groups’ assessments of the study of the QoD in Ghana. Analysis conducted in this chapter also aims to answer the two hypotheses developed in Chapter one of this study. First, it aims to discover to what extent are the Ibrahim Index and the APRM comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana? And second, to what extent do the EIU and Freedom House offer comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana? In order to achieve this, a comparative analysis of all four assessments will be conducted to identify which group(s) offer more comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one conducts an overview of assessment by Freedom House, the EIU, the IIAG and the APRM with a view to identifying strengths and weakness within each assessment. Based on issues identified in section one, section two is a comparative analysis of Freedom House, the EIU, the IIAG and the APRM. In this section, the hypotheses developed in chapter one will be addressed. The last section is an analysis of category scores given by Freedom House, the EIU and the Ibrahim Index. The section identifies the impact of category scores on overall democratic ratings and rankings.

6.2.1. Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Ghana: An Overview of Freedom House, the EIUID, IIAG and the APRM.

In 2008, Freedom House rated Ghana “free” scoring it 1.5 out of a possible 7.0. This rating was the combined average of its political rights (PR) rating of 1 and civil liberties rating of 2 (see methodology in 3.3.1.3) (Freedom House 2008 b). Ghana’s ‘free’ status was determined by a number of empirical evidence occurring in the preceding year (2007) as well as in 2008. According to the 2008 Freedom House report on Ghana, the country is considered to be a thriving democracy and continues to experience relative peace and stability in a region largely characterised by political upheaval, conflict and instability (Freedom House 2008 b). Many of the liberal features of its democracy continually set the standard for good democratic governance in the sub-region\textsuperscript{23}.

Some of the strengths of Freedom House’s classification system are that they make for easy grouping and classification of Ghana as a democratic country. The country earned the ranking of “free”, which indicates a satisfactory (according to Freedom House’s methodology) level of freedom within the realm of political rights and civil liberties operating in the country. The ‘free’ status also means that Ghana is above the minimum requirement of an electoral democracy which is the minimum political system criteria used by Freedom House to measure the quality of freedom (see 3.3.1.2). The quality of democracy in Ghana thus incorporates high elements of both political rights and civil liberties which are important dimensions for a high quality democracy. In addition, the group provides a qualitative report of events occurring between 2007 and 2008 that influenced the “free” category score obtained by Ghana. Further to this, the fact that Freedom House releases yearly reports, allows for comparison in the quality of democracy in Ghana between different years. The report highlighted the important political milestone—“the second-turnover” test or

\textsuperscript{23} Liberal features refer to the protection of civil and political rights as criteria for democracy (International IDEA 2010:18).
democratic consolidation occurring in 2008, in which political power was transferred from
the NPP to the NDC (Freedom House 2009).

Although Freedom House’s analysis of the QoD in Ghana for the year 2008 revealed a strong
democratic system within the county, its limited categorisation of “free”, “partly free”, and
“not free” inhibits analysis beyond this point. This is because it does not indicate the level of
freedoms attained within each category. As a result, countries like Sweden and Ghana are
both classified as ‘free’ using Freedom House’s classification system, even though
comparison of other democratic assessments, including—EIUID, shows a higher quality of
democracy attained in Sweden—“full” democracy, than Ghana—“hybrid” democracy.
Furthermore, the exact or specific status of democratic consolidation in Ghana is not reflected
in Freedom House’s assessment. As earlier stated, the 2008 elections marked the point of
democratic consolidation (see. 4.3). However, this important political milestone is not
reflected in Freedom House’s classification, as Ghana was categorised as “free” in 2007 and
earned the same status of “free” again in 2008. The classification system adopted by
Freedom House fails to reflect important political developments that may show variations
within specified categories of the quality of democracy.

In 2008, the EIUID classified Ghana a hybrid regime. The country was placed 94 out of the
167 countries surveyed (EIU 2008). This ranking was determined by the combined average of
the category scores for the electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government;
political participation; political culture and civil liberties (see 3.3.2.3). Ghana’s hybrid status
reveals that the regime has a combination of democratic and authoritarian features, which
reveals some serious democratic flaws within its political system that could threaten the
country’s overall democratic stability.

Some of the strengths of the EIUID’s study of the quality of democracy in Ghana reveal that
its four-category classification (see 3.3.2.3) allows for further examination of the quality of
democracy beyond an electoral democracy classification. As such Ghana is considered a
‘hybrid’ rather than a ‘full’ or ‘flawed’ democracy, which reveals the extent and degree of
democratic consolidation attained in the West African country. Further to this, the global
nature of ranking allows the quality of democracy achieved in Ghana to be compared and
contrasted against other African countries (see EIU rank in Tables 7 and 8 below).
However, the EIUID does not provide a qualitative report of events occurring within the year that influenced its ranking of democratic quality. Because of this, it is difficult to ascertain important developments influencing Ghana’s category scores (see table 10) and 97th/“hybrid” place ranking, thus identifying flaws within its political system that could threaten the country’s overall democratic stability. The fact that democracy assessments are released periodically rather than annually also hampers the effective comparison of the quality of democracy in the country between 2007 and 2008. As such, it is difficult (using only EIUID surveys) to determine an improvement or regression in the quality of democracy in Ghana.

The IIAG scored Ghana 66 out of 100 for the quality of governance in the country for the year 2010, the higher the value, the better the level of governance (see 3.3.3.3. Ibrahim Index 2011). The scores awarded Ghana by the IIAG alludes to the consolidated nature of Ghana’s democracy. Some strengths identified within the IIAG assessment of the quality of democracy in Ghana includes the use of a numerical ranking system, which allows for the quality of governance to be measured against other African countries. Ghana’s 6th position ranking shows that the country is more democratic than Senegal that was ranked 15th position, but less democratic than Botswana that was ranked 3rd (see table 7 and 8 below, Ibrahim index column). This approach is beneficial because it is not restrictive, (by placing countries into categories without identifying differences between countries grouped within a specific category) but it allows for the identification of quantitative differences between these countries. Furthermore, a shift (upwards or downwards) in ranking generally highlights important political events occurring in the country.

Further to this, the IIAG survey is also targeted for an African/regional audience because assessments released are a compilation of 54 African countries. This allows for closer examination of the quality of governance in Ghana, which can also be measured against other African peer countries in various sub-regions or within the African region as a whole. The IIAG assessments revealed that Ghana’s score of 66 was higher than the regional score for West Africa which was 51 (Ibrahim Index Report 2011). The country also scored higher than the continental average which was 50. Ghana was thus ranked 7th out of 53 African countries surveyed and 2nd out of 16 West African countries surveyed. (a ranking of 1st position displays the best possible scenario of good governance while a lower ranking shows lower levels of good governance (see 3.3.3.3. Ibrahim Index Report 2011).
Another advantage of the IIAG process in Ghana, is its yearly release of surveys which allows for the comparison of the quality of governance over an extended period of time. The table shows that Ghana’s quality of governance consistently improved between 2006 and 2007, but experienced a decline in 2008. In 2009 the quality of governance improved and remained steady in 2010, (see table 6 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ghana’s QoD Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures extracted from data compiled by (Ibrahim Index 2011).

In spite of strengths associated with the IIAG assessment in Ghana, the index does not provide a qualitative explanation for quantitative differences in rankings. For example, IIAG assessments reveal that Ghana was ranked 6th position, while Botswana was ranked 3rd position. However, assessments provided do not indicate what accounts for Ghana being placed 6th and Botswana 3rd. Further to this, the IIAG does not provide a qualitative report of events occurring within the year that influenced its ranking of democratic quality.

As earlier stated (see 3.5), the APRM is the only qualitative study of quality of democracy included in the present study. As such, the group’s method of assessing the quality of democracy in Ghana differs significantly from the other three quantitative studies. Despite this, there are some identified strengths of the APRM’s study in Ghana. First, the APRM’s study consists of a thorough, “comprehensive and frank pictures of governance” in Ghana (Gruzd 2010:3). Because of the group’s multi-faceted approach (see 3.5.1.3) to assessing democracy, the APRM provided a thorough analysis of the state of democracy and political governance. “It commended Ghana for its good democratic practices and pointed out “fault-lines” within its democratic architecture (Gruzd 2010:3). This helped provide valuable information on political events occurring in the country that influence democratic assessments.
Further analysis of the APRM’s 2005 report on Ghana highlights that the country is a beacon of hope in a region that is particularly volatile. The country remains committed to good governance and has shown this through its decision to voluntarily undertake the APRM’s base review process (Open Society 2010:2). This is pertinent given the prevalence of bad governance and the likelihood of African governments to object to such a process. Third, the APRM attests to Ghana’s consolidated liberal architecture which has continually strengthened since the country’s return to multi-party politics in 1992. Fourth, its democratic and orderly alternation of power has further contributed to its democratic standing. And fifth, political stakeholders have shown commitment to the unfolding democratic process and generally viewed the electoral landscape as “robust” and “open”… (APRM 2005:XII).

Nevertheless, the report also identifies concerns in the areas of democracy and good political governance for improvement within the country’s democratic architecture. These issues relate to inadequate human, financial and logistical resources which limit the capacity of the electoral commission and hamper its credibility and legitimacy. Another concern is the lack of internal democracy within political parties which may possibly weaken the prospects for continued democracy in the country. Other issues include low representation of women in politics and the emerging trend of ethnic voting that may present certain problems for the consolidation of democracy in Ghana (APRM 2005:XII).

Second, the APRM’s study of Ghana is valuable because it “profiles positive practices” by providing an exemplary assessment of democracy and good governance in Africa that helps counter negative images of Africa (Gruzd 2010:3). This is evident through the study conducted in Ghana that highlighted that democratic consolidation and good governance is possible in Africa (contrary to popular western belief). Ghana’s positive profiling was largely responsible for President’s Obama’s visit to the country in 2009 from a host of other African nations (see 1.3).

Third, since the APRM assessment of Ghana was made public, it has been used as an ‘early warning” system to identify dominant negative trends and potential crisis issues within the democratic architecture. In this regard, the APRM highlighted sensitivity around ethnic voting in Ghana which if politicised, may become a source of violent ethnic conflicts. As such, the Ghanaian government has been careful not to politicise ethnicity so as to maintain peace and stability in the country (APRM 2005:XII).
Fourth, the APRM report has “spurred reforms” in Ghana. This is because the report was responsible for Ghana: “developing a draft land use master plan”; establishing “a ministry of chieftaincy and cultural affairs”; increasing its “district assemblies from 138 to 166”; passing laws on: “human trafficking, persons with disabilities, whistleblowers and domestic violence”; drafting a “national policy on the aged”; and establishing a number of institutions to address corruption, including “tender boards and internal audit agencies” (Gruzd 2010:3).

Fifth, the APRM process in Ghana has encouraged “peer learning” in other African countries. This is because the APR process as adopted in Ghana spear-headed a research system which included the use of—“desk work, household surveys, expert interviews and focus group discussions”, that has been adopted by other countries e.g. Uganda (Gruzd 2010:4). Further to this, Ghana was able to ‘mentor’ other West African countries, including—Benin, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone, in the area of democracy and good political governance (Gruzd 2010:4). The APR process in Ghana enabled “peer” African countries to closely examine the quality of democracy in Ghana, which can further be measured against other African countries that have also been peer-reviewed.

Sixth, the APRM forum in Ghana has created an avenue for knowledge-sharing and provided well-sourced information for civil society and members of the media to focus on, particularly—low representation of women in politics and the emerging trend of ethnic voting in Ghana (APRM 2005:XII), as well as corruption in Nigeria, high population growth in Uganda and xenophobia in South Africa (Gruzd 2010:4).

Despite the success of the APRM evaluation process in Ghana, some procedural challenges were identified in the areas of lack of inclusivity and insufficient transparency. The first problem involves lack of inclusiveness of civil society groupings in the process. Many CSOs were either not consulted or consultations with them were delayed, As a result, many Ghanaian CSOs felt that the National Governing Council (NGC) comprised mainly of persons who did not represent the interest of civil society groupings in Ghana (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 21).

The second problem that characterised the APR process in Ghana, concerns failure to publicly publish the CSAR along with the CRR (see 3.5.1.3), as the former is the ‘principal document’ that informs findings of the latter report (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 25). Further to this, the country review report was released six months after presentation at the APR forum, but
only part of the CSAR was released to the public on grounds that the document was to remain confidential until after completion of the review process. However, even after completion of the process, the full CSAR has not been released for public consumption (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 25).

The challenges faced by the APRM in Ghana raises questions about the integrity and legitimacy of the process. This is because, the review process is suppose to be a true and unbiased reflection of the state of democracy and good governance in Ghana, but this was constrained by the lack of broad-based civil society involvement in the process which hampers legitimacy of the APR process. Furthermore, failure to release the CSAR causes doubt about the integrity of the process because it makes one to question the government’s intention behind refusing to publicly release the Country Self-Assessment Report.

6.2.2. Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Ghana: A Comparison of Freedom House, the EIU, IIAG and the APRM.

Freedom House’s analysis of the QoD in Ghana is comparable to assessments given by the Ibrahim index and the APRM because all three groups consider the country to be highly democratic. While Freedom House categorizes Ghana as “Free”, the APRM considers the country exemplary in the practice of democracy and good governance. The Ibrahim index also ranks the country highly in the area of governance, given its 7th position ranking of the country. The EIU is the only group that gives a disparate account of the QoD in Ghana for the year 2008.

Despite the differences within the studies with regard to selected methodologies, (see 3.4), the following issues have been identified in respect to the four studies. The first issue relates to the Ibrahim Index and the APRM as comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana. In answering this question, it is important to firstly highlight that both measurements form an integral piece to studying the quality of democracy as they both focus primarily on Africa and provide a platform for assessing democracy with the African context. In this regard, the IIAG measures the quality of governance in all 54 African countries and the APRM measures democracy and good governance (among other things) in participating member states.
Second, both studies are relatively recent, with the APRM being established in 2003 and the Mo Ibrahim in 2006. The establishment of these studies probably follows the growing democracy deficit in many parts of Africa that has occurred since democratisation in the 1990’s (see 1.2). As a result, the Ibrahim index and the APRM show commitment on the part of stakeholders to provide an African platform for addressing issues of democracy and good governance on the continent.

Further to this, both groups have similar goals—addressing issues of democracy and good governance on the continent. As opposed to just offering democratic rankings, the groups actually aim to improve democracy and good governance on the continent. Democracy assessments produced by the Ibrahim index and the APRM are dedicated to improving the quality of democracy and political governance on the continent. They aim to measure democracy from a citizen-led approach as expressed by the IIAG (see 3.3.3.2) and the Country Self-Assessment Report provided by the APRM (see appendix 8.1.3. objective 2). No other group in Africa measures the quality of democracy from this perspective. As seen through the workings of the Ibrahim Index and the APRM, they remain the two most prominent African platforms to achieve the objective of promoting democracy and good governance on the continent. As such, it is argued that both groups form an integral part to measuring the quality of democracy in Africa and can be used as comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana.

The second issue relates to, to what extent are the EIUID and Freedom House comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana. Given the quantitative nature of assessments conducted by the EIUID and Freedom House, it is easy and conducive to surmise that both groups are comparable assessments of the quality of democracy in Ghana. Besides similarities in the use of the quantitative method, other comparisons abound. Firstly, both Freedom House and the EIUID provide measurements that are based on a democratic spectrum. Freedom House provides a three scale measurement of —“free”, “partly free” and “not free”, while the EIUID offers a four scale measurement of—“full democracies”, “flawed democracies”, “hybrid democracies” and “authoritarian regimes”. These different spectrums show that the groups are interested in measuring the quality of democracy beyond the point of democratisation. As such it moves beyond a dichotomous democratic assessment to measure the extent and nature of democracy.
Second, both groups are global assessments that measurement the quality of democracy in different regions across the world, so as to get a “snapshot” of the state of democracy in these different countries. As such, Freedom House and the EIUID provide a global platform for assessing the quality of democracy in the world. This allows democratic experts to compare democratic trends within and across countries, with a view to predicting or forecasting the future of democracy in these countries.

Third, both groups agree on the democratic point of departure—being an electoral democracy as the prevalent political system that is assessed (see 3.3.1.2. for definition of an electoral democracy). However, the EIUID argues that it offers a thicker or more maximalist definition of democracy than Freedom House (EIU 2007). This is because it includes categories such as: democratic culture and has a substantive checklist questions than latter (see appendix 8.1.1. and 8.1.2. for comparison of checklist questions).

While there are similarities between Freedom House and the EIUID, the groups also differ in a number of respects. First, they offer different views on the quality of democracy in Ghana, In the case of Freedom House, the country is considered “free”, while the EIUID considers it a “hybrid” regime. Explanations for these differences range from the use of less comprehensive checklist questions, to differences in coding methods by the two groups (see 3.4.1 to 3.4.6). These differences raise important implications for the quality of democracy in Ghana because it produces conflicting accounts of the extent and nature of democracy.

Second, assessments produced by Freedom House are released annually, while the EIUID’s assessments are somewhat sporadic. This means that Freedom House’s assessments provide a more reliable and consistent picture of the quality of democracy, as opposed to the EIUID which does not release yearly surveys. Due to this, it becomes extremely difficult to compare democratic trends in Ghana over an extended period of time, applying only EIUID surveys. It is therefore necessary to consult other global surveys in order to access annual democratic assessments. Given this, it is argued that while Freedom House and the EIUID are similar in terms of approach and methodology, they cannot be used as comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana.

Further analysis of assessments provided by the EIUID and the Ibrahim index reveal inconsistencies in their various accounts of the quality of democracy in Ghana. According to the EIUID, Ghana was ranked 94th on a global scale but was ranked 7th by the Ibrahim Index.
on a regional scale. However, a survey of all the African countries included in the EIUID’s
165 country survey reveals that Ghana rank 12th out of 50 African countries. This would give
Ghana the status of a “full democracy”, placing it on the same position—12th, as occupied by
Canada on the global scale (EIU 2008). While the EIUID ranking of Ghana would still be
lower than 7th place position awarded by the Ibrahim Index, it is still more democratic than
the 94th place ranking given to the country on a global scale.

Also, the EIUID records that Benin, Mali, Madagascar, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Senegal,
performed better than Ghana. However, these countries performed significantly lower than
Ghana according to assessments produced by the IIAG for the same year (see table 7 below).
This gives a disparate view of the QoD in Ghana as provided by the EIUID and the Ibrahim
Index and provides conflicting accounts on the level of democracy in Ghana. Since it is
difficult to ascertain what accounts for these differences (without access to actual field
research conducted by the groups), it may be surmised, based on previous analysis, that the
issues identified in (see 3.4) account for differences in the quality of democracy as recorded
by the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index. The table below highlights differences between QoD
country rankings given by the EIUID and the Ibrahim index:

Table 7: Dissimilar Country Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EIUID Rank</th>
<th>Ibrahim Index Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>33rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: EIUID ranking ranges from 1 to 165, while the Ibrahim Index is from 1 to 54. This is based on the number
of countries included in each study.

Table 7 shows that Ghana was ranked 94th out of 165 countries on a global scale by the
EIUID but was ranked 7th out of 54 African countries on a regional scale by the IIAG.
However, Ghana was ranked consistently lower than Benin, Mali, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Mozambique and Senegal by the EIU, even though these same countries performed lower than Ghana, according to assessments provided by the Ibrahim index. Possible explanations for disparate rankings in the QoD in Ghana and the above-mentioned countries may relate to issues such as; the use of indicators, nature of checklist questions, data collection and coding systems. Another important implication of these differences is that it may suggest that global and regional measurements assess the quality of democracy in different ways.

This is because global assessments focus primarily on procedural aspects such as the electoral process and political participation and functioning of government but pay little or insufficient attention to socioeconomic aspects that measure democracy from a citizen-led approach. As such countries such as Benin, Mali, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique and Senegal, may have stronger procedural aspects than Ghana but may be weaker in other socioeconomic aspects. But because procedural aspects carry more value within many global measurements of democracy, countries reflecting these aspects are scored higher than countries that pay more attention to other socioeconomic aspects. In this regard, it is important to note that regional measurements such as the Ibrahim index (and the APRM) generally embody more thicker and inclusive measurements of democracy, consisting of political as well as socioeconomic categories that aim to measure democracy from the experiences of the citizen.

Despite dissimilar country rankings, similarities also exist between QoD country rankings awarded by the EIU and the Ibrahim index. This is in relation to countries such as; Mauritius, South Africa, Cape Verde, Botswana and Namibia. Both the EIU and the Ibrahim Index record that these countries performed better than Ghana as indicated by assessments provided (see Table 8 below). This highlights that in some instances, consistency may exist between global and regional assessments of the quality of democracy in Ghana. The table below highlights similarities between the QoD country rankings given by the EIU and the Ibrahim index:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EIU rank</th>
<th>Ibrahim Index rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Comparable Country Rankings
Table 8 shows that Ghana was ranked 94th out of 165 countries on a global scale by the EIUID but was ranked 7th out of 54 African countries on a regional scale by the Ibrahim Index. Ghana was also ranked lower than Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa by both the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index, which show consistency between the two groups in measurements provided. This consistency may also be accounted for by stronger procedural aspects in Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa which outweigh the value of socioeconomic measurements.

Although Tables 7 and 8 show different accounts of the QoD in Ghana, in relation to other African countries, the tables highlight inconsistencies between global and regional measurements of the quality of democracy in Africa. As earlier indicated, (because of lack of access to actual field research conducted by the groups), it is difficult to pin-point actual reasons for these discrepancies. However it may be surmised that these inconsistencies are due mainly to methodological and substantive issues described in (3.4.), and the value attached to procedural aspects by many global democracy measurements.

6.2.3. The Quality of Democracy in Ghana: Category Analysis

In assessing the quality of democracy in Ghana, each quantitative group provides category scores for each indicator or checklist question. These category scores thus make up the overall ranking, or democratic classification given to a country (see the quantitative approach in 3.3). In this regard, Tables 9, 10 and 11 below, detail scores awarded to Ghana by Freedom House, the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index in respect to the various categories covered by the groups.
Table 9: Freedom House’s Category Scores for the QoD for Ghana 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score out of 7 (with 1 being the best and 7 the worst)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political pluralism and participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning of government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression and belief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal autonomy and individual rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures in tables were extracted from data compiled by (Freedom House 2008a) for the year 2008

Table 10: EIUId’s Category Scores for Ghana 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Electoral Process and Pluralism</th>
<th>Functioning of government</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Democratic Political Culture</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scores out of 10</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with 1 being the worst and 10 the best)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures in table were extracted from data compiled by the (EIU 2008) for the year 2008

Table 11: Ibrahim Index’s QoD Category Scores for Ghana 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Continental average</th>
<th>Highest country score</th>
<th>Lowest country score</th>
<th>Ghana’s score out of 100</th>
<th>Ghana’s rank out of 53 African countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety and Rule of Law</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Mauritius 89</td>
<td>Somalia 5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rule of law</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Botswana 97</td>
<td>Somalia 0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accountability</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Botswana 86</td>
<td>Somalia 3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personal safety</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Mauritius 80</td>
<td>Somalia 3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National security</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Mauritius 100</td>
<td>Somalia 13</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and Human rights</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Cape Verde 78</td>
<td>Somalia 13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participation</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Cape Verde 83</td>
<td>Libya and Eritrea 3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rights</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Cape Verde 86</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gender</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Lesotho 76</td>
<td>Somalia 23</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Freedom House provides an overall rating for the category political rights (consisting of the electoral process; political pluralism and participation and functioning of government) for which Ghana scored 1 out of a possible 7, the highest possible score awarded in the category (Freedom House 2008b). Also, Ghana scored 7.42 out of a possible 10, for a similar category (electoral process and political pluralism) within the EIU/D assessment (EIU 2008: 6). This was the country’s highest score from among the five different categories used by the EIU to measure the quality of democracy.

The Ibrahim index’s analysis of aspects pertaining to democratic procedures are found under the rule of law, accountability, participation (which cuts across various categories). For the rule of law, Ghana scored 85 out of 100 ranking it 5th from among the 53 African countries included in the study. For accountability, Ghana scored 61 out of 100, ranking it 8th position. For participation, Ghana scored 72 out of 100, ranking it 9th position.

These figures reveal that aspects of Ghana’s electoral system are particularly strong, as indicated by Freedom House’s rating of political rights, the EIU/D scores on the electoral problem and pluralism and the Ibrahim index’s ratings of rule of law, accountability, and participation in country. As such country’s electoral process remains exemplary and is continually being consolidated by good democratic practices.
However, in the other procedural aspects pertaining to the functioning of government; political participation and the democratic culture, Ghana’s scores are below the half-way mark of 5.00. The scores indicate that Ghana was rated 4.64 for functioning of government; 4.44 for political participation and 4.38 for democratic culture respectively. These scores suggest that while Ghana’s electoral system is particularly consolidated, other procedural aspects are yet to be strengthened. The EIUID’s low scoring of Ghana for the categories of: functioning of government; political participation and democratic culture may shed light on why the country was ranked 94th and rated a “hybrid” regime. This is largely due to the numerical value of these aspects on the EIUID scale, which heavily influences finally ratings. Further to this, Ghana strong electoral process is insufficient to counter-act the low scoring received for other aspects of the country’s procedural elements.

Although the EIUID separates the procedural aspects into different categories, as highlighted above, Freedom House does not sub-divide procedural aspects pertaining to political rights into different category scores. As such, Ghana’s score of 1 reflects the best possible rating for procedural aspects. Because all procedural aspects identified in Freedom House’s study are classified under the ‘umbrella’ of political rights, it is difficult to decipher which procedural aspects carry more scoring weight. Further to this, Freedom House does not indicate which aspects within its political rights category weigh more. The difference in scoring weight between the two groups may offer an explanation as to why Freedom House’s rating of Ghana is “free” and the EIUID rates the country a “hybrid” regime.

With regard to substantive aspects, which make for a fuller conception of democracy (see.2.2.2), a number of socioeconomic rights fall into this category. Freedom House and the EIUID assess substantive aspects of democracy in the category—civil liberties, while the Ibrahim Index covers substantive aspects in an array of different categories.

In Freedom House’s category—civil liberties, Ghana scored 2 (Freedom House 2008b), while the EIUID scored the country 5.88 for the same category. The Ibrahim index’s analyses of aspects pertaining to substantive issues are found under rights; gender; poverty/welfare; health and education. For the aspect of rights, Ghana scored 75 out of 100 ranking it 3rd from among the 53 African countries included in the study. For aspects of gender, no information was displayed (see key in Table 11). For aspects of poverty/welfare Ghana scored 69 out of
100, ranking it 6th position. For health, no information was displayed and for education, the country scored 66 out of 100, ranking it 10th position.

Ghana’s rating on civil liberties as displayed by all three groups suggests these substantive aspects of democracy are not as consolidated as the country’s procedural element, particularly—the electoral process. Ghana’s score of 2 as awarded by Freedom House is lower than its score of 1 for political rights. However, the EIUID scored the country 5.88 which is higher than scores awarded Ghana for functioning of government 4.64; political participation 4.44; and democratic culture 4.38. But because the compilation of these three procedural aspects carries more weighing value, they have more influence on the final rating scores than the substantive aspect of civil liberties. Although the EIUID’s Ghana score of civil liberties is slightly above the average rating of 5, it still reveals some loopholes in the system which if not adequately addressed could hamper the quality of democracy in Ghana.

According to scores given by the Ibrahim Index, Ghana is particularly strong in the area of rights, as it was ranked 3rd position in Africa. But the country is the weakest in the areas of gender and health as no information was provided which means that it did not feature in the top ten country placements.

A breakdown of the category scores awarded to Ghana by Freedom House, the EIUID and the Ibrahim index highlights a number of things. First, it reveals that Ghana’s democracy is particularly consolidated in the area of some procedural elements, such as the electoral process but at the same time, the country is weak in other procedural dimensions such as the functioning of government, political participation and a strong democratic culture. Second, substantive aspects of the country’s democratic framework are yet to be strengthened which means that procedural elements remain the mainstay of the country’s democratic architecture. The third issue relates to different weighting of procedural and substantive elements by the different groups which may account for conflicting accounts of the quality of democracy in Ghana.

6.3. Conclusion

The Chapter conducted a comparative assessment of Freedom House, the EIU, the Ibrahim index and the APRM’s study of the QoD in Ghana in order to reveal the relationship between
each assessment. The study highlighted a number of important issues. First, the study identified that quantitative studies, though similar in approach and methodology may offer different accounts of the quality of democracy. This was highlighted through comparison of Freedom House, the EIUID and the Ibrahim index which revealed that while Freedom House and the Ibrahim index considered Ghana to be highly democratic, the EIUID considered the country to be a “hybrid” regime.

Second, the Ibrahim Index and the APRM were identified are comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana because both studies provide a platform for assessing the quality of democracy within an African context due to the fact that both assessments are relatively new and were established because of the growing nature of democratic deficits that had engulfed many parts of Africa. Further to this, both groups do not only assess the quality of democracy in Africa, but they aim to improve the quality of democracy and good governance, through the profiling of countries exhibiting positive examples of democratic norms on the continent. This is achieved through the groups’ inclusive and citizen-led approach to measuring the quality of democracy and good political governance on the continent.

A third issue identified was that Freedom House and the EIUID are not comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana. This is largely due to emphasis placed on procedural aspects within EIUID measurements and insufficient detailing of different categories within Freedom House’s measurement. Besides the fact that both groups provide assessments that are global in nature and include a vast number of countries, in different regions of the world, they offer different accounts of the status of democracy in Ghana.

Fourth, there were inconsistencies between the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index of African account of countries considered to be more democratic than Ghana. On one hand, the EIUID ranked a number of African countries as more democratic than Ghana, but on the other hand, the Ibrahim Index considered those same countries as performing lower than Ghana on the democratic scale. However, in other instances, there existed similarities between the EIUID and the Ibrahim index’s account of countries more democratic than Ghana. This raises issues concerning the strength of procedural vis-à-vis substantive elements of democracy because
the procedural dimension is often preferred, giving it more numerical value over the substantive dimension.

Fifth, the study identified differences in global democratic assessments vis-à-vis regional ones and highlights a possible need to develop more African/regional ‘friendly’ measurements that aim to measure the quality of democracy from an ‘African’ viewpoint.

And sixth, the study identified that Ghana’s democracy is particular consolidated in procedural areas such as the electoral process and political pluralism, but is lacking in substantive areas. The difference between the two facets of Ghana’s democracy may cause different groups to offer varying accounts of the quality of democracy in the country.

This chapter also highlights a strong correlation between findings identified in chapter five and those highlighted in this chapter. The assessment of the quality of democracy factors in Ghana which was carried out in the previous chapter revealed a particularly consolidated political framework. This was also identified in this chapter as seen through the electoral process and political pluralism as identified by FH and the EIUID. However, certain weaknesses were highlighted both in chapter five and in this chapter, which surrounds the country’s socio-economic or substantive areas. Similarity in findings reveals accuracy and consistency in the approach in which the quality of democracy is studied. Also, it highlights important aspects of democracy that either help to consolidate or weaken the quality of democracy in a country. Furthermore, consistency in findings is important in establishing a consolidated framework for measuring the quality of democracy in Africa.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion
7.1. Introduction

This chapter concludes the present study by evaluating the quality of democracy in Ghana based on the research conducted in previous chapters. The chapter provides general comments, suggestions and recommendations on the study. The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the study, identify strengths and problems encountered during the research, as well as provide suggestions and recommendations on improving studies on the quality of democracy in Africa. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first part of the chapter provides an overview of the study, which will capture the trajectory of the research. The second part of the chapter discusses the main findings, with a view to answering the research questions posed at the onset of the study. Lastly, the chapter provides suggestions and recommendations geared at strengthening and improving the value of democratic assessment models.

7.2. Overview of research

This dissertation focused on the quality of democracy in Ghana, as seen through the democratic “lenses” of prominent democracy assessment groups, such as: Freedom House, the EIUID, the IIAG and the APRM. The purpose of the study was to establish the quality of democracy in Ghana, based on evaluations conducted by the different groups and to also identify whether a correlation existed between the ways these different groups measured the quality of democracy.

In order to achieve the set objectives of the study, the paper firstly discussed the focus shift from the study of democratization to the quality of democracy. The research found that this focus shift is attributed to the rise in the number of countries considered to be democratized, but not necessarily embodying substantive features of the QoD. Although many countries are considered democratized because they embody the standard features of a democracy, many lack important substantive features needed to characterise their systems as a “good quality” democracy. Secondly, the research proceeded to examined factors which are considered important attributes in studying the quality of democracy. At this point, the research found that the ‘quality of democracy’ lies in the consolidated nature of an array of democratic practices, values and norms, which generally form factors of the ‘quality of democracy’.
These different factors include: the QoR, QoST, QoS oC and the QoL and provide a holistic theoretical framework for assessing the QoD (Andreev 2005).

Thirdly, the paper discussed the two main ways in which the quality of democracy may be studied. The research found that assessments conducted on the study of the quality of democracy can be categorised into two main groups: namely quantitative and qualitatively measures. Within these two groups, Freedom House, the Economic Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, are classified as quantitative measures, while the APRM is considered qualitative, due mainly to the approaches adopted in their assessment of the QoD.

The fourth aspect of the research focused on the case study—Ghana. This involved an exploratory study of the search for democracy in the country. The research details a tumultuous historical trajectory, marred by struggles to consolidate democracy, as a result of political and economic mismanagement as well as social upheaval and several intermittent years of military rule (Chazan 1988:93; Haynes 1993:451). After three failed democratic experiments, numerous military interventions, and years of political and economic mismanagement, democracy began to take root in Ghana. This was marked by the establishment of the fourth republic in 1992. With the advent of this republic, the quality of democracy began to slowly strengthen. Now, Ghana’s current democratic position is consolidated and particularly pertinent in the West African region which is infamously marred by political volatility and instability (Olukoshi 2001:1).

The fifth aspect of the research involved an assessment of the quality of democracy factors in Ghana based on the identified theoretical framework of analysis. The research details that since the re-introduction of multi party politics in 1992, the quality of democracy factors have consistently improved in the areas of the quality of the political regime, the quality of the state, the quality of society and the quality of life. Politically, Ghana is lauded as a “beacon of democracy”. However, the country is increasingly plagued by “excessive patronage”, an increasingly powerful executive and corruption within the civil service. These shortcomings need to be adequately addressed so as to strengthen the QoR and further consolidate Ghana’s admirable democracy.

Economically, Ghana remains West Africa’s biggest economic success story. Ghana’s economic agenda has achieved modest success, as poverty levels over the past decades have
significantly dropped. However, rising inflation levels, widened budget deficit, increased electricity, water and food costs and youth unemployment threatens to hamper the QoSoc and the QoL, and undo Ghana’s economic success story.

Socially, Ghanaians enjoy a peaceful and stable coexistence, due mainly to improved levels of education and infrastructural development. However, insufficient gender parity; high levels of child crime and a widening gap between the rich and the poor may pose a threat to both the QoSoc and the QoL for future generations.

The sixth aspect of the research provides a comparative analysis of studies conducted by Freedom House, the EIUID, the IIAG and the APRM on the quality of democracy in Ghana. The research highlights that there is general consensus among groups such as Freedom House, the IIAG and the APRM on the quality of democracy in Ghana. Though ranked and assessed through different means, all three studies consider Ghana to be highly democratic. Freedom House rated the country as “free” and the IIAG ranked it 7th position from a total of 54 African countries surveyed, while the APRM released a qualitative report identifying the strengths of Ghana’s democratic architecture. The only study that offered a dissimilar account of the quality of democracy was the EIUID which rated the country a “hybrid regime”.

7.3. Summative research findings

A comparative assessment of Freedom House, the EIUID, the IIAG and the APRM study of the QoD in Ghana highlighted a number of important issues. First, the study identified that quantitative studies, though similar in approach and methodology may offer different accounts of the quality of democracy. This was highlighted through comparison of Freedom House, the EIUID and the Ibrahim index which revealed that while Freedom House and the Ibrahim index considered Ghana to be highly democratic, the EIUID considered the country to be a “hybrid” regime.

Second, the Ibrahim Index and the APRM were identified as comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana because both studies provide a platform for assessing the quality of democracy within an African context, due to the fact that both assessments are relatively new, and were established because of the growing nature of democratic deficits that has engulfed many parts of Africa. Further to this, both groups do not only assess the quality
of democracy in Africa, but they aim to improve the quality of democracy and good governance, through the profiling of countries exhibiting positive examples of democratic norms on the continent. This is achieved through the groups’ inclusive and citizen-led approach to measuring the quality of democracy and good political governance on the continent.

A third issue identified was that Freedom House and the EIUID are not comparable measurements of the quality of democracy in Ghana. This is largely due to the emphasis placed on procedural aspects within EIUID measurements and insufficient detailing of different categories within Freedom House’s measurement. Besides the fact that both groups provide assessments that are global in nature and study vast numbers of countries, they offer different accounts of the status of democracy in Ghana.

Fourth, there were inconsistencies between the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance’s account of countries considered to be more democratic than Ghana. On one hand, the EIUID ranked a number of African countries as more democratic than Ghana, but on the other hand, the Ibrahim Index considered those same countries as performing lower than Ghana on the democratic scale. However, in other instances, there existed similarities between the EIUID and the Ibrahim index’s account of countries more democratic than Ghana. This raises issues concerning the strength of procedural vis-à-vis substantive elements of democracy because the procedural dimension is often preferred, giving it more numerical value over the substantive dimension. Further to this, it identifies differences in global democratic assessments vis-à-vis regional ones and highlights a possible need to develop a more African/regional ‘friendly” measurement that aims to measure the quality of democracy from an ‘African’ viewpoint.

And fifth, the study identified that Ghana’s democracy is particular consolidated in procedural areas such as the electoral process and political pluralism, but is lacking in substantive areas. The difference between the two facets of Ghana’s democracy may cause different groups to offer varying accounts of the quality of democracy in the country.

7.4. Values of measurements.
Assessments offered by Freedom House and the EIUID of the quality of democracy move beyond a dichotomous democratic assessment to measure the extent and nature of democracy in Ghana. Freedom House provides a three scale measurement of—“free”, “partly free” and “not free”, while the EIUID offers a four scale measurement of—“full democracies”, “flawed democracies”, “hybrid democracies” and “authoritarian regimes”. The category scale method allows for further investigation into the quality of democracy, which is on the right path to assessing the quality of democracy, as dichotomous approaches fall short of this. Through this category scaling approach, it was identified that Ghana is beyond the point of democratisation, which allows for further investigation into the quality of democracy in the country.

Secondly, quantitative assessments generally allow for comparison of the quality of democracy in Ghana over an extended period of time. Studies produced by Freedom House and the EIUID aid in tracking positive or negative democratic trends in a country. Data released by the IIAG on Ghana for instance, showed a mixed trend in quality of democracy in the country since 2006 (see table 6), but for the most part democratic improvements were recorded between 2006 and 2007 and again in 2009.

Thirdly, assessments produced particularly by the Ibrahim index and the APRM are dedicated to improving the quality of democracy and political governance on the continent. They aim to measure democracy within the context of African realities. No other group in Africa measures the quality of democracy from this perspective. As such, they remain the two most prominent African platforms to achieve the objective of promoting democracy and good governance on the continent.

Fourthly, assessments produced by the Ibrahim index and the APRM provide a balanced overview of procedural and substantive categories of democracy in Ghana. This allows for a clearer picture of the quality of democracy in the country, one that does not over-emphasise on one aspect at the cost of another.

And lastly, the APRM assessment of Ghana has been crucial in ensuring policy reforms; promoting peer learning and knowledge sharing among African countries; and “profiling positive practices” by providing an exemplary assessment of democracy and good governance in Africa that helps counter-act negative images of Africa.
7.5. Problems with assessments.

With regard to the use of quantitative studies as a tool for effectively measuring the quality of democracy in Africa, the study highlighted three main challenges.

The first problem relates to discrepancies between global and African democratic rankings of the quality of democracy in Ghana. A comparison of assessments EIUID and the Ibrahim index reveal inconsistencies in the accounts of the quality of democracy in Ghana. According to the EIUID, Ghana was ranked 94th on a global scale but was ranked 7th by the Ibrahim Index on a regional scale. Further to this, the EIU Index records that Benin, Mali, Madagascar, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Senegal, performed better than Ghana. However, these countries performed significantly lower than Ghana according to assessments produced by the IIAG for the same year (see table 7). This gives a disparate account of the QoD in Ghana between the EIUID and the Ibrahim Index which gives a conflicting account about democracy in Ghana.

Secondly, relates to insufficient balance between procedural and substantive elements within democratic categories which may also account for conflicting accounts of the quality of democracy in Ghana. The EIUID in particular pays strong attention the procedural aspects of democracy in Ghana which means that in the final scoring, these aspects weigh more than substantive elements. This raises issues concerning the strength of procedural vis-à-vis substantive elements of democracy because the procedural dimension is often preferred, giving it more numerical value over the substantive dimension. Further to this, it identifies differences in global democratic assessments vis-à-vis regional ones and highlights a possible need to develop more African/regional ‘friendly’ measurement that aims to measure the quality of democracy from an ‘African’ viewpoint.

A third issue concerns the lack of available data within quantitative studies, on democratic rankings and ratings for consecutive years. As previously discussed in this paper, the assessment group—EIUID produces data intermittently, which hampers the effective and continuous assessment of the quality of democracy over an extended period of time. In this paper, some years have been left out of the study due to lack of data.

With regard to the use of the APRM as a tool for effectively measuring the quality of democracy in Africa, a number of issues have been identified. One of the first problems
identified, is the apparent usage of the APRM as a “means to an end” rather than an “end in itself”, through which Africa can ensure continued donor funding without fully committing itself to complete political and socioeconomic overhauls on the continent. The continued voluntary and advisory element of the APRM has contributed to this and neutralised the efficacy of using the body as an effective tool measuring the quality of democracy in Africa (Stulz 2007: 6-7).

A second identified problem is that the APRM tends to reinforce exemplary cases of good governance in African countries and under-represents cases on the opposite end of this spectrum. This point is highlighted when analysis is conducted of Freedom House’s 2005 report, in which there appears to be congruity in the fact that APRM participating countries were consistently ranked “freer” than their non-participating counterparts. This begs to argue that countries with stronger political and socioeconomic structures are more likely than their weaker counterparts to accede to the APRM. As a result, the APRM tends to highlight mainly positive examples, without sufficiently shedding light on equally important bad practices of governance on the continent. An additional problem closely linked to the APRM’s display of mainly positive examples, is that it may discourage authoritarian African states from using the APRM as a tool through which it accedes to democratic reforms (Stulz 2007:8).

Thirdly, even when the APRM is used to successfully profile positive cases of good governance on the African continent, its standard for assessment has been criticised by international donors for being too low. This is further worsened by alleged “informational input deficiencies”—surrounding the data gathering processes and the “length and complexity of the APRM questionnaire”, as well as lack of “technical competency” among others (Stulz 2007: 15-16). These issues have caused observers to insist on the importance of having parallel monitoring systems to ensure integrity and transparency (Stulz 2007:8). The attitude of western observers towards the APR process, as well as the observation they raise poses two additional problems for the APRM. On the one hand, it brings to light the minuscule regard they have for African structures and processes and on the other hand, it begs to question whether the APR processes are indeed subject to manipulation by the head of states and governments of participating African countries?

Fourthly, the APRM fails to effectively establish a “fail/pass” (qualitative or otherwise) scoring system. In actuality, the body clearly identifies the importance of taking into
consideration a country’s historical background and level of development, which effectively means that African countries have different “starting points” and as such cannot be expected to be on the same level of development (Stulz 2007:12). While this stance proffered by the APRM is valuable in itself because it assess each country based on the country’s own standards. It however fails to prescribe a universal African standard by which countries can be evaluated. The benefit of such a prescription is that, it would lay to rest the doubts that many western observers have about the APR process, while also limiting (to some extent) manipulation of the process by heads of states and governments, as countries will either meet or fall short of standardised requirements.

And lastly, the APRM process has proven to be quite costly for lower-income countries, which further inhibits participation by these states and also reinforces some of the problems raised in the preceding paragraphs.


Measuring the QoD is an important aspect in studying democracy. As such, it is imperative that measurements are consistent, holistic, accurate and reliable. In order to achieve this, a number of recommendations are suggested.

First, there is a need to establish an external moderation review committee with regard to quantitative assessments with the sole responsibility of verifying the quality of democracy findings as produced by different assessment groups. This is to ensure that information obtained is reliable and accurate and reflects appropriate accounts of the quality of democracy. The panels’ should be an independent body consisting of specialists from different area fields so as to bring expertise to the verification process. The establishment of these verification panels will help produce consistent and reliable measurements of the QoD on an annual basis.

Second, there is need for a more balance in the area of procedural and substantive democratic assessment categories so as to allow for a more balanced overview of the study of the quality of democracy.

Third, it is recommended that annual qualitative reports are provided alongside quantitative statistical studies. This will help contextualise and substantiate quantitative assessments
against the backdrop of positive or negative democratic trends and also reflect important political milestones occurring within the year which subsequently influenced ratings and scores of the QoD in the country.

Fourth, it is important to establish more African-based assessment groups such as the APRM and the Ibrahim index, with a view to measuring the quality of democracy and governance from an African perspective, as well as providing platforms for improving the quality of democracy and governance on the continent. Such organisations should not be restricted to value prescriptions, but should evaluate the quality of democracy on a standardised African developed model so as to ensure that assessments are legitimate and can be effectively used as a tool for measuring the quality of democracy in Africa. The organisations should be funded through African capital to ensure that they remain an African tool for democracy, independent of external interference.

Fifth, it is recommended that stage two of the APRM review procedure (see 3.5.1.3.), be conducted in a two step phase. The first phase should involve consultation with the CRM and other non-partisan NGO, while the second round of talks should then incorporate representatives from government. This will ensure that civil society have a free and open platform to air and discuss their views and concerns without possible government interference and manipulation. A similar approach is also suggested by Kanbur (2004:10), who argues that civil society should have a independent platform from that of the APRM, in which they can conduct assessments of their own, so as to effectively critique the shortcomings of the APRM assessment. This approach would address some of the shortcomings identified in the 2005 APRM Ghana process.

Sixth, it is recommended that the APRM narrows down its focus area to issues of democracy and political governance. This is suggested so as to ensure that the APR adequately addresses key issues of democracy and good governance, primarily seen as the root causes of economic and social ills on the continent, as opposed to “spreading itself thin” by covering a plethora of focus areas—democracy, political, economic, and corporate governance, that the body is currently tasked with (Kanbur 2004:10). Furthermore, this narrowed-down approach will also ensure that reviews are done in a more competent and timely fashion, as the APRM is frequently criticised for it’s the slow pace of the review process and “informational input deficiencies” (Stulz 2007: 15-16).
7.7. Proposals for Future Research

Given the differences between the quality of democracy as recorded by global and regional assessments, future research should focus on two main areas.

Firstly, research should be conducted on what accounts for inconsistencies in the quality of democracy as measured by different assessment groups, given that factual empirical evidence is the same across the board. Research should therefore focus on how one assessment group’s ranking of the quality of democracy may differ significantly from another group in this regard.

Secondly, research should be carried out on the possibility of establishing an African measurement for assessing the quality of democracy on the continent. Due to certain differences between global democratic assessments vis-à-vis regional ones, there is a need to explore the possibility of developing an African or regional standard for measuring the quality of democracy in Africa. Even with this, such a measurement should not compromise standardised democratic values and norms in the ‘name’ of finding an African measurement system. Instead, African values should be incorporated into standardised democratic values and norms with a view to exploring what it means to measure the quality of democracy from an African democratic perspective.

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Appendix 1: Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties Checklist Questions

**POLITICAL RIGHTS CHECKLIST**

**A. ELECTORAL PROCESS**
1. **Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?**

   - Did established and reputable national and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent elections for head of government to be free and fair? *(Note: Heads of government chosen through various electoral frameworks, including direct elections for president, indirect elections for prime minister by parliament, and the electoral college system for electing presidents, are covered under this and the following sub-questions. In cases of indirect elections for the head of government, the elections for the legislature that chose the head of government, as well as the selection process of the head of government himself, should be taken into consideration.)*
   - Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent election for head of government?
   - Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
   - Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign free of intimidation?
   - Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
   - Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
   - Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
   - Is each person's vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure equal representation?
   - Has a democratically elected head of government who was chosen in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? *(Note: Although a peaceful, "velvet coup" may ultimately lead to a positive outcome-particularly if it replaces a head of government who was not freely and fairly elected-the new leader has not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)*
   - In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other subnational officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the
conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?

2. **Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?**

- Did established and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to be free and fair?
- Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent national legislative election?
- Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
- Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout the campaign free of intimidation?
- Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
- Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
- Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
- Is each person's vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure equal representation?
- Have the representatives of a democratically elected national legislature who were chosen in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? *(Note: Although a peaceful, "velvet coup" may ultimately lead to a positive outcome-particularly if it replaces a national legislature whose representatives were not freely and fairly elected-members of the new legislature have not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)*
- In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?

3. **Are the electoral laws and framework fair?**
• Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections?  
  (Note: Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an election if the ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the election is infringed.)

• Are election commissions or other election authorities independent and free from government or other pressure and interference?

• Is the composition of election commissions fair and balanced?

• Do election commissions or other election authorities conduct their work in an effective and competent manner?

• Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage?  (Note: Suffrage can be suspended or withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity, such as mental incapacity or conviction of a serious criminal offense.)

• Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and nonpartisan manner, as opposed to gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage?

• Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as proportional versus majoritarian) been manipulated to advance certain political interests or to influence the electoral results?

B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION

1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?

• Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, excessively large membership requirements, etc.?

• Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, or other peaceful activities?

• Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?

2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
• Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully competing in elections?

• Are there legitimate opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the national legislature or in subnational governments?

• Are opposition party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?

3. **Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?**

• Do such groups offer bribes to voters and/or political figures in order to influence their political choices?

• Do such groups intimidate, harass, or attack voters and/or political figures in order to influence their political choices?

• Does the military control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities, including in countries that nominally are under civilian control?

• Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign military troops, the use of significant economic threats or sanctions, etc.?

4. **Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?**

• Do political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific concern to minority groups?

• Does the government inhibit the participation of minority groups in national or subnational political life through laws and/or practical obstacles?

• Are political parties based on ethnicity, culture, or religion that espouse peaceful, democratic values legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate?

C. **FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT**
1. **Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?**

   - Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office?
   - Do other appointed or non-freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?
   - Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs, the military, and foreign governments, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?

2. **Is the government free from pervasive corruption?**

   - Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflict of interest?
   - Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
   - Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that function without impediment or political pressure or influence?
   - Are allegations of corruption by government officials thoroughly investigated and prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents?
   - Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media?
   - Do whistleblowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and corruption?
   - What was the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score for this country?

3. **Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?**

   - Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens able to comment on and influence pending policies of legislation?
• Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it?
• Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public scrutiny?
• Does the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely fashion?
• Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of government contracts?
• Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media scrutiny and verification?

ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL RIGHTS QUESTIONS:

A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?

• Is there a non-elected legislature that advises the monarch on policy issues?
• Are there formal mechanisms for individuals or civic groups to speak with or petition the monarch?
• Does the monarch take petitions from the public under serious consideration?

B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

• Is the government providing economic or other incentives to certain people in order to change the ethnic composition of a region or regions?
• Is the government forcibly moving people in or out of certain areas in order to change the ethnic composition of those regions?
• Is the government arresting, imprisoning, or killing members of certain ethnic groups in order change the ethnic composition of a region or regions?

CIVIL LIBERTIES CHECKLIST

D. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BELIEF
1. **Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?**
   (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
   - Does the government directly or indirectly censor print, broadcast, and/or internet-based media?
   - Is self-censorship among journalists common, especially when reporting on politically sensitive issues, including corruption or the activities of senior officials?
   - Does the government use libel and security laws to punish those who scrutinize government officials and policies through either onerous fines or imprisonment?
   - Is it a crime to insult the honor and dignity of the president and/or other government officials? How broad is the range of such prohibitions, and how vigorously are they enforced?
   - If media outlets are dependent on the government for their financial survival, does the government withhold funding in order to propagandize, primarily provide official points of view, and/or limit access by opposition parties and civic critics?
   - Does the government attempt to influence media content and access through means including politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies and newspaper registrations, unfair control and influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selective distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery?
   - Are journalists threatened, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed by government or nongovernmental actors for their legitimate journalistic activities, and if such cases occur, are they investigated and prosecuted fairly and expeditiously?
   - Are works of literature, art, music, or other forms of cultural expression censored or banned for political purposes?

2. **Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?**
   - Are registration requirements employed to impede the free functioning of religious institutions?
   - Are members of religious groups, including minority faiths and movements, harassed, fined, arrested, or beaten by the authorities for engaging in their religious practices?
• Does the government appoint or otherwise influence the appointment of religious leaders?
• Does the government control the production and distribution of religious books and other materials and the content of sermons?
• Is the construction of religious buildings banned or restricted?
• Does the government place undue restrictions on religious education? Does the government require religious education?

3. **Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?**

• Are teachers and professors free to pursue academic activities of a political and quasi-political nature without fear of physical violence or intimidation by state or nonstate actors?
• Does the government pressure, strongly influence, or control the content of school curriculums for political purposes?
• Are student associations that address issues of a political nature allowed to function freely?
• Does the government, including through school administration or other officials, pressure students and/or teachers to support certain political figures or agendas, including pressuring them to attend political rallies or vote for certain candidates? Conversely, does the government, including through school administration or other officials, discourage or forbid students and/or teachers from supporting certain candidates and parties?

4. **Is there open and free private discussion?**

• Are people able to engage in private discussions, particularly of a political nature (in places including restaurants, public transportation, and their homes) without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities?
• Does the government employ people or groups to engage in public surveillance and to report alleged antigovernment conversations to the authorities?

E. **ASSOCIATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS**
1. **Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?**

   - Are peaceful protests, particularly those of a political nature, banned or severely restricted?
   - Are the legal requirements to obtain permission to hold peaceful demonstrations particularly cumbersome and time consuming?
   - Are participants of peaceful demonstrations intimidated, arrested, or assaulted?
   - Are peaceful protestors detained by police in order to prevent them from engaging in such actions?

2. **Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)**

   - Are registration and other legal requirements for nongovernmental organizations particularly onerous and intended to prevent them from functioning freely?
   - Are laws related to the financing of nongovernmental organizations unduly complicated and cumbersome?
   - Are donors and funders of nongovernmental organizations free of government pressure?
   - Are members of nongovernmental organizations intimidated, arrested, imprisoned, or assaulted because of their work?

3. **Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?**

   - Are trade unions allowed to be established and to operate free from government interference?
   - Are workers pressured by the government or employers to join or not to join certain trade unions, and do they face harassment, violence, or dismissal from their jobs if they do?
   - Are workers permitted to engage in strikes, and do members of unions face reprisals for engaging in peaceful strikes? (Note: This question may not apply to workers in essential government services or public safety jobs.)
• Are unions able to bargain collectively with employers and able to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that are honored in practice?
• For states with very small populations or primarily agriculturally-based economies that do not necessarily support the formation of trade unions, does the government allow for the establishment of peasant organizations or their equivalents? Is there legislation expressly forbidding the formation of trade unions?
• Are professional organizations, including business associations, allowed to operate freely and without government interference?

F. RULE OF LAW

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
• Is the judiciary subject to interference from the executive branch of government or from other political, economic, or religious influences?
• Are judges appointed and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner?
• Do judges rule fairly and impartially, or do they commonly render verdicts that favor the government or particular interests, whether in return for bribes or other reasons?
• Do executive, legislative, and other governmental authorities comply with judicial decisions, and are these decisions effectively enforced?
• Do powerful private concerns comply with judicial decisions, and are decisions that run counter to the interests of powerful actors effectively enforced?

2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
• Are defendants’ rights, including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, protected?
• Are detainees provided access to independent, competent legal counsel?
• Are defendants given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal?
• Are prosecutors independent of political control and influence?
• Are prosecutors independent of powerful private interests, whether legal or illegal?
• Is there effective and democratic civilian state control of law enforcement officials through the judicial, legislative, and executive branches?

• Are law enforcement officials free from the influence of nonstate actors, including organized crime, powerful commercial interests, or other groups?

3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?

• Do law enforcement officials make arbitrary arrests and detentions without warrants or fabricate or plant evidence on suspects?

• Do law enforcement officials beat detainees during arrest and interrogation or use excessive force or torture to extract confessions?

• Are conditions in pretrial facilities and prisons humane and respectful of the human dignity of inmates?

• Do citizens have the means of effective petition and redress when their rights are violated by state authorities?

• Is violent crime either against specific groups or within the general population widespread?

• Is the population subjected to physical harm, forced removal, or other acts of violence or terror due to civil conflict or war?

4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

• Are members of various distinct groups-including ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals, and the disabled-able to exercise effectively their human rights with full equality before the law?

• Is violence against such groups widespread, and if so, are perpetrators brought to justice?

• Do members of such groups face legal and/or de facto discrimination in areas including employment, education, and housing because of their identification with a particular group?

• Do women enjoy full equality in law and in practice as compared to men?
• Do noncitizens—including migrant workers and noncitizen immigrants—enjoy basic internationally recognized human rights, including the right not to be subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, the right to due process of law, and the rights of freedom of association, expression, and religion?

• Do the country's laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and other regional treaties regarding refugees? Has the government established a system for providing protection to refugees, including against refoulement (the return of persons to a country where there is reason to believe they fear persecution)?

G. PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?

• Are there restrictions on foreign travel, including the use of an exit visa system, which may be issued selectively?

• Is permission required from the authorities or nonstate actors to move within the country?

• Do state or nonstate actors determine or otherwise influence a person's type and place of employment?

• Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary documents to travel, change one's place of residence or employment, enter institutions of higher education, or advance in school?

2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?

• Are people legally allowed to purchase and sell land and other property, and can they do so in practice without undue interference from the government or nonstate actors?

• Does the government provide adequate and timely compensation to people whose property is expropriated under eminent domain laws?
• Are people legally allowed to establish and operate private businesses with a reasonable minimum of registration, licensing, and other requirements?
• Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary legal documents to operate private businesses?
• Do private/nonstate actors, including criminal groups, seriously impede private business activities through such measures as extortion?

3. **Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?**

• Is violence against women, including wife-beating and rape, widespread, and are perpetrators brought to justice?
• Is the trafficking of women and/or children abroad for prostitution widespread, and is the government taking adequate efforts to address the problem?
• Do women face de jure and de facto discrimination in economic and social matters, including property and inheritance rights, divorce proceedings, and child custody matters?
• Does the government directly or indirectly control choice of marriage partners through means such as requiring large payments to marry certain individuals (e.g., foreign citizens) or by not enforcing laws against child marriage or dowry payments?
• Does the government determine the number of children that a couple may have?
• Does the government engage in state-sponsored religious/cultural/ethnic indoctrination and related restrictions on personal freedoms?
• Do private institutions, including religious groups, unduly infringe on the rights of individuals, including choice of marriage partner, dress, etc.?

4. **Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?**

• Does the government exert tight control over the economy, including through state ownership and the setting of prices and production quotas?
• Do the economic benefits from large state industries, including the energy sector, benefit the general population or only a privileged few?
• Do private interests exert undue influence on the economy through monopolistic practices, cartels, or illegal blacklists, boycotts, or discrimination?
• Is entrance to institutions of higher education or the ability to obtain employment limited by widespread nepotism and the payment of bribes?

• Are certain groups, including ethnic or religious minorities, less able to enjoy certain economic benefits than others? For example, are certain groups restricted from holding particular jobs, whether in the public or the private sector, because of de jure or de facto discrimination?

• Do state or private employers exploit their workers through activities including unfairly withholding wages and permitting or forcing employees to work under unacceptably dangerous conditions, as well as through adult slave labor and child labor?

Source: Information in Appendix A was extracted from data compiled by (Freedom House 2010).

Appendix 2: The Economic Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy’s Checklist Questions

I Electoral process and pluralism
1. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free? Consider whether elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices.
   1: Essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates (for example, no bans on major parties)
   0.5: There are some restrictions on the electoral process
0: A single-party system or major impediments exist (for example, bans on a major party or candidate)

2. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair?
   1: No major irregularities in the voting process
   0.5: Significant irregularities occur (intimidation, fraud), but do not affect significantly the overall outcome
   0: Major irregularities occur and affect the outcome
   Score 0 if score for question 1 is 0.

3. Are municipal elections both free and fair?
   1: Are free and fair
   0.5: Are free but not fair
   0: Are neither free nor fair

4. Is there universal suffrage for all adults?
   Bar generally accepted exclusions (for example, non-nationals; criminals; members of armed forces in some countries)
   1: Yes
   0: No

5. Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies?
   1: Yes
   0: No

6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Yes formally, but in practice opportunities are limited for some candidates
   0: No

7. Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Not fully transparent
   0: No

8. Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another clear, established and accepted?
   1: All three criteria are fulfilled
   0.5: Two of the three criteria are fulfilled

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0: Only one or none of the criteria is satisfied
9. Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government?
   1. Yes
   0.5: There are some restrictions
   0: No
10. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?
    1: Yes
    0.5: There is a dominant two-party system in which other political forces never have any effective chance of taking part in national government
    0: No
11. Is potential access to public office open to all citizens?
    1: Yes
    0.5: Formally unrestricted, but in practice restricted for some groups, or for citizens from some parts of the country
    0: No
12. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance?
    1: Yes
    0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions or interference
    0: No

II Functioning of government
13. Do freely elected representatives determine government policy?
    1: Yes
    0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
    0: No
14. Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government?
    1: Yes
    0: No
15. Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority?
    1: Yes
    0.5: Yes, but there are some serious flaws
0: No
16. Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services
   1: Yes
   0.5: Influence is low, but the defence minister is not a civilian. If the current risk of a military
coup is extremely low, but the country has a recent history of military rule or coups
   0: No
17. Foreign powers and organisations do not determine important government functions or
   policies
   1: Yes
   0.5: Some features of a protectorate
   0: No (significant presence of foreign troops; important decisions taken by foreign power;
country is a protectorate)
18. Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant
   political power, parallel to democratic institutions?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
   0: No
19. Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government
   accountability to the electorate in between elections?
   1: Yes
   0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist
   0: No
20. Does the government’s authority extend over the full territory of the country?
   1: Yes
   0: No
21. Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to
   information?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
   0: No
22. How pervasive is corruption?
   1: Corruption is not a major problem
   0.5: Corruption is a significant issue
0: Pervasive corruption exists
23. Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
   0: No

24. Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives
   1: High
   0.5: Moderate
   0: Low
   If available, from World Values Survey
   % of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control
   1 if more than 70%
   0.5 if 50-70%
   0 if less than 50%

25. Public confidence in government
   1: High
   0.5: Moderate
   0: Low
   If available, from World Values Survey, Gallup polls, Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer
   % of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in government
   1 if more than 40%
   0.5 if 25-40%
   0 if less than 25%

26. Public confidence in political parties
   1: High
   0.5: Moderate
   0: Low
   If available, from World Values Survey
   % of people who have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence
   1 if more than 40%
   0.5 if 25-40%
   0 if less than 25%
III Political participation
1 if consistently above 70%
0.5 if between 50% and 70%
0 if below 50%
If voting is obligatory, score 0. Score 0 if scores for questions 1 or 2 is 0.
28. Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
0: No
29. Women in parliament
% of members of parliament who are women
1 if more than 20% of seats
0.5 if 10-20%
0 if less than 10%
30. Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations.
Score 1 if over 7% of population for either
Score 0.5 if 4% to 7%
Score 0 if under 4%.
If participation is forced, score 0.
31. Citizens’ engagement with politics
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics
1 if over 60%
0.5 if 40% to 60%
0 if less than 40%
32. The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations.
   1: High
   0.5: Moderate
   0: Low
   If available, from World Values Survey
   % of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations
   1 if over 40%
   0.5 if 30% to 40%
   0 if less than 30%

33. Adult literacy
   1 if over 90%
   0.5 if 70% to 90%
   0 if less than 70%

34. Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news.
   1: High
   0.5: Moderate
   0: Low
   If available, from World Values Survey
   % of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day
   1 if over 50%
   0.5 if 30% to 50%
   0 if less than 30%

35. The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation.
   1: Yes
   0.5: Some attempts
   0: No
   Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts Consider measures
to facilitate voting by members of the diaspora. If participation is forced, score 0.

**IV Democratic political culture**

36. Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy?
   1: Yes
   0.5: Yes, but some serious doubts and risks
37. Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections

1 if less than 30%

0.5 if 30% to 50%

0 if more than 50%

38. Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule

1 if less than 10%

0.5 if 10% to 30%

0 if more than 30%

39. Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that would prefer rule by experts or technocrats.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make decisions for the country

1 if less than 50%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if more than 70%
40. Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that democracies are not good at maintaining public order.
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order
1 if more than 70%
0.5 if 50% to 70%
0 if less than 50%
Alternatively, % of people who think that punishing criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy
1 if more than 80%
0.5 if 60% to 80%
0 if less than 60%
41. Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes that democracy benefits economic performance
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies
1 if more than 80%
0.5 if 60% to 80%
0 if less than 60%
42. Degree of popular support for democracy
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey
% of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of government
1 if more than 90%
0.5 if 75% to 90%
0 if less than 75%
43. There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state
1: Yes
0.5: Some residual influence of church on state
0: No

V Civil liberties

44. Is there a free electronic media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. One or two private owners dominate the media
0: No

45. Is there a free print media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. There is high degree of concentration of private ownership of national newspapers
0: No

46. Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of violence)?
1: Yes
0.5: Minority viewpoints are subject to some official harassment. Libel laws restrict heavily scope for free expression
0: No

47. Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?
1: Yes
0.5: There is formal freedom, but high degree of conformity of opinion, including through self-censorship, or discouragement of minority or marginal views
0: No

48. Are there political restrictions on access to the Internet?
1: No
0.5: Some moderate restrictions
0: Yes

49. Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions?
1: Yes
0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions

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0: No
50. Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances?
1: Yes
0.5: Some opportunities
0: No
51. The use of torture by the state
1: Torture is not used
0: Torture is used
52. The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence.
Consider the views of international legal and judicial watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an important judgement against the government, or a senior government official?
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
53. The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression.
Are all religions permitted to operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel intimidated by others, even if the law requires equality and protection?
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
54. The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law.
Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
55. Do citizens enjoy basic security?
1: Yes
0.5: Crime is so pervasive as to endanger security for large segments
0: No
56. Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue government influence
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low

57. Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms
Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low

58. Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that basic human rights are well-protected.
1: High
0.5: Moderate
0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey:
% of people who think that human rights are respected in their country
1 if more than 70%
0.5 if 50% to 70%
0 if less than 50%

59. There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people’s race, colour or creed.
1: Yes
0.5: Yes, but some significant exceptions
0: No

60. Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties
1: Low
0.5: Moderate
0: High

Source: Information in Appendix B was extracted from data compiled by the (EIU 2012).
Appendix 3: APRM—Democracy and Good Political Governance Checklist Questions relating to Objectives

OBJECTIVE ONE: Prevention and Reduction of Intra-and Interstate Conflicts

QUESTION 1:
What are the recent or on-going conflicts in your country and the sources of these?

INDICATORS
(i) Outline the factors that cause or are potential sources of conflicts that may impact on your country's peace, stability and security (internal sources of conflict), including but not limited to:

- Drug trafficking,
- Organised crime,
- Economic inequality and wealth distribution,
- Illicit arms trade,
- Ethnic, religious and other diversities,
- Refugees and internally displaced persons;

(ii) List the key sources of conflict between your country and the neighbouring countries.

QUESTION 2:
What mechanisms exist for preventing, reducing, and managing conflicts in your country or region and how effective are these mechanisms?

INDICATORS

(i) Provide evidence of country's efforts in terms of legal provisions, institutions and resource allocation in managing diversities including but not limited to regional, ethnic, religious and economic inequality;
(ii) Describe the country's efforts in promoting peaceful relations with its neighbours, including but not limited to managing its borders and resolving other cross-border disputes;
(iii) Provide evidence of an early warning system and other intervention mechanisms with respect to intra- and inter-state conflicts;
(iv) Assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms in place and measures that have been taken to sustain progress in conflict and post-conflict management (monitoring, evaluations and follow-ups).

*Recent" here connotes within the last 5-10 years but should be flexibly interpreted in the context of the country’s history. “Diversity” relates to regional, ethnic, religious, gender, economic and other diversities

QUESTION 3:
To what extent have regional and sub-regional organisations been involved in intra- and inter-state conflict resolution affecting your country?
INDICATORS
(i) Enumerate the regional and sub-regional institutions active in conflict resolution in your country, and examples of conflicts they have intervened in or resolved;
(ii) Assess the effectiveness of these organisations and authorities in preventing and managing conflicts, maintaining peace, security and stability;
(iii) Describe the challenges faced by these organisations in seeking to play a role in conflict resolution and the steps being taken to mitigate these challenges. Please give detailed explanation with supporting material where applicable

OBJECTIVE TWO: Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen rights and supremacy of the Constitution

QUESTION 1:
In your judgment, does the political system as practiced in your country allow for free and fair competition for power and the promotion of democratic governance?

INDICATORS
(i) Outline the individual and collective political rights and mechanisms and institutions to protect them;
(ii) Outline the legal provisions and regulations governing political association in your country;
(iii) Assess the effectiveness of these provisions and regulations with respect to the viability of the party, taking into account amongst other things membership, policies and resource allocation for political parties in the country;
(iv) Describe your electoral system, providing relevant legal and institutional provisions as appropriate;
(v) Assess the effectiveness of the electoral system in terms of its capacity to deliver results that are adjudged to be broadly free and fair;
(vi) Provide reports produced by governmental sources and other sources on recent elections held in your country;
(vii) Provide evidence of recent contentious electoral cases and how they were resolved by the courts.
*Recent* here connotes within the last 5-10 years

QUESTION 2: What weight do provisions establishing the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution carry in practice?

INDICATORS
(i) Identify the relevant legal provisions that establish the rule of law and affirm the supremacy of the Constitution and describe the procedures for amending your country’s Constitution;
(ii) List institutions tasked with enforcing these provisions and assess the effectiveness of these institutions, through recent cases/reports.

QUESTION 3: How and to what extent is decentralisation effected in your country?

INDICATORS
(i) Identify the relevant legal provisions (if any) for decentralisation and the autonomy of decentralised entities;
(ii) Assess the effectiveness of the decentralisation mechanisms in terms of decision-making, resource allocation, institutional capacity, service delivery and outline measures taken to address the shortcomings.

QUESTION 4: How has decentralisation contributed to the quality of governance?

INDICATORS
(i) Provide evidence of improved broad participation of people at the grass root levels due to decentralisation;
(ii) Give evidence of improved accountability of the decentralised entities to stakeholders.

QUESTION 5: Are the security services subject to the rule of law and the oversight of civil authorities?

INDICATORS
(i) Provide evidence of the legal provisions and procedures for the accountability of the security services to democratic institutions of government, especially the judiciary and legislature;
(ii) Assess the effectiveness of the oversight role of civil authorities over the budget and the use of security services.

**OBJECTIVE THREE: Promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights as enshrined in African and international human rights instruments**

**QUESTION 1:** What measures have been put in place to promote and protect economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights?

**INDICATORS**  
(i) Identify legal provisions that recognise and guarantee each of these the rights including but not limited to the right to:  
- Equal access to employment,  
- Education,  
- Health,  
- Freedom of speech,  
- Freedom of religion,  
- Accessible and affordable housing for the ordinary citizen;  
(ii) Assess the effectiveness of legal provisions and mechanisms put in place to promote and protect these rights;  
(iii) Provide evidence of major cases of violations of citizen rights and liberties entertained by the courts over the preceding five years.

**QUESTION 2:**  
What steps have been taken to facilitate equal access to justice for all?  

**INDICATORS**  
(i) Provide evidence of legal provisions and institutions/mechanisms set up to facilitate access to justice, including fees, proximity of courts, legal education and legal Aid;  
(ii) Provide details of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (if any) that may be available or in operation;  
(iii) Give details of measures taken to sustain progress (training, monitoring, evaluation, adjustment);
(iv) Provide evidence of any prior official assessment (within the last 5-10 years) of the justice system to establish the level of access.

**OBJECTIVE FOUR: Uphold the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective legislature**

**QUESTION 1:**
What are the constitutional and legislative provisions establishing the separation and balance of powers among the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary branches of government?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide evidence of constitutional and legislative provisions establishing and guaranteeing the separation of powers;
(ii) Describe the mechanisms (if any) to resolve conflicts between the branches of government;
(iii) Assess the effectiveness of the separation of powers and mechanisms for checks and balances. Please explain and provide evidence of any conflict that was resolved by this mechanism.

**QUESTION 2:**
To what extent is the judiciary independent?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide evidence of legal provisions establishing the independence of the judiciary, including but not limited to: resource allocation, and procedure for appointment, determination and security of tenure, promotion, remuneration and sanction of judicial officers;
(ii) Assess the degree of independence of the judiciary and provide evidence to support your assessment;
(iii) Provide details of any official assessment or prior survey on the independence of the judiciary.

**QUESTION 3:**
How would you rate the independence of the legislative body in your country?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide evidence of legal provisions and resource allocation establishing the independence of the legislature; including but not limited to the initiating of bills, proposing amendments (including amendments to the budget), and opportunity to question executive action;
(ii) Provide an assessment of the independence of the legislature and give details of reports of any official assessment;
(iii) Describe measures taken to sustain progress (training, evaluation, available reports).
Please give detailed explanation with supporting material where applicable

**OBJECTIVE FIVE: Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants**

**QUESTION 1:**
What measures have been taken in the country to strengthen institutions for an efficient and an effective public service?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide details of legal provisions, institutions and resource allocation for an efficient and effective civil service;
(ii) Provide evidence of administrative reform to improve public service delivery and measures taken to sustain progress;
(iii) Describe the mechanisms of promoting the evaluation of civil service delivery including the opportunity for citizens to express their opinion on the quality of service delivery;
(iv) Provide evidence to support your assessment including any official report on the efficiency and the effectiveness of public service delivery.

**QUESTION 2:**
To what extent does the country have a transparent system of recruitment, training, promotion, management and evaluation of civil servants

**INDICATORS**
(i) Outline the legal provisions, procedures and institutions for recruiting, promoting, managing and evaluating civil servants;
(ii) Give evidence of incentives for rewarding well-performing civil servants;
(iii) Provide evidence of cases of disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal and prosecution of civil servants related to the shortcomings of service delivery;
(iv) Give evidence of measures taken to sustain progress (monitoring, evaluation, training).

**OBJECTIVE SIX: Fighting corruption in the political sphere**

**QUESTION 1:**
What is the state of corruption in the country?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide an assessment of the overall perception of corruption in your country;
(ii) Provide evidence to support your assessment including any official reports on the assessment of the state of corruption in your country.

**QUESTION 2:** What measures and actions have been taken to combat corruption in the political sphere and with what results?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Describe the legal and institutional measures that have been taken to combat corruption, including but not limited to: requirements for declaration of assets; establishment of specialised anti-corruption entities and the procedure of appointment of the heads of these entities;
(v) Give details of the major cases of alleged corruption prosecuted and disciplinary sanctions taken over the past five years.

**OBJECTIVE SEVEN: Promotion and protection of the rights of women**

**QUESTION 1:**
What measures have been taken to promote and protect the rights of women in the country?

**INDICATORS**
(i) Provide details of the legal provisions that articulate and guarantee the rights of women in the country and mechanisms to enforce these rights including but not limited to resource allocation, affirmative action and mainstreaming gender equality;
(ii) Assess the effectiveness of these measures and outline the challenges faced;
(iii) Provide details of measures taken to sustain progress (training, evaluation and monitoring);
(iv) Provide any official reports on the assessment on the status of women in the country.
QUESTION 2:
What measures have been put in place to enhance the participation of women in the society?

INDICATORS
(i) Provide evidence of any legal provisions, institutions, national or local programmes or policies to enhance women’s role in society, including participation in politics and leadership positions;
(ii) Provide evidence of the number and percentage of women appointed over the past 5 years to decision-making positions, including the number of women elected to the parliament and local authorities;
(iii) Describe the challenges faced and measures taken to sustain progress.

OBJECTIVE EIGHT: Promotion and protection of the rights of children and young persons

QUESTION 1:
What concrete measures have been taken to promote and protect the rights of the child and young persons?

INDICATORS
(i) Provide details of legal provisions, measures and policies that promote and protect the rights of children and young persons including but not limited to:
Health, care and welfare;
Child Education;
Custody and Guardianship;
Right to seek and receive information aiming at promoting its social, spiritual, physical and mental well-being;
Measures against all types of child abuse including child slavery and child labour, child prostitution and child pornography;
(iii) Assess the effectiveness of these measures in terms of trends in the overall improvement of the status of children and young persons in the country over the past five years;
(vi) Provide evidence of measures taken to sustain progress (training, monitoring, follow up actions, adjustment, reports available).
Source: Information in Appendix 3 was extracted from data compiled by the (African Union 2013).