The extent to which China's involvement in Africa contributes to the security-development nexus

by
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SUPERVISOR: Prof M. Schoeman

November 2014
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that: “The Extent to which China’s Involvement in Africa Contributes to the Human Security-Development Nexus” is my own work, that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete reference, and that this dissertation was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another University.

Sphamandla Percival Mpisane

Signature……………………………..

Date……………………………….
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the following people for their assistance, support and contributions that aided in the completion of this study.

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ABSTRACT

Topic: The Extent to which China’s Involvement in Africa Contributes to the Human Security-Development Nexus

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Degree: Master of Security Studies

The concepts of security and development have always existed, even before the end of the Cold War. However, it was the former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who introduced to the world, the notion of a ‘security-development nexus’. This notion was encouraged by the shift in security concerns. This was a shift from traditional perspective focusing on protecting the interests and borders of the state, to a focus on ensuring the safety of citizens within a state. Such safety included a duty by the state to protect its citizens from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. Moreover, the focus in this notion of a nexus shifted towards protecting citizens from sudden and harmful disruption in the patterns of their daily lives.

This notion of a security-development nexus resulted in the need to appraise the significance of the factors that underpin this fundamental shift in the African context; to conduct an assessment of the understanding and perceptions held about Africa’s approach to this nexus; and to propose some measures which African governments can utilise to sustain the new approach to the security-development nexus, including possible areas of further research.

The study discovered that man African countries are unable to utilise this nexus to their advantage because they faced to many intra-state conflicts which they couldn’t control, and they were also underdeveloped. It was then clear that many African countries needed external involvement. As a result, the researcher decided to do assess one of Africa’s biggest partners, China. The purpose was to discover the extent to which an external players’ (China) involvement in African contributes to the strengthening on this security-development nexus in Africa.
The study was carried out following a qualitative research methodology that combines both the descriptive and analytical approaches. The descriptive approach largely draws from the literature studies of primary and secondary sources, and the analytical approach was useful in analysing the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa contributes to the security-development nexus.

The findings confirmed that notwithstanding China’s alleged exploitation and extraction of raw material and natural resources in Africa, they are to a certain extent contributing to the security-development nexus in Africa. The research findings also established that the relationship between China and Africa is a mutual beneficial one. It is not one where China only exploits Africa’s raw material and natural resources. It is based on a give and take partnership. While China provides African countries with development aid, unconditional loans, grants and infrastructure development, China is also gaining in return.

It is therefore clear that a number of factors regarding China’s involvement in Africa need to be debated and researched before one can conclude that China does not contribute to the security-development nexus in Africa, and also to measure the exact extent to which China contributes to the security-development nexus in Africa.
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<td>AFDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Organisation</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CNMC</td>
<td>China Non-Ferros Metal Corporation</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ESCR</td>
<td>Economic Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<td>MFEZ</td>
<td>Multi Facility Economic Zone</td>
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<td>MINUMSA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>Peoples Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PMI</td>
<td>Purchasing Manager’s Index</td>
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<td>PWC</td>
<td>Post-war Construction</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>SBG</td>
<td>Standard Bank Group</td>
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<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>TI</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

1.1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been commonplace to assert that security and development are interlinked, interdependent and mutually reinforcing (Bajpai 2000:12). What were traditionally two discrete sectors are increasingly meshing. Institutions conventionally associated with development are becoming involved in the security sphere and vice versa. Bilateral and multilateral donors and private institutions have integrated developmental and security considerations in responding to intra-state human security and human development issues such as conflict and climate change. For instance, the United Nations (UN) agencies and some emerging powers, notably China, increasingly take into account the linkages between human security and human development (Hurwitz and Peake 2004:1) in their relations with developing countries.

In this context ‘human security’ refers to the broadening of the concept of security since the end of the Cold War. This shift is characterised by the inclusion of referents other than states. By using the notion of human security, security has been “developmentalised” (Buur, Jensen, and Stepputat 2007:10) in the sense that a number of basic human needs have been suggested as being indispensable for the survival of the individual. Buur et.al (2007) further acknowledges that unlike the traditional concept of (national) security, the human security agenda focuses on the safety of citizens rather than the state. In addition, it focuses on the concept of sovereignty that is conditioned by the states’ respect for the rights of citizens (Duffield 2004:49) rather than by sovereignty representing the absolute and unfettered power of the state over its citizens.

Conversely, ‘human development’ refers to the merging with and subjecting of development to security concerns (Duffield 2001:2). In this sense development has been ‘securitised’ or has been labelled a security issue. This securitisation is in relation to the salience of internal armed conflict in poorer African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), and the growing preoccupation with crime and violence in developing and rapidly urbanising countries such as South Africa (SA). The observation is that economic
inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance are the root causes of armed conflict and crime. Further observations are that while underdevelopment could explain armed conflict, the calamities of conflict are themselves seen as having huge costs in terms of missed development opportunities, disintegrating and failing states and low indexes of human development (Buur et.al 2007:9).

The conceptualisation of these terms explains the linkage between human security and human development. It proves that human security and human development are interlinked, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The human security-development nexus can be useful in Africa since it is a poor continent and often experiences internal conflicts such as that in the DRC. Consequently, this study aims to assess China’s role in reinforcing the security-development nexus in its developmental approach in Africa.

The motive behind choosing China is because China is rapidly growing as a non-traditional donor and investor in the region and there have been claims that is has surpassed aid provided by traditional donors. The other reason is to discover whether China is actually assisting the continent in reinforcing the human security-development nexus or whether it is only focusing on extracting raw materials and natural resources for its own benefit. The study will begin with a discussion of the roots of the human security-development nexus. To illustrate China’s involvement in Africa, the study will make use of examples involving various underdeveloped and developing African countries in an attempt to cover most regions of the continent. Such countries include the CAR, DRC, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Zimbabwe, Zambia and SA.

1.2. Literature overview

The preliminary overview of the relevant literature focused on three areas: 1) the general conceptual discourse, the emergence and expansion of the human security-development nexus; 2) the nature and role of China’s human security and human development aid to Africa; 3) the comparison of China and traditional donors’ human security and development aid to Africa.
1.2.1. The Emergence of the Human Security-Development Nexus

The core work that established the nexus between human security and human development is the key report published by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 titled An Agenda for Peace. The report outlines the central tenets of the human security-development nexus. A second report that further elaborated on this nexus was the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994 which focuses on Human Security and illustrates the need to link it with human development in order for both to succeed. In the UNDP Report of 1999, Kofi Annan further stressed the importance of the nexus. Apart from the institutional contribution to this nexus, there is also a number of scholarly works focusing on it. Some of the prominent scholars are Wilkin (2002); Klingebiel (2006); Stern and Ojendal (2010); and Dowding (2011).

1.2.1.1. Institutional Conceptualisation

Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) report talks about ‘post-conflict’ and ‘peace-building’ as a coordinated action to identify and support structures tending to strengthen and solidify peace and avoid relapse to conflict. The report ushered in a new era of political affairs where, after the Cold War, a number of lower-level armed conflicts broke out. In the early 1990s a wave of insecurities pervaded many countries and regions with ethnic conflicts, genocides, deadly violence, appalling human rights abuses and massive flows of refugees within and sometimes across borders (Boutros-Ghali: 1992). Boutros-Ghali’s report called for the linking of human security and human development to address the conflicts, human rights abuses, underdevelopment and the famine experienced by many countries after the Cold War, especially in Africa. This link led to what today is known as the ‘human security-development nexus’ which, according to Boutros-Ghali (1992), meant that in order for human security issues to be tackled, human development is needed, and vice versa.

After Boutros-Ghali had introduced the human security-development nexus in 1992, the UNDP issued its 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) also focusing on the
nexus. The Report argued that the traditional understanding of security neglected the legitimate concerns of ordinary individuals who sought security in their daily lives (UNDP 1994). This report identifies two core aspects. Firstly, safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, secondly, protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, work or in communities. According to the 1994 UNDP report, human security issues can only be addressed if states also focus on human development.

Annan further stressed the importance of the nexus. He advocated for the UN and the international community of states, as well as other sectors such as the business community to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention (UN 1999:6). Both Boutros-Ghali (1992) and Annan (1999) argued that the security-development nexus is essential as a solution for structural violence and underdevelopment in the world. Here Annan (1999) includes the inequalities and injustices between the rich and the poor, the North and the South, and men and women as contributing to conflict. Such insecurities and underdevelopment issues were understood as both the roots and triggers of social tensions, conflict escalation and armed violence.

1.2.1.2. Scholarly Conceptualisation

Following from these reports, several scholars started explaining the human-security nexus. Amongst these is Wilkins, whom in his book, Global Poverty and Orthodox Security, shows how these separate discourses (human security and human development) developed and were amalgamated in the post-Cold War era. Wilkin (2002:637) argues that the merger between human security and human development is characterised by the “construction of a network of neoliberal global governance incorporating public and private institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), think-tanks, charities, aid agencies, intellectuals and corporations” (Wilkin 2002). As a result, the relationship between the state, capital and citizens has been restructured. The state now provides capital (human development) with the conditions it needs in order to thrive and the citizens with the tools (human security) that they need in order to succeed in a market economy – the human security-development nexus.
According to Wilkin (2002), advocates of development saw an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political interests, and superior financial resources associated with military security and foreign policy by linking human security with human development. The link between human security and development is an attempt to join two discourses that have always been compatible with and supportive of each other.

In his paper titled, New Interfaces between Security and Development: Changing Concepts and Approaches, Klingebiel (2006:1) points out that traditionally human security and development were pursued as two separate architectures, whereas in the post-Cold War era, the link between security and development has become a mantra of policy. He argues that the focus of international relations has acquired new flexibility by addressing not only the macro-level of power relations among states, but also micro (intrastate) dimensions of human security, human development and human rights in the so-called 4Ds framework: diplomacy, development, defence, and democratisation.

Klingebiel (2006:2) cautions, though, that throughout the 1990s, there was too much commitment to human health and human security, and humanitarian interventions, and very little attention to state security. This principle is not only confined to a military intervention in reaction to severe human harm, which a state is unable or unwilling to end (responsibility to react), but it implies two other major commitments. Firstly, the responsibility to prevent, aiming at helping local efforts to address both the causes of a conflict and their more immediate trigger. Secondly, the responsibility to rebuild based on the urgency to help states and societies in the construction of durable peace, good governance and sustainable development. Human security represents the linking of development and security. For Klingebiel, the link is manifested through the various economic, educational, health and political interactions aimed at improving the resilience and well-being of individuals whose existence is defined by the contingencies of underdevelopment.

In their paper on human security and human development, Stern and Ojendal (2010:5) assert that human security is divided into two ideas. They first argue that the protection of individuals is a strategic concern for national as well as international
security. Secondly, security conditions for people's development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence, law and order, but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues enabling a life free from risk and fear. Their definition of the human security-development nexus emphasises the protection of human beings and local communities from a variety of threats, ranging from individual to collective, and from physical to political, economic, social and environmental.

Another scholar is Dowding (2011:332), who discusses the human-development nexus within the context of two schools of thought, Idealism and Realism. He argues that the Idealist perspective on security and development has triumphed over the Realist school of thought. The Realists argue that the state is the core unit of an international system which is anarchic in nature and the main focus should be on the protection of the state rather than on human security and development. Therefore, the first priority of the state is to ensure its own security. Hence, states seek to increase their power relative to others for a geopolitical advantage. However, he emphasises that this is unnecessary in the post-Cold War era. In the Idealists' view, individuals, public opinion and morality, rather than national interests and state power, should be the critical determinants of the international system and its security. This is because Idealists believe that in the post-Cold War era the referent object of security ought to be the citizens rather than the state. This is due to change in security issues from interstate wars to security issues such as unemployment, famine, political repression and global warming.

1.2.2. Human Security-Development Aid to Africa

There is a fast-growing literature on China's involvement in Africa. In this section, attention is paid, first, to China's involvement in Africa. Thereafter, recent literature on human security and human development aid to Africa, focusing specifically on China, is covered. There have been debates over China's involvement in Africa, some arguing that China's role in Africa is exploitative while some argue it is based on mutual benefit. For instance, the edited book by Edinger, Herman, and Jansson on China's engagement in Africa (2008:1) argues that China's deepening involvement across Africa has become the subject of much debate. They speak
about two competing schools of thought that tend to discuss China’s involvement in Africa as either inherently good or bad.

They argue that for scholars of the former persuasion, China’s engagement in Africa is benign and does not threaten Africa’s human security and human development. Instead, these scholars believe that China’s increased trade, investment and aid, assists in achieving sustainable human security and human development across the continent. For those who are against China’s involvement in African nations, China is part of a ‘new scramble for Africa’ and is the ‘new imperial power’ in Africa. They further argue that China’s involvement in the African continent is a ‘colonialist project’ that will perpetuate Africa’s underdevelopment through exploitation, extraction and destruction of the African continent’s resources and industrial capacity which may lead to deepening insecurity. The book, though, results in cursory conclusions which do not contribute to a more nuanced explanation of China’s involvement in Africa. This discussion of literature on China’s role in Africa will first focus on China’s contribution to Africa’s human security, then on human development, concentrating mainly on the work of authors who overall view this involvement as positive and then those who view it as negative.

1.2.2.1. Human security

China has played a significant role in international peace and security in Africa through the provision of humanitarian aid and support of peacekeeping missions. According to Tull (2006:459), China has started to play an active role in this regard, albeit reluctantly, considering its staunch policy of non-interference and its historical lack of contribution to international peacekeeping missions. In recent years, China has contributed to UN peacekeeping missions throughout Africa. For instance, in April 2003, about 175 Chinese troops and a medical team of 42 personnel were deployed to the DRC on a peacekeeping mission. In December 2003 nearly 600 Chinese peacekeepers were deployed to Liberia.

Furthermore, Alden (2007) also acknowledges China’s contribution to Africa’s human security and asserts that in 2005, China capitulated on the Darfur issue, and supported the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to western Sudan. The IRIN (2006) argues that China previously opposed a deployment of a peacekeeping
mission in western Sudan because of its oil interests in that region, and the mutually beneficial relationship between Beijing and the Sudanese government, justifying its lack of support to an intervening force to its commitment to sovereignty and non-interference. However, the Chinese government ultimately granted $3.5 million in budgetary support and humanitarian aid to the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and played a pivotal role in convincing the Sudanese government in 2007 to accept a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur. In Alden’s (2005:142) view, this indicates that China has had to recognise the importance of taking part in UN-sanctioned missions to promote international stability, including Africa’s human security and human development (Alden 2005). Moreover, in terms of humanitarian aid, China donated $200 000 towards fighting droughts in the Horn of Africa, and also donated $610 000 towards combating draught in Darfur (Alden 2005).

According to Tull (2006:475), China’s growing involvement in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance is commendable, particularly considering the decline in political will from Western states to participate in peacekeeping missions in Africa. However, there is a trace of irony in China’s support for peacekeeping missions, particularly in countries such as Sudan, where China plays an active role in perpetuating conflicts and human rights abuses (Tull 2006). In this sense, China is part of the problem, yet simultaneously is trying to be part of the solution. According to Botha (2006:98), this indicates an inconsistency in China’s foreign policy. On the one hand, China is willing to ignore large-scale human atrocities and even fuel conflicts in order to accrue commercial gains and ensure energy security. On the other hand, China is eager to present itself as a responsible international power by supporting international efforts to quell those self-same conflicts that it helps to create.

1.2.2.2. Human development

In his paper on China’s presence in Africa and the economic and commercial benefits derived from this presence, Lafargue (2005:7) argues that in return, Africa benefits from the booming trade with China. For example, trade between China and the DRC increased between 2002 and 2008 due to a growth in the DRC’s exports of raw materials to China. In 2007 the DRC exported US$304.8 million worth of cobalt,
and this figure increased to US$1.13 billion in 2009 (Burke, Jansson and Jiang 2009:30). Furthermore, Africa also receives exponentially growing investments (especially in infrastructure) and large volumes of development finance which assist in addressing human security issues. For example, China has been actively involved in the CAR as well. China contributed to major aid projects such as the $67.4 million loan from the Exim Bank of China to install fixed and mobile networks in the country (Austin, Bradley, Michael, Andreas, Alex, and Vijaya 2013:147). In addition, China contributed towards the construction of a 20,000 seat stadium in Bangui financed by the Chinese government and also assisted in the cancellation of US$11.4 million in debt owed to China (Austin et.al 2013:352).

Lafarge (2005:8) also argues that African governments tend to prefer China’s larger, soft loans with few strings attached to criteria-rigged loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and Western economies such as the United States of America (USA). Lafargue (2005:4) acknowledges that the more African economies are geared to exporting unprocessed goods, the less likely other sectors like service or manufacturing will flourish within the continent. He points to the fact that cheap imports from China have severe consequences as they sometimes contribute to displace local production in some African countries.

Writing from an emerging economy point of view, in their work on the involvement of emerging economies in Africa, Rampa and Bilal (2011:1) argue that since the 1990s, the relationship between Africa and China has been reinforced rather than being new. It is the continuation of engagement through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the struggle for independence from Western colonialism. China’s cooperation with Africa, including technical assistance, dates back to the 1950s and what is new is the growing intensity of their relationship. For example, in November 1956, the Chinese government gave Egypt 20 million Swiss Francs in cash to support their fight for the right to the Suez Canal. In 1960, the Chinese government agreed to assist Guinea to build a match plant and a cigarette plant. In the 1960s, China sent seven agricultural specialists to Mali in helping their experiments on sugarcane and tea, which also succeeded (Xiaoyum 2004:14). This relationship refers to China’s economic (human development) and strategic (human security) assistance to Africa and China’s relative weight as an emerging economy in the global economy. Rampa
and Bilal further argue (2011:2) that the economic growth of China serves as a
sense of inspiration for Africa because progress on human security and human
development can be made relatively quickly. China’s involvement in Africa benefits
the region because of massive investments in infrastructure and resource
development.

Not all authors, though, perceive China’s involvement in the continent as being
mainly positive. Such authors include Alden and Davies (2006), who express their
concerns about the deteriorating human security and human development conditions
in African countries. Alden and Davies (2006:83) argue that these conditions include
a looming future debt crisis among many African countries. Beattie and Callan
(2006) concur with them and adds that “China’s emergence as an alternative lender
is increasing, creating a new wave of hidden debt in Africa as it backs its companies’
expansion overseas with increasingly aggressive lending”. For example, in 2007,
China loaned over $2 billion to Zimbabwe in an attempt to prop up its collapsing
economy. This led to more debts in Zimbabwe (McGreal 2007).

Moreover, Chileshe (2010:5) acknowledges that in Zambia, Chinese involvement is
crucial for two reasons. First, Chinese assistance is mainly through loans and to a
lesser extent, grants. Secondly, Zambia has a history of difficulty in managing and
paying back external loans, largely because of the lack of a legal framework to guide
the process. This leads to an increase of debts in Zambia. Alden and Davies
(2006:84) further argue that Chinese involvement in Africa includes a diversion of
intra-regional trade which harms the prospect of Africa’s human security and human
development. This includes efforts towards regional integration and the impact of a
huge, non-domestic economic power, such as China, on human rights, labour,
environment, and government conditions.

This view is echoed in the work of several others. For instance, from an emerging
economy perspective, in his work on China’s Diplomacy in Africa, Wenping (2010)
adds that China’s involvement in Africa has been accelerated by its primary interests
to extract raw materials from the region to enrich itself rather than to assist in human
security and human development desires. That is, Africa with its established and
new oil fields and relative openness to foreign aid and investments is an obvious
place to do business with. He further claims that China’s ‘tied foreign aid’ to Africa helps to attract young Chinese to the region, as the labour for large infrastructure projects is mostly imported. This further increases unemployment of Africans on the continent.

Wenping (2010) adds that Africa has become a migration destination for many Chinese citizens looking for new economic opportunities, thus, undermining local businesses and increases security threats. For example, though Chinese business helps Africa generally, but with some costs, in countries such as SA, citizens have complained about the Chinese in the country. Wenping (2010) further asserts that SA citizens complain that Chinese employees in the country must endure long hours and low pay. Other residents complain that though the Chinese contribute to bringing consumer goods, in the process, they are killing local business.

Moreover, Alden, in his book titled Resurgent Continent? Africa and the World: Emerging powers and Africa, argues China has made significant inroads into Western political and economic dominance in Africa (2010:12). According to him, this leads to a diversification of external factors involved across a range of sections in the African economy. Much of this interaction is being framed in terms of new forms of multilateral and bilateral arrangements. He further asserts that China’s involvement in Africa is driven by the need to exploit and extract raw materials, natural resources (such as gold and energy) and markets.

1.2.3. Comparison between China and traditional donors

There is a growing debate about the difference between Africa’s traditional and new donors. Traditional aid refers to development or economic assistance emanating from Western economies such as the USA, France and the United Kingdom (UK). New development aid refers to development aid from emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil (Kragelund 2010:1). The question is: which aid effectively contributes to Africa’s human security and human development? For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on China as an emerging power, with a view to explore the impact of its aid on human security and human development in the continent.
From an emerging country perspective, in his work on China-Africa relations, Anshan (2007:69) asserts that there are growing concerns over China’s labour practice and some African countries see limited benefits to local employment and the economy. There are concerns that the Chinese model for infrastructure development in Africa limits employment opportunities for local citizens. From a developing economy point of view, in their paper on emerging economies’ aid to Africa, Reisen and Ndoye (2008:9) argue that China generally focuses on a project’s economic viability. On the other hand, they argue that traditional partners emphasise long-term debt. They claim that China makes a distinction between productive and non-productive investments – the latter is generally financed through grants and the former by loans.

Writing from an African and Chinese perspective, in their paper titled, ‘BRICS Philosophy for Development Financing and their Implications for LICs’, Mwase and Yang (2012:3) argue that China tends to provide non-cash financing for African projects without attachment of policy conditionality. China views this as part of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country and as a means of circumventing corruption (Condon 2012:7). Mwase and Yang (2012:6) further argue that there is no significant positive relationship between aid allocation and institutions. According to them, most Chinese development financing in Africa is concentrated in the infrastructure sector.

For instance, Chinese financing and interest-free loans are offered mostly for the construction of social infrastructure such as stadiums, market squares, medical clinics, schools, and government complexes. Preferential and credit line loans, on the other hand, are provided for productive infrastructure such as hydropower, water generation, roads, and railways. Mwase and Yang (2012) also claim that China’s financing, often comes as part of a package such as multi-year financing, including grants complementing FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), loans, and lines of credit with various elements. These elements are intended to tackle multiple constraints on human security and human development and the package can be complex, especially when national resource reserves are used as collateral. For example, under what has been coined the ‘Angola Model’ Chinese financing is used to build projects, usually infrastructure, which is often contracted to Chinese companies, which source their supplies from China.
Brautigam (2011:6) argues that for traditional donors, public funds for aid are often justified in the home country on the basis of poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance, or social welfare enhancement. For China, which is still a ‘lower middle income country’ that receives significant development assistance, its assistance to Africa supports mutually beneficial growth for both China and Africa. These differences from traditional donors contribute to divergences in the way in which human security and human development assistance is derived and how its effectiveness is assessed. These differences have also affected how China coordinates with other development partners.

In his work on China’s relations with Africa, Buruku (2012) argues that China generally evaluates its assistance to Africa using two main measures: cost competitiveness and completion time. Projects tend to have shorter approval time than those of traditional donors who place greater emphasis on consultation processes, feasibility studies and societal and environmental safeguards. Buruku (2012) points out that the sustainability of some Chinese projects has often been under pressure due to lack of maintenance.

Overall, therefore, there are marked differences between Chinese aid and aid provided by traditional donors from the West. It is furthermore evident that there are contending perspectives and arguments with regard to China’s implications for being involved on the African continent. There is a need for more studies that focus on examples of Chinese aid involvement in particular countries and sub-regions on the continent, with specific reference to its impact on the security-development nexus.

Based on the review of scholarly literature, the following propositions were made at this stage:

• China’s involvement in Africa is based on an evaluation of the African continent’s potential with regard to natural resources and raw materials beneficial to China’s fast-growing economy.

• China’s involvement in Africa is based on the provision of a market for China’s exports, and the continent’s usefulness as a political ally in the international arena.
China takes a strategic position on the African region with regards to political dynamics of Africa and does not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries.

China’s relations with Africa are based on elite interactions. That is, enhancing the growth of businesses and infrastructure growth in big cities.

China’s development aid is better and preferred by most African countries as compared to aid from traditional donors.

Although China exploits Africa’s raw material and natural resources, some Africa countries (with respect to infrastructure, interest-free loans, humanitarian assistance, healthcare and grants), to a certain extent, benefit from China’s involvement.

1.3. Research problem

The focus of this study is derived from the debates over and criticisms of China’s involvement in Africa. As a result, the researcher has decided to embark on this research to discover if these accusations are indeed true or not. The researcher did this through an attempt to answer the following question: what role does China play in reinforcing the human security-development nexus in its development approach to Africa? This question leads to a number of secondary research questions: a) What is the nature of China’s assistance to Africa? b) With reference to the growing relations between China and Africa, what implications do these have for the existing relations between Africa and traditional donors, including their aid?

As far as temporal delimitations are concerned, the study focused on the period from the year 2000 to the present since China’s involvement, though not new, intensified during this period. For the sake of a historical perspective, the growth of the human security-development nexus since the end of the Cold War was considered. The period under review tracks the evolution of the emergent norm of the human security-development nexus and explores the nature of China’s contribution in this regard to Africa.
1.4. Research methodology

The proposed study took on a qualitative and analytical research methodology. The strength of the qualitative method is that it allows for the interpretation of the variables under study which in this case is an assessment of China’s role in reinforcing the human security-development nexus in its developmental approach in Africa. Hence, this study constituted a literature-based analysis of the human security-development nexus and China’s human security and development aid to Africa. Furthermore, a qualitative research design guided the researcher towards inductive, context-specific findings as to the weaknesses, contradictions and strengths of China’s development aid to contribute to human security and development in Africa.

Based on the qualitative nature of the proposed study, the researcher used an array of both primary and secondary information sources. Key primary sources emanating from the African Development Bank (AFDB); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the UNDP Reports; the Chinese Embassy; the World Bank; Standard Bank Reports; speeches and statements of African and Chinese leaders; the IMF; and documents such as resolutions, meeting recordings, statements and reports were utilised to provide facts, terms of reference and opinions about China’s involvement and its human security and development aid to Africa. Secondary sources dealing with thematic and conceptual analyses of China’s involvement in Africa, such as editorials and opinion pieces, journal articles, commentaries, press releases and academic literature on the topic were critically investigated in order to determine China’s contribution to Africa’s human security and human development. This study is explanatory in nature and not exhaustive. Because the issue of development aid is both broad and comprehensive, only a number of aspects were identified to serve as indices against which to measure the nature of China’s involvement in peace and security on the continent.

The study is demarcated in conceptual, temporal and geographical terms. With regards to conceptual delimitation, the study focused on the understanding of the link between human security and development as encapsulated by Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Report and the UNDP Report of 1994, and the supplementary theoretical discourses
that followed by the scholars of Security and Strategic studies, and/or International Relations.

Chapter 1 serves to introduce and contextualise the study in order to clarify the scope and focus of the research. A preliminary literature overview is offered and the research methodology is explained. The relationship between human security and development forms the essence of Chapter 2, which serve as the conceptual framework of the study. The analytical framework developed in this chapter consists of identifying indices and characteristics of the security-development nexus. It is utilised in chapter four to analyse and evaluate the extent to which China’s aid to Africa contributes to strengthen human security and human development in the continent.

Chapter 3 explores the human security-development nexus within the African context. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the link between the nexus and China’s involvement in Africa. This chapter provides an overview of the issues of human security and development in Africa, and the subsequent injection of Chinese development aid and assistance. This is done by focusing on several aspects which serve as conceptual frameworks to strengthen the human security-development nexus. Such aspects include human rights and good governance; peace building and state building; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; employment; health care; and economic development. The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the applicability of the human security-development nexus to Africa.

Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 by analysing how China’s involvement in Africa contributes to human security and development. This is done by using statistical information relating to investment, trade and development aid to Africa. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate if China is contributing towards human security and development in Africa or not. If it does, to what extent, and if it does not, what is China’s interest and agenda in Africa?

Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarising the findings and drawing conclusions on the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa has contributed to human
security and human development. The study concluded with recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War the link between security and development intensified due to changes in security issues and the need for a focus on development. This link is known today as the security-development nexus. The general idiom which emerged from this intensification was that there can be no development without security and no security without development. Developed countries such as France, along with multilateral institutions such as the UN, have engaged in peacekeeping missions in Africa through integrating security and development programmes. Such missions include the July 2013 Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which was necessitated by the 2012 Tuareg rebellion (UN 2013). According to the UN (2013), the purpose of this mission is to “support the political process and help stabilize Mali through focusing on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State Authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections”. Another recent mission is the 19 December 2013 International Support Mission in the CAR which was the result of CAR’s conflict under the Djotodia administration, backed by France and initially led by the African Union. This mission was concerned with protecting civilians and it supports the transition process in the country as a result of security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis and the country’s regional implications (UN 2013).

The notion of the security-development nexus increased debates between commentators and analysts who favour it and those who are against it. According to Piccitto (2004:299), those who are in favour of the nexus see it as the best solution for achieving the most effective policy to champion challenges facing many developing countries. On the other hand, those who are against the nexus, sees it as a threat to development and poverty reduction, and as a promotion of security needs of the major powers, especially the US, in its leadership of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWT). In line with this debate, Chandler (2007:363) argues that some critical security theorists such as Duffield (2006:12) suggest that “the development and
poverty reduction agenda is already one that has been subordinated to Western security concerns. The shift from macro-development approaches to good governance policy-making, sustainability and poverty reduction already contains within it the desire to contain these underdeveloped regions”.

In light of the above, this chapter will focus on theories related to the security-development nexus on an institutional and scholarship point of view. The purpose of this is to explore the core ideas put forward in these categories in order to arrive at a framework that could be utilised in order to investigate the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa contributes to the strengthening of this nexus.

2.2. The Link between human security and human development

With end of the Cold War and the emergence of new security threats discussed in the previous chapter, a number of major challenges in the security debate emerged. Security as a concept was expanded and the focus shifted from inter-state towards intra-state conflicts. This shift was accompanied by an increased focus on ethnic and minority conflicts, and which expanded later to include environmental and other root causes of armed violence (Chandler 2007:364). With the expansion of the concept of security emerged a greater emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict. Attention was given to options for external efforts to prevent internal conflict. These efforts were in part spearheaded by the UN. Prominent advocate of this thinking was the UN, especially the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose 1992 Agenda for Peace defined much of the subsequent policy and academic debate. This was followed by the 1994 UNDP Report, Kofi Annan in 1999, and then different scholars from different school of thoughts.

2.3. Boutros-Ghali’s approach to the human security-development nexus

Though a relationship existed before between security and development, the notion of a security-development nexus was introduced by Boutros-Ghali. His focus was on ‘post-conflict’ and ‘peace-building’ as a means of identifying and supporting measures which assist in strengthening and solidifying peace and avoiding relapse to conflict. Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Report came at a time where after the Cold War, the world was witnessing a number of lower-level armed conflicts. These conflicts were
apparent in Eastern Europe and Africa and manifested in the form of ethnic conflicts, genocides, deadly violence, appalling human rights abuses and massive flows of refugees within and sometimes across borders (Boutros-Ghali: 1992). The 1992 Report called for the linking of human security and human development not only to address issues of conflicts, but also issues of human rights abuses, underdevelopment and the famine experienced by many countries after the Cold War, especially in Africa. According to Boutros-Ghali, the security-development nexus meant that in order for human security issues to be tackled, human development is needed, and vice versa.

The core argument of Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace Report was the importance of ‘peace building’ as an essential instrument for strengthening human security and development. Boutros-Ghali referred to peace building as “activities in-between conflict (civil war, genocide) and the employment of a peacekeeping force on the one side, and broader development (or state building) strategies on the other” (Bueger and Vennesson 2009:12). He argues that the concept refers to the transition from conflict-policies to development-policies. It refers to action “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict”. He further argued that human security along with peace building was a concept that went beyond traditional security thinking to look at the social, economic, political and natural environments in which conflict might flourish (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

It is clear that for Boutros-Ghali, peace building was an essential activity required after conflict. To complement peace building, he referred to capacity building, reconciliation and socio-economic transformation. Boutros-Ghali also argue that peace building is a strategy for reflecting a “long-term approach to maintaining peace and security, embracing other fields generally associated with early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistances, reconstruction, and even political and economic development. Issues of governance and institutional capacity, thus also fall within the remit of peace building as do concerns with broader structural issues in the international arena that may facilitate the achievement and maintenance of an equitable peace” (UN 2009:10).
Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Report sets forth a comprehensive, integrated approach to resolving the complex linkages between the issues of peace, democratisation, employment, food security, human development and the environment. It argues that the type of development that would be sufficient to promote security is increased focus on democratic forms of government which are essential for lasting peace and social stability, protection of human rights, economic development, and human welfare (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Moreover, according to the 1992 Report, democratic states are engines for human development and they ensure the “acquisition of universal physical, social and organizational values which transcend social differences such as freedom for initiative, open-mindedness, tolerance, cooperation, communication, coordination, integration, harmony, with the environmental, honesty, integration, cleanliness and systematic functioning”.

Conversely, Boutros-Ghali also argues that effective security measures or approaches to promote development would be to decentralise the state-centric and competitive security system (Boutros-Ghali 1992). He argues that it is unnecessary for states to essentially and entirely be responsible for ensuring their own security needs. This is because in doing so, it increased the perceived threat to other nations, leading to almost inevitably to the escalating arms race characteristic of the Cold War period. Instead, the 1992 Report proposes an alternative system which is inclusive and cooperative, rather than exclusive and competitive. It presents a concrete plan for establishing a cooperative security system to provide full security guarantees to all its member states by means of a standing ‘world army’ open to all nations that practice democratic principles and renounce the right to aggression against other nations (Boutros-Ghali 1992). These values are a powerful spur to development and form the basis for an emerging universal culture, which yet permits expression of cultural differences. A better understanding of the process of value formation is essential for formulating a comprehensive theory of development.

In his 1992 Report, Boutros-Ghali disagrees with the view that external human development and human security aid are the main determinants of development. Instead, he emphasises the full development of human resourcefulness (Boutros-Ghali 1992). He further emphasises the need for the formulation of a comprehensive theory of development and presents essential elements of a new approach to
stimulating human-centred social progress. Boutros-Ghali blames the failure of Western policy analysts to predict the high levels of inflation and falling output that resulted from macro-economic reform. He regards them as the consequences of viewing a process of complex multi-dimensional social, political, economic and cultural transition in narrow monetary terms.

As a result, Boutros-Ghali (1992) advocates for people to progressively develop their capacities and release their energies for higher levels of material, social, cultural and psychological advancements than relying too much on external aid. He argues a concerted effort by external actors to make conscious the previous unconscious, trial and error process of human progress by formulating a comprehensive theory of evolving human capacities, which can serve as the basis for integrated conceptual models.

It is clear that Boutros-Ghali discourages external human security and human development aid in isolation, but prefers external actors to grant their support within the consortium of the UN. He argues that political stability is not an end in itself, it is a condition of durable economic and social development and the fulfilment of the human potential (Boutros-Ghali 1992). According to Boutros-Ghali (1992) here, the links between peace and development need to be acknowledged and understood. For instance, the world has seen the deterioration of economic and social conditions give rise to political rife and military conflict. Therefore, as Boutros-Ghali (1992) further argues, external donors should grant security and development aid under the activities of the UN for peace and security. This should be carried out under the expense of the UN responsibilities for development. For Boutros-Ghali, it is essential that human security and human development be pursued in an integrated, mutually supporting way.

2.4. The 1994 UNDP approach to the human security-development nexus

After Boutros-Ghali introduced the human security-development nexus in 1992, the UNDP issued its 1994 Human Development Report which also emphasised the need to link security and development. The Report reiterated the shift of the conceptualisation of security. It argued that the traditional understanding of security neglected the legitimate concerns of ordinary individuals who sought security in their
daily lives. This report identifies two core aspects. Firstly, the safety of citizens from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and secondly, the protection of citizens from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of their daily lives – whether in homes, work or in communities. According to the 1994 UNDP report, human security issues can only be addressed if states also focus on human development.

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report brought new attention to the security-development nexus as it sought to broaden the definition of security by putting emphasis on threats towards individuals. The concept of human security was brought to the fore of deliberation. A new or at least revised security discourse was a growing concern, shifting the referral object of security from the state towards individuals. Traditional state security was no longer enough – human security seemed to be the answer (Brinkestom 2012:9). Human security as described in the 1994 UNDP Report is seen as an approach that does not only address the results, but more importantly the root-causes of human insecurities. The approach is often referred to as a bridging approach between security and development. A link between human security and human development is explicit (Werthes and Debiel 2006:7), and within the 1994 UNDP Report it is stated how human security should be the backbone to a new development paradigm (UNPD 1994).

The core arguments of the 1994 Report are that there should be an increase in investments on human development, not in arms; engaging policy makers to address the emerging peace dividend; giving the UN a clear mandate to promote and sustain development; enlarging the concept of development cooperation so that it includes all flows, not just aid; agreeing that 20% of national budgets and 20% of foreign aid will be used for human development and establishing an Economic Security Council (UNDP 1994). The core arguments of the 1994 Report are further reiterated below.

The 1994 Report’s core argument is that human security and human development share four fundamental elements. The Report first argues that human security and human development are both people-cantered. It challenges the orthodox approach to security and development. That is, state security and liberal economic growth respectively. Both human security and human development emphasise that people
are the ultimate ends but not the means. Both treat human beings as agents of their security and development and argue that individuals should be empowered by either the state, to participate in the strengthening of their own security and development. Second, both perspectives are multidimensional. Both human security and human development address people’s dignity as well as their material and physical concerns. Third, both schools of thought consider poverty and inequality as the root causes of individual vulnerability. Fourth, they both address chronic poverty (UNDP 1994).

According to the 1994 UNDP HDR (UNDP 1994:69), external development cooperation for sustained human security and human development must be broadened to include all the international flows, not just aid. Some of the most significant non-aid flows the 1994 Report speaks about, are private invest, labour and international trade and finance, including debt payments. With regard to foreign aid, the 1994 Report argues that the motives for foreign aid programmes have been diverse. They are sometimes driven by idealism, generosity and international solidarity, but often also by political expediency, ideological confrontation and commercial self-interest (UNDP 1994).

As a result, such varied motives and objectives have produced some unsatisfactory outcomes – leading to considerable disenchantment of both the donors and recipients. However, the 1994 Report admits that these negative results do not mean that there are no success stories at all. According to the Report, external aid has played a big part in the progress of developing countries. For instance, development cooperation with external actors has enabled vital technological advancements – from new industrial processes to vaccines for children to hybrid seeds for the ‘Green Revolution’ to infrastructure development aid for the developing world (UNDP 1994).

The 1994 UNDP Report argues that donor countries usually specify a large number of objectives for aid. They believe, for example, that aid should help in reducing poverty, promoting human security and human development, guaranteeing human rights, protecting the environment and improving national governance. But their programmes do not appear to be directly linked with these objectives. The main reason for this is that most aid allocations are country-focused rather than objective-
focused (UNPD 1994:72). Consequently, the 1994 UNDP Report advised for negotiations for a global compact for human security and human development as one of the most important ways of linking external aid to specific objectives.

Moreover, in the global compact, all nations would pledge to ensure that within 10 years, for instance, all their people are provided with at least the very basic human security and human development needs. This would include social services such as primary education and primary health care. It would also give people equitable access to assets such as land and credit needed to permit a decent standard of living (UNDP 1994:77). According to the 1994 UNDP Report, achieving these objectives would probably require additional expenditure of $30 to $40 billion a year. Many countries such as South Africa and Nigeria can achieve these objectives using their own resources – often by restructuring their expenditure priorities. Others will need extensive external assistance.

One way the 1994 UNDP Report suggests in implementing the human security and human development compact is through a 20:20 formula. That is, countries should allocate, on average, 20% of public spending to human security and human development priorities. Some very poor countries such as South Sudan and Zimbabwe may not, however, be able to afford this and will alternatively have to depend on external aid to fill the gap, with donors allocating a significant share of their aid budgets to human security and human development priorities. According to the 1994 Report, 20% would be an appropriate figure. On the other hand, donors will also have to allocate a 20% or more since many of them have enormous scope for reallocating their aid. By doing so, they can lift the proportion of human priority goals to 20%. The compact will thus be based on shared responsibility. Developing countries would allocate 20% of their budgets, and donors 20% of their aid to human security and human development priorities. This 20:20 commitment would mean that three-fourths of extra funds would come from developing countries and one-fourth from the donors (UNDP 1994:78). As a result, according to the 1994 Report, the political, financial and humanitarian case for such a compact will be strong. It could ensure that every nation, poor and rich, can reach a basic threshold of human security and human development.
2.5. Annan’s approach to the human security-development nexus

The importance of the security-development nexus was further stressed by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan in 1999. Annan (1999) advocated for the UN and the international community of states as well as other sectors such as the business community to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention (UN 1999:6). Both Boutros-Ghali and Annan argued that the security-development nexus is essential as a solution for structural violence and underdevelopment in the world. Here Annan includes the inequalities and injustices between the rich and the poor, the North and the South, and men and women as contributing to conflict. Such insecurities and underdevelopment issues were understood as both the roots and triggers of social tensions, conflict escalation and armed violence.

Annan’s core argument is that there can be no human development without human security and no human security without human development (UN 2005). Here, Annan is stressing the importance of linking security with development. According to him, human security, human development and human rights are inextricably linked, and as a result, he argues that the “freedom from want, the freedom from fear (corresponding to human security), as well as the freedom to live in dignity” should be realized. He further asserts that contemporary threat (from 2005 when he published the report) demand broad, deep and sustained global cooperation. Thus, as Annan further elaborates, nations around the world must create a collective security system to prevent terrorism, strengthen non-proliferation, and bring peace to war-torn areas such as northern Africa, while also promoting human rights, democracy and development (UN 2005).

2.6. Scholarly Conceptualisation of the security-development nexus

The end of the Cold War did not only change the conceptualisation of security, but it also changed the referent object of security. Indirectly, this led to the linking of security and development to respond to new security threats. According to Buzan (1991:431), in the re-conceptualisation of security, threats are no longer identified in terms of national security and insecurity. Response strategies no longer focus mainly on serving ideational and ideological security objectives defined by political elites into which all other security dimensions and actors were simply subsumed. Human
security needs at home and abroad are no longer of secondary concern to national political security concerns. In addition, traditionally the security and rights of individuals could be sacrificed for the sake of national security objectives. This occurred even in democratic countries without much resistance from citizens that trusted or did not engage much with the arguments of their political leaders.

Buzan (1991) further asserts that in traditional approaches, resources for security provision focused on the political and military aspects of security. That is, the defence of borders, investment in the quality of military personnel, material and equipment and support of countries that belonged to the same ideological camp. Other needs, such as societal security, were serviced only when resources were available and populations claimed the right to argue for responses to different needs and entitlements through democratic decision-making processes. However, such approaches have been changing gradually since the end of the Cold War. There has been a shift of security debates away from a “politically and ideologically motivated oversimplification to the empirically and reality-driven complexity of security provision that the world witness today” (Buzan 1991). As a result, the comparing, understanding, matching and merging of security and development concerns and responses have emerged and developed. The meaning of security has shifted since the early 1990s to also encompass the concept, ‘human security’. Its main goal as a holistic concept is to make people safe at the core of the organizations, institutions and processes based on the assumption that these were created to meet human needs and offer protection from threats to their survival and well-being.

Today it appears that the distinctions between security and development are inextricably linked, as illustrated by the literature review presented in chapter one. The literature speaks about the inevitability of speaking about one without the other. For example, in African countries such as the DRC and CAR, it is impossible to solve human security since there is not sufficient human development to have the necessary resources to build or improve human security. Furthermore, it is also difficult for these countries to enhance their human development when they are engaged in conflicts and there is too much insecurity. Western governments and multilateral institutions have used state failure in African countries to argue that the link between security and development has been misunderstood. After the Cold War,
it was seen as a matter of need to reconsider security-development linkages. This is evident in a study conducted by the World Bank, which revealed that more of the worlds’ underdeveloped compare to the developed countries were engaged in conflict of some form (FMECD 2004). Indicators show that the poorer a country, the greater its risk of violent conflict. The FMECD (2004) further asserts that a country with an annual per capita income of 250 US dollars has a 15% chance of experiencing a civil war in five years. This is in contrast to a country that has an annual per capita income of 5000 US dollars where the probability of civil war is less than 1%. So it is necessary that security and development complement each other to tackle conflict and underdevelopment.

Nevertheless, the International Peace Academy (IPA) (2004a:3) suggests that more research is needed on the conceptual underpinning of the security-development nexus. The IPA argues that the assumptions about the nexus are based on very little empirical evidence of causation. Even the assumption that there is a positive correlation between security and development has been questioned. External human security and human development aid can contribute to intensifying conflicts or inflaming grievances (Cramer 2006:51). For example, this has been evident in Mali, where external aid has been ineffective from an economic and institutional development perspective. According to the IRIN News (2013), aid in the country has enabled corruption to escalate, undermining the governments’ will and ability to raise revenue through productive means or taxation, and insulating it from accountability to the population. As a result, this has directly led to conflicts in the north and political crisis in Bamako.

IRIN News (2013) points out that there have been situations in Mali, where external aid has fuelled ethnic conflicts which contributed to the delays in development. For instance, a UNDP project gave millions of dollars to Mali after the 1990s rebellion. The intention was disbarment and demobilisation. However, in the process, reintegration of ex-combats were given disproportionately to one ethnic group, the IfoghasTuaregs, and directly used to buy loyalty and consolidate power at the expense of their ethnic rivals, the Imghad Taurags. This led to conflict, especially since the country suffers from a low degree of institutional development and a high level of insecurity issues. Though external involvement to strengthen the nexus is for
a good course, it can, however, equally lead to social and political changes that are a spur to human security and human development than a retarding factor (Cramer 2006:53).

It is clear that the concept of a human security-development nexus is a contested one. But this has not prevented the nexus from becoming the key tool for policymakers. At the same time, this contestation has become a spur to the formation of new international collaborations and interventions due to fears of that it may intensify conflicts. The redefinition of development took the emphasis away from traditional economic indicators of GDP (gross domestic product) and trade. The redefinition broadened the concept to include psychological and material factors related to the measurement of human well-being (Narayan-Parker and Patel 2000:32). On the other hand, security has been redefined to encompass not merely the security of citizens and states, but also security concerns much more broadly than merely the threat of violence (UN 2003). This includes economic and social concerns such as welfare, employment and the distribution of national wealth.

2.6.1. Duffield’s theory of the human security-development nexus

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the shifts in the meaning of the security and development towards a nexus which represent a new or an enhanced policy framework for addressing security and development issues. Duffield (2006:14) wants more external actors to take responsibility in strengthening human security and human development in countries experiencing such issues, especial counties such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the CAR in Africa. Duffield (2006) identified three linked claims in relation to the nexus.

The first is that the nexus between human security and development is not the result of something new which has been learnt through trial and error with regard to external international policy intervention. The nexus is not something which has been reached through a consensus because of some scientific deliberation or inquiry, or something which has been established because it has been proven that it works efficiently and effectively within the policy community. Rather, Duffield (2006) argues that what drives the human security-development nexus as a policy is “the loss of a policy-framework that previously provided a strategic framing for concepts of security.
and development”. According to him, this is reflected in both institutional and ideational shifts which reflects and institutionalise the shift in policy accountability away from its traditional centres (such as the Western countries) towards a diverse range of policy actors (such as emerging countries like Brazil, China, and India), to the subjects of intervention themselves (such as SA).

The second claim is the ‘institutional’ one which argues that in response to the loss of strategic thinking and policy-making, there has been a reorganization of policy-making mechanisms both at intra and inter-state level. Duffield (2006:15) here argues that with many human securities and human development issues escalating across the world, especially in African countries such as CAR and DRC – there is a need to increase the number of external and internal actors and/or institutions. According to him, this will assist in facilitating more meaningful and regulatory interventions, and also be able to pass the buck for policy responsibility. As a result, the policy-burden will be shared and there will not be a shortage of external actors and international institutions to assist the developing countries. This is because the number of players involved in strengthening the human security-development nexus will be diversified, which also include private policy contractors rather than developed and/or Western countries only. The impact of the security-development nexus there is not to be observed so much on the ground, in the alleged new forms of coordination of international intervention, as at home, where the responsibility for the policy-making and accountability for outcomes has been widely diffused.

Duffield’s (2006) third claim is the ‘ideational’ one. Here he argues that “the human security-development nexus, far from being an instrument of far-reaching intervention, seeks to stress the limits of what can be achieved by external policy-makers”. In this claim, the nexus is seen a result of the continuous process of creating new ideas. Duffield (2006) reiterates that the understanding of the nexus as a withdrawal from the traditional understanding of the concepts of security and development, and strategic policy-making should be viewed as a reflection of new ideas rather than the subordination of one set of existing policy practices or policy interests to another. Rather than a framework of coherent intervention, Duffield (2006) argues that “there is a framework of ad hoc intervention mixed with the
limiting of expectations, more mediated political engagement, and the disapproval of external or international responsibilities”.

In its broadest sense, human security is more than the absence of violent conflict. It further includes human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil their own potential. Through the redefinitions and linking of security and development, and subsequently following the above steps (claims), poverty can be reduced, economic growth can be achieved and conflict may be prevented. This might lead towards human security and development. This redefinition and broadening of the meanings of security and development indicate that a distinction between the two concepts can only be made once they have been emptied of their traditional meanings or contents. This is supported by Stewart, who observes that “development and security are linked in themselves, even in the absence of the causal connections” (Stewart 2004:4).

2.7. Conclusion

Having considered the literature on the human security-development nexus, it is clear that development aid to improve human security and human development needs to focus on several aspects. Due to limited space, the study will only focus on the following aspects: human rights and good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; employment; healthcare; and economic development. The study will do this by focusing on facts and statistics concerning these aspects, as well as the positive and negative impacts China has in Africa with regard to these aspects. The study will further utilise case studies (African countries) as examples in order to apply these aspects to Africa. The next chapter utilises the above aspects to provide a historical overview of China’s involvement in Africa from 1956 to the present. In analysing China’s role in promoting human security and human development in Africa, chapter four will provide an assessment of the extent to which Chinese aid addressed these issues.
CHAPTER THREE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

3.1. Introduction

China’s involvement in Africa since the year 2000 has been described as the most striking dimension of its international engagement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003). As seen in earlier chapters, this has been the result of a sharp decrease in investment and interests of Africa’s Western traditional trading partners. This also includes China’s economic needs which require greater resources as well as the development of a new market. As a result, this led China to apply its expanding financial resources for the good of carving out a position not only in African extractive industries, but also in other sectors where its companies had a competitive advantage (Rich and Recker 2013: 63). For example, human rights, good governance, peace building and state building, peacekeeping, democratisation, employment, access to health care, economic growth and access to education. All these issues have proved in the literature that they can contribute in strengthening the human security-development nexus.

Although Western interests and companies remain dominant in many African countries, China’s presence is expanding at a very rapid rate, and this has aroused an unprecedented international attention with regard to China’s involvement in Africa. Though the China-Africa relations are increasing enormously, they are however not new. They are deeply rooted in historical experiences and lessons of the socialist period, and to some extent, goes even beyond that time frame. For instance, though not well documented like Africa’s relation with Europe, the history of China-Africa relations dates back to the ancient time (Pham 2006:239). Pham (2006:240) asserts that evidence shows that exchanges with northern Africa go back to the early Han dynasty, before the Christian era, through indirect contacts via Arab merchants. He then acknowledges that it was only under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) that Sino-Africa relations achieved their historical climax through a series of expeditions that reached the East African coast.

However, the literature reveals that there was a break in these relations until the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Rich and Recker 2013: 65). Due to this break and the
subsequent re-emergence of China-Africa relations after the Bandung Conference, this chapter will attempt to provide a historical overview of China’s involvement in Africa from 1956 to the present, although the early relationship (3.2) will be dealt with only very briefly and without any attention to detail. Within this period, the chapter will simultaneously discuss the types of involvement, investment, trade and development that China is involved in on the continent. This will be done through providing facts, figures and statistics. The main purpose of this chapter, utilising the mentioned periods and variables, is to provide a historical overview which reveals the extent to which China has contributed to the human security-development nexus in Africa. Such aspects which contribute to this nexus that the study will discuss, include human rights and good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; and economic development. In applying these aspects to Africa, the study will make use of case studies which include African countries such as Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Namibia, Madagascar, the Comoro Islands, Cameroon, Uganda, Lesotho, Kenya, Nigeria, the DRC, Togo, Mali, and Liberia.

3.2. The early China-Africa relationship

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, Chinese leaders claimed that they, like Africa, suffered from Western imperialism. They sought ways in which Africa can feel they can relate to China. This period coincided with the quest for African independence and as a result, China played an active role in supporting African aspirations (Pham 2006:240). In 1958, China and Africa held their first Asia-Africa Conference, the Bandung Conference as Beijing attempted to assert its leadership over the Third World and the non-aligned movement (Rich and Recker 2013:66)

According to Wenping (2010), Egypt was the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China, in May 1956. By the early 1960s, over 10 African countries, including Morocco, Algeria and Sudan had established diplomatic relations with China. By the end of the 1970s, 44 out of 50 independent African states had entered into diplomatic relations with China (Wenping 2010). Pham (2006:241) argues that during this period (1950s-1970s), China’s involvement in Africa was
primarily centred on advancing China’s communist ideology in African countries. According to Wenping (2010), China strategically achieved this by supporting independence and liberation movements in Africa, providing not only moral and rhetorical support, but also weapons and military training. As a result, China’s African policy was described as a policy with two main purposes: “(1) to counter the recognition of Taiwan as the representative of China and thus to shore up votes for the eventual rejection of Taiwan’s China credentials at the UN; and (2) to counter the West’s influence and then the Soviet Union’s influence on the continent” (Rich and Recker 2013:67).

Though China was not financially stable during these times of political re-orientation after the Bandung Conference in 1958, they however contributed in supporting Africa with economic aid. For instance, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, China gave about $2.5 billion to 36 African countries in aid (Wenping 2010). China also sent 10 thousand engineers, donors, and technicians to provide assistance for African human security and human development. China further undertook various infrastructure projects, one of which is the 1860km long Tanzania-Zambia railway. This railway was financed and built by China and hailed as a monument of China-Africa friendship upon its completion (Wenping 2010). Through these aid projects, China gained a good reputation among Africans. In retrospect, China’s contemporary engagement with Africa has its roots in the policies pursued during this period.

China embarked on economic reforms in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, and China-Africa relations entered a new stage (Vogel 2011). China focused on domestic economic development and opened up to the Western world, and its political interest in Africa declined (Wenping 2010). As a result, China-Africa relations were largely neglected in most of the 1980s. This neglect lasted until China faced growing diplomatic isolation after the Tiananmen Square Protest in 1989. China then resorted to re-evaluating its foreign policies in an attempt to re-establish its political interests in Africa. At this stage, China slowly revamped its relations with African countries. This was not simple, so China had to be strategic about it. The Chinese government then strategically sent its officials on goodwill missions to Africa. Exchanges with African leaders were actively promoted and efforts were made to normalise relations with as many African countries as possible irrespective
of ideological allegiance. In its efforts to revamp and regain confidence and loyalty of African leaders, China resorted to assisting African states in critical issues necessary for strengthening human security and human development, such as human rights and good governance.

3.3. Human rights and good governance

China has always expressed its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. However, this seems to be detrimental for Africa since it may mean that though China trades, invests and provides development aid, it does not value the protection of human rights and the promotion of good governance in the conflict-ridden African continent. It seems as if China, unlike the West, does not require recipients of development funding to implement anti-corruption measures (Taylor 2006:934). This means it will be difficult to refer to China as a reliable source for promoting human rights and good governance in Africa. China is also known for being corrupt. For instance, in 2008, Chinese companies were ranked 21 out of 22 countries for their propensity to bribe by the Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Bribe Payer’s Index (TI 2008).

Chinese infrastructure projects have been found to embed disreputable human rights violations. For instance, in Zambia, SA and Namibia, it was discovered that Chinese managers have repeatedly ignored local minimum wage laws and affirmative action requirements, while refusing to pay social security and allowances (Jauch and Sakaria 2009:18). In response to Western criticism, the Chinese authorities asserted that “Civil and Political Rights (CPR) should not be given primacy over Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR)” (Zakaria 1994:111).

In China’s view, ESCR are achieved through economic development and investment, and deviations from an economic growth for the sake of CPR are not justifiable. China often expresses a strong conviction of the non-universality of human rights (Brown and Sriram 2008:253). This means China’s attitude towards the realisation of human rights and good governance in Africa is negative. China believes it is impossible to realise or achieve the protection and promotion of human rights and good governance in Africa since there is not considerable economic development. For instance, the ‘Asian values’ argument claims that certain cultures
value family and community more than individuality. To them, the Western conception of human rights is inapplicable to the Chinese setting and household (Brown 2008:254).

According to Brown and Sriram (2008:254), China has repeatedly refused to take advantage of its economic power status to intervene in any of its aid recipients who commit even the most extreme human rights abuses or corrupt practices. This is the result of China’s belief that domestic human rights issues should not be a concern of external actors and so it has no interest in meddling in the internal affairs of others unless it’s strengthens its investments.

Furthermore, China’s involvement with corrupt African governments has received endless criticism from Western scholars. The critics, notably Coyne and Ryan (2008), argue that China should use its development leverage as a political tool and threaten to cut off financial aid to recipients that repeatedly violate human rights. They further claim that aid rewards the behaviour of dictators and actively funds the oppression of the reformists. Some examples of states in which China has been expected to play a pivotal role in protecting human rights and promote good governance, Angola, Sudan and Zambia, each of which will be briefly considered below.

3.3.1. China in Angola

Angola is an autocratically ruled state that is well known for corruption, inefficiency and persistent poverty. The African country was ranked 42 out of 48 sub-Saharan African states on the 2007 Index of African Governance list (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2007:36). The country is also reported to have enormous oil reserves with the Human Rights Watch reporting that in a five-year period, $4.2 billion worth of oil revenues was drawn off Angola’s public accounts (Human Rights Watch 2004). This amounts to around 10% of GDP, in a country where most people live with less than $2 per day (World Bank 2006).

As a result of Angola’s corrupt government, in 2004, the IMF attached transparency measures requirements to the loans it provided to the country for post-war reconstruction efforts. The ruling elite were reluctant to sign such a deal, but were
desperately in need of the funds. Unexpectedly though, the Chinese EXIM Bank saw this and took it to its advantage and offered to provide Angola $2 billion worth of loans, with no conditions relating to corruption of transparency attached (Keenan 2009: 25). Consequently, Angola turned down the IMF’s assistance and decided to do business with China with an agreement to provide China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day (Taylor 2006:947).

In the same year, the Angolan government released a statement saying that Western financial markets impose “conditions on developing countries that are nearly always unbearable and sometimes even politically unacceptable” (quoted in Taylor 2004). Western media and aid organizations denounced China for helping Angola to avoid pressure to clean up corruption (Swann and McQuillen 2006). The Chinese director for CARE foundation commented “the big Chinese loan gives a lot more flexibility for Angola not to comply with the conditions for other deals. It allows the government to escape transparency” (Africa News Service 2005). The Chinese loans were used to restore three rail lines that were essential to Angola’s mineral exports, construct a new airport, and build low-income housing (Taylor 2006:949). As Brautigam (2009:11) points out, “there is still enormous corruption, but roads, clinics, and schools are being built”. According to Zhao (2011), Angola has experienced immense growth since 2005. However, he also thinks it is still unclear to identify how well the growth translates into a reduction in inequality and corruption, as well as the promotion of human rights.

3.3.2. China in Sudan

In the late 1990s, after American and Canadian companies abandoned South Sudanese oil fields in response to North American consumer and investor hostility, China stepped in and filled the void (Rothberg 2008:2). The state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) owns the biggest share in Sudan’s largest oil venture, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (Taylor 2006:949). Not only did Khartoum use Chinese oil money to fund its ethnic cleansing of South Sudan insurgents, but China also sold them weapons to do it (Brown and Sriram 2008:259).
In violation of a UN embargo, $100 million worth of aircraft and small arms were sold to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir between 1996 and 2003 (Brautigam 2009:25). The Chinese ambassador to SA, Liu Guijin explained, “we don’t believe in embargoes. That just means that people suffer. From a practical consideration, embargoes and sanctions can’t solve problems” (IRIN 2006). Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong was also quoted as saying “business is business. We try to separate politics from business. I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair” (Taylor 2006: 960). China tried to resolve the conflict in Sudan diverting from its policy of non-interference. For instance, in 2007, Beijing used its influence with Bashir to press for the acceptance of a common AU and UN peacekeeping force in Darfur (Large 2008:95). However, this attempt was insufficient to halt the escalating human rights abuses and China’s support of the Bashir regime.

China further built small arms manufacturing factories in Sudan, and contracts for the supply of military equipment were officially concluded with Sudan (Niquet 2006). The Chinese also assisted Sudan with military training, and this assistance received criticism from the West, arguing that the Chinese criteria for cooperation is the total absence of political conditions and refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of African states such as Sudan (Niquet 2006). Moreover, China took more advantage of circumstances in Sudan when the traditional Western sources such as the World Bank cut-off their ties with Sudan since it was violating human rights. The West questioned the legitimacy of the Sudanese regime and its regime’s ability to enforce the rule of law over the population and territory, which it saw as limited (Alden 2014:3). As a result of the regime and China’s support of it, security challenges continued to unfold.

According to Alden (2014:4), China has been criticised for allowing human rights abuses and authoritative regimes in Sudan. This includes the uproar around Chinese support for Khartoum during the onset of the Darfur crisis in the early 2000s. This support underscored the negative impact that Chinese engagements in one African country could have on both its African policy and global manoeuvrability (Lange and Patey 2011: 40). In support of the regime, which violated human rights and led to the ill-administration of the country, China further sold arms to Sudan. According to Chuka (2011:70), China’s arms sales to Africa between 1996 and 2003 made up
10% of all arms transfers to Africa, from 2004 to 2007 China’s percentage increased to almost 18%. In addition, China’s arms sales to Africa stood at US$1.3 billion in 2003 (Alden 2007:7).

Chinese weapons and ammunition worsened the conflict and security in Sudan. For example, they have been used to commit violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by government forces, militias and groups (Saferworld 2011: ii). China has continued to supply Khartoum with weapons despite the Sudanese Government’s persistent violation of a UN arms embargo on Darfur. This shows that China does not prioritise the promotion of human rights and good governance in its involvement in Africa, especially in Sudan. This may be due to escalating criticisms of China that it uses the UN Security Council (UNSC) to protect the Sudanese regime and its economic interests in the country (Saferworld 2011: iv). For example, between 2004 and 2007, China consistently abstained from or weakened resolutions on the Darfur issue, including those related to sanctions and the deployment of UN peacekeepers. However, in 2007 China’s view on the situation began to change and it voted for the deployment of a joint UN-AU force in Darfur after Khartoum gave its consent, and this consent was to a large degree the result of Chinese pressure (Saferworld 2011: vi).

Chinese officials and scholars support China’s principle of non-interference, and assert that alternatively, China has exerted some influence in Sudan (Li 2007:70). For instance, diplomatic relations with Khartoum after 2006 are regularly referred to as examples of where Beijing has used its bilateral influence to push for an end to the conflict (Karrar 2010:10).

On June 2006, Special Envoy Lu Guazong was sent to Darfur and in 2007, Special Envoy, Zhou Jun followed. Shortly after this, Ambassador, Liu Guijin, was appointed the first Special Representative of China in Africa, and was assigned the Darfur crisis as his first priority area of focus (Saferworld 2011:31). According to Yu and Wang (2008), the objective of these envoys to Sudan was to convince the Khartoum regime to work towards a settling of the Darfur conflict. In 2007, former President, Hu, visited Sudan and outlined four key principles of resolving the Darfur conflict: (1) Sudanese sovereignty should be respected, (2) there should be peaceful settlements
through dialogue and consultation on equal footings, (3) the AU and the UN should play constructive roles, and (4) regional stability and the livelihoods of local people should be safeguarded (Yu & Wang 2008).

After numerous unsuccessful attempts by China to end the conflict, China finally decided to symbolically take off Sudan from their list of countries with preferred trade status (Huang 2010). In 2007, Ambassador, Liu, reportedly announced that China was dropping all assistance to Sudan except humanitarian aid (Taylor 2009:107). This Chinese pressure on Sudan eventually contributed to the Khartoum regime’s agreement to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan’s three-phase plan for the resolution of the conflict, including the deployment of a joint AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur (Taylor 2009).

3.3.3. China in Zambia

In the 1990s, China’s rapidly growing economy generated a demand for more raw materials and decided to seek for market opportunities in Africa. For instance, the Chambishi copper mine in the heart of Zambia’s copper belt had been closed for years. The China Non-Ferros Metal Corporation (CNMC) then saw an opportunity and bought 85% of the mine in 1998 for $20 million (Brautigam 2009:3). The project was hailed as a prime example of how foreign investment can bring jobs and spread technology to Africa. Then in April 2005, an explosion at the mine killed 51 Zambian workers due to poor safety standards followed by Chinese foremen (French 2010). A year later, many Zambian mine workers decided to embark on a labour demonstration, and in the process six Zambians were shot by a Chinese supervisor (French 2010). Moreover, a similar incident occurred in April 2011, when eleven protesters at a demonstration against poor working conditions were shot and wounded by Chinese managers (Palitza 2011).

In 2010, China’s investment in the country surpassed $1 billion, and an additional $5 billion was promised from 2010 to 2013 (Palitza 2011). It is estimated that at least 20,000 Zambian jobs had been created in the copper mines and support industries (Belk 2011). Despite this growth, though, 60% of Zambians still live below the poverty line (World Bank 2011). According to the World Bank (2011), this is a case where economic growth has not translated into a significant poverty reduction. Most
of China’s investment goes directly back into the mining industry, with only 10% invested in agriculture, retail, and manufacturing (Belk 2011).

Anti-Chinese sentiment has become an increasingly important issue in domestic Zambian politics. For instance, in the 2006 presidential elections, the opposition candidate, Michael Sata, ran on the platform that the Chinese exploitation of Zambia’s resources and mistreatment of workers needed to be countered. He asserted that “they are just flooding the country with human beings instead of an investment and the government is jumping. We have to be careful because if we leave them unchecked we will regret. China is sucking from us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our wealth” (Chimangeni 2007).

As a result, China announced that it would withhold any investments into Zambia until after the elections. The incumbent pro-China candidate, Rupiah Banda, won by a small margin, and immediately after his victory, China announced it would relieve $211 million of Zambia’s outstanding debt (Keena 2007). In the September 2011 elections though, things took a U-turn and Sata won the elections. His victory was hailed as an anti-China referendum in Africa. After the 2011 elections, Zambian employees received raises from Chinese-owned mining companies (Belk 2011).

3.4. Peacekeeping and post-war construction

China’s foreign policy is centred upon the principle of non-interference. According to Barton (2009:14), “it goes against China’s foreign policy principles to interfere in the domestic affairs of a fellow country. China wishes to fully respect the international sovereignty of a fellow country, as to inadvertently protect its own national sovereignty from other prying nations”. This principle affects the relationship between the economic and political dimension in the Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, China, as a big economy, the international community is increasingly having high expectations of it. The world expects China to make positive and tangible contributions to global peace and security, and contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and post-war construction (PWC) in Africa (Ayenagbo, Njobvu, Sossou, and Tozoun 2012:22). The aftermath of the Cold War witnessed China’s expansive engagement in maintaining international peace and security. From this
period, China has been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations in African countries such as Liberia and Sudan.

In addition to economic assistance, China also provides African states with military training and assistance programmes. For instance, in 2007, China began a de-mining assistance programme in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sudan with the aim of training personnel. China has in addition provided these countries with equipment and funds to conduct de-mining operations. On the whole, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was able to train about 300 de-miners in 20 countries contributing to the clearance of nearly 200,000 square meters of minefield (Cordano 2014).

China is assuming a more active and less conservative approach to peacekeeping in Africa. This is evident in Chinese support of the UN Organisation Mission if the DRC (MONUC/MONUSCO). Between 2003 and 2013, China deployed UN peacekeepers to Mali following the French intervention, sent police forces to Liberia, and was deeply involved in the attempt to get to a ceasefire in South Sudan. In addition, it is worth noticing Chinese participation in the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia (Cordano 2014).

Altogether, in December 2013, China was deploying 2,078 peacekeepers in nine different mission, which included 174 policemen, 39 military experts, and 1,865 military troops. This was more than any other permanent member of the UNSC, and was the sixth largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budge. The vast majority of Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in Africa. In particular, China has at the moment, military personnel involved in Cote D'Ivoire, Darfur, the DRC, Liberia, Mali, Republic of South Sudan (RSS), and Western Sahara.

3.4.1. PKO and PWC in Liberia

On November 30, 2003, China sent its first team of 500 peacekeepers to Liberia which also included personnel responsible for engineering, medical services and transportation. These peacekeepers contributed in various aspects. For instance, in the cease-fire agreement, the protection of civilians and UN staff, ensuring the
protection of human rights, assisting the state police in reforms and restoration, and offering training to local police (Ayenagbo et al 2012:27).

By sending this team, China helped make sure that the Liberian government would function well and bring peace to Liberia while Western countries are often wary of sending their troops to Africa (Ayenagbo et al 2012:28). According to Ayenagbo et al (2012), the arrival of Chinese soldiers in Liberia signalled a wider commitment to peacekeeping in Africa in order to rebuild peace in the country as well as extend Chinese influence on the continent. The Chinese transport unit carried more than 14,000 tons of materials, the engineering unit rehabilitated 375km of roads while the medical unit conducted more than 1,900 laboratory tests on patients of various diseases while at the same time providing free medical services to the locals (Ayenagbo et al 2012).

China has not only contributed to the security and peace of Liberia, but also to post-war reconstruction and development by helping locals build and renovate some public facilities such as bridges and roads, and providing free medical treatment to local communities. China’s involvement in the country was commended by the UN, which awarded 558 Chinese peacekeepers with UN medals on March 15, 2010. This recognition is the result of the achievements made by China’s three components of the contingents such as maintaining a road network of 303km, as well as connecting Zwededru to Tappita, Fish Town and Pyne Town (Ayenagbo et al 2012).

Moreover, China was further applauded for providing essential health care services to over 1,500 UN staff and members of the local population. In addition to clocking over 346,985km supplying over 36,260 tons of cargo, water, and fuel in support of UNMIL’s work, China’s ‘blue helmet’ had provided crucial logistical support to the Government County Senatorial by-election. China further donated $50,000 worth of medical supplies and recreational materials to communities in Zwedru and had saved the lives of a community near Freezone in Monrovia, which would have been obliterated by a fire outbreak.
3.4.2. PKO and PWC in Sudan

The crisis in Sudan began in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) accused the government of oppressing the Darfur non-Arab population. This genocide was intense in the Darfur province, and to alleviate the conflict, China attempted to balance its ties with the different parties involved. That is, the government-backed militias and local Darfuri resistance movement composed of 27 rebel groups (Ayenagbo et al 2012:29). According to Ayenagbo et al (2012), China showed its interest in the political settlement of the Darfur crisis because of the potentially destabilising influence of the crisis had on the rest of Sudan and regional stability. As a result, along with the UNSC and the West, China contributed to the drafting of a resolution (resolution 1769) and also ensured an agreement that this issue was a political problem and therefore required a political solution and process rather than economic sanctions favoured by the West.

Consequently, China sent five batches of humanitarian aid to Darfur in 2004 and the fifth, worth US$5.2 million, was sent on August 2007, consisting of cross-country vehicles, ambulances, medical instruments and mobile houses (Ayenagbo et al 2012). China further contributed US$$3.5 million to AMIS, the AU Mission in Sudan in June 2006. China contributed 444 troops to UNMIS in South Sudan and 322 troops to UNAMID. China’s contribution to Sudan has been commended by the US as being indispensable, especially when it comes to influencing the government in Khartoum and being able to operate as a mediator (Ayenagbo et al 2012).

China’s decision to join the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (much earlier, it had contributed 350 engineers to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Darfur region of the Sudan) follows its multi-billion dollar investment in the infrastructure of oil refinery in South Sudan, in improving agricultural performance, in building critically-needed roads, and in exploring hydropower possibilities (Rotberg 2014:24).

China was also active earlier in brokering a resumption of petroleum pumping when South Sudan and the Sudan were embroiled in a dispute over oil transit revenues. Now China has helped influence the various negotiations in Addis Ababa, which nudged South Sudanese President Kiir and Machar to forge the latest internal
ceasefire. China further pledged US$1 million to an intergovernmental effort to monitor the ceasefire.

Moreover, China is also building a pipeline and a railway from Mombasa on the Kenyan coast towards the new Kenyan oil deposits to the West of Lake Turkana and toward the Uganda oil fields near Lake Albert. Both the railway and the pipeline could conceivably be extended to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, and to the South Sudanese petroleum field.

### 3.5. Democratisation and political development

China’s increased pressure and involvement in Africa since the 2000 has faced criticism from especially Western countries, such as the US (Barton 2009:14). This criticism follows accusations that China’s growing economic role in Africa is counterproductive to democratisation and development (Whittington 2012:19). For the purpose of political development, the consequences of China’s economic development are detrimental to African democratisation. As a result, this, as the literature argues, might hinder the strengthening of the human security-development nexus. For instance, China’s policy of non-interference means that China does not involve itself in the politics and democratisation process of African states. This is dangerous for African development and may lead to unintended consequences for China’s economic interests.

This view is supported by Whittington (2012:28) who argues that China will begin to weigh the costs and benefits of involving itself in the political affairs of its African partners. He further reiterates that China will not hesitate to change its policy towards African sovereignty should it investments be threatened. Some authors such as Power and Mohan (2010:482) believe that China’s capacity to assist in the democratisation process in Africa is uncertain. This is because China’s decisions and actions are based on the interest of China making profit and protecting it investments. For instance, according to Power and Mohan (2012), during the Liberian war China continued to support the Liberian President, Charles Taylor despite increasing international pressure to end trade with Liberia. They argue that this resistance was based on pushing China’s interests of purchasing timber.
However, when Taylor left his office as president, China then switched and joined the UN peacekeeping missions to restore order in the country.

Furthermore, China also has a tendency of investing in war-torn countries to serve its economic interest. Rather than a democratisation process, this may lead to authoritarian regimes since they often support the leader in power (Whittington 2012:28). For example, in the instance of Sudan, proceeds from Chinese oil investments were potentially used to perpetuate acts of genocide against South Sudan. This exposes China selective non-interference which means China can only assist in the democratisation and political development process if it is in their economic interest. So, one can say that China is not a reliable contributor to strengthen human security and development.

The Fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was held in 2013 adopted the Beijing Action Plan for 2013-2015 that will provide African countries with US$20 billion as concessional loans for the development of infrastructure, agriculture, and manufacturing (FOCAC 2014). In 2011, trade between the PRC and Africa reached US$260 billion, of which US$166 billion represented the value of China’s exports to Africa. This was a drastic surge from US$1 billion in 1980. China has also been involved in peace and security projects in Africa, and has contributed modest auxiliary troops to peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Liberia, the Western Sahara, and the DRC. In 2013, China contributed US$5 million in peacekeeping equipment to the AMISOM (FOCAC 2014).

In addition, China aided African governments in meeting the exponentially increasing public demands for infrastructure and services more quickly (OECD 2011). China further enabled African countries to meet some of the public demands for development, particularly in infrastructure such as roads, buildings, bridges, airports, hospitals, schools, universities, and telecommunication (World Bank 2011). China’s unconditional and unqualified cooperation has also allowed African governments to enjoy access to finance, expertise and development aid with no political conditions. Incumbent governments in Africa have gained some performance legitimacy. China, through its unconventional development path and soft loans, has provided African
governments with the possibility of tipping the balance of legitimacy for states at least in the delivery of some public goods (World Bank 2011).

China sold Zimbabwe fighter aircraft and military vehicles for US$200, despite a US and EU arms embargo. Furthermore, a radio-jamming device was used by the Zimbabwean government to block broadcasts of anti-government reports from independent media outlets during the 2005 parliamentary elections (McLaughlin 2005). Weapons were sold to the Nigerian government and they have been used to put down violence in the Niger River delta directed against economic exploitation by multinational oil companies, including Chinese corporations (Taylor 2009:17).

3.6. Economic development

China’s involvement in economic development in Africa has been marked by the establishment of the FOCAC in 2000. For instance, prior (1999) to the establishment of the FOCAC, bilateral trade and investment between China and African totalled $2 billion, but in 2007 this figure increased to more than $40 billion a year, and in 2010 it became about $114 billion (O’Brien 2008:78). China’s increased economic development contribution in Africa has been noticeable through a number of corporations which are doing business in the continent with a focus in varying sectors. For example, according to the Financial Times (2009), more than 800 Chinese corporations are doing business in Africa mainly in infrastructure, energy and banking.

Furthermore, in 2007, China announced cutting off tariffs for all goods imported from 25 out of 49 African nations with which China does business (O’Brien 2008:77). Arvin and Sheriffs (2009:39) notes that China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa has increased enormously from 2000 to 2006, and African countries have also received less western aid than they did during the 1980s. For instance, in 2007 alone, China offered $8 billion to Africa compared with only $2.3 billion offered by the World Bank (Arvin and Sheriff 2009:39). In addition, China mostly invests in African countries where it is getting natural resources from. For instance, in 2004, 54% of China’s total investment in Africa went to oil-exporting states such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan (De Looy 2006:26).
According to the African Development Bank Group (AFDB), China’s economic growth offers an opportunity to boost development in African countries (AFDB 2011:1). For instance, in 2008, trade between Africa and China reached US$100 billion and FDI flows from China to Africa amounted to US$5.4 billion. The AFDB further adds that Chinese loans and concessional assistance finances a wide range of development projects. With respect to trade and investment, the AFDB warns that China’s burgeoning trade and investment relationship with Africa does not benefit all sectors and/or countries equally. For instance, about 70% of Africa’s exports to China comes from Angola, SA, Sudan and the DRC, and are heavily dominated by raw materials such as oil, copper, cobalt, and cotton. In addition, about 60% of imports from China, largely manufactures, are destined to SA, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco. According to the AFDB (2011:2), Chinese outward FDI to Africa shows a similar pattern of concentration, with 50% flowing to the mining sectors of just a handful of resource-rich countries such as Nigeria, SA, and Sudan.

China contributed to the railway and the train station construction site in Angola, part of an agreement in which China helps build infrastructure in exchange for oil. Trade between African countries and China reached US$166 billion in 2011. China further contributed to the new headquarters of the AU. However, not all Africans welcomed this gift with open hands. According to Ighbor (2013), West African commentator, Chika Ezeonya referred to this gift as an insult to the AU since the building was designed, built and maintained by a foreign country. This building was not a first one that China contributed to African. For instance, China has assisted to build a hospital in Angola (2004-2006); a road from Lusaka (Zambia) to Chirundu in the Southeast (2005); a stadium in Sierra Leone (2006); a sugar mill and a sugarcane farm in Mali (1996); and a water supply project in Mauritania (2011). At the fifth FOCAC, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao listed yet more developments, including 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centres and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres throughout Africa. China further extended US$51 million in funding to Mali in September 2014. This funding included the construction of a fourth bridge across Niger River in the capital Bamako, and a railway line between Bamako and Conakry, the capital of Guinea (The Africa Report 2014).
3.6.1. China in Zambia

China has been active in Zambia’s economic development and according to the FOCAC (2014), China’s FDI in Zambia has accumulated to US$2.6 billion, with more than 500 Chinese companies investing in various sectors of the country’s economy. The economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Zambia, Chai Zhijing said the Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ), which is the first economic zone to be operated by China in Africa, has also attracted 29 companies in which more than 7000 jobs have so far been created (FOCAC 2014). Moreover, Zambian Commerce, Trade and Industry Permanent Secretary, Siazongo Siakelenge said “the Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) concept is to promote technology transfer, while creating massive job opportunities for the people of Zambia” (FOCAC 2014). He further urged Chinese companies to relocate to Zambia looking at investment incentives the Government was offering to companies investing in the MFEZ.

According to the AFDB (2012), China’s investment in Africa spans many sectors and is not confined to the Chinese government and large state-owned companies. Instead, several private Chinese companies have also invested heavily in Africa. For example, Huawei, a Chinese leading global telecom service provider, has invested a total of US$1.5 billion and employs 4000 workers in Africa (AFDB 2012).

In addition, China’s trade with Africa has also grown steadily since 2000, reaching US$160 billion in 2011 from just US$9 billion in 2000. (AFDB 2012). During this period, China’s share in Africa’s total trade rose from 3% to 13%, and the AFDB (2012) argues that China’s increased interest in Africa has been motivated by China’s desire to acquire the continent’s natural resources to sustain its rapid growth. In 2012, China imported one third of its oil from Africa, and some of its investments were tied to resource extraction (AFDB 2012). For instance, in the same year, Angola bartered oil resources for infrastructure development.

Furthermore, according to the Standard Bank Group (SBG), Africa remains a very important and strategic investment destination for China and its approximately 2000 companies (SBG 2014). The Group (2014) argues that “when Chinese firms consider investment destinations around the world, Africa is always top of the mind. Africa is usually among the first destinations that are considered by Chinese
companies that are looking to expand internationally, not only because of its abundant natural resources, but also because of its rich cultural heritage, which in many ways is more similar to Chinese custom than that of the Western world”.

The SBG (2014) further stresses that China is still unquestionably Africa’s largest single trading partner which reached US$210 billion in 2013, up 6% from the US$198 billion figure that prevailed in 2012. Moreover, Chinese imports from Africa, which largely comprise hard commodities, reached approximately US$115 billion, while Chinese exports to Africa totalled about US$94 billion (SBG 2014).

Notwithstanding the fact that China’s official Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) has fallen to a 6 month low of 50.5% in January 2014, the SBG foresees an increase China’s economy to 7% by the end of 2014. This prediction is informed by China economic growth in the past two years (SBG 2014). According to the Information Office of the Chinese State Council, China’s cumulative investment in Africa has doubled from US$ 9,33 billion in 2009 to US$ 21, 23 billion in 2012 (SBG 2014). The Group claims that Chinese loans to African governments have been concentrated on improving infrastructure, and these figures range from US$ 30 billion to US$ 40 billion.

The SBG (2014) has identified some recent examples of China’s involvement in Africa. These include the China National Petroleum Corporation’s acquisition of a stake in Mozambique’s offshore natural gas fields, the China National Gold Group Corporation’s investment in the Republic of Congo, the China National Nuclear Corporation’s acquisition of a stake in a Namibian uranium mine, and the Chinese-invested iron ore project expansion in Sierra Leone (SBG 2014).

3.6.2. China in Egypt

In August 2014, the Chinese and Egyptian Foreign Ministers, Wong Yi, and Sameh Shukry, held talks and agreed to make joint efforts in building “one belt and one” (FOCAC 2014). According to the FOCAC (2014), when Egypt and China speak of ‘one belt and one road’, they are referring to the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, infrastructure and trade networks put forward by XI during his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia. In these talks, China
encouraged more Chinese investments in the country and also expressed its willingness to assist the country in boosting its industrialisation through the transfer of advantageous production capacity and advanced technologies. The Chinese Foreign Minister further added that China also hopes to rely on Egypt’s geographical convenience so that more of China’s products could be sold on the markets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (FOCAC 2014).

Wong further reiterated that China does not seek trade surplus, and hopes that Egypt can be more active in promoting its own products on the Chinese customers (FOCAC 2014). He also noted that with more Chinese investments and tourist flowing into Egypt, it is even more tangible for a final realisation of a trade between the two countries. According to the FOCAC (2014), Wong further expressed Beijing’s desire to cooperate with Cairo on a basis of mutual benefit. This cooperation will include nuclear power, new energy, railways, ports, tunnel construction, and agriculture, especially in areas where China enjoys well-tested technologies and rich building and operational experiences. On the Egyptian’s part, they believe that by promoting their country’s strategic ties, as well as practical cooperation with China, Egypt’s development can be anticipated (FOCAC 2014).

3.7. Conclusion

Having gathered the relevant information relating to the historical perspective of China’s involvement in Africa, the study has discovered some unanswered questions on human security and human development. The chapter provided an overview of China’s involvement in Africa in a number of specific areas such as human rights and good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; and economic development. The overview further included specific examples such as Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Egypt, and Liberia.

The study will attempt to address these questions in the next chapter (4) which will analyse China’s role in promoting human security and human development in Africa. The study will do this by providing an assessment of the extent to which Chinese aid addresses these issues. In the assessment, the study will analyse the extent to which China contributes towards promoting and protecting Africa’s human rights and
good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; and economic development.
CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with a number of interrelated aspects that are important in understanding China’s involvement in Africa and the extent to which it contributes to the continent’s human security-development nexus. This framework is derived from the UN Reports of 1992, 1994 and 1999, as well as scholarly insights pertaining to China’s involvement in Africa.

Having established that China’s involvement in Africa covers a range of issues, it is therefore logical to conduct a critical review of these issues based on the propositions and questions that arise from the previous chapters. The previous chapter provided information (facts and figures) regarding China’s involvement in Africa.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse and evaluate the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa, discussed in the previous chapter, contributes to the strengthening of the human security-development nexus. For this purpose, this chapter will focus on following questions:

- What role does China play in reinforcing the human security-development nexus in its development approach in Africa?
- Does China’s involvement strengthen human security and human development in Africa?
- What is the nature of China’s assistance to Africa?

Based on the overview provided in Chapter three, this chapter considers China’s involvement in the fields of human rights and good governance, peacekeeping and post-war construction, democratisation and political development, and economic development.
4.2. Human rights and good governance

In chapter 2, a number of aspects which can contribute to strengthening human security and human development were identified. Among them is the promotion and protection of human rights and good governance. This issue was stressed in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Human Development Report discussed in chapter two. With regard to human rights and good governance, there was an agreement among a number of sources that China plays a minimal role. This literature revealed that China’s role in contributing to human rights and good governance in Africa is sabotaged by its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, as well as its desire to protect its economic interests.

The literature agrees that China’s involvement in Africa is more focused on profit-making and protecting its economic interests, rather than contributing to Africa’s human security and development. This means China only involves itself in Africa’s human rights and good governance when it sees a threat to its economic interest in the continent. Prominent sources in the issue of human rights and good governance include Botha (2006); Niquet (2006); Taylor (2006); the World Bank (2006); Rotberg and Gisselquist (2007); Brown and Sriram (2008); Coyne and Ryan (2008); Large (2008); the Transparency International (2008); Brautigam (2009); Jaunch and Sakaria (2009); Chuka (2011); Lange and Patey (2011); Palitza (2011); Saferworld (2011); Shaw (2011); Zhao (2011); and Alden (2014). These sources are parallel to one of the schools of thought discussed by Edinger et al (2008:1) which is covered in the literature review (chapter two).

From this school of thought, it is clear that China’s profit-driven motives can potentially lead to the exploitation of workers, environmental degradation, and elite corruption, as well as repressive behaviour. This is apparent in African countries such as SA and Nigeria where there are high advances in economic development which transform the lives of everyday people, leading to a growing middle class that demands more rights and improved social conditions that expand economic rights (Shaw 2011:28).

China is further accused of being involved in corruption with some of the African countries. Such corruption might be the result of China’s desire to protect its
economic interests in the province. This corruption may hinder the prospects for good governance in Africa, and a further infringement on human rights. China’s corruptness was exposed by the Transparency International (TI) in its 2008 Bribe Payer’s Index which ranked China 21 out of 22 countries for their propensity to bribe (TI 2008). This means that it is inappropriate to refer to China as a reliable source to promote human rights and good governance in the continent while they are a corrupt country themselves.

China’s corruption was further compounded in its infrastructure projects which are accused of human rights violations. For instance, in Zambia, SA, and Namibia, the information discovered that Chinese managers have repeatedly ignored local minimum wage laws and affirmative action requirements, while refusing to pay social security and allowances (Jaunch and Sakaria 2009:16). This means China does not share the same sentiments when it comes to Africa’s the protection and promotion human and labour rights in the continent. According to the World Bank (2006), China does not believe that civil and political rights should be prioritised over economic, social and cultural rights, and advocates that each country’s human rights protection should be its sole responsibility. It is therefore clear from the information that China does not contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights and good governance in the continent. For instance, China supports and funds countries practicing dictatorship regimes - such countries include Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe. In Sudan, China supported and funded President Omar al-Bashir in his ethnic cleansing of South Sudanese insurgents and also provided them with weapons to do so (Brown and Sriran 2008:259). This is further evidence that China does not contribute to human rights and good governance in the country, but only perpetuates human rights abuses.

China’s resistance to intervene in the internal affairs of African countries is further perpetuated by China many African government’s support of each other in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to resist too much intervention in their own sovereign affairs. This forms part of China’s (indirect) strategic aid conditions in Africa, as a result, African countries and China are reluctant to criticise and question each other’s human rights record. However, one should not misinterpret the literature and assume that China does not value human rights, and respects other countries’
beliefs. China believes another country’s human rights is their business and not of another and different countries have different definitions for human rights and they cannot be applied globally.

The Chinese further continued human rights abuses in Africa by fuelling tensions in Sudan when they supported Khartoum during the onset of the Darfur crisis in the early 2000s by selling arms to the country. The information reveals that China also violated human rights of Zambian workers in 2005 where it decided to ban union activities and began paying Zambian employees less than US$67-a-month minimum. The Chinese shot dead any Zambian worker who engaged in poor working conditions protests and demonstrations. For instance, in 2006, six workers were killed, and in April 2011, 11 were employees were shot dead (Palitza 2011). This is further evidence that China will protect its economic interest at any cost. This is parallel with the literature review where Botha (2006:98) warned that China’s actions indicate an inconsistency with respect to their foreign policy. According to Botha 92006), on the one hand, China is willing to ignore large-scale human atrocities and even fuel conflicts in order to accrue commercial gains and ensure energy security. On the other hand, China is eager to present itself as a responsible international power by supporting international efforts to quell those self-same conflicts that it helps to create.

The information shows that China’s ignorance and neglect of human rights abuses have faced immense criticisms and pressure from the above sources. For instance, Coyne and Ryan (2008) criticised China not setting as a requirement for providing development assistance, the implementation of anti-corruption and anti-human rights violation measures. They argue that China’s refusal to use its ties and development aid to oppressive African regimes as a political tool to threaten and cut off ties with them, as well as financial assistance legitimises the abuse of human rights. This means, China indirectly promoted the abuse of human rights in Africa, and unless they pose a threat to their economic interests, perhaps, they may have an influence.

This has had negative implications for many African countries which have been abandoned by their traditional Western donors. Examples of such countries include Angola and Sudan. Angola is known as an autocratic and corrupt country (Rotberg
and Gisselquist 2007:36). After Angola refused the IMF’s transparency measures in its loans and its resort to Chinese funds, this was a clear indication of China’s influence on some of the African countries. This revealed that Angola was joining the direction of human rights abuses and bad governance which was funded by the Chinese. Though China’s funding in Angola contributed to the economy in 2005, this growth did not, however, translate to the reduction of inequality and corruption, as well as the promotion of human rights and good governance (Zhao 2011). Angola accepted Chinese funding despite its (China) neglect and disrespect of the Angolan citizen’s human rights. This might have been the result of Angola’s strong belief in China’s policies, lack of political conditions against the declining confidence and belief in Western traditional donors.

Angola in 2006, when it was deserted by the IMF, decided to engage in business with China with an agreement to provide China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day for a loan in return (Taylor 2006:947). This had a negative impact on Angola’s relationship with their traditional Western donors such as the USA and Canada who cut off ties with the country. China’s loans were used to restore three railways that were important for Angola’s mineral exports, and also assisted in the construction of a new airport, and built low-income housing (Taylor 2006:949). This was a strategic influence of China in the country to promote its economic interest in Angola, and there was no intention to contribute towards ending human rights abuses. Moreover, though roads, clinics and schools were built, however, corruption persisted (Brautigam 2009:11). In 2009, Angola attempted to address the issue of corruption where it began to publish its oil revenues and expenditure account of the Ministry of Finance website (Brautigam 2009:274). This was one step which symbolised a crucial attempt towards transparency without Western loans. However, there is no evidence that this was the result of China’s influence.

The literature also shows that China has been involved in human rights abuses in Sudan. This is evident in China’s assistance of President Omar al-Bashir with military training which had no political conditions, and China’s refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of Sudan (Niquet 2006). This support questions the legitimacy of the Sudanese regime and its ability to enforce the rule of law over the population and territory (Alden 2014:3). The information discovered that China uses its policy of non-
interference to interfere in any human rights abuses occurring in the African continent unless it serves its economic interests. This means China’s attitude towards African human rights is negative. China justifies itself by arguing that economic development is the priority in the continent rather than focusing on the promotion and protection of human rights and good governance. China believes that it is impossible for Africa to address and be assisted in human rights violations. Most Western countries criticise China for engaging in African countries with resources such as oil. Such countries include Angola and Sudan.

China continued to advance its economic interest and ignored the conflicts in Sudan, as they built small arms and manufacturing factories in Sudan. The Chinese further assisted Sudan with military training, and this assistance received criticism from the West. This support underscored the negative impact the China involvement in Africa has on both African policy and global manoeuvrability (Lange & Patey 2011). China’s support of the regime showed its desire to protect its economic interests in the country while it’s also further violated human rights and led to the ill-administration of the country. According to Chuka (2011:70), China’s arms sales to Sudan between 1996 and 2003 made up 10% of all arms transfers to Africa, from 2004 to 2007, China’s percentage increased to almost 18%. Chinese weapons and ammunition worsened the conflict and security in Sudan, and they were used to commit human rights violations and international humanitarian law by government forces, militias and groups (Saferworld 2011:ii).

China was experiencing too much pressure from the West, and as a result, they had no choice but to try and resolve the conflict by diverting from its policy of non-interference. For instance, in 2007, Beijing used its influence with al-Bashir to press for the acceptance of a common AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur (Large 2008:95). This shows that China was desperate to protect its investments and image which was now at risk since Sudan was becoming intensely unstable. Chinese investments were becoming a target for opposition leaders, civil society activists, and rebels, and this was due to China’s close ties with the ruling regime (Saferworld 2011:ii). So, by ignoring the political strife in the country, China places both its interests and image at stake. To prevent this, China resorted to contribute to Sudan’s security, and this was due to pressure on China from the West.
4.3. Peacekeeping and post-war construction

Peacekeeping and post-war construction is another aspect which was discovered by the literature review as a possible contributor to the nexus. However, because of China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries, it might seem that China cannot directly play a central role in peacekeeping and post-war construction. It may also seem that, as in the previous aspect, China’s engagement on the African continent is for its economic interests rather than advancing peacekeeping and post-war construction measures. But this might not be the case. This chapter will attempt to analyse the information (facts and figures) provided in the previous chapter under the sub-heading, ‘peacekeeping and post-war construction’ in order to determine to what extent this is true. Prominent sources in this section of the chapter include Cordano (2014) and Ayenagbo et al (2012:27).

The relationship between China and Africa is predominantly economic, but China’s role in Africa is continuously increasing in the political and security domains (Cordano 2014). This increased involvement provides both new opportunities and challenges for Africa. China seems to offer at least a small level of military assistance to all of the countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations. Such countries include Angola, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As noted in the previous chapter, it is worth noting that military assistance is provided not only to countries relevant because of their natural resources, as illustrated by the fact that China has maintained important cooperation with Tanzania, a country which is unimportant with regard to raw materials even though it assumes relevance as a port and rail terminus (Cordano 2014).

As is typical on the part of China, military ties are often developed on a bilateral basis through high-level political delegations (Cordano 2014). These ties with African countries are marked by different components. An important role is played by financial assistance by way of grants and aid. Another component is the transfer of conventional weapons and military technologies.

Chinese engagement in training personnel able to de-mine should be welcomed as an important step in improving security conditions in Africa, which will in turn, assist in development conditions. However, Chinese assistance can be ineffective in
bringing about peace and security if not connected to governance and development issues. In addition, since its assistance is not conditional to the respect of human rights and political conditions, China has supported military forces responsible for the violations of international humanitarian law. China’s assistance guaranteed to military forces that are used by authoritarian government as a tool to maintain power can certainly increase short-term stability, but at the price of negative effects on the development and the long term security of those countries (Cordano 2014).

There is evidence that China has transferred armaments to several African states, such as Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Namibia and Nigeria (Cordano 2014). China’s involvement in Africa with regard to arms trade guarantee several advantages since the competition of Western companies is low and China can present itself as a reliable supplier that does not make the sale of weapons dependent on the respect of human rights. China is also able to offer low prices, as well as very favourable financing options (Cordano 2014). This is due to the fact that China sells weapons to Africa as part of its general strategy to consolidate political ties and economic relations. For instance, China’s arms sales to Africa could facilitate China’s attempt at gaining access to important natural resources. Although China may claim that it transfer of arms to African countries is based on the desire to reinforce the stability of African states, however, this may risk undermining the respect for human rights and may not necessarily contribute to the creation of more responsible and accountable militaries. Such an example was highlighted in the previous chapter where in Sudan, the army committed human rights violations with Chinese arms and with tacit support from the Chinese government (Cordano 2014).

In addition, China’s involvement in African peacekeeping missions may be seen as a strategic measure to gain a relevant profile throughout the UN and obtaining diplomatic, as well as an economic advantage. This may also allow international trade and the opportunity to have access to the natural resources needed for its development. China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa can also create goodwill for them, and also be utilised as a relevant tool to raise China’s profile as a responsible power (Cordano 2014).
Moreover, China’s growing influence in African security is certainly motivated to a great extent by the attempt to safeguard its interests on the African continent. This often seems to coincide with the need for peace and security of the African continent and can favour stability in several African countries. For instance, Chinese energy security has engendered a strong Chinese interest in assuming stability of those regions that are essential for its energy supply. Given the vast presence of workers in infrastructure on the continent, the security of Chinese workers is another one of China’s main interest that can push China to uphold stability in Africa (Cordano 2014).

The literature revealed a tension between Chinese responsibility as an international ascending power and its interest in protecting economic and political ties. The effect of Chinese military assistance, provision of arms to African states, and Chinese involvement in peacekeeping operations on the continent has been a mixed one so far. China has contributed to increased security and stability as a result of the de-mining training provided to African military personnel and the participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In this regard, Chinese relations with authoritarian regimes may also help UN peacekeeping efforts, encouraging some countries to consent to the operations. On the other hand, China does not select the beneficiary of its help depending on respect for human rights or human security. Thus, China is not contributing to the creation of more responsible and accountable militaries. The assistance guaranteed to military forces that are used by authoritarian governments as a tool for maintaining power can certainly increase short-term stability, but at the price of negative effects on the long-term security of those countries (Cordano 2014).

For instance, in the case of Sudan, the realities of oil, and the fact that China constructed the main pipeline northwards from South Sudan and has a controlling interest in the Sudan’s main oil refinery, it is no surprise that China’s long affirmed policy of non-interference in the affairs of African (and other) nations has now been modified to dispatch a battalion of peacekeepers to South Sudan. From the literature, it is evident that China is fully invested in the strategic future of South Sudan, and the adjacent oil producing state. For instance, by sending a battalion of peacekeepers shows that China intends to fully engage with the region in an enduring manner (Cordano 2014).
In Liberia, the information shows that unlike the issue of human rights, China is really playing a vital role to contribute to this nexus. According to Ayenagbo et al (2012:27), in November 2003, China sent its first team of 500 peacekeepers to Liberia which also included personnel responsible for engineering, medical services and transportation. These peacekeepers assisted in supervising the enforcement of the cease-fire agreement by the country’s various parties, protect the security of the public and UN staff, maintain basic human rights, assist the state police in reforms and the country’s restoration, and offer training to local police (Ayenagbo et al 2012:27).

By sending this team, China helped make sure that the Liberian government functioned well and helped bring peace to Liberia while Western countries are often wary of sending their troops to Africa (Ayenagbo 2012:28). According to Ayenagbo et al (2012), the arrival of Chinese soldiers in Liberia signalled a wider commitment to peacekeeping in Africa in order to rebuild peace in the country as well as extend Chinese influence on the continent. The Chinese transport unit carried more than 14,000 tons of materials, the engineering unit rehabilitated 375km of roads while the medical unit conducted more than 1,900 laboratory tests on patients of various diseases while at the same time providing free medical services to the locals (Ayenagbo et al 2012).

China has not only contributed to security and peace of Liberia, but also to post-war reconstruction and development by helping locals build and renovate some public facilities such as bridges and roads, and providing free medical treatment to local communities. China’s involvement in the country was commended by the UN which awarded 558 Chinese peacekeepers with UN medals on March 2010 (Ayenagbo et al 2012).

Moreover, China was further applauded for providing essential health care services to over 1,500 UN staff and members of the local population (Ayenagbo et al 2012). In addition to clocking over 346,985km supplying over 36,260 tons of cargo, water, and fuel in support of UNMIL’s work, China’s ‘blue helmet’ had provided crucial logistical support to the Government County Senatorial by-election. China further donated $50,000 worth of medical supplies and recreational materials to
communities in Zwedru and had saved the lives of a community near Freezone in Monrovia, which would have been obliterated by a fire outbreak.

Despite the fact that China exploits African resources for its own benefit, this is in line with what Western countries have been doing for a long time. China therefore acts like any other great power. However, China does at the same time provide, like many great powers, practical assistance, and has also shown it willingness to become involved in furthering UN goals and objectives, for example, in Sudan. In addition, and contrary to Western great powers, China does become involved in peacekeeping operations.

4.4. Democratisation and political development

China’s policy of non-interference is always criticised by the West as a policy of advancing China’s economic interests. As seen in the previous discussions, China’s policy of non-interference is contradictory. This is because China does interfere when their economic interests or investments are at risk. With regard to democratisation and political development, China’s economic role in Africa has been negatively labelled as counterproductive to democratisation and development (Whittington 2012:19). This part of the chapter will discuss the extent to which China contributes to democratisation and political development in Africa. Prominent sources in this section include Power and Mohan (2010); Whittington (2012); FOCAC (2014) which is the China-Africa forum, and so one has to be careful in using it as a source as one could argue that it could be propaganda. So, what FOCAC has to say, has to be measured against other sources. Other sources include the OECD (2014); Iwilade (2014); and the World Bank (2014).

The information reveals that China does not play any role in democratisation processes of African countries unless the regime no longer generates profit for them and no longer protects Chinese interests. According to Power and Mohan, China’s resistance to end trade and contribute to the democratisation process in Liberia despite mounting international pressure is based on pushing China’s interests of purchasing timber. However, when Taylor left his office as president, China then switched and joined the UN peacekeeping missions to restore order in the country. This shows a pattern with the previous aspects that China exerts influence if it does
not have any interests in the country, as it does not have meaningful relationships with countries with resources it does not desire. In this respect, one can also argue that China joined the UN peacekeeping missions in hope that by solving the conflict, it would again be possible to benefit from Liberia.

China is involved in states which lack strategic resources but which serve as useful markets, and allies in geographical struggles. In these countries, China has not yet undermined democracy but rather has offered significant aid-supporting joint ventures, making technical grants and investing in infrastructure. Such countries include China, Tanzania, and Zambia (Iwilade 2014:4). China is also involved in countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria, which have significant strategic resources. Here, China’s role often exacerbates the ‘resource curse’, and strengthens neo-patrimonial structures. In this regard, China is hardly a democratic influence (Iwilade 2014).

China further engages in countries such a Liberia that is emerging from conflict, where China makes important and helpful peacekeeping interventions. As these interventions are within the framework of the UN, China’s actions contribute to the reinforcing and gradual consolidation of democracy (Saferworld 2011). Since China’s involvement in African states is based on investments with strategic decisions and actions within which it operates, this makes it difficult to generalise about how it impacts on democratisation in Africa.

China’s ability to influence political processes varies significantly across the continent, with different countries offering different contexts and thus different ways of understanding China’s role. Any complete analysis of China’s impact on democratisation in Africa would therefore be nuanced, and thus avoid broad generalisations that often merely reproduce Western fears about Chinese global geostrategic competition, rather than the realities of China’s engagements with the continent (Campbell 2007:120).

For instance, China’s refusal in the early 2000s to pressure Sudan to pursue peace in Darfur, southern Darfur, Kordofan and its other conflicts zones was very much connected to the securitisation of its oil investments in the country. Bashir’s government relied on the extensive militarisation of oil-producing areas to guarantee
unfettered extraction. This was backed by deliberate policies of depopulation of these regions and dispossessing peasants of land, which in turn, led to conflict and suffering. It is difficult to see how these domestic policies could have been acceptable in a democratic state. China, thus, had a vested interest in perpetuating the hold of Sudan’s governing elite in power, thereby the claim that resource-rich states are an arena where China is often an undemocratic force (Iwilade 2014:8).

By 2004, China had become visibly more active in encouraging the Bashir regime to consider peaceful solutions to its many insurgencies. Subtle Chinese pressure is partly responsible for bringing Bashir to the table and to the eventual Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudanese’ People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This agreement culminated in the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Chinese interests in stability in the region were also increased when it was a diplomatic victory over Taiwan, when Chad decided to switch loyalties in 2006.

Chinese impact on democratisation in Africa is highly varies and context-specific. The specific internal conditions of African states predispose the Chinese impacts on democratisation to certain influences from China. Where the state is transitioning to democracy and enjoying relative stability, China often supports rather than disrupts democratic process. States such as Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania fall into this category. Where the state possesses strategic resources, China often exacerbates the ‘resource curse’ and strengthens neo-patrimonial structures and corruption. In these types of cases, China is usually a problem for democratisation. States such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan are good examples here. Where states are in post-conflict states, for instance, Liberia, China usually plays useful roles within multilateral peacekeeping frameworks. In this sense, it impacts positively on democratisation, as it helps to consolidate peace and support electoral and other such institutional structures.

China’s investments and impacts are far more concentrated in a few countries in African than the discourse about a ‘new Sinosphere’ suggests (Wild and Mepham 2006). Even where China has a significant presence, the actors should be disaggregated to account for the growing relevance of private Chinese investors and embedded social networks, which operate outside the control of Beijing. The most
obvious example of China’s anti-democratic impact on an African state is Sudan. This case shows how China’s problematic ‘non-intervention’ policy has gradually become muted to strategically expand and protect its economic interests in Sudan.

As a state now driven by pragmatic rather than ideological consideration, China can be expected increasingly to support measures that will guarantee its investments, promote stability and enhance its global standing. If, in doing this, it continues to respond to international pressures about its relations with African governments, one may be cautiously optimistic about the net prospects of China as a player in African democratisation. This optimism is to be qualified by the specific content of each state within which China plays a role (Iwilade 2014:10).

Furthermore, China also has a propensity of investing in war-torn countries to serve its economic interest. Rather than a democratisation process, this may lead to authoritarian regimes since China often supports the leader in power (Whittington 2012:28). For example, in the instance of Sudan, proceeds from Chinese oil investments were potentially used to perpetuate acts of genocide against South Sudan. This exposes China’s selective non-interference which means China only assists in the democratisation and political development process if it is in their economic interest. So, one can say that China is not a reliable contributor to strengthen human security and development. In comparison, what China is doing in Africa is very much like that of traditional great powers that also, for many decades, supported authoritarian governments and dictatorships.

4.5. Economic Development

China’s contribution to human development in Africa does not infringe on its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This contribution forms part of China strategic effort to form cooperation between China and Africa to assist Africa’s economic development. This cooperation is marked by the establishment of the FOCAC in 2000. With the establishment of the FOCAC, China’s trade, investment and aid to Africa has increased tremendously. This means that China is contributing to the nexus, with respect to economic development.
The relationship between China and African countries is not a one-way street where China’s involvement in Africa is only exploiting Africa’s raw materials and natural resources. It is based on a give and take partnership. While China provides African countries with development aid, unconditional loans, grants and infrastructure development, China is also gaining in return. For instance, Chinese companies are getting raw material such as coal from SA, iron ore from Gabon, timber from Equatorial Guinea, and copper from Zambia. The Chinese further require new markets for their products in Africa. This relationship is the type of relationship which was discussed in the literature where two schools of thought were identified, one favouring China involvement in African, and the other against. For those scholars who are in favour of China’s involvement in Africa, the relationship is beneficial to the continent since China’s increased trade, investment, and aid contributes towards achieving sustainable human security and human development across the continent (Edinger et al 2008:1).

However, there is also a negative side to this relationship. For instance, Chinese products severely affect local business since many African countries cannot compete with cheap fabrics and garments from China. As a result, some countries such as Tanzania have stopped Chinese firms from selling their products in the country’s markets. Instead, they have only welcomed them as investors. Chinese industries have also been criticised by the Zimbabweans’ furniture Manufacturing Association of the crippling Zimbabwean furniture industry since they sell cheap and weak furniture (Drummond & Liu 2013).

Moreover, Chinese firms have also violated the safety of workers, leading to insecure working conditions. This issue has been prevalent in Zambia whereby Chinese-run mines in the country has been accused of not taking adequate safety measures for their local workers (Ighobor 2013). China’s presence in some African countries has not been pleasant. There have been cultural tensions as a result of language barriers.

The literature has revealed that China may have a negative impact on economic development in Africa. For instance, in its involvement in African countries, China tends to advocate a Chinese-style economic development model based on a
restricted market system with a single political party in power, and in the African market context, this seems to be the political elite (Ajakaiye 2006). This does not only impede domestic security and development, but also provides limited market access to other global trading partners, leaving Africa’s traditional Western donors, such as the US at a disadvantage.

China has shown its contribution to Africa’s economic development by sending about 800 of its companies to Africa to do business, mainly in infrastructure, energy, and banking (Shen 2013). Though this is a good gesture by China, it however, undermines African countries and its businesses since instead of bringing its own companies, China can invest in African businesses already dealing with the above sector, and assist African governments to establish its own companies dealing with infrastructure, energy and banking. This further reveals that China’s interest in Africa is to make profit, to assist Africa to develop with their companies rather than assisting African companies to develop their own countries.

Nonetheless, Chinese companies have assisted Africa more than the West since the establishment of the FOCAC. For instance, in 2007, China offered US$8 billion to Africa compared with only US$2.3 billion offered by the World Bank (Arvin & Sheriff 2009:39). Moreover, though China’s contribution to Africa’s economic development is more than that of the West and is increasing, however, the literature pointed out that China’s assistance is biased. China mostly invests in African countries where it’s getting natural resources. For instance, in 2004, 54% of China’s total investment in Africa went to oil-exporting countries such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan (De Looy 2006:26).

The AFDB also applauded China’s contribution to economic development in the country, and it believes this offers an opportunity for boosting African economic development (AFDB 2011:1). However, China’s burgeoning trade and investment relationship with Africa does not benefit all sectors and countries equally. For instance, according to the AFDB (2011:2), about 70% of Africa’s exports to China comes from Angola, SA, Sudan, and the DRC, and are heavily dominated by raw materials such as oil, copper, cobalt, and cotton. China has further contributed in creating economic zones in Africa in order to assist in the continent’s economic
development. For instance, these zones have contributed in creating 7000 jobs, they have promoted technology transfers between China and Zambia (FOCAC 2014).

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter commenced with an overview of the literature discussing China’s approach to the human security-development nexus in Africa. It then focused on the key aspects of the desktop research findings, including an analysis of the information collected. It also provided some critical analysis of China’s approach, including the dynamics of the human security-development nexus. Based on the general theme of the study and information collected, some of the attitudes and perceptions regarding China’s approach to the human security-development nexus were established.

The information collected confirmed the research theme that China’s approach towards Africa is very broad and generally problematic. It established that China is criticised by some Western countries and institutions for its policy of non-interference, which undermines many African countries with respect to human rights, for instance.

Analysis of the information strongly indicates that China contributes mainly to aspects which serve its economic interests, or when its economic interests are at stake, and when experiencing immense external pressure. The information also indicated that though China exploits China’s raw materials and natural resources, Africa, however, also benefits in the form of development aid, humanitarian aid, and infrastructure.

The next chapter concludes the study by summarising the findings and drawing conclusions on the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa has contributed to human security and human development. The chapter will further provide recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

Chapter Five summarises this study; tests the assumptions that the study was based on; and presents the main conclusions that were reached in this study.

5.2. Summary of the study

The aim of this study was to discover the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa contributes to the strengthening of the human security-development nexus. The research objectives were aimed at, firstly, identifying the role China plays in reinforcing the human security-development nexus in its development approach in Africa; secondly, to explore if China’s involvement in Africa strengthens human security and human development in Africa; thirdly, to illustrate the nature of China’s assistance to Africa.

Chapter One, an introduction to the research, outlined the background of the study and identified the research problem as having derived from the debates over and criticisms of China’s involvement in Africa. This debate and criticism informed the need to critically review and analyse the extent to which China’s involvement in Africa contributes to the strengthening of the human security-development nexus. A qualitative research methodology that combines both descriptive and analytical approaches was adopted in conducting this study. Based on the review of both primary and secondary sources, a desktop research was conducted in order to establish the perceptions held by different scholars and institutions about China’s involvement in Africa with respect to the nexus.

Chapter Two, on the concept of the security-development nexus, provided a number of inter-related themes that are essential for understanding the security-development nexus. It showed that the security-development nexus is a necessary policy for, especially for developing countries. It also revealed the general idiom that there can be no human security without human development, and no human development without human security. So, any prospects for effective human security and human security required a link of the two concepts. The chapter further developed an analytical framework for measuring the extent to which China’s development aid
contributes to Africa’s human security and human development. This analytical framework includes human rights and good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; healthcare; and economic development. This chapter further revealed two schools of thought relating to China’s involvement in Africa. That is, one that argues that China’s involvement in Africa benefits the African continent, and the other arguing that the relationship is detrimental to Africa.

Chapter Three provided a brief background of the history of China-Africa relations, and then proceeded to China’s involvement in the continent since 2000. This chapter examined and discussed China’s contribution to Africa’s human rights and good governance, utilising Angola, Sudan and Zambia as case studies; peacekeeping and post-war construction, using Liberia and Sudan as case studies; democratisation and political development; and economic development, utilising Zambia and Egypt as case studies.

Chapter Four utilised the findings of the previous chapter and analyses China’s role in promoting human security and human development in Africa. This chapter does this by providing an assessment of the extent to which Chinese aid has contributed in addressing the issues of human rights and good governance; peacekeeping and post-war construction; democratisation and political development; and economic development. The analysis contained in this chapter will parallel with the literature overview discussed in Chapter Two.

### 5.3. Testing of the assumption

The research study was based on a number of assumptions. These assumptions include the following:

- China’s involvement in Africa is based on an evaluation of the African continent’s potential with regard to natural resources and raw materials beneficial to China’s fast-growing economy.
- China’s involvement in Africa is based on the provision of a market for China’s exports, and the continent’s usefulness as a political ally in the international arena.
China takes a strategic position in the African region with regards to the political dynamics of Africa and does not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries.

China’s relations with Africa are based on elite interactions. That is, enhancing the growth of businesses and infrastructure growth in big cities.

China’s development aid is better and preferred by most African countries as compared to aid from traditional donors.

Although China exploits Africa’s raw material and natural resources, some Africa countries (with respect to infrastructure, interest-free loans, humanitarian assistance, healthcare and grants), to a certain extent, benefit from China’s involvement.

The study has answered the research questions and sub-questions in the previous chapters by focusing on Chinese contributions to the escalating issues facing African countries. This part of the study summarised and divided these answers into economic (development and political (security) advantages and disadvantages.

5.3.1. Economic advantages for Africa

The benefits to China in terms of access to natural resources, new markets, and support within the UN are obvious, but it is not always clear what economic benefits African states obtain from engagement with China, despite China’s claims regarding partnership. There are opportunities and potential, but not all of these have translated into positive realities within Africa. Some of the opportunities of trade include: a low price of goods that can improve that standard of living for those in poverty, and an improvement in the macroeconomic environment that may result in less need to incur budget deficits for social programs (Ajakouye 2006). These improvements depend on a growing international economy with increased demand for mineral and agricultural resources. They are also dependent on African states, transforming potential gains into reality through investment in sustainable development projects (Shaw 2011:32).

A further advantage of Chinese development assistance to African states is that it is faster and more accessible and available than that from the West. They are often willing to launch business in countries considered too risky by Western
entrepreneurs (Tull 2006:450). There are fewer impacts studies and other hurdles that create delays. Chinese developers just come in and build (Shinn 2006). While the speed in this situation is appealing, the sacrifice of neglecting to do impact studies for such project is costly to the people. Issues such as environmental degradation and forced relocation threaten the social and economic rights of people.

5.3.2. Economic disadvantages for Africa

Although there are some potential gains to be made for African states, there are also some risks from the increasing involvement of China in Africa. These risks include neo-colonial investment practices that discourage diversification of the economy and weaken emerging industries, destructive hiring practices, and failure to meet quality and safety standards. One of the assumptions of the literature can be summarised as that China does not always have the interest of African countries at heart. So, African countries may be risking becoming captive to Chinese neo-colonial practices. African countries are mostly exporting raw materials rather than finished goods to China, which they import back as expensive manufactured goods.

Moreover, this might not have a negative impact for the African elite as they benefit from the construction of presidential residences, and getting aid for their own personal use. However, it has a strong negative impact on ordinary citizens. African governments often place their countries and citizens at risks by negotiating and entering into agreements with the Chinese which do not necessarily translate into human security and human development. Such agreements involve funds, technology and political protection from international pressures such as sanctions from the IMF and the UNSC.

Though trade occurs between China and African states, there is a suspicion that large capital flows do not go to African countries. For instance, Chinese investors prefer to invest in Chinese businesses in Africa instead of in African businesses. African businesses further suffer from Chinese competition and this has a harmful impact on African exports. China often hires Chinese workers that local residents for Chinese-sponsored projects. This increases the burden of high unemployment and it is not beneficial for African economies.
5.3.3. Political advantages and disadvantages

It is ironic that China has such a strong political impact in Africa even though it vows a policy of non-interference. Its economic practices have clear political impacts, intended and unintended, and appear to do little to help the promotion of democracy associated with the protection of human rights (Taylor 2009). It is the African elite who benefit most from engaging with China while the general public sees few advantages and a number of disadvantages. (Tull 2006:455). African leaders are looking for models of success that do not threaten established regime interests (Alden 2007).

The most notable appeal of Chinese aid and trade for African elites is that it provides an alternative to conditional Western aid and political pressure (Shinn 2006). For instance, as witnessed in Chapter 3, the Chinese loaned the Angolan government a US$9 billion in order to avoid taking a loan with the IMF with specific conditions to improve the lives of the underprivileged (Drummond & Liu 2013). Without the conditions that come with much Western investment and assistance, African leaders can use the revenues they receive from China in a number of ways that do not benefit the African general public and threaten human rights (Taylor 2009). This may be negative for the China African relations since the interests of the African governments are not the same as the masses. This may suggest that in the future, for instance, local African populations will turn against Chinese firms in Africa, even in conditions where the government has close relations with China.

While China insists on upholding the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty, this is being exploited by African leaders for self-protection. They use their power to employ violence and gain a favourable distribution of wealth from trade and aid. As seen in Chapter 3, the literature has argued that such engagement could even threaten China’s own interests in the continent. For example, China’s relations with Mugabe in Zimbabwe may seriously undermine any relations it may have with a post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.

Revenues obtained from Chinese trade by authoritarian regimes to maintain and enrich themselves always come with detrimental consequences. For instance, the promotion of democracy in African states may continue to be hindered. China’s
involvement in Africa as an alternative to Western assistance which does not consider the promotion and protection of human rights, good governance and democracy as compare to the Western countries and institutions. This has not only worsened the violation of human rights, but also weakened any measures attempting to promote and strengthen human security and human development in Africa. China does this by funding sanctioned regimes, which in turn use those funds to continue hindering the prospects for human security and human development. This was evident in Chapter 3 with Bashir in Sudan.

Moreover, it was also seen in Chapter 3 that the combination of China’s commercial activities and the policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states has had detrimental effects. For instance, it has compounded governance problems, particularly in Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Zimbabwe, and Angola (UNCTAD 2013). Such engagements in these states undermine their efforts to foster better corporate and environmental governance. This does not only pose a human security problem, but also presents a human development problem because African leaders will not adopt market principles when it undermines their power. This also means China contributes minimally in strengthening the human security-development nexus.

A further consequence related to the above is that trade revenues and Chinese aid are spent on the militarisation of many African states, as seen with Sudan. In the case of Sudan, it was also evident that such militarisation has and may continue to fuel conflict and repression, instead of supporting sustainable human security and human development projects. Chinese aid has further proved to disregard international sanctions posed on authoritative regimes, by continuing to purchase significant amounts of illegally harvested timber from Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Mozambique, and at one time also purchasing “conflict timber” (Shinn 2006) from the Congo and Liberia. These purchases assisted in funding the on-going conflicts in these conflicts.

The literature further confirmed that China sells military hardware to corrupt regimes which increases their capacity to continue with their oppressive running of their respective states. The militarisation of the state’s increased conflict, does not only put people at risks, but also threatens African countries’ capital assets and future.
economic development, which hinders the prospects for strengthening the human security and human development nexus in the continent. The literature has argued this to be the result of China’s involvement in the continent. China’s funding of authoritative regimes also creates an unfavourable investment interest climate and draws away FDI. All of the above issues impacts negatively on economic, social and civil, as well as political human rights.

5.4. Recommendations

This study on the security-development nexus forms part of various initiatives undertaken by different African and International scholars and institutions with a view to understanding and thereby contributing towards more knowledge and understanding of the nature and impact of China’s involvement in Africa. One of the driving factors in this regard is the dynamics of Africa’s human security and human development challenges.

The study has shown that, notwithstanding the elevation of China’s strengthening of the human security-development nexus in Africa, realistic adjustments have to be instituted. These changes will have to include several recommendations. For instance, China must restructure and modify its policy of non-interference in order to be able to directly intervene and contribute towards alleviating human rights violations, enhancing good governance, creating more local job, the transfer of more technology, and improve working conditions.

If there is real external interest to assist Africa in strengthening its human security and human development, a study should be conducted to test the viability and the probability of success of an increased Sino-West cooperation as a solution for more opportunities and greater security and development in the African continent.

Africa should take advantage of its relationship with China and increase its market access and export capacity in new industries to gain greater access to other Asian countries and also in an effort to diversify its export product. This may increase economic growth for human development, which will in turn contribute towards human security.
To ensure human rights, good governance, democratisation, and political development, it is crucial that African governments engage in business with China in an open and transparent manner. That is, full public disclosure of all major contracts in the extractive industries. This may further mean that the Chinese and African countries should work to strengthen their legal and regulatory framework to ensure that they create a conducive business environment to invest in, and that all the relevant institutions needed to support trade facilitation between the two parties are transparent, accountable and robust.

In order to increase the chances of overturning Chinese investment into human security and human development, it will be advisable that Chinese companies be encouraged to subscribe to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in order to reduce government corruption and promote economic growth for those countries that have mineral wealth to extract.

The scarcity of open source information concerning the issues of the effects of Chinese military cooperation with several African states, and the repercussions of China’s important role in the trade of arms within Africa makes it difficult to assess the relevance and the effects of such assistance. A further study should be undertaken in this regard.

The military relations between China and African states are under-examined since the Chinese military assistance is not always transparent. It is difficult to evaluate clearly the nature and the details of such a relationship.

5.5. Conclusion

Chinese involvement in Africa has had some positive effects on the human security-development nexus. For instance, though Africans have complained about Chinese business undermining local businesses and hiring Chinese labour, there is however some contribution in this regard. China has contributed to the development of critically needed infrastructure, and an increase in economic growth, particularly in sectors or geographic areas in which international financial institutions and Western governments have been unwilling to engage.
Chinese engagement has also had deleterious effects. For instance, it has helped non-democratic regimes cling to power; reinforced many African countries’ dependence on raw materials and unskilled labour; contributed to the loss of hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs in certain industries, such as textiles; and contributed to high levels of debt, economically unviable decisions, and official corruption.

Moreover, from the information collected, the study can argue that China has four overarching strategic interests in Africa. That is, access to natural resources, particularly oil and gas; markets for Chinese exports; political legitimacy; and sufficient security and stability to continue its commercial activities. China’s contribution to Africa has led to African governments to look to China to provide political recognition and legitimacy, and to contribute to their economic development through aid, investment, infrastructure development, and trade.

The negative impacts of China’s involvement in Africa are exacerbated by existing economic and political conditions in many African countries. Such countries lack human security and human development, which in turn, affects the other. This makes it difficult for the nexus to prosper as argued by China in Chapter 3 that prioritising human rights at the expense of economic development only delays this nexus. So, at this point, one can conclude that the political conditions in many African countries are inadequate for converting Chinese investments into projects that can promote long-term economic growth.

The prospect for the nexus is further hindered by the political elite who have a lock on the national economy, and the economy is not structured in a way that the benefits trickle down to the larger population of the continent. However, one can conclude that the relationship between China and African countries is not a one-way street where China’s involvement in Africa is only exploiting Africa’s raw materials and natural resources. It is based on a give and take partnership. While China provides African countries with development aid, unconditional loans, grants and infrastructure development, China is also gaining in return.
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