Just war; unjust consequences. A comparative analysis of the Christian realist tradition in St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr with U.S. foreign policy in Iraq

by

Robert Paul Pappas

Academic Supervisor

Prof. Dawid Etienne de Villiers (D. Th.)

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics

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To the Reader

Throughout the history of civilization, mankind has managed warfare to settle disputes among hostile forces. Within this milieu, war is an extension of political objectives; however, power politics is neither an institutional tradition nor the substance of sovereign state actor survival. Rather, it is a reflection of the moral or amoral aptitude of its peoples and leaders. The nobility of a nation, especially, elite state actors eventually succumb to the foibles of unprecedented power. The blind enticement of elite state actor power is its failure to recognize the limitation of its national influence upon the stage of international affairs. So it was with Greece and Rome, their philosophic and judicial foundations were controverted by their demise upon the world stage. In like manner, the United States has excessively depended on unprecedented economic and military power, which has betrayed the very spirit of its constitutional forefathers. The United States of America has ignored the very foundations of its democratic tradition, its spiritual and moral heritage, and its innate sense of justice that has inspired western civilization. Just war; unjust consequences is an ardent appeal to a nation that has lost sight of its place in history. It is a poignant reminder that nations that drift from the moral and political traditions that sustain the constancy of national greatness, eventually, like Rome, become a dream in the annals of history.

Robert Paul Pappas
Preface: Declaration

I, Robert Paul Pappas, declare that the dissertation/thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

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Summary

The challenge of the just war theory in the post-modern era is compounded by technologic advances in warfare and the friction among state actors in a decentralized state system. The inquiry of this investigation on just war is the extent of its validity in an era that extols the sciences and human reason on the one hand and economic necessity on the other as the standard by which state actors regulate their political objectives. The thesis *Just war; unjust consequences* examines the longevity of the just war tradition, its moral necessity throughout history and its indispensable application in the nuclear age. Chapter 2 examines the moral foundations of the ‘two kingdoms’, which formulates the background of the just war theory, from the biblical account of the great controversy between good and evil to the formation of modern church/state relations. Within the ancient and contemporary setting, ecclesiastical and theological traditions have provided a public platform to establish moral parameters in regards to state actor intent and post-modern application, such as the U.S.-Iraq war. Chapter 3 investigates Augustine’s enduring contribution to the moral and historical formation and longevity of the just war theory. From its earliest development to its modern antecedent the just war theory has been an integral aspect of the philosophical and theological analysis distinguishing ‘why’ and ‘how’ wars are fought and the import of moral parameters to manage international conflict. Chapter 4 examines Reinhold Niebuhr’s contribution to the realist tradition and U.S. foreign policy in the 20th and 21st centuries. This section examines the impact of the modern state actor’s intent for war. The primary issue is that the classical formulation that identifies human nature as the catalyst of social disorder and war is superseded by the scientific method, which adheres to the viewpoint that war is complicated by numerous economic and political factors. Hans Morgenthau’s realist tradition of international relations theory, which advocates that humankind is the centric disruptive force by its abuse of power at all levels of human interaction especially among nations was eventually eclipsed by Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist school of thought, which shifted the culpability of war from the egocentricities of human nature to the disproportions of economic and military power among competing state actors in a decentralized state system. This shift in international relations theory within the framework of weapons of mass destruction contested the validity of the just war tradition in the nuclear age. Chapter 5 reasserts the Christian realist tradition’s viewpoint that the perpetrator for war is the individual actor within collective competitive self-interest, epitomized by the state actor. The classical model is reinstated as a plausible cause for war. It is within this framework that a contemporary adaptation of the just war moral theory is provided to contest the contemporary complexities of warfare in the 21st century. Chapter 6 investigates the practical challenges of modern warfare. The background of Operation Iraqi Freedom reveals the complications of state actor competition in international politics, and the necessity of moral parameters to thwart unwarranted state actor aggression. Finally, Chapter 7 reiterates the prolonged necessity of the just war tradition in both the ancient and modern eras and, the import of moral parameters to thwart unwarranted state actor aggression and provides a reformulation of the just war moral theory to challenge the viewpoint that deems the utility of weapons of mass destruction as viable national security alternative and its tactical application in warfare.
Key Terms

There is a holistic link between the ten key terms selected in this investigation. The fundamental overlapping concepts in this study intimate a progressive synthesis of ideas peculiar to the philosophic nature of the re-examination of the just war tradition in contemporary politics. The ten key terms and their expansionary explanations are as follows:

*St. Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430)* was an influential theologian during the demise and eventual disintegration of the Western Roman Empire. His writings have influenced both Catholic and Protestant traditions. His voluminous works have influenced theological, philosophical and social thought on a variety of contemporary issues. Augustine is credited for reformulating the just war theory. His reconstruction of the Roman *casus belli* has influenced moral delineations on war throughout ancient and modern society. Oliver and Joan O’Donovan examined Augustine’s universal influence upon western civilization (O’Donovan & O’Donovan 1999, p. 104). Reinhold Niebuhr stated that “Augustine was, by general consent, the first great ‘realist’ in western history” (Niebuhr 1953, pp. 120, 121). Augustine’s candid appraisal of human nature recognized the human agent as the central variable of friction in the domestic and international order.

*Reinhold Niebuhr (1892 – 1971)* was America’s most influential social ethicist in the 20th century amidst the prevailing theological liberalism of his time. Niebuhr then reestablished the classical theological axiom of original sin as the cause of societal friction in the national and international order. His influence surpassed the traditional ecclesiastical confines of the Church. Niebuhr was the father of the realist tradition in international affairs. Theologians, statesmen, diplomats and government leaders have testified to his pervasive philosophic influence in international politics. Richard Crouter points out:

Liberal and conservative political pundits, journalists, and writers have rediscovered the rich legacy of the premier twentieth-century Protestant theologian and public intellectual Reinhold Niebuhr . . . A lifelong critic of American hubris and overreaching arrogance, Niebuhr was radically dedicated to social justice and the processes of democracy, while resolutely critical of authoritarianism, whether in religion or in politics. Led by the new prominence of Niebuhr’s name, diverse Americans are apparently fascinated as well as perplexed by his way of plumbing the human condition. His popularity was always greatest among secular opinion-makers, academics, and intellectuals. That situation is echoed today, even if it is less clear to many of these figures how much Niebuhr’s central teaching was shaped by the Christian tradition (Crouter 2010, p. 3).

Niebuhr, like Augustine, promulgated his views to a nation that was yearning for moral and philosophic direction during the brutalities of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. His philosophic construct of human nature and competitive collective self-interest in the international order added vital insights to the realistic function and limitation of economic and military power to thwart radical ideologies that threatened western civic and religious liberties.

*Christian realism*: The Christian realist tradition’s underlying premise that sin is the quintessential culprit of organized violence among hostile nations; and further, that human nature and/or its collective manifestations in the socio-economic and socio-political order are the basis of friction and conflict. Niebuhr stated that “Augustine was, by general consent, the first great ‘realist’ in western history. He deserves this distinction because his picture of social reality in his *civitas dei* gives an adequate account of the social factions, tensions, and competitions which we know to be well-nigh universal on every level of community” (Niebuhr 1953, pp. 120-121). Niebuhr’s Christian realist tradition influenced a contemporary political movement in foreign policy analysis referred to as the realists’ tradition of which George F. Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau were major advocates. This theory entails that the aberrant actions of men and nations are centered in human nature, which could only be restrained by a judicious utilization of power. Hans J. Morgenthau’s classic treatise *Politics among nations* was formulated upon
this premise, which influenced generations of international relations and foreign affairs specialists. However, the classical realist tradition was challenged and superseded by the neorealist that controverted classical political theory by asserting that conflict does not reside in the nature of man but in the state system. Kenneth Waltz championed the neorealist tradition, which nullified human nature as the dominant feature of civic and international conflict. Conflict among state actors, according to Waltz, is provoked by a decentralized state system. The issue is not war of itself, but the avoidance of a total war scenario among the two superpowers that could provoke a nuclear holocaust. The realist theory within its various political and religious traditions is inseparably linked to the nuances of national and international conceptions of power.

Original sin: The concept of sin is not peculiar to Christianity (Hastings 1951, vol. 11, p. 528ff.). However, the concept of original sin is peculiar to Christianity as it recounts an explanation of the fall of man, the original sin, in the Garden of Eden (Gn 3). The concept of ‘original sin’ attributed to Augustine is formulated from the writings of the apostle Paul in Romans 5: 12-21. Thomas R. Schreiner states that “Romans 5: 12-21 is one of the most difficult and controversial passages to interpret in all of Pauline literature” (Schreiner 1998, p. 267). The diversity of interpretation on original sin throughout church history affirms this assertion. The doctrine of ‘original sin’ is the fundamental concept defining Augustinian and Niebuhrian social ethics. Augustine’s candid assessment of human nature is foundational to a Christian realist interpretation of man’s belligerent social action in history. Niebuhr reiterated the classical concept of sin as an explanation for collective self-interest that exacerbates human conflict in the economic and political order. According to the Christian realist, sin permeates, men and nations, secular and religious institutions, but within the social order is most notable among competing collective groups. Niebuhr emphasized that the two fundamental power structures in society are economic and political; however, between the socio-economic and socio-political forces, politics is the most contentious because it inevitably is an action or reaction of power between contending national and international forces. Niebuhr stated that “...society...merely cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that the egoism of the group has a double force. For this reason no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of power” (Niebuhr 1933, p. 363, cf., Kegley & Brezal 1956, p.168). The inseparable link between sin and human nature; human passions of hatred, fear, revenge and suspicion among other behavioral expressions that provoke nation state hostilities and ultimately war is attributed and inseparably linked to the concept of sin, as the explanation of the amoral social incongruities – thus, warfare is centered in the individual actor, rather than a mere product of societal influences.

The two kingdoms are a recurrent motif in biblical and philosophic Christian literature. The great controversy between Christ and Satan was reconstructed in Augustine’s classic The city of God wherein the clash between the heavenly and earthly cities is unavoidable. Even though Augustine wrote this apologetic to counteract the argument that Rome’s demise was attributed to the adoption of the Christian religion, it set the stage for the inevitable friction in the home, community and state orders and the realist interpretation of conflict and war. However, the ‘Two Kingdoms’ scenario was reformulated as Imperial Rome was replaced by the Holy Roman Empire on the one hand and the contemporary state actor on the other. Contemporary church/state relations superseded the constant friction between imperial and ecclesiastical authority and power. The church is God’s living testimony of grace to a world encumbered by human limitation and self-love, but it is also part of the political, religious, cultural and traditional expression of its respective community.

The just war theory: War is a cyclic ancient and contemporary societal friction between hostile forces that culminates in bloodshed, displaced civilians, depleted economic resources, and an impoverished moral aptitude of its peoples and their leaders. Both the conqueror and conquered suffer the negative consequences of war. The price in war to sustain justice is costly to both victor and the vanquished. The custom and tradition of war is embedded in the human psyche. The line of demarcation between moral and amoral behavior leading to war is a constant debate among the philosophic, political, and legal communities. However, there is a definitive line between ‘how wars are fought’ and ‘why wars are fought.’ The Augustinian just war tradition’s focus is the manageability of war to stave unwarranted
violence and bloodshed. *Jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* axioms that encompass the just war theory have been altered and adapted to manage unprecedented violence in war throughout history. Augustine criticized the customary reliance of war, while recognizing the inevitability of war in the earthly city. War in its ancient and modern format is defined as a clash between hostile enemy forces. It is the culmination of a frustrated diplomacy as nations vie for economic and geopolitical advantages in our fluctuating decentralized state system. Augustine does not disclaim war, but criticizes unjust aggression and the political utility of war.

The *nation state* is the dominant economic and political unit in the international system. It is inseparably intertwined with the traditions, customs and established institutions of its citizenry. The demise of the Roman Empire enabled displaced barbaric hoards to settle territory. The demise of the Holy Roman Empire enabled these ethnic tribes to establish national identities and eventually the nation state. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia recognized the nation state as the central feature in the budding state system. Eventually the fundamental elements of a state sovereignty-based system were officially recognized at the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. “International society is built around sovereign statehood as its bedrock organizing principle” (Weiss & Daws 2008, p. 389). The state controls the ebb and flow of domestic and international commerce, dispenses justice, preserves cultural and moral traditions, maintains law and ensures order and stability in the state system. It is within this recognized civic unit that wars are fought, geopolitical claims are made and the hope to establish a just order by recognizing moral and legal restraints in war is established.

**Power:** There are many intriguing facets regarding the word “—power”. Within the framework of international affairs the modern elite state actor sustains its national security objectives by maintaining economic and military power. In fact, economic power is a prerequisite to military power, the basis of the elite state actor to sustain the status quo or maintain its prestige among the consort of nations. According to Niebuhr, the only means to thwart Communist aggression during the Cold War was to maintain a balance of power, or, aptly coined, “the balance of terror”, among the two superpowers. Nuclear weaponry, the ultimate deterrent to nuclear war, implied that nations would not risk a total war scenario because of the catastrophic economic and physical fallout from such a confrontation. Nonetheless, economic coercion and military power are inseparable components in the realist tradition. It should be recognized that the balance of power model within the framework of economic and military power is the pivotal force in geopolitical relations. In other words the link between human nature and power is ‘conflict’. Waltz attributed to nuclear and military power a means to foster a precarious peace among nations in a decentralized state system. While the balance of power is a central motif in international politics, it is the threat of weapons of mass destruction that has changed the face of war and international affairs in our modern era.

**Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** have altered the face of modern warfare and redefined national security and deterrence issues in the present multipolar state system. The proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons among rogue state actors and their sponsored terrorist allies is the single greatest threat to the West that could destabilize a fragile decentralized state system on the one hand and the international political economy on the other. It is impractical to think that elite state actors can successfully thwart the procurement of such weapons, but the underlying apprehension among the consort of nations is the prospect that hostile rogue state actors and subversive terrorist groups could procure such destructive weaponry. The tension with Saddam Hussein and Al Qaida illustrate the point. After 9/11, national security issues shifted from traditional bipolar geopolitical issues to regional stability. Protecting international investments such as scarce resources that have a definitive effect on the domestic and international economy superseded the ideological war of words.

The *U.S.-Iraq wars (1990 – 2011)* were a prolonged hostile contest between U.S.-lead Coalition forces and Iraqi Ba’athists, led by Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein initiated the U.S.-Iraq war when Hussein invaded Kuwait, consequently the Arab league (OPEC) began to drive down the price of oil because of over-production, which weakened the dollar per barrel price and contributed to President Hussein’s inability to manage the ensuing debt crisis resulting from the Iraq-Iran War. Saddam Hussein was determined to secure hegemonic dominance in the Middle East to safeguard oil production in order to
control the economic outcome of Iraq, whereas the West was determined to thwart his despotic scheme. The tensions between President Hussein and the West entailed three U.S. administrations, both Democrat and Republican traditions, which were determined to oust the Ba’athist dictator. Operation Iraqi Freedom culminated a prolonged determined effort by a frustrated America that was unable to cope with Saddam Hussein’s bellicose behavior in the Middle East region. War is aptly described by Clausewitz as an uncertain fog amidst the incongruities of political agendas. Operation Iraqi Freedom has been characterized as a flagrant abuse of U.S. power to secure scarce resources. However, there were many contributing factors that finally initiated the U.S.-lead Coalition forces that eventually deposed President Hussein. Nonetheless, the U.S.-Iraq war was a defining moment for U.S. foreign policy. It was a pivotal juncture in U.S. history that redefined the American rationale for war when confronted by hostile forces that could weaken its elite state actor authority and power in the international community.
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CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction

It was the Roman *casus belli* “just cause” for war that laid the foundation of the ancient and modern just war theory. Its utility was overshadowed by the demise of the republican tradition, as warfare developed into a customary policy among the Roman military. Its rebirth, however, is attributed to St. Augustine of Hippo, who emphasized the necessity of managing unwarranted conflict among hostile forces and broadened the Roman *casus belli* by incorporating moral parameters that would thwart excessive carnage in war. Centuries later Thomas Aquinas reiterated Augustine’s just war premises during an era of unprecedented ecclesiastical power. The High Middle Ages witnessed the blurred digression of secular and ecclesiastical power as both Emperor and Pontiff utilized war powers to sustain their authority and control of the Holy Roman Empire. In a sense, Aquinas challenged the claims of the canonists that endorsed holy war prerogatives, by reestablishing the Augustinian tradition and emphasizing the subjective motives for warfare. The just war tradition played an important role during the development of the German state as Luther denounced the peasant revolt because it lacked centralized authority to declare war. In this way, Luther was able to sustain monarchical rights in order to preserve the reformation movement. It was John Calvin who endorsed the republican tradition in order to preserve a balance between religious and secular powers. Regardless of the political tradition of the state, war was a customary policy among the budding nation states. Monarchical powers were more apt to settle their differences on the battlefield than through the auspices of diplomacy. Within the Augustinian tradition, Calvin emphasized the moral requisite of ‘last resort’; it was the responsibility of nations to avoid war if possible, rather than adhering to warfare as the primary policy to resolve embittered issues among the consort of nations. However, due to the union of church and state, the Catholic and Protestant traditions both relinquished their moral authority to condemn wars as just or unjust. Within the framework of just war, Hugo Grotius endorsed international law as an effective instrument for nations to resolve disputes that could escalate into war. This formulation was reiterated by Paul Ramsey in the 20th century. Ramsey restated the just war tradition within Protestant reflection in order to provide the United States a moral compass when challenged by communist aggression during the Cold War. Ramsey instilled the just war tradition in the mainstream of American thought during a crucial time in history.

The just war tradition has a prolonged history. It has adjusted to political changes as well as to modifications in military tactics and weaponry. The legendary Roman legions were superseded by heavy infantry; hand-to-hand combat was superseded by the use of the long bow and eventually gun powder. The weaponry of rifle and canon was superseded by airpower, tank and gas warfare during World War I. The war on the seas also witnessed another nemesis, that of submarine warfare. World War II witnessed the advent of atomic weaponry the precursor of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to comprehend the importance of the just war theory, it is vital to reflect upon the political, ideological and military strategic sciences that utilize warfare as a means to secure political objectives among the nations.

1.2 Ideologies, Coalitions and Power Blocks

The history of war is a complex progression intertwined with epic ramifications for the conqueror and the conquered. We shall never fully understand the social, economic and political remodeling of societies and the lives of men, women and children who have suffered the dehumanizing consequences that just and unjust conflicts thrust upon the combatant and noncombatant.

Both ancient and modern thinkers of religious and secular traditions have grappled with just war suppositions. The evolution of proficient and deadlier weaponry throughout history on the one hand, and the inevitable geopolitical clashes on the other necessitates a reformulation of appropriate norms in conducting war. The modern infatuation with warfare glosses over the reality so aptly stated by Carl Von
Clausewitz that “War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed” (Clausewitz 1984, p. II.3, 149). While strategic geopolitical ‘gain of control’ is the prize of conquest; violence and blood and death are the essence of war.

The justification for war is a multifaceted process that is frequently prompted by economic, ideological, or political conflicts. Clausewitz states: “War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature, and their political character increases the more the plan applies to the entire campaign and to the whole state” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 7). In other words war cannot be separated from the state of affairs. Ancient and modern warfare are interconnected, and interdependent upon the political policies, traditions and objectives of government.

When Sparta was alarmed by the Athenian economic trade monopoly and naval supremacy in the Mediterranean after the Greco-Persian war, rather than negotiate terms for peace, war ensued. Thucydides stated that the “growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon made war inevitable” (Thucydides 1.24). After the first Peloponnesian War (460 – 445 B.C.E.), both Athens and Sparta were cautious to adhere to the terms of peace. However, conflict between less significant city-states like Thebes, Corinth and Corcyra eventually undermined the delicate balance of power between the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian league. Donald Kagan points out that Athens posed no immediate threat to Sparta and its allies after the declared peace between the two superpowers. However, Athens unprecedented power provoked jealousy and distrust among the lesser city-states of the Peloponnesian league and eventually Sparta. Distrust aggravated by antithetical forms of government, social philosophies, unrest between competing Greek city-states, as well as the consuming anxiety for power and control, triggered a brutal conflict (431 – 404 B.C.E.), which neither Athens nor Sparta fully recovered from, thus weakening the Hellenes to external forces of conquest, and eventually a faded memory of their former glory (Kagan 1995, p. 56).

In a similar vein U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegrams of 1946’ articulated his suspicion of Soviet global ambitions, and was the pivotal assessment summarizing the United States’ official anti-communist foreign policy, as well as the impetus, which portrayed the U.S. as the leader of the free world (Jensen 1991, pp. 17-31). The ensuing competitive struggle between the United States and the U.S.S.R., referred to as the Cold War, was fought by ideology, propaganda, an escalating arms race, nuclear weaponry (MAD), the sophistries of clandestine covert operations, Olympic competition and the NATO and Warsaw Pact power blocks, and redefined the parameters of a global conflict referred to as the balance of power in a precarious nuclear age. I posed the question to my former professor, Ambassador (ret.) Roland M. Timerbaev concerning the initial U.S.S.R.’s hardline response to the nuclear arms race. Timerbaev simply emphasized the degree of fear, threat and distrust Moscow grappled with when confronted by the U.S. nuclear arsenal. George Kennan also reiterated his misgivings of Soviet intentions as early as 1945 when responding to the idea of sharing vital civil and military data with the Stalinist

1Donald Kagan contends that Spartan fears were the determining factor in renewing the Peloponnesian war and states: “Why did the Spartans decide to fight when might be a long and difficult war against a uniquely powerful opponent, facing no immediate threat, for no tangible benefit, provoked by no direct harm to themselves? What had dissolved the normally conservative Spartan majority favoring peace, led by the prudent and respected King Archidamus? Thucydides explained that the Spartans voted for war, not because they were persuaded by the arguments of their allies, “but because they were afraid that the Athenians might become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Greece was already in their hands” (Kagan 1995, p. 56).

2Ambassador (ret.) Roland M. Timerbaev is a world expert in nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Dr. Timerbaev is one of the founding fathers of the NPT treaty. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR/Russian from 1949-1992. Dr. Timerbaev culminated his professional career in 1988-1992, in which he headed the Russian Federation Mission in Vienna. Also, Ambassador Timerbaev participated in negotiating the ABM treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the PNE Treaty, and other arms control agreements (CPSR n.d.).
regime. Kennan emphasized: “There is nothing – I repeat nothing – in the history of the Soviet regime which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia, or even those who have chances of assuming power within the foreseeable future, would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought that they would materially improve their own power position in the world” (Kennan 1967, p. 296). Technology increases, weapons are upgraded; nations flex their economic and military power and political influence incites a spirit of fear, distrust and suspicion – these are catalysts of both ancient and modern warfare.

The fundamental human responses of fear, distrust and state actor fixation for national security in our postmodern age are also aggravated by the spirit of nationalism. While engaged in oral testing I assigned my students at Sahmyook University in Seoul, South Korea – an article deliberating on the nuclear proliferation tensions in the Korean peninsula (Engelhardt 1996, pp. 31-37). The discussion turned over to Miss Kim, a student in the English department – quiet and unassuming, innocent and gentle, cultured and articulate, as well as a professed Christian. But her opening statement caught me off-guard. As though it were yesterday, I recalled her candidly clear introductory remark: “Today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy”. It is a brutal reality among nations. There are no friends, only partners of ideology and mutual benefit. And so the proverbial question asked by a troubled lawyer to Jesus Christ – “And who is my neighbor?” – reechoes throughout our competitive state system. A world mutated by economic competition, military power, and diplomatic duplicity. As individuals we love; as nations we fight. It is a sickly, yet realistic paradox of the friction among nations.

Long before Carl Von Clausewitz’s classic On war influenced his generation and beyond, Sun Tzu articulated the quintessence of warfare and the state in his ancient treatise the Art of war. The sage of China stated: “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed” (Sun & Sun 1996, pp. 15, 40). If only world leaders could perceive the nature of an event before it would happen. However, political foresight is an illusion, due to innate human limitations and the numerous unknown variables of war, which assure that even the most carefully thought out plan against one’s adversary, will often fail. While governments develop a military doctrine within the grand strategy of political agendas and goals, the unexpected often thwarts the best-laid plans to avoid war and socio-economic hardship.

Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Czar Nicholas II of Russia, and Emperor Franz Josef of Austria, believed that their rationale for war was a just cause. But the flames of jingoistic nationalism, bitter rivalries among European monarchies, and the unbridled ambition for power and geopolitical conquest blinded the rational capacity to perceive the affects that a European conflict would have upon the international political environment. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the European powers endeavored to avoid war by creating and maintaining a balance of power through shifting political and military alliances, but were incapable of thwarting the impact of revolutionary ideologies, shifts in regional power and realpolitik resulting from German unification. This provoked tensions between competing monarchies among the major powers, destabilizing the shifting power coalitions, digging into two distinct power blocks; thus superseding any diplomatic solutions for peace (Kissinger 1994, pp. 167-168). Once again passion overcame prudence; reason gave way to nationalistic and impulsive fears, thereby igniting a horrendous conflict. The assassination on June 28, 1914 of the heir to the Austrian-Hungary Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Hapsburg monarchy, by a Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip, enhanced

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1 Henry Kissinger points out that the balance of power preserved the liberties of states, but eventually not the peace of Europe. By “the end of the twentieth century’s first decade, the Concert of Europe, which had maintained peace for a century, had for all practical purposes ceased to exist. The Great Powers had thrown themselves with blind frivolity into a bipolar struggle that led to petrification into two power blocs, anticipating the pattern of the Cold War fifty years later. There was one important difference, however. In the age of nuclear weapons, the avoidance of war would be a major, perhaps the principle, foreign policy goal. At the beginning of the twentieth century, wars could still be started with a touch of frivolity. Indeed, some Europeans thinkers held that periodic bloodletting was cathartic, a naïve hypothesis that was brutally punctuated by the First World War” (Kissinger 1994, pp. 167-168).
growing distrust among the European elite monarchies. Within weeks of the assassination World War I broke out with reckless abandonment in which the royal dynasties of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia eventually disintegrated. The United States War Department in February of 1924 estimated the number of casualties in the First World War at 37,508,686 (The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition, vol. 29, p. 360). Civilian deaths resulting from military conflicts, disease, starvation, exposure and massacres during the war from 1914 to 1918 are estimated at 12,618,000 (The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition, vol. 29, p. 360). The most causalties (66.6 percent of the total), were experienced by Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Russia (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 19, p. 737). It also restructured the geopolitical map of Europe and provoked socio-political movements that would redefine our present world order. The treaty of Versailles would eventually incite German nationalism and give power to Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich (Lee & Michalka 1987, pp. 28-29). The collapse of the Romanoff dynasty in Russia inflamed the fires of revolution providing the impetus for Stalinist socio-political reforms and communist power. The collapse of the Romanoff dynasty can be attributed to many causes in the political, economic and social sectors as well as the inescapable socialist movement espoused by Lenin, who in 1915 declared: “The United States of the World (and not just of Europe) is that State form for the unification and freedom of nations which we identify with socialism” (Lenin 1915, p. V I 23). The First World War was the catalyst that propelled communism into power – “failures at the front, huge losses, demoralization and collapse in the rear, and the Rasputin scandal all aroused intense dissatisfaction with autocracy in all strata of Russian society” (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1974, vol. 18, p. 198). The intense rivalry between the great monarchies of Europe collapsed. The Czar of Russia and his family were murdered by the Bolsheviks, and the Kaiser of Germany and the Austrian Emperor relinquished their powers of state. In essence World War I gave birth to World War II and eventually the Cold War, and the ascendancy of U.S. global hegemony.

The autonomous nature of the contemporary state actor on the one hand and the development of weapons of mass destruction on the other has challenged the utility of the just war theory. Nonetheless, the state actor is obligated to protect its populace and national and international assets against enemies foreign or domestic in order to sustain its sovereign status amidst a volatile state system. The mechanism of politics, according to Clausewitz, initiates as well as curtails wars. The relationship between government objectives and state actor competition often incites conflict. Nonetheless, a nation state has a moral obligation to protect its citizenry.

1.3 Military Doctrine and the Nature of Politics

Nations are imbued with distinctive characteristics that identify their unique culture. War is not always a geopolitical clash for power and raw territory. It is also a means to preserve or propagate one’s language, psychological mindset, religious or philosophical norms, socio-political traditions and historical origins, which distinguishes a nation from all others. To ensure national security and identity, governments develop strategies to maintain independence and power in the international environment. The modern state actor develops a military doctrine, which is a crucial element of national security policy or grand strategy. A grand strategy “is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state theory about how it can best cause security for itself” (Earle 1971, p. viii). The implementation of a grand

1 The treaty of Versailles not only enacted harsh economic and military sanctions but cast the blame of the war solely upon Germany. Most Germans hoped for a moderate treaty based upon Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points; however, France and Great Britain were adamant that Germany acknowledge full liability and accept the terms of the treaty. “At virtually every political level, Germans considered the treaty a searing wound to their national pride and a deep affront to the German character. The unanimous condemnation of the treaty in Germany as a Diktat obscured the possibility of political understanding and cooperation between victors and vanquished, which could have reduced international tension left by the war” (Lee & Michalka 1987, pp. 28, 29). The stage was set for Hitler to move the German people at will after years of disaffection after Versailles.
strategy to ensure national security objectives follows these steps: 1. Identify the possible threats to the nation’s security; 2. Develop efficient economic, political, and military solutions for potential threats, and 3. Prioritize prospective threats within the context of a nation’s economic means. Since nations have limited resources, the most effective military methods should be selected to achieve political objectives.

Barry R. Posen stipulates three military operations in regards to a grand strategy to secure a nation’s autonomy: “Offensive doctrines aim to disarm the adversary—to destroy his armed forces. Defensive doctrines aim to deny an adversary the objective that he seeks. Deterrent doctrines aim to punish an aggressor—to raise his costs without reference to reducing one’s own” (Posen 1984, p. 14). The interconnection between military doctrine/grand strategy to the international political system can induce or reduce an arms race as well as encourage or discourage war. A military doctrine can be a liability to a nation’s security interest, if the strategies are not properly integrated with the political goals of a respective government. Economic strength and resources affect military power, but political objectives within the context of the grand strategy influence the tactics of warfare. The relationship of national security objectives, economic/military solutions for security threats and the most effective means to implement war management strategy can be further illustrated by the following conflicts.

1.4 War Management and Security Objectives

Quick strike capabilities using conventional forces to achieve rapid deployment and victory devised by Hitler’s Third Reich called blitzkrieg enabled Germany to achieve military mastery of Europe by 1940. High-speed warfare has been adapted in different conflicts such as the Six-Day War in June of 1967, when Israel realized that the Soviet backed Gamal Abdel Nasser was preparing for war, and decided not to wait, initiating a ‘quick strike’ against Egypt, eventually capturing the whole Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank from Jordan (Nye 2007, pp. 190-191). In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait claiming it as an artificial creation of the colonial era and hoped to cash-in by usurping its vast oil reserves, which Iraq needed to off-set its massive debt accrued by eight years of war with Iran. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, generated “the largest rapid deployment of U.S. forces and supplies in history” (GOA Code 398060/OSD Case 8818 1991, p. 1). Saddam Hussein was astonished by the prompt response of U.S. and NATO forces led by President George H. W. Bush (GOA Code 398060/OSD Case 8818 1991, p. 2), and other regional allies (Freeman & Karsh 1991, p. 6). The bombing of Iraq commenced January 17, 1990. On February 24, 1990, Coalition ground forces initiated their attack and liberated Kuwait four days later on February 27, 1990 (Bradford 2006, p. 572). The rapidity of the Desert Storm ground war is referred to as the “100-hour ground offensive” (Jaques 2007, p. 298). The United States’ massive fire-power decimated Saddam Hussein’s military infrastructure, in a rapid military campaign. While Hitler’s blitzkrieg was a war of aggression, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm were responses to self-determination and nation state autonomy, it was the 1967 Israeli conflict that fits the category of ‘preventive war’— designed to deter any potential aggression. A preventive war can also prevent a further escalation of regional warfare and ‘total war’ scenarios. Israel took advantage of its superior fire power and surprised a potential threat by a surprise conventional strike. Plano and Olton define preventive war as follows: The “doctrine of preventive war calls for a surprise attack that is dedicated to the destruction of an enemy state that is developing a superior force for a crushing future attack. The theory assumes that the other side in an arms race is determined to undertake a future aggression, that time is on its side, and that an immediate decisive strike could destroy that future threat” (Plano & Olton 1988, pp. 209-210). The total Israeli losses during the Six Day War were “689 killed and 2,563 wounded” contrasted to Egyptian casualties of over “10,000 dead, the Jordanians 1,000 and the Syrians 2,500. It has been a stunning display of the classic technique of blitzkrieg”. The war also enhanced Israeli defenses as well as establishing itself, as dominate and superior military power in the Middle East (Brown 1985, p. 255).

Joseph Nye Jr. makes a distinction between preemptive strike which “occurs when war is imminent” and preventive war which “occurs when leaders believe that war is unavoidable, thus, war is better now than later” (Nye 2007, pp. 165-166). There is a definitive yet shaded line between a
preemptive and preventive war scenario. War strategists can misconstrue or mislead nation state policy on the validity of their cause – it is for this reason that the just war theory is so vital in the decision making process that defends a declaration of war. Michael Walzer points out the moral justification for intervention, and proposes three conditions that validate war or military intervention “in the absence of overt aggression”: 1. When a set boundary contains two or more political communities of which one is engaged in a military struggle for independence. The question of succession or “national liberation” and the struggle for self-determination is at stake. 2. When an intervention is needed, to balance or re-correct a previous political interposition, by giving a people the right to invalidate a first intervention by a counter intervention, and 3. When there is an obligation to intervene and rescue people from enslavement, massacre or genocide (Walzer 1977, p. 90). These three moral assessments according to Walzer, justify military intervention. However, this assessment is not without challenges because of the crucial role of the nature of political decision-making strategies, which often distort either preemptive or preventive war scenarios as a legitimate claim for war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union claimed the high moral ground for Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively, but the results were devastating. The 1994 massacres of Rwanda, and the Second Congo War, also known as Africa’s World War (1998 – 2003), were essentially ignored by the United States and NATO (Nye 2007, pp. 165-166). And what about the second American revolution when the southern states sought nation state autonomy from the United States? I doubt President Lincoln would agree that civil conflict among a dissenting group legitimizes secession rights. Nonetheless, the geopolitical process is a continuous phenomenon of the rise and fall of nations throughout ancient and modern history.

While the 1967 Israeli conflict is referred to as a preventive war, the framework of a justifiable military intervention stratagem is very significant in our modern context. Defensive and deterrent military doctrines can be effective offensive military strategies to accomplish political goals as well. Like in sports, so it is in war; your best defense can at times be a highly effective offense. The context of preemptive and preventive intervention needs further delineation.

Preemptive strike is also termed ‘decapitation attack’ or ‘first strike’. It was a strategy developed by Soviet military experts during the 1950s. A preemptive strike is an unexpected and sudden surprise attack against an enemy. Soviet leadership devised this strategy as a defensive mechanism to decimate any potential response from the United States nuclear arsenal. This strategy evolved when considerable time was needed to equip bombers and liquid fuel rockets. The element of surprise of an unexpected nuclear attack, which could destroy central command operations and any possible coordinated counterattack, as well as thwart an immediate response, neutralizing a retaliatory response, would put into question the effectiveness of first strike strategies. The psychological effect would devastate one’s enemy, but in the progression of time such an approach to war was suicidal, in that any limited exchange between the nuclear powers would embolden an all-out exchange of nuclear weaponry. The fear of annihilation through a balance of nuclear power was a central policy objective to discourage aggression. Instead, the two superpowers would vie for power and global influence by ‘limited war’ in developing countries.

When using the term preemptive war in our present context, it is usually in relation to conventional military weaponry and resources (Ali 1989, pp. 38-39; 72-73; 218-219). A preventive war is when a sovereign state actor realizes that its adversary has a limited or superior military advantage and is preparing superior weaponry and forces for a future attack. Preventive war aims to avert a shift in the balance of power that would advantage its enemy. In order to avoid a future total war scenario or a potential crippling strike, a surprise attack (using conventional weaponry) is launched even though war is not imminent. The 1967 Israeli campaign against a Soviet backed Arab state actor corresponds to this category of military action (Plano & Olton 1988, pp. 209-210). The end game is victory as well as limited casualties and the hope of avoiding a total war. A preventive war has a different nuance in that one’s adversary may have superior power, but offers no immediate or long term threat; yet, thinking that hostilities are inevitable in the future, war ensues – this was the case when Sparta renewed
military hostilities against Athens – a classic example of preventive war (Reichberg, Syse & Begby (ed.) 2006, p. 4),
howbeit with devastating results to both the conqueror and conquered.

Unrestrained and indiscriminant violence targeting government, military, and civilian personnel is referred to as ‘terrorism’. On August 7, 1998 at 10:30 a.m. a suicide bomber in a truck laden with powerful explosives parked outside the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killed 213 people and injured 5,000 of whom 12 were United States government employees and 32 were Foreign Service National employees (Morgan 2008, p. 1). On that very same day another U.S. embassy was attacked at 10:39 a.m. and at least 11 were killed and 85 injured in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Greater casualties would have resulted if the truck bomb had closer access to the Department of State facility (“Report of the accountability review boards: bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, n.d.). The United States intelligence agency “established with certainty” that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaida network were responsible (Pillar 2003, p. 2, 3).

September 11, 2001 or 9/11 was the most destructive terrorist act perpetrated by Osama bin Laden. More than ninety countries lost citizens during the attacks on the World Trade Center. There were 3,030 killed and 2,337 injured in the 9/11 attack (Morgan 2008, p. 1). Four commercial airlines with highly explosive jet fuel were utilized as conventional weapons of war. Two Boeings’ 767, American Airline flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175 slammed into the north and south sides of the World Trade Center towers in New York. Another American Airline flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon and the fourth United Airline flight 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after an intense mêlée between the passengers and the hijackers (The 9-11 Commission Report 2004, pp. 4-14). The 9-11 offensive assault by al-Qaida against the United States was unexpected, deadly and an unwarranted aggressive terrorist attack in modern history.

The act of terrorism or violent assault upon combatant and noncombatant’s alike is condemned by the West as a cowardly murderous act and a crime against humanity (Plano & Olton 1988, pp. 201-202). However, the Islamic Jihadists may think of it as a tactic of warfare of which civilians are victims of their respective government’s policies. War is not a black or white scenario; it is often enmeshed within the gray areas of decision-making, which in this case is obscured by the cultural mindset of the radical Islamic jihad movement. Walter Laqueur emphasizes the difficulty of defining terrorism while demonstrating that numerous conflicts throughout history have utilized terrorist tactics as a subordinate strategy in the process of a conflict. Yet, there is a progressive modern trend of utilizing “systematic terrorism” as the essential weapon of warfare (Laqueur 1987, pp. 11, 12, 149-152). The strategy in modern terrorism is utilizing the ‘fear factor’ that anyone, at any time, in any place can be a casualty of war. Andrew Bacevich points out that the consequences of 9/11, makes war “an all but permanent and inescapable part of life in the twenty-first century” (Bacevich 2002, p. 225).

Another scenario is ‘accidental war’. The present day tensions between India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the Russian Federation and other Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members, adds potential fear for accidental nuclear war resulting from mechanical and electronic error, or failed human judgment. While there are no recorded incidents of accidental war in our modern era, such a circumstance would be devastating when considering the destructive power of just one nuclear or hydrogen warhead. To understand the devastating power of nuclear weaponry we only need to refer to the atomic bomb utilized in Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War. On August 6, 1945 the United States dropped a fifteen kilotons bomb of enriched uranium on Hiroshima. An estimated 350,000 inhabited the city. Of this number, about 71,000 were instantly killed and another 200,000 within five years, died due to direct exposure to the effects of radiation. More than 98% of the city’s buildings were damaged or destroyed (The Encyclopedia Americana International

1 “The Corinthians eagerly encouraged the Spartans to lead an attack against the Athenians in a classic statement of the idea of preventive war: even if we face no imminent danger to our city-states from the enemy, they argued, this enemy has nevertheless shown us hostile intent, and his attitude and plans are such that an armed conflict on a large scale is ultimately inevitable” (Reichberg, Syse & Begby (ed.) 2006, p. 4).
The Table of comparative nuclear yields enables us to understand the devastating power of nuclear weapons.

### Comparative Nuclear Yields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category/Type</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Relations to Hiroshima Bomb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima bomb</td>
<td>12-15 Kt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Imposed by the TTB Treaty</td>
<td>150 Kt</td>
<td>—11.1 times larger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Hydrogen Bomb Test</td>
<td>10.4 Mt</td>
<td>—770 times larger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest Nuclear Test (USSR)</td>
<td>58 Mt</td>
<td>—4296 times larger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest U.S. Nuclear Weapon</td>
<td>0.25 Kt</td>
<td>—54 times smaller</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Kt = kiloton; Mt = Megaton; TTB = Threshold Test Ban (signed in 1974 by the United States and Soviet Union to reduce environmental damage by limiting weapon tests in regards to underground testing of 150 kilotons each and minimize detonation of these yields. Last column calculated using 13.5 Kt as the estimated size of the Hiroshima bomb (Cochran, Arkin & Hoenig 1984, pp. 32-34).

As the comparative nuclear yields chart depicts, the hideous effects of nuclear war are too awful to even contemplate. Nuclear threat, nuclear blackmail or first strike scenarios are not optional or even imaginable to settle armed conflicts. Nonetheless, rogue state actors that possess nuclear weapons or nuclear facilities to develop enriched uranium are a grave concern for the global community. Albert Einstein stated: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes” (Partington 1996, p. 268). History is replete of tribal, civil and international conflicts. War is a complicated exchange of hostilities between contending forces that engage in coup d’états, revolutions, systematic terrorism, psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare tactics, conventional preemptive strikes, preventive war, and limited and total war scenarios are designated strategies in warfare management to successfully meet the objectives in a defensive or offensive political campaign.

However, the unmanageable effects of regional, hegemonic or global nuclear war overshadows any and all viewpoints on the just war theory; in fact, the technologic advancement of modern conventional warfare also challenges the utility of the just war tradition. The pundits that claim that just war theory is an outmoded moral axiom of bygone days are justified within their sphere of expertise – after all how could anyone deem any war just if thousands or even millions of innocent noncombatants suffer the fallout of weapons of mass destruction? This investigation reaffirms the moral requisite of the Augustinian just war tradition that emphasizes the managing of unwarranted violence to curtail needless slaughter and death, which in turn in our modern era denounces the utilization of WMD because of a potential escalation of nuclear yields in light of a heated nuclear exchange. In order to better understand the contemporary relevancy of the just war tradition it is necessary to examine its literary history. The literary history of the just war theory is a reaction to the political, ideological and military sciences of the times in which authors delineated upon ethics and warfare. It is important to trace and capsulize the literary history of the just war theory in order to comprehend its contribution to when war is morally acceptable, and what behavior in warfare should be morally condemned. The literary works provide an historical overview of the literary development of ethics and warfare.

### 1.5 Literary Background of the Just War Tradition

The just war tradition has a peculiar literary evolution. It is the by-product of the Roman *casus belli* that was redefined by Augustine to minimalize unwarranted carnage on the battlefield. It was systematized by Thomas Aquinas to thwart the unhallowed dictates of the ecclesiastical canonist that
popularized holy war, and was eventually incorporated by Hugo Grotius into the framework of just war and international law. The just war tradition has been adapted to countermand the ever-increasing trends of warfare science that necessitates moral parameters to thwart or curtail unwarranted violence on the battlefield. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC – 43 BC) reiterated the importance of the Roman casus belli during a major paradigm shift in Roman political and military tradition. The excerpts within the works of De officis, De re publica and Philippiques reiterate the vital significance of maintaining justice in war in order to vindicate Rome’s military policies and hegemonic expansion. St. Augustine (354 – 430) wrote during a time of Imperial Rome’s national demise. The imperial power was constantly embroiled in civil wars among competing generals and national wars against barbaric hoards infiltrating sovereign territory. Augustine’s excerpts on war are dispersed throughout his writings. The passages within the works of The city of God, Letters, On free choice of the will, Questions on the Heptateuch and Reply to Faustus the Manichaeen initiated the just war tradition in western thought. Thomas Aquinas’ (1225 – 1274) classic work Summa theologica systematized the Augustinian just war requisites during a time of unparalleled Church authority and power. Aquinas redefined the objective and subjective motivations for war in an era of church compliance and duplicity. War had become an accepted polity to restrain infidels, punish heretics and maintain civic order in the empire. During the demise of the Holy Roman Empire and the maturing nation state system, nations adhered to a religious preference, which redefined the geopolitical nature of Europe. The incapacity of the church to espouse just war principles because of the inseparable link between state and church inspired Catholic and Protestant thinkers to develop a system of laws to manage volatile tensions among nations. John Calvin (1509 – 1564) in the Institutes emphasized the just war premise, ‘last resort’, to restrain unauthorized and unrestrained authority for war. The constant friction among the cohort of European states caused Calvin to emphasize that war is a necessity for justice rather than a guise for geopolitical expansionism. Hugo Grotius’ (1583 – 1645) monumental work The law of war and peace (1625) altered the political terrain on how nations would manage war policy by posting just war requisites within the framework of international law. However, the Napoleonic conquests changed the force of war. Professional armies were replaced by the efforts of government, indigenous populations and national military power to sustain national security and expand the frontiers of the state. The utility of war had become a customary expedient to resolve hostile issues throughout Europe. Europe experienced the godless effects of total war, which ravaged the moral, spiritual and social well-being of nations. Within the context of power balances and power politics among European nation states during the First and Second World Wars, Hans J. Morgenthau (1904 – 1980) suggested in his treatise Politics among nations (1948) within the context of ‘war of total populations’, that the just war doctrine, was reduced to an autonomous monarchical political utility for war. The very principle of a just war was diminished to a legal and moral pretext for war on the one hand and a moral pretext to justify war among the masses of people on the other. In essence the legal and moral requisites for war unified the government, military and the population base for war (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 367, 368). While the allied forces during the Second World War claimed a ‘just cause’ for war against Nazi tyranny, the brutalities of war shifted from the battlefield to population centers. The unleashing of the atomic bomb upon the population centers of Nagasaki and Hiroshima gravely altered military tactics and stratagem. The Cold War challenged conventional wisdom regarding war since the advent of weapons of mass destruction. The two superpowers claimed the moral upper-hand in regards to their foreign policy objectives for world order and peace. The American Catholic Bishop’s treatise, the United States Catholic conference, The challenge of peace: God’s promise and our response (1983) challenged U.S. foreign policy and nuclear defense strategy during the Cold War. It revised prevailing Catholic views on just war in regards to the advent of weapons of mass destruction. It was a major shift in Catholic thought on just war since Vatican II. Paul Ramsey (1913 – 1988) is credited with re-examining and implementing the just war theory into Protestant ethical reflection. The works Basic Christian ethics (1950) and War and the Christian conscience (1961) established societal moral foundations and reiterated the importance of just war into the mainstream of American political thought. Michael Walzer’s (1935 – ) book Just and unjust wars (1977) investigate the moral dilemmas of just war in the post-modern era. The text was written during the height of the Cold War. Walzer states that the tension in the international order is “generated by a conflict.
between collective survival and human rights” (Walzer 1977, p. 325). The impassioned defense for noncombatant immunity, which challenged prevailing government military doctrine, was complicated by moral issues in the wake of nuclear warfare policy. Walzer’s premise challenged an era of unprecedented military power, but is antiquated by the dawn of a volatile multipolar order. George Weigel’s (1951 –) treatise *Tranquilitas ordinis* (1987) reiterates that the post-Vatican II and Catholic political theory in the United States is a theology of peace not war. Weigel redefines and reaffirms the Catholic position on peace in the international order. The process of just war is understood within the context of statecraft rather than a set of moral principles for military action. Ultimately the failed processes for peace between hostile nations, is the only justification for warfare. Ramsey, Walzer, American Catholic Bishops and Weigel provide monumental insights that reaffirm the limitations of the just war tradition as well as its validity. The affirmation of the just war tradition is its adherence to moral guidelines that challenge the volatile nature of power politics. The texts are limited by the historical milieu in which written, but are considered invaluable sources on war. Gregory M. Reichberg, Hennik Syse and Endre Begby’s edited work *The ethics of war: classic and contemporary readings* (2006) is a rich resource that compares essential classical and contemporary texts on war. It is considered an indispensable anthology on the nature of war. John M. Mattox’s book *Saint Augustine and the theory of just war* (2006) reaffirms the relevance and recommitment of the Augustinian just war tradition. Mattox’s systematic appraisal of Cicero’s *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles provides an accurate correlation to Augustinian just war theory and subsequent adjustments to the evolution of technologic advances for warfare. The depth of argument and application adds to the credibility of the treatise, which inculcates the moral tradition of ethics and warfare. Howard M. Hensel’s edited work *The prism of just war* (2010) is a product of globalization and just war theories. The collection of essays evaluates the just war theory in different historical time frames and cultures – East and West traditions are provided to “understand better the ways in which diverse cultures throughout the world approach the just use of armed force” (Hensel 2010, p. 274). Hensel’s work emphasizes the significance of understanding different ‘just use of armed force’ traditions as diverse global alliances are forged in a decentralized multipolar state system. Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans and Adam Henschke edited work the *Routledge handbook of ethics and war: just war theory in the 21st century* (2013) emphasizes the four essential elements in warfare: *jus ad bellum, jus in bello*, the state actor and the soldier. This investigation underscores the validity of the just war theory and its relationship to modern warfare. This is especially the case in regards to just war and territorial claims in regards to technologic warfare. It also evaluates the role of the contemporary state actor and its relationship to just war theories.¹ The information provided reviews the diverse resources available that delineate on morality and the use of force in war.

This investigation contributes to the literary genre in regards to the just war moral theory in the following manner: 1. It maintains a theoretical link by recognizing that the Augustinian just war tradition is an extension of the Roman *casus belli*. Augustine builds-upon the traditional concept of just war by acknowledging Cicero; however, unlike the Roman *casus belli* that focused on state prerogatives to expand its geopolitical territory, Augustine emphasizes ethics in war. 2. This investigation recognizes that Augustine reformulates the *casus belli* within the moral framework of Christian thought, which accentuates the moral obligation of the state to curtail unnecessary and unwarranted violence in war. The *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* traditions have been reiterated and adapted to the shifts in state power and

the force of war science that enhances friction among nations throughout history. It is the obligation of peoples and leaders to recognize the limitation of warfare to sustain state actor autonomy in the world order. 3. This examination of the Christian realist tradition also reiterates the concept that the primary moral agent in power politics is neither the state nor its institutions, but resides in the individual and collective actions of humankind. The strength of nations is not merely its tradition and culture of national power, but the moral and spiritual resources of its peoples and leaders, illustrated by the political actions of a state actor that affect national and international policy, and 4. This analysis maintains the historical tradition that the just war moral theory is a viable polity in the 21st century. It reiterates just war moral tenets in relation to the changing force of the state actor in contemporary politics and also provides a reformulation of the just war theory in relation to weapons of mass destruction. However, this study is complicated by the contemporary advancements in conventional and nuclear weaponry and the centric force of the autonomous state actor in a decentralized state system. Warfare is an integral part of the human experience. The issue of ethics and war is a constant friction between the states that are responsible for the safety of its citizenry as well as its sovereign state actor status and the moral tenets of society in order to protect the spiritual, moral and economic resources of a nation.

1.6 Background of the Problem

During the 20th and 21st centuries the just war tradition has been gradually eclipsed as a primary variable to understand when war is morally acceptable and what decision-making in warfare should be morally condemned. The philosophic tension between the classical and modern interpretation of the ‘cause of war’ is liable for the diverse approach to power politics in our post-modern society. There are several factors that have contributed to the demise of the Christian classic viewpoint that the nature of man is the pivotal societal cause for war. 1. Western secularism has invalidated the Christian classic viewpoint that the egocentric nature of humankind is the primary factor of organized violence. Kenneth Waltz asserts that this view is much “older than Niebuhr. Within the Christian tradition, it is stated in classic terms by St. Augustine. Outside that tradition, it is elaborated in the philosophy of Spinoza. In the political writing of the twentieth century, it is reflected most clearly and consistently in the works of Hans Morgenthau. These four writers, despite their numerous differences, unite in basing their political conclusions upon the assumed nature of man” (Waltz 1970, p. 21). Waltz and those of a similar vein of thought deride the ethereal nuance of human nature as the primary factor of friction and violence in the societal order. 2. Another factor is globalization, which has been intensified by mass media, ever-increasing electronic communications and recognized state actor sovereign rights, which has amplified the cultural, political, religious and legal differences among the consort of nations. The economic mechanism of interdependent states, a bi-product of globalism has provided opportunities for international dialogue on an assortment of issues while on the other hand it has intensified friction among nations. The clash of ideas and customs, state survival and power, the accent of secularist western trends and a blurred Christian tradition that has been incorporated within the panoply of world religions has attributed to the demise of the Protestant tradition in western civilization and it’s just war antecedents. 3. The 20th century also testified to the influence and demise of religious thought in the socio-civic order of the United States. Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King Jr. and Billy Graham influenced generations of Americans. The impact of Protestant thought upon the moral values of Americans stemming from the Puritan cultural heritage sustained a nation through the drive for national independence and eventually global dominance. However, the visages of Puritanism have been overshadowed by a liberal agenda, which has redefined marriage, and family, sovereign state rights, the prerogatives of military powers, and the redefinition of clandestine operations in times of peace and war. The American moral tradition has been overshadowed by libertine agendas in the social strata, which has caused a polarization of values and culture. 4. The muddled issue of what constitutes state actor power in a competitive decentralized multipolar state system has aggravated competitive forces among elite state actors unknown in ancient and modern history. The modern multipolar state system has intensified state actor competition for scarce resources on the one hand and the procurement of deadlier weaponry to ensure national security on the
other, and 5. Weapons of mass destruction have also altered contemporary military tactics and the means to secure state actor objectives. The force of conventional and WMD military weaponry has blurred the moral parameters as to what constitutes a just and unjust war.

This background sheds light on the fundamental questions that need to be addressed in lieu of the constant friction between moral principles and war, contrasted to state actor objectives and security issues in a volatile international system.

1.7 Research Question

The relevancy of the just war theory since the 20th century has been seriously questioned for a number of reasons: 1. The rejection of the classical interpretation of evil, which designates that the principle of ‘sin’ and ‘human nature’ is culpable for societal friction and ultimately war. This long standing tradition has been rejected by modern thinkers that deem an ‘innate principle of rebellious behavior’ as an outmoded assumption. Rather the issue for the cause of war is the result of state actor survival in a highly competitive state system. Contemporary literature ignores such claims whereas this investigation reinstates the formulation that the cause for war resides in individual or collective self-interest, rather than the failed mechanism of political institutions or the autonomous nature of the contemporary state actor, and 2. The modern advent of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weaponry has also deemed the utility of the just war theory as outdated. However, even some commentators that adhere to the just war tradition to countenance the use of tactical nuclear weapons, fail to comprehend the moral parameters of warfare. The very spirit of the Augustinian just war tradition is the preservation of life through the management of unwarranted violence and death on the battlefield.

This investigation questions both of these assumptions regarding the contemporary irrelevancy of the just war theory, provides a case for reaffirming the central motif in the previous tradition that violence resides in human nature, in its individual or collective state and for reiterating the moral parameters of just war in relation to the assumption that weapons of mass destruct are an effective national security mechanism. By discussing this twofold theme, which has been neglected by contemporary literature, this investigation wants to underscore the validity of the Augustinian just war theory in contemporary society. The basic research question it deals with is: What are the underlying motifs within the Augustinian just war tradition that needs to be reaffirmed and reintroduced in the debate on morality and war within the contemporary global paradigm? In order to comprehend the validity of just war tenets it must be contrasted to an event to clarify the muddled ethical challenges of modern warfare. The two gulf wars (particularly Operation Iraqi Freedom) are recent events that provide a current historical analysis. Within this framework this examination reaffirms the underlying cause of warfare, stressed in the Augustinian just war tradition, while modernizing the just war theory to contest the assumption that weapons of mass destruction are a viable security measure among nations.

1.8 Purpose of the Research

The purpose of the study is to demonstrate that the just war tradition, in an adapted form, still has relevancy in the competitive state system. This will be done in a critical discussion of the cause for and nature of the Iraq war. This investigation formulates a critical analysis of the development of the moral parameters of the just war tradition. It capsulate the development and application of the just war tradition throughout history and restates its vital contribution in our post-modern era by analyzing, contrasting and adapting jus in bellum and jus in bello traditions within the background of the two Iraqi wars. The formation of the research supports the validity of the Augustinian just war tradition as a viable mechanism to thwart unnecessary contemporary state actor aggression on the one hand and denounce the utilization of weapons of mass destruction or their practicality to ensure national defense on the other.
1.9 Justification for the Research

This study is important because the nature of modern warfare amidst an ever-increasing precarious multipolar state system has reinforced a Machiavellian predisposition in regards to state actor power. The just war tradition has had a considerable impact throughout the history of western civilization; however, the rise of secularism and the autonomous nature of the contemporary state actor minimizes its import when state actor security is threatened.

The just war tradition is not an excuse for war. It should not be misconstrued as means to utilize tactical nuclear weaponry. It is not the driving force to support a justified retaliation among hostile state actors. It is simply a moral mechanism to restrain and manage the escalation of violence between hostile forces. This aspect of the just war moral theory advocates the non-use of weapons of mass destruction because of their unmanageability when increasing nuclear yields are utilized to defend a state actor and the unpredictable devastating fallout effects of WMD on both combatant and noncombatant. Hopefully this treatise may shed more light on the discussion regarding *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* viewpoints in regards to war in the 21st century.

1.10 Methodology of the Research Problem

The researcher adhered to a ‘literature study’ to investigate the post-modern relevancy of the just war theory. In this study primary and secondary literature sources were utilized in varied academic and professional disciplines. Even though this is a Christian ethic reflection, the author deemed it necessary to examine the just war tradition outside the literary scope of theological reflection. The purpose of utilizing sources from international relations theory, military science theory, history, theology, social ethics and magazine sources, which encompassed practical and academic material, is to make the study relevant to the statesmen and foreign policy practitioner as well as the theological academic community. Ethics and war cannot be separated from the fields of domestic and international politics. Also, the researcher was certain that his academic background in theology, social ethics and international policy studies could contribute to the overall investigation of the thesis, which inevitably influenced the method of ascertaining sources that could provide a distinctive viewpoint on war and Christian ethics in the 21st century.

1.11 Scope and Limitations of this Investigation

The study concerns itself within its ancient and contemporary time-frame. The two kingdoms, the unfolding account of the *casus belli*, the formation of the modern state actor and delineations of human nature turned out to be crucial components in the development and applicatory appraisal of the just war moral theory. However, the investigation does not explain the mechanism for application of the just war theory into the mainstream of foreign policy analysis. The reexamination and application of the just war tradition into the hearts and minds of the guardians of foreign affairs is outside the parameter of this study. The primary objective is to reestablish a connection with the just war tradition within the shifting 21st century international paradigm, which has lost sight of the limitation of elite state actor power among the consort of nations.

1.12 Outline of the Study

The findings of the research are presented in three parts. After this introductory chapter 1, chapters 2 and 3 focus on the moral and traditional parameters of the Augustinian just war doctrine. Chapter 2 considers the period from the first battle recorded in the sacred text to the separation of church and state powers that provided Augustine and Niebuhr a public platform to espouse their viewpoints. Chapter 3 continues with an examination of the development and impact of the *casus belli* on Christian thought, its adaptation throughout crucial periods that demanded a reformulation of morality and war.
This preliminary investigation set the stage for the contemporary challenge against the Christian classic viewpoint regarding the nature of the state and humankind. Chapter 4 examines the Christian realist tradition in regards to the nature of contemporary power politics, exemplified by the centric force of the autonomous state actor that has reshaped the 21st century international paradigm. The clash of philosophical viewpoints between the scientific and Christian realist perspectives is detailed in chapter 5, in which a reexamination of the classical Christian realist tradition is reformulated to coincide with the post-modern realities of contemporary warfare. Chapter 5 stipulates that the human element is a primary variable in organized violence. It does not demand an acceptance of the classical theory of itself, but points out that the cause of war resides in the inner recesses of human nature not in the formalities of institution or paradigm shifts in the state actor system. Within this framework a justification for just war is considered contrasted to its pacifist antecedent, and a relevant reformulation of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* traditions, which lead into the following chapters’ applicatory framework to personify the contemporary relevancy of the just war tradition. Chapter 6 continues with an applicatory investigation of the complex issues of war in the 21st century. The two Iraqi wars in general and Operation Iraqi Freedom are recent events that explore the tenuous friction among elite state actors and the amoral challenges of power politics and state actor survival. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the study, makes some conclusion, and offers suggestions for further reflection and study.
CHAPTER II

2.1 The Two Kingdoms: Moral Foundations and Warfare

War is the Achilles Heel of Christendom; its very nature distorts and misrepresents the noblest moral axioms to curtail violence and to cope with the destruction of a nation, a home and a way of life. War is that final gasp of desperation; the ultimate frustration between contending ideologies; the eventual cessation of peaceful relationships. In war someone, somewhere at some time will always suffer the consequences of opposing hostilities. The politics of war is inseparably linked to the institutional social fabric of culture and tradition, and ultimately it is embedded in a spirit of insecurity and inevitably a contest of power. The roots of war are as old as the universe itself. The Christian sacred text in the Revelation delineates on the ancient cosmic struggle between the Prince of Peace and the lord of war – the great controversy between the Lord God Almighty and his former covering cherub Lucifer – “that ancient serpent called the devil or Satan” (Rv 12: 9). It is a desperate conflict or total war scenario. It is depicted as an “actual battle” (Charles 1920, p. 323), wherein Michael the commander-in-chief directs the angelic hosts in a preemptive attack, designated by the infinitive πνίεκηζαη “to make war” (Rv 12: 7) against his adversary the dragon (Mounce 1977, p. 241). The results of the battle are definitive, the devil and his angels are “hurled down . . . to earth” (Rv 12: 9). The ancient controversy becomes a contemporary realism – the antagonistic military leadership is designated; the battlefield is this world, and the coveted resources are the hearts and minds of humanity.

War is the personification of distorted facts. Both sides claim a right to wage war. Both sides accuse the other of deception (Gn 3: 1-7; Mt 4: 1-11). The war between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is a unilateral mandate; it is a choice for or against one side or the other. The contending forces are divided into a bipolar contest, which ultimately ends in eternal life or extinction (Jn 3: 16). The apostle Paul utilizes military language to illustrate the seriousness of the struggle against τά πνευματικά τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἑπορασίοις “the spiritual [forces] of evil in the heavens” and the Christian is admonished to put on ἕτοιμα “the whole armor of God” to stand against the devil’s schemes (Eph 6: 10-17). This deadly spiritual warfare is a realist paradigm in Pauline thought. Peter T. O’Brien states: “It is only by donning the divine panoply that believers can be properly equipped against the devil’s attacks” and that the “armour of God can be understood as the armour that God supplies . . .” (O’Brien 1999, pp. 462, 463). The Christian believer is not admonished to fight, but to stand in the power of God against satanic delusions. The weapons of Christian warfare are symbolized by the παλαιόπληθος “full armor” such as helmet, shield and breastplate are defensive armaments; whereas, the sword is an offensive weapon to counter the attacks of the enemy (Judson 1961, pp. 27-33). Paul reiterates that the weapons in this spiritual warfare are not the result of human invention or human power, but the δυνάμει τοῦ θεοῦ πρός καθαίρειν όργανοτον “divine power to destroy strongholds” (2 Cor 10: 4). The Christian believer’s weapons are faith, prayer and scriptural authority. Philip E. Hughes reiterates: “Only spiritual weapons are divinely powerful for the overthrow of the strongholds of evil” (Hughes 1962, p. 350).1 There is in early Christianity a conclusive awareness of good and evil. The cross of Christ stands between the two testimonies of witness – the Old and New Testaments. The standards of righteousness and

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1Hughes states: “Only spiritual weapons are divinely powerful for the overthrow of the fortress of evil. This constitutes an admonition to the Church and particular to her leaders, for the temptation is ever present to meet the challenges of the world, which is under the sway of the evil one, with the carnal weapons of this world— with human wisdom and philosophy, with the attractions of secular entertainment, with the display of massive organization. Not only do such weapons fail to make an impression on the strongholds of Satan, but a secularized Church is a Church which, having adopted the standards of the world has ceased to fight and is herself overshadowed by the powers of darkness” (Hughes 1962, p. 350).
unrighteousness are unambiguously comprehended in the cross of Christ. Its power reechoes throughout the ages and illuminates the revelation of God’s saving grace. The power of the cross, the crimson tide of cleansing grace through faith in the world’s Redeemer demands a life of conformity to the will and purposes of God. Therefore the two kingdoms in the New Testament are a spiritual encounter between God and the adversary of souls. The ancient warfare has come to fruition in the incarnate Christ who confronts, exposes, and defeats the ruler of this world (Mt 4: 1-11; Mk 5: 1-13; Lk 10:17, 18). The Church is under the guidance and protective care of God against the treacheries of the evil one (Jn 17: 11, 15; 2 Th 3: 3). This friction is intensified between the heavenly and earthly cities as the battle between good and evil is reenacted in everyday life.

The two kingdoms are a spiritual and corporeal manifestation in ancient and modern Christian history. The cosmic battle between good and evil is reenacted in both the church and the state. The unification of church and state has at times weakened or strengthened the ecclesiastical impact in society. Sometimes the church has capitulated under the demands of the state or its abuse of power to the detriment of social justice; whereas, there have been rare instances where ecclesiastical policy has been an outstanding socio-moral preservative. The Edict of Milan (313) and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provided a platform of opportunity, which enabled Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) and Reinhold Niebuhr (1892 – 1971) to formulate moral guidelines correlated to civic responsibility and war, at a time when the church and the state needed moral guidance in a troubled world order. Their heralded legacy, their penetrating insights, their prophetic voice continues even to this day in regards to friction and conflict in the national and international order.

The art of war encompasses and permeates ancient and modern literature. History attests that the commonality of war is an intimate and violent social interaction. The theoretical and real-world endeavor to understand war is an endless examination, which confronts and condemns modern humanity with its double standards, exhorting peace while preparing for war. Just war is not a subject of Christian origin. In fact, the Roman Republic lauded their hegemonic success to the casus belli or ‘just cause’ for war. Nonetheless, it was the dominance of the Christian tradition and community that led to a revision of the just war tradition espoused by Augustine of Hippo. The moral axioms of justice ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ war are inseparable elements that are referred to as ‘just war’. However, the just war moral theory is intricately linked to the Christian interpretation of sin and the fallen nature of humanity. This singular examination of the human predicament bypasses the on-going debate as to ‘why wars are fought’ to the more realistic inquiry on ‘how to fight a war’. The two kingdoms scenario illustrates the progressive tension of the Christian interpretation of social accountability between church and state relations as it relates to warfare in every epoch.

2.2 The Infant Christian Church and the Two Kingdoms

Is it possible to interpolate a post-modern view in regards to first century Christianity? Is it reasonable to utilize the word ‘pacifist’ to describe the social mindset of early Christianity? Is it possible that the early Christian community functioned more on an exclusive spiritual reality than their spiritual ancestors or descendants of faith? What a thrill it must have been to actually claim to have walked and talked to the Messiah, to behold his miracles and listen to his instruction. Is it possible that the early Christian community after Pentecost (Ac 2) was a little closer to the spiritual kingdom than the post-modern Church? The author of the Epistle of John testified about the interaction with the τὸ λόγον τῆς ζωῆς “the word of life”, the eternal one (1 Jn 1:1), whom the disciples ‘heard’, ‘seen’, ‘looked at’ and ‘touched’ accounted for a dynamic witness to successive generations. I. Howard Marshall states: “Jesus is both the preacher of God’s message and the message itself.” Our writer here wants to emphasize that the Christian message is identical with Jesus; it took personal form in a person who could be heard, seen, and even touched” (Marshall 1978, p. 102; see Bultmann 1973, p. 8). The kingdom of God supersedes social status, educational refinement, or ethnic advantages; it is a matter of faith in the redemptive work of Christ. The salvation by faith experience is inseparable from the object of life and message – Jesus Christ. The kingdom of God is synonymous to the Spirit filled life in the Christian community.

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The focus of the kingdom of God is not the political and civic power of Imperial Rome. When questioned about His civic activities Jesus assured Pilate that “My kingdom is not of this world” (Jn 18: 36). When Pilate was convinced that Christ’s kingdom was not a seditious attack against Rome; Jesus Christ was cleared of all charges. Pilate asserted: “I find no case against him” (Jn 18:38; 19: 4, 6). In the gospel of John, Christ renounces the establishment of a Jewish kingdom (Jn 3, 14, 18) or any movement of a seditious, revolutionary nature against the Imperial power. There are no political ambitions or ulterior motives. Nonetheless, Jesus Christ was not a pacifist. Jesus Christ lived as an example to mankind that the weapons of our spiritual warfare are prayer, scripture and complete trust in the will and power of God.

The cosmic warfare that ‘great controversy’ between Christ and Satan, light and darkness, righteousness and unrighteousness, reached its zenith amidst the clamoring Jewish mob, which sacrificed its religious heritage for national power and peaceful coexistence with Caesar’s Rome (Jn 11: 48-50, 19: 15). The cross of Christ is the definitive dividing line between the two kingdoms, and the celebrated symbol of Christendom since Golgotha (Mt 27: 32-54; Mk 15: 21-41; Lk 23: 44-56). Jesus Christ’s desire is to do the will of God and to make himself a sin offering (Jn 4: 34; Is 53; Dn 9: 20-27), by securing the immeasurable grace of salvation by way of the cross, the kingdom of God is secured for those who receive Christ as their source of redemption (1 Cor 1: 30, 31; Heb 11: 39; 12: 1-3). The liberating grace of God has been provided to everyone that recognizes human limitation from the visages of sin and associated with prostitution and its wider range of immoral abuses.

The list of fifteen vices, though not exhaustive, covers a large spectrum of moral and social depravities that challenged and affected the primitive Christian community. The Pauline tradition always designates the vices to be shunned for the flourishing church. It is the indwelling Spirit that prevents the believer from capitulating to a libertine or legalistic lifestyle. The indwelling Christ through faith in the power of God through the Holy Spirit provides the grace to live in a world of compromise and sin (Rm 8: 1-11; Gl 2: 20; Eph 4: 17-24; 5: 3-5). The gospel is not a philosophic construct but a moral reinforcement to preserve the home, community and nation.

The list of fifteen vices, though not exhaustive, covers a large spectrum of moral and social depravities that challenged and affected the primitive Christian community. The πορνεία “fornication” associated with prostitution and its wider range of immoral abuses ἀκαθαρσία “impurity” and ἀπελέγεια “lewdness”, “licentiousness” referred to as the three “illicit sexual activities” (Betz 1979, p. 283), coupled with εἴδωλολατρία, “the worship of idols” (Betz 1979, p. 284) belonged “to the stock-in-trade of Jewish polemic against paganism”. These are counterbalanced by “enmity, quarrelsomeness, jealousy, outbursts of rage, selfish ambitions, dissensions, party spirit and envy, suggesting that it was in these forms that the ‘flesh’ manifested itself in the Galatian Christians” (Bruce 1982, p. 250). However, Burton points out that the list of vices fall into four groups: 1. Three sins in “which sensuality in the narrower sense is prominent”. 2. Two [vices] which are “associated with heathen religion”. 3. Eight [vices] that involve elements of interpersonal and social “conflict with others”, and 4. The vice of “drunkenness and its natural accompaniments” (Burton 1980, p. 304). Paul is explicit that “those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God” (Gl 5: 21). The Pauline tradition always designates the vices to be shunned and virtues to be inculcated into the Christians lifestyle. Victor Furnish states:

Paul uses forty-two different terms relating to thirty-nine distinct vices, he uses fewer than twenty terms relating to sixteen distinct ‘virtues’ a difference which also holds when looking at the New Testament as a whole. Thus, the range of “virtues” is, for Paul as for the New Testament in

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general, approximately only one third as wide as the range of vices and these tend to cluster around the three central themes of love (ἀγάπη, II Cor. 6:6; Gal. 5:22; cf. longsuffering, kindness, peace, gentleness, goodness, self-control, etc.), purity (ἁγνότης, II Cor. 6:6; ἁγνός, Phil. 4: 8), and truthfulness, (ἀλήθεια, II Cor. 6:6; Phil. 4: 8; cf. knowledge, faithfulness, etc). The most important of these lists is in Gal. 5: 22-23 and amply documents the extent of which the "virtues" Paul enumerates have their context within his own thought and purpose. (Furnish 1968, p. 86).

Why does Paul focus more on the negative, ‘vices’, rather than the positive, ‘virtues’, in the early Christian community? The values and customs of Imperial Rome were a constant source of tension between the two kingdoms of church and state. Paul was dealing with new converts whose lifestyle was permeated by pagan custom. Their previous mindset was antithetical to the virtues and beliefs of the newly formed religious sect and had to be reeducated in the ways of the Christian faith. It is very similar to the children of Israel whose economic, social and religious culture and tradition had disintegrated after many years of slavery in Egypt (Ex 1: 8-22; 32: 1-6). The Israelites were illiterate and had adopted many of the amoral customs of their Egyptian oppressors. The Lord God on Mt. Sinai provided the book of the covenant, the Pentateuch, to reeducate the Israelite community. Within this context the apostle was fully aware of the moral and spiritual heritage of spiritual Israel.

Paul counter-balances his list of vices with virtues. His opening statement ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος “the fruit of the Spirit is” – designated by a present continuous tense, a subtle yet assertive reminder that Christian virtue is not an incongruous experience, but a consistent and unswerving commitment to Christian maturity and morality. Love is the binding force, the central component among the virtues listed, contrasted to the natural inclination to foster obligatory authority in the social strata. F. F. Bruce states that if “the works of the flesh as a whole be compared with the fruit of the Spirit as a whole, it will appear that the works of the flesh are disruptive of κοινωνία whereas the fruit of the Spirit foster it” (Bruce 1982, p. 255). The virtues that Paul emphasized were demonstrative values, rather than philosophic premises. The Johannine tradition summed-up the practical nature of Christian faith and practice, “Little children, let us love, not in word or speech, but in truth and action” (1 Jn 3: 18 NRSV).

It must have been a stirring experience to interact with someone who had met with the historical Christ. The message and life of Jesus of Nazareth were inseparable witnesses of the divine worship. There was great power in the testimony of living witnesses to succeeding generations in the early Christian community who grasped the reality and nearness of God’s personal gift of salvation in Jesus Christ – the central figure of the Christian religion (Josephus, The antiquities of the Jews, 18.3).³ The kingdom of God had touched the kingdom of men in ways that was unfathomable. Nonetheless, social realisms, political ambitions, and economic necessities are more about grass-root movements than theological and philosophical systems of truth. The early Christian sect offered social equalities within the Christian community, which enhanced its immediate popularity in Imperial Rome, which was regulated by legal and customary traditions that limited human relationships. However the gospel was a social power of equality that redefined human relationships.

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³ The ancient Historian Josephus (37-100 A.D.) stated: “Now, there was about this time Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him man, for he was a doer of wonderful works—a worker of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews, and many of the Gentiles. He was [the] Christ; and when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men amongst us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him, for he appeared to them alive again the third day, as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him; and the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day” (Josephus, The antiquities of the Jews, 18.3).
2.3 The Social Gospel, the Cross and the Two Kingdoms

The Apostle Paul’s profession of faith recorded in Galatians 3: 28, commonly referred to as the “Magna Carta of a New Humanity”, redefined the social class structure among believers in particular and society in general. The most fundamental power to a grass-roots movement is self-worth. The importance of the gospel was its emphasis on social equality ‘in Christ Jesus’. However, the birth of Christianity transpired during the era of the Caesars of Imperial Rome. The contemporary media inaccurately portrays ancient Rome as a brutal and violent nation. There is a dark side of Rome, which intrigues the modern psyche, yet Imperial Rome was a civilized society in a precarious world order – Roman conquest was counter balanced by a genius for law and governance unforeseen in ancient times. The greatness of Greek philosophy, sciences and art overshadowed the Mediterranean world. In fact, in “almost all their other intellectual endeavors the Romans were the eager pupils of the Greeks, but in law they were and knew themselves to be the master. In their hands law became for the first time a thoroughly scientific subject, an elaborately articulated system of principles abstracted from the detailed rules which constituted the raw material of law” (Nicholas 1996, p. 1). Bruce Metzger states that the “Roman empire achieved what previous empires had attempted with only partial success—the welding of many nationalities and peoples into one unified whole. Because of her peculiar genius for law and government Rome was able to maintain a more or less stable civil order for nearly half a millennium” (Metzger 1965, p. 30). The geopolitical vastness of the Pax Romana necessitated the jus civile “Roman citizen law” and the jus gentium, “law of the people” to successfully govern its immense multi-lingual and multi-cultural empire. The development of law and civic institutions of Rome demands a closer investigation.

2.4 Roman Law and Government: The Earthly Kingdom

Religion and law are inseparable and fundamental formulations in both ancient and modern societies. The founding principles that serve as a moral compass to guide and maintain the socio-political framework is a necessity for those who govern and those who are governed. The Babylonian Codes of Hammurabi and the Mosaic moral, civic and religious laws in the Pentateuch are prominent examples of ethical principles to formulate and regulate the social, economic, political and religious traditions of a specific community (Hertzler 1936, pp. 120-121). While Rome was a city-state the need for law became more evident as the community expanded. According to tradition delegates were appointed in 451 B.C., a commission of representatives, the decimvir “a group of ten men”, who were selected citizens with the task of developing a “written text of the customary law”, which was known as the ‘Twelve Tables’ (Stein 1999, pp. 3, 4; cf. Borkowski 1997, pp. 28, 29). These written set of rules were the foundation of Roman law. Cicero described the Twelve Tables as the source of all public and private laws, and stated, “Though all the world exclaim against me, I will say what I think: that single little book of the Twelve Tablets, if anyone looks to the fountains and sources of Laws, seems to me, assuredly, to surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in weight of authority, and in plenitude of utility” (Cicero, De oratore, 1, pp. 44, 195).

The purpose of the Twelve Tables was to provide some social guarantees between the patrician “aristocrats” who ruled the Roman province and the plebeian “commoners” who were the life force of the social and economic system. The Twelve Tables were the foundation of Roman Republicanism, foundational to the Roman legal science and modern jurisprudence (cf., Ibbetson & Lewis 1994, p. 14). The original copies were written on bronze plates then destroyed by the Gaul’s in 390 B.C. These laws were subsequently reproduced from various sources, thus preserving the sanctity of the civic and religious tradition and Roman legal science (Nicholas 1996, p. 15). The initial stage of Roman law in the Monarchical period was referred to as ‘archaic law’, a combination of the mores maiorum “human norms” and “divine injunctions”. It was formalistic and steeped in religious ritual, and the ius “unwritten or undeclared law” (Johnston 1999, p. 2), affecting sacral and juridical application in regards to legal and civic matters (Couperus 1993, pp. 17, 18). Scholars have scarce information of the Monarchical era; however, it was during this period of the ius, that the “constitution comprised the King, the council of
elders, and the assembly of the people”, but private law between individuals was a later development (Walker 1980, p. 1087). The primary focus of Roman law and religion was to maintain proper human relationships. The oral regulations handed down from generation to generation were intermingled with religious traditions to sustain the social and moral fabric of the community. The paternal figurehead was the undisputed authority of the family unit. As the population of the Roman city-state expanded the requisite for more efficient governance and laws to regulate its expanded territories necessitated a comprehensive approach to maintain social order in the budding Republic. The eventual challenge of all developing nations is the class struggle between the ruling and working caste. The social friction in the Roman Republic (510 – 367 B.C.), were in large part the result of attempting to forge an effective cooperative relationship between the Patrician nobility and the Plebeian working class, who comprised the majority of the population. In order to maintain civic harmony in regards to the struggle for economic and political power, a representative form of government evolved – the Republic. There were four essential elements, which enhanced the Republican tradition in ancient Rome. These were the Magistrates, the Tribunes, the Assembly and the Senate.

The Magistrates inherited royal power and eventually superseded the king in the monarchical structure. There were two magistrates referred to as consuls authorized with full executive powers. However, their authority was limited by the ability to veto each other’s legislative mandates. The magistrates held office for only one year and their executive powers were restrained by the Assembly. As Roman power and population expanded, other magistrates were added to support the consul’s in their respective spheres of duty; nonetheless, the principles of the imperium remained the same; each magistrate had full power within his own administrative duty, subject to the same limitations and veto powers of magistrates’ superior to him. The balance of executive powers was a major contribution of Roman Republicanism. The pivotal function of the magistrates on behalf of the Consul’s duties was the authority to administer matters pertaining to private law. The administrative powers granted in 367 B.C. for a magistrate to administer the civil law solidified magisterial influence and power on the legal strata of the Republic. As Roman conquest resulted in unprecedented geopolitical expansion and economic growth, two divisions were added in 242 B.C. to administer the jus civile and the jus gentium in order to effectively govern the numerous nationalities as a unified whole (Nicholas 1996, pp. 4, 5). While the Republic expanded its services, only two elected officials, referred to as Praetors, presided over the private law. The Quaestors administered the financial duties on behalf of the consuls in the fiscal administration of Rome, assisting the “consuls in the administration of criminal jurisdiction” as well as “the principle law officers of the State, following the decline in the importance of the Praetors” (Borkowski 1997, p. 4). These administrative leaders were the legal and executive foundation that sustained the diverse Roman citizenry and foreign population in the Republic.

The Tribunes (494 B.C.) were elected Plebian magistrates representing their respective constituencies and officiated over the concilium plebis – the “plebeian legislature”. As members of the Senate, the tribunes had invested powers to convene the Senate, veto other magisterial decisions, and protect individuals from abuses inherent in the system – making the Tribunes a potential threat to the authority and influence of the Senate (Borkowski 1997, p. 4). The Curule Aedile (367 B.C.) administered the public works, the market place, arranged the public games, exercised limited civil jurisdiction, and their sphere of influence contributed to the “law of sale”. Another influential feature was the Censor (443 B.C.), appointed to relieve the consuls by collecting data on the Roman population, which categorized the “wealth, tribal background, and military ranking” as well as “determining the eligibility to vote, to serve in the legions, and liability to taxation” (Borkowski 1997, p. 4). It was within the powers of the Censor to discipline an individual in private or public life, for misconduct, by placing a nota “mark”, which deemed him inter alia subject to some form of disciplinary action or social ostracism. The Censor also engaged in fiscal duties such as state contracts and collecting revenue for the state treasury. The Censor’s powers encompassed all phases of society, from the everyday citizen to Senate members. Eventually these powers diminished toward the end of the Republic and were appropriated by the Emperor of Imperial Rome (Nicholas 1996, pp. 4, 5).
The Assembly consisted of four representing bodies. 1. The *comitia centuriata* elected high ranking magistrates. It was the most prestigious assembly due to its enactment of the Twelve Tables. 2. The *comitia curiata* formerly “conferred powers on superior magistrates” and assumed a minor role in legislature decision-making. 3. The *comitia tribute* administered routine legislation and elected less significant magistrates. This assembly represented a geographical representation of the tribal peoples, and 4. The *concilium plebis* was the most powerful of the assemblies and eventually dominated the political and legislative platform in Rome. While each assembly had its own autonomy there were some guiding principles to maintain a functional relationship between the various institutions. Only a presiding magistrate could convene an assembly. The assembly could not legislate, debate or draft bills. It was the responsibility of the assemblies to accept or reject the proposal; the majority vote would pass or eliminate the recommended legislation (Borkowski 1997, pp. 30, 31). The Roman Republic provided their rendition of the balance of governmental powers to properly represent the people, and to expose and suppress government corruption while maintaining their vast territories. However, the slow digression of feuding civic powers dismantled the Roman Republic’s representative system. During the era of the *Princeps*, “the first citizen” initiated by Octavian (27 B.C. – 14 A.D.), the powers and influence of the assemblies waned and, during the era of the *Dominis* “lord” inaugurated by Diocletian (284 – 305 A.D.), the assemblies were replaced by government bureaucracies under the imperial directives to regulate the vast Roman domain through the autonomous power of Caesar.

The Senate was the preeminent representative body in Rome. It served as counsel or provided advice to leaders, and debated issues of state without the power to legislate their recommendations. However, it was within the capacity of the Senate “to declare laws invalid for want of form or shelve a valid law during a crisis” (Borkowski 1997, p. 31). As the power of the Emperor increased during the *Principate* (27 B.C. – 284 A.D.), the assembly’s functionality gradually diminished; and for a short period in the second century the Senate enacted law, but eventually became the legal and executive mouthpiece of the Emperor. Declareuil stated that from “the second century the Emperor had complete legislative power; from the third [century] no one any longer shared it with him” (Declareuil 1926, p. 27; cf., Nicholas 1996, p. 17). The *ius edicendi* “the right to issue edicts” by high ranking magistrates formed a new direction in law referred to as the *ius honorarium* “the law of those in honorary positions” – these legally binding directives within the sphere of jurisdicative powers provided a supplement to the *ius civil* or “civil law”, which transformed Roman legal science into a more flexible cosmopolitan system of jurisprudence. The edicts were utilized by a few designated magistrates and ultimately a powerful executive instrument of the Emperor.

The Roman legal system incorporated its forms of checks and balances to thwart corruption, maintain civic unity, and ultimately meet the demands of its complex and progressive society. Yet like all systems the ideal often supersedes the realities of everyday life. Jill Harries points out that the inadequacies of the Roman legal system favored the privileged classes over the poor: “The laws did not apply equally and if a wrongdoer came from the wealthy classes, then he might escape punishment, whereas a poor man, because of his ignorance of how to conduct such matters, would undergo the penalty prescribed by the law” (Harries 1999, p. 6). History is replete of the shortcomings of legal manipulations and injustice. The preeminent institutional determinations of impartiality fall short to provide equilibrium of law and justice in both ancient and modern eras. Despite the inconsistencies of Roman law, the process was the only lucid legal framework of its time and established a structure of governance that rivaled the democratic principles of the Athenian Greeks because of the inherent limitations of its competitive city-state system. The rise and preeminent prestige of the Roman Republic (510 B.C. – 27 B.C.) was eventually undercut by social chaos. After the third Punic war in 146 B.C., Rome was unrivaled and the sole heir of political and commercial dominance. However, the last century was riddled by civic upheaval and the slow decline of moral laxity, accompanied by a rise in greed and crime. Roman historians struggle with the moral and social demise of Roman society during times of unprecedented peace. The *Locus classicus of juvenile’s sixth satire* depicts the dilemma:
In the days of poverty
Kept Latin women chaste: hard working, to little sleep,
These were the things that saved their humble homes from corruption—
Hands horny from carding fleeces. Hannibal at the gates,
Their men folk standing to arms. Now we are suffering
The evil of too-long peace. Luxury, deadlier
Than any armed invader, lies like an incubus
Upon us still, avenging the world we brought to heel (see Dawson 1996, p. 162).  

Political dissensions, family disputes contending for the throne, and internal conflicts eventually erupted into civil war. Julius Caesar (100 – 44 B.C.), from 60 to 50 B.C., formed political alliances with Marcus Licinius Crassus (115 – 53 B.C.) and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (76 – 45 B.C.) referred to as the ‘First Triumvirate’ or an extra-legal agreement, which was an unofficial coalition that collapsed after the death of Crassus (53 B.C.) in the battle of Carrhae. Immediately Caesar initiated a civil war in 49 B.C., against Pompeius and emerged victorious after the battle of Munda (45 B.C.) as the undisputed authority of Rome. Caesar’s centralized political power and assumed title dictator perpetuo, “dictator in perpetuity” agitated the Senate. The Republican constitution was in affect suspended, which instigated a conspiracy in the Senate of which twenty of the sixty conspirators, excluding Cicero, united with Junius Brutus to eliminate the Roman despot. Caesar was tactless, inaccessible, and discourteous to Senatorial representatives, corrupted by success, and demanding honors of deification that were antithetical to Roman tradition. The assassination was inevitable, but the dictatorial trend initiated by Caesar initiated a new era of Roman governance referred to as Imperial Rome (The Encyclopedia Britannica, 1967, vol. 4, pp. 573-577). Octavian (the great-nephew whom Julius Caesar adopted to be his political heir), learned the lesson of Caesar’s overt display of power by concealing the outward demonstrations of authority under the guise of constitutional reform, but the Roman Republic was never the same and eventually vested Octavian full powers as Augustus the first Emperor of Rome. 


The Empire was subject to the weaknesses of imperial leadership. The Principate witnessed the atrocities of the most infamous tyrants. Edward Gibbon elaborates:


The golden age of Trajan and the Antonines had been preceded by an iron age. It is almost superfluous to enumerate the unworthy successors of Augustus. Their unparalleled vices, and the splendid theatre on which they were acted, have saved them from oblivion. The dark unrelenting Tiberius, the furious Caligula, the feeble Claudius, the profligate and cruel Nero, the beastly Vitellius, and the timid and inhuman Domitian, are condemned to everlasting infamy. During fourscore years (excepting only the short and doubtful respite of Vespasian’s reign), Rome groaned beneath an unremitting tyranny, which exterminated the ancient families of the republic, and was fatal to almost every virtue and every talent that arose in the unhappy period (Gibbon 1960, pp. 1, 2).


It was during the Principate that Rome reached its zenith of prestige and power. The “constitutional system that had evolved under Augustus was resilient enough to withstand the presence at the helm of the affairs of Rome of the occasional monster or halfwit as Emperor” (Borkowski 1997, p. 15). The legal framework sustained the social infrastructure in both the jus civile and the jus gentium in a complex multicultural empire on the one hand and sustained the political institutions on the other. Yet the sustaining power of Caesar was the Roman Legions. While modern society has lauded the genius of the ancient Greeks, which overshadowed its beneficiary; yet Rome rialed its predecessor. The magnificent Coliseum and Pantheon of Rome, the Aqueducts, the Forum of Trajan (113 A.D.), the monuments and mausolea that celebrated their heroes of renowned and honored families as well as the limitless international highways, those “famous roads that traversed the Empire in all directions and exacted the


\(^{1}\) The contributing factors for civic unrest and glorification of war are stronger in the Latin: \textit{nunc patimur langae pacis mala} (now we suffer the evils of long peace), (see Dawson 1996, p. 162).
most diligent care for their maintenance constitutes one of the Roman government’s titles to glory” (Chapot 2001, pp. 90-92). These magnificent achievements conveyed the message of Roman power and unchallenged authority imposed upon ally and enemy alike throughout its vast domain. The Roman military was the right arm of power. Josephus commended the Roman army for their military discipline and strategy in which “valor”, and “not the bare gift of fortune”, was the root cause of attaining such a vast dominion. Disciplined ranks, vigilant planning, accurately executed stratagem and the flexibility to correct tactical miscalculations enabled the Roman army to be a formidable force on the battlefield (Josephus, The wars of the Jews, 3.5; 1.8; cf., Goldsworthy 2007, p. 53). The Roman legion perfected warfare strategy and enforced the will of the state. While many great ancient armies have traversed the geopolitical landscape throughout history, the Roman Legion improved, adapted and implemented the science of war on a level that even fascinates the modern military strategist (Peddie 1996, pp. ix - xiii). Roman law and military might united a vast hegemon that furthered the social sciences, architecture, communications and law.

Rome was a citadel of social order and law in a violent world. William Burdick elaborates: “The Roman Empire as a political organization passed away centuries ago, but Roman jurisprudence through its influence still remains a world power. In its modernized form Roman law has become the law of more than three-fourths of the civilized globe, and Gibbon’s words written in the eighteenth century, ‘the laws of Justinian still command the respect or obedience of independent nations,’ are even more significant today than then” (Burdick 2007, p. 1). Rome perfected the strategies of war and national security. Rome’s vast road system enabled the quick military response to any and all hostile challenges to its hegemony. Rome under Augustus implemented the policy of balancing the size of its military strength to its economic production. Rome comprehended the geopolitical advantage and range of tactical strategic planning in order to maintain national security objectives (Bradford & Bradford 2001, pp. 277-279). Rome provided the best military medical care, which has been only surpassed by modern medical advancement (Metz 1991, p. 138). Rome’s pragmatism, logicality, and organizational development systematized the “use of sewers, a safe water supply, a varied diet, regular cleansing of the streets, inspection and monitoring of public food supplies, cremation of the dead and burial outside city walls, public baths and sanitary public latrines . . . provided the raw material of the Roman army with the healthiest urban environment in history in which to be born and grow” (Metz 1991, pp. 139, 140). In so many ways Rome was recognized as the center of the arts, sciences, architecture and law. However, Rome was a product of its times; its unremitting civic tradition and cultic constraints; its irreverent regard for life and its structured caste system that eventually popularized the Christian faith.

2.5 The Power of Acceptance: There is Neither Jew or Greek

St. Paul declared: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or female; for we are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gl 3: 28). Racism is a social contaminate, a collective social malignancy that deprives humanity of its re-creative autonomy. Racism is not only a social disorder; rather it is also an intrinsic carnal disorder, which can express itself in many shapes and forms. It was the cross of Christ (Eph 2: 13, 14), that broke the τό μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ “middle wall of partitions” of ethnic divisions representative among Jews and Gentiles. The conflict in the newly formed church as a result of the Judaistic eschatological nationalism, meritorious legalism, and spiritual pride that inhibited early Christian development – this created numerous social issues of which ‘circumcision’ was just a microcosm of a greater challenge to the newly formed religious sect. Social equality ‘in Christ’ permeated Pauline thought. The formulation in 1 Corinthians 12: 13, “For we were all baptized by one Spirit into one body—whether Jews or Greeks, slave or free” is reiterated in Colossians 3: 11, “Here there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian or Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and in all”. The power of self-worth, the pervading influence of social equality, the dignity of social affluence among church members, popularized the initiation rite of baptism. Richard N. Longenecker among other scholars supports the viewpoint that Galatians 3: 28 is a baptismal confession that not only designated one’s death to the old way of life (Rm 6: 6; Eph 4: 22; Col 3: 9), but transformed
social relationships covering “in embryonic fashion all the essential relationships of humanity” (Longenecker 1984, p. 34). The initiation rite of baptism’s demonstrative confession of faith, ‘to the God/man Jesus Christ’ on the one hand, and unforeseen social and political equalities on the other initiated an unavoidable collision with the traditional values and laws of Imperial Rome. In fact, Christian custom and tenets were antithetical to the various traditions represented throughout ancient civilization.

Both Pharisaic Judaism and the Greco-Roman world possessed similar chauvinistic characteristics related to race. Longenecker suggests that the three couplets in Galatians 3: 28 were a conscious attempt to counter,

the three bĕrākôt (“blessings,” and “benedictions”) that appear at the beginning of the Jewish cycle of morning prayers: “Blessed be He [God] that He did not make me a Gentile; blessed be He that He did not make me a boor [i.e., an ignorant peasant or a slave]; blessed be He that He did not make me a woman” . . . . Analogous expressions of “gratitude” appear in Greek writings as well; for example, “that I was born a human being and not a beast, next, a man and not a woman, thirdly, a Greek and not a Barbarian” (Longenecker 1990, p. 157).

Betz stresses that the formula οὐκ ἐν Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην “neither Jew nor Greek” is likely “a variation of a well-known Hellenistic political slogan”, Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι, “Greeks and barbarians”. This slogan circulated a few centuries before Paul, emphasizing the “unity of mankind” and the “abolition of the cultural barriers separating Greeks and non-Greeks”. However, Betz assumes that Paul shared similar viewpoints with Judaism and Stoicism that “the unity of mankind corresponds to the oneness of God” albeit in Paul’s thought “unity” that was redirected or “accomplished through Christ and the gift of the Spirit” (Betz 1979, pp. 191, 192). The power of culture, tradition and philosophy cannot be overestimated. Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s treatise comparing Pauline and Stoic thought reinforces the viewpoint that humanity is part of that great web of human experience and thought (Pedersen 2000, pp. 293, 294). Nonetheless, Paul unequivocally claims “that the gospel that was proclaimed by me is not of human origins; for I did not receive it from any human source, nor was I taught it, but I received it through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gl 1: 11,12). The ramifications of the gospel affect the believer’s interpersonal and social orientation. Udo Schnelle points out that house churches were composed of both Gentile Christians and Jewish Christians, which needed a socio-soteriological mandate to foster unity. Schnelle states that “with the expression ἐν Χριστῷ Paul unites the vertical and the horizontal realms: from communion with Christ (cf., Gl 3: 27) grows a new communitas of baptized believers that now transcends fundamental gender, ethnic, and social alternatives (Gl 3: 28; 1 Cor 12: 13)” (Schnelle 2003, p. 482).1 What Stoic or other ancient humanistic analyses envisioned, Christianity was able to provide by recognizing that cooperate change begins with the individual and then, permeates the community.

Within this secularized framework Paul never challenged the social inadequacies or atrocities of the Imperial Roman Empire. Unlike our modern day social gospel reformists, St. Paul encouraged cooperation with the governing authorities despite the mounting antagonism and persecution against the early Christian sect. Paul specified that the cross of Christ “abolished the laws and commandments in decrees” (Eph 2: 15). Against what? – any theory, any theology, any philosophic supposition, any socio-political misconceptions, which undermined the redemptive power of Christ’s sacrifice and church unity,

1 Udo Schnelle states: “The house church, as a center of early Christian mission, thus permitted a relatively undisturbed practice of religious life and facilitated an efficient competition with synagogue congregations and cultic associations. Finally, the house church also offered a setting for breaking through the conventions of social structure and value systems and for living out the new identity in Christ (cf., Gal. 3: 26-28). With the Christian house churches, the differences between people lost their importance. God had torn all of them out of their old life and placed them in a new reality, which Paul describes as being in Christ. Faith in Christ Jesus did not separate; it tore down the old walls and built no new ones. Believers really became one in Jesus Christ. The struggle between poor and rich, slave and free, male and female, did not determine the reality of the early Christian house churches, but mutual participation in the unity of the one community established by Christ” (Schnelle 2003, pp. 155-156).
was emphatically condemned by the apostle (Gl 2: 11-14). What the New Testament supported in general, the apostle Paul articulated in particular was the power of love (1 Cor 13), the binding force of God’s grace in the newly formed church, within the framework of the cross and the Spirit filled life that ultimately unites diverse ethnicities in the Christian community (Gl 2: 15b-16; 1 Tm 4: 7). The first step in fostering positive relationships in the early Christian community was to ‘see past’ and ‘look beyond’ color, ethnic traditions and lingual divisions to the surpassing worth, the all-inclusive grace of God. Paul’s threefold emphasis is an unremitting progressive dynamic, which corrected the intrinsic disorder of racial and economic profiling in the hope of adjusting social mindsets and eventually institutions to provide the rights of humanity to all classes of people.

2.6 There is Neither Slave or Free

Slavery was a universal institution. What the Greeks developed the Romans refined in an intricate and complex web of law. The Greek social strata divided the masses into dissimilar classes such as free or slave; Greek or barbarian; wise or foolish, and male or female. In fact, the Greco-Roman discrimination between free and slave was apparent, because the “punishments prescribed by law for slaves were of a degree of severity to those for free men” (Wiedemann 1988, pp. 15, 61). Even though this social polarity was condemned by numerous critics, the institution of slavery was an essential economic and political necessity among nations. Paul Louis reiterates the point that “slavery is the basis of the whole economic system in the States of antiquity”. Roman conquest reiterates the observation that “slavery maintained by war and requiring war as a means of obtaining recruits, was a recognized custom, a universal practice and one of the few features common to all existing forms of civilization” (Louis 1927, pp. 9, 37). The conquered had no rights. The life of the slave was a precarious ordeal. Even though there were cases of Roman citizens put into slavery because of the refusal of military service (Cicero, Pro caecina 33.96-35.101), or penal slavery, which ostracized undesirable elements in society, these were preventative measures to “ensure state control of dangerous criminals of low status”, and afforded little economic advantage. The Roman government had adopted a policy of social ostracism and in some instances slavery for serious white-collar offenders; however, members of the upper class who committed a serious crime during the early Roman era were sold into slavery while in “the late Republic, the punishment of exile outside Rome was used for this purpose. In the Imperial period, although Rome now managed a vast empire, the dangerousness of high-class offenders could be controlled effectively by lifelong exile” (Archer 1988, pp. 79); whereas the dangerous criminal element of low estate were removed from the urban centers and sent to the mines (Archer 1988, p. 79). Eusebius noted that Christians were also sent to the “provincial copper mines” simply to add to their “distress and hardship” (Eusebius, Church history, 8.12.10). Slavery was a social custom in ancient civilization.

The master of the slave had complete autonomy and legal recourse. Initially the head of the Roman household had “absolute rights to punish their slaves, like their sons, with death” (Wiedemann 1988, p. 173). “Under the Empire, the general tendency for the state to restrict or at least monitor the rights of a pater familias extended to the execution of slaves. This does not mean that slaves could not continue to be executed in the most brutal fashion, but at least they were protected from any arbitrary whim of their masters by need to obtain a condemnation before the court” (Wiedemann 1988, p. 173). The slave’s life was a precarious experience dependent upon the disposition of his master. Some masters were deeply attached to their slaves (Mt 8: 5-13) and “examples of loyal slaves were important evidence in favour of the Stoic proposition that slaves were moral agents who deserved to be treated humanely” (Seneca, 3, 17). Nonetheless slaves were considered “merely ‘a thing’ (res), ‘a mortal object’ (res mortale), simply ‘chattel’ (mancipium), not a person, and had no personal or human rights except as permitted him by his master” (Longenecker 1984, p. 49). The slave cult was discreetly altered and challenged by the apostle Paul, who emphasized redemptive equality among believers.

The apostle Paul understood the slavery motif in regards to Israelite bondage in the land of Egypt (Ex. 1: 8-22). The Old Testament festivals were a celebration and solemn reminder of God’s deliverance of Israel from Egyptian oppression. The yearly celebrations commemorating Israel’s liberation from
foreign domination to statehood was utilized to Paul’s advantage when emphasizing the δούλος “slave” imagery in reference to righteousness and sin (Rm 6: 6-14). The two kingdom scenario is developed in the Pauline dualism of “slaves of sin” and “slaves of righteousness” (Rm 6: 17, 18) – to be a slave of sin is alienation from God and death; whereas a slave of righteousness is true freedom and eternal life. True Christian freedom is submission to the will and purpose of God. The liberating premise of Paul was that both slave or free had direct and equal access through faith in the merits of Christ’s righteousness, the all-inclusive acceptance and status as sons and daughters of God. The ‘dignity of humanity’, the ‘equality of believers’ was understood within the Christian community as a model of the heavenly city.

The debate regarding Paul’s apparent apathy to social and political reform perplexes the contemporary temperament. Why did Paul limit his social and political restructuring to the parameter of the church? There are several reasons provided by numerous commentators, for example: The early church was eagerly waiting for the Second Coming of Christ. Paul declared: “let each of you lead the life that the Lord has assigned, to which God called you”, and further elaborates, “Were you a slave when called? Do not be concerned about it. Even if you can gain your freedom, make use of your condition now more than ever” (1 Cor 7: 17, 20-21, 24). Was Paul requesting church members not to better their situation because of the imminent return of Christ? Or was Paul most likely reminding the new converts about Christian priorities? 2. Paul was unwilling to incite social friction that could provoke civic conflict; neither the New Testament writers in general nor Paul in particular supported political anarchy. While the early Christian community had its confrontations with the State (Ac 4:19), Paul encouraged a cooperative relationship with governing authorities (Rm 13: 1-6; 1 Tm 2: 1-4). If Paul supported a social agenda could it cause a revolution to the extent of anarchy? It should be remembered that Paul was a former Pharisee, who participated in the Jewish Sanhedrin. Even though the Jewish senate had limited civic authority during Roman occupation, the power and influence of the Sanhedrin could not be underestimated. Paul focused upon his gospel commission to the gentiles. It was not his calling to change Rome. To a great extent Roman law, security and road system aided in the spread of the gospel. Paul wanted to avoid any misunderstandings with the Roman government. The apostle was a Roman citizen. In order to protect the community of believer’s Paul cooperated and faithfully adhered to his law-abiding relationship to the State on the one hand and the benevolent values of the Christian community on the other. The apostle’s attitude was representative of both his Roman and heavenly citizenship (Ac 16: 37-38; Eph 2: 19), and 3. Paul probably believed that the Lord would see the implications of the gospel message permeate the lives of professed believer’s and eventually influence society at large. Institutions cannot change themselves. The witness of the early Christian sect testified to the transforming power of the gospel and the power of social equality.

The second period (2nd and 3rd centa.) is marked by the progress of Christianity in the Roman Empire, in spite of repeated—sometimes sporadic, sometimes systematic—persecutions, until in 313 it had attained such importance and influence that Constantine deemed it politic to strengthen his position as Emperor by adopting this persecuted religion as his own (Hastings 1951, vol. 3, p. 589).

Paul’s emphasis was about fostering positive relationships among the different classes of people. The home church provided a unique environment to nurture and develop a sense of community focusing on Christ as the head of the church (Eph 5: 23; Col 1: 18). The influence of the early Christian sect eventually permeated the values of society. The mindset must be transformed before political institutions can be altered (Phlp 2: 5). Theo Preiss states that the “Gospel penetrates systems and civilizations but is never identified with them. In particular it is more realistic than all idealisms and all so-called political realisms, for it attacks the heart of the problems, the personal center and personal relationships” (Preiss 1954, p. 33).

It was in the Epistle to Philemon that Paul provided the strongest statement concerning the institution of slavery. Onesimus was a runaway slave whom Paul returned to his owner and master, Philemon. It should be recognized that it was Paul’s duty as a law abiding citizen to return the slave to its
proper owner. Also, the penalty for runaway slaves was severe, sometimes incurring the death penalty, and finally, Paul was acting as a law abiding citizen, while providing a conflict solution between slave owner and slave within the parameters of love and forgiveness. Paul stated to Philemon, “When I remember you in my prayers, I always thank God because I hear of your love for all the saints and faith toward the Lord Jesus. . . . welcome him [Onesimus] as you would welcome me . . . If he has wronged you in any way, or owes you anything, charge that to my account” (Phlm 4, 5, 17, 18). Paul also stresses the foundational unit in Roman society the *familia* “household” to complete the social Christian mandate in order to establish unity among the early Christian community.

### 2.7 There is Neither Male or Female

In the ancient Greco-Roman world, a division among classes of people was a social institution. While Roman institutions resembled her Greek rivals, the Roman passion for law developed an intricate web of jurisprudence that analyzed every legal aspect of human relationships. The Roman’s considered *liberates*, “freedom” as “the most fundamental ‘divide’ in determining the legal status of an individual”, and *civitas* “citizenship”, specifically Roman citizenship as the next most fundamental privilege, followed by the *familia*, “household” of which the *pater familias*, “male head of the household” exercised complete legal authority. The Roman tradition considered the family as the most essential “building block of the Roman state, since, metaphorically, the *familia*, is often understood as the state in miniature”. The “adult males are accorded the highest civil status, and they also predominate in legal sources, reflecting, obviously, a society that is largely male dominated” (Frier & McGinn 2004, pp. 11, 12, 13). The Roman Empire was managed by law and sustained by its disciplined armies; however, the foundation of its greatness was the household.

The *pater familias* maintained complete legal authority over his male decedents, wife, daughters, adopted children, and slaves. The wife was subject to a male legal guardian throughout her entire life. However, the wife of Roman citizenship was under the legal guardianship of her father and after his death, his male descendants, not her husband’s. Roman law prescribed the legal status of the male and female marriage arrangement in regards to the status of the respective marriage partner. The wife was excluded from political and military pursuits; and her legal rights were tightly regulated. Even if the wife, a Roman citizen, had inherited money and wealth the assets were regulated by the male who had been designated as the legal guardian. Naturally there are always exceptions to the rule. Since Rome was a warfare state, the men folk were often away fighting wars for State and glory, which necessitated among the elite women the responsibility of “making major decisions within their family circles, especially decisions concerning the education, marital arrangements, and political careers of both their own children and the offspring of their female and male siblings” (Vivante 1999, pp. 263, 264). Since women were excluded from military service it provided opportunities out-of-necessity to participate in family businesses and social responsibilities solely designated for the *pater familias*. However, this situation was the exception to the rule. Rome was a patriarchy, its male dominated society extended from the household to the Senate. It is within this context that the Pauline social mandate that there is “neither male nor female” reverberates with the progressive power for change and Imperial Roman suspicions. Frier and McGinn claim that the “legal weight that is attached to social stratification increases significantly in the late Empire” (Frier & McGinn 2004, p. 13). Family unity was centered upon the *pater familias*, which was challenged to some extent by the gospel that stipulated spiritual equality among the household.

Paul once again reaffirms that both male and female have equal access to the grace of God through the merits of Christ, and focuses upon the love of God as the crucial foundation of family unity (Gl 3: 28; Eph 5: 21-33; 6: 1-4). The submissive relationship between husband and wife is reciprocal as both look to Christ as the head of the church. The submissive relationship of the wife to her husband “was called for, not because it was conventional for wives in Greco-Roman society, but because it was part and parcel of the way in which they were to serve their Lord” (O’Brien 1999, p. 437). It is the law of love rather than Roman paternal and ancestral customs that regulated the Christian household. The emphasis of the gospel regarding human relationships was antithetical to the Greco-Roman and Jewish customs.
regarding human relationships. It should also be noted that despite efforts in contemporary society to ensure race equality; the struggle for social equality is an ongoing friction in the home, community, among nations and even between state actors. An illustration designates the antithetical values between Imperial Rome and the early Christian church.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pax Romana: Class Stratification</th>
<th>Early Christian Social Mandate</th>
<th>Christian Social Values</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Jus civile</em> “Roman citizen law” and the <em>jus gentium</em> “law of the people”. Regulated civil and public law to sustain order in the Roman Republic and Imperial Empire. Greek and Roman polarity enhanced social bias’s which Roman jurisprudence and military power held-in-check.</td>
<td>οὐκ ἔνι Ιουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην “there cannot be Jew nor Greek”. The social mandate eradicates ethnic, cultural and traditional divisions that cause sectarian behavior and dissensions in the Christian community. All peoples, in all lands, in all languages have equal access to God through the substitutionary and meritorious sacrifice of Jesus Christ.</td>
<td>The social strata, the dividing wall of hostilities, has been eliminated by the cross of Christ (Eph 2: 13-16). The welding of two diverse communities into one ‘in Christ’ fosters unity, and brotherly love (Phlp 2: 3-11).</td>
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Slavery is an institution of the common law of peoples (*ius gentium*) which puts someone into ownership (*dominium*) of somebody else. Slaves were considered res “a thing”, *res mortale* “a mortal object” or *mancipium* “chattel”. Slaves had no identity and were under the sole authority of their master. Slavery was the basis of the economic system in the states of antiquity.

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The Roman household was the basic construct in society. The *pater familias* “father of the household” had exclusive legal and authoritative power in the family. The Roman Republic and Imperial Rome were patriarchal in nature, from the household to the Senate, Rome was a male dominated society with little legal or social rights for women.

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The Pauline social mandate was revolutionary without the revolution through the subtle influences of God’s transforming grace. Roman legal science, like its modern counterpart, was often overshadowed by the mundane responsibilities of life. However, the attractive liberating social influence of the early Christian sect was counterbalanced by intense intermittent persecution. This separated the curious adventurist from the genuine professed Christian. Nonetheless, the Christian sect grew and solidified itself in the social strata of Rome. As the Christian sect flourished throughout the Roman Empire, the philosophic differences and allegiances enhanced social ostracism and persecution. The early Christian sect had to choose between Caesar and Christ; the demarcation between the heavenly and earthly cities was definitive and warranted banishment and death to those who slighted the cult worship of the emperor.
2.8 Early Christianity and the Roman State: The Two Kingdoms

While the *pater familias* was the basic element in society that solidified the traditional values of Rome; Caesar-worship was the expressed ‘badge of loyalty’ to certify the Roman subject’s allegiance to the State. It was less of a religion and more of a litmus test of national patriotism to ensure a political bond of cosmopolitan uniformity (Angus 1929, p. 22). Ancient Rome was a coherent societal blend of paternal traditional values undergirded by a sophisticated jurisprudence and solidified by an undivided loyalty to Caesar, who was in essence the State in verity. The iconic status and worship of Caesar enhanced a deification rite after death, which solidified the importance of the cultic experience. The Roman populace could worship any number of mystery cults or seek other philosophic avenues to placate their inner psyche, but Caesar-worship was a standardized State requirement that was non-negotiable. The social values, the civil and military traditions of Imperial Rome conflicted with all that early Christianity espoused and ultimately were perceived by Rome as a threat to the State because of the Christian community’s social mandates and uncompromising loyalty to their Savior/God – Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, why were the Christians periodically and then systematically persecuted for their religious faith, when various foreign mystery cults and even Judaism were initially tolerated by the Republic and Imperial Rome?

Theodore Mommsen provided a threefold argument in regards to ancient Roman policies pertaining to foreign cults: 1. Foreign cults were tolerated as long as it was heterogeneous in nature and not practiced by Roman citizens. 2. While Judaism’s monotheistic exclusiveness conflicted with Roman traditional polytheistic practices, the Jewish religious tradition was inveterately interconnected with a geopolitical community that justified its provincial cultic practice, and 3. The fate of Christianity was its uncompromising monotheism and non-national roots or a foreign cult without a legitimate nation state heritage (Mommsen 1890, pp. 389; see 421–425). Simeon L. Guterman contested Mommsen’s treatise suggesting that civic polity and tradition in both the Republic and Imperial Rome were always antagonistic and suspicious of Jewish geopolitical monotheism or any foreign cult that challenged Roman civic and religious tradition, the cornerstones of unity and identity in ancient Rome. From Livy (59 B.C. – 17 A.D.) to Diocletian (244 – 311 A.D.) the preeminence of Roman citizenship and allegiance to the State and the later development of the imperial cult intensified Roman suspicions and hostility toward Jewish and eventually Christian monotheism. According to Guterman, Mommsen’s hypothesis that excessive monotheism and a non-geopolitical base exacerbated persecution against the early Christian community was a “new idea non-existent before the advent of Christianity. Roman policy was practical, not philosophical; only a philosophical or theological system could have bridged the gap in thought involved in saying that the acceptance of a single god entailed the denial of the existence of other gods” (Guterman 1951, p. 42). When Paul courageously testified of the resurrected Christ before King Herod Agrippa II, Queen Bernice, and governor Festus, as well as the city magistrates (Ac 26: 22-29); King Agrippa stated to Festus, “This man could have been set free if he had not appealed to the emperor” (Ac 26: 32). Once Paul entered Roman jurisdiction, the claims as a Christian were in direct violation to his professed Roman citizenship and the traditional civic cultic tradition. Guterman states that the crime for which Christians were liable often had something to do with the Imperial Roman civic cult that demanded of the Christians the worship of the statues of the gods and the emperor. The Christian Roman citizens were sent to stand trial before the emperor, whereas the non-citizens received their judgments in their respective localities. If found guilty the former were decapitated, the latter were sent to the arena (Guterman 1951, p. 44). The apostle Paul’s privileged Roman citizenship and his ardent zeal for the gospel aggravated a climatic clash between church and state.

Never had the two kingdoms shone with such stark contrast among mortals until that day when the most powerful ruler of the nation’s, whose name struck fear in the hearts of friend and foe alike, sat upon the judgment seat before the aged apostle. Paul the Elder, worn torn from years of service stood face to face with the youthful, ambitious Nero. Paul, representative of a despised religious sect contrasted to
Nero the ruler of the most powerful nation in ancient history. There is no record of that confrontation between the apostle Paul and Emperor Nero; however, there is a recorded witness of the unceasing friction between the two kingdoms – the conflict between church and state, which has been reenacted throughout history.

The New Testament writers had much to say regarding church and state relations. Paul stressed that the government authorities were instituted by God and ordained to uphold justice and maintain civil order (Rm 13: 1-7). Paul’s deliberation on church and state was not a polarization of Roman Citizenship contrasted to the Christian’s profession of faith, rather it was a natural outworking of a life fully surrendered to the will of God (Rm 12: 1, 2). The apostle stressed the importance of prayer for government leaders (1 Tm 2: 1, 2), and discouraged any form of anarchy (Rm 13: 1). Reginald White states:

Proud of his Roman citizenship, by temperament prudent and realist, this Jew from the provinces shared the gratitude of most provincials for Roman peace, order, justice and administration, which had made possible his missionary journeying, frequently rescued him from the violence of mobs, and often restrained social evils (2 Thessalonians 2). It is not surprising that Paul’s attitude to Roman rule should be positive and loyal, that he wished to forestall any suspicion that Christians were political agitators, and counseled believers to win if possible the favour of the watching world (White 1979, p. 183).

However, a more thorough Biblical survey provides a balanced view of the Apostle Paul’s concept of the two kingdoms. Paul recognized that human civil authority was a temporary expedient, that Christ would hand over “the kingdom to God the Father, after he has destroyed every ruler and every authority and power” (1 Cor 15: 24). Paul also expressed the fallibility of civil authority in that it “crucified the Lord of Glory” as well as the limited understanding of human knowledge in regards to eternal realities (1 Cor 1: 18-25). While Paul’s multicultural mindset established an unprecedented social mandate (Gl 3: 28), the apostle re-emphasized the ‘heavenly citizenship’ of the Christian believer (Phlp 3: 20). Paul understood the liabilities of human government and never deviated from his alliance to the kingdom of God; nonetheless, to foster any revolutionary intentions were frivolous, and would only jeopardize the fledgling Christian sect. Paul the Roman Citizen was also Paul the ardent evangelist. His death testified to the limits of governing authority that interferes with religious liberties (2 Tm 4: 16-18). Paul testified that his faith in Jesus Christ was not a felonious act deserving judicial punishment, but the epitome of grace and life of a law-abiding citizen.

The apostle Peter however, personally witnessed the crucifixion and understood the inadequacies of social justice when confronted by political expediencies that threaten institutional power and authority (Jn 11: 48). Like Paul, Peter recognized that an organized civic power provided a suitable and stable civic environment for the early Christian community. Unlike Paul, Peter says nothing about taxes (Rm 13: 7; see Mt 22: 15-22) and disregards government authority as a “servant of God” (Rm 13: 4). In a similar vein of thought however, Peter stressed emphatically to ἵππημεν “submit” to the governing authorities (1 Pt 2: 13). The usage in the Greek is an aorist passive imperative denoting a command, but not of blind submission to arbitrary rule, but rather a law abiding response worthy of public commendation to those in power, who are entrusted by God to sustain civil order (1 Pt 2: 14). Also, Peter made reference to the ἄνθρωπον κτίσις (v. 13) or literally “human creature” or “human institution” translated in the NIV as “to every authority instituted among men” or “the authority of every human institution” in the NRSV. These modern translations overshadow the subtle limitations of imperial civic and cultic authority (v. 13b) as well as its limited autonomous authority contrasted to the will of the all-powerful ‘ruler’ God (Col 1: 16). The implication is a submission of good behavior as a witness against unfounded malicious accusations against the Christian community’s social and theological mandates (1 Pt 2: 18-25: 3: 1-7). Schreiner accurately points out that by “submitting to government, Christians demonstrate that they are good citizens, not anarchists” (Schreiner 2003, p. 130). As the early Christian church expanded so did its disapproval with Rome. As Rome persecuted the Christian sect the apostles eventually withdrew its
support from civic authority. This is noticeable when comparing the apostles Paul, Peter and John the Revelator.

The apostle Peter was not a Roman citizen, unlike his colleague Paul. However, the apostles shared similar points of view regarding civic responsibilities and duties of law-abiding citizens. Both made every effort to convince the civil authorities that a Christian exemplified the best in moral integrity and civic responsibility; nonetheless, their allegiance was to their God/Savior Jesus Christ, not Caesar. Their witness and death (Lockyer 1972, pp. 255-258) testified that the will of God had precedent over the capricious demands of State that interfered with freedom of worship, the moral tenets of the Christian faith (Gl 5: 19-25), and unwavering commitment to Jesus Christ (Phlp 3: 7-9). The early Christian sect or the ‘Jesus movement’ initially perceived as a regional off-shoot of Judaism, rapidly spread throughout Asia Minor and eventually fostered itself in the very seat of power – Rome. The unsuccessful efforts of Rome to influence Jewish-Palestinian traditions provoked political unrest and eventually Jewish rebellion. Gerd Theissen states that the reason the Roman State misunderstand the Christian movement was related to “those radical theocratic movements which arise at the beginning of the century and which, seizing on old traditions, proclaim the replacement of all structures of governance by the governance of God” (Theissen 1982, p. 29). The radical messianic movements such as the Zealot freedom fighters, or the peaceful Jesus movement, which proclaimed a universal kingdom among humanity, were easily perceived as instruments of civic discontent. Even though the subsequent expulsion of Christian believers from the Synagogues was transferred to the home church, which provided a structured worship service and peaceful social mandates in relation to civic authority, the popularity of the early Christian church was hindered by severe persecution, which critically altered the viewpoint of the New Testament authors regarding the Imperial Roman power.

John the Revelator portrayed Jesus Christ as a conquering King in Revelation1: 5, and concludes with the Blessed Hope (Rv 22: 12, 20). The Revelation is representative of a literary tradition referred to as apocalyptic or persecution literature, which was a source of encouragement and hope to the post-Pauline church. The aged apostle, secluded on the penal colony of Patmos, composed a letter to assure the Christian community in all ages that God will ultimately overcome evil and establish his eternal kingdom (Dn 2). Kenneth Strand points out that Revelation falls into “the scope” of biblical apocalyptic, which “emphasizes destiny”, and the final cosmic triumph of good over evil. The fundamental elements of this literary style inspired confidence amidst extreme social and political persecution and martyrdom. Its biblical application encourages God’s downtrodden people of His constant care (Ps 46: 1); God’s command of current events (Rv 1: 4), and Christ’s second advent to reinstate harmony and universal peace (Strand 1976, pp. 18-22). The witness of Revelation no longer appeals to the favor of the governing authorities, but denounces Imperial Rome as a persecuting and idolatrous demagogue (Mounce 1977, pp. 250, 251; cf., Aune et al 1998, pp. 776-778; Walvoord 1966, p. 212). The Old and New Testament demonstrate a common thread throughout the sacred text that the state is a servant of God and subject to His authority (Dn 2; Jn 19: 11; Rm 13: 1, 4). Even though the New Testament writers tolerated the state of Rome in varying degrees, there was an unflinching commitment to Christ. Cullman states:

Now we understand why we hear a tone quite different here from that in Romans 13. In all other points the Johannine Apocalypse may be a book radically different from the Epistle of the Romans; but in the interpretation of the state there is no contradiction. . . . Regarding the State’s requirement of worship of Caesar’s image Paul would not have spoken otherwise than the author of the Johannine Apocalypse (Cullman 1956, p. 83).

Jesus Christ, the essence and embodiment of worship among Christians clashed with the cultic state worship of Caesar. Nevertheless, the love of the first generation of Christians established a legacy for succeeding generations to emulate when enduring persecution and martyrdom for the name of Christ. It was Polycarp (69 – 155 A.D.), the bishop of Smyrna, a reputed disciple of the apostle John (Irenaeus, Against heresies: fragments for the lost writings of Irenaeus, iii; Tertullian, On prescription against
heretics, xxxii), who in response to the proconsul, replied: “Since thou art vainly urgent that, as thou sayest, I should swear by the fortune of Caesar, and pretendest not to know who and what I am, hear me declare with boldness, I am a Christian”. His profession of faith provoked betrayal, social humiliation and death (Polycarp, The encyclical epistle of the church at Smyrna, X). As the Christian community expanded, the efforts of Imperial Rome intensified to eradicate the religious sect that defied the traditions of the fathers, the civic cult and the worship of Caesar. Amidst intermittent and systematic persecution it was obvious that the Christian sect permeated all social strata (Phlp 4: 22). The Ante-Nicene writings depicted the theological challenges and social issues that confronted the early Christian sect and their struggle with the Imperial Roman State.

2.9 Ante-Nicene Fathers and the Two Kingdom

Justine Martyr (110? – 165 A.D.), was born in Flavias Neapolis of Samaria, a pagan by birth, schooled in the ancient classics of Greece. Martyr showed early signs of a sincere seeker of truth amidst the magnificent grandeur of Imperial Rome. Through observation and contact Justine Martyr witnessed the fearless demeanor of Christians threatened by death. The testimony of Old Testament truth and the gospel message, according to Martyr, was the only valid soteriological philosophy. What little we know about Justine Martyr is garnered from his two treatises, Apologies and The dialogue of Trypho, which are a living testimonial of his life and thought. While teaching in Rome, the Cynics plotted, sanctioned and sealed his untimely death during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (Roberts & Donaldson 2004a, pp. 159-161). Justine Martyr’s two kingdoms were reflective of the apostolic witness that emphasized the tension of living and honoring God while respecting governing authority. While Martyr emphasized the eternal rather than the transitory (Martyr, What kingdom Christians look for, xi), he also supported civil obedience, citing Matthew 22: 17, 19-21. In this passage, even though Christ’s rabbinic authority was contested by the Pharisees and Herodians in regards to the temple tax, Jesus Christ’s admonition: “Give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to God the things that are God’s” (Mt 22: 21), was a recognized stipulation to pay tithes and civic taxes. However, Martyr, like the apostles before him, unwaveringly points out that to “…God alone we render worship, but in other things we gladly serve you, acknowledging you as kings and rulers of men, and praying that with your kingly power you be found to possess also sound judgment” (Martyr, Christ taught civil disobedience, xvii). Martyr draws a definitive line between the two kingdoms, relentless for the human rights supporting religious liberties without the threat of persecution and recognizing the state as ordained of God.

Irenaeus’s (120 – 202 A.D.) ethnic origins, educational pedigree and birthplace are ambiguous (Osborne 2001, p. 2). Polycarp influenced the young Irenaeus, who later became a faithful Bishop and defender of Christian dogma. Church tradition claims that Polycarp inspired Irenaeus’ decision to join the Christian sect. A Moscow manuscript entitled the Martyrdom of Polycarp states that Irenaeus was teaching in Rome at the time of Polycarp’s martyrdom (Osborne 2001, p. 3). However, the relationship of the apostles to Polycarp and Irenaeus was only three generations; wherein we observe a rapid decline and deviation from scriptural tradition, and the eventual amalgamation of theological tradition and pagan customs that infiltrated the early Christian sect.

Irenaeus comprehended the dilemma, confronted the philosophical assaults of paganism, and defended the revelation of God against the Gnostic sophistries that had infiltrated Christian thought. The major part of his work Against heresies is dedicated to refuting the Gnostic elements that attempted to

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1 “For neither could Anticetus persuade Polycarp to forego the observance [in his own way], inasmuch as these things had been always [so] observed by John the disciple of our Lord, and by other apostles with whom he had been conversant—” Irenaeus. Against heresies; Fragments from the lost writings of Irenaeus. “For this is the manner in which the apostolic churches transmit their registers: as the church of Smyrna, which records that Polycarp was placed there by John: as also the church of Rome, which makes Clement to have been ordained in like manner by Peter” (Tertullian. On prescription against heretics, xxxii).
understand the origins of evil and reconcile the finite with the infinite in terms of comprehending the nature of Christ (Roberts & Donaldson 2004a, p. 311). Amidst this arduous challenge, insights into the social and political tensions illuminated the contrasts between the two kingdoms. Regarding the initial attack upon the authority of scripture (Irenaeus, Against heresies, I.IX; III.II), the foundational dogma of the one and eternal God – the Father, the Son Jesus Christ, and Holy Spirit was at the center of the Gnostic debate (Irenaeus, Against heresies, I. X). The two kingdoms in Irenaeus’ delineation embodied the battle between two opposing ideologies represented by the kingdom of God – the ecclesia on the one hand and pagan Rome on the other. The debate regarding the supremacy and sovereignty of God through His creative power was fundamental in refuting Gnosticism and the claims of imperial authority (Irenaeus, Against heresies, II.VI; V.XXVI).1 Christianity, a minority religious sect, was an association of believers struggling to withstand the philosophic sophistries that were antithetical to the gospel message, which infiltrated and disregarded the Christian profession of Christ’s Deity and Lordship of the church and the antagonistic onslaughts of the imperial civic cult. This created an impassible philosophic chasm between the Christian community and Imperial Roman.

Tertullian’s (145 – 220 A.D.) influence as a theologian and apologist has accorded him the reputation as “the father of Latin Christianity” and “the founder of western theology” (Cross 1958, p. 1352; Gonzáles 2010, pp. 91-93). Church tradition asserts that Tertullian was born in Carthage and was the son of a Roman centurion. His conversion to Christianity and subsequent response to serve as a Presbyter is dated from 180 to 190 A.D. Subsequent to his conversion Tertullian served as a jurist consult (Roberts & Donaldson 2004b, pp. 3-15; Gonzáles 2010, pp. 91-93). Eusebius stated that Tertullian was “well versed in the laws of the Romans” and “respects of high repute” as well as “one of the especially distinguished men of Rome” (Eusebius, Church history, II.2.4, 106). Indeed, his legal mindset and rhetorical training provided the necessary discipline to formulate theological works, which influenced later church thought. Tertullian was more vocal about the Christian community’s relationship to the government, the military establishment and encouraged incessant prayer for the welfare of the Roman Empire. Tertullian stated: “without ceasing, for all our emperors we offer prayer. We pray for life prolonged, for security to the empire; for protection to the imperial house; for brave armies, a faithful senate, a virtuous people, the world at rest, whatever, as man Caesar, an emperor would wish” (Tertullian The first apology, XXX). Tertullian reiterated the purpose of governing authority as the civic instrument to maintain peace and order (Tertullian, The first apology, XXXI). Through the vast dominion of imperial Roman power, Tertullian credited the postponement of the ἐξάταυτον “end time” – “in fact, the very end of all things threatening dreadful woes—is only retarded by the continued existence of the Roman Empire” (Tertullian, The first apology, XXXII).

The increasing trend of Christians serving in the military was criticized by Tertullian, who invoked blessings upon the Roman armies, but discouraged Christian participation in military service. The two kingdoms theme resonates in this context: “There is no agreement between the divine and the human sacrament [sarcamentum in Latin context depicts ‘a military oath’ to the warrior cult of Rome]—the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be due to two masters—God or Caesar” (Tertullian, On idolatry, XIX). The taking of life was an unlawful action, which negated Christian participation (Tertullian, On idolatry, XIX) as well as the receiving of military honors or taking military oaths, which invoked the blessing of the gods. (Tertullian, The chaplet, Or de corona, XI & XII).2 The growing social awareness of Christians in civic affairs was overshadowed by the constant friction between their allegiance to the Christian’s God or Caesar (Tertullian, The first apology, XXXIV). Tertullian adhered to the apostles’ mandate on government

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1 The battle between the two kingdoms is a spiritual warfare. This point is further illuminated in Irenaeus (Against heresies, V.XXVI) wherein Irenaeus adheres to the prophecies of Daniel in reference to the demise of the present empire and the eternal domination of the kingdom of God.

2 The military crown or wreath adopted Roman custom was a form of idolatry paying homage to the gods of war and was forbidden by Christian teaching and tradition (Tertullian, The chaplet, Or de corona, XI & XII).
responsibility and Divine authority. The Christian sect was challenged by the civic demands of the State and the expressed will of God and suffered the consequences for their professed faith until the Edict of Milan.

Origen (185 – 254 A.D.) was born in Alexandria, of God-fearing parents. His father, a teacher of rhetoric and grammar, provided a solid education and instilled virtues to his son that would someday aid the Christian sect in its constant conflict against pagan philosophy and theological heresy. Disciplined in the study of scripture and a student in Greek philosophy, the stage was set for the most “celebrated biblical critic of antiquity” (Roberts & Donaldson 1999, pp. 223-235). Among the great men and women of sacred and secular history there is a decisive moment, a turning point, that catapults the humble but ardent reformer of righteousness into the forefront of the battle amidst the two kingdoms. So it was with Origen, the “great persecution of the Christians under Septimius Severus broke out, and among the victims was his father Leonides, who was apprehended and put in prison” thus sealing his blood among the faithful martyrs of that era (Roberts & Donaldson 1999, p. 225). While the Roman State struck a blow to the young Origin by depriving him of his father, Origin countered by the words of his pen. The Christian community was becoming a noticeable factor in Roman society. The civic responsibilities of military service and civil service put a new slant on Origen’s defense of the two kingdoms. While the Roman State argued that it is a patriotic duty for citizens to participate in the defense of the empire, and assist in its governmental functions, Origen put forth an on-going argument that the Christian will assist the Empire through their ardent prayers and supplications. Origen stated: “And as we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up war, and lead to the violation of oaths, and disturb the peace, we in this way are much more helpful to the kings than those who go into the field to fight for them” (Origen, Against Celsus, LXXIII). The early church fathers disregarded military and civil service.

And those who rule over us well are under the constraining influence of the great King, whom we believe to be the Son of God, God the Word. And if those who govern in the Church, and are called rulers of the divine nation—that is, the Church—rule well, they rule in accordance with the divine commands and never suffer themselves to be led astray by worldly principle (Origen, Against Celsus, LXXV).

The Christian church continued to separate itself from all civic and military duties to protect its identity by abstaining from immoral practices or exposing itself to all forms of paganism. The theological and moral purity of the Christian sect was paramount to the entrusted leadership in the ongoing battle with the social and political trends of Roman society. The two kingdoms were to experience a paradigm shift through the influence of a Christian serving at the royal court.

Lactantius (260 – 330 A.D.) witnessed the progression of a persecuted religious sect to a legalized church institution that would inevitably influence religious thought and socio-political policy. The background and pending circumstances that inspired this ardent church father to join a despised and persecuted sect has not been chronicled. Nonetheless, Lactantius was resolute and courageous and to “his honor he was not a fair-weather Christian, but boldly confessed the faith amid the fires of the last and most terrible of the great persecutions” (Roberts and Donaldson 2004c, p. 5). Lactantius written appeal entitled Of the manner in which the persecutors died, warned the imperial power to put-an-end to persecution or reap the just rewards of those who fight against the kingdom of God, represented by the church. Essentially it was a warning to the future arm of royal imperial authority to understand that there is a God in heaven, who judges the offenders of the Christian faith (Lactantius, Of the manner in which the persecutors died, I). Lactantius stood upon the borders of a liberated Christian sect. Undoubtedly, the optimistic and powerful testimony for the gospel left a profound impression upon the future edicts of Constantine the Great. The unusual opportunity to educate Constantine’s son, Crispus, afforded a dialogue with the future liberator of the persecuted Christian sect (Froom 1950, p. 353). Educated and articulate, eloquent and noble, Lactantius, formulated universal concepts of non-violence, brotherly love and social responsibility. His theological beliefs coincided with the natural law of love, acknowledged by citing the renowned statesman, Cicero.
Therefore discord and dissension are not in accordance with the nature of man; and that expression of Cicero is true, which says that man, while he is obedient to nature, cannot injure man. Therefore, if it is contrary to nature to injure a man, it must be in accordance with nature to benefit a man; and he who does not do this deprives himself of the title of a man, because it is the duty of humanity to succor the necessity and peril of a man” (Lactantius, The divine institutes, book VI, ch. XI; cf., Cicero, De officiis., iii.5).

The eloquent insights in The divine institutes reaffirmed the ethical line of reasoning for the dignity of humanity and the sanctity of life, which counteracts any form of violence and war. Lactantius endeavored to synthesize Christian moral thought and civic responsibility by utilizing the philosophic resources of the reputed statesman Cicero, and his active participation as a tutor to the son of Emperor Constantine testified to the gradual thawing of hostilities between the Christian sect and Imperial Rome. Undoubtedly, the life and times of Lactantius were a precursor to that ensuing epoch of church history, wherein the Christian sect becomes an officially recognized religion and the eventual dictate of sacred and secular policy.

It is evident that the Ante-Nicene Fathers drew a definitive line between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. War was considered an organized iniquity, which the Christian community denounced. Participation in it was condemned as an act of transgression, and a martyr’s death as an honorable consummation of one’s profession of faith. The Roman Empire, in turn, denounced Christianity as unpatriotic and a treasonous religious sect. Nonetheless, a progressive dialogue between church leaders and Imperial Rome was evident from Justine Martyr’s appeal for religious liberty to Lactantius’ influence in a pagan royal court. The legalization of the Christian sect by way of the ‘Edict of Milan’ (313), and the recognition of Catholic Christianity as the official state religion in February 27, 380, commonly referred to as the Edict of Thessalonica, set the stage for the church to eventually influence religious and political policy in a new geopolitical paradigm known as the Holy Roman Empire. The Christian religion was more favored among the imperial house than the indigenous population. The alliance between the imperial court and the church shielded the Christian community from the influences of paganism. This enabled Augustine the ecclesiastical autonomy to develop theological and moral axioms, effectively minister to the Christian community, and influence Christian thought.

Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (340 – 379 A. D.): Augustine (354 – 430) is the preeminent Church father that has universally influenced Christian thought, the socio-political and theological traditions of both Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. Augustine’s scholastic contribution was indebted to the spiritual care of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. It was through the ministry of Ambrose that Augustine was introduced to the gospel of grace, which inspired devotion to the Christian faith (Augustine, The confessions of St. Augustine, v. xiii.23). Ambrose baptized Augustine on Easter Sunday, 387, along with his friend Alypius and his illegitimate son of fifteen years, Adeodatus (Augustine, The confessions of St. Augustine, IX.VI.14. 133 n13, 134 n3). H. B. Workman refers to Augustine’s baptism by Ambrose as “one of the great spiritual events of the world” (Hastings 1951, vol. 1, p. 375). Ambrose was born of Roman nobility and raised in a Roman Christian home. His father served as the praetorian prefect of Gaul, one of the four highest ranking officers in the empire attending to the affairs of the emperor. After the unexpected death of his father, Ambrose’s mother moved to Rome (352) where the young erudite received a traditional Latin education. Ambrose was a man of extraordinary talent and ability. While exposed and instructed in the Christian doctrines through the teachings of Simplicianus, Ambrose settled upon a career in law. At the age of thirty (372), Valentinian I, through the advice of the Christian Probus, the prefect of Italy, designated Ambrose as the Consular of Liguria and Æmilia provinces. Even though he was politically connected, Ambrose’s personal integrity and administrative proficiency were recognized among his peers and a rewarding future awaited him. However, in 374 both Catholic and Arian bishops of Milan died. Both parties sought suitable replacements. Since Milan was situated within Ambrose’s jurisdiction, it was within his delegated power to preside over the election process. A popular and unanticipated movement supported by both Arian and Catholic factions elected the Consular to sacred
office. Ambrose was humbled by the sacredness and overwhelming responsibility of the bishopric because of his present status as a catechumen. F. Homes Dudden states:

Ambrose received no systematic theological education. A lawyer and a magistrate, he was thrust, without time for preparation, into a position wherein he found himself called, not only to preach the faith to the inhabitants of Milan, but also to give a lead to the whole Western Church on difficult theological questions. . . . His theological knowledge was picked up in scanty hours snatched from the business of administering a great diocese and of conducting important affairs of Church and State (Dudden 1935, p. 555).

His natural limitations in ecclesiastical experience and scriptural knowledge compounded by the political nature of the office agitated his resolve for baptism. Nonetheless, eight days after baptism on December 7, 374 A.D., Ambrose was ordained the Bishop of Milan and immediately sold his possessions to support the poor and the church. Ambrose’s lifework was characterized by vigilance, courage and an incessant ardent zeal for the glory of God. Among the fourth century Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Ambrose and Augustine are commended as the progenitors of the classical just war tradition, which theologians, canonists, legal philosophers and political theorists have reformulated in their respective adaptations of the just war tradition. Augustine’s defense of the Christian religion in The city of God during the fall of Rome would clarify the friction between the heavenly and earthly cities, thus providing the underpinnings of Christian theology, social ethics and war.

2.10 St. Augustine of Hippo and the Two Kingdoms

The fall of the Pax Romana was gradual but decisive. The opulent grandeur of that eternal city, that center of the sciences and arts, and the center of civilization was reduced to rubble by the Germanic barbaric hoards. On August 24, 410, Alaric and his Gothic army annexed Rome (Duruy 1900, pp. 2-6). The Empire was stunned. The calamity was aptly summarized by Jerome, “If Rome be lost, where shall we look for help” (Jerome, The letter of St. Jerome, CXXIII, 17). The demise of the Roman Empire was an ominous reminder that even an eminent and esteemed society can wither and die. Rome was a protective haven from the barbaric hoards and theological heresy. The Goths attributed the fall of Rome to the Christian prohibition of paganism (Froom 1950, p. 476). The capture of Rome was achieved by an uncivilized people who cast a dark shadow upon the legalization of the newly recognized religion, which for nearly a century had enjoyed its social and political freedoms only to succumb to the realization that their beloved Empire was a delusion of bygone days. This unexpected downfall, this unanticipated event, incited a response from Christianity’s most ardent defender, Augustine of Hippo, who constructed his Magnus opus, the De Civitate Dei “The city of God”. It is within this masterpiece that Augustine’s literary genius shone forth as a “monument to the literary culture of the Later Empire” and his intellectual proficiency to navigate “among the cumulus clouds of eruditions” (Brown 1967, p. 304). His passion for God’s glory; his relentless devotion to the church and genuine concern for the Roman Empire inspired a literary delineation that established the sovereign grandeur of the kingdom of God – characterized by the church. Peter Brown points out that it was “Augustine’s intention, in the City of God, to prove to his readers that hints of a division between an ‘earthly’ and a ‘heavenly’ city could be seen throughout the history of the human race” (Brown 1967, p. 319). It was a reminder to the immediate congregation, struggling with the demise of Imperial Rome and the taunting visages of paganism, of their renewed allegiance to the heavenly city and a conscious conviction of God’s sustaining grace in world events. It is also a reminder to future generations that God, who encompasses eternity, will sustain his faithful remnant in their continued pilgrimage in the heavenly and earthly kingdoms (Schaff 2004, The city of God, vol. 2. I: n1, 1).1 In The city of God, Augustine not only defended the Christian message and mission,

1 Philip Schaff states: “Augustine uses the term civitas Dei (πόλις θεοῦ) of the church universal as a commonwealth and community founded and governed by God. It is applied in the Bible to Jerusalem or the church of the Old Covenant (Ps. Xi:6, 4; xlvii. I, 8; lxxxvii.3), and to the heavenly Jerusalem or the church perfect. (Heb. Xi. 10, 16;
but reiterated that the demise of Rome was the manner of all earthly powers that has its foundations in human power and wisdom. The fall of Rome, like nations before her, was the essence of human limitation and sin. Yet, there is an inseparable friction between the two cities that necessitates cooperation between the sacred and secular activities of humanity and ultimately the earthly city will fulfill the purposes of God.

It is an overwhelming task to capsulate the numerous comparative generalities throughout *The city of God*; the heavenly and the earthly cities represent that epic journey of the two distinct yet interactive realities. The Christian lives in a tension between two kingdoms – the earthly city is based on self-love, self-glorification, exaltation of human wisdom, the pride of human achievement, the unbridled ambition for power, the force of conquest, and the subsequent destiny of extinction. The heavenly city is based on an unconditional love for God, a life of service to humanity for the glory of God, and the eternal home where the saints have fellowship with angels and holy men of God (Augustine, *The city of God*, XIV, 28). The two cities are antithetical ethically and eschatologically; yet paradoxically share a common bond of compliance (Augustine, *The city of God*, X, 32). Edward Long Jr. states: “The burden of citizenship in the earthly city is a consequence of sin; the promise of healing within the heavenly city is the expression of grace. The pagan man knows only the first, with its trials and heartaches; the Christian knows both” (Long 1967, p. 176). The burdens of life; the vulnerabilities of human weakness and self-love, the contest of power and conquest contrasted to love and service, are the common-lot of the two cities “until the last judgment effects their separation” (Augustine, *The city of God*, I, 35).

The Apostles and the Ante-Nicene Fathers were spiritually and civically alienated from the Imperial Roman state. A mandatory cultic alliance to the emperor and brutal persecutions with no recourse to human rights drove the early Christian sect into the shadows of society; but, the Edict of Milan (313) and the Edict of Thessalonica (380) altered the socio-political landscape. The Christian community was inseparably integrated into the social fabric of the State. The challenge that confronted the ancient church in regards to state authority was the demarcation between the apostolic model, which recognized state power to preserve civic order by restraining and punishing the evil element in the world or the shifting paradigm that utilized state authority to assist the church to promote morality and advance the Christian religion. The cessation of persecution, the legalization of Christianity and Theodosius’ official prohibition of paganism in 392, solidified the socio-political relevance of Catholic Christianity (Scott 1995, p. 63). Augustine wrote *The city of God* a century after Constantine liberated the Christian sect. While a bishop, Christianity was eventually recognized as the undisputed official religion of the Roman Empire. However Eusebius’ glowing description of the newly liberated Christian “church of the living God, a pillar and foundation of the truth” (Eusebius, *Church history*, X.IV.7) was shunted into the limelight of socio-political expectations and the validity of the Christian religion was challenged by the unforeseen demise of the Roman Empire. The Christian religion’s promise of grace, favor and protection to those who honor and obey God was misinterpreted. This tragic contradiction cast a dark shadow upon the declarations of the Christian faith that prompted Augustine’s ardent apologetic. Augustine’s defense is predicated upon his understanding of human nature; its ultimate limitation apart from God’s transforming grace and the ultimate demise of the earthly city, which only exists to necessitate the will of God.

While Augustine defined the parameters of the heavenly and earthly kingdoms, it was implied that “the intermingling of the cities of God and of man as the permanent character of political activity,

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1 “Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord” (Augustine, *The city of God*, XIV, 28).
necessitating a practically minded approach to politics that emphasizes it as a process-guided *societas* rather than as a ‘teleocratic’ corporate *universitas*” (Heyking 2001, p. 10). It is important to define the Augustinian concept of the state as a system of governance in conjunction with ‘heavenly virtues’ rather than interpolate our modern paradigm of the nation state system that evolved after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. Rome was an Empire, albeit a decaying empire. Nonetheless, Augustine recognized the legitimate purpose of government and its inseparable relationship with the heavenly and earthly kingdoms. Augustine’s perspective suggests that the secular government could promote peace and assist the church on a daily basis. Augustine points out that the church’s “pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisitions of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven” (Augustine, *The city of God*, XIX, 17). Like the children of Israel who adapted to the nations during their dispersion, so the faithful inhabitants of Christian faith represented by the heavenly city should take advantage of the earthly city’s “well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule” until “this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away” (Augustine, *The city of God*, XIX. 17, 26). The nations ancient or modern are under the guiding principle of omnipotent power, but the church has its responsibilities to morally sustain the earthly city.

The underlying principle which supports a “process-guided societas” in Augustinian thought is the conception of original sin or ‘total depravity’, which proposed that the human will is a slave to sin, incapable of receiving salvation without the intervention of God’s grace, and incapable of performing the good apart from divine aid (Gilson 1960, pp. 157-160). The heavenly kingdom sustains the earthly kingdom through the lives that have been transformed by the grace of God. The church, according to Augustine, was the underlying moral force that could sustain the state. The earthly city encumbered by self-love and sin was counter balanced by the heavenly city’s selfless love, the moral seasoning that sustains society.

... Robert Markus, the author of the benchmark study of Augustine’s political thought, argues that political authority for Augustine has its roots in sin: “‘Control of the wicked with the bounds of a certain earthly peace’ remained Augustine’s fundamental thought about the purpose of government.” If political life is to be moral, subpolitical civil society institutions such as the family or churches, not statesmanship or the political process, can supply that morality (Heyking 2001, p. 5, cf., Markus 1970, p. 96).

While Augustine formulated a definitive demarcation between the two kingdoms, there is an apparent fusion of the heavenly and earthly kingdoms. The earthly kingdom is a precondition of governance; whereas, the church maintains civic virtue through moral leadership in the earthly kingdom. However, there seems to be an ambiguity in Augustine’s thought related to social and political institutions. It is important for the heavenly kingdom to enjoy the fruits of law and order provided by the earthly kingdom; accordingly, David VanDrunen points out that “Augustine does not emphasize the legitimate and God-ordained status of civil government as a positive matter” and cites O’Donovan, who claims a similar observation that “Augustine had no conception of the state as an institution, but only of the earthly peace as a condition of order” (VanDrunen 2010, p. 32). However, recent studies adhere to a more amicable approach regarding Augustine’s social ethics and its relationship to political order. Charles Mathewes proposes that political trends and institutions often set the agendas for religious thought. Mathewes espouses a ‘theology of public life’ rather than a “public theology’, which is often filtered to accommodate the secular world view. The Christian religion is more than a set of standards espousing the Golden Rule or the commonalities of social justice, instead of “arguing for the legitimacy of religion in public life, it would argue for the legitimacy of public life in religion” (Mathewes 2008, pp. 9, 10). In other words the Christian is not merely a subject of the world order, but a citizen in fusing the graces of God in the liberal post-modern era. Mathewes establishes the Christian/civic engagement within the scope of Augustinian thought and perceives in Augustine the ascetic essence of Christian virtue that influences public life. The Augustinian viewpoint is a positive construct in the modern era and challenges the
contemporary Christian tradition that perceives change in politics through direct political engagement through legislative enactments. Mathewes portrays an amicable Augustinian world-view that meets the challenges of liberal democratic tradition. Also, Eric Gregory retraces a constructive analysis of Augustinian thought within the context of love and politics in order to establish a normative account that provides an ethical basis for citizens and leaders within a liberal democracy. Gregory establishes an Augustinian civic liberalism within the framework of love, which is the stimulus for justice in the socio-economic and socio-political arena (see Gregory 2010). Both Mathewes and Gregory are cultivating an amicable application of Augustine to post-modern western civilization. Augustine is a positive influence in regards to progressive paradigm shifts in contemporary politics. This adaptation of Augustinian thought overlooks secularism’s pessimistic response to organized religion and traditional values; nonetheless, it reinforces the pervading influence of Augustine in contemporary Christian thought.

It should be pointed out that the unavoidable inter-relationship of Christians functioning in their respective civic duties neither provided credence for a Christian social order in the earthly kingdom nor did it negate the importance of Christian service in the earthly city. Augustine’s social and political ambiguity is unclear since the civic order was established (by a Christian emperor) and the religious authority was officially recognized as well. Church and state powers were inseparably intertwined yet secular and ecclesiastical offices possessed sufficient autonomy to preserve their respective functions without interfering or compromising their designated tasks. Augustine’s impact on Christian thought in general and just war moral theory in particular is attributed to his common sense approach to the natural order of human interaction and the unavoidable dynamics of greed and power.

The Sage of Hippo is many things to many theologians and their many theologies. As we ponder Augustine’s just war statements, primarily his statements regarding *jus ad bellum*, “just cause for war”, it should be recognized that Augustine was a bishop, a preacher, a theologian, and a citizen of the western empire. It is inconceivable that Augustine specifically prepared a treatise that would have such a monumental and lasting effect upon the history of philosophy. This grand achievement is interrelated with an ancient Empire that in so many ways mirrors the essential contemporary socio-political system of power politics. His world is our world in verity. Reinhold Niebuhr reiterates that “Augustine was, by general consent, the first great ‘realist’ in Western history” (Niebuhr 1953, p. 121). Niebuhr elaborates that the “*Civitas Dei* gives an adequate account of the social factions, tensions, and competitions which we know to be well-nigh universal on every level of community” (Niebuhr 1953, p. 121; cf., Augustine. *The city of God*, II.21; XV.4). Augustine’s realism was reflective of a world order that was competitive, precarious and utterly disjointed. His socio-political perceptions were not the systematic delineation of a modern political scientist, but a student of ‘human nature’ that recognized the abuses of power in his own distorted world order. What facilitated the transformation to sustain justice in the earthly realm were not the infrastructures of governance, but the minds and hearts of humanity. Even though Augustine’s recognition of the ‘governing authority on behalf of the governed’ falls short of a distinct application that the state is an established instrument of God, his dependence upon government power to thwart the Donatist faction gave rise to “the great medieval synthesis and its theory of the two swords” (Long 1967, p. 175), which reached its zenith during the Holy Roman Empire – the epitome of Papal power.

### 2.11 The Two Swords and the Two Kingdoms

The two swords doctrine illustrated by uniting church and state powers was attributed to Augustine. His classic statement, “Therefore the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven” (Augustine, *The city of God*, XX, 9) resonates throughout Christendom as the harbinger to the new paradigm of church and state power politics. Pope Gelasius I (492 – 496) formulated the two swords doctrine, which would manage the empire through the “consecrated authority of bishops” and “royal power”, the one centered in the pope and the other in the emperor. Gelasius was the first Pontiff to assume the title “Vicar of Christ” and adamantly adhered to the primacy of Papal infallibility in all matters of spiritual dogma (Kelly 1988, p. 48). It was Gelasius’s viewpoint that both church and state could function responsibly within their respective spheres, the “civil magistrates is in charge of the
maintenance of peace, order, and justice, while spiritual interests and salvation are in keeping of the church” (Easton & Wieruszewski 1961, pp. 83, 84). This noble aspiration was short-lived as church and state vied for power. Intense debates ensued over the issue whether secular authority was within the jurisdiction of Papal power, or whether religious authority was a requisite of secular power. Unlike the early Christian community and Ante-Nicene Fathers, which emphasized God’s saving grace; the “temporal power made the papacy independent in the exercise of its jurisdiction, but at the expense of its spiritual character” (Schaff 1885, p. 235). It was Emperor Charles the Great, known as Charlemagne (742 – 814), who challenged the two sword paradigm by taking a direct role in both church and state affairs. Charlemagne was an ardent student of Augustine’s The city of God (Ogg 1935, p. 111), and maintained a benevolent yet unyielding monocratic rule over both theological and civic policies.

Charles looked upon his Empire as a Divine State. He felt that he had been appointed by God as the earthly head of Christians. He read and loved Augustine’s book de Civitate Dei. He believed that he had set up the Civitas Dei, in the second empirical sense, which Augustine placed beside the Civitas Dei as the spiritual union of all saints under the grace of God, as a great earthly organization for the care of common earthly needs in a manner pleasing to God, and for the worthy preparation for the better life in the world to come. Augustine, it is true, had seen the empirical manifestation of the Civitas Dei in the universal Catholic Church. Charles saw no contradiction. For him the ecclesiastical body and the secular were one. He was the head. And while Augustine placed the Roman Empire as fourth in the order of world-empires and as Civitas Terrena in opposition to the Kingdom of God, for Charles this dualism was no more – his Imperium Romanum is no Civitas Terrena. It is identical with the earthly portion of the church founded by Christ (Seeliger 1995, p. 628).

Charlemagne ruled with unprecedented authority; however, this was the exception to the rule. The previous coronation of emperors set a precedent in the mind of Pope Gregory VII (1073 – 1085) that accorded pontifical rights to set-up or dispose kings and emperors (Mombert 1888, p. 38). This was referred to as the Dictatus Papae or the ‘Dictates of Hildebrand’, which postulated the church’s prerogative to administer justice, manage civil governance, and even dispose sovereigns who through weakness controverted church policy in their administration of civic affairs (Ogg 1935, pp. 261, 262). A century later Innocent III (1198 – 1216) reached the pinnacle of ecclesiastical and secular power. A fragmented empire entangled with warfare and dissension was ready for direction and leadership (Packard 1927, pp. 1, 2). Innocent III skillfully provided the statecraft to implement Gregory VII’s Dictatus Papae or in the words of Le Roy Froom the “most powerful of all the pontiffs and the achiever of that daring goal of theocratic rule over all the world which Gregory VII had envisioned” (Froom 1950, p. 670). Innocent III perfected the statecraft of censorship or ecclesiastical weapons referred to as ‘excommunication’ and the ‘interdict’. Excommunication was a dreadful judgment imposed on laymen and kings alike – such a designation deemed the condemned as a social outcast, excluded from all legal protection and deprived from the sacraments and thereby destined to perdition. The interdict was utilized to force a ruler to submit to papal dictates, but with a more punctuated effect on everyday life. Religious rights were suspended with exception to baptism and confession. Civil government services were postponed such as, for example, legal services and will of trust, while public officials were prohibited from performing their civil function. Like modern day sanctions and blockades an interdict was directed against a city, a region or even a kingdom. Innocent III utilized these ecclesiastical legislative weapons for both religious and political purposes. The battle for secular power was demonstrated by the conflict between the Pontiff and Philip Augustus of France (1165 – 1223) and King John of England (1166 – 1216), who were both disciplined by interdicts. The latter eventually surrendered his kingdom to the Pope and “received it back through annual payment as a feudal fief held in vassalage to the pope“ (Flick 1909, pp. 551-555, cf., Froom 1950, p. 672). Innocent sculptured a resilient masterpiece of religious and political leadership in his eighteen years pontificate. His accomplishments have never been equaled by any other Pope. The waning power of the papacy influenced Boniface VIII (1294 – 1303) to reiterate the two swords doctrine but with a significant alteration. Whereas Gelasius I recognized both religious and
secular autonomy adhering to their distinctive responsibilities, Boniface VIII’s ‘two swords’ doctrine entrusted both ecclesiastical and political powers under the sole jurisdiction of the church. Both Gelasius I and Boniface VIII adhered to the principle of cooperative coexistence between ecclesiastical and secular powers, but Boniface insisted that the state function within the authority of church polity (VanDrunen 2010, pp. 32-36). The irony of ecclesiastical power usurping secular authority is an unfamiliar concept in Augustinian thought, but the tensions between the heavenly and earthly cities has been enacted in every epoch of sacred history.

The Augustinian heavenly and earthly kingdoms, contrasted to the two swords doctrine were antithetical in three distinct categories: 1. The eschatological destinies of each kingdom were diametrically opposed to each other. The heavenly kingdom’s destiny is contrasted to the transitory standards and ultimate extinction of the earthly kingdom. 2. Augustine put little faith in state authority and acknowledged the practical need for government only in regards to sustain peace and provide temporal necessities, and 3. The two kingdoms had distinctive characteristics illustrated by the two loves, which set them apart when intersecting one another in the earthly order. The radical and violent reaction of the Donatist faction within the ranks of the clergy warranted civil discipline, but cannot be compared to the crusaders’ brutal conflict against the infidel. The two swords doctrine emphasized a temporal kingdom and vindicated the use of force to enact its policies.

Not surprisingly, the two swords doctrine transformed into a deadly two-edged rapier. The Shepherd of Christianity maligned his designated mission as peacemaker to a despotic advocate of ‘holy war’ policy (France 1999, pp. 204, 205). The crusades and Inquisition under the guise of a holy war or religious cleansing blinded the church from its designated task of providing moral and spiritual leadership to the secular arm of the earthly kingdom. Nonetheless, the royal and papal courts united when challenged and confronted by an Augustinian monk from Erfurt by the name of Martin Luther. The reformers reiterated the principles of sola scriptura and sola fide, which redefined the parameters of Church authority in relation to the social, economic and political traditions in a shifting world order.

2.12 The Reformers and the Two Kingdoms

John Wycliffe (1324 – 1384) ‘the morning star of the Reformation’ (White 1950, p. 80) through his emboldened affirmation that “... since the laity should know the faith, it should be taught in whatever language is most easily understood” (Wycliffe 1913, p. 74) encouraged all classes of people to have access to the scriptures, and thus formulated the guiding Protestant principle of sola scriptura “by scripture alone” that set the seal of faith and promise in the sacred text, and gave birth to an innovative religious faction referred to as Protestants. Martin Luther (1483 – 1546) the Augustinian monk from Erfurt, Germany was the first born among nine siblings. Hans Luther, whose common pedigree annulled any possibility of an inheritance, was an energetic entrepreneur taking advantage of the lucrative copper mine industry, which enabled the young Martin Luther access to a formal education. Hans’s ambition for his son was a legal education and career. Luther excelled in his studies and completed the requisite degree to proceed to the school of law. It was during these formative years on July 2, 1505, that Luther experienced a life threatening occurrence that altered the course of his life and in turn sacred and secular history. While traveling home Luther was caught in a violent summer storm near Stotternheim – the ferocity of the storm was life threatening and ignited such fear of death, that Luther promised a vow of service, “Help me, Saint Ann, I will become a monk”. Luther realized the solemn accountability of his vow before God. How problematic it must have been to change the course of his life because of a pressured oath that would disappoint the expectation of his father. Luther entered the renowned Black Monastery of the Augustinian hermits at Erfurt, which commenced a legacy of theological and pastoral leadership that revived the biblical truths overshadowed by years of unbridled ecclesiastical power – the gospel of justification by faith in Christ Jesus (Mullett 2004, pp. 3, 4; cf., McKim 2003, pp. 3,4).

Luther mounted the pinnacle of scholastic achievement by completing his doctor theologiae, “doctor of theology” on October 19, 1512. Luther immediately succeeded his mentor Johann von Staupitz as Vicar General of the German observant Augustinian Hermits and Dean of the Theology Faculty of

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Wittenberg University. It is within this setting that Luther researched the original interpretation of δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως, “righteousness by faith” or the unmerited grace of God toward sinners (Luther, Lectures on Romans, vol. 25, pp. 8, 9, 31, 32). This overwhelming revelation of God’s free gift of salvation in Christ Jesus was referred to as the “tower experience” (McKim 200, pp. 23-25).

Initially, Luther made every effort to merit salvation through rigorous acts of penance, but such acts only intensified a spirit of despair, depression and hopelessness. The penitential system left him empty through years of speculative anxiety of an avenging God (Mullett 2004, pp. 43, 44). Luther stated:

I was indeed a pious monk and kept the rules of my order so strictly that I can say: if ever a monk gained heaven through monkery, it should have been I. All my monastic brethren who know me will testify to this. I would have martyred myself to death with fasting, praying, reading, and other good works had I remained a monk much longer (Hillerbrand 1978, p. 24).

The intermittent struggles of depression and spiritual emptiness inspired a search for God. As Luther comprehended the message of salvation in Christ Jesus an imminent clash between Luther and the established religious order was unavoidable. By 1514 Luther added a practical dimension to his busy schedule by becoming the municipal preacher of Wittenberg, a small town of two thousand people, which provided a public forum to expound the scriptures to the lay members; it was here Luther exposed the fallacy of indulgences and penance. Johan Tetzel’s (1465 – 1519) aggressive sales of indulgences in the local vicinity of Wittenberg aggravated Luther, who challenged this lucrative business as deceitful and contrary to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Luther stated in regards to indulgences that those “indulgences, which the preacher loudly proclaims to be the greatest grace, are seen to be truly such as regards the promotion of gain”. Luther denounced any soteriological benefits to acts of penance and the purchase of indulgences and insisted that “—Papal pardons cannot take away even the least of venial sins, as regards its guilt”. Luther condemned symbols of faith as a form of idolatry and adhered to the premise that the “cross set up among the insignia of the Papal arms is of equal power with the cross of Christ, is blasphemy” (Wage & Buchheim 1885, pp. 11, 12). The call to righteousness by faith alone, through grace alone, rather than a meritorious system of worship was a beacon of light to the masses and alarmed the established religious order of pending heresy.

Martin Luther proclaimed his Ninety Five theses to debate the issue of penance and indulgences in order to reform the monastic order. Luther never intended to break away from his theological and ministerial heritage; nevertheless, the situation between Luther and Rome erupted. A papal bull in 1520 was issued denouncing Luther’s writings and activities and eventually excommunicated the reform-minded monk. Luther retorted with theatrical satire writing rebuttals entitled Against the execrable bull of anti-Christ and Against the new bull forged by Eck, which triggered a theological impasse and irrevocable breach between Luther and Rome. The situation was aggravated beyond reconciliation by Luther, when on December 10, 1520 at 9 a.m. during a gathering at Wittenberg that both scholars and students witnessed Luther casting the papal bull into the fire signifying the theological battlefield with both emperor and the pontiff (Mullett 2004, pp. 117-120). His bold denunciation of papal infallibility was not given in a spirit of reform but revolution. The theological delineations professed by Luther culminated at the Diet of Worms from January 28 to May 25, 1521, when Emperor Charles V commenced the Edict of Worms that contested Luther to either retract or reaffirm his 95 theses. The renowned Dr. Johann Eck was the official imperial and papal legate (Atkinson 1971, p. ch. 4, cf., Mullet 2004, pp. 117-120). Luther expounded his views and testified:

Unless I am convinced by the testimony of the scripture or by clear reason (for I do not trust either in the Pope or in councils alone, since it is well known that they often erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the word of God. I cannot and will not recant anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience. May God help me. Amen (Hillerbrand 1996, pp. 2, 463).
Within this framework Emperor Charles V on May 25, 1521 pronounced Luther an outlaw, and set in motion an interdiction against his literature, which also required immediate arrest for heretical activities, with an emphatic stipulation of criminal charges to any and all who aided him. The uncompromising schism ignited into the Reformation era. The theological parameters of the two kingdoms redefined religious authority from papal infallibility to the sacred text, the Bible. Luther had established an enduring legacy that influenced not only theological thought but economic and political traditions as well.

Though overshadowed by Martin Luther, the French theologian and legal erudite John Calvin (1509 – 1564) established a profound influence upon the “Reformed Churches in Europe and America” (Schaff 2002, p. 257). Troeltsch points out that the difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism can be traced in no small measure by the fact that Luther began his career as a monk and Calvin as a lawyer (Troeltsch 1958, p. 72). Calvin’s legal background developed precision of thought, analytical skills and articulated statesmanship that enabled him to confront the pending crisis challenging the Protestant movement. Calvin’s theological investigations were not a replacement of Luther’s works but a much needed systemization of Protestant thought and dogma. The Christianae religionis institutio provided a precise interpretation of Christian theology for the Protestant movement to counteract medieval tradition.

The Institutes of Calvin is one of those epoch making books, like Newton’s Principia in science, or Kant’s Kritik in Philosophy, the interest of which is enduring. Hitherto no book had appeared which took commanding rank as an exhibition of the doctrines of the Reformed Churches in their unity and connexion. Melanchthon’s Commonplace hardly served the purpose. Yet this was a work requiring to be done, both as a satisfaction to the mind of the Church, and in order that the Reformation might have something to oppose to the great and compact systems of the Middle Ages (Hastings 1951, vol. 3, p. 147).

Calvin was characterized as physically frail but possessing an iron will and an exceptional intellectual capacity balanced with an ardent desire for knowledge that showed promise in his formative years of development. Theodore Beza also points out that even in Calvin’s early years “he was in a surprising manner devoted to religion, and a stern reprover of all the vices of his companions” (Beza 1836, p. 98; cf., Harkness 1931, p. 4). Calvin was a product of his Catholic orthodoxy, was educated in the elite schools in Paris, Orléans and Bourges. His legal aptitude was developed at Orleans under the French jurist Pierre de l’Estoile; Calvin finished his studies with the famous Italian jurist Andrea Alciato at Bourges. Calvin at the age of twenty-three published his first book, a commentary on Seneca’s Treatise on clemency (Harkness 1931, pp. 5, 6).

Like Luther, Calvin’s paternal authority exercised considerable influence on his vocation, but his father’s death freed him of any obligations to further his legal career. It was clear that Jean Calvin guided his son to enter law school rather than an ecclesiastical vocation because a law career “opened a surer road to riches and honors” (Harkness 1931, p. 4). It is within the time frame of 1532 – 1533 that Calvin made the remarkable leap from a humanist and lawyer to a theologian. It is unlikely to determine the exact time of Calvin conversion or determine the influences, which inspired him to support a persecuted Christian movement. There were many factors that influenced Calvin to move beyond the traditions of Catholicism to embrace the Reformed faith. 1. Calvin was a university student – it was within the university that the intellectual trends of society were debated and the pending conflict between the Protestant and Catholic faiths was unavoidable. 2. Calvin’s family circle and friends provided contacts that were active in the resistance movement. Calvin undoubtedly met with and debated the conflicting issues 3. Calvin could have witnessed the death of martyrs who were burned at the stake for their profession of faith. This profound witness of unswerving faith and confidence testified to the validity of their reformed Christian experience. 4. Calvin was unable to find peace in the formalisms of Romanism and found solace and grace in the recesses of Christ’s righteousness, and 5. The young Calvin was susceptible to the divine will of God and willingly surrendered his full energies to the furtherance of the gospel. Whatever the motivation, Calvin joined the ranks of the reformers and put forth all his energies to proclaim the gospel of grace.
He [Calvin] speaks of his conversion as a sudden one (subita conversio), but this does not exclude previous preparation any more than in the case of Paul. A city may be taken by a single assault, yet after a long siege. Calvin was not an unbeliever, nor an immoral youth; on the contrary, he was a devout Catholic of unblemished character. His conversion, therefore, was a change from Romanism to Protestantism, from papal superstition to evangelical faith, from scholastic traditionalism to biblical simplicity (Schaff 2002, p. 310).

Calvin never credited anyone for his conversion but God. Calvin states: “God himself” . . . “produced the change. He instantly subdued my heart to obedience” (Schaff 2002, p. 310). Like the apostle Paul, Calvin’s call to ministry coincided with his conversion. Calvin wholeheartedly served the Protestant cause providing the essential ecclesiastical infrastructure and church polity to stabilize the Protestant movement in European society. Luther was the catalyst, elucidating the witness of past reformers regarding the power of the cross through the merits of Christ, whereas Calvin systematized the message of the great reformer and provided a platform of polity that would influence sacred and secular institutions as well (Steinmetz 1995, p. 3).

Even though his political formulations have been overshadowed by secular and Christian humanists, the evolution of Calvin’s thought permeated Europe, the United Kingdom and eventually the American colonies. The efforts of William Whittingham, John Knox and Edmund Grindal promoted Calvinism in the English speaking world (Steinmetz 1995, p. 4), and eventually the Puritan reformers promoted Calvinism within the historic context, which revolutionized governance and political institutions in the new America.

Calvin influenced kings and the working class; he inspired reformers and the intelligentsia; he challenged papal authority and revolutionized the arts, sciences and philosophic systems, and eventually the geopolitical order (Cottret & Cottret 1997, p. 157ff.). The irony of modern socio-political thought in the last millennia is its interdependence on religious thought, which affected political ideologies and ethical social norms through the works of Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Niebuhr. Their contributions have influenced the foundations of law, international political systems and even the constitutional formation of nation states. Even though the reformers were a product of their times, subject to the fads and trends of their social environment, the lives of great men and women are often perceived differently in the ensuing years, as history sheds light on the long-term impact of their words and actions.

The Holy Roman Empire’s political and religious context maintained the status quo during the life of the Reformers. The feudal political system was complex and the interactive conflicts between church and state powers, which out of necessity worked with each other to solidify their positions of authority, was a cyclical adventure of survival. Paul R. Waibel describes the complexities in the loosely confederated alliances during the birth of the protestant movement.

In 1483, the Holy Roman Empire, or “the Empire” as it is commonly referred to by historians, was a loose federation of more than 300 autonomous political entities, both secular and ecclesiastical. At the time of the Reformation, there was a king (the king of Bohemia), four archbishops, forty six bishops, eighty-three other ecclesiastical lords, twenty-four secular princes, 145 counts and other secular lords, and eighty-three imperial free cities. If one includes the so-called “knights of the Empire,” who acknowledge no overlord except the Emperor, and who ruled over estates averaging no more than 100 acres, then the number of sovereign political entities within the empire could reach as high as 2000.

This crazy-quilt empire was presided over by an emperor elected since 1356 by seven electors—three ecclesiastical (the archbishops of Mainz, Trier and Cologne) and four secular (the Duke of

1 “For more than four hundred years Calvin has influenced the way successive generations of Europeans and Americans have thought about religion, structured their political institutions, looked at paintings, written poetry and music, theorized about economic relations or suggested to uncover the laws which govern the physical universe” (Steinmetz 1995, p. 3).
Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, the Count of Palatine of the Rhine, and the King of Bohemia). The powers of the emperor were negotiated anew at each election. In practice, the emperor’s authority was limited to whatever loyalty his diverse subjects were willing to grant him (Waibel 2005, p. 1).

There was one Faith that sanctioned all other institutions, including the emperor. There was one State, which recognized the authority of the church. The Holy Roman Emperor was selected by seven princes, four secular and three ecclesiastical and was crowned by the Pope as the designated ecclesiastical representative of the state; it was this official designation that legitimized the emperor’s elected status. This was Martin Luther’s world; this was the political reality of John Calvin; this was the milieu of the reformers who changed the course of history. It was within these surroundings that the seeds of sola scriptura, “by scripture alone”, and sola fide, “by faith alone” in the merits of Christ, were preached during the Holy Roman Empire era. The message of Christ’s righteousness inspired a movement that initiated the Protestant tradition, which emphasized scripture and salvation by faith in the merits of Christ alone (Heb 4: 14-16; Rm 3: 21-26; Php 3: 7-11; 1 Jn 2:1, 2; Rm 8: 31-39). These premises were the foundation of an enduring tradition that reinterpreted church and state relations.

2.13 Martin Luther, John Calvin and the Two Kingdoms

The consolidation of church and state during the Holy Roman Empire emphasized a distinctive theological focus in regards to the heavenly and earthly kingdoms: 1. The Pontiff was the “Vicar of Christ” and Christ’s personal representative on earth (Froom 1950, p. 671. 10n), and 2. The Catholic Church was the only means of salvation and remission of sins to the world in general and to the secular ruling class in particular (Waring 1968, p. 22). The paradigm shift from papal infallibility to scriptural authority on the one hand and the emphasis of salvation by faith on the other ignited a theological schism, which would redefine the fundamental parameters of Catholic and Protestant thought. Luther elaborated in his Roman’s commentary that “... Christ’s act of righteousness leads, by grace, to acquittal and life for all men, that is, it came to many, or all who are justified in no other way than through His righteousness” (Luther 1972, pp. 25, 48). John Calvin reiterated the point that “Christ was given to us by God’s generosity, to be grasped and possessed by us in faith. By partaking of him, we principally receive a double grace: namely, that being reconciled to God through Christ’s blamelessness, we may have in heaven instead of a Judge a gracious Father; and secondly, that sanctified by Christ’s spirit we may cultivate blamelessness and purity of life” (Calvin, Institutes, vol. 1, p. 725). The Augustinian dichotomy of the heavenly and earthly kingdoms was reiterated by the Reformers; however, the separation of church and state powers was a work in progress. Even though Luther and Calvin modified church and state jurisdiction, the visages of the Holy Roman Empire influenced the various European monarchies of the 18th and 19th centuries to assimilate their respective government policies with their preferences for either Catholic or Protestant faiths. The state/church formulation in Europe impeded ethical delineations on just war, as state powers utilized war as an instrument of geopolitical expediency.

Both Luther and Calvin utilized scripture as their basis to reformulate the respective jurisdictions between ecclesiastical and magisterial authority. Both Luther and Calvin disapproved of theocratic elements in either Catholic or Protestant church polity. Both Luther and Calvin had conservative views supporting government as established by God. Both Luther and Calvin refuted the office of the regalia bishops, who exercised both secular and religious authority (Larson 2009, pp. 3, 4), and both were adamant that pastoral duties should be entrusted to spiritual and not secular pursuits. While Luther and Calvin adhered to the scriptural validity of government, Calvin distrusted the monarchy (tyranny) and democracy (mob rule) and favored a Republican format of governance (Larson 2009, pp. 92, 93); whereas Luther was indebted to the protective arm of independent princes (Fife 1957, p. 264), which influenced the development of his understanding related to the civic authority (McKim 2003, p. 108). While Luther and Calvin supported the separation of church and state powers, there was a definitive difference in their application of state authority in relation to church polity or church polity in relation to state authority that
would influence the relevance of social ethics in succeeding generations. L. S. Koetsier suggests that “. . . Luther subordinated the church to the state, while Calvin subordinated the state to the church” (Koetsier 2003, p. 91). The medieval church developed an unhealthy dependence on secular power. Both Luther and Calvin developed their respective church and state paradigms to prevent ecclesiastical reliance on secular power, yet violent friction between the Catholic and Protestant traditions required protection for the Reformers. Time would judge Lutheran and Calvinistic political thought. It would either vindicate or criticize their social political viewpoints by the unfolding drama of political thought that would eventually shape the nation state system.

2.14 Martin Luther: Church and State and the Two Kingdoms

Augustine lived amidst a predominantly pagan society, whereas Luther, in contradistinction, lived amidst a predominantly Christian society. Augustine wrote The city of God during the demise of the Imperial Roman Empire, whereas Luther proclaimed the gospel during an established Holy Roman Empire. Augustine ministered when church and state maintained their respective autonomous functions, whereas Luther ministered while the church maintained jurisdiction in both ecclesiastical and state powers. Augustine’s heavenly and earthly kingdoms paradigm, personified by the moral characteristics of the Divine through the professed children of God, was contrasted to the degenerate principles of the world exemplified by the children of disobedience, and their father the devil. However, the two kingdoms interconnect through the interrelationships among the children of God and the children of the world. This necessitates a spirit of coexistence to maintain order and peace in the social strata. Augustine never exonerated or denigrated the political order; it ultimately will fulfill the divine and infallible will of God. The kingdom of heaven is eternal, whereas the kingdom of the world will eventually perish.

Luther’s denunciation of papal autonomy and pretentious religious practices sowed the seeds of discontent accelerating an unavoidable clash between contending theological viewpoints. The resulting threat upon his life mandated his physical protection from the threats of the Emperor and Pope. The embittered clash pitted German nobility sympathetic to his cause to query the relationship between the gospel and the worldly sword. Luther’s treatise entitled Temporal authority was the first ethical delineation against the predominant concept that the Catholic Church was the only earthly authority to wield religious and civil justice. Luther was a pastor as well as a theologian and comprehended the limitations of theologizing ethical delineations to the nobility of Germany. Luther’s language is simple and emphatic. His ethical treatise takes into account the carnal or natural condition of humanity while maintaining the gospel of God’s transforming grace. Temporal authority is divided into three categories: 1. The divine origins of civil authority; 2. The limitations of civic power, and 3. The proper exercise of civil authority. Luther’s treatise cannot be separated from its historic context – Luther was responding to the condemnation and denunciations of the Holy Roman Emperor and ecclesiastical Papal Bull against his writings and ministry (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, pp. 83, 84). Nonetheless, this treatise on church and state laid the foundation for church polity and civic responsibility in succeeding generations.

Luther’s heavenly and earthly kingdoms differentiated the genuine Christian from the non-Christian. The kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world are two distinct classes of people throughout salvation history (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 88); however, the civil sword has also existed from the beginning of the world (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 86)1 and continues to maintain order against violence. This is testified by the apostles in the Holy Scriptures. The intrinsic connection between virtue and justice is a grace, a gift from God. Luther’s delineation on the inner and outer man is a constructed dualism representing spiritual life and temporal responsibility. Luther’s

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1 Luther Waring states: “Luther teaches us that the state is natural and necessary to the human race and that, as such, it is a part of the divine economy for man. This being true, it has always existed and must continue to exist to the end of time. Nations come and go, kingdoms rise and fall, forms of government and administration suffer change; but the state, as an institution, is permanent and universal” (Waring 1968, p. 83).
formula of the heavenly and earthly kingdoms has a dual parallel to the two governments (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 92). The two governments are co-dependent, in that the spiritual government is necessary to “produce righteousness”, whereas the earthly government is necessary for “the punishment of the wicked” (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, pp. 87, 91, 92). The spiritual government is the moral standard pervading society while the earthly government enforces justice; this relationship is an inseparable link that mandates an indispensable interconnection between the two orders. Luther’s treatise is attempting to maintain a sensitive balance between the power of God’s grace and the power of civil justice. It is out of necessity for an outward-peace that the children of the world maintain order; however, Luther stated that “sword and authority, as a particular service of God, belong more appropriately to Christians than to any other men on earth” (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 100). Why does Luther support Christian participation in the social order? Luther maintains that the genuine Christian, by virtue of his character, is best suited to dispense justice. There is no contradiction of motive because “in this way the two propositions are brought into harmony with one another, at one and the same time you satisfy God’s kingdom inwardly and the kingdom of the world outwardly (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 96). In this way a Christian can participate in the civil government without contradicting his profession of faith (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 95). In fact, a Christian’s participation in civil service is the definitive link that binds the two governments.

Luther was a realist and derided the absurdity of a Christian government on the basis of human universal wickedness (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, pp. 90, 91), and the theocratic failure of both Israel and the Papacy illustrates the point. Also, Luther acknowledged that genuine Christians would always be a minority in the world, negating any Christian government formulation (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 91). Luther’s world was precarious, pretentious, and politically volatile. The abuse of power among the nobility was a common practice. The separation of church and state powers was a work in progress; nonetheless, Luther clearly defined the jurisdiction of church and civic authority. The state cannot enforce or compel the Christian faith, this “the bishops should do, it is a function entrusted to them and not to the princes” (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 114), and “so limits the governing authority that it is not to have the mastery over the faith or the word of God, but over evil works” (Luther, Christian in society, II/45, p. 110). Luther’s ethical treatise is directed to his immediate audience. The context is obvious, whereas the application is complicated by the shifting philosophic, political ideological and fluctuating nation state paradigms. In Luther’s defense, it was understood that power corrupts and that the grace of God is the only safeguard for those who serve at the highest levels of government. Luther’s two governments or church and state paradigm resembled Gelasius’ two swords formula; however, Luther provided a fundamental framework to balance the powers between church and state. The emphasis prohibiting the clergy from participating in secular affairs was to procure a pure and undefiled ministry by avoiding the previous temptations resulting from unbridled civil power and authority. Luther’s formulation also recognized the universal and permanent institution of the state, the very basic element in national identification for the future development of the German state. Therefore, Luther gave theological credence to the essential building-block of nationalism, the nation state. Luther was a wise and prudent theologian, the perennial spokes-person of his time that facilitated an inevitable influence on socio-political thought for succeeding generations. His ethical treatise on Temporal authority must be understood within the parameter of God’s transforming grace contrasted to the carnal and natural man; albeit, both having an obligation to maintain civic order and protect society from injustice. This was only conceivable by separating from the Roman Catholic Church and establishing an independent German confederation. The church would proclaim the gospel, while the state would protect civic order; the church was the moral preservative for society, while the state would maintain the church by allowing it to function as ‘the church’.

Luther’s formulation did not take into account shifting philosophic and political paradigms that would eventually amalgamate state authority in the Church community. The protective arm of the German Princes was a necessity to solidify the reformed faith from Papal dominance. Nonetheless, both the independent spheres of church and state and the emphasis of self-determining freedoms in religious and political thought were unable to withstand the challenges of National Socialism’s rise in power and
popularity after the humiliating effects of World War I and the treaty of Versailles. The demise of the German Evangelical church is noted by their adherence to the racial propaganda and dehumanizing policies of the Third Reich. A pastor and later bishop of Brandenburg, Joachim Hossenfelder utilized the National Socialist vocabulary to radicalize the racial prejudice of the German Christians. Hossenfelder asserted: “We stand on the ground of positive Christianity. We confess an affirmative, race-conformed belief in Christ, as he is in accordance with the German spirit of Luther and heroic piety . . . We see in race, Volkstum, and nation what God has bestowed upon us and the orders of life entrusted to us, to care for whose preservation is God’s law for us. Hence the mixing of races is to be opposed . . . We reject the Jewish mission in Germany, as long as the Jews possess the right of citizenship and thus the danger of race-concealment and bastardization continues” (Voegelin 1999, pp. 163-164; cf., Goldschmidt & Kraus, 1999, p. 192). Hossenfelder represented a fanatical viewpoint while the moderate stance represented by Reich Bishop Müller, which was supported by the National Socialist party, declared: “Belief in Christ is race-conformed in form, Christ-conformed in content . . . The New Testament in itself is Gospel, the Old Testament does not become Gospel even through the New Testament. Israel was the chosen people (Volk), but God rejected it, and gave the Gospel to a “people” (Volk) who would bear his fruit. No nation may claim the Gospel for itself alone, but God even today can still espouse or reject peoples, as he once did” (Voegelin 1999, p. 164; cf., Goldschmidt & Kraus 1999, p. 194). The surrender of the message of the gospel expressed in the ‘Magna Carta of a New Humanity’ (Gl 3: 28), was ignored by the National Socialist party and silenced the voice of the Christian community, which abandoned the gospel of racial equality to the Aryan Paragraph through the “nazification of faith, theology, structure, and business of the church that had been set in motion” (Kelly and Weborg 1999, p. 26).

Swiss Theologian Karl Barth stressed that Lutheranism shared responsibility for Hitler’s tyranny and National Socialism. Barth claimed that Lutheran dogma enhanced the independent “authority of the state” as the “Christian justification of National Socialism”. This enabled the Nazi party to rise to power as a legitimate authority for both church and state. The separation of “creation and the law from the gospel” empowered the State National Socialist party with a sacral autonomy immune to the comprehensive claims of God’s authority over all principalities and powers (Barth 1948, p. 122). Wolfhart Pannenberg states:

In historical terms, Barth’s judgment on the significance of Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms does not deal adequately with the circumstances of Luther’s era, but it still remains true that the gaps which remained in Luther’s synthesis provided the occasion for historical tendencies to take hold in the portion of the Christian tradition influenced by Luther. These were consequences which Luther neither was aware of nor anticipated, and which thus had the historical consequences that Barth and other critics have rightly described as disastrous (Pannenberg 1981, p. 127).

Dietrich Bonhoeffer suggested that the New Testament demands unconditional allegiance to Christ, the indispensable focus of ‘the cross’, which defines the relevant relationship between church and state – “There is a state, in the proper sense, only when there is a Church. The state has its proper origin since and with the cross (like the Church) in so far as this cross destroys and fulfills and affirms its order” (Bonhoeffer 1960, p. 63). Both the church and state are under the jurisdiction of Christ; however, allegiance to Christ supersedes political tyranny. James D. Tracy points out, “according to Bonhoeffer, Luther had simply confirmed the Constantinian fusion of church and state”, and, as a result, had succumbed to “a minimal ethic of innerworldliness” (Bonhoeffer 1965, p. 324). Bonhoeffer’s pastoral ministry in the Confessing Church and clandestine activities testified to the utter desperation felt, the dangers willingly confronted in order to preserve the purity of the Christian faith from the Third Reich. What we have garnered from the German Christian experience with Hitler’s National Socialism is the realism that a community of believers can disorientate their Christ consciousness and displace their confession of faith by jingoistic misadventure; nonetheless, Luther is no more responsible for Hitler’s rise to power than Augustine is responsible for the Spanish Inquisition. Theologians and critics overlook the socio-political factors after World War I, the treaty of Versailles and ensuing economic hardship, which
heightened German nationalism against the European powers that suppressed their economic growth and threatened their national security. World War I dismantled the Austrian, German and Russian monarchies and the treaty of Versailles “never operated as a system adhered to by the major powers, and amounted to little more than an armistice between two world wars” (Kissinger 1994, p. 806). Nonetheless, Luther initiated the Protestant movement, redefined the biblical theological tradition and set in motion the nation state system that would redefine global politics in the modern age. However, Luther’s successor, John Calvin, would provide socio-political traditions that redefined civic traditions in an expanding world order.

2.15 John Calvin: Church and State and the Two Kingdoms

Martin Luther’s two kingdoms reformulated a balance between church and government authority in order to secure the Protestant Reformation and preserve the gospel message by providing a framework for an autonomous German state, and established Protestantism, as the preferred state/church preference. Naturally, the demise of the Holy Roman Empire and the rising popularity of the Protestant Reformation were as much about lucrative economic independence, national identity and monarchical autonomy then the pure principles of the gospel. The schism between Catholic and Protestant thought exploded throughout Europe. The Protestant Reformation succeeded in countries that were indisposed to Catholic policy.

Where it proved possible to arrange such Concordats, the governments involved—as in France and Spain—tended to remain faithful to the Catholic Church throughout the Reformation. But where the disputes over Annates, appointments and appeals remained unresolved—as in England, Germany and Scandinavie—the pressures on the Papacy continued to build up. Even before Luther’s protestations began to be heard outside Germany, it is clear that these pressures had already come almost to the breaking point (Skinner 1978, p. 60).

John Calvin remodeled Luther’s two kingdom/two government scenario within the parameters of Republicanism or representative governance through the Geneva experiment (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.8). Calvin’s heavenly and earthly kingdoms resembled Augustine’s ‘two cities’ separating Christians and non-Christians in regards to their eternal destiny exemplified by their disposition to faith and moral conduct in the world. However, Calvin adhered to Luther’s application of the ‘two cities’ in regards to the spiritual and secular jurisdictions in the world – church and state. Calvin perceived that “Christ’s spiritual kingdom and civil jurisdiction are things completely distinct” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.1). Unlike Augustine who neither exonerated nor denigrated civil authority within the interrelationships among the heavenly and earthly kingdoms, Calvin dignified the secular office by declaring – “Accordingly, no one ought to doubt that civil authority is a calling, not only holy and lawful before God, but also the most sacred and by far the most honorable of all callings in the whole life of mortal men” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.4). Unlike Luther, who separated church and state functions designated by gospel and law, Calvin insisted on a cooperative relationship between magistrates and church officials (Kelly 1992, p. 15). While Calvin emphatically insisted that church “ministers have no jurisdiction and wield only the spiritual sword of the Word of God” (Calvin, Ecclesiastical ordinances of 1541, 49). It was also insisted that moral values were an inseparable component in both the spiritual and secular kingdoms,

. . . there is a twofold government in man: one aspect is spiritual, whereby the conscience is instructed in piety and in reverencing God; the second is political, whereby man is educated for the duties of humanity and citizenship that must be maintained among men. These are usually called the “spiritual” and “temporal” jurisdictions . . . by which is meant that the former sort of government pertains to the life of the soul, while the latter has to do with the concerns of the present life—not only with food and clothing but with laying down laws whereby a man may live his life among other men holily, honorably, and temperately. For the former resides in the inner mind, while the latter regulates only outward behavior. The one we may call the spiritual kingdom, the other, the political kingdom (Calvin, Institutes, 3.19.15).
Calvin’s implementation of an ecclesiastical constitution revolutionized church and state relations. The legal background provided opportunity to facilitate a representative format into the governing policies of Geneva. The challenge of the French Reformer was to protect Protestant church dogma from Catholic heterodoxy and Anabaptist extremism (Walker 1969, p. 124), and the power of the Geneva state powers. Calvin’s ecclesiastical constitution referred to as the *Ecclesiastical ordinances* was a prototype – as such, it was subjected to the challenges to govern an effective relationship between the sacred and secular traditions. It is difficult from our modern perspective to comprehend the monumental effort to facilitate theological and ethical mandates in the civic order without the church controlling the state or the state controlling the church. Religious culture among the Reformation was prone to think in terms of one sword, one power governance as secular and religious authority vied for the upper-hand in the two spheres of church and state polity.

Calvin recognized the flaws in a theocratic polity. The Roman Catholic formula abounded in ecclesiastical and civil atrocities with the added burden of constant strife between the two orders of authority. His choice was a representative consistory functioning as a church court focusing on ecclesiastical issues, rather than civil matters. Prior to Calvin’s application of representative ecclesiastical powers, Geneva was ruled autocratically for centuries by a regalia prince-bishop. The Geneva magistrates controlled the sacred office after the expulsion of the Bishop and his canon lawyers, who for centuries relegated the political and social order. Calvin’s efforts to purge the church from political power were more successful than his efforts to prevent the magistrate’s from interfering in church polity.

Calvin reiterated the fundamental principle that “the ministers have no jurisdiction and wield only the spiritual sword of the Word of God . . . and that there is no derogation by this consistory from the authority of the Seigneury or the magistracy; but the civil power shall continue in its entirety” (Calvin, *Ecclesiastical ordinances of 1541*, 49). This was an essential foundation to maintain the biblical purpose in ministry and separate the religious and civic orders. The consistory dealt with doctrinal issues: “If anyone speaks critically against the received doctrine, he shall be summoned for the purpose of reasoning with him” (Calvin, *Ecclesiastical ordinances of 1541*, 48). Church related issues: “If anyone is negligent to come to church in such a way that serious contempt of the communion of Christians is apparent, or if anyone shows himself to be scornful of ecclesiastical rule, he shall be admonished” (Calvin, *Ecclesiastical ordinances of 1541*, 48). This was also the case with moral and behavior related issues such as vandalism, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct, domestic quarrels and many other sins (Monter 2009, pp. 467-484; cf., Larson 2009, p. 6). The *Ecclesiastical ordinances* were counterbalanced by Calvin’s theological convictions that: 1. Magistrates were ordained of God as specified in the Holy Scriptures (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.4). 2. While anarchy is denounced, a coercive despotic magistrate does not negate the recognition of God’s ordained mandate of governing authority (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20. 4. 5.7). 3. Magistrates are responsible to uphold the worship of God and maintain both tables of the Law (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20. 4.9). 4. Magistrates can utilize designated force to fulfill their civic duties if necessary (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20. 4.10), and 5. Magistrates are invested with the authority to wage wars and levy taxes (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20. 4.11, 13).

The consistory had no jurisdiction over capital offenders and maintained a designated pastoral profile. Mark Larson states: “It must never be forgotten that Calvin and the rest of the consistory never put a single heretic (including Michael Severtus), a single murderer, or a single adulterer to death. They may well have concurred with a particular execution, but it was the Small Council alone which had the power of the supreme penalty of capital punishment” (Larson 2009, pp. 6-7). Nonetheless, the Geneva experiment was a work in progress. It was impractical to totally separate the church from civil power, although it was Calvin’s determination to liberate church authority to function in its respective sphere.

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1 Walker suggests that Calvin combated the heretical fanaticism inculcated in an offshoot sect within the Anabaptist movement proclaiming the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth at Münster. While Walker deems such theological reflection as insignificant; Calvin understands that the Anabaptist interpretation of the kingdom of God as a political and spiritual manifestation on earth could only distort the truth concerning church and state jurisdiction.
free from the controlling influences of the civil magistrates and envisioned that both state and society would benefit from the moral tenets of the gospel, whereas the state would protect and establish church worship (Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.20.3.2.). In this manner the spiritual and political jurisdictions were responsibly complemented in the social order.

Calvin established four orders to administer the Geneva Church. These were composed of pastors, doctors, elders (nominated and appointed by the government) and deacons. Each order was designated its specified function within the ministration of church polity. The pastors preach and “administer the sacraments”, the doctors teach “sound doctrine”, the elders admonish the “backsliders and those of disorderly conduct” and render service to the company of pastors concerning related issues and the deacons minister to the poor and sick. Bernard Cottret points out that this organization was “not restricted to Calvinism—Bucer’s views were hardly different—but they found their highest degree of systematization in the work of the French Reformer” (Cottret 2000, p. 165). These four orders were represented in every quarter of the city. The moral mandates and work ethic, the prohibiting of begging and disorderly conduct, and the ministration of the sick and poor were “distinguishing traits of the Calvinist city” (Cottret 2000, p. 165). Calvin was a second generation reformer, a theologian and diplomat, whose systematic mindset and statecraft enabled him to plant the seeds of truth in the fertile soil of social revolution that would reap the fruition of political reform in succeeding generations. Herbert Lüthy suggests that Calvin was “responsible for the birth of those Calvinist communities, fiercely rebellious to any human authority over consciences, for whom the separation of Church and State always took place as a matter of course when the State did not identify itself with the community – as was the case in ancient Geneva and in the Puritan settlements of New England” (Lüthy 1970, p. 52). Douglas Kelly also points out that various scholars have noted “the distinction and yet the close union of church and state which Calvin achieved with the precision possible in the self-governing city-state was an important factor in the spread of Calvinism” (Kelly 1992, pp. 14-15). We can neither underrate nor overstress Calvin’s contributions to modern political institutions and constitutional reforms. The French Reformer cast a colossal shadow across the horizon of social/political thought. Calvin was the catalyst of a reform movement, whose notable adherents to his theological and political formulations—significantly reformatted, adapted and upgraded Calvinistic premises to their modern context in a changing world order (Witte 2002, pp. 2-3).

What Luther established by separating church and state powers, Calvin remodeled and refined in a Republican city-state paradigm. It was, however, the founding fathers of the American Revolution, who redefined a threefold governance formula of checks and balances, counter-balanced by autonomous religious guarantees. The American colonials adhered “to a two powers theory of church and state as two divinely ordained bodies, neither one deriving its power from the other, but both from God, so that neither one was subservient” (Kelly 1992, p. 129). It is within this milieu and tradition that Reinhold Niebuhr, an ordained minister and scholar, disseminated his heralded political realism, when the United States assumed the international reins of power in the nuclear age.

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1 John Witte states: “Building in part on classical and Christian prototypes, Calvin developed arresting new teachings on authority and liberty, duties and rights, and church and state that have had an enduring influence on Protestant lands. Calvin’s original teachings were periodically challenged by major crises in the West—the French Wars of religion, the Dutch Revolt, the English Revolution, American colonization and the American Revolution. In each such crisis moment, a major Calvinist figure emerged—Theodore Beza, Johannes Althusius, John Milton, John Winthrop, John Adams, and others—who modernized Calvin’s teachings and converted them into dramatic new legal and political reforms. This rendered early modern Calvinism one of the driving engines of Western constitutionalism. A number of bedrock Western understandings of civil and political rights, social and confessional pluralism, federalism and social contract, and more owe a great deal to Calvinist theological and political reforms” (Witte 2002, pp. 2, 3).
2.16 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Two Kingdoms

The Reformation revolutionized social norms, permeated political institutions and refocused the Christian community upon the message of God’s reconciling grace through the merits of Christ’s righteousness. The revelation of God’s love through the liberating power of the cross was overshadowed by violence between factious and contentious adherents in both the Catholic and Protestant communities. In the Thirty Years War (1618 – 1648) professed Christians and the respective ethnic monarchies contested in a shameless battle for geographic power in the name of the cross. The Holy Roman Empire was crumbling and a new world order would emerge and redefine international politics. As the modern nation state system evolved, war was considered an instrument, a political utility to settle disputes. Even though the Thirty Years War was fought primarily in Germany, its ramifications permeated Europe. Ecclesiastical authority was paralyzed to influence the respective monarchies on the issue of war because the state/church formula was intertwined with their respective nation’s grand strategy objectives, coupled with ethnic nationalism, and the inseparable relationship of ecclesiastical authority and the royal crown as well as disputes over theological dogma. The incapacity of ecclesiastical leaders to foster cooperation among themselves and respective European magistrates was the impetus that influenced Alberico Gentili (1552 – 1608) and Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645) to implement Christian principles within the context of natural law, to develop an international system regulated by the law of sovereign nation states, where social issues that affected the community of nations, ‘primarily war’ could find a resolution through the innate common sense of national leadership for the establishment of peace, prosperity and community. The complicated factors facilitating positive relationship between religious and secular powers was a gradual process that eventually influenced the social order. John Locke’s (1632 – 1704) The second treatise of government reaffirmed the reformed tradition’s republican spirit, which inspired the colonial fathers’ convictions that liberty and freedom are instilled virtues in governance and the hallmarks of human rights. James Madison stated:

It is certainly very material that the true doctrines of liberty, as exemplified in our political systems, should be inculcated on those who are to sustain and may administer it. . . Sidney and Locke are admirably calculated to impress on young minds the right of nations to establish their own governments, and to inspire a love of free ones (Montgomery 1966, p. 50A).

The process of a Republican form of government was first initiated by local self-governing congregations of English Puritans who had come to America to escape persecution and discover a new life of opportunity. The Puritans never intended to break from the Church of England, but their reforms were unacceptable, especially their anti-theocratic convictions, their distastes of the divine rights of kings (advocated by Kings James and Charles), and deep-rooted fears of Popery through the marriage alliance between Charles I to Henrietta of France, a Catholic princes (Schenk 1948, pp. 7, 8). The Puritans reestablished their Zion in the wilderness of the new world. A visitor who witnessed the Puritan exodus to the new world asserted, “God’s people are come into a new country where they freely enjoy the liberty of his holy ordinances without any trouble or molestation at all, either of bishop, archbishop, or any other inferior carping minister or gaping officer, so they come unto the land and the Lord with new hearts and new lives” (Trelawny 1977, p. 66 n3). However, the heavenly and earthly kingdoms, typified by church and state, were a work in progress. The Puritan formula was Calvinistic in nature, in that church and state functions were theoretically separated; but it more closely resembled Boniface VIII’s model of the two swords, which emphasized that church and state coexisted and functioned under the directives of church polity. Emerson states:

The relation that developed between church and state in Puritan Massachusetts was close, though the two were separate. The Cambridge Platform declared that the “power and authority of magistrates” is “for helping and furthering” the churches: “It is part of that honor due to Christian magistrates to desire and crave the consent of approbation” of the churches which provide “encouragement and comfort. . . . The end of the magistrate’s office is not only the quiet and
peaceable life of the subject in matters of righteousness and honesty but also in matters of
godliness, yea, of all godliness.” And the preface to The Book of the General Lawes and Liberties
of Massachusetts Bay observed that in New England “our churches and civil state have been
planted and grown up (like two twins) together like that of Israel” in such a fashion that “each do
help and strengthen [the] other, the churches, the civil authority and the civil authority, the
churches (Emerson 1977, p. 51 n29).

The separation of church and state exemplified in the Massachusetts Bay Colony was “far greater than in
England” (Emerson 1977, p. 67). Nonetheless, the Puritan leaders modeled their society after ancient
Israel and espoused a theocratic format. John Cotton, a leading Puritan theologian during the early days
of the Massachusetts Bay, stated in 1636, that “. . . Democracy, I do not conceive that ever God did ordain
as a fit government either for church or commonwealth. . . As for monarchy, and aristocracy, they are
both of them clearly approved, and directed in scripture, yet so as referreth the sovereignty to himself, and
setteth up Theocracy in both, as the best forms of government in the commonwealth, as well as in the
church” (Guerrant & Martyn 1967, p. 70). The Puritans emphasized their covenant relationship “because
God, who was then bound up in covenant with them [the Hebrews] to be their God, hath put us in their
stead and is become our God as well as theirs and hence we are as much bound to their laws as well as
themselves” (Emerson 1977, p. 68). Emerson described the Puritan concept of church and state as a
fusion of sacred and civic duties because the theocratic model of ancient Israel is a theological/historical
pattern that redefined the dynamic relationship between the church covenant and the civil covenant – as
Israel entered the land of promise covenanted to them by God, so the Puritan community reestablished
God’s covenant in the new world, because the Puritans applied the covenant of grace as an Old and New
Testament tradition (Emerson 1977, p. 68). Both the church and the state maintained their respective
functions. Both the church and the state were to compliment and assist each other, and both the church
and the state should seek to serve God. The Puritan paradigm was a product of opportunity and biblical
typological interpretation.

Darren Staloff attributes the pre-colonial socio-political environment as “the perfect laboratory
for finding the inner dynamics of that coalitional movement”: 1. The absence of the church of England or
any other established religion opened the door of opportunity to establish a Puritan community. 2. The
populace was composed of men and women of like temperament and belief, the “Great Migration largely
excluded the lowest strata of English society”, and 3. The absence of the English upper class who defined
British customary society, as well as staunch supporters of the Church of England, enabled Puritan
society to flourish in the new world. The Puritan clergy and magistrates were the dominant upper class
and “the system of cultural domination they imposed made them the ruling class. This novel form of
cultural authority, predicatd on Puritan Biblicism, effectively unified the church and state in a polity
structure” (Staloff 1998, p. 204).

The Puritan community prospered in New England but their self-imposed religious uniformity
and intolerant disposition was challenged by Roger Williams – freedom and religious liberty were soon to
radically transform church and state relations in the new world. The two kingdoms, church and state,
would assume autonomous roles in the new world and solidify the cornerstone of civil and religious rights
in the American republican tradition.

New England winters are brutal and the terrain challenging for the adventurist who sought
economic and religious freedom. Unity of spirit and the binding force of community were essential to
survive in the new world. The impression of religious liberty in both the old and new world was
considered an outlandish view that threatened the established order. Edwin Gaustad suggests that the
“common assumption was that if religious liberty prevailed, churches would close, governments would
fall and all moral standards would collapse” (Gaustad 2001, p. 84). However, there was one who
interpreted the times, fought against the established consensus and upheld that “‘Soul Liberty is of God’
and that conscience is by nature free and beyond the control of men and states. But liberty of conscience
is still more inclusive; it is freedom of mind and conscience to practice and profess any ‘Truth’ as the
natural and civil right of man, if no purely civil laws are broken” (Ernst 1932, pp. 434-435).
Roger Williams (1603 – 1683) became a Christian at an early age and was apprenticed by the honorable Sir Edward Coke (1552 – 1634), famous jurist and opposition leader against the royalists. Williams was educated at Pembroke College, Cambridge and received his foundational degree, A.B. in 1627, as a professed Anglican (Ernst 1932, p. 31). Williams was of common birth, yet a product of his renaissance and reformation heritage, which inevitably molded his separatist and anti-institutional viewpoints. Cambridge, like all universities, was an academic center engaging the socio-political issues of the times. It was in the halls of academia that Williams came into contact with the popular concepts of sovereignty and natural rights advocated by philosophic and Christian thinkers. Williams’s freedom of spirit and strong theological convictions rejected the neo-conservative movement in both the British Crown, which reaffirmed the divine rights of kings and the Church of England’s staunch and radical support of that divine recognition, Anglican neo-orthodoxy and the bloody persecutions that followed. It was during this turbulent process that Williams converted to Puritanism and was outraged by the royalist platform that was unsettling and usurping church and state powers, which affected his removal from Cambridge, negating any future appointment to minister in the Anglican Church. Fortunately, a Puritan lord, Sir William Mechan, provided a chaplaincy appointment that enabled the young Williams a vocation, which granted him exposure to the educated and cultured Puritan class and access to liberal advocates who rejected royal and ecclesiastical claims (Ernst 1932, pp. 29-36, 50-59).

Sir William encouraged the chaplain to attend a constituency meeting supported by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. It was during this meeting that the gospel commission of spreading the gospel to the indigenous population of America inspired Roger Williams of the opportunities for mission service. It was also during this meeting that Williams met his future antagonists, all seeking a better life. The preaching of the gospel message in the wild recesses of the new world thrilled the young chaplain. However, Roger Williams’s missionary adventure was an escape from persecution as well as the ardent compassion for the native Indians. The zealous chaplain of Otes attacked Bishop Laud’s church reforms, the Book of Common Prayer, and the newly structured formal services with their ceremonial pomp. Bishop Laud condemned Williams an enemy of the state, which Sir Edward Coke and Puritan high society were unable to protect Williams from prosecution. Roger Williams’ radical views of church and state and his theological convictions of tolerance precipitated an untimely departure to the new world. James Ernst summarizes Roger Williams’ religious development and convictions:

As a child of eleven he had been converted by London Dissenting preachers. When he signed the Subscription Book in January, 1627, he was a Puritan Anglican. In 1629 when arguing with Cotton and Hooker, he had become a semi-Separatist after the teachings of Ames and Jacobs. And by December, 1630, he was a rigid or extreme Separatist. In his political views he followed in general the principles of Fortescue, Bracton, Littleton, and Sir Edward Coke, having taken over the compact theory and the nature-rightly ideas from the European schools of philosophy and Suarez (Ernst 1932, p. 58).

Roger Williams and his wife Mary traveled to the new world on December 1, 1630; the two months voyage in the dead of winter was piloted by Captain Pierce, who safely guided the Lyon to Nantasket, near Boston. The Almighty God takes the common and performs uncommon feats of glory for His name sake. Roger Williams would redefine religious rights, which are a precursor to human rights. Williams was immediately assigned a pastoral position in Boston, but refused because the church formats too closely resembled the Church of England. An agitated Williams denounced the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s theocratic policies as “Anti-Christ” (Ernest 1932, p. 433) and through a series of contentious debates with John Cotton, on toleration and his separatist beliefs, was finally ostracized from Massachusetts in October, 1635 and then sought safety in the wilderness of Rhode Island.

The great controversy motif between Christ and Satan, the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, the heavenly and earthly cities, were articulated in theological application to church and state relations. John Witte Jr. points out that European Anabaptist delineation on a “separation between the fallen world and the redeemed church” motif recurred in Roger Williams’s “wall of separation between
the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world” (Williams 2000, pp. 29 n21, 49 n88). The separation of church and state would safeguard ecclesiastical purity and freedom of worship and enhance socio-political stability to safeguard the civic order.

Undergirding Roger Williams’s stance on separation of ecclesiastical and civil powers is the concept of ‘freedom of conscience’, which implied that human beings have an innate or ‘natural moral capability’ to achieve to some degree ‘the requirements of conscience’ in relationship to their respective socio-political orders. The non-Christian is capable of living a principled lifestyle because the law of God is written upon the heart (Rm 2: 14-15). Williams was ahead of his time and applied the relationship of a separation of religious and civic powers within the framework of free conscience as a positive moral agent in a diversified society (Dawson 1990, pp. 27-30). The relationship between Williams’s concept of free conscience and self-determination, and that of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson testify to the positive influence that religion had upon the founding fathers of colonial America.

Williams attributed the conformity of religion and state “the greatest occasion of civil war, ravishing of conscience, and persecution of Christ Jesus in his servants, and the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls”. Williams also stipulated that the means of dealing with diversified mindsets throughout the world was not the force of arms, but that “Sword which is only able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of Gods Spirit, the Word of God” (Guerrant & Martyn 1967, pp. 71-72). This fundamental principle that people of diverse persuasions, among Christian and non-Christian, among the churched and the un-churched, could neither be oppressed nor persuaded against their free conscience was a radical solution to avert war, social unrest and intolerant religious bigotry that constantly plagued Europe. Roger Williams spearheaded the separation of church and state powers in the Rhode Island colony, but it was James Madison (1751 – 1836) and Thomas Jefferson (1743 – 1826) who implemented ‘the wall of separation’ doctrine into the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution asserts:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances (United States Constitution, First Amendment).

Both Madison and Jefferson supported ‘a wall of separation’ to discourage a state supported church. The development of the First Amendment Clause and the autonomous relationship between church and state powers has been a work in progress. The founding fathers of America recognized the benefits of religion and morality as an essential component for responsible government “because it increased virtue among the people, a necessary element for the maintenance of a free republic” (Meese 2005, p. 303). The battle for religious liberty slowly progressed in America until the framers of the Constitution implemented this unique relationship between church and state powers – many generations either ‘struggled for’ or ‘fought against’ this American tradition – until “freedom of religion as both constitutional principle and social reality is among the America’s greatest contributions to the world” (Meese 2005, p. 307).

The autonomous separation of both church and state powers enabled ecclesiastical representatives to express their ethical delineations or criticisms without state interference on the one hand and the churches meddling in political policy on the other. To say it does not happen is naïve and irresponsible. However, the mechanism of the First Amendment Clause guarantees freedom of expression, which creates a necessary ‘balance of power’ for the church to function in an ethical advisory capacity to confront a host of socio-political issues without prostituting itself to the grand strategic objectives of a nation state. It is within this church and state environment that Reinhold Niebuhr provided guidance on assorted issues relative to political realism during the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, arms control, nuclear weaponry and warfare and the inherent limitations of state actor power.
2.17 Reinhold Niebuhr, Political Realism and the Two Kingdoms

Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr (1892 – 1971) was a pastor, scholar, teacher, activist and statesman. While recognized primarily as the father of the modern realist tradition, his ministry was a multifaceted ministry, which incorporated a career that had spanned nearly five decades, and continues to illuminate the understanding of the philosophic misadventures of power politics in international affairs. It is within the global community that the constancy of his theological view on the nature of man underpins the Christian social realism, which continues to reeducate subsequent generations.

Niebuhr did not consider himself a theologian and never systemized an elaborate philosophic treatise like Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa theologica* or Karl Barth’s *Church dogmatics*. However, in the words of Bob E. Patterson, “Reinhold Niebuhr was the most influential American theologian” in the 20th century, “the one American who finds a comfortable place in a modern theological pantheon comprised mainly of Europeans” (Patterson 1977, p. 14). Niebuhr’s influence encompassed both church and secularists; diplomats and foreign policy strategists; as well as government leaders. Diplomat and Foreign Service strategist George Kennan credited Niebuhr “with exercising a greater intellectual influence on him than anyone else” (Mayers 1988, p. 126). Hans Morgenthau hailed Niebuhr as “the greatest living political philosopher of America” (The editors 1971, p. 126). Politicians and statesmen such as Adlai Stevenson, McGeorge Bundy and Hubert Humphrey acknowledged Niebuhr’s impact on their political thought (Harries 1986, p. 1; cf., McKeogh 1997, p. 1). Also, Civil Rights activist “Martin Luther King Jr., in a BBC interview shortly before his death, acknowledged Niebuhr as one of the two major intellectual influences in his life” (Patterson 1977, p. 18). Close friend and colleague John C. Bennett, claimed that “Niebuhr has been criticized for being the one who more than anyone else provided Christian legitimization of the Cold War” (Bennett 1982, p. 92). While Niebuhr’s political realism revolutionized the philosophic infrastructure of the balance of power and containment theories, it was the works of Hans J Morgenthau, who implemented the realist tradition into the American political process. Morgenthau referred to Niebuhr as “the father of us all”, referring to Niebuhr’s influence in the political realist tradition (Lang 2004, p. 26, n12). Hans J. Morgenthau’s assessment and evaluation of international affairs dominated postwar policy and is considered one of the most influential political theorists of the 20th century. Morgenthau’s treatise, *Politics among nations* went through six editions and was the academic standard for decades that formulated the realist paradigm throughout the Cold War era. The neorealist reaction in the 1980’s was initiated by Kenneth N. Waltz and contemporary theorists interested in models of power continue to allude to the realist and neorealist theories and application to their respective contexts (Lebow 2003, p. 216) – the ripple effect of Niebuhr’s thought cannot be underestimated in contemporary international affairs.

Reinhold Niebuhr was the son of a preacher, and a product of the land of his birth, America. Though his theological roots were formulated in the Reformation tradition, Niebuhr’s educational exposure to Yale divinity school fine-tuned his analytical skills and opened the young Niebuhr to the liberal treasures of theological acumen and embarked upon a successful pastoral, literary and teaching career. The unique aspect about Niebuhr’s theological thought was his ability to adjust to the signs of the times; it was not an impulsive change regulated by the trends of society, but a process of growth and reevaluation. While ministering in Bethel Evangelical church in Detroit, Michigan (1915 – 1928), Niebuhr adhered to the socialist platform to counter-act the monopolization of “Big Business” in the economic sector; however, eventually cut ties with the socialist movement in America because of its distorted application in the political/military order evolving in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Niebuhr supported the pacifist platform after World War I but eventually refuted its claims because of its ineptitude to confront the ultimatums of war in view of the Nazi and Communist crises. Niebuhr was a firm supporter of a balance of power to thwart communist aggression, but ultimately criticized the mishandling of the Vietnam War. Niebuhr recognized the importance of American responsibility in global politics, but rejected the idea of its messianic mission in world affairs. An ardent, bold and courageous reformer – his literary prowess formulated the philosophic structures of political realism within the
context of Christian thought, yet able to captivate the hard-core politician and statesman to the logical consequences of his arguments (Miller 1973, pp. 359-407).

The progression of Niebuhr’s thought from a professed liberal to a diehard realist was a combination of life experience and personal conviction of inherited human limitations and unrestrained self-interest in the socio-political order. Niebuhr elaborates:

About midway in my ministry, which extends roughly from the peace of Versailles to the peace of Munich, measured in terms of Western history, I underwent a fairly complete conversion of thought which involved rejection of almost all the liberal theological ideals with which I ventured forth in 1915 (Niebuhr 1939, p. 542).

The two kingdoms were in philosophic conflict. The 20th century marked an era of dynamic geopolitical power shifts, antithetical ideological hostilities, and catastrophic technological advancements in warfare hardware stratagem, which would redefine the economic and political character of the global community. On the one hand the Church was caught between liberal interpretations that overemphasized the social gospel, which attempted to correct an unjust social system, yet downplayed the creaturely limitations of human nature and original sin within the framework of a Darwinian progressivism. On the other hand Orthodoxy stressed eschatological overtures that overshadowed socio-political realities and in some religious circles interpolated messianic misconceptions concerning church and state viewpoints in a dynamically changing world order. The global conflict against Nazi and Communist regimes in Germany and Russia demanded a balanced viewpoint from a democratic tradition, which understood the necessity to implement equilibrium of power to thwart radical ideological expansionism. It was Niebuhr’s observation of human interaction in the competitive capitalist sector that dashed any philosophic utopianism. Patterson points out that the “early insight into the ugly realities of an industrial society, particularly the exploitation of men by other men and the church’s placid indifference, was to change his pastoral ministry” (Patterson 1977, p. 26). The church in America was challenged by his biblical realism; his emphasis on human self-centeredness and the horrid realities of misguided collective power struggles in the socio-economic and political orders revolutionized the application of diplomatic and foreign policy analysis in the international order as well.

Political scientist Kenneth Waltz states: “Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian . . . has written as many words of wisdom on problems of international politics as have any of the academic specialists in that subject, has criticized utopians, Liberals and Marxist alike, with frequency and telling effect. Political realism is impossible without a true insight into man’s nature” (Waltz 1970, p. 20, cf., Niebuhr 1953, pp. 101, 102). Niebuhr’s formula of the nature of man and sin restated in a 20th century framework was not an original concept but a renaissance of a rich theological tradition stemming from the apostle Paul to St. Augustine, reiterated by Spinoza, rediscovered by the reformers Luther and Calvin, revamped by Søren Kierkegaard and redirected by modern reformist Karl Barth. Niebuhr contended with liberal Christian thought and criticized Christian orthodoxy. His moderate stance made him the target of both traditions, yet was able to affect change where it counted most – in the hearts and minds of the foreign policy community.

The history of the two kingdoms from the apostolic tradition to modern constitutional mandates separating church and state powers is pitted with friction between the two orders. There is no consistent model that defines the appropriate interpretation of ecclesiastical and state balance of powers. Rome’s persecution of a Christian sect has little semblance to Hitler’s Christian Germany that persecuted Jews, except the commonality of human nature that is prone to abuse its power in the name of religion. It is the investigators view that Augustine and Niebuhr’s contribution was dependent upon a generation that supported and popularized their mandates.
2.18 The Historicity of the Two Kingdoms

The insights of the two kingdom paradigm demonstrates the complexities of human interaction at all levels of the social ladder; the inseparable connection between religious thought and the socio-political restraints in everyday life; and the inevitable power of philosophic influences that mold social norms for succeeding generations. It is within this context that the delineation of the two kingdoms and their relationship to just war necessitates the inevitable connection between the nature of man and political realism espoused by Augustine and more fully developed by Reinhold Niebuhr.

First, the literal cosmic controversy between Christ and Satan, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, portrayed in the New Testament (Mt 4: 1-11; Eph 6: 11, 12) was eventually interpreted as the struggle between the Christian sect and the Imperial Roman State. The profession of faith in Jesus Christ and specified social and moral axioms were the litmus test that separated the genuine from the counterfeit in regards to fellowship in the heavenly or earthly kingdoms. Ironically, the Edict of Milan (313), which established the Christian sect as a moral and social savior, but was unable to thwart the unanticipated decline of the Pax Romana. Thus, it was assumed that “Christian truth had validated itself by arresting the decay of Roman civilization and that its final inability to stop the decay had invalidated it” (Davis & Good 1960, p. 3). This sense of despair motivated Augustine to write The city of God, to redefine the limitations of earthly political infrastructures contrasted to the eternal nature of the kingdom of God. Augustine’s realism shone forth in that the earthly kingdom or every empire depicted as ‘the city of this world’ is subjugated to an unregenerate humanity. The failed attempt of medieval Christianity only validates his premise that systems of governance established upon power (whether ecclesiastical or secular) would eventually decay because of the antithetical nature of the relation between the virtue of love and the destructive nature of self-love that molds and fashions viewpoints that influence the rise and fall of nations.

This line of thought was reiterated by Luther and Calvin; however, their formulation that attempted to develop a balance of church and state relations was subject to the rapidly changing political climate that eventually challenged the autonomy of either the church or the state in verity. Monarchical power, religious and dogmatic bias, nationalism and the subjection of the church to the crown and nation, and grand strategic objectives neutralized ecclesiastical authority on moral issues, primarily just war. The fact that warfare was an instrument of the state further complicated the situation. The struggle to separate from the existing political order of the Holy Roman Empire on the one hand and the violent reaction to the Reformation on the other created a chasm among the philosophic/political communities that loathed the contradictory Christian profession of holy war. The likes of Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili and Grotius implemented Christian moral thought within the framework of natural law and developed a formulation for international law to regulate the consortium of recognized sovereign nation states. It was the hope that national representatives would possess the integrity to work-through socio-political issues, primarily war, for the sake of peace, prosperity and community.

Reinhold Niebuhr inherited a threefold church/state system that fostered an opportunity to promulgate the political views in contemporary politics within the following context: 1. Within a threefold system of checks and balances in a democratic infrastructure; 2. Civic and religious autonomy that provided a platform to espouse his views, and 3. A developed international legal system that fostered diplomatic communication. Niebuhr confronted a vast array of social, economic and political issues and developed the philosophic underpinnings of the realist tradition in America. His concepts are not only credited for instilling political realism in the mainstream of American foreign policy, but also influencing the proponents of political realism in global affairs in the works of George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau. It would be understandable in contemporary society to misjudge his influence in contemporary international politics. The dispute between the classical and contemporary interpretation on the causes of state actor friction and war has overshadowed Niebuhr’s insights on human nature and collective self-interest.

Nonetheless, the present complexities of modern civilization may perhaps reconsider the influence of human nature and its aggressive disposition as a primary cause of war, rather than systems of
governance. In other words political systems are as strong and efficient as the people who administer them. It is the agent rather than the system of governance that regulates justice and sustains healthy moral trends that affect generations. It was Niebuhr who asserted: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (Niebuhr 1947, p. xi). Niebuhr’s emphasis on human limitation is not an excuse for one’s incapacity to administer the affairs of state. It is a challenge to safeguard and maintain the most efficient civic governance to sustain nominal justice in an unjust world. The balance of opinion between the civic and religious orders should offset any dysfunctional socio-political misadventure that would disgrace national objectives; yet history attests that church and state often resemble the proverbial adage of ‘the blind leading the blind’ into national catastrophe. Nonetheless, the most proficient model in the two kingdom scenario is a separation of church and state powers that sustains a stable civic order while safeguarding moral integrity.

Second, the heavenly and earthly kingdoms are inseparably linked through social interaction – from the laws of Rome to modern day jurisprudence; from ancient warfare to the modern war tradition; from the multiplicity of social and economic issues that confront mankind on a daily basis. The secular environment has a binding influence on our societal values, traditions, cultural mindsets and perception of reality. Nonetheless, the claim of the gospel of Christ as a transforming power in the lives of an obedient faith (2 Cor 5:17; Rm 1:5) – that grace, that faith ‘in Christ’, which transfers the children of darkness to the heavenly kingdom of selfless-love and service is a dynamic process that nurtures virtue in the civic community. However, at this pivotal juncture, both Augustine and Niebuhr refute temporal utopianism as it relates to the structures of empires and nations. The grand strategy of sovereign nations is intimately intertwined with their respective socio-political ambitions. War, as an organized institution to defend or expand geopolitical or ideological aims is inseparably intertwined with political objectives. In the case of the Augustinian just war theory, it must be understood within the context of Roman just war tradition, or the writings of Vegetius’ Epitoma rei militaris and the framework of the Roman law tradition. In the case of Reinhold Niebuhr’s political realism and just war scenario must be understood within the context of Carl Von Clausewitz ‘total war’ concept and the framework of international law. The evolution of warfare from sword and shield, the invention of gunpowder, the advent of the canon, and the technologic advances of conventional weapons to the splitting of the atom has altered our conception of ‘how wars are fought’.

Third, the fundamental connecting link of man’s nature to historical realism is the binding element in both Augustine and Niebuhr’s thought. Humanity’s natural inclinations of fear, distrust, manipulation and deviant misadventure to utilize power without restraint is a constant dynamic in both ancient and modern politics. It is within this framework that Augustine’s just war tradition is recognized as a moral theory rather than an appendage to the Roman war tradition. In a similar vein Niebuhr’s political realism takes into account the coercive nature of group collective power in the economic and socio-political order by its egotistic adherence to ideologies that can only be controverted in the international arena by a balance of power. Critics invalidate Augustine and Niebuhr’s views as outmoded and invalid because of the modern advances of the sciences, modern warfare and a complicated decentralized multipolar international system. However, the consistent actions of mankind’s destructive activities in history contrasted to the ensuing rise and fall of nations validates Augustine and Niebuhr’s argument that political systems and national objectives are inevitably limited by the human agent. Republicanism without ethical restraints can digress into a ‘godless democracy’ or ‘mob rule’ if the national leadership misplaces its confidence in state power as the beacon of righteous just cause while neglecting to identify the limitations of national power. Often humankind repeats the mistakes of a flawed national war policy only to vindicate our demise by willfully forgetting the witness of history and visionary utterances of the prophets.
2.19 Conclusion

The two kingdoms scenario is a foundational scheme that provides a moral basis between the heavenly and earthly cities. The literal manifestation, the great controversy between good and evil, exemplified in scripture is reenacted within the lives of humankind. The early Christian sect alleged that Imperial Roman power and cultic worship of the emperor was representative of demonic forces warring against the citadel of righteousness – the church (Eph 6: 10-18). However, a political shift enacted by Constantine the Great ensured unprecedented civic and religious authority to the once persecuted sect. The fall of Imperial Rome was superseded by the Holy Roman Empire wherein church and state were fused in an uneasy political alliance in which the state and church both claimed divine rights in the civic and religious administration of the empire. The heavenly city was an earthly manifestation of power yet deprived of the graces of God. Ecclesiastical authority annulled human rights as Emperor and Pontiff autonomously steered the fate of humanity in the Middle and High Middle Ages. Like Constantine the Great, Martin Luther revolutionized the formation of church and state by the rediscovery of the primary directive of *sola scriptura* and *sola fide* that transformed theological dogma, worship and ethnic identity. Germany’s break from the Empire signaled a major paradigm shift – the nation state system. Monarchies either retained or abandoned the universal Christian faith. The overriding issue was political autonomy rather than the graces of the gospel of Christ. Philosophic and political mandates endorsed most notably by John Calvin in Switzerland and John Locke in England planted the seeds of Republicanism, constitutional reform and the rights of humankind revolutionized the formation of civic and religious powers. Even so, religious pluralism was discouraged and persecution was a constant threat against anyone who dared controvert designated state-religious practices throughout Europe. In England, the Puritans ventured to traverse the vast ocean expanse to an uncivilized land in order to practice their personal religious convictions. Roger Williams marked a turning point in regards to religious practice and conscience, laying the foundation for the separation of church and state in America through the efforts of Madison and Jefferson, who established unprecedented rights of conscience and worship in the new world. America was heralded as the bastion of religious and political freedom, and economic opportunity as millions fled Europe to enjoy the fruitage of unprecedented human rights. The ancient and modern paradigm, Imperial Rome and America, proffered unprecedented religious rights to influence social and political traditions. It is within this framework that St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr benefited from their respective state and church traditions to establish the relevance of the gospel as an indubitable moral guide in the political maze of civic polity and war.
CHAPTER III

3.1 Saint Augustine’s Just War Theory

Roman law reinforced an integrated multicultural empire; the Roman military solidified its authority and power throughout its vast domain. The Romans were recognized for developing the modern science of jurisprudence and equally credited for revolutionary military tactics. Declareuil asserts that “...Rome’s mission was war and her vocation law” (Declareuil 1926, p. 3). The Romans conquered, organized, and integrated foreign kingdoms within its hegemonic web of *jus gentium* with the strength of the Roman army to suppress seditions and rebellion throughout its vast empire. Kagan states, “Although Cicero emphasizes the defense of allies and honor as the causes of Rome’s many wars and the roots of its power, he reminds us that its ‘wars were fought on behalf of allies or for empire (de imperio)’ and that ‘our ancestors took up arms not only to be free but also to rule’” (Cicero, *De officiis* 2.26; Cicero, *Philippics* 8.12; cf., Kagan 1995, p. 242). The Roman military was known for its ambition to conquer and its disciplined military ranks. Josephus reiterated this fact that Roman military discipline, superior tactics and stratagem, and thus “valor” and “not the bare gift of fortune”, attained such a vast dominion (Josephus, *The war of the Jews*, 3.5.1-8). Both the Republic and Imperial Rome solidified their authority by subjugating kingdoms and integrating their diversified resources to effectively administer the empire and enlist the cooperation of conquered nations to provide manpower to fight their wars and secure the borders. However, Rome was steeped in legal and sacral traditions as well. It was economically counterproductive to destroy everything in its path to hegemonic dominance. Economic power is the fundamental requisite to military might and geopolitical dominance (Niebuhr 1932, pp. 7, 15, 210). War was the instrument by which Rome procured raw resources and slave power to manage its empire. The Roman war tradition was intertwined with sacred rituals, and legal ramifications to justify a formal declaration of war. The concept *bellum iustum* “just war” had its origins in pagan Rome (Grafton, Most & Settis 2010, pp. 972, 974). The Romans maintained two distinct forms of warfare: *bellum*, warfare conducted against a recognized state; *guerra*, a form of warfare waged against nomadic and plundering tribes. Worley clarifies the ‘just war’ concept: “if two states were to coexist peacefully after war, then war should be subject to rules. Without these rules, only a perpetual cycle of retribution was possible. These pragmatic concerns did not apply to stateless, lawless tribes invading Europe from the Asian steppe” (Worley 2003, p. viii). Rome was the center of civilization in a violent world in which the strong imposed their will and authority upon the weak; yet Roman law and tradition enhanced a multi-national compliance throughout its empire unforeseen in ancient times (Metzger 1965, pp. 30, 31). Roman law was the adhesive that united the multicultural empire, and the Roman military solidified republican and imperial authority and power throughout its vast domain. It is within this framework that Rome developed regulations that validated recourse for war in order to justify its claim to unify Italy and eventually its hegemonic ambitions.

The ancient Romans adhered to the principle of *casus belli* “just cause” to justify and participate in war and Vegetius’ *Epitoma rei militaris* reiteration on military tactics are crucial elements in understanding Augustine’s just war moral theory. Ancient Roman leadership averred the moral high ground in warfare, thus “embracing the rhetoric of *iusta causa* as being the basis of Roman moral and military superiority” (Bederman 2001, p. 222). The Roman Republic legitimized its rights to warfare by sacral and legal mandates. However, Rome, like the empires before her, was subject to the temptations

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1 Reinhold Niebuhr states: “The chief difference between the agrarian civilizations, which lasted from the rise of ancient Babylon and Egypt to the fall of European feudalism, and the commercial of industrial civilizations of today is that in the former the military power is primary, and in the latter it has become secondary, to economic power.” Niebuhr also reiterates that “political power has been made more responsible to economic power” (Niebuhr 1932, p. 7).
that plague unrestrained power and status – the arrogance of power, national pride and moral apathy. These attributes rescinded traditional Roman virtues, eventually deprecating the innate sense of justice. The battle of Adrianople (378 AD) was a major setback to the mindset of Roman military invincibility and prestige. As barbaric hoards infiltrated the empire, hegemonic boundaries collapsed. Alarmed by these setbacks, which weakened faith in Roman power and authority; Vegetius attempted to reinvigorate military tradition and tactics. It is within this milieu that Augustine is recognized as a theologian with an innate sense of moral realism about the nature of man and warfare. Augustine’s delineation on sin and the nature of man is the dividing line between Roman just war theory and the Christian just war tradition. In order to clarify Augustine’s position on just war, it is contrasted to Vegetius’ observations on Roman warfare tactics and tradition. In fact, military science and practice between 5th century Imperial Rome and the Holy Roman Empire in the High Middle Ages were similar to Roman tactical stratagem espoused by Vegetius. It is interesting to note that Vegetius’ writings on warfare were finally replaced by Carl von Clausewitz’s work *On war*, which updated warfare tactics and stratagem due to the advent of gunpowder and advances in the military sciences. Within this context, moral theorists such as Grotius and Ramsey, systematized or adapted Augustine’s views on just war to their respective socio-political paradigms. The subsequent additions to the just war tradition has enhanced, rather than outmoded Augustinian thought on warfare. Augustine identifies the human agent as the all-encompassing nucleus (the force for good or evil) in society, rather than law, governing institutions or the state, which ultimately deteriorates by its intrinsic link to the innate disposition of the human act.

There is a demarcation, a definitive line in relation to the science, purposes, and motivations of warfare. How wars are fought, why wars are fought, in contrast to the just cause requisites for war are often convoluted before, during and after hostilities. The ancient and contemporary philosophic communities have endeavored throughout history to thwart organized violence. Nonetheless, war is an extension of political objectives intertwined with aggressive distrust and skepticism analogous to the nation state environment. The underlying current of human nature, human interaction and individual and collective competition among the consort of nations that succumbs to war is repeated in every era. The science of war is spurred on by the aggressive technologic mandate to develop deadlier weaponry. This has warranted moral legal codifications to thwart unjustifiable bloodshed during war throughout history. The history of war, the unavoidable clash amongst the heavenly and earthly cities, requires the cooperative efforts of leaders, statesmen, diplomats, foreign policy specialists and ethicists to pursue solutions that restrain, or deter the cyclic nature of war.

3.2 The Greco-Roman War Tradition

Ancient warfare was inseparably interconnected to sacred and social traditions, economic necessity and tribal identification. Throughout the process of civilization war has affected a vital role in sustaining authority and leadership, group cohesiveness and survival. The birth of military science is a progressive prerequisite to assure national security throughout the history of mankind. The great monumental Greek epic the *Iliad* symbolized the significance of heroic warfare, an oral tradition stemming from the Mycenaean period and the Dark Ages (1200 – 800 BC) written in the contemporary setting of the eighth century poet Homer (Sage 1996, p. 1). The *Iliad* is more than an exposition on early Greek culture; it is an opportunity to analyze the warfare tradition; the heroic warrior code of mortal combat (Homer 2008, 16.310-320), the use of missile weapons (Homer 2008, 13.520-530; 20.280-290), the utilization of heralds (Homer 2008, 2.460-490), and the social caste of a budding civilization (Homer 2008, 2.188-206). The *Iliad* illustrated the dominant status of the warrior cult. Greek culture stressed that the importance of individual military “success was the key area in which to achieve standing among a noble’s peers” and during the Hellenistic era “success in warfare was still the crucial element in legitimizing political power and remained the most important royal activity” (Sage 1996, p. xi). Warfare was a dominant activity among the Greek city-states. Michael Sage states that the “basic motivation for alliances in the Greek world always remained military security”, which in most cases was “directed
towards specific military objectives” (Sage 1996, p. 66). This was especially true in regards to the two superpowers, Athens and Sparta, which vied for Hellenic supremacy. The centrality of warfare in Greek civilization and tradition was intertwined with formal declarations, symbolic acts and sacred ritual. The constancy of Greek warfare finally ceased when Rome conquered and instilled the *jus gentium* that secured peace among the competitive city-states.

The Roman just war tradition has been primarily credited to Cicero and is foundational to Augustine’s moral thought, which is witnessed by his affinity to this great Roman senatorial statesman. However, long before Cicero, Plato supported centralized authority, “the state” to wage war (Plato, *Laws* XII, 112, a/b), and non-combatant requisites to protect the civilian population during an outbreak of hostilities (Plato, *Republic*, V, 471 a/b). Nonetheless, Plato was a realist recognizing that “the state must be organized for violent survival in an unruly world” (Edwards 1972, p. 64), where fear, distrust, geopolitical competition and unbridled power were the model in ancient international relations. The Greco-Roman warfare tradition was an admixture of sacred and legal requisites to justify a declaration of war. However, the Greco-Roman war traditions varied philosophically and politically. The Greek city-state system constantly challenged the peaceful resolve between the Delian League, led by Athens and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta. The unity of the Greek city-states following the defeat of Persia slowly deteriorated as economic competition and fragile alliances between lesser significant city-states undermined a precarious relationship between the two superpowers. Throughout the history of Greece economic competition, socio-political tensions, violence and war between the various factions stipulated the ritual and legal services of the *θῆξπμ*, a “herald”, “whose duty was to make public proclamations” (Arndt & Gingrich 1957, p. 432 n1).

The Greeks contracted the services of heralds to facilitate diplomatic relations prior to war, stipulate redress for grievances/damages prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to authorize the declaration of war, select the site of battle, and declare truces and peace treaties (Bederman 2001, pp. 227-229). The services of heralds were not always solicited. Throughout the history of Greece, intense competition for commercial trade routes escalated trade wars among the Argo-Saronic Islands of Greece in the Saronic Gulf (Hasebroek 1965, pp. 97, 98). Thus, in the 5th century, Ægina, a city-state just 17 miles (27 km) from Athens disregarded the protocol of redress and avoided a formal announcement of war in order to launch a surprise attack against her Athenian commercial rival (Bederman 2001, p. 228). The diplomatic duties of the herald were complicated by the delicate city-state system, which maintained a sensitive balance of power between Athens and Sparta. David Bederman suggests that the “key characteristic of ancient Greek international relations was the sheer number of polities and the many combinations in which they were formed for the purpose of offense and defense, and of hegemonic and balance-of-power diplomacy” (Bederman 2001, p. 214). In a remote corner of Greece conflict between the two-neutral city-states of Corcyra and Epidamnus agitated distrust, hatred and ultimately hegemonic ambition that escalated into the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Civil war broke out in 436 BC between democratic and aristocratic factions in Epidamnus. The displaced and ousted aristocracy immediately formed an alliance with the non-Greek Illyrians with an immediate counter attack on their native city. The democratic faction petitioned Corcyra for assistance, but heretofore Corcyra adhered to a strict policy of neutrality among the Greek states and determined to avoid involvement in the regional conflict. The democratic faction then turned to Corinth for support, and offered to become a colony of Corinth in return for their assistance. The Corinthians accepted the terms of agreement, but a history of enmity, distrust and war existed between Corinth and Corcyra, which only aggravated further hostilities. Corinth dispatched soldiers and aid to assist Epidamnus; the Corcyraeans responded by sending forty battleships and provisions demanding Epidamnus to surrender the city-state to the aristocratic faction – the battle lines were drawn. The Corcyraeans’ appeal for arbitration was countered by a declaration of war. Thucydides referenced the

1 Kenneth Waltz states: “Thus among the Greek and Italian city-states and among the European nation-states, any state threatening to outstrip the others in power could expect that an attempt would be made to check-it. And this was the case not because they enjoyed the process of checking each other, but because for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival” (Waltz 1970, p. 210).
function of the herald: “Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals . . . the Corinthians sent a herald before them to declare war . . . the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to sail against them . . . On the return of the herald without peaceful answers for the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet the enemy” (Thucydides i.29). The Corcyraeans won the battle, but lost their political autonomy, because it was an isolated autonomous city-state without the protective hegemonic umbrella of either Athens or Sparta. The Corcyraeans underestimated the Corinthian city-state’s ambition for revenge and overlooked Corinth’s alliance to Sparta and the Peloponnesian league.

The break-away Corinthian colony of Corcyra illustrates the point of the fragile relationship among the city-states. The diplomatic maneuverings of Athens to eventually defend Corcyra while upholding the terms of peace with the Peloponnesian league (primarily Corinth and Sparta) exacerbated tensions with Corinth that endeavored to provoke war without a herald (Thucydides i.53). However, in the Hellenic war tradition it was essential to avoid any legal allegations of initiating hostilities. In “Greek morality” in which the formalistic “appearance of aggression in international relations was to be avoided . . . there was a legal concern associated with being the party that actually declared the war” (Bederman 2001, p. 214). While the incident in the harbor of Sybota, wherein the Corinthians tried to agitate a conflict with Athens, which amounted to ‘saber rattling’, illustrated the political friction that characterized ancient disputes among the city-states. However, it was not until the formal cessation and disintegration of relations between Athens and Sparta, that Thucydides noted that “the starting point of the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians [was when] they no longer made contacts without heralds” (Thucydides ii.1). From the Greek epic *The Iliad* honoring the cultic hero to the Peloponnesian war, heralds performed specified duties related to organized warfare in Greek society.

Even though Greek polity was complicated by the city-state system throughout the Aegean, a common religion and language were the unifying elements that enabled communication, covenants, truces and peace treaties. The fragmented Greek city-state system developed offensive and defensive alliances, but never established commercial or civil international laws to regulate the sensitive balance of power. This state of affairs enhanced a volatile exchange between competing city-states. The utilization of ambassadorial services and heralds was an ancient custom to alleviate the strains of international relations, which were eventually formulated and upgraded by the Roman *fetial* institution (Smith & Anthon 1857, p. 154) within the framework of *jus gentium* “the law of nations” and the Roman constitution. However, war was not a thoughtless exploit for the Hellenes – for the Greeks, the “norms of conduct in warfare” were formulated within the rational, philosophic and sacral mindset, an unwritten code referred to as the “law common to the Greeks” or “the [common] laws of mankind” delimited their just or unjust cause for war (Bederman 2001, p. 264; cf., Dawson 1996, pp. 55, 56).

Greek warfare policy stipulated identifiable rights to both parties: 1. The rights of the ἡγεμός the “alien” during times of peace and war. 2. Religious customs, sacred institutions and professional immunities conferred to diplomats and heralds. 3. The defeated armies could retrieve their dead for burial (the bodies were not to be mutilated). The retrieval of the dead by the defeated warring party was an official admission (through the services of a herald calling for a truce) as to who lost or won the contest (Sage 1996, p. 98), and 4. According to Greek custom prisoners were under the sole authority of the conqueror. The slaves could be retained, marketed or executed. However, among Greeks certain conditions guaranteed the humane treatment of prisoners in regards to: 1. The captured soldier could be ransomed for a fixed amount even though it was not obligatory for the victor to accept it. 2. The unconditional and voluntary surrender of a soldier annulled the death penalty, and 3. The conditional surrender if confirmed by an oath was to be respected and the pending status of the conquered would be resolved through negotiations between the two city-states (Greenidge 1896, pp. 46-48).

There was restraint in the Greek warfare tradition. The hoplite clashes were quick contests on a specified battlefield. Greek warfare was calculated to immediately settle disputes without suffering notable physical and economic damage. The retreating soldiers were rarely pursued and heralds witnessed the clash of arms (Manicas 1989, p. 27; cf., Sage 1996, pp. 94, 95). However, Michael Sage proposes that the “so-called ‘heraldless war’, which opened hostilities without observing the traditional preliminaries, was evidence of an intention to wage a total war that would lead to the extinction or total submission of
the losing side” (Sage 1996, p. x). This scenario was the exception to the rule. Ancient warfare culture adhered to the universal deployment of diplomats and their peculiar customary religious warfare traditions. The rise and fall of nations were determined in many cases by a single major battle. The Peloponnesian War altered the course of the classical Greek Hoplite warrior tradition – for the first time two ancient superpowers had the resources for a prolonged battle that redefined the ancient war tradition.

Today we are accustomed to nations remaining at war for years on end, wars that involve a number of battles. Such protracted wars were the exception in ancient times. The Roman war with Carthage is remembered in history precisely because it was a rare occurrence, lasting for 200 years and involving numerous land and sea battles. For the first time, a state demonstrated the ability to fight on and on, suffering horrendous losses while still retaining its political and military existence. The more normal occurrence in ancient times was for the fate of states to be settled in a single battle, with the victor gaining all of his military and political objectives and the [vanquished] losing his empire. Wars were not so much exercises in strategy as they were exercises in political and military decapitation (Gabriel & Metz 1991, p. 82).

Athenian naval power changed the course of strategic land warfare and challenged the revered, traditional Spartan culture and Hoplite tactics, which dominated the imagination in both ancient and modern folklore (Rawson 1991, p. 1). The Peloponnesian War revolutionized the diversity and complexity of warfare stratagem and tactics. The traditional head-on-clash of Hoplite warfare was outmoded and replaced by more sophisticated tactics. The recruitment of mercenaries, more highly trained professional soldiers, was enlisted on a large-scale basis. The effective deployment of heavy and light armored soldiers on the battlefield revolutionized pitch battle strategy. The import of naval power and the traditional seasonal war engagement superseded by yearlong campaigns were the sure results of the desperate clash between the two superpowers in the Aegean (Sage 1996, pp. xix-xxiv). Even though the Spartans eventually prevailed by exposing the limitation of Athenian dependence upon naval power, the Peloponnesian war stratagems and tactics were a precursor to advanced ancient warfare. Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) deliberated on the complications of war and the shortcomings of the traditional hoplite phalanx in the late fourth century. Military assets now consisted of a navy, cavalry, light infantry and a siege train (Aristotle, Politics, 6.7, 7.6, 7.11); walled cities were obsolete as the legendary Macedonian army dismantled the polis – the political and authoritative center of classical Greece (Dawson 1996, p. 105). The Greeks safeguarded the city-state tradition; however, the polis, the center of democratic tradition, was limited by “wars of expansion, including those aimed at empire” (Manicas 1989, p. 28). The Greek city-state system was not a stable, unifying form of governance that enhanced political and social unity. The Hoplite tradition was synonymous to a ‘weekend warrior’ fighting for freedom and glory; defending the rights of the polis in an ever-changing alliance of checks and balances. However, the Peloponnesian war altered the course of history because it altered the course of military science.

The application of a progressive military science on the battlefield has been mentioned as decisive factors in the rise and fall of empires. The intensity and consistency of major conflicts

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1 Elizabeth Rawson states: “For over two and a half millennia politicians and philosophers, in the light of their own needs and convictions, have regarded now one aspect and now another of Sparta as significant. From almost the dawn of Greek history enormous prestige surrounded her, and this was exploited to recommend the most desperate virtues and institutions; the occasional reactions are correspondingly obsessive. Only Rome, sometimes as republic and sometimes as empire, has exerted greater attraction; influence cannot be measured, and is a word to avoid.” (Rawson 1991, p. 1).

2 Donye Dawson states: “If the Greeks were losing faith in their ability to control warfare by the time of Aristotle, the best explanation would appear to be that warfare was in fact becoming uncontrollable. The decisive change came around the middle of the fourth century, when the new sleegcraft, added to the already formidable armies of Macedon, put an end to the self-sufficiency of the city-state and removed the forum that had cultivated the unique political culture of classical Greece” (Dawson 1996, p. 105).
revolutionized the face of ancient warfare. From the Spartan Hoplite phalanx, to Athenian naval operations, and the “Macedonian legacy of integration and diversity of force” – the Roman military inculcated and adapted the innovative stratagems and tactics of its predecessors into the most flexible, feared and effective ancient military tradition (Parker 1995, pp. 32-49). However, the Roman republican tradition intertwined its formidable military power with a *casus belli* ‘just cause’ mandates to thwart the aggressive nature of state power and ambition.

### 3.3 Ancient Roman Just War and Casus Belli “Just Cause”

Unlike the Greek city-state system, the Roman Republic had a customary methodical religious process intertwined with the Roman understanding of the legal restraints for warfare to validate the *casus belli* “just cause” for war against another state. Marcus Tullius Cicero stated: “no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted, or warning has been given and a formal declaration is made” (Cicero, *De officiis*, I.11.34-36). Roman redress for war included: 1. Insults directed against Roman ambassadors; 2. Breaches of treatise; 3. A Confederate’s defection to an enemy state; 4. Attacking a state that is protected by a covenant stipulating Rome’s protection; 5. Deceit was also another cause for war, and 6. Self-defense of Republic/Imperial national security interests. (Bederman 2001, pp. 224-226). Naturally the ideal was minimized by the realities of geopolitical ambition; nonetheless, the “Romans clearly valued the moral high ground that a proper *casus belli* granted them. They regarded it as a signal feature of their international relations and what made them special as a State” (Bederman 2001, p. 226). When Rome had a grievance against another state a *rerum repetitio* “demand for satisfaction” was stipulated to the representing assemblies. Public representatives known as *ius fetiale* or college of Roman priests were specifically entrusted with Roman foreign relations. The *fetiales* directed the standards of redress, formal declarations of war, formal ratifications for peace, and the observance of sacral forms related to the aforementioned warfare procedures, as it related to the hostilities between Rome and an opposing nation (Watson 1993, pp. 1-3).

The recourse for declaring war was a meticulous legal and sacral procedure. Four *fetiales* were chosen to represent the Senate and the Rome citizenry. One team member, was designated the *pater patratus populi Romani* to direct the negotiation process. The *fetiales* in the early Republic were referred to as “peacemakers” as their initial function stipulated remedies to prevent war between the Latin states, but this role radically changed because of Roman hegemonic ambition. The chief negotiator clothed in official sacral garb traveled to the border of the hostile nation or tribe offering a prayer to Jupiter, vindicating the justness of the course of action to declare war. The *fetiales* then crossed the border and replicated his stipulations to the first indigenous warrior representative. This procedure was repeated a third time as the principal negotiator stipulated redress to a citizen at the gate of the respective civic center. Finally a fourth protest was extended to the chief magistrate and the constituency. If a satisfactory response was not returned within thirty days, the *pater patratus* would publically announce the decision before the local leaders and residents, explicate the precarious results, then accompanied by his colleagues return to Rome. The *pater patratus* would then explain the case before the Senate and the people. If the Senate and the people decided for war, the *pater patratus* would return to the border of the hostile state and launch a spear charred at the blade point tipped in blood, symbolic of the fire and slaughter of warfare (Smith & Anthon 1857, pp. 153,154; cf., Bederman 2001, pp. 232-240; Watson 1993, pp. 1-9). As Rome expanded its territory, the *fetiale* ritual was modified to meet the demands of Roman warfare. In the “early third century BCE when Rome began to fight *bella transmarina*, wars across the seas” (Kingsbury & Straumann 2010, p. 37) the impractical process of an overseas *fetiale* ritual was superseded by a symbolic gesture, which “required a prisoner of war to purchase land at Rome, so as to create a plot of nationally hostile territory; and henceforth they threw the spear into it” (Kingsbury & Straumann 2010, p. 37). While war in ancient Rome was a contest of power and might, the legal and sacral formalities for war were required to justify redress and assure Roman success in its hegemonic conquest. However, the nature of Roman warfare dramatically changed between the Republican and Imperial eras. This change related to a vast Empire that necessitated a strong military force to secure and maintain Roman assets.
Rome during the Republic was an “aggressive and militaristic state” (Rich & Shipley 1993, p. 261). However, the Republican army was a citizen’s militia dedicated to the state, whereas the imperial military lauded as the first modern professional army, was more dedicated to the personality of its leaders than the state (Neiberg 2001, p. 12). Octavian signified the dividing line between the two eras of Roman military tradition. During his reign, reforms were implemented, such as fiscal stability for the army, retirement allowances, and terms and conditions of service. Military service was not a citizen’s duty but a lifelong career (Alston 1995, pp. 1-3). These reforms were “still recognizable three centuries later and elements of the Augustan military system can be perceived in the armies of the Christian emperors of the fourth century” (Alston 1995, p. 4). At what point then, were redress and the declaration of war an excuse for further conquests? The Roman military was a formidable force that refused defeat. The nobility of *casus belli* was hindered by greed, power and glory. Adrian Goldsworthy states that the Roman mindset during the Republic contributed to its success in war — a “Roman war could only end when the enemy ceased to be a threat, having either been absorbed as a subordinate ally or destroyed as a political entity” (Goldsworthy 2007, pp. 92, 93). The Romans were never willing to concede defeat until victory was assured. However, John Rich points out the unethical egoism of some commanders in the second century BCE who instigated “wars without provocation out of desire for booty and/or a triumph” (Rich & Shipley 1993, p. 57). Nonetheless, Senatorial authority was able to check the sporadic abuses of power during the Republican era. The Republican army fought for glory and the state. The Imperial army took an oath of allegiance to the emperor during the *Principate*, rather than the senate or the people of Rome (Goldsworthy 2007, p. 123). Eventually, the demise of centralized imperial power and economic failure (money economy to a barter system) on the one hand, eventually challenged dictatorial imperial power on the other, during the *Dominate* era to the commander in the field who was able to secure better conditions and afford an army (Delbrück 1990, pp. 210-217). The ensuing civil wars, which neglected borders and imposed economic burdens, eventually imploded the empire. At some point the *casus belli* for war was a legal and religious formality that was overshadowed by internal strife and a declining warfare tradition.

The ancient Roman *casus belli*, ‘just cause’ for war, is a complex assessment. It necessitates a critical examination of the shifting authoritative power structures to declare war from the Republican representative tradition contrasted to Imperial self-rule. The rise and prestige of the Roman Republic (510 B.C. – 27 B.C.) was eventually undercut by social chaos and civil war. After the third Punic war in 146 B.C., Rome was economically and politically dominant. However, the last century of the Roman Republic was dominated by civil war rather than foreign conquests. With little threat to Roman hegemony, a prolonged peace provoked a new era of moral laxity, greed and crime (Dawson 1996, pp. 161-162). Political dissensions among the prominent families aggravated internal conflict and eventually civil war (Dawson 1996, pp. 160-161). Julius Caesar’s brilliant military and political leadership solidified the quest for power. From 60 to 50 B.C., Caesar formed political alliances with Marcus Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus referred to as the *First Triumvirate* or an extra legal agreement, which was an unofficial coalition that collapsed after the untimely death of Crassus (53 B.C.) in the battle of Carrhae. Immediately, a civil war ensued in 49 B.C. from which Caesar emerged as the undisputed authority of the Empire. Caesar centralized power and assumed the title *dictator perpetuo*, “dictator in perpetuity”, an honorific deification. This declaration, unprecedented in the Roman Republican tradition, culminated in his assassination by a factious Senate hoping to reinstate Republicanism. Julius Caesar initiated the transition from Republic to Imperial power. The Republican constitution was in effect suspended with unconditional decision-making powers usurped by Caesar, which aggravated a conspiracy in the senate of which “twenty of the sixty conspirators (not Cicero)” were unit by Marcus Junius Brutus to eliminate

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1 Michael Neiberg states: “Despite all the similarities to Greek warfare, the Romans differed from the Greeks in their understanding of leadership. Greek leaders understood themselves to be ‘first among equals’, usually equipped and treated just like their men. By contrast, Roman generals in the empire period became so powerful that their men often swore oaths of loyalty to them personally. Generals like Julius Caesar turned their armies into virtual empires as large as Rome’s, which counted 60,000,000 by 1 AD. When the generals fought amongst themselves, however, the system could and did, devolve into civil warfare” (Neiberg 2001, p. 12).
the Roman despot. Caesar’s mandate for unprecedented dictatorial state powers, the tactless and inaccessible demeanor to senatorial representatives, and the claim to godlike honors that were antithetical to the Roman republican tradition provoked the assassination (The Encyclopedia Britannica, 1967, vol. 4, pp. 573-577). Octavian (the great-nephew whom Julius Caesar adopted to be his political heir), learned the lesson from Caesar’s unbridled display of power and concealed the outward demonstrations of authority under the guise of constitutional Republican reform, but the Roman Republic concern for a stable social order forfeited its representative traditions and vested Octavian with full powers as Augustus, “the revered one”. The Augustan era was a glorious manifestation of wise decision-making that stabilized governance, staved corruption and maintained civil order. Augustus was “continuously at the forefront of affairs (since Julius Caesar’s murder) for 58 years and sole ruler of Rome for the last 45” (Borkowski 1997, p. 15). It was during the Principate era initiated by Augustus, the ‘first emperor’, which set the stage for Rome’s unprecedented zenith of prestige and power. It was also during this era we witness the gradual digression from a representative government to the eventual rubber-stamping of Caesar’s objectives and ambitions through administrative and legal enactments. During the Republic the respective assemblies and particularly the Senate influenced legal and civil polity, but during the imperial era the Emperor, by virtue of his special powers, influenced the content of law. In the second century A.D., a new legal construct referred to as the cognitio extraordinaria, granted the Emperor autonomous civil and legal powers over criminal cases, thus superseding the traditionally established juridical process. The Imperial power also influenced the judicial process of let opinions, limiting the jurist process for opinions by granting leading senators the ius respondendi or conferred legal authority on behalf of the Emperor on all official matters of law. This was not to infer that the Roman juridical process was totally usurped by state power, but an illustration of the autonomous powers of the Emperor in all phases of civic life (Tellegen-Couperus 1993, pp. 83, 84, 97). The cult of Emperor Worship interconnected with unprecedented and indisputable legal, military and administrative authority, which prepared the way for the Dominate era enacted by Diocletian (244 – 311 A.D.).

It was during the Dominate that the Emperor seized complete legal control of judicial powers, religion, the military and governance. The cyclical misadventure of civil war, economic depression and socio-political unrest plagued the empire. Diocletian initiated three reforms: 1. Seizing political control by removing all military leaders from civil office, confining the army to a strictly military role. Diocletian recognized that whoever controlled the military essentially controlled the seat of power. The last remnants of the Republic were discarded; in essence the emperor was the law incarnate. 2. Dividing the empire into two parts, the Eastern Empire (which his predecessor Constantine established at Constantinople) and the Western Empire at Rome. The administrative challenges had become too complicated and the empire too vast for the emperor. Diocletian delegated the West to a trusted colleague, while taking charge of the East, which enhanced its geopolitical significance. Diocletian and Maximus appointed junior partners to be their successors, developed the Tetrarchy or the rule of four Emperors having their respective sphere of responsibility, but ultimately reporting to Diocletian, who had definitive decision-making powers, to stimulate economic and political reforms, and 3. The Emperor reverted to centralized economic power, state-control of arms factories; farm laborers and small independent landholders were confined to farming for the state, as well as currency reform to check inflation and wage freezes on specified goods to stabilize the economy. The economic crisis, which witnessed constant food shortages and high taxes, were directly related to military commitments throughout the empire. Eventually, Diocletian and Constantine secured the borders of the empire from barbaric tribes, stabilized the economy in a country that was weakened by fifty years of anarchy and economic recession. The military victories were decisive, breathing new life into a dying empire (Borkowski 1997, pp. 18, 19).

When Diocletian retired, the Tetrarchy disintegrated and civil war ensued in the Western Empire between Maxentius and Constantine. In 312 Constantine defeated Maxentius at Saxa Rubra, about nine miles northwest of Rome. The drowning of Maxentius in a desperate attempt to escape over the Milvian Bridge (Ponte Molle) concluded Constantine’s triumph on October 28, 312 (Hastings 1951, vol. 4, pp. 77, 78). Constantine attributed his victory to divine power (Jackson 1908, pp. 250, 251; cf., Eusebius, The life of Constantine, XL). His victory in 312 secured the emperorship in the West and in 324, after defeating
his rival in the East, Constantine consolidated power as the undisputed Emperor of Rome. The two remarkable features concerning Constantine’s reign were the establishment of Constantinople as the capital of the Eastern Empire and the legalization of Christianity. It is one of the pronounced ironies and paradigm shifts of ancient history. The utility of Roman law and centrality of Imperial power that mercilessly slaughtered Christians suddenly provided freedom of worship to a minority religious sect, which eventually dominated the religious and geopolitical landscape of western civilization. Diocletian, the ‘great organizer’, and Constantine, the ‘great liberator’, solidified social, economic and political stability to a decaying empire. After Constantine’s death in 337, the army decided that succession rights should be limited to Constantine’s three sons (Pohlsander 1996, p. 77). Possible rivals were eliminated. Hans A. Pohlsander makes reference to a ‘bloody coup’ eliminating possible rivals vying for the throne, whereas, David S. Potter categorically claims “murder of their kin” after the empire was divided between the three sons of Constantine (Potter 2004, p. 462).

The three siblings and respective entourages vied for power in the never-ending saga of treachery and deceit. In 340 Constantius led his army in Constan’s territory, purportedly to assist his brother Constantius during the Persian campaign. Constan claimed such actions as an act of war, ambushing and killing Constantinus outside of Aquileia (Sextus Aurelius Victor, pp. 41.21). Whatever the tensions between the older (Constantinus) and youngest (Constan) siblings, the empire was now divided into two parts until Constan in 350, was assassinated “in the thirteenth year of his reign as an Augustus” at the age of twenty-seven by the usurper Magnentius (Sextus Aurelius Victor, pp. 41.22-23). Constantius (350 – 361) refused to share imperial power with Magnentius as a co-ruler of the empire. Seeking revenge for his brother’s death, Constantius’s army defeated Magnentius in the battle of Mursa Major. This defeat precipitated Magnentius’s suicide.

The empire was too vast for one man to administer. As a result, Constantius promoted two of his cousins to the subordinate rank of Caesar. The eldest surviving son of Constantius’ half-uncle, Constantius Gallus, was elevated to the rank of Caesar in 351, but was executed three years later (Marcellinus 1862, p. XIV.XI). Constantius in 355 promoted his last surviving cousin, Gallus’s younger half-brother Julian, to the post of Caesar in the western provinces. Julian proved to be a capable leader. His popularity among the Gallic legions undermined Constantius’s authority, and extended Julian the title of Augustus. Constantius sent envoys to deter Julian’s ambition by encouraging him to submit to the designated support role of Caesar. Julian’s claim of Augustus initiated war between the two factions. By 361 Constantius prepared for battle to break the power of the Gallic legions in another civil war. Ironically, en route to dethrone the usurper Julian, Constantius succumbed to a fatal illness, named Julian his rightful successor, was baptized and died of fever on November 3, 361. Paul K. Davis states that as soon as Constantine’s sons died, they were “followed not by blood relations but by generals from their armies” (Davis 1999, p. 83). Julian, the last of the Constantian dynasty (not direct lineage), was also the last non-Christian emperor of the first Christian era. Julian reverted to the ancient Roman pagan practices, which proffered the acronym ‘Julian the Apostate’. Flavius Claudius Julianus Augustus (355 – 363) was mortally wounded during a battle against the Sassanid Empire on June 26, 363. Immediately after his death, Jovian (363 – 364), a career soldier or a primicerius domesticorum “lieutenant in the corps of the imperial guards” was declared emperor by his soldiers. Jovian reestablished Christianity as the official religion of the Empire ending the brief revival of paganism under Julian. However, Jovian suffered a humiliating defeat by the Sassanid Empire that disgraced Rome. The brief reign of eight months (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXV, I-X. X.15; cf., Lenski 2002, pp. 14-19) was superseded by Valentinian I (364 – 375), who agreed to co-rule with his brother Valens. Valentinian I administered the Western empire, while his brother Valens administered the Eastern Empire (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXVI. I-V). Fatefully, Procopius, a Celician maternal cousin of former emperor Julian, claimed his imperial birthright by bribing two legions assigned to Constantinople and seized the eastern imperial capital. When Procopius extended his control of Thrace and Bithynia to validate his authority as Augustus on September 28, 365, civil war broke out between the two competing eastern Roman Emperors. Procopius was defeated and executed by Valens May 27, 366 (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXVI. VII-IX). In order to solidify power Valentinian I and Valens incorporated a third co-ruler, Valentinian’s son Gratian, to secure
succession entitlements (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXVII.VI.11-15). While preparing for a campaign against the Quadi, a Germanic tribe that infiltrated Valentinian’s native province of Pannonia, the western emperor suffered a ruptured brain vessel and died November 17, 375 (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXVII.VI). Gratian, at the age of sixteen was the undisputed emperor of the western empire. The military at Pannonia required Gratian to inaugurate his younger half-brother Valentinian II, as co-emperor. Gratian administered the Gallic part of the western empire, while Italy, Illyria and Africa were administered by his younger brother and his step-mother Justina (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXX.X.1-6) In 378 Gratian’s uncle Valens was killed in the battle of Adrianople (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXXI.XIII.12.14-16). Both Gratian and Valentinian II were the sole heirs of a decaying empire. The death of their uncle left a vacancy that was filled by Theodosius I (379 – 395), the last emperor to rule over both the western and eastern halves of the Roman Empire.

It was within this framework that both Augustine and Vegetius wrote and lived, a time in which the Emperors usurped power through the support of the military. Ironically both Augustine and Vegetius reflected upon the Republican model in regards to ‘first moral principles’ (Cicero), and the military tradition of the Roman Republic. The gradual disintegration of the Pax Romana is a complex science; however, the tangible demise of ancient Rome was related to Roman military power that solicited and empowered the leading candidates’ desire for fame and glory, and the subsequent social chaos, national security breach and economic burdens of civil war. Adrian Goldsworthy points out that “Charismatic generals such as Sulla, Pompey and Caesar created armies far more loyal to their leaders than the state. This added an increasingly violent dimension to Rome’s competitive politics. The professional armies were as often set to fight against other legions as they were against the foreign enemies of Rome” (Goldsworthy 2007, p. 109). Lynn Montross states: the “years from 235 to 297 were given over to anarchy ruled by sword or dagger. Forty-six emperors or pretenders were slain or assassinated in strife that drew most of the legions away from their posts. With the border left undefended at vital points, the barbarians found an opportunity to add invasion to the horrors of civil war” (Montross 1944, p. 87). The effect of civil unrest and war throughout the history of Imperial Rome testified to the fragile socio-political environment of Vegetius and Augustine, and the subsequent reactions to the times in which these statesmen lived. It also elucidates their pragmatic insights into the necessity of a reexamination of military discipline and tactics and the amoral dilemmas of war in general and civil war in particular. However, the turning point in ancient warfare is often attributed to a decisive battle. Adrianople was such a battle that challenged Roman military superiority on the battlefield.

3.4 The Battle of Adrianople and Vegetius

The battle of Adrianople (378) exposed the myth of Roman invincibility. It enabled Germanic infiltration into the empire and eventually the sacking of Rome. The Roman army was responsible for civil discontent, a decaying economy, shattered borders and a faint recollection of Roman power and prestige. Adrianople was the culmination of a number of factors. There was friction between Valens, a battled hardened warrior, and nephew, Gratian, a mere teenager. There was faulty intelligence on the strength of the Germanic army and poor execution of military tactics prior to and during the battle. The sweltering weather conditions undermined the strength of the Roman army. And finally, the overconfidence of Roman tactical stratagem and superiority was another contributing factor. Rome had fought many wars against the barbaric hoards with consistent success. The Germanic victory was a psychological tour de force. Even though Gratian and Theodosius I briefly restrained barbaric infiltration, the stage was set for a major paradigm shift that would be instrumental in the development of the modern nation state system.

The Roman Empire was collapsing – both Gratian and his uncle Valens were preoccupied with internal and external factors that challenged national security. It is not so difficult to understand Valens’s disrespect and frustration for his nephew Gratian. Gratian, though a teenager, was both co-emperor and the undisputed authority of the western empire. The relationship between Gratian and Valens was fraught with distrust, suspicion, and fear of betrayal. Even though Gratian agreed to assist his uncle, he was
unable to arrive on time. Valens’s decision for battle was not an impulsive reaction of jealous rage to prove himself the better man, but a desperate situation: “Valens joined the battle without Gratian because Gratian simply took too long to arrive” (Lenski 2002, p. 365). Above all else, Adrianople demonstrated the inherent weakness of a dual-emperorship. The inability to rapidly deploy troop reinforcements to defend the eastern and western corridors from barbaric incursions exposed the limitation of a co-Augustan leadership platform. This dilemma was one of Augustine’s major assertions in regards to jus ad bellum that mandates singularity of authority to effectively confront the challenges to national security.

Another factor was failed intelligence. Valens was uninformed about the overall strength of the Germanic forces and heavily armed cavalry units estimated at 50,000, supposedly on a plundering expedition near the sight of battle (Davis 1999, p. 82). Delbrück proposes that it was reported that the Germanic army was only 10,000 men strong (Delbrück 1990, pp. 279, 280-281). Valens was assured of victory. However, the Germanic cavalry was the decisive element that turned the tide of battle in the favor of the barbaric forces at Adrianople and not only won a decisive victory but changed the course of military tactics. Roman armies had fought against Germanic hoards with great success even though outnumbered; however, Adrianople disclosed advanced military tactics of the Germanic army like the defensive laager, the dominate role of heavy cavalry as the main tactical thrust, and the ruse of a pillaging expedition that secured a decisive victory. Valens’ tactical collapse was complicated by undisciplined military tactical errors in the field of battle. The summer heat, improperly rationed soldiers and indecisive and unprepared leadership further complicated Valens’ preparations for battle (Spaulding, Nicherson & Wright 1937, pp. 253-254). As early as 379 Greek historian Libanius suggests that Valens’ generals were blamed for ill-advised decision-making leading to the disastrous consequences of the battle (Libanius, Orations, 24.3-5). Also, the Germanic tribes were better equipped than their predecessors. The Germanic leaders understood Roman warfare tactics and “thousands of their soldiers served as Roman mercenaries” (Fuller 1954, p. 268).

As the respective armies positioned for tactical advantage, Valens’s diplomatic mission was abruptly interrupted as light infantry, without orders, attacked the enemy wagon camp. This premature action triggered damaging tactical inaccuracies among infantry and cavalry units trying to coordinate tactical battle alignments. The Roman battle formations were caught off-guard. The cavalry was overwhelmed by the massive barbaric hoards and failed to support the infantry. Destruction and defeat followed. Marcellinus graphically depicts the scene:

2. Then the two lines dashed against each other, like the beaks (or rams) of ships, and thrusting with all their might, were tossed to and fro, like the waves of the sea. Our left wing had advanced actually up to the wagons, with the intent to push on still further if they were properly supported; but they were deserted by the rest of the cavalry, and so pressed upon by the superior numbers of the enemy, that they were overwhelmed and beaten down, like the ruin of a vast rampart. Presently our infantry also was left unsupported, while the different companies became so huddled together that a soldier could hardly draw his sword, or withdraw his hand after he had once stretched it out. And by this time such clouds of dust arose that it was scarcely possible to see the sky, which resounded with horrible cries; and in consequences, the darts, which were bearing death on every side, reached their mark, and fell with deadly effect, because no one could see them beforehand so as to guard against them. 3. But when the barbarians, rushing on with their enormous host, beat down our horses and men, and left no spot to which our ranks could fall back to deploy, while they were so closely packed that it was impossible to escape by forcing a way through them, our men at last began to despise death, and again took to their swords and slew all they encountered, while with mutual blows of battle-axes, helmets and breastplates were dashed in pieces, 4. Then, you might see the barbarians towering in his fierceness, hissing or shouting, fall with his legs pierced through, or his right hand cut off, sword and all, or his side transfixed, and still, in the last gasp of life, casting round him defiant glances. The plain was covered with carcasses, strewing the mutual ruin of the combatants; while the groans of the dying, or of men fearfully wounded, were intense, and caused great dismay all around. 5. Amidst all this great tumult and confusion our infantry were exhausted by toil and danger, till at last they had neither strength left to fight, nor spirits to plan anything; their spears were broken by the frequent collisions, so that they were forced to
content themselves with their drawn swords, which they thrust into the dense battalions of the enemy, disregarding their own safety, and seeing that every possibility of escape was cut off from them. 6. The ground, covered with streams of blood, made their feet slip, so that all that they endeavored to do was to sell their lives as dearly as possible; and with such vehemence did they resist their enemies who pressed on them, that some were even killed by their own weapons. At last one black pool of blood disfigured everything, and wherever the eye turned, it could see nothing but piled-up heaps of dead, and lifeless corpses trampled on without mercy. 7 – At last our columns were entirely beaten back by the overpowering weight of the barbarians, and so they took to disorderly flight, which is the only [recourse] in extremity, each man trying to save himself as well as he could (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXXI.XIII.2-7).

The empire was stunned; Adrianople exposed the weaknesses of Roman military tradition and tactics. Rome lost on that day her native sons: Valens with his generals Trajan and Sebastian perished. Thirty-five tribunes fell in battle, and many captains of battalions. The master of the horse and the high steward and a former Commander-in-Chief succumbed to the blood soaked fields of Adrianople. Two thirds of the army, about 40,000 men, perished as well (Marcellinus 1862, pp. XXXI.XIII.18-19).

There is a consensus among scholars that the battle of Adrianople altered military stratagem and tactics; heavy cavalry would be the dominant fighting force in Europe for the next thousand years (Davis 1999, p. 86). Oman and Beeler state that the “military importance of Adrianople was unmistakable; it was a victory of cavalry over infantry” (Oman & Beeler 1953, p. 4). The mobility of heavy cavalry units changed the course of warfare; however, superior numbers on the side of the Germanic tribes and failed intelligence and misplaced confidence in Roman military invincibility played a crucial role in the final outcome at Adrianople. The Republican legions were able to surmount the devastating setbacks of the battle of Cannae (216 BC); however, this was not the case at Adrianople. The defeat was so decisive that an empire was paralyzed with fear that barbarous hoards were capable of overwhelming a Roman army inside the empire’s frontiers (Eggenberger 1967, p. 5).

In retrospect the 3rd and 4th centuries witnessed the gradual enlistment and interdependence of barbaric tribesmen into the ranks of the Roman army as respective emperors endeavored to maintain their power and lives. The complications of collapsing borders led to a contraction of marketable goods and services (including slaves), which were symptoms of an economic regression that made it difficult to meet the hegemonic demands of the imperial empire. Economic necessity and Germanic tribal warfare tactics altered the size of military units and warfare stratagem. Both Diocletian and Constantine foresaw the necessity of reorganizing the military to meet this changing dynamic (Delbrück 1990, pp. 212-218). The gradual dependence upon Germanic tribesmen to secure national defenses eventually undermined Roman authority and military dominance as migrant forces acquired the craft of war from Rome and eventually utilized it to their advantage in the changing geopolitical paradigm of the 5th century. After Adrianople, Roman victories were interminably overshadowed by that devastating defeat. The Roman army under the direction of Theodosius I witnessed vast mobilizations of Germanic cavalry and infantry into its ranks as well as tactical shifts from infantry to cavalry as the main thrust of military force. Nonetheless, this tactical shift altered the identity, repute and emblematic invincibility of the famed Roman legions. It is within this setting that Vegetius reexamined military tradition, discipline and tactics.

3.5 The Impact of Vegetius on Military Tactics

The impact and longevity of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus’ Epitoma rei militaris, “Epitome of military science” from the 5th to the 19th century was finally superseded by Carl Von Clausewitz philosophical treatise On war (Dawson 1996, p. 162). Vegetius’ Epitoma is considered an academic treatise by some and a practicum on military tradition and tactics by others. In its time it was the “military Bible” (Spaulding, Nicherson, & Wright 1937, p. 419) and standard by which the educated soldier examined the art of war. In short, the Epitoma was read throughout the Middle Ages (Delbrück 1990, p. 203) and the Renaissance (Vegetius 1993, p. xiii) and has effectively influenced warfare tactics. The Epitoma was the only classical military treatise that maintained its popularity throughout the Middle Ages.
and the Renaissance until the advent of gunpowder and more technically advanced weaponry changed warfare tactics.

Vegetius was a civil bureaucrat, not a military strategist. The book was addressed to either Theodosius I (379 – 395), Valentinian II (375 – 392), Honorius (395 – 423) or Valentinian III (425 – 455). The only name that appears in authoritative sources in 12th century manuscripts is Theodosius I (Reeve 2004, p. viii); however, the dedication to the emperor in mind is still a debate in progress. Reeves points out that the debacle of Adrianople is a valid point of reference for Vegetius to “have urged a return to older policies of recruitment and older standards of equipment and training. For that reason and others, most historians favour a date in the 380s” (Vegetius 2004, pp. ix-x). Adrianople was the logical impetus, the catalyst that provoked Vegetius’ work, which resembled a compilation from Roman statesmen concerning the military science of war. Vegetius utilized the sources of Marcus Porcius Cato’s treatise De re militari (234 – 149 BC), Aulus Cornelius Celsus’s (25 BC – 50 AD) De medicina “on medicine”, Sextus Julius Frontinus’s (40 – 103 AD) treatise on Strategems, Paternus’s insights into military law and the constitutions of Augustus (63 BC – 14 AD), Trajan (53 – 117 AD) and Hadrian (76 – 138 AD) (Vegetius 2004, 1.8). Vegetius referenced the golden age of Roman military science, while acknowledging the Greek warrior cult and tactica, especially the Spartan discipline and fighting skills. However, Vegetius adamantly points out that “we ought to be inquiring after the military science of the Roman People, who extended their Empire from the smallest bounds almost to the regions of the sun and the end of the earth itself” (Vegetius 2004, pp. 1.8; III).

The early period of Roman warfare was perceived as a life and death struggle with no alternative for defeat, only victory. Goldsworthy points out that the early Roman warfare tradition during the Carthage and Hellenistic campaigns embraced the mindset that the “Romans fought to destroy the enemy army and end its capacity ever to fight again. . . . The Roman negotiating position was always the same: a demand for the other side to concede total defeat regardless of the current military situation” (Goldsworthy 2007, p. 81, 85). The Roman soldiers during the Republic were indigenous combatants who fought for glory and the state. Their inner quality to sustain a relentless pursuit for victory regardless the number of attempts to eventually defeat an enemy, enabled them to accomplish their ambition to unify Italy and embark upon their hegemonic conquest. The golden age of the legion was legendary for its severe discipline, constant training and mastering the craft of hand-to-hand combat. But the Roman legion was more than a tactical science; it was an attitude, a mindset that instilled confidence, courage, and a destiny with history. However discouraging the outcome of battle, the legions persisted until victory was assured; however glorious the victory the legions were inspired to fulfill their destiny of global conquest. In their view all their wars were ‘just wars’, because it was their destiny to civilize the world. Nonetheless the earthly kingdom is subject to the laws of nature, the inevitable rise and fall of empires (Dn 2). Economic breakdown, moral and political apathy, decentralized imperial authority, and the inescapable geopolitical shift enhanced by migrant barbaric tribes’ eventually unsettled Roman civilization. The failure at Adrianople was emblematic of a decaying and outmoded imperial system that was unable to adjust and recognize the social, economic, and geopolitical paradigm shifts that confronted the empire.

Adrianople altered the course of military history. Vegetius altered the course of military science. Instead of encouraging pitch battles, Vegetius cautioned for self-control, resolve and proposed a more defensive tactical advantage. The famous axiom, “He who desires peace, let him prepare for war. . . No one dares challenge or harm one who he realizes will win if he fights” (Vegetius 1993, p. 3, preface, 63. n3) is considered an ancient prelude to the modern theory of deterrence. Instead of overemphasizing the legendary legion and their famed infantry, Vegetius encouraged guerilla tactics as an optional stratagem prior to a pitched battle (Vegetius 1993, 3.9). Vegetius recognized the importance of the light and heavy cavalry as an essential tactical element in battle and in “Roman tactics as he describes them it is the cavalry who (in all normal cases) are called upon to deliver the decisive attack” (Vegetius 1993, 3.16; cf.,

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1 Vegetius’ most memorable phrase is vis pacem, parabellum “If you want peace, prepare war”. Scholars have utilized this phrase for either deterrence theory or pre-emptive strike (Vegetius 1993, p. 3, 63, n3).
Spaulding, Nicherson, & Wright 1937, p. 253). He also stressed the tactical advantage and importance of a functioning navy as well (Vegetius 1993, 4.31). The ability to adjust to advanced warfare tactics on the one hand, while supporting proven ancient Roman military discipline and tactics on the other, enabled *Epitoma rei militaris* the flexibility to adjust to the progressive demands of warfare until the nineteenth century. Delbrück states:

In Charlemagne’s time, the work was edited for the needs of the Frankish army. In the testament of a certain Count Everard de Frejus, from the time of Louis the Pious (837), the name Vegetius is mentioned. During the siege of the Château Gaillard, Gottfried Plantagenet had the works of Vegetius thoroughly examined, in order to find the best means of attack. There are no less than 150 copies in existence dating from the period between the tenth and fifteenth centuries. During the Renaissance, the book was reprinted time and again. The Austrian Field Marshal Prince von Ligne declared it to be a golden book; he wrote “Vegetius said that a god inspired the legion, and as for me, I find that a god inspired Vegetius” (Delbrück 1990, p. 203).

Vegetius’s influence on medieval warfare is “proved not only by testimonies that his book was the habitual reading of the educated soldiers of the time, but also by the many striking resemblances between his precepts and what they actually did” (Spaulding, Nicherson, & Wright 1937, p. 419). His delineations on military tactics were the undisputed standard. However, neither the early medieval era (476 – 1000) nor the High Middle Ages (1000 – 1300) witnessed any innovative weapons development or tactics that changed the course of history. The English longbow was utilized on the European mainland in the mid-fourteenth century during the *Hundred Years War*, particularly at the beginning of the conflict at the battles of Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) and the legendary battle of Agincourt (1415). Norman Housley affirms that in “terms of tactics and organization, the historian searches in vain for a ‘military revolution’ in this period [1200-1320]” (Keen 1999, p. 113). This explains Thomas Aquinas’s (1225 – 1274) systematic reproduction of Augustine’s *just war* principles and reaction to the canonists and ecclesiastical magistrates who believed that “in practice a just war and a public war meant the same thing” (Keen 1999, p. 122). Just and unjust warfare throughout the Middle Ages were also complicated by the distorted claims of secular and ecclesiastical authorization to declare war in the Holy Roman Empire. The High Middle Ages witnessed the reoccurring tensions of ethnic rivalries, dynastic claims to the seat of power, civil conflict, brutal treatment of noncombatants, which was “accepted as a natural concomitant of war”, destructive raiding parties for ill-gotten gain and glory as well as the call to holy war or crusades (Keen 1999, p. 122). Ironically, there was one Emperor and one Pontiff and one acknowledged interpretation of Christian faith; nevertheless, the “unrelenting bellicosity of Europe’s rulers exerted massive fiscal demands on their subjects; the ‘military state’ and ‘fiscal state’ were twins” (Keen 1999, pp. 134, 135). The canonists enacted the will of their magistrates, and the moral enquiry of ‘why’ wars were waged was overshadowed by the justification of nationalistic intolerance and princely entitlements. While there is no witness of a ‘tactical revolution’ in the High Middle Ages, a progressive demarcation of ethnic and princely alliances prompted heavy taxation, the necessity for organized armies to sustain the rights of kings/princes and their lieges.

This succinct summary contrasts the historical background of warfare to the development of the philosophic and moral principles of just war. The great works on warfare theory are never produced in an academic citadel removed from the mainstream of human social interaction. Both Vegetius and Augustine wrote during the fall of the Roman Empire. There is nothing more personal than to witness the moral and political demise of one’s nation. This context elucidates the social and political context in which Augustine provided revision of the Roman *casus belli* tradition.

### 3.6 Augustine and the Sages of Just War Moral Theory

The ancient Roman *casus belli* ‘just cause’ to declare war was eventually hindered by the natural inclinations for glory and power, decentralization of authority, and civil anarchy. Both the Republic and
Imperial authorities envisioned Rome’s destiny to rule and civilize the world. Unprecedented economic and military power often distorts right from wrong, factual from fictional realities, and legal from illegal actions in the international arena. Rome recognized that they could conquer the world, and so they did; meanwhile, moral sacral traditions to declare war were gradually superseded by a mere formality and arrogance of power that deemed Roman conquest as the only credible standard for civilized culture and international security. The decline of Rome correlates to the decline of military collaboration with centralized authority and the state. Vegetius’s *Epitoma* reiterated the science of Roman warfare, that ancient art of discipline and tactics intertwined with courage and honor that instilled fear in the enemies of Rome. Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* reiterated the imperfections and transient nature of the earthly kingdom. The earthly kingdom is subject to the law of human nature; the rise and fall of nations, the desire to conquer among the great and mighty of the earth and everything that this world embodies has a beginning and an end. There will always be calamities; warfare is a natural inclination of human interaction and must be balanced by common sense moral axioms to secure order amidst disorder. Augustine and Vegetius were contemporaries representing the autonomous relationships between moral enquiry and military science on the one hand and the interdependent equilibrium of *just war* moral theory and warfare stratagem on the other. It is impossible to separate the two concepts. A responsible military doctrine incorporates both moral and tactical delineations to offset misguided agendas, unwarranted violence, and decimated resources that would eventually undercut warfare effectiveness. Ancient and modern theorists have witnessed the horrific consequences of war because of the recognition that the Christian realist tradition is verifiable throughout ancient and modern history. Augustinian insights on *just war* have initiated a dialogue on the limitations of warfare and the necessity of moral tenets to maintain civil order in a competitive international system. However, it is important to emphasize the impact of the Roman just war tradition reiterated by Cicero and then reinterpreted by Augustine and subsequent theorists.

3.7 Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine and Aquinas on Just War

The ratification and advancement of Catholic Christianity as the official state religion since the 4th century established a theological and socio-political platform for the Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers. George Weigel points out that “Augustine broke decisively with the pacifism and antimilitarism of earlier church fathers such as Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius. In this fallen world, war is inevitable” (Weigel 1987, p. 29). This turn of events laid a foundation for ecclesiastical authority in both church and civil governance. Augustine provided the initial set of Christian principles regarding *just war* among the reputed Church Fathers. The insights have been the subject of debate and the standard by which Christian thought augments or criticizes the numerous applications pertaining to *just war* moral theory. Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant communities revert to Augustine, which testifies to the clarity of his theological principles, the depth of his brilliant arguments, and the conviction of logic amidst the harsh realities of his generation. However, the insights on just war were a fundamental reflection of the views of the statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero. While Augustine’s *The city of God* elucidates the ancient classical sages, those reputed prodigies of the arts and sciences, Cicero’s *Hortensius* was credited as inspiring the young Augustine to pursue wisdom and moral excellence (Augustine, *The confessions*, III.IV.7). Cicero is referred to no less than twenty times in *The city of God*, and his philosophic reflections left a profound

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1 Augustine states: “In the ordinary course of study, I lighted upon a certain book of Cicero, whose language, though not his heart, almost all admire. This book of his contains an exhortation to philosophy, and is called *Hortensius*. This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned my prayers to Thyself, O Lord, and made me have other hopes and desires. Worthless suddenly became every vain hope to me; and, with an incredible warmth of heart, I yearned for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise that I might return to Thee” (Augustine, *The confessions*, III.IV.7).
impression on Augustinian moral political thought (Brown 1967, pp. 36, 57, 299-300). Nonetheless, Augustine’s just war formulation is examined within the heavenly and earthly kingdoms paradigm. His understanding of the earthly kingdom as it relates to the function of the state is an instrument of God to fulfill the divine purpose in an amoral and brutish world. In essence the heavenly kingdom benefits from the earthly peace in the course of its pilgrimage. George Weigel states:

Unlike later Catholic theorists, notably St. Thomas Aquinas, Augustine did not conceive the state as a “natural” institution, an expression of innate human sociability. Rather, the state exists because of man’s weakened nature after the Fall. The state is a necessary institution because without it the reign of evil in the world would be unfettered. Yet the state is itself problematic, given the fallen nature of its citizens; the sins of those who inhabit the earthly City (Weigel 1987, p. 28).

Cicero, like Plato and Aristotle lauded ‘the state’ as the epitome of civic responsibility and honor, and its preservation as the indispensable basis for the moral and physical wellbeing of civilization. Cicero stated: “But when a state is destroyed, obliterated, annihilated, it is as if (to compare great things with small) this whole world perished and collapsed” (Augustine, The city of God, xxii.6; cf., Cicero, De re publica III. xxiii). The ‘State’, according to Cicero, was the center of life – the arbiter of justice and truth; the authority of law and order; the power of security and safety, and the consummation of civilization – Rome. Cicero idolized the Republic State system and lamented the demise of constitutional Republicanism (Cicero, De officiis, LXI). As Roman statesman Cicero understood the limitations of political power, the contests for control and the unjustifiable nature of war and conquest. Cicero also witnessed the destructive and horrific nature of civil war and its destabilizing effects on traditional casus belli. Cicero recognized that the Roman casus belli functioned responsibly in a representative Republican tradition, rather than a Roman state that centered military power and allegiance to a single enigmatic personality. The connecting link between Cicero and Augustine is intriguing. Both witnessed the subversive consequences of civil war (cf., Taylor 1916, p. 85). Both witnessed the fragile and inadequate nature of despotic leadership. Both criticized the deplorable dependence of the state on military power, and both witnessed the demise of their respective political paradigms. John M. Mattox points out that “Augustine’s admiration for Cicero as a just-war thinker is evidenced by the fact that it is to Augustine that we owe credit for the preservation of many of Cicero’s statements on just war” (Mattox 2006, p. 14). This inseparable link was a testimony of the importance of the casus belli tradition. Cicero reiterated a current, yet fading military/state tradition, whereas Augustine reproduced a discarded military/state tradition. Cicero extolled Roman governance and hegemonic destiny, whereas Augustine understood the importance of a stable earthly order while maintaining a realistic appraisal of the conflicts among state powers, human egoism and the unavoidability of war in the international order. The historical context of Cicero’s statements in light of the demise of Roman republicanism demonstrated the socio-political corollaries that Augustine experienced in his lifetime, particularly the contests for imperial power and civil war. Ultimately, for Augustine, the issue at hand was the relationship of war and violence to ecclesiastical authority and church policy.

Cicero stressed that the “rights of war must be strictly observed” (Cicero, De officiis, I.XI) and restated that just war suppositions should stipulate: 1. That the Roman state “declares war” for national defense, as well as its “honor”, a punitive action of revenge to maintain hegemonic security against an

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2 Cicero states: “In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we should still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all” (Cicero, De officiis, I/XI).
enemy that desecrated covenants and treatise (Cicero, *De re publica*, III.X xiii; cf., Augustine, *The city of God*, XXII. 6). 2. The only recourse for war is when the negotiation process fails to obtain the desired resolution (Cicero, *De officiis*, I.XI.34). War is only approved after all options have been deliberated. War is not a means unto itself, but rather serviceable for peace. 3. The purpose of war is to “live in peace unharmed” (Cicero, *De officiis*, I.XI. 35). The ultimate rationale for war is societal peace. It is a social catalyst for maintaining civic stability. 4. The sacral “fetial code of the Roman people” should be strictly unharmed (Cicero).

3.8 Cicero and Jus Ad Bellum

Just Cause: According to Mattox, the connecting link between Cicero and Augustine is a state’s right to declare war “in defense of its honor or its safety” (Cicero, *De re publica* III. xxii; Augustine, *The city of God* XXII.6). This Ciceronian specification deems that a situation that could justify a declaration for war is also a “strong presumption against war” (Mattox 2006, p. 15). Cicero expands the just war premises to incorporate punitive action or “revenge” (Cicero, *De re publica* III. xxiii) and also those “wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation” (Cicero, *De re publica* III. xxiii). Cicero’s
adherence of “honor” or “revenge” falls into the traditional *casus belli* in defense of Rome’s allies, or declaration of war against a confederate that defrauded a previously ratified treaty or covenant. In light of Rome’s zeal for law it is conceivable to understand the overt inclination for revenge and war when defrauded by an ally. Cicero further elaborates that “There are two kinds of injustice—the one, on part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who, when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being afflicted” (Cicero, *De officiis* VII. xxiii). Rome’s commitment to defend her allies, according to Cicero, attributed to its hegemonic expansion. “[O]ur people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole world” (Cicero, *De re publica* III. xxiii).

Comparative Justice: Cicero customarily adhered to a motive of national purity. Mattox points out that war fought for the honor and the glory of Rome was not categorically unjust. However, wars for honor or glory were less noble or just than wars fought for revenge in behalf of the state. Cicero states: “But when a war is fought out for supremacy and when glory is the object of war, it must still not fail to start from the same motives which I said a moment ago were the only righteous ground for going to war. But those wars which have glory for their end must be carried on with less bitterness” (Cicero, *De officiis* I.xi.38). There are nuances of motive; contrasting honor, revenge and glory with a less vindictive (bitter) spirit in battle. Cicero condemns the ruthless and deceptive nature of war, not the war of conquest itself. In contrast Mattox points out that Augustine condemned “national honor” and “personal glory” in war, which are decisive factors as to ‘why’ wars frequently occur (Mattox 2006, p.16).

Right Intention: Cicero recognized the utility of war for hegemonic expansion and denounced unwarranted greed, unbridled power and ruthless bloodshed. However, “supremacy” or hegemonic conquest and individual glory must be held-in-check by the *casus belli*. As long as personal glory did not interfere with state objectives, Cicero associated glory as a virtue of valor on the battlefield. At this point Cicero and Augustine clash in regards to national/interpersonal motivations for war. Mattox states, “For Augustine, motivation is absolutely fundamental in assessing the justice of a nation’s participation in war” (Mattox 2006, p. 16). Incontrovertibly, ‘right intension’ is a central theme in Augustine’s *jus ad bellum* formulation; whereas, for Cicero conquest and glory are synonymous terms within the *casus belli* tradition, as long as the desired result is “to live in peace unharmed” (Cicero, *De officiis* I.xi.35). Even though Cicero and Augustine concur on just war as a defensive strategy, there is disagreement as to ‘what’ constitutes a right motive for war in other philosophic categories. Nonetheless, Cicero reiterates that a secured peace by deception is an incompatible element in the *casus belli* tradition.

Public Declaration and Last Resort: Cicero adheres to the traditional *casus belli* reiterating the essential demand for redress followed by an official declaration for war. His formulation for just war is within the prescribed Roman Republican tradition of military law. Cicero states: as for “war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code of Roman People under all the guarantees of religion . . . . that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been given and a formal declaration made” (Cicero, *De officiis* Lxi.36). The fetial code was regarded by the Republic as an essential aspect of Roman morality in warfare. The process of civil war witnessed by Cicero threatened this tradition because of the loyalty of the military to the figurehead of Rome rather than the will of the people comprising the state. Mattox points out that ‘public declaration’ and ‘last resort’ are inseparably linked, this has influenced both classical and neoclassical thought on designated authority to declare and initiate war.

Peace as the Ultimate Objective of War: Cicero asserted that the “only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed” (Cicero, *De officiis* I.xi.35). The overriding principle for war is civic order and stability. Cicero understood Rome’s contribution of civic peace in a cruel and violent world. Roman law and military power were inseparable linked to sustain a stable national and international order. Mattox reiterates that Augustine “repeatedly will state that peace is the ultimate aim of war, although he will allow for the utter destruction of an enemy in certain very specific circumstances” (Mattox 2006, p. 17). This theme is tantamount in regards to further deliberations on peace and social responsibility among sovereign powers. While nations and tribes were absorbed into the Roman Empire through the enactments of *jus gentium*, which lauded the republican state as the center of civilized order, Augustine understood the state as the protector of social order, rather than a means unto itself, and that

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3.9 Cicero and Jus In Bello

Proportionality: Mattox reiterates Cicero’s and Augustine’s agreement of thought that justice in war is unjust unless “limitations are placed upon the manner in which they are fought. . . . the fact that one state is wronged by its enemies does not justify the aggrieved state’s committing unconstrained acts of violence against its enemies” (Mattox 2006, p. 17). Cicero stated that “there is a limit to retribution and to punishment. . . . that the aggressor should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in order that he may not repeat the offence and that others may be deterred from doing wrong” (Cicero, De officiis I.xi.33). The Roman legions were renowned for their uncompromising and brutal campaigns. War was a matter of life, and defeat was unacceptable. The Roman civil wars added a different dimension to the psychological nuance of violence and conflict in the empire. Cicero encouraged restraint in the face of civil military rivalries and loathed this reckless digression of warfare.

Discrimination: Cicero and Augustine adhered to the principle of rights accorded to nations and especially soldiers that initiated cessation of hostilities and surrendered their arms. Cicero asserted, “when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been bloodthirsty and barbarous in their warfare. . . Not only should we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms” (Cicero, De officiis I.xi.35). Cicero emphasized that a “man who is not legally a soldier has no right to fight” (Cicero, De officiis I.xi.37). Roman soldiers were required to take an oath of allegiance to their respective military unit before engaging in battle. Mattox points out that Augustine adopted this premise “arguing that citizens, when acting as agents of the state – as for example, a law enforcement officer, executioner, or soldier – can engage in activities, such as the deliberate taking of life, which would be utterly illegal and immoral if they committed the acts in a private capacity” (Mattox 2006, p. 18). Both Cicero and eventually Augustine recognized that legally binding restraints upon the military started with the basic unit – the soldier.

Good Faith: Cicero advocated the necessity of honoring treaties and covenants ratified with an enemy state and their soldiers and maintained that it is honorable to comply with the demands of a treaty and circumvent all forms of deception to gain unfair advantage on the battlefield. Cicero stated, “In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit to guile” (Cicero, De officiis I.xi.35). Dishonest advantages through ruses and fabricated treaties were incompatible elements of just war such injustices through subtle legal loopholes provoked the adage “More law, less justice” (Cicero, De officiis I.x.33). Cicero detested fractured state relationships and recognized the essential binding advantages of compliance to the spirit of the law. Mattox states that “Augustine shares with Cicero this emphasis on the importance of intent as it applies to maintaining good faith with the enemy. Both he and Cicero are able to look beyond legalistic technicalities. However, Augustine is willing to allow the propriety of deliberately deceptive practices in warfare in a way that Cicero seems to refuse to countenance” (Mattox 2006, p. 18).

Cicero’s just war formula was an admixture of the traditional casus belli and a reaction to the realities of a political system and military tradition that was deteriorating under the guise of Republican reform. Cicero was eloquent, determined and honorable. Like the apostle Paul, Cicero was willing to confront the vicissitudes of life that challenged and endangered civic stability. His upright demeanor amidst the threats of loss and death illustrates the eternal law of grace written upon the hearts of those who do not know God but show that “the righteous requirements of the law are written on their hearts” (Rm 2:14-15). Cicero’s honored life and depth of logicality enlightened Augustine of Hippo to deal with the unavoidable consequences of war in the earthly city. The intricate link between these giants of scholastic and real-world experience is the binding force of their integrity and uprightness to delineate the transparencies of truth regardless the cost – “while slander may blacken the reputation, it cannot stain the
character” (White 1955, p. 32). Augustine modified Cicero’s *casus belli* precepts in a Christian framework to meet the demands of the newly recognized state religion – Christianity.

### 3.10 Ambrose and *Jus Ad Bellum*

Ambrose recognized the socio-political dilemmas that confronted the Church. The exposure to his father’s administrative career and personal experiences in law as well as related administrative duties as Governor of a province in Northern Italy, disclosed to Ambrose those civil issues that challenged traditional Christian thought. War and the consequent civil disorders were all too common in the empire. His observations on war enlightened by magisterial exposure and real-world experience enhanced a radical and practical application on warfare and church policy. Ambrose was influenced by Cicero’s just war reflections, even though the “hallmarks of just-war discourse are more perspicuous in Cicero than they are in Ambrose” (Mattox 2006, p. 19). Nonetheless, Ambrose articulated three dimensions concerning warfare that would later influence Augustinian *jus ad bellum* moral theory.

Ambrose applied Old Testament principles in order to reinforce the *casus belli* tradition illustrated in the life of King David (1040 – 970 B.C.). The dividing line between just and unjust war, was that just war is the equilibrium between fortitude and justice; whereas, “fortitude without justice is the source of wickedness” or unjust wars (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXXV.176). King David, the defender of Israel, illustrated the principle of godly fortitude in war because: 1. King David “never waged war unless he was driven to it. Thus prudence was combined in him with fortitude in the battle”. 2. King David never engaged in “war without seeking counsel of the Lord”, and 3. His many victories “in all wars” were attributed to the willingness from beginning to the end of his kingship to fight the enemies of Israel regardless the cost to his personal safety (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXXV. 177). Douglass P. Lackey points out that Ambrose believed that the preservation of the empire justified war. His reliance on the more militant Old Testament texts justifying war for the defense of the Roman empire controverted the Sermon on the Mount, wherein Jesus Christ declared, “Do not resist an evil person, If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Mt 5: 39). However, Augustine later on resolved this tension that what is mentioned here is not a “bodily ostentation, but a preparation of the heart” or inward disposition. (Augustine, *The gospel of John*, Tractate CXIII. XVIII. 4; cf., Lackey 1984, p. 14). War was inevitable because of the nature of the earthly kingdom. Ambrose rationalized that defense against the barbaric tribes was justified in order to preserve the Christian faith and maintain civic stability (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXVII. 129). Also, Ambrose opened an additional dimension on just war regarding the restraint and authorization of self-defense, which gravely limited personal self-defense, contrasted to the credence for war to defend the empire and asserted that “I do not think that a Christian, a wise and just man, ought to save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbor” (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, III. IV.27). Ambrose established a principle forbidding violence in personal self-defense while validating violence in defense of the empire. The demarcation between individual self-control in life-threatening situations and corporate killing in war is a major theme in Augustine’s just war delineations. Finally, Ambrose nebulously alludes to civic and inner peace. Ambrose succinctly delineates between David’s exploits and the peace of Jerusalem contrasted to the true peace that is the fruitage of the indwelling Christ (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXIV. 114; III. XXX. 155). There is a definitive distinction between authorized participants in war contrasted to the spiritual character of the clergy. Ambrose stated, “But the thought of warlike matters seems to be foreign to the duty of our office, for we have our thoughts fixed more on the duty of the soul than on that of the body; nor is it our business to look to arms, but rather to the affairs of peace” (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXXV. 175). Peace is a primary theme in Augustine. George Weigel emphasizes that *Tranquillitas ordinis* “the peace of public order in dynamic political community” is the eventual objective of the Augustinian just war doctrine (Weigel 1987, pp. 26-31). Ambrose would depart from the traditional mindset of the early church fathers, which provided a more progressive viewpoint on church policy and warfare.
3.11 Ambrose and Jus In Bello

Ambrose also reflected upon the limitations of power and violence in war and was in a unique position to have served in both high ranking secular and sacred administrative responsibilities. This exposure added insight to the arguments on war, which necessitated a civic response because of the revolutionary paradigm of Christianity as the newly appointed State religion. John M. Mattox points out three dimensions in Ambrose pertaining to *jus in bello* requisites that challenged traditional Christian thought. ‘Proportionality’: Ambrose depended heavily on the Old Testament to support his views on defensive war to preserve the Christian empire. Ambrose alluded to Joshua son of Nun, Gideon, Jonathan and the Maccabees (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XL. 205-208). Ambrose was fascinated by the faith, courage and steadfastness of the Maccabean revolt against King Antiochus and pointed out that warfare in the earthly city should preserve justice. The armies of Israel during the Old Testament and Inter-Testament eras sustained civic, social and moral order. However, violence has limitations and Ambrose was predisposed to mercy and compassion against an enemy. Ambrose also referenced the example of the prophet Elisha (Elijah’s replacement) in II Kings 6: 15-23: when pursued by a foreign power, which God delivered into his hand, the inquiry of the king of Israel was “Shall I kill them” and Elisha responded “Do not kill them” and “Would you kill men you have captured with your own sword or bow? Set food and water before them so that they may eat and drink and then go back to their master”. Ambrose suggested that “it was seemly to spare an enemy and to grant his life to an adversary when indeed he could have taken it, had he not spared it” (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, III. XIV.87). The Bishop of Milan reiterated that ‘pastoral duties’ are equivalent to peacemaking, which established an ecclesiastical policy prohibiting clergy to take up arms.

Discrimination: Like his spiritual predecessors Ambrose prohibited cleric’s involvement in war. Ambrose stated that the “thought of warlike matters seems to be foreign to the duty of our office, for we have our thoughts fixed more on the duty of the soul than on that of the body; nor is it our business to look to arms, but rather to the affairs of peace” (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. III.175). In 385, in reaction to the emperor’s command to surrender the basilica of Milan and the subsequent take-over as imperial troops stormed the house of God, Ambrose countered, “I cannot surrender the basilica, but I may not fight” (Ambrose, *The letters of Saint Ambrose*, 20.19.22). The Ante-Nicene and Nicene/Post-Nicene fathers formulated an explicit distinction between pastoral and civic duties. As the church became more powerful in secular and religious matters, this biblical tradition was eventually compromised as the High Middle Ages witnessed the fabrications of holy war to foster ecclesiastical authority.

Good Faith: Finally Ambrose reiterated Cicero’s admonition to maintain covenants and promises with an enemy. The rules of engagement between opposing armies were to be respected regardless of the consequences. Ambrose stated, “how great a thing justice is can be gathered from the fact that there is no place, nor person, nor time, with which it has nothing to do. It must even be preserved in all dealings with enemies” (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. XXIX. 139; cf., Mattox 2006, pp. 22-23). While Ambrose consented to the civic and military tradition in regards to covenants and pledges made with an enemy, he perceived barbaric infiltration into the empire as a threat to church and state order.

The enemies of Cicero and the enemies that threatened 4th century Rome were different in nature, but the same principle regarding national security applied. The Roman Republican army was an offensive military force expanding the Empire, whereas the 4th century Roman army was in a defensive posture, witnessing the gradual collapse of long-established geopolitical boundaries. Nonetheless, both Imperial Rome and the Church perceived that the barbaric tribes were a threat to the civic and ecclesiastical infrastructure of the empire. Augustine inherited and reformulated the just war principles from the philosophic delineations of Cicero and his revered mentor Ambrose. The ecclesiastical leaders consented to the view that war is an unavoidable social occurrence in the earthly city; therefore, ethical norms are necessary to manage the science of warfare to maintain order and discipline in the civic order for the preservation of peace and the sanctity of life. Augustine would set forth intermittent moral principles throughout his writings to reinstate the just war tradition in western civilization.

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3.12 Augustine, Political Realism and Just War

As we examine the just war tradition, it should be recognized that Augustine functioned as a theologian not a social ethicist, military strategist or magistrate. The comments on war are brief, practical and dispersed throughout his voluminous writings. Like most of the church Fathers, Augustine’s time was devoted to opposing heresy and meeting the spiritual needs of the church community. However, Augustine could not separate himself from the world. War against the barbaric tribes and civil war between imperial military factions was an unavoidable reality, which required a calculated response.

The essence of war, the purpose of war, and the end results of war are an ancient and modern quagmire intertwined with a nation’s economic goals, socio-political ambitions and military doctrine within the overall grand strategic scheme. The challenge that confronted the Ante-Nicene Fathers (2nd and 3rd century Christianity) was preserving the moral innocence and theological purity of the infant church while maintaining a separation between church and state. Ancient Rome considered Christians an enemy of the state. Christians were utterly disgusted by polytheism and the pagan lifestyle. This resulted in brutal persecutions against the Christian community by Imperial Rome and ultimately disdain and distrust for the seat of power and authority of Rome. However, a gradual thaw and acceptance of Christianity as the state religion changed everything. The innocence of primitive Christianity was undercut by gnostic elements that infiltrated the church community. Paganism and heresy infiltrated the church; apostasy from the priest and layman challenged church authority. Augustine, after the dictates of Milan, imprudently capitulated to support civic intervention to preserve theological tradition from Donatist teachings and disruptive violence in order to safeguard the church. These actions, however, shifted the divine command from love your enemies to compel your enemies. History testifies that, when religious power digresses from the platform of ἀγάπε ―love‖, one of the fundamental rights of humanity, violence and persecution are the inevitable results. Augustine, like Cicero, wrote from a context of Empire. The empire was entangled in violence. The rise and fall of emperor and usurper heightened civic instability. Civil war among competing Imperial armies threatened secured borders. The Roman casus belli eventually was an excuse for military expansionism. Roman warfare had become a customary civic polity even among competing legions within the empire.

Augustine always considered war a sin. If war was inevitable it should be waged with sadness. On the one hand war was a judicial response against unjust aggression and on the other restoring peace, justice and social order. Augustine understood the brutalities of war and detested violence and never extolled warfare as an integral element of civic policy (Augustine, The city of God, 19.7). Augustine provided seven essential principles of just war within the context of jus ad bellum, “just cause for war”, jus in bello “justice in war” and jus post bellum “justice after war”, or the cessation of hostilities between opposing forces. This section examines Augustine’s expansion of the Roman casus belli that was eventually restated by Aquinas during the Holy Roman Empire and then adapted by the Reformers to meet the demands of a changing world order.

3.13 Augustine and Jus Ad Bellum

Just Cause: The Augustinian just war tradition was formulated within the cycle of social interaction: the house, the state, and the world. Each level manifests increased social friction. The world according to Augustine “is larger, so it is fuller of dangers”, and the foremost obstacle is “the differences of languages” which is compounded by imperial power to dominate other nations by imposing on “subjects nations not only her yoke, but her language” through the process of hegemonic expansion. Augustine summarizes this point by criticizing the cost of imperial unity – “how many great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed, have provided unity”. Augustine categorized two forms of organized violence resulting from this chain of social interaction in the earthly city: 1. War between nations; and 2. The horrid realities of civil war (Augustine, The city of God, 19.7).
Augustine recognized the escalating tensions in authority and power in the Roman household, the civic order and inter-state relations. The Roman household was the building block of Roman society – the state. State survival on the international relations level would naturally incite nation state hostilities and eventually war. Augustine’s realist paradigm recognized that tensions, hostilities and violence in the earthly city are the results of the natural man’s separation from God. Thus all wars are the result of sin; however, not all declarations to wage war are sinful. Augustine stated, “For it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to war, would still be matter of grief to man because it is man’s wrong doing” (Augustine, The city of God, 19. 12). Unlike the Roman tradition of glory and conquest in war, Augustine stipulated “grief” or “sadness” an essential element in warfare. The warrior cult is neutralized; war is a matter of necessity, rather than a means to an end. In Augustinian thought the requisites for just war are an all or nothing at all scenario. Each axiom is interlinked with equal force to invalidate one’s reckless abuse of power for personal glory. Augustinian just war tradition denounces war as an instrument of policymaking; rather, it confronts the social imbalances between contending forces in the hope to restore peace in the civic order. Unlike Cicero’s Roman Republic that conquered and sustained hegemonic dominance, Augustine’s Imperial Rome was declining; the concessions on just war compared to the traditional Roman casus belli were a reality-check in a changing socio-political paradigm. Rules on warfare change because of unforeseen complications that demand a major paradigm shift to preserve the socio-political order and in Augustine’s mind the religious order as well. The example of 9/11 illustrates the point when a society’s freedoms are threatened; concessions on personal freedom are sacrificed for the greater good of society. Within the context of empire, little has changed except the unwillingness to perceive that the earthly city is subject to major paradigm shifts when it is least expected.

There is a link, a coalescing component, uniting just cause with the objective intentions to wage war. Augustine counterbalanced the human dilemma pertaining to organized violence, which advocated war as a customary polity among contending forces for the sake of personal gain and does this by making reference to the sovereign that can recognize the clear purposes of God in war from selfish ambition and the deprecating brutalities that follow such a course of action. Like Moses, fighting battles on behalf of God to thwart wickedness and preserve righteousness in the earthly kingdom (Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, 22.74.78). Thus, just wars are fought by just sovereigns, who take it upon themselves to fulfill the purposes of God in times of peace and war. Augustine claimed that Christian sovereigns and soldiers could validate the objectives for organized warfare as long as the legal and inner requisites for justice are satisfied.

Right Intention: Augustine delineates upon the objective and subjective nature of just cause. The right motives for war controverted the Roman formalities of casus belli calling for redress, which at times was a legalistic pretext to justify warfare and extend the empire. Both Cicero and Augustine reiterated the significance of self-defense as a pretext to just cause. Augustine suggests as a “rule just wars are defined as those which avenge injuries, if some nation or state against whom one is waging war has neglected to punish a wrong committed by its citizens, or return something that was wrongfully taken” (Augustine, Questions on the Heptateuch, 6.10). The legalistic pretext for war in reference to “avenge injuries” or “return something that was wrongfully taken” is counterbalanced by inner motives – the actual rationale to declare war. The presumptions of earthly sovereignty are contrasted to obedience to the express will of God. The lust for power under the guise of peace is contrasted to the wisdom of men who through the dictates of conscious understand the appropriate time, force of action, and intensity of violence to attain a just victory in war. Augustine depicts the natural inclinations that undercut morality in war and asserts that the “real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and lust of power” (Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII.74). It is because of these things in disobedience to the will of God, that “some lawful authority, good men undertake wars” (Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, XXII. 74). The Roman Empire eventually imploded through contentious hostilities between imperial authority and aspirants to the throne of power. Throughout the history of Imperial Rome from the time of Cicero to Augustine the struggles between contending Roman nobility and eventually popular military leaders enhanced civic discord. The
subsequent division between the Eastern and Western Empires; the subsequent strains and distrust between respective imperial powers eventually invalidated the socio-political grand strategy that a unified Republic offered in the golden age of the empire. According to Augustine only a designated sovereign could declare war, thus justifying the unavoidable realities of bloodshed in organized warfare.

Designated Authority: Augustine stated that only a recognized governing authority is solely empowered and responsible to declare war. During the Roman Republic the recommendation from the fetial for redress was presented to the Senate and the people of Rome, who deliberated and decided the alternatives for war. During the Imperial Roman era the emperor eventually usurped full-powers to declare war. This was made possible by organizing a professional army that swore an oath of allegiance to the emperor, who controlled judicial powers in order to preserve imperial authority. The socio-political demise from the Principate era to the Dominate era is noteworthy.  Diocletian’s Tetrarchy formula, or ‘rule of four’, was unable to prevent the bloodlust for power among the leading candidates for emperor. The Roman governing mechanism was broken; civil war prevailed and the one empire, two capital, two emperor system was ill-equipped to confront the unrelenting demands of the declining empire. If there was a particular contributing factor that undermined the economic and political stability of Imperial Rome it was the demise of centralized authority to regulate the Roman military.

Augustine reiterated the conviction that God is the arbiter of justice in the earthly kingdom. Power is entrusted to humankind as a sacred trust from God. God has entrusted humanity within the auspices of sovereign authority – the declaration war (Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaeans, XXII.75). Augustine stated, “. . . for the natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and safety of the community” (Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichaeans, XXII.75). There is a reciprocal relationship between ‘just men’ managing ‘just governments’ fighting ‘just wars’ in order to safeguard peace in the earthly city (Augustine, Letters, CXXXVIII.14). It should be noted that ‘just sovereigns’ ruling nations does not negate the possibility of war. Augustine’s emphasis on ‘designated authority’ has a dual application; on the one hand it is the sovereign that can declare war, on the other it is within his vested authority to terminate the warfare process and manage terms for peace, and instill civic order.

Peace the Objective of War: The brutal hostilities even in a just war are counterbalanced by the objective for peace. Augustine formulates just war within the context of an unhindered pursuit of happiness, whereby the fruits of joy and peace are displayed in the interaction among nations. The ultimate objective of a just war is peace. The objective for peace should be a fundamental requisite, the preliminary consideration in the decision-making process. Augustine’s reflections on peace are a reciprocal formulation. It is a diplomatic action to negate hostilities between nations. Augustine maintained that “it is a higher glory still to stay war itself with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war” (Augustine, Letters, CCXXIX.2). This exhortation to statecraft and diplomatic resolution to avert war was emphasized by Augustine toward the end of his life and reveals the noble fruits of righteousness that one would expect from a church leader. Nonetheless, diplomatic solutions are often overlooked when nations go to war. The objective for peace or its modern counterpart, an “exit military strategy”, is a fundamental element in Augustinian thought. Augustine suggested “it is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war” (Augustine, The city of God, XIX.12). The termination of warfare hostilities and a negotiated peace is a social mandate in Augustinian thought. Augustine does not outline diplomatic solutions; however, it must be remembered that The city of God was a response to the sacking of Rome by the Goths, an unfamiliar predicament for the greatest military power unable to defend Roman territory. The question is a working definition of Augustinian ‘terms for peace’. Is the historicity of these statements a defensive posturing, corresponding to Vegetius’ defensive rhetoric: “He, who desires peace, let him prepare for war. . . . No one dares challenge or harm one who he realizes will win if he fights”? (Vegetius 1993, p. 3, preface). It is a credible supposition that Augustine sanctioned Roman military efforts against the barbaric tribes as a casus belli, while denouncing barbaric infiltrations into the empire.

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that disrupted and threatened the civic order as unjust (Bainton 1960, p. 99). Either just or unjust wars, Augustine condemned the reckless disregard for life. Augustine’s primary focus in regards to the earthly kingdom is the rejuvenation of peace after war and the restoration of civic order, the subsequent results of a legitimate just war cause.

Augustine’s explanation on just cause, inner character/motivation and authorized war powers is rational, synergetic and a realistic solution to maintain civic order in the earthly city. Augustine concedes that the state though limited by the natural order, can establish a relative peace through a just sovereign that acknowledges the lordship of God and recognizes that war is an instrument of justice to punish the evil-doer, rather than an expansionistic policy. Peace is the inseparable link between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum requisites, which synchronize the moral, legal and political preconditions for a flourishing community. The ultimate liability to peace is war and war is the ultimate liability to the civic order. These concepts are antithetical elements in Augustinian thought. The realistic appraisal of the human condition defamed warfare as a primary solution to resolve conflict. The restoration of peace in the civic order was an Augustinian mandate, an inseparable component of his jus ad bellum delineations. It is interesting to note the interdependent nature of the just war moral theory. Augustine incorporated jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles as a holistic interpretation of the just war tradition, which provided a definitive understanding as to ‘why’ and wars are fought contrasted to ‘how’ wars are fought.

3.14 Augustine and Jus In Bello

Vegetius reiterated the tactical science of war that once inspired ancient Rome to unparalleled heights of international dominance. Military science is an analysis of tactical advantage between two hostile forces vying for geopolitical dominance. Tactical advantage is a combination of tactics/stratagem, weapons technology and psychological resilience. The Roman soldiers were fearless in battle and defied death. Rome was determined to conquer its enemies regardless the cost. Bloodshed—the chaos of mortal combat and the ultimate rewards for victory were esteemed by this aggressive civilization. The ancient Romans were masters of the art of war. However, Roman conquest and dominance were a faint recollection, a historic reflection written upon the annals of antiquity by the time Augustine incorporated his views on just war. Both Vegetius and Augustine witnessed the demise of the empire. Vegetius expounded upon those ancient credos of warfare that propelled a small city-state to an illustrious empire. However, Augustine’s Christian viewpoint denounced the deification and habitual continuity of war in Roman society. Vegetius adapted Roman warfare tradition to the 4th century tactics witnessed after Adrianople. Augustine adapted Cicero’s casus belli “just cause” to justify Christian participation and church polity to the socio-political realities of war in the earthly city. There is a definitive line between these two traditions, how to win a battle or the art of conquest, contrasted to how a battle is fought with the least amount of casualties. This ‘definitive line’, however, is often blurred in the ‘fog of war’. Augustine’s jus in bello “justice in war” is a minimalist theory, a necessary restraint in battle to circumvent needless casualties and unwarranted brutality in war.

Proportionality: War was detestable to Augustine, who considered it a sin, an inseparable link to the earthly city. However, war was unavoidable; it must be waged with genuine sorrow, not in a spirit of revenge. Warfare required moral axioms to minimize casualties on the battlefield, but it is also an instrument of God to curve injustice and evil and restore justice. In order to restrain evil and restore peace in the civil order, a just sovereign is designated to wage war until victory is secured. Augustine stated: “Let necessity, therefore, and not your will, slay the enemy who fights against you” (Augustine, Letters, 189.6). It is necessary to wage war to the extent of victory, avoid revenge and senseless slaughter (Augustine, Letters, 93.8). John Mattox points out that “Augustine may well be the first figure in the just-war tradition to offer a version of what is now known as ‘the doctrine of military necessity’: that armies can justly take such violent actions as may be necessary to accomplish their assigned task, consistent with the aim of restoring peace and order” (Mattox 2006, p. 61). Augustine delineates between the necessity of taking life in war to restore peace and civic order contrasted to excessive and malicious slaughter. The Augustinian minimalist approach on the restraints of warfare is foundational to the doctrine of jus in bello
and has been ratified, redefined and supplemented in the Geneva Protocols of 1949 (cf., UK Ministry of Defence 2004, pp. 2.6.2, 5.33.2, 16.44). The compulsion of over-kill in war, and the complexities of military necessity require restraints to safeguard combatants and noncombatants.

Discrimination: Augustine specified the moral parameters of the soldier authorized by the state to protect the civic order, a general admonition to noncombatants, and specified the responsibilities of the clergy in times of war. Augustine developed important perspectives regarding combatant and noncombatant duties during war. After the official recognition of Christianity throughout the empire, the church fathers faced numerous moral issues regarding church policy and warfare. Could a professed Christian fight and kill on behalf of the state and maintain his salvation status with God? The New Testament proclaimed a gospel of love and peace. Jesus Christ asserted that the children of God are πεινηνσοι “peacemakers” (Mt 5:9), dispensing the love of God to a dark and foreboding world. Augustine recognized that ‘killing to defend’, represented a spiritual paradox, which contradicted the gospel of Christ. Augustine pointed out that the directive to love is an inner disposition. In fact a “soldier who kills the enemy is acting as an agent of the law, so he can easily perform his duty without inordinate desire” (Augustine, *On free choice of the will*, 8). There is, according to Augustine a classification of killing that is not a ‘sinful action’ such as when a “soldier kills the enemy, when a judge or his representative puts a criminal to death, or when a weapon accidentally slips out of someone’s hand without his willing or noticing it” (Augustine, *On free choice of the will*, 6, 7). War can be waged in genuine sorrow, not revenge; in defense of the state, rather than conquest, in order to maintain civic peace. The soldier is obligated to obey the authority of either just or unjust sovereigns to defend the state; in fact this authority and “position makes obedience a duty” (Augustine, *Reply to Faustus the Manichaeans*, XXII.75). However, a soldier cannot act outside the parameter of designated authority to take a life or indiscriminately dispense justice (Augustine, *The city of God*, I.6), and must perform the duties “according to the commission lawfully given him, and in the manner becoming of his office” (Augustine, *Letters*, 47.5). There is a nuance in Augustine that it is almost a treasonous act if a soldier refuses this duty to defend the state when societal harmony and the civic order are threatened (Augustine, *The city of God*, I.6). The empire and the barbaric tribes could not coexist. It was the responsibility of both the sovereign and the soldier to protect the religious and secular order from imminent invasion. While the public order was under obligation to administer justice to maintain civic order, noncombatants and the clergy were prohibited from engaging in violent conflicts.

According to Augustine, a citizen participating in a public trust on behalf of the state, such as a soldier, law enforcement officer, or executioner can deliberately take life, while such actions in a private capacity would be considered illegal and a ruthless act. In fact, Augustine indicated that a Christian should not retaliate against violent or potential life threatening situations. The Sermon on the Mount, according to Augustine, articulated the maxim “resist not evil, to avert taking pleasure in revenge, in which the mind is gratified by the sufferings of others, but not to make us neglect the duty of retraining men from sin” (Augustine, *Letters*, 47.5). Augustine also asserted that “killing others in order to defend one’s own life, I do not approve of this, unless one happens to be a soldier or a public functionary acting, not for himself, but in defense of others or of the city in which he resides” (Augustine, *Letters*, 47.5). The noncombatant’s only recourse, if possible, during a conflict was to either flee from the theater of violence to a temporary secured area or hope that an enemy would not kill the noncombatant populace. Mattox points out that “Augustine’s jus in bello doctrine does not provide anything approaching a list of rules either for identifying or, once identified, for safeguarding non-combatants. Nevertheless, Augustine unambiguously advocates that a spirit of mercy and forbearance should be displayed towards all those who fall into the power of their enemies” (Mattox 2006, p. 63). The barbaric invasion of Rome in 410 illustrates the point. The Goths extended mercy to the Christian populace that took refuge in Christian basilicas (Augustine, *The city of God*, I.4, 10). This was an exception to the rule. Noncombatants are the victims of war and according to Augustine the clergy are the spiritual guardians of their constituency in times of peace and war.

Building upon Ambrose’s admonition that clerics are prohibited to bear arms and participate in war (Ambrose, *Duties of the clergy*, I. III.175), Augustine adds another dimension in reference to the
barbaric invasions within the boundaries of the empire. Augustine recognized the precarious nature of war, its threat to Christian autonomy and the subsequent persecution of the clergy. The general populace had two options during war, either flee to a secured area or reside in the theater of violence at their own risk. If the clergy are endangered then it is permissible to flee (Mt 10:23), provided that the clergy do not avoid their pastoral duty to attend to the spiritual needs of the church in the theater of conflict. Augustine stated: “When any of them [ministers] is specially sought for by persecutors, let him by all means flee from the city to another, provided that the Church is not hereby deserted, but that others who are not specially sought after remain to supply spiritual food to their fellow-servants, whom they know to be unable otherwise to maintain spiritual life” (Augustine, *Letters*, 228.2). However, if bishop, minister and laity are alike threatened then “let not those who depend upon the aid of others be deserted by those on whom they depend. . . . either let all remove together to fortified places, or let those who must remain be not deserted by those through whom in things pertaining to the Church their necessities must be provided for” (Augustine, *Letters*, 228.2). Augustine safeguards the spiritual relationship between clergy and laity by clarifying their responsibility toward each other during war. The occupational designation of a soldier clarifies the difference between combatants from noncombatants. The essential factor between the two classes is the legal utilization of force to defend the existing order contrasted to the spiritual preservation of the existing order, which nurtures civic virtue in the earthly city. In this way, the purity of the gospel is preserved in a world of compromise, deceit and bloodshed. Ultimately God in His infinite wisdom will reestablish justice and prevail over evil when the heavenly city supersedes the existing order.

Good Faith: Augustine adhered to the principle of honoring covenants, treaties and truces “when faith is pledged, it is to be kept even with the enemy against whom the war is waged” (Augustine, *Letters*, 189.6). However, Augustine justified ambushes as a legitimate military tactic provided that the war is just (Augustine, *Questions on the Heptateuch in Aquinas*, *Summa theologica*, Q40. Art.3). Augustine referred to Joshua 8: 1-2, in which God gave a direct command to Joshua to set an “ambush” against the city of Ai. The divine injunction, in Augustine’s mind, sanctions ambushes, which legitimize its practice in a just warfare scenario. While a just cause in war sanctioned ambushes as a viable military tactic, the practice of deceit under the façade of truth was condemned, a breach of honor between hostile forces. The paradox justifying ‘deceit’ in war is counterbalanced by a divine injunction on the one hand and the justice of one’s cause in war on the other. The moral challenge is the ‘just directive’ in war. At what point does a ruse or ambush cross the line of ‘good faith’ against an enemy in the heat of battle? Like the Trojan Horse, the history of ruses is a recurrent military practice. In Augustinian thought the validity of ruses are directly correlated to *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles. The Augustinian justification for deliberate deceptive acts in war has been reformulated in the Geneva Protocols of 1899 and 1949. (UK Ministry of Defence 2004, p. 5.17.1, n64).³

A renaissance highlighting Augustinian just war principles was initiated by Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274), a Dominican scholastic, who replicated traditional just war principles centuries later. Both Augustine and Aquinas wrote from a context of empire – the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire respectively. Augustine wrote from a perspective of a declining empire; whereas, Aquinas wrote from a perspective of unprecedented ecclesiastical authority and power in both the secular and ecclesiastical spheres of power. In Aquinas’ world the Emperor and Pontiff were continuously vying for power in an uneasy alliance that was tattered by suspicion and power politics. Both secular and ecclesiastical powers asserted their divine rights to wage war to thwart any aggressor that could challenge the authority and the unity of the empire. The Holy Roman Empire was comprised of one Emperor, one Pontiff, and one Faith, but it was beset by violence that cast doubt and shame upon its Christian profession. Ironically, the clash

³ “Ruses of war are, therefore, measures taken to obtain advantage of the enemy by mystifying or misleading him. They are permissible provided they are not perfidious and do not violate an agreement. Belligerent forces must be constantly on their guard against, and prepared for, legitimate ruses, but they should be able to rely on their adversary’s observance of promises and of the law or armed conflict” (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 5.17.1, n64).

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between European Christianity and Islam provided an uneasy alliance between the emperor and pope to liberate the holy land and terminate political threats and theological opponents within the empire. This set of circumstances would alter the warfare powers tradition that had been traditionally the auspices of secular authority. A brief examination of the Christian and Islamic clash in the holy land illustrates the historic development of the holy war tradition in the High Middle Ages.

3.15 Just War as Holy War in the Holy Roman Empire

Byzantine Jerusalem in 614 AD fell to an invading Persian army under the command of Shahrbaz. The holy relic the True Cross was captured and taken as a prize of war to Ctesiphon, the imperial capital of the Persian Sassanids. The sacred relic was eventually returned to Jerusalem after Emperor Heraclius (610 – 641) conquered the Persians at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636. After the Prophet Mohammad’s death in June 8, 632, his successor, and senior disciple Caliph Abu Bakr, expanded the power of the Muslim state during the Ridda Wars. Prior to Abu Bakr death in 634, Umar ibn al-Khattab was named the successor. Umar was a brilliant political and military strategist, and a significant force in expanding Islamic hegemonic ambitions. Between 636 and 638, Caliph Umar conquered Jerusalem by an invading Muslim army that occupied the Holy City and established an Islamic presence for the next four and half centuries through a succession of Muslim military governors. The Umayyad caliphate governed from the capital of Damascus until 750. The Umayyad caliphate was overthrown by the Abbaside caliphate, which governed from the capital of Baghdad till 878. However, the vastness of the territory challenged hegemonic control of the remote areas of the empire. This enabled a Turkic officer, Ahmad ibn Tulun, to brake from the central authority of the Abbaside rulers and establish the Egyptian Tulunid caliphate that was reluctantly recognized as an autonomous vassal to the caliphate. His rule extended to Egypt, Syria, the Holy Land, Hajaz, Cyprus, and Crete. The Tulunid ruled from 868 to 905 and were eventually conquered by an Arab Shia Muslim caliphate ruled by the Fatimids from 969 to 1073. The Fatimids were overthrown by the Turkish Seljuks who established their authority in Jerusalem from 1073 to 1098, but were surmounted by the Fatimids who recaptured Jerusalem in 1098 prior to the First Crusade (cf., Boas 2001, pp. 8-20; Esposito 2004, pp. 26, 77-78, 119-121, 142, 158-159). Jerusalem was the center of Christian history and worship. The annual pilgrimages were a dangerous situation. Limited access to the Church of the Sepulcher and other sacred sites controlled by the Muslim populace infuriated the Emperor and Pontiff. It was Pope Urban II on November 27, 1095, that mobilized the first Crusades to liberate Jerusalem, initiating the Holy War policy as the Pontiff enacted a more aggressive just war tradition then Ambrose or Augustine could imagine. James Turner Johnson proposes that in the “hands of the holy warriors just war doctrine became an ideological weapon to stir up the faithful against infidels” (Johnson 1975, p. 16). Undoubtedly, holy war represented a major shift in the jus ad bellum doctrine. The original intent of Augustinian jus ad bellum in minimizing casualties in order to secure civic peace was overshadowed by his exemplary support to suppress the Donatists on the one hand and a medieval misinterpretation of what constituted ‘justice’ in legitimizing warfare on the basis of ‘justified violence’ to liberate Jerusalem from the infidels on the other. However, it should be noted that the early Christian church contrasted to its medieval counterpart was a dissimilar tradition. Nonetheless, another ingredient that contributed to the use of secular power to coerce the enemies of the church or the holy war tradition was the Donatist faction that challenged ecclesiastical authority and civic order in the remote region of Roman North Africa.

3.16 Augustine and the Donatists

W. J. Sparrow-Simpson summarized Augustine’s rationale for supporting State coercion against the Donatists (see Sparrow-Simpson 1919). During the intense persecution instigated by the Roman Emperor Diocletian (244 – 311), some clergy and laypeople renounced the Christian faith and yielded the scriptures in order to avoid torture and martyrdom. After the persecutions subsided and official recognition was reinstated to the minority Christian sect, the Catholic Church willingly offered the
Augustine, exemplified in Christian gentleness is a better alternative than administering capital punishment. A more gentle approach to dissuade the Donatists from heresy and civic violence. A peaceful resolution during a crucial period of sacred history and hegemonic disorder.

Heterodoxy and unrestrained civic unrest influenced Augustine to consider the policy of coercion (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.15.18). Augustine states that “scarcely any churches of our communion could be safe against their treachery and violence” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.18) and appealed to the state to intervene and restore civic order (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.18.19). Augustine proposed that it is permissible to “enact laws against impiety” that distort truth and church unity (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.19). Augustine points out that free will is not an excuse for deliberate rebellion and states, “For why, when free-will is given by God to man, should adulteries be punished by the laws, and sacrilege allowed? Is it a lighter matter that a soul should not keep faith with God, than that a woman should be faithless to her husband?” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.20). However, Augustine recognized that it is better that “men should be led to worship God by teaching, than that they should be driven to it by fear of punishment or pain” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.21). However, the Sage of Hippo adhered to a personal conviction to compel the disobedient unto obedience. Freedom of will cannot be ignored, but coercion cannot be disregarded when dealing with an insubordinate faction that is destabilizing both the civic and religious order. Augustine rationalized from Luke 14:22 that in times like these, “Compel them to come in” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.24). At the same time Augustine and others were formerly opposed to compulsory worship and would settle for a more amicable penalty against those who disrupt the civil order by their teachings and actions (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.25). For example, Augustine suggested a more gentle approach to dissuade the Donatists from heresy and civic violence. A peaceful resolution exemplified in Christian gentleness is a better alternative than administering capital punishment (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.26). However, the inexcusable violent action against church leadership influenced Augustine’s views against the Donatists faction (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.27). In light of this, Augustine defended his actions to appeal for State intervention, not from a spirit of revenge, but “with the view of defending the church entrusted to his charge” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.28), and also support the state’s intervention to restrain the Donatist schism. Augustine stated, “it came about that a religious and pious emperor, when such matters were brought to his knowledge, thought it well, by the enactment of most pious laws, entirely to correct the error of this great impiety, and to bring those who bore the standards of Christ against the cause of Christ into the unity of the Catholic Church, even by terror or compulsion, rather than merely to take away their power of doing violence, and to leave them the freedom of going astray, and perishing in their error” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185: 28). Augustine referred to the rebellion and death of Absalom, King David’s eldest son, as a sad but indispensable requisite for civic peace (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.32), and justified coercive action as a punitive instrument to restore church unity (Augustine, *Letters*, 182.32). Finally, Augustine rationalized the state’s reaction to the Donatists, a policy that was personally endorsed, in the form of a simple illustration: “Suppose two men in a house which you know is certain to fall. You try to warn them, but neither will come out. One says that if you try to force him he will kill himself. Will you not risk his committing suicide in your desire at least to save the other who has no such suicidal proclivities” (Augustine, *Letters*, 185.33; cf., Sparrow-Simpson 1919, p. 124). To avoid challenges that threaten Church authority it was essential to purge the Donatist faction. Augustine firmly believed that state pressure was necessary to restore spiritual and civic harmony. Augustine has no misgivings about the tenuous nature of the earthly kingdom; however, the state under the direction of a ‘just sovereign’ can further the cause of the heavenly city by protecting God’s elect. While many commentators criticize Augustine’s use of force as an abuse of ecclesiastical authority, it cannot be compared to the holy war polity enacted by the Pontiff during the Crusades. Augustine’s
capitulation to utilize the authority and power of the state as well as coercive measures against the Donatists was misinterpreted by the church to sanction violence by Papal authority under the banner of the Cross. The High Middle Ages redefined the just war doctrine. For the first time, ecclesiastical authority usurped secular sovereign powers to wage war. It is vital to examine the evolution of ecclesiastical policy that sanctioned the holy war tradition.

What was the dynamic that qualified a regalia bishop or the Pope to declare holy war on the enemies of the church? How did the scholastic theological and canonist communities contribute to this process? Part of the problem was incorporating the ancient Roman casus belli into the Holy Roman Empire infrastructure that synthesized church/state powers. It was like pouring new wine into old wineskins. The Augustinian just war formula was predicated upon the ancient Roman model in which “religion was in the service of the government” whereas in the Middle Ages the “relation between religion and politics was much less stable, and the Church had much more power over the state” (Johnson 1981, p. 154). This dynamic tension between secular and ecclesiastical powers challenged the fundamental Augustinian premise that only the designated sovereign should declare a just war. However, Augustine’s support for state coercion to suppress the Donatist movement (Johnson 1975, p. 36) on the one hand and the papal assumption that the Pope is the “Vicar of Christ” on the other, within the parameter of Old Testament thought wherein the God of Israel declared holy wars against the enemies of Israel, initiated the rationale that Christ’s personal envoy, the Holy See, was designated to utilize violent means if necessary to protect and expand the church order. The Catholic Church in the High Middle Ages recognized the Pontiff as the only viable geopolitical leader. The tensions between Pope and Emperor on the issue of designated authority to declare war incited the delineations of theologians and canonists. In fact, James Turner Johnson points out that in “their attempts to define the legal status necessary to convey the authority to wage just war the canonists had to consider closely the nature of the tangled political relationships of the 13th and 14th centuries; at the same time they had to engage the more fundamental question of the nature of political authority itself” (Johnson 1981, p. 151). The canonists and theological community were as concerned about the issue of designated authority as it related to secular and ecclesiastical authority that it diminished the significance of other Augustinian jus ad bellum requisites (Johnson 1981, pp. 150, 151). The evolution of canonist thought, which validated and augmented Papal authority, to assume secular and religious powers and eventually justify holy war, merits an investigation.

The aim of canon law was to manage the complexities of church organization and empower the Pontiff with indisputable authority in both secular and religious polity (Lamonte 1949, p. 394), which propelled the Catholic Church, to unprecedented power in the High Middle Ages. A. L. Smith proposes that the “ideal of the golden age of the canonists was to make a working reality of the kingdom of God upon the earth; to express the laws of that kingdom in a coherent, all-embracing code, and to enforce that code upon the still half-heathen kingdoms of the world” (Smith 1913, p. 51). The first notable attempt was Pseudo-Isidore (a scholar or group of scholars, 845 - 853) that assembled a forged “patchwork of authentic laws and made-up laws” recognized as a genuine source, perhaps to enable suffragan bishops in their respective diocese a direct connection to the Pope, in order to circumvent the intrusive authority of the regional metropolitan (Logan 2002, p. 77; cf., Ullmann 2003, p. 100). However, the urgency of papal necessity in the secular and religious order eventually overshadowed provincial mandates, which enabled the Papacy to countermand state powers and influence in the Roman Catholic Church. The works of Pseudo-Isidore were an admixture of Roman law, papal dictates, scripture and false decretals. In fact, the “formative collection of Gratian (c. 1140) contains 375 chapters drawn from this source” (Logan 2002, p. 77).

1 John Lamonte states: “The competence of the canon law is of two kinds: the ratio personae—all cases affecting clerics in any way, based on the old idea of the personality of the law, and the ratio materiae, cases dealing with ecclesiastical organization, ecclesiastical property, the sacraments, legitimacy, divorce, testaments, wills, heresy, schism, perjury, usury, sorcery, and blasphemy. Students, crusaders, and employees of churches were considered to be clerical person for the purpose of the canon law. Also the extension of the competence over sacraments to include will, oaths, and pledges opened a fertile field of litigation which often conflicted with the secular courts” (Lamonte 1949, p. 394).
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78). Nonetheless, this was the underpinning of an idea, constructing an official code of ecclesiastical polity, which came to fruition in the works of a monk and Bolognese legal erudite, Gratian, whose legal collection entitled *The concordance of discordant canons* (1139 – 1141), referred to as the *Decretum*, set the standard for the codification of ecclesiastical law. Ironically, it was the Renaissance era that witnessed a rebirth of Roman law and jurisprudence, which provided Gratian the essential background and opportunity to develop a codification system of ecclesiastical law (Lamonte 1949, pp. 394, 575). Since Bologna was the legal center for both civil and canon law in the Holy Roman Empire, the popularity of canon law as an authoritative instrument to support papal power necessitated its study even among elected Popes in the High Middle Ages. It was canon law that empowered the Pope with incontrovertible powers in every aspect of secular and ecclesiastical life. Walter Ullmann states:

What we see in the actions of the Innocents, Gregories, Bonifaces and other notable ecclesiastical rulers, was but the execution of a policy, insistently, sometimes persuasively, not seldom extravagantly, propounded by the teachers and interpreters of the canon law. Perhaps in no other age of the history of mankind did the law play such a paramount role as in the centuries after Gregory VII. For the whole struggle between emperor and pope centered in the law” (Ullmann 1949, p. 1).

The tension between secular and religious powers in the High Middle Ages provoked tensions between the Emperor and Pontiff that was counterbalanced by canon law and secular legislation against those dictates. It was the canonists that contributed to the legitimate authorization and militant role of the Pope to wage holy war as a just war, by providing legal precedent from both canon law and scripture to validate papal decreals when counteracting political and heretical opponents. According to James Turner Johnson, Gratian’s just war viewpoint was influenced by the insights of Augustine and Isidore of Seville. Gratian’s formula stressing “designated authority” to wage war was unique to his era. This does not invalidate ‘designated authority’ in the Augustinian just war tradition that was also cited in Gratian’s *Decretum*, but stresses the complexity of the ‘designated authority’ scenario in the political and religious custom in the Holy Roman Empire. A comparison of these viewpoints elucidates Johnson’s viewpoint on the development of papal authority related to ‘designated authority’ to declare war. It is noteworthy to understand the emphasis on centralized authority and just war policy peculiar in Gratian’s formulation. While other church fathers stipulated the importance of designated authority; it was Gratian’s unique insight reflecting upon the tensions between the Emperor and Pontiff that vied for political and ecclesiastical dominance in the Holy Roman Empire. Gratian’s just war specification and its relation to authoritative powers to declare war is unmistakably concrete and precise.1

1 ‘Designated authority’ is the foundational link of the just war tradition. During the time of Augustine, the one empire, and twofold Western and Eastern governing authorities were unable to effectively coordinate logistical support to successfully prevent the infiltration of the barbaric tribes into Roman territory. This was most notable at the battle of Adrianople. Adrianople illustrated the logistical disaster that resulted from two primary power bases, rather than one designated authority to unify the army, declare war, ratify terms for peace, and maintain harmony between legions. During the High Middle Ages the friction between Emperor and Pontiff once again reiterated the importance of designated authority in relation to war powers. In fact, the tension between secular and religious authorities during this time period was the central issue of the just war doctrine that eventually led to a perversion of war powers by ratifying ‘holy war’ as a viable tenet of ecclesiastical authority. In our modern era the modern state actor within its varied political traditions designates its leadership. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which recognized nation state autonomy and the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, acknowledge designated leadership as a legally recognized aspect of national sovereignty. But in times of war the lines are blurred in regards to designated authority and tyrannicide, of which the later has been attributed to Adolf Hitler, and most recently by the West, Saddam Hussein. ‘Designated authority’ is the key that encompasses the *jus ad bellum, jus in bello* and *jus post bellum* traditions. The leaders of nations have the authority to declare war as well as the power to instill peace among the concert of nations.

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Gratian’s just war formula reinforces the Augustinian tradition, even though it more closely resembles Isidore’s just war viewpoint. Johnson points out three factors of Gratian’s brief formula: “the authority to wage war, an edict or declaration formally announcing the war, and the purpose of avenging injuries” (Johnson 1981, p. 153). Gratian’s just war formula reiterates the ancient Roman *casus belli* with greater emphasis directed toward designated authority. The socio-political environment of the Holy Roman Empire amalgamated secular and ecclesiastical powers to the extent of empowering the Pontiff with unprecedented geopolitical powers. However, giving the Pontiff, war powers, was clearly a conflict of interest. The solution was formulated within the acumen of the canonists. While Gratian stipulated the importance of designated authority to declare a just war, the complicated web of imperial and ecclesiastical powers accentuated a unique political rift related to the declaration of war powers, which were eventually clarified by Gratian’s immediate successors the Decretists. This legal school of thought redefined canon law to ensure and safeguard the Pontiff’s prerogatives to declare war. While it was accepted policy that clergy were prohibited to participate in war and limited prerogatives were conferred on the regalia bishops, these limitations apparently did not apply to the Pope. The question centered on the legal rationalization regarding the rights of papal authority, principally the Pontiff, as it related to the declaration of war powers.

There were five interrelated movements that eventually sanctioned papal prerogatives to declare a holy war. 1. Augustine’s utilization of state powers to coerce enemies of the church established a precedent among the church fathers (Augustine, *Letters*, 185, 28). 2. The theological and traditional mandate of Pontifical infallibility, as designated by the title “Vicar of Christ”, the protector and guide of God’s kingdom on earth, further empowered the Popes secular authority (Ullmann 1949, pp. 55, 151-153). 3. The pronounced powers of the regalia bishops that already exercised religious and secular authority. 4. Rufinus, a major legal thinker among the Decretists, took the first step in his *Summa decretorum* (1157) stipulating an *ordinaria potestas*, which meant an “official who is able to command a war and have his command acted on has the authority to do so” (Johnson 1981, p. 156). However, it was Huguccio (1157–1210) the most influential canonist of the Decretists that made an ambiguous reference to the office of “prince” as the secular official who could authorize war. Without qualification, the term ‘prince’ conveyed no more meaning than Rufinus’s *ordinaria potestas* that detracted from Gratian’s just war formula by obscuring the role of secular and religious authority to declare war (Johnson 1981, p. 156), and 5. The subtle shift from secular to ecclesiastical authority to wage war within the legal eruditions of Bologna was a crucial period in ecclesiastical law. The Decretists eventually rationalized the Pontiff’s prerogative for the declaration of war powers within the context of just war, referred to as holy war. This was the legal parameter of ecclesiastical authority in war, which Pope Innocent III (1160/61 – 1216) utilized in full-force to restrain heresy or curb potential political opponents. Ironically, Huguccio was the teacher and mentor of Innocent III (Ullmann 1949, p. 3) and maintained a professional relationship with
his prized pupil throughout his career. The elevation of canon law established and safeguarded ecclesiastical authority and power in the sacred as well as secular responsibilities of state in the High Middle Ages. It is within this framework that ecclesiastical powers rationalized and justified holy war as an alternative medium for the Pontiff to manage the Holy Roman Empire.

3.17 Holy War as Just War

The unavoidable clash between Christianity and Islam unleashed a new brand of war, the war of the cross or holy war. In its infancy, holy war was an ardent movement, to liberate Jerusalem from the Infidel, reinstate the pilgrimage rights of Christians and secure the Church of the Sepulcher (Riley-Smith 1999, p. 1). Pope Urban II on November 27, 1095, in his native France, in the township of Clermont, inspired war among the populace. As Urban II traveled and proclaimed the liberating power of the cross (not from sin but enemies of the state in general and Catholic faith in particular) the response was so overwhelming that the holy war tradition became a prevailing feature in warfare stratagem throughout the High Middle Ages. The maxim “God Wills It” was the rallying cry that mobilized the first and subsequent crusades, which established the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Atiya 1962, p. 46). The papal mandate to liberate Jerusalem from the Infidel and recover the holy land eventually digressed into the application of force against papal political opponents and heretics. After the First Crusade Pope Urban II immediately targeted Islamic expansionism in Spain and the Levant (1114 and 1118) and also implemented the holy war doctrine in two different theaters; the Germans crusaded against the pagan Slavs to the north and east of the German borders, while the Saxons crusaded against the Wends (West Slavs living near Germanic settlements) under the dictates of Pope Eugenius III in 1147. However, it was Pope Innocent III that employed the Fourth Crusade that conquered and decimated Constantinople, thus instilling fear in political or theological opponents that threatened or refuted western church authority (Riley-Smith 1999, p. 41). The numerous crusades between the 11th and 16th centuries are countless. The political ramifications were intriguing, and the bloodshed in the name of the cross unsettling. Nonetheless, it was Innocent III that mastered the art of diplomatic duplicity and holy war to foster undisputed authority in the Holy Roman Empire. Jonathan Riley-Smith states:

Under Pope Innocent III another major breakthrough occurred with the first deployments of crusading against heretics and papal political opponents. Both could be, and were, depicted as oppressors of Christians and Mother Church, and much the same justificatory framework, sentiment, and imagery that were used in papal bulls declaring crusades against Muslims, Slavs, or Mongols, were employed in the calls to crusade against Hofenstaufen emperors or Cathar heretics (Riley-Smith 1999, p. 41).

It was Innocent III through the auspices of canon law that conquered kingdoms, waged war against Infidels, and displaced heretics and political opponents alike. Innocent III’s power and authority was the results of a long line of Pontiffs in the High Middle Ages that disdained secular meddling in church affairs. Holy war was a pretentious instrument of justice with horrific, unethical ramifications. While religion in Augustine’s era was serviceable to the state, religion in the High Middle Ages was a constant contest of power between imperial and ecclesiastical authority. At times, the state was under the sole power of the Pontiff. In fact, Innocent’s ascendancy of indisputable secular and religious authority and power is directly attributed to the exploitation of the holy war policy and other papal dictates that expanded geopolitical control throughout Europe. The goal of the canonists to circumvent civil meddling in church affairs by entrusting the Pontiff with unprecedented secular and sacral powers, initiated numerous socio-political issues regarding the unethical utilization of war powers. Within a millennium the Holy See was the commander-in-chief and the glory of the cross of Christ was denied its redemptive power.
The Renaissance rekindled ancient Roman jurisprudence and provided western Christianity with the necessary political leverage to compete with the secular government. The canonists of Bologna had a more immediate influence upon the legal ramifications of just war in the High Middle Ages. The crusades enabled the papacy military alternatives to deal with enemies foreign and domestic. However, it was Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274), the Dominican scholastic, who created a lasting influence in our modern era through the systemization of the Augustinian just war tradition in the *Summa theologica*. Aquinas presented rational theological and philosophic alternatives, which were in contrast to the contorted incongruities disseminated by the canonists. It is necessary to understand Aquinas’ stance on warfare within the context of canon law, the struggle between secular and ecclesiastical powers, and an empire engrossed in bloodshed, and the art of war that eventually reshaped our modern political system.

### 3.18 Thomas Aquinas and Double Effect

Thomas Aquinas is acclaimed as the preeminent theologian of western Catholicism. His delineations on a vast array of topics have influenced almost every facet of theoretical and everyday life of the western Catholic community. Aquinas was declared a saint in 1323, and the *Summa theologica* was the fundamental work to counter the Protestant reformation in the 16th century. In 1879 Pope Leo XIII declared Aquinas’s teachings the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. Even after the modern applications of Vatican II, the Dominican erudite continues to project considerable philosophic influence throughout both modern religious and secular thought (Davies 2002, p. 334). This is especially the case with the issue of just war. Aquinas was a realist about war even though he did not share Augustine’s pessimistic view on the nature of man and the state. Aquinas incorporates Aristotelian premises to strengthen philosophic premises, but functioned within a homogeneous culture that was essentially intolerant to any and all divergences from the Mother Church. Aquinas was not the great liberator of Christian dogma. He rather systematically reiterated the fundamental dogma of western Catholic Christianity in a church culture that was destabilized by the canonists. The warfare tradition espoused by Vegetius on the one hand and Augustine’s just war tradition on the other were the standards of warfare during Aquinas’s lifetime; however, the church/state model in the High Middle Ages challenged the delineation on what constitutes a just and unjust war.

Vegetius’ *Epitoma rei militaris* was the military standard during the High Middle Ages. There were no major changes in weapons technology, until the advent of gunpowder between the 14th and 16th centuries. In fact, “The Second Lateran Council (1139) forbade the use of crossbows, bows and arrows, and siege machines in wars against other Christians” (Barkenbus 1992, p. 252). In a sense Aquinas replicated Augustinian just war axioms. Malham M. Wakin states that on “what constitutes a just war, Aquinas added little to Augustine” but concludes that Aquinas “stressed the importance of a pure motive; one who has been injured may not exploit his just grievance as an opportunity to gratify a lust for revenge” (Wakin 1986, p. 229). With the inclusion of *bellum sacram*, “holy war” warfare was a permanent fixture in the Holy Roman Empire. Aquinas’s delineation on just war was twofold: 1. It was a causal admission of the permanence of war as a form of civic polity between antagonistic factions. This was further demonstrated by Aquinas’s admission that wars could be fought on a holy day (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Ila-IIae, Q. 40, Art.4), and 2. War was inevitable; thus restraining its horrific effects was tantamount in curtailing unnecessary bloodshed. In a sense Aquinas was a precursor to the modern strategy of ‘containment’ in warfare. Though warfare in the medieval period was a conventional hand-to-hand combat scenario, the brutal atrocities during this time period defied the gospel claims of the church and human rights. The Crusades denied combatant and non-combatant human rights. The pillaging of Constantinople during the fourth crusade underscored the atrocities of greed, fame and fortune in the name of religion. Aquinas recognized the unavoidable reoccurrence of war and expounded upon the objective and subjective motivations in war.

Another feature that expanded the traditional Augustinian perspective on self-defense was Aquinas’s principle referred to as the doctrine of double effect, or the permissibility of self-defense
stipulated in the *Summa theologica* in the section on *homicide* (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Ila-Ilae, Q. 64. Art. 7). Aquinas states:

Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in *being*, as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists, *it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense.* (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7).

Aquinas emphasized motivation or intention in self-defense and points out “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention” (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7). The ripple effect of one’s actions, according to Aquinas, is dependent upon the transparency of motive contrasted to a spirit of spiteful revenge. The apparent definition is not a philosophic formality but a conscious understanding of the complicated consequences of unexpected and/or unavoidable situations that necessitate the self-defense or accidental death of just and innocent life. Aquinas blatantly asserted that killing the innocent was prohibited (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64. Art. 6). Aquinas was emphatic that “warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric” (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2). However, in Objection 3 and its subsequent response in ‘Reply Obj. 3’, wherein a self-defensive action of a cleric or layman that results in the death of the assailant, is prohibited, Aquinas nonetheless restates that there are cases in which the unexpected or “irregularity” of a self-defensive action resulting in the death of an assailant was unintentional. Aquinas proposes that the consequences of an overt action in self-defense should be judged by a guiltless motive or an intention of “revengeful spite” (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64. Art. 7). Essentially Aquinas stipulates that even an acquitted reaction in self-defense can initiate unintended negative consequences; however, if the intention was a guiltless motive then it justifies the negative consequence because the earthly order in which we live imposes the good and the evil, which our finite capacity cannot fully comprehend until the decision is put into action.

Aquinas’s principle of double effect is formulated within the section *On homicide*, Question 64, Articles 7 and 8 and stipulates in Article 7 that the “act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor” (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7). Aquinas further qualified circumstantial killing or accidental cause by “chance” as a “cause that acts beside one’s intention” (Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, Vol. III. Pt. II-II, Q. 64. Art. 8), as a guiltless action if a “man pursues[s] a lawful occupation” stipulated by the civic order to maintain justice or peace (Aquinas, Vol. III. *Summa theologica*, Pt. II-II, Q. 64. Art. 8). It is regrettable but not a mortal sin when a life is taken within this set of circumstances. Aquinas’s doctrine of double effect can be applied in two ways: 1. The Individual in Combat: The connection between justified homicide and justified war are indissoluble. It is unfortunate but evident that noncombatant casualties are incidental to just and unjust wars. The soldier in combat can mistakenly take the life of an innocent victim but the intentions of the soldier will either vindicate or accuse his actions. Collateral damages are ancillary to warfare, and 2. Organized Warfare: Killing in a just or unjust war is unavoidable. Warfare dictates

1 John Nef states: “In the thought of the scholastic philosophers, as represented by Thomas Aquinas, war was legitimate only when undertaken at the order of a sovereign authority, on behalf of a just cause, and with a rightful intention. On other terms war was sinful. Priests were forbidden to engage in it on any terms, because their calling was above that of the soldier. Their mission was to the ministry of the altar, where the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally. It was unbecoming therefore, for them to slay or shed blood; more fitting that, if necessary, they shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portrayed in their ministry” (Nef 1968, pp. 307-308).
organized violence. Self-preservation is an innate response in combat. The irony that killing within the context of just cause instills civic stability is a major paradox peculiar to the earthly city. The doctrine of double effect in the context of self-defense is as much about vindicating *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* axioms in Aquinas’s immediate context, which inevitably influences moral implications regarding modern warfare.

The doctrine of double effect was not posited within Aquinas’s just war formula. The primary emphasis on motive or intention was not measured in terms of killing and saving lives, rather in terms of good and evil. Since the High Middle Ages the doctrine of double effect also referred to as collateral effects or collateral damage has been applied and adjusted to both the conventional and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenarios. Douglas P. Lackey states:

Catholic moral theology acknowledges that in the course of doing good it is sometimes necessary to bring evil into the world. The principle of double effect says that it is permissible by action A to bring such evil into the world provided that four conditions are satisfied: 1. Act A must not be evil in itself. 2. Act A must also have a good effect that outweighs the evil effect. 3. The good effect must be intended and the evil effect not intended. And 4. The evil effect must not be the means by which the good effect is achieved (Lackey 1984, pp. 168-169).

Lackey wrote during the Cold War period when strategic arsenals with first strike potential or détente (peaceful coexistence between two hegemonic super powers), operated within a precarious balance of terror of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The sheer power of nuclear weaponry could decimate both military and civilian targets. The arms race and the numerous treaties such as Salt I and Salt II were intended to reduce specified nuclear arsenal to enhance peaceful coexistence and reduce catastrophic casualties in lieu of a nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, nuclear warfare has challenged the classical just war doctrine. However, “Aquinas’s greatest contribution was to secularize the just war criteria by grounding them solidly in the principle of double effect” (Wells 1996, p. 18).

The Roman Catholic Church was an inseparable part of society and influenced every aspect of the civic community. However, the justification for crusading transformed the political terrain in the Holy Roman Empire to such an extent that it enabled the Protestant Reformation reformers the civil, military and the theological justification to secure independence from the Emperor and Pontiff. War, just or unjust would evolve into a political instrument in the grand strategic objectives of nation state’s national and international policies. This was the case during the High Middle Ages when holy war policy blurred the sanctity and misconstrued the purpose of the sacred office.

### 3.19 Aquinas on Motivation and Holy War

The canonists were concerned about the legalities of designated authority, while Aquinas focused on motive or subjective intensions to justify or condemn personal self-defense and organized warfare. While Aquinas reduplicated Augustinian just war tradition, Sydney Bailey states: “While to Augustine the injury itself provides the just cause for war. Thomas Aquinas demands some fault on the part of the wrong doer: his culpability which deserves punishment is the justifying reason for going to war. The just war formula is primarily in the nature of a punitive action against the wrongdoer for his subjective guilt rather than his objectively wrongful act” (Bailey 1972, p. 10). The 5th century church and state relations were transparent in regards to their respective secular and ecclesiastical roles. Augustine Christianized for the most part a Ciceronian formula that demanded redress for a wrong committed against the state. However, in the Holy Roman Empire uniformity of worship and conformity of dogma were standardized. Formalism accompanied by legalistic overtures to the Catholic faith obscured the pretentious spirit of greed, avarice and worldly fame. Aquinas’s dissatisfaction with the spiritual nature of the church was perceived by the purpose of the *Summa theologica*, which reiterated the message and mission of the church. Religion in the High Middle Ages was eclipsed by moral relativism that contradicted the gospel. It was Jesus Christ that remonstrated against the formalism of his day and exhorted, “Not everyone who
says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophecy in your name, and in your name drive out demons and perform many miracles?’ Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evil doers’ (Mt 7: 21-23; cf., Mt 25: 31-46). Duplicity and crusading were synonymous actions. Aquinas’s formulation of double effect was a counter measure to the current trend of his time to declare and justify war in the name of God (secular or religious) while killing opponents to accrue geopolitical power under the guise of a holy crusade.

While Aquinas never overtly cited the phrase ‘holy war’, there are references to the utilization of coercive force at the service of religion under specific conditions. His formulation restricted the abuses identified with crusading while maintaining the religious tradition of a uniform faith. Aquinas stipulated that many wars were affected by the non-Christian element that hinders the faith by their “blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even their open persecutions . . . for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with unbelievers” (Aquinas, Summa theologica, Pt. II-II Q. 10, Art. 8). Aquinas pointed out that unbelievers could not be persuaded to embrace the faith against their free will unless the faithful compel the unbeliever through their dutiful witness. However, those heathen, Jews or former believers that once accepted the Catholic faith, such as “heretics and all apostates”, but reneged their profession of faith “should be submitted to bodily compulsion” in order to fulfill their vow before the Lord and church (Aquinas, Summa theologica, Pt. II-II Q. 10, Art. 8, Reply Obj. 1-4). Undoubtedly, Augustine’s influence was instrumental in Aquinas’s thought on this point, but it cannot be misconstrued as a license for the brutalities of holy war, which was the result of the radical canonist movement. Aquinas came as close as anyone during the High Middle Ages to denouncing the sacral advantages of crusading without officially incriminating himself – it was a matter of unity and faith, rather than a geopolitical instrument of unbridled power in both the heavenly and earthly cities. The influence of Aquinas on Catholic thought and tradition is indisputable, but two world wars in the 20th century on the one hand and weapons of mass destruction on the other challenged Catholic viewpoints on just war at Vatican II.

3.20 Aquinas and Vatican II

Posited within the context of caritas “charity”, Aquinas enquires: Is it always sinful to wage war? This implied that warfare was a common element in medieval society. It also stipulated a converse application that both secular and ecclesiastical authorities were conducting unjust wars. Why else entertain the question. Aquinas challenged the context of war by his reflection on a theme that canonists had deemed incontrovertible. Within the parameter of jus ad bellum Aquinas developed a linear progressive interconnection between designated authority, just cause for war and rightful intention (Aquinas, Summa theologica, Vol. III. Pt. II-II Q. 40. Art. 1). The complexities of the Holy Roman Empire necessitated a rational response to the instrument of war, which had digressed as a customary policy rather than a divine retribution against injustice. While Gratian and the canonist focused on designated authority in war; Aquinas was concerned about motive and intention to counterbalance the abuse of power in war. Rather than sanctioning its utility, Aquinas recognized the inevitability of war, and skillfully and systematically reminded his readers of the moral justifications as well as the unprincipled pitfalls of warfare. Aquinas defended the viewpoint on just cause by referencing Augustine. And like Augustine, Aquinas provided a moral framework to contain the escalation of war and reduce unnecessary causalities. George Weigel reiterates: “Thomistic just–war theory is ‘minimilist’: its purpose is not to glorify combat, but to determine the minimal conditions under which the resort to armed force may be morally justifiable” (Weigel 1987, p. 37). However, the evolution of gunpowder between the 15th and 17th centuries would dramatically alter the face of warfare. The advent of gas, air and tank warfare during World War I would revolutionize modern conventional warfare as well as the prohibition of chemical warfare. The splitting of the atom, the subsequent development and destructive power of nuclear weaponry contrasted to the classical just war tradition was eventually challenged at Vatican II (1965), signaling a major shift in Roman Catholic thought on the just war doctrine.
The Cold War witnessed an unprecedented escalation of conventional and nuclear arms provoking a balance of terror between the Soviet Union and the United States. Phrases such as mutual assured destruction, nuclear umbrella, nuclear winter, evil empire, and weapons of mass destruction aptly portrayed the fear, distrust, suspicion and ideological rift between the two superpowers. The bipolar system was restrained by limited war scenarios, third world skirmishes, and intermittent cataclysmic threats of nuclear warfare. The world was divided and standing upon the precipice of destruction. While global peace, the mutual bond among nations, unified the international community as to the absurdities of WMD, Vatican II emphasized the precarious peace between the two superpowers and aptly described the Cold War as an aberration of justice (Vatican II 1965, 81). Nonetheless, the Vatican II Council delineated in Gaudium et Spes that nations should “put aside national selfishness and ambition to dominate other nations” for the sake of human dignity and the sanctity of life. This Cold War document asserted that “…as long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, government cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted” (Vatican II 1965, 81). However, the primary emphasis of the document is the destructive power of weapons of mass destruction, the extravagant cost of the arms race and the resulting economic deprivation suffered globally because of excessive expenditures on national defense. The Vatican II Council affirmed that the “reciprocal slaughter” and “the deadly after effects” compel us “to undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude” (Vatican II 1965, 79). The primary issues that challenge the just war theory, are:

Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of an extensive area along with their populations is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation (Vatican II 1965, 80).

Since peace must be borne of mutual trust between nations and not be imposed on them through fear of the available weapons, everyone must labor to put an end at last to the arms race, and to make a true beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but proceeding at an equal pace according to agreement, and backed up by true and workable safeguards” (Vatican II 1965, 80).

In the minds of many theologians and ethicists, the Cold War rendered the concept of just war obsolete. The development of smart technology, the advancement of sophisticated delivery systems, the improvement of chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry and the potential proliferation of these instruments of destruction throughout the world, heightened a sense of urgency to challenge governments’ policy on weapons of mass destruction. The viewpoints provided in Vatican II (December 7, 1965) – adapting the church to the challenges of pluralistic society, especially in regards to war and peace, came to fruition in a pastoral letter entitled The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983). The American Catholic Bishops pastoral letter on war and peace was a “significant event in American Catholicism. It represented for the first time an official statement of the Catholic church challenging, on moral grounds, the policies of war and peace of the U.S. government” (Byrns 2001, p. 113). The pastoral letter not only challenged U.S. government policy on WMD, but also the foreign policy objectives espoused by Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morgenthau and neorealist Kenneth Waltz. The United States stance on weapons of mass destruction was guided by a long-standing tradition championed by Reinhold Niebuhr, the father of the realist school of thought. However, it is important to reiterate that the challenge espoused by the American Catholic Bishops was also an alternative Christian interpretation on modern warfare policy.

The view of superpowers on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was dramatically challenged by the American Catholic Bishops. The superpowers’ policy on deterrence and the arms race initiated an alarming response that contradicted the traditional Roman Catholic stance on just war in contemporary international affairs. Essentially, the response of the American Catholic Bishops was an extended reappraisal of Vatican II, regarding weapons of mass destruction, which incited a “completely fresh reappraisal of war” (Vatican II 1965, 80). It is within the context of an escalating competitive distrust
among the two super powers in the international order. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the unthinkable and horrific casualties and consequences of nuclear war and the horrid consequences of World War I and World War II, which antiquated total war policy, inspired the American Catholic Bishops to reconsider the applied parameters of the just war tradition.

3.21 American Catholic Bishops and Jus Ad Bellum

The bishop’s point out that the Augustinian intent was that “war was both the result of sin and a tragic remedy for sin in the life of political societies. War arose from disordered ambition, but it could also be used, in some cases at least, to restrain evil and protect the innocent” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 81. 26). Within a fragmented and decentralized international order the Roman Catholic Church supported just war premises formulated by Augustine and Aquinas, which articulated the necessity for self-defense among nation states. Conversely, the desired strategy is to counteract war; however, if the situation is unavoidable, than “restrict and reduce” an escalation of war in order to restore civic peace (United States Catholic conference 1983, pars. 82, 83. 27). The American Catholic Bishops supported a peaceful resolution between hostile nation states, but just war stipulations have been postulated to manage a just resolve when hostilities erupt between competing nation states. The Bishops have developed a progressive just war reformulation, which is an extension of Vatican II, to deter the arms race and aggressive and uncompromising nuclear proliferation policy.

Just Cause: A just war is officially recognized only to confront “a real and certain danger, i.e. to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to secure basic human rights. As both Pope Pius and Pope John XXIII made clear, if war of retribution was ever justifiable, the risks of modern war negate such a claim today” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 86. 28). The Bishop’s primary concern in ‘just cause’ for war is the protection of innocent life, a return to civic order and maintaining a stable global system. The bishop’s commitment to the classical jus ad bellum framework reinforced the symbiotic relationship between just cause and its respective subcategories, which stipulate that a decision for war outside any or all of the moral axioms is categorically unjust.

Competent Authority: The American Catholic Bishops state that in the “Catholic tradition the right to use force has always been joined to the common good; war must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 87. 28). However, the Bishops point out that the complications in the modern nation state are twofold: 1. The declaration of a police action or so-called undeclared war challenged U.S. presidential authority. This reference alludes to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, which epitomized the sporadic limited war scenarios resulting from the ideological hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States, and 2. The complexities of anti-government movements erupting into revolutionary war, and the subsequent social chaos that challenged established ‘designated authority’ were all too common. The legalities of ‘designated authority’ in a fragile and unpredictable international order were challenged by a spirit of self-determination to submit to civil authority in times of civic unrest and war. The bipolar environment acerbated political loyalties. Neutrality among nations was not optional as the global community was expected to cooperate with either communist totalitarianism or democratic capitalism.

Comparative Justice: Nuclear weaponry and the destructive power of conventional weaponry often overshadow the nation states’ ‘merit or demerit’ in a hostile dispute that either justifies or disqualifies its claim for war. The American Catholic Bishops assert that the

... category of comparative justice is designed to emphasize the presumption against war which stands at the beginning of just war teaching. In a world of sovereign states recognizing neither a common moral authority nor a central political authority, comparative justice stresses that no state should act on the basis that it has ‘absolute justice’ on its side. ... comparative justice is designed to relativize absolute claims and to restrain the use of force even in a ‘justified’ conflict (United States Catholic conference 1983, pars. 92, 93. 29).
The destructive power of conventional modern weaponry and its effect upon national and international stability, according to the bishop’s, deems comparative justice an essential just ad bellum requisites to restrain the two superpowers from taking advantage of their power while avoiding responsibility for the exploitation of military power in order to secure geopolitical advantages.

Right Intention: The American Catholic Bishops incorporate ‘right intention’ within the context of just cause – a war must pursue peace and social order as its final objective. The Bishops state: “During a conflict, right intention means pursuit of peace and reconciliation, including avoiding unnecessarily destructive acts or imposing unreasonable conditions (e.g., unconditional surrender)” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 95. 30). Right intention was a fundamental concern in Augustinian just war delineations. The Bishops reiterated the traditional jus post bellum as a mandatory requisite, stressing the end result of war is relative justice and peace inducing a stable international order.

Last Resort: The bipolar hostilities between the two superpowers overshadowed the influence of the United Nations. In fact, during the Cold War the United Nations was an impotent international organization. The American Catholic Bishops prescribed a definitive role for the United Nations to be a mediator to promote world order in the bipolar system. The Bishops asserted that in order for war to be justified “all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 96. 30). The recommendation for peacekeeping forces to manage the recurrent international conflicts was unsuccessful as the Soviet Union and the United States competed for hegemonic ascendency – both claiming the high moral ground in among the international community. The destructive power of weapons of mass destruction and the probability of limited war escalating to a total war scenario mandated a rational response of self-control to sustain containment and minimize collateral damage.

Probability of Success: This criterion is an intangible pre-condition. Warfare is influenced by many factors and dependent upon resources, logistics, economic strength, updated armaments, preparation for the natural elements in nature and a well-planned and executed strategic objective. The Bishops acknowledge this “difficult criterion” but “its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 98. 30). The progressive link stipulated by the bishop’s jus ad bellum axioms, incorporates an interdependent relationship between probability of success and proportionality. Even the best planned tactics fail. The art of war is subordinate to the natural limitations of humanity and nature.

Proportionality: The bishop’s stated that “proportionality means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. Nor should judgment concerning proportionality be limited to the temporal order without regard to a spiritual dimension in terms of ‘damages,’ ‘costs,’ and ‘the good expected’” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 99. 31). The American Catholic Bishops suggested that the principle of proportionality is intimately linked with jus ad bellum and jus in bello requisites. The example cited was the Vietnam War, which devastated physical, moral and spiritual resources on both sides. The Vietnam War was a prolonged, futile conflict that negated any positive results for the United States. The limited war scenario in Vietnam, which was substantiated by the domino theory that espoused that American intervention, was necessary to thwart communist expansionism in Asia. The fear of Chinese intervention, total war scenarios and the constant threat of nuclear warfare between the two superpowers stimulated alternative viewpoints on American power and war.

### 3.22 American Catholic Bishops and Jus In Bello

According to the bishop’s the destructive capabilities of modern weaponry have necessitated an indissoluble link between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello traditions. The principles that have special significance are ‘proportionality’ and ‘discrimination’. According to the Bishops the primary concern is the “use of weapons of horrendous destructive power” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 101.
31), which would have incalculable effects on combatant and noncombatant alike. In a similar vein, the Vatican II conference asserts,

Indeed, if the kind of weapons now stocked in the arsenals of the great powers were to be employed to the fullest, the results would be the almost complete reciprocal slaughter of one side by the other, not to speak of the widespread devastation that would follow in the world and the deadly after-effects resulting from the use of such weapons (Vatican II 1965, 80).

This observation alludes not only to the possibilities of nuclear catastrophe but also the failure of the ‘laws of war’ during World War II – war, for the first time, was not restricted to the battlefield alone. The preliminary bombings of London, England and the reciprocal response by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) on Dresden, Germany serves as a case in point. The American Catholic Bishops also point out that the utilization of nuclear weaponry is a socio-economic and ecological disaster. The Bishops validate the binding force of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* requisites by emphasizing that “[o]ne of the criteria of the just-war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace. We must ask whether such a reasonable hope can exist once nuclear weapons have been exchanged” (United States Catholic Conference 1983, par. 159, 50).

The American Catholic Bishops adherence to the just war formula was a creative extension of the Augustinian and Aquinas tradition. Their emphasis on justice and peace reiterates Augustine’s original intent that peace and social order are the ultimate results of a just cause for war. However, contemporary society often utilizes ‘just cause’ as excuse for war, rather than a mandate to manage the process of war, thwart unwarranted violence, and preserve lives. The Cold War was an era of epic advances in military science that revolutionized military and political strategy and tactics. In an effort to thwart the possibility of nuclear war, a parish pastor in Detroit, Michigan by the name of Reinhold Niebuhr, revolutionized the philosophic norms of power politics and U.S. foreign policy in the international arena.

3.23 Reinhold Niebuhr and Just War

The unavoidable consequence of war is the ripple effect of events that change the course of history. World War I was such a war. Instead of empowering the geopolitical ambitions of either the Austrian, German, or Russian monarchies, it set in motion a Wilsonian mandated consortium of democratic European states that projected the United States as a major force in international affairs. World War I initiated a set of geopolitical events (most notably the treaty of Versailles) that led inexorably to World War II and eventually the Cold War, which solidified the United States as the leader of the ‘free world’. An inexperienced America would interact among the cultured Europeans with a diminutive familiarity in international leadership. Nazi and Communist ideologies denigrated the spiritual and ethnic freedoms of the West. World War II would reignite the horrid flames of war, further advancing military tactics and modern weaponry. Monarchical polity was superseded by class ideology. Hitler’s ‘Aryan race’ and Stalin’s ‘classless society’ would promote unfathomable brutalities of ethnic and ideological cleansing in the name of the greater good. The republican framework, the constitutional intent and spiritual resources of America, were antithetical viewpoints in a fragile world order. Within this framework, Reinhold Niebuhr witnessed World War I and World War II and the Cold War. Niebuhr observed the unexpected demise of the European monarchy and also criticized the fallacious nature of ideological warfare. Niebuhr condemned the incomprehensible brutality of the holocaust and also addressed the dynamic and rapid changes in the international order that advanced weapons of mass destruction as the epitome of national defense. Niebuhr was leery of the unanticipated rise of the American global power and dominance. In all these epic events, war was the pivotal instrument of political policy. The visages of a Clausewitzian total war scenario was a disgusting reality in a world that was subjected to the fragilities of human finiteness and the selfish greed of collective state actor power in the international order.
Niebuhr’s pacifism during World War I was superseded by an aggressive mandate to immobilize the Third Reich’s hegemonic ambitions. The tragic consequences of the monarchical clash in the First World War were superseded by an arrogant Aryan elitism that craved annexation and conquest, subjugation and ethnic cleansing to ensure the purity and permanence of the Germanic state. Niebuhr stated: “. . . Hitler’s fierce German nationalism prompted the German minority in the Sudetenland to espouse the cause of Pan-Germanism and provided Hitler with a force of disruption” (Niebuhr 1959, p. 180). Charles C. Brown elucidates Niebuhr’s viewpoint that the “Nazi creed as compounded of Hegelian state worship, Nietzschean glorification of power, and a romantic emphasis on race in Herder and Fichte” must be overtly challenged, and “Hitler must be stopped by force” (Brown 2002, pp. 98, 99). Niebuhr was an ardent critic of German Nationalism and recognized the Nazi threat to western civilization. As events slowly deteriorated, Hitler’s militant objectives gradually enveloped Europe and the decision for war gained momentum. Niebuhr was not a warmonger; his realist paradigm recognized that politics is a contest of power and a balance of power was necessary to prevent expanding tyranny.

However, Niebuhr disputed the inadequacies of the predominant just war theory, which was considered a byproduct of the Catholic ‘natural law’ tradition. The fundamental divide is Niebuhr’s concept on original sin that refuted Catholic rationalism, which in Niebuhr’s thought eclipsed human finiteness or sin by formulating universal rational norms, which provided a transparent, legalist ethic overtly distinguishing justice and injustice or defense and aggression in war. History testifies that not all “wars are equally just and not all contestants are equally right. Distinctions must be made. But the judgments which we make are influenced by passions and interests, so that even the most obvious case of aggression can be made to appear a necessity of defense” (Niebuhr 1941, p. 283). Catholic rationalism embraced an idealist self-assurance that ‘rational-beings’ working together can surmount socio-political obstacles, whereas Niebuhr’s realist tradition while espousing a judicious use of power, recognized that even ‘rational beings’ influenced by ideological schemes can capitulate to self-interest and greed of power, which can only be regulated by a balance of power.

Ancient and modern warfare testify to the complicated friction of vengeance, competition and distrust displayed in the recurrent cycle of violence between radical factions, or nation states. Niebuhr understands that human nature and political collective egoism can only be constrained by a balance of power. This element adds a unique dimension to his view on just war. Niebuhr’s denunciation of Hitler’s German Nationalism and ardent defense of World War II policy denounced the pacifist anti-war stance on the basis that ‘force’ not ‘love’ can resolve collective conflict in the earthly city. His Christian and political realism doubted the effectiveness of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello tradition, since a synthesis of customary traditions and government are imperiled by self-centered political ambitions and innate human limitations. However, Colm McKeogh states that it is “right to place [Niebuhr] within the Christian just war tradition, as he himself did when he aligned himself with its pragmatic wing which stressed the role of conscience and the avoidance of elaborate formula” (McKeogh 1997, p. 148). Niebuhr’s support of the war effort to overthrow Hitler’s Third Reich would undergo complicated reformulations when confronted by the Soviet Union that acquired atomic weapons after the Second World War.

Niebuhr initially justified American presence in Indochina as a necessary deterrent to Communist aggression and expansionism. As events eventually unfolded Niebuhr became disillusioned by the succession of governments and regarded the governments on both sides as tyrannies we should not support (Bennett 1982, pp. 91-94). In February of 1965, Niebuhr wrote an editorial entitled: From Supporter of War in 1941 to Critic in 1966 (Bennett 1971, p. 39). In June of the same year, the editorial board jointly signed their grave misgivings about U.S. presence in Vietnam which was entitled: U.S. Policy in Vietnam: A Statement (Editorial board, 1965, pp. 125-127). The Editors stressed that the escalation of the war effort did not thwart communist aggression from North Vietnam and were concerned that the Vietnam War would adversely affect relations between the United Sates and the Soviet Union in maintaining a sustainable peace in Asia that could forge a North Vietnamese and Chinese alliance, thus further destabilizing the balance of power in Asia. Furthermore, there was a general consensus that continuous bombing north of the 17th parallel would provoke a clash between the United
States and China. The Editorial Board’s consensus was the prevention of a general war and some form of reconciliation with the Chinese government (Editorial board 1965, p. 126). In March of the following year, the Editorial Board united in supporting their anti-war rhetoric in a declaration of protest against the nations Vietnam policy (Editorial board 1966, pp. 33-34). In reference to this emphatic denunciation against U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, John C. Bennett and Reinhold Niebuhr stated: “We opposed the war both because it is so cruelly immoral and because it is an attempt to do what American power cannot do . . . our rejection of the whole stance of our country with its counter-revolutionary in the Third World have united the members of our Board, who represent different generations” (Bennett 1971, p. 39). Niebuhr was “horrified by the cruelty of the war and the destruction that we were bringing to Vietnam. He came to give moral support to the anti-war movement in our country” (Bennett 1982, p. 93).

Niebuhr also thought it unattainable to implement a modern democratic tradition into an agrarian culture, which had neither the spiritual, political nor economic resources to inculcate traditional western democratic values and claimed that our “involvement in Vietnam was motivated by a utopian idea of democracy and freedom for the whole world and by a simple anti-Communism” (Stone 1969, pp. 48-49). Niebuhr criticized the bombing of civilians (Bennett 1982, p. 93), and was appalled at the hint of the utilization of tactical nuclear weaponry (Bennett 1982, p. 93). Ironically, Niebuhr not only opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, but also contested an “absolute withdrawal” from Asia and supported former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford’s policy, which maintained “some kind of U.S. presence in Southeast Asia” (Stone 1969, p. 49), in order to sustain a balance of power in the region. Nonetheless, in Niebuhr’s estimation, the Vietnam War substantiated an important lesson regarding the limitations of military power in establishing democracy and peace in the third world. Vietnam was one of many limited Cold War conflicts between the two superpowers. Niebuhr’s realist posture and the American Catholic Bishops anti-nuclear debate during the Cold War represented the prevailing schools of thought in America regarding the arms race and containment. The viewpoints supported by both traditions exposed the divergent views on war amidst the church community. The Pacifist incapacity to provide a rational social ethic that could challenge the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union was articulated by the American Catholic Bishops.

3.24 Niebuhr and the American Catholic Bishops: Beyond Just War

Weapons of mass destruction deem the just war tradition as outmoded; however, power politics between the two hegemonic superpowers necessitate the just war tradition in a competitive state system. Reinhold Niebuhr firmly believed that the only force that could neutralize the Communist threat was a balance of power referred to as a balance of terror or Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In his estimation, the arms race and stratagems of containment were central in maintaining peace in the international order. Niebuhr suggests that it was more essential to possess nuclear weapons than to persuade the other side not to develop nuclear weapons. The balance of power and/or the nuclear umbrella were often mentioned as the preeminent safeguards against nuclear war. Even though civilization was confronted by the possibility nuclear war, John C. Bennett pointed out that Niebuhr’s “realism did not tempt to despair. He knew that it was possible to stumble into nuclear war through a technical or political misadventure, but he felt that as long as a balance of terror was fairly stable this was not a danger on which to dwell” (Bennett 1982, p. 93).

In 1958, Niebuhr claimed that tactical warfare was as morally evil as the utilization of the ultimate nuclear yields and asserted that transportable tactical weaponry is as destructive as the bomb that fell on Nagasaki. The use of strategic and tactical weapons, Niebuhr stated, “would mean the destruction of our moral claim for our civilization” (Bennett 1982, p. 94). It should be noted that Niebuhr’s adherence to a strong defense or nuclear umbrella did not minimalize the necessity for diplomatic interaction between the two super powers. ‘First use’ and subsequent retaliation were intolerable scenarios and a spirit of détente necessitated survival; nonetheless, Soviet expansionism, according to Niebuhr, provoked the arms race to contain the Communist threat. Niebuhr’s emphasis on nuclear proliferation was an antithetical alternative to the American Catholic Bishops commitment to nonproliferation. The Bishops
stressed that genuine global peace can only be achieved by reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear stockpiles.

The American Catholic Bishops emphasized the amoral liabilities of nuclear weaponry and the arms race in the “overwhelming probability that major nuclear exchange would have no limits” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 144. 45). The Bishops perceived that their role in society was to influence the public consensus against weapons of mass destruction as an instrument of national policy. Even if military facilities are targeted the radiation fallout would kill vast numbers of the population and contaminate the atmospheric and ecological system. The Bishops categorically denounced nuclear proliferation and stipulated that, “Prevention is our only recourse” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 145. 46). The Bishops stipulated three principles regarding: 1. Counter-population warfare; 2. Initiation of nuclear war; and 3. Limited nuclear war. These axioms challenged the myth of nuclear deterrence as an effective alternative for national security.

Counter-population Warfare: The American Catholic Bishops uncompromisingly assert that “under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 147. 46). The Bishops emphasize that retaliatory action, whether nuclear or conventional, which destroy indiscriminate population centers of innocent noncombatants because of the “reckless actions of their government, must also be condemned” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 148. 47). Initiation of Nuclear War: The Bishops criticize the “concept of initiating nuclear war on however restricted a scale” (United States Catholic 1983, par. 150. 47). Another important concern was a tactical nuclear response to a conventional attack, which is “morally unjustified” and formulated a ‘no first use’ policy – the atomic bombs that were employed to curtail a land-based operation to end WWII in the Pacific theater is a determinate factor for this stipulation (United States Catholics conference 1983, par. 153. 48). Limited Nuclear War: The Bishops are skeptical about the meaning of ‘limited’ in reference to nuclear war. The word ‘limited’ is deceptive, for tactical weaponry during the heat of battle, provoke some important issues: 1. To what extent will leaders have sufficient information to ensure discrete strategic objectives during a limited nuclear exchange? 2. During a conflict can accurate decisions sustain a limited nuclear war while evading the temptation to utilize more powerful nuclear yields? 3. During the chaos and destruction of a limited nuclear exchange, will the military leaders maintain a policy of discriminate targeting? 4. What are the probabilities of tactical computer errors during a limited exchange? What are the assurances and liabilities of a technical and human error preventing or provoking a nuclear exchange? 5. What is the casualty scenario during a limited exchange? How many millions of people will die before a cessation of hostilities? And 6. What are the limits of the effects of “radiation, famine, social fragmentation and economic dislocation?” (United States Catholic conference 1983, pars. 158, 159. 49, 50). The central theme highlighting the Bishops’ debate is the sanctity of life, the dignity of humanity and the integrity of the nation state. The Bishops are neither unmindful to the dangers of communist expansionism nor discard the necessity of deterrence; however, the Bishops distinguish between a precarious peace sustained by containment policies that continuously threaten life on a global scale and a genuine peace required to maintain a stable international order. The Bishops point out that the “moral duty today is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring and to protect and preserve those key values of justice, freedom and independence which are necessary for personal dignity and national integrity” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 175. 55). The American Catholic Bishops and Reinhold Niebuhr are representative of two divergent approaches to nuclear policy objectives, but both perspectives sought international order in a precarious bipolar system.

3.25 Niebuhr and the Bishops in Retrospect

In Niebuhr’s estimation, the balance of power is necessary in a world of collective self-interest. The hope for peace and love are constrained by a contested ideology, enhanced by fanatical adherents of collective ideological policy, and is limited by man’s ‘inherent’ selfishness. Niebuhr’s moral assessment of sin and the nature of mankind in power politics evolve upon the balance of power to offset collective
self-interest. Niebuhr’s formula stressed that the fear of annihilation, not reason, preserves humanity from ultimate destruction. On the other hand the American Catholic Bishops moral axioms formulated in reference to Vatican II and the just war tradition within a progressive pluralistic ethic emphasizes the sanctity and dignity of life. The Bishops believe that reason and faith, hope and dialogue within the framework of collective cooperation will ensure global peace.

The Niebuhrian formula asserts that in a contested bipolar environment, there are natural limitations and options to maintain peaceful coexistence. In a world where power and weakness are exploited, nuclear deterrence is the only viable option. Niebuhr maintained that peace, albeit a ‘precarious peace’, is sustained by an increase of nuclear deterrence through a balance of power to contain Soviet ambitions. The balance of power between the Soviet Union and United States is the only means to thwart Soviet expansionism. The balance of power among the two superpowers will ensure international order not disorder. In contrast, the American Catholic Bishops believe the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons is the only realistic option to secure international peace. The Bishops point out that ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are ultimately counterproductive, unjustified, impractical and amoral. The potential for global destruction outweighs the artificial benefits of containment. The Bishops stressed that reductions in the nuclear arsenal, disarmament and the eventual elimination of WMD will ensure a lasting global peace.

Finally, Niebuhr’s view on war is formulated within the framework of the Christian realist tradition. All nations can be entrapped by collective self-interest. Niebuhr emphasized that power affects all nation state actors regardless of the nobility of their spiritual and political traditions. This enabled Niebuhr to be either critic or supporter of U.S. foreign policy objectives while maintaining his Protestant viewpoint and personal faith in a sustaining Divine power over the affairs of history. However, the nuclear balance of power was the lesser of the two evils when contrasted to the greater evil, Soviet communist ideology and expansionism, which threatened the very foundations of freedom and human dignity throughout the world. On the other hand the Bishops’ just war theory is formulated within the framework of the Augustinian *Tranquillitas ordinis* that maintains that socio-political order keeps things from getting worse than would be under conditions of anarchy or as George Weigel asserts: “the peace of public order in dynamic political community” (Weigel 1987, p. 31). The objective of the Augustinian just war tradition is maintaining justice and peace in a distorted world order. The American Catholic Bishops reiterate the point: “One of the criteria of the just-war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace” (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 159. 50). However, the Bishops stress that the arms race and the development of more sophisticated WMD undermine the humanitarian mandate for collective justice and peace in a competitive bipolar environment.

Significant paradigm shifts in the international order have occurred since these two viewpoints on weapons of mass destruction dominated the mainstream of debate regarding foreign policy objectives during the Cold War era. Reinhold Niebuhr’s political realism and subsequent influence on 20th century’s foreign policy is unrivaled. The American Catholic Bishops alternative response is noteworthy; nonetheless, there are many who may think that the works of Reinhold Niebuhr and the American Catholic Bishops are antiquated by the process of time. The former Soviet Union is a faint recollection, while the United States of America has maintained a semblance of its economic and military power. But today’s enemy does not play by the rules of just war. The innocent and unassuming noncombatant is as much a target of terrorism as are political and military leaders. What we learned since 9/11 is that an enemy exists who does not fear death, who has no respect for religious or civil liberties, and does not care to what extent his/her actions destabilize the international order. On this point the moral delineations endorsed by Niebuhr and the American Catholic Bishops stressed the significance of self-control when confronted by nuclear war – it is the common ground of the non-use of WMD and the amoral consequences of that society that capitulates to unleash WMD, thus opening a torrent of misguided nuclear policy among international allies and enemies alike to justify their unrestrained use of weapons of mass destruction in the name of civic self-preservation.
3.26 Augustine, Just War and the 21st Century

Throughout history, the just war tradition has been altered by the evolution of military tactics and stratagem and technologic advances of weaponry. The varied forms of just war popularized by the ancient Roman casus belli became a dominate fixture through the writings of Augustine, systematically reapplied by Thomas Aquinas, reformulated by Vatican II and redefined in the era of modern power politics. Augustine is lauded as the father of the just war doctrine, but approaches to validate his significance in our contemporary setting is complicated by the contemporary state system and weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, Augustine’s just war axioms continue to challenge and exert influence on philosophic approaches on war in the 21st century. Paul Ramsey’s War and the Christian conscience (1961) trace the moral lineage of noncombatant immunity and proportionality to the works of Augustine and Aquinas respectively, emphasizing their moral contribution to warfare polity. James Turner Johnson’s Ideology, reason, and the limitations of war (1975) categorically disconnects classical and neoclassical just war traditions. The dividing line between these two traditions is revelation on the one hand and natural law on the other. Johnson’s historical criticism of the just war tradition reevaluates an ideological pattern of thought, its dissolution and rectification and the subsequent impact the just war tradition has on succeeding generations. George Weigel’s Tranquillitas ordinis (1987) traces the Catholic just war tradition from Augustine to Vatican II and the subsequent demise of Catholic tradition on war and peace in contemporary society. Weigel maintains that the rich historicity regarding the just war theory has been overshadowed by modern philosophic and political trends that have reshaped Catholic political tradition especially in the United States. His emphasis on peace in the political community challenges contemporary power politics in a competitive world order. John Mattox’s Saint Augustine and the theory of just war (2006) stipulate that Augustine’s jus ad bellum and jus in bello are more than an intermittent ethical reflection. Mattox points out that “one must assume that his just-war pronouncements were sufficiently cogent so as to make sense to the philosophically unreflective, but nevertheless earnest and pious, fifth-century Christian soldier” (Mattox 2006, p. 7). Mattox asserts that Augustine’s genius was his ability to integrate classical, biblical, patristic, and philosophical viewpoints into a viable Western just war formulation. In essence a compilation of Augustine’s seemingly intermittent writings on just war are logical, methodical and rational reflections that formulated a continuing theory on ethics and war. Howard M. Hensel’s edited work The prism of just war (2010) suggests that Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas and the Spanish thinkers incorporated a metaphysical structure integrating ethical teleology and theocentric natural law. This framework enabled the respective theorists to develop philosophic viewpoints on morality, right intention, and individual and group responsibility to the state, state authority and the legitimate use of armed force. Hensel utilizes these theological and philosophic formulations to reinforce a congruent classical and neoclassical just war tradition.

A plethora of warfare studies from numerous secular and religious theorists mandate the importance of the just war moral theory in a world that continues to struggle with relative justice and a precarious peace in the international system. Augustine reiterates the unavoidable clash between the heavenly and earthly cities – this effects every phase of life, but is most notable between hostile conflicts among nations. Just war is a minimalist approach to restrain unnecessary bloodshed and manage the progress of war on the battlefield. The Augustinian just war tradition was not developed in an academic citadel; rather, it was a reaction to the contorted socio-political environment of Rome. The rise and fall of world leaders; the advancement of military tactics and weaponry; the tragic consequences of war which alters the course of history; the dismantling of a nation and social traditions, myriad of lives displaced by organized violence all testify that war is an appalling expression of misguided political ambition that reveals the most noble and formidable characteristics of humanity. Augustine’s formulation of human nature and sin, reiterates the dilemma of moral restraints in war and the conclusive necessity for peace to maintain a stable civic order.

The longevity of Augustine’s just war tradition is perpetuated by the context of empire and the linear digression of human nature and sin. This necessitates jus ad bellum and jus in bello axioms to confine the frantic passions of war. But collective self-interest, nation state egoism, and greed of power
afflict the noblest socio-political aspirations when national identity and civic freedoms are threatened. However forensic its postulates in a fluctuating world order, these tested axioms have endured the rise and fall of nations, and their celebrated statesmen. Like ancient Rome, our present world order is fraught with greed of power – the survival of the sovereign state actor. Both Augustine and Niebuhr confronted the political policies of their respective civic orders. Both reverted to a realist tradition recognizing the foibles of human nature and the limitations of civic institutions. And both recognized that civic stability is overshadowed by a competitive world order because it is restrained by human finiteness and selfishness, and must be delimited by *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* requisites on the one hand or a balance of power on the other.

The framework of just cause for war undergirds designated authority, right intention and civic justice and peace. The intimate link between these moral requisites stipulates a universal paradigm for leadership/decision-making necessary to determine if war is a defensive necessity, a jingoistic overreaction or foreign policy objectives influenced by economic necessity. Augustine witnessed the debilitating effects of the commandeering of authority through the reckless misadventures of the imperial army, which destabilized the civic order. Designated authority in Augustine’s thought is concerned about the inner characteristics of a leader as well as the formalities of civic authority. Essentially, just wars are fought by just sovereigns. Naturally the modern day paradigm incorporates a pluralistic world order, democratic traditions and the auspices of international organizations such as the United Nations that assist a consortium of nation states to maintain international order. Nonetheless, designated authority is indispensable at each sphere of civic interaction. It is the fundamental requisite to thwart anarchy and social chaos. Designated authority in a fragile international order is paramount to sustain the global economy, international law, and encourage religious and civic rights. The Augustinian emphasis on designated authority is the basis for governance to maintain relative justice and peace in the earthly kingdom.

The sovereign or elected official, according to Augustine, may have just cause for war, yet may abuse his power for inordinate gain. Just cause in war delimits defensive tactics from exercising their offensive capabilities. War defames the cowardly, exonerates the brave, it intensifies the spirit of ethnic hatred and denigrates the conquered. Nonetheless, human nature is prone to conquer, maintain supremacy and manipulate weakness. History is replete with noble determination in war yet twisted into reckless misadventure. War intensifies passion, hatred and survival. Augustine recognized from personal experience the cyclical returns of hate for hate as civil unrest between competing imperial army’s aggravated civic insecurity in a decaying empire. His understanding of human weakness and insecurity maintained that even the noble and principled could digress into uncontrolled passion in the heat of battle. Right intention in war is the litmus test of leadership. It exposes the inner veil of the soul, and national intent. Sooner or later history justifies or condemns the original intent of a distorted or principled war policy.

The resolve for war is civic peace for both the conqueror and the conquered. This Augustinian axiom is the overriding theme on just war moral theory. It is the fruition of the heavenly kingdom embracing the earthly city. Augustine recognized the incapacity of the earthly order to secure genuine peace that only the grace of God could provide. Yet, relative justice and relative peace are necessary for the prosperity of church and the state. Peace in the political community enhances order in a world that is perpetually on the precipice of disorder. Augustine wrote from a viewpoint of a failing empire and recognized the stabilizing effects of civic and military cooperation. If properly conducted, according to Augustine, war was not the end of peace; it was the beginning of peace.

There will always be an explicit tension between the heavenly and earthly cities. Augustine’s paradigm of civic peace is always a work in progress. Warfare that perpetuates hostilities and distrust, even after the war has been officially terminated, is an unjust war. This seems to be the case in a globalized society, which recognizes the escalation of friction among elite state actors. The modern international order adheres to a global interdependent economy, the auspices of international organizations, the structures of international law, and threat of economic sanctions to maintain harmony.
and thwart war in a fragile world order. Nonetheless, war has once again become a means to an end, a source of customary policy to maintain national security among the consort of nations.

3.27 Conclusion

When does a just war in the international order become a means to an end? Where is the dividing line between just cause in war and nation state collective self-interest? These were issues that Reinhold Niebuhr deliberated upon during World War II and the Cold War era when hegemonic expansionism and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union disrupted world peace. The bipolar environment was fraught with the unprecedented escalation of WMD, clandestine operations, propaganda and limited war scenarios throughout the international order. The Cold War exemplified the frigid formalities of distrust, suspicion and blatant skepticism between the two superpowers. When questioning the friction between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, my former professor Russian Ambassador Roland Timerbaev (ret) reiterated that the “escalation of American nuclear power was alarming, and fearful . . . what else could we do?” Both the Soviet Union and the United States claimed the moral high-ground. Both the Soviet Union and the United States denounced each other as deceiving and misleading the world. Both superpowers claimed the righteous cause of their policies to liberate the oppressed. It was Reinhold Niebuhr, who articulated the incentives of national self-interest and the exploitation of power to secure grand strategic objectives.

The present international order is also a fragmented multi-polar environment, maintained by fragile alliances, which are undergirded by delicate economic incentives. The United States maintains a global leadership role, but has been likened to a ‘tiger without teeth’ in trade wars with nations the United States has unwittingly developed as future economic and military rivals. No less than a decade into the 21st century the United States has fought two costly wars in the Middle East. The terrorist threat is real and has cost American lives, and unfortunately denigrated American international prestige. The result of the Afghan and Iraqi war is a sluggish and impotent U.S. economy tottering upon the brink of another global recession. The United States government deliberately ignored sovereignty state rights and protocol by killing Osama bin Laden outside the mandatory expediencies of international law. Political realism recognizes the advantages of economic and military power. Niebuhr’s Christian and political realism deliberates on the necessity and restraint of that power. Niebuhr also denounced Communist ideology and expansionism, but also warned the United States against self-righteous agendas, the arrogance of power politics and national collective self-interest – at what point does a just cause digress into an excuse for coercive action and national egoism? Niebuhr summarized the necessity of a balanced national polity, and articulated the maxim that “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (Niebuhr 1947, p. xi). His vindication of democracy did not negate state actor limitations when collective selfishness abuses its national and international privileges. Within this framework the Clausewitzian war policy will set the stage for the total war tradition and its effect on the First and Second World Wars. The Clausewitzian war tradition is the background in regards to Niebuhr’s views on U.S. foreign policy to thwart the Nazi and Communist threat, nuclear weaponry, power balance politics and the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic tradition. Crucial elements from this scenario will provide an application of Augustine’s *jus ad bellum* and Niebuhr’s criticism of the limitations of nation state power in the nuclear age in regards to the liberal democratic tradition.

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1 Ambassador Roland Timerbaev is a Russian diplomat, who has served the former Soviet Union and Russian Federation in many crucial diplomatic posts throughout his celebrated career. As a world expert in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, and one of the founding fathers of the Non Proliferation Treaty, Ambassador Timerbaev has served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR/Russian Federation Mission to Vienna and the United Nations. Also Ambassador Timerbaev participated in negotiating the NPT, the ABM treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and other arms control agreements (CPSR n.d.).
CHAPTER IV

4.1 Reinhold Niebuhr: Just War and Nuclear Realities

The aftereffects of war alter the socio-political trends of history. Its very nature facilitates hostility, hatred, bloodshed and retaliation between contending forces. The dynamic of war is the inevitable and unavoidable clash between the heavenly and earthly cities. The heavenly city’s moral posture on church and state relations during the \textit{Pax Romana} gradually digressed as church policy was supported by secular authority to thwart the tide of moral laxity in a decaying empire. The adage that ‘power corrupts’ afflicts both church and state. In retrospect, the church in the High Middle Ages succumbed to coercive force to sustain church policy. The holy war policy desensitized the moral assessments of ecclesiastical authority in particular and the church in general. Warfare between the Catholic and Protestant communities revealed the spiritual corruption that had permeated western civilization. Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645) summarizes the point:

\begin{quote}
I have had many and weighty reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up; there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly let loose for the committing of all crimes (Grotius, \textit{Prolegomena} XXVIII, cf., Hensel 2010, p. 87).
\end{quote}

The demise of the Holy Roman Empire was eventually superseded by the nation state system. The ancient tribal ethnicities defended their geopolitical entitlements and approved their preference for either the Catholic or Protestant tradition. The royal monarchies were the undisputed representatives of a developing nation state system. War had become an instrument of civic policy. The church, the arbiter of truth and righteousness more often endorsed the call-to-arms than speak against the demoralizing effects of unjust cause for war. The church was powerless to unify the contentious royal factions in Europe and create an atmosphere of justice and civic peace. The classical just war tradition reformulated by Augustine and revitalized by Aquinas was eventually restructured within the framework of natural and international law. The time-honored influence of Vegetius was outmoded by technologic advances in weaponry, and a new world order. The art of war was a business and a science. National objectives were intertwined with expansionistic policies. Colonialism enabled the monarchy the economic resources to sustain political power in the new world order. The intimate corollaries between political agendas and warfare stratagem are clarified by Carl von Clausewitz’s classical maxim that “war is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 7). Unlike Vegetius, Clausewitz’s observations on warfare were in the field of battle. His examination of the art of war sets the stage for Niebuhr’s political realism, the nature of man and the threat of collective national egoism in the international arena. The misapplication of power politics during the restructuring of the international system came to fruition during the life-time of Reinhold Niebuhr. The First and Second World Wars accelerated war science and the devastating force of total war. Hitler’s German Nationalist Party was eventually superseded by Stalinist Communism, which redefined the parameters of conventional warfare within a bipolar framework. The Cold War was no longer a stalemate between two contending superpowers, but a potential nuclear holocaust that threatened civilization.

The 20th century was fraught with two devastating world wars and a Cold War that polarized the international community. The prevailing mood of human perfectibility and innocence was obliterated by the brutalities of global conflict, the ruthlessness of which even now stagers the imagination. That such pitiless barbarism could be on display in the modern era was a stunning revelation to many. Amidst the rapidly changing world order in the 20th century, Reinhold Niebuhr postulated the political and
philosophical underpinnings for a nation and the free world confronted by Nazi and Communist tyranny. Niebuhr displayed courage and resolve to guide a nation to the heavenly city while recognizing the friction and turmoil of its earthly sojourn. Niebuhr’s candid Christian realist interpretation permeated both religious and secular thought alike. His persona was bigger than life, to some the most articulate American theologian, while others lauded him prophetic status, and yet others denounced Niebuhr’s Christian political realism as a secularist mandate for war. Even so, Niebuhr warned, rebuked and guided a nation through the challenging socio-economic and socio-political issues of the 20th century.

Niebuhr witnessed the brutal effects of both the First and Second World Wars. The delicate balance of power between the European powers during the First World War was surpassed by the backlash of Nazi aggression after the Treaty of Versailles as Hitler’s military forces invaded Europe. While German nationalism initiated two world wars, the misapplication of Carl von Clausewitz warfare science provided the philosophic basis that sustained the militant application of a bellicose state actor. Clausewitz is the father of modern warfare science. His insight into warfare science is considered a standard text for contemporary military tactics and leadership.

4.2 Carl Von Clausewitz and the Mindset of War

Carl Von Clausewitz’s (1780 – 1831) composition Vom Kriege “On war” is the standard military text, reformulating the philosophical and pragmatic dimensions on warfare. Clausewitz, a soldier and military theorist, writing from personal experience during the Napoleonic offensives, molded subsequent generations’ interpretive applications on the policy of modern warfare. However, the modernist criticism of this masterpiece is contingent upon viable facts. First and foremost, On war was a work in progress, which the author intended to refine before succumbing to the perils of war. 2. Clausewitz wrote from the context of monarchical power and leadership, rather than our modern state actor democratic tradition. This influenced his views on the unique relationship between military and civil authority regarding the recurrent process of war. 3. On war emphasized, as did Vegetius’ “Epitome of military science”, the primacy of land forces, but had little to say about naval operations, and 4. Conventional air power, nuclear weaponry, sophisticated conventional war technology, the multifunctional dimensional responsibilities of the modern military, and an unstable and competitive global system were incomprehensible in his time (Cimbala 2001, pp. 11, 15-16).

Nonetheless, the treatise On war has withstood the test of time. Colin S. Gray summarizes the point that “Clausewitz bequeathed to posterity a body of thought on war that is more persuasive by far than is anybody of thought by a rival theorist, or even rival camp of theorists” (Gray 1999, p. 75). However, like any masterpiece the challenges of interpretation and application are slanted within the era in which it is applied. Jan Willem Honig’s brief textual criticism regarding On war, expands upon this issue comparing the modern English translation of Michael Howard and Peter Paret, which was written during the Cold War period, which subjugated the science of warfare to politics, while previous translations succumbed to a more militaristic view (Strachan & Herberg-Rothe 2007, pp. 69-73). Hew Strachan expands this point that prior to the First World War the emphasis gleaned from Clausewitz by the German military leaders was on strategy and tactics. However, at the end of the First World War the focus on Clausewitz was the relation of war and civil policy – the “lesson the inquiry drew from Clausewitz was the need for military subordination to political control” (Strachan 2011, p. 387). The reorganization and redevelopment of German military stratagem and policy after World War I, complicated by the treaty of Versailles and the resentment of German nationalism after the World War I, once again extrapolated from Clausewitz that the answer to the problem of military and political strategic direction lay in the concentration of powers in a supreme leader (Strachan 2011, p. 389). The Feldherr or “true supreme commander” came into fruition in Adolf Hitler’s firm grasp of power in the German Nationalist party. In light of this Hew Strachan states that when “Hitler cited Clausewitz in Mein Kampf, he quoted the 1812 memoranda, not On War. In due course Clausewitz would be co-opted into the Nazi pantheon” (Strachan 2011, p. 384).
In both the First and Second World Wars, German military planning focused on Clausewitz’s content at the expense of its context. Civic and military leaders have often adjusted the intent and interpretation of On war to their peculiar era. The compulsion during times of war is to take premises out of context, which can misconstrue the principles intended by its author. The trends of contemporary society often influence civil political mindsets and policies. Colonel William Black illustrates the point: “‘Eternal peace’ wrote Molten on December 11th, 1880, to Professor Bluntschli, ‘is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; courage and selflessness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in materialism’” (Balc 1911, p. 1). The prevailing mood among the general population, intelligentsia and governing authorities was that warfare was a customary policy to settle international disputes. Nevertheless, Clausewitz was not a demagogue of war, but a realist about the purposes and passions and tragedies of warfare. The author understood the indispensable balance between war and politics to secure the best results in a campaign between two antagonistic nation states. Clausewitz also recognized the negative consequences of warfare and egocentric political agendas (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.1.11.81). It would be unfeasible to abbreviate the numerous theories without doing injustice to the overall depiction that portrays Clausewitz’s interpretation of warfare. Nonetheless, the intimate relationship of friction among hostile forces that causes war, the inevitable cause and effect and escalation during war, is a testament that in power politics, regardless of its era, even a judicious utilization of its necessity, can be a façade for geopolitical expediency. What then are the links between Clausewitzian war theory and Niebuhr’s political realism? What were the causes that facilitated an unbridled escalation of war and eventually the arms race in the 20th century? The Clausewitzian era not only witnessed the change in warfare tactics and the strategic force of political agendas, but also the complications of power balances to secure international harmony among the European nations.

4.3 Carl Von Clausewitz and the Polity of Warfare

The budding nation state system and the Napoleonic war initiated a jingoistic reaction that both government and peoples alike had an invested interest in the processes and outcomes of war policy. The nature of Napoleonic hegemonic conquest unleashed total war scenarios, which exposed the finest and vilest attributes in human nature on the battlefield. While the theory of war throughout history illustrates the complexities of human relationships, especially among hostile forces, warfare is an underlying extension in the overall grand strategy of national policy. War, according to Clausewitz, in itself is an extension of political goals and agendas. War is the end-game, the results of a failed diplomacy, or a fierce form of nation state interaction that is resolved by bloodshed. Clausewitz states: in “short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.6. 607). War is a formal declaration of unsuccessful communication between state actors to avert organized violence; the result is a national response that incorporates the entire resources of a country.

The Clausewitzian ‘trinity’ composed of peoples, military power and government policy is the fundamental formula, the culmination of action to organize a nation for warfare (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.1.28. 89). It is also a precursor to modern power politics. Modern warfare is a unified effort involving human resources and military science and supplemented by economic power, which is regulated, restrained or even unconstrained by government policy. Within this context, war is neither a means unto itself, an autonomous law of self-regulation, nor an irrational action of brute force, but an extension of nation state grand strategic objectives. However, Clausewitz stresses that political ambitions and aims create war (Clausewitz 1984, pp. 8.6. 606, 607). Also, while the political agendas influence the intensity of the military campaign, it is also government policy that neutralizes the military to circumvent unwarranted civic chaos. In a more modern formulation war and civic polity is the quintessential balance of power between these two vital forces during the development of the 18th and 19th centuries’ nation state system. Clausewitz, the philosopher soldier, developed a philosophic model that maintained the nation...
state system, in order to sustain viable checks and balances among fragile alliances to prevent hegemonic expansionism and conquest.

Even though Clausewitz wrote from an unstable hegemonic order because Europe was confronted by Napoleonic conquest, it was perceivable that this circumstance influenced the innovative changes in military science and tactics. Like the Peloponnesian war, which altered the face of campaign and battle, so also, Napoleonic conquest altered the face of campaign and battle. Ethnic jingoism plunged Europe into hegemonic disarray. It is within this framework that the art of war in its traditional offensive and defensive strategic nuances was the impetus of the total war scenario or as Clausewitz asserted “the pure element of enmity unleashed” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.6. 605). However, Clausewitz is adamant about the appropriate relationship between government and military policy, in Clausewitz’s estimation, the relationship between war and political agendas are inseparably linked in order to maintain civic order during a military campaign. War by nature is organized chaos. Its effectiveness is ultimately dependent upon clearly thought-out and well-planned political objectives, which do not overextend military capabilities (Clausewitz 1984, pp. 8.3.B. 585, 586). Clausewitz points out that war is not an end of itself. It is not the embodiment of self-law, but an extension of political goals, hence, “war is only a branch of political activity that it is in no sense autonomous” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.6. 605), but a definitive instrument of civic polity to secure political objectives. What then is the line of demarcation between war and civic policy? Clausewitz states that “[o]nce again war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own issues” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.6. 610). In other words, warfare policy is an interdependent socio-political instrument reliant upon the general populace, which undergirds its economic provisions and sustains its military man-power on the one hand and government policy, which directs its purpose and intensity during the campaign to either a successful or unsuccessful conclusion of the military campaign on the other.

Clausewitz’s philosophic premises regarding military and state policy was revolutionary. In a world where the general populace was expected to service the state in war with diminutive rights, his reasoning restructured the relationship between the state, military and civilian powers. However, the subordinate role of the army to the state was an anomaly at best. Nonetheless, Clausewitz has been criticized as the father of the total war doctrine, rather than the progenitor of military and civic relations. It is within this framework that Clausewitz suggests that war between civilized nations augments political objectives and the military force against the enemy state. In essence “[w]ar, therefore, is an act of policy” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.1.23. 86). The political aim regulates the military campaign. How then do we rationalize the jingoistic carry-over from Clausewitz’s Napoleonic era to the First and Second World Wars? In the Middle Ages nations hired mercenaries or professional armies irrespective of their nationality. But after the demise of the Roman and Holy Roman Empires, ethnic tribes eventually galvanized into the respective nation state. The spirit of nationalism was rife among Europeans ardently supporting the state. The Napoleonic war further enhanced the spirit of jingoism; peoples and leaders as well as secular and religious institutions, ardently supported government objectives in times of war and peace. The fundamental issue about war according to Clausewitz is that government policy, not the military, enacts war. Clausewitz proposes that “policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.6.B. 607). In fact, the blurred relationship between political agendas and the warfare campaign is clearly delineated in Clausewitz’s mind. In other words the intricate relationship between warfare and government policy is only superseded by the fundamental aspects of warfare tactics on the field of battle in order to secure grand strategic objectives. While the evolution regarding the art of war and political objectives determined in both ancient and modern societies, the manner and extent in which battles are fought, the goals and aims of national war policy and their various rationales are essentially the same – the quest for geopolitical dominance undergirded by economic and military power. In light of Clausewitz’s keen observations on the interdependence between war and government policy, Reinhold Niebuhr further elucidates the point that “every nation is caught in the moral paradox of refusing to go to war unless it can be proved that the national interest is imperiled, and of
continuing in the war only by proving that something much more than national interests is at stake. . . .

Every nation must come to terms with the fact that, though the force of collective self-interest is so great, that national policy must be based upon it” (Niebuhr 1952, pp. 36, 37). The relationship between Clausewitz’s military theory and Niebuhr’s political realist tradition is grounded within the framework of economic and military power.

4.4 Carl Von Clausewitz, Reinhold Niebuhr and Political Realism

Clausewitz states when “whole communities go to war—whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples—the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy” (Clausewitz 1984, pp. I.1.23. 86, 87). The political objectives and demands determine the escalation of force in war (Clausewitz 1984, p. 8.B. 585). The political aims determine the strengths and limitations of state resources to accomplish the task during war (Clausewitz 1984, pp. 8.B. 585, 586). Within this framework a nation state’s military objective and all that it includes is solely dedicated to defeat the enemy. How an enemy is defeated is the issue at hand. The wide-ranging warfare stratagems such as preventive or preemptive warfare, Blitz Krieg, limited or total war scenarios are calculated within a nation’s grand strategic scheme to secure geopolitical objectives. It is within this context that Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’ is a precursor to modern power politics, and the interdependent relationship that incorporates the general populace, military power and government leadership. Nineteenth century power politics set the stage for the total war scenario in both the First and Second World Wars. Twentieth century European warfare was no longer a private monarchical affair; rather it was a unified effort enlisting the support and maintenance of the entire nation. It is within this historical milieu and viewpoint that Niebuhr developed Christian realist schemes to confront the pending perils of global conflict – nuclear warfare.

The reality of war is bloodshed and death. The aim of war is to defeat the enemy. The war campaign is essentially an extension of political objectives. In regards to the moral fabric of European society, Clausewitz’s points out that the “invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.1.3. 76). In a similar vein of thought Albert Einstein stated that the “unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes” (Partington 1996, p. 268). The Clausewitzian total war scenario within the nuclear age is a global calamity. Both the First and Second World Wars illustrate the obsolete nature of conventional warfare when unrestrained force was utilized to obliterate the enemy to secure an unconditional surrender. While Niebuhr abhorred the monarchical feud that initiated the Great War, his pacifist demeanor was altered when Hitler’s Nazism challenged and refuted the very ideals and values of American freedom and democracy. The Wilsonian mandate for a union of free democratic European nations was rescinded by the Treaty of Versailles, which only incited German nationalism on the one hand and the eventual standoff with Stalinist Communism on the other. Niebuhr believed in just war to fight the evils of Nazism and a nuclear balance of terror to thwart communist expansionism. Niebuhr states:

The resulting stalemate in nuclear weapons has introduced one hopeful element into this world contest. It has prompted both sides both to realize and to admit that the other side is not intent on war. On our part this changes the whole posture of defense against an inevitable catastrophic war, which was prompted by the dubious analogy between Nazi and the communist tyrannies, and the resultant conviction that the communist system could not gain victories except by military adventures (Niebuhr 1958a, p. 59).

It is ironic that a Pastor from Detroit would develop the political philosophical underpinnings that would sustain the western Christian tradition and foreign policy objectives in the 20th century and beyond. Niebuhr’s interpretation of power as it related to the bipolar environment within a Cold War framework
has ramifications for the 21st century as well. While the current international system encounters economic inconsistencies and geopolitical competition, the expediencies of collective power posturing continue to challenge the liberal theory of interdependent economies and nation state cooperation (Gilpin 1987, p. 172). The judicious utilization of economic and military power is a constant challenge among nations especially among elite state actors. The First and Second World Wars changed the terrain of power politics, which was redefined by the advent of atomic weaponry and the development of ‘deterrence’ and ‘containment’ policies that espoused the nuclear balance of power to thwart capitalist and communist expansion.

4.5 Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian Realism and the Balance of Power

The Second World War opened a new chapter in Niebuhr’s evaluation of man’s responsibility to the national and international system. Nazi nationalism and Marxist utopianism within the framework of a radical communist totalitarian state alarmed Niebuhr that an ideological class struggle of global proportions confronted and threatened the free world. Niebuhr’s socialist/pacifist sympathies were aggravated and superseded by the radical militaristic Communist expansionism after the post-World War II era. Niebuhr’s endeavor to curb domestic economic injustice through a balance of power between the working class and corporate powers, and his anti-pacifist stance in regards to the Nazi and Communist ideologies, was foundational to the development of political realism’s influence that revolutionized the U.S. foreign policy objectives after the Second World War.

When Niebuhr entered the public arena the social gospel was a half-century movement that emphasized human innocence, perfectibility and virtue. It initiated the civil rights movement and established a social ethics tradition with an optimistic idealism that love and cooperation could solve all the struggles and complications confronting the domestic and international order. In essence humanity was the arbiter and judge of history. Niebuhr’s emphasis on sin, man’s innate creatureliness, self-love, self-interest, and self-righteous nationalism challenged the prevalent Protestant school of thought that was unable to grapple with the realities of the First and Second World Wars. Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. elaborates:

[Niebuhr’s] emphasis on sin startled my generation, brought up on optimistic convictions of human innocence and perfectibility. But nothing had prepared us for Hitler, Stalin, the Holocaust, concentration camps and gulags. Human nature was evidently as capable of depravity as of virtue. . . Traditionally, the idea of the frailty of man led to the demand for obedience to ordained authority. But Niebuhr rejected that ancient conservative argument. Ordained authority, he showed, is all the more subject to the temptations of self-interest, self-deception and self-righteousness. Power must be balanced by power (Schlesinger Jr. 1992).

Richard M. Fried states in his book Nightmare in red that Niebuhr “posited the relevance to politics of the notion of ‘original sin’. He warned of man’s will to power, a menace that could never be eliminated, and of the fallacy of utopian thought, which failed to take human weakness into account. Communist, he argued, were the worst offenders” (Fried 1990, p. 65). Niebuhr’s view of original sin maintained that human perfectibility was an illusion; however, rejecting the doctrine of total depravity, Niebuhr states that the “disposition to hide self-interest behind the façade of pretended devotion to values, transcending self-interest, is well-nigh universal. It is, moreover, an interesting human characteristic, proving that the concept of ‘total depravity’. . . is erroneous” (Niebuhr 1953, p. 120). His rejection of the Augustinian/Lutheran tenet of total depravity was not an attempt to pacify any particular school of thought. Rather, the ramifications regarding man’s ability to discern evil, recognize and perform the good regardless of how pretentious his/her motives, has definitive consequences in Niebuhr’s political realism. The litmus test justifying conflict against tyranny is the recognition that humanity is held accountable for a wrong course of decision-making and action. The fact that mankind is able to discern right from wrong justifies corrective action in the national and international system, which is best served by a balance of
power in its respective socio-economic and socio-political domains. However, a judicious use of power must be tempered by virtue. Niebuhr elaborates that the “facts about human nature which make a monopoly of power dangerous and a balance of power desirable are understood in neither theory but are understood from the standpoint of the Christian faith” (Niebuhr 1953, p. 100). \(^1\) Humanity’s recognition of God in history, the consequences of irrational abuses of national and international power, the pride of humankind in light of the eternal grace of God should humble the statesman, the leader and laymen alike regarding the eternal resources of wisdom in God in light of the frailties of life in the nuclear age. It is within this framework that one of Niebuhr’s less quoted statements provides insight to his view of nation power. Niebuhr states: “The most perennial heresy in the life of mankind is the worship of the nation as if it were God” (Niebuhr 1958b, p. 45). Nations like their institutional traditions are restricted by the innate limitations of humankind. A just nation and governing institutions are the byproduct of just men and women, which are kept responsibly functional in their specific sphere by equilibrium of power in their respective spheres of responsibility.

Niebuhr emphasized that the two fundamental power structures in society are economic and political, and that the political structure within a capitalist framework is often regulated by economic interests. However, between the socio-economic or socio-political forces, politics is the most contentious because it inevitably is an action or reaction of power between contending forces. Niebuhr suggested in 1933 that “... society... merely cumulates the egoism of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that the egoism of the group has a double force. For this reason no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of power” (Niebuhr 1933, p. 363; cf., Kegley and Bretall 1965, p. 168). Since economic and political inequalities of privilege are the result of disproportions of power, the consequence to procure and maintain relative justice through a balance of power incites conflict between contending forces. Niebuhr asserted that the

...very essence of politics is the achievement of justice through equilibria of power. A balance of power is not conflict; but a tension between opposing forces underlies it. Where there is tension there is potential conflict, and where there is conflict there is potential violence. A responsible relationship to the political order, therefore, makes an unqualified disavowal of violence impossible. There may always be crises in which the cause of justice will have to be defended against those who will attempt its violent destruction (Niebuhr 1935, p. 116).

Within the international arena, group pride or collective behavior within the parameters of national policy, such as the Nazi or Communist ideology can only be neutralized through a balance of power. Unlike the Clausewitzian total war scenario, which is a non-optional principle in the nuclear era, the moral force of an equilibrium of power between contending forces, and the collective guilt of utilizing weapons of mass destruction elucidates Niebuhr’s mandate for peace through a judicious use of military power. Niebuhr’s fundamental viewpoint regarding a balance of power in order to sustain social justice in the national system was a pre-Second World War concept. However, when applied in the nuclear era, it was precariously susceptible to the advent of weapons of mass destruction and, the illogicality and irrational actions of humankind when confronted by imminent destruction.

The Cold War with its inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) gravely altered the constraints of modern warfare. Limited war scenarios were backed by the two superpowers vying for hegemonic global superiority. The adage “if you are not with us, you are against us” divided the global community. The fundamental divide that provoked the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear holocaust

\(^1\) The two theories that Reinhold Niebuhr alludes to are classical economics (capitalism) contrasted to the Marxist theory. Niebuhr states: “There are in fact two secular theories of the community and only one of them obviously makes for totalitarianism; the one theory, the thesis of classical economics, was held by the middle classes. The Marist theory was the weapon of the industrial classes. They both make faulty analysis of the human situation. But the classical theory provides for a multiplicity of powers and the Marxist theory leads to a monopoly of power” (Niebuhr 1953, pp. 99-100).
was ideological in nature. Niebuhr firmly believed that communism was the embodiment of evil and in 1950 asserted that our involvement in the Cold War with the Soviet Union is more than a “... mere political power. It is the ‘fatherland’ of a political religion which had transmuted the prophets of a utopian faith into tyrannical priest-kings of a vast system of exploitation” (Niebuhr 1950, p.66). Niebuhr perceived that Marxist utopianism amalgamated with a militant Stalinist ideology enhanced an aggressive fanatical response among its adherents to utilize any means of power to promulgate their global ambitions. It was determined that communism was a “foe who embodies all the evils of a demonic religion” (Niebuhr, 1954a, p. 1). Niebuhr’s sophisticated Christian anti-Communism influenced American perceptions regarding the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’ with unbridled ambitions to destabilize the global order. John C. Bennett states that “[Niebuhr] has been criticized for being the one who more than anyone else provided Christian legitimization of the cold war” (Bennett 1982, p. 92). However, despite the utter distrust of Soviet policy, Niebuhr always insisted on the “necessity of coexistence with the Soviet Union” (Bennett 1982, p. 92). Niebuhr recognized throughout the Cold War, that the price to be paid for a peaceful coexistence was “firmness against communism, on the one hand, and the willingness to ease tensions, on the other” (Niebuhr 1954b, p. 98). The firmness of which Niebuhr alluded to was the utilization of atomic weaponry as a deterrent to a Soviet attack (Niebuhr 1951, p. 1). Niebuhr’s support to utilize nuclear weaponry against Communist expansionism was rhetorical in nature and the prevailing mood of U.S. foreign policy, and the international political community at large. An understanding of deterrence levels illustrates how the Cold War influenced the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States’ deterrence policy has been categorized by Herman Kahn into six levels.

(1) minimum: a relatively small deterrence that depends on nuclear taboos—the inconveniences suffered by both sides, the sanctity of thresholds, and a variety of unreliable attack mechanisms; (2) workable: a capacity of inflicting millions of casualties on the enemy and of destroying vital property; (3) adequate: a reliable threat to kill 5 to 10 percent of a population; (4) reliable: the killing of more than 33 percent of the population; (5) approaching absolute: the killing of between half and 200 percent, which, for all practical purposes, means the end of the world; (6) stark: overkill by a factor of ten or more that would convince anyone that their use would be cataclysmic(Ali 1989, p. 49).

Deterrence served a twofold purpose: first in Niebuhr’s estimation “the power of its deterrent gives us time to perfect our ideological and military defenses all over the world where the Russian power is probing and pressing” (Niebuhr 1957, p. 113). Niebuhr asserted as early as 1951 that the “more solid chance of avoiding war still lies in achieving such a preponderance of political, moral and military strength that the Soviets would not risk an attack” (Niebuhr 1951, p. 1). Also a nuclear stalemate would deter both superpowers to initiate a massive nuclear attack because a “large scale war would be suicidal for both victors and vanquished” (Niebuhr 1956, p. 81). Niebuhr states:

The theory has been that arms races lead inevitably to conflict. But here we are depending for a kind of security upon the preservation of an uneasy stalemate in the production of guided missiles and nuclear weapons. We are not at all safe because either side may stumble into the big war while engaging in the many tussles between the two systems in every part of the world. But at least both sides seem intent upon avoiding the big war and recognize that the foe is equally intent on the objective (Niebuhr 1956, p. 81).

The philosophical underpinnings of the balance of power or better stated a balance of terror depicts the nature of nuclear warfare and the unstable relationship between the United States and the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. After the deaths of Stalin and Khrushchev and the Cuban missile crisis debacle, the two superpowers altered their militaristic views within the parameters of limited deterrence and the formalistic overtures of détente. However, the U.S.-Vietnam War (1955 – 1975), the Soviet-Afghan War (December 27 1979 – February 15 1989), the lingering Cold War tensions between
the Stalinist regime in North Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea, Iraq, Iran and numerous bipolar skirmishes among the second and third worlds exemplified the distrust and cynicism between east and west relations since the 20th century. Niebuhr revived the classical realist tradition with a modernist emphasis that stipulated humankind’s innate limitation in every aspect of social interaction, especially within the international order. The preservation of state autonomy within a decentralized state system is beyond power balances, the rational capacity of man or the will-of-survival among state actors. It is the realization that God’s redemptive grace is at work in human history.

4.6 Niebuhr, Power, the Sovereign State and War

Reinhold Niebuhr reiterated and reformulated the classical realist tradition in a contemporary context. His emphasis on original sin, the nature of man, and human accountability as the central motif, the underlying and reoccurring pattern regarding power, power balances in the economic and political spheres, is a consistent principle that facilitates a critical evaluation of state sovereignty and the state system without forfeiting Christian ethical norms regarding state actions. Niebuhr’s view on the nature of humanity focuses on the individual actor. Man is not simply a reflection of social norms or state polity. Man is endowed with free will to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘evil’, and is also accountable for decisions and actions in the domestic, civic and international spheres. The self-sacrificing principle of love, the essence of community, however, is eventually eclipsed by collective self-interest. The intense rivalry between groups of collective self-interest is an unavoidable contest of power. When shifting from national to international politics the friction within and among state actors intensifies. The international state system becomes a contest of ideological superiority, economic strength and military power. It is within this framework that Niebuhr eloquently defends the virtues of American democracy. Despite the struggles of the democratic tradition to insure justice, the strength of democracy to safeguard justice is its system of checks and balances; this denies any person or group of people the unrestricted power to dominate the economic and political orders, while allowing a mechanism for self-criticism, which is still evident in the American democratic tradition. Niebuhr states:

But modern democracy requires a more realistic philosophical and religious basis, not only in order to anticipate and understand the perils to which it is exposed, but also to give it a more persuasive justification. Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary. In all nondemocratic political theories the state or the ruler is invested with uncontrolled power for the sake of achieving order and unity of community. But the pessimism which prompts and justifies this policy is not consistent; for it is not applied, as it should be, to the ruler. If men are inclined to deal unjustly with their fellows, the possession of power aggravates this inclination. That is why irresponsible and uncontrolled power is the greatest source of injustice (Niebuhr 1947, pp. xi-xii).

The concept of power is a primary motif in Niebuhr’s realist formulation, in regards to individual action, state actor and state system polity. The autonomous nature of the state actor in a competitive state system intensifies aggressive grand strategic policies among nations. The traditional boundaries in the modern state system have been superseded by unprecedented economic and military power. Niebuhr reflected upon the effect of state power, which redefined hegemonic and global ambitions. The multipolar balance of power between the First and Second World Wars, and the postwar era on the one hand and the bipolar contest between the United States and the Soviet Union on the other, in his opinion, provide distinctive insights regarding the correlation between power and war. Niebuhr evaluates power, the state and war within a multipolar and bipolar tradition. Niebuhr articulated the defense and criticism of the democratic tradition, which was capsulated in two celebrated treatises: The children of light and the children of darkness and The irony of American history. In these distinguished works, Niebuhr’s optimism and fears, apprehensions and hopes, as well as faith in the ultimate culmination of history is intertwined with the merciful providences of God. The insights provided a firm foundation for further delineations on international relations theory.

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The viewpoint concerning the construct of American democracy is summarized by Niebuhr: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary”. It is both a commendation regarding man’s determination for justice and truth and condemnation of mankind’s inclination to control and manipulate and denigrate humanity. While democracy is a dynamic composite of civic responsibility, an intelligent educated constituency with a moral and religious foundation and tradition; it is also influenced by elements of self-love and self-interest, which intensifies the contest for power at every level of human interaction. Niebuhr believed that the contest for power is an individual dilemma compounded by various competitive circumstances and unalterable force when collective interests attempt to effect or manipulate economic or political policy in its favor (Niebuhr 1947, p. 143).

While democracy affords the best opportunity for justice, Niebuhr had scant confidence in the aggressive nature of the state actor. He points out that every “nation has its own form of spiritual pride” and that “nations have always been constitutionally self-righteous” (Niebuhr 1952, pp. 28, 146). In fact, in reference to America, Niebuhr states that “Our own culture is schizophrenic upon the subject of power” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 5). The temptation of the hegemonic state actor to embrace power in its various nuances while denying its inherent national limitations is a precipitous step toward national idolatry. This was the probable failure of Communism, which lauded that state and the working class as judge and savior of society and history. The values and traditions of American democracy are not immune to imperialistic ambition or expansionism to procure national and international assets.

Niebuhr promoted the concept regarding the ‘anarchy among the community of nations’ through the aggressive friction among elite state actors during and after the post-Second World War era. The redistribution of dominant state actors in the post-World War II era altered the multipolar world order with Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States as the primary powers in the international community. Niebuhr claims that the community of states would be destabilized by “international chaos, slightly qualified by minimal forms of international cooperation” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 153). In fact, it was emphasized that the “problem of overcoming this chaos and of extending the principle of community to worldwide terms has become the most urgent of all the issues which face our epoch” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 153).

The European system, familiarized to jingoism, persistent shifting power balances, definitive boundaries and expansionism, economic and geographic acquisitions through the polity of warfare, and the mindset of centuries of distrust, fear and hate, had to adapt itself to a modified world order that necessitated cooperation among traditional rivals. The new order, the international state system, a revised multipolar system enhanced by technological advances and economic cooperation, necessitated international cooperation to maintain justice and order. Nonetheless, Niebuhr emphasized that state autonomy or “the pride of nations” is averse to acquiesce to universal moral demands, or the alluring benefits of international cooperation when confronted by perceived threats to national security. Niebuhr suggests: “We may live for quite a long time in a period of history in which a potential world community, failing to become actual, will give rise to global, rather than limited, conditions of international anarchy and in which the technics of civilization will be used to aggregate the fury of conflict” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 162).

Niebuhr suggests several elements that support ‘anarchy’ or the threat of international disorder in the global community: 1. Technological advances in weaponry, logistical and communications support. This modern development enables the elite state actors’ undeniable access to any part of the geopolitical and geo-economic world market. 2. The dominant elite state actors have power to maintain their national security objectives without “binding commitments to the common interests of all nations” (Niebuhr 1947, pp. 160, 162). Niebuhr asserts that domineering state actors will be “powerful enough to create systems of unilateral security, which will not be adequate for the preservation of peace, but will seem adequate for

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1Reinhold Niebuhr states: “No democratic society can afford to capitulate to the pride of dominant groups. The final end of such appeasement is the primitivistic homogeneity of Nazism” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 143). This fundamental axiom would later define Niebuhr’s concept of the balance of power to thwart communist tyranny.
their own protection” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 171), and 3. Niebuhr stressed the inherent limitations of weaker state actors to nullify the aggressive actions of the dominant state powers and stated that the “... international politics of the coming decades will be dominated by great powers who will be able to prevent recalcitrance among the smaller nations, but who will have difficulty in keeping peace between each other because they will not have any authority above their own powerful enough to bend or deflect their wills” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 171). Niebuhr proposes that a “balance of power is in fact a kind of managed anarchy” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 174), which can maintain a perilous peace, and a tentative justice and world order. The international community has two primary responsibilities. The “first task of a community is to subdue chaos and create order; but the second task is equally important and must be implicated in the first. That task is to prevent the power, by which initial unity is achieved, from becoming tyrannical” (Niebuhr 1947, p. 178). While friction in the state system is aggravated by the multipolar paradigm; it is the balance of power maintained by elite state actors that preserves order in the international system. However, elite state actors can also destabilize world order through the threat of war. The threat of war enhanced by technologic advances in the military sciences can also be the very instrument to maintain order among the superpowers. However, while elite state actors endeavor to sustain international peace and order, the urgencies of national security and hegemonic ambition supersedes the general needs for nation state restructuring among the third world countries. The state system, according to Niebuhr, is not mandated for equal rights among nations. Even though the democratic tradition has replaced or decentralized monarchical authority and power on the one hand it has done little to restructure second and third world countries. The inevitable destabilizing result is anarchy in the state system, which can only be tempered by power balances in an aggressive world order. There were two primary outcomes that changed the state system after the Second World War: the advent of nuclear weapons and the development of first, second and third world countries in the international state system.

The United States after the Second World War emerged as the world leader, which inevitably determined the fate of the British Empire. “Despite the strong friendship between Roosevelt and Churchill, it was a fixed prejudice of American policy-makers that we must prevent the British from using the war for their imperial purposes” (Niebuhr 1959, p. 20). Such fears were short lived with the fall of Singapore in February of 1942, the surrender of 130,000 troops and the demise of the prized Singapore naval base (without even a shot fired against the Japanese Imperial forces) marking the collapse of the British Empire in the Far East (Judd 1996, p. 310). The partition of India on August 14, 1947 marked the end of British dominance in Southeast Asia by creating two new states, India and Pakistan (Judd 1996, p. 323). The aftermath of India and Pakistan gave birth in 1948 to the independence of Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) as the domino affect undermined British colonial interests throughout the world. The Axis powers were not the only nations to lose their colonies. The Second World War shattered European expansionism as nationalism ran rampant throughout the world. The unforeseen consequence of global warfare was a decisive force that reshaped the destiny of the state system as former colonies liberated themselves from their colonial taskmasters. The emergence of second and third world countries was overshadowed by the unprecedented power of the United States and the Soviet Union. The fledgling developing countries had little time to develop their economic infrastructure, national identity and established state autonomy. The choice was clear; neutrality was discouraged and most of the second and third world countries eventually sided with one or the other superpowers.

Also, the Second World War gravely altered the stratagem of warfare. The just war tradition to avert civilian casualties was ignored as the passion and hatred between hostile forces resulted in the aerial bombing of civilian targets. The Total War scenario demanding unconditional surrender aggravated unwarranted revenge, as desperate measures were inculcated into Allied and Axis military tactics to destroy the enemy with little consideration for innocent population centers. The U.S. Army Air Force and the British RAF pounded German targets in retaliation to Hitler’s unanticipated aerial attacks on London. The Allied forces fire-bombed Hamburg, Essen and Dresden, killing tens of thousands of innocent civilians in a matter of days as the war was coming to a decisive conclusion. Tokyo in March of 1945 was set ablaze as 100,000 civilians perished as the United States attempted a speedy conclusion to the war to avert more combatant casualties (Sherry 1987, pp. 261-282). Campbell Craig points out that it took the
“firestorms three or four days, coming as a result of hundreds of sorties, to decimate the populations of Dresden and Tokyo; in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one plane dropping one bomb managed to kill tens of thousands of civilians in each city instantaneously (Craig 2003, p. 24). While the 1949 Geneva Protocols condemned such actions against civilian populations, the stage was set. The recognition of the devastating effects of nuclear weaponry against combatant targets and noncombatant centers was counterbalanced by its power to secure hegemonic, global ambitions and instill an uneasy compliance among weaker state actors.

The post-World War II era eliminated hegemonic competitors in the western hemisphere. Great Britain’s prolonged role to preserve the balance of power among the European states came to an abrupt end. The final blow to their hegemonic ambition came when neither the United States nor the Soviet Union supported UK, French and Israeli action in 1956 to reoccupy the Suez Canal. This set of circumstances enabled the United States and Soviet Union to monopolize and control the strategic nuclear arsenal. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the nuclear umbrella and subsequent agreements restricted the proliferation of nuclear weaponry among the strong and weak state actors alike. Nonetheless the bipolar relationship was fraught with unbridled competition and threats of catastrophic retaliation. The constant upgrading of nuclear weapons and more accurate missile systems testified to the sentiments of fear and suspicion that existed between the two superpowers. The Allied forces’ bombardment of noncombatant centers in Germany and Japan during the Second World War also shows that when national security and state sovereignty are threatened, a nation will not hesitate to utilize the most destructive technologies, rather than risk defeat.

Nations will either acquiesce to a stronger state actor to maintain state autonomy or risk the frightful onslaughts of war to defend and protect their sovereignty. When state sovereignty, life’s traditions, customs and freedoms are threatened, the brutal effects of total war are soon to follow. However, a tactical or strategic nuclear attack between the United States and the Soviet Union could escalate into an all-out exchange that would decimate western civilization. The postwar multipolar paradigm was a decentralized, fragile state system as elite state actors competed for hegemonic or global dominance. The bipolar world, however pretentious and one-dimensional, complicated by adversarial ideologies and the unmanageable aftermaths of limited or massive nuclear retaliation were controlled by a cautious coexistence. The stark realization that in nuclear war there are no legitimate victors influenced an unstable peaceful coexistence as a viable option.

Reinhold Niebuhr’s fear of preventive war was intertwined with the innate antagonistic frustrations between capitalist and communist traditions, self-righteous ambition in a nation’s ideals and destiny and the impulsive responses of distrust, hate and fear between hostile forces as the unpredictable ingredients for total war, the precursor of a nuclear holocaust. However, Niebuhr adamantly supported containment and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet power while maintaining a cautious and observant pragmatism regarding Soviet motives and movements around the world (West 1958, p. 53). Niebuhr disagreed with Kennan’s emphasis that foreign policy objectives should primarily focus on state “national interests” (Niebuhr 1952, pp. 147-150). Niebuhr pointed out that it is national vanity to assume that state interests (especially among the two powers) coincide with the needs and interests of the international community. Collective self-interest among nations is the precursor to a contest of power; the ultimate contest of power to settle disputes is war. Total war in the bipolar world was the quintessence of chaos and disorder in the international system. Total war in the nuclear era was to be avoided at all costs. Thus, the separation of military power from state objectives was essential in sustaining a precarious peace among the two superpowers. Niebuhr pointed out that a “democracy cannot of course, engage in an explicit preventive war. But military leadership can heighten crises to the point where war becomes

1 Charles C. West personifies the prevailing Cold War view among theologians regarding Communist ideology and expansionism: “It has the dangerous dynamic of a fierce self-righteous power convinced of its mission to mold the world according to its pattern, convinced that its devotees have taken ‘the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.’ This is why there can be no mutual confidence in relations between Russians and the West, and negotiations only on the basis of positions of strength” (West 1958, p. 53).
unavoidable‖ (Niebuhr 1952, p. 146). The subordination of the military to civic powers inherent in the American democratic system was more adept at maintaining a credible war doctrine, especially in the nuclear age, than the Kremlin that centralized both civic and military powers among elite party members. Nonetheless, while modern military technocratic advances deemed the policy of war futile; nuclear warfare deems any form of retaliation suicidal. The aversion to nuclear war, according to Niebuhr, was neither the rationality and equanimity of man, nor the righteous aversions inherent in any political system; but the innate reaction to preserve life. Niebuhr proposed that the “peril of nuclear war is so great that it may bridge the great ideological chasm between the two blocs and make them conscious of having one thing in common: preference for life over death” (cf., Johnson 1982, p. 1015).

Niebuhr’s assessment of the nuclear dilemma is formulated within the framework of human nature and free will, which empowers and/or entices the state actor to coerce and manipulate weak state actors through its unprecedented military power. While the balance of power on the one hand and the preference for life over death on the other is the impetus by which the two superpowers are compelled to preserve a precarious peace through the formalistic overtures of détente, the speculative distrust between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has affected relations throughout the Cold War and beyond. In 1949 Niebuhr articulated his fears and hopes in the burgeoning era of nuclear warfare.

The bitter dilemma that we faced when the fact of the atomic bomb first shocked us and that we face today is this: On the one hand, we know that a third world war would probably destroy the centers of population and the institutions of large parts of the world and that it might gravely injure the physical and mental health of future generations; on the other hand, this appalling prospect should not cause this nation or other nations to yield to the blackmail of any power that may threaten to use the bomb. If we could say that the only thing in the world that matters is the prevention of the third world war, our moral problem would be comparatively simple. But, it is our responsibility to work to preserve the peace without clearing the way for any nation or group of nations to use the bomb with impunity to enslave others.

. . . The most profound difference that Christianity should make to our feeling about the atomic bomb is that it should enable men to live with faith in a world that will never again be as secure as it once thought itself to be, that will always face the possibility that its progress will be wiped out by catastrophe. Our greatest danger may not be that of actual atomic destruction, but rather the danger that humanity may become so obsessed by this fear of destruction that life will be narrowed to the search for security and lose most of its meaning. This is essentially a religious problem; the faith that human history is in the hand of God, who in Christ identifies himself with men, can deliver us from the great fear (Editorial board, 1955, p. 7).

Niebuhr’s Christian realism is a prudent appraisal of humankind’s condition when grappling with contending forces on the individual, national, international levels. It also recognizes the inherent limitations of humanity while acknowledging its capacity to alter the course of history through the decision-making process at each level of life’s experience. Niebuhr’s hope in Divine providence throughout the course of history enabled him to see beyond the veil of the unfolding drama of power politics, the selfish ambition of nations and the consistent threat of nuclear warfare. His insights warranted praise or criticism within the theological community, but his influence was recognized most in the lives of government leaders, statesmen and policy experts who reshaped and modernized the science of foreign policy and international relations theory. Niebuhr wrote during the First and Second World Wars and Cold War era. His views are limited by a bipolar framework, but the underlying emphasis in the innate limitation of men and nations, verify the durability of his observations in our postmodern era.

4.7 Reinhold Niebuhr and the Cold War Policymakers

War is a precursor of war – we cannot misconstrue national forgiveness for national forgetfulness. In either case, the justification for war is usually usurped by national revenge. Clausewitz states that the
“ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.1.9, 80). While warfare is regarded as the ultimate instrument of persuasion to coerce an enemy of the validity and relevance of a nation’s political objectives, yet how often the conquered admits defeat? Time heals wounds, but not the spirit of jingoism and revenge. The West celebrated the demise of monarchical despotism after the First World War only to see the ascendancy of a demonic Nazi state order on the one hand and Communist tyranny on the other. The West grasped the Soviet Union power during the Second World War only to see the ascendancy of Stalinist communism’s costly challenge throughout the Cold War era. The west celebrated the fall of communist tyranny only to witness ensuing cold war tensions in an unstable multipolar world order.

While Reinhold Niebuhr provided the theological and political underpinnings for the realist school of thought regarding United States foreign policy. George F. Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau continued the realist tradition that developed and sustained U.S. foreign policy to meet the ensuing crisis of the Cold War. George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegrams of 1946’ articulated the West’s suspicions of Soviet expansionism. Kennan’s evaluation of the Soviet Union was the pivotal assessment shaping an official U.S. stance against communist expansionism, while portraying the United States as the leader of the free world. In fact, it was Kennan that proposed containment of Soviet military and political aspirations (Kennan 1967, pp. 304, 354-367; cf. Kennan 1947, pp. 576-582.), a policy that had been considered since 1941, but hindered by the pressing complications of the Second World War (Gaddis 1982, p. 4). Kennan’s containment policy in foreign affairs was eventually superseded by Hans J. Morgenthau’s notable treatise on power politics entitled Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, which stipulated that the balance of power or the lack thereof was the primary factor in causing or preventing war. Morgenthau proposed that all “politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns, that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 39). In essence, according to Morgenthau, only “power alone can limit power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 170). While Niebuhr, Kennan and Morgenthau provided the philosophic underpinnings that shaped realist tradition and U.S. containment strategies through a balance of power; it was neorealist Kenneth N. Waltz that redefined the parameters of international politics, stipulating that the causes of war were neither innate to human nature nor in stringent power balances in the state order, but the consequences of a decentralized state system. Waltz points out that among “political scientists, Morgenthau and Kissinger are considered to be traditionalists—scholars turned toward history and concerned more with policy than with theory and scientific method” (Waltz 1979, p. 63). Like Niebuhr, Morgenthau attributed human nature as the primary cause for conflict and violence in the world order on the one hand and the tenuous nature of the balance of power throughout history as the primary cause for war on the other (Morgenthau 1961, p. 212). The potential of evil in human actions, humanity’s finite creatureliness, the inherent desire for good that is enfeebled by collective selfishness, finds its roots in classical Christian thought, which has influenced the socio-political tradition to the present day. Waltz affirms that this view is much “older than Niebuhr. Within the Christian tradition, it is stated in classic terms by St. Augustine. Outside that tradition, it is elaborated in the philosophy of Spinoza. In the political writing of the twentieth century, it is reflected most clearly and consistently in the works of Hans Morgenthau. These four writers, despite their numerous differences, unite in basing their political conclusions upon the assumed nature of man” (Waltz 1970, p. 21).

Morgenthau and Waltz represent two diverse approaches to understanding the functionality of the national and international political order. Morgenthau, undoubtedly influenced by Niebuhr’s political realism, which stipulated that man’s volatile nature is the cause of war, was a classical interpretation that has been rejected by political scientist that adheres to the scientific method. Waltz rejects the notion of the fall of humanity or original sin. Like his scientific colleagues, Waltz logically infers that if corrupt men/states start wars then good men/states should prevent wars; this rational inference is contradicted in history. Since the fallen nature of mankind is a constant condition, it offers no hope to remedy the civic incongruities that affect the international order. Why? Because human nature cannot change; however,
human institutions can be altered to meet the dilemmas of society and ultimately the international system. Waltz criticized Morgenthau’s overemphasis on power as an excessive premise regarding the abuse of power as the primary cause of all social and political friction in the national and international order. Waltz stressed that power is as much an instrument for good as for evil rather than a “supreme value that men by their very nature are led to seek. Whether or not power should be ‘the supreme value of states’ is then not the question. Rather one must ask when, if ever, it will be a supreme value and when merely a means” (Waltz 1970, p. 37). The tensions between these two theories pose a dilemma among students and scholars alike in international affairs. It also enhances tension among the philosophic and scientific communities and contributes to the failure of exchanging ideas on how to deal effectively with state actor competition and war.

Both normative and scientific deductions have important contributions to make in international politics. Nevertheless, historical or scientific theories are not synonymous with the ethical ramifications of just cause for war, either during or after such an event. Each perspective has contributing components regarding the complicated provocations of contemporary warfare. Both the writings of Morgenthau and Waltz are Cold War texts. While Morgenthau’s views are debated and criticized, the treatise on the balance of power has been acknowledged as an “intrinsic feature of international politics and that a general theory must take account of the concept” (Little 2007, p. 91). A renaissance of the classical state model in neoclassical realist thought has attempted to incorporate both realist and neorealism traditions (see Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009). On the one hand, Morgenthau’s six editions of his original text are a testimony to their popularity and witness of an aggressive and competitive world order. On the other hand, (especially among the two superpowers) Waltz’s neorealist theory revolutionized the approach to international political theory. Ken Booth reiterates this assessment by leading scholars in the international relations (IR) field. Booth states: “All students of international politics are familiar with Kenneth Waltz’s famous books’ (Robert Jarvis); ‘Kenneth N. Waltz is the preeminent theorist of his generation’ (Robert O. Ethane); ‘Kenneth Waltz is the most important international relations theorist of the past half century’ (John J. Mearsheimer); ‘Kenneth Waltz is the pre-eminent international relations theorist of the post-World War II era’ (Stephan M. Walt)” (Booth 2011, p. 3). Both Morgenthau and Waltz demand investigation regarding their fundamental theories on the balance of power and war and are not only contemporaries of Reinhold Niebuhr, but their examination on power and war is a reflection in support or opposition to Niebuhr’s Christian realism.

When endeavoring to understand the concepts and theories of classical texts regarding international relations or any subject matter, there is a tendency to either overlook the context or the multiplicity of views that develop a holistic construct that was envisioned by the author. International relations theory is a contemporary science, but a complex system that mandates a cautious analysis of both the specific and general trends that create a picture of world politics. Numerous studies have scrutinized, redefined and evaluated those constructs that enable political scientists and statesmen to better understand the world in which we live. However, in the international relations field, the arguments and constructs unavoidably center on the works of Morgenthau and Waltz. Their grasp of history and the scientific method, the familiarity of limited and total war scenarios, and witness to the ever-changing paradigms of international affairs compounded by the sophistications of the war sciences and sophistries of power politics have established their works as textual standards for the serious IR student, political scientist and statesman alike.

4.8 Hans J. Morgenthau, on Power, the State and War

Morgenthau’s theory of international politics within the framework of historical analyses revolves around human nature, power and state relations. Political realism, power politics and state actor self-interests are interconnected and are not affected by place or time (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 8, 14). The friction among nations in history regardless of social, economic or political conditions suggests that the “struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 33). Morgenthau cites two examples: 1. Societies ancient or modern condemn murder but will
condone war to maintain power and security, and 2. The struggle for domination affects all categories of human interaction from the family to the interstate and state levels (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 33, 34). In his estimation national and international politics are but “two different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 38). However, it is in the international system that “armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 29). State autonomy is intrinsically linked to economic and military power. In fact, state autonomy, in Morgenthau’s estimation, is synonymous to power. Why? Because Morgenthau’s nation state theory emphasizes national sovereignty as one of the vital elements stimulating tension in the international system. He stresses that the “nation is, as we have seen, the recipient of man’s highest secular loyalties” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 511). States are a combination of ethnic mindsets, patriotism, resources, religion, secular and historical traditions, and definitive physical boundaries – the state is a sanctuary of community. The history of the modern nation state system is a struggle for power, which can only be sustained by a balance of power and in times of unresolved tensions – war.

How then do states maintain power? Why do states maintain power? What is the natural relationship among the consort of nations that possess this power? The realist tradition asserts that conflict and struggle for power is an ancient and modern experience. Morgenthau evaluated the balance of power in the modern state system stemming from the sixteenth century, “when theorists first started self-consciously to conceptualize the balance of power and develop policies based on this conceptualization. It is from this juncture that it becomes possible to observe, in conjunction with the power politics dynamic, a new balance of power dynamic whereby states attempt to manipulate distribution of international power in order to establish and maintain a stable state system” (Little 2007, pp. 100, 101). The stability of the alliances was contingent upon the shifting of major powers to offset any and all ambitions for domination. Morgenthau states: “Alliances are a necessity function of the balance of power operating within a multi-state system” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 181). Like a finely crafted clock, the mechanism of alliances was a constant preoccupation to counter the ambitions of the major European powers and to prevent regional or hegemonic domination. The balance of power among alliances was the means to preserve state sovereignty, the “struggle between an alliance of nations defending their independence against one potential conqueror is the most spectacular of the configurations to which the balance of power gives rise” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 189). Morgenthau points out that throughout

. . . its history of more than four hundred years the policy of the balance of power succeeded in preventing anyone state from gaining universal dominion. . . . Yet universal dominion by any one state was prevented only at the price of warfare, which from 1648 to 1815 was virtually continuous and in the twentieth century has twice engulfed practically the whole world (Morgenthau 1961, p. 204).

Through a balance of power the European system preserved its independent nation state sovereign status through the labyrinth of alliances, diplomacy and limited wars. It is within this context that Morgenthau categorizes three patterns of state policy in the struggle to maintain, increase or manipulate national power in the international system.

Status Quo Policies: “A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 39-43). The status quo is aimed at safeguarding the distribution of power among nations. The most effective instruments to maintain the status quo among state actors are treaties and international organizations that support the specified covenants or agreements among respective nation states. This is especially the case after terms of agreement to conclude a military campaign. However, political and economic adjustments among nations are a natural consequence of international politics. Change is expected. This does not mean that a nation state is against changes in the regional, hegemonic or international state system. Rather nations are opposed to changes that drastically reverse the power of elite state actors and relations among nations, modifying elite actor status to a second rate-power. This
was the case when the Soviet Union officially dissolved on December 25, 1991, which enabled fifteen former Soviet Republics independent sovereign state status. The unforeseen demise of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War, but altered the balance of power in the new world order.

Morgenthau points out that the tenuous balance of power between state actors has been a constant friction among European nations and asserts that the “mutual fear lest the other alliance be intent upon changing the status quo while professing to maintain it was one of the main factors in bringing about the general conflagration of the First World War” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 41). The status quo is the ideal configuration among nations, but it is often disordered when geopolitical and economic political ambition destabilizes the international system.

Imperialistic Policies: “A nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations—whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status—pursues a policy of imperialism” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 44-71). There is a subtle but definitive line between imperialistic and status quo policies. Morgenthau reminds us that “[n]ot every foreign policy aiming at an increase in the power of a nation is necessarily a manifestation of imperialism” and a “policy seeking only adjustment, leaving the essence of these power relations intact, still operates with the general framework of a policy of the status quo” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 45). The fundamental challenge is a judicious utilization of economic and military power essential to maintain the status quo among the consort of nations. Empires and nations alike use power at their disposal to maintain, defend, and sustain their position in the world order. Morgenthau states that the safeguarding of existing geopolitical entitlements is different than the “dynamic process of acquiring one” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 45). The dynamic process implied here is the instrument of war as a means of acquiring power to alter the state system.

Morgenthau emphasizes three incentives of imperialist policy. Victorious War: The contest of war, the subsequent victory of one nation against the enemy, alters the status quo prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Morgenthau states:

When a nation is engaged in war with another nation, it is very likely that the nation which anticipates victory will pursue a policy that seeks a permanent change of the power relations with the defeated enemy. The nation will pursue this policy regardless of what the objectives were at the outbreak of the war. It is the objective of this policy of change to transform the relation between victor and vanquished which happens to exist at the end of the war into the new status quo of the peace settlement. This war that was started by the victor as a defensive war— for the maintenance of the prewar status quo—transforms itself with the approaching victory into an imperialistic war; that is, for a permanent change in the status quo (Morgenthau 1961, p. 54).

The Treaty of Versailles, according to Morgenthau, is an example of imperialism because it superseded prewar status. The conqueror becomes the master of the conquered, which eventually instilled the jingoistic reaction of revenge. Lost War: The Treaty of Versailles decimated German honor and contested national security issues and fears. The fettered chains of Versailles were eventually broken through years of strategic preparation as one imperialistic misadventure was superseded by Hitler’s imperialistic ambitions from 1935 to the end of the Second World War. In reference to defeat in war, Morgenthau points out that this “very status of subordination, intended for permanency, may easily engender in the vanquished a desire to turn the scales on the victor, to overthrow the status quo created by his victory, and to change places with him in the hierarchy of power. In other words, the policy of imperialism by the victor in anticipation of his victory is likely to call forth a policy of imperialism on the part of the vanquished” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 54). And, Weakness: Imperialism is emboldened by weak states or geopolitically empty spaces that are accessible to stronger states. This was the case during colonial expansionism, Napoleonic empire-building, and Hitler’s military campaigns from 1939 – 1941. Morgenthau states that the “attractiveness of power vacuums as an incentive to imperialism is at least a potential threat to the survival of many of the new nations of Asia and Africa, deficient as they are in the most important elements of power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 55). These three inducements that stimulate imperialism are foundational to the three goals of imperialism. Imperialism can progress in several
directions as powerful state actors compete in the international system. Morgenthau points out that the objectives of imperialism can be world domination, hegemonic supremacy or local preponderance. Even though Morgenthau wrote from a Cold War perspective, his observations regarding nation state motivation and the precarious relationship between first and third world countries in the international system is significant in our present era.

World Empire: History is replete with personalities and nations pursuing world domination. Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander the Great, Caesar, and the Arabian Empire of the 7th and 8th centuries, Napoleon I and Hitler all have, says Morgenthau, “an urge toward expansionism which knows no rational limits, feeds on its own successes and, if not stopped by a superior force, will go to the confines of the political world” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 56). The desire for power and conquest is “characteristic of unlimited imperialism, which in the past has been the undoing of the imperialistic policies of this kind” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 56). Morgenthau also correlates a destabilized balance of power as the main cause for unrestrained global aspirations. Morgenthau states that the “importance of the Napoleonic wars in this respect is twofold. They destroyed the balance of power and threatened temporarily to replace it with a universal empire” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 390). Hence, preventive wars are a natural outgrowth of the balance of power and war in general in the modern nation state system has its origins in the balance of power (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 211, 212). The political strain between first and third world countries is a constant challenge in the modern nation state system and is only held in check by a balance of power among the two superpowers. However, empires eventually wither and are replaced; eventually resources dissolve and infrastructures are antiquated by unforeseen socio-political factors. The shifting economic and political paradigm destabilizes alliances in the international community; distrust stimulates an arms race, and alliances are formed to sustain national insecurity. Morgenthau reiterates that the “struggle between an alliance of nations defending their independence against one potential conqueror is the most spectacular of the configurations to which the balance of power gives rise” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 189).

Continental Empire: Morgenthau defines a continental empire as a “geographically determined imperialism”, most notably illustrated in European affairs from the 15th to the 20th centuries by the policies of Louis XIV, Napoleon III, and William II that attempted to manipulate the balance of power for hegemonic ascendancy (Morgenthau 1961, p. 56). The 19th and 20th centuries also witnessed the United States’ restrained foreign policy to maintain the status quo in North and South America. The Monroe doctrine was issued partially in response to the many Spanish and Portuguese colonies that declared their independence in South America. The tenet stipulated that it would neither interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in European affairs on the one hand, nor would it tolerate any European countries to fill-in the vacuum of vacated European state powers to reestablish a presence in North and South America on the other. Morgenthau states: the “Monroe Doctrine, by postulating for the Western Hemisphere a policy of the status quo with regard to non-American powers, erected a protective shield behind which the United States could establish its predominance with that geographic region” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 57). While the United States had the power to invade Canada or Mexico, or impose hegemonic supremacy in South America, it acquiesced to a “general framework of a geographically limited policy a localized imperialism” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 57). Even though the Monroe doctrine limited the United States’ colonial ambitions in North and South Americas; it established unprecedented U.S. authority among the Americas.

Local Preponderance: A nation that desires unobstructed socio-political power and influence in its immediate political environment seeks a policy of ‘local preponderance’. Morgenthau states that the “prototype of localized imperialism is to be found in the monarchical policies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great, Louis XV, Maria Theresa, Peter the Great and Catherine II were the moving forces of this kind of foreign policy. . . . The difference between such a localized imperialistic policy, continental imperialism, and unlimited imperialism is the difference between the foreign policies of Bismarck, William II, and Hitler. Bismarck wanted to establish Germany’s preponderance in Central Europe; William II, in all of Europe; Hitler, in the whole world” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 57). Local preponderance in Morgenthau’s thought is also defined within the framework of Soviet expansionism in “Finland, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and Iran
are also of a localized nature” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 57). The blurred line of decision-making among elite state actors demonstrates the enticement of acquiescing to unrestrained economic and military power. It epitomizes moral relativism at the international level, which denotes that there is neither good nor bad as long as political objectives are accomplished. Local preponderance is a dangerous state actor disposition because warfare under the direction of state objectives becomes the means by which all political actions are judged—its wars are not invasions, but rather, political liberations.

Morgenthau points out that the state objectives for conquest adhere to three methods of imperialism: The utilization of ‘military force’, ‘economic power’ and ‘cultural influence’. Morgenthau suggests that these methods are the means by which policy objectives are accomplished. Also, from a standpoint of global or hegemonic power, these three elements are interdependent components, which have far reaching economic and political ramifications to establish state actor status in the international community. Morgenthau claims that “military imperialism seeks military conquest; economic imperialism, economic exploitation of other peoples; cultural imperialism, the displacement of one culture by another—but always as means to the same imperialistic end. That end is always the overthrow of the status quo; that is, the reversal of the power relations between the imperialist nation and its prospective victims” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 58). The Japanese occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945 is an exemplary illustration of imperialistic expansionism. However, there are lesser or greater degrees of imperialistic expansionism depending upon one’s point of view. The perception of occupier or liberator is in the eye of the beholder. Nonetheless, these methods of imperialism are clarified in degrees of effectiveness in securing state objectives. Military imperialism is an ancient and modern praxis. War is the crudest, most ancient and prevalent practice of imperialistic conquest. Morgenthau claims that the “great conquerors of all times have also been the great imperialists. The great advantage of this method from the point of view of the imperialistic nation lies in the fact that the new power relations resulting from military conquest can as a rule be changed only by another war instigated by the vanquished nation, with the odds normally against the latter” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 58). Warfare is a probability, a calculated risk with the high stakes of conquest or the consequences of defeat. War is the quintessential instrument of coercion that has established empires, eradicated nations and peoples, and altered the lives and traditions of unidentified civilizations—names without faces, faces without hope, vanquished from the annals of history. Both ancient and modern states utilize economic and military power to sustain its dominance among nations.

War is the thrust, the finality of a failed diplomatic process; economic power is the means to sustain that thrust. Economic imperialism is the means to cripple or control the fate of nations. International trade and commerce is an ancient and modern practice. Morgenthau’s economic and political paradigm was formulated within an aggressive military tradition and posture of strength and force. Economic theory and practice was not developed to the extent of the modern political paradigm was formulated within an aggressive military tradition and posture of strength and force. Economic theory and practice was not developed to the extent of the modern 21st century standards. Nonetheless, Morgenthau recognized the “common characteristic of the policies we call economic imperialism is their tendency, on the one hand, to overthrow the status quo by changing the power relations between the imperialist nations and others, and on the other hand, to do so not through the conquest of territory but by way of economic control” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 59). The straightforwardness of two rival governments in a bipolar context vying for global superiority through economic incentives to persuade and control respective governments has been superseded by a more complex system. Morgenthau’s fundamental insight, however limited in scope, acknowledged and recognized the power of economic incentives to lure weak state actors to one’s side as nations counter-balance potential competitors in the fragile international political economy.

The world of ideas, tradition and culture is another means to influence state opinion. The philosophic and legal remnants of Greece and Rome testify to the power of cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is the most subtle and according to Morgenthau, “the most successful of imperialistic policies” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 60, 61), to influence allies, potential allies and even one’s enemies— is the marketing of national values, ideas, traditions and beliefs. Cultural imperialism “aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two nations” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 60, 61). The discernment of fact from myth, truth from fabrication, and right from wrong is the propagandists’ craft

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and the constituents’ nightmare. The unobtrusive and inadvertent sale of ideas has been advertised on the internet, cinema and the unavoidable clash of ideas in our post-Cold War era. Globalization, interdependent economies and the formalistic shifts from military to economic alliances have redefined the parameters of modern state relationships; nonetheless, war is still considered a crucial instrument of national polity when a nation struggles to sustain its global or hegemonic objectives. Morgenthau states that “cultural imperialism generally plays a role subsidiary to the military and economic varieties. Similarly, while economic imperialism sometimes stands by itself, it frequently supports military policies. On the other hand, while military imperialism is able to conquer without the support of nonmilitary methods, no dominion can last that is founded upon nothing but military force. Thus the conqueror will not only prepare for military conquests by economic and cultural penetrations” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 63). It is within this milieu that the strong state actors display their power despite alterations to the world order and the subsequent challenges to maintain their economic and political status in the international community.

Policy of Prestige: Morgenthau stresses that a “nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate the power it has, either for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it, pursues a policy of prestige” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 72-85). The policy of prestige is rarely recognized as such because it is intimately connected to the “predominant theoretical and practical concern with the material aspect of power in the form of force, actual, or threatened” on the one hand and the formalistic, diplomatic duplicities of modern politics, which are the antithesis of the democratic tradition, which according to Morgenthau, is “devoid of any organic connection with the business of international politics” – the business of peace-making on the other (Morgenthau 1961, p. 72). Also, the policy of prestige is the means of maintaining the status quo or sustaining the semblance of power among nations, through an aggressive grand strategy rather than appearing weak, struggling to maintain equilibrium of power in the international political system (Morgenthau 1961, p. 72). The policy of prestige is a psychological force. According to Morgenthau, “prestige is at most the pleasant by-product of foreign policies whose ultimate objectives are not the reputation of power but the substance of power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 79).

The substance for power among nations has many shapes and forms of which the most prevalent are diplomatic ceremonial, and the display of military force. Diplomatic Ceremonial: The pomp and circumstance of diplomatic protocol goes beyond the formalistic overtures of state pride; it is a demonstration of respect and power. In fact, “under international law a State is a legal person with legal rights and obligations” (Roberts 2009, p. 23). The state as a legal entity is distinguished from multinational and international corporations on the basis of population and defined territory that has been recognized by international law; this legal recognition “determines its capacity as a legal person, its competence, and the nature and the extent of certain rights and duties” (Roberts 2009, p. 23). The modern nation state system has undergone many variations throughout its brief history; nonetheless, it is the legally recognized territorial unit in the international system, with specified rights and privileges granted to its diplomatic representatives, which consists of “immunity from the criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the State which he is visiting” (Roberts 2009, p. 24).

The various parts of the nation state with its designated heads of state, ministries, diplomatic missions and state representatives, are essential components in maintaining grand strategic objectives. Towering above the principles and ideologies of state are its leaders, the embodiment and personality of a nation state. Their movements, associations, and every act are weighed in the balances as the very pulse of its people and sometimes the very heart, mind and soul of a nation. Morgenthau attributes diplomatic ceremonial as a powerful demonstration of national status and cites as an example the 1804 coronation of Napoleon I and Pope Pius VII, “each of the two rulers had a vital interest in demonstrating his superiority over the other” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 73). Napoleon demonstrated his superiority by placing the crown on his head with his own hands while adhering to detailed protocols to conciliate the Pontiff. The Duke of Rovigo, one of Napoleon’s generals and minister of police, chronicles the preliminary protocols of authority and power between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII.
He went to meet the Pope on the road to Nemours. To avoid ceremony, the pretext of a hunting-party was assumed; the attendants with his equipages, were in the forest. The Emperor came on horseback and in a hunting dress, with his retinue. It was at the half-moon on the top of the hill that the meeting took place. There the Pope’s carriage drew up; he got out at the left door in his white costume; the ground was dirty; he did not like to step upon it with his white silk shoes, but was obliged to do so at last.

Napoleon alighted to receive him. They embraced; and the Emperor’s carriage, which had been purposely driven up, was advanced a few paces, as if from the carelessness of the driver; but men were posted to hold the two doors open: at the moment of getting in, the Emperor took the right door, and an officer of the court handed the Pope to the left, so that they entered the carriage by the two doors at the same time. The Emperor naturally seated himself on the right, and this first step decided without negotiation upon the etiquette to be observed during the whole time that the Pope was to remain at Paris (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 73, 74).

During the Potsdam Conference (July 16 – August 2, 1945), “Churchill, Stalin and Truman were unable to agree on who should enter the conference room first; finally they entered through three different doors at the same time. These three political leaders symbolized the respective power of their nations. Consequently, the precedence accorded to one of them would have given his nation a prestige of superiority over the other two which the latter were not willing to concede” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 75, 76). The policy of prestige is either a symbolic strategy that demonstrates the substance of power among strong state actors, or an appearance of power by other state actors that covet national recognition and respect.

Display of Military Force: The alternative to display power other than diplomatic ceremonial protocol is the exhibition of military power. The demonstration of military power can be a pretentious or pragmatic statement. A Roman general after a victorious campaign could qualify for a “Triumph”. This exalted and coveted privilege was awarded by the Senate while the candidate anxiously waited outside Rome city-limits. If granted, the general would be shrouded in a crimson cloak, a crown composed of bay leaves and a laurel branch awarded to senior generals, a golden chariot and the exhilarating experience of parading his troops and acquired spoils of war through the venerable city of Rome (Dando-Collins 2002, pp. 12, 307; cf., Parker 1928, pp. 228-230). Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Hitler paraded the military might of the Third Reich, a prelude to the demoralizing blitzkrieg that enveloped Europe. Both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War boasted of their military might through a series of land based and atmospheric nuclear tests, and an unprecedented arms race to assure their preparedness for war. On the other hand North Korea, which boasts of its one million armed forces has displayed its military might within the parameter of its 주체사상 – the North Korean concept of self-identity and autonomous self-reliance, also referred to as Kimilsungism. This ideology or philosophic system stipulates economic and political independence from all outside influences (Byun 1991, pp. 21-22). The DPRK’s self-reliant polity within a stringent Stalinist framework has provoked the worst fears of the West. The impoverished hermit nation has developed missile and nuclear capabilities and is now experimenting with long range delivery systems, as a display of its traditional policy directives to boost its public image before the reputed elite state actors, so that North Korea can be recognized and respected as a global power. The DPRK’s constant rhetoric for war and its threat to dissolve the 1953 Armistice agreement are constant reminders of the perilous visages of the Cold War.

The display of military power also has many shapes and forms such as mock warfare exercises to flex military force to prevent or warn a potential enemy of the consequences of an attack. Morgenthau points out that it is “hoped that the prestige of one’s own nation will be great enough to deter the other nations from going to war. At the same time it is hoped that, if this policy of prestige should fail, the mobilization of the armed forces before the actual outbreak of war will put one’s own nation in the most advantageous military position under the circumstances” (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 78, 79). Nuclear weaponry has redefined the parameters of modern warfare, but it is not a substitute for conventional war, as nations are averse to engage in massive extermination; nonetheless, the advent of sophisticated
weapons technology has increased the deadly force of conventional warfare to the extent that war in its varied formulations is an ever increasing destructive force as nations develop more state-of-the-art weaponry to deter or destroy any threat to their state sovereignty.

Within this framework Morgenthau points out two objectives of the policy of prestige: 1. A self-reliant platform to engage in either the status quo or imperialist objectives. This is not a rhetorical application of power, but the very substance of power, which enables the respective state actors to pursue state goals and agendas unimpeded, and 2. The demonstration of this economic, military and cultural supremacy is perceived among allies and rivals among the consort of nations. Morgenthau states a “policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it such a reputation for power as to enable it to forego the actual employment of power. Two factors make that triumph possible: reputation for unchallengeable power and reputation for self-restraint in using it” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 81). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States maintained its military supremacy, its unswerving role in maintaining an American presence in troubled regions around the world and a reputation for self-restraint in light of its unequaled military power. It was President George H. W. Bush on August 18, 1988 at the Republican Convention that articulated the American idealism of “a kinder, gentler nation”–a rhetorical formula to smooth the road for U.S. global preeminence after the Cold War (Levantrosser & Perotti 2004, pp. 107, 317; cf., Himelfarb & Perotti 2004, p. 269).

The fall of communism, the unification of East and West Germany, and the United States’ victory in Kuwait signaled a new era of peace and reconciliation as America’s role in the new world order looked bright as it approached the 21st century. America’s presence and power was a beacon of light in a dark and cruel world, but like the earthly city, America’s global aspirations were short-lived. The persona of invincibility was shattered on 9/11; the myth of ultimate power and global dominance crumbled as the twin towers lay in ruins, a tangled jungle of steel and cement. The United States was aroused from its slumber, awakening to the realities of a world that has always been on the edge of catastrophe. Like the flip of a switch the “kinder and gentler nation” transformed into an aggressive and relentless force, vanquishing the threats of global terrorism.

The destruction of the Twin Towers, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed America’s resolute purpose to defend its ideals, protect its international assets and sustain a fragile international order; it also exposed the limitations of military power to win the hearts and minds of indigenous populations, confronted by the brutalities of war. There are two discrepancies of the policy of prestige: 1. The policy of prestige is blighted when a nation portrays an exaggerated picture of a “reputation for power which exceeds the power it actually possesses” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 82), and 2. The failure to recognize a potential enemy can undermine the policy of prestige. This is when a strong nation state disregards the power of a potential enemy, as in the case of Japan’s disregard to the United States’ resolve for war after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The other factor is the “absence of an American policy of prestige in so far as reputation for military power is concerned”, which “invited neglect and attack from its enemies, failure for its policies, mortal danger to its vital interests” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 84). History repeated itself as the United States lowered its guard against potential security threats because of a misapplication of globalization polity and American invincibility in the 21st century. Osama bin Laden miscalculated America’s response to the unprovoked attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. The subsequent war on terror, the declaration of war in Afghan, and the American resolve for justice applied to those who masterminded the deaths of innocent civilians startled Al Qaida. Saddam Hussein also miscalculated U.S. fears regarding WMD, disregarded the U.S.-lead Coalition threat for war, and was blinded to his limited economic and military powerbase contrasted to coalition lead forces. The world may never be the same after 9/11 but state actor power in its various shapes and forms will continue to determine a vital role in the relations among nations and the quest for war and peace.

The inevitable consequences of sustaining the policy of prestige within the international community are state actor friction, hostility and war. Conflict, violence and war are an ancient and modern singularity. Morgenthau believes that mans’ greed for power and geopolitical shifts affected by this demonstration of power between contending forces especially among the two superpowers is the cause of war and suggests that preventive war is the natural outgrowth of the balance of power.
Morgenthau adheres to the principle that most of the “wars that have been fought since the beginning of the modern state system have their origin in the balance of power” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 212). The contest for power between contending forces validates the contradictions in human nature when pursuing economic and political security. Warfare, just or unjust, during the inception of the modern nation state system was a customary polity among national and dynastic aristocrats. Morgenthau elaborates:

Throughout the period of limited warfare, the distinction between just and unjust war remained at best ambiguous and was finally abandoned in the 19th century when war was considered to be a mere fact, the conduct of which was subject to certain moral and legal rules, but of which all states had a legal or moral right to avail themselves at their discretion. In this view, war was an instrument of national and, more particularly of dynastic policy to be used alternately or simultaneously with diplomacy, as the government saw fit (Morgenthau 1961, p. 368).

The Napoleonic conquest altered warfare policy. It redefined the destructive force of warfare alliances and revealed that war policy was no longer the right of a privileged class, but incorporated the united effort of the entire nation. The dynamic relationship between the populace and government drastically challenged the concept of ‘just cause’ for war during the First and Second World Wars. Just war during these two global conflicts was confined to jus ad bellum requisites, which necessitated the full collaboration of the general populace to support the war effort. It is within this context that Morgenthau elaborates upon the interdependent distinctions of total war.

Morgenthau lived during the two most deadly conflicts in world history. His observations are based upon historical data, primarily during the development of the modern nation state system to the Cold War era. Morgenthau understood the European mindset and witnessed the ideological and ethnic tensions emanating from this troubled region. Total war was the consequences of centuries of jingoistic antagonism, ethnic bigotry, monarchical egocentrism and a misapplied application of the Clausewitzian war theory. The First and Second World Wars redefined the destructive force of warfare: 1. The multiplicity of nations involved in the war process. The Allied and Axes conflict was the apex of a balance of power struggle with no reasonable cessation of hostilities until unconditional surrender or victory was declared by opposing forces. 2. The evolution of the technological developments of conventional warfare intensified the rapidity of the kill-factor in war. 3. The advent of nuclear weaponry, implemented by the Truman administration at the end of the Second World War redefined the nature of modern warfare and nation state power in the international community, and 4. These axioms of total war are not limited to global conflict. The complications of competitive international trade, opposing ideologies and the nature of the bipolar environment influence the stability or instability of the international political system. Both the strong and weak state actors play a vital role in maintaining the stability of the international system.

Within this context Morgenthau elaborates on the factors that comprise total war. Total war in our modern era has four interdependent components. 1. The “war of total populations”, which is “the fraction of the population completely identified in its emotions and convictions with the wars of its nations” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 365). War of total population has two elements: The moral factor, according to Morgenthau, is “the revival, in the twentieth century, of the doctrine of just war; that is to say, of the distinction between belligerents whose participation in war is justified in ethics and law, and those who are not considered to have the legal and moral right to take up arms” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 367). The just war doctrine developed by Augustine, summarized by the medieval scholastic Aquinas, and reiterated by just war theorists such as Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili and Grotius was eclipsed in the budding state system by dynastic authority and ambition, ecclesiastical partiality, and jingoistic rivalry, which empowered the sovereign as the sole policy-maker in war. However, in order for the national population to fully identify with a total war scenario, a moral justification was essential to attain support for the defense of the nation. There is also an empirical factor, the requisite to amass indigenous armed forces on the one hand and sufficient man-power to defend the state on the other. The use of mercenaries, or heterogeneous armies, which fought for money and adventure, deprived of patriotic loyalty or partisan nationalistic conviction,
was outmoded by the total war paradigm. 2. The “war by total populations”, which is “the fraction of the population participating in war” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 365). War was no longer an autonomous political decision between sovereign authority and private conscripted forces. War was no longer an independent action of state while the general population base was disconnected from the realities of state conflict. The eventual liberation and unification of nations and the competitive nation state system enhanced what Morgenthau describes as “nationalistic universalism”, which demanded that, the “participation of the population in war is correspondingly enlarged” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 371). In other words the entire population has been incorporated into the military doctrine. The enlistment of combat forces, specialized units that provide supplies, logistical, and communication support on the one hand and the noncombatant industry which develops technological advances in weaponry, communications and intelligence on the other are interconnected in the security of a nation. 3. The “war against total populations”, which is “the fraction of the population affected by war” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 365). War is a traumatic experience for the noncombatant. Unidentified casualties litter the battlefield, unmindful of ally or enemy, combatant or noncombatant. Displaced civilian populations are lost in the shadows of ambiguity, their pains and sorrows only recognized in the muted annals of history. The First and Second World Wars redefined the atrocities suffered by the noncombatant community in total war. Morgenthau attributes the increased destructiveness in the 20th century of combatants and noncombatants to technological advances in military science and the destructive power of modern weaponry. Total war in the twentieth century initiated the arms race to develop the most sophisticated, efficient and destructive conventional, chemical and nuclear weaponry. While humanity decries the destructive power of modern weaponry; common sense mandates security from enemies that threaten our way of life as we know it, and 4. The “war for total stakes”, which is the “objective pursued by war” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 365). The unprecedented rapidity of telecommunications and logistical support, the power and utter devastation of conventional and nuclear weaponry, according to Morgenthau, “make the conquest of the world technically possible” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 378).

The great empires of Greece and Rome and Napoleon’s France were unable to maintain their vast geopolitical empires because of the absence of technological resources to control their vast domains. However, that is not the case today. The modern nation state has the firepower, superior organized forces and technological and logistical resources to subjugate peoples everywhere regardless of times and seasons or topography. Therefore this “concatenation of human and material forces, freed and created by the age of the machine, has given war its total character “and has given “total war that terrifying, world-embracing impetus which seems to be satisfied with nothing short of world dominion” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 385). While much has changed since the economic, ideological and geopolitical order of Morgenthau’s era, the sophisticated and destructive power of conventional weaponry continues to escalate as strong nation states and weak nation states either continue to control or obtain WMD in an age of unprecedented geopolitical instability. In light of this Morgenthau stresses: “Total war waged by total populations for total stakes under the conditions of the contemporary balance of power may end in world dominion or in world destructiveness” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 386). The present era testifies to the limitations and impractical nature of world domination. The superficial unanimity of nation states through interdependent economies is minimized by an unprecedented arms race, and terrorist groups as well as duplicitous volatile rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran. While capitalism, quality of living standards, and international trade are the prevailing standards by which nations gage their state interactions in the present world order, it is military power in general and the acquisition of nuclear weaponry in particular that commands respect among nations and provides a semblance of state security.

In reference to 20th century warfare, Morgenthau states: “No nation can pursue a policy of compromise with the military determining the ends and means of foreign policy. The armed forces are instruments of war; foreign policy is an instrument of peace” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 566). Morgenthau succinctly reiterates the point that the “armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master” (Morgenthau 1961, p. 566). War and foreign policy are wholly distinct enterprises, but unavoidably connected to secure national objectives. The overlapping of military and foreign policy objectives are a constant friction among civic and military representatives, especially in modern democracies wherein
numerous opinions may contradict political objectives for war. Each has its vital role to play to secure peace and harmony among the consort of nations; nevertheless, for either military or civil power to supersede the authority of the other could frustrate the processes for peace or provoked the probabilities of war. The sovereign powers of state overshadow international organizations (IO) that have been developed to enhance international cooperation. According to Morgenthau, world government, or centralized authority, will eventually succumb to the autonomy of sovereign state objectives. Thus a responsible foreign policy is the best means to avert or manage war, enhance peace and enable the government to be the leader of public opinion rather than its slave (Morgenthau 1961, pp. 567-568). Morgenthau summarizes the following observation:

The objective of war is simple and unconditional: to break the will of the enemy. Its methods are equally simple and unconditional: to bring the greatest amount of violence to bear upon the most vulnerable spot in the enemy’s armor. Consequently, the military leader must think in absolute terms. He lives in the present and in the immediate future. The sole question before him is how to win victories as cheaply and quickly as possible and how to avoid defeat.

The objective of foreign policy is relative and conditional: to bend, not to break, the will of the other side as far as necessary in order to safeguard one’s own vital interests without hurting those of the other side. The methods of foreign policy are relative and conditional: not to advance by destroying the obstacles in one’s way, but to retreat before them, to circumvent them, to maneuver around them, to soften and dissolve them slowly by means of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure. In consequence, the mind of the diplomat is complicated and subtle. It sees the issue in hand as a moment in history, and beyond the victory of tomorrow it anticipates the incalculable possibilities of the future (Morgenthau 1961, p. 566).

Morgenthau recognized the cyclic nature of war stemming from the autonomous nation state and carefully outlined the tenuous civic efforts to maintain a balance of power throughout history in order to sustain peace and minimize conflict. Morgenthau also emphasized the natural aggressive disposition of human nature to conquer and avert the sporadic misadventure of world domination and its inevitable influence on the nature of total war polity. His viewpoint also grasped the volatile relationship in history between competitive state actors, the contest for survival, and the determination of elite state actors to disregard its inherent state limitations among nations. The underlying premise that the abuse of power in its myriad shapes and forms is the sole cause of war and geopolitical upheaval only reinforced the concept that the best of nations are subject to the good, the bad and the ugly of state political objectives. Ultimately collective state interests supersede moral and legal theory when a state actor’s security is challenged.

His world, unlike no other, was confronted by the potential calamity of nuclear war. His interpretation of power is foundational to the study of international relations. Even though the bipolar context of his classic work Politics among nations is limited by the overall complications of our multipolar paradigm; the underlying position on power, its intimate connection to geopolitical conquest, is an enduring contribution that can neither be underestimated nor ignored when reflecting upon the relations among nations. However, the one-sided historic observations and application of Morgenthau’s treatise is the efficacy of Kenneth N. Waltz’s deductive application on nation state relations in his monumental treatises Man, the state and war (MSW) and the Theory of international relations (TIR), which are more conducive to the socio-economic and socio-political convolutions of the modern international system.

4.9 Kenneth N. Waltz on Power, the State and War

Kenneth N. Waltz broke from the classical interpretation, which emphasized the nature of man and sin as the underlying cause for war and aggressive competitive behavior among state actors. It is plausible that Waltz’s treatise Man, the state and war was a direct criticism of Morgenthau’s viewpoint that stresses the primacy of power and power balances between state actors. Waltz turned from the
classical interpretation that stipulated that the innate violent disposition of human nature was the cause of war. Instead, Waltz suggested that the causes of war were inherent in a decentralized state system. Both Morgenthau and Waltz were impassioned to understand the causes of war and peace in international affairs. Both adhered to the basic principle that the balance of power among competing state actors affected the international community even though their viewpoints and approaches to understand organized violence were dissimilar.

The great traditions of political thought are passed on from generation to generation. Civilization can only build upon the wisdom and observations of its philosophic predecessors that have withstood the test of time. Waltz established credibility among conservative and progressive thinkers alike during his era by analyzing, criticizing and developing his tripartite premises of the three images in reference to the philosophic traditions of St. Augustine, Spinoza, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, Rousseau, Niebuhr and Morgenthau (cf., Waltz 1970). This was an essential step in challenging the old while initiating a new era of international relations investigation. The observations of Hobbes on the state of nature and monarchical authority; Rousseau’s observation of political structure that consists of man, the state and nation state system; and St. Augustine’s and Reinhold Niebuhr’s observations on the nature of man and sin are representative of an underlying principle that established their respective theories that examined the relationship of humankind and power politics. Waltz grasped the traditions of renowned mentors of political thought such as Rousseau (Waltz 1970, p. 6), reformulated in a progressive social scientific environment that initiated a new movement in international relations theory and scholarship. By modeling his basic premises on philosophic traditions on the one hand, while developing a first generation theory of international relations on the other, Waltz was able to bridge the gap between classical and progressive political thought.

Waltz’s theory of international politics evaluates the big picture or major underlying causes for war. His model is a holistic paradigm of social interaction composed of man, the state and the state system, which is a commonly held view in the contemporary international community. Waltz points out that in a “manner of speaking, all three images are a part of nature. So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two” (Waltz 1970, p. 160). Waltz’s treatises *Man the state and war* and *Theory of international politics*, revolutionized the method of evaluating the primary cause of nation state friction and war in the international system. Lebow and Valentino point out that in “MSW he made the case for war as a system-level phenomenon. In TIP, he developed a system-level theory to account for hegemonic wars” (Booth 2011, p. 213). War and peace are an all-encompassing concern for Waltz. However, there is a definitive-line of thought between knowing the overt complexities of war contrasted to their underlying causes. Hidemi Suganami points out that Waltz’s three images are “not strictly speaking even about the causes of war in the sense of what they are, but more specifically about how the causes of war which have been identified can be ordered in terms of their relative importance. Weighing of causes is a very different exercise from finding them” (Booth 2011, p. 198). It is within this framework that Waltz evaluates three images and their subsequent impact on contemporary international political theory and war.

The first image is man, the nature of man and its impact on war. The first image is the dividing line, in Waltz’s estimation, between the old and new approach to evaluating the complexities of war and the balance of power in international politics. His denunciation of the premise that the causes of war among states is an act of sin in human nature is vigorously criticized and consequently disconnects Waltz from the classical school of political thought, of which Morgenthau is the chief proponent. The terms ‘sin’ and ‘human nature’ are metaphysical at best for the hard-core scientist, whose conclusions are virtually by definition, limited to the observations and measurements of the natural world. Waltz reasons that if corrupt men start wars how is it that the good in humanity is unable to prevent war. How does one differentiate between either righteous or malevolent nation states? The logic of amoral state actors as the cause of war contrasted to righteous state actors as a means for peace is incomprehensible. Waltz suggests that the premise of original sin is antiquated by the sciences on the one hand, and the nature of the international state system on the other. Ethical values and laws are subject to social influences not
‘revelation’. Waltz asks the question, “Does man make society in his image or does his society make him?” (Waltz 1970, p. 4). After all, the state actor, in Waltz’s estimation is the primary force of influence in the anarchical system.

The two prevailing views of human nature espoused by liberal optimists and traditional pessimists are criticized by Waltz because the classical interpretation in its varied nuances does not take into consideration the transforming agent of social influences at all levels of human interaction. The prevailing view that one can nurture the good in human nature to correct socio-political maltreatments and establish peace among nations is as naive as proposing that human nature is the primary cause of all wars: a hopeless condition that can only be restrained by the instrument of power, and power balances (Waltz 1970, pp. 20, 21). This perception of human nature as the primary issue of power conflicts is the point of tension between Waltz and Morgenthau. Waltz states:

Thus Morgenthau rejects the assumption of “the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature,” and explains political behavior by the sometimes merely blind, sometimes too cleverly egotistic behavior of men, a behavior that is the undeniable and inevitable product of a human nature that “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover” the laws of politics (Waltz 1970, p. 27; cf., Morgenthau 1961, pp. 3-4; Niebuhr 1937, p. 30).

Waltz’s observation regarding the unalterable nature of humanity and original sin offers little hope, in his estimation, to confront the economic and political challenges that face the state actor and state system. Waltz does not deny the adverse influence of the nature of man in society and war; however, refuses to make it a means to an end, or the primary cause of war (Waltz 1970, p. 232). If human nature is the center of one’s paradigm then it is problematic to resolve state and state system issues in a stringent classical interpretation because such a view overlooks other factors that provoke conflict. Waltz adheres to the principle that humanity is a byproduct of its environment. Within this framework, even though those political and legal norms are essential to regulate state objectives, it is yet plausible that any correction that needs to be made to resolve war can only occur at the state level. Waltz concludes on this point:

Often with those who expect an improvement in human behavior to bring peace to the world, the influence of social-political institutions is buried under the conviction that individual behavior is determined more by religious-spiritual inspiration than by material circumstance. With those who link war to defects inherent in man, the impetus is more clearly in the opposite direction. To control rapacious men requires more force than exhortation. Social-political institutions, especially if the writer in question is this-world oriented, tend to move to the center of the stage. The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to shift attention away from human nature—because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed, whereas socio-political institutions can (Waltz 1970, p. 41).

The shift from classical politics that makes mankind the centerpiece of political organization is reallocated to the state itself. This apparent modification elucidates Waltz’s premise that the sovereign state actor is the primary mover in the international system. This pivotal adjustment sets the stage for a revolutionary application of sovereign state powers in a decentralized state system.

The second image is the state actor. While human nature is not the primary determining factor for the cause of war, it is categorically related to war since man is a socio-economic and socio-political component of society. However, Waltz asserts that the “internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace” (Waltz 1970, p. 81). It is within this context that Waltz reevaluates the contradictory assessments of the 19th and 20th centuries’ ideals for peace in a turbulent world order. The desire for global peace through international trade and the Wilsonian concert of free democratic states. on mandate the liberal aspiration that state actors that are moved by the same impulse of national cooperation can initiate in a new era of peace. Waltz infers that right and wrong, truth or error in the national order is in the eye of the beholder – both democratic and totalitarian regimes claim the moral upper hand over its
rivals. Despite the overtures of national piety, ultimately economic and political force is utilized to secure anticipated state objectives.

Thus, the notion that a good nation state is foundational for social order and peace, while unscrupulous states initiate instability and conflict is an invalid presupposition. It is within this context that human nature or the particular acts of individuals, according to Waltz, is reflected within the state actor and that state actions are reflected in reoccurring behavior patterns in the international system. The quintessential challenge in Waltz’s deliberation on war in reference to the second image is the independent nature of state actor autonomy. The sovereign state as a legally recognized power, which epitomizes centralized authority in the state system has the means to start war; however, it is not the primary factor for the recurrence of war. The underlying cause for the relapse of war is a decentralized authoritative power base in the international system, which is powerless to control the constant friction between competitive state actors in a volatile bipolar environment. The cyclical struggle for state survival in regards to state sovereignty takes precedence among the concert of nations. Andrew P. Dunne clarifies the point that “Waltz generally meant that states seek their own individual survival rather than some system-motivated goal” (Dunne 1996, p. 66). The state actor is the driving force in the international order.

In reference to Waltz’s theme in Man the state and war, Suganami points out that “His main thesis is that ‘man’ and ‘the state’ are important because we cannot explain particular wars without reference to what they do but that ‘the international system’ is important because it explains the possibility and recurrence of war” (Booth 2011, p. 198). Waltz wrote during the Cold War era. The overwhelming power of the United States and the Soviet Union overshadowed any endeavors pursued by the United Nations to restrain the constant struggle for global domination between the two rival powers. While the post-Cold War era demanded the services of the United Nations to encourage a consensus for peace, security, environmental and many other miscellaneous issues (Mingst & Karns 1995, pp. 1, 2), this was not the case during the Cold War. Both Morgenthau and Waltz shared a common viewpoint that there is need for a world governing power to arbitrate peace and security issues between the major contending state actors. However, both concluded that sovereign state autonomy would supersede recognized centralized authority that was intended to enforce security measures within the international system. It is within this construct that state action and security are clearly delineated between Morgenthau and Waltz.

The realist tradition emphasized power among state actors as an end in itself; whereas Waltz and the neorealist movement emphasized power as a means to acquire and maintain security objectives (Levy & Thompson 2010, p. 32). The autonomous power of the state actor, according to Waltz, is the dominant feature regarding state behavior patterns among first, second and third world countries, which effects conflict in a decentralized state system.

The third image is the international system. Waltz stresses that the “absence of an authority above states to prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from particular wills means that war is inevitable” (Waltz 1970, p. 182). The interdependence of man, the state and the state system are inevitably overshadowed by state sovereignty. Waltz reaffirms that with many “sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur” (Waltz 1970, p. 159). Ostensibly, the advent of nuclear weaponry challenged the dynamics of modern warfare but not war itself. The act of force against force has affected all nations at all times and in every corner of the earth. This constant friction among modern sovereign states enhanced by a decentralized state system deters humankind’s quest for peace. Kenneth N. Waltz summarizes the following observation:

In anarchy there is no automatic harmony. The three preceding statements reflect this fact. A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, inspired by the circumstances in which all states exist (Waltz 1970, p. 160).
The unrelenting recurrence of war, the challenges to international harmony, the overpowering train of circumstances throughout successive decades of distrust, fear and suspicion blinds the rational capacities for international order only to be offset by a balance of power or, more adequately termed, the ‘balance of terror’ between competing nuclear powers. Waltz’s obsession to understand the underlying causes of war was not an uncalculated fixation, but a calculated recognition that intermittent skirmishes between two superpowers with unlimited power could escalate into a preemptive nuclear strike. Thus the reoccurring skirmishes within the context of the second image of state autonomy were a trivial matter compared to the greater consequences of unmerited global catastrophe resulting from a preemptive nuclear strike – to understand the underlying causes of war was a step closer to thwarting a total war scenario between the two superpowers.

Therefore, a bipolar rather than a multipolar environment in Waltz’s estimation is the most desirable and stable state system. The balance of power is not the primary cause for war, but the actuality for peace. In an anarchical system that adheres to unrestrained force to maintain power, or the status quo maintained by a balance of power is the only effective means to maintain peace in the state system. Waltz stresses that “Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in multipolar worlds” (Waltz 1979, p. 171). Centralized power-politics demonstrated by the bipolar Cold War environment contrasted to decentralized power-politics exemplified by multipolar states in pre-World War I and II and the present state system attests to the complications that arise when many state actors envision their respective political agendas as the blueprint for global stability and peace.

Waltz contrasts bipolar and multipolar traditions in order to bolster the claim that a bipolar system is the most effective arrangement in managing and maintaining state system stability. Even though his observations were formulated during the Cold War, these insights are also applicable in our modern state system. The unforeseen break-up of the Soviet Union and the geopolitical reordering of state sovereign powers especially after 9/11, are reminiscent of the rise and fall of empires and of hegemonic reshaping of state actors in both ancient and modern history. Among the numerous insights regarding the advantages and disadvantages of bipolar and multipolar relations, Waltz, in his Theory of international politics, provides some principles in relation to power and power balances that are also applicable to contemporary state actors in the 21st century. 1. The bipolar world enhances transparency for state actor objectives among the primary superpowers without fear of interference from first, second or third world countries from either side. Waltz points out that in “great-power politics of bipolar worlds, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt” (Waltz 1979, p. 170). However, in a multipolar world, the danger factor escalates when strong state actors are also increased – “who is a danger to whom, and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems, are matters of uncertainty” (Waltz 1979, p. 170). The adage ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ is the watchword among state actors especially when old enemies forge alliances.

Modern alliances are disrupted when sovereign state objectives are threatened. The trust factor is often circumvented by past recollections of distrust, but the nature of autonomous state actor power is its ability to adjust to the minor and major fluctuations in the international system. 2. In the bipolar system, state actor objectives and goals can become reality anywhere in the world. War or the threat of war between weak state actors can lead to significant shifts of power for either side. A gain for one side is calculated as a loss for the other side. The two superpowers have the logistical and military power to act promptly to unsettling events that threaten their geopolitical power base. In the multipolar world “dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily obscured” (Waltz 1979, p. 171). Waltz stresses that the dominant state actor in a multipolar alliance must be cautious about the implementation of state objectives that advantage their own economic and geopolitical ambitions. This situation can polarize allies and eventually threaten the coalition itself (Waltz 1979, p. 171).

Strong state actors in either a bipolar or multipolar system often disregard their limitations of economic and military power. Waltz suggests that in a bipolar world there are no geographic boundaries. The United States and the Soviet Union are capable of acting or reacting to any threat to its respective
geopolitical territory anywhere in the world. Since their allies can neither add to nor detract from their logistical and military power, “they concentrate their attention on their own disposition” (Waltz 1979, p. 171). Waltz states that in a “multipolar world, who is a danger to whom is often unclear; the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes with concern and respond to them with whatever effort may be required is consequently weakened” (Waltz 1979, p. 171).

Therefore, Waltz concludes that “self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world” (Waltz 1979, pp. 171-172). The bipolar world is a world of centralized power, a simplistic formulation that recognizes its enemy, its desired economic and political goals, and the means to perpetuate its hegemonic objectives. The multipolar world is a world of decentralized state actor authority, a complex formula that eventually blurs the distinction between ally and enemy. The multipolar paradigm negates the unilateral action of an elite state actor to monopolize economic, political systems and scarce resources. However, elite state actors are prone to overextend their economic and military resources in order to maintain its global influence. Waltz points out: “Miscalculation by some or all of the great powers is the source of danger in a multipolar world; overreaction by either or both of the great powers is the source of danger in a bipolar world” (Waltz 1979, p. 172). Ideological and geopolitical confrontation and the subsequent overreaction between the United States and the Soviet Union on a multiplicity of issues either resulted in inconsequential crises on the one hand or limited war scenarios at worst on the other. However, Waltz believes that miscalculation among competing states in a multipolar environment “threatens a change in the balance and brings the powers to war” (Waltz 1979, p. 172). In the bipolar world, the balance of power held in check the hegemonic status quo, through the possibility of nuclear warfare and the instinct for survival. In the multipolar world of the early 20th century the status quo was upended by the constant shifts among major state actors until war shattered the European continent and dangerously altered the world-view. War has been a pragmatic feature of the post-World War II era. However, the limited war skirmishes throughout the Cold War era were deemed inconsequential by Waltz, not because war is a trivial matter among sovereign states, but rather, isolated clashes were a better alternative than total war between the two superpowers. Waltz’s emphasis on the autonomous nature of the state actor while underscoring a constructive viewpoint on the balance of power to maintain international order in a bipolar environment, revolutionized the examination regarding the potential causes of war among state actors.

4.10 Waltz, State Autonomy and Just War

The preeminence of the sovereign state developed in Waltz’s formulation stresses the autonomous state actor as the central feature of the state system, which minimizes human accountability and individual decision-making in international politics. While the modern democratic tradition is a system of checks and balances; the inanimate nature of the balance of nuclear power, the desensitizing effect of mass media, and mass communications have overshadowed the personal element in power politics, which blurs the distinction between just and unjust war. Morgenthau comprehended just cause for war as a necessary cohesive element to sustain a total war effort; Waltz’s emphasis on state autonomy assigns just cause for war as a state prerogative, and the decentralized state system, as the catalyst that makes the state a law unto itself, the consequences of state survival. Waltz suggests that

. . . a good cause may justify any war, but who can say in a dispute between states whose cause is just? If one state throws around itself the mantle of justice, the opposing state will too. In the words of Emmerich de Vattel, diplomat and writer of the mid-eighteenth century, each will then “arrogate to itself all the rights of war and claim that its enemy has none. . . . The decision of the rights at issue will not be advanced thereby, and the contest will become more cruel, more disastrous in its effects, and more difficult of termination”. Wars undertaken on a narrow calculation of state interests are almost certain to be less damaging than wars inspired by a supposedly selfless idealism (Waltz 1970, pp. 113-114).
There is a correlation between modern wars; calculated or accidental, happenstance or deliberate, the causes for war are innate to human nature, which enacts its policies and direct its efforts. Clausewitz clearly stipulates that war is an act of policy and that warfare is the instrument to secure and sustain that policy. Sovereign state calculations to secure national objectives are subject to unforeseen consequences that can have a copious ripple effect upon the economic and political trends in the international community. Ascertaining the underlying causes for war is a necessary component to dissuade state aggression that could destabilize the international community, especially if elite state actors are hostile to each other; nonetheless, when a state actor has the power to engage in war, it is the responsibility of the international community to challenge the motives that lead to war. The underlying causes for war are counterbalanced by an understanding of the causal motives for war. The just war tradition discloses the subtle yet intrinsic nature of government polity for war. State motives for war are often a recollection of history; the moral axioms for war are challenged, reiterated and even redefined in subsequent eras. In light of this, Augustinian just war premises are not outmoded, but rather overshadowed by state actor autonomy and the complex state system, the scientific method and an amoral renaissance that desensitizes social and political accountability in domestic and international affairs.

In retrospect the irony of the Cold War was that both superpowers portrayed the other as the belligerent antagonist, the epitome of evil and illusion, deceiving the peoples of the world. The aggressive arms race, the uncompromising propaganda and the tumultuous clandestine turf wars were overshadowed by the possibility of nuclear warfare. The third image stresses the weakness of a decentralized state system to cope with the independent nature of sovereign state power, especially the two unchallengeable superpowers. This alarming situation, according to Waltz, is the underlying factor for limited war that might escalate into total war. The conception of just or unjust wars during the Cold War era, according to Waltz, was unreasonable when contemplating the alternative – imminent destruction of the bipolar rivals and their allies.

Morgenthau and Waltz approached the issues and solutions of war from diverse points of view. Their views on power politics, power balances in international affairs and solutions to thwart total war scenarios continues to influence the international relations community. A critical application of their perspectives illustrates the divergent path to peace in regards to the classical and critical methods of investigation.

4.11 Morgenthau, Waltz and International Politics

The concept of power, power balances and war are central themes in international politics. According to Morgenthau, war resides in the nature of man, whereas Waltz adheres to the view that the decentralized power vacuum in the state system is the issue regarding friction among nations. According to Morgenthau the intimidating principle of power and power balances are the quintessential basis of war and peace, whereas Waltz believes that a judicious use of power is the means to maintain the status quo, which will avert war and maintain peace. According to Morgenthau a multipolar dimension among strong state actors is the best formula to maintain equilibrium of power in the contemporary state system, whereas Waltz asserts that a bipolar environment is best suited to maintain the status quo and avert war. The simplistic formulation of two elite state actors is only complicated by an addition of other elite state actor competitors. According to Morgenthau military history is cyclical in nature and war in general and total war in particular can only be averted as the human actor circumvents state aggression through the auspices of diplomacy, whereas Waltz firmly believes in the law of state survival, the natural inclination to preserve state sovereignty in the international system. Limited war in general and total war in particular is circumvented by an intrinsic survival mechanism – the autonomous state actor.

Both Morgenthau and Waltz detest war. War in the bipolar world was an irrational polity. The advent and impending threat of nuclear weaponry, the mechanization of conventional warfare, the rapidity of logistical and communications support, deemed war as an obsolete instrument in settling international disputes. Both Morgenthau and Waltz acknowledged that the sovereign state would eventually circumvent global cooperation and the cessation of war. The natural inclination of man to
conquer, the natural instinct for state survival among a competitive international community has deemed warfare a perennial option to settle domestic and international disputes in the state system.

4.12 The Assessments of Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Waltz

The contributions of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz are foundational to the philosophic nuances of war and state policy in international relations. The neoclassical realists’ attempt to fuse the realist and neorealist traditions may be as successful as pouring new wine into old wineskins. However, there are elements in each tradition that demands an examination. The fundamental component of society is the individual actor. It is impossible to separate the human agent from the decision-making process of the state actor. Even the hierarchical nature of democratic societies entrusts the economic and political polity of a nation to an elite group who have been elected to guide a nation. Every form of government has a centralized figure(s) to influence, develop and guide a nation’s national and international policy. Morgenthau revitalized the moral nuances of the classical state model while Waltz reformulated and emphasized the moral neutrality of the state actors in the international system. However, Niebuhr’s position on original sin was a pivotal perspective that provided the philosophic latitude to facilitate criticism concerning capitalist and communist societies; pacifist and just war traditions and the judicious or abuse of power in the shifting international system.

The underpinnings of Morgenthau’s thought that power and power balances are the primary cause of war since the inception of the modern state system is counterbalanced by a centric view of the state. The classical model of good and bad states was a factor in America’s role as the leader of the free world during the Cold War era. This belief energized and validated America’s resolve that empowered her to defend the free world against Nazi and Communist tyranny. Morgenthau understood the autonomous nature of the state, its force for good or evil, and the temptations of power that test the character of an elite state actor. State actors are not immune from greed, materialism and arrogance; but the bipolar conflict provided two options. The precarious nature of this bipolar conflict was the ever present display of unprecedented state actor power not just between a greater or lesser evil, but the righteous cause of the United States against an ‘evil empire’ – communist tyranny, which was the antithesis of American values and tradition. When two superpowers claim the moral upper-hand, the virtue of their policies and the righteous claims of their global ambitions can escalate into the unthinkable dilemma of nuclear war. If human nature is unalterable, reasoned Waltz, then the stabilizing force in a decentralized international system is the sovereign state. It is imperative to understand the general causes of war to thwart any possibility of thermonuclear war. Waltz was determined to avert a Third World War. The probability of nuclear war inspired Waltz to better understand and devise a theoretical system through scientific investigation to calculate the shifts of economic power and ideological influence that would be a precursor to total war. Waltz counterbalanced the whims of individualism, personality and power by the corporate power of the autonomous state actor in the state system. The solution to maintain peace in a decentralized state system is to understand how to manage the power balances among autonomous state actors. However, Waltz’s dismissal of the inherent limitations and weaknesses in human nature and disregard of the individual actor as an accountable moral agent in the ongoing processes of power politics, delimits the elite state actor as a moral agent in the state system. The idea of just or unjust war is substituted by wars of necessity that preserve the balance of power among elite state actors without escalating into an uncontrollable conflict.

Elite state actors and empires integrate philosophic, political and religious traditions as well as economic and military power to foster its hegemonic and global ambitions. It is not by the battles fought, and the foes conquered that nations are remembered. The conquests of Greece and Rome are their legacies of philosophy and law to forthcoming generations. The rise and fall of empires is a peculiar science. Even righteous nations can succumb to greed and acquiesce to collective self-interest that far exceeds their obligations to the global community. Even empires renowned for their philosophic prowess, legal jurisprudence and democratic system of checks and balances to thwart the tide of tyranny and injustice, can eventually succumb to the destructive forces of human frailty, vainglory and self-centered
power politics. Niebuhr stressed that it is “characteristic of human nature, whether in its individual or collective expression, that it has no possibility of exercising power, without running the danger of overestimating the purity of the wisdom which directs it. The apprehensions of allies and friends are, therefore, but a natural human reaction to what men intuitively know to be the temptations of power” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 132). The hegemonic state actor is enticed, asserted Niebuhr, to either over-depend on military power on the one hand or recreate inferior state actors in its state image on the other — and in most instances, a combination of both elements in the shifting saga of international politics. The visages of empire have left their imprint on past accomplishments as succeeding generations praise their genius and triumphant achievements. But the elite state actor and empire systems that have affected the trends of history achieved dominance through the processes of war. The modern state system in all its diverse political traditions, its numerous power balances, its technocratic advances and its pretentious subtleties to maintain the promise of peace will always succumb to warfare, when state sovereignty is threatened, national identity endangered and the myriad of diplomatic exchanges exhausted.

4.13 Conclusion

Niebuhr’s basic premise is that individual self-interest within the parameters of collective competition, permeates every aspect of economic and political life, affects every strata of society, religious and secular institutions, and the state actor in verity; this challenges the prevalent view that the state actor is the central moral, spiritual and political heartbeat of a nation. The righteous resolve of a nation is not inherent in its laws or traditions, but in its peoples and leaders that comprehend and enact just policies in a system of checks and balances to off-set any group from dominating another. The democratic tradition, which mandates an innate sense of moral judgment, is also prone to national misadventure because of its inherent limitations — human nature. A state actor can be corrupted by national pride, or an overdependence upon economic and military power to maintain its prestige among the consort of nations. The litmus test of a mature state actor is the recognition of its economic, political and military limitations in the international order. However, the cyclic nature of the rise and fall of nations testifies to the fact that man’s incapacity to learn from history those political pitfalls that have defamed the dignity of mankind reiterates the never ending saga of war polity in the international order.

Niebuhr’s emphasis on sin, the human condition of self-love and its adverse effects on the processes of power politics within religious and secular institutions and ultimately the state actor has been either ignored by liberal factions within the church or ridiculed by the scientific community. In many cases, leaders and policy experts take out of context those statements that befit their personal premises and policies while denying Niebuhr’s fundamental axiom that humanity is prone to debilitating self-interest at every level of society, which if not recognized and checked can influence unethical decisions and trends that can demoralize a state actor. However, Niebuhr’s Christian realist viewpoint never contradicted with the recognition of man’s rational capacity to work through those issues that threatened the state actor and the state system. War and nuclear war, in Niebuhr’s estimation, were not insurmountable obstacles but a challenge that could be resolved through the spirit of humanity, the unquenchable desire for life and the common respect demanded of the human family.

The classical and scientific institutions have failed to recognize the validity, import and contribution of their respective traditions. Each in its own way endeavors to ascertain truth to better understand the world in which we live, in order to preserve social and political order and avoid the unnecessary reoccurrences of war. But the postmodern criticism regarding human nature and the consequences of sin are unwarranted, as much as the classical failure to admit that there are aspects of reality that only the scientific method can perceive. While truth is in the eye of the beholder, it remains the quintessential standard that plagues the sincere quest to comprehend right from wrong, the best course of action that would preserve the dignity of the state actor in an increasingly competitive international system.

The scientific method is likened to a perfectly developed glass ball positioned in its designated track. Regardless where the track drives the marble it will eventually conclude its self-designated task at
the end of its predetermined destination. If an experiment is properly performed within its designated methodological parameters, the data collected and correlated, a rational and definable statistical interpretation can provide significant insights to a variety of issues. The classical model of human nature is likened to an imperfect pebble or stone. If you drop the stone it will rarely reproduce a similar path. In fact it is impossible to predetermine or replicate the destination of that flawed object until its journey’s end. So it is with human nature, which is not an indefinable variable, but an irrational variable that has destabilized the natural order. Like the wind, which we see not where it came from but witness its results, so it is with the consequences of human nature in our daily lives. For example: hate, revenge, resentment, retribution, selfishness, and greed contrasted to love, peace, kindness, gentleness, courage, prudence, self-control, which are aspects of the innate disposition of mankind have consequences at every level of human interaction. Human nature and sin is an irreconcilable duplicity that controverts the best intentions of humanity to maintain order on the individual, state and international state system. Niebuhr recognized the dangerous path of elite state actors that fail to recognize their natural limitations in the global order. The inevitable result of such denial is an over-dependence on economic and military force to procure and maintain state power.

Even in our postmodern era the earthly city is challenged with the unavoidable competition and violence at every level of human interaction. The principle of love is superseded by self-love as groups of collective self-interest inevitably controvert the principle of community against the economic and political strains of society. The earthly city is limited by the finite capacity of man to comprehend all things, yet man has the power to alter the course of nature and history through the destructive force of warfare. The heavenly city, the epitome of grace and love, the noble foundation of community, will inevitably clash with earthly realities of human competition, which culminate among individual state actors in the international state system. Economic and political power is foundational to state autonomy; however, economic and military power is the prerequisite for power politics and war among nations. While some political systems are more advantageous to enhance a just order, and other political systems more prone to enact injustice, the temptation to exploit power affects all political systems and state actors because of the human element, which in full knowledge of history always reduplicates the sins of the fathers, never learning from past failures, but always repeating the inhumane atrocities against humanity in war – this, the ‘original sin’ of men and nations, demands the necessity of just war in order to preserve a world order from the catastrophic destructive force of nuclear warfare, the unparalleled defacing of God’s image in humanity.

In light of this examination the causes for war are twofold: 1. The decentralized state system within a volatile shifting international paradigm has become increasingly complex and unmanageable. Though war is denounced, it remains a viable option to settle international disputes. War in its numerous designations is still war, and will continue to play a vital role as nations compete for scarce resources and geopolitical advantage to maintain state sovereignty, and 2. War and peace are the sure results of the individual and corporate human condition. Augustine and Niebuhr assert that war is the consequence of human depravity, within a competitive world order. Therefore, the just war doctrine is not an excuse for war, but a check on unethical aggression for war and the unwarranted carnage inherent in warfare itself. In light of this, nothing has distorted the polity of warfare more than weapons of mass destruction and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with this impending dilemma. In Niebuhr’s estimation, the liability of the human condition is its irrational reaction to the forces of economic and military power among state actors that threatens national security and its claims of state actor autonomy, which is challenged and redefined in every era.
CHAPTER V

5.1 The Social and Political Realism of Saint Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr

The just war tradition has undergone a curious evolution, from its birth within the Roman Republic, which invoked the blessing of the gods to secure victory, to Cicero’s just war premises that magnified the state at the expense of imperial power, and moving finally to Augustine’s Christian Rome, which transformed the Roman casus belli by emphasizing the limited utility of war. The just war tradition was once again reiterated by Thomas Aquinas as a criticism of the perilous misadventures of the crusades inspired by the legal enactments of the canonists that authorized and empowered the Pontiff to declare holy war. Martin Luther resurrected the Augustinian tradition re-emphasizing designated authority as the hallmark of civic and religious order, while John Calvin reaffirmed Augustine’s just war premises advocating ‘last resort’, thus restraining unwarranted authorization for war. As the Holy Roman Empire dissolved, a major paradigm shift evolved – the nation state. The state actor paradigm highlighted the diversity among the consort of nations. The unavoidable ethnic tensions, the moral ineffectiveness resulting from ecclesiastical competition and indifference between Catholic and Protestant communities, and the unremitting quest for territory incensed a continuum of unremitting conflict among nations. The just war tradition was once again analyzed and redefined, as Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius developed and popularized the constructs of international law to thwart the ever increasing tides of war amidst the evolving nation state paradigm. The First and Second World Wars once again contested the just war tradition. The bloody European feud redefined the parameters of total war through the technologic advancements of modern weaponry. Biological, chemical and nuclear weaponry have maligned the just war tradition as an outmoded concept that has outlived its utility in a complex and competitive state system. To further the alienation of moral ethics from war in contemporary society, the state actor, its institutions and progressive customs have been venerated as the nucleus of civilization. It has matured as the all-encompassing force of good. It embodies the ideal of governance and depending upon its power base constitutes the effect for change in the state system. Revelation, the hallmark of religious experience and moral ethics has been circumvented by rationalism the hallmark of the investigative sciences and a liberal democratic tradition that lauds society as the originator and beneficiary of social values.

The church was the moral conscience of the Imperial Roman Empire. Through Augustine the church defined the ethical parameters, limitations and prerogatives of the state in regards to war. However, throughout history warfare has always been counterbalanced by philosophic constructs to manage the process of organized violence. The recognition that war is not a means unto itself, but an extreme violent friction among nations to address unresolved issues among state actors prompts philosophers and statesmen, civic leaders and the general populace alike to limit its activity. The prophetic adage, “You will hear of wars and rumors of war” (Mt 24:6), reiterates the human condition – the cyclic nature of war and violence among competing state actors throughout history and the unfolding competition among nation states. However, while nations are openly reluctant to commend war as an advantageous policy to settle disputes, it’s utility to secure geopolitical and economic goals is indisputable.

Rome was renowned for its scrupulous adherence to the jus civile “Roman citizen law’ and the jus gentium “law of the people” to maintain order throughout its vast dominion. The Roman casus belli adhered to a peculiar protocol to work through its grievances with other nations. But the nobility of Roman law and tradition was blighted by unprecedented power through the policy of war. At what point did the Roman just war tradition become a justification to declare war and expand its vast domain? The moral traditions of the Roman Republic steadily deteriorated as its imperial counterpart justified all its wars as casus belli in order to sustain its empire. The reformulation of the just war tradition throughout history is a combination of three fundamental elements: 1. The precedence of state actor autonomy within the competitive structure of nations. The state actor functions in terms of preserving its national sovereignty and domestic and international assets that sustain its power in order to maintain its territorial
claims in the state system. Regardless of the political paradigm and balance of power shifts in ancient and modern societies, the kingdom, the nation or the contemporary state actor function to preserve its existence among competing nation states. The progressive nature of military science and the technologic advancement of weaponry have dramatically transformed the tactics of warfare. From sword and spear to the revolutionary development of gunpowder; from tank and aerial warfare to the destructive force of weapons of mass destruction; from smart technology and drones to the deployment of modern conventional war tactics; from intermittent skirmishes among ancient conflict to the modern capacity of mass killings in contemporary warfare, the process of modern warfare has challenged the just war tradition, and 3. The emergence of globalization has disordered the processes of economic and political cooperation. Also, the rapidity of mass communication, the complexities of interdependent economies, the friction among religious traditions, the emergence of WMD as the most desired means of national security, and the competition for natural resources has complicated the processes for international peace. The intimate link between political agendas and military strategy overshadows legal and moral axioms that appear to interfere with a state actor’s grand strategic objectives. While political agendas, according to Clausewitz, give birth to war. It is the military that maintains the state. But the destructive force of modern warfare is the most eloquent argument in defense of those just war tenets that protect the dignity and sanctity of the combatant and noncombatant.

The contemporary state actor as the dominant fixture in the state system is attributed to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the fundamental elements of the state sovereignty-based system, which were officially recognized in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. The contemporary state actor in “international society is built around sovereign statehood as its bedrock organizing principle” (Weiss & Daws 2008, p. 389). The state controls the ebb and flow of domestic and international commerce, dispenses justice, preserves cultural and moral traditions, maintains domestic and international law and ensures order in the state system. However, state autonomy is mutually dependent upon the personality of its people and leaders that forge a political and economic path to preserve its statehood.

The budding state system in general and realpolitik in particular was established upon the classical model, which was most notably espoused by Augustine, reiterated by Spinoza, contextualized by Reinhold Niebuhr and finally articulated in the international relations’ field by Hans J. Morgenthau. The classical model stressed the individual actor’s inherent weaknesses and innate compulsion for violence as the basis for war. The classical tradition, which was established within the framework of ‘original sin’ was eventually superseded by Kenneth Waltz, who suggested that war, resulted among state actors because of a decentralized state system that neither had the designated authority nor power to thwart state hostilities. Waltz suggests that human nature and the concept of original sin is an intangible conventionalization that has outlasted its practical application to explain the complex and contemporary causes of war. Thus, the warfare and civic peace is a social conditioning, rather than an inherent condition in human nature (Waltz 1970, pp. 51, 55). Waltz states: “Social-political institutions, especially if the writer in question is this–world oriented, tend to move to the center of the stage. The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to shift attention away from human nature—because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed, whereas social-political institutions can be” (Waltz 1970, p. 41). In a similar vein of thought Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson suggest that human nature is a “‘permissive condition’ for war, in the sense that it allows war to happen” (Levy & Thompson 2010, p. 21), but is an inadequate interpretation that has no explanatory or analytical perspective in comprehending the overall tangible causes concerning war and peace. The natural characteristics of hate, selfishness, distrust, rage, and rebellion, for example, may contribute to the outbreak of war, but is not the primary ‘variable’ or ‘trigger’ that causes war (Levy & Thompson 2010, p. 21). Stephen P. Rosen employs a scientific interpretation of human nature in regards to biological inheritance, and social conditioning to describe the relationship of human cognition to warfare. Rosen demonstrates an inseparable link between cognition, and the “conscious and unconscious center of decision making” in which human nature is the fusion of “human cognition”, that is “affected by biological inheritance, as those inherited factors are shaped by human interaction with the environment”
(Rosen 2005, p. 3). This interpretation limits the influence, the conscious responsibility of individual free-will that shapes and molds the social environment for war and peace. Nonetheless the effects of immoral or virtuous behavior patterns in human nature are indefinable variables according to the scientific community, and are considered a secondary or tertiary variable, but not the underlying cause for organized violence. The general consensus regarding human nature is summed-up by Noam Chomsky, the American intellectual connects human nature to human need, not from a position of faith and hope, but community. There is rejection among the scientific community regarding the relationship of human nature and war as a viable scientific research alternative to the understanding of violence (McGilvary1999, p. 223). The general consensus is that moral values and their impact on state and institutional traditions is a product of social environment (Peck 1987, pp. 193-199).

The significance of the social environment on the moral character of a nation and the contribution of the scientific method to better comprehend the economic and political issues of our times is invaluable. However, the neorealist tradition, which emphasizes sovereign state survival in a decentralized international system, and the realities of competition and power, neglects the impact of ethics on state longevity. The state actor is the embodiment of its people’s moral personality. Contemporary thought overlooks the contribution of religious tradition as a stabilizing force to prevent the exploitation of power that disrupts civic and international harmony. There is more to war and organized violence than a decentralized state system, radical ideologies or an abuse of power politics. Self-interest, greed, materialism, hate, distrust and other adverse characteristics of personality lie deep within the human psyche, which is a plausible interpretation of state actor friction that incites domestic and international disorder. The concept of the origins of sin is not a 'guilt-trip' or a concocted theory to validate Christian social ethics. It is a sincere appraisal of the human condition, the recognition of a solution through the merits and grace of God in Christ Jesus as the foundation of the ethical barriers that are needed to protect the social, economic, and political fabric of a nation. The separation of church and state does not mean the separation of morality from the state, but recognition that the state is prone to collective unprincipled behavior, and needs to be reminded of its limitations in the state system, particularly in the area of war. The just war tradition is a response of the reality of conflict among nations and the need to monitor the motivations and purposes for war. The concept of sin is a philosophic examination of evil and the basis of ethical mandates to sustain the moral and spiritual fabric of society to ensure domestic and international order.

The foundational premise of the Christian realist tradition is the intrinsic principle of sin and its pervasive influence upon the individual and collective mindset of a nation. The Christian realist tradition maintains that the principle of sin, individually and collectively is the perpetrator, the irrational variable that causes friction among nations and eventually war. According to Augustine the principle of sin, defined as self-love, is the quintessential element, the center of sinful volition, which causes friction and lawlessness affecting human behavior in the home, the city, and the state. Until recently the concept of original sin was universally acknowledged by the Catholic and Protestant traditions. Popular literary works, poetry and art depicted Adam’s disobedience and the consequences of his fall. Men and women from all walks of life voiced their agreement to its universal acceptance. However, the 19th century marked a turning point in biblical interpretation. The rising popularity of lower and higher criticism of scripture, the influence of Darwinian thought upon creationism and moral tradition, the philosophic and scientific criticism of the biblical concept of human nature and the origins of sin, and the recent globalization and synthesis of world religions in western culture, have diluted the significance of the Christian interpretation of sin and it’s just war antecedent in western civilization.

The doctrine of original sin is the fundamental concept regarding Augustinian and Niebuhrian social ethics. Augustine’s candid assessment of human nature is foundational to a Christian realist interpretation of history. Early Christianity was not an academic exercise, but the application of biblical revelation and ethical axioms to better understand the social disorders that affected church and society. The Christian realist emphasis on the universality of sin and its effects on individual and collective behavior ultimately set the stage for Niebuhr’s contemporary application of the realist tradition in America foreign policy.
The correlation between the Christian concept of original sin and warfare will be investigated. It is the classical interpretation of original sin that identifies and distinguishes virtues from vices, and the self-interest and friction that affects all levels of social interaction in the earthly city. According to Augustine sin is the root of war and proposes that all wars result from sin and should be waged with sadness. However, the Christian tradition recognizes that there are two alternatives in organized violence, that being the just war doctrine and Christian pacifism (Patterson 2008, p. 5). Augustinian social ethics is an alternative response to thwart unwarranted and needless violence in war. The western just war tradition is Augustine’s response to unjust and unwarranted conflict in light of the certainty of war in the Roman Empire. According to Augustine the litmus test of an unjust conflict is the unrestrained and unmanageable killing in war. Within the framework of ‘original sin’ and war in contemporary society, there are two predominant elements, the church and the state actor. This chapter will focus on: 1. The relationship between original sin as the basis of the just war theory and its historical and moral implications in western civilization. The classical model espouses the intrinsic selfishness of the ‘natural man’ as the basis of the social and civic disordering in society. In essence the modern state actor is the embodiment of the civic institution, the evolution of social values and a revised social imperative – capitalism. Niebuhr attests that even democracy can succumb to the eccentricities of unrestrained power. 2. The state has been authorized in ancient and modern times to declare war. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans supports secular authority to protect the domestic order from internal and external dangers that would disrupt civic harmony. What then is the responsibility of the church in regards to state action prior to, during and after war? Should the Church have a voice or sheepishly turn a deaf ear to the realities of war? The tension between church and state concerning warfare policy necessitates a clear delineation between the pacifist and just war traditions. The pacifist tradition is a rational debate against direct or indirect church participation in organized violence. To what extent can the church dialogue with the state in regards to warfare policy. The observations of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer provide valuable insights into these inquiries. The Church as a rational moral voice is obligated to advise, rebuke and protect the ideals and traditions of the state during the process of war. While Christian pacifism has important contributions regarding the limitations of ecclesiastical authority during war; the just war doctrine is also rational and practical model to service the state actor. 3. The connecting links between Christian realism and the just war tradition on the one hand and a modern application of the viable tenets of just war on the other is not a modern redefinition of the just war tradition, but an adaptation of its principles in the 21st century. Throughout history jus ad bellum requisites have been adapted to the changes in military science and the state order. Augustine, Gratian, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Spinoza, Morgenthau and contemporary theorists have utilized and adapted the casus belli to justify, explain or denounce war. Its longevity testifies to its general acceptance throughout western civilization and should continue to influence the processes of modern warfare, and 4. The application of jus ad bellum principles in regards to U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, known as the Bush doctrine shall be investigated. The foreign policy application of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ is the backdrop to understand the contemporary challenges and application of just war tradition. The purpose of this investigation is to comprehend the difference between just war and an invasion. It is the expressed purpose of this section to provide an understanding of the foundations of Christian realist tradition, its relationship to the just war tradition and application to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

5.2 Original Sin and Just War

The starting point in this investigation is the Christian concept of sin; it’s historical and contemporary application to the world of realpolitik. The important aspect regarding the origin of sin is the concept of evil, which in Augustinian thought is rooted in self-love. According to Augustine, this is the basis of all social disorders. Organized violence is the fruitage of self-love. However, the Augustinian concept of self-love is an antithetical concept when contrasted to contemporary social values. The ideas of truth and falsehood, righteousness and wickedness, right and wrong are universal in nature, yet have alternative interpretations in ancient and modern societies. These values are also portrayed as a byproduct of western religious tradition that was developed by Catholic and Protestant thought. Thus, the concept of

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original sin progressively developed stemming from St. Paul, the early church fathers and culminating in Augustinian thought.

The concept of sin is not peculiar to Christianity (Hastings 1951, vol. 11, 528 ff.); however, the concept of original sin is distinctive to Christianity as it recounts an explanation of the fall of man, the original sin, in the Garden of Eden (Gn 3). Deliberations regarding the concept of sin are varied among Christians and deemed outmoded by the scientific community. Nonetheless, the concept of sin is interrelated to other biblical themes such as law and grace; repentance and forgiveness; justification and sanctification, salvation and judgment, and the perousia – culminating in the completed work of redemption by the cross of Christ. According to the sacred text, it is the principle of sin, which has caused an unavoidable schism between the heavenly and earthly cities. Sin is lawlessness (1 Jn 3: 4) and the ultimate fruitage of sin is death (Rm 6: 23), which can only be conquered through faith in the merits of Christ’s righteousness. It is only through Christ (Jn 3: 16; Is 53) that the heavenly city is ultimately restored when this “corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality” (1 Cor 15; 53 KJV).

While the book of Genesis portrays the paradise lost motif in the Garden of Eden (Gn 3); the book of Revelation proclaims paradise restored, where the revelator beholds a “new heaven and a new earth” (Rv 21:1-4). The synoptic gospels and the book of John proffer a practical solution to the dilemma of sin in the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. Christ does not offer worldly honor or the conquest of empires. The battlefield is the hearts of humanity. The ambitions of the earthly city are superseded by heavenly priorities (Mt 6: 33). Self-love and pride are enveloped by selfless-love and humility exemplified in the life of Christ. Within this framework Jesus Christ exercises divine authority to forgive sins (Is 53; Jn 1: 29; Mt 9: 1, 2), and deliver its victims from temptation and sin (Jn 8: 1-11). It is the grace of Christ that enables the community of faith to live morally responsible lives in a world of amoral compromise. The heavenly and earthly cities collide; the clash of personal interests and ambitions are superseded by the inner principle of love, the hallmark of the spiritual kingdom of God (Jn 18: 36; 1 Cor 13). The merits of Christ conquer the consequences of sin by exposing the character of Satan and establishing direct access to the throne of grace (Jn 17: 13; Rm 8: 31-34; Jude 24).

The First Epistle of John sheds light upon the dilemma of sin in human nature. The author of sin, the devil, is contrasted to the source of deliverance and forgiveness, Jesus Christ. The human race is weakened and conquered by sin, victimized by a compromising world order that is under the dominion of the evil one, yet protected by the grace of God through the forgiveness of sins and transforming power to preserve the faithful to cope with temptation (1 Jn 3: 1-10). Humanity is under the divine mandate of grace, wherein God promises protection and victory in Christ Jesus (1 Jn 5: 4, 5). There are external or visible manifestations among the community of faith such as keeping God’s commandments (1 Jn 2: 3,4; 3: 22, 24; 5: 2, 3; 2 Jn 1: 6), maintaining credible moral relationships among fellow believers (1 Jn 4: 19-21), and remaining unstained from the amoral trends of society (1 Jn 2: 15-17; 5: 4). The underlying premise of the first Epistle of John denies any form of sinlessness or human perfectionism. I. Howard Marshall states that “. . . John here stands firm against all claims to perfection that Christians may make. None of us is free from sin; none of us can claim that we do not need the cleansing offered by Jesus Christ for sinners” (Marshall 1978, p. 120). The contrast of light and darkness, Christ and the evil one, the community of faith and the world, love and hate, and faith and denial are subject to the frailties of sin in the natural man. However, the covenant between God and community in scripture promises deliverance from the power of sin through the intercessory work of Christ Jesus (1 Jn 1: 7-9; 2: 1-2), the insignia of Christian faith. The formulation of original sin attributed to Augustine is essentially from the works of the apostle Paul. Thomas R. Schreiner points out that “Romans 5:12-21 is one of the most difficult and controversial passages to interpret in all of Pauline literature” (Schreiner 1998, p. 267). The diversity of interpretation throughout church history validates Schreiner's viewpoint. To understand the concept of original sin or the ‘origin of sin’, as it relates to war and state actor power, an overview of these contested scripture verses is indispensable.

Romans 5: 12-21 refers back to verses 1-11, designated by Διὰ τοῦτο "Therefore", which reaffirms the hope that believers have in the redemptive work of Jesus Christ (1 Cor 6: 11), while
establishing the superiority and sufficiency of Christ’s substitutionary sacrifice for sin, as described in chapters 6-8. The context of verses 12-21 defines and reaffirms the consequences of sin through the one man, Adam, which is θάνατος "death" that affects all of humanity and the existence and condemnation of ὁ νόμος "the law" or "the law of Moses/Pentateuch". Christ has conquered sin and fulfilled the demands of the law on the cross of Calvary (1 Cor 15: 55-56; Mt 5: 17-20; Rm 8: 2, 4). Also, this section contrasts the one man, Adam, who sinned in a state of innocence and perfection (Gn 3: 1-11) to Christ, who, ἐν ὁμοίωματι σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας "in the likeness of sinful human nature" (Rm 8: 3), conquered sin and Satan (Mt 4: 1-11), and lived without sin (1 Jn 3:5; Heb 4: 15). Cranfield states that the “fact that there are those who, being justified by faith, are also now God’s friends means that something has been accomplished by Christ which does not just concern believers but is as universal in its effects as was the sin of Adam” (Cranfield 1975, p. 269). Thus, the universal implication of the principle of sin, which has affected the human race, is superseded by the redemptive work of Christ. Adam's failure is fully recompensed through Christ's victory and merit made possible through his atoning sacrifice on the cross (Rm 5: 5; Col 1: 20).

There are two corresponding elements emanating from Adam’s sin – death and law (vss. 12-14). According to Paul the universal consequences of sin is death. The principle of sin is manifested in physical and spiritual death. Dodd describes death in this passage as “a comprehensive term for the disastrous consequences of sin, physical and spiritual” (Dodd 1974, pp. 81-82). The paradise lost motif was not only the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, but the defacing of the spiritual image of God through disobedience. The consequence of disobedience is soon recognized in the murder and death of Adam and Eve’s first born son Able by the hand of his brother Cain (Gn 4: 1-16). Paul states that “sin was indeed in the world before the law” (vs. 13 NRSV), which is demonstrated by death. But to say that there is no recollection of law before Moses overlooks the encompassing theme of the apostle Paul. There is a recollection of the knowledge of sin when Joseph was tempted by Potiphar’s wife to commit adultery (Gn 39: 9). Joseph responded: וְאֵיךְ אֶעֱשֶה הָרָעָה הַגְדֹלָה, הַזֹאת, וְחָטָאתִי, לֵאלֹהִים (Ezek 36: 26-27; Rm 10: 8). Paul states the existence of sin through the actuality of death on the one hand and the revelation of sin through the conscious principle of the law on the other (Rm 5: 20). Both witnesses, death and law, are universal principles in the world. The νόμος the ‘law’ is not a negative concept in Pauline thought. The law is not an agent of sin (Rm 7: 7), it is a standard of righteousness (Rm 7: 12), but deemed ineffective to reform human behavior apart from the grace of God. The law is only a reflection of one’s true spiritual condition. There is no power in the law to change lives. Martin Luther asserts that the “Law . . . drives us to Christ” (Luther, Lectures on Galatians, 1535: W, XL, 532, 533. see 347). Therefore, through the merits of Christ through the agency of the Holy Spirit, the law is imprinted or written upon the heart on those who place their faith in Christ’s atoning sacrifice (Jr 31: 31-34; Heb 8: 8-12; Ezk 36: 26-27; Rm 10: 8).

Paul then shifts the attention of his readers in verses 15-17 to the sufficiency of God’s grace ‘in Christ ‘contrasted to the Adam’s disobedience and leaves no room for doubt regarding the efficacious plan of redemption for humanity. The reign of sin through Adam’s overt act of rebellion in the full knowledge of God’s will (Rm 5: 14, 15), caused death to those in ignorance or in full knowledge of his principles (vs. 14). Nonetheless, the distinction between Adam’s παράπτωσις "transgression" contrasted to the ἡ γάρς τοῦθεν "the grace of God" in verse 15 and the consequences of judgment because of sin resulting in κατάκριμα "condemnation" is contrasted to δικαιοσύνη "justification” that is made available through Christ in verse 16, culminating in verse 17. Paul affirms that the penetrating effects of sin, is superseded by the grace of God through the gift of righteousness in Christ Jesus. The principles of sin and righteousness cannot be understood as a balance of power or dualistic component in the nature of man. There is no coexistence between the principle of sin and righteousness – according to scripture we are either slaves of one or the other. The phrase πολλοῖς μαλλὸν lit., ‘by much rather’ or ‘much more’, is inserted between 17a designating the consequences of sin and death, contrasted to 17b designating the gift
of righteousness, once again emphasizes the superiority, the completeness of Christ’s liberating righteousness from sin and death.

Paul reaffirms the previous statement in verses 18-19, designated by ἄρα οὖν ὡς lit., ‘So therefore as’ or an inferential ‘therefore’ or ‘consequently’ continuing the trend of thought by reiterating that the condemnation of πάντας ἀνθρώπους ”all men” is superseded by the gift of justification for ”all men”. Thus, by one act of disobedience human nature is dominated by the principle of sin, whereas by one act of obedience humanity is liberated from the power of sin (vs. 19). Why does Paul emphasize the universality of sin and righteousness? The apostle goes to great lengths to parallel the contrasts between the first and second Adam to point out the dilemma of the human condition and the only course of remedy – Jesus Christ. According to Paul sin is inclusive; it permeates all nations, all ethnicities, and all classes of people in every epoch. No one is immune to its principle and condemnation and ultimate outcome – death. However, the gospel of righteousness by faith (Rm 1: 16, 17), not only substantiates God’s love in the gift of his Son, but condemns national, racial and social status categories and self-righteousness in all its varied formulations when contrasted to the surpassing glory of the atonement for sin on the cross of Christ.

Paul reiterates the function of the νόμος ”law” in Romans 3: 19. In verses 20-21, the apostle reaffirms the endearing theme of Christ’s surpassing gift of righteousness to fallen humanity; while preparing the reader for the following transition in chapters 6-8. Here, Paul emphasizes the believer’s true spiritual condition and death to sin as a ruling principle in one’s life through the power of God’s grace ‘in Christ’. While Paul argues that the law of nature (God’s creation) condemns humanity for rebellion against his divine creatorship and authority (Rm 1), its witness is ineffective; rather it is the law given through Moses that increases the trespass (vs. 20). The oral tradition has been updated by a written codification. The full force of the law is available, and humanity is held accountable to its demands, which it can never satisfy; however, despair gives way to hope for just as “sin reigned in death, so also grace might reign through righteousness to bring eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Rm 5: 21 NRSV). The phrase ὑπερεπερισσάς ἐπελεύ̱σεν ἡ χάρις ”grace more abounded” in verse 20 is a climatic term reemphasizing the previous contrasts by designating the finality of righteousness over sin in verse 21. Cranfield points out:

The triumph of grace described in v. 20b was not itself the end of the matter. Its goal was the dispossession of the usurper sin and the replacement of its reign by the reign of grace. In expressing the divine purpose in the triumphant overflowing of grace, Paul has for the last time in this section made use of a comparison—this time comparing the never-ending reign of the divine grace with the passing reign of sin (Cranfield 1975, p. 294).

Cranfield attributes Romans 5:12-21 to universal reconciliation (Cranfield 1975, p. 271). Victory over death and the condemnation of the law is assured in Christ (1 Cor 15: 22). However, the glorious reign of righteousness neither diminishes the gravity of sin nor its destructive principle in the lives of men and nations. If anything, it reveals the infinite price paid to rescue humanity from its devastating effects. It is from these verses in general and verse 12 in particular that the doctrine of original sin flourishes (see 1 Cor 15: 22; Rm 2: 23-24; 5: 12-21; 7: 18-24).

The fundamental teachings of the apostle Paul on the origins of sin have been altered throughout history as ecclesiastical leaders and theologians confronted dissenting views that contested the tenants of the sacred text and church tradition. The Old and New Testaments are full of references defining, recounting and delineating the consequences of sin. The motifs of sin and morality, rebellion and law, wickedness and righteousness, injustice and justice, disobedience and obedience permeate the Bible. Unlike postmodern theologians and theorists that disregard the seriousness of sin, the Bible writers had an acute understanding of its devastating, humiliating, and destructive force in the lives of men and nations. There is in the Old and New Testament a progressive development of the concept of sin. The act of sin is intimately and ultimately connected to the principle of sin (Mt 5: 27-28; Rm 5: 12-21). The progressive understanding of sin in the Bible has been replicated in church history. The early church Fathers such as
Irenaeus, Origin, and Tertullian pioneered, reshaped and reiterated the concept of sin as heretical philosophies infiltrated and challenged Christian teachings. The urgency of the times demanded a response, which also solidified the gradual development of the New Testament text in general and the authority of Pauline literature in particular to counteract heretical teachings such as the apocryphal gospels and Gnosticism—a syncretistic philosophic system that inculcated elements of oriental mysticism, Greek philosophy, and Judaism that undermined the essence of the gospel such as the nature of God, creation, redemption and the deity of Christ.

Paul was not a political or social activist and did not provide any treatises on the pertinent issues of his time. Paul’s social mandate in Galatians 3: 28 was a congregational construct. The apostle did not publicly confront the inequalities prevalent in Roman society. Nonetheless, Paul was a Roman citizen and a Christian. His allegiance to the emperor was respectful and dignified, but was superseded by an ardent love and supreme loyalty to God in 'Christ Jesus'. Paul’s primary concern was the spreading of the gospel message to the gentile world and sustaining the moral tenets that distinguished the true believer from the world (Eph 4: 29-5: 3-7). However, Paul provided the ethical underpinnings that would influence Catholic and Protestant thought. Depending upon one’s viewpoint on scriptural inspiration and personal conviction regarding ecclesiastical authority in society, Paul provided the soteriological and moral underpinnings that would influence the social and political traditions of western civilization.

As the sacred writings of the reputed apostles were canonized, the acceptance and authority of the Pauline corpus established an irreplaceable foundation that would enhance church authority and shows the significance of social ethics and morality in everyday life. Sin and righteousness (Rm 5: 12-21), church and state (Rm 13: 1-7), Christian deportment in the social order (Eph 5: 22-6: 1-9), and Christian behavior that characterized a true believer from the world (Gl 5: 16-26; Eph 5: 3-5; Col 3: 1-17) influenced the values of both church and state. The death of personal witnesses of Christ Jesus, the mounting tensions of heretical teachings, social and civic friction necessitated the development of an authoritative New Testament canon. This provided the church with an authoritative guide to navigate the Christian community confronted by philosophic heresy and state persecution. The gradual formulation regarding the concept of sin was developed by the early church fathers that clarified biblical dogma from infectious heterodoxies on the one hand and the knowledge to substantiate the claims of the gospel message and mission on the other. However, the connection between sin and war was a gradual process actualized when the persecuted Christian sect became the official religion of the state.

5.3 The Early Church Fathers: Church and State

Irenaeus challenged Gnosticism, defended the validity of the atonement and validated the importance of scripture as the standard of Church authority. This early church father was recognized as the first biblical theologian. Irenaeus formulated the 'doctrine of recapitulation' that emphasized the fall from Edenic innocence and the ultimate restoration of humanity from sin (Bettenson 1969, p. 13). The recapitulation theory was developed by Irenaeus because the Gnostic interpretation of evil, the incarnation, and the atonement undermined the redemptive paradigm in scripture, thus inciting a retaliatory response from Irenaeus to defend the Christian community. Irenaeus ambiguously referred to the fall and the consequences of sin, by the first Adam, and the subsequent victory over temptation and sin through the second Adam – Jesus Christ (Irenaeus, Against heresies, III.XXII/3; XXIII). Irenaeus’ reference to Adam’s transgression skirted the concept of sin as an inherent principle in human nature. This was overshadowed instead by collective guilt and punishment, resulting from Adam’s disobedient act. However, Cain’s impudent disposition toward God and unwarranted premeditated fratricide necessitated an explicit curse from God (Irenaeus, Against heresies, III.XXIII/3.4; see Gn 4). Even though Irenaeus did not conceptualize or define sin as a natural and overpowering inclination in human nature, this does not nullify the concept of sin among the early church fathers in the sacred text. His ardent defense of the atonement of Christ is all about the principle of sin and the full and complete reconciliation and restoration of mankind with God through the merits of Christ. When confronting the Marcionists, a Gnostic sect, Irenaeus stated that God is not accountable for humankind’s sinful condition (Irenaeus,
Against heresies, IV. XXIX/1.2). Irenaeus also emphasized that God’s displeasure and retributive response to sinful behavior even among his professed believers was a warning for the Christian community to shun disobedience and the wrath of God (Irenaeus, Against heresies, V.XXVII). While Irenaeus attributed inherited sin to the descendants of Cain (Hastings 1951, vol. 9, 560); the principle of the origin of sin attributed to Adam’s fall and its consequences upon the human race was more fully developed in the writings of Origen and Tertullian.

While Irenaeus may have been the first church father to systematize fundamental Christian teachings to counter the infiltration of Gnostic beliefs; Tertullian in the West and Origen in the East continued the ardent defense of Christian thought and tradition against the sophistries of Gnostic philosophy. These anti-Gnostic fathers ministered amidst a hostile government, a plethora of mystic religious cults and philosophical systems vying for the attention of a general populace seeking social acceptance and salvation. Tertullian dedicated five volumes against the Gnostic heresy. Origen, a product of the Alexandrian academic and cultural environment investigated all forms of philosophic thought to defeat Gnostic tenets in order to more effectively promulgate Christian truths. The church fathers fostered hope and direction among the layman and utilized the philosophic traditions of the times as a medium to preserve and spread the gospel message to all classes. The primary concern among the early church fathers was to maintain theological and moral purity among its members. The church fathers were so engrossed to combat the Gnostic teachings that had infiltrated the Christian community, that their writings were solely dedicated to the essence of biblical dogma. It was not until the Pelagian heresy that a systematic appraisal of sin and the nature of man were developed to controvert the libertine elements of paganism that had permeated the church.

Origen’s statements on inherent sin can scarcely generate any significant theological reflection; however, his observations are partly a response to the practice of infant baptism and a rationalization for the widespread dilemma of sin through the force of free will (Origen, De principiis, II.IX/6). Infant baptism was a popular tenet of the Alexandrian school, which became a widespread practice throughout Christendom. The prevailing viewpoint suggested that while mature individuals succumb to sin and experience suffering and death, the innocent infant who had not consciously sinned also experienced the indignity and disposition of suffering, and the peril of eternal loss, which baptism at birth would rescind through the merciful intervention of the grace of God. Origen’s justification for infant baptism was supported from the Old Testament, which states that a “. . . sacrifice for sin was offered even for newborn infants, as not being free from sin”. It states, “I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me”; also, “They are estranged from the womb”; which is followed by the singular expression, “They go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies” (Origen, Against Celsus, VII.; see Ps 51: 5; 58: 3). Another interdependent premise alluding to the consequences of Adam’s fall was the seminal relationship between Adam and the human race (Origen, De principiis, II/6; cf., Chadwick 1984, p. 90, n56). These two basic premises concerning an inborn taint at birth, referred to as birth-sin or the natural seminal link of Adam to the human race that promulgated sin from generation to generation was another progressive link toward Augustine’s doctrine of original sin.

The third independent development toward a concept of original sin is attributed to Tertullian. The universal notion that Adam’s fall inculcated inborn sin from generation to generation was scarcely cited by either Irenaeus or Origen. However, Tertullian formulated an extensive and explicit analysis of the original sin concept by developing the ‘traducianist theory’, which was derived from Stoic philosophy and Scripture (Tertullian, A treatise on the soul, V.VII). The fundamental premise is that God created Adam by giving him the breath of life and making him a living "soul" (Gn 2: 7), whereby humanity, in a corporeal state of nature, is composed of soul and body, not derived from matter but the power of God ex nihilo or ‘out of nothing’ (Tertullian, A treatise on the soul, III). Even though life is the conjunction of soul and body, the soul is the center of life, intelligence, free will and at birth the principle of sin to the body (Tertullian, A treatise on the soul, XXII.XXVII.XXXIX.XL). Therefore, the soul tainted from seminal relations, emanating from Adam’s fall, regenerating sin among humanity, is perceived as a state of actual sinfulness. The corporeal state of humanity is transmitted from generation to generation, disseminating corruption in the earthly city. However the soul though tainted by sin, can
experience spiritual regeneration through the grace of God (Tertullian, *A treatise on the soul*, XLI). The 'traducianist theory' was not officially acknowledged by the church; nonetheless, Tertullian’s theory of soul-sin made a lasting impression and was eventually reformulated to meet the challenges of the church in succeeding generations. It should be pointed out that the writings of the early Christian sect were essentially preoccupied with heresies that had infiltrated the community. Greco-Roman thought and Jewish philosophy stirred heretical teachings that challenged fundamental Christian beliefs. Theological and moral purity was the primary focus of the early church fathers. This had two effects upon the early church: 1. The early Christian sect renounced Roman sacral and social norms, and 2. The Roman state interpreted their allegiance to their god as a direct challenge to state authority and the emperor. Ironically, despite the tension between the early Christians and Rome, some of the church fathers maintained that Rome was the guardian of the civic and international order. However, the gradual development of a doctrine of sin was in response to the Gnostic heresies and pagan ritual that challenged early Christian culture.

Justine Martyr (100 – 165) points out that the Christians primary concern is the heavenly city not the earthly city. Justine Martyr experienced persecution by the state authorities, but emphasized that Christ taught civil obedience. Justine Martyr states: “Whence to God alone we render worship, but in other things we gladly serve you, acknowledging you as kings and rulers of men, and praying that with your kingly power you be found to possess also sound judgment” (Martyr, *The first apology*, XVII). However, Irenaeus’ (120 – 202) reaction to imperial persecution, explains the supremacy and final victory of God over earthly empires as well as the eventual dissolution of the Roman Empire (Irenaeus, *Against heresies*, V. XXVI). This exemplified the on-going strain between church and state, which was reiterated by Tertullian (145 – 220), who criticized the increasing trend of Christians serving in the military. Tertullian disdained Christian participation in the military and condemned the receiving of military honors, the taking of military oaths and denounced a Christian killing in war as an unlawful act (Tertullian, *The chaplet, Or de corona*, XI, XII; *On idolatry*, XIX). Conversely, Tertullian acknowledged Rome’s stabilizing force in the civic and international order. Tertullian also recognized the biblical imperative regarding civic authority: “We respect in the emperors the ordinance of God, who has set them over the nations” (Tertullian, *The first apology*, XXXII). As the Christian sect population base increased so did its exposure to the governing authorities. The Roman state demanded that Christians participate in the municipal and military order. Origen (185 – 254) stated that the Christian community should not participate in civic and military service. Origen supported the current policy that Christians would assist the Empire through their ardent prayers and supplications: “And as we by our prayers vanquish all demons who stir up war, and lead to the violations of oaths, and disturb the peace, we in this are much more helpful to the kings than those who go into field to fight for them” (Origen, *Against Celsus*, LXXIII).

While the early church fathers ardently maintained their theological and moral tenets, this did not prevent professed Christians from joining the military. Nonetheless, the Christian sect continued to separate itself from civil and military duties to protect its identity by abstaining from all forms of paganism. During the ministry of Lactantius (260 – 330), Christianity was officially recognized as the State religion. Lactantius emphasized universal non-violent concepts, which stressed the dignity and sanctity of life because “it is the duty of humanity, to succor the necessity and peril of a man” (Lactantius, *The divine institutes*, VLXI). The stirring insights in *The divine institute* fueled the early Christian commitment to the moral tradition that emphasized the theological and moral purity of the Christian community from all forms of paganism and any form of violence and war. However, it is interesting to note that Lactantius’ participation as tutor to the son of the Emperor Constantine attested to the gradual acceptance of Christians in the Empire.

The tension between the budding Christian sect and Imperial Roman polity was unavoidable. While Roman law was a cohesive element to unite the Empire, the cult of the Emperor personified this symbol of power and unity.
Emperor worship was a political rather than a religious cult, though it eventuated in the worship of the state. . . . Christians were placed in the irreducible dilemma of being compelled to apostatize by token worship of Caesar if they would save their lives, or of appearing unpatriotic because they would not conform to state requirements. Irregular and perfunctory as emperor worship was, it symbolized the desire for protection by some visible power that was more real than the older gods who had proved ineffectual. The Roman felt that their security was personified in the head of state, who was responsible for their food, their pleasures, their safety, and their future. The result was a state cult which set the emperor in the place of God and created an atmosphere of man-worship. Such an attitude was hostile to Christianity, which was as rigidly uncompromising toward idolatry as Judaism and ever been. The constant pressure of the state was an unremitting threat to Christianity even under those emperors who did not take it seriously and who consequently did not promote any active persecution of dissidents. On the other hand, the very name “Christian” became synonymous with subversion and in the eyes of the general public Christians came to be classed with criminals (I Pet. 4: 15,16) (Tenney 1965, pp. 116-117).

The Christian religion clashed with the societal values and political traditions of Rome. The early church fathers were adamant about their unremitting commitment to ‘Christ worship’ and the theological and moral sanctity of the community of believers. As the Christian population base increased, so did state persecution. However, the attractiveness of the Christian religion permeated all social strata and eventually was recognized as the official state religion. Constantine the Great’s affirmative support of the Christian religion was the definitive legal action that established the Christian sect as an official state religion. As Christians continued to serve in the civic and military order, this unavoidable situation necessitated an ecclesiastical response. Ambrose of Milan was a Christian and governing administrator. His ministry influenced Church thought regarding social issues that challenged traditional church policy on war.

Ambrose (340 – 379) was the turning point regarding a representative appraisal of the changing social dynamic of church-state relations in regards to warfare. By vocation a governing administrator, by election the Bishop of Milan, Ambrose’s reflections regarding war and civic responsibility was a practical application of a real-world view. Ambrose’s theological and civic views on warfare would influence Augustine’s just war tradition. Ambrose deemed war in defense of the empire as a justifiable war (Lackey 1984, p. 14). War was inevitable. Warfare against the barbaric hoards was a legitimate action to defend the state from foreign intrusion and preserve the Christian faith (Ambrose, Duties of the clergy, I.XXXVII. 129). Ambrose recognized killing on behalf of the state during war as an act of justifiable self-defense to sustain the civic order in contrast to killing in self-defense in a noncombatant role, which in his estimation was unlawful (Ambrose, Duties of the clergy, III.IV, 27). Ambrose also made a distinction between authorized personnel to defend the state from foreign intrusion contrasted to the spiritual function of the clergy, who were invested to insure the spiritual needs pertaining to the church (Ambrose, Duties of the clergy, I.XXXV. 175). While utilizing the biblical illustrations in the Old Testament as a legitimate pretext for defensive war, the Bishop of Milan was always the peacemaker maintaining by example the sanctity of the ministry. The correlation between Ambrose’s theological tenets and war was a process that culminated in Augustinian thought. Ambrose acted from a standpoint of a savvy administrator, with real world experience in the civic sector. Ambrose understood the realities of the state and the solemn responsibility to the Church. Ambrose’s theological and just war observations influenced the young Augustine. However, it was Cicero’s casus belli reflections that would most influence Augustinian thought on the matter of warfare. While Augustine modified Cicero’s just war precepts within a Christian construction to meet the ethical and social challenges of the newly recognized state religion, it was the concept of original sin that formed the basis of Christian realism, the candid appraisal of state limitations, and the necessity of moral obligations in war.

Roger Epp refers to the mid-twentieth century Christian realism as the “Augustinian Moment” in which the present global order is indebted to Augustine’s political treatise The city of God that established the modern Christian realist tradition (Patterson 2008, p. 3). Reinhold Niebuhr suggests that “Augustine was, by general consent, the first great ‘realist’ in western history and deserves this distinction because his
picture of social reality in his *civitas dei* gives an adequate account of the social factions, tensions, and competions which we know to be well-nigh universal on every level of community” (Niebuhr 1953, pp. 120, 121). The fundamental feature of Christian realism in both Augustine and Niebuhr’s thought is the concept of sin, and collective self-interest within the socio-political order. While both Augustine and Niebuhr are separated by time, Niebuhr stated: “A generation which finds its communities imperiled and in decay from the smallest and most primordial community, the family, to the largest and most recent, the potential world community, might well take counsel of Augustine in solving its perplexities” (Niebuhr 1953, p. 146). An understanding of the concept of original sin is the initial phase in recognizing the philosophic synthesis in regards to the ancient and modern classical tradition that emphasizes societal friction and conflict among state actors that eventually escalates into war. Augustine challenged prevailing Church viewpoints while maintaining church tradition. His writings set the stage for future delineations on Christian responsibility in the social order.

5.4 **St. Augustine, Original Sin and War**

Augustine represents a theological tradition in religious thought, which assimilated and developed the concepts of original sin and redemption from the early church fathers, and classical apostolic thinkers. Tatha Wiley points out that to “Augustine is rightly given credit for shaping the classical doctrine, but he neither started from scratch nor from a theological doctrine intact from scripture and early Christian belief” (Wiley 2002, p. 56). Augustine’s concept of the universality of inherited sin was a process that culminated when confronted by the Pelagian controversy. It should be noted that his universal application of inherited sin necessitated, in Augustine’s mind, the universal need of redemption in Christ Jesus. Ultimately his passion and purpose for ministry was exalting and praising the surpassing worth of God’s grace in redeeming mankind from sin through the merits of Christ’s cross.

Augustine initially adhered to the Neo-Platonian concept of preexisting-souls, which symbolically interpreted the Edenic story of Adam’s fall by suggesting that sinning disembodied spirits were incarnated in this life for remedial punishment. Augustine eventually rejected the idea of “preexistence of the soul and a transcendent fall, dismissing them as hangovers from his Manichaean days” (Wiley 2002, p. 59). The dilemma of the relationship of sin and the soul prompted Augustine to adopt Tertullian’s 'traducianism' as a more plausible explanation for explaining the nature of sin as the “human soul is generated with the body through sexual intercourse—a better philosophical resource for explaining human solidarity in sin with Adam. Transmitted with the body and soul is Adam’s sin” (Wiley 2002, p. 59). Traducianism was however formulated upon a Stoic naturalism, which limited the scope of divine equity and mercy and was considered a defective paradigm to fully understand the origin, universality, and effects of sin and its divine remedy (Pickman 1937, pp. 72, 73).

As Augustine became disenchanted with the Manichean religion and secular philosophic expressions, the sage of Hippo examined the human condition in the Epistles of Paul and expressed in his *Confessions* the inner longing of his soul for Christ – “Thou movest us to delight in praising Thee; for Thou hast formed us for thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee” (Augustine, *The Confessions*, I, 1). The recognition, the inner conflict from personal experience that man was incapable of saving himself or performing what was intrinsically good apart from God’s grace not only coincided with his personal experience, but also resonated with the classic Pauline observation, “I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me” (Rm 7: 18, 20). At what point did Augustine differentiate between the origins of sin and personal sin? In the *Confessions* it is recognized both the act of sin and its origins – “bearing all the evils I had committed against you, against myself, and against others—sins both numerous and serious, in addition to the chain of original sin by which ‘in Adam we die” (1 Cor 15: 22)” (Augustine, *The confessions*, 5.9.16). Wiley states:
Augustine’s invocation of *originate peccatum* in the *Confessions* did not advance the theory that each human being inherits Adam’s actual sin. In this context the term suggests the *entanglement of sin or sin from the beginning* more than inherited sin. Like Paul, Augustine establishes a causal relation. The *reason why* human beings have pervasive inclination to evil—evidence of their hostility to God—thwarting their moral decision and action is *because* of Adam’s sin. Personal sins are virtually inevitable given the bias toward sin. This bias once acted upon, individually become entangled in sin (Wiley 2002, pp. 58-59).

The works and influences of Cyprian, Ambrose and Tertullian guided Augustine’s clarification on the subject, and the issues of infant baptism, the Donatist and Pelagian controversies, also attributed to defining and formulating Augustine’s views on original sin.

The practice of infant baptism became an important source of clarification for Augustine’s development of original sin. That is not to say that such practices were without issues, but Augustine considered the custom of infant baptism as a valid expression of faith (Wiley 2002, p. 60; cf., Augustine, *On forgiveness of sins and baptism*, I.36, 41, 42; II.43). The practice of infant baptism was gradually recognized as a hereditary concept of sin that had permeated early Christianity; it was an endeavor to secure salvation for innocent infants from the visages of sin such as premature suffering and death. Within the context of the acts and principle of sin, Cyprian (200 – 258), reaffirmed the necessity of infant baptism (Cyprian, *The epistles of Cyprian*, LVIII.2), and referenced the apostle John, who stated that “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us” (1 Jn 1: 8) (Cyprian, *The treatises of Cyprian*, IV, 22; *Testimonies* 54). Cyprian’s view on sin would prove valuable in regards to Augustine’s prolonged struggle with the Donatists (Wiley 2002, p. 61). Ambrose would also influence Augustine’s understanding that sin is transmitted biologically and is the binding link of “humankind’s solidarity in sin with Adam” (Wiley 2002, p. 61). Ambrose provided foundational arguments that enabled Augustine’s theological challenge against Pelagius (Wiley 2002, p. 61; cf., Augustine, *On original sin*, II. 47, 48). Jerome (347 – 420) also influenced Augustine’s “biological theory of inheritance” (Wiley 2002, p. 61). Jerome denounced the philosophic premise of human ‘sinlessness’ and pointed out that King David declared: “Behold I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me” (Jerome, *The letters of St. Jerome*, CXXXIII. 2). Jerome applied the sources of Didymium the Blind (313 – 398) an Eastern Church theologian who supervised the influential catechetical school of Alexandria – “Didymium maintained that infants were born with a sin transmitted through physical procreation and thus in need of divine forgiveness” (Wiley 2002, pp. 61, n14, 225). Augustine also gleaned viewpoints from Ambrosiaster regarding the universality of sin. Ambrosiaster’s interpretation of Romans 5: 12 translate the text from the Latin Vulgate in regards to the universality of sin, literally “in whom all sinned” (Wiley 2002, p. 61). Augustine formulated his premises on the ‘origin of sin’ from the theological tradition of the early and contemporary church fathers of his time and on interpersonal experiences and asserts with regard to Adam: “Thence, after his sin, he was driven into exile, and by his sin the whole race of which he was the root was corrupted in him, and thereby subjected to the penalty of death . . . And thus ‘by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; an so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.’ By ‘the apostle’ the apostle, of course, means in this place the whole human race” (Augustine, *The enchiridion of faith*, 26). Wiley summarizes the consequences of Adam’s fall: “The penalties for Adam’s sin were (1) death, loss of the gift of immortality; (2) ignorance, loss of the knowledge of intimacy with God; and (3) difficulty, loss of the stability to accomplish the good one wills” (Wiley 2002, p. 63).

According to early Christian thought the underlying disorder of human passion known as *concupiscence* was a permanent imperfection caused by Adams’s fall. It is noted that while “concupiscence is not itself sin, it inclines persons to sin” (Wiley 2002, p. 64). Concupiscence was not only understood as uncontrolled and dominant sexual desire, but an identification of humankind’s innate self-love that fosters rebellion against God. The rational capacity tainted by sin is free to choose evil freely, but is unable to innately choose the good freely (Finny, Scholer & Ferguson 1993, pp. 424, 428). Wiley reiterates the point that “Augustine argued that only liberation from this bondage to sin is the divine infusion of the Holy Spirit, caritas, love for what is right and for doing what is right. Because of
Adams’s sin, fallen humanity is born without *caritas*. Human beings are servants of its opposite, *cupiditas*. Hence their tendency to choose evil, not good” (Wiley 2002, p. 66). This enabled Augustine to develop a distinctive identification of human nature for the Christian church. Augustine was also able to clearly define God’s transforming grace as the essential remedy and ethical median to remedy the effects of sin in the earthly city. According to Augustine one must first understand the disease before applying the remedy. Henry Chadwick suggests that “even when writing of free choice, he had declared that without God’s grace to rescue fallen man; one cannot be set on the right path” (Chadwick 2001, p. 115). Man by nature is morally flawed and incapable of transforming his moral temperament apart from God. Humanity will always struggle with its natural inclinations. According to Augustine: “From all which it is shown with sufficient clearness that the grace of God, which both begins a man’s faith and which enables it to persevere unto the end, is not given according to our merits, but is given according to his own most secret and at the same time most righteous, wise, and beneficent will” (Augustine, *On the gift of perseverance*, 33). Augustine’s viewpoint regarding human nature and sin would be refined when confronting a local faction referred to as the Donatists.

The Donatist movement redefined two significant Church policies that would reshape Western Orthodox Christianity. The first, already alluded to, was Augustine’s rational for giving credence to State intervention to utilize force to maintain civic stability and church unity. This situation redefined forthcoming church polity, which invested the regalia bishop and/or Pontiff with secular authority and in the case of the Pontiff, the power to declare holy war. However, the immediate concern that confronted Augustine was that Donatism was a direct reaction to the Diocletian persecution. During this intense persecution some clergy and lay leaders renounced their faith in Christ, yielded the scriptures, and denied their affiliation with the Christian community. The schism between these two factions centered on the status of those clergy who betrayed their public confession of faith. This situation incensed the Donatist, who claimed that the sacraments of forgiveness performed in behalf of the apostate leadership, was invalid and that the clergy that betrayed their sacred trust must be re-baptized and re-ordained before reinstatement in any official capacity. This minority sect in Roman North Africa threatened the Church position regarding the sacraments thus endangering church authority and unity. Augustine renounced such action and maintained that the priestly sacral office, not the faulty character of the clergy, gave credence to the import of the sacrament of penance. In other words, the “sacramental life of the church gets its meaning and power from Christ and the word of faith in the church, not from the individual minister” (Fitzgerald 1999, p. 744). Augustine’s reaction was not an excuse for sin but recognition of the frailty of humanity and it avoided the extremes of perfectionism, legalism and libertinism in Christian experience while maintaining the sanctity of the sacraments in the church. Augustine maintained a balance between human limitation and sin made possible by the power of God’s grace, moral transformation, and the sacraments. Tatha Wiley suggests: “Augustine’s anti-Donatist writings (c. 406 C.E.) reflect a theological position grounded in his existential experience of moral impotence and his developing theology of original sin” (Wiley 2002, p. 59). The remedy for moral weakness among the clergy was not their expulsion and reconfirmation of faith, but their reconciliation to God by a sincere acknowledgment of sin and by being renewed into Christian fellowship and community by the forgiveness of sins.

Whatever questions, deliberations or uncertainties that challenged Augustine’s assessment regarding the nature of man, original sin and salvation, the Pelagian controversy provided the public platform to address and develop and solidify a response that would endure the test of time. The paradox of heresy is not the obvious, or the apparent contradictions of truth and error, but rather, the subtle misgivings of truth mixed with error. The early Christian church combated external heterodoxies that threatened the fundamental axioms of the Christian faith with veracious clarity and unremitting conviction. But like all movements truth is corrupted by human opinion, intermingled with the grace of God. The greater threats to church and country are not external forces, but are the consequences of internal implosion that denigrates the noble axioms that sustain a people, an institution and a nation. We witness its flawed and limited nature. The outstanding qualities of truth are superseded by moral relativity. And yet, the Imperial Roman tradition, the beacon of light among barbarism, permeated the Christian sect, blurring the distinction between a good Christian and a good pagan. Pelagius, the monk from Britain,
observed the moral complacency that intruded the sophisticated and common Christian classes of Rome. His call to obey the commandments and will of God was honorable, his denunciation of spiritual apathy is commendable and his ardent defense of Christian sacrifice and morality is admirable. But the interpretation of attaining character and salvation through human reason and obedience incited an unavoidable clash with the Bishop of Hippo. Pelagius was ardent, erudite, articulate and most of all a zealous Christian patriot. His movement, referred to as Pelagianism, permeated the Christian community in the far reaches of the Empire. Peter Brown states that the Donatist schism was a local issue but the Pelagian controversy secured for Augustine a “truly international reputation” (Brown 1967, p. 341). It is within the parameter of this controversy that a matured delineation on the origins of sin has reverberated, redefined and reshaped the soteriological traditions existent in both the Catholic and Protestant communities.

Pelagius denied the tenet of original sin resulting from Adam’s fall and asserted that Adam’s transgression and death were not transmitted to his descendants (Augustine, On the proceedings of Pelagius, 24). Pelagius advocated that humanity was born untainted, that Adam’s original sin, his disobedient nature, was not passed-on to his offspring. Procreated untainted, through the capacity of free will, humankind could cultivate character for good or evil (Augustine, On the grace of Christ and On original sin, II, 14). Good and evil result from free will, repeated actions forms character. Adam’s example of disobedience only encourages sin and rebellion in his descendants; but Christ is the great example that man can emulate. Humanity has an inborn capacity through free will to turn to God, seek forgiveness, and develop a righteous character through the discipline of abstinence (Augustine, On the grace of Christ and On original sin, I, 24-44; cf., Pelagius 1993, p. 94). Pelagius advocated that man is justified by grace at baptism for past sins (Pelagius 1993, pp. 39, 62, 81, 95), but was unable to reconcile his view of justification with the biblical premise that all humanity has sinned (Rm 3: 23). The Pelagian viewpoint on free will and ascetic living were foundational to the formation of Christian character and salvation. The disparity between man’s inborn capacities for righteous living advocated by Pelagius contrasted to man’s utter dependence upon God’s grace because of original sin advocated by Augustine influenced the tenet of total depravity—the sinner’s unmerited all-embracing dependence upon the grace of God.

The doctrine of peccatum originis ‘sin of the origin’ or ‘original sin’ was developed by Augustine to counteract the influence of Pelagius (Augustine, On forgiveness of sins, and Baptism, 22.X). Augustine acknowledged a historical state of innocence and guilt resulting from Adam’s fall from grace (Augustine, On forgiveness of sins, and Baptism, 36.XXII). Augustine distinguished between the state and condition of sin as the precondition, the cause for sins committed (Augustine, On forgiveness of sins, and Baptism, 11.X). Augustine believed that original sin is clearly taught in the scriptures, it is a universal dilemma and that Christ alone is the remedy for sin (Augustine, On forgiveness of sins, and Baptism, 33.XXIII, 39.XXVI; 40.XXVII; 41-53). Augustine also adhered to the viewpoint that original sin is of natural decent through child birth (Augustine, On forgiveness of sins, and Baptism, 19.XV; 20). Within this framework original sin resulted from free will (Augustine, On the nature of grace, 3.III) and that free will is a neutral and nonaligned power inclined towards faith or unbelief. However Augustine’s neutral stance on free will would eventually incorporate the idea that humanity's natural inclination toward sin would enslave mankind to the extent that only the grace of God could restore the sinner. (Augustine, On the spirit and the letter, 58; Against two letters of the Pelagians, I, 5). Augustine adheres to the view that man is prone to evil, incapable of good except through the grace and righteousness of Jesus Christ (Augustine, On the proceedings of Pelagius, 7; On the Spirit and the letter, 5. III). Augustine states: “They are not, then, free from righteousness except by the choice of the will, but they do not become free from sin save by the grace of the Savior” (Augustine, Against two letters of the Pelagians, 5). Therefore the Pelagian premise that man could attain perfection in this life through the power of free will without divine grace is contrasted to the Augustinian premise that the utter helplessness and depravity of humanity to free itself from the power of sin comes only through the regenerative power of the righteousness of Christ. The dilemma of sin and human nature is a natural and enduring condition, which affects all phases of life in the earthly city. Augustine’s assessment of the human condition and its effect on the home, community...
and the nation state is formulated on the premise of original sin. The natural man is prone to self-love; his ambitions and goals are antithetical to the divine mandate of forgiveness and love. Therefore friction in the home, the city, the state and among nations is inevitable. Augustine’s emphasis is that even though humanity is blessed with free will, the effect of Adam’s sin is so complete in human nature that humanity is incapable of righteousness without divine aid (Augustine, *On the Spirit and the letter*, 4), thus influencing his assessment on the limitations of the earthly city because of the universality of sin that effects humankind.

Augustine recognized that the earthly city was encumbered by self-love, friction among the respective social orders and competing nations (Augustine, *The city of God*, 19.7). Recognizing that war is the fruitage of sin, Augustine states: “The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust for power, and such like” (Augustine, *Reply to Fautus the Manichaeans*, XXII, 74). A just war is by a just authority, but just wars were to be waged to correct evil – “When war is undertaken in obedience to God, who would rebuke, or humble, or crush the pride of man, it must be allowed to be a righteous war” (Augustine, *Reply to Fautus the Manichaeans*, 75).

Augustine understood the social realities that confronted church and state and specified that a Christian could defend the state in times of war and maintain a public confession of faith as well. Augustine maintained: 1. The state could wage just wars, and 2. Reiterated that the church could defend a just war as the best means of protecting the social order. Augustine adapted the church to its contemporary spiritual and societal setting, but never lauded the state as the centric feature of society and history. To Augustine, the magnificent glory of the cross, the eternal destiny of the heavenly city was his all-encompassing passion, but a passion that was balanced by the realities of life. George Weigel states:

Augustine was specifically confronted with the charge . . . that the collapse of the western empire before the invading barbarian hordes had something to do with the Christian ethos. In its narrower form, the charge was that traditional Christian pacifism had helped create untenable military circumstances for the western empire; the broader charge was that Christian other-worldliness, the Church’s concern to prepare its members for the next life, had led to an historical and socially irresponsible approach to the inescapable problems of individuals and societies in history. Rebutting these indictments required the systematic exposition of a Christian social ethic and a more nuanced answer to the moral problem of war and peace than had been given before (Weigel 1987, p. 27).

Augustine’s premises on the origin of sin, human nature, the sacraments and church authority would reshape the political landscape in the Holy Roman Empire and Reformation. The Medieval Roman Catholic Church developed a more favorable view of original sin by counterbalancing two distinctive aspects of human nature. Adam’s original sin eliminated the state of original righteousness and immortality for the father of the human race and his descendants; also, Adam’s disobedience merited for mankind an eternal separation from God, human culpability, spiritual and physical death, and the frailties and sufferings of humanity in the natural order. However, man’s fall, according to this tradition, is not a totally depraved state of being, but an intrinsic weakening or deterioration of humankind’s natural rational endowments. Humanity’s free will and rational capacities are limited but salvageable through the meritorious tutorship and guidance of the Church (see Brant 1962, pp. 58-60; cf., Ferm 1945, pp. 551, 552). The medieval concept of original sin was fraught with moral and ontological dilemmas. Even though fallen nature was powerless to correct moral deficiencies and incapable of reclaiming its supernatural dispositions prior to Adam’s fall, there was yet inherent in humanity the capacity to reclaim the character of God through one’s rational capacity (Wiley 2002, p. 97). In other words, only through the grace of God and the sacraments extended by the church could the community of believers attain grace and acceptance before God. The Protestant Reformers rejected this twofold application. The reformers maintained that the grace of God is freely bestowed upon those who display faith in the merits of Christ’s atonement within the framework of the free gift of forgiveness of sin and righteousness ‘in Christ’. The Protestant movement adhered to a standardized Augustinian interpretation of original sin, which
emphasized that humanity's spiritual capacity was totally depraved and that the grace of God is the sinner’s only hope for salvation, a supposition that was restated by Martin Luther.

The High Middle Ages was fraught with friction between church and state. The complicated maze of political affairs, the manipulation of socio-economic polity between ecclesiastical and secular powers, the constant struggle between Pope and Emperor, constantly attempting to usurp each other’s authority, overshadowed the sacraments, the graces of God’s gift in his Son Jesus Christ for indulgences and self-merit – the price for salvation was cheapened by human decadence and pride. Amidst the spiritual darkness Martin Luther stood boldly proclaiming the everlasting gospel of righteousness by faith to a church that had betrayed its spiritual mission by usurping secular authority and worldly ambition. Unknowingly and unpretentiously, Luther initiated a movement within the framework of the Augustinian tradition, which redefined theological tradition, social ethics, government and the eventual formation of the state system.

5.5 Martin Luther: Original Sin, Total Depravity and War

The writings of St. Paul enabled Luther to revive the theme of the gospel message that ὁ δὲ δίθατον ἐφίππεως ζήσεαι "the righteous shall live by faith" (Rm 1: 17). The message emphasized that grace is available to everyone who trusts in the merits of Christ's righteousness. The dilemma of sin and its effects upon the earthly city was countered by the atonement of Christ. The Augsburg Confession of 1530 elucidates Luther’s clearest positions on original sin, free will and the causes of sin. Also The Formula of Concord of 1580 is the authoritative Lutheran statement of faith, which is composed of Luther’s Corpus Doctrinae ‘body of doctrine’ known as the Book of Concord. These invaluable sources provide a clear formulation concerning Luther’s view on original sin, free will and justification by faith and its Augustinian antecedent that enhanced the popularity of the Protestant movement throughout Europe.

Luther asserts that Adam’s fall is original sin. Reflecting upon the Augustinian tradition, Luther states in his Lectures on Romans:

. . . . . That the apostle is in this passage talking about original sin and not actual sin is proved in many passages, and we assume this to be so from these points: First, because he says: “through one man.” Thus blessed Augustine says in his work On the Merits of Sins and Their Remission, Book I, in opposition to the Pelagians: “If the apostle had wanted to point out that sin came into this world not be propagation but by imitation, he would not have spoken of Adam as the one who originated it, but rather of the devil, . . . of whom it is said in Wisd. Of Sol. 2: 24 ‘And the follow him who are of his side.” In this sense Adam also imitated him and thus had the devil as the originating cause of his sin. But here the apostle says “through a man.” For all actual sins enter and have entered the world through the devil, but original sin came through this one man. In the same place blessed Augustine also says: “Thus when the apostle mentions that sin and the death which passed from this one to all men through propagation of the human race took its beginning” (Luther, Lectures on Romans, pp. 296, 297).

This excerpt reiterates not only the enduring tradition of original sin but also the influence that Augustine had upon Luther and subsequent protestant reformers on this matter. Luther stressed that humanity is not held culpable for the guilt of Adam’s sin; however, the corruption in the nature of man resulting from Adam’s disobedience is so devastating and complete that there is “nothing sound, nothing uncorrupt in the body or soul of man, or in his mental or bodily powers” (Schaff 2007, p. 100). The corruption of sin has thoroughly maligned man’s spiritual rational powers. While Augustine stressed the importance of ‘free will’ in relation to choices and acts for good or evil, Luther stressed that the phrase ‘free will’ is unbiblical, and that the carnal man is incapable of utilizing his rational powers to comprehend spiritual things unless regenerated by the grace of God (Lund 2002, p. 45). The Formula of Concord regarding ‘free will’ asserts in section II, points I & II that the “understanding and reason of man in spiritual things are wholly blind, and can understand nothing by their proper powers” and that the “unregenerate will of
man is not only averse from God, but has become even hostile to God, so that it only wishes and desires those things, and is delighted with them, which are evil and opposite to the divine will” (Schaff 2007, p. 107). Luther’s position regarding the nature of sin and its effect on free will reiterated and enhanced the classification of the human condition referred to as total depravity. This was due in part to elements of Pelagianism that had infiltrated Catholic thought and Luther’s adherence to the Augustinian tradition. The concept of total depravity or humanity’s estrangement from God, and the utter corruption of body and soul and free will, exposed once again the helplessness of mankind to attain a saving relationship with God, unless personal faith adheres to the provisions provided in the atoning work of Christ.

Luther opposed the medieval position on infant baptism, the sacraments and the church as the embodiment and dispenser of grace. Johann Tetzel’s sale of indulgencies was representative of a biblical misapplication of scripture, according to Luther, that had permeated the Medieval Church. The issue was not attaining moral perfection through the sacraments but grasping by faith a renewed, direct—justified—relationship with God through faith in the merits of Christ. This simplistic and fundamental formulation that the ‘just shall live by faith’ challenged the medieval construct that the Church was the sole mediator of salvation. Hans J. Hillerbrand states: “Luther also propounded a new understanding of the church. . . . What was so strikingly new was that Luther outlined here dimensions of the true church that could be perceived only by faith, for it is only by faith that baptism and bread and wine are taken to be sacraments, even as it is only by faith that the gospel is accepted as the Word or God” (Hillerbrand 2007, p. 54). This viewpoint revolutionized the medieval spiritual culture and tradition. Luther adhered to the premise that baptism removes the guilt of original sin, but not the underlying principle of sin. Also, this concept adheres to the viewpoint that this “concupiscence toward evil remains, and no one is ever cleansed of it, not even the one-day-old infant. But the mercy of God is that this does remain and yet is not imputed as sin to those who call upon Him and cry out for His deliverance. For such people easily avoid also the error of works, because they so zealously seek to be justified” (Luther, Lectures on Romans, pp. 259, 260).

Luther’s theological premises, his soteriological convictions, his influence on the spiritual, traditional and cultural heritage of German civilization and statehood revolutionized the civic, national and intercontinental paradigm. The Augustinian tradition is reflected in his adherence to biblical principles that Divine authority has designated governing powers to direct, protect and sustain the nation (Luther, Christian in society II/45, pp. 93, 94). His church and state construct is reflected in his support for a separate German State (Waring 1968, p. 126), and his spiritual appeal is reflected upon the responsibility of the German princes to protect the reformation movement (McKim 2003, p. 14). Luther’s denunciation against the Peasants demand for social rights was not only based on staunch biblical views on obeying governing authority, but fear that civic internal strife would thwart the process of statehood, which could impede the reformation process and endanger the pure gospel message and mission. Despite Luther’s strong personality and convictions, his viewpoints did not advocate war and violence. Instead, Luther was a pragmatic thinker who recognized the necessity of an established social order and the importance of maintaining designated powers to secure the liberation of the German Christians from Emperor and Pope. For Luther, war was necessary to maintain order during the destabilizing confrontations with the Holy Roman Empire. Luther adhered to the “Augustinian tradition’s rejection of offensive war and added his own rejection of crusade. Luther did not reject all political violence, however. At times, war might be a
necessary evil. The power of the sword is given to magistrates to limit chaos, crush evil, and promote justice on behalf of the innocent” (McKim 2003, p. 189).

In reference to war, Luther stated, “Let this be, then, the first thing to be said in this matter: No war is just, even war among equals, unless one has such a good reason for fighting and such a good conscience that he can say, ‘My neighbor compels and forces me to fight, though I would rather avoid it’. In that case, it can be called not only war, but lawful self-defense . . . Take my advice dear lords. Stay out of war unless you have to defend and protect yourselves and your office compels you to fight. Then let war come” (Luther, Christian in society, III/46, p. 121).

Within the parameters of Luther's social thought, which emphasized *sola fide* “justification by faith” as the overriding theological construct in scripture, humanity was no longer subjugated to the oppressive ecclesiastical mandates that regulated church and state. However, Luther was a product of his time and distrusted the fusion of church and state powers peculiar to the Holy Roman Empire. His quest for statehood was both a theological, political and ethnic necessity. The pragmatic approach to maintain civic order was a predominant concern regarding German independence. The stringent separation of church and state powers to maintain civic order eventually collapsed during the First and Second World Wars. Luther forged a definitive line between sacred and secular responsibilities in order to preserve the sanctity of the church ministry.

Luther deliberately separated church and state powers as demonstrated by his personal distaste for the Holy Roman Empire church/state tradition. However, Luther did not intend to separate morality from the state nor allow the state to usurp ecclesiastical authority. Luther neither imagined that the church would cease to be the voice of reason and conscience nor the state its protector. Nonetheless, his stringent, calculated predisposition regarding the abuse of ecclesiastical powers that influenced his church/state paradigm would eventually deteriorate during the 20th century. This is the result of human nature's predisposition for power rather than the tenets of Lutheranism. It is significant to understand the misapplication of the Lutheran tradition, which gravely influenced the relationship and reaction of the German Christian Church to both the Kaiser’s call to arms and Hitler’s nazification of the German Christian Church. The German church would be blinded by national pride, jingoistic patriotism and a desperate attempt to preserve the fatherland. The contemporary perversion of Luther’s original intents for Germany discredited the Christian tradition in Europe. The sacred balance between grace and law was eventually usurped by the state, which made Hitler the personification of law, a law devoid of the Christian graces of love and forgiveness. Thus, the nazification of the German Protestant Church silenced the voice of reason and compassion amidst the foulest atrocities enacted against humanity – lawlessness prevailed, which plunged Europe into global warfare.

Luther's views regarding the gospel, social issues and church and state relations were refined by Calvin. Calvin provided theological clarification and revolutionized viewpoints on state and church relations on the one hand and the republican formation of state power in the new world order on the other. Calvin's emphasis that government services especially the position of magistrate was considered the most important calling entrusted to humanity by God. The theological tradition espoused by Calvin emphasized within a republican framework the just war tradition. The French reformer redefined the parameters of war and state powers.

### 5.6 John Calvin: Original Sin, Free will and War

John Calvin also adhered to the Augustinian tradition and reiterated the early reformer’s position that “the inherited corruption, which the church fathers termed ‘original sin,’ meaning by the word ‘sin’ the depravation of a nature previously good and pure” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.5), aptly describes the human condition. Calvin states, “Therefore all of us, who have descended from impure seed, are born infected with the contagion of sin” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.5). Calvin states: “We must surely hold that Adam was not only the progenitor but, as it were, the root of human nature; and that therefore in his corruption mankind deserved to be vitiated” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.6). Calvin criticized the Pelagian premise that sin is the result of bad conduct, an imitation of Adam’s disobedience and pride. Rather it is
an inherited condition through propagation, a natural condition resulting from Adam’s disobedience. He acknowledged Augustine’s premise that “we are corrupted not by derived wickedness, but that we bear inborn defect from our mother’s womb” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.5). Calvin’s twofold summarization regarding the origin of sin, emphasizes: 1. “we are so vitiated and perverted in every part of our nature that by this great corruption we stand justly condemned and convicted before God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence and purity”, and 2. . . that “this perversity never ceases in us, but continually bears new fruits—the works of the flesh” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.1.8). The only hope for man’s dilemma is the unmerited grace of God provided by Christ’s atoning sacrifice. Through the cross of Christ, humanity by faith, can receive the full adoption of sons and daughters of God. The first step toward this reconciliation is God’s gift in his Son, who is our righteousness. Calvin states: “Therefore, we explain justification simply as the acceptance with which God receives us into his favor as righteous men. And we say that it consists in the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.11.2). Calvin’s viewpoint on ‘salvation by faith’; his progressive comprehension of free will, portrayed an optimistic viewpoint that church and state could co-exist in the new world order.

What then is the extent of sin upon humanity’s rational capacities? Calvin goes to great lengths in his *Institutes* to formulate a rational understanding of free will. At the onset recognizing that free will is a philosophic construct (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.1-3), Calvin states that all “ecclesiastical writers have recognized both that the soundness of reason in man is gravely wounded through sin, and that the will has been very much enslaved by evil desires. Despite this, many of them come far too close to the philosophers” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.4). Calvin criticizes a misapplication of the concept of free will by those Church Fathers, who conceded to the philosophic trends of their era because: 1. A “frank confession of man’s powerlessness would have brought upon them the jeers of the philosophers with whom they were in conflict”, and 2. To avoid “giving fresh occasion for slothfulness to a flesh already indifferent toward good” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.4). This capitulation to understand the true force of the will is the result of trying to “harmonize the doctrine of Scripture halfway with the beliefs of the philosophers” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.). Augustine criticizes Chrysostom and Jerome for misunderstanding the true force of human freedom and affords to correct this misunderstanding that has permeated western orthodoxy.

While Luther nullified the force of free will on the basis that it is unbiblical, Calvin acknowledged its functionality on the one hand and the import of the Augustinian tradition on the other. Calvin attacks the prevalent philosophic view that human will is composed of a corrupted sensuality and unblemished reason; the Greeks adhere to the idea that man has ‘self-power’ or an inborn ability to distinguish right from wrong and develop virtue through innate powers of the will. Calvin denounced this idea and provides a working definition from reputed church fathers to support his viewpoint. Calvin derived the definition of free will from Origen, supported by Augustine, that free will is a “faculty of the reason to distinguish between good and evil” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.4). Earlier church leaders adhered to Augustine’s view on free will because it was “clearer and did not exclude God’s grace. They realized that without grace the will could not be sufficient unto itself” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.4). Within this framework, Calvin points out that the scholastics “teach that the power of free decision resides, that is, in the reason and the will” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.4). It is imperative to comprehend its proper functionality.

It is within this milieu that Calvin nudges the door to a more tolerant appreciation of humankind’s rational capacity and civil obligation. Calvin states that it “happens that when the church fathers are discussing free will, they first inquire, not into its importance for civil or external actions, but into what promotes obedience to the divine law. Although I grant this latter question is the main one, I do not think the former ought to be completely neglected” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.5). Even though Calvin alludes to divine election or God’s elective grace; Calvin suggests that “it has not yet been demonstrated whether man has been wholly deprived of all power to do good, or still has some power, though meager and weak; a power, indeed, that can do nothing of itself, but with the help of grace also does its part” (Calvin, *Institutes*, 2.2.6). In the earthly city there is a constant conflict between falsehood and the innate power to distinguish good from evil, and justice from injustice. Adhering to Augustine, Calvin points out that sin undermines free will. The idea of freedom of choice is misleading because of the principle of sin there are innate human limitations. Nonetheless, there is a unique dualism; the ‘free will’ is unrestricted to choose
righteousness, but is a slave to sinful inclination. However, human reason has not been totally deprived to comprehend and perform those civic duties that sustain order in society. The issue is that humanity is in danger of ascribing glory to itself rather than its Creator for the rational endowments that God has bestowed upon the human race. Despite the self-love of humankind to credit itself for the natural endowments that God has so bountifully provided, it is our privilege to extol the mercies of God, wherein lay our safeguard from a prideful self-sufficiency, the precursor of civic and spiritual disorder.

Even though God bestowed natural gifts have been corrupted by sin, man’s natural endowments have not been wholly extinguished. Calvin states: “Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out; but it was partly weakened and partly corrupted, so that its misshapen ruins appear” (Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.12). Calvin suggests that humankind apart from divine grace is restrained, incapable of grasping those things pertaining to God. Even though humankind is restrained by sin from living a holy life, attaining a knowledge of God, and discerning the providence of God, Calvin suggests that humankind as it relates to ‘earthly things’ has been endowed by God to perform those duties pertaining to the present order, which includes “government, household management, all mechanical skills, and liberal arts” (Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13). In regards to the earthly order Calvin suggests that “since man is by nature a social animal, he tends through natural instinct to foster and preserve society. Consequently, we observe that there exist in all men’s minds universal impressions of a certain civic fair dealing and order. Hence no man is to be found who does not understand that every sort of human organization must be regulated by laws, and who does not comprehend the principles of those laws. Hence arises that unvarying consent of all nations and of individual mortals with regard to laws. For their seeds have, without teacher or lawgiver, been implanted in all men” (Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13).

In a sense Calvin’s comprehension of sin and free will is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, his thought acknowledged the devastating effects of sin on the spiritual recesses of humankind, while on the other, credited humanity with an inborn intelligence, albeit weakened, impaired and imperfect because of sin, to regulate the social order in the earthly kingdom. Within this framework we can grasp Calvin’s tremendous political impact on western civilization. Unlike the prevalent Anabaptist tradition of his day, or Luther’s stringent church/state paradigm, Calvin provided a positive view regarding civil government and civic service. David W. Hall points out that “Calvin believed that both politics and providence were operative” (Hall 2009, p. 76). Calvin separated clerical and magisterial responsibilities, but encouraged a functioning relationship between these two powers to serve the needs of the state. Calvin's civic-religious construct was not a watered-down version of the Holy Roman Empire, but a commonly-held view that God was working with the state to fulfill His sovereign purpose. In fact, Calvin referred to earthly civil magistrates as “Vicars of God” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.6), as the “highest gift of beneficence to preserve the safety of men” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.25). Calvin believed that the position of the magistrate was as much a sacred calling as the clerics and claimed that the civic calling is the “most sacred and by far the most honorable of all callings in the whole life of mortal men” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.4; cf., Hall 2009, p. 77). Within this church and state paradigm there is a more natural connection of the state as protectorate of positive law. Calvin claimed that God alone is sovereign among the nations; his rule and dominion are indisputable and eternal, but sin created a chasm of rebellious impropriety, which demands in the interim human government to preserve the social order. Calvin’s insights revolutionized the processes of government and developed a more thorough criticism of monarchical powers (Calvin, Institutes, 2.20.29-31). Calvin also instilled the concept of government checks and balances or an orderly political resistance with prayers and patient resolve. Calvin set in motion through the Geneva experiment the processes of representative government, which added a different dimension on warfare polity. John Witt Jr. states: “Building in part on classical and Christian prototypes Calvin developed arresting new teachings on authority and liberty, duties and rights, and church and state that have had an enduring influence on Protestant lands” (Witt 2002, p. 2). However, it was Calvin’s philosophic construct that God had endowed humankind with the ability to manage society, govern, and advance in the sciences that was a crucial contemporary philosophic source for the contemporary Christian realist tradition.
The magistrate has the prerogative to declare war. Calvin states: “Therefore, both natural equity and the nature of the office dictate that princes must be armed not only to restrain the misdeeds of private individuals by judicial punishment, but also to defend by war the dominions entrusted to their safekeeping, if at any time they are under enemy attack. And the Holy Spirit declares such war to be lawful by many testimonies of Scripture” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.11). Calvin pointed out the lack of information in the New Testament regarding church and state relations. The purpose of the apostles was proclaiming the gospel and building-up the kingdom of God. Calvin points out that the admonition to soldiers in Luke 3:14, was their social demeanor and obligation rather than an admonition to discard their weapons. Thus, the rationale for war is not state revenge or retaliatory action against an enemy but “concern for the people alone” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.12). The magistrate must be cautious to avoid a spirit of “headlong anger, or be seized with hatred, or burn with implacable severity” (Calvin, Institute, 4.20.12). The magistrate must always guard against an abuse of power. His sacred office demands restraint and a spirit of “pity on the common nature in the one whose special fault they are punishing” (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.12). In the spirit of the church fathers and the reformers, Calvin was concerned about restraining war and the avoidance of unwarranted organized violence, but recognized its widespread utility among the European nations. Even though war is an imperfect instrument that could be a catalyst through just magistrates to sustain justice in an unjust world, its utility is a ‘last resort’ except when it is absolutely unavoidable and necessary (Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.12). Calvin maintained the Augustinian just war tradition. Mark Larson designates four essential ‘just war’ conditions in Calvin’s thought: 1. There must be a designated authority, either from the magistrate or parliament. 2. There must be a just cause, a definitive grievance for war. 3. A resolute ‘right intention’ or ‘motivation’ that enforces justice in war, and 4. Calvin added a fourth protocol that stipulates the necessity of ‘last resort’, the responsibility of the magistrate or parliament to resolve and check an impending war through the professional services of diplomatic representatives. It was necessary to avoid bloodshed at all costs, only when all resources for peace have been exhausted, is war declared, even then war must be waged with the object of restoring justice and protecting the commonwealth (Larson 2009, p. 80).

However, it was Calvin’s viewpoint that God had endowed humankind with the ability to govern society as well as advance in the arts and sciences that was a crucial contemporary philosophic source for Niebuhr’s Christian realist tradition. Luther’s concept of free will, according to Niebuhr, opposes modern social advances and overshadows humankind’s power to forge its own destiny. It was the philosophic premises of Calvin’s view on human reason and Kierkegaard’s psychological analysis of original sin that were the connecting links for Niebuhr to correlate the Augustinian realist tradition to the contemporary stage of international politics. Political realism is more than a theory to Niebuhr; it was the essence of mankind’s destiny with history. It is the acknowledgement that God is active in everyday life and that all earthly principalities and powers however imperfect is prone to misjudgment and miscalculation, contrasted to God’s boundless grace and mercy within the framework of his judgments amidst the unfolding dramas of world history.

5.7 Reinhold Niebuhr: Original Sin and War

Reinhold Niebuhr’s legacy to contemporary theology is redefining and revitalizing the concept of sin in the post-modern era. The contemporary shift in the theological tradition influenced his biblical interpretation of the event of Adam’s Fall as symbolic of humankind’s present defective condition, but still maintained that the “problem of sin rather than finiteness is, in other words, either implicitly or explicitly the basic problem of life” (Niebuhr 1943, p. 3). In an age of human perfectibility and achievement, Niebuhr readdressed the issue that the principle of sin is the fundamental divide that either affects social harmony or incites friction at every level of society. Niebuhr points out that a “theology which fails to come to grips with this tragic factor of sin is heretical both from the standpoint of the gospel and in terms of its blindness to obvious facts of human experience in every realm and on every level of moral goodness” (Niebuhr 1940, pp. 17-18).
Niebuhr emphasized that humanity is incapable of rising above collective self-interest especially in the arena of power politics. Wiley states that in “Niebuhr’s judgment collective egoism is the chief cause of humanity’s callous brutality and inhumanity” (Wiley 2002, p. 139). The overt calamity of collective egoism is intrinsically related to the origin of sin in human freedom (Niebuhr 1937, p. 11). The origin of sin or evil, according to Niebuhr, is rooted in anxiety, egoism and human freedom. These three elements are the basis of humanity’s rebellion against God in history and the cause of social unrest and war. The seething anxiety of mankind is agitated by unsatisfied ambition (Niebuhr 1940, pp. 12, 13), which is a by-product of egoism, which according to Niebuhr, is “sin in its quintessential form” (Niebuhr 1937, p. 11). Niebuhr stressed that a literalist interpretation of Genesis 3 overshadows the responsibility of human freedom – a freedom that is capable of evil or good; a freedom that is capable of justice or injustice; a freedom that enacts righteousness or succumbs to the despotic abuses of power. Humankind’s disinclination to acknowledge its dependence upon God inevitably thrusts humanity at the center of universal existence, the fruitage of anxiety, egoistic passion and the misuse of free will.

Original sin is not a past historical event; according to Niebuhr, it is an ongoing natural phenomenon centered in human existence. Humanity does not inherit Adam’s guilt. Rather sin originates from humanity’s misuse of its freedom by choosing evil over good. Niebuhr appropriated Kierkegaard’s (1813 – 1855) application of original sin to further clarify his viewpoint in the post-modern era. Patterson states:

Kierkegaard renewed the doctrine of original sin in an ingenious modern fashion by giving it a “psychological” explanation. Niebuhr accepted this account. To Kierkegaard the ultimate original sin was mysterious; but he argued that the psychological condition under which it took place could be investigated. These conditions involved (1) man’s double nature as animal and spirit, (2) the resultant state of unstable anxiety, and (3) the inevitable sprouting of sin. Kierkegaard said that sin was inevitable, but left room for man’s responsibility in succumbing to temptation (Patterson 1977, p. 95).

Humanity is not a mechanical automation prone to sin, but an intelligent being conscience of its environment, weaknesses, and conscious of its limitations. Original sin, according to Kierkegaard, is an existential realization, the conscious freedom to sin. In this manner sin is a natural aspect of man’s social existence. Its realization allows humankind to comprehend amoral and moral actions, and to be held accountable for the consequences of decisions made at every level of existence. Niebuhr adjusted his concept of original sin to an era of deductive reasoning in the sciences and liberal theological interpretation and application. It is interesting how Niebuhr utilized the theological and philosophical nuances from Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Kierkegaard to modify his concept of sin to the modern era. Kierkegaard’s contribution is one of many viewpoints of the Protestant tradition that Niebuhr adapted to formulate a modern awareness of human restraints and imperfection while having the capacity to alter the course of history.

Humans, individually and collectively, are social creatures. However, Niebuhr states: “Collective life of man undoubtedly stands on a lower moral plan than the life of individuals” (Niebuhr 1940, p. 13), because collective egoism is more difficult to manage especially if it is influenced by radical ideologies or disproportions of power. Wiley elucidates Niebuhr’s view on the negative aspects of collective egoism, as a “communal existence [that] generates parochial loyalty or tribalism, a kind of spontaneous attachment of individuals to one another” (Wiley 2002, p. 139). This social phenomenon affects all cultures, political institutions and traditions. It is an economic and political realism that Niebuhr eventually applied to international politics. Within this framework politics becomes a contest of power, which in the world of

1Niebuhr states: “But the fact is that anxiety is an inevitable concomitant of human freedom, and is the root of the inevitable sin which expresses itself in every human activity and creativity . . . There is no life which does not violate the injunction ‘Be not anxious.’ That is the tragedy of human sin. It is the tragedy of man who is dependent upon God, but seeks to make himself independent and self-sufficing” (Niebuhr 1940, pp. 12-13).
hegemonic competition can only be managed by a balance of military power between the two superpowers.

Niebuhr lived through the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. Consequently, he understood the devastating social impact of warfare and the ideological challenges of the democratic tradition and the peculiar temptations of global leadership. Within the framework of the Cold War, 'justice in war' was maintaining a precarious peace among the two superpowers and the recognition of national fallibility was an essential step in recognizing the moral or amoral context of a nation in a contested world order. Niebuhr's theological constructs provided a contemporary context that appealed to the international community. An examination of Niebuhr's theological formation of thought that established his Christian realist views is necessary to understand his contemporary application of power politics in the 20th century.

Niebuhr discarded the literal interpretation of Adam's fall, a predominant feature of ancient and reformed evangelical Christian thought. His progressive views also rejected the Augustinian viewpoint that the universality of sin is continued from generation to generation by seminal propagation. Niebuhr disagreed with the prevailing Lutheran tradition that Adam's sin totally corrupted human reason. His theological training was much more liberal than conservatives would like to admit. Notwithstanding the emphasis that sin is a decisive feature in the Christian realist tradition, Niebuhr maintained his Protestant heritage that God in history is the only source of truth and love and forgiveness and hope. His legacy affected both the religious and secular community. Like Augustine, Niebuhr's influence was universal in scope and has redefined the moral parameters and limitations of elite state actor power in the international system.

The idea of original sin, sinful volition, and aberrant acts of sinfulness has been disregarded in western civilization, thus opening the door to moral relativism; a viewpoint that is prevalent in contemporary western society. The postmodern era does not completely refute the influence of human nature, but questions its overall effect on social values and deems it an intangible element, a byproduct of man's environment. In a world of constant fluctuations and change the idea of a constant innate amoral defect in humanity frustrates the inquisitive and speculative investigator, who hopes that mankind can surmount social and political issues that affect the quality of life. Reinhold Niebuhr recognized the pitfalls of total depravity, and the ruinous application it would have upon postmodern thought that grapples with socio-political complexities that influence a people, a nation and state system. Niebuhr articulated a position that contested total depravity by acknowledging the orthodox tenet of original sin, yet without denying that humanity has the rational capacity to recognize good or evil and implement constructive or detrimental policies among nations. In this way there is an ethical requisite for human responsibility and accountability in international power politics. However, his criticism of the perfectibility of man in history, human limitation and the utter perversion of self-love that affects men and nations, religious and secular institutions has been shunned by the secular and liberal Christian traditions. Richard Crouter articulates the challenge of defining sin in our postmodern era.

Sin is a tough sell in modernity. Since it can’t be measured, those who are committed to crunching numbers as the requisite path to truth will remain unimpressed. But as long as self-righteousness persists among humanity, something like the classical notion of sin (in the sense of Augustine and Niebuhr) remains cogent. As a “hard teaching” of the Christian tradition, it resists being watered down through an appeal to liberal instincts. Niebuhr helps us explain how individuals and nations can step over the bounds and get into radical moral disarray. Like all good theories, a compromised theory loses its explanatory power. It also yields fewer occasions for self-examination or for thinking about tragic aspects of the human story and of how we might best confront them (Crouter 2010, p. 58).

The concept of sin as an explanation of the human condition has either been unheeded or discredited in contemporary society but Niebuhr’s observation of the pervasive nature of sin at all levels of human interaction is a reminder that man and society must recognize that the egocentricity of state actor competition and survival can affect the noble and sincere aspirations of the state actor power. His insights into the human condition and its influence in the world of power politics are timely since little
has changed since his writings. The concept of sin is not a condemnatory syllogism but a diagnosis of a condition that must be reexamined in every era to prevent destructive propensities in man and community. Like a patient that routinely checks the body under the guidance of a qualified physician, to avoid life threatening diseases, so man and society must recognize those harmful elements in the nature of man that threaten the peace and stability of society. Humanity is an amazing creation; its free will is capable of glorious accomplishments in every aspect of knowledge and culture. But the same free will that creates and develops the beautiful and sublime is capable of some of the most brutal atrocities imaginable.

Niebuhr recognized the limitations and detriment of institutionalized religion in the American experience; however, the unique aspect of American democracy is the intentional incorporation of checks and balances within the public, private and civic order. This provided, according to Niebuhr, the means to secure and maintain justice and liberty and the moral purity of a nation for a people who are willing to defend it. The fact that Americans can confront complex issues in an open forum without threat to 'free speech' or 'lawful association' or some such thing was and is the single greatest achievement of governance in western civilization. However, even a democratic system is imperiled by unbridled economic and military power and national prestige. Niebuhr’s discrediting of U.S. foreign policy during Vietnam was more than a superficial denunciation of a nation that over-depended upon military might and American idealism as the universal remedy against Communist tyranny. Niebuhr realized, like Augustine, that nations are as strong as their recognized limitations. When does the lamb of innocence become the best of prey? When did the Roman Republic become a brutal empire? The seeds of self-love and the temptations of national self-interest are subtle, but its effects have influenced the course of history.

The classical interpretation of politics, which centers civic friction and eventually war within the framework of sin and the individual actor, is the basis of the Christian realist tradition. Within this tradition is the recognition of evil and its moral alternatives to thwart the social trends that enhance war from selfish ambition. The Christian realist tradition acknowledges the need for positive law restraints in the social order to curtail violence and crime, but the Christian realist tradition recognizes that the formalities of law are only effective when a nation has a natural inclination to know right from wrong and obey the dictates of conscious. The external feature of revelation and religion are the moral fiber of a nation. Within this context the just war tradition is one among many social contributions to deter the policy of warfare.

5.8 The Christian Realism of Augustine and Niebuhr

Augustine and Niebuhr recognized the limitations of national power and prestige and the tendency to national self-righteousness that tempts them to over-extend their hegemonic and global authority. The temptation among elite state actors is the need to validate economic and military force as necessary tools in the quest for world peace. Warfare is a recurrent social experience in both ancient and modern eras. Humanity rarely learns from the lessons recorded in history. History's increasing scientific acumen, which has thwarted disease, prolonged the quality of life, and even put man in reach of the stars, is not utilized to limit war but rather to develop deadlier arsenals that sustains the national security of the elite state actor or those nations that are willing to pay for it. The vicious cycle of war is a verification of the innate insecurity of human nature, which necessitates organized warfare as a necessary policy to ensure survival of the individual and the state. Augustine’s just war doctrine recognized the reality of warfare in the earthly city. While the sage of Hippo decried the brutality of war, Augustine did not write volumes denouncing the atrocities of war, but devised an unpretentious revision of the casus belli tradition to curtail needless state conflict, and senseless killing in a violent world order. Augustine lauded the sanctity of life over the glory of the state and maintained that 'civility in war' could only be ensured by those who have the power to enforce it. While modern statesmen and policy makers are absorbed with the causes of war, the just war tradition recognizes the importance of state actor motivation for war and the consequences of that process upon regional or hegemonic stability in the theater of conflict. The limitations of inherent national power and the consequences of over-extended authority in the world order determines in retrospect the attainment or failure of a nation’s foreign policy objective. Conflicts are not
always the harbinger of greater catastrophe. Both Germany and Japan are testimonies of the restorative power of forgiveness, acceptance and reconstruction on behalf of the Allied powers after the Second World War. Nonetheless, just war requisites are not only normative rules prior, during and after war; it is a moral preservative of the elite state actor that desires respect and trust among weak and strong state actor competitors in the international system. In reference to the Christian realist tradition, Augustine and Niebuhr have similarities that galvanize their respective traditions.

Both Augustine and Niebuhr observed, ministered and wrote within the context of empire. The Pax Romana and the Pax Americana have been compared and contrasted by historians, policy makers, statesmen and theologians. Ancient Rome like the United States developed a massive economy, which was both expanded and protected by its military power and laws and traditions to sustain its national and international power. Even though Augustine wrote during the unforeseen demise of Imperial Rome, its military tradition, its laws and architecture left an enduring legacy. On the other hand, Niebuhr wrote during the unforeseen ascendency of U.S. power and global responsibility; its military power and democratic and economic traditions have left an enduring legacy as well. Also, the America of the 21st century, like her Roman counterpart, is imperiled by political dissension, broken moral and physical boundaries and a gravely weakened economy (cf., Gilpin 1981, p. 166). The fact that Augustine’s just war premises were written within the context of Empire, systematized by Aquinas during the Holy Roman Empire and reformulated by Grotius within the context of international law and a budding state system testifies to its universal adaptation in every epoch. The science of war must be counterbalanced by *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* moral traditions to thwart unnecessary conflict that can be averted by the auspices of diplomacy. Augustine and Niebuhr recognized the innate bent in human nature, the inevitable friction that exists at every level in the social order; the unavoidable competition among nations and the utility of war to dominate and maintain national and international power.

The connecting link between tribe, nation and empire, according to Augustine and Niebuhr, is the competitive nature of mankind upon the national and international stage. The classical realist interpretation espouses that the individual actor and collective groups are the primary variables that either maintain harmony or enhance discord in the state system. This is the philosophic parameter that sustained Augustinian and Niebuhrian Christian realism. The state and its institutions are not immune to the selfish misadventure of groups or national leadership that adheres to a fanatical ideology or an unrelenting grand strategic agenda. Augustine’s premise that just men can fight just wars is complicated by modern democratic traditions and bureaucracies that overshadow ethical directives. Both Augustine and Niebuhr recognized that leaders and nations can succumb to political self-interest to maintain national and international interests, by an over dependence on military power and a forced or subtle recreation of a weaker state actor into the image of its benefactor. Augustine had little good to say about the earthly city; its traditions, its culture and philosophies were restricted by self-love and likely to succumb to coercive tactics. War in its individual or collective experience, can only be thwarted or limited by governing authorities that inculcate the just war tradition within its military doctrine to restrain organized violence. Niebuhr also recognized the limitation of the state actor in history. Finite humanity, its inborn limitations to know and see all things, moved by impulse and self-love, the coercive nature of self-centered groups, competing ideologies and competition among elite state actors can only be regulated by a balance of power. The times of Augustine and Niebuhr were as different as the ancient is from our modern era. But the fundamental, underlying relationship between human limitation, national power, and warfare to resolve international disputes persists to this day.

Both Augustine and Niebuhr wrote from unique eras of Christian faith and tradition that provided a platform for their respective views that influenced the secular and religious communities. Augustine wrote his views when Christianity was the officially recognized religion of the Imperial Roman Empire. The Imperial Christian Church was not a political power or a radical social force; it did not enact secular laws or declare holy wars. There were some definitive and clear functions and responsibilities between church and state authority. Augustine’s observations were accessible to ecclesiastical, civic and military leaders. As a result the Imperial Christian Church’s theological and moral authority popularized Augustine’s writings and persona. In a similar vein Reinhold Niebuhr wrote during an era of American
piety and religiosity. The United States at the time of Niebuhr was predominately a Protestant tradition. The separation of the church and state powers and the revered nature of pastoral authority in 20th century America enabled Niebuhr access to both secular and religious traditions. Augustine and Niebuhr overcame the inherent antagonism toward religious thought in regards to war, and military policy because the time in which their views were debated the populace willingly received their direction in a world confronted by civic and international disorder. Both traditions looked for direction from these two influential thinkers of Christian faith, who so ardently loved God and country and provided a workable social ethic in a world of disorder.

Augustine and Niebuhr reevaluated and redefined the military restraints of their times. But the church has always been divided in relation to its civic responsibility and war. The Thirty Years War marred the spiritual contributions of both Catholic and Protestant traditions. Certain factions among the Anabaptist denounced war and encouraged the Church to maintain a neutral policy in relation to the nation based upon the sermon of the mount. Grotius moved from the church as the source of love and peace to the embodiment of international law to settle disputes among nations. His criticism of ecclesiastical support of monarchical war policy influenced his investigation for alternative methods to resolve international conflict. During the Cold War era Paul Ramsey adapted the traditional just war formula within the restraints of international law to deter third world skirmishes that could escalate into a total war scenario among the two superpowers. Among theologians and respective church traditions there have been differences of opinion regarding the extent of the church’s involvement in government war policy. The early Christians advocated complete isolation from combatant obligations to the Imperial Roman state, whereas, the German Christian church’s capitulation to the Kaiser’s war policy on the one hand and Hitler’s nazification of German Christianity on the other shattered the influence of the Christian religion in Europe after the two great wars. The struggles between church and state in the 20th century exemplified the ongoing friction within the church in relation to the issue war.

5.9 The Contemporary Church, Pacifism and the Just War Tradition

According to John Howard Yoder (1927 – 1997), Reinhold Niebuhr’s criticism dismantled liberal pacifism because the pacifist movement failed to develop a social ethic that could deal with the ensuing threat of global war. Yoder points out that “Liberal pacifism collapsed because it did not have an ethical answer to Hitler” (Yoder 2009, p. 296). Yoder elaborates:

And then came Niebuhr’s critique, which argued against the theology of liberal pacifism from its ethic. His critique did not proceed from a challenge to its epistemology—the place of scripture, common sense, or experience—or its view of the church and the church’s place in Western society, or its view of atonement and the place of suffering. In those respects Niebuhr was still liberal. It was from its political ethic that he collapsed its theology (Yoder 2009, p. 296).

Niebuhr’s denunciation of pacifism was a combination of classical interpretation of the nature of man (which the pacifist failed to address), and the relentless force of collective self-interest groups motivated by fanatical ideologies (such as Hitler's National Socialism and Stalin's Communism) that promoted political idealism or utopianism as the only viable option in the international order. The Second World War demoralized the theory of a progressive perfectionism of humankind. Niebuhr argued that in a world of intense state competition, force must be met by force. It is the only means to defend freedom and the democratic way of life.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) was a native of Austria and participated in the Great War. Wittgenstein believed that war develop interpersonal and national character. Wittgenstein made many friends in England, and considered the UK his home away from home. But when the ‘Great War’ erupted in Europe, without hesitation, he immediately committed himself to defend the fatherland. Wittgenstein was a product of the nationalistic spirit so prevalent among Europeans. David Edmonds and John Eidinow state: “When he [Wittgenstein] heard that his friend Bertrand Russell was in prison as an
opponent of the war, he did not withhold his respects for Russell’s personal courage, but felt that this was heroism in the wrong place” (Edmond & Eidinow 2002, pp. 89-90). Kenneth Waltz points out that the “major assumption of pacifism, asserts that wars will not end until men in one way or another become better” (Waltz 1970, p. 42). The failure of pacifists, according to Waltz, is its presumptive belief that religion and institution can thwart the aggressive nature for war among state actors through education and social refinement. Waltz is critical of the pacifist movement, or any social movement, which is shielded from the national and international political realities confronting the state actor in a decentralized state system (cf., Waltz 1970, p. 75ff.). His observations are shared by realists and neorealist that emphasize the necessity of power balances in order to maintain order in a state system on the brink of nuclear holocaust. Kennan, Morgenthau and Waltz do not take pacifism seriously because it failed to offer any logical remedy to thwart or limit war, especially when confronting Nazi or Communist tyranny. This line of thought continues to the present day with statesmen, diplomats, policy makers and the international community. Meic Pears suggests that pacifism is a private retreat of an individual from politics; there cannot be a pacifist state because the use of force is inherent in the state system. Pears points out that the earlier Christian pacifist movements, such as the pre-Constantinian church and the Anabaptists, were directed to individuals in the church. The earlier Christian traditions believed that the moral and spiritual stance of the church had no place in the civic order. In this manner pacifism was representative of a private withdrawal of the church from the state. However, Pears contrasts the pietism of earlier Christian movements to the liberal secular pacifist movement that has influenced the contemporary church, which is a proactive and sometimes coercive force in society, contrasted to the earlier Christian tradition that advocated a retreat into the private sphere (Pears 2007, p. 174). Pears refers to this secularized pacifism as “distasteful” and “circumstantial” – admitting however, that there are cases of pacifists who are not afraid to “dirty their hands” and have braved the dangers of war by serving as medics, chaplains and stretcher bearers. However, Pears states that the weakness of the pacifist ideology is the “danger of elevating personal moral purity of the self above the sometimes desperately urgent need of the weak for protection” (Pears 2007, p. 175). Pacifism has no answers, no course of action against tyrannical personalities that have persecuted and murdered thousands or millions of innocent noncombatants.

Augustine’s just war doctrine was partly in response to the traditional nonviolent stance of the early church fathers and the constituents viewpoint that the church is the moral voice of the lay-member and the state regarding social issues and Imperial Rome that adhered to the casus belli as a customary means to settle disputes among contending forces. Throughout history Christian thinkers have confronted state limitations on war. The most prolific contributors to the theological debate on peace and war during Reinhold Niebuhr’s lifetime were Swiss German theologian Karl Barth and German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Their experiences provide important insights into the complicated issues of war and the limits and prerogatives of church authority regarding warfare.

Karl Barth (1886 – 1968) is a significant contributor regarding the just war debate and is differentiated from other theologians because of his sophisticated and sometimes problematic approach to pacifism and the just war doctrine. His views are a realistic appraisal of the 20th century. Barth reformed the liberal theological movement that permeated European scholarship in the 19th and 20th centuries. Mueller states: “Future generations will not hesitate to speak of him with Augustine and Aquinas, Luther and Calvin, and with Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Indeed, it is fair to say that even as Schleiermacher dominated the theology of the nineteenth century and is the father of liberal theology, so Barth dominated much of the theology of the twentieth century and is the father of neoreformation theology” (Mueller 1972, p. 13).

Several factors influenced Barth to reject the liberal German Protestant tradition: 1. The brutalities of the First World War contradicted the fundamental premises of man’s innate goodness and the ability of civilized society to circumvent war. 2. Barth was repulsed by the Christian Churches fanatical support of monarchical and socialist war platforms in the First and Second World Wars, which betrayed the gospel message and commission, and 3. War was no longer a unilateral action between a sovereign and his professional army, but an inclusive policy that incorporated combatants and noncombatants alike. Barth witnessed the carnage of global conflict and recognized its demeaning
influence upon the spiritual and moral customs in church and society. Barth also rejected the radical militaristic element that was prevalent among the intelligentsia. The 1914 Manifesto of the ninety-three German intellectuals to the civilized world was a radical document endorsed by 93 leading German intellectuals encompassing German scientists, scholars and artists unified behind the Kaiser to support military action in the early part of the First World War. Barth’s former teacher, Adolf von Harnack was one the signatories that endorsed the war effort. Barth believed that Harnack made a grave error in giving credence to war in lieu of his sacred calling and was uncomfortable with the impression that the German state could claim divine merit and support for the war effort. The relationship of the church in regards to just and unjust wars was the central motif that shaped and redefined European social ethics. Barth dedicated a major section in his Church dogmatics to the relationship of ecclesiastical authority and the warfare tradition. After the fall of the German Royal family, the Weimar Republic (1919 – 1933) was established immediately after the First World War, but economic depression, social unrest, political extremism and the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles eventually undermined government authority. The German populace turned to Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party to restore German power and prestige in Europe (Gorringe 1999, p. 35; The Encyclopedia Britannica 1967; cf., Manifesto of the Ninety-Three).

Karl Barth was a professor of theology at the University of Göttingen (1921 – 1925), University of Münster (1925 – 1930) and the University of Bonn (1930 – 1935) Germany and witnessed the eventual nazification of the German Protestant church. Barth and associates, who adamantely defied Hitler’s disingenuous program to control church policy, composed the Barmen Declaration, a statement that opposed the Nazi party’s legal authority over the German Christian church. The German Christian movement adopted the Nazi platform, which endorsed anti-Semitism, as well as extreme nationalist and ethnic cleansing policies. Barth was the centric personality that inspired the Barmen document that opposed Hitler's Third Reich. Barth refused to swear allegiance to Hitler and the National Social Party and also established the Confessing Church, which was an independent Christian sect that denied state control and intervention of its theological and social policies. As a result of his public defiance of Nazism, Barth was asked to relinquish his professorship at Bonn and was forced to return to Switzerland continuing his ministry and lectureship at the University of Basel from 1935 until his retirement in 1962 (cf., Brown 1963, pp. 55-57; Gorringe 1999, pp. 128-129).

Barth witnessed the brutalities and carnage of the First and Second World Wars, hence, warfare was a central theme in his social ethics. Barth was dismayed by the nazification of the German Christian Church and the general spiritual indifference of the Christian community to Hitler’s policies during World War II. However, his ethics on war is a complicated and sometimes obscured interpretation of the just war tradition. Barth’s view on war in regards to the individual and the state is his overriding concern for the church. It is important to reiterate that Barth’s primary concern is not war of itself, but the influence and authority and ecclesiastical limitations or prerogatives with respect to the state decision for war. In his estimation the interdependent relationship between the citizens, the state and church are inseparably linked in regards to one's civic responsibility to God and humanity.

The church is the harbinger of peace and salvation. Its witness of the grace of God in the lives of humanity sets it apart from the civic responsibilities of the state. Its sacred responsibility is to guide not coerce; foster hope, maintain righteousness and protect and sustain the spiritual and moral aptitude of a nation during times of national and international conflict. The church is to sustain the sanctity and dignity of humanity in all its religious and secular pursuits. The fundamental axiom of God’s creative power, according to Barth, is that the “blessing of life is a divine loan unmerited by man” (Barth 1961, p. 336). In other words “human life—one’s own and that of others—belongs to God” (Barth 1961, p. 397). The dignity of man is inseparably connected to the blessing of life. And the spiritual and physical preservation of life is the protectorate of the Church. The command not to murder (Ex 20: 13), is understood by Barth not only as a civic responsibility among its citizenry, but a denial of capital punishment as well. Barth believed that there is no place for taking a “worthless life” (Barth 1961, p. 446) and that it is the responsibility of the Christian Church to renounce capital punishment on a “worldwide scale” (Barth 1961, p. 446). Where then is the dividing line between killing in war and capital punishment? Since God
renounces murder, at what point does this validate war as a legitimate instrument of self-preservation? Bart asserts that the “political order as such rests on the will of God, the struggle for its concrete stability, like the resistance of the individual against attack, may well be the command of God, and in the course of this struggle it may well be required to apply the ultima ratio against those who endanger it” (Barth 1961, p. 447). The national security of the state from foreign intrusion and unavoidable conflict, according to Barth, justifies that the “state exists in the abnormal situation in which God demands it from one or more of its leaders for its preservation in extremis” (Barth 1961, p. 447). Barth differentiates between murder, the unlawful taking of innocent or a “worthless life” on the one hand and killing in defense and preservation of the state actor on the other.

Barth states that there are two critical situations that allow for killing or execution in order to protect society. The first is high treason during a war and the second is tyrannicide in which the “leadership has illegally or legally put itself in power and is threatening the stability of the country” (Barth 1961, p. 449). In reference to Hitler, Barth suggested: “There was no theoretical doubt that this was a case for the ultimate ratio and must be treated as such” (Barth 1961, p. 449). Society must protect itself from imploding and defend its social order from internal and outside threats. Barth criticized European wars and asserted that the Old Europe that separated the military classes from the civil classes are by-gone days (Barth 1961, p. 451). According to Barth, “today everyone is a military person . . . everyone participates in the suffering and action which war demands” . . . it is an “illusion to think that there can be an uncommitted spectator” (Barth 1961, p. 451). Barth articulates the point: “Each individual is himself the fatherland, the people; each individual is himself a belligerent. Hence, each individual must act when war is waged, and each has to ask whether the war is just and unjust” (Barth 1961, p. 451).

Barth’s assessment of the just war tradition is a 20th century appraisal of warfare. The Napoleonic war, the precursor to massive military expansionism and hegemonic domination laid the foundation for the First and Second World Wars. Barth proposed that war was a quest for vital resources, the “possession of land and property” and the “deployment of power for the acquisition of power in the elemental sense” (Barth 1961, p. 451). In essence war is massive extermination, “whole nations as such, are out to destroy one another” . . . “It only needed the atom and hydrogen bomb to complete the self-disclosure of war in this regard” (Barth 1961, p. 453). The quintessential aspect of war is killing on behalf of the state actor, since the war effort incorporates combatant and noncombatants, “all its members are actually engaged in killing, or in the direct or indirect preparation and promotion of killing” (Barth 1961, p. 454). However, Barth differentiates between illegal, prohibited killing/murder and permissible killing in war. A soldier that kills an aggressive enemy need not harbor any guilt for his sacrifice and service in defense of the country (Barth 1961, p. 462).

Barth makes it very clear that the Christian Church must always denounce war (Barth 1961, p. 457), while recognizing that war is not always avoidable, but it opposes the “satanic doctrine that war is inevitable and therefore justified” in all circumstances (Barth 1961, p. 460). The Church should always support other options for peace, however, only when a state has no other choice than to “surrender or assert itself as such in face of the claims of the other. Nothing less than this final question must be at issue if a war is to be just and necessary” (Barth 1961, p. 461). If war breaks out “the church will have its own part to play in a state which finds itself in this kind of emergency” . . . the church must “stand by this nation, rousing, comforting, and encouraging it, yet also calling it to repentance and conversion” (Barth 1961, p. 463).

There is an enduring and dynamic relationship between the Church, the state and its citizenry. The church stands upon the lofty height of moral discretion in regards to just and unjust wars; however, the church is composed of people, people who are the driving force of the civic order. The church cannot separate itself from the state because its policies are intimately intertwined with the social, economic and political fabric of society – the state. The ethical standard of the church during war is always the call to peace in times of peace or conflict. The church rallies to sustain the state by its prayers and moral courage because in war everyone is a belligerent; everyone combatant and noncombatant alike are a collective force to sustain the physical and spiritual assets of the state actor during war. The church recognizes the

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divine calling of the state, but eschews injustice, a righteous voice denouncing social injustice and especially unjust conflict in an unjust world.

The state is the protector of the individual; the individual as citizen is expected to sustain and defend the state. However, the state cannot act as the individual’s conscience. The ‘freedom of will’ supersedes state loyalties, and limits the power of the state in regards to those who refuse to participate in the war effort. Barth suggests that there is a distinction between a conscientious objector during a just or an unjust war and implies that a conscientious objector during a just war has little recourse to complain against the state for its role in war contrasted to conscientious objectors that adamantly avoid conscription during an unjust war (Barth 1961, p. 468). Throughout Barth’s treatise on war is the issue of the church as a voice of reason, an arbiter of peace, a source of comfort, repentance and hope to those directly or indirectly involved in the war effort. However, Barth asserts that there is a “material error in conscientious objection, however, if it rests on an absolute refusal of war, i.e., on absolutism of radical pacifism” (Barth 1961, p. 469). However Barth disagrees with Schleiermacher that to “exclude oneself from participation in war, if one does not consider it to be just, is rebellion” (Barth 1961, p. 468). Barth did not support pacifism, but tolerated 'conscientious objectors', who refused to defend the state in time of war.

Barth stressed the interdependent relationship of the church, the state and the individual. This cohesive dynamic relationship also extended among the consort of nations as well. While the state does not encourage war, while it stands ready to defend its sovereignty, it also must honor its treaties or assist those weaker nations that need support in a just war scenario (Barth 1961, p. 462). The importance of alliances was a primary factor in the Allied victory in Second World War. Barth recognized that alliances are a necessary component for state sovereignty and survival during war. The commonality of democratic values and freedom among alliances is a powerful cohesive force to dissuade hostile state actors from destabilizing the state system.

Barth makes two imperative statements that summarize his viewpoint on war and killing in a just or unjust conflict: “War reveals the basically chaotic character of the so-called peaceful will, efforts and achievements of man. It exposes his radical inability to be master without becoming not merely a slave but his own destroyer, and therefore fundamentally a suicide” (Barth 1961, p. 452). Also, “Killing is a very personal act, and being killed a very personal experience. It is thus commensurate with the thing itself that even in the political form which killing assumes in war it should be the theme of supremely personal interrogation” (Barth 1961, p. 466). Barth was appalled by the church’s duplicity and silence during the First and Second World Wars. The radical and militant nature of the church throughout history greatly disturbed him. His viewpoints on war are a sincere appraisal to protect the credibility of the Christian church and community before the world. The passages in which Barth reflected on war has proved to be enduring; its seemingly complicated concepts on organized conflict is a testimony of the complex challenge to coincide the just war doctrine with Church authority and polity in modern warfare. In spite of the brutalities and carnage of war, Barth never supported the pacifist tradition.

Barth suggests that the “church must not preach pacifism” (Barth 1961, p. 460). The Christian community must counter pacifism and national militarism because of its overriding emphasis on disarmament or armament; both principles circumvent the primary objective of war, the “restoration of an order of life which is meaningful and just” (Barth 1961, p. 459). Barth opposed the militant post-Constantinian theology of war, and pacifist absolutism. On the one hand the church cannot endorse war; to do so contradict the fundamental commission of the church to proclaim the gospel of grace. On the other hand the church cannot endorse pacifism because it would abandon both the individual and state in its extremity. Pacifism’s “inflexibility”, its “abstract negation of war” and “isolation”, is not in touch with the realities, degradation and destructive force of war in the lives of the soldier, family, and the state (Barth 1961, pp. 456, 458, 460). Barth disclosed the logic and force of the pacifist doctrine, its unremitting standards of peace and love, but could never reconcile its tenets to the European experience (Barth 1961, p. 456). Barth’s social ethic on war was a World War II reflection. Its conservative outlook was subjective to his era. Timothy Gorringe points out that Barth was concerned first and foremost about
reconstruction in Europe, and especially in Germany, and then towards the urging of sanity in the Cold War" (Gorringe 1999, p. 166). As the situation eventually resolved itself, Barth turned his attention to European reconstruction and Cold War policy. His moderate stance on communism and criticism of American realism challenged the American Christian community's support of the Cold War, Gorringe states:

After the Hungarian invasion Reinhold Niebuhr attacked Barth for remaining silent, maintaining, 'we know the reason why!' Barth, however, regarded the invasion as communism's own self condemnation, which was not in need of further commentary from the West. More controversy followed in 1958 with his letter to an East German pastor, in which he suggested that East Germany might be 'God's favourite' rather than the West. For this he was severely criticized by both the Swiss and the West German press. Writing for The Christian Century in 1958 Barth noted that he had no inclination whatever toward Eastern communism but 'I regard anticommunism as a matter of principle an evil even greater than communism itself.' ‘What kind of Western philosophy and political ethics—and unfortunately even theology—was it whose wisdom consisted of recasting the Eastern collective man into an angel of darkness and the Western “organized man” into an angel of light? And then with the help of such metaphysics and mythology . . . bestowing on the absurd “cold war” struggle its needed higher consecration?

Barth's stand during these years was so unpopular that, on his retirement in March 1962, the pro rector of Basle University saw fit to criticize him for it publicly in a farewell speech (Gorringe 1999, p. 220).

The fact that nuclear weapons were situated so close to the European theater influenced Barth's volatile reaction to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The hostile relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was alarming. Barth’s disfavor with Cold War policy is understandable under these circumstances, especially when the allied superpower was dictating terms from overseas. Barth was not a pacifist, but any possibility of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers was, at best, a precarious situation for Europe and the world; and at worst, such an exchange created the possibility for extinction of the human race. Barth detested the U.S. Cold War policy and his uncritical stance toward eastern communism further complicated his social ethic on war.

Barth’s social ethics was criticized for its inability to deal with the harsh realities of power politics (Lovin 1984, pp. 23-24). His moral guidance, so articulately formulated in his Dogmatics, fell-short of the ‘courage and resolve’ to confront Soviet expansionism. Nonetheless, Barth’s theological paradigm encouraged self-control and patient resolve in the face of the nuclear holocaust. There was a chasm of theological disparity between Niebuhr and Barth, but the two theologians' perspectives were as much about their cultural mindset as their theological convictions. Ultimately, according to Barth, the immeasurable and glorious God of history would triumph over evil.

War challenges the character of man like no other politico-social interaction. The docile become high-strung. Courage and fear, hate and forgiveness, bravery and cowardice are enacted time and again on the battlefield. War is desperation; it is a two edged sword; it protects while it destroys. War sustains while it tears down. War, more than any other occurrence, is an integral part of the human experience. War is the Achilles heel of the Christian Church. The church must steer the state actor from war if possible, yet provide counsel and guidance to leaders during times of crisis. The church is a bulwark of peace and comfort to the soldier, while safeguarding the rights of the 'conscientious objector'. The Church is a refuge for both the combatant and the noncombatant. In the annals of church history and war, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906 – 1945) stands-out as one of the most complicated and controversial personalities in regards to pacifist and militant views on war. Bonhoeffer was the driving force behind the Confessing Church after the departure of Karl Barth to Switzerland. Bonhoeffer was a pacifist turned political activist, which redefined the moral parameters of church and state relations. How could a pastor and preacher alter his persona into a spy and resistance conspirator and participate in an assassination plot against Hitler? Bonhoeffer’s decision to turn from his pastorate to political activism is a curious journey; it seemed as though the resistance movement among the Bonhoeffer’s was a family affair.
Bonhoeffer’s German inclination was church and country. His pedigree was extraordinary, which was composed of theologians, lawyers, public servants and his father, Karl Bonhoeffer, a renowned psychologist. Like most Germans, the Bonhoeffer family was religious, but not in the habit of attending church services. The turning point for the Bonhoeffer family was the First World War. Dietrich’s older brother was a casualty of war. This incident influenced Dietrich to become a theologian, a decision that was not well received among his family members. Bonhoeffer rejected the liberal German theological tradition taught at the University. His Christ-centered convictions would sustain his faith during the demise of the German Christian church. Also, while at Union Theological Seminary (1930 – 1931), Bonhoeffer reevaluated his views on race, which would influence his denunciation of Hitler's anti-Semitism policy on one hand and militant warfare policy on the other. Eric Metaxas points out that Jean Lasserre of France, a student, friend and committed pacifist, often spoke to Bonhoeffer about the Sermon on the Mount and how it influenced his theology – “From that point forward it became a central part of Bonhoeffer’s life and theology, too, which eventually led him to write his most famous book, The Cost of Discipleship. Just as important, though, was that as a result of his friendship with Lasserre, Bonhoeffer became involved in the ecumenical movement, which eventually led him to become involved in the Resistance against Hitler and the Nazis” (Metaxas 2010, p. 113). Another life changing experience was Bonhoeffer’s friendship with African American Albert F. Fisher. It was in New York that Bonhoeffer witnessed the Christian zeal of African American worship and preaching. What amazed him was the fact that African American choirs would sing to the ecstatic applause of white church members, but would be denied equal rights. The racial segregation policy enacted especially among American Christians befuddled Bonhoeffer. To what extent did this experience in America influence his attitude regarding the Nazi persecution of Jews? Soon Bonhoeffer would personally witness the inhumane and merciless racial profiling of Jews in Germany and the heartless indifference of the Reich Church to the mass murder of these innocent victims (Metaxas 2010, pp. 107-110).

National prestige was restored as the German people entrusted the fate of their nation to Adolf Hitler. As early as 1933, after Hitler was democratically elected as chancellor of Germany, Bonhoeffer perceived the affects that Hitler’s policies would have upon German society. Hitler was essentially deified. Like Caesar, the Führer of German was the personification of state worship. The nazification of the German Catholic and Protestant church was slow but certain. The German Christian church’s capitulation to the tenets of the Third Reich and the Führer principle, according to Bonhoeffer, was an idolatrous apostasy from the biblical tenets of the Christian faith. As Hitler rallied support from both Catholic and Protestant communities, the voice of reason was silenced. Bonhoeffer responded by running an unofficial (non-registered) seminary. The Confessing Church was a beacon of light that had yet to capitulate to the Socialist National Party platform. The Confessing Church was a desperate effort, a faint and futile endeavor, to thwart the demonic alliance of the German Christian Church and Hitlerism. Bonhoeffer states that the Confessing Church “bears the burden of the responsibility of being the true Church of Jesus. It proclaims ‘Here is the church’! ‘Come here’! In proclaiming this it comes up against both friends and enemies. Where it recognizes enemies it confirms the barriers they have drawn consistently and without compromise. Where it recognizes friends, it finds common ground and is ready for conversation in the hope of communion” (Bonhoeffer 1966, p. 91). The Nazi’s dissolved the Confessing Church by denying military chaplaincy and pastoral positions to Confessing Church ministerial candidates and eventually drafted and assigned the ministerial candidates at the German front. Bonhoeffer’s religious conviction as a conscientious objector was problematic. In January 23, 1939, a draft notice was issued for all men born between 1906 and 1907 to register for military service. His decision not to bear arms was further complicated by the Reich's refusal to allow him to serve as a military chaplain.

This situation was seemingly resolved when Union Theological Seminary offered Bonhoeffer a teaching and pastoral position. However, while at Union Theological Seminary, Bonhoeffer was ridden with guilt and felt that his initial decision abandoned the church, friends, and family. Bonhoeffer sincerely believed that his isolation from Germany would disqualify him from the reconstruction of German Christian church and society after the war. Bitterly, silently and with much prayer, Bonhoeffer decided within a few short months to return to Germany. It was during this interim period that Bonhoeffer made a
radical decision that would alter the course of his life and influence successive generations. His brother Klause and brother in law Hans von Dohnanyi were deeply involved in the conspiracy to remove Hitler. In fact the Bonhoeffer family and many of their respective professional associates and friends had similar misgivings about Hitler. It is unclear as to when Bonhoeffer joined the conspiracy and participated in clandestine operations against the Third Reich. Hitler’s policies had coercively crossed the line of church and state – Bonhoeffer responded accordingly. Larry L. Rasmussen suggests that the conventional Lutheran “Two-sphere thinking meant certain parasitism in Bonhoeffer’s social ethic”, in other words “Nonviolence in Bonhoeffer’s ethics is parasitic in that he acknowledged the necessary use of violent coercion by some as obedience to Christ’s command while denying it as a possibility for disciples” (Rasmussen 2005, p. 121). Like the ancient prophets that witnessed the economic, social and political collapse of Israel, Bonhoeffer was stunned and astounded by the spiritual and moral demise of the fatherland. Bonhoeffer's reaction to the German Christians apostate condition that deviated from the traditional German faith by embracing the National Socialist Party's platform solidified his personal conviction, which endorsed Hitler's elimination in hope of preserving the German tradition of church and state.

Bonhoeffer denounced Hitler as the enemy of the state and the church. His reaction to Nazism was predicated upon his credentials as a church leader as well as acting as a concerned citizen in a desperate attempt to protect the church from a corrupted state religion. Bonhoeffer was recruited by his brother in law to serve in the Abwehr, the military intelligence agency. This enabled Dietrich to make contacts with the Allied powers through his ecumenical acquaintances. It also enabled him to share information related to the condition of the church, the persecution of the Jews, and the movements within the government to remove Hitler from power. Bonhoeffer publicly attacked Hitler’s policies and was arrested for political opposition and conspiracy to assassinate Hitler in 1943. After two years of confinement at Buchenwald, Bonhoeffer was executed by hanging at Flossenburg (cf., Dramm 2009, pp. 231-233). Bonhoeffer's radical temperament is the exception to the rule – his bigger than life persona as preacher, theologian, dissident and martyr has staggered the imagination, and personified his motto: “When Christ calls a man he bids him come and die” (Bonhoeffer 1963, p. 7). Bonhoeffer’s experience unveils the volatile nature of war, patriotism and sacrifice. His experience is neither the standard nor an example of Christian action or reaction, but a poignant example of the twists and turns, anxieties and desperations of war.

The issue for Bonhoeffer was not the justified response of the Allied powers to declare war, but the imminent implosion of German culture and tradition. The twisted maze of Hitlerism contradicted everything that was German. The Austrian tyrant must be dealt with on his own terms. Mercy and compassion, prayers and patience must give way to force and eventually assassination. The church has been the persecuted and the persecutor. Her long history is a chronicled witness of peaceful resolve and persecution. Nonetheless, from the inception of the Protestant movement, John Calvin emphasized prayer and patience on the one hand and the due process of government policy to remove unfit leadership on the other. This traditional concept endorsed the view that it is necessary to avoid civil violence, but there are times when tyrannicide is the only option. However, the church cannot be advocate and judge at the same time. Bonhoeffer recognized his dilemma; it eventually cost his life.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer stressed that the unwillingness of professed Christians to act upon moral conviction was a perversion of grace. The failure of the German Christian Church to defend the Jews was partaking in the sins of the state. The failure of the church to confront state crimes against humanity by allowing it to flourish was a reprehensible evil. On the other hand, Bonhoeffer proposes where the “state becomes the fulfillment of all spheres of human life and culture; it forfeits its true dignity, its specific authority as government” (Brocker 2006, p. 508). Hitler had usurped all rights and prerogatives of church and state. As the masses blindly accorded Hitler full government powers, the fate of Germany was sealed. The fact that military officers were participating to assassinate Hitler was in violation of their military oath. The personalities involved in the assassination attempt of Hitler turned to Bonhoeffer for moral guidance and Bonhoeffer in return gave them his life. Tyrannicide is an ancient and contemporary reality. The deposing of a despotic leader is more than preserving the bureaucracies of state; it is the preservation
of the dignity of humanity; but like war itself, the full impact of tyrannicide is a complicated subject matter that can only be accurately estimated by the critics of history. The social injustice that results from war is a constant challenge to church policy. This is especially the case when dealing with ecclesiastical and nuclear warfare policy. Within this framework, there is an impasse between the pacifist and just war proponents when moral authority and influence has passed from the church to the state actor; neither of the two traditions have the influence in the postmodern era, which has made the centric force of the state actor the personification of law and moral custom in the national and international system.

5.10 Just War Moral Theory in the Contemporary World Order

The pacifist movement does not properly assess the consequences of sin and the inherent limitations of humankind. It refuses to acknowledge the vital role humanity has in rectifying its own dilemmas, securing its own national interests, and often is uninformed to the processes that secure its personal interests and freedoms. It overlooks the obvious contradiction of war that it is not so much the combatant who ‘pulls the trigger’ who should be feared, as it is the noncombatant, the political decision-makers, who has the power to make war. However, the church is placed between two seemingly contradictory policy objectives. To stand firm on moral principle, to be a guiding source of courage and strength on behalf of the state and soldiers during war time on the one hand and guiding the radically volatile dissident or the conscientious objector on the other. Nonetheless, the diversity of opinion is the strength of democratic societies. When the voice of moral reason is silenced by the fleeting glories of xenophobic hysteria and jingoistic fanaticism, then an unexpected disintegration of the national order naturally follow (see Dn 2).

Another aspect regarding a clarification of the just war debate is the diversity of theological mindsets of Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer and Barth. All were of German decent but widely differed in their political objectives regarding war. These three scholars were contemporaries who shared the same sentiments toward Nazi Germany, but their theological approach on how to deal with Nazi tyranny (and for Niebuhr and Barth, Communism) was seemingly contradictory. The just war doctrine for the First and Second World Wars was a political instrument to rally the populace for war, but was impotent to thwart the brutal carnage that enveloped Europe. The voice of the church was silent as nations clashed upon the battlefields of Europe.

Bonhoeffer’s life was cut-short and it is unfeasible to project the direction of his theological dialogue after the war. His martyrdom is an eloquent portrait of personal conviction and courage but his cooperation in the assassination plot depicts a man that had lost sight of God’s sovereign providence among the nations. The post-World War II era drove Niebuhr and Barth into separate camps. Niebuhr was engrossed with the communist threat to western civilization, while Barth turned his immediate attention to the reconstruction of Europe and Germany. Niebuhr interpreted Communism as the epitome of evil, while Barth perceived it as a temporary political setback that would eventually run its course. Niebuhr solicited a nuclear balance of power to stave Communist aggression, while Barth encouraged patience and calm in the face of nuclear holocaust. However, both Barth and Niebuhr recognized that the God of history was fulfilling his divine directives in history. Ultimately, truth would triumph over evil; the gospel of Christ would eclipse the weaknesses of the earthly kingdom. Niebuhr states:

The whole history of man is thus comparable to his individual life. He does not have the power and the wisdom to overcome the ambiguity of his existence. He must and does increase his freedom, both as an individual and in the total human enterprise; and his creativity is enhanced by the growth of his freedom. But this freedom also tempts him to deny his mortality and the growth of freedom and power increases the temptation. But evils in history are the consequence of this pretension. Confusion follows upon man's effort to complete his life by his own power and solve its enigma by his own wisdom. . . . The Christian faith is the apprehension of the divine love and power which bears the whole human pilgrimage, shines through its enigmas and antinomies and is finally and definitively revealed in a drama in which suffering love gains triumph over sin and
death. This revelation does not resolve all perplexities; but it does triumph over despair, and leads to the renewal of life from self-love to love (Niebuhr 1949, pp. 233-234).

However, self-interest exemplified among collective geopolitical objectives impedes national and international cooperation and enhances a self-sufficient façade of elite state actor power. The friction among elite state actors is a contest of power; its recurrent course amidst the economic and political rivalry among nations is organized violence. Just war moral theory during the Cold War era, according to Niebuhr, was limited by the contemporary elite state system. Each superpower claimed the moral high-ground, which blurred the utility of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* requisites. The post-World War II era posed a new threat to the elite state actor – weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weaponry changed the face of war, military tactics and national security. The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was an ideological contest that threatened civilization. The friction among the two superpowers was aptly termed the balance of terror. Niebuhr’s Christian realism legitimized the threat of nuclear force in order to curtail communist expansionism. The only means to thwart the tide of communist aggression was by a calculated arms race, and the hope that humankind’s rational capacity would enhance the desire for life, rather than the possible extinction of western civilization. The just war doctrine would undergo a thorough reevaluation as the United States and the Soviet Union would defy the limits of diplomatic prowess and statesmanship to deter nuclear catastrophe.

5.11 Just War Tradition and Nuclear Warfare Policy

A major turning point regarding the just war tradition was the indiscriminate bombing of noncombatants during the Second World War. Warfare was no longer delegated to the battlefield. It incorporated population centers as well. The just war tradition was ignored as an afterthought as the war between Allied and Axis forces engaged in a total war scenario. Hitler’s attacks on London catalyzed a reaction by Allied forces to bomb the population centers of Hanover and Dresden. This set the stage for the utilization of atomic weaponry on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The time-honored rule of military conduct to fight war on the battlefield and avoid civilian casualties was dispensed with by the firebombing of civilian targets as a justifiable tactic to preserve Allied lives and enhance a speedy conclusion to the war.

Goebel and Nelson emphasize that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki invalidated the just war tradition of discrimination. The subsequent Cold War doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) also “abandoned a second key principle of just war teaching namely, proportionality”. With no restraints to the arms race, mutual distrust among the superpowers, and the ever present threat of human error the consequences of indiscriminant nuclear fall-out on civilian populations is unavoidable. United States and Soviet Union deterrent policies calculated an absence of a major war. Nonetheless, this viewpoint challenged the conventional just war principle of ‘civic peace’ between former enemies, because the notion of international order between two hostile superpowers was invalidated by a ’precarious coexistence’, with no guarantee to prevent nuclear war with exception to the desire for survival and the rational faculties of mankind (Goebel & Nelson 1988, p. 78). Capt. Kenneth Kemp asserts that one of the radical transitions in modern warfare is the population-as-national-resource transformed as population-as-target (Lackey 1989, p. 39). History has demonstrated in both ancient and modern epochs that formal diplomatic overtures for peace are forfeited when state actors are threatened by unconditional surrender. The inconceivable brutalities in war and human rights violations against the conquered have become justifiable actions among nations.

Cassel, McCally and Abraham point out an alarming shift from deterrence policy based on MAD to the military doctrine of nuclear war fighting, which advocates that nuclear war is a survivable event. According to this treatise state department strategist Arthur M. Cox’s proposes that strategic nuclear warfare is an outmoded option superseded by the military doctrine of nuclear war fighting. At the height of Cold War tensions in 1975, Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne supported the viewpoint that ‘nuclear war fighting’ is a viable option in limited warfare. Cassel, McCally and Abraham emphasize that Gray and
Payne claim that a restrained use of nuclear weaponry is “consistent with the Catholic Church doctrine of just war, that a nuclear war is a survivable event, that mutual assured destruction is immoral, and that the United States needs the ability to wage a nuclear war ‘at any level of violence’” (Cassel, McCally & Abraham 1984, pp. 25, 26). The Limited Nuclear War (LNW) doctrine has been integrated into U.S. nuclear policy since 1974 by Secretary of Defense James M. Schlesinger. It has been incorporated into the U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine and functions within the parameter of specified tactical nuclear yields, targets, regions and even state actors. Sheikh R. Ali defines limited nuclear warfare: “Any nuclear war short of a general or all-out nuclear war will be considered a limited one” (Ali 1989, p. 127). From a public health perspective limited or general nuclear war are equally detrimental and have sever irreversible effects on the social, physical and moral health of a nation.

The fear factor of a precarious deterrence policy (MAD) and the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons referred to as nuclear war fighting were counterbalanced by a more intermediate approach to the nuclear arms race articulated by President Ronald Reagan in March 23, 1983, referred to as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or the Star Wars initiative. Reagan’s SDI proposal was a theoretical application of hi-tech satellites providing a protective shield or a ‘space-based defensive umbrella’ for the United States and Europe by utilizing focused laser or particle beams to thwart a Soviet attack. Reagan’s proposal was supported by conservatives, criticized by liberals and denounced by the Soviet Union, which stressed that SDI was in direct violation of the Salt I ABM treaty. Nonetheless, SDI was designed to eliminate the threat of nuclear warfare by assuring the American people and her allies that a defensive system was able to intercept a Soviet ballistic missile at all three phases of its flight—the boost, midcourse and terminal phases. The critics of SDI denounced it on account of a lack of technocratic capability to develop such a complex defense system, its overwhelming cost, its vulnerability to missile, or laser counter-attack and no guarantees of its ‘leak-proof’ functionality during an attack.

Supporters countered the critics with the argument that a functional SDI system would give the United States an advantage during arms negotiations. However, the complication of SDI is summed-up by the adage that a ‘great defense is your best offense’, which suggests that SDI was more than a defensive shield. The SDI project mandated a significant change in attitude regarding deterrence and containment policies. The Reagan administration altered the current nuclear doctrine of assured mutual destruction to one of ‘mutual assured survival’. (Plano & Olton 1988, p. 202; Ali 1989, pp. 242-243; Elliot & Reginald 1989, p. 171). SDI was complicated, controversial and expensive. Douglas P. Lackey states that the U.S. nuclear doctrine and its moral implications were heatedly contested during the Reagan administration. Lackey regarded the Star Wars initiative as an historic event because of its emphasis on preserving population centers. The moral debate between defensive and offensive strategies has been disputed since the advent of missile based nuclear weaponry. However, Reagan’s SDI initiative according to secretary of defense, Casper Weinberger, was “more idealistic, moral and practical than . . . mutual assured destruction” (Lackey 1989, p. 2; see n4). The rationale behind SDI, the protection and preservation of innocent population centers during a nuclear attack, questioned the adequacy of mutual assured destruction as a viable Cold War deterrent.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. developed a progressive alternative to the Star Wars Initiative and mutually assured destruction. Nye suggested that the issue in the deterrence debate is not nuclear weaponry of itself but the basis of its policy application. Weapons of mass destruction have been publicized as the arsenal of choice to sustain national security policy. The elite state actor military doctrine is inseparably intertwined with weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate defense. Nuclear weapons among many state actors are considered a primary deterrent to protect state autonomy. This viewpoint challenges the traditional just war theory that criticizes the necessity of technologic advancements of modern weaponry in a complex state system. The system of checks and balances in the democratic process neither guarantee moral action nor justice in the overall scheme of a state actor’s grand strategic objectives. Among nations, especially elite state actors, there is an inclination, a definitive determination to sustain its preeminence by directing and maintaining the status quo in the complex global system. Nuclear warfare is formally denounced, but intrinsically a key component of the military doctrine among the nuclear powers. Nuclear weaponry is here to stay and will always be considered the ultimate offensive or defensive deterrent.
According to Nye, the Augustinian just war doctrine is an explicit ‘just defense’ deterrence doctrine. It is a valid applicatory instrument in the postmodern era as a limited ‘just deterrence’ within a theoretical framework of five maxims of nuclear ethics falling under the rubrics ‘motives’, ‘means’, and ‘consequences’. Nye’s formulation determines the essential requisites to curtail a potential escalation of nuclear warfare. ‘Motives’ are a just and limited cause for self-defense. Self-defense includes biological survival, the protection of our freedoms, and cultural traditions (Nye 1986, p. 100). However, Nye suggests that deterrence is a multifaceted application that includes personal as well as mutual capabilities within the Allied nuclear umbrella. It should be an exclusive or inclusive deterrent policy reliant upon the moral delineations of discrimination and proportionality within the balance of power scheme. ‘Means’ incorporates two vital elements in Nye’s formulation: 1. Under no circumstances designate WMD as normal or conventional weaponry on the one hand and 2. “Minimize harm” to innocent noncombatants on the other (Nye 1986, p. 99). Nye utilizes personalized verbiage to describe the destructive force of nuclear weaponry and contrasts the destructive power of nuclear weaponry to the frailty of innocent population centers. Nye states: “One can construct and aim a nuclear weapon that is so small and accurate that it will do about the same damage as conventional ‘iron bombs’ full of high explosives. But even those miniature nuclear weapons must never be treated as normal usable weapons, because politically and technically they are too closely related to their big brothers of mass destruction” (Nye 1986, p. 105). Is it possible to limit nuclear war? The risks are staggering and failure to do so deems the unthinkable. There is a fine line, asserts Nye, between limited tactical nuclear exchanges and an “all-out spasm of total devastation” (Nye 1986, p. 105). The relationship between limited and total nuclear war is blurred by the human element in the heat of exchange between hostile state actors. It is within this context that nuclear weapons are recognized as an invalid, unacceptable means of settling international disputes. ‘Consequences’ in relation to WMD specify the reduction of risk of nuclear war in the short term and reduction of dependency upon nuclear weapons over time (Nye 1986, p. 99). Ultimately the elite state actors must recognize the inherent limitations of nuclear weaponry as a full-proof security alternative. This does not nullify the necessity of a ‘just deterrence’, asserts Nye, but reinforces the detriments of first use and the ultimate calamity of any society that justifies nuclear weaponry without due investigative process to defend its actions.

Nye’s development of just deterrence is a Cold War evaluation; there are elements in his argument that are applicable in the 21st century. Even though the bipolar atmosphere was tense, traumatic and threatening during the Cold War, there was also clarity among the two superpowers. There were only two sides, two ideologies, and two hegemonic powers that controlled the world’s nuclear arsenal and military strategy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and September 11, 2001 critically altered the state system paradigm. A competitive multipolar state system on the one hand and enemies without faces, or defined territorial boundaries, who peddle death to combatant and noncombatant on the other are the contemporary challenges to state system stability.

How does a state actor protect its civil radioactive material or military grade uranium from terrorists? The terrorist threat represents a major policy shift on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Rogue state actors that are suspected of supporting terrorist activities represent a major threat to the West, primarily the United States and her European allies. This situation has intensified a resurgence of the early crusades in our postmodern world as Christian and Islamic traditions clash in contemporary society. Terrorist networks and rogue state actors that support terrorist activities coupled with the intrinsic fear, distrust, and hysterical suspicions among hostile state actors could escalate conflict throughout the world. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter underscore the concerns of the western powers regarding the vulnerability and accessibility of civil radioactive materials or penetrable security failures regarding global weapons grade uranium, which could threaten national security and population centers. The theft or diversion of nuclear weapons; the illicit procurement of materials to develop nuclear or radioactive weapons; the sabotage of nuclear facilities releasing radiation and the detonation of a dirty bomb dispersing radiation all increases the probability of a nuclear event and embolden nuclear terrorism. Ferguson and Potter state:
Nuclear weapons offer terrorists the ultimate means of inflicting mass destruction. A combined strategy of enhanced intelligence, disruption of terrorist organizations, protection of nuclear weapons and material, and emergency preparedness is required to combat this threat. The United States and its allies must therefore give high priority to a coordinated and sustained effort to reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism as an essential element of the worldwide struggle against terror” (Ferguson & Potter 2004, p. 335).

The Augustinian just war tradition from its inception to the present day has been challenged by two fluctuating elements: the autonomous state actor in a decentralized state system that incites war and the unprecedented technologic evolution of increasingly sophisticated weaponry. However, it is the devastating force of nuclear weaponry that has outmoded the Clausewitzian total war scenario. The just war doctrine is not an excuse for wars, neither would it justify indiscriminant mass slaughter resulting from conventional or weapons of mass destruction. Rather, it is an ethical/moral restraint to manage and prevent unnecessary limited or total war conflicts. Another important aspect of nuclear weapons is the progressive nature of weapons technology. Nuclear weapons development has come a long ways since the atomic bombs ‘Little Boy’ dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and ‘Fat Man’ dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Contemporary nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems are beyond the grasp of the common populace that is obsessed with the daily responsibilities of life. The sophistication and destructive power of modern arsenals among the nuclear powers, especially the elite state actors, is staggering.

Despite the damaging effects of nuclear warfare and the attempts to limit nuclear yields and deployment, the stockpiling of nuclear weaponry is considered the ultimate surety for national defense. In theory, nuclear weapons as the ultimate de facto deterrent have yet to be proven in our modern era. Its manageability is based upon the rational capacity for survival among our species. But history is replete of despotic tyrants who have challenged the law of survival among nations. Ethnic hatred, revenge and fear can provoke the worst-case scenario. It would make sense as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, the probability of human error, and/or mechanical or systems failure of such systems will increase. Kenneth Waltz suggests otherwise and states that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons could enhance a regional balance of power in the Middle East (Waltz 2012, pp. 2-5). This appraisal assumes that all state actors that possess the WMD would act accordingly. But humanity is not predictable, like an algorithm linking cause and effect; nations, like its people, possess free will to steer its course in history. Waltz neglects to acknowledge the destructive force of individual and collective self-interest throughout the long history of religious and political animosity in the Middle East.

The human element in war is that indefinable component that inspires nobility of spirit, courage, bravery and patriotism on the one hand, while inciting, distrust, greed and fear on the other. Throughout our ancient and modern eras the innate distrust among tribes, nations and empires exemplifies the human predicament – the inability to manage organized violence. Clausewitz states: “Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 2.3, 149). Modern warfare cannot be separated from its populace, leadership, institutions, political traditions and its grand strategic objectives. There are different types of war: accidental war, total war, limited war, preemptive war, holy war, preventive war and nuclear war. The overt causes for war may be a decentralized state system or an imbalance in the political economy, or possibly an ideological schism among state actors, but the causal motives for war are those indefinable variables of human nature such a distrust, fear, ethnic division and suspicion that give birth to war. So it was with Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the contemporary friction between the U.S., Russia and China. The motivations of greed, revenge, hate and suspicion are powerful incentives that provoke war. Whether human nature is the primary, secondary or even tertiary element of war, there is no nation or political tradition that is immune to its deprecating effects. The personality and emotional make-up of a nation is the populace, exemplified by its leaders, which is driven by patriotic or jingoistic impulses and in some cases blinded by its own inability to comprehend the consequences of just or unjust wars. It is for these
reasons that the just war moral theory is a necessary instrument to protect society from misinformation, miscalculation and misapplication of sources that misstate the processes state friction as a pretext for war. Therefore, the fundamental requirement of *jus ad bellum* axioms is the capability of the state actor to recognize and manage organized violence that is unavoidable, yet necessary to establish and maintain justice and peace, the hallmarks of regional and international stability. However, just war has been overshadowed by the capitalist mandate of interdependent economies as a stop-gap for war. Modern history testifies that the state actor, especially an elite state actor, minimizes or even eclipses international law in order to maintain its international dominance. In our modern era, the capitalist tradition is the all-encompassing passion of contemporary society. It has blinded the American democratic tradition, wherein ethical values are only useful when desired economic goals are obtained.

The evolution of just war has always been a reaction to economic or political friction among nations. Cicero’s reaffirmation of the *casus belli* was an admonition, a warning to the changing world order, Imperial Rome, which lauded the power of the Caesar over the principles of Republicanism. Augustine’s Christianization of the Roman *casus belli* was a reaction to the dissention among the armed forces, the ensuing civic unrest, and the frantic attempt to curtail the customary polity of war to settle disputes. Augustine witnessed the demise of the western empire, the barbarian insurgence and, after the sacking of Rome; he realized the necessity to establish an enduring social ethic for the church in a changing world order. Aquinas reiterated the *casus belli* through the eyeglass of his spiritual forefather, Augustine. Aquinas reaffirmed the just war tradition, to thwart the influence of the canonists and reestablish the righteous cause for war amidst an ambitious imperial and ecclesiastical court. Martin Luther reaffirmed the just war tradition by emphasizing governing authority to establish German independence and protect the protestant movement. John Calvin reiterated the purpose of war as a means to safeguard justice. His emphasis on ‘last resort’ was a reaction to the pervasive utility of war among the monarchical caste. Hugo Grotius once again reiterated the just war tradition within the boundary of international law, in reaction to the Thirty Year War and the inability of the church to foster peace and love. Grotius turned to the consort of nations through the auspices of diplomatic mission and law to establish peace and curtail war. The just war tradition was an essential policy to rally national support in both the First and Second War Wars. The premises of just cause for war was instrumental in criticizing U.S. foreign policy in Viet Nam; its moral axioms condemn unwarranted violence and are an essential stop-gap in our modern era to the unhallowed effects of the Clausewitzian total war scenario, the precursor to nuclear holocaust.

The classical interpretation of human nature and war has provided an enduring principle of Christian realism, the recognition that nations are subjected to the weakness and limitations of its peoples, leaders, and the need for ethical restraints to protect the moral and spiritual constructs of a nation in times of war. The clash between the heavenly and earthly cities is reenacted in every era of history. It is important to investigate a connection of the just war tradition to the technologic advances of modern arsenals and economic competition in the 21st century. This can only be achieved as we apply some essential *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* elements to critique Operation Iraqi Freedom by investigating the motives and the consequences of the United States war in Iraq. However, it is recognized as a citizen of a respective national tradition that there is an ambiance of pride and personal bias when investigating the policies of America. It is important to emphasize that the United States has been a bulwark of freedom and liberty, and has upheld the cause of human rights by ensuring nations those civic and religious rights that has been a blessing to its people and the world throughout its short history. Nonetheless, even good nations eventually collapse; even righteous causes are blinded by misguided ambition, miscalculation and national pride. It is important to review the just war doctrine and understand its contemporary application in the contemporary state system.

5.12 *Jus ad Bellum a Contemporary Moral Warfare Polity*

The literature on the just war tradition since Cicero’s reexamination of its republican roots has been readapted in every era. However, the 20th and 21st centuries have witnessed a misapplication of its
principles. For example, the just war tradition in the First and Second World Wars was a nationalist instrument to rally state support for war. During the Cold War some radical policy advisers utilized its principles to support the use of tactical nuclear weapons within a national security scheme. In the 21st century the just war tradition has been eclipsed by the centric force of elite state actor objectives and has been overshadowed by progressive theories that have faith in humankind to steer its course in history without recognizing the force of collective self-interest among state actors.

The just war moral theory challenges motives, as well as the outward actions of the policy-makers. It reveals the covert objectives, casting light upon things that are concealed in darkened recesses of greed and unbridled power. The just war doctrine is also a means to manage unwarranted slaughter among hostile forces. The very nature of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles negates the utilization of tactical and other nuclear yields in war because of the unmanageable consequences among combatant and noncombatants. The just war tradition is a guide to protect a state actor from unnecessary wars that can deplete economic resources and damage the moral resources of a nation. The contemporary revision of the just war moral theory is an adaptation to the 21st century that has over-emphasized economic coercion and military power on the one hand and state actor autonomy on the other.

*Jus ad bellum* requisites are those moral insights that validate a nation’s just/impartial prerogatives for war. Just cause for war is a combination of moral requisites that develop a holistic formulation to validate a state actor’s declaration for war. First and foremost is Designated/Competent Authority: the contemporary state actor governed by diverse organized political traditions and ideology complicates but necessitates just war tradition. Nationally, the sovereign state assumes unilateral autonomy in the state actor system. It is vested with a balance of powers nationally and internationally. Internally the state is bound by its constitutional mandates that limit its authority by a series of checks and balances inherent in its judiciary, legislative and federal system. Internationally, the modern state actor is constrained by global institutions and international law. Each state actor has a designated appointed public authority. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 – 2011), President George W. Bush of the United States (2001 – 2009) and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (1979 – 2003) represented their respective countries. An interesting aspect regarding competent authority in our modern era of human rights and governance is the issue regarding repressive governments that thwart the processes of justice domestically and internationally. In order for a war to qualify as a just war the designated political authority must ensure justice in its own respective social, economic and political systems. Both the United States and Iraq have a seat at the United Nations, an acknowledgement of their recognized statehood, but the concept of what constitutes a legally binding government is a matter of opinion. Our global village is diverse ethnically, politically, religiously and culturally, and globalization has escalated friction within the decentralized state system. Nonetheless, each recognized contemporary state actor has a designated leader, specified legal boundaries that enable its leaders to declare war.

However, the Augustinian mandate that just wars are fought by just men is distorted by political bureaucracy and tradition, partisan politics, self-interest caucuses, transnational corporations, international trade agreements and miscellaneous domestic and international friction that complicate the decision-making process for war in our modern era. Competent authority is the fundamental praxis of the just war doctrine in both ancient and modern politics; this construct is the basis for an effective application of other just war requisites in our contemporary state actor and state system tradition. Its recognition enables the consort of nations to resolve issues that affect regional, hegemonic and the international system. At what point, however, does a leader become a tyrant? Both ancient and reformation Christian leaders supported designated authority as a divine directive and encouraged patience and prayers, or in the case of Calvin, a political system of checks and balances to curve tyrannical authority. Richard Goldstone points out that “local rules and customs of war have been promulgated for millennia, the development of a truly global ‘Law of War’—and the consequent evolution of international crimes and humanitarian law—is a comparatively recent phenomenon” (Weiss & Daws 2008, p. 463). The debate regarding tyrannicide is divisive and debatable. While the World Court has claimed traditional jurisdiction on such cases, its authority cannot supersede a state actor’s civic
judiciary system, which seeks to instill justice for its population base that has suffered crimes against humanity by their leaders.

Just Cause and Right Intention (or just ‘self-defense’) defines state actor aggression and right intention for war, which constitutes another set of axioms that clarify a just war in the contemporary state system. Traditionally, just cause for war is an overt, explicit reaction to defend the state and innocent noncombatants from armed attack, the restitution of territory illegally seized by an aggressive state actor and/or correction of malicious policies that have destabilized the national and international order. The use of force is qualified by the subjective intentions of the state actor as well. In other words, objective and subjective motivations for war must coincide with each other in order for a strong state actor to justify the defense of a weak state actor. Commandeering assets and profiting from those assets from the war effort contradicts the spirit of ‘right intension’ for war. The punishment of evil, the recompense of property, the restoration of human rights and the reinstatement of the dignity of humanity is not an excuse for profiteering. There is a blurred line between just ‘self-defense’ and ‘right intension’ in modern warfare, especially when considering the centric force of state actor political objectives. In war, the legal and moral mandates for war are often disregarded by ‘war itself’. In time history will judge the actions and decisions of the policy makers. An underlying motive for war in the present competitive state system is when military action is regarded as an economic necessity serving the self-interest of the defending state actor rather than an instrument to restore justice and civic harmony between the hostile state actors.

Comparative Justice is another ethical safeguard, which is a preventative measure to ensure that the state actor’s decision-making mechanism for war is accurate and sensible. However, the modern state actor is predominately concerned about safeguarding its own national security, and securing its own national and international assets, rather than formally safeguarding justice or correcting injustices by warfare. State actor autonomy in our modern state system is the crux of the problem in resolving international disputes. The idea of justice may be unfeasible especially in modern warfare; however, Augustine’s concept of comparative justice is another definitive ethical guideline to ensure that the aggrieved party has a legitimate motive for war. While both parties encounter conflict and as an aggressive state actor is condemned for its actions, there must be a disparity of suffering, a disproportion of injustice suffered by the aggrieved state actor to justify the use of defensive force in war. In other words, it must be obvious, evident to all that the maltreated, victimized party has a legitimate just cause for war. Otherwise, the obscure nuances of conflict should be resolved by the United Nations and their respective state actor diplomatic mission.

Probability of Success safeguards the aggrieved state actor if it is incapable of restoring justice and procures satisfactory restitution in war. There are two aspects of probability of success that should be considered. Even if a state actor has been wronged it may not have the military capability to correct the hostile intrusion of its designated state sovereignty. In this case it may either acquiesce to the demands of its enemy or seek assistance from an ally to defend its just cause for war on the one hand while taking its grievance to the UN Security Council to defend its sovereign rights on a global platform on the other. Another aspect of the probability of success in our contemporary era is when an elite state actor has the military power to enforce justice, but refuses to assist a weak state actor because there is no geopolitical advantage to justify the cost of warfare. On the one hand, when restoring justice and civic order, there is a reluctance to exit the regional theater after war because it may disadvantage an elite state actor's regional or hegemonic opportunities. This was the scenario in Afghanistan. The fight against the Taliban was not really as important as a sustained physical presence in the Middle East. After the elite state actor has restored human rights and social order, the defending military power must have a viable exit strategy. The strong state actor must respect the sovereign state rights of other nations and respect state actor protocols in the international system. Liberation cannot be misconstrued as occupation. Respect for an aggrieved state actor’s rehabilitation is a process that begins before the war effort. An elite state actor must recognize its economic and political limitations in the state system in order to maintain relations among allies and enemies.

Last Resort and a Public Declaration for War in regards to the Pax Americana unlike the Pax Romana functions within the auspices of global international law and institution. The declaration of war
not only affects the hostile state actors in question, but the global community as well. The diplomatic overtures to avoid war are contradicted by the numerous intentions to malign the diplomatic process to curtail war throughout history. However, Hans Morgenthau fully embraced the prowess of the diplomatic corps to thwart organized violence in the state actor system. Last Resort is that quintessential gasp of hope, the ultimate determined effort to elude the reckless abandonment of unwarranted violence between state actors. In retrospect ancient Rome was the sole arbiter of law and order in its vast hegemonic domain; however, the modern state actor is restrained by internal and external legal mechanisms that challenge or validate its right for war within the state system. The hurdles of constitutional restraints and international law are the two essential factors in restraining a nation's resolve for war. When every avenue to avoid war has been exhausted yet without success, than the aggrieved state actor can declare war. President Bush’s greatest challenge prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom was not persuading the American people but convincing the UN Security Council regarding his resolve for military action against Iraq.

Regional Peace as the decisive objective for War: Regional peace is when social justice, economic stability and civic harmony have been restored. It is when warfare strategy exceeds the destructive force of war and regional stability has been restored. The successful cessation of violence among enemies, restoration of peace between hostile state actors, and the normal restoration of life is the ultimate objective and litmus test of just cause for war. This is illustrated by the Second World War, wherein the allied forces reestablished the civic, economic, and political infrastructures of Germany, Japan and Italy. It is one of the great success stories of national and international forgiveness and restoration of state actor sovereignty in history. War is the visages of barbarism. Its destructive power incapacitates the conqueror and the conquered. But according to Augustine the purpose of war is to correct evil and restore justice. Ultimately the consequences for constructive restoration will offset the socio-economic, physical and spiritual degradation familiar to warfare. Peace is the ultimate fruitage of a just war. Mattox points out that peace is the “end of violence, the avoidance of future violence, and, to the greatest extent possible, the establishment or restoration of happiness and human flourishing—in short, a just and lasting peace—must be the end toward which the war is fought” (Mattox 2006, p. 10). In our modern state system the litmus test for the just war moral theory is a peaceful resolve, a civic restoration and restoration of regional and hegemonic stability resulting from war, in the theater of conflict. The interdependent nature of the just war tradition is perceived by jus in bello requisites that have been implemented in the framework of the Geneva Conventions, which recommitted itself to the protection of noncombatants during the process and cessation of war.

5.13 Jus in Bello a Contemporary Moral Warfare Polity

Within the framework of the jus ad bellum tradition are the related interdependent concepts of 'Discrimination' and 'Proportionality': These two concepts, which have been incorporated into the Geneva Conventions protocol reinforce the irrelevance of WMD as a primary or even a plausible national security alternative against aggressive state or rogue state actors. The First and Second World Wars were a definitive turning-point to ensure that population centers would be protected from conventional and nuclear warfare. Protecting innocent population centers and utilizing necessary military force to accomplish a military campaign are compromised when considering tactical or larger nuclear yields. The power of nuclear, hydrogen and neutron arsenals have horrific moral, physical and ecological consequences. It is the ultimate act of genocide in our contemporary state system.

The just war moral theory has been an on-going tradition throughout western civilization. Its contribution to maintain peace and social order cannot be underestimated. The just war doctrine is not an excuse for war but its ancient credo acknowledges that war does exist and must be managed to curtail unwarranted bloodshed in order to restore civic harmony among nations.
5.14 The Contemporary Relevance of the Just War Tradition

Thus far, an attentive overview of the importance and modifications of the just war tradition through western civilization has confirmed its significance throughout history. Within this context there are some aspects to its evolution. The Augustinian just war tradition is an extension and revision of the *casus belli*; its revision to manage the process of war, is an acknowledgment that war is inevitable among the consort of nations. That the principle of sin, that aggressive innate frictional behavior among men and nations, which has destabilized the world order, incite warfare, can only be managed by moral axioms as nations cooperate to instill ethical and legal boundaries to protect the dignity of soldier and citizen. Therefore, the just war tradition acknowledges a demarcation between good and evil. Augustine's political realism overshadowed state actor autonomy and survival in a distorted world order. Leaders and nations are held accountable for their actions. In other words, there is ethical and moral clarity, a rationale for maintaining order in war. That rationale is societal peace and harmony among allies and former enemies. Only then can the fruits of peace be restored in the earthly city and international harmonies come to fruition. But the question remains: Is the just war theory still applicable in spite of the enormous changes regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction, a resurgence of international terrorism and the unpredictable autonomy of the state actor?

In order to understand these pertinent challenges it is important to extend the definition of the just war tradition to our modern age. The Augustinian just war tradition contested a distorted *casus belli* in order to manage organized violence and restrain needless bloodshed and carnage. It was designed to correct evil in order to restore justice, community and international order. Therefore, no limited or total conflict that increases the probability of nuclear war is a just war. Its destructive force nullifies its expediency; its demoralizing aftereffects invalidate its efficacy to secure peace among the consort of nations. In other words, the destructive power of nuclear weaponry, tactical or otherwise, nullifies the manageable of warfare. It decimates the moral claims of any nation that seeks retribution for first use or retaliatory response. The proliferated use of weapons of mass destruction is unchartered territory. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among elite state actors, rogue state actors and terrorists incites the worst case scenario, but to sanction the use of WMD as a just cause, a retaliatory reaction to a preemptive strike and its use during war misinterprets Augustine's viewpoint that organized violence is to correct evil, manage and thwart the escalation of violence, rather than continue international animosities among the community of state actors that will take generations to heal.

It is the noncombatant that suffers the consequences of war. It is the innocent populace that suffers the misjudgments of misguided political and military strategists. Civilian collateral damage in war is inevitable. However, an adherence to the Augustinian just war tradition is an essential barrier to prevent the escalation of limited conflict in order to avoid a total war scenario. It is a stop-gap to manage wars that could otherwise have negative global consequences. Elite state actors have the most to lose and are subjected to the greatest scrutiny when trying to secure national and international objectives. It takes one careless decision to decimate the international order, but it takes a concerted effort to avoid the pitfalls of war and nuclear holocaust.

Major global problems such as worldwide inflation, trade and payments deficits, competition over scarce resources, hunger, widespread unemployment, global environmental dangers, the growing power of transnational corporations, and the threat of international financial collapse, as well as the danger of world war resulting from these growing tensions--cannot be remedied by a single nation-state approach. They shall require the concerted effort of the whole world community (United States Catholic conference 1983, par. 242. 75).

However, Augustine's worldview was similar to our contemporary era. The sage of Hippo wrote during a time of empire and political disorder. John M. Mattox points out that the "assumption that traditional just-war theory is no longer applicable in the nuclear era is as perilous as the assumption of the homeowner who elects not to purchase insurance because the policy specifies that coverage does not apply in the
Some moderation of violence, just like some insurance against catastrophe, is better than none at all" (Mattox 2006, p. 176).

History is witness to the utility of just war to thwart unwarranted violence; yet if there is a time that the world demands ethical controls for war, it is now. The technologic advances of weaponry and the destructive power to wage war more efficiently and with greater force are increasing. The Augustinian just war tradition reaffirms the question: Is it not the responsibility of humanity to rightfully apply moral principles to manage and thwart war to avoid regional conflict that can provoke international conflict and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

Another aspect of the importance of just war is the autonomous nature of the state actor. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United State became the unsolicited power-broker of the world order. The reemergence of international terrorism has provoked a constant vigilance against an enemy that does not fight according to any set of international norms. It is enticing while defending freedom for an elite state actor to overextend its political objectives and military services and neglect to comprehend its own inherent national limitations in the state system. Augustinian just war tenets are a reminder of the moral rights of enemies in war and the ultimate rebuke to any nation that adheres to the utility of war as a means to achieve policy objective. Nonetheless, the war on terror must continue, but elite state actors must adhere to the principles of truth and justice that establish their authority and credibility among the consort of nations. With rare exceptions, war provokes more war. The purpose of just war is to stabilize national and international order or what Augustine refers too, the "tranquility of order" (Augustine. The city of God. XIX. 13). While 'political peace' is a seemingly unattainable standard, it is better than no standard at all. The inbuilt corollary among elite state actors to maintain and sustain their prestige and/or status quo in fragile decentralized state system is an ancient and modern challenge. James E. Dougherty suggests that the reason that "the just war theory" reappears in history is "because the real world in which morality and politics have to remain intermixed cannot do without it" (Dougherty 1984, p. 53). There will always be a tension between morality and politics, ethics and military power, social integrity and organized violence, but the real issue is not to allow societal fads and trends to blind a state actor from leaping head-first into a war without due reflection on its consequences upon the spiritual, moral and economic resources of a nation.

The final examination of the relevance of just war in our modern era is its relationship to economic globalization. While it is an assumption that interdependent economies are a stop-gap to prevent war in the state system, it has averted the elite state actors thus far from reckless military confrontation. Disproportions of economic wealth have exposed visible distinctions among state actors, which is a primary cause for international conflict. Fanny Coulomb points out that "[i]t is certainly still possible today to write a fundamental text in international economics without referring to the military or strategic balance of power. But it is no longer possible to assert, without other explanation, that the market economy, today dominant, leads to peace. One should rather try to understand the part played by the economy in human conflict; it is also essential to analyze economic relations in terms of power and conflicts" (Coulomb 2004, p. 268). Unprecedented poverty, international trade deficits, scarce resources, transnational corporate power and the constant friction among affluent and disadvantaged state actors incite war rather than curtail it. Economic power is not the solution for peace but the means to secure military strength and control in the world order. Economic power at best is an artificial artifice that can decay before our eyes; its promise for quality of life cannot be misconstrued for the quality or integrity of an individual, a community and a nation. Economic power is the basis of military power, rather than the basis of peace. Augustine's worldview was intermingled with the realization that humanity is encumbered by self-love – the crux of self-love is societal friction in the home, community and the nation. If collective self-interest is the basis for war and violence then ethical principles for war are the means to manage conflict and thwart the tide of human aggression in an anarchic world order.

Throughout history philosophers and theologians, statesmen and diplomats have endeavored to curtail and manage the processes of war. The Geneva Conventions were developed to codify legally binding tenets to manage unwarranted brutalities in war. International organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and restricted authorization regarding crimes of aggression (Roberts 2009, p. 31.19, 498), but IO's are subjected to the autonomous nature of the state actor, minimizing their influence on the global stage. As long as morality and politics confront, embrace and contradict each other within the pantheon of state actor conflict, the Augustinian just war tradition will shed light upon the darkened recesses of human violence amidst a competitive world order.

5.15 Conclusion

The development of the modern state actor and state system, unlike its ancient political predecessors, has enacted several internal and external legal mechanisms to prevent the impulsive exploitation of war. However the best efforts to curtail war have been overshadowed by a decentralized state system as well as the dominant force of state autonomy within a competitive multipolar environment. In spite of the efforts of the state sovereignty charters of Westphalia and the Montevideo Convention and the United Nations to enhance a spirit of community and equality among nations, a definitive demarcation persists between elite and weak state actors. This fact of history, the strong exploiting the weak, is enacted at every phase of life – the home, the city, the nation and the international system. The recognition and cause of the friction that exists among individuals, groups of individuals and state actors is not as important as its solution. War is complicated. It is like a mysterious mist that is only elucidated within the framework of historic reflection. It is no wonder that President George W. Bush refers to the Afghan and Iraqi wars as "the fog of war" a phrase popularized from Clausewitz, that asserts: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in the fog of a greater or less uncertainty” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I.3, 101; cf., Clausewitz 1950, pp. 32, 33). The quintessential issue pertaining to just and unjust warfare in the decentralized state system is the inability of the United Nations and the limited force of International Organizations to circumvent elite state actor authority and power when its security and survival are challenged among the consort of nations.

The purpose of this investigation is not to be judge and jury or offer any verdict regarding President George W. Bush’s persona. State actor leadership is the most problematic job and sacred trust granted to mankind. What we see is not a conspiracy theory or secret agenda to secure assets in the Middle East, but an opportunity, an unexpected occurrence when Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait on the one hand and Osama Bin Laden on 9/11 incited an unavoidable conflict with the United States on the other. The United States took an offensive military tactic against terrorism. This provided the logistical advantage to settle a score with Iraq, which eventually enticed an elite state actor to maintain its global prestige, because it had the power to do so. In war the demarcation between right and wrong is blurred when elite state actors endeavor to maintain the status quo. Even a democratic state actor can mistakenly misinterpret its actions as a righteous liberation of persecuted people while succumbing to imperialistic misadventure. But the political agendas leading up to the Iraqi war was a culmination of years of frustration in dealing with Saddam Hussein rather than an isolated impulsive reaction for war.

The just war doctrine is a stop-gap. It is a vital component among the nuances of foreign policy analysis. The just war axioms encompass a large range of ethical inquiries that must be examined and redefined in every era when contemplating war. The just war tradition is universal; it supersedes partisan politics; it is still a viable universal tenet for western civilization. It is applicable to all cultures, race or political traditions and most important; it limits the aggressive utilization of conventional weaponry and nullifies weapons of mass destruction as a viable military alternative. However, ethical delineations are not compulsory on the state actor. Their application is arduous and humbling because the greatest challenge of an elite state actor is its own disinclination to acknowledge its limitations in the vast global arena of international politics. Therefore, an examination of the consequences of the U. S.-Iraq war will provide clearer insights into the motives for war, which has provoked Iran’s quest for weapons of mass destruction and destabilized the Middle East region. Nations, like people, look back on their failures and

1 O. J. Matthijs Jolles translates: “War is the province of uncertainty; three-fourths of the things on which action in war is based lie hidden in the fog of a greater or less uncertainty” (Von Clausewitz 1950, pp. 32, 33).

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successes, but rarely learn from past experiences, as the next generation blindly reenacts the circuitous route to war.
CHAPTER VI

6.1 Iraq: Just War; Unjust Consequences

War is an extension, an instrument to secure political goals and agendas. The ‘fog of war’ is aptly portrayed as the fog of realpolitik. The personification of this inseparable link is augmented in the modern era; the modern state actor and international system are further complicated by the advances of technology and mass media that has aggravated the dissimilarities among nations. Interdependent economies, the unifying scheme of globalization fail to address the ethnic, political and social divisions among the consort of nations. Despite humankind’s efforts to unify the world order; distrust, economic rivalries, national security issues, and the nature of state actor sovereignty overshadow a decentralized international system that is ineffective to prevent the processes of war. The dichotomy among strong and weak state actors is a test of loyalty, rather than a distribution of power and authority. The elite state actors go through the formalities of economic and political collaboration; yet the underlying spirit of cooperation is complicated by foregone years of ideological tensions, economic competition and military threat of force. Clausewitz states: “If for a start we inquire into the objective of any particular war, which must guide military action if the political purpose is to be properly served we find that the object of any war can vary just as much as its political purpose and its actual circumstances” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I. 2. 90). This truism depicts our contemporary setting. War tactics have been adapted to meet the demands of the hegemonic and regional theaters of interest. The paradigm shifts in the state system influence a state actor’s grand strategic objectives. As soon as there was a cessation of the Soviet threat, the United States adapted its military arsenal and tactics to meet the demands of a changing world order – regional conflict.

In response to the waning of the Soviet threat, U.S. military planners have instituted a broad-based revision of strategy. For forty years that strategy had a single focus: containment of Soviet military and, at times, political expansion. Now, with the threat of Soviet expansion largely dissipated, the U.S. military is gradually adopting a strategy focused on regional contingencies. This policy views the major threats to U.S. interests as arising not primarily from a central (read Soviet) threat but from spirals of regional instability or from a number of aggressive regional hegemons such as Iraq and North Korea (Mazarr, Snider & Blackwell 1993, p. 161).

War policies coincide with political objectives in order to secure and sustain national and international assets. The actual issue of our multipolar environment is not ideological; even religion is a secondary variable, a misdirected fanaticism of jihadist unity. The essence of political friction among elite state actors is the conquest for natural resources; not the domination of natural resources, but equal access to scarce resources. Nevertheless, Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 – 2011) was a complicated scenario. It has been the conspirator’s dream and the realist’s nightmare. It has been the deliberation of endless debate and redefined the persona and purpose of the United States. If anything the United States-Iraq war has been cluttered by misinformation and misapplication of the facts regarding weapons of mass destruction on the one hand and the Bush doctrine that advocated democracy as the unifying and stabilizing cogency in the Middle East on the other.

The purpose of this investigation is to trace the economic, political, and social issues that provoked the conflict between the United States and Iraq. We will utilize the weekly reports of The Economist to identify some of those factors that eventually aggravated an unavoidable conflict between the U.S. government and Saddam Hussein. The intentions for war are perceived in a myriad of conflicting issues and political intrigue in relation to the personality of Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction and oil. This conflict illustrates the complex issues of international politics in the 21st century. It serves our purpose to understand the import of just war in our modern state system and the
circumstances that would inevitably destabilize the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

6.2 9/11 and the Iraqi War

It was just another Tuesday as Americans went about their daily routine. It was just another Tuesday when arriving for work at the National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. After a few hours of work our group rushed from their respective responsibilities to play ping-pong. It was our fifteen minutes break-time of relaxation, converse about our electrifying lives and catch-up on old news; suddenly one of our colleagues ran into the room and flipped on the television. We witnessed the footage of United Airlines Flight 175 and American Airlines 11 midair impact into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Shock, dismay, and a terrible foreboding settled upon our little group. As the hours unfolded it became disturbingly clear that the United States was a target of a terrorist attack. Like the flip of a switch the American persona of freedom and democracy was challenged by a group of emboldened jihadist terrorists. Like Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, 9/11, 2001 redefined the power and prestige of America – a date that would “live in infamy” in the minds of all Americans. It was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Pearl Harbor speech that exhorted, “I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us” (Roosevelt n.d.). That ‘form of treachery’, the seductive covert misadventure of terrorism once again entangled the United States into the complex maze of war. President George W. Bush stated: “My mind drifted back over history. I was looking at a modern-day Pearl Harbor. Just as Franklin Roosevelt had rallied the nation to defend freedom, it would be my responsibility to lead a new generation to protect America. I turned to Andy [Card] and said, “‘You’re looking at the first war of the twenty-first century’” (Bush 2010, p. 137).

President Bush went from a civilian president endorsing education reform and economic expansion to a ‘wartime president’ defending a nation. Initially, what provoked the war in retrospect was not as important as how to fight an enemy without faces and without national boundaries and maintain national focus and unity. The Bush administration set three goals after the 9/11 attacks: “First, keep the terrorists from striking again. Second, make clear to the country and the world that we had embarked on a new kind of war. Third, help the affected areas recover and make sure the terrorists did not succeed in shutting down our economy and dividing our society” (Bush 2010, p. 140). The war on terror, created the ‘fear factor’ that anyone, anywhere at any time could be a potential target. Combatant and noncombatants were victims of 9/11 and it was apparent that the aerial bombings of innocent civilians during the Second World War was being superseded by a more sinister tactic in 21st century – the reality of unprovoked violence anywhere in the world. Paul R. Pillar states:

Counterterrorism, even though it shares some attributes with warfare, is not accurately represented by the metaphor of a war. Unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies nor the prospects of coming to closure, be it through a “win” or some other kind of denouement. Like the cold war, it requires long, patient, persistent effort, but unlike it, it will never conclude with the internal collapse of an opponent. There will be victories and defeats, but not big, tide-turning victories. Counterterrorism is a fight and a struggle, but it is not a campaign with a beginning or an end (Pillar 2003, pp. 217-218).

The Bush administration’s pivotal foreign policy stance was connecting terrorist groups with their rogue state actor sponsors. President Bush asserted that the “United States would consider any nation that harbored terrorists to be responsible for the acts of those terrorists. This new doctrine overturned the approach of the past, which treated terrorist groups as distinct from their sponsors. We had to force nations to choose whether they would fight the terrorists or share in their fate” (Bush 2010, p. 137). In this way it was feasible for the Bush administration to identify the rogue state actor sponsoring the Al Qaida terrorist network, which advantageously gave the U.S. a political opportunity to undertake the
military offensive overseas to Afghanistan, and eventually extend the theater of conflict to its plausible cessation – Iraq.

The stage was set for the United States to declare war on Al Qaida and their state actor sponsor, the Taliban, a militant Islamic fundamentalist tribal organization that once dominated large portions of Afghanistan, with its governing seat of power located in Kabul from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban is regarded as a fanatical Islamic faction. Their extremist application of Islamic law is even odious to some moderate Muslims. The war against Islamic fundamentalists was not a local affair; it also inculcated and included anyone who detested western values, influence and power. The Bush Administration adamantly stressed that the war in Afghanistan was a ‘just war’; President Bush stated that “We were acting out of necessity and self-defense, not revenge” (Bush 2010, p. 184). Bush also pointed out that “I knew in my heart that striking al Qaida, removing the Taliban, and liberating the suffering people of Afghanistan was necessary and just” (Bush 2010, p. 197). The United States embarked upon the first war of the 21st century in the most volatile region in the world. The U.S. would go into battle in a region that neither Alexander the Great, nor the British and the mighty Soviet Union could master. It was on October 7, 2001, only twenty-six days after 9/11 that the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom. It was on March 20, 2003 that the United States and Great Britain initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom. The question that haunts the inquisitive, the analytically minded policy maker, and the enquiring citizen is the motive; the intension for the U.S. war in Iraq. Two key words have consistently resurfaced time and again, ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’. If ever there was a war that damaged the national credibility, the international integrity and trustworthiness of American ideals, it was the Iraqi War (2003 – 2011).

What were the issues that challenged the just war theory, when the United States invaded Iraq? The demarcation between liberator and conqueror is often blurred, but limitations of authority and power must be drawn. It is a forgotten issue, but history has a tendency to repeat itself. What were the complexities that enticed or threatened U.S. prestige in the state system after 9/11? We can conjecture about national and international morality, but the interpretation of truth usually belongs to the state actor that wields the most economic and military power in the unpredictable multipolar state system. There are numerous conspiracy theories; but war is not a conspiracy, rather an impenetrable fog or as Clausewitz asserts the “fog of a greater or less uncertainty” (Clausewitz 1950, p. 1. 3). The ‘fog of war’ is an elusive contaminant in both ancient and modern warfare. War is only an instrument or extension of political agendas. Within this framework there are two overriding themes that must be explored: 1. The just war tradition is a moral theory. As a moral theory it demands the moral and principled aptitude of its leaders, their respective institutions and nation to recognize and restrain malicious aggression that would destabilize the state system. Essentially just wars are fought by just peoples; but even a leader and a nation can be caught-up in the overwhelming backlash of collective vengeance and jingoistic fervor, and 2. However noble, virtuous and structured national tradition and ideals may be, internal and external influences and forces can challenge the moral resolve of any nation. In verity, a state actor’s grand strategy and sovereign survival supersedes moral and legal requisites in the national and international order especially, if an elite state actor’s power base is threatened. In light of this, national limitations are an afterthought when an elite state actor is convinced that a threat to the status quo or its prestige would inevitably destabilize its power and then the state system. The egocentric nature of nationhood has a tendency to assume that ‘it is the center’ of the international system. The human element is pervasive individually and collectively as nations prepare for war.

Wars are planned objectives, but coincidence often plays a part in the fortune and misfortune of nations. There is an unforeseen drama, the limited recognition of cause and effect that provokes war as well. Osama bin Laden’s 9/11 attack was lauded by al Qaida as an effective assault upon the United States. But America’s unanticipated military offensive in Afghanistan proffered the logistical opportunity to fight a war on two fronts. Osama bin Laden’s claim to fame was short-lived as his reckless misadventure was the impetus that changed the face of Middle East politics. However, Middle East politics in general and the Iraqi conflict in particular can be traced to Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It is from this vantage point that the researcher will examine six fundamental socio-economic and socio-political factors that provoked war in the Middle East. These six trends are: 1. The violent persona of
Saddam Hussein; 2. The ongoing saga of unseating President Hussein from power; 3. The effects of United Nations sanctions on the Iraqi WMD program and its effect upon the Iraqi civic infrastructure and morale; 4. Alliances, coalitions and the discord among the United Nations Security Council; 5. The complex issues regarding Iraqi oil and its effect on coalition unity, and 6. The search for weapons of mass destruction. Within this context, elite state actor intentions and motives for war and its affect upon regional and international stability can be more clearly discerned.

6.3 Saddam Hussein and Middle East Politics

The western caricature of President Hussein was the result of an embittered and contested force of wills between Saddam Hussein and the U.S. government since Operation Desert Shield/Storm until his subsequent execution. President Hussein was portrayed as a psychopath, a demented adventurer, bent on destruction regardless the cost. While President Hussein’s decision-making process was pitted by sporadic miscalculations and an overriding national pride. Saddam was a studious politician that understood the power of mass media, the pivotal role of centralized authority and the advantages of positive public projections to establish his long-term leadership. His embittered resentment of the West, fueled by the Arab folklore of the godless crusades, nineteenth century imperialism, colonial expansionism, and his pro-Soviet socialist platform, which incited constant friction with the West in Middle East politics, instilled an underlying hatred to anyone or anything that would incite foreign interference in Arab culture, tradition and politics (Hilsman 1992, pp. 235, 236).

Saddam Hussein’s obsessive nationalism and his ardent love for Babylonian folklore “gave him a number of incarnations to adopt, such as Hammurabi the Law-giver, Saladin, King Faisal I” and the famed King Nebuchadnezzar II, lauded as the king of the golden empire (see Daniel 2), who ruled from 605–563 B.C.E. (Simpson 2003, pp. 20, 21), inspired President Hussein with a longing to reinstate Iraq as the predominate power, the undisputed hegemon among the consort of Arab state actors. The history of the United States is relatively short. Its ascendency to world power is astonishing. However, contemporary western tradition overlooks those ancient cultures that rose to power from Mesopotamia, the cradle of civilization. Egypt, neo-Babylon (Iraq), and Medo-Persia (Iran) have left their mark on ancient civilization. Contemporary state actors rooted in ancient tradition and folklore is deemed outmoded, yet, have a sense of national pride and longevity of culture and statehood that the West cannot fully comprehend or appreciate. This is the case for Iraq (neo-Babylon). Such names as Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin and Faisal I are lauded in sacral rite and history. Their memories incite glory and power; the prestige of bygone days when Babylon was the shining light of civilization. Hussein’s national pride mingled with the fact that Mesopotamia is considered the cradle of civilization was a determining factor that fueled his obstinate challenge against the U.S.-lead Coalition. However, Roger Hilsman suggests: “Saddam Hussein’s ambition is great, but it is realistic in the sense that his most grandiose dream has probably been to become the head of a unified Arab world, rather than the conqueror or an empire beyond that world” (Hilsman 1992, p. 229). President Hussein understood the limits of his power on the global stage and played to a larger degree to the predispositions of his Arab neighbors, but was generally feared, rather than distinguished as a unifying force in Arab politics.

Hilsman points out that President Hussein “clearly has a Hobbesian view of life. The world is one of all against all. It is a violent and hostile world, one in which the will to self-preservation rules. Life is a ceaseless struggle to survive. Hussein clearly would heartily agree with Hobbes’ description of life as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’” (Hilsman 1992, p. 230). Hussein’s volatile temperament, his natural distrust to any potential rivals, his constant alertness to suppress internal discord, his quest for absolute power, and his brutish punishment toward any and all who challenged his authority was an indigenous mindset, the cyclic personification of past dictators, in a volatile region that had seen its share of political upheaval. However, it was his inclination to utilize chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran War and on the rebellious Kurdish population within his country that unsettled the West. Defensive or offensive uses of chemical weaponry are odious to the West and condemned in international law. It was disturbing among the international community that President Hussein’s natural inclination to use
chemical weapons to safeguard Iraqi sovereignty and without remorse or concern for international law. This aspect of his personality, the all or nothing at all, or success at all costs; a dictator that would stop at nothing to maintain his power and suppress his internal and external rivals, with a potential arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, posed a problem to the United States and the world. The U.S. lead Coalition was convinced that his obtaining of WMD would threaten U.S. assets abroad and their allies in the region, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. It appeared that the ambitious despot could only be dealt with by military force in order to thwart his ambition to control the riches of Middle East oil.

It takes a lifetime to develop character, but only a fleeting careless action to malign a reputation. President Hussein’s reputation as a careless adventurist, a “ruthless pragmatism” (Hilsman 1992, p. 233), was set and sealed by western global opinion. As soon as President Hussein invaded Kuwait, the incursion was branded, consigned to damnation by the western powers, destined to the ongoing assaults of western propaganda, legal enactments, and ultimately a disgraceful fall from power. The rise and fall of nations and their leaders is as old as history itself. But the manner in which Saddam Hussein met his own demise is a foreboding testament of elite state actor reaction to a potential threat to the international political economy on the one hand and upbraiding elite state actor authority on the other.

The path to war often takes a circuitous route; the tension between Iraq (Babylon) and Iran (Medo-Persia) is as old as civilization itself. Throughout history these two rival powers have constantly vied for hegemonic supremacy. After President Hussein’s ascendency to power, Iranian fundamentalist sought to purge the Middle East from secular and western influences. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait were targeted by Iran to disrupt and if possible topple their representative regimes. Efraim Karsh states:

Iraq suffered from a special subversive effort, whereby the Iranians sought to topple the Ba’ath regime, headed since July 1979 by Saddam Hussein . . . They urged the Iraqi people to rise against their government; supported the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq and underground Shi’ite movements; and they launched terrorist attacks against prominent Iraqi officials. When these pressures eventually led to the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980, Khomeini wholeheartedly embraced ‘the imposed war’ as a means of consolidating his regime and furthering its influence throughout the region (Karsh 2003, p. 11).

The Iranian hostility toward the Ba’ath party exploded into a brutal conflict between these two ancient foes. The Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988) was the personification of brutality and carnage. Whether President Hussein’s utilization of chemical weapons was a defensive necessity to turn the tide of war is debatable (Karsh, Navias & Sabin 1993, p. 36). The fact is Hussein used whatever means available to safeguard Iraqi sovereign territory. The cessation of the Iran-Iraq War was a moral victory of sorts for Iraq depending upon one’s point of view; however, neither side completed its military objectives. The “three-quarters of a million casualties—of which perhaps one-third were Iraqi’s”, took its toll upon the heart-rending displacement of families, but territorial lines essentially remained the same as before (Bin, Hill & Jones 1998, p. 2). The war for Iraq devastated its economic infrastructure, gravely retarded its quality of living standards, and endangered Iraq’s oil revenue, its primary source of income to offset economic depression. President Hussein was desperate and needed immediate income to offset debts and inflation that was destabilizing the Iraqi economy. This was the crux of the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict and the growing tension between Saddam Hussein and the Arab league (OPEC).

President Hussein was unable to pay off his wartime debt. A sizable portion of the debt was owed to Kuwait, which economically subsidized and provided logistical support to Iraq during the war, but Kuwait was unwilling to forgive Iraq’s wartime debt. The churlish response by Kuwait infuriated President Hussein, who felt justified to request the cancelation of the wartime loan in lieu of the collateral damage suffered during the war – a war that defended the interests of the Arab league as well. Wartime debt and diplomatic tensions between the neighboring countries eventually embittered the former allies. President Hussein accused Kuwait of slant drilling and vehemently condemned OPEC for driving down the price of oil, which weakened the dollar per barrel ratio and his ability to handle the ensuing debt crises (Watson 1995, p. 156).
A few months after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, OPEC granted Iraq a production quota equal to that of Iran, which amounted both to a political maximum (a higher quota would not have been acceptable to Tehran) and an economic minimum (Baghdad could not export as much as possible). But the second of Iraq’s key economic conditions (a high price for oil) was at the mercy of the two Gulf countries—the UAE and Kuwait—whose leaders couldn’t resign themselves, it seemed, to the discipline required by OPEC for balancing supply and demand and stabilizing the price of crude. Kuwait, in particular, represented a major source of concern. . . . Nothing, it seemed could control Kuwait’s oil production . . . (Bin, Hill & Jones 1998, p. 10; cf., Saddam’s gulf of threats, 1990, p. 39).

The tension between Iraq, the UAE and Kuwait was irredeemable. On July 17, 1990, President Hussein threatened war with UAE and Kuwait. By August 2, 1990, at “0200 the Iraqi Hammurabi Armored and Tawakalna Mechanized Division (Republican Guard) easily overrun a Kuwaiti brigade guarding the border and invade Kuwait. . . . At 0530 the battle for Kuwait City begins, and by 1400 is over” (Hutchison 1995, p. 1). On August 6, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 condemned the invasion of Kuwait and demanded economic sanctions. On August 9, the UN Security Council Resolution 662 denounced the invasion as an illegal action (Hitchison 1995, pp. xv, 4). By August 23, Saddam Hussein officially reinstated Kuwait as part of Iraq, or “the re-establishment’ of the 19th province of Iraq” (Hutchison 1995, p. 19). Saddam’s unwillingness to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait initiated Operation Desert Shield a “215-day logistics war” (Menarchik 1993, p. xiii), a rapid, mega logistical achievement, which according to General Colin Powell was “one of the largest and most successful deployment operations in our nation’s history” (Hutchison 1995, p. xiv). Hutchison states that “Logistics affects military strategy, military strategy affects grand strategy, and grand strategy affects political outcomes. It raises important issues for America’s security policy in the post-Cold War and is worthy of leadership interest to ensure America’s logistics is in order” (Hutchison 1995, p. xiv). This would prove true when President George W. Bush would finally conclude the ongoing saga with President Hussein, a process that his father was politically impeded to complete because his administration was bound by the promise that the “‘multi-national’ force was there for deterrent and defensive purposes only” (Aggressors go home, 1990, p. 20).

The thought of President Hussein monopolization of the Middle East oil trade was unacceptable by the West and the OPEC members. His invasion in Kuwait also posed an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and Israel (Hutchison 1995, p. 36). However, Saddam Hussein realized the inability of his armed forces to defeat the U.S.-lead Coalition; his next move was political survival at home. From February 22-24, 1991, Iraq embarked upon a scorched-earth policy destroying as many Kuwaiti oil wells as possible. By February 23 over 450 Kuwaiti oil wells were set ablaze (Hitchison 1995, pp. 118, 121; cf., Fire and water, 1991, p. 26). On February 24, U.S.-lead Coalition forces routed the Iraqi military. The astounding rapidity of Operation Desert Storm is referred to as the “100-hour ground offensive” (Jaques 2007, p. 298). This humiliating defeat only emboldened Saddam Hussein’s hatred of the United States and its allies. It would set the stage for a perennial stand-off between the United States and Iraq.

President Hussein has been characterized as a ruthless and brutal tyrant and is considered a skilled manipulative pragmatist with a predatory mindset. Hussein was overtly accepting but trusted no one and was the personification of vindictiveness when cheated. Hussein had a Hobbesian world-view and coveted power and was arrogant and bold; defiant and courageous; flamboyant but insecure; calculating but somewhat adventurous. The West denounced him as a demented psychotic, the ‘embodiment of evil’. Indeed the world is a safer place without him. However the world may judge Mr. Hussein’s persona, it appeared that Saddam Hussein was a normal despotic dictator who simply despised America, and utterly miscalculated the U.S. response to his invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein was the symbolic fixture of evil in the West, while heralded as a cult hero among some Islamic jihadists and anti-American factions, but like his despotic predecessors before him, sealed his legacy in bloodshed.

President Hussein challenged American global authority, and his one careless misadventure transformed the face of global politics. It is within this framework that an investigation of his constant
friction with the U.S. is one of several issues that provoked his impending fall from power. The political intrigue leading-up to his trial and subsequent execution is a complex maze of power, animosity and jingoistic egotism. But international politics is not a one sided affair. Operation Iraqi Freedom was the culmination of years of distrust with the western powers and the visages of Cold War suspicion. The escalating tensions between the United States and Iraq, the escalating tensions between three presidential administrations and Mr. Saddam Hussein, mandated an irreconcilable situation that was pitted with suspicion, distrust and hatred. Mr. Hussein’s imprudent saber rattling; his surreptitious persona; his brutal vindictiveness; his blatant threats and his crimes against humanity personify the adage “for all who take the sword will perish by the sword” (Mt 26: 52, NRSV).

President Hussein challenged and defied the United States and its allies that had an invested interest in the oil reserves in the Middle East. The tension between Hussein and the Arab league on the one hand and strained relations with the Soviet Union on the other isolated the proud dictator. There is always a turning point that provokes distrust and eventually war. The invasion of Kuwait was in effect the definitive end of international trust and eventually initiated his fall from power.

6.4 The United States vs. Saddam Hussein

President George H. W. Bush (1989 – 1993) presumed that an immediate rebellion would ensue after Saddam Hussein’s humiliating defeat. America took a risk that the Gulf War would “spell the end of Saddam Hussein” (After the storm, 1991, p. 24),1 hoping that an internal uprising would depose the Iraqi dictator. However, such optimism overlooked Saddam’s centralized infrastructure that solidified his power. In the passing of time the allied victory was overshadowed by Saddam Hussein’s uncanny ability of “clinging to power” – the allied forces realized that their Gulf War victory was a short-lived celebration (Iraq’s atomic enigma, 1991, p. 39). It was reported in The Economist that the . . . world is waiting for Mr. Hussein to fall, but it has failed to take two things into account. Saddam Hussein is back in dictatorial form, and his people are exhausted by war, terror and shortages. After the horror of suffering that followed the rebellions in north and south, the people are easy to contain. They feel betrayed by America, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which urged them, over the radio, to rise in revolt. Now they are hungry and tired. Prices are out of sight, people spend all they have got, and not got, on food, leaving little time or energy to think of throwing out a dictator (Master of his universe, 1991, p.40).

President Bush utilized sanctions to impoverish and humiliate Iraq in the hope to depose Saddam Hussein (Desert storm in a teacup, 1991, p. 48; cf., Oil for food, 1991, p. 52; Going in, 1992, p. 34). President Bush openly supported nationwide insurgencies and United Nations sanctions to topple the Iraqi dictator, but such efforts faltered as Saddam Hussein clung to power by securing Ba’ath party allegiance. An appropriate summation of the West’s ongoing policy states that the “flaw in the West’s policy, according to one thoughtful diplomat, is that it has failed to get an encouraging message across to the Iraq people; it has not sent the signal that it will help them if Saddam Hussein goes. ‘People Fear,’ says this envoy, ‘that whoever rules the country, the approach of hostile outside world will be the same’” (A short, not very sharp, punch, 1993, p. 34).

President Bill Clinton (1993–2001), a Democrat, represented a changing of the guard but continued the strong-arm tactics against Saddam Hussein. The United States and the United Nation’s inability to enforce UN arm’s and nuclear weapons inspections made it clear that force not diplomacy would deter Mr. Hussein’s ambitions. President Clinton, like his predecessor, openly plotted to overthrow

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1 The tenuous nature of international politics that ‘today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy’ aptly applies to U.S.-Iraq relations after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States’ support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War was slighted when President Hussein annexed Kuwait: “A miscalculation that makes the American response harder is that, until a short time ago, the United States was treating Mr. Saddam Hussein as something of a friend, backing him is his war against Iran, forgiving his transgressions. No longer” (Goodbye Kuwait, 1990, p. 30).
Saddam Hussein’s regime (Between storms in Iraq, 1998, p. 49). The Economist reiterated the frustration between the U.S. and the Iraqi dictator: “No one can be sure how, or when, Mr. Hussein will leave office. He could be thrown out tomorrow, or hang on, as Fidel Castro has in Cuba, to infuriate American presidents for years to come” (Desperate foxes, 1998, p. 17). President Clinton’s Iraqi policy consisted of two crucial elements, ‘containment and regime change’ (Hiro 2001, p. 167).

The resurging tensions between the U.S. and the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein’s obstruction to further cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors, and the Clinton Administration’s weak and blurred foreign policy objectives in the Middle East prompted Operation Desert Fox, an intensive U.S.-British four day bombing campaign from December 16 to 19, 1998, which pinpointed selected Iraqi conventional and nuclear sites. The Clinton Administration’s show of force was a reminder to Mr. Hussein that the U.S. could strike with impunity and would continue to dictate terms in the Middle East with or without the support of the United Nations Security Council or the approval of their Arab allies (Hiro 2001, pp. 163-167). Even though Desert Fox was criticized by Russia, China and the Arab league, President Clinton maintained his objective to “contain” but not ridding the world (yet) of Saddam Hussein through diplomacy, economic sanctions, and military force” (Campbell & Rockman 2000, p. 233). However, Clinton’s unilateral airstrike caused a rift among UN Security Council members, primarily Russia, China and France on the one hand and public criticism from Arab allies on the other. Further allegations that UNSCOM was infiltrated with the U.S. intelligence apparatus further complicated relations with the UN Security Council signifying a major rift between the U.S. and marginal allies as well (Hiro 2001, p. 164). President Clinton’s actions signified a departure from his engagement policy and the initial step toward a U.S. unilateral approach to the Iraqi regime. Ironically, President Clinton’s impeachment hearing set for the 17th was postponed until further notice, dubbing Desert Fox as a political rather than strategic campaign. Nonetheless, when questioned about the action taken against Iraq, Clinton stated: “We will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq . . . and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people” (Bombing in a quicksand, 1998, p. 65).

Like President Bush, who enlisted the Kurd’s and Shia’s to revolt against Saddam Hussein immediately after Desert Storm; President Clinton also encouraged the Iraqi people to rise in revolt against the Ba’athist regime. Within days after Desert Fox, news of an attempted coup in late January by “two generals-Lt. Gen. Kamil Sajit, a Sunni from Falluja, and Gen. Yelechin Omar, an ethnic Turkoman from Kirkuk—who inducted five other senior officers” was eventually discovered by the Saddam regime and immediately arrested. The primary conspirators were “executed in early March, and their bodies delivered to their families” (Hiro 2001, p. 167). Despite further efforts by the Clinton Administration to contain and depose Saddam Hussein, the resilient dictator maintained a firm grip upon the controls of power, which further exasperated the western alliance.

President George W. Bush (2001 – 2009), the son of former President George H. W. Bush, entered the oval office with a civilian agenda emphasizing education and economic expansion, but 9/11 altered his political agenda. An unforeseeable threat to U.S. national security loomed upon the horizon of western civilization – jihadist fundamentalism. This fanatical militant terrorist reaction to U.S. power and global influence was inspired by Osama bin Laden (1957 – 2011), the leader of al Quida, a sophisticated and determined terrorist organization. United States foreign policy shifted into a wartime mindset determined to take the offensive by engaging the enemy in its in conspicuous location – Afghanistan. It was a war like no other, a war without boundaries, faces without state actor identity. The monumental strategy that turned the tide to fight a war on two fronts was President Bush’s policy that state actors that supported terrorist activities would be considered an enemy of the United States – no longer could terrorist hide within the shadows of the desert, cloaked in the devious garb of jihad; the West was unwilling to compromise until victory was assured.

While the war on terror raged, the gnawing, frustrating friction with the Iraqi regime continued, like a recurring nightmare, Saddam Hussein reappeared on the international stage waging his war of words and blatant insults at the United States and its coalition alliance. The fate of war is an enigmatic maze of political intrigue and coincidence. While commentators have forced a connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, such appraisals are groundless; the only common-ground
between the two was a passionate hatred of the West in general and the United States in particular. Saddam Hussein was threatened by fanatical fundamentalism. Its incultation into Iraqi society would incite civic unrest and shred the Ba’ath party from power. However, the 9/11 attack and the subsequent deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan enabled the U.S. military a strategic situation to contend in two war zones in order to eliminate the Middle East and the world of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

After 9/11 the Bush Administration reformulated its foreign policy objectives. By the “course of the spring of 2002 the president began to fill out the doctrine that lay behind his ‘axis of evil’ declaration. Issued as the National Security Strategy in September 2002, this formal statement endorsed military preemption as a legitimate strategy” (Zelizer 2010, p. 76). Efforts were made to rally support from exiled Iraqi dissidents. Exiled Iraqi opposition leaders provided two documents: “One described principles for the creation of a democratic state.’ The other outlined a two-year period of transition between the ousting of Mr. Hussein and the establishment of constitutional rule” (Saddam’s would be successors, 2002, p. 57). The exiled Iraqi’s objective to depose Saddam Hussein was more than a rhetorical acclamation; America was willing to “release $92m of long-promised funds to finance the groups, and will provide military training for up to 10,000 exiles. And its preparations for war continue, remorselessly” (Saddam’s would be successors, 2002, p. 57). It was apparent to the Bush Administration that regime change was only possible through military force. The constant war of words, sanctions, no-fly zone enforcement and hopes for a revolution by the people and for the people was never going to materialize. The escalating military build-up of U.S. and coalition troops on Iraq’s southern flank on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey’s qualified consent for U.S. access to their facilities on the other was an omen of destruction. The Economist stated that “Few outside America relish the idea of watching a wounded country being mauled by a superpower, but just about everyone would like to see Iraq’s dictator depart” (The contradictions of a crisis, 2003, p. 45).

Throughout the ever-increasing conflict between the United States and Saddam Hussein, America endeavored to undermine, intimidate and remove Mr. Hussein from power by inciting internal insurrection among the Kurd’s and Shia’s, disgruntled military personnel and religious leaders. The hope of moving the masses to depose Saddam Hussein failed. These futile efforts overlooked Mr. Hussein’s will to survive, his savvy political maneuvering, and his centralized power and authority in the Ba’athist regime. Three presidential administrations attempted to wash their hands by hoping to dethrone the Iraqi dictator from power by internal rebellion, but all efforts were destined to failure culminating in the most undesirable scenario, a unilateral action by the United States to declare war on Iraq. By the time George W. Bush entered office, the situation between Mr. Hussein and the United States was irreconcilable. The burning embers of distrust and suspicion, impatience and animosity ignited an unavoidable conflict that would alter the ideological-political map of the Middle East.

Three United States presidential administrations, representative of both Republican and Democratic traditions, pursued a similar course of action, the determination to humiliate and depose Saddam Hussein from power. Throughout the conflict between the United States and Iraq, Mr. Hussein’s permanent demise was the one consistent foreign policy objective that united republicans and democrats. The constant barrage of U.S. pressure to instigate internal insurgency, UN sanctions, and no-fly zones were calculated to economically and politically disrupt, degrade and dishonor Saddam Hussein. Only when Mr. Hussein was deposed could the United States modify and affect Middle East foreign policy in order to secure regional stability in one the most volatile regions in the world. However, 9/11 was the turning point, the determining factor that determined the fate Mr. Hussein. Osama bin Laden’s attack upon U.S. soil instilled U.S. determination to take the offensive against bin Laden in Afghanistan and ultimately depose the Iraqi despot.

The wars against Saddam’s Iraq and Osama bin Laden terrorist network demanded different strategic and tactical strategies, but the common denominator was their elimination from power. Contemporary warfare inculcates economic sanctions, clandestine operations as well as military conventional force. However, in an age of human rights economic sanctions is controversial and amoral depending upon one’s point of view.

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6.5 United Nations Sanctions and the Gulf War

Contemporary warfare is accomplished through economic coercion as well as force of arms. United Nation sanctions are the contemporary counterpart to an ancient siege. Instead of crippling a city, an entire nation can be devastated by economic sanctions. The elite state actor and its respective alliance members can inflict more damage by manipulating and controlling an aggressive state actor’s international trade and finance than direct warfare – in this way, the morale of the people is broken, the natural resources to prolong a war are crippled and the authority of despotic power is destabilized. Cortright, Lopez and Gerber-Stellingwerf state: “United Nations sanctions against Iraq were the longest, most comprehensive, and most controversial in the history of the world body. Although sanctions were criticized for their harmful humanitarian impacts, they were largely successful in achieving Iraq’s disarmament by pressuring the regime to accept grudgingly the UN weapons monitoring mandate” (Weiss & Daws 2008, p. 350).

While the purpose for sanctions was to coerce Saddam Hussein to open all his facilities for UNSCOM inspections, the deprivation of essential goods and services and the effects of comprehensive sanctions devastated the general population, while inflicting extreme misery upon the Iraqi children. Health, nutrition, sanitation, and education were decimated by the after effects of the Gulf war, a definitive breach of the United Nations human rights law and the Geneva Convention. After the first year of sanctions the United States and Britain intended to continue the process; their “plan, in a nutshell is to impoverish and humiliate Iraq until it rids itself of Mr. Hussein” (Desert storm in a teacup, 1991, p. 48). The global challenge to America was the reaction of public opinion to visible signs of widespread suffering inflicted upon ordinary Iraqi citizens; but such visible signs of suffering were contrasted to the ensuing danger of Mr. Hussein’s nuclear ambitions, which overshadowed the plight of the Iraqi people.

The oil for food program was a muddled endeavor to alleviate suffering by managing the distribution of food, medicine and essential goods and services, but western powers thwarted the humanitarian programs (Oil but no food, 1997, pp. 41-42). The Economist described the Iraqi predicament as “singularly punishing” and the “clear losers in this saga are the ordinary citizens” (Saddam does it, again, 1998, pp. 49-50; Between storms in Iraq, 1998, p. 49). The paradoxical effects of UN sanctions is articulated: “But inside Iraq, where almost every family has been touched by tragedy, opinion is united: the impoverishment, the dearth of schoolbooks, the scarcity of basic medicines—all are the fault of a triumphalist America humiliating Iraq after what the Ba’ath Party still calls, without irony, ‘the mother of all battles’” (Playing on the brink, 1998, p. 25). The Economist depicts the deplorable effects of eight years of sanctions in the middle-class town of Al-Hilla, Iraq.

Evidence of their plight is everywhere. In one school, a class of over 60 children crowd into a room a few metres square, sitting on the cold concrete floor. There are no desks. Electric wiring has been taken from the walls, the door from its frame, and the glass from the windows. The deputy principle says teachers do not bother to show up for a salary whose value has been shrunk by inflation since 1991 from $40 to $2 a month. At Al-Hilla, pupils are divided into three shifts of three hours a day each. Most children take an extra three years to finish primary school, even though all subjects save reading, writing and arithmetic have been canceled.

In the city’s main public hospital, the manager greets visitors with elaborate formality. But there is nothing elaborate about the facilities. An oil lamp stands ready by his desk; power cuts are frequent. He used to earn $50 a month; enough, he says, to get married, and buy a house and a car under the Iraq’s subsidized socialist system. Now he earns just $3—not even enough for breakfast each day. . . . A man with both legs broken say there are no pain-killers. Nor is there disinfectant to clean the floor.

Throughout the town, the only businesses that thrive are those auctioning off the televisions and living-room suites of the newly impoverished. The tap-water tastes foul; pregnant women dare not
drink it. Sewage rises in rank pools from broken pipes, rubbish is piling up in repulsive fetid heaps (Surviving sanctions, 1998, p. 53).

After eight years of sanctions, Saddam Hussein remained in power. In fact, the ill-effects of sanctions upon Mr. Hussein’s power-base emboldened his defiance against the West, and perpetuated the rationale that to “abandon sanctions now would be to hand victory to Saddam Hussein and to give him a free hand to build his arsenal of chemical, nuclear, and biological weaponry” (Containing Saddam, 1999, p.19). The psychological effects of sanctions against Iraq were a tour de force, a masterful stroke of military genius, stratagem and tactical advantage. The United Nations enacted over 70 resolutions between 1990 and 2003 to deal with Saddam Hussein; but ultimately their efforts were futile and eventually culminated in Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Iraqi dictator.

It is noteworthy to highlight some of the significant resolutions and comprehend their impact on Iraq, leading-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. On August 2, 1990, R660 condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The rapidity of the international community was amazing, within three days, on August 6, R661 imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq. On August 9, R662 condemned the annexation of Kuwait as “null and void”. This public declaration of Iraq’s illegal access to Kuwait was followed by R665, on August 25, which imposed a shipping blockade to enforce a maritime embargo. On November 29, R678 authorized member states to force Iraq into compliance regarding previous Security Council resolutions by January 15, 1991; the deadline was set, but President Hussein disregarded the UN resolve to enforce Security Council resolutions and U.S.- lead Coalition unanimity (Bin, Hill & Jones 1998, p. 31).

By April 3, 1991, R687 declared a formal cease-fire bringing an end to hostilities; established UNSCOM for WMD inspections and further extended sanctions. The devastating impact of Desert Shield/Storm on the Iraqi industrial and civic infrastructure on the one hand and economic sanctions on the other intensified civilian hardships. The result was a dismantled education system, inoperative sewage plants, food shortages, antiquated drilling equipment and deprivation of essential goods and services. On April 14, 1995, the deplorable civic situation necessitated R986, the oil for food program, which was designed to provide designated billions of dollars for food, medicine and essential commodities for the Iraqi people. This program was monitored by a special UN commission, but from its inception was hindered by corruption and minimal results. Also, the oil for food program was predicated upon the Iraqi regime’s willing cooperation with UN inspectors.

On September 9, 1998, the Iraqi regime refused to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA; this action was condemned by R1194 and would illustrate the ongoing tension between the United Nations, the U.S.-lead Coalition alliance and Saddam Hussein. Mr. Hussein’s refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM exacerbated the Bush Administration’s impatience to resolve the situation by diplomacy, resulting in the call to arms. In March of 2003, R1472 was a proposal by Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom to authorize military action against Iraq. However, joint statements by France, Germany and Russia opposed any UN resolution that authorized military action. On May 22, 2003, R1483 recognized the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers. On October 16, 2003, R1511 stipulated three vital objectives after the occupation of Iraq: 1. To denote the temporary nature of the coalition provisional authority; 2. The development of a constitution and free elections for a transfer of power to the Iraqi people, and 3. The mandate for a multinational security force and the reconstruction of Iraq (UN security council resolutions related to Iraq, n.d.).”

On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously supported R1540, under chapter VII of the United Nations charter, which requires that all state actors are obligated to prevent the proliferation of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as materials that could aid non-state actors from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction (UN Resolution 1540 committee report 2004). The international community was united in its belief that the utmost threat to national and international security was the illicit use of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations and the U.S.-lead Coalition alliance endured over a decade of intense confrontation and on-going debate regarding Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. The physical threat of potential weaponry was not as disturbing as Saddam Hussein’s disposition to use chemical weapons to achieve his military objectives. The fact that President
Hussein, a recognized state actor leader, utilized chemical weapons, which is in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions, was unnerving.

It was evident that a decade of sanctions had failed to depose the Ba’athist regime. Both France and Russia urged the cessation or extensive modification of sanctions because of its failure to topple the government of Saddam Hussein. France and Russia urged that the real victims in this on-going saga were the Iraqi children deprived of food, medicine and proper sanitation. The United States disagreed with this reasoning by pointing out that civilian suffering was attributed to the Iraqi government, and relaxing sanctions would reward the cruel actions of the Ba’athist government.

The plight of the Iraqi populace was detestable and criticized by the international community. In fact, the human rights violations resulting from UN sanctions to thwart further aggression strongly contradicted the very nature and purpose of the United Nations. The end of the Cold War witnessed the insurgence of UN influence in international politics. Even then, an elite state actor such as the United States would wield its influence among the Security Council members and neutral state actors to cooperate or at least be sympathetic to its cause against Saddam Hussein (Hurd 2007, pp. 174-179). Also, the sanctions provided the United States with a tactical military advantage when engaging the Iraqi regime. For over a decade, sanctions stripped the Iraqi people of their dignity and will to resist their western antagonists; it irrevocably reduced Mr. Hussein to a mere shadow of power. The history of the UN sanctions for war-torn Iraq fulfilled its appointed purpose; Saddam Hussein was prevented from obtaining WMD on the one hand while making it clear to the global community that there is a zero-sum tolerance regarding a non-state actor’s desire to obtain such destructive capabilities on the other. But this moral victory was short-lived on account of the failure of the United States to locate any weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, in retrospect the underling objective for sanctions; their demoralizing effect upon the Iraqi people to defend their sovereign territory; their intimidating effects upon a depleted Iraqi military; and their paralyzing effects upon Saddam Hussein leadership, was the determining factor that empowered the United States and UK armed forces a swift conquest of Iraq. It should be noted that UN R678 that initially sanctioned Operation Desert Shield/Storm to defend Kuwait and contain Mr. Hussein was silenced when George W. Bush invaded Iraq. The United Nations was unable to prevent the actions of elite state actor’s political objectives. While UN Security Council members urged the U.S. to wait for UN approval for military action against Iraq, the formation of trust among Security Council members was hindered by distrust, personal ambition and an impatient resolve to depose Iraq of its leader. The stage was set from a ‘just cause’ for war that would degenerate into an invasion/occupation of discontent among competing elite state actor powers competing for scarce resources in the Middle East region.

Throughout the United Nations Security Council proceedings the United States, Russia, China and France continued to disagree on Iraqi foreign policy. The UN sanctions were a conflict of interest among the elite state actors; only war itself would silence the voice of the critics. The unity exemplified during the first Gulf War would eventually deteriorate among the elite state actors. The consequences of their actions would reshape nuclear power policy in the Middle East.

6.6 The Frailty of Alliances, Coalitions and the Two Gulf Wars

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait incited an overwhelming international response. Ultimately, thirty state actors joined a military Coalition alliance against Iraq (Cohen 1993, p. 45). The challenge for George H. W. Bush was to maintain focus and unity among the Coalition members. This was a vital task when considering the diversity of nations participating in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The UN became essential from the first days of the military campaign; its utility enabled the United States to work through the delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union, China, Arab countries and some of its allies. The UN Security Council apparatus required cooperation among the elite state actors to accomplish its military objectives in order to accomplish its mission.

While the Coalition alliance cooperated cautiously and sensibly during the inception of the first Gulf War, ensuing tensions with France, Russia and China would eventually derail the Coalition alliance
and would be a determining factor in the unilateral action of the United States to invade Iraq. The major participant in this scenario was the Soviet Union.

When the Soviet Union joined the international condemnation of Iraq, it seemed to be taking a huge gamble. The Soviet Union was Iraq’s largest arms supplier and in 1972 the two countries had signed a special 20-year friendship treaty. What is more Iraq pays for its Soviet arms with oil, but has fallen behind in its repayments to the tune of 70m barrels of oil. With Russia desperately short of the stuff, antagonizing its former allies in Iraq could prove to be costly (Making up, 1990, p. 54).

Soviet debt complicated by the unavoidable clash of the U.S.-lead Coalition against Iraq on the one hand and Russia’s strategic interest in the Middle Easton the other put the former Cold War antagonists in a politically awkward position. Russia would condemn, denounce and decry the Iraqi regime’s obstinate course, but like France, it was against any resolution that would support the immediate use of military force (Forging a superpower alliance, 1990, p. 37). Russia and France endeavored to prevent war, but UN R678 demanded an ultimatum to President Hussein.

Russia, China and France were reluctant to provoke President Hussein, primarily for economic reasons. Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, made it clear that the “Soviet Union, France . . . and China were now clearly different from the ‘imperialist’ objectives of Britain and America” (War, peace and Mr. Gorbachev’s Arab solution, 1990, p. 46). Even though President Bush was willing to negotiate terms for peace with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the overriding issue was if it would be “safe, whatever happens, to allow Mr. Saddam Hussein and his regime to emerge unscathed, whether the unexpressed war aim, absent from any UN resolution, is not just to free Kuwait but to unseat Mr. Hussein” (Is war receding? 1990, p. 45). While war loomed over the Security Council’s proceedings, President Gorbachev (1985-1991) made it clear that a military solution was unacceptable. When President Hussein declared Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq and exhibited a persistent unwillingness to negotiate a complete withdraw, his fate was sealed, negating any possibility of a peaceful settlement, a “last minute telephone appeal from Mikhail Gorbachev to Mr. Bush for delay was ignored; the UN Security Council abandoned its token efforts to stop war with talk” its over, 1991, p. 24). Nonetheless, just weeks into the bombing campaign, the Soviet’s criticized the relentless bombing campaign and gave assurances that if Mr. Hussein withdrew from Kuwait, it would support the “sanctity of Iraq’s own borders, promise to veto any attempt to impose penalties on Iraq, including any trial of Mr. Hussein himself, and commits itself to helping to arrange a subsequent international discussion on regional issues” (Waging an invisible war, 1991, p. 17; Waiting for Aziz, 1991, p. 21).

The unforeseen demise of the Soviet Empire, established the United State as the dominant world power. The rise of uncontested American global influence was a staggering blow to the Kremlin. Boris Yeltzin (June 1991 – December 1999) came to power with high expectations among his countrymen to immediately remedy the economic and political issues that plagued Russia; however, the Russian Federation was economically depleted because of constant economic and political instability on the one hand and Yeltzin’s quest to restore the break-away Republic, Chechnya under Moscow’s control on the other. Moscow’s preoccupation with Chechnya and a staggering economic debt limited its diplomatic influence. Yeltzin was criticized by the West for “selling arms and even nuclear components to Iran, opposing the embargo against Iraq, and entering into negotiations with countries like Libya. It was overlooked by the critics that those countries had substantial foreign debts to the Soviet Union, which Russia hoped to collect” (Felkay 2002, p. 246). Moscow’s waning power prevented it from preventing American military ambitions against Iraq. Nonetheless, the massive Iraqi debt to Russia and the luring attraction of Iraqi oil to repay that debt emboldened Russia to contest any unilateral actions by the West against Iraq. Only when Vladimir Putin was reassured by the United States that Russia would not be excluded from Iraqi oil rights, would it disregard Saddam Hussein’s demise. Bobo Lo reiterates the point that the “Putin administration has adopted a flexible stance on behalf of Russian oil interests in Iraq. . . .
in the event of regime change in Iraq, Russian economic interests are not prejudiced for political (or indeed any other) reasons” (Lo 2003, p. 63).

The predominant regional military organization since its inception has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was established in 1949 to provide regional security from Soviet military aggression. NATO membership has expanded over the years, but its original membership consisted of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the United States. However, France and Spain have remained politically and militarily independent. Early in the history of NATO’s inception President Charles de Gaulle protested the United States’ dominant role in the alliance; France disagreed on the mission of NATO especially in Asia, and pointed out the dynamic changes in the Cold War, especially the Soviets sputnik program. President de Gaulle initiated an independent nuclear arsenal, withdrew its military forces from NATO, and France has independently assisted NATO when it is advantageous or the situation necessitates its cooperation (see Kaplan 2004, pp. 29-55). France’s independent political and military policies in regards to the NATO alliance clarified its ‘official and unofficial’ response to the U.S.-lead Coalition in Iraq. Such an approach illustrates France’s motives for supporting sanctions and a no-fly zone, yet criticizing U.S. military action in the region. France was able to palliate Mr. Hussein without acquiescing to his demands. In July of 1991, France was awarded the largest Iranian offshore field that could “produce 100,000 b/d—in affect an old-style concession because the French company is financing, developing and marketing the field and its oil” (Oil’s new world order, 1991, p. 64). The French (along with Russia and China) continued to challenge U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, the French were supportive of the American and British no-fly zone in the southern part of Iraq when it enhanced their political objectives, even though the no-fly zone policy was not mandated by the United Nations Security Council (Going in, 1992, p. 34). The vacillating French disposition regarding U.S.-lead Coalition agendas and UN sanctions provoked a considerable amount of negative feedback among NATO members. It illustrates the autonomous nature of state actor self-interest when contending over economic, political and scarce resource issues among nations.

When the United States wanted to enforce a travel ban on Iraqi officials for blocking UNSCOM inspections, it was France, Russia and China among the permanent members that abstained to vote (Deep waters, 1997, p. 55). These three permanent members each had motives for forgoing U.S. demands on Iraq.

Cracks in the council’s consensus on Iraq were evident before the latest stand-off. China, France and Russia have long argued that some prospect of an easing of sanctions should be held out to Mr. Hussein in order to encourage his compliance with UNscom’s task. China, supplier of rogue weapons to many a rogue regime, cares little for UNscom’s task. Russia, desperate to recover the debts it is owed by Iraq and to resume trade, needs sanctions to be lifted first. France is eyeing greedily the huge oil and other contracts that will then follow” (That man again, 1997, p. 17).

Throughout the U.S.-Iraq stand-off, there was a steady decline of support among the original charter members that ousted strongman Hussein from Kuwait. The continued discontent among France, Russia and China disillusioned attitudes among some Coalition alliance members. We should not be surprised; throughout the history of the state system, the fragility of alliances and security coalitions exemplifies the dominant nature of state actor sovereignty, state actor geopolitical interests and state actor grand strategic objectives. Essentially the advantages of alliances, which best secures respective economic and national security objectives is eventually derailed by collective self-interest. The adage, ‘today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy’ or the ‘friend of my enemy is my friend’ are not trite motifs, but the state of human affairs in an intense competitive world order. The predominate issues that provoked the two Gulf Wars were the oil rich deposits of the Middle East and weapons of mass destruction. All underlying friction; Saddam Hussein’s bellicose mindset, the United States’ subversive attempts to oust the Iraqi leader, the intensification and destructive force of sanctions, and the deteriorating relationships among the U.S.-lead Coalition members hinged upon economic necessity and nuclear weaponry. These two fundamental issues
incited distrust and competition among elite state actors would eventually restructure U.S. objectives in the Middle East.

The tensions between elite state actors during the two Gulf Wars eventually frustrated the effectiveness of the United Nations to manage the Security Council members and prevent war. Once again, the autonomous and independent nature of the state actor was prevalent during the turbulent thirteen years siege between the West and Iraq. The demoralizing economic and political effects of UN sanctions, the broken will of the Iraqi people and a depleted power base of the Ba’athist party facilitated the survivability of the U.S.-lead Coalition alliance without the support of France, Russia and China. The unprecedented capability of the United States to unilaterally act upon its foreign policy objectives was a disturbing recollection to the former Soviet power that once brandished the spotlight of hegemonic dominance. The present sovereign state actor within a multipolar state system is an era of fragile alliances, but the United States resolve to maintain its unilateral power and prestige reminded ally and adversary alike that in the world of power politics, its authority and dominance was not to be challenged if its national and international security is endangered.

The gradual disintegration and support of UN Security Council members and Coalition allies on the one hand and oil incentives on the other were the turning point in the U.S. lead invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration recognized that its influence among NATO was diminishing and feared a resurgent Saddam Hussein, which would permanently obscure Middle East politics.

6.7 Saddam Hussein, Oil and Alliances

Security coalitions and alliances have been an ancient and modern requisite for warfare. The frantic attempt of Sparta to thwart Athenian economic expansion divided the Greek city-states. The Delian league and Peloponnesian league redefined ancient and modern warfare. The Holy Alliance of 1815 was developed after the Napoleonic war, the leadership of Czar Alexander I of Russia united Austria, Prussia and Russia to curtail the spirit of revolution and secularism in Europe that threatened monarchical power. The Allied alliance would defeat the Axis powers during the Second World War, crushing Hitlerism in Europe and setting the stage for a new world order. The Cold War witnessed a U.S.-Soviet stand-off that continued from 1945 to 1991, which redefined power politics in the nuclear age. Stephen M. Walt defines an “alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. This definition assumes some level of commitment and an exchange of benefits for both parties; severing the relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost something, even if it were compensated in other ways” (Walt 1987, p. 1). The U.S.-Coalition alliance was Saddam Hussein’s perennial challenge, the constant international friction between the U.S.-lead Coalition and Iraq determined Mr. Hussein’s tactics to destabilize the UN Security Council and the U.S.-Coalition alliance by providing oil incentives to vacillating UN Security Council members and Coalition allies.

Saddam Hussein’s ambition for hegemonic dominance in the oil rich Middle East was thwarted by the United States for several reasons. President Hussein was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union. The Soviet/Russian government maintained diplomatic ties with Iraq because of a friendship treaty and massive Iraqi debt of Soviet arms sales and Russia’s desperate need to reclaim reimbursement of that debt through the bartered payment of Iraqi oil. The Soviet-Iraq relationship also provided Russia with a strategic political foothold in the Middle East. The Soviet/Russian government never utilized their armed forces in either Operation Desert Shield/Storm or Operation Iraqi freedom. The Cold War was over in theory, but diplomatic tensions between America and Russia continued to influence vital foreign policy objectives as the United States assumed unprecedented global power. The visages of Soviet influence in the Middle East would gradually dissipate as America substituted Soviet socialism with the American democratic tradition in Iraq.

Likewise it was recognized that President Hussein’s fixation to monopolize OPEC would destabilize the international political economy. The vast Iraqi oil fields could categorically satisfy global demand and replace Saudi Arabia as the preeminent international oil exporter. Mr. Hussein’s animosity
toward the United States elicited a desperate policy objective to weaken U.S. power in the region by providing Iraqi oil enticements to coalition members. Mr. Hussein’s stratagem to incite friction among coalition allies by offering lucrative oil concessions and take advantage of former Cold War rivalries, especially within the UN Security Council, gradually dismantled unity among U.S.-Coalition allies as well. The United States was losing its influence among the broad Coalition alliance and forfeiting its authority within NATO as it continued to pressure the alliance to overthrow the Ba’athist regime. John W. Schoen reported that the “list of countries with an interest in Iraq’s oil industry is long—at least 31 companies from 21 countries have had talks in one form or another with Saddam Hussein about developing Iraq’s oil fields once sanctions were lifted. Russia and France, vocal opponents of U.S. military effort to topple Saddam, top the list. The former regime also cast widely the promise of lucrative oil contracts to smaller countries—from Algeria to Vietnam” (What agreements were made between Saddam Hussein and foreign companies for access to Iraq’s oil? n.d.).

Saddam Hussein used oil as a political weapon to garner support from any state actor that would rally to his side. His hope to impede a U.S. invasion of Iraq was predicated upon dissent among coalition and UN Security Council members and international sympathy toward his cause. For example, after a devastating earthquake, Turkey was extended a gift of $10m-worth of oil, a gesture that was designed to make it harder for “Turkey to condone the use of its bases for American and British air strikes” (Charming, 1999, pp. 55, 56). Also, leading firms of key U.S. allies such as Totalfinaelf of France, Eni of Italy and Repsol YPF of Spain signed bilateral agreements to secure Iraqi oil. Russian oil contractor Tatneft, a subsidiary of Zarubezhneft “secured oil concessions worth up to $90 billion”. Also, politically important countries such as France’s Total, and other national oil companies from China and India sought oil concessions from Mr. Hussein as well. Even Royal Dutch/Shell, an Anglo-Dutch oil and gas conglomerate headquartered at The Hague, Netherlands with a registered office in London, England sought drilling agreements with Saddam Hussein. The most impressive arrangement however was with the Russian oil giant, Lukoil, which secured drilling rights in the coveted West Quran oil field estimated at “11 billion barrels of oil” (Saddam’s charmed offensive, 2002, pp. 61-62). The international community eagerly anticipated the cessation of UN sanctions against Iraq. The vast riches of Iraqi oil blinded ally and rival alike as the international community coveted the liberal concessions of the Hussein regime. However, the most intriguing aspect of the oil concessions was the covert negotiations between France, Russia, China and Saddam Hussein. When sources exposed France’s Total SA and Elf Aquitaine’s undisclosed negotiations with Mr. Hussein, the political duplicity between France and Iraq was angrily criticized by the West. According to Kenneth R. Timmerman, the French-Iraq connection was worth an “estimated $100 billion over a seven year period”. This would give France “exclusive production-sharing contracts with Saddam’s regime that were intended to give them a stranglehold on Iraq’s future oil production for decades to come” (Timmerman 2004). The French had a lot to gain by keeping Mr. Hussein in power. Accusations that the French government had purposely undermined the UN Security Council by their constant criticism of UN sanctions and the U.S. foreign policy objective to topple Hussein’s regime in order to retain their oil concessions were widespread. Timmerman asserted that the “French did not merely disagree with the United States over Iraq, as did a certain number of our allies: They actively sought to rally world leaders and public opinion to treat the United States—not Saddam Hussein—as the enemy” (Timmerman 2004). Timmerman’s overreaction was representative of many in the west who loathed French independence during the Iraqi crisis. However, this situation also signaled the fragile state of affairs between the United States and France; it reinforced the realization that French duplicity and independence go hand and hand. The French were true to form, but their actions were representative of a growing consensus among Coalition members that detested U.S. unilateral decision-making in the Middle East region.

Also, tensions mounted as Russia continued to contract oil rights with the Iraqi government. Throughout the history of Russian-Iraq relations, a number of agreements from 1969-1971 were tendered to the Soviet Union and other Eastern Socialist bloc nations to develop the Iraqi oil industry. Vladimir Rogov states:

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In April 1972, with assistance from the USSR, the first stages were started up of the oil field in Northern Rumaila, with production of up to 5 million tons of year, and in 1974—of the second stage, with a productivity of up to 18 million tons. In this same period, in 1973, one of the world’s biggest oil fields, West Qurna-2, was discovered. The geological exploration of this field (2D seismic and drilling of exploration wells) was performed by Soviet geologists and service organizations. For a long time, development of the field was put off, largely owing to the military actions in which Iraq became involved in the 1980’s, the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and subsequent UN economic sanctions.

In anticipation of the sanctions being lifted at the end of the 1990s, companies from Russia, China and France signed a series of oil contracts with Saddam Hussein’s government. One of the key contracts related to the West Qurna-2; in 1997, LUKOIL, Zarubezhneft and Mashino import signed an agreement on comprehensive development of the giant West Qurna-2 oil field. Under the project, all sorts of work permissible within the bounds of the UN resolution, the partners did not launch actual field development. Saddam Hussein’s government cancelled this agreement in 2002, referring to the absence of active work on the project (ROGTEC n.d.).

France, Russia and China endeavored to secure oil concessions from Saddam Hussein, while excluding the United States from the rich reservoir of Iraqi oil. The idea that competing state actors had access to Iraqi oil while sidelining the United States was unconceivable. Saddam Hussein was determined to isolate the U.S. from its allies and deny the American oil industry any access to its oil reserves. But Saddam once again underestimated U.S. military power and resolve. The looming question that haunted America was the precarious consequences of a resurrected and revitalized Saddam Hussein after sanctions were lifted.

After nearly thirteen years of political friction with Saddam Hussein, the western alliance eventually deteriorated when steadfast allies wavered, as oil inducements exposed the faulty formalities of state actor alliances. State actor survival in regards to procuring scarce resources overshadowed the coalition objective to depose the Hussein regime and reinstate a stable and amicable government. The quest to secure scarce resources played a vital role in isolating the United States and the United Kingdom. Cold War animosities resurfaced, former hostilities reemerged as the second Gulf War exposed the volatility of alliances in a decentralized state system. The United Nations’ inability to negotiate a peaceful settlement reestablished its past impotent irrelevancy and present inability to manage international friction among elite state actors. There are no alarming disclosures when state actors decide to procure scarce resources to maintain the ‘status quo’ or international ‘prestige’ among the consort of nations. The survival of a sovereign state actor is embedded within the mindset of a people and its leaders. Saddam Hussein’s strategy to isolate the United States disregarded America’s capability to wage war without a broad coalition base. But the underlying anxiety of the West and some Middle East allies is appropriately recapped in The Economist: “When oil has made Iraq rich again, who is to say that an unchastened Saddam will not revive his dream of turning Iraq into the nuclear-armed super-power of the Arab world” (Now reel him in, 2002, p. 9).

The remerging issue in regards to the first and second Gulf Wars was Saddam’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. His utilization of chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war on the one hand and the Kurds on the other incited the fears of the international community of a nuclear armed Ba’athist regime. The accusation that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons program was the primary issue that provoked Operation Iraqi Freedom and altered the political landscape in the Middle East.

6.8 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Operation Iraqi Freedom

President George W. Bush’s quest to locate weapons of mass destruction is one of the most elusive and awkward chapters in U.S. intelligence history. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was based upon viable, tangible evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed and continued to pursue chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. The circuitous route to locate weapons of mass destruction during and
after Operation Iraqi Freedom ended in confusion and discomfiture. President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were portrayed as prevaricators, with a theatrical flair for exaggeration.

Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair claimed that the danger of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons was clear and present, and that from its nuclear programme imminent. They thus portrayed invading Iraq as necessary and urgent, rather than optional and postponable. What has or, rather, hasn’t been found in Iraq since the war ended... has called into question not only the integrity of the intelligence that informed these claims, but also that of the governments that made them (Secret weapons, 2003, p. 12).

Untangling fact from fiction is an arduous task. What appears so obvious is enveloped in the duplicitous fog of political friction among state actors. Suspicion and accusation regarding Mr. Hussein’s weapons program was a twelve year process that culminated in war. It was not just a war of frustrated attrition, but a war that was intimately intertwined with the aftermath of 9/11 and previous Cold War friction after the United States assumed global dominance.

Saddam Hussein provoked the Gulf War. His calloused inclination to utilize chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war, against the Kurds and Shia’s and Coalition forces (Tucker 1997, pp. 114-122), incited anxiety among the international community. His emboldened denunciation and hatred of the United States was a synthesis of his indigenous jingoism intermingled with the visages of Cold War suspicion. Hussein was a tyrant that had an appetite for unbridled power and the unrestrained inclination to use it. In retrospect the fears of a nuclear armed Hussein was real and alarming. The idea of Saddam Hussein having possession of WMD was inconceivable, an unacceptable option.

The objective throughout the U.S.-Iraq stand-off was the overthrow of the Hussein regime. However, the 9/11 terrorist attack gravely altered U.S. foreign and defense policy on the one hand and war strategy on the other. President Clinton’s engagement and containment policy were superseded by a more aggressive political posture. The previous deterrent policies were developed to counter the Soviet nuclear arsenal. But a new era had dawned; a war without boundaries; enemies without faces; war tactics that did not differentiate between combatants and noncombatants. The fact that a diminutive terrorist network could wreak such havoc upon the socio-economic structure of an elite state actor was befuddling. Al Qaida challenged American prestige and authority. It emboldened terrorist networks and rogue state actors to defy the West. The massive nuclear arsenal and military power of the United States was incapable of deterring terrorists from destabilizing the international order. President Bush declared in June 2002 at West Point that “Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist groups with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies” (Bush 2002). This speech marked a new era in national defense policy. President Bush determined an aggressive preemptive strike policy against rogue state actors that supported terrorism that threatened the security of the United States.

The first step in identifying the enemy was to connect the terrorists with their state actor sponsors. The second step was uncovering hostile regimes that would destabilize the world order by providing WMD to terrorist networks around the world. It is understandable why the United States would associate the Hussein regime as a potential WMD sponsor of cell terrorist groups. His past record and hostile intent against the West sealed his fate. Thus, there is a peculiar evolution in the process of the U.S. military doctrine during the Gulf crises. President George H. W. Bush pursued a just cause policy, thwarting unwarranted aggression, reestablishing recognized state actor boundaries, ensuring repayment for collateral damages and reestablishing regional order. His successor, President Clinton focused on containing the Hussein regime. Punitive military action, UN Sanctions and Security Resolutions were vigorously implemented to contain and instigate regime change. Finally President Georg W. Bush endorsed a preventive and preemptive doctrine policy, an aggressive unilateral military objective to thwart terrorist groups and rogue state actors that threatened the national security of the United States. These aggressive foreign policies were specifically implemented to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell define preventive war and preemptive strike: “Preventive war is based on the concept that war is inevitable, and that it is better to fight now while the costs are low rather than later when the costs are high. It is a deliberate decision to begin a war”. On the other hand, “Preemption by contrast, is nothing more than a quick draw. Upon detecting evidence that an opponent is about to attack, one beats the opponent to the punch and attacks first to blunt the impending strike. States that fear preventive war often adopt preemptive strategies” (Wirtz & Russell 2003, p. 116). The Bush Administration synthesized these two concepts; an aggressive military doctrine unlike any in U.S. history was the sure result of a nation that perceived terrorist groups and their rogue state actor sponsors as a direct threat to the national and international economic and security infrastructure. Within this framework, according to Wirtz and Russell, there are four elements that highlight the Bush preventive war and preemptive strike doctrine: 1. Deterrence is not the only defense option to thwart hostile intent. 2. Deterrence is not likely to work against terrorists, who are willing to sacrifice their lives, their families and respective nations for their fanatical jihadist platform. 3. The United States must take immediate action against potential threats. In other words, the Bush administration was leery of “wait and see policies” when it came to terrorist activities, and 4. The all-out efforts to thwart WMD proliferation are not guaranteed. North Korea and Iraq continue to develop WMD programs. Therefore it is imperative that the United States adjust to contemporary regional realities and adapt U.S. military capabilities and doctrine to the challenges of the new world order (Wirtz & Russell 2003, p.116).

Gregory Koblentz points out that after intensive tracking of Iraqi weapons facilities, the United States and Israel in 1987/88 uncovered chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) research centers located a Salman Pak. The CW and BW facilities were 15 miles south of Baghdad and primarily developed CW and researched lethal pathogens, *anthracis* and *botulinum* toxin (Koblentz 2009, p. 171). Saddam Hussein on April 2, 1990 publicly announced his possession of binary chemical weapons munitions (Comprehensive report of the special advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD 2004). It is important to reiterate that Saddam Hussein used CW during the Iraq-Iran war to thwart a major Iranian ground offensive and it is believed that his possession of CW thwarted Coalition forces from entering Baghdad. Chemical weaponry was his weapon of choice and Hussein used it as a national security deterrent. The Bush Administration based their pretext for military action on tangible, substantial evidence of WMD. Throughout the Hussein regime, the quest for WMD was carefully monitored (See: CNS staff, Winter 1995 2/2 – Fall 1999 6/4. Regarding Nuclear and Missile Related Trade and Development for Selected Countries. The nonproliferation review. Note: this data is not available for public domain after 1999). UN sanctions and related security resolutions were implemented to discover and prevent the dictator from possessing binary technology that could be used for military and civil purposes. However, the incessant bombing raids during the Desert Shield/Storm campaign and President Clinton’s military strikes against Mr. Hussein essentially decimated numerous weapons facilities.

The Bush Administration was adamant that Mr. Hussein possessed BW capabilities and was intent on resuming a nuclear weapons program as soon as sanctions were lifted. While hindsight controverts President Bush’s suspicions, the seeds of distrust had mandated an irreconcilable clash between Iraq and the United States. When the Bush Administration realized that a ‘smoking gun’ or physical evidence of WMD was nonexistent (Blix 2004, pp. 234, 235), the scenario after the invasion shifted from physical evidence to the Hussein regimes strategic intent. The underlying issue that alarmed the Bush Administration prior to the invasion was Saddam Hussein’s economic resurgence after the oil embargo had halted on the one hand and NATO allies and competitive state actor’s assimilation into Iraq’s oil industry on the other, thus impeding regime change (bent on developing WMD) and thwarting any possibility to restore a pro-west government in the region and preventing the spread of WMD in the Middle East.

While WMD were the public issue that justified war, it was the preventive and preemptive military doctrine that set the stage for war, triggered by the U.S. assessment of the Hussein regime’s strategic intent after economic sanctions were lifted. America dreaded a revitalized Ba’athist regime. Saddam Hussein’s hatred of the United States and his enduring diplomatic ties with Russia prompted immediate action. The Soviet/Russian government had strong political influence in Iraq and Iran. The
United States was determined to off-set the visages of Russia’s Cold War alliances by fostering a pro-west presence in Iraq. This could only be accomplished by deposing Saddam Hussein. The United States assumed that regional stability would be restored. But their obsession to depose Saddam Hussein and maintain a presence in Afghanistan and gain equal access to the lucrative oil concessions thwarted the United States from effectively containing Iran’s intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The ongoing tensions with Russia provoked Cold War recollections. The former Soviet Union’s economic and political ties with Iraq and Iran would be a determining factor regarding nuclear weapons policy in the Middle East. However, the U.S. unilateral invasion of Iraq provoked a definite response from Iran, a determined effort to secure nuclear weapons to off-set the U.S.-Israeli nuclear umbrella in the region.

The U.S. policy to thwart WMD in Iraq was eclipsed by its desire to instill a pro-west government in order to secure oil concessions from the newly formed Iraqi government. The ‘fog of war’ or more aptly stated the ‘fog of politics’ in the modern state system is complicated by economic demands to sustain national and international power among state actors. The friction between the U.S., Russia and China unwittingly precipitated a political schism between the newly formed U.S.-Iraq alliance and a Russian/Chinese backed Iran; the consequences of this friction among elite state actors has set the stage for WMD proliferation in the Middle East.

6.9 The Aftermath: Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The last Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shāh Pahlavī (1941 – 1979), in 1974 contracted the German firm Siemens and its subsidiary Kraftwerke to construct a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. During that time ninety percent of Unit One was complete, with sixty percent of the equipment installed, and Unit Two was fifty percent complete. However, construction of the nuclear plant was temporarily delayed after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which replaced the Shah of Iran with an anti-West government. Another major set-back was the Iran-Iraq War in which the site was bombed six times. Iraqi attacks on the Bushehr site on November 1987 destroyed the central core area of both reactors (Koch & Wolf 1997, p. 127, n52, n53; cf., Sciolino1995, p. A4; Hibbs 1991, p. 17). The Gulf War and the mounting tensions between the United States and Iraq made it problematic for Iran to obtain international cooperation to complete the nuclear power plant. Iran contacted many west European nuclear suppliers to rebuild the Bushehr plant, but the United States pressured these firms to cancel their business with Iran because of nuclear weapons proliferation concerns. The Iranian government then turned to China and Russia for assistance to develop their nuclear program.

The Soviet Union/Russia and Iran signed a series of agreements in the 1990’s to resume and complete the Bushehr power plant. The United States continued to stall the cooperative efforts of any nation that would enhance Iran’s civil or nuclear weapons capability. This was especially the case with dual-use nuclear components for civil and military purposes. It is interesting to note China and Russia’s eagerness to assist Iran with the essential components, knowledge and training to operate a nuclear facility. The rift between the United States and its UN Security Council members, Russia and China, continued to deteriorate as old enemies reemerged. The Chinese and Russians provided Iran with the technical assistance to mine natural uranium and mill it into yellowcake. The Chinese and Russians supplied the necessary nuclear components and technologies that could enable Iran to develop weapons grade uranium. The Chinese also assisted Iran to explore for uranium deposits (Koch & Wolf 1997, p. 124). U.S. intelligence reported in July 1997 that “Russia was advising and assisting Iranian efforts to mine uranium ore in the Saghand region of Yazd province. Russia initially denied these reports”, but in November 1998, Mikhailov confirmed that Minaton had designed a small-scale (100 to 200 MT/year) uranium mine for Iran. Also, the Russian government in 1998 was willing to provide a research “40 MWt heavy water research reactor”, which was capable of producing weapons grade uranium (Wehling 1999, pp. 137 n29, 136 n18; cf., Smith 1997, p. A7). Even though Russia canceled its gas centrifuge plant, because of extreme diplomatic pressure, the stage has been set for Iran to develop nuclear weapons capabilities in the 21st century. Wehling states: “Apart from the cancelled gas centrifuge plant and the
research reactor reportedly under negotiation, the most serious concerns over Russia’s nuclear exports to Iran arise from the continued provision of training and know how” (Wehling 1999, p.138).

To further complicate the nuclear build-up in Iran, Russia was criticized by the West for supplying missile technology to Tehran. Donald Rumsfeld reported in 1998 that “Iran’s missile programs had ‘benefited from broad, essential, long term assistance from Russia’” (Wehling 1999, p. 141 n68). While these allegations were denied by the Russian government, “Ludmila Khromova, president of Inor, and representative of other organizations accused of supplying missile materials to Iran said that their exports to Iran were made with the full knowledge of the Russian government” (Wehling1999, p. 140, n49; cf., Filipov1998, p. 1). While Iran continuously contacted firms in the United States, Britain, Europe, and rogue state actor’s such as North Korea to facilitate its nuclear and missile capabilities, it was China and primarily Russia that aided Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions. The fragile alliance among the UN Security Council members between the two Gulf Wars provoked an irreversible disposition of distrust and competition, which altered the state of affairs in the Middle East. The spirit of cooperation deteriorated between the dominant elite state actors when repositioning their geopolitical claim in the Middle East. Russia and the United States’ rivalry before and after the Cold War provoked the worst-case scenario—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime has safeguarded the international community from nuclear weapons proliferation and has recently witnessed the precarious misadventure of rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea to procure weapons of mass destruction and missile technology as the ultimate de facto deterrence among state actors. The Gulf Wars witnessed the tragic effects among contending elite state actors. The shifting international paradigm from a bipolar, multipolar and American unprecedented superpower status; the visages of Cold War competition; a fragmented UN Security Council and unilateral action against Iraq and a pretentious regard for regional security overshadowed by oil concessions testifies to the overpowering effects of the autonomous nature of the state actor survival in a decentralized state system.

The friction between the United States, China and Russia tainted the process for peace in the Middle East. An impotent UN Security Council in a fragmented decentralized state system was unable to unify the U.S.-lead Coalition. The visages of Cold War competition left its imprint among state competitors as America supported a pro-west government in Iraq, while Russia counterbalanced with a nuclear powered Iran. The seeds for nuclear weapons proliferation have been established in the most volatile location on earth. The inability of the global community to rectify Saddam Hussein’s brutish regime has only resurrected a more fanatical opponent that is a natural enemy of the West and Israel. It is unimaginable that China and Russia would provide the technical training to rogue state actors such as North Korea and Iran. Russia’s indifference to global opinion regarding a nuclear Iran and the United States incapacity to police the world in a decentralized state system has left a fragmented world order in which effective alliances are trammeled by state actor competition.

The tension between the United States, Russia and China continues to restructure the international paradigm. The inability of the Obama administration to curtail Iran’s WMD ambitions is a witness to the limitations of military power to curtail nuclear ambitions among nations that deem WMD as the ultimate national security measure in the world order. The autonomous nature of the contemporary state actor and the proliferation of nuclear weaponry are the underlying issues that challenge the moral relevance of the just war theory in our precarious state system. Its adaptation and reclamation in the 21st century is necessary to guide statesmen, diplomats and policy makers in a turbulent world order that has digressed from the moral parameters of foreign policy on the one hand and the over-dependence of economic and military power on the other.

6.10 State Actor Autonomy, Morality and War

This brief examination provides a historical chronological time-line of the economic, political and military frictions that in effect provoked Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also, a viewpoint of the autonomous force of the state actor in a volatile multipolar decentralized state system is investigated. The perception
that morality is overshadowed by state actor interests and that the just war moral theory is limited by the nature of the state system is recognized. The viewpoint of academics cannot fully comprehend the perspective of administrative power and decision making that deems war necessary to protect a state actor’s national and international interests. The Bush administration has never expressed regret for its decision to invade Iraq. Unlike the Afghanistan war, the Bush administration has never claimed its decision to go to war in Iraq as a just and defensive necessity. President Bush acted within the parameter of force and power, the collective necessity of elite state actor interests to sustain America’s prestige among the consort of nations. The concept of morality and American foreign policy is a constant challenge among policy-makers. Kenneth Thompson points out that “Ethics and foreign policy do not mean the disappearance of tragedy” (Thompson 1980, p. 7). In a similar vein ethics and war do not mean the disappearance of international conflict. In fact, Thompson also suggests: “There would be no moral problem in politics or foreign policy if the actors involved perceived one another’s interests and goals in the same way. There would be no moral problem in foreign policy if the nations of the world had more or less convergent interests” (Thompson 1980, p. 15). The singularity of purpose among nations is espoused as a plausible unifying polity; nonetheless, the author’s Cold War evaluation recognizes that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union claimed the moral upper-hand while denouncing their respective adversary’s domestic and international policies. There will always be a disparity between values and actions, especially when nations consider their foreign policy objectives. However, Thompson believed that the tradition of moral reasoning, rather than ‘abstract moralism or hopeless cynicism’, can better understand the realities of state actor power without making it a means to an end. Robert McElroy’s post-Cold War text defines the present issue in relations of morality and international relations. McElroy states that there are two primary issues that question the import of morality in the field of international relations. The “first stems from the desire to establish the independence of the study of international affairs from all ethical and philosophic presuppositions, to construct a value-free science” and the second reason for the vanishing interest in the “role of morality flows from the massive impact that realism has had in the field of international affairs” which “stresses the roles of necessity and anarchy in the politics of nations. In such a world of intense competition among nations, there is little room for meaningful choice on the part of state decision makers, and even less room for choice of moral values that conflict with national interests” (McElroy 1992, p. 3). The authors address the primary challenge of international affairs: 1. The amoral implementation of state actor power on the one hand and 2. National interests supersede moral values when state actor interests are threatened on the other.

6.11 Conclusion

There are definitive economic and political factors that contributed to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, after the decline of Soviet power, the previous Cold War friction between the two superpowers was superseded by the United States’ dominant superpower status in world politics, which also contributed to the disharmony among the UN Security Council members. The inability of the elite state actor powers to rectify Saddam Hussein’s brutish regime, the quest for oil concessions, and the lingering spirit of rivalry among former Cold War rivals contributed to the present disorder in the Middle East. Even though Operation Iraqi Freedom was encumbered by the visages of Cold War indifference and U.S. dominance after 9/11, the war effort itself was based on state actor autonomy in a competitive state system that necessitated war in order to safeguard elite state actor power among the consort of nations. Clausewitz states that “even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final” (Clausewitz 1984, p. I, 1.9, 80). The initial deterrent to validate jus ad bellum requisites for war among coalition members to counter Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait eventually deteriorated into the brutish consequences of an invasion and eventually an occupying power. The history of alliances and state actor cooperation in the ancient and modern state system has been regulated by economic and geopolitical interests that influence political policy objectives.

Conversely, in order for the United States to have equal access to oil concessions and solidify regional and international stability, it was imperative to depose the Ba’athist dictator. But there was much
more at stake than the obvious sabre rattling that existed among competing elite state actors. The
deterioration of the U.S.-lead Coalition was evident. If Saddam Hussein had survived UN sanctions and
revitalized his WMD ambitions in the Middle East and fostered his hegemonic objectives by providing oil
concession to allies and rivals, while excluding the United States, it would have been impossible for the
U.S. to remove Saddam Hussein from power. However, in removing one imprudent tyrant from the seat
of power only provoked a precarious response from its neighbor, Iran. The failure of the UN Security
Council to confront and contain both Iraq and Iran is largely due to Russia’s unwillingness to play the
part of peacemaker. Putin’s Cold War mindset enhanced friction between U.S.-Russian relations, which
has undermined a potential peace process in the Middle East.

War begets war. The First World War and the humiliating concessions of the Treaty of Versailles
provoked German nationalism and set the stage for the Second World War. The devastating effects of the
Second World War, the advent of nuclear weaponry and a definitive ideological rift among emerging
superpowers set the stage for the Cold War. The lingering distrust among former Cold War enemies, the
inability of elite state actors to set the stage for peace when confronting tyranny has set the stage for
unprecedented WMD proliferation and a volatile Middle East region.

The human element, its inherent limitations, its insatiable thirst for power, its insecurity and
innate disposition of collective self-interest within the framework of independent sovereign states is the
foundation of friction and ultimately war among state actors. It is a major cause of international friction, a
contributing factor to the aggregate inequalities that exist among nations that provoke limited and total
war scenarios. The two gulf wars illustrate the moral and amoral consequences of elite state actor
competition and power. Circumstances beyond the grasp of human understanding, the innate and peculiar
psychology among peoples and their leaders, provoke the worst fears of insecurity and the desire to
ascertain the means for national respect among the consort of nations – nuclear weaponry. Our inability to
learn from history, to apply its lessons to curtail the downward cycle of human woe and misery in warfare
is our ‘original sin’. Little has changed since the ancient battlefields have claimed their victims, only to
succumb to the endless reenactments of war and violence. But there is also nobility, an innate desire for
justice and truth, a heralded disposition for prudence and courage, hope and love, faith and honor that
counterbalances the incongruous actions of terrorist networks and their rogue state sponsors. It is a daily
battle, it is an ongoing contest waged among peoples and nations that desire peace over violence, that
seek order over anarchy, that covet liberty over despotism and support just cause in war over naked
aggression. Truth is in the eye of the beholder: Uprightness, honor and integrity are infrequent virtues in
western political culture, which emphasizes the impulsive reaction, the immediate aggrandizement, or
spirit of compromise. But war, like no other social activity demands the integrity of humankind to curtail
its devastating results and secure societal peace among the nations, this is the purpose of the just war
tradition. Warfare among nations is inevitable, but humanity has been endowed with the capacity to
implement terms of peace – just cause for war is the knowledge to know the difference; while untiringly
preserving the dignity of humankind.
CHAPTER VII

7.1 Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr in the 21st century

The Johannine account of Pontius Pilate, Prefect of the Roman province of Judea (AD 26 – 36), judge, advocate and voice of Caesar’s Rome, depicts his confrontation with the Christian Messiah – Jesus Christ. Judea was rife with sedition and rebellion. Any sign of revolt, any hint of insurrection was met with the full brunt of Roman power and discipline, symbolized by the cross. When Pilate examined Jesus Christ, amidst all the seditious allegations, Christ responded, “My kingdom is not of this world” (Jn 18: 36). It was an awkward moment for the Roman Prefect, accustomed to the mutinous curses aimed at the occupying Roman power. The confrontation between Pilate and Jesus Christ epitomized the friction between church and state. Jesus Christ denounced earthly ambition, earthly power, and an earthly kingdom. Christ’s focus was his messianic mission, and the redemption of humankind from sin. Pilate was ignorant of Christ’s mission and message, and questioned: “What is truth?” This depicts the unavoidable conflict of the heavenly and earthly cities. The inevitable friction of church and state, morality and politics, and ethics and warfare, illustrates the constant friction between these two viewpoints. Nevertheless, where there is morality and politics, there is the just war tradition to thwart the tide of unwarranted aggression among nations that is so blatantly prevalent throughout history.

The underlying current in the Augustinian and Niebuhrian realist tradition is that man as the center of his universe, the driving force of history, is unable to restrain the recurring tide of organized violence. While humankind has the capacity to instill peace among the nations, it is also capable of great evil and destruction. War, as in no other social interaction, depicts the virtues of courage, self-sacrifice and nobility of spirit only to be counterbalanced by the vices of revenge, hate, distrust, and unwarranted slaughter and violence. Augustine and Niebuhr recognized that the pervading contaminant of war is unavoidable and it is the responsibility of the church to provide moral guidelines to circumvent unnecessary violence. War begets war; the causal effect of national revenge, the autonomous nature of the contemporary state actor, the increased friction of ideas, religious and political traditions, and the clash of cultures in our modern era has precarious ramifications in our nuclear age.

The advent of WMD and primarily nuclear weaponry has transformed the modern military strategic tradition. Clausewitz witnessed the birth, the formation of world conflict, but our modern age is faced with a more insidious postulation of state actor policy – the myth that WMD are a viable, full-proof deterrent against state actor aggression. The concept that nuclear weaponry enhances national security is a paradoxical calamity. Anne Harrington de Santana points out that the “most fundamental paradox of nuclear weapons – the paradox from whence all others derive – is that they complete the logic of maintaining national security through force while at the same time leaving the United States more vulnerable than ever before” (Santana 2009, p. 325). We often reflect upon the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate as a successful account of the nuclear balance of power as the means to maintain peace and thwart aggression. Yet the nuclear balance of power demands balanced minds. The 21st century may witness the breakdown of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) guidelines as rogue state actors such as North Korea and Iran destabilize the world order by their fetish nuclear ambitions, thus inciting a nuclear arms race or even nuclear arms alliances.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the U.S. backing of a pro-west government in Iraq; the U.S.-Israeli alliance; the U.S. prevalent pervasive presence in the Middle East has provided the rationale, the undeniable excuse for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons program. However, as afore mentioned, China and Russia’s unwillingness to embark upon a platform of nuclear containment and regional peace was a major contributing factor inciting the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The myth, however, that additional nuclear weapon state actors, will enhance a long-standing balance of power even in a volatile region such as the Middle East is predicated upon the view that state actor autonomy (indeed, state actor survival) will stave-off any reckless nuclear misadventure. However, the human element is always
prevalent; it is that indefinable, irrational variable with such horrific visible consequences throughout
history. The escalating friction among the consort of nations, the impulsive nature of rogue state actors
vying for nuclear weapons, provokes the worst case scenario.

It is this frame of reference that necessitates a constructive comprehension of the Augustinian just
war tradition. Augustine’s common link with the classical interpretation of man and politics is twofold: 1.
His understanding of original sin, its pervasive taint upon societal friction on the one hand and the
unavoidable, inevitable antagonism among contending hostile forces, which results in war on the other.
There will always be friction among state actors. There will always be wars to fight, battles to be won or
lost as the never ending saga of state actor conflict is raised to the highest pitch by the advent of WMD.
Reinhold Niebuhr reiterated this common link, the inherent limitation of human nature, by pointing out
that sin pervades the social order in every particular as well, but is most notable among competing
collective forces that manipulate economic, political and military power in the world order, and 2.
Augustine’s solution to the inevitable consequences for war in the earthly city was a revision of the
traditional Roman casus belli, which was reformulated to emphasize the management of warfare to thwart
the escalation of unwarranted slaughter over the glory of nation state power, while Niebuhr defended a
precarious peace amidst nuclear power balances and unavoidable arms escalation to thwart communist
aggression in the hope that humanity’s relish for life would supersede the destruction of civilization by
maintaining an equilibrium of power. Both Augustine and Niebuhr recognized that state actor economic
and military power is not a means to an end. The ‘will’ to resolve the perplexities of the state actor in a
volatile decentralized state system is intrinsically related to the choices, decisions and actions of its
peoples and leaders. Its collective force can be built up or torn down, execute justice or sustain injustice,
inspire righteousness and compassion or ruthlessly denigrate the dignity of humanity.

As this investigation draws nigh, and we reflect upon the human predicament of organized
violence, it is important to glean some important lessons from this philosophic investigation. The strength
of this study is the recognition that the Christian realist tradition is an important aspect of human political
behavior. Its comprehension of humankind’s innate aberrant disposition toward violence is reenacted in
everyday life and reinforced by history. However it also recognizes an invaluable and irreplaceable
contribution of scientific investigation that provides unique insights into those social, economic and
political issues that provoke civic disorder. It is important to synthesize these analyses to recognize and
clarify those volatile issues among nations that destabilize the international order.

7.2 Republicanism, Christian Realism and War

The Roman casus belli was eventually distorted as a justification for war rather than a
clarification for war. Cicero reiterated the Roman just war tradition, its nobility and its utility as a means
to circumvent unwarranted Roman aggression.¹ However, its eventual decline as a regulatory instrument
for just wars followed when Rome succumbed to the eccentricities and imperfections of a decadent
imperial culture. Augustine’s moral observations and criticisms regarding Roman warfare contradicted
the viewpoint that war was primarily a customary geopolitical requisite, or an essential policy to sustain

¹Once again we reiterate Cicero, who asserted: “In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace
that shall not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we should still have at least some sort
of constitutional government, if not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all” (Cicero, De officiis,
I. XI). However, Republicanism is no surety that a state actor will not deviate from the national path of integrity and
avoid the pitfalls of greed and misdirected foreign policy objectives. National virtue tempered by recognition of state
actor economic and military constraints is foundational to prolong elite state actor influence among the consort of
nations and the consort of sovereign state powers is one small cog in the wheel of the unfolding drama of history:
“In the word of God only is this clearly set forth. Here it is shown that the strength of nations, as of individuals, is
not found in the opportunities or facilities that appear to make them invincible; it is not found in their boasted
greatness. It is measured by the fidelity with which they fulfill God’s purpose” (White 1952, p. 175).
and expand national power. Augustine set the stage for a revolutionary reformulation that reordered the casus belli as a deterrent to unwarranted and unmanageable slaughter in war. War was sanctioned for correcting evil, restoring justice and civic harmony. But its utility depended largely upon the righteous resolve of its peoples and especially its leaders to instill ethical requisites before, during and after the military campaign.

Cicero’s lauding of the Roman Republic; its laws, its traditions, its glorious reign in history contrasted with Augustine’s recognition of the inherent limitations of the earthly city. The city of God paints a pitiable picture of human pride and the woeful effects of self-love. But Augustine also recognized the leavening effects of love and community; justice and society, and peace and civic harmony. His masterful apologetic suggested that Christianity is a moral and spiritual preservative, a bulwark against the social ills that fragment statehood. Even though war in all its ramifications is unavoidable, the fruitage of war is perceived by a peaceful cessation of hostilities, the restoration of social order and the restitution of amicable relations among nations. Only when the cyclic reoccurrence of distrust and retaliation is broken can the reoccurring continuum of war cease and international order be sustained.

Niebuhr also understood the inherent weaknesses of the state actor. The liberties so very much valued in the democratic tradition; the inherent checks and balances that sustain justice are subject to the weaknesses and limitations of human nature. It is understood by the founding fathers, that sustaining constitutional mandates are only possible when a nation’s people have an innate sense of right and wrong; justice and injustice, and love and community. Even noble state actors can succumb to selfish ambition in the international arena. The Vietnam War was a case in point, only to be repeated in Iraq. The Bush doctrine defining regional stability as the inculcation of democratic tradition in the Middle East, disregarded that the fate of national self-determination resides in the will of the people, not military force. Its successes depend largely upon a grassroots response of both peoples and their leaders to incorporate its principles as a long-standing political tradition. The strength of republicanism resides among the free will of mankind to instill political values, implement constructive moral and customary traditions and maintain and protect its liberties. A fundamental insight in this study, which challenges the rationale and official policy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, is that it will always be our neglect, our blind ambition to acquiesce to capitalist demands as the undergirding impetus that shapes foreign policy objectives. This is the basic weakness of a market driven society that lauds ‘quality of life’ over ‘moral values’, ‘state actor interests’ over ‘ethical and legal mandates’. However, this is not a unique phenomenon, but rather a peculiar aspect of elite state actor power throughout history. As a result, war becomes a utility of foreign policy, rather than a last resort.

War is a recurrent phenomenon. There will always be economic and political friction among the consort of nations. There will always be wars to settle disputes. Where there are elite state actors vying for power in the decentralized state system, friction is inevitable. Where there are economic inequalities and political antagonism among the consort of nations, war is unavoidable. The ‘realist’ and ‘neorealist’ traditions, which manage the escalation of limited conflict and hope to thwart total war by a judicious utilization of economic and military power are not outmoded, but must be cautiously reinforced in our multipolar world order, without succumbing to the false notion that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the ultimate de facto security deterrent. However, the neorealist recognition of the primary

1 “But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war, would still be matter of grief to man because it is man’s wrong-doing. Let everyone, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling” (Augustine, The city of God, 19/7). The success of justice in war is the innate determination and disposition of peoples and leaders to adhere to moral principles within the framework of international law to circumvent unwarranted international conflict. It is tantamount for restraint in war to originate in the hearts and minds of peoples and leaders, rather than depending upon the fleeting ineffectual management of international organizations to restrain conflict.
aggregates of displaced power and power balances that maintain order in the international system, must be compensated by a clarification of short-term policy choices in a competitive multipolar state order. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro state:

In the short run, anarchy gives states considerable latitude in defining their security interests, and the relative distribution of power merely sets parameters for grand strategy. The actual task of assessing power and the intentions of other states is fraught with difficulty. The calculations and perceptions of leaders can inhibit a timely and objectively efficient response or policy adaptation to shifts in the external environment. In addition, leaders almost always face a two-level game in devising and implementing grand strategy; on the one hand, they must respond to the external environment, but, on the other, they must extract and mobilize resources from domestic society, work through existing domestic institutions, and maintain the support of key stakeholders. Over the long run, however, regimes and leaders who consistently fail to respond to systemic incentives put their state’s very survival at risk. Thus, while the international system may socialize states to respond properly to its constraints over time, as Waltz contends, it cannot alone explain the shorter-term policy choices that states make, which can have dramatic consequences for both national security and the structure of the international system” (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009, pp. 7-8).

There will always be paradigm shifts in the state system. There will always be political theories to guide society through the complicated maze of uncertainty. The neorealist and the emerging neoclassical realist tradition will always have to grapple with the varying degrees of state power in the national and international system. This predicament, compounded by weapons of mass destruction, defines the challenge to the Augustinian just war tradition; the complexities of state actor autonomy, the disputes resulting from a shifting international paradigm in a decentralized state environment, the constant technologic advancement of conventional and WMD weaponry, and the unpredictable variable of human behavior that undermines the concerted effort for international harmony. The primary foci of the Augustinian just war tradition is its management of curtailing escalating violence on the one hand, while correcting and subduing aggressive state actor behavior on the other. Therefore, the implausible economic, environmental and social perplexities of our contemporary state system, which trigger conflict, are in need of ethical restraints because the fragility of our globalized community deems so.

The political maneuvering during the first and second gulf wars highlighted the psychological, political and economic friction that culminated in the U.S. unilateral invasion of Iraq. Some can or cannot support the role of UN sanctions, the U.S. administration’s determined role to depose Saddam Hussein or even the invasion itself as a utility of state actor survival, but the litmus test, the moral fruition of warfare is perceived by a reinstatement of societal peace and regional stability. The visages of Cold War competition, the defiant policy of Russia and China supplying Iran with nuclear facilities training was a reaction to U.S. unilateral power, as well as the U.S. determination to secure a strategic foot-hold in the oil rich Iraq, which further complicated a volatile Middle East. The fruitage, therefore of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a nuclear-armed Iran and intensified regional friction. The realist appraisal of unpredictable collective state behavior incites the worst case scenario of nuclear proliferation in the 21st century. The first gulf war was based on a just cause to discipline a reckless aggressive Ba’athist regime, but eventually deteriorated into a unilateral action to secure equal access to Iraqi oil concessions while hoping to preserve regional stability by deposing Saddam Hussein. The U.S. intention for unilateral action may appear logical amidst the ebb and flow of world politics. The U.S. endeavor to secure a pro-West government succeeded, whereas their ambition to privatize Iraqi oil failed; nonetheless, Operation Iraqi Freedom proffered the American oil corporations a firm-position in some of the riches oil reserves in the world (Ehrenberg et al 2010, pp. 357-364). However, by deposing one reckless dictator it gave birth to another fanatical leviathan that is not controlled by a single misguided personality, but a religious/political culture that is the antithesis of western Republicanism. The U.S. invasion of Iraq incited an Iranian nuclear weapons program; this event has destabilized, not harmonized the Middle East region. What was a just cause to thwart aggression has significant unjust consequences – regional unrest...
and the spread of WMD in the Middle East. The foregoing nuclear balance of power between the United State and the former Soviet Union is not an applicable model that ensures: 1. Weapons of mass destruction are an effective deterrent to aggressive state behavior in our multipolar state system; 2. State actors share similar convictions about the destructive force of WMD in warfare; 3. State actors will always abide by the covenants and stipulations of the NPT; 4. Human error or mechanical failure would never initiate a retaliatory response, and 5. The ineptitude among some international policy makers to acknowledge the increasing probability of a nuclear mishap as additional state actors acquire WMD. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union gave evidence that it was possible to regulate the world’s nuclear arsenal during an intense conflict, the past is no guarantee for today’s growing WMD dilemma.

7.3 Just War, the Nuclear Arms Race and Armageddon

The just war tradition stipulates the responsibility that a state actor has to manage unwarranted violence and killing in war. Its premises mandate an avoidance of unwarranted organized violence, yet recognize the inevitability of state actor conflict. It condemns and nullifies the unmanageable action and reaction of nuclear preemptive strike and retaliatory response because killing in nuclear war may not be successfully managed or guarantee the curtailment of larger nuclear yields during a heated exchange between hostile state actors. The blurred distinction between tactical nuclear weaponry and massive nuclear yields is contingent upon the action and reaction of the individual actor, the mechanism of decision-making that determines first strike or retaliatory measures. It is a similar debate to the one regarding gun control, but with more precarious consequences. Guns do not kill people; people kill people. Firearms can be utilized to safeguard a home or a community, but a firearm in the hands of an irresponsible, revengeful, imbalanced citizen has wreaked havoc in communities around the world. What then weapons of mass destruction? Nuclear weapons don’t kill people; people kill people. Is state survival a sufficient guarantee to safeguard the global community? Human finiteness, mechanical imperfection and miscalculation, hate and revenge are factors that aptly describe the precarious nature of WMD in the hands of terrorist networks, their rogue state sponsors or even elite state actors that deem a retaliatory strike necessary to preserve state order or civilization.

Nuclear weaponry and the formidable eschatological predictions of Armageddon conjure fear, fanaticism and futuristic doomsday prognostications. It is an inappropriate characterization of God’s character as senseless vengeful and destructive. Even within Christian circles, the word Ἀρμαγεδών “Harmagedon” or “Armageddon” invokes numerous interpretations. Dissenting opinions on biblical inspiration and revelation, eschatological traditions; law and grace, pre- and post-millennial views and the manner of the παρουσία (Second Advent of Christ), incite a plethora of interpretations that boggles the imagination. The apocalyptic literary tradition in the Book of Revelation however, depicts God’s vindication as righteousness overcoming evil, while the kingdom of God is established by God himself to usher in his eternal kingdom (Dn 2: 42-45). D.S. Russell states that the kingdom of God comes not by “evolution but by revolution—or rather by a supernatural and catastrophic intervention. God himself will break in upon history in a mighty act of judgment and establish his kingdom” (Russell 1978, p. 21). Therefore, the great controversy between Christ and Satan – good and evil – is culminated, and global order is restored. The intent of prophetic and apocalyptic literature (see Daniel and the Revelation) is to offer hope to the community of faith that God, amidst all the sufferings and tragedies of life, shall reinstate cosmic peace and justice by deposing the tyranny of evil. The inheritors of his kingdom are imbued with Christ’s characteristics to safeguard its perpetual reign. However, there is not a predestined natural law, a prophetic utterance or a divine mandate that necessitates the obliteration of mankind through WMD. God the Father, who sent his Son to atone for the sins of the world specializes in restoring humankind from the visages of sin and death (Jn 3: 16, 17). God has endowed humanity with the knowledge and rationale capacity to circumvent nuclear catastrophe. But the dilemma of collective incongruities of state actor competition, the emergence of terrorist networks and their rogue state actor sponsors will always demand our vigilance to deter policies that threaten liberty and national and international order. However, the destructive force of nuclear weaponry, its utility as a deterrent against
total war and its proliferation in the 21st century is the fruitage of humanity. The nuclear dilemma is best summarized by Albert Einstein: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes” (Partington 1996, p. 268).

The formidable unknown in relations to war and weapons of mass destruction is when human error or mechanical failure would provoke an unsolicited response that will inevitably affect innocent population centers, thus wreaking havoc upon the international political economy, devastating the autonomous claims of state actor authority in war, maligning human rights, and threatening a delicate eco-system that sustains our civilization. It is within the rational capacity of humankind to thwart the inevitable nightmare of nuclear holocaust by recognizing that there is nothing eschatologically prophetic about the destruction of mankind by weapons of mass destruction. The issue is the fanatical fears of unbalanced tyranny that fails to comprehend the monumental judgment upon any and all state actors or terrorist networks that capitate in first strike or retaliatory response scenarios. A contemporary Augustinian just war formulation that stresses societal peace as the litmus test of a just cause for war, and denounces the utilization of WMD as a military option or response because of the nature of its unmanageable destructive power and the ‘moral incapacity’ of a state actor power to restrain from employing powerful nuclear yields during a retaliatory nuclear strike.

7.4 Conclusion

War is the Achilles-heel of Christendom. The church cannot sanction its political utility; ignore its reoccurrence in our ancient and modern society or its devastating effect upon the spiritual, moral and economic resources of a nation. The Christian realist tradition recognizes the inherent friction among state actors and the reality and inevitability of conflict. War, more than any other social interaction, is pitted with political duplicity in a world order that condemns its methods, but succumbs to its utility to resolve international disputes. This investigation has reconstructed the impact of the Augustinian just war tradition as a viable moral polity to manage warfare by thwarting unwarranted bloodshed, unjustified escalation of violence in war, and the condemnation of the utilization of WMD as a first strike or retaliatory response weapon. 1. This examination stipulates that human nature, the innate aggressive nature of humankind, is a dominant variable in the cause of war. It also incorporates the valued resources of the investigative sciences, but points out that conflict resides in the inner recesses of the individual actor and intensifies among collective self-interests as a constructive or destructive force to resolve international disputes. The innate human egotism of hatred, revenge, suspicion, fear and jingoistic fanaticism so peculiar to our species accentuates the basis of friction and conflict among nations. 2. The interpretation of the ‘two kingdoms’ provided a moral platform for both Augustine and Niebuhr, who successfully implement their moral objectives into the mainstream of civic polity to ensure justice and peace in a volatile world order. The tension between religion and politics in western civilization has accentuated an ethical platform to confront the amoral hostilities peculiar to warfare. This has been the Christian realist’s contribution to the civic order, that being, to provide moral alternatives in order to manage unwarranted violence experienced in war. 3. This inquiry traced the development of the just war tradition. Augustine did not originate the just war tradition, but utilized the Roman casus belli to reformulate and correct a warfare polity that too often adhered to war as a customary alternative to settle national and international disputes. While it is expected for nations to secure national interests by maintaining military power to thwart hostile action that threatens a nation, it should be noted that the just war moral theory has been adapted to meet the aggressive nature of men and nations throughout history. Even though the just war tradition has been overshadowed by current analyses that redefine human conflict, the just war theory is a moral bulwark in a new world order that has witnessed the resurgence of international violence. The just war tradition has been challenged in our modern era by the technologic evolution of conventional and nuclear weaponry and the ever-increasing political complexities inherent in the international system. Nonetheless, its significance has resonated throughout history as a necessary bulwark to thwart unnecessary state actor aggression. Even though contemporary warfare is economically unfeasible, politically outmoded and dehumanizing, warfare is the alternative political utility to sustain
elite state actor power. The moral and political friction throughout western civilization in war substantiates *jus ad bellum* requisites to countermand escalating violence among hostile state actors. It is a necessary polity for those who have been entrusted with the affairs of state. 4. Modern warfare is a ‘fog of uncertainty’, a complicated maze of political intrigue and deception, power and rivalry, state actor competition, friction and violence. War is an ancient and modern political utility that has enforced justice while fostering unwarranted bloodshed and despotism. Its cyclic reoccurrence throughout history; the fact that nations never learn from the wars of their forefathers recollects the persistent visages of the ‘human bent’ toward organized violence that necessitates moral guidance to thwart unwarranted state actor aggression among the consort of nations, and 5. Modern warfare is complicated by a decentralized state system. It is provoked by globalization that has necessitated our cooperation while inciting state actor differences. War more than ever is a utility to secure scarce resources while elite state actors are determined to maintain the ‘status quo’ or ‘national prestige’ among the consort of nations.

Unlike the Roman *casus belli* that eventually lauded war as a customary utility to resolve hostile disputes, and the eccentricities inherent in national power, the Augustinian ‘just war’ tradition is dedicated to manage and curtail unwarranted escalating violence. Thus, the uncontainable power and nature of nuclear warfare is deemed unjust. Its utility as the ultimate national security deterrent is contradicted by its destructive force upon combatants and noncombatants alike. The destructive nature of nuclear war necessitates its nonproliferation, and yet, it is the weapon of choice among the state actor community. The fundamental challenge to the just war tradition is the advancement of technologic conventional weaponry and weapons of mass destruction, state actor autonomy, and the irrational and amoral decisions of enigmatic state actor leadership. However, this dilemma neither negates nor nullifies the just war tradition, but ‘necessitates’ *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* requisites among the stewards of foreign affairs, especially among elite state actors, which contend to maintain their status and power in the international system.

Therefore, this investigation has differentiated the moral parameters as to ‘why nations go to war’ contrasted to ‘how wars are fought’. Also, within the Christian realist tradition, it has reestablished the moral continuity and relevance of the just war tradition in the ancient and post-modern era. Finally, this examination of ethics and war adapted a reformulation of the just war theory in relation to weapons of mass destruction. It concludes that WMD are not necessarily an effective security deterrent, because its destructive potential depends upon the ‘rational’ of its peoples and leaders in times of war. Peace among nations does not depend upon an inherent mechanism of state actor survival, but recognition that elite state actors have the power of decision to sustain peace or destroy world order. In war, the underlying desire to avert unwarranted violence is often superseded by ‘war itself’. The success for peace among nations resides in the inner recesses of its peoples and leaders that understand the difference between justice and injustice, and that have the common sense to recognize elite state actor economic, military and political limitations in the international system.

It has been a circuitous adventure tracing the evolution of the Augustinian just war tradition. It has withstood the multitudinous shifting paradigms in the world order. It has endured the onslaught of the investigative sciences and has emerged unscathed by the uncertainties of a world order that repeats the precarious nature of organized violence. The just war tradition is more than a series of axioms; it is a protective shield to guide a state actor through the pitfalls of unwarranted and costly wars that drain the spiritual, moral and economic resources of a nation. While nations are subject to drift from those founding principles that instilled courage, liberty and inculpable enterprise; the just war tradition is a bulwark of civic clarity in times of national darkness and decline. The secret of its success is not of nature’s law, but the resolve of a nation, its peoples and leaders, who are fearless to denounce the incongruities of societal injustice and state actor tyranny that destabilizes the world order. War will always abide in the hearts of humanity, its imprint upon the annals of history reiterates the common reliance on organized violence to resolve conflict, but its utility to correct evil, reinstate regional stability and social harmony depends upon an innate sense of virtue and vision upon those who direct the affairs of state. Therefore, the recognition of our human predicament instills unpretentiousness in the face of war, and the courage and determination to assume the role of peacemakers in a world constantly embroiled in conflict.


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Abbreviations of Bible Books

**Old Testament**

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**New Testament**

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