



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA

**Gordon Institute
of Business Science**
University of Pretoria

**Analysis of South Africa's use of soft power strategies as a small state within
BRICS**

Yogeni Chetty

Student Number: 12298302

**A research project submitted to the Gordon Institute of Business Science,
University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Business Administration**

Date: 4 November 2013

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION FORM

Student details			
Surname:	Chetty	Initials:	Y
Student number:	12298302		
Email:	yogenic@wwcapital.co.za		
Cell :	0833375991	Landline:	0116851004 (W)
Course details			
Degree:	MBA	Year completed:	2013
Department:	GIBS		
Supervisor:	Professor Albert Wocke		
Supervisor email:	<u>wocke@gibs.co.za</u>		
Confidentiality / Embargo			
Do you need to have your report embargoed? If so, write a letter of motivation to substantiate (please attach letter to this form). Without a letter this will not be granted.			
Yes		No	X
If yes, please indicate period requested			
Two years		**Permanent	
**Please attach a copy of the letter of permission from the Vice-Principal: Research and Postgraduate Studies, if indicated, permanent. Without a letter this will not be granted.			
A copy of your research report will be uploaded to UPetd/UPSpace Can the Information Centre add your email address to the UPetd/UPSpace web site?			
Yes X	Yes	No	
If no, please motivate (ignore if report is to be embargoed)			
Copyright declaration			
<p>I hereby certify that, where appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my research report ("the work"), allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version of the work I submitted is the same as that, which was approved by my examiners and that all the changes to the document, as requested by the examiners, have been included.</p> <p>I understand that all rights with regard to intellectual property in the work vest in the University who has the right to reproduce, distribute and/or publish the work in any manner it may deem fit.</p>			

I agree that, a hardcopy of the abovementioned work be placed in the Gordon Institute of Business Science Information Centre and worldwide electronic access be given to the softcopy on UPetd and UPspace.

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. du Toit', written over a horizontal line.

Date:

4 November 2013

ABSTRACT

Small states are challenged with lower levels of influence than larger states and require special strategies to overcome these challenges. Multilateral organisations (“MLOs”) are often dominated by larger members who have traditionally been leaders of these organisations. Soft power strategies, through attraction and co-option, are viable alternatives for small states to gain influence within MLOs.

The aim of this research was to formulate a typology of soft power strategies and a framework which small states can use to gain influence within MLOs. A qualitative and exploratory study was conducted, which involved semi-structured interviews with six respondents. A multiple case study approach that analysed four countries within four MLOs was used.

The findings were that the greater the number of soft power sources possessed by a party, the greater the strength of such party’s soft power. It was inconclusive that open markets and open communication is better suited to using soft power. The common interest principle was found to be a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power. The overall finding was that soft power strategies are dependent on the strength of the soft power source and the type of context within which it is exercised. A framework was formulated for the use of soft power.

Keywords: BRICS, multilateralism, small states, soft power, South Africa

DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my own work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration at the Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University. I further declare that I have obtained the necessary authorisation and consent to carry out this research.



Yogeni Chetty

Student Number: 12298302

Date: 4 November 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to everyone who supported and encouraged me throughout this MBA journey and in finalising this research report.

To my research supervisor: Professor Albert Wocke, thank you for your insights and assistance.

To my friends, family and colleagues: Thank you for your patience and understanding and for providing me with the time and space to complete this MBA. The support and conversations have been invaluable.

To my MBA friends: Thank you for the fun times and for taking me along with you on this journey. The learning, support and memories will forever be a part of this journey.

To the respondents of the interviews: Your insights into the various countries and stories were invaluable and thoroughly enjoyed. This research would definitely not have been possible without your contribution. Thank you.

To my editor and transcriber: Claire Pienaar and Glenda Birchfield: Thank you for the dedication and time attributed to refine my work.

To my team at Worldwide Capital: Thank you for the immense support and for putting up with those really stressful days. This achievement would not have been possible without this support, for which I will be forever grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	I
DECLARATION.....	II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	III
LIST OF TABLES	VIII
LIST OF FIGURES	IX
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH PROBLEM	1
1.1 RESEARCH TITLE	1
1.2 DEFINITION OF PROBLEM	1
1.3 SELECTION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM	2
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	3
1.5 RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH TOPIC TO BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA	4
1.6 A CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE SMALL STATE	4
1.7 MULTILATERALISM DEFINED	6
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	7
2.1 INTRODUCTION	7
2.2 SOFT POWER.....	7
2.2.1 DEFINITION OF SOFT POWER.....	7
2.2.2 HOW ARE THE OUTCOMES OF SOFT POWER MEASURED?	9
2.2.3 LIMITATIONS TO THE THEORY OF SOFT POWER	10
2.2.4 SOURCES OF SOFT POWER	11
2.2.5 ANALYSIS OF THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCES	14
2.2.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOFT POWER SOURCES	15
2.2.7 FUNCTIONAL MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS	15
2.2.8 TARGET ATTITUDE.....	16
2.2.9 INFLUENTIAL ACTORS AND LEVELS OF SOFT POWER.....	17
2.2.10 COMMON INTERESTS.....	18
2.2.11 TYPES OF SOFT POWER STRATEGIES.....	19
2.3 CONCLUSION.....	22
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS.....	24
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	25
4.1 INTRODUCTION	25
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN	25
4.2.1 QUALITATIVE.....	25
4.2.2 INDUCTIVE APPROACH	25
4.2.3 CASE RESEARCH APPROACH.....	26
4.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY.....	27
4.3.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS.....	27
4.3.2 POPULATION AND SAMPLING	27
4.3.3 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE.....	28

4.4	DATA COLLECTION	31
4.5	DATA MANAGEMENT	34
4.6	DATA ANALYSIS	34
4.7	DATA VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY	35
4.8	RESEARCH LIMITATIONS	36
4.9	CONCLUSION.....	36
CHAPTER 5:	RESULTS.....	38
5.1	INTRODUCTION TO RESULTS	38
5.2	RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS	38
5.3	MEXICO.....	38
5.3.1	THE G20	39
5.3.2	MEXICO WITHIN THE G20.....	40
5.3.3	RESULTS: RESEARCH PROPOSITION ONE – THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS	41
5.3.4	RESEARCH PROPOSITION TWO: A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	44
5.3.5	RESEARCH PROPOSITION THREE: COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER.....	46
5.3.6	RESEARCH PROPOSITION FOUR: THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT. 46	
5.3.7	ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	47
5.4	POLAND	47
5.4.1	EU	49
5.4.2	POLAND WITHIN THE EU	50
5.4.3	RESULTS: RESEARCH PROPOSITION ONE: THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS	50
5.4.4	RESEARCH PROPOSITION TWO: A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	54
5.4.5	RESEARCH PROPOSITION THREE: COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER.....	55
5.4.6	RESEARCH PROPOSITION FOUR: THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT 56	
5.4.7	ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	57
5.5	SINGAPORE.....	57
5.5.1	ASEAN.....	58
5.5.2	SINGAPORE WITHIN ASEAN	59
5.5.3	RESULTS: RESEARCH PROPOSITION ONE: THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS	59
5.5.4	RESEARCH PROPOSITION TWO: A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	63
5.5.5	RESEARCH PROPOSITION THREE: COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER.....	64
5.5.6	RESEARCH PROPOSITION FOUR: THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT 65	
5.5.7	ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	66

5.6	SOUTH AFRICA	67
5.6.1	BRICS	68
5.6.2	SOUTH AFRICA WITHIN BRICS	69
5.6.3	RESULTS: RESEARCH PROPOSITION ONE: THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS	69
5.6.4	RESEARCH PROPOSITION TWO: A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	75
5.6.5	RESEARCH PROPOSITION THREE: COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER.....	76
5.6.6	RESEARCH PROPOSITION FOUR: THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT	76
5.6.7	ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	78
5.7	CONCLUSION.....	78
CHAPTER 6:	DISCUSSION OF RESULTS	80
6.1	INTRODUCTION	80
6.2	RESEARCH PROPOSITION ONE: THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS.....	80
6.3	RESEARCH PROPOSITION TWO: A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	82
6.4	RESEARCH PROPOSITION THREE: COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER.....	85
6.5	RESEARCH PROPOSITION FOUR: THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT	87
6.6	CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS	90
CHAPTER 7:	CONCLUSION.....	93
7.1	INTRODUCTION	93
7.2	RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES.....	93
7.3	MAIN FINDINGS	93
7.3.1	THE STRENGTH OF SOFT POWER SOURCE IS DEPENDENT ON POSSESSING MORE OF THE SOFT POWER PILLARS.....	94
7.3.2	A CONTEXT THAT HAS MORE OPEN MARKETS AND MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION IS BETTER SUITED TO USING SOFT POWER.....	94
7.3.3	COMMON INTERESTS ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SOFT POWER	94
7.3.4	THE TYPE OF SOFT POWER STRATEGY THAT IS SUCCESSFUL IS DEPENDENT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SOFT POWER SOURCE AND AN OPEN CONTEXT.....	95
7.4	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS	95
7.4.1	ACADEMICS	95
7.4.2	POLICY MAKERS.....	96
7.5	PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: SOFT POWER MECHANISM.....	96
7.6	LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH.....	99
7.7	OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	99
7.8	CONCLUSION.....	100
REFERENCES	101

APPENDICES.....	106
APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW CONSENT LETTER	106
APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW AUTHORISATION LETTER.....	107
APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE	108

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Comparison of country descriptors and statistics.....	29
Table 2: Mexico and larger states within G20.....	30
Table 3: Poland and larger states within EU.....	30
Table 4: Singapore and larger states within ASEAN.....	30
Table 5: South Africa and larger states within BRICS.....	31
Table 6: List of respondents.....	32
Table 7: Interview statistics.....	33
Table 8: Mexico's rankings on selected indices.....	43
Table 9: Mexico's soft power sources.....	44
Table 10: Mexico's rankings in terms of openness.....	45
Table 11: Mexico, United Kingdom and United States exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.....	46
Table 12: EU membership.....	47
Table 13: Poland's rankings on selected indices.....	52
Table 14: Poland's soft power sources.....	53
Table 15: Poland's rankings in terms of openness.....	55
Table 16: Poland, France and Germany exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.....	55
Table 17: Singapore's ranking on selected indices.....	61
Table 18: Singapore's soft power sources.....	62
Table 19: Singapore's rankings in terms of openness.....	63
Table 20: Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.....	64
Table 21: South Africa's rankings on selected indices.....	73
Table 22: South Africa's soft power sources.....	74
Table 23: South Africa's rankings in terms of openness.....	75
Table 24: BRICS's exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.....	75
Table 25: Case studies' score for six pillars.....	80
Table 26: Case studies' ranking on selected indices.....	81
Table 27: Case studies' level of soft power sources.....	82
Table 28: Case studies' openness indicators.....	83
Table 29: Level of openness of cases measured against World Economic Forum pillars.....	84
Table 30: Export data for cases.....	84
Table 31: Case studies' ranking of openness.....	85
Table 32: Common interest significance.....	86
Table 33: Soft power strategies of selected cases.....	87
Table 34: Summary of findings.....	90

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Soft power mechanism.....	97
------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Research title

Analysis of South Africa's use of soft power strategies as a small state within BRICS.

The virtue of moral power:

***"It is better to win hearts and minds than to attack towns and cities"* (Zhu Geliang (AD 181 – 234) as cited in Huang and Ding, 2006, p. 29)**

1.2 Definition of problem

Multilateral organisations ("MLOs") include large and small members states (Panke, 2012b). This composition may result in unequal power relations among the members of MLOs, which may pose a challenge to smaller states in influencing the decision making and negotiation outcomes conducted by such organisations (Keohane, 1969; Panke, 2012b).

Small states encounter a challenge when they attempt to voice their opinions and as a result, these states risk being dwarfed within MLOs by their larger counterparts. Small states therefore need to develop a strategy to gain influence within these organisations. The use of soft power as explored by Chong (2010) is proposed in this research study as a strategy to enlarge the presence and voice of small states within MLOs.

Soft power is the influence of attraction or co-option through intangible sources, such as culture, political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2004). In contrast, hard power is the influence of command and control, through tangible sources such as economic and military might (Nye, 2004). The nature, sources and limitations of soft power are discussed in Chapter 2, along with the conditions under which soft power strategies should be either used or not used and how to effectively use specific soft power strategies.

The research problem identified is that there is no existing framework that explains how to wield soft power (Wang & Lu, 2008). A state that possesses soft power sources

needs to capitalise on the situation by exercising that soft power in a manner that enables the state to gain influence. This research study examines the use of soft power strategies by small states within MLOs, with the view of developing a typology of soft power strategies and a practical framework to be used generally by small states within MLOs and specifically by South Africa within the group of five major emerging national economies that include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).

The overall question that this research study aims to answer is, "how do small states wield soft power within MLOs?" This study intends answering this main question by the following sub-questions:

- How do small states identify their soft power strengths?
- Within which contexts is it better for small states to exercise soft power?
- Which conditions are necessary conditions for the effective use of soft power?
- Under which conditions will soft power strategies be more successful?

1.3 Selection of research problem

This problem was selected due to the debate about whether South Africa's recent inclusion within the BRICS grouping is justified. It was argued by the founder of BRICS, Mr. Jim O' Neill, that it was never intended that South Africa be a member of this grouping, mainly due to the smallness of its population and its GDP when compared to its BRICS counterparts (O'Neill, 2012). This debate positions South Africa as a small state within the multilateral BRICS grouping. This smallness is further discussed by Kappel (2011), where South Africa's territorial size, population, average growth of GDP and share of global foreign trade is discussed through comparison with that of its BRICS counterparts. In addition to its smallness, South Africa also lacks hard power strengths due to the size of its GDP growth and the lack of a strong military force. South Africa, like other small states within multilateral settings, therefore risks the possibility of being dwarfed by their larger counterparts that possess greater hard power strengths. It is necessary for such small states to develop a strategy to enable them to make their presence heard.

MLOs such as the G20, MERCOSUR, the European Union ("EU") and SADC, all include small states that have the challenge of being unable to contribute to the decision making process and influence the outcome of negotiations. These size-related obstacles within international organisations include lower than average financial and

economic resources, lower levels of activity, lower bargaining power levels and smaller delegations at the negotiation table (Panke, 2012b). These challenges were conceptualised as that of vulnerability by several studies, including that of Keohane (1969), Chong (2010), Sutton (2011) and Bishop (2012).

In addition to these challenges, larger states may have more votes within these organisations. This is evident in the case of the EU where states with larger populations have more votes. In the case of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), states with a larger economic size have more votes (Panke, 2012b). The reduced voting rights are one such example where the smallness of a state creates a disadvantage within a multilateral setting. These challenges and in particular, the limited hard power strengths of such states within MLOs, are discussed throughout this research report.

Although the use of soft power may require a long term strategy and may be more difficult to develop as discussed by Huang and Ding (2006), it is this power or strategy, which may be within the capacity of small states to develop, rather than that of hard power. Soft power has been defined in terms of the existing literature. The gap that exists is the lack of a model or framework setting out exactly how such soft power may be wielded and what strategies may be used to gain influence from such soft power.

1.4 Research objectives

One of the crucial objectives of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of the soft power strategies used by small states in multilateral settings. This research examines this concept of soft power and formulates a typology of soft power strategies to be used by small states. This research formulates a practical framework that may be used by small states to better achieve their objectives and influence decision making within MLOs. In order to achieve the objectives set out, this research analyses the concept of soft power and identifies conditions under which soft power can be used by small states within multilateral settings.

This research study is structured using a multiple case study approach. Four MLOs have been selected. The study analyses four countries within these MLOs. The use of a multiple case study approach, across different MLOs and different countries, facilitates or enables the generalisation of the findings and lends itself to thicker data findings. The scope of this research study is therefore an analysis of the soft power strategies of four states within multilateral settings globally.

1.5 Relevance of research topic to business in South Africa

The recent BRICS summit held in South Africa and the level of importance that is attached to the BRICS grouping by the South African government and businesses alike, results in this topic being highly relevant to South Africa (Fisher, 2013). In addition to BRICS, South Africa is a member of other MLOs, such as IBSA, the G20 and the United Nations Security Council. The findings of this research could be relevant to South African relations within such groupings.

This research is intended to benefit policy makers within South Africa by enabling them to develop more appropriate soft power strategies for further advancement within BRICS and other groupings to which they belong. It is also intended to contribute to the body of knowledge of international relations, by benefitting small states in new and existing MLOs to develop a soft power strategy which will enable them to achieve their objectives and influence the outcomes of such groupings.

1.6 A conceptualisation of the small state

The concept of a small state was originally considered within the setting of military power between great and small states (Keohane, 1969). There have been different views regarding the definition of the concept of a small state. A categorical and quantitative approach to conceptualisation of small states has been followed by among others, Chong (2010) and Sutton (2011). Proposed categories used in defining small states as discussed by Sutton (2011) range from that of population size identified by Kuznets (as cited by Sutton, 2011), to population size plus useable land area identified by Demas (as cited by Sutton, 2011), to population size and arable land area and GNP identified by Jalan (as cited by Sutton, 2011). A pure categorical approach has been problematic, as it is difficult to determine which thresholds are appropriate for the respective categories. Over the years the thresholds have changed as they have become irrelevant, but this approach failed to capture the situation where a state may be regarded as large within certain contexts and small within others.

Lee and Smith (2010), criticised the use of quantitative criteria such as those referred to by Sutton (2011) and those before him, as set out by Keohane (1969), as being arbitrary criteria which do not take into account the relativity of the concept. Lee and Smith (2010) preferred a qualitative and relative approach when defining the concept of small state in relation to larger states. The example of Gabon being classified as a small state in relation to Sudan, but as a large state when compared

with Equatorial Guinea, is quoted by Lee and Smith (2010). If a fixed definition were used to define Gabon as a small state, then Gabon would be defined as a small state in both settings. The relative, qualitative approach emphasised by Lee and Smith (2010) considers concepts such as power, influence and self-image for defining small states.

Similarly to Lee and Smith (2010), Panke (2012a) identified context as the appropriate measure to determine whether a state is a small state. Panke (2012a) discussed economic power within the context of trade, military power within the context of conflict or security and a voting system within the context of negotiation settings that have a distribution of voting, like with the EU. Panke (2012a) did not define a small state in absolute terms, but similarly to Lee and Smith (2010) in relational terms.

It is therefore assumed for the purpose of this research that the more appropriate definition of a small state is the contextual and relational approach set out by Lee and Smith (2010) and Panke (2012a). For the purpose of this research, a state may therefore be defined as small in relation to other states within a multilateral setting if such a state can be overpowered or overwhelmed by other states, such that the small state is less able to gain influence or make its voice heard within such setting. It is this approach to defining small states that was followed by Gron and Wivel (2011) regarding the analysis of small states within the EU. The context for this research study is therefore that of multilateral settings with a specific emphasis on the level of influence or power that a state possesses.

In summary, a number of factors may therefore be applied in defining a small state, which could include economic power, military power, voting power, GDP size, population size, territorial size or level of influence within the multilateral setting. The relational and contextual approach to defining small states is the same as that used by Nye (2004) in his explanation of the concept of soft power. The context of small states, possessing soft power within multilateral settings is therefore highly relevant for the purposes of this research study. A comparative approach enables an assessment of the level of soft power. The assumption is that South Africa is a small state when compared to its BRICS counterparts in terms of its geographic size, population and GDP as discussed by Kappel (2011) and in terms of the level of influence that it has in BRICS.

1.7 Multilateralism defined

Multilateralism was described by Karns and Mingst (2010), as a piece of global governance through which a group of three or more states coordinate or build coalitions with other states. In forming such groups, these states relinquish some of their individual state sovereignty. MLOs were formed to fulfil some specific need or gap (Karns & Mingst, 2010). Multilateralism is formalised through informal or formal agreements (Karns & Mingst, 2010). Formally, multilateralism occurs through treaties, charters or statutes. In certain instances multilateralism occurs through the formation of ad hoc groups or coalitions, such as the G20. These ad hoc groups lack a formal structure and in some instances take the form of a dialogue forum or platform for further discussion on predetermined issues (Karns & Mingst, 2010).

Multilateralism has been largely revived following the global financial crisis in 2008. The G20 has been proactively involved in this revival through the capitalisation of the IMF (Woods, 2010). South Africa is a member of several MLOs, often as a small state trying to make a difference.

The benefit of multilateralism is that single states are able to garner a stronger presence through coalition building which may result in such states being better able to influence international negotiations (Karns & Mingst, 2010). In addition, multilateralism enables states to tap into the expertise of other member states through this network. It is for these reasons that multilateralism is of particular relevance to middle powers and small states, which are fundamentally states that may be restricted by a lack of hard power strengths. Multilateralism is seen as an opportunity through which small states may protect their interests and by which global economic governance institutions may be reformed to deal with changing economic and global orders (Qobo & Dube, 2012). Although multilateralism provides numerous opportunities for small countries, it suffers from a lack of formal institutions and a lack of continuity, which has consequences for driving the agendas of both multilateralism and that of small states.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter set out the research topic, the research objectives and rationale for the research. The theory of soft power was introduced and the concepts of small state and multilateralism were defined. This chapter reviews the literature on a few key areas directly related to the topic. Firstly, a description surrounding the concept of soft power is discussed and analysed, which includes the nature and limitations of this theory. Secondly, the sources of soft power, in terms of the six pillar framework are analysed. Thirdly, conditions for the effective use of soft power, being a functional marketplace of ideas and a common interest among the parties, is analysed. Fourthly, the soft power strategies identified through the literature and their conditions for use are discussed. The above matters are expounded, taking into account the need to convert soft power sources into realised power through the achievement of desired outcomes.

2.2 Soft power

2.2.1 Definition of soft power

Power has traditionally been described and understood narrowly in terms of its hard power attributes, being that of “command and coercion” (Nye, 2004, p. 4). The concept of power has been expanded by Nye (2004) to include soft power attributes of attraction and co-option. In contrast to hard power, which is authoritative and relies on “military and economic might” (Nye, 2004, p. 5), soft power is persuasive and relies on its ability to inspire others to emulate and adopt the values that the soft power encompasses (Nye, 2004). It is the theory of soft power put forward by Nye (2004) that forms the basis of this research.

Traditional champions of hard power strategies include the United States and China through the use of their economic and military might. The theory of soft power was specifically proposed by Nye (1990) to transform the foreign policy of the United States by including soft power elements. According to Das (2013) and Nye (1990), the international political arena has been changing, with the onset of globalisation and the interdependency of states, such that intangible sources of power, including soft power

have become more relevant. There is a shift away from hard power, which causes conflicts of interests and has risky consequences (Das, 2013).

Soft power must first be possessed by a party, which is defined by Nye (2004) in terms of a party's soft power sources. Possessing soft power sources is not soft power in itself, such sources must be converted into realised power, which is achieved through desired outcomes or goals (Nye, 2004).

Soft power is interpreted as a relational concept. A state's level of power is assessed in relation to other states within the international arena (Huang & Ding, 2006). Objectives of states are achieved through gaining followers and building leadership. Soft power is a context-based theory as it is reliant on, among other things "geographic proximity, foreign policies of other countries, and distribution of international power" (Huang & Ding, 2006, p. 24).

Due to its intangible nature, soft power is sometimes difficult to conceptualise. It is more than a power of attraction, as the attraction must result in a change in the preferences of the subject (Fijalkowski, 2011). According to Fijalkowski (2011), it is not sufficient to simply sell the Chinese image to Africa; such sell must result in a buy-in from Africa, which would be the desired outcome. The change in preferences is therefore a desired outcome of soft power, which may be manifested in a number of ways. The possible outcomes or success of soft power is best described by the comment by the Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew: "soft power is achieved only when other nations admire and want to emulate aspects of that nation's civilization" (Gill & Huang, 2006). The outcomes are discussed under 2.2.2 below.

The difficulty with soft power is compounded by the subjectivity surrounding the attraction element of soft power, as discussed by Mattern (cited in Fijalkowski, 2011). The subjectivity of attraction results in it being difficult to generalise under which conditions soft power would be effective, as different entities may be attracted to different things. The agent wielding the soft power, depending on its skills and the context within which it acts, can control and shape the preferences or outcomes desired, as stated by Nye (cited by Fijalkowski, 2011). Soft power can therefore be more flexible than hard power, however intangible and difficult to measure.

In summary, soft power is an attractive power that is highly context dependent, which means that its effectiveness is subjective. In addition it is largely a relationship construct in that it is dependent on the relationship between the agent and the subject

(Fijalkowski, 2011). The explanation of soft power of Sun Zi (as cited in Wang & Lu, 2008) is that it is “the power to subdue the enemy without a fight” (p. 427). It therefore does not involve brute force but requires a leader that possesses contextual intelligence. Such a leader must have the ability to adapt and shape strategies, to persuade and influence the outcomes that are desired (Nye, 2008). It is essentially a diplomacy tool.

Soft power alone is not sufficient to gain influence. This strategy needs to be reinforced by hard power under certain circumstances (Das, 2013). The combination of soft power and hard power is a separate strategy known as smart power, as referred to by Nye (2009), which falls outside the scope of this research. This research therefore focuses purely on soft power as a strategy.

2.2.2 How are the outcomes of soft power measured?

Soft power is difficult to measure given its intangible nature (Huang & Ding, 2006). The concept of soft power and its sources are more qualitative than quantitative in nature. Huang and Ding (2006) referred to the suggestion of Nye (2004) that soft power can be assessed through the use of polls or focus groups. It was recognised by Huang and Ding (2006) that soft power is broader than popularity and the use of polls is therefore substantiated through other aspects such as tourism and the increase in the number of international students in China. The difficulty experienced by Huang and Ding (2006) was identifying whether the use of a particular soft power strategy by a country actually caused the desired outcome or whether such outcome would have resulted regardless of the use of the soft power in question. It is the causal link that Huang and Ding (2006) recognised as being deficient in Nye’s (2004) theory of soft power. The model developed by Huang and Ding (2006) considered the use of country A’s soft power sources, projected at policy actors in country B, which projection actually leads to country B supporting and implementing the policies of country A. The use of soft power by country A can be said to be successful if it results in country B adopting or supporting the policies that country A was promoting. The causal link is therefore the use of soft power resources resulting in “actual foreign policy outcomes” (Huang & Ding, 2006, p. 33). Similarly, Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber (2010) discussed the measurement of the success of soft power by examining whether a state has made progress towards the achievement of its stated goals.

2.2.3 Limitations to the theory of soft power

Li and Worm (2011) referred to the work of Huang and Ding (2006) in explaining that the shortcomings of Nye's (2004) work were that it failed to put in place a mechanism to explain how soft power sources may be converted by a party into actual soft power. This research aims to explore this specific gap in the literature.

Kroenig et al. (2010) developed a theory that established preconditions under which states can use soft power to their advantage. Kroenig et al. (2010) applied the framework established to that of the United States' use of soft power within the contexts of military and politics. The framework established by Kroenig et al. (2010) focused on external conditions, which were established as necessary conditions for the use of soft power. Kroenig et al. (2010) controlled the conditions of their research by specifically excluding soft power resources because their study was confined to one state with a single set of soft power resources. Kroenig et al. (2010) acknowledged that due to the specific focus on the United States, the framework established was not capable of being generalised to other countries and was therefore limited.

The framework of Kroenig et al. (2010) established three preconditions for the effective use of soft power. A limitation of this theory is that, according to Kroenig et al. (2010), each of the conditions are necessary conditions to be able to use soft power effectively, but even if all three conditions are met, it may not be sufficient to achieve the outcomes desired. There are, therefore many limitations to the theory introduced by Kroenig et al. (2010), which may only be successful under carefully controlled conditions.

The existing framework of Kroenig et al. (2010) cannot be applied to MLOs, generally as it fails to take into account internal competencies of a state regarding soft power resources and it fails to take into account strategic factors. It is therefore necessary to develop the framework of Kroenig et al. (2010) to allow for such framework to be more generalizable to other countries and more specifically to small states within MLOs, globally. This research study develops the framework established by Kroenig et al. (2010) more comprehensively by including internal conditions such as soft power resources and expanding the framework to include a strategic component. This research also extends the application of this framework to MLOs, with the view of establishing a practical framework for the use of soft power by small states within MLOs.

2.2.4 Sources of soft power

According to Nye (2004), a state's soft power is derived from soft power sources which include culture, political values and foreign policies. Li and Worm (2011) further categorised the sources of soft power established by Nye (2004) into a framework of six pillars, namely cultural attractiveness; political values; development model; international institutions; international image and economic temptation. These six pillars were an extension of Nye's (2004) described sources, in that foreign policy was expanded upon into the development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation, in order to emphasise different elements from which soft power capabilities may be built.

This research focuses on how a state utilises soft power by identifying strengths in their soft power sources and areas for improvement, using the six pillar framework, much like that conducted by Li and Worm (2011). Development or building of soft power was discussed by Li and Worm (2011) and is perhaps an area for further research.

Soft power sources in the form of the six pillars are a prerequisite for the use and further advancement of soft power as a strategy. These six pillars are internal factors, in that such factors can be developed internally by the state. It should however be mentioned that although such factors are internal factors, the development of these factors are often dependent on a state's people and their actions, especially when considering the cultural attractiveness pillar.

2.2.4.1 *Cultural attractiveness*

Nye (2004) described culture as a country's values and practices, which may be evidenced through its entertainment, literature, popular culture and art. It is those values and practices which are attractive to others that will result in cultural soft power. Popular culture, although an important source of soft power, is not soft power by itself (Nye, 2004). The popular culture must result in attraction for it to be regarded as soft power (Nye, 2004).

Huang and Ding's (2006) perspective was that, culture, as a source of power within the Chinese context, is more influential in culturally similar situations. An example of such a situation could perhaps be regional settings, where Chinese culture stands a better chance of being influential in Asia due to the culture being more similar, when compared with the level of influence in countries such as the United States or in

Europe, where the culture is different. This example may be likened to the principle of common interest, which refers to small states raising issues that are within the common interest of the EU (Gron & Wivel, 2011). Raising issues of common interest is more likely to gain acceptance than raising issues which are contentious. This begs the question about whether a common interest is a condition that is necessary for the use of soft power, which will be discussed further under 2.2.10.

2.2.4.2 Political values

Political values as described by Nye (2004) include a country's domestic and international political values and the manner in which the country conducts itself at home and abroad. In order for a country's political values to be a source of soft power, such a country must demonstrate consistency in its application of the political values that it sets for itself. According to Huang and Ding (2006) China should utilise widely accepted norms which drives international participation. Politically, these values could be the use of democracy, as suggested by Western scholars (Li & Worm, 2011). Factors such as human rights and freedom violations could diminish a country's political value strength (Li & Worm, 2011), and thereby limit the strength of soft power.

2.2.4.3 Foreign policy

According to Nye (2004), a country's foreign policies must appear to be legitimate and have moral authority in order for it to be a source of soft power. It is this legitimacy and moral authority which has been expanded on in several studies, including that of Chong (2010), Fijalkowski (2011) and Li and Worm (2011). An example of this is the stance taken by a state on human rights or gender empowerment issues. Additionally, the good neighbour policy of China, as discussed by several authors, including Gill and Huang (2006), Huang and Ding (2006) and Li and Worm (2011) is an example of a state displaying good foreign policy from a regional perspective. This policy adopted by China and others within the region is based on principles of non-interference and is directed at establishing a stable environment.

2.2.4.4 Development model

Li and Worm (2011) discussed the development model as being a successful economy. The authors mentioned above then extended the definition to include principles of the Beijing Consensus, which included, among other things, a stable political environment, innovation and financial liberalisation. According to Huang and Ding (2006) the development model of China was more appealing to developing

economies within the Middle East, Africa and Latin America than to developed economies, such as Western democracies. The specific examples of the development model of a state emphasised by Chong (2010) were “political economy potential” and “models of good governance” (p. 383). National political economy potential referred to by Chong (2010) is the competence that a state displays in the management of its economic activities, which included trade flows, capital flows and labour flows. If a state displayed competence in this area, such competence would result in the development of a strong moral capital or reputation. Similarly good governance, which included upholding of the law and property rights; respect for human rights and the absence of corruption and cronyism, is also essential in the development of a good reputation (Chong, 2010).

2.2.4.5 International institutions

International institutions referred to the role played by a nation within international institutions, which role may be used to frame and set the international agenda (Li & Worm, 2011). This role could therefore include those played by states within MLOs such as BRICS, G20, EU and ASEAN. It is this role that is of importance in a multilateral setting as it enables a state to shape the international order and to influence other member states.

2.2.4.6 International image

International image is the manner in which a country is perceived in the international arena and is strongly linked to a country's government, brand and reputation (Li & Worm, 2011). Due to the attractive nature of soft power, this pillar is highly relevant for soft power. This pillar is linked to the credibility and reputation of a country. According to Chong (2010), it is the enhancement of its reputation that is especially relevant for small states in order to gain better access to FDI and finance. According to Li and Worm (2011), China enhanced its international image following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 in its efforts to stabilise the financial system, by electing not to devalue its currency.

2.2.4.7 Economic temptation

Economic temptation refers to the potential economic gains offered by one country to another and the attraction which may be attributed to a country's wealth (Li & Worm, 2011). The example of economic temptation is that of China offering trade and

investment opportunities to its partners, in a global context following the financial crisis (Li & Worm, 2011).

2.2.5 Analysis of the strength of soft power sources

Li and Worm (2011) stressed the debate surrounding which sources were most important, with some scholars arguing that culture is most important and others that political values are most important. Li and Worm (2011) concluded that all six pillars are important in building soft power and no emphasis was placed on any such source of soft power.

Contrary to Li and Worm (2011), Huang and Ding (2006) argued that China requires a balance of the soft power resources, as identified by Nye (2004) to be culture, political values and foreign policy and, that the lack of a balance among such resources leads to a misalignment between its resources and its outcomes or objectives. The view of Huang and Ding (2006) was therefore that a country must not only possess all of the soft power sources, there must also be a balance amongst such sources. This argument regarding the balance of soft power sources versus having all the sources leads to the formulation of the first proposition.

Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Li and Worm (2011) further analysed the strengths of Chinese soft power sources and found that it was “Chinese culture, Chinese development model, and China’s economic temptation” (p. 73), which were the strongest sources. The argument published by Li and Worm (2011) was that although these six pillars have been considered with the context of China, such pillars may be generalised across other countries, with the understanding that each country may, in addition, possess country-specific soft power sources. An example of a country-specific soft power resource is that of the Japanese management system (Li & Worm, 2011). A country may therefore possess one or more of these sources of soft power in varying degrees of strength.

A state needs to use the six pillars to identify whether it possesses any one or more of the six pillars. If so, the state needs to identify which of the six pillars it possesses. The nature and strength of a state’s soft power sources in relation to the six pillars determine the strategies that the state should follow. This investigation is an internal enquiry into the strengths or core competencies of a state.

2.2.6 Limitations of the development of soft power sources

The implementation and application of soft power by a country is rather difficult for a number of reasons. The sources of soft power, as identified earlier are intangible and as a result are often outside the sphere of governmental control (Fijalkowski, 2011; Kroenig et al., 2010). By way of example, culture and values are almost impossible for governments to control. Another limitation relates to the reliance of soft power on credibility and reputation, which can be damaged by both governments and their people alike (Fijalkowski, 2011). In addition, the results of soft power, due to its nature, tend to take some time before they are evident and as pointed out by Fijalkowski (2011) by using China as an example, are difficult to measure. In addition to the limitations associated with the application of soft power, it cannot under circumstances like war be a substitute for hard, military power (Kroenig et al., 2010). It is therefore important to understand in which situations soft power can be applied and in which situations the application thereof may have to be supplemented by hard power.

2.2.7 Functional marketplace of ideas

The first condition of the framework set out by Kroenig et al. (2010), is that the communication of the message or the projection of the soft power must take place within a “functioning marketplace of ideas” (Kroenig et al., 2010, p. 414). This condition refers to the context within which the soft power message is received. The context must be one in which the message is perceived as attractive (Kroenig et al., 2010).

According to Kroenig et al. (2010), this marketplace, much like an economic marketplace requires competition, in order to be functional. Therefore, in order for soft power to be effective, it must be received within a functional context, where the competition for ideas is facilitated and communication is not censored or restricted (Kroenig et al., 2010). This functional context is one that is open and where there is a facilitation of information exchange. Similarly to Kroenig et al. (2010), Huang and Ding (2006) referred to the context as being significant, in that a “favourable international context” (p. 24) is essential.

This functioning marketplace can be likened to one that is not characterised by authoritarian rule, as authoritarian rule does not facilitate the competition of ideas and effective deployment of soft power (Kroenig et al., 2010). China’s restrictive control over its media and its authoritarian model are referred to by Chu (2007) as an indication of some of the challenges to the Chinese soft power development, which

supports the need for a functional marketplace of ideas when using and exercising soft power. Similarly to the functional marketplace, Chong (2010) referred to the medium being of relevance. The medium referred to by Chong (2010) is the use of communication and technology to interface and through which the presence of the actor may be enlarged. It is the view of Chong (2010) that these mediums may be used by small states to virtually enlarge their presence, in a soft power way.

Kroenig et al. (2010) suggested that where a functioning marketplace does not exist, then perhaps the creation of such a marketplace may be a precondition, in that the party wishing to use soft power may have to shape the marketplace or context such that it is more receptive to receiving the message. It is suggested by Kroenig et al. (2010) that advocating for a freer media and reduced censorship may facilitate such a marketplace. An example of a functioning marketplace of ideas, as stated by Kroenig et al. (2010) is the promotion of democracy among states that have undergone electoral revolutions. It was determined by Kroenig et al. (2010) that due to the experience of the electoral revolutions, these states were functional marketplaces of ideas for the purpose of the American democracy campaign. Additionally, Kroenig et al. (2010) argue that the United States failed to influence the Iraqi public mainly due to the environment or context being unsuitable for the exercise of soft power. It is this open functional marketplace, as described by Kroenig et al. (2010) that is referred to as the context for the purpose of this research.

In summary, a functional marketplace of ideas is therefore one where the message is perceived as attractive, competition for ideas is facilitated, communication is facilitated and authoritarian rule is not present. The discussion surrounding a functional marketplace of ideas or context that is more conducive to the use of soft power leads to the second research proposition.

Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

2.2.8 Target attitude

The second condition of the framework set out by Kroenig et al. (2010), which is the third precondition to the framework established by this research is a psychological or behavioural one, which refers to the attitude of the target. A message received within a functional marketplace of ideas must result in a changed attitude of the target that receives such message. According to Kroenig et al. (2010), the attitude of the target

must be receptive to the change. This condition involves the element of persuasion, in that the communication must result in the target being persuaded to change its attitude.

According to Kroenig et al. (2010), there are three factors which determine the probability of attitude change. The first two factors relate to the message. The source of the message must be “credible and attractive” (Kroenig et al., 2010, p. 415) and the message must be “repeated and contain[s] emotional content” (p. 415). The credibility of the source involves a component of trust and independence. It is more likely that a target will be receptive to a source, if such a source were an independent third party with no self-interest in the outcome of the message being communicated. The frequency and content of the message is an important determinant for attitude change (Kroenig et al., 2010). A repeated message is more likely to be better received and accepted. This is evident with advertising, where success can be achieved through a highly repeated message. Lastly, the target’s level of self-esteem and mood are also factors that affect attitude change (Kroenig et al., 2010). According to Kroenig et al. (2010), low esteem and a good mood are more conducive to persuasion.

These three factors are psychological factors which could have a material impact on the deployment of soft power by a state. The psychological nature and complexity surrounding these factors requires further study and analysis which is beyond the scope of this research.

2.2.9 Influential actors and levels of soft power

The third condition is that the change in attitude must cause or result in the desired outcome, which in the context described by Kroenig et al. (2010) is an international political outcome. This condition is therefore concerned with the target and whether that target is capable of influencing the relevant outcome. It requires an influential actor. From a state perspective, these states must target influential actors who are capable of generating the change or outcome that the state desires. There are different categories of influential actors that include an individual (although rarely) or an elite (Kroenig et al., 2010). Li and Worm (2011) have an expanded view of influential actors or targets, which is combined with the level of soft power variable.

Kurlantzick (as cited by Li and Worm, 2011) argued that soft power may be categorised into high soft power and low soft power depending on the target. If the soft power was targeted at political elites, then high soft power would be required, with the converse being a target of the general public, requiring low soft power.

It is assumed for the purpose of this research study and given the setting of states exercising soft power within MLOs that a high level soft power is required and that such power should be projected at political elites.

2.2.10 Common interests

In the discussion surrounding influential actors, Kroenig et al. (2010) argued that the message must be consistent with the target's material interests. If the message is consistent with the material interests of the target or not in direct conflict with such material interests, then the probability of success of such soft power is greater (Kroenig et al., 2010). Kroenig et al. (2010) discussed the example of the United States' effort to occupy Iraq. This was in conflict with the material interests of the Iraqi people to maintain their sovereignty and their efforts therefore failed.

The condition related to the material interests of the target is linked to the principle of common interest as discussed by Bjorkdahl (2007) and Gron and Wivel (2011). It is this principle of common interest which may be an important condition under which the use of soft power may be more successful.

Gron and Wivel (2011) argued that states should, in the case of the EU, present their issue as being within the common interest of the EU members. Kroenig et al. (2010), in contrast to Gron and Wivel (2011) contended that in order for a target to change its attitude or be influenced, the issue must be within the material interests of the target. The material interest concept refers to an issue which is not in direct conflict with the main interests of the target and not necessarily being the same or common interests with that of the target.

Gron and Wivel (2011) discussed the avoidance of a conflict of interest with proposals "from any of the big EU member states" (p. 529). This raises an argument about whether small states should ensure that they present a proposal which is in the common interest of the larger states or in the common interests of a larger number of states or that which does not conflict with the material interests. In the EU this presents a challenge for small states, as the decision making policies of the EU have shifted from being that of a simple majority basis to being on a size basis (Gron & Wivel, 2011). The arguments presented by both Gron and Wivel (2011) and Kroenig et al. (2010) raised the question about whether the proposal made by small states should align to the common interests or the material interests. The alignment with common interests is a broader and more involved degree of alignment than simply avoiding a

conflict with the material interests of a state. This leads to the following research proposition.

Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

This principle of common interests is particularly relevant within regional MLOs, as was the case of the EU (Gron & Wivel, 2011).

2.2.11 Types of soft power strategies

The strategy utilised by a state would depend on the strength of a state's soft power resources and the context within which the soft power is being exercised. The challenges faced by small states in international negotiations, include lower levels of resources, both administrative and financial (Gron & Wivel, 2011; Panke, 2012a). The lower level of resources may inhibit the negotiation power of these states due to, among other things, smaller delegations dedicated to the issues and lower levels of activity (Panke, 2012a).

Firstly, in order to ensure that resources are used effectively, such states should define and prioritise their goals and focus (Gron & Wivel, 2011; Panke, 2012a). Secondly, as argued by Gron and Wivel (2011), states should present their issue as being within the common interest of the grouping. Thirdly, according to Gron and Wivel (2011), small states should attempt to reach agreement or consensus among the large states on any given proposal that it puts forward, through mediation activities.

Gron and Wivel (2011) suggested a departure from the traditional small state strategy, which accepts the weaknesses of small states towards a smart state strategy of using the weaknesses to gain influence. According to Gron and Wivel (2011) small states fly under the radar as they are not viewed as threats to larger states and therefore have a greater "freedom of action" (p. 530). Bishop (2012) referred to the moral influence of small states and the ability of such states to influence due to a lack of involvement in setting the rules of international arenas.

Gron and Wivel (2011) explored three different smart state strategies being, the state as a lobbyist, the state as a self-interested mediator and the state as a norm entrepreneur.

The lobbyist role is derived through possessing expert knowledge and the use of diplomats or order to gain access to influential institutions. Gron and Wivel (2011) suggested that the Commission and Parliament of the EU be targeted in pursuing the lobbyist role. The small state can, according to Gron and Wivel (2011), use the consensus philosophy of the EU to broker or mediate negotiations among larger states that further their own interests. This strategy involves a degree of prioritisation and according to Panke (2012a) may be more successful where states are regarded as impartial. The impartiality was discussed further by Kroenig et al. (2010) as being an obstacle to a state wielding soft power, in that the state needed to be seen as credible. This was evident in the case of the United States in Iraq, where the Iraqis did not regard the United States as credible due to their self-interested pursuits.

In addition to the above strategies, some of the persuasive strategies identified by Panke (2012a) included framing or re-framing the argument to influence the negotiation process, using causal, moral, legal or technical arguments and coalition building. Panke (2012b) discussed prioritisation, the applicable voting system and capacity building initiatives as being conditions that play a prominent role in determining the level of influence of small states within international organisations.

Framing or re-framing is the defining of the argument or imminent issue by setting the parameters, linking the problem to a line of action and assigning responsibility for resolving the problem (Bjorkdahl, 2007; Panke, 2012a). States may be able to manipulate the negotiation process through the use of this strategy, in that they frame the issue in the best possible light to achieve their outcomes (Panke, 2012a). The manner in which the issue is perceived could play a role in the persuasive ability of the state targeting such issues (Panke, 2012a). This strategy may be better suited to small states that have little self-interest or can demonstrate a common interest (Bjorkdahl, 2007; Panke, 2012a).

Causal, technical, moral or legal arguing is the method employed by a party to influence the negotiation outcome. The appropriateness of the type of argument is dependent on the expertise of the small state and the nature of the issue (Panke, 2012a). The technical and legal arguments would require the relevant expertise (Panke, 2012a). This strategy may be useful to small states where they possess the specific expertise and are, by reputation, regarded as experts (Panke, 2012a). Panke (2012a) argued that small states may be better positioned than large states to make moral arguments, as they may be regarded as more impartial due to their size.

According to Panke (2012b), the use of arguments and framing strategies was most useful when a state had sufficient information and good reasons.

One of the strategies discussed by Lee and Smith (2010), Vickers (2011) and Panke (2012a) that may be highly relevant given the multilateral context of this research is coalition building. Panke (2012a) referred to "winning coalitions or blocking minorities" (pp. 321), which is referred to by Keohane (1969) as alliances of small states. Small states form a group or bloc of minorities, in order to increase the level of their presence and reach, on a collective basis, thereby influencing the outcome of the negotiations. It was Keohane's (1969) observation that small states were ineffectual on their own and that they needed to act on a large, collective basis in order to succeed. Vickers (2011) refers to such strategies by small states as creative and effective within the World Trade Organisation. The example of small states using coalition building strategies as a defiance strategy against the practices of the WTO is discussed by Lee and Smith (2010).

Coalition building therefore enabled these states to gain a larger voice in negotiation settings and to shape outcomes. The number of states comprising the coalition is of relevance, with the strength being derived from larger numbers. Coalition building is also more effective where the members have similar or common interests (Panke, 2012b). Different types of coalition building strategies were identified by Braveboy-Wagner (2010) which included creating allies with great powers, creating allies with small states, maintaining neutrality or non-alignment. These types of coalition building strategies may be pursued by small states.

Agenda-setting, as discussed by Bjorkdahl (2007) is an introduction of a new idea or placing an issue at the forefront of discussions. According to Bjorkdahl (2007), this strategy was most useful when a state possessed expertise and knowledge. It may also be driven through occupying positions of authority within multilateral settings, such as the chair of an organisation. Panke (2012b) discussed the need for states that occupy such positions to maintain a balance between their position of authority and appearing to be too self-interested. This balance referred to maintaining impartiality.

Chong (2010) and Bjorkdahl (2007) referred to the strategy of diplomatic mediation, which is the role played by states to resolve disputes using negotiation tactics. This is the type of situation where the independence of the state plays an important role in the outcome of the diplomatic mediation. According to Chong (2010) and Panke (2012a),

small states that appear to be detached from a matter may be better positioned for negotiation in the settlement of a dispute or conflict required for diplomatic mediation.

The lobbyist, agenda setting, coalition building and arguing strategies are dependent on the setting within which they are exercised.

Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context.

2.3 Conclusion

The information reviewed revealed a gap in the literature, as there is no causal mechanism for the conversion of soft power sources to realised soft power. It was this gap that was explored through a conceptual analysis of soft power and its limitations. The difficulties in measuring the outcomes of soft power were discussed and the alternatives that emerged from the literature were discussed.

The theory established by Kroenig et al. (2010) was analysed and debated. This theory established preconditions for the use of soft power. It is this theory that is intended to be expanded by this research study. The theory of Kroenig et al. (2010) was limited in its application to a single state, in particular, the United States. This application restricted the theory from a more general application, in that it could only be applied on a single state basis and excluded, among other things, specific soft power sources of a state. This research study is intended to develop the theory such that it is generalizable across countries, globally, in order that it may be used by small states within MLOs. This research is intended to apply the six pillar framework to analyse soft power sources and to develop a strategic component to apply specific strategies, in order to convert the soft power sources into realised soft power.

Proposed conditions for the use of soft power, being open markets and open communication and the common interest approach were discussed and emerged as research propositions. Soft power strategies and their conditions for use, which emerged from the literature, were presented.

The literature from which the propositions were formulated has been presented, including the literature that pertains to the soft power pillars, the level of openness of markets and communication, the common interest principle and identified soft power

strategies. These propositions, as set out in Chapter 3 are tested more rigorously in this research study.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

The purpose of this research, as explained in Chapter 1, was twofold. Firstly, it was to understand and analyse soft power strategies used by small states in multilateral settings. Secondly, it was to develop a framework that describes the manner in which soft power strategies could be used by such states within the context of multilateral settings. Chapter 2 discussed the literature surrounding soft power, the sources of soft power in the form of the six pillars and the different types of soft power strategies. The research propositions set out below emerged from the literature review, as supported by the rationale for the research and the objectives set out in Chapter 1. The research propositions were clustered into categories. Research proposition one pertained to the category of soft power sources. Research proposition two referred to the category of the context. Research proposition three related to common interest as a condition for the use of soft power. Research proposition four applied to the category of soft power strategies combined with the context and the soft power sources. This research aims to investigate the following research propositions:

- **Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars.**
- **Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power.**
- **Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power.**
- **Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context.**

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This research was conducted using a qualitative method and a multiple case study approach. This approach enabled the researcher to meet the research objective of formulating a typology of soft power strategies and developing a practical framework for the use of soft power.

4.2 Research design

4.2.1 Qualitative

A qualitative approach is an open-ended, flexible approach to research which is useful to gain deeper insights and meanings and to explore complex concepts (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2009). Qualitative approaches are better suited to flexible and exploratory studies as opposed to structured and scientific studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The research objectives, as set out in Chapter 1, were to gain a deeper understanding of soft power strategies that have been used by small states, with the view of developing a soft power strategy framework. This objective involved a certain degree of speculation and exploration into the subject matter. The qualitative method was therefore better suited to understanding the complex concepts of this research.

4.2.2 Inductive approach

The approach used for the purposes of this research was a combination of an induction and a deduction approach. Teale (as cited by Perry, 2001) discussed a pure induction approach which is where no prior theory is used and the research is fully exploratory. Deduction involves the testing of existing theory (Perry, 2001). The middle ground, as identified by Perry (2001), is where the researcher confirms or disconfirms a theory using case research. With this research study, observations were made about possible theories through the literature review in Chapter 2, which included theories that were

unconfirmed and required further data in order to develop such theories into a framework.

The deductive approach of this research utilised multiple case study analysis. As stated by Wocke (2005), the case study approach involves a comparative analysis of cases on a conceptual basis. As identified by Saunders and Lewis (2012), the case study approach is suitable for exploratory research, where the researcher desires a superior understanding of the context. The context was highly relevant to this research as it involved a special case being that of multilateral settings of selected organisations.

This research therefore aimed to conduct an explorative study of the literature and through an interview process and case study analysis, discovered which soft power strategies have been used and how they have been used.

4.2.3 Case research approach

The specific qualitative approach selected for this research was the multiple case research approach. According to Perry (2001), the case research approach is suitable to research problems that involve questions of “how and why?” (p. 305). As set out in Chapter 1, this research was constructed around the main question, “how do small states use soft power sources within MLOs?” In addition the research provided justification for the use of soft power by small states, by answering the question of why the soft power should be used.

According to Eisenhardt (1989), case study research is useful to build theory or to develop grounded theory. The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed a gap in the literature, in that a causal mechanism for the conversion of soft power sources into realised soft power had not been established. This research set out to develop such causal framework using a multiple case study approach. Eisenhardt (1989) established a detailed process to build theory from case study research, which processes were followed, as this was applicable in this research.

In accordance with the process set out by Eisenhardt (1989), the research questions were broadly defined in Chapter 1, which is step one of the process. This enabled a better focus of this research. Preconditions and strategic variables were identified through the literature review. It was intended that the variables and the relationships between them would be tested and firmly established through the research process, involving the data collection and analysis.

The case research approach is useful in analysing a case from within, in order to fully understand the context and to develop new theory or elaborate upon existing theory (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Theories have emerged from the literature review in Chapter 2, which were elaborated upon to develop new theories for the purpose of this research. Case research is appropriate to studies where the causal links that it wishes to establish are too complex for questionnaires, with the result that multiple answers may be derived from single questions (Eisenhardt, 1989). The nature of this study is complex and it is necessary to explore multiple views in order to achieve the outcomes of this study.

Dyer and Wilkins (as cited by Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008) state that the purpose of case research is to completely explore the contexts of the case study from a number of perspectives, including economic, social and cultural. This contextual approach lends itself to a “thick description” (p. 120), which is rich and considers the data from many angles (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). It was this multifaceted approach that was used to determine the framework for this research.

This approach helped in better understanding the manner in which small states have used soft power strategies within the context of multilateral settings. The context is highly relevant to this research because strategies may be more effective in certain multilateral settings than others.

4.3 Research strategy

This strategy was guided by the objectives, which are delineated in Chapter 1. It was intended that the multiple case study analysis be conducted across four different countries and MLOs worldwide.

4.3.1 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was a selection of small states within MLOs.

4.3.2 Population and sampling

The population or universe for the purposes of this research was small states. The sample selected did not constitute a finite or complete list or sample frame, which is required for a probability sample (Saunders & Lewis, 2012). A non-probability sampling technique was therefore used.

4.3.3 Sampling technique

Step two of the process, as defined by Eisenhardt (1989) was the selection of cases, which involved defining the population and selecting the cases according to theoretical sampling. Glaser and Strauss (as cited by Eisenhardt, 1989) raised the important point of cases being selected to fulfil theoretical reasons and not statistical reasons. For the purpose of this research, cases were chosen to fill theoretical categories. Theoretical sampling is a type of sampling technique that aims to obtain data that fills or develops the categories (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). It is not intended to be representative of the population for statistical analysis.

The cases selected are states that fall within the definition of the small state, set out in Chapter 1 and which have had an influence on different MLOs globally. The smallness of these states was determined on a relative basis in relation to the context of the MLOs that they belong to.

The number of samples or cases selected had to be determined. It was recommended by Perry (2001) that the minimum number of case studies should be between two and four and the maximum, between ten and fifteen. The number of cases selected was four, which satisfied the sample size requirements and was determined feasible given the time available to conduct this research.

The process followed to select these cases was a two stage process. Firstly, four MLOs were selected. The criteria for these MLOs were that:

- the organisations have a distribution of small and large countries as its members;
- the organisations were global organisations with members from a variety of countries and were therefore highly representative;
- two of the organisations were regional MLOs, with its members being restricted to specific regions. These organisations were ASEAN and the EU;
- two of the organisations were non-regional MLOs, with its members not being restricted to a specific region. These organisations, being BRICS and the G20 comprise members on different continents;
- these organisations were characterised by active involvement of its members, in the form of summits, trade agreements and specific agendas that drive their activity; and

- the activities of these organisations could be measured in terms of tangible outcomes, such as summits, agendas and agreements.

The size or influence distribution of the MLOs enabled the identification of strategies used specifically by small member states. The global and regional and non-regional distributions of member states facilitated the generalisation of the framework which emerged.

Secondly, the states or unit of analyses selected were small states when compared to other states within the respective groupings. These states therefore filled the category of a small state, being the theoretical sample. In addition these states all actively pursued a soft power strategy and used the soft power sources at their disposal. The states also satisfied the criteria of possessing soft power sources or the pillars as identified in Chapter 2. This sampling is therefore theoretical, as propounded by Eisenhardt (1989) and not random sampling.

The MLOs that were selected were the G20, the EU, ASEAN and BRICS. The four countries that were analysed for this research were Mexico within the G20, Poland within the EU, Singapore within ASEAN and South Africa within BRICS.

The table below includes some comparative descriptors and indicators of the countries selected in relation to each other.

Table 1: Comparison of country descriptors and statistics

Indicators	Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
MLO	G20	EU	ASEAN	BRICS
Continental country region	North America	Europe	Asia	Africa
Developed status	Developing	Developed	Developing	Developing
Income level	Upper middle income	High income	High income	Upper middle income
Land area (sq. km)	1,943,950	304,150	700	1,213,090
Population	120.8 million	38.54 million	5.312 million	51.19 million
GDP (USD)	1.178 trillion	489.8 billion	274.7 billion	384.3 billion
GDP per capita (USD)	9,747	12,708	51,709	7,508

Note: The land area is from World Bank (2011); the population is from World Bank (2012a); the GDP is from World Bank (2012b); and the GDP per capita is from World Bank (2012c).

The table below includes some comparative indicators of Mexico in relation to some of the larger states within G20.

Table 2: Mexico and larger states within G20

Indicators	Mexico	United Kingdom	United States
Developed status	Developing	Developed	Developed
Income level	Upper middle income	High income	High income
Land area (sq. km)	1,943,950	241,930	9,147,420
Population	120.8 million	63.23 million	313.9 million
GDP (USD)	1.178 trillion	2.435 trillion	15.68 trillion
GDP per capita (USD)	9,747	38,514	49,965

Note: The land area is from World Bank (2011); the population is from World Bank (2012a); the GDP is from World Bank (2012b); and the GDP per capita is from World Bank (2012c).

The table below includes some comparative indicators of Poland in relation to some of the larger states within the EU.

Table 3: Poland and larger states within EU

Indicators	Poland	France	Germany
Developed status	Developed	Developed	Developed
Income level	High income	High income	High income
Land area (sq. km)	304,150	547,660	348,570
Population	38.54 million	65.7 million	81.89 million
GDP (USD)	489.8 billion	2.613 trillion	3.4 trillion
GDP per capita (USD)	12,708	39,772	41,514

Note: The land area is from World Bank (2011); the population is from World Bank (2012a); the GDP is from World Bank (2012b); and the GDP per capita is from World Bank (2012c).

The table below includes some comparative indicators of Singapore in relation to some of the larger states within ASEAN.

Table 4: Singapore and larger states within ASEAN

Indicators	Singapore	Indonesia	Thailand
Developed status	Developing	Developing	Developing
Income level	High income	Lower middle income	Upper middle income
Land area (sq. km)	700	1,811,570	510,890
Population	5.312 million	246.9 million	66.79 million
GDP (USD)	274.7 billion	878.2 billion	366 billion
GDP per capita	51,709	3,557	5,480

(USD)			
-------	--	--	--

Note: The land area is from World Bank (2011); the population is from World Bank (2012a); the GDP is from World Bank (2012b); and the GDP per capita is from World Bank (2012c).

The table below includes some comparative indicators of South Africa in relation to some of the larger states within BRICS.

Table 5: South Africa and larger states within BRICS

Indicators	South Africa	China	India
Developed status	Developing	Developing	Developing
Income level	Upper middle income	Upper middle income	Lower middle income
Land area (sq. km)	1,213,090	9,327,489.9	2,973,190
Population	51.19 million	1.351 billion	1.237 billion
GDP (USD)	384.3 billion	8.358 trillion	1.842 trillion
GDP per capita (USD)	7,508	6,188	1,489

Note: The land area is from World Bank (2011); the population is from World Bank (2012a); the GDP is from World Bank (2012b); and the GDP per capita is from World Bank (2012c).

4.4 Data collection

Step three of the Eisenhardt (1989) process stated that case study analysis be conducted through a combination of data collection methods, which may include observations, interviews, questionnaires and archives. The use of multiple methods or sources of data as described by Eisenhardt (1989) enabled triangulation, which enhanced the credibility of the research conducted.

Data was collected from secondary data sources, semi-structured interviews and from media sources. Secondary data sources included the World Bank and the World Economic Forum ("WEF") report on global competitiveness. Country data analysed included secondary data from the interviews to assess the strength of a country's soft power source in relation to the six pillars, exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP and population size among the countries selected.

Six face-to-face interviews were conducted with a combination of country representatives based in South Africa and researchers and academics, during August and September 2013. Four country representatives were interviewed, representing each of Mexico, Poland, Singapore and South Africa. These representatives have offices in South Africa and were each involved in some way in the promotion of their

respective countries in South Africa and the facilitation of information exchange and trade between South Africa and their represented country. Their role as ambassadors and country representatives positioned them as experts on their countries and each country's relations with South Africa.

Two interviews were conducted with academics and researchers who are experienced in international relations and have knowledge on the countries selected and the multilateral institutions of which they are members. Their knowledge and experience positioned these individuals as experts for the purposes of this research. The data obtained from these interviews were used to support the data obtained from the country representative interviews.

The positions held by all respondents within their respective organisations have been disclosed with these individuals' consent. In most cases the names of these individuals have been disclosed. Confidentiality was therefore not an issue when collecting data for this research study. This information together with the titles assigned to each respondent is furnished in the table below.

Table 6: List of respondents

Name of respondent	Organisation	Role of respondent	Type of expert	Reference
Hector Valezzi	Embassy of Mexico in South Africa	Ambassador of Mexico	Country Representative	Mexican Ambassador
Ryszard Nowosielski	Embassy of the Republic of Poland	Commercial Counsellor	Country Representative	Polish Commercial Counsellor
K. R. Nithianandum	High Commission of the Republic of Singapore	Deputy High Commissioner	Country Representative	Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore
Undisclosed	Department of International Relations and Cooperation	Director: BRICS	Country Representative	Director of BRICS South Africa
Dr Lyal White	Gordon Institute of Business Science	Senior Faculty: Director for the Centre for Dynamic Markets	Professional Expert	Expert 1
Memory Dube	South African Institute of International Affairs	Senior Researcher – Economic Diplomacy Program	Professional Expert	Expert 2

The interviews were conducted face-to-face at the offices of each of the respondents. The interviews lasted about an hour each, as per the statistics provided in the table below.

Table 7: Interview statistics

Description	Quantity
Number of interviews	6
Length of all interviews	367 minutes
Average length of interview	61.17 minutes
Shortest interview	37.17 minutes
Longest interview	96 minutes
Average length of transcripts	19 pages
Shortest transcript	15 pages
Longest transcript	24 pages

All participants were eager to participate in the interviews and expressed a deep interest in the research being conducted. Access to individuals was in most cases not problematic. The information obtained from the individuals enabled the propositions to be tested and satisfied the objectives of the research.

The interview process was partially controlled with the respondents through a set of themes related to the propositions identified. A completely structured interview approach with a defined set of questions was not suited to this study's complex and exploratory nature. Actual questions posed to respondents varied and were adapted according to the responses received (Saunders & Lewis, 2012). In order to gain further insight, the types of questions asked were mainly probing type questions.

Each respondent was sent an information pack that included a consent letter (Appendix A), a letter from the University confirming that the researcher was a student and was conducting research (Appendix B) and a set of indicative questions that would be asked during the face-to-face interview, a sample of which is attached hereto as Appendix C. These questions provided the respondents with an enhanced idea of the direction and focus of the discussion. This proved to be quite useful, as it enabled some of the respondents to mentally prepare how they wished to discuss the more complex questions. All of the respondents did not however answer all of the questions.

The approach was to triangulate these various sources of data in order to ensure more consistent and reliable findings. This approach was used to eliminate the errors and biases which may result from a single dimensional approach.

Step four of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was to enter the field, and this involved an overlap between data analysis and data collection. Van Maanen (as cited by Eisenhardt, 1989) referred to the use of field notes, running commentary and constant observation and analysis. It was this technique of a combination of analysis and collection through observation and notes that was used. Detailed hand-written notes were taken during each of the interviews, which assisted the process of observation and analysis and confirmed any inaccuracies in the transcripts. Each of the interviews was audio recorded, with the subjects' prior written and verbal permission. These audio recordings were later transcribed, which aided in increased, detailed analysis.

4.5 Data management

The data collected through the semi-structured interviews was backed-up electronically on an electronic audio device and virtually through cloud computing services. Electronic mail and external hard drives were also used to maintain additional back-ups of such data and to ensure that the data was secured at all times. These storage mechanisms further ensured that the data would be available for any future research.

4.6 Data analysis

Step five of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was the analysis of within case data. Within case analysis helped to analyse the volumes of data through detailed and descriptive case study summaries. Graphical and tabular data tracking the categorical data, as identified by Miles and Huberman (cited in Eisenhardt, 1989) also assisted with this analysis. The aim with this type of analysis was to become familiar with each case as a "stand-alone entity" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540). This type of analysis was documented in Chapter 5, with each case summarised comprehensively on an individual, objective basis. This within case analysis enabled the identification of patterns of each case prior to the cross-case analysis, which follows in Chapter 6.

Step six of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was the search for cross-case patterns. This step was based on the assumption that people process information poorly by prematurely reaching conclusions, thereby rendering such conclusions false. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested developing categories to search for similarities and differences across cases. The categories chosen for this research was the six pillars.

Each of the cases selected were analysed across each of the six pillars to identify similarities and differences, which are discussed in Chapter 6. In addition to the six pillars, categories were formed through the propositions, which were used to analyse the data in Chapter 6.

Step seven of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was the shaping of hypotheses, which in this research study refers to research propositions. The process described by Eisenhardt (1989) was an iterative process that involved comparing the data to theory in order to arrive at an appropriate connection between data and theory. With this research, propositions were reviewed and these were initially developed as guiding propositions.

Step seven of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was a comparison of emerging literature or theory with existing literature. This process involved the identification of similarities and differences between the emerging theory and existing theory. It is this process, according to Eisenhardt (1989) which lends itself to improved internal validity and the generalising of theory.

Step eight of the process identified by Eisenhardt (1989) was reaching closure, which occurred when the saturation point for data and theory had been reached. With case saturation, it occurred when no further insights would be derived from adding further cases. With this research study, the number of cases selected was four. Data saturation had been reached for the propositions being investigated. Theory and data saturation referred to the point where further iterations between the theory and the data were no longer possible because no further insights were gleaned.

4.7 Data validity and reliability

According to Saunders and Lewis (2012), factors that threaten the internal validity of research include subject selection, history, testing, mortality and ambiguity about causal direction. The subjects of this research study were selected from different geographical areas and MLOs, which improved the validity of the subject selection. There were no historical or current events that impacted on the findings of this research. The testing or data collection process did not result in any biases on the part of the respondents. Mortality did not play a role as the research was not dependent on any specific respondents. Causal direction did not play a role in this study.

External validity and reliability of this study was maintained through a process of triangulation of a number of data sources and through the multiple case study approach. These data sources included data from semi-structured interviews, secondary data from existing data bases, such as the World Bank and the WEF, journal articles, media articles and general observations. The number of data sources improved the external validity of the research and enhanced the consistency of findings (Saunders & Lewis, 2012). The use of the multiple case study approach enhanced the degree to which the findings are generalizable across a number of contexts.

The interviews were conducted with country and industry experts. Questions and relevant theory were discussed and explained with the respondents, which ensured that the respondents had an accurate understanding of the topic. The limitations of this research are discussed in the section that follows.

4.8 Research limitations

The limitations of this research related to the exploratory nature of the study, the case study approach, researcher bias and time constraints. The limitations of the qualitative approach are that it can often result in imprecise results, due to its openness and unstructured nature.

The limitations of the case study approach are that it can be too complex, with a large volume of data (Eisenhardt, 1989). This may lead to difficulties in assessing relationships. Researcher bias is possible with the qualitative approach, which is more subjective and which may result in findings that are biased in favour of the researcher (Zikmund et al., 2009). It is for this reason that an approach involving the triangulation of data sources was used. A decision regarding the number of respondents to be interviewed was made, taking into account the time constraints. A larger sample would have been possible, had more time been available. However, the level and amount of data obtained from the respondents was sufficiently rich and detailed to test the propositions.

4.9 Conclusion

The data collected through the process and method set out in this chapter were sufficient to test the propositions set out in Chapter 3. The sample was of adequate size to meet the theoretical sampling criteria set out in this chapter. The respondents

were professionals and experts regarding the subject matter being tested and the interviews with such respondents yielded a rich quality of data to meet the research objectives set out in Chapter 1. The chapter which follows presents the findings from the interviews and the various secondary data sources, in alignment with the research propositions.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

5.1 Introduction to results

The results set out in this chapter are presented using the propositions stated in Chapter 3. The methodology set out in Chapter 4 emphasised that this research involved a multiple case research approach. As mentioned, four MLOs were selected and four small states within such MLOs were selected. The chapter that follows provides a description of each of these countries and organisations on an independent, objective basis. The information obtained on each of these settings emerged from the semi-structured interviews, secondary data sources including the World Bank and the WEF, various media and other sources. The data for each country and organisation is presented in alignment with the propositions identified in Chapter 3.

5.2 Research propositions

The four research propositions are discussed in relation to each of the case studies, in the order of Mexico, Poland, Singapore and South Africa. The research propositions are:

- **Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars.**
- **Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power.**
- **Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power.**
- **Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context.**

5.3 Mexico

Mexico is classified as a small state for the purposes of this research, within the context of the G20, due to its status of being a middle income and a developing nation when compared with the G7 members (Martinez-Diaz, 2007). The developing nation

status of Mexico results in it possessing a disproportionate level of power in relation to the more mature or developed G7 members of this grouping.

According to Euromonitor International (Euromonitor International, 2012a), Mexico is classified as the world's fifth largest emerging market. It is a member of NAFTA and of the G20. It was harshly affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, possibly as a result of its dependence on the United States (Euromonitor International, 2012a). The major risks to the Mexican economy emerge from poor public finance management, poor management of energy and high levels of violence. The strengths of Mexico lie in the stability of its financial system and its open policies towards investments (Euromonitor International, 2012a). The country learnt from its own economic crisis in 1994, by strengthening its financial system, to include better risk management and higher banking reserves (Euromonitor International, 2012a).

Mexico is the largest exporter in Latin America and the 20th largest exporter globally (Euromonitor International, 2012a). Despite such high levels of export, Mexico has had a trade deficit since 1997. The Mexican economy is an attractive FDI destination due to its large consumer market, access to North America through NAFTA and open foreign investment policies (Euromonitor International, 2012a).

5.3.1 The G20

The G20 was established in 1999, in response to the Asian financial crisis, to transform the global governance system in order to better manage the crisis and to generally stabilise the financial system (Martinez-Diaz, 2007; Qobo & Dube, 2012). The G20 is an extension of the G7 and according to *Expert 2*, "the G8 actually runs the G20".

The G20 comprises the G8 members, namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States and the non-G8 members, namely Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the European Union.

The G20 comprises a mix of developing and developed nations as its members. This combination of countries is, according to the Mexican Ambassador, "the 20 most influential countries in the world".

Members were originally represented at the G20 via finance ministers, which has since changed to head of state representation (Russia's G20 Presidency). This

representation by heads of state, according to *Expert 2* results in the G20 having “*more credence ... more weight*”.

There appears to be two shifts in the G20, in that its members include more developing nations or emerging markets and it appears to be exercising more global power and influence. In addition, the G20 when compared to other, larger international organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation appears to function more effectively and efficiently. This is supported by the following comment by the Mexican Ambassador: “*but these twenty economies, countries, I mean is much more easier to deal with, instead of dealing with 195 countries in the world*”.

In recent times, following the 2008 financial crisis, the agenda of the G20 has been to support other international governance institutions through, for instance, raising additional funding for the IMF. Some of the reformations implemented by the G20 included a shift in the quotas of the IMF and the World Bank to include the representation and voting power of more developing nations (Qobo & Dube, 2012).

Developing countries have increased their activity within the G20. The factors that may promote the influence of developing countries within the G20 include developing countries outnumbering developed countries, being the G8 countries and the rotating chairperson position of the G20 which allows developing countries to be the host country of the G20 for a year (Martinez-Diaz, 2007). The holding of positions of authority allows the host country to introduce their own special interests as agendas for the summits (Martinez-Diaz, 2007).

The factors that prevent the developing countries from gaining influence within the G20 include outcomes being decided on a consensus basis rather than a voting basis, that the G7 has more resources, which allows them to better shape the agendas, conduct more research and develop better positions; that the G7 is able to rely on its membership of other networks such as the IMF and the UN; that the G7 holds its own meetings prior to the G20 summits, which allows them to develop a common agenda and consolidated position; and that the G7 has regular communication and meetings (Martinez-Diaz, 2007).

5.3.2 Mexico within the G20

According to Oxfam (Oxfam Mexico, 2012), Mexico as the host of the G20 2012 Summit raised the significant issues of poverty through food security, infrastructure and

green growth. The focus on these issues is indicative of a small state using its position as chair of the G20 to drive the agenda. According to Oxfam (Oxfam Mexico, 2012), holding the chair does not appear to have resulted in Mexico gaining sufficient influence, in that the outcomes do not appear to have been served. This criticism by Oxfam (Oxfam Mexico, 2012) of the Mexican presidency is tempered by the nature of the agenda set by Mexico. The elements of food security, infrastructure and green growth are long-term targets, which takes years to achieve. The lack of influence of Mexico within the G20 appears to be confirmed by the following comment by *Expert 1*: *"Mexico's role in the G20 is not as influential as what it probably wishes it was"*.

5.3.3 Results: Research proposition one – The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Cultural attractiveness

From a cultural perspective, the Mexican Ambassador explained that the tourism industry is significant and diverse. According to the Mexican Ambassador: *"I would say that where culture and economies are linked, the most is in the tourism industry"*. Closely linked to tourism is the attractiveness of the Mexican beaches, entertainment, food and archaeological sites. Food was specifically singled out as an attractive feature of the Mexican culture, which has in recent times expanded to other areas, including the Southern US. The Mexican Ambassador also emphasised the language of Spanish as being highly significant, due to the commonality with the United States and Latin America. The Mexican Ambassador commented that: *"Mexico has become the biggest country, Spanish-speaking country in the world"*. It is this common language which could be of significance to international relations within global MLOs, such as the G20. It becomes apparent from these findings that Mexico has a rich culture which is characterised by many cultural and geographical assets.

Political values

The political values that were discussed by the Mexican Ambassador include the struggle for independence, the implementation of the constitution and the democratic environment of Mexico. Mexico has undergone significant transitions which led to an open economy of current times. According to the Mexican Ambassador: *"It was a democracy, but not perfect at all. It was a democracy with electoral fraud.... The candidate of the party was chosen by the president who was in force. He has the last word on who was going to be the candidate of the party and so it was not a full*

democracy". It appears then that the Mexican democracy is not without its flaws, which impacts negatively on the political value pillar.

Corruption, lack of transparency and poor law enforcement are serious concerns for Mexico, which are evidenced by the poor rankings of Mexico on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, as set out in Table 8 below. These acts may pose a threat to governmental stability.

Development model

The Mexican Ambassador described the development model of Mexico as that of good trade policy, openness and responsibility. It also includes infrastructure and capacity building initiatives. Mexico fared quite well on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index, as set out in Table 8 below. Mexico performed well on the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom in 2013, which measures, among other things, property rights and entrepreneurship. Despite the fair ranking on this index, the business environment of Mexico is characterised by weak institutions, rigid labour practices, violence and corruption (Euromonitor International, 2012a).

There are many monopolies in the telecommunication, media, beer and cement industries that further restrict the openness of Mexico's economy (Sharma, 2012a). Mexico is controlled by family-run tycoons. The large power of the oligopolies results in fast-paced stock market growth, but in slow economic growth, much like in South Africa (Sharma, 2012a).

International institutions

Mexico is actively involved in international institutions, particularly the G20, where it has hosted summits and meetings. Some of the issues that it drives in the international arena as commented by the Mexican Ambassador are that: *"Mexico is particularly keen in participating human rights. For instance their transformation of the commission on human rights into our council was done by Mexican diplomats"*. This was in reference to the United Nations Council on Human Rights.

International image

The international image of Mexico, as described by the Mexican Ambassador is a peace-keeping nation, which actively seeks the protection of its people. Examples of this include the nuclear disarmament initiatives by Mexico of Latin America. Mexico has

actively sought the protection of its people, especially those that have migrated to the United States. The Mexican Ambassador mentioned that over 50 consulates have been set up in the United States. This image is further supported by the following comment by *Expert 1*: *"Mexico has had a great image up until now, and people love Mexico. Mexico projects a natural soft power but they've had a lot of crime and drug-related issues over the last few years and then inequality has advanced quite dramatically, so Mexico has got a lot of social problems to deal with and that's undermined their international image, a very similar thing to South Africa"*.

Economic temptation

The potential economic gains from dealing with Mexico include good, solid partnerships on an equal or a win-win basis. This is confirmed by the following statement by the Mexican Ambassador: *"We believe that a good partnership has to be equal, which means that we don't want to sell more than we buy"*. Mexico appears to follow a win-win strategy with regards to its international relations and in particular within the G20, as confirmed by the Mexican Ambassador.

Table 8: Mexico's rankings on selected indices

Index	Ranking	Observation
Index of economic freedom (2013)	50/185	Good
Ease of doing business (2013)	48/185	Good
Corruption perceptions (2012)	105/176	Fair to poor
Overall global competitiveness (2013) (measures competitiveness in terms of institutions, policies and productivity factors)	55/148	Good
Key competitiveness pillars indicating a development model		
First pillar –institutions	96/148	Poor
Second pillar-infrastructure	64/148	Fair to poor
Third pillar- macroeconomic environment	49/148	Good
Eighth pillar – financial market development	59/148	Fair to good
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	74/148	Fair to good
Tenth pillar – market size	11/148	Excellent
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	55/148	Good

Twelfth pillar - innovation	61/148	Good
-----------------------------	--------	------

Note: The index of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation (2013); the ease of doing business is from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank (2013); the corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2012); and the overall global competitiveness and the key competitiveness pillars are from The World Economic Forum (2013).

A synopsis of Mexico's soft power sources is represented in the table below, which emerged from the discussions held with the Mexican Ambassador.

Table 9: Mexico's soft power sources

Pillar	Description of soft power held	Strength of pillar (Observation)
Cultural attractiveness	Tourism, entertainment, history, language and food	Very good
Political values	Transition to independence and democracy	Fair
Foreign policy	Evidenced by development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation	Good
Development model	Open trade policy and open economy	Good
International institutions	Active involvement in NAFTA, G20 and others	Very good
International image	Peaceful solution seeker, constructive nation, non-military and protection of people	Fair to good
Economic temptation	Encourage good partnerships and trade and win-win strategies	Good
Overall strength of soft power sources	A combination of all six pillars	Good

Mexico appears to have a good development model, poor political values, good economic temptation and overall an open economic system.

5.3.4 Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

Mexico is generally an open society, which has an open trade policy. It works hard at establishing good relationships and partnerships with other countries, including its trade partners. This is evidenced by this comment by the Mexican Ambassador: *"Mexico, being a very open economy in terms of exports and imports"*. The openness of the Mexican economy was further confirmed by the following comment made by

Expert 1: "Mexico has more trade agreements than any other country in the world and it is consciously and aggressively open".

The view of the Mexican Ambassador is that: *"We believe because of our recent history that an open economy works...better than a closed economy"*. The level of openness in the Mexican market was not achieved without challenge or difficulty, which is evident by this comment by the Mexican Ambassador: *"I tell you that this was a painful, painful openness of the Mexican economy"*.

The rationale for the openness of the Mexican economy is captured by the following comment by the Mexican Ambassador: *"I think, Mexico thinks, you have to be open. If you protect your economy for a long, long time, the economy does not improve. They don't invest in research; they don't invest in better materials; they don't invest in capacity relief for their workers, they just keep on going..."*.

The strengths of Mexico from a global competitiveness perspective lies in the macroeconomic environment, market size and business sophistication, as these pillars all score at or below the overall ranking of 55. Mexico appears to also perform well on the innovation pillar, with a ranking of 56.

The assumption for the purpose of this research is that openness is measured by six pillars of the WEF Global Competitiveness Report, namely Institutions, Financial Market Development, Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business Sophistication and Innovation. It is these pillars that contribute towards investment attraction, open markets and open communication. The level of openness of Mexico is therefore determined from these six pillars, as set out in the table below.

Table 10: Mexico's rankings in terms of openness

Pillar	Ranking	Observation
First pillar: institutions	96/148	Poor
Eighth pillar: financial market development	64/148	Fair to good
Ninth pillar: technological readiness	74/148	Fair to good
Tenth pillar: market size	11/148	Excellent
Eleventh pillar: business sophistication	55/148	Good
Twelfth pillar: innovation	61/148	Good

Note: The data set out in the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The performance on these pillars contributes towards and supports the view held by the Mexican Ambassador and the respective experts that Mexico is an open economy. However, there are areas of poor performance such as poor institutions and perhaps poor communication.

A further indicator of the level of openness of a country to trade and investment is the exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. The table below sets out the exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP for Mexico and its larger counterparts within G20.

Table 11: Mexico, United Kingdom and United States exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP

Country	Exports % 2011	Exports % 2012
Mexico	32%	33%
United Kingdom	32%	32%
United States	14%	No data

Note: The export data is from World Bank (2012d).

The exports percentage for Mexico is almost the same as the United Kingdom, which is considerably higher than the United States.

5.3.5 Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

The adoption by Mexico of a win-win strategy, as indicated by the information presented under research proposition four, is indicative of Mexico seeking to satisfy common interests of all parties involved in the negotiation outcomes. Furthermore, Mexico is a member of NAFTA, whose members are Canada and the United States. These three countries are all members of the G20. The common interests of these three countries can also be driven through the G20 and vice versa.

5.3.6 Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context.

The strategy followed by Mexico is aptly described by the following comment by the Mexican Ambassador: *"We believe that a good partnership has to be equal, which means that we don't want to sell more than we buy"*. Mexico appears to follow a win-

win strategy regarding its international relations and in particular within the G20, as confirmed by the Mexican Ambassador.

Mexico has also occupied the position as the chair of the G20 in 2003 and then again in 2012 (Russia's G20 Presidency). It has used this position of authority to drive its own interests or agenda and to influence the larger or more influential members of the G20.

Mexico also appears to engage in regular dialogue and communication with the G20. This grouping is generally active, with summits and pre-meetings being held annually.

A further strategy adopted by Mexico appears to be active involvement in international institutions, especially the G20. Increased involvement may contribute towards enhanced influence.

5.3.7 Additional findings

According to the Mexican Ambassador, soft power is not useful when there are *"matter[s] of life and death"*, but is better suited to situations that are win-win situations.

5.4 Poland

Poland has been a member of the EU since 2004 (Euromonitor International, 2013a). It is classified as a small state for the purposes of this research and within the context of the EU because of its status as a former communist country, its young democracy, its fairly new EU membership and because it falls outside the Eurozone (The Economist, 2011). In many respects, Poland is regarded as an outsider of the EU. This is evidenced by the attempt by Germany to exclude Poland and other EU members that fell outside the Eurozone from the competitiveness pact designed to integrate the EU (The Economist, 2011). The EU membership is set out in the table below.

Table 12: EU membership

Year	Member joined
1950	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands (founding members)
1973	Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
1981	Greece
1986	Spain and Portugal
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden
2004	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
2007	Bulgaria and Romania

Note: Membership data obtained from (Communication Department of the European Commission).

Poland, and more specifically Warsaw, was principally destroyed by World War II. Since then, the country has developed as a debt free nation that focuses on building strong institutions (Sharma, 2012b). Poland's economy has grown during the period of the financial crisis, despite the impact of the crisis on Europe. The growth of its economy has slowed to 2.2%, but it continues to grow on an annual basis. The spread of its economic sectors across manufacturing, trade, services and construction has created a buffer for Poland, in that it is not overly-reliant on any one sector (Euromonitor International, 2013a).

The main risks to the Polish economy stem from growing public debt, high unemployment as well as inflation and imported energy (Euromonitor International, 2013a). The manufacturing and real estate sectors are the main strengths for Poland. In addition the country is centrally located within the EU, which enhances its accessibility for its manufacturing export market. External demand could be a concern for Poland, due to its export market exposure to the EU. However, currently the local demand is proving to be sufficient in developing the Polish economy. The services sector has also experienced growth in 2012.

Poland acts as a transit country for the distribution of Russian natural gas to the EU. This has resulted in disputes and tensions between Russia and Poland. Russia has been considering alternative transit routes to exclude Poland, which has created further tension (The Economist, 2011). Poland is vulnerable to Russia, as it is dependent on Russia for its own energy supply.

Poland is open to economic trade. The country experienced a trade deficit in the period between 2007 and 2012. Large components of Poland's imports are from oil, natural gas and mineral fuels. Manufacturing is highly energy intensive and therefore increases the demand for energy (Euromonitor International, 2013a).

It is an attractive FDI destination, due to its openness. It is however not overly dependent on FDI, which has offered protection during the financial crisis. The country has a prudent fiscal policy and a low government budget deficit. Due to its fiscal policy and strong economic outlook, Poland has maintained a good credit rating of A-, as classified by Standard and Poors in January 2013 (Euromonitor International, 2013a).

5.4.1 EU

According to Gron and Wivel (2011), the number of small member states of the EU increased following the end of the Cold War. Historically, the founding members of the EU agreed on weighted votes in the Council of Ministers, independence of supranational institutions and no permanent presidency of the EU, in order to create a balance between small and large member states (Gron & Wivel, 2011). The Commission was seen as a counterweight to the Council and was relied upon by small states to enhance influence in the EU. The Commission enabled small states to have a louder voice and assisted such states with resources for research and other purposes (Gron & Wivel, 2011). According to Gron and Wivel (2011), the role of the Commission has diminished in recent times, posing a challenge to small states that previously relied on the Commission.

The Lisbon Treaty resulted in greater power being held by Parliament, with the Commission President being elected through Parliament elections. Politics therefore played a superior role in the Commission, following the Lisbon Treaty, which resulted in further challenges to the level of influence of small states. The strengthening of the role of Parliament further marginalised small states, as seats in Parliament were then determined according to countries' sizes (Gron & Wivel, 2011).

The Council has, over time, gained influence over the Commission and Parliament has gained greater influence over the Council. The Lisbon Treaty changed the voting methods that previously favoured small states. The previous voting methods included unanimity and a simple majority, which did not take into account the size of a state. The new method under the Lisbon Treaty was the qualified majority voting method. This voting method required 65% of the EU population to pass a decision. This shift clearly favoured larger states and marginalised smaller states.

Although the principle of a rotating presidency applied, the EU Council was presided over by an EU Council President. This practice undermined the efficacy of the rotating presidency. The rotating presidency was an important tool for small states to gain influence and make their voices heard. The Lisbon Treaty allowed for ad hoc cooperation among larger states. This ad hoc cooperation fell outside the ambit of the internal rules, which previously allowed for a levelling of the playing field among small and large states.

5.4.2 Poland within the EU

One of the main areas of strategic focus for Poland in the EU was the use of its location in Central Europe (Stepniak, 2002). It is this location that enabled Poland to act as a transit country for the supply of Russian natural gas to the EU (The Economist, 2011). Closely linked to the strategy of location is the advocacy by Poland of the rights of countries in the Eastern European region, such as the Ukraine, Moldova or the Balkan countries, who are not members of the EU (Stepniak, 2002). In many ways Poland positioned itself as the gateway to the EU for these Eastern European countries.

Poland recognised the need to shape the EU policy through the development of common policy. In addition, Poland realised that they had to develop the human resources required to effectively represent Poland on the EU Council (Stepniak, 2002).

Poland was cognisant of the need to ensure the development of an educated and competitive population, whilst preventing a “brain-drain” to the rest of the EU. The country was also interested in establishing strong property rights to encourage the purchase of property in Poland by EU citizens. It is these efforts that have established and maintained the openness of the Polish economy to foreign trade and investment (Stepniak, 2002). An analysis of Poland reveals that the country focuses on building its internal strengths or competencies, such as human resources skills and institutions, in order to build a stronger position within the EU.

Societal participation and dialogue is encouraged by the government. The government undertook a campaign to inform and involve society through its application for accession to the EU (Stepniak, 2002).

5.4.3 Results: Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Cultural attractiveness

Culturally, the Polish Commercial Counsellor emphasised the relevance of the traditional values of the Polish people. It appears that these values stem from the Catholic religion. The Polish Commercial Counsellor explained that the Polish are a nation who are proud of being able to improvise. The explanation provided is

interpreted to mean that the Polish nation has the ability to adapt and to employ good problem solving skills.

Political values

From a political perspective, Poland is a democracy. According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, the Polish do not appear to be very co-operative in their practices, whether it is locally or in the international arena. There appears to be a culture of competition and not co-operation.

Development model

The development model of Poland appears to stem from its attractiveness as an investment destination, its open markets and its strong business sectors, being automobile manufacturing and general industrialisation. This is evidenced by the following comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"market is one of the most effective in Europe"*. Education appears to be a strong focus for Poland. Poland appears to be actively involved with international companies that have initiated operations in the country. This is evidenced by the following comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"this is fact that these companies are present in big numbers. Now is flattering fact also that they change approach from locating in Poland production to making in Poland research work...because of this high level of education of young people"*. The presence of these international companies in Poland is an indication of the attractiveness of the destination to business and perhaps investment. This is further enhanced by the country's Ease of Doing Business practices. In 2013, Poland ranked 55 out of 185 countries on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index. This was a marked improvement from the previous year's ranking of 74. Poland simplified property registration, enforcement of contracts and resolved insolvency issues, which contributed towards the improved rankings (Euromonitor International, 2013a).

International institutions

International institution involvement does not appear to be too strong. Other than participation in the EU, Poland does not appear, from discussions with the Polish Commercial Counsellor to be actively involved in international institutions.

International image

Currently, Poland appears to be viewed positively by the international community. According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, it is: *"the survival of crisis, big amount of foreign investment, young dynamic [land] population"*. In supplementary support of this, Expert 1 commented by stating: *"Because Poland is regarded as probably the largest and most influential country in Eastern Europe...So, in the EU it's very underdeveloped, but is regarded as one of the most important countries in the EU, but important new countries in the EU"*.

Economic temptation

From an economic temptation perspective, Poland is an attractive destination for foreign investment. According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"We are also receiving a lot of money, from about ten billion US Dollar we are receiving from European Union..."* It appears as if Poland has a large percentage of highly educated young people, being, according to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"more than Germany and Austria"*. The labour market in Poland also appears to be attractive to these foreign companies, as is evident by the following comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"And one important thing is about Poland that we are very competitive as regards labour costs"*.

The rankings of Poland on selected indices are set out in the table below.

Table 13: Poland's rankings on selected indices

Index	Ranking	Observation
Index of economic freedom (2013)	57/185	Good
Ease of doing business (2013)	55/185	Good
Corruption perceptions (2012)	41/176	Good
Overall global competitiveness (2013) (measures competitiveness in terms of institutions, policies and productivity factors)	42/148	Good
Key competitiveness pillars indicating a development model		
First pillar -institutions	62/148	Good
Second pillar-infrastructure	74/148	Fair to good
Third pillar- macroeconomic environment	65/148	Fair to good
Eighth pillar – financial	38/148	Very good

market development		
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	43/148	Good
Tenth pillar – market size	20/148	Excellent
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	65/148	Fair to good
Twelfth pillar - innovation	65/148	Fair to good

Note: The index of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation (2013); the ease of doing business is from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank (2013); the corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2012); and the overall global competitiveness and the key competitiveness pillars are from The World Economic Forum (2013).

A synopsis of Poland's soft power sources is represented in the table below, which emerged from the discussions held with the Polish Commercial Counsellor.

Table 14: Poland's soft power sources

Pillar	Description of soft power held	Strength of pillar (Observation)
Cultural attractiveness	Traditional values, religious history and improvisation	Fair
Political values	Democracy	Fair
Foreign policy	Evidenced by development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation	Good
Development model	Open trade policy, open economy, industrialised, good education and good market	Good
International institutions	Main involvement in EU	Fair
International image	Admired for surviving the crisis, good investment destination and good market	Good
Economic temptation	Attractive to multinational corporations as a hub, attractive labour market, industrialised, survived the crisis, attracting FDI, highly skilled and EU member - access	Good
Overall strength of soft power sources	A combination of all six pillars	Fair to good

In summary, Poland appears to have a good, open foreign policy.

5.4.4 Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

The Polish Commercial Counsellor referred to a closed society as one that is *"hermetic"*. According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"In the case the countries are hermetic, you know, there is no flow information, you know, so there will be natural tendency to have hard power"*. This was compared to a country like Iran that perhaps has less soft power, due to the closed society.

Poland is a country that has progressive markets and is open to the inflows of investments. The openness of the Polish markets is evidenced by the rankings of 38 on the WEF Global Competitive Report for financial market development and a market size of 20. Both these rankings are better than the overall Polish ranking of 42 and this is an indication of factors or strengths that contributed to the overall ranking.

This is evidenced by the following comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"we are basically development on foreign capital. You know, so foreign countries often there are very good conditions for investing in Poland"*. The large presence of foreign companies in Poland is also indicative of the openness of Poland to foreign investment.

It appears that although the country is open to investment and global ideas, the people are more conservative and focused internally on Poland. This is evidenced by the following statement by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"it already opened but not in the minds of the people. They are happy to have general knowledge of the world but they are related to Poland, to what happens in Warsaw, what happens in Poland but not what happens in wider context"*.

In 2012, Poland ranked 41 out of 176 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. The country has worked hard at eradicating corruption in the public sector, which has contributed to a better performance on this index and has enhanced the level of openness of this economy (Euromonitor International, 2013a).

According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, soft power requires a high level of exchange of information, in contrast to hard power which does not require this.

Poland has performed excellently regarding market size, which according to the WEF, is a measure of the level of openness of a country to international trade. Similarly, the

Polish rankings for financial market development are very good. These rankings are set out in the table below.

Table 15: Poland's rankings in terms of openness

Competitiveness Pillar	Ranking	Observation
First pillar -institutions	62/148	Good
Eighth pillar – financial market development	38/148	Very Good
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	43/148	Good
Tenth pillar – market size	20/148	Excellent
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	65/148	Fair to good
Twelfth pillar - innovation	65/148	Fair to good

Note: The data set out in the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The following table sets out the exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP for Poland and its larger counterparts within the G20.

Table 16: Poland, France and Germany exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP

Country	Exports % 2011	Exports % 2012
Poland	45%	46%
France	27%	27%
Germany	50%	52%

Note: The export data is from World Bank (2012d).

The level of exports of Poland is higher than France and not that much lower than Germany.

5.4.5 Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

The Polish Commercial Counsellor was of the view that if the partner with whom a state has a relationship is: *“from the similar culture”* then soft power may be a better approach. This highlights the principle of common interests. The example explained by the Polish Commercial Counsellor under research proposition four regarding four countries forming a coalition also highlights the principle of common interest. These four countries shared common interests in the form of their cultural and intellectual roots, their religious backgrounds and their common objectives of becoming members of the EU, which they achieved in 2004 (International Visegrad Fund).

A possible approach or strategy suggested by the Polish Commercial Counsellor was the forming of a coalition and the formation of a defined purpose, where the members have common interests. According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, although this is idealistic, it facilitates the use of soft power, in that these members can then use soft power to achieve their defined purpose. There does however need to be a sophisticated level of exchange of information in order to achieve the defined purpose through soft power, which was discussed by the Polish Commercial Counsellor.

5.4.6 Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context

The Polish Commercial Counsellor alluded to the use of a coalition building strategy in the following comment: *"I am implementing this, for example, here by working closely with commercial councils, you know, of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia... because we are not really close in nature, close in level of development and we together we can be a bit stronger, you know? We can have more weight in dealing with all European Union. Even we would have more I would say votes than Germany or France or something like that..."*

The example of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia forming a coalition is further expanded on by the following comment: *"but I can give you one example that these countries I mentioned to you, it means Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia cope with very closely cooperated when they were joining the EU, so they cooperated together to agree in most, I would say, convenient terms. They helped each other in solving problems, something like that. The name of these countries so-called Visegrad group and this cooperation started just before we, we entered the European Union, so this is just an example you know of solving of a small country situation when they are joining a bigger organisation".* These four countries shared common interests in the form of their cultural and intellectual roots, their religious backgrounds and their common objective of becoming members of the EU, which they achieved in 2004 (International Visegrad Fund).

In addition to coalition building, the Polish Commercial Counsellor commented generally that the strategy that is used is dependent on the conditions of the country, the health of its democracy and the strength of its leaders. This is evident from the following comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"Also, it depends on personality, you know, who is politicians you know? It depends what is the democracy,*

who is, you know, winning, you know. So this--your strategy as regards, you know, countries is also dependent on healthy I would say internal democracies..."

5.4.7 Additional findings

According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, soft power cannot be exercised in times of war, and then hard power is more appropriate. The Polish Commercial Counsellor had the perspective that soft power is better for normal situations and for long term solutions. In addition, if the partner or target is, according to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"mature or responsible, you can be soft ..."* According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, a hard power approach involving punitive measures is perhaps necessary where nations are behaving irresponsibly towards *"the disadvantage of all community..."*, as with Greece.

According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor, the EU is using hard power strategies by withholding membership unless the country in question complies with all the rules and adopts acceptable methods and processes to continue running its affairs. The example of the EU using hard power is a positive use of this power, according to the Polish Commercial Counsellor. The EU is an example of a MLO that employs formal structures, rules and standards which all members have to adhere to: *"for the common good"* (the Polish Commercial Counsellor). These standards have enabled countries like Poland to advance comparably rapidly and according to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"jumped almost two hundred years in twenty years"*.

5.5 Singapore

Singapore is a member of and one of the founders of ASEAN. Singapore is classified as a small state for the purposes of this research due to its small territorial and population size. Singapore therefore fulfils the classic definition of a small state, being the quantitative and categorical elements as encapsulated by the research of Keohane (1969), Chong (2010) and Sutton (2011). The smallness of Singapore in relation to the other selected cases is set out in Table 1.

According to Euromonitor International (2012b), Singapore's growth is forecasted to decelerate in 2012, as a result of the pressures on the global economy. Singapore is, however a popular business and tourist destination, which appears to be acting as a buffer against the slower growth (Euromonitor International, 2012b). It has strong

business policies and is generally an open economy to trade. Singapore is a strong advocate of property rights, has an efficient government and a transparent and flexible regulatory environment (Euromonitor International, 2012b). Singapore has also displayed resilience to external economic challenges. The main business sectors, other than tourism are retailing and financial services. The financial services sector in Singapore has proven to be resilient mainly due to low levels of consumer and corporate debt. The banks have good levels of capital reserves that acted as a buffer against the global economic crisis.

Singapore has high levels of export and inflows of FDI. The FDI inflows as a percentage of the country's total GDP in 2011 was 24.6% (Euromonitor International, 2012b). It acts as a regional hub for imports, exports and general trade, with strong trade relations between Singapore and its neighbours. It maintains a healthy trade surplus.

5.5.1 ASEAN

ASEAN was formed in 1967 and comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand as founding members and Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam as subsequent members (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012).

In 2008 the ASEAN members entered into the ASEAN Charter, which provides for the institutional framework and sets the rules for this organisation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). The ASEAN Charter aimed to institutionalise ASEAN by creating new committees and enhancing roles of foreign ministers and the Secretary General of ASEAN. This charter has legal force and effect in that it has been ratified by all member states (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012). Enhanced commitment was established through the charter at a political, economic and public level. The charter established levels of accountability, reporting lines and dispute resolution mechanisms.

The framework and institutions that govern this multilateral organisation is an indication of the long history and commitment to this organisation by its members (Kraichitti, 2006). Since 2000, there has been a proliferation of bilateral and free trade agreements concluded between ASEAN members (Kraichitti, 2006). FDI has been an important focus for each ASEAN member, with members having developed their own national strategies to attract FDI. These strategies include local elements to ensure that benefits for the host country are structured (Kraichitti, 2006).

According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"ASEAN now serves as a forum for us, you know, we have a platform upon which to dialogue with each other. It we have differences, we have a platform"*. ASEAN is a regional grouping that facilitates regional cooperation. It appears that ASEAN is therefore a MLO, which is primarily a dialogue forum.

ASEAN is, according to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"more of an economic, social, cultural entity"*, than a political entity. It does not have military aspirations and is more focused on building the ASEAN community, by ensuring *"peace and stability in our part of the world"* (Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore). The objectives of ASEAN are therefore to build the ASEAN community by 2015, to ensure peace and stability in the region and to develop the region in terms of *"economic, social, cultural cooperation"* (Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore).

5.5.2 Singapore within ASEAN

Singapore is one of the founding members of ASEAN and has contributed to the nature and objectives of this organisation. Singapore is a huge proponent of creating an environment of shared interests, through which communities are developed in accordance with practices that have been successful. This is evident through Singapore establishing training assistant programs for the region. Singapore improves awareness of its country and its value through the use of training assistant programs. Countries in the South East Asian region are invited by Singapore to learn new skills and better practices through these programs, as indicated by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore. These programs are used by Singapore to share their knowledge and experience with their neighbours, with the view of up-skilling their region. The use of these practices has led to members of the region voluntarily wishing to adopt the practices or model of Singapore in order to further their levels of excellence.

5.5.3 Results: Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Cultural attractiveness

Culturally, as described by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"Singapore is a meritocracy"*. This policy allows for the appointment of people on the basis of merit, which means, according to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore that: *"a*

candidate who is the best qualifying gets the job". In addition good morals and values are of importance to Singaporeans. Principles of good governance, equality and protection of minority rights are fundamental for Singapore. It is an attractive destination for immigrant workers. This high level of immigrant workers does create inequality issues, with locals being concerned about the availability of jobs (Euromonitor International, 2012b). This, therefore, has an impact on the levels of equality and the protection of minority rights.

Political values

Politically, the country is a democracy. According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore, Singapore's leaders are held accountable for meeting the objectives that they promise to their people. The following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore on political values is of significance: *"And a government that is efficient, it is clean, honest, has good value systems, good corporate values etc. which it adheres to, is likely to succeed in achieving the goals and the objectives it sets for itself, you know, and I think this is one of our sources of our strength in Singapore"*. The black mark against Singapore is that it is ruled politically by one party, which has an impact on civil freedoms (Euromonitor International, 2012b).

Development model

The development model of Singapore is linked to its circumstances, being the lack of resources other than human resources. Singapore has worked hard at maximising the value derived from its people. The approach taken by Singapore is best seen in terms of the following quote by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"it is the circumstances that we found ourselves in and that also helped us to sit down and think how best within the limits of our resources can we best develop Singapore because we don't have any national resources"*. Singapore prides itself on good governance, which stems from its philosophy of efficiencies. Given that its people are a priority, investment in health and education are of paramount importance to the Singapore Government.

International institutions

It is actively involved in groupings such as ASEAN and APEC and others. Apart from its membership of ASEAN, Singapore has secured strong free trade agreements with the US, China and India and many bilateral agreements (Euromonitor International,

2012b). It appears to have a regional focus in terms of its international institutional involvement and not a global focus.

International image

Internationally, Singapore is viewed very highly in terms of its growth and development model, its competitiveness and excellence in financial institutions and services, which is evident by the rankings set out in Table 17. It is a leader both regionally and globally. This is confirmed by the following comment by *Expert 1*: “So, Singapore has got a very, very positive image in terms of how it engages and how it integrates and how it connects with the world”.

Economic temptation

The potential economic gains could stem from economic trade opportunities from transacting with Singapore. Singapore has highly skilled and educated people with strong value systems. The potential gains include a diversity of sectors, including tourism, financial and other services.

Table 17: Singapore’s ranking on selected indices

Index	Ranking	Observation
Index of economic freedom (2013)	2/185	Excellent
Ease of doing business (2013)	1/185	Excellent
Corruption perceptions (2012)	5/176	Excellent
Overall global competitiveness (2013) (measures competitiveness in terms of institutions, policies and productivity factors)	2/148	Excellent
Key competitiveness pillars indicating a development model		
First pillar -institutions	3/148	Excellent
Second pillar-infrastructure	2/148	Excellent
Third pillar- macroeconomic environment	18/148	Excellent
Eighth pillar – financial market development	2/148	Excellent
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	7/148	Excellent
Tenth pillar – market size	34/148	Very good
Eleventh pillar – business	17/148	Excellent

sophistication		
Twelfth pillar - innovation	9/148	Excellent

Note: The index of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation (2013); the ease of doing business is from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank (2013); the corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2012); and the overall global competitiveness and the key competitiveness pillars are from The World Economic Forum (2013).

A synopsis of Singapore's soft power sources is represented in the table below, which emerged from the discussion held with the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore.

Table 18: Singapore's soft power sources

Pillar	Description of soft power held	Strength of pillar (Observation)
Cultural attractiveness	Meritocracy, multiculturalism, strong values, protection of minorities and equal rights	Very good
Political values	Democracy and accountability of leaders	Good
Foreign policy	Evidenced by a combination of development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation	Excellent
Development model	Good governance, efficiencies, resource-based, education, highly skilled, health and community building	Excellent
International institutions	High regional participation levels	Good
International image	Positive, good rankings on competitiveness, education and financial institutions	Very good
Economic temptation	Regional trade, regional development and advancement	Very good
Overall strength of soft power sources	A combination of all six pillars	Very good

The above rankings and observations indicate the global levels of excellence achieved by Singapore regarding its development model and its foreign policy. Singapore therefore possesses a strong degree of soft power sources.

5.5.4 Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

Cooperation among the members of ASEAN is of utmost importance to Singapore. Interaction among members is conducted on the basis of consensus. The following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore is an indication of the principle of consensus that is followed: *"I think it would be fair to say that not one of the Asian countries actually exercises muscle, you know, because ASEAN in terms of policy making within the regional body works on a basis of consensus. ... it means that everyone must agree with a certain policy point of view or a certain policy direction. So consensus is important"*. This appears to indicate that no one member of ASEAN exercises dominance over another member. This is an indication of the high level of open communication among Singapore and the ASEAN members.

The use of communication and technology was discussed by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore as an important tool of soft power, which is evident by the following comment: *"So they will have to find greater ways and means in which there will be greater interaction that is for the benefit of the countries for each other's growth and development and I think technology would probably be one of the key factors that boosts this interfacing greater co-operative ventures between countries. This is where soft diplomacy, as you see, becomes very, very important"*.

It appears that the view held by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore is that open communication through technology is a highly relevant tool of soft power, in creating awareness surrounding a country's culture and in facilitating cooperation among nations. The following table sets out Singapore's rankings in terms of openness which range from excellent to very good. This is a clear indication of the sophisticated levels of global openness of this country.

Table 19: Singapore's rankings in terms of openness

Competitiveness pillars	Ranking	Observation
First pillar -institutions	3/148	Excellent
Eighth pillar – financial market development	2/148	Excellent
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	7/148	Excellent
Tenth pillar – market size	34/148	Very good
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	17/148	Excellent
Twelfth pillar - innovation	9/148	Excellent

Note: The data set out in the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The following table sets out the exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP by Singapore in relation to its larger counterparts within ASEAN, which indicates that the Singaporean level of openness far surpasses the region.

Table 20: Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP

Country	Exports % 2011	Exports % 2012
Singapore	207%	201%
Indonesia	26%	24%
Thailand	77%	75%

Note: The export data is from World Bank (2012d).

5.5.5 Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

Singapore is a country that strives to achieve a common good for both its country and region. According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore, it was a challenge to find the common good or common interests for the region. The rationale for the challenge, according to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore was *"Because interests can vary, as someone once said, the only permanent interest for each country, each country has its own self-interest to pursue, which is peculiar you know, to their history, to their people's culture, to the politics of the place, to the economics of the place, to the country etc"*.

The members of the ASEAN grouping are very diverse in terms of culture, religion and history, but such members, according to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore have: *"recognised that as a region and we will and we should be able to work together because our interests are common, we want to see peace and stability in our part of the world, because that helps us to develop and progress"*. The challenge, according to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore is therefore in finding a policy that is common to all and upon which all members may agree. By the same token, ASEAN appears to follow the principle of non-interference, as is evidenced by the following comment made by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"ASEAN's basic philosophy is not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, you know, I think that is one of the primary talents of ASEAN, we don't interfere in each other's domestic affairs"*.

It appears as though one of the fundamental principles of ASEAN is that of consensus. This is supported by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"ASEAN in terms of policy making within the regional body works on a basis of consensus"*.

The common interest philosophy of Singapore is aptly described by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"And you have to find ways and means in which there is a common space in which all countries can interface and interact and a commonality of co-operative enterprises, you know, which helps not just the country that is seeking to engage another, but also the other country that is seeking to engage with this"*.

5.5.6 Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context

The context of Singapore is a nation that encourages sharing of ideas and knowledge with its neighbours. It follows the strategy of cooperation and community building. The community building approach is evidenced by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"ASEAN's objectives rather, are firstly to build an ASEAN, what they call ASEAN community by 2015"*.

Singapore has a strong development model that appears to be the model that its neighbours wish to emulate. This desire on the part of the neighbours to emulate the strategy or model followed by Singapore does not appear to be imposed or forced on anyone. This is evidenced by the comment made by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"So it is not because we are going out and saying use our model, you know, but we are there, they can see what we have done, and how we go about doing it you know; so it is an intangible thing. I mean it is not something that we do consciously, wilfully, but it is there"*.

It appears as though the success and growth of Singapore is closely intertwined with the region. Regional development appears to be of paramount importance. This is evidenced by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"what we can ourselves contribute at least in terms of peace, stability, harmony, and for us, being in South East Asia, you know, because we will always be in South East Asia, anyway for us our objective at least in terms of foreign policy is to help contribute to*

that peace, stability, to the harmony, prosperity, progress and development, you know, of South East Asia”.

Another strategy or approach followed by Singapore is that of dialogue and open communication, which according the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore, they: *“utilise and look for areas in which we can augment and strengthen economic engagement”.*

Another main strategy is that of cooperation on a win-win basis. This is evidenced by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *“I think it is a very, very simple equation, when there is harmony, there is stability in our backyard, in our neighbourhood, and that means that we have the space in which to progress, to develop and progress, you know, and so--and also to continue on this is of course the prosperity welfare and the wellbeing of people and countries in South East Asia – when they do well, we do well, when they not do well we don't do well”.*

This is further confirmed by an additional comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *“we work on a basis of it is very simple: you win, I win, we are not going to say “I want to have the upper hand in this”, “I am going to be biggest winner”, no. It is a very, very simple philosophy and we go about to say, “Look you will gain and we will gain” and that is how it must be”.*

5.5.7 Additional findings

An emphasis was placed on the emergent levels of inter-dependencies that countries have on each other through globalisation. According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *“I think increasingly in a world that is interdependent, I think it probably would be a tendency to employ softer mechanisms, you know, in order to arrive at policy agreements. I think we probably are past the historical point of whereby sheer military might is a determinant in terms of persuading others to come around to a county's point of view”.*

According to Expert 1: *“I think ASEAN is probably one of the strongest areas of soft power--of active soft power, because you have these countries from Asia that are loathed to have any form of active coercive power and they want to still have some type of relevance and role in global agenda setting”.*

In addition Singapore appears to be the “model citizen” in international relations, which is evidenced by the following comment by Expert 1: *“So Singapore in international relations is a country--whenever you want to learn about a country, especially in the east, you go--you look at it through the lens of Singapore. The Singaporeans have studied every country. Singapore have adopted the whole notion of know your neighbours and know your bigger neighbours better than you know yourself because these are--and they do, they know every one of their neighbours a lot better. They've got the best academics that study these countries; they've got the best trade negotiators; they've got highly paid technocrats and their bureaucracy works”.*

5.6 South Africa

South Africa became a member of BRICS in 2010. South Africa is classified as a small state for the purposes of this research and within the context of BRICS, due to the small size of its population, territory and GDP and the level of influence that it possesses relative to that of its BRICS counterparts (Kappel, 2011). This is evident from the data presented in Table 5.

In 2012, the South African economy was growing at a slow rate of 2.5% in real terms. Despite the slow growth, South Africa is the largest Sub-Saharan economy in terms of output. However, the growth rate is lower than the Sub-Saharan regional average of 5.0% (Euromonitor International, 2013b). In effect the South African growth rate is decreasing the average growth in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The forecasted growth rate for 2013 is expected to be below 2% (Mittner, 2013). South Africa is therefore not the economic leader in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Mining strikes and a high unemployment rate are in many respects crippling the South African economy. Public debt has increased considerably to 41.9% of GDP in 2012 from 28.3% of GDP in 2007 (Euromonitor International, 2013b). The credit rating of the country has been downgraded by Standard and Poor's in 2012 to BBB (Isa, 2013). Energy remains a source of concern for South African productivity which is largely dependent on coal. In addition, South Africa is characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality. Education and health are also of serious concern for the nation. Education levels are very low and a significant “brain-drain” is being experienced by the country (Euromonitor International, 2013b).

There has been a shift in the trade patterns for the country from Europe to China. In 2009 South Africa experienced a recession due to over-reliance on Europe as a trading partner (Euromonitor International, 2013b). China imported 12,9% of raw materials from South Africa in 2012. According to Euromonitor International (2013b), the BRICS membership has enhanced trade relations between South Africa and the BRIC members. South Africa experienced a trade deficit, which in 2012 was -3.7% of total GDP. In addition South Africa was in a current account deficit position of -6.1% in 2012 (Euromonitor International, 2013b).

5.6.1 BRICS

BRICS (formerly BRIC until South Africa's entry in 2010) was a term coined by Goldman Sachs in 2001 (O'Neill, Building better global economic BRICs, 2001). BRIC referred to Brazil, Russia, India and China and was 'O'Neill's (2001) prediction for the nations that would dominate the economic stage in the near future. South Africa was not included originally and was only subsequently included as a member following much lobbying and an eventual invitation by China in 2010 (Alden & Schoeman, 2013). According to the Director of BRICS South Africa, BRICS was: *"what we call Wall Street equity concept or construct - they wanted to make money off it, it was a new market bracket to make money from. But 2009--it was a diplomatic initiative between the BRICS leaders at the time. So there's quite a nuanced difference between the two"*.

Since its inception in 2001, BRICS has evolved, albeit gradually, into a more formalised grouping, with the holding of formal summits and forums and the appointment of ministries. Further changes to this grouping are that it was originally an economic acronym and has since evolved into more of a political alliance. According to Expert 2, *"the group sort of took a slight turn when South Africa joined; it became more of a political group"*. Recent developments within BRICS include the promotion of a BRICS development bank and the formation of the BRICS Business Council and the BRICS Think Tanks Council (The Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation). Although BRICS is evolving, like other MLOs before it, it lacks formal structure and strong institutions. Instead, members focus on peer learning and on building cooperation, which may be facilitated through institutions like the BRICS Business Council and the BRICS Think Tanks Council. The members of BRICS appear to be divided on important issues and on their vision for BRICS. The forum therefore appears to lack cohesion.

This group comprises strong global economic players in the form of Brazil, India and China. These states are leading the shifts in the global economic order and are leaders of economic growth. In comparison, South Africa lags behind and did not originally merit inclusion within BRICS, according to its founder. South Africa is the baby of the group when it is compared in terms of territorial size, population and GDP to that of its counterparts, as compared in Table 5 (Kappel, 2011). It therefore begs the question regarding how South Africa, as a small state can leverage its membership of BRICS to gain value and to offer value.

Since the first BRICS summit in 2009 BRICS, like the G20, has adopted the rotating chairperson practice of governance. This practice enables the chairperson of the grouping to set the agenda for the forthcoming year. A small state like South Africa is therefore given the opportunity to drive its own special interests in the year that it chairs BRICS, which was incidentally 2013.

5.6.2 South Africa within BRICS

According to Expert 2: *"South Africa enjoys a lot of respect globally as – well, it's a middle power, it's not a super power... but it sort of plays this role of bridging the gap between developed countries and developing countries and it plays that role very, very well"*. This is essentially the role that South Africa plays within BRICS and the multilateral arena.

South Africa used its position as the chair of the BRICS summit to advance issues such as strengthening the inter-BRICS trade levels and relationships, the African agenda and the BRICS development bank (Fransman, 2012). There have been criticisms surrounding the effectiveness or success of the summit. According to Expert 2: *"some critics would say the summit was a failure because they didn't actually establish the bank itself. But they made the decision that they are going to establish the bank... but the outcome was predetermined"*. According to Expert 2, the outcome was predetermined because it had already been decided at the Delhi Summit in 2012.

5.6.3 Results: Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Cultural attractiveness

Culturally, as stated by the Director BRICS South Africa: *"the rainbow nation concept is another very strong trademark of South Africa"*. It is this concept that describes South Africa's multicultural society, which according to the Director of BRICS South Africa *"gives us...again I think a certain, leverage, because we can transcend just unilateral perspectives on the issue, because our own composition is multidimensional"*. It is this multicultural society that contributes to a strong tourism sector, as foreigners are attracted to the diversity and exceedingly rich traditional culture that is South Africa.

Sport has also been an important source of South Africa's cultural soft power. This is evident from the following statement by the Director BRICS South Africa: *"our sport contributes significantly to our soft power and that obviously crystallised in the very successful hosting of the 2010 World Cup"*.

Political values

Politically, South Africa is perceived in terms of the following comment made by the Director BRICS South Africa: *"I think we're the ultimate example of soft power because the political transition of South Africa that occurred, you know, in 1994 already gave South Africa a certain, what we sometimes call, moral disposition in the world because of the fact that this became a cited example for peaceful transitions"*. According to Expert 2, following the transition: *"South Africa started ... asserting itself on the global arena as an international player, a responsible international player, and the fact that South Africa managed to transition from apartheid to democracy without any bloodshed...was a miracle for the rest of the world and South Africa took it upon itself to champion the issues of human rights, equality, fairness and you find South Africa actually championing that within the African continent"*.

According to the Director BRICS South Africa, further political values lie in: *"the focus on peaceful coexistence almost, like our de-nuclearisation that I've also referred to, you know, human rights has got a strong emphasis, gender empowerment has got a strong emphasis"*.

Politically, South Africa has a modern constitution and has been a democracy since 1994. It is questionable as to whether it is truly, a functioning democracy and this question is perhaps evident through the rating of 0.0 in 2011 on the Political Stability and Absence of Violence index (Euromonitor International, 2013b). The scale runs from -2.5 to 2.5 and higher levels indicate good governance. The freedom of speech,

entrenched in the South African Bill of Rights appears to be properly enforced, as indicated by the positive rating of 0.6 in the Voice and Accountability Index in 2011.

Although corruption remains a growing concern for the South African government, South Africa's ranking in 2012 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index was 69 out of 176 countries, which placed South Africa 9th in Sub-Saharan Africa. Relative to its Sub-Saharan counterparts, South Africa scores much better on transparency and is perhaps a further reason to promote the gateway role in Africa.

Development model

The development model is quite diverse, with development areas of tourism, financial services, skills development and innovation. The Director of BRICS South Africa commented as follows on this aspect: *"South Africa's globally...recognised as a systemic important economy because we're a G20 member. Then, South Africa is also globally recognised for its absolute financial excellence. I mean, on those indexes we rate in some, number two in the world, number three in the world"*. In addition, the Director BRICS South Africa stated that: *"macro-economic framework has always been lauded, you know, by economists"*.

The South African strength in financial institutions is further supported by its ranking according to the WEF Global Competitiveness Report in 2013, which placed South Africa 2nd in the bank financial soundness category and 1st for securities exchange regulation and financial legal rights (The World Economic Forum, 2013). Its trade relationship with China is increasing. Financial intermediation, mining, real estate and business activities formed a large component of the South African economy in 2012. The economy is well-diversified across these sectors. In 2013, South Africa ranked 39 out of 185 countries in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index. This is verification of South Africa's strong institutions and modern trading system. South Africa was ranked 74 out of 185 countries in the Index of Economic Freedom Index for 2013 and 6th in the Sub-Saharan African region.

International institutions

South Africa is a highly active participant in multilateral and other international institutions globally and regionally. The multilateral approach of South Africa is described by the Director BRICS South Africa as: *"one of the cornerstones of foreign policy"*. Some of the other multilateral involvements as highlighted by the Director of

BRICS South Africa are that the country: Co-chair[s] the development working group, which is very critical for the South and a few other technical bodies then too, that, you know is very pertinent. We on the ECOSOC. at the moment at the United Nations". According to the Director of BRICS South Africa: "the fact that we belong to this many laterals, also testify to our influence. I know South Africa is often compared to countries like Canada and perhaps Norway and so on, who champion certain pertinent issues on the peace agenda, non-proliferation".

International image

The international image of South Africa is good and is derived mainly from the South African culture, political transition and development model, as described above. However it is issues such as corruption, crime, poor equality, poor health and education systems that impact negatively on the international image and the development model. The Director of BRICS South Africa commented: "I think our credentials, I mean the fact that in a short period of time we were re-elected to the United Nations Security Council, your standing and reputation in your continental and regional organisations: the AU and SADC, the fact that you spearhead so many critical programmes for the continent and the region". This is further supported by the following comment made by the Director of BRICS South Africa that: "we host all these major events and conferences regularly, for which we are approached. Whenever there are critical resolutions in the world, they will approach South Africa for its support there too". This is further supported by the comment made by Expert 2: "it is a country that is being listened to. Why? It is because they have been very effective in terms of placing themselves in that position as that middle power: we have THIS interest and we have these lessons that we can share with the rest of the world".

This transition was recognised globally through the awarding of Nobel peace prizes to South African icons, including former president Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. These awards are also an indication of the strong international image held by South Africa.

Economic temptation

The economic potential or gains of South Africa is best described through the following comment by the Director BRICS South Africa: "we very strong on our economy and our services sector is well developed, notably the financial aspect. Our stock exchange is one of the highest--top 10 in the world". The sectors of main importance include

tourism, mining, financial services, IT and research. In addition the Director of BRICS South Africa commented that *“the demographic potential of South Africa and the continent, you know, the young populations that will be future consumer classes”*. With regards to mining, the Director of BRICS mentioned that: *“in situ non-energy mineral wealth is estimated at 2.5 trillion dollars, which makes us a BRICS in a GDP comparison so to speak”*.

Another potential gain from transacting with South Africa as discussed by the Director of BRICS South Africa is: *“South Africa’s relationship with the continent and the fact that we are seen or perceived as a gateway, a springboard... I mean a lot of multinationals based in Johannesburg can extend operations from there”*. This gateway role is expanded further by the Director of BRICS South Africa by the following comment: *“but also our own companies, our own multinationals or businesses, they’ve got expertise on the continent, certain experience, which could also be useful for joint ventures, partnerships, that type of thing”*. This is further supported by Euromonitor International (2013b), which states that global companies use South Africa as a base or hub for their Sub-Saharan African operations.

Table 21: South Africa’s rankings on selected indices

Index	Ranking	Observation
Index of economic freedom (2013)	74/185	Good
Ease of doing business (2013)	39/185	Very good to excellent
Corruption perceptions (2012)	69/176	Good
Overall global competitiveness (2013) (measures competitiveness in terms of institutions, policies and productivity factors)	53/148	Good
Key competitiveness pillars indicating a development model		
First pillar -institutions	41/148	Good
Second pillar-infrastructure	66/148	Fair to good
Third pillar- macroeconomic environment	95/148	Fair
Eighth pillar – financial market development	3/148	Excellent
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	62/148	Fair to good
Tenth pillar – market size	25/148	Very good to excellent
Eleventh pillar – business	35/148	Very good

sophistication		
Twelfth pillar - innovation	39/148	Good

Note: The index of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation (2013); the ease of doing business is from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank (2013); the corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2012); and the overall global competitiveness and the key competitiveness pillars are from The World Economic Forum (2013).

A synopsis of South Africa's soft power sources is represented in the table below, which emerged from the discussions held with the Director BRICS South Africa.

Table 22: South Africa's soft power sources

Pillar	Description of soft power held	Strength of pillar (Observation)
Cultural attractiveness	Tourism, rainbow nation and sport	Very Good
Political values	Peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy, human rights and gender empowerment promotion, modern constitution and diplomatic skills	Fair
Foreign policy	Evidenced by a combination of development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation	Good to very good
Development model	Systemic important economy, good macroeconomic framework and excellent financial institutions	Good
International institutions	Active involvement in UN, UN Security Council, G20, BRICS, SADC, AU and others	Very good
International image	Good credentials, political icons and peaceful transition	Good
Economic temptation	Services sector, financial institutions, stock exchange, mineral wealth, demographic potential, highly skilled, innovative, research and development, gateway role, hub for multinational corporations, African experience and expertise	Good
Overall strength of soft power pillars	A combination of all six pillars	Good

The above information indicates that South Africa has very strong soft power sources, performing at an above average level for almost each pillar with the exception of political values. The political values is impacted negatively by the corruption levels.

5.6.4 Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

South Africa has an open market policy, in terms of both local and international trade and investment. This commitment to open investments is evidenced by the following remark by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *“And South Africa itself is a major investor on the continent that people don't always readily realise. Even amongst the BRICS, South Africa's the largest intra-BRICS investor among the group... The thing with China, except for the Standard Bank deal, South Africa would have been a larger than China, ... the one deal changes the equation”*.

The high rankings with regards to financial market development and market size indicate that South Africa has high levels of openness to trade and investment, which are further supported by good institutions and a healthy level of innovation.

Table 23: South Africa's rankings in terms of openness

Competitiveness pillars	Ranking	Observation
First pillar –institutions	41/148	Good
Eighth pillar – financial market development	3/148	Excellent
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	62/148	Fair to good
Tenth pillar – market size	25/148	Very good to excellent
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	35/148	Very good
Twelfth pillar - innovation	39/148	Good

Note: The data from the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The following table sets out the exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP by South Africa in comparison to its BRICS counterparts and is indicative of the high level of openness of South Africa in comparison to its BRICS counterparts.

Table 24: BRICS's exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP

Country	Exports % 2011	Exports % 2012
South Africa	29%	28%
Brazil	12%	13%
Russia	30%	29%
India	24%	24%

China	31%	No data
-------	-----	---------

Note: The export data is from World Bank (2012d).

The BRICS grouping has since 2009 conducted regular meetings and summits, which is an indication of the level of open communication channels amongst its members. This is further evidenced by the following comment by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *"But in the specific instance of BRICS, if you look through all the declarations from ... right through to ... you will see there are shared principles, and you know, those are the regular ones of multilateralism, rule of law, non-interference, peace and security and also then the quest for reform of global governance institutions".*

The Director of BRICS also commented on the global arena and the need for countries to work together to solve global problems. The comment made by the Director of BRICS on this point was that: *"BRICS is conscious...that globalism requires transcontinental cooperation ... And because of their shared value systems or principles, you know, which is not belligerent".*

5.6.5 Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

South Africa does not appear to demonstrate a common interest strategy with BRICS. The BRICS grouping, due to its newness has not yet developed a cohesive strategy. However the comment by Expert 2 regarding the BRICS approach in relation to the G8 is of relevance. Expert 2 commented that BRICS: *"is a counterpoise...they are not competing with the G8 in terms of supremacy and global political and economic issues, but they want to assert themselves saying to the G8, saying we are also here and we want to be significant, and equal stakeholders when it comes to global economic and political affairs".* The BRICS agenda appears to be aligned with the G20 agenda and from that perspective, there appears to be some common interests.

5.6.6 Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context

South Africa as a member of a number of constituencies or MLOs can, according to the Director of BRICS South Africa also play a role in persuasion. Particular mention was made of the role of chairperson through the following comment by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *"But South Africa, one way or another would either chair the Africa*

Union Group or the NAM Group or the G77, you know, as I say, this is contingent on when, where and what. But I mean, from those positions also, you have an enhanced or amplified voice...". The following comment by Expert 2 further confirms the role of chairperson: *"there's no secretariat to drive it. It's not like the EU that has... supra-national authority. So you don't have that in the BRICS. You don't have that in the G20, and hence it has the hosting country that is going to decide what is going to be on the agenda".*

It is these positions of authority that, according to the Director of BRICS South Africa can contribute to South Africa's soft power. It is the view of the Director of BRICS South Africa that: *"one can say that we have a certain skill in diplomacy and multilateralism. Because why do we get re-elected and repeatedly hosting major UN conferences? And it shows that there's a moral authority of some sorts that is sought from South Africa by the global community".*

The South African international strategy is captured in the following comment by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *"But South Africa continued to remain at the forefront of these calls for a more equitable global governance system, whether it be in the context of the United Nations and more specifically, security council reform, or, you know the Bretton Woods institutions, etc. etc. and then notably for the continent to be repositioned globally".*

The South African BRICS strategy is described by the Director of BRICS as follows: *"around the three levels of analysis or engagement that's taking place with the BRICS: the global, the regional and the national domestic".* The Director of BRICS describes the national domestic level in terms of policy objectives delineated in documents such as the New Growth Path and the National Development Plan. The regional level as described by the Director of BRICS is: *"our own prioritisation of the African agenda, which is where we try and support the African Union's different programmes-- ...to the extent possible. And our soft power in that regard is also well known. We regularly serve on some of its major ...institutions. I mean Dr Dlamini-Zuma is now the chairperson".* The inclusion of the African agenda as a part of the South African BRICS agenda is evident from the latest BRICS summit held in South Africa, where South Africa coordinated: *"a retreat between BRICS leaders and African leaders"* (Director of BRICS South Africa). The global strategy level is evident by the following comment by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *"And then on the global level there's obviously the shared vision of a more equitable global governance system".*

5.6.7 Additional findings

In contrast to its position within BRICS and in the context of Africa, South Africa possesses hard power strengths relative to the other countries in Africa. This is evidenced by the statement made by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *“economically, in the African continent, I would say we have a bit of hard power because of the size of our economy in relative terms. But, I mean obviously it's not--the way we use it is not coercive. In fact, we get a lot of criticism that we should be more coercive”*.

BRICS is committed to strengthening the intra-BRICS trade levels. According to the Director of BRICS South Africa there is *“a realisation that the more we strengthen the intra-BRICS economics cooperation investment trade, the less dependent or vulnerable BRICS economies will become to shocks due to economic woes in other traditional partners' economies. I mean, we all know the quantitative easing, the Euro Zone still has its own challenges”*.

BRICS is working on the public image of this grouping and according to the Director of BRICS South Africa: *“And I think you will also see increasingly soft power focus areas coming into the play”*.

The Director of BRICS mentioned that the EU continues to be an important trading partner for South Africa, but that South Africa has to consider other partners in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It was the relationship with the BRICS that enabled South Africa to weather the crisis.

5.7 Conclusion

In summary the findings for Mexico indicate that this country has a strong source of soft power in the areas of culture, development model and economic temptation. The Mexican economy appears to be an open one. A limited common interest approach is adopted by Mexico. Soft power strategies of a win-win strategy, occupying positions of authority and dialogue and communication are followed by Mexico. The findings for Poland indicate a fair performance in cultural attractiveness and political values and a good, open foreign policy. Poland appears to have open markets and has followed the common interest approach within the EU. The main soft power strategy followed by Poland is coalition building. The findings for Singapore indicate a level of global

excellence in soft power. Singapore follows a very open market approach and a common interest approach within the ASEAN region. The main soft power strategies of Singapore are cooperation, community building, dialogue and open communication and a win-win strategy. South Africa's findings indicate that the country has strong sources of soft power in each of the six pillars with the exception of political values. There is no real common interest approach. The main soft power strategies are active involvement in MLOs and occupying positions of authority.

The findings in this chapter were sufficiently detailed to enable the propositions to be tested further in this study. These findings are analysed and interpreted in Chapter 6 using a cross-case analysis, in alignment with the propositions.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses and interprets the findings described in Chapter 5. This chapter is presented in alignment with the propositions derived from Chapter 2. Chapter 5 discussed the findings on a within case analysis basis, as described by Eisenhardt (1989). This chapter analyses the findings using a cross-case analysis as set out by Eisenhardt (1989), with the view of providing answers to the propositions explained in Chapter 3, by identifying patterns.

6.2 Research proposition one: The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Proposition one requires an assessment of the level of strength of the soft power sources. The findings for this proposition set out in Chapter 5 were mainly derived from the framework, being the six pillars that were used to analyse the soft power sources of a country. Six pillars of soft power sources were identified through the literature review from the work by Li and Worm (2011) and Nye (2004). Each of the case studies' level of soft power were analysed using the six pillar framework.

The following table arranges each of the cases in terms of the six pillars' assessment.

Table 25: Case studies' score for six pillars

Six pillars	Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
Cultural attractiveness	Very good	Fair	Very good	Very good
Political values	Fair	Fair	Good	Fair
Development model	Good	Good	Excellent	Good
International institutions	Very good	Fair	Good	Very good
International image	Fair to Good	Good	Very good	Good
Economic temptation	Good	Good	Very good	Good
Overall strength of	Good	Fair to good	Very good	Good

soft power sources				
---------------------------	--	--	--	--

The findings for Mexico and South Africa set out in Table 25 were almost identical, revealing a strong level of soft power sources for these countries. This finding for the two countries is surprising and appears to be indicative of a deeper level of similarities among these two countries. Singapore was the clear outlier, far outperforming the other countries, with soft power sources that exceeded expectations. Poland lagged behind the others, with a level of soft power sources that was fair to good. The six pillar analysis determined the level of strength of the soft power sources of each of these countries, as required for proposition 1. It is these sources that a country uses to exercise soft power, as described by Nye (2004).

The six pillar analysis was supported by the performance of the countries in terms of selected indices, which indicated the development model and competitiveness among other corresponding factors. The following table collates the performance of the cases in terms of the indices selected.

Table 26: Case studies' ranking on selected indices

Indices	Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
Index of economic freedom	50/185	57/185	2/185	74/185
Ease of doing business	48/185	55/185	1/185	39/185
Corruption perceptions	105/176	41/176	5/176	69/176
Global competitiveness	55/148	42/148	2/148	53/148
First pillar – institutions	96/148	62/148	3/148	41/148
Second pillar – infrastructure	64/148	74/148	2/148	66/148
Third pillar – macroeconomic environment	49/148	65/148	18/148	95/148
Eighth pillar – financial market development	59/148	38/148	2/148	3/148
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	74/148	43/148	7/148	62/148
Tenth pillar – market size	11/148	20/148	34/148	25/148
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	55/148	65/148	17/148	35/148
Twelfth pillar – innovation	61/148	65/148	9/148	39/148

Note: The data from the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The data obtained through the interviews and as set out in Table 25 and Table 26 above indicates that Singapore far outperforms the other countries and is a clear winner on the global stage across most of the indices. The only pillar where Singapore

is surpassed by the other states is in terms of market size. This is a size related deficiency, as Singapore is considerably smaller than the other countries on many levels, as indicated by Table 1. The South African strength with regards to financial market development rivals that of Singapore, which is an indication of the country's strength in the financial sector. As explained in Chapter 5, the performances on these indices were used in support of the data obtained from the country representatives and experts on the political values and foreign policy components of the six pillar analysis. Although South Africa and Mexico appear to have almost equal performances in terms of the six pillar analysis, South Africa appears to surpass Mexico on most of the indices as indicated in Table 26 above. This appears to indicate that the levels of soft power sources of the respective case studies are as set out in Table 27 below.

Table 27: Case studies' level of soft power sources

Rank	Country
1	Singapore
2	South Africa
3	Mexico
4	Poland

Each of the case studies selected indicate a presence of soft power sources across each of the pillars. These countries possess varying degrees of soft power sources and varying strengths across each of the pillars. Poland appears to possess the least amount of soft power sources and a considerably lower level under the cultural attractiveness pillar. The findings for these case studies indicate that research proposition one is supported in each of the cases, in that the more soft power pillars a state possesses the greater the strength of its soft power source. This finding is in support of the argument put forth by Li and Worm (2011) that all six pillars are important and that emphasis should not be placed on any one pillar. Additionally, the argument put forward by Huang and Ding (2006) that a balance of the soft power sources is required is rejected by these findings.

6.3 Research proposition two: A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

Proposition two identifies a condition for the use of soft power, being the level of openness in terms of markets and communication. This proposition was derived from the work of Kroenig et al. (2010) and Huang and Ding (2006), where the authors

considered a functional marketplace or a favourable context as being necessary for the exercise of soft power. Each of the cases were analysed on their levels of openness from the data obtained through the interviews, against six of the twelve pillars from the WEF Global Competitiveness Report and export data as a percentage of GDP.

The openness of each of the countries is supported by the comments of the respondents, which are summarised in Table 28 below.

Table 28: Case studies' openness indicators

Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
Open in terms of exports and imports	Progressive markets	Open dialogue and communication with partners	Commitment to investments
More trade agreements than any other country in the world	Open to investment inflows	Consensus based partnerships	Open markets
Aggressively open		Open markets and open to investment inflows	

It is important to consider the findings for this proposition in Chapter 5 in light of the following comment made by Expert 1 in response to the question surrounding conditions for the effectiveness of soft power: *"Under a more open world, a more open and connected world. One that becomes more globally aware of each other in terms of culture, politics, beliefs, religion or religious acceptabilities... and where we have open media. Media is a huge transmitter of soft power. Free movement, free media and open social systems and open consumer markets, so, again, open inter-connectedness is a big component of soft power"*. This comment appears to indicate that open communication, open markets and open societies may be conditions for soft power.

It is apparent from the above data and from the following comment by Expert 1 that each of these countries displays a high level of openness: *"but where they are all alike is their openness. They are all very, very globally open, very globally--and they have opened up in very recent years. That's their similarity; that's where they've got strong parallels. All of them"*. It follows from the above that the selected countries have open markets and open levels of communication. It appears from the above findings that each of the countries display a level of openness, whether it is in terms of markets or communication.

The competitiveness pillars identified and measured, among other things, the institutions, financial market development, technology and innovation of the cases selected. Table 29 lists the performances by the selected cases against these pillars.

Table 29: Level of openness of cases measured against World Economic Forum pillars

Competitiveness pillars	Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
First pillar – institutions	96/148	62/148	3/148	41/148
Eighth pillar – financial market development	64/148	38/148	2/148	3/148
Ninth pillar – technological readiness	74/148	43/148	7/148	62/148
Tenth pillar – market size	11/148	20/148	34/148	25/148
Eleventh pillar – business sophistication	55/148	65/148	17/148	35/148
Twelfth pillar - innovation	61/148	65/148	9/148	39/148

Note: The data from the above table is from The World Economic Forum (2013).

The exports of goods and services for each of the cases, as a percentage of GDP are set out in Table 30 below.

Table 30: Export data for cases

Country	Exports % 2011	Exports % 2012
Mexico	32%	33%
Poland	45%	46%
Singapore	207%	201%
South Africa	29%	28%

Note: The export data is from World Bank (2012d).

The above data further support the findings in Table 31 that Singapore has the highest level of openness when compared with the other cases. South Africa's has the lowest percentage of exports to GDP when compared with the other cases.

According to Expert 1: *"ASEAN is probably one of the strongest areas of soft power--of active soft power, because you have these countries from Asia that are loathed to have any form of active coercive power and they want to still have some type of relevance and role in global agenda setting"*.

The Director BRICS South Africa commented: *"I think we're the ultimate example of soft power because the political transition of South Africa that occurred, you know, in 1994 already gave South Africa a certain, what we sometimes call, moral disposition in the world because of the fact that this became a cited example for peaceful transitions. That's already a very strong determinant of South Africa's soft power and then obviously linked to iconic leadership, like former president Mandela etc. It enhances that aspect thereof".*

It is also apparent from the comments made by the representatives that Singapore and South Africa possess a high level of soft power.

Singapore can be classified as the sure leader regarding openness, with the only exception being that of market size. The ranking of openness of South Africa appears to be better than Mexico, with Poland surpassing Mexico.

Table 31: Case studies' ranking of openness

Rank	Country
1	Singapore
2	Poland
3	South Africa
4	Mexico

The above findings do not appear to indicate a clear link between openness and the exercise of soft power. It cannot be inferred with absolute certainty that openness results in an environment that is better suited for the exercise or use of soft power as suggested by the research proposition and the work of Kroenig et al. (2010). The comment by the Polish Commercial Counsellor which is of particular significance to this proposition is: *"In the case the countries are hermetic, you know, there is no flow information, you know, so there will be natural tendency to have hard power"*, is indicative of the natural tendency of closed societies to use hard power. It is however not certain that the opposite, being that open societies tend to use soft power, can be inferred. The proposition is therefore supported to a limited degree.

6.4 Research proposition three: Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

This proposition is one that outlines a possible necessary condition for the use of soft power. The proposition suggests that in order for a party to use soft power, common

interests are required between the parties involved. This proposition is derived from the works of Gron and Wivel (2011) and Kroenig et al. (2010) that argue the need for common interests or material interests.

The following table describes the level of attention placed by the respective countries on common interests.

Table 32: Common interest significance

Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
Win-win approach, seeking the common interests of all participants	Confirmed the link between common interest and soft power	Seeks the common good for the country and region	Not actively seeking common interest with partners
Indirectly using common interest principles	Common interest was used to form a coalition with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia	Worked hard to find a common interest for the region within ASEAN	BRICS appears to be a non-cohesive grouping
		Actively seeking common interests	BRICS has common interest with G20
		Non-interference	BRICS appears to be trying to adopt a win-win approach

The findings set out in the above table indicate that Poland and Singapore have displayed examples of actively seeking common interests with their partners. Mexico has indirectly and perhaps unknowingly applied the common interest principle through their general approach of a win-win strategy. South Africa, in contrast to the others, does not appear to be seeking influence on the basis of a common interest with its partners. In addition, South Africa does not appear to be aligned with its counterparts on the continent. This is evident from the following comment by Expert 2: *“South Africa in the BRICS, it’s used its position as... the continental leader or representative, if you will, which is really more of a self-imposed ((laughs)) leadership than anything and which position is more--is taken more seriously outside of the continent than within the continent, so it is a contested position within the continent”*.

There is an indication that BRICS is not cohesive in its strategy and that members each appear to have their own strategies that are separate and distinct from the group strategy. This is evidenced by the following comment by Expert 1: *“because the BRICS were never able to come to a consensus on certain global issues and they never--I can’t see them doing that very, very quickly... They’re not as cohesive as what they might propose that they are”*. There is also an indication that BRICS is trying to adopt a

win-win approach, which is evidenced by the following comment by the Director of BRICS South Africa: *"And what BRICS is trying to reset that thinking for mutual gains, win-win situations. And if you look at the statements by the new Chinese president at the fifth BRICS summit, you will see a resonance also there. You know, you really want the paradigm shift on the way the world deals"*. These are, however, BRICS approaches and not a South African approach.

According to the Polish Commercial Counsellor: *"so it is for short solution in crisis situation I think hard power is--there is no better approach. As regards, you know, normal life I think soft power is much better ...but of course you should also look with whom you are dealing, you know...In case you have knowledgeable people, you know, with from the similar culture. You are not foreign to them. Soft power is okay ..."* The Polish Commercial Counsellor confirmed the proposition that soft power may be a better approach where there are common interests, in the form of a common culture between the parties.

Mexico, Poland and Singapore appear to be adopting a common interest approach with their partners and neighbours, which enhances their soft power. South Africa does not have a strong common interest approach. It is uncertain whether this lack of common interest hinders the South African soft power strategies. The finding for this proposition is that common interests are a necessary condition for the exercise of soft power.

6.5 Research proposition four: The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context

The following table demonstrates the soft power strategies adopted by the countries selected within their respective MLOs, which emerged from the interviews.

Table 33: Soft power strategies of selected cases

Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
Win-win	Coalition building	Cooperation	Position of authority
Position of authority	Cooperation	Community building	Agenda setting
Dialogue and communication		Regional integration	Global, regional and national approach
Active involvement and participation		Non-threatening	Cross-MLO membership
		Dialogue and open	

		communication	
		Consensus	

The rankings of each of these countries' soft power sources are set out in Table 27 above. The findings reveal that Singapore has the strongest soft power sources when compared with the other three cases. The findings set out in Table 31 reveal that Singapore has the highest level of openness among the four countries selected. The Singapore model supports the principle of common interest in their interactions and dealings within the MLO and the region itself.

According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore, Singapore does not consciously follow a tactical approach in dealing with the members of the region. According to the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"we utilise and look for areas in which we can augment and strengthen economic engagement. That is our source of strength really you know, because I think there are areas in which I think other ASEAN countries know our strengths, which they use as a model themselves you know... so indirectly there are things that we do in Singapore which without our telling them, "Look why don't you guys, you know, look at how we did that?" you know, but they look at us and you know that, well, why don't we use the Singapore model, you know. Let's try and use the Singapore model. So it is not because we are going out and saying use our model, you know, but we are there, they can see what we have done, and how we go about doing it you know; so it is an intangible thing. I mean it is not something that we do consciously, wilfully, but it is there"*.

It appears as though, in achieving excellence in various areas, including competitiveness, financial services and other sectors, Singapore has unconsciously employed the use of soft power. This model of development and economic success has encouraged others to emulate and adopt the Singapore way of doing things. It is this approach which is almost an ideal model of soft power, as originally described by Nye (2004), because it achieves the goal of soft power, being the changing of preferences through attraction and not through coercion. Singapore appears to have achieved "actual foreign policy outcomes" (p. 33) through the use of soft power, as described by Huang and Ding (2006). Taking into account the level of Singapore's soft power sources, its levels of openness and the adoption of the common interest principle, Singapore appears to have adopted soft power strategies which have been successful. The case study of Singapore appears to fully support research proposition four.

The findings under Table 25, Table 26 and Table 27 reveal that South Africa has the second strongest levels of soft power sources when compared with the other three countries. According to Table 29, Table 30 and Table 31, South Africa appears to have the third best levels of openness among the four countries. South Africa does not appear to support the principle of common interest in their dealings on the continent or within BRICS. The outcomes achieved by South Africa thus far within BRICS include the holding of the position of chair of BRICS, setting the agenda and the signing of agreements in support of the BRICS Development Bank. BRICS however follows a rotating chair principle and comprises only five members. The BRICS Development Bank has been on prior agendas for BRICS and is not a new agenda item. It is therefore uncertain about whether the strategies adopted by South Africa have been successful. In addition, South Africa's *"self-imposed leadership"* (Expert 2) on the continent has not resulted in the development of any type of common interest among South Africa and its regional counterparts. South Africa appears to possess a strong level of soft power sources and high levels of openness, which does not appear to have been translated into sufficient soft power for the country within the BRICS MLO. The lack of common interest appears to be the downfall in South Africa's soft power strategy.

According to the findings under Table 25, Table 26 and Table 27, Mexico appears to have the third strongest levels of soft power sources when compared to the other three selected countries. The level of openness of Mexico is fourth in terms of the pillar analysis in Table 29, Table 30 and Table 31. Mexico's export levels are however high, with Mexico emerging in third place when compared to the four countries. The principle of common interest appears to be adopted by this country on an indirect basis. It however does not appear to be a strong philosophy for this country. Within the G20, Mexico has held positions of authority and driven its own interests through setting agendas for the G20 summits. According to Oxfam (Oxfam Mexico, 2012), the agenda driven by Mexico does not appear to have been successful. According to Expert 1: *"Mexico's role in the G20 is not as influential as what it probably wishes it was"*. The Mexican level of soft power sources is diminished to a certain extent by their political values and their image in relation to crime and corruption. The exercising of soft power by Mexico has not been highly successful.

Poland's level of soft power sources is much lower than the other three countries, as evidenced by the findings in Table 25, Table 26 and Table 27. Poland appears to be conscious of the impact that openness plays. The Polish markets and level of

communication appear to be good. Polish society appears to be conservative and traditional. The Polish export levels are high, which contributes towards their levels of openness. Poland appears to have a strong view regarding the principle of common interest, which they have used quite effectively in building coalitions. This is a successful outcome of the Polish soft power strategy. As stated by the Polish Commercial Counsellor, Poland successfully created a coalition among the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, which influenced the EU in accepting these countries as members in 2004. It appears as though Poland was successful at using a soft power strategy, being coalition building, despite having low levels of soft power sources.

6.6 Conclusion and findings

A deep, rich understanding of the concept of soft power and how it related to the respective case studies was gleaned from the interview process. The data enabled the discovery of fresh insights into soft power, which further allowed for the propositions to be tested and resulted in the identification of the strategies followed by the selected countries.

The following table sets out the summary of the findings across each of the cases for each of the propositions.

Table 34: Summary of findings

Research proposition	Mexico	Poland	Singapore	South Africa
1. The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
2. A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited
3. Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
4. The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context	Not Supported	Not Supported	Supported	Not Supported

The Singapore case supported all the propositions with the exception of proposition two, which was supported to a limited degree. Research proposition one was fully

supported by each of the case studies, indicating a positive relationship between the strength of soft power source and the number of soft pillars possessed. The findings therefore indicate support for the argument put forward by Li and Worm (2011) that all six pillars are important. Furthermore, it may not be necessary to have a balance among the soft power sources, as suggested by Huang and Ding (2006). Proposition two was supported to a limited extent by each of the case studies, in that it was difficult to establish with absolute certainty that open markets and communication are better suited to using soft power. The findings for proposition two were somewhat contrary to the position held by Kroenig et al. (2010), that a functional marketplace or context that is open is essential for the use of soft power. Proposition three was supported by all cases. South Africa was the only case that did not appear to follow a common interest approach. South Africa possessed an above average level of soft power sources and clearly had an open context. Despite such attributes, South Africa has failed to successfully use soft power. The findings for this proposition support the view held by Gron and Wivel (2011) who presented a proposal where the common interests of states is highly relevant when dealing with regional MLOs, like the EU. Proposition four was not supported by three out of the four case studies. Poland was the clear exception, with the country having a low level of soft power sources but being able to successfully use soft power strategies. In contrast, Singapore possessed an above average level of soft power sources and high levels of openness, used the common interest approach and was successful in its soft power strategy.

The difference between Poland and South Africa lay with the common interest principle. South Africa did not apply this principle, whereas Poland did. It may be inferred that it is this principle which is a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power strategies and that it is lacking in the South African approach. The Mexican case study revealed above average levels of soft power sources, above average levels of openness, a slight commitment to common interests and unsuccessful use of soft power strategies.

The findings revealed that the ideal model to be followed by small states is the Singapore model. Although, the context within which soft power is used is a highly relevant factor that could play a role in the effectiveness of soft power, as was the case with both Poland and Singapore. The context being, the MLOs to which these states belonged were regional MLOs. Poland and Singapore effectively exercised soft power within these regional MLOs.

The findings also revealed that possession of soft power sources alone may not be sufficient in converting such sources into actual soft power, as was the case with South Africa. Additionally, the more soft power sources possessed by a party does not necessarily imply or translate into a more effective use of soft power. The non-cohesive nature of the MLO that South Africa belongs to and the lack of regional commonality could be significant factors inhibiting soft power success. These factors appear to indicate that cooperation, shared principles or common interests and regional commonality are conditions for the effective use of soft power by small states in MLOs. The right strategy for the appropriate setting is highly relevant. Finally, while Singapore supports proposition 4, Poland appears to have successfully used soft power strategies without possessing a large degree of soft power sources.

The final chapter revisits the research problem and the research objectives set out in Chapter 1, and emphasises the significant findings of the study, and concludes the research paper by making recommendations to stakeholders and recommendations for future study.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the findings that emerged from the data collection. This chapter revisits the origins of the research and provides a background to the research problem and the research objectives that were originally created. This chapter presents the significant findings of this study and the framework that has been developed. Recommendations to stakeholders, being policy makers of small states within MLOs, including South Africa shall be made. This chapter also presents the limitations of this study and opportunities for further research.

7.2 Research background and objectives

The background to this research is the uneven level of power within MLOs and the challenges faced by small states in making their voices heard. Soft power strategies were analysed as a means for small states to gain influence within MLOs and overcome their size-related challenges.

South Africa is positioned as a small state for the purpose of this study within the BRICS MLO. It, like other small states, requires strategies to exercise enhanced levels of influence and to avoid being dominated by the larger members. Other small states within MLOs face similar challenges to South Africa.

This study was conducted using a multiple case study approach. The propositions were tested against these case studies, being small states within their respective MLOs. The objective of the study was to identify the strategies that were used by such states and the conditions under which such strategies were successful and to formulate a framework for the use of soft power.

7.3 Main findings

Six interviews were conducted with country representatives and experts. These interviews yielded detailed, constructive findings which enabled the propositions to be

tested. The findings mainly supported the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, with the open markets and open communication conditions being supported to a limited extent. This research developed the existing theory established by Kroenig et al. (2010) by introducing the six pillar framework and the common interest condition within the newly identified precondition phase and by developing a strategic phase, as set out in the proposed framework in Figure 1. The key findings of this research are discussed in relation to the propositions and the research questions.

7.3.1 The strength of soft power source is dependent on possessing more of the soft power pillars

Each of the cases supported research proposition 1, where the level of soft power is strengthened by possessing more of the soft power pillars. The findings for research proposition 1 answered research question 1; the six pillar framework may be used by small states to identify their soft power strengths and, in addition their deficiencies.

7.3.2 A context that has more open markets and more open communication is better suited to using soft power

It could not be determined with absolute certainty that an environment of open markets and communication is better suited to soft power than a closed environment. Research proposition 2 was however indirectly confirmed by the Polish Commercial Counsellor who stated that closed societies tend to rely on hard power. The findings did not fully answer research question 2, in that open markets with open communication were not finally identified as the contexts which are better suited for using soft power.

7.3.3 Common interests are a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power

The common interest principle was followed by three out of the four cases, with South Africa being the notable exception. Poland and Singapore were the cases that mainly supported proposition three, with Poland exceeding the requirement by applying the principle to a coalition building strategy. The findings for this proposition answered research question 3 by determining that common interest was a necessary condition for the use of soft power.

7.3.4 The type of soft power strategy that is successful is dependent on the strength of the soft power source and an open context

Singapore displayed high levels of soft power source and the context of ASEAN is one where the principles of openness and common interests thrive. The soft power strategies of Singapore were successful, taking into account the variables such as high soft power source, openness and the context of the MLO.

Poland presented a different finding, in that it possessed low levels of soft power sources but was still able to successfully use soft power, as a result of employing the principle of common interest in its interactions with its partners. This finding indicates that low levels of soft power sources can still be effective if the appropriate strategies and paths are followed.

In contrast to Poland, South Africa satisfied all the requirements by having high levels of soft power sources and high levels of openness, but its soft power strategies were not as successful. The variable missing from South Africa's approach was the principle of common interest.

The strategies which were successful in the Singapore context were cooperation, community building, regional integration, a non-threatening approach, dialogue and open communication and consensus. Another strategy of notable mention is coalition building, which was successfully followed by Poland in gaining membership of the EU. These strategies are identified by this research as the typology of soft power strategies which may be used by small states within MLOs. It is this typology of strategies that provides the answer to research question 4.

7.4 Recommendations for stakeholders

The findings of this study provide useful recommendations for academics and policy makers within the areas of international relations and foreign diplomacy. The following recommendations are based on the interpretation of the findings derived from the case studies.

7.4.1 Academics

There is an extensive body of knowledge that has developed on soft power since the original formulation of this concept by Nye (1990). The gap identified was the lack of a causal mechanism to convert soft power resources to actual soft power. This research

proposes a framework, set out in Figure 1, which may be useful to academics that wish to further enhance the field of international relations through the theory of soft power.

7.4.2 Policy makers


The findings in Chapter 5 and the analysis in Chapter 6 indicate that the Singapore model of soft power is the ideal model of soft power, which may be adopted by other countries with success. However, this model, like soft power is context dependent. The model works because the context of ASEAN and its member states is conducive to this soft power approach and due to the level of soft power in this region. This is evidenced by the following comment by the Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore: *"Fortunately for our region this is not backed up by the power of the country concerned. I think it would be fair to say that not one of the Asian countries actually exercises muscle, you know, because ASEAN in terms of policy making within the regional body works on a basis of consensus"*. There are lessons which can be followed by others, particularly regional lessons of common interest. The Singapore way is to teach and share practices with neighbours. This practice of sharing ideas has been successful for Singapore within the region. It may serve South Africa well to follow a common interest approach within the African region, as this region may be deficient in such awareness and practices. The use of a common interest approach within the current soft power strategies of South Africa may enhance the South African image and reputation within Africa and may facilitate better negotiation outcomes for South Africa and the region.

Other countries, such as Mexico and Poland may work on developing their soft power sources. Poland appears to be deficient in the area of cultural awareness. The approach of countries such as China and Turkey in establishing institutes around the world to improve awareness surrounding their respective cultures could be followed by countries like Poland, where their culture is not widely known. Countries such as Mexico and South Africa where crime, corruption and violence diminish their international image, may work more on their public image.

7.5 Proposed framework: Soft power mechanism

The conditions for the use of soft power are presented in Figure 1, which describes two phases for the use of soft power, being the precondition phase and the strategy phase. The proposed framework sets out each of the preconditions which must be satisfied before proceeding to the strategy phase.

Figure 1 Soft power mechanism



With phase 1, the precondition phase, a state should use the six pillar framework to determine where their internal competencies lie from a soft power perspective. As discussed in Chapter 2, these six pillars are an analysis in terms of cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image and economic temptation. The findings for proposition 1 are that a balance among the soft power sources, originally described by Nye (2004), being culture, political values and foreign policy and as argued by Huang and Ding (2006) is

not required. Therefore a state that possesses any one or more of the six pillar sources of soft power is in a position to use such soft power source to achieve realised soft power outcomes.

It is this six pillar framework that supplements and further develops the theory of Kroenig et al. (2010). The next three conditions of the proposed framework described in Figure 1 above is the theory of Kroenig et al. (2010), which includes a functional marketplace of ideas, the attitude of the target and an influential target. These conditions are described in more detail in Chapter 2. It is assumed for the purpose of this research study that these conditions be applied within the precondition phase, as described by Kroenig et al. (2010). Proposition 2 was derived from the condition of a functional marketplace of ideas, which relates to a context that is open. From the findings and the interpretation of the findings discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, this proposition was only confirmed to a limited degree. It is assumed for the purpose of the proposed framework set out by this research study in Figure 1 that this condition will apply and it is therefore included.

The common interest condition discussed as part of proposition 3 is a further development to the theory of Kroenig et al. (2010). The findings for this proposition are that common interest is a necessary condition for the effective use of soft power. This condition is of particular significance to MLOs as was demonstrated through the Singapore and Poland case studies.

The second phase, being the strategy phase is a further development of the theory of Kroenig et al. (2010). This phase fills the gap identified through Chapter 2, in that it sets out a causal mechanism for converting soft power sources into actual soft power. This phase envisages that a state determines its soft power sources through the six pillars. The soft power sources will then lead to the identification of the appropriate strategy. According to the findings under proposition 4, the type of strategy depends on the strength of the state's soft power sources and the context. It was not conclusive that an open context is a condition. Despite this inconclusive finding, this research finds that for regional contexts such as ASEAN and the EU, specific strategies such as coalition building and open communication may be more relevant.

The last construct of the proposed framework set out in Figure 1 above relates to outcomes. Huang and Ding (2006) discussed the outcomes of soft power and the measurement thereof, which has been highlighted by this research as a matter which requires further study. It is the view of Huang and Ding (2006) that outcomes are achieved when they are measured against the objective or goal of the party using soft

power and are found to have achieved the said objective or goal. This view is accepted for the purposes of this study.

7.6 Limitations of the research

This study was limited, given the time constraints to four case studies. Although the findings were rich and detailed, it is possible that other contexts such as MERCOSUR and CARICOM could yield additional results to supplement the findings from this study.

This study was conducted on purely a qualitative basis. A mixed methodology, including quantitative analysis may add deeper value and more advanced findings to a study of this nature.

7.7 Opportunities for further research

The research involved a partial analysis of BRICS and the South African strategies within such MLOs. This organisation is fairly new and South Africa's membership is recent. The organisation is evolving and is still establishing its governing practices and institutions. An opportunity for further research would be to conduct a similar study in a period of five years when the organisation has more firmly established its agendas and its members are firmly entrenched within the organisation.

This study involved an analysis of how to use soft power and did not delve into building soft power. These capacity building strategies were discussed by, among others, Li and Worm (2011) and Panke (2012a) Panke (2012b). A multiple case study could be conducted on a regional basis, to identify strategies that may be used by both large and small states that wish to build soft power capabilities. China is particularly interested in developing its soft power and actively engages in such activities in order to improve its soft power capabilities.

The work of Kroenig et al. (2010) discussed a psychological component for the use of soft power, being the attitude of the target. According to Kroenig et al. (2010), the mood of the target and other psychological factors may be relevant in persuading the target to change its preferences. This psychological component requires further study and could supplement the findings of this research study.

One of the limitations of soft power was the difficulty in measuring or assessing the effectiveness of the soft power strategies, as identified by among others, Huang and Ding (2006). Further research is required to supplement the work of Huang and Ding (2006), by formulating more concrete measurements of the effectiveness of soft power strategies.

7.8 Conclusion

The proposed framework of this study has possible relevance to academics that wish to develop the body of knowledge on soft power and international relations. Additionally, policy makers may apply the framework in their work to enhance soft power strategies being used within MLOs.

Many of the respondents interviewed for this research study commented on the inter-dependencies of countries on each other, with the rise of globalisation. There has become a greater need for countries to cooperate with each other in order to eradicate global problems of unemployment and poverty. The Deputy High Commissioner of Singapore commented that the world is realising that problems are not unique to a particular country and that solutions can be shared across countries to resolve such problems. Cooperative strategies such as soft power and diplomacy have a greater role to play in this inter-connected, globalised world. The Director of BRICS South Africa made the following comment in relation to South Africa's vision for a stable and more equitable Africa and World: *"Which I know is very normative perhaps, and we get criticised for the idealism, but if you can't dream, you know, what's left? You have to have that vision of the type of world you want to see one day to realise that type of world or world order, so to speak. And I think that's exactly the soft power - that vision that you have"*.

REFERENCES

- Alden, C., & Schoeman, M. (2013, January). South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order. *International Affairs*, 89(1), 111-129.
- ASEAN Secretariat. (2012). *ASEAN*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from ASEAN: <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean>
- Bishop, M. L. (2012). The political economy of small states: Enduring vulnerability? *Review of International Political Economy*, 19(5), 942-960.
- Bjorkdahl, A. (2007, November 22). Norm advocacy: A small state strategy to influence the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(1), 135-154.
- Bloomberg, L. D., & Volpe, M. (2012). *Completing your dissertation A road map from beginning to end* (2nd ed.). United States of America: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Braveboy-Wagner, J. (2010, September). Opportunities and limitations of the exercise of foreign policy power by a very small state: The case of Trinidad and Tobago. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(3), 407-427.
- Chong, A. (2010, September). Small state soft power strategies: Virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(3), 383-405.
- Chu, Y. (2007, October 15). China's fourth rise: Soft power communication, impediments, and success. Retrieved October 7, 2013, from AMIC: <http://amic.org.sg/conference/AMIC2013/Full%20Papers/C6/Yingchi.pdf>
- Communication Department of the European Commission. (n.d.). *Europa*. Retrieved September 19, 2013, from Europa: http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm
- Das, A. K. (2013). Soft and hard power in India's strategy toward Southeast Asia. *India Review*, 12(3), 165-185.
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 532-550.
- Eriksson, P., & Kovalainen, A. (2008). *Qualitative methods in business research*. Sage Publications Ltd. doi:10.4135/9780857028044
- Euromonitor International. (2012a, August 20). *Euromonitor*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from <http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx>
- Euromonitor International. (2012b, August 29). *Euromonitor*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from <http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx>

- <http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx>
- Euromonitor International. (2013a, March 12). *Euromonitor*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from [Euromonitor: http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx](http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx)
- Euromonitor International. (2013b, April 17). *Euromonitor*. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from [Euromonitor: http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx](http://www.portal.euromonitor.com/Portal/Pages/Search/SearchResultsList.aspx)
- Fijalkowski, L. (2011). China's 'soft power' in Africa? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(2), 223-232.
- Fisher, R. (2013, March 26). Another BRICS in the wall: Interview with Maite Nkoane-Mashabane. *Daily Maverick*. South Africa. Retrieved March 27, 2013, from Daily Maverick: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/>
- Fransman, M. (2012, November 21). *Department of International Relations and Cooperation*. Retrieved September 2, 2013, from Department of International Relations and Cooperation: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/frans1121.html>
- Gill, B., & Huang, Y. (2006, July 18). Sources and limits of Chinese soft power. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 48(2), 17-36.
- Gron, C. H., & Wivel, A. (2011, September). Maximizing influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From small state policy to smart state strategy. *Journal of European Integration*, 33(5), 523-539.
- Heritage Foundation. (2013). 2013 Index of economic freedom. Retrieved September 16, 2013, from Heritage Foundation: <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>
- Huang, Y., & Ding, S. (2006). Dragon's underbelly: An analysis of China's soft power. *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 23(4), 22-44.
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank. (2013). Doing Business 2013. (10th). Retrieved September 16, 2013, from Doing Business: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB13-full-report.pdf>
- International Visegrad Fund. (n.d.). *International Visegrad Fund*. Retrieved September 15, 2013, from International Visegrad Fund: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about>
- Isa, M. (2013, May 28). S & P affirms South Africa's credit rating. *BD Live*. Retrieved September 20, 2013, from BD Live: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/>
- Kappel, R. (2011, September). The challenge to Europe: Regional powers and the shifting of the global order. *Intereconomics*, 46(5), 275-286.

- Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2010). *International organizations the politics and processes of global governance* (Second ed.). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputian's dilemmas: Small states in international politics. *International Organisation*, 23(2), 291-310.
- Kraichitti, K. (2006). ASEAN free trade agreements: Policy and legal considerations for development. Retrieved May 20, 2013, from ASEAN Law Association: http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/9GAdocs/w3_Thailand.pdf
- Kroenig, M., McAdam, M., & Weber, S. (2010). Taking soft power seriously. *Comparative Strategy*, 29(5), 412-431.
- Lee, D., & Smith, N. J. (2010). Small state discourses in the international political economy. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(7), 1091-1105.
- Li, X., & Worm, V. (2011, March). Building China's soft power for a peaceful rise. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 16(1), 69-89.
- Martinez-Diaz, L. (2007, October). The G20 after eight years: How effective a vehicle for developing-country influence? Retrieved August 5, 2013, from The Brookings Institution: <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2007/10/17development/1017development.pdf>
- Mittner, M. (2013, July 29). Experts support Reserve Bank on GDP forecast. *BD Live*. Retrieved September 20, 2013, from BD Live: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/>
- Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft power. *Foreign Policy*, 80, 153-171.
- Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J. S. (2008). Contextual Intelligence. In J. S. Nye, *The Powers to Lead* (pp. 85-108). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J. S. (2009). Get smart. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(4), 160-163.
- O'Neill, J. (2001, November 30). Building better global economic BRICs. *Global Economics Paper No. 66*. Retrieved January 21, 2013, from <http://www.goldmansachs.com/>
- O'Neill, J. (2012, March 30). SA's BRICS score not all doom and gloom. *Mail & Guardian*. Retrieved January 21, 2013, from Mail & Guardian: <http://mg.co.za/>
- Oxfam Mexico. (2012). The G20 development agenda: Insights from Mexico. *OXFAM Mexico, A.C.* Retrieved August 5, 2013, from Oxfam Mexico: <http://www.oxfam-mexico.org/>
- Panke, D. (2012a). Dwarfs in international negotiations: How small states make their voices heard. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 313-328.

- Panke, D. (2012b). Small states in multilateral negotiations. What have we learned? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 387-398.
- Perry, C. (2001). Case research in marketing. *The Marketing Review*, 1(3), 303-323.
- Qobo, M., & Dube, M. (2012, December). The burdens of multilateral engagement and club diplomacy for middle-income countries: The case of South Africa in the BRICS and the G20. *SAIIA Occasional Paper No 126*. Retrieved May 28, 2013, from SAIIA: <http://www.saiia.org.za/>
- Russia's G20 Presidency. (n.d.). *G20*. Retrieved September 17, 2013, from G20: http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html
- Saunders, M., & Lewis, P. (2012). *Doing research in business & management*. London: Pearson Education Limited.
- Sharma, R. (2012a). Mexico's tycoon economy. In R. Sharma, *Breakout Nations: In pursuit of the next economic miracles* (pp. 73-82). Penguin Group.
- Sharma, R. (2012b). The sweet spot of Europe. In R. Sharma, *Breakout Nations: In pursuit of the next economic miracles* (pp. 97-110). Penguin Group.
- Stepniak, A. (2002). Strategy of Poland's membership in the European Union. *Intereconomics*, 37(4), 183-188.
- Sutton, P. (2011). The concept of small states in the international political economy. *The Round Table*, 100(413), 141-153.
- The Economist. (2011, November 12). Look at it this way; Non-members. *The Economist*, 401(8759). Retrieved August 6, 2013, from <http://0-search.proquest.com.innopac.up.ac.za/docview/903676337/13FBDA5E425668397EA/2?accountid=14717>
- The Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation. (n.d.). *BRICS5*. Retrieved June 20, 2013, from BRICS5: <http://www.brics5.co.za/>
- The World Economic Forum. (2013). The global competitiveness report 2012-2013. Geneva. Retrieved September 16, 2013, from The World Economic Forum: <http://www.weforum.org/>
- Transparency International. (2012). Corruption perceptions index 2012. Retrieved September 16, 2013, from Transparency International: <http://www.transparency.org/>
- Vickers, B. (2011, April). Between a rock and a hard place: Small states in the EU-SADC EPA negotiations. *The Round Table*, 100(413), 183-197.
- Wang, H., & Lu, Y.-C. (2008). The conception of soft power and its policy implications: A comparative study of China and Taiwan. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17(56), 425-447.

- Wocke, A. (2005). *The development of a model for human resource strategy for multinational corporations*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.
- Woods, N. (2010). Global governance after the financial crisis: A new multilateralism or the last gasp of the great powers? *Global Policy*, 1(1), 51-63.
- World Bank. (2011). *World Bank*. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2>
- World Bank. (2012a). *World Bank*. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>
- World Bank. (2012b). *World Bank*. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>
- World Bank. (2012c). *World Bank*. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>
- World Bank. (2012d). *World Bank*. Retrieved October 28, 2013, from World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS/countries>
- Zikmund, W. G., Babin, B. J., Carr, J. C., & Griffin, M. (2009). *Business research methods* (8th ed.). Cengage Learning. Retrieved April 29, 2013, from http://www.cengage.com/marketing/book_content/1439080674_zikmund/book/

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Interview consent letter



21 August 2013

Dear Sir

Request for Interview

I am conducting research through interviews, in partial fulfilment of a MBA degree through the Gordon Institute of Business Science. The information obtained from you and your organisation, should you decide to participate, is intended to be used in my research on South Africa and its position within the BRICS grouping. I am trying to find out more about the strategies used by South Africa and by small states within groupings similar to BRICS. Our interview is expected to last about an hour and it is expected that the interview will help us to better understand the strategies used by South Africa and other states like Mexico, Poland and Singapore within groupings like BRICS, G20, EU and ASEAN.

The research report compiled from data obtained through the interview process will be publicly available and as such the information disclosed by you, should you decide to participate, will not be kept confidential. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can withdraw from the process at any time without penalty or recourse. There will not be any costs incurred by you or your organisation.

Should you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact my supervisor or me. Our contact details are provided below.


Please sign below to indicate your consent to the interview and to the information being publicly disclosed.

Yogeni Chetty

Researcher

email: yogenic@wwcapital.co.za

0833375991 / (011) 685 1004



Professor Albert Wöcke

Research Supervisor

email: wockea@gibs.co.za

(011) 771 4000

I agree to take part in the research described above and to the interview being recorded.

Signature of Participant

Full Name:

Position:

Appendix B – Interview authorisation letter



**GORDON
INSTITUTE
OF BUSINESS
SCIENCE**



14 August 2013

To whom this concerns

Please note that Yogeni Chetty (Student number 12298302) is currently registered for the Masters in Business Administration (MBA 12.13) degree with the University of Pretoria's Gordon Institute of Business Science.

Yogeni is currently conducting research as a requirement for the degree.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any queries in this regard.

Kind regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M Mrabalala", with a horizontal line underneath.

Mandisa Mrabalala

MBA Programme Coordinator

Gordon Institute of Business Science

Mrabalalam@gibs.co.za

Appendix C – Interview schedule

Interview Schedule for Semi-Structured Interviews

- 1 Could you give me a brief synopsis of the role that you play within the organisation?

Soft Power

- 2 What do you understand by the terms soft power and hard power?
- 3 In your opinion, does soft power have a role to play in influencing organisations like BRICS, G20, EU and ASEAN?

BRICS

G20

EU

ASEAN

- 4 Do you think that large states within multilateral organisations, like BRICS, EU, ASEAN and G20, can be persuaded through soft power?
- 5 Under what circumstances is the use of soft power by states most effective?

Context:

Country	Multilateral Organisation
Mexico	G20
South Africa	BRICS
Singapore	ASEAN
Poland	EU

- 6 What is the nature or mission of
 - a. G20
 - b. EU
 - c. ASEAN
 - d. BRICS
- 7 How do these organisations differ from each other
- 8 Have soft power strategies been used by the selected countries within the selected multilateral organisations
- 9 If so, what strategies have been used by each of them?

- 10 What are the selected country's approaches to negotiations within their respective multilateral settings? What are their objectives?
- 11 In order to improve trade levels or increase investment, **who** or at **what level** should each of these countries **target** within their respective multilateral settings?

Soft Power Sources or Pillars

- 12 Do you think that the selected countries have strong soft power sources? If so, what are they?
- 13 What parts of each country's culture could be influential in the multilateral setting?
- 14 What political values of each country are influential?
- 15 A development model is the growth or economic success model of a country? How would you best describe each country's development model?
- 16 How is each country viewed internationally? What is its image?
- 17 What is the level of participation of each country within international institutions that they belong to? Example Mexico within G20, NAFTA; South Africa within BRICS, G20, IBSA, UN Security Council etc.
- 18 What are the economic gains to be had from transacting with each of these selected countries within their respective multilateral setting?
- 19 In your opinion, does each multilateral setting dictate different negotiation strategies? If so, what would be the strategy that would be most influential for:

G20

EU

ASEAN

BRICS