SYNOPSIS OF COMMUNITY OF INSECURITY: SADC’S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Abstract

This article presents a synopsis of Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa, published by Ashgate in 2012. It focuses on SADC’s efforts to establish a common security regime; conflict and peacemaking in Southern Africa between 1992 and 2012; and the prospects of SADC becoming a security community. It summarises the reasons for SADC’s difficulties in the sphere of regional security and politics, namely the weakness of member states, their unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to communal mechanisms, and the absence of common values among them. The main conclusion is that these problems lie primarily at the national level and cannot be solved at the regional level. SADC is a forum of states and it cannot do anything that these states will not permit it to do.

Introduction

Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa explores the establishment, evolution and effectiveness of SADC’s security arrangements between 1992 and 2011.¹ The story is filled with the drama of war, intrigue and mistrust among neighbouring states. The dramatic tension is heightened by the widely held expectation in the early 1990s that post-apartheid Southern Africa would shed the destructive conflict of the past and embark on a journey of peace, stability, development and regional integration. These hopes have not been met. After SADC’s formation in 1992 major conflicts continued to plague the region and many thousands of its people endured chronic insecurity. Ironically, the construction of SADC’s collective security arrangements was itself a source of bitter acrimony among member states. Against this background, Community of Insecurity

seeks to answer two questions: why did SADC fail to set up a viable security regime and engage in effective peacemaking? And is SADC a nascent security community?

This article presents a synopsis of the book, covering SADC’s struggle to establish a common security regime; conflict and peacemaking in Southern Africa; and the prospects of SADC becoming a security community. I attribute SADC’s difficulties in the sphere of regional security to the weakness of member states, their unwillingness to surrender sovereignty to communal mechanisms, and the absence of common values among them.²

The struggle to establish regional security arrangements

SADC was founded in 1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions.³ It was a time of great hope and promise in Southern Africa. The Cold War had drawn to a close, easing regional tensions, and multi-party elections were held in several countries for the first time. Most importantly, the system of apartheid and minority rule in South Africa was about to be replaced by a democratic dispensation. This would not only bring an end to Pretoria’s destabilisation of its neighbours but would also bring the most powerful country in Southern Africa into the regional community. A spirit of optimism prevailed in anticipation of an era of stability and economic growth.

Notwithstanding this optimism, the Southern African states had no illusions that the region would be free of conflict. In 1996 they established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, a common security regime charged with promoting peace and security through political, military and security co-operation and the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflict. In 2001 the Summit approved the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which covers the objectives, structures and strategies of the Organ, and two years later the heads of state signed the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

² Given the constraints of space, this article provides only a limited number of references. A full set of references can be found in Nathan, Community of Insecurity.
³ The members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar (suspended in 2009), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The formation of this security architecture was bedevilled by rancorous discord over a ten-year period. One major disagreement concerned Zimbabwe’s view that SADC should focus exclusively on economic issues and that a new association, a revamped version of the Frontline States, should be created to deal with security. As the first Chair of the Organ, President Mugabe treated the security body as an autonomous institution, disconnected from the rest of SADC. In 1998, when President Mandela held the Chair of the Summit, he became so frustrated with Mugabe’s rival authority as the head of the Organ that he threatened to resign if the Organ was not properly integrated into SADC and made accountable to the Summit. This provocative move exacerbated the tension surrounding regional security arrangements.

SADC was also polarised around apparently incompatible pacific and militarist approaches to regional security. One camp, comprising Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, regarded the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for co-operation and peacemaking would be political rather than military. The militarist camp, comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised defence co-operation and military responses to conflict. Mugabe announced that he foresaw the Organ evolving into a ‘kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region’.

This debate rendered the Organ inoperative in the 1990s. According to Walter Tapfumaneyi, a Zimbabwean defence ministry official, the Organ stalemate was due to Pretoria’s opposition to the use of armed force in peacemaking. He argued that this policy was sorely mistaken:

All the conflicts that have arisen in southern Africa since 1989 have shown that it is necessary, at least in the early stages of the conflict resolution and peace-building continuum, to apply collective military force, not as an end in itself, but as a catalyst to an effective political solution. It is therefore superfluous and hypocritical for the South African government and its apologists to advocate a strict adherence to early warning and diplomatic solutions to SADC conflicts.

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5 Congo wins membership in sudden expansion of SADC, *SouthScan* 12(33), 12 September 1997, 258.
The members of the pacific camp, on the other hand, were opposed to giving the regional security regime a predominantly military character. In light of the turbulent history, contemporary disputes and uncertain political future of Southern Africa, they were especially resistant to the grand strategy of collective defence via a NATO-type treaty based on the principle that ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. They believed that this strategy carried the danger of being drawn into a war without careful deliberation and without good cause. By the time the Summit finally approved the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, the text had been so watered down that it no longer entailed a binding commitment to collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack on a member state. Instead, states are free to participate in collection action approved by the Summit in any manner they deem appropriate.

The significance and intensity of the pacific-militarist debate derived from its relevance to war and crisis. As discussed below, the strategic import of the division was brought into sharp relief by SADC’s response to the 1998 rebellion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the 2009 coup in Madagascar.

**Conflict and peacemaking in Southern Africa**

Between 1992 and 2011 there were a number of prominent conflicts in the SADC region. They included the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002; a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC that began in 1998 and has been followed, to the present date, by sporadic outbursts of fighting and large-scale displacements of people; election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; election disputes in Malawi in 1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001; election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001; undemocratic elections and state repression and violence in Zimbabwe from 2000; and violent protests and a coup in Madagascar in 2009.

In addition, there were instances of use or threat of force by SADC states against each other. In 1998 Angola threatened to invade neighbouring Zambia in order to halt supplies to Unita and two years later Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory. In the same year South Africa and Botswana deployed troops to quell a mutiny in Lesotho. In 2008 political tension between Zimbabwe and Botswana acquired a military dimension when
Gaborone mobilised artillery and troops along their common border and Harare accused Botswana of providing military support to opposition insurgents.  

Notwithstanding the existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In many of the conflicts referred to above, it refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. There were several reasons for this. Member states were keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise trade and functional co-operation, and governments that were not democratic were naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring countries that engaged in undemocratic practices. Moreover, the SADC states were determined to maintain a public posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militated against public criticism of each other.

SADC’s inadequate peacemaking performance is also attributable to the problems afflicting the Organ. In the 1990s the lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high intensity conflict contributed to collective inertia, contradictory and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peacemaking and peace enforcement. Most of these problems were apparent during the crises in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. In both cases a small group of SADC countries embarked on military action in the name of the organisation despite the absence of a SADC mandate authorising such action.

SADC was deeply divided over the DRC rebellion. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe deployed troops to defend President Kabila, while South Africa, backed by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, pursued a ceasefire and negotiated solution. The divergent strategies led to angry sparring between Pretoria and Harare and provoked lasting antagonism. Rocky Williams captured these dynamics perfectly when he invoked the notion of ‘two SADCs’.  

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In 1999 Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe, exasperated by the Organ impasse and the stance of the pacific group, signed a defence treaty without notice to the SADC Summit. This controversial action reinforced the impression of ‘two SADCs’, cleaved along militarist and pacific lines. Naison Ngoma concludes that the defence treaty and the DRC deployment ‘almost dealt a mortal blow to the sub-region’s efforts at enhancing co-operation’. In 2002 Angola, South Africa and Zambia facilitated the ending of the Congolese war but over the next decade SADC devoted surprisingly little attention to renewed fighting in the DRC.

SADC’s reaction to the Madagascar coup in March 2009 looked like a minor reprise of the organisational imbroglio around the DRC. The initial response of the Organ was to threaten force if the ousted President, Marc Ravalomanana, was not reinstated immediately. The Organ was chaired at the time by King Mswati of Swaziland, whose predilection for military action in Madagascar was shared by Mugabe. Other states were unhappy about this approach because it escalated the crisis and enabled the coup-makers to rally popular support against external intervention. The militarist posture also prevented SADC from becoming properly involved in the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations and the African Union. In June 2009 South Africa took the Chair of the Summit and prompted the regional body to embark on mediation. The mediation was compromised by the Organ’s threat of force, which generated resistance and confusion as SADC seemed to be playing ‘good cop’ and ‘bad cop’ simultaneously.

SADC fared very poorly in relation to the Zimbabwe crisis. From 2000 onwards the Zimbabwean government, faced with the prospect of losing power in an election, attempted to suppress the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and opposition activists through violence, intimidation and manipulation of elections. The Summit’s public response was predominantly one of solidarity with Harare. It downplayed the human rights abuses, turned a blind eye to the electoral malpractices and condoned violent land seizures that violated the rule of law. Botswana was the only member state that consistently objected to Harare’s transgressions of its Treaty obligation to respect human rights and the rule of law.

In 2007 the Summit appointed President Mbeki to mediate a resolution of the crisis. The mediation was controversial and contested, with the MDC repeatedly calling for Mbeki’s resignation on the grounds that he was biased in favour of the ruling party, Zanu-PF. The controversy intensified during the 2008 election, which was wracked by intense violence against the MDC. Once again, SADC was disunited. Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius and Tanzania were convinced that Mugabe had to go, that a transitional government should replace his regime and that Mbeki’s mediation team should be made more balanced by including other African leaders.\(^\text{12}\) Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa opposed this position and protected Mugabe.

Mugabe ended up winning a presidential electoral victory that was indisputably flawed.\(^\text{13}\) Nevertheless, the Summit continued to recognise him as the President of Zimbabwe, effectively endorsing his subversion of the democratic process. Mbeki thereafter brokered negotiations between Zanu-PF and the MDC, which resulted in the signing of the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) and formation of a coalition government. At the time of writing (June 2013), the jury is still out on whether the GPA can be judged a success. More broadly, it is difficult to disagree with Kofi Annan’s assertion that SADC could have and should have done more to tackle the Zimbabwe crisis.\(^\text{14}\)

The Summit’s position on Zimbabwe revealed starkly the extent to which SADC’s norms of state solidarity and anti-imperialism trump those of democracy. This was also painfully evident in the Summit’s disbanding of the SADC Tribunal, an institution provided for in the Treaty. In 2008 the Tribunal ruled that the Zimbabwean government’s seizure of land owned by white farmers violated the Treaty principles of non-discrimination and the rule of law. The regional court ordered the government to refrain from interfering with the farmers’ occupation and ownership of their properties. Harare spurned the court, continued to subject the farmers to violent harassment and mounted a campaign to emasculate the Tribunal. Instead of upholding the Treaty and defending the Tribunal, in 2011 the Summit dissolved the regional court. This move was roundly criticised by lawyers’ associations and human

Explaining SADC’s failure to establish effective security arrangements

Many analysts in Southern Africa have attributed SADC’s difficulties in setting up a security regime to disagreements among member states over the regime’s status and structures, to a struggle for hegemony between South Africa and Zimbabwe and to personal animosity between the presidents of these countries. This perspective is not wholly inaccurate but it is incomplete because it focuses on manifestations of deeper problems.

In *Community of Insecurity* I argue that SADC’s failure to create effective security arrangements was due to three deep-rooted structural problems. First, and most importantly, there was an absence of common values among member states. There were two key lines of division in this regard: between democratic and authoritarian orientations in the domestic policies of these states and between pacific and militarist tendencies in their foreign policies. As noted above, the drafting of the Mutual Defence Pact and consolidation of the Organ floundered because of the rift between the pacific and militarist camps. The absence of a consensus on democracy did not inhibit the endorsement of democratic norms in SADC’s official documents but it prevented the organisation in practice from addressing authoritarianism and repression in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and other member countries.

The antagonism between South Africa and Zimbabwe undoubtedly hindered progress. The animosity had its origins in historical circumstances and contemporary power relations. For nearly twenty years under apartheid, Pretoria had wrought extensive destruction in Southern Africa through its policy of regional destabilisation. When it embraced democracy in 1994 it became the dominant power in SADC, challenging Mugabe’s status as the foremost regional leader. The ensuing tension was inevitable but it would probably have eased over time had Pretoria and Harare pursued similar foreign policies and been equally committed to a


democratic agenda. The persistence and severity of the conflictual relationship stemmed from the fundamental political differences between the two countries.

In order to explore the significance of the normative divisions in SADC, I distinguish between the internal and external logic of a regional organisation as necessary but separate requirements for cohesion and effectiveness. The external logic, which is strong in Southern Africa, refers to the interests, gains and objective conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the assessment of its members. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC, refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member countries that enables these countries to engage in close political and security co-operation. A high level of congruence engenders the affinity and trust that are prerequisites for states to develop common policies on sensitive issues, adopt a set of binding principles and rules and accept the resultant constraints on their decision-making and conduct. Whereas the external logic is the fuel that drives a regional organisation, the internal logic is the glue that holds it together.

The internal logic is relative in the sense that the degree of normative congruence needed for success varies according to the focus, type and form of multilateral engagement. The Southern African experience confirms what might be expected intuitively in this regard: the threshold is lower in non-sensitive areas than in the realm of high politics; it rises in the progression from co-operation to co-ordination to integration; and it is higher in a formal regime like the Organ than in an informal association like the Frontline States. Notwithstanding their disputes around the Organ, SADC states have sufficient affinity and trust to co-operate in a range of functional sectors, such as water and energy. They have also been able to co-operate on security issues that are relatively uncontroversial, examples of this being their technical co-operation on military and police matters through the Organ’s Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, the SADC Standby Force Brigade and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation.

In the 1980s the Frontline States achieved cohesion on the basis of its members’ common opposition to apartheid and colonialism but it did not seek to regulate their conduct through binding rules. The requisite threshold of political congruence is much higher in the case of the Organ, which stipulates principles and rules that are intended to constrain state behaviour

and decision-making. If the domestic and/or foreign policies of member states are incompatible, the regime is unlikely to be effective for a host of reasons: there are no common values on which to base the rules, develop communal policies and attain cohesion; the organisation will instead be wracked by divisions that inhibit collective decision-making and action; its members will breach the declared norms that are inconsistent with their national policies; and member states that are authoritarian will not fulfil a mandate to respect human rights and the rule of law. These dynamics lie at the heart of SADC’s dismal record on peacemaking and democratic governance.

The second major problem is that the SADC states are loath to surrender a measure of sovereignty to regional structures and they have been especially reluctant to embrace a collective security regime that encompasses formal rules, binding decision-making and the possibility of interference in domestic affairs. The anxiety about diluting sovereignty arises from the political weakness of states, many of which have only a tenuous hold on sovereignty, and from the lack of common values and mutual trust. The ultra-sensitive approach of member states to sovereignty has severely undermined the functioning of the Organ, the integrity of the Treaty and the integration mission as a whole. The disbanding of the Tribunal put paid to any illusions that the SADC states were prepared to subordinate their authority on matters of domestic governance to the Treaty and regional institutions.

The third critical problem is that Southern Africa is characterised by small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity, which have impaired the efficacy of all SADC’s forums and programmes. This problem has been compounded by the historical aversion of member states to centralising the co-ordination of regional programmes in a strong secretariat. Given their opposition to transferring sovereignty to a regional organisation, for many years states favoured a decentralised model with a small secretariat that did not have decision-making power. With respect to collective security arrangements, they preferred an informal and flexible approach to one that was centralised and based on fixed rules and procedures. The Secretariat’s lack of authority and capacity continues to thwart the attainment of institutional cohesion and effectiveness.

SADC as an emerging security community
A number of scholars have claimed that the SADC region is a ‘nascent’ or ‘emerging’ security community.\textsuperscript{18} The notion of a ‘security community’ was brought to prominence by the seminal work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{19} They defined a ‘security community’ as a situation where a group of people have reached a level of integration and a sense of community and common identity strong enough for them to enjoy dependable expectations of peaceful change, which is to say that they have a real assurance that their disputes will be settled by means other than fighting. By definition, states that comprise a security community regard the threat and use of force against each other as unthinkable and eschew preparations for fighting one another.

In his historical survey Deutsch found that ‘compatibility of main values’ in the political domain was an essential requirement for the establishment of security communities. The critical values differed from one region to another and depended on the domestic politics of the participating units. In some processes of integration leading to a security community, states had tacitly downplayed and depoliticised certain incompatible values.\textsuperscript{20}

The scholars who claim that SADC is an emerging security community justify this proposition with reference to the organisation’s security architecture. This perspective is flawed because it focuses on official agreements and structures rather than on the actual circumstances of the region, many of whose people and states are profoundly insecure, and it ignores the content of the agreements. The Organ Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact deal explicitly with the possibility of large-scale violence within and between member states and hence do not reflect ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, the benchmark of a security community. On the contrary, the documents portray a community of insecurity. Given the number and severity of conflicts in Southern Africa over the past twenty years, and the potential for conflict in the future, this is a realistic picture of the region.


\textsuperscript{20} Deutsch et al, 	extit{Political Community}, 46-9, 66, 197.
Conclusion

Of the various obstacles to SADC playing a consistently useful role in the sphere of peace and security, the most important has been the absence of common values. The lack of collective endorsement of the democratic principles enshrined in the SADC Treaty has prevented the organisation from dealing decisively with the Zimbabwe crisis, from addressing other undemocratic practices in the region and from promoting human security through the rule of law and respect for human rights. Moreover, for over a decade the normative differences between the pacific and militarist camps, and the animosity and mistrust induced by these differences, obstructed the establishment of a workable security regime. The absence of common values has also impeded the emergence of a security community.

SADC’s founding documents highlighted the centrality of common values as the glue that would bind member states and lay the platform for regional security. The SADC Declaration of 1992 proclaims that the ‘abiding basis for continuing political solidarity and co-operation in order to guarantee mutual peace and security in the region’ would be provided by economic co-operation, integration and common values and systems. Accordingly, the SADC Treaty stipulates that the organisation’s objectives include the ‘evolution of common political values, systems and institutions’. Subsequent events showed that this outlook was eminently correct but that the aspiration could not be met. The Southern African experience supports the observation by Connie Peck that common values, their codification into well-developed norms and adherence by member states to these values and norms are key determinants in the peacemaking success of regional organisations.

The main conclusion regarding the problems that have frustrated SADC’s exertions to create effective security arrangements – the absence of common values; fear of losing sovereignty; and weak states – is that these problems cannot be solved at the regional level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation derive from, and are constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its member states. To imagine that SADC can somehow drive the

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transformation of these states, transcend the differences between them and promote democracy and human security is to misunderstand the essence of the organisation. SADC has no transcendent status and authority. It is nothing but a forum of states and it cannot do anything that these states will not permit it to do.

The Organ is most likely to become effective if it is utilised and supported energetically by a core group of democratic countries that are willing to devote adequate resources to it, provide incentives for compliance with democratic norms and put pressure on member states that deviate from these norms. There are no grounds, however, for believing that this will occur in the foreseeable future.