

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION IN LEBOWA

by



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*To my wife, Carolina*

## PREFACE

Rapid urbanisation is becoming one of the most provocative problems of our times, especially on the continent of Africa. Because of the comprehensiveness of the phenomenon, the aim of this study is to make a modest but meaningful contribution to our knowledge in this field.

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## CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

Urbanisation has received increased attention during the past few decades, mainly because of a marked increase in the nature and magnitude of this phenomenon. Urbanisation is, however, not a "new" phenomenon, as it is generally accepted that the first cities date back to 4000 BC in Mesopotamia and Egypt, to 2000 BC in China and to 1000 BC in the Andes (Peterson, 1975, p. 402). These cities were founded mainly to meet the need for *physical protection* and were, therefore, as a rule secured from outside attacks by high, surrounding walls. Growth in these cities was, however, slow as the majority of the population were involved in agricultural activities.

As time passed, more and more people moved from the country to the larger concentrations of populations. This gradual movement was especially apparent during the *Middle Ages* in Europe. In Paris, for example, the population numbered 59 000 in 1292 while Rome had about 55 000 inhabitants in the sixteenth century. London's population grew from 18 000 in the eleventh century to 35 000 in the fourteenth century (Russell, 1958, Tables 63-65). The latter is, therefore, an example of the gradual growth in towns and cities during the Middle Ages.

The rise of *cities* during the Middle Ages (especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries) had multiple and extensive implications. The nature and characteristics of the cities differed considerably from those of the traditional country districts. As far as the economical, political, social, cultural and legal circumstances in these "new" cities were concerned, a marked difference was apparent when compared to those in a rural setting. This *distinctive new character* that was being developed in the cities laid the foundation for the formation of a new urbanised group of inhabitants who came to specialise in non-agricultural activities. The impact of this process was so great that the urban development in Europe during the eleventh and twelfth centuries has been identified as one of the causes of the *Industrial Revolution* in the nineteenth century (Cipolla, 1976, p. 145). The

industrial Revolution is recognised as one of the most important events in the history of the human race.

From the above it will be clear that the founding of cities since the period before Christ and especially during the Middle Ages in Europe had a major impact on the human race and brought about radical changes, such as the Industrial Revolution. However, the period over which these changes took place stretched over several centuries so that the changes, although radical and affecting lifestyles, were not so severely felt when taking place.

Since the *Industrial Revolution* in the nineteenth century, the *urbanisation process* has *accelerated* considerably. This is emphasised by twentieth century writers referring to "super-urbanisation" or "over-urbanisation", pointing to an urbanisation rate where urban populations are doubling every twenty years (Friedman, 1973, p. 91). Davis (1972) found that since 1950, the vast majority of large world cities were already characterised by "over-urbanisation". It is especially Africa which is experiencing, since 1950, a rapid *rate* of urbanisation, which is actually increasing.

The urbanisation dilemma has developed to such an extent that apart from a nuclear war and starvation, it has been rated as the largest single catastrophe threatening the human race (Dwyer, 1974, p. 10). *Africa* is not excluded from this possible catastrophe. At present the highest urbanisation *rates* in the world are recorded in Africa (Gutkind, 1974). This could lead to serious consequences, as the majority of the population of Africa are still living in rural areas. If one can rely on past history and estimates for the future, the next two decades could be critical for Africa and the impact on the population could be even greater than that of the Industrial Revolution on nineteenth century Europe. In the next two decades several million people will move to urban areas. This flow of people to the cities will not only be fed by population migration but also by high rates of natural increase in population. The main reason for the migration movement is the aspirations of people to increase their economic wealth and raise their standards of living (Hanna and Hanna, 1971, p. 102) and in many instances even to ensure self-preservation.

The urbanisation of *Blacks* in *South Africa* echoes the trend of the rapid rate of urbanisation in the rest of Africa. The level of Black urbanisation in South Africa reached a relatively low 32 per cent in 1980 (compared to the level of urbanisation of other population groups in South Africa). Certain scientists are of the opinion that this level may even increase to 75 per cent in the year 2000 (Sadie, 1973), while more conservative estimates put the figure at 46 per cent (Celliers and Groenewald, 1982). In a nutshell, South Africa will have to cope with an enormous increase in Black urbanisation within the next two decades when millions of Blacks will expand the size of cities and towns. This process will be supported by relatively high natural increases (Blacks are in the second phase of the demographic cycle, where the natural growth rates are high and the mortality rate is falling). To influence this phenomenon will not be an easy task (not to mention the possible reversal of the process). It would be an error "... to believe that Whites can totally direct the urbanisation of Blacks in all aspects especially as far as planning, administration, housing, services according to Western standards and concepts are concerned" (Smit and Booysen, 1981, p. 2).

The *national states* in South Africa (independent as well as self-governing) have to cope with the same basic problem of urbanisation although at present not to the same extent (according to official sources, only 16 per cent of the population of national states were urbanised in 1980). Because of the absence of an urbanisation strategy in the national states, a potentially large percentage of their populations may become urbanised outside their areas of jurisdiction. This poses a tremendous challenge from a planning point of view. If this problem is, however, neglected or ignored, without taking into consideration the "... tremendous socio-economical and political forces being unchained by this urbanisation process", South Africa is faced by serious problems (Smit, 1981, p. 107).

The survey undertaken in this study is related to the manner in which the urbanisation process is taking place in the national states, and the extent to which it can be directed by means of some *strategy*. In the national states the goal of an urbanisation strategy might be taken to be the avoidance of socio-economical and political consequences that would be to the detriment of the community.

## 1.2 HYPOTHETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE

The *first* and most important point of departure of this study is that South Africa is faced with a *large-scale Black urbanisation process*. This process will most probably take place within the next two to four decades. In 1980, approximately 32 per cent of the total Black population lived in urban areas, compared to 89 per cent of the Whites and 77 per cent of the Coloureds (Republic of South Africa, 1982). Black urbanisation is an *unstoppable reality* descending on the South African community, with effects that will be felt in virtually all spheres of life.

The national states will not escape this urbanisation process. This is apparent from the fact that the urban population of the national states has increased from 594 420 in 1970 (Republic of South Africa, 1976) to an estimated 2 million in 1980, including squatters (Smit and Booysen, 1981, p. 26). This points to a rapid *rate* of urbanisation.

The *second* point of departure of this study stems from the fact that *no comprehensive urbanisation strategy* exists in South Africa (*ibid.* p. 100). Some of the reasons might be that South Africa has wide, open spaces which are taken for granted; that the urbanised Whites, Coloureds and Asians are occupying a relatively small percentage of the total area of the country; and that the Black urbanisation process is in the early stages of gaining momentum. Urbanisation problems are presently being handled on an *ad hoc* basis, with very little (if any) planning. Moreover, these problems are being handled by various parties such as the Central Government, governments of the national states, local governments and government agencies. The result is a lack of co-ordination in all these efforts. There are, for example, various departments and other institutions involved in the establishment of towns in the national states.

The absence of an urbanisation strategy also applies to the national states. All the national states are still in an early stage of economic development, with the result that basic development programmes, like the development of agriculture, community services and government services are still receiving high priority.

The *third* point of departure on which this study is based, is that unless authorities in South Africa (defined as consisting of the Republics of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, and the self-governed national states) in good time takes note of the estimated extent of the Black urbanisation process, the process can easily develop into a serious threat. This study is trying to make a contribution in this field by bringing the importance of the process to the notice of the public sector.

The *fourth* point of departure revolves around an *administrative aspect* which has wide practical implications for a study on urbanisation. It concerns the official *definition* of an *urban area* by the Department of Statistics. When this definition, which refers to places as urban when they have a form of local government (i.e. an administrative function), is applied to national states, only the inhabitants of proclaimed townships are regarded as "urban". This study regards such a view as inadequate when contemplating *Black urbanisation* in an *Africa context*. To eliminate this disadvantage, this study proposes a *more realistic* definition of Black urbanisation which is a truer reflection of the *extent* of urbanisation in the national states. This is an approach also taken in several international studies and will serve as a basis on which an urbanisation strategy will be propounded in this study.

### 1.3 RESEARCH OUTLINES AND METHODS

Viewed against the background of the importance of urbanisation, both in an international and national context, together with the necessity for the development of a strategy within which an urbanisation process might take place, this study will try to make a contribution to this subject by investigating the presence of the urbanisation phenomenon in one of the national states in South Africa, namely Lebowa. The present *level* of urbanisation in Lebowa will be determined and the most likely *future developments* in this regard will be estimated. The study will then focus on the economics of the urbanisation process in Lebowa, upon which a strategy can be suggested that will be capable of absorbing the expected high rate of urbanisation.

*Chapter 2* presents a comprehensive description of urbanisation as a world-wide phenomenon. The concepts "urban" and "urbanisation" are discussed, while the extent of urbanisation in the world in general and in Africa in particular is described.

While Chapter 2 indicates that natural population increase is one of the basic reasons for urbanisation, *Chapter 3* devotes attention to the other important reason for urbanisation, namely rural-urban migration. The decision to migrate is analysed in the light of international experience, while special attention is paid to the reasons for the migration of Blacks in South Africa. In conclusion, the factors promoting urbanisation in the national states are highlighted.

Against the general background on urbanisation presented in the previous two chapters, the occurrence of this phenomenon in Lebowa is described in *Chapter 4*. Because of the close relationship between urbanisation and population, various aspects of the latter are discussed, including the age and sex composition of the *de facto* population, various dependency ratios (indicating the burden placed on the adult population) and the size of the economically active population. The survey of the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa distinguishes between the composition of the urban and the rural population in 1970 and 1980.

The third and last section of Chapter 4 takes a closer look at population and urbanisation estimated for the future. In this section a new classification is presented regarding the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa. This classification represents a more realistic approach towards urbanisation in Lebowa and is developed to apply to the African context. Based on this new classification of urbanisation, the *de facto* population of Lebowa is projected for the next 20 to 40 years. From these projections it basically emerges that Lebowa will be in the midst of a population explosion which will stimulate high rates of urbanisation.

In *Chapter 5* some economic activities in Lebowa affecting urbanisation are discussed. These activities are discussed with reference to the gross domestic product, which serves as a measure of economic growth and which has an influence on the level of urbanisation, the gross national

income, where a distinction is made between the income earned by Black inhabitants and the portion of the income earned by continuously absent citizens, and the outflow of purchasing power, whereby urban developments inside the territory are directly affected.

The economics of the present urbanisation process in Lebowa are discussed in *Chapter 6*. In the absence of an urbanisation strategy, the urbanisation process in Lebowa is continuing in a *laissez-faire* way. This "strategy" has already been proved to be unsuccessful in many Third World countries. At present the urbanisation process is being encouraged in an unco-ordinated fashion within a broader development strategy. Chapter 6 will focus on the economic consequences of providing the social and physical infrastructure in the eighteen proclaimed townships.

An alternative urbanisation strategy for Lebowa is presented in *Chapter 7*. The evaluation of the economic consequences of the present urbanisation process described in the previous Chapter will be preceded by an indication of the relationship between economic development and urban growth. The suggested alternative strategy will basically take one of the principles proposed by the Tomlinson Commission, namely to develop fewer, but larger towns or cities in the national states, as a starting-point. In conclusion, this Chapter suggests a possible selection of towns in Lebowa that will satisfy the prerequisites outlined.

*Chapter 8* contains a summary of this study together with general conclusions on the subject of urbanisation in Lebowa.

To achieve the goals of this study as indicated up to now in the preceding paragraphs, this study is primarily based on a *literature study* of available information. Unfortunately, much of the information required was not available, in which case it was supplemented by personal visits to Lebowa, as well as discussions and exchanges of ideas with persons involved in or affected by the development of this area.

#### 1.4 DEMARCATION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

The field of this study will be limited to the national state generally known as Lebowa, which is geographically situated in the Northern Transvaal, north of Pretoria. According to the 1975 consolidation proposals of the Central Government, Lebowa's fourteen separate geographic areas

will be consolidated into eight areas, excluding the Moutse district, which is presently kept in trust by the South African Government.

There are a number of towns in Lebowa which have an urban nature, apart from other large population concentrations. However, the majority of Lebowa's population are living in rural areas. In other words, considerable scope for future urbanisation exists.

A fact that has to be borne in mind in this study is the existence of large adjoining White towns near the geographic borders of Lebowa, especially Pietersburg, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen and Groblersdal. These towns are all well-developed because of definite functions that are being performed. Owing to their ability to develop functional differentiations among their inhabitants and their physical structures, these towns can offer job opportunities on a fairly large scale, including to the inhabitants of Lebowa. Apart from creating employment opportunities for Lebowa citizens, such developments also have negative effects, such as the outflow of purchasing power from Lebowa and the outflow of manpower for longer or shorter periods, which of course retards economic development in Lebowa.

This study concentrates on the two largest geographic blocks in Lebowa, namely North Lebowa and South Lebowa. Not only do these two blocks accommodate a major portion of the *de facto* population, but they also supply resources to such an extent that the major proportion of the economic activity of Lebowa takes place in them.

## CHAPTER 2

## URBANISATION AS A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most salient phenomena of the twentieth century has been the process of urbanisation. This phenomenon has occurred in developed countries as well as developing countries throughout the world: "This is a world-wide phenomenon.... The impact of urban growth may be even greater in the underdeveloped countries than in the industrialised nations, for it is occurring on top of a mass of other problems..." (Lilienthal, 1962, p. 5). This rapid urban growth has already reached such dimensions on a world scale that scientists are prepared "to place them third in importance only to those of the threat to civilisation from nuclear warfare and the continued existence of hunger among large sections of the world's population" (Dwyer, 1974, p. 9).

The twentieth century is, therefore, characterised by the tendency of people to agglomerate in selected *urban concentrations*. It is estimated that by the year 2000 more than one half of the total population of the world (i.e. more than 3 billion people) will be concentrated in urban areas. Parallel to this phenomenon of urban concentration is the unrivalled upsurge in world *population growth* since about 1950. Where the world's total population has increased to approximately 2 500 million in 1950, it has risen to 3 628 million in 1970 and to 4 368 million people in 1980 (Davis, 1972, p. 9 and World Development Report, 1980). Thus, between 1950 and 1980 the combined world population has increased by nearly 75 per cent. According to United Nations estimates, the total world population will reach 6 200 million people in the year 2000, indicating a further increase of more than 40 per cent during the last 20 years of this century. In Section 2.3 of this chapter more attention will be given to this extent of world urbanisation, dealing with total urban population growth as well as world population growth. A clear distinction will be made between the more developed and the less developed regions of the world in this regard.

Against this background it is the purpose of this chapter to concentrate, in the first place, on the concepts of *urban and urbanisation*

as they are described by different experts in the world today.

Secondly, this chapter will focus on the *extent of urbanisation* in the world. Attention will be given to this process on a global scale, with reference to developments in developed countries as well as less developed countries. Particular attention will be given to the urbanisation process as it has developed on the continent of Africa over the last century, and how it is likely to develop towards the end of the twentieth century. It will be shown that although Africa is the *least urbanised* of all the continents (only 24,4 per cent of its total population was urbanised in 1975), its *rate of urbanisation* is the highest in the world. This high rate of urbanisation can have advantageous effects on national and regional economic development, in that the supply of the production factor of labour can be utilised to the benefit of the community and of economic development. A high rate of urbanisation or concentration in large cities can, however, also give rise to many problems in the urban sphere, like uncontrolled squatting, high rates of unemployment and disproportionate regional development.

## 2.2 THE CONCEPTS URBAN AND URBANISATION

To define or describe a commonly accepted concept, the meaning of which is regarded as *urban*, is by no means an easy task. The reason is that the international study of urbanisation is still impeded by the fact that "urban" settlements are diversely defined (United Nations, 1976). Different countries have various interpretations of what is regarded as urban. Many countries use different criteria to describe urban areas. The result is that any international comparison in this regard is weakened.

For purposes of this study it is important to make a clear distinction between the various *criteria* used in the literature on urbanisation to describe this phenomenon. The three criteria of urbanisation generally used to describe an urban area are the minimum population size criterion, the administrative criterion and the economic activity criterion. Each of these criteria will now be discussed in brief.

The *minimum population size* criterion is probably not used by many countries. Davis (1969, p. 15) found that some 122 countries out of

a total of 195 countries (i.e. 63 per cent) specify no minimum size for an urban area. Some major countries, however, use this criterion, including the United States of America, some Latin American countries, New Zealand and Canada, to name a few. Of the countries that do use a minimum-size urban definition, nearly 80 per cent specify a minimum population of between 2 000 and 7 500 people, while only 5,5 per cent of the countries specified a total population of more than 7 500 people in their urban definitions (Davis, *loc.cit.*).

In the United States of America, one of the major definitions used in the study of urban economics is that of *urban place*, which is described as all incorporated places with populations of 1 000 people or more (Bish and Nourse, 1975, p. 12). To overcome the problem of indicating the size of an agglomeration of adjacent incorporated places (within an urban area), the Bureau of Census identifies:

- (a) unincorporated places with populations of more than 1 000 people *outside* urbanised areas; and
- (b) unincorporated places with populations of more than 5 000 people *within* urbanised areas, if they have a separate identity (*loc.cit.*).

Other countries using the minimum-size criterion are New Zealand, which regards all urban areas, cities, boroughs, town districts, townships and country towns with more than 1 000 inhabitants as urban, and Brazil, which uses a minimum of 5 000 people to define an urban area.

The United States of America, in defining an *urban area*, also uses the minimum-size criterion. The Bureau of Census describes an urban area as an area with (United States of America, 1972, Bureau of Census):

- (a) a central city with a total population of 50 000 or more;
- (b) surrounding incorporated places with a population of 2 500 or more;
- (c) incorporated places with populations of less than 2 500 containing 100 housing units in a 5-square-mile area; and
- (d) unincorporated places containing more than 1 000 inhabitants per square mile.

One of the disadvantages of this criterion is that it does not measure population density. It defines the number of people living in an urban area, but does not describe the size of the area or the density of inhabitants. An exception is the definition of an urban area in the USA, described above, where unincorporated places with more than 1 000 inhabitants per square mile are included in the definition. This criterion also excludes smaller towns, like mining and industrial settlements, which have an urban nature and tradition, but which have a small number of inhabitants. In Ireland, for example, there are such small places which exercise distinctly urban functions as minor service centres for scattered rural communities (Smailes, 1975, p. 8). Their populations are very often less than 1 000 people. Examples of this kind of settlement in South Africa include the Hendrina power station and the Springbok Collieries in Middelburg, Transvaal.

This criterion has a number of advantages. In the first place, it is simple and not complicated in its application. It does not involve a sophisticated method and presents a sound measurement of urbanisation within its limitations.

Secondly, this criterion is particularly valuable in its application in Third World countries, where most of them are characterised by high urban population growth rates, resulting from high rates of natural increase and/or high rates of rural-urban migration. Third World countries do not experience high levels of urbanisation, but rather high rates of urbanisation, which makes it more acceptable and convenient to use the *size* of population in an urban area as a measurement of urbanisation.

In the third place, this criterion lends itself very effectively to a combination with other criteria of urbanisation, for instance the involvement of inhabitants in certain economical activities.

Fourthly, it has the advantage of serving as an indicator for potential investors in an urban area, especially as far as the marketing of their products is concerned.

For the purposes of this study, the minimum population-size criterion will be used in a partial description of the extent of urbanisation.

All Black agricultural settlements in Lebowa, with large concentrations of people (populations of 5 000 or more) will, for instance, be regarded as part of a semi-urban population. The inhabitants of some closer settlements and squatter settlements near larger towns will also be included in this semi-urban group. This minimum-size criterion will, however, be combined with the question whether the inhabitants identified as such, will be involved in non-agricultural activities, to distinguish them clearly from inhabitants of rural areas who are primarily involved in agricultural activities.

It should be clear that no commonly accepted minimum-size criterion is used to describe an urban area. Much will depend on the population distribution and the economic advancement of the individual country.

The second or administrative criterion of urbanisation occurs where to be classified as urban, an area has to have some legal or administrative status, making it an area with "urban character". Administrative criteria usually refer to the form of local government and institutions in an urban area and the "nature" of the area, i.e. whether it has certain amenities like water, electricity and sanitation. This means that a very small grouping of people may be classified as urban (like in the USSR), simply because of a "minor" administrative function being performed in such an area or place (Smailes, 1975, p. 8). It may, however, also mean that large agglomerations of people can be excluded from this definition, because of the lack of any formal form of local government or even certain basic amenities.

South Africa is an example of a country that uses an administrative criterion to define an urbanised area. Until 1970 the Department of Statistics regarded an urban area as:

- "(a) all cities and towns with some form of local government; and
- (b) areas of an urban nature, that is areas with urban amenities (water, electricity, etc.), but without some or other form of local government. All other areas are regarded as rural."

In 1980 the second part of this definition was eliminated.

The third criterion of urbanisation that is often used to define an urban area is based on the involvement of the inhabitants of an area or place in certain economic activities. Normally a distinction is made between agricultural activities and non-agricultural activities. People primarily involved in agricultural activities, i.e. dependent on agriculture for their survival, are usually classified as residing in rural areas. People involved in non-agricultural activities are then regarded as living in urban areas. In India, for instance, an area is classified as urban when at least three-quarters of adult males are engaged in non-agricultural activities (Smailes, 1975, p. 9).

The advantage of this criterion is twofold. Firstly, from an economic point of view it is based on the manner in which the four production factors, namely labour, land, capital and entrepreneurship, are combined to ensure a living. Secondly, this criterion can be combined with other criteria of urbanisation, notably the minimum population-size criterion, to define an urban area. It can be assumed that in a *high* minimum-size criterion of say 5 000 or more inhabitants, it is unlikely that these people will be primarily involved in agricultural activities.

This criterion actively describes *urban activities*, where people are employed in the mining sector, the industrial sector or the commerce and services sector, compared to rural activities, where people are normally employed in the agricultural sector. People involved in urban activities may be described as *urbanised individuals*, which means that they live an "urban life", i.e. involving themselves in urban activities in an urban area.

In conclusion, it can be said that all three criteria of urbanisation described above, have individual merits. In South Africa, the second criterion, that of an administrative criterion (i.e. a form of local government), is presently being used to describe or define an urban area. The minimum-size criterion is used by some major countries (for example the United States of America) in defining an incorporated place and an urban area. The third criterion of urbanisation, i.e. describing the economic activities of people, has merit from an economic point of view.

In an African context, the best criterion to use to define an urbanised area is probably either the minimum-size criterion or the urban-activities criterion, or possibly a combination of the two criteria. As indicated in the previous chapter, urbanisation in Africa is on a different level and in a different stage from those in industrialised countries. Until it has reached the same level as in these countries, it needs a different evaluation.

Having described the three criteria of urbanisation, as well as related concepts of "urban", we can now turn to the concept of *urbanisation*. Numerous experts from different countries have already written many books and papers on the phenomenon or concept of urbanisation. Today the process of urbanisation can be observed in almost every country in the world, and it has already been said that "the twentieth century is the century of urbanisation" (United Nations, 1976, p. 9). However, not many attempts have been made in the literature, maybe wisely, to produce a short and comprehensive definition of this phenomenon. Among the reasons are the various disciplines involved in the process of urbanisation which look at urbanisation from different viewpoints - like jumping into a stream, although from different places on the embankments! Another reason is that there are a wide variety of factors present in various countries, some more developed than others, influencing this phenomenon, with the result that a common definition of urbanisation would not be effective. Jones states in this regard that "the phenomenon of urbanization, universal in the contemporary world, is being generated by so many different factors, operating with different emphases in each separate country, that it would be impossible, as well as unwise, to try to summarize the process in any meaningful way" (Jones, 1975, p. 19).

This section will, therefore, point out what connotation or meaning some of the leading experts on urbanisation attach to "... one of the most compelling societal forces operating in history" (Friedmann, 1973, p. 65).

Urbanisation has a micro as well as a macro side. This distinction of urbanisation is probably and basically the most distinct segmentation of this concept. *Micro-urbanisation* refers to the individual's

decision to move to an area of destination (or an urban place or area) and the execution of this decision. It starts with the expression of the wish, or the forced decision due to circumstances, and continues into the actual movement to an urban place, as Mayer (1962) has pointed out in his study.

Micro-urbanisation not only refers to the change in the physical place, but also to a sudden change in occupation, which often occurs when an individual moves from a rural to an urban area. Not only is there a new physical environment, but also a new cultural environment, to which an individual adapts himself in the course of time. Within this new environment a person will gradually change his attitudes, customs, values and sometimes beliefs. Friedmann (1973) refers to this occurrence in his second definition of urbanisation.

Macro-urbanisation, on the other hand, refers to the general change in settlement patterns, which occurs as a result of individuals' decision and execution of these decisions (micro-urbanisation). Davis (1969) refers to urban settlements while Friedmann (1973) talks about urban environments, all of which indicates a settlement pattern that is different from a rural settlement pattern. This is all the net result of individual decisions and needs no further description. It should be borne in mind, however, that these individual decisions can be reversed, with the result that many individuals may leave the new environment in exchange for their original environment, like temporary migrant labour. Unless this is done *en masse*, such reversed decisions will not have a serious effect on macro-urbanisation, that is on established settlement patterns.

It is appropriate at this point in time to state that there are, broadly speaking, two *schools of thought* on urbanisation. The one school of thought which, according to Friedmann, is still widely accepted in academic and planning circles (Friedmann, 1968, p. 364), emphasises the economic, physical and social problems of urbanisation (see Hauser, 1970, p. 201-214). This approach sees rapid urbanisation as an impediment to national development and feels that it should be discouraged or that its impact should be reduced because of its negative influence on the society. Many governments all over the world share this school's view, and "... seek to constrain urbanisation by stra-

tegies of varying kind and degree" (Fair, T J D and Davis, R J, 1976, p. 145).

The second school of thought accepts urbanisation as an inevitable fact, "... capable of creating conditions that will favor a rapid advance towards the goals of national development" (Friedmann, 1968, p. 364). This approach, therefore, sees urbanisation in a more positive light, being an instrument which can create and stimulate development opportunities. The trend of human beings to assemble in certain large concentrations may in other words be used to the benefit of the society by making effective use of one of the major factors of production, namely human labour. Support for this statement comes from Russian experts: "Large cities and agglomerations possess a great social and informational potential, the highest level of education and culture and, all things considered, of productivity, as well as labour intensification and scientific and technological progress" (Lappo and Pivovarov, 1975, p. 224). Friedmann (1968, p. 366) goes so far as to suggest a strategy of deliberate urbanisation, based on accelerated urbanisation, concentrated decentralisation and political strategies capable of overcoming the "crises of inclusion".

We can now turn to the question of what is meant by the concept of urbanisation. Some authors attach a *demographic* meaning to urbanisation, e.g. Davis (1969, p. 7) who states that urbanisation refers to "... the proportion of the total population concentrated in urban settlements, or else to a rise in this proportion". Davis makes a clear distinction between urbanisation and the growth of cities. The urbanisation process, which represents a shift of people from widely distributed settlements to concentrated urban settlements, has a beginning and an end, while the growth of cities has no limit. Even if the total population of a country lives in concentrated urban settlements and has reached its full capacity, cities can still grow by way of natural increase. Cities are normally seen as places or areas of either 20 000 people or more, or places with 100 000 inhabitants or more.

Other writers, like Thompson, also share this demographic view of urbanisation but add another important element. Thompson states for instance that urbanisation is characterised by "... movements of

people from small communities concerned chiefly or solely with agriculture to other communities generally larger, whose activities are primarily centred in government, trade, manufacture or allied interests" (Thompson, 1935, p. 189). Apart from the process of *movement* of people from small communities to larger communities, there is also a process of *change*, where people get involved in different activities, affecting their socio-economic lifestyles, where this process is "... a social process involving people in social relationships within a new kind of physical environment" (Epstein, 1969, p. 279). This aspect of urbanisation will be discussed later.

Mabogunje (1968, p. 33) also uses the word urbanisation in a demographic frame of reference when he refers to it as "... the process whereby human beings congregate in relatively large numbers at one particular spot of the earth's surface". This is a vague description of the urbanisation concept, mainly due to the lack of a common definition of what is regarded as an urban centre.

Mayer's description of urbanisation, namely "... the movement of individuals between rural and urban (Xhosa) society" (Mayer, 1962, p. 4), acknowledges the geographical mobility of people, but also identifies a social mobility of people where, apart from a structural aspect, a cultural aspect is also involved. The structural aspect refers to the extent to which a person has become town-rooted, while the cultural aspect refers to the extent that a person has changed his behaviour patterns or values. Mayer is of the opinion that only where both these modes of urbanisation have been achieved by the same individual, should one refer to urbanisation in an unqualified way (Mayer, 1962, p. 7). In practice, however, it may happen that a person may become town-rooted but at the same time maintain the original culture, values and attitudes.

From the views on urbanisation discussed so far, it is clear that urbanisation is in the first place a *process*. This process involves both a process of movement, where people move geographically from sparsely populated areas to more concentrated agglomerations, and a process of change. This process of change must be seen in the *psycho-sociological* framework of reference. To urbanisation, where it refers to a change

in an individual's "... patterns of behaviour or values" (Mayer, 1962, p. 6). This change in an individual's behaviour as a result of living in a town (Mayer's cultural aspect of urbanisation) points in general to a person's "urban way of life".

From what has been said above, it should be clear that there is another side to urbanisation, namely the *sociological* aspect. Dubb, for instance, views urbanisation as a sociological concept, which refers to changes in behaviour upon coming to town (Dubb, 1974, p. 448). Mitchell is one of the opinion that urbanisation implies "... participation in social relations in urban areas" (Mitchell, 1956, p. 695). Even in the USSR there is a shared belief that urbanisation involves these two basic processes: "... urbanisation is characterised by processes of concentration, intensification and diversity of non-agricultural functions, the formation of an urban way of life, progressive forms of settlement, and the development of contacts and urban culture" (Lappo and Pivovarov, 1975, p. 224).

One of the most comprehensive descriptions of the urbanisation concept comes from Friedmann, who combines the two processes or modes or urbanisation in a biarticulate definition of urbanisation (Friedmann, 1973, Chapter 4):

"Urbanisation<sub>1</sub>: The geographical concentration of population and non-agricultural activities in urban environments of varying size and forms."

"Urbanisation<sub>2</sub>: The geographical diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organisations and institutions."

Friedmann argues that both forms of urbanisation refer to a complex of spatial processes and their associated patterns. There are four major spatial processes: decision-making and control, capital flows, innovation diffusion, and migration. Relating to each of these spatial processes are spatial patterns: the spatial distribution of power, the economic activity location pattern, a socio-cultural spatial pattern, and settlement patterns. Using these processes and patterns in a spatial system, Friedmann introduces a paradigm for the study of urbanisation in the form of a core-periphery model, where a fifth pro=

cess, namely that of "emergent innovations", plays a very important part, especially in the core region (Friedmann, 1973, Chapter 4).

Friedmann's description of urbanisation, however, lacks an exact classification of "urban environment", which he only describes as "of varying size and forms". This is mainly due to the different definitions that different countries place on what they regard as "urban", as already indicated. Despite this disadvantage, the definition uses the urban-activity criterion described earlier, excluding all agricultural activities.

It is quite clear that Friedmann in his view of urbanisation sees a physical new environment where people agglomerate in larger concentrations, and where there is a diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organisations and institutions. This urban culture has its influence on the activities of individuals as well as location settlements, giving rise to "traditional" and "transitional" regions, where "... this complex pattern of regional variations will, in turn, influence settlement patterns and activity locations" (Friedmann, 1973, p. 66).

In conclusion, it is clear that urbanisation is a continuous *process* which has different aspects and which can be viewed from different angles. It is a phenomenon that affects the lives of millions of people and which still grows in force and is to an increasing extent becoming a factor that has to be taken into account.

With this short description of the concepts urban and urbanisation, this study will focus in the next section on the extent of urbanisation in the world, with special reference to Africa.

### 2.3 THE EXTENT OF URBANISATION IN THE WORLD

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, about 3 per cent of the world's population lived in urban places. This figure rose to about 15 per cent by 1900, to 40 per cent by the mid-seventies, and is expected to reach 50 per cent by the end of this century (Hay, 1977, p. 71). Davis calculated that if the world's urban population were to continue to rise at the 1950-70 rate, over 50 per cent of the world's population would be living in urban places already by 1987,

compared to 61 per cent by the year 2000 and 100 per cent by the year 2031 (Davis, 1972, p. 52). His lowest projection, which indicates that the world will have more than 50 per cent of its inhabitants living in urban places by the year 2000, corresponds with Hay's projection (see above). Table 2.1 gives the world's projected population in rural and urban places, 1970 - 2000, according to the highest constant-rate projection, while Table 2.2 uses the lowest constant-rate projection.

From Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 it can be seen that the rate of increase in the urban population between 1980 and 2000 will be three to four times higher than the increase of the urban population as a percentage of the total population. For example, in the case of the highest constant-rate projection, the increase in the urban population between 1980 and 2000 will be 98 per cent, while the increase of the urban fraction will be 60 per cent. In the case of the lowest constant-rate projection, the increase in the urban population during the same period will be 72 per cent, while the increase of the urban fraction will be 33 per cent (Davis, Vol II, p. 124).

The projection of the world's *total* population by the year 2000 in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 compares favourably with the United Nations' "medium" projection of total world population of 6 200 billion people.

Figure 2.1 shows the growth of the world's urban and rural population since 1970 (according to Davis' lowest constant rate projection).

From Figure 2.1 it can be seen that the world's urban-population will surpass the total rural population in 1997.

In considering the extent of world urbanisation, it is advisable to make a clear distinction between the *more developed countries* and the *less developed countries*, due not only to the different conditions that exist in these two sets of countries, but also to the considerable difference in the purview of urbanisation. At present more than two-thirds of the developed countries are urbanised, compared to about one-fourth of the less developed countries (U N, 1976; Davis, Vol II, 1972, p. 240). However, the urban populations of less developed countries are increasing at twice the rate of those in developed countries; for example, between 1920 and 1960 the urban population in the less developed countries rose at an annual average rate of

Table 2.1 - Projected population in rural and urban places, 1970 - 2000  
(highest constant-rate projection)

Year	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Millions	%	Millions	%	Millions	%
1970	2 229,0	61,4	1 399,0	38,6	3 628,0	100,0
1975	2 321,6	58,3	1 659,6	41,7	3 981,2	100,0
1980	2 400,0	54,9	1 968,8	45,1	4 368,8	100,0
1985	2 458,6	51,3	2 335,6	48,7	4 794,2	100,0
1990	2 490,2	47,3	2 770,7	52,7	5 261,0	100,0
1995	2 486,3	43,1	3 286,9	56,9	5 773,2	100,0
2000	2 436,0	38,4	3 899,3	61,6	6 335,3	100,0


Source: Davis, Kingsley (1972), *World Urbanization 1950 - 1970*, Volume II: Analysis of Trends, Relationships and Development, University of California, Berkeley, U S A, p 126.

Table 2.2 - Projected population in rural and urban places, 1970 - 2000  
(lowest constant-rate projection)

Year	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Millions	%	Millions	%	Millions	%
1970	2 229,0	61,4	1 399,0	38,6	3 628,0	100,0
1975	2 352,8	59,1	1 628,4	40,9	3 981,2	100,0
1980	2 483,5	56,9	1 885,3	43,1	4 368,8	100,0
1985	2 621,5	54,7	2 172,7	45,3	4 794,2	100,0
1990	2 767,1	52,6	2 493,8	47,4	5 261,0	100,0
1995	2 920,9	50,6	2 852,3	49,4	5 773,2	100,0
2000	3 083,1	48,7	3 252,1	51,3	6 335,3	100,0

Source: Davis, Kingsley (1972), *World Urbanisation 1950 - 1970*, Volume II: Analysis of Trends, Relationships and Development, University of California, Berkeley, U S A, p 126.

FIGURE 2.1 : GROWTH OF THE WORLD'S URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, 1970 - 2000



4 per cent, compared to a rate of 1,9 per cent in the developed countries over the same period. This trend was also visible in the increase in the rate of urbanisation (the percentage of urban population in relation to total population in agglomerations of more than 20 000 inhabitants) during the period 1920 - 1960, when the rate was 2,3 per cent in less developed countries and 1,1 per cent in developed countries (U N, 1969).

This rapid increase in the urban population of the less developed countries must be seen against the background of the rapid increase in total population in the Third World. Birth rates in the less developed countries are twice as high as in developed countries, with the result that the natural increase in the former is far greater than that in the developed countries. According to the United Nations population projections, the total population of the more developed regions may grow by about 20 per cent between 1975 and the year 2000, and that of the less developed countries by 75 per cent (U N, 1976, p. 16).

When looking deeper into the extent of urbanisation in the world, it would be wise to follow the United Nations classification of *nine more developed regions* and *fifteen less developed regions*. These regions are listed in Table 2.3, which indicates urban, rural and total population, in each case measuring the annual growth rate as well as the population growth in absolute numbers.

From Table 2.3 it can be seen that the annual growth rate of the total populations in less developed regions (2,31 per cent) was nearly three times as high as the total population growth rate in the more developed regions (0,86 per cent) during 1970 - 1975. During the same period the annual *urban* growth rate in less developed regions was nearly twice as high as the urban growth rate in more developed regions. These growth rates were 4,07 per cent and 1,73 per cent, respectively.

It is also interesting to note that the *rural population* is declining in the more developed regions, by 17,3 million in absolute terms during 1970-1975, or 0,97 per cent per annum. In the less developed regions the rural population does not grow as fast as the urban population, but still comprises the larger part of the total population, namely

Table 2.3 - Rates and amounts of increase in total, urban and rural population, 1970 - 1975, in more developed and less developed regions of the world

Region	Annual growth rate (per cent per year)			Amount of growth (millions)		
	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion
<u>More developed regions</u>	<u>0,86</u>	<u>1,73</u>	<u>-0,97</u>	<u>47,7</u>	<u>65,0</u>	<u>-17,3</u>
Northern Europe	0,41	0,74	-0,54	1,7	2,2	- 0,5
Western Europe	0,58	1,21	-1,40	4,4	6,9	- 2,5
Eastern Europe	0,64	1,81	-0,78	3,4	5,2	- 1,8
Southern Europe	0,72	1,72	-0,66	4,7	6,5	- 1,8
Northern America	0,90	1,53	-1,03	10,5	13,4	- 2,9
Soviet Union	0,99	2,33	-0,92	12,3	17,0	- 4,7
Japan	1,26	2,32	-1,64	6,8	9,1	- 2,3
Temperate South America	1,43	2,13	-1,28	2,7	3,2	- 0,5
Australia and New Zealand	1,83	2,15	0,03	1,5	1,5	0,0
<u>Less developed regions</u>	<u>2,31</u>	<u>4,07</u>	<u>1,69</u>	<u>309,7</u>	<u>142,7</u>	<u>167,0</u>
China	1,66	3,26	1,20	67,0	29,6	37,4
Caribbean	1,93	3,31	0,73	2,5	2,0	0,5
Other East Asia <sup>1)</sup>	2,15	4,26	0,25	5,7	2,4	0,3
Central Africa	2,27	5,84	1,23	4,9	2,8	2,1
Melanesia	2,41	8,82	1,56	0,4	0,2	0,2
Polynesia and Micronesia	2,54	4,29	1,77	0,2	0,1	0,1
Western Africa	2,58	5,03	2,06	14,0	4,7	9,3
Central South Asia	2,59	4,05	2,22	96,1	31,7	64,4
Southern Africa	2,68	3,74	1,82	3,5	2,2	1,3
Eastern South Asia	2,70	4,64	2,18	40,9	14,8	26,1
Eastern Africa	2,74	5,67	2,37	14,7	3,5	11,2
Northern Africa	2,74	4,53	1,65	12,6	7,9	4,7

Table 2.3 (continued)

Region	Annual growth rate (per cent per year)			Amount of growth (millions)		
	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion
<u>Less developed regions (cont.)</u>						
Western South Asia	2,83	4,77	0,45	11,6	8,2	3,4
Tropical South America	2,90	4,35	0,96	24,2	20,8	3,4
Central America	3,21	4,43	1,68	11,6	8,9	2,7

1) East Asia other than China or Japan.

Source: United Nations Population Division, in United Nations (1976), Habitat; Conference on Human Settlements, Global Review of Human Settlements, Item 10, A/Conf., 70/A/1, New York.

167 billion, compared to the urban population of 143 billion. This is especially due to the larger rural populations in Central and Eastern South Asia, as well as China, Western Africa and Eastern Africa.

The degree or *level of urbanisation* in the world in 1950 and 1975 is indicated in Table 2.4. From this Table it can be seen that the level of urbanisation in the more developed regions rose from 53,4 per cent in 1950 to 69,2 per cent in 1975, while in the less developed regions it rose from 15,6 per cent to 27,3 per cent over the same period. As stated earlier in this section, however, the rate of growth in the urban population of the less developed regions is far greater than that of the developed regions.

From Table 2.4 it can be seen that the less developed regions at present are not as highly urbanised as the developed regions. The latter are all at least 56 per cent urbanised, while no less developed region is more than 60 per cent urbanised. It is clear that the continent of Africa is still the least urbanised, namely only 24,4 per cent.

What are the factors contributing to the large-scale increase in the world's *total population* and especially to the rapid increase in the

Table 2.4 - The level or degree of urbanisation in eight major areas and twenty-four regions of the world, 1950 - 1975

Area or region	Percentage of urban in total population	
	1950	1975
Northern America	63,6	76,5
Oceania	64,5	71,6
Europe	54,8	67,2
Soviet Union	39,4	60,5
Latin America	40,9	60,4
East Asia	16,6	30,7
Africa	13,2	24,4
South Asia	15,5	23,0
<u>More developed regions</u>	<u>53,4</u>	<u>69,2</u>
Australia and New Zealand	78,7	85,5
Temperate South America	62,8	80,8
Western Europe	63,2	77,1
Northern America	63,6	76,5
Japan	50,3	75,2
Northern Europe	70,8	75,1
Soviet Union	39,4	60,5
Southern Europe	44,9	59,2
Eastern Europe	42,2	56,6
<u>Less developed regions</u>	<u>15,6</u>	<u>27,3</u>
Tropical South America	36,5	59,3
Central America	39,5	57,1
Other East Asia <sup>1)</sup>	23,2	50,0
Caribbean	33,0	48,2
Southern Africa	36,5	46,2
Western South Asia	23,3	43,7
Northern Africa	23,2	39,5
Micronesia and Polynesia	20,6	32,1
Central Africa	8,1	24,6
China	11,1	23,5
Eastern South Asia	13,4	22,1

Table 2.4 (continued)

Area or region	Percentage of urban in total population	
	1950	1975
<u>Less developed regions (continued)</u>		
Central South Asia	15,6	21,1
Western Africa	9,6	18,5
Melanesia	2,0	13,7
Eastern Africa	5,3	12,3

1) East Asia other than China or Japan.

Source: United Nations Population Division, in United Nations (1976), Habitat; Conference on Human Settlements, Global Review of Human Settlements, Item 10, A/Conf., 70/A/1, New York.

world's *urban population*? Two major components can be identified, namely natural increase (births minus deaths) and migration (people moving from rural to urban areas). In this last category may also be included rural areas that are reclassified as urban areas. It is the aim of this section to show to what extent each of these components contributes to the increase in the total, urban and rural populations of the world.

As far as the growth of the urban population of the world is concerned, it is estimated that roughly one half of this growth is due to natural increase, while the other half is due to migration. This is, however, a very general description of the situation and does not necessarily hold true for individual regions or countries.

Table 2.5 shows the effect of these components on urban and rural population change for 1960, as well as the period 1970 - 1975, in both developed and less developed regions.

In *general* one of the most significant trends seen in Table 2.5 is that natural increase is becoming a larger component of urban population growth in less developed regions than migration. Around 1960 the urban populations of the less developed countries increased by 19 million people of which 10 million were added through natural increase and 9

Table 2.5 - Components of urban and rural population change in urban and rural areas of more developed and less developed regions, 1960 and 1970 - 1975 (per cent per year)

Component	More developed regions			Less developed regions		
	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion	Total popula= tion	Urban popula= tion	Rural popula= tion
<u>1960</u>						
Birth rate	2,15	2,01	2,33	4,28	3,79	4,41
Death rate	0,90	0,89	0,93	2,03	1,54	2,17
Rate of natural increase	1,25	1,12	1,40	2,25	2,25	2,24
Transfer rate <sup>1)</sup>	0,0	+1,23	-1,66	0,0	+2,30	-0,59
<u>Rate of growth</u>	<u>1,25</u>	<u>2,35</u>	<u>-0,26</u>	<u>2,25</u>	<u>4,55</u>	<u>1,65</u>
<u>1970-1975</u>						
Birth rate	1,72	- 2)	- 2)	3,75	- 2)	- 2)
Death rate	0,92	- 2)	- 2)	1,43	- 2)	- 2)
Rate of natural increase	0,80	0,80 <sup>3)</sup>	0,80 <sup>3)</sup>	2,32	2,32 <sup>3)</sup>	2,32 <sup>3)</sup>
Transfer rate	0,0	+0,93	-1,77	0,0	+1,75	-0,63
<u>Rate of growth</u>	<u>0,80</u>	<u>1,73</u>	<u>-0,97</u>	<u>2,32</u>	<u>4,07</u>	<u>1,69</u>

1) Consists of net rural-to-urban migration and rural-to-urban area reclassification.

2) Not yet determined.

3) Rate of natural increase roughly assumed to be equal in urban and rural areas.

Source: United Nations Population Division, in United Nations (1976), Habitat: Conference on Human Settlements, Global Review of Human Settlements, Item 10, A/Conf./70/A/1, New York.

million through rural-to-urban transfer. During 1970 to 1975 the urban population of these regions increased by 28 million people of which 16 million were added through natural increase and 12 million through rural-to-urban transfer. This implies that the "contribution" of migration to urban population growth in less developed countries de-

clined *in general* from 47,3 per cent around 1960 to less than 43 per cent in 1975. If this trend in some less developed countries continues, namely that natural increase becomes a larger component of urban growth than migration, it will have a serious impact on their government policies with regard to migration control. It will mean that even if their governments would be able to control migration movements effectively, they would still be faced with a large addition of people to urban concentrations, for better or for worse.

The rural population in the less developed countries has grown at the same rate during the two periods (at about 1,6 per cent per year). This is based on an assumed equal rate of natural increase in urban and rural areas during the period 1970 - 1975. It is probably a defective assumption because, especially in the case of developing countries, children are regarded as an "asset" in rural areas whereas they are more "costly" in urban areas (Kindleberger and Herrick, 1977, p. 244). In addition, because of the non-availability of adequate medical services in rural areas, a higher mortality rate exists in these areas than in urban areas. The result is that higher rates of natural increases are experienced in rural than in urban areas.

It is estimated that the population in less developed regions has increased naturally from 35 million in 1960 to 46 million in 1970 - 1975, or from 2,24 per cent to 2,32 per cent, while rural-to-urban migration has increased from 9 million in 1960 to 12 million in 1970 - 1975, which indicates negative growth rates of 0,59 per cent and 0,63 per cent.

In the more developed regions the rate of natural increase has dropped significantly from 1,4 per cent in 1960 to 0,8 per cent during the period 1970 - 1975, while the transfer rate rose slightly from 1,6 per cent to 1,7 per cent during the two periods. The result was that the population in the rural areas decreased at a rate of 0,3 per cent in 1960 and probably at a rate of nearly 1,0 per cent per year during 1970 - 1975. Partly because of this trend, migration may now be responsible for slightly more than half of the urban growth in the developed regions.

When one examines the *sex composition* in urban and rural areas in the world, it is not possible to derive definite trends showing that males or females are the more dominant group in urban or rural areas. One of the reasons is that different circumstances prevail in the different regions or countries of the world affecting the decisions of males or females to stay in rural areas or to find a living in urban areas, or vice versa. People make decisions based on political, social, economic or geographical factors, depending on a wide range of different conditions in the specific area or country.


Figure 2.2 shows the sex ratios of the adult urban and rural populations in the world, measured in males per 100 females. From Figure 2.2 it can be seen that males form the dominant sex group in urban areas only in the last two regions, namely South Asia and Africa. This is due to a large extent to the fact that most rural-to-urban migrants are young, unmarried men, and secondly that traditionally women are the agricultural workers. In the first three listed regions in Figure 2.2, namely Australia and New Zealand, North America and Latin America, males form the dominant group in the rural sector, partly because traditionally males have been involved in this sector (United Nations, 1976).

Table 2.6 shows the *age structure* of the world's population in different urban and rural settlements in 1960.

From Table 2.6 it can be seen that there is a lower percentage of children in the 0-14 year age group in urban areas than in rural areas. The reason is that the birth rates in urban areas (at least in 1960) were lower than the birth rates in rural areas (see Table 2.5). The age group of 15-44 years shows a reverse trend, in that the larger percentage in this age group resides in the urban areas. This is largely due to the fact that it is predominantly "younger" people who migrate to the urban areas, with the result that urban areas have, in general, slightly more people of working age than rural areas, hence the higher concentration of people in the 15-44 year age group in urban areas.

With regard to the age group 45 years and over, it is interesting to note that in the first four areas listed in Table 2.6, namely Australia

Figure 2.2 - Sex ratios<sup>1)</sup> of the adult population in urban and rural settlements in eight major regions or countries, 1960



1) Males per 100 females, 15 years and older.

Source: U.N. Population Division, in United Nations (1976), Habitat: Conference on Human Settlements, A/Conf., 70/A/1, New York.

Table 2.6 - Distribution of the world's population according to age, in urban and rural settlements in eight major regions or countries, 1960

(Percentages)

Area		All ages	0-14 years	15-44 years	46 years and over
Australia and New Zealand	: Urban	100,0	29,4	41,3	29,3
	: Rural	100,0	35,1	40,6	24,3
Northern America	: Urban	100,0	30,3	40,4	29,3
	: Rural	100,0	33,6	38,5	27,9
Latin America	: Urban	100,0	38,4	44,4	17,2
	: Rural	100,0	45,9	40,3	13,8
Europe	: Urban	100,0	23,6	42,3	34,1
	: Rural	100,0	28,7	39,9	31,4
Soviet Union	: Urban	100,0	27,8	48,8	23,4
	: Rural	100,0	33,4	40,2	26,4
Japan <sup>1)</sup>	: Urban	100,0	26,4	53,3	20,3
	: Rural	100,0	32,9	43,0	24,1
South Asia	: Urban	100,0	39,9	46,6	13,5
	: Rural	100,0	42,9	42,4	14,7
Africa	: Urban	100,0	40,0	47,5	12,5
	: Rural	100,0	43,8	42,0	14,2

1) "Urban" population taken as that of densely inhabited districts.

Source: United Nations Population Division, in United Nations, (1976), Habitat: Conference on Human Settlements, A/Conf., 70/A/1, New York, 1976.

and New Zealand, Northern America, Latin America and Europe, people seem to remain in the urban area, whereas in the Soviet Union, Japan, South Asia and Africa, people seem to return to their area of origin, which largely explains the higher percentage of people in this age group living in the rural settlements in these areas. The conclusion that the United

Nations arrives at in this respect is that women in urban areas have a stabilising effect, which induces many rural-urban migrants to remain in the urban areas indefinitely, while a shortage of women in urban areas has a residential instability effect, which prompts many rural-urban migrants to return to their area of origin (United Nations, 1976, p. 40).

#### 2.4 THE EXTENT OF URBANISATION IN AFRICA

Although Africa is the *least urbanised* of all the continents in the world, its *rate of urbanisation* is among the highest in the world (Breese, 1969, p. 128; Hance, 1977, p. 130). According to the United Nations, the high rate of urban population growth in Africa will continue during the closing stages of this century, and the urban population in Africa is likely to treble between 1975 and the year 2000 (United Nations, 1976, p. 43).

In general, it can be said that urbanisation in Africa has not come about as a natural, indigenous process. Urbanisation in Africa has to a large extent, with the exception of parts of Western Africa, been "imported". Mabogunje (1968, p. 25) remarks on Africa that "... urban development has been a *recent* phenomenon related to the European colonisation of Africa". Smit (1979, p. 5) points out that the Black populations in East, Central and Southern Africa "... never established an indigenous urban tradition", with the result that "... traders, missionaries, and colonial powers were largely responsible for the establishment of towns and cities in Black Africa".

In the historical perspective of the capital cities of Africa, it is possible to distinguish between historical capitals which were ancient capitals confined to Arab Africa; native capitals which started in the later centuries of the Middle Ages in the Western parts of Africa and which were mostly influenced by Arab and Asian cultures; colonial capitals which were "imported" into Africa by the colonial powers; and post-independence capitals which were in general the inherited colonial capitals (Hamdan, 1969, p. 146).

*West Africa* presents a special case as far as urbanisation in Africa is concerned. The Yoruba, which were an immigrant group that moved into the South Western parts of Nigeria, probably had an urban culture long before any colonial influences. According to Mabogunje (1968, p. 76) the Yoruba formed kingdoms between the seventh and tenth centuries, which gave rise to several towns or centres in Nigeria. These towns were basically administrative and trade centres, many of which were situated in the savanna belt of the West African coast. From these open grassland areas the surplus agricultural products were probably traded for imported goods from traders across the Sahara (Kuper, 1965, p. 25).

The Yoruba towns had a definite pattern in their lay-out, with the palace of the head of the city administration, the market place and the religious places all placed in the centre of the town, with roads linking this central district with the rest of the town. The Yoruba towns also had walls built around them, mainly to protect them from attacks in the open grassland area where they were situated.

As for the *rest of Africa*, little evidence can be found of any urban hierarchies prior to colonial influences. According to Soja and Weaver (1976, p. 236), the urban centres in contemporary *East Africa* "... is almost entirely the product of British and German decision-making during the first few decades of colonial rule". These centres were in many ways "foreign" to Africa. "The period up to the end of World War I, when all of East Africa came under British control, was thus an era of colonial penetration, locational selection, and infrastructural development. The result was a new network of settlements capped by the colonial core cities and structured by a hierarchy of administrative centres enforcing colonial control and representing imperial interests" (*ibid.*, p. 239).

During the nineteenth century the same happened in *North Africa*, namely that people from Europe started to move to some of the centres in that part of Africa, where "... the foreign population concentrated in and dominated the major cities" (Abu-hughod, 1976, p. 193).

The colonial impact was also felt in *West Africa*, where there was some form of an urban culture in pre-colonial centuries: "The colonial

régime came to give new meaning to these centres and to inject advanced urban technologies, already developed elsewhere, into their traditional existence" (Mabogunje, 1968, p. 43). Most of these developments took place in Nigeria. As in the case of Southern Africa, "dual cities" developed in West Africa, and specifically Nigeria, which bore the effect of this contact between colonial powers and traditional behaviours: "... most urban centres in Nigeria are an amalgam of two contrasting levels of urbanisation - a traditional, almost medieval, pre-industrial urbanisation and an advanced, industrial urbanisation. Both continue to exist side-by-side"(Mabogunje, 1968, p. 43). During the colonial period the Nigerian towns underwent a tremendous change, not only in their physical structure (bricks and cement blocks replaced mud walls), but also in their economic structure.

In *Southern Africa* the colonial powers arrived in the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries and established their own towns. Many coastal towns were formed initially, like Lourenco Marques and Cape Town, with a typical colonial structure. In the years that followed, colonial centres were also formed inland, like Pretoria, Salisbury, Nairobi and Kampala. Large settlements in Zambia, for instance, were largely the result of British imperialism (Heisler, 1974, p. 2).

In *South Africa* relatively few of the Black people were drawn into the new type of economy which was developing as a result of white settlement between 1652 and 1860; it was only since the discovery of mineral wealth in South Africa (diamonds were discovered in 1886) that the Black people "... were incorporated into the modern economy on a large scale" (Houghton, 1974, p. 401). The Black people were traditionally involved in a subsistence economy, notably agriculture, and were never before exposed to a free-enterprise system. The discovery of minerals towards the last part of the previous century, together with the accompanying urban development "... produced a radical alteration in the preceding pattern of life" (Union of S.A., 1955, p. 9).

In general it can be said that the colonial capitals of Africa were characterised by their *instability*, in that they shifted from location to location, which points to the fact that their inhabitants were very often "adventurers" and people seeking their good fortune, who did not mind to leave an area if they did not find what they searched

for. With the exception of West Africa, urbanisation in Africa, therefore, never developed indigenously but was "imported" or "sticked onto" the traditional African base. This type of urbanisation came primarily from the Western world, with also some Arab and Asian influences.

In the pre-colonial period, indigenous trade centres, controlled by tribal chiefs who acted as merchants, were found along the West Coast of Africa (even as far south as Angola), as well as the East Coast, where Arabs established trade centres. The early colonial capitals influenced the traditional African way of life to some extent and over a long period of time. Thus, seen in a world-wide context, Africa is still a "left behind" continent as far as urbanisation is concerned. With certain exceptions, Africa south of the equator has not yet grown as far as urbanisation is concerned, and the element of urbanisation stimulation has not yet come to the fore. Most of the developments that have taken place in regard to urbanisation growth, have occurred during the last hundred years, which is a relatively short period. Hamdan (1969, p. 149) is of the opinion that most colonial capitals in Africa "... are the product of the last century if not of the present one", and it is known that the colonial capitals were initially responsible for most of the urban growth in Africa. This historical development of urbanisation in Africa is one of the prime reasons why Africa today holds the position of the least urbanised continent.

It will be useful, in conclusion, to look at the extent of urbanisation in Africa as at present. This can be done against the background of Table 2.7, which shows the population of Africa from 1650 to the year 2000, in absolute figures as well as in percentage of the world population.

In 1979 the estimated population of Africa was 457 million, or about 10,6 per cent of the world population. This proportion of the world population is relatively small, if one bears in mind that the continent of Africa comprises about a quarter of the world's surface.

Africa's population as a share of the world's population declined between 1650 and 1920, partly because of a gradual increase in the populations in Europe and the Americas through factors associated with

Table 2.7 - Estimates of the population of Africa, 1650 - 2000

Year	Population (millions)	Percentage of world population
1650	100	21,2
1750	106	13,4
1800	107	10,9
1850	111	8,8
1900	133	8,1
1920	143	7,7
1930	164	7,9
1940	191	8,3
1950	222	8,8
1960	273	9,1
1975	401	10,1
2000	811	13,1

Source: Abate, Y, African population growth and politics, in *Issue*, a quarterly journal of opinion, The African Studies Association, Vol. VIII, No. 4, 1978.

the Industrial Revolution, and partly because of the slave trade and the European colonial measures (Abate, 1978, p. 14). Africa's share of the world population has, however, started to rise again in the late twenties and is expected to increase to 13,1 per cent of the world's population by the end of this century.

What is important to note in Table 2.7 is the dramatic upsurge in the absolute population of Africa after 1850. It took one hundred years to increase Africa's population by 6 million people (from 1650 to 1750), while the next 200 years (1750 to 1950) added a further 116 million people to the continent. In the next 25 years (from 1950 to 1975), some 179 million people were added to Africa's total population, while it is estimated that the last quarter of this century will see a doubling of the continent's population, from 401 million people in 1975 to an estimated 811 million people in the year 2000, an estimated increase of 410 million people. This indicates a population growth rate of 2,85 per cent, which is quite high when compared to the world's

population growth rate of 1,7 per cent (see Table 2.8). At this rate, Africa's population is increasing by 13,3 million people annually (Abate, 1980, p. 102). This high projected growth in population excludes, however, natural disasters like severe droughts, earthquakes, etc. If this growth rate increases in the next few decades, as some sources expect, it is possible that Notestein's maximum estimate of Africa's total population of 864 million by the year 2000 may be reached or even exceeded (Notestein, 1969, p. 16).

There are several reasons for this dramatic upsurge in Africa's total population growth. A few of the most important reasons are high fertility rates and declining mortality rates (due to extended medical services). Table 2.8 compares the population growth rate of Africa in 1975 with North America, representing a more developed region, and the world.

Table 2.8 - Population growth rate of Africa, North America and the world, 1979 ('000)

Region	Birth rate	Death rate	Rate of annual growth (%)
Africa	46	17	2,9
North America	15	9	0,6
World	28	11	1,7

Source: Abate, Y, Population growth and urbanisation in Africa, in Current History, Vol. 78, No. 455, March 1980.

From Table 2.8 it is clear that Africa has still a very high average crude birth rate of 46 per 1 000 people. Despite the fact that birth rates vary between individual African countries, it is clear that even the countries in Africa with the lowest birth rates still exceed the average birth rate of the world.

Despite a declining mortality rate, this rate is still high in Africa. The annual death rate in Africa is 17 per 1 000 people, compared to 11 per 1 000 in the world. A few of the major factors that contributed to this high mortality rate in Africa during the last decade were severe droughts, which claimed the lives of thousands of people,

high infant mortality rates (infants who die before their first year), periodic indigenous wars, and diseases like malaria, bilharzia and tuberculosis.

From the foregoing it is clear that Africa still experiences a high fertility rate, and a declining mortality rate, which means that before Africa can move into the next phase of the demographic cycle where the growth rate will start to decline, the fertility rate will have to start moving downwards. This may mean that Africa will still, for the foreseeable short-term future, remain in her present phase of the demographic cycle.

Table 2.9 indicates the percentage *age distribution* in the different regions in Africa as well as for Africa in total. From Table 2.9 it can be seen that 44 per cent of Africa's population is under 15 years of age, with only 3 per cent over 65 years. This leaves a potential economically active population of 53 per cent. The dependency ratio, that is the ratio of people under 15 years of age plus those over 65 years to the economically active population, in the case of Africa is very high, namely 47:53. This means that there are 89 dependents for every 100 economically active people in the adult age group. In Western Europe the dependency ratio is 36:64, which indicates that there are 56 dependents for every 100 economically active adults. Such a high dependency ratio as in the case of Africa usually places a strain on economic development in that more (financial) resources have to be canalised to education and health facilities for the young.

Table 2.10 shows the urban population in 20 countries in Africa, both as a percentage of total population (which is an indication of the level or degree of urbanisation) and the average annual growth rate in the urban population.

From this table it is clear that none of the listed countries (perhaps with the exception of Algeria and South Africa) have yet achieved the *level of urbanisation* of developed countries such as the United Kingdom (90 per cent), Australia (87 per cent) and the United States of America (70 per cent). The *rate* of urbanisation in Africa, however, tells a different story. The average annual growth rate of the urban population of the twenty countries listed in Table 2.10

Table 2.9 - Percentage age distribution of selected regions in Africa, 1975

Region	All ages	Under 15 years	15-64	Over 65
Western Africa	100,0	45	52	3
Eastern Africa	100,0	45	52	3
Northern Africa	100,0	44	53	3
Central Africa	100,0	43	54	3
Southern Africa	100,0	41	55	4
<u>Africa</u>	100,0	<u>44</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>3</u>

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1977, Twenty-ninth issue, New York, 1978, p. 139.

cannot be taken as representative of the whole continent, since it represents some of the highest urban growth rates on the continent. Recent estimates on the rate of urbanisation in Africa between 1960 and 1970 was 5,3 per cent, which probably increased to 5,5 per cent per year between 1970 and 1975 (The Courier, 1979, p. 46). The average urban growth rate for low-income countries throughout the world during the periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1975 was 3,4 per cent and 4,2 per cent, respectively, while it amounted to 0,9 per cent and 0,5 per cent, respectively, in the United States over the same periods. It can, therefore, be seen that an urban growth rate of more than 5 per cent per annum is an extremely high one, compared to other countries. Of the countries listed in Table 2.10, Malawi had a staggering urban population growth rate of 18,2 per cent per annum between 1970 and 1975, followed by the Ivory Coast with 9,3 per cent.

Thus, with less than 25 per cent of the total population of Africa residing in urban areas, Africa still remains the least urbanised continent in the world. The current rate of urbanisation, however, which is estimated at well over 5 per cent per annum, is among the highest in the world. North Africa is the most urbanised sub-region in Africa, with East Africa the least urbanised.

Table 2.10 - Urbanisation in some countries in Africa, 1960 and 1975

Country	Urban population			
	As percentage of total population		Average annual growth %	
	1960	1975	1960-70	1970-75
Algeria	30	54	6,1	6,8
South Africa	47	48	2,8	2,9
Marocco	29	37	4,3	4,1
Zaire	22	35	5,1	5,4
Zambia	23	34	5,4	5,4
Ivory Coast	19	33	7,3	9,3
Ghana	23	32	4,6	5,1
Cameroon	14	27	5,6	8,0
Malawi	4	20	12,7	18,4
Zimbabwe	13	20	6,8	6,4
Angola	10	18	5,1	5,7
Nigeria	13	18	4,7	4,6
Guinea	10	16	6,2	6,2
Ethiopia	6	12	6,1	7,0
Kenya	7	12	6,6	7,0
Niger	6	10	7,0	6,8
Uganda	5	10	6,3	8,5
Tanzania	5	9	6,3	8,5
Mozambique	4	7	6,6	6,8
Lesotho	2	4	7,7	8,1

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1979, Washington, D.C., August 1979, p. 164.

The growth of Africa's cities has *two components*, namely natural population increase (births minus deaths) and rural-to-urban migration. According to Table 2.8, the annual population growth rate in Africa during 1979 has been estimated at 2,9 per cent, with a relatively high birth rate. There can, therefore, be no doubt that such a high rate of natural increase will contribute to expand cities in Africa.

It will be remembered that the United Nations estimated (Table 2.5) that the rate of natural increase probably exceeded the rate of transfer in less developed countries during the 1970-1975 period. Writers like Abate (1978, p. 17) argue that this is not yet the case in Africa and that the rate of migration exceeds the natural population growth rate and "... in some cases is about twice as high". Because the process of migration is at present still such an important phenomenon *in Africa*, special attention will be devoted to various aspects of this process in Chapter III.

In conclusion: There is no doubt that urbanisation has reached such enormous dimensions that it may very well become a threat to mankind itself, if not handled properly. What is more important is the pace or speed with which this phenomenon is approaching mankind, especially in Africa. Time will not permit mankind to deal with this problem on an *ad hoc* basis. What is needed is planning, logic and vision.

In Africa there seems to be a connection between urbanisation and a barter system and especially a money economy. It was largely through colonisation that the "modern" money economy was introduced in Africa and that cities developed. As long as the majority of the people are involved in self-sufficient production, they can hardly specialise in non-agricultural activities, with the result that they do not gather in large numbers in urban areas. It seems that this phase has passed in Africa.

## CHAPTER 3

 RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AS A MAJOR REASON FOR URBANISATION,  
 INTERNATIONALLY AND IN SOUTH AFRICA

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 the extent of *population growth* as a decisive factor in the urbanisation process in the world and in Africa has been highlighted. There can be no doubt about the importance and powerful forces being created by this phenomenon today. There is, however, a second major factor which contributes to the expansion of urban societies, namely *migration*, which will receive thorough attention in this chapter. Many forms of migration exist, but in this chapter only *rural-urban* migration will be discussed.

Using the time-period approach to classify migrants, we can identify four kinds of rural-urban migration. Such an identification can be presented in the following manner:

	With family	Without family
Temporary migration	1	2
Permanent migration	3	4

Temporary migration is usually of a short-term nature and includes seasonal migrants and migrants who have not yet finally decided. Sometimes persons move to a different locality for several years without intending to stay in the destination area on a permanent basis (or in fact doing so). This would still be regarded as temporary migration. Permanent migrants, on the other hand, never return to their area of origin. Such persons find new roots in new areas of destination. Temporary migration often paves the way for permanent migration in succeeding years (White and Woods, 1980, p. 18). Consequently, the distinction between temporary and permanent migration is not always obvious.

Four different kinds of migration can now be identified, referring to the presentation above. In the first place a temporary migrant can migrate with his family to a destination area, which probably happens very seldom. Secondly, temporary migration can occur without families joining the migrant. Thirdly, permanent migration can take place with families, which in most cases has a stabilizing effect in the area of destination, or fourthly, it can occur without families, which probably happens mostly with single migrants, such as males employed in mines.

The various types of migrants, based on this description of various kinds of rural-urban migration, will be discussed in section 3.2.3 of this chapter. The existence of temporary and permanent migration in various countries will be indicated.

Despite the fact that, generally speaking, rural-urban migration is regarded as a declining contributor to urban population growth in less developed countries (see Table 2.5), this phenomenon is still highly significant in many less developed countries and should under no circumstances be treated lightly.

In the international literature on urbanisation, experts from various countries have already written many books on the question of why people move to urban areas. This is a phenomenon occurring, with no exception, in every country in the world. The only difference is the extent to, and pattern in which, this process takes place.

This section will, therefore, look at the reasons or causes of this type of migration, firstly in an *international context* and then within a *Southern African* framework.

## 3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

### 3.2.1 General background

It is desirable to begin this section with one of the best known and most referred to models of migration, namely the *Harris-Todaro model* of migration. This model has been discussed in great length in the literature on migration.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration states basically that the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas is functionally related to two principal variables, namely (Todaro, 1969, p. 139):

- (i) the urban-rural income differential; and
- (ii) the probability of obtaining an urban job.

According to the Harris-Todaro model of migration, the decision of the individual migrant to migrate is largely determined by the individual's "expectation" of earning a higher income in the area of destination (the urban area). This "expected" urban real income varies directly with the probability of obtaining a job in the urban area. The probability of obtaining a job in the urban area depends furthermore on the number of unemployed and underemployed workers in the urban area. According to Berg (1970), the differential between average unskilled earnings in urban areas and average income in rural areas is sometimes between 300 and 400 per cent in favour of urban areas.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration distinguishes between "expected" urban income and actual rural income, being the basic factors that will influence the decision-making of an individual migrant. The expected income is described as actual income earned multiplied by the probability of obtaining an urban job.

It is clear that as long as the expected urban income exceeds the actual rural income that the individual receives, such a worker is likely to leave the rural area and to migrate to the urban area, even if he is not sure whether he will obtain a job in the urban area. Such a situation will have serious consequences both for the rural and the urban areas. The greater these *imbalances* between expected and actual incomes, the greater the pressures will become on *urban areas*, especially when the influx of new workseekers exceeds the rate at which new jobs can be created (Todaro, 1973, p. 38). If this income differential gives rise to an excessive stream of migrants from rural to urban areas (this is one of the basic assumptions of the Harris-Todaro model of migration), it will also have severe consequences for the *rural areas*, in the sense that labour will leave the area, thereby impeding economic development. According to Todaro, this can be overcome by "holding the

line on the growth in the urban sector while focusing on rapidly raising the incomes in the rural sector" (Todaro, 1976, p. 222).

In a study for the World Bank in 1979 Mazumdar developed a revised hypothesis of the Harris-Todaro model. This revised hypothesis provides an explanation of wage differentials, based on the fact that labour moving to urban areas is not of a homogeneous quality. Family migrants, Mazumdar argues, will have for instance, a different supply price than individual migrants. Mazumdar states that the elevated wage is more likely to be determined by the higher supply price of more permanent migrants (like family migrants). This *higher supply price* is usually linked to *higher productivity* and greater stability. The result is that the high-wage formal sector is often filled by family migrants, while individual migrants are usually found in the low-wage informal sector.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration, therefore, provides an explanation of the *basic reason* for *individual migration*, namely the existence of a wage differential between urban and rural areas. This wage differential, together with the probability of finding a job, will determine whether a person will migrate or not.

It is necessary, however, to look in greater detail at the factors playing a role in the decision-making process of individual migrants, to serve as a background for the reasons for migration in South Africa.

### 3.2.2 The decision to migrate

What factors play a role in a migrant's decision to migrate? According to Lee (1965) and Hoover (1971), migrants are influenced by the following factors:

- (i) Factors associated with the area of origin.
- (ii) Factors associated with the area of destination.
- (iii) Intervening obstacles.
- (iv) Personal factors.

It should be clear that the decision to migrate, including the reasons for this decision, is very seldom homogeneous or consistent; "... (it) is never completely rational, and for some persons the rational component is much less than the irrational" (Lee, 1965). It is, therefore,

necessary to take a closer look at the different factors in each of the four categories mentioned above, to determine in what way they influence the decision to migrate.

### 3.2.2.1 *Factors present in the area of origin*

In his famous work on the Negro in the United States of America, titled "An American Dilemma", Gunnar Myrdal states rightly that the *Great Migration*, which started in 1915, had a tremendous impact on especially the *Negro population*, particularly in the sense that it affected the geographical distribution of Negroes. In a short period of only three decades, from 1910 to 1940, more than 1,7 million Negroes migrated from the rural South to the urban North, to such an extent that in 1940 almost 90 per cent of all Negroes in the Northern and Western states lived in urban areas (Myrdal, 1944, p. 183).

There are *several reasons* why the Negroes in the south of America moved away from these Southern areas. It seems rather strange that the Negro migrated to areas with a generally cold climate, close to the Great Lakes and bordering Canada. The Southern states of America, on the other hand, where the Negroes have settled traditionally, is characterised by a generally warm climate. Why then did the Negroes move to such a cold climate, after being naturally inclined to live in warm areas, like the Southern states and in earlier times Africa?

Myrdal identifies several factors associated with the *area of origin* which influenced many Negroes to move away from the south or out of the area of origin (Myrdal, 1944, p. 191):

- (i) *schools* for Negroes were not so rapidly improved as for Whites and not as swift as in the north;
- (ii) the slow trend towards *Negro landownership* was broken just after the turn of the century;
- (iii) the *natural increase* of the population in the south impeded the expansion of employment opportunities;
- (iv) Negroes were not allowed to share much in the *opportunities* that developed in order to improve their economic position;

- (v) Whites began to monopolise the new *cotton growing* in the south west;
- (vi) during the depression the Whites began to *compete* with Negroes in traditional Negro jobs; and
- (vii) *Southern agriculture* became worse, mainly due to droughts, world agricultural trends, the Federal agricultural policy, and the depression during the thirties. *Unemployment* in the agricultural sector was unavoidable.

These factors served as "*push*" factors that influenced and even forced many Negroes in the Southern areas to move to the Northern areas.

Only one of the abovementioned factors listed by Myrdal, namely natural increase, was within the control of the Negroes in the south. They had very little say in any of the other listed factors that pushed them away from the south. In a sense they became *victims of circumstances* in their own area.

Some of the *basic factors* listed by Myrdal in this regard that have influenced people to leave their area of origin have also been identified by other experts in the world. Jones (1975, p. 21) states, for instance, that "... it is the weaknesses and stresses in the economic and social environment of rural areas..." which play a significant part in the decision-making process of migrants to move *away* from the area of origin. In these views the *economic (and social) characteristics* of the rural area play a determining role in the decision-making process of migrants, building up pressures on the inhabitants.

One of the major economic factors influencing people to migrate, as indicated by the Harris-Todaro model, is the existence of *income differentials*. In a study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1960, it was concluded that "... the main push factor causing workers to leave agriculture is the lower level of incomes" (ILO, 1960, p. 209). According to this report, lower levels of income is a universal reason for migration. Studies undertaken in Sudan, Khartoum and Brazil have all found that wage differentials is a strong impetus to geographic movement of people (Sinclair, 1978, p. 38).

Economic factors influencing people to migrate also include *lack of job opportunities* in rural areas and *severe conditions of poverty*. These situations occur mostly in the absence of comprehensive development programmes. Sometimes the lack of economic opportunities is so severe that people are *forced* to migrate in order to survive.

Other writers, like Hoover, place a different emphasis on the reasons for migration from rural areas. He is of the opinion that migration from an area of origin is primarily determined by the *demographic characteristics* of the population in the area, rather than by economic characteristics of the area (Hoover, 1971, p. 178). There are, for instance, areas that lose their well-educated young people regardless of local economic opportunities. In such cases local economic opportunities may not be significant enough to keep people from leaving the area of origin, e.g. in Ghana, where the level of education seems to be an important factor in inter-regional migration (Beals, 1967, p. 480/6). The availability (or non-availability) of information on better opportunities in other areas will definitely play a role in the decision-making process of well-educated young adults in rural areas, as well as the "better-off" families.

The decision to leave the area of origin, for whatever reason, is seldom taken instantly. People in rural areas have, in most cases, a *long acquaintance* with their area, with the result that normally such a person has sufficient time to decide whether to leave the area (Lee, 1965, p. 50). In cases where people do decide to migrate, steady *contacts* are usually maintained with the kin and tribal group or home community. Because of this often long acquaintance, this home community is often held together by a network of reciprocal obligations (Gutkind, 1965 and Heisler, 1974).

It seems most likely, in conclusion, that the decision to leave the area of origin can generally be linked to *economic reasons*, that is prevailing economic circumstances in the rural area. This serves as a very strong "push" factor. The social environment and demographic features are in support of the influencing process. Not less than five of the seven factors listed by Myrdal that "pushed" Negroes from the south, have an economic base.

### 3.2.2.2 *Factors present in the area of destination*

What attracts people to an area different from their own area? Why are they willing to risk what they have for something they do not know they will get in return? Knowledge of the area of destination is seldom exact, with the result that there is always an element of ignorance or even mystery about such an area (Lee, 1965, p. 50).

In his study on the Negro problem in the United States of America, Myrdal (1944, p. 191) lists the following reasons why Negroes moved *towards* the North during the "Great Migration", which started in 1915:

- (i) more *economic opportunities* (in relief if not in employment);
- (ii) more *security* as a citizen;
- (iii) greater *freedom* as a human being;
- (iv) it became fashionable for many middle-class Whites to employ Negroes as servants, who did not object to *hard work* and *low wages*;
- (v) *Whites* went on *strike* in big Northern industries, creating a demand factor;
- (vi) there was a *desire* among the better-off Negroes to improve themselves (economically and otherwise); and
- (vii) Negroes got a chance to enter *Northern industries* because of the stopping of immigration during World War I.

The most important factor that encouraged Southern Negroes to move northwards was perhaps a *desire* for *economic* (and social) *improvement*, despite the fact that a high unemployment rate developed among especially the Non-White male population in the Northern states (it amounted to 39 per cent in 1937). Mostly due to the presence of "favourable economic factors" in the area of destination (in this case the Northern states) many Negroes left their area of origin. This move was encouraged by the establishment of contacts in the Northern states. The fact is that Negroes in the South became aware of the differentials that existed between their area and the area of destination. Owing to the "seemingly" better economic opportunities in the North, and the corresponding lack of similar (or better) economic

opportunities in the South, they were encouraged to move to the North.

There is no doubt that towns in the area of destination serve as a strong "pull" factor, these towns being "centres of opportunity", acting as positive attractions with a magnetism. In many less developed countries, the attraction of towns and cities lies in the industrialised component, where industrial growth is "believed" to supply a "better way of life" and better living conditions.

In various international studies on migration and urbanisation it is obvious that *economic incentives*, whether in a negative sense in the area of origin or in a positive sense in the area of destination, play a vital role in the decision-making process of individuals. Econometric work confirms that people move for *economic gain* from poorer areas to wealthier areas (Yap, 1977, p. 244). The positive economic incentives include *higher average annual earnings* as well as *employment opportunities* in the areas of destination. Migration between South American countries is, for example, motivated chiefly by the desire for better employment (Breton, 1976, p. 345). In a study done in the Sudan, it was found that 89 per cent of those who had been employed before they moved to Greater Khartoum went in search of employment, which indicates that they either did not have adequate work in their previous place of residence or that their incomes were lower than those they "expected" to earn in Greater Khartoum (Oberai, 1977). In the United States of America it was found that in *intercounty* moves (people moving to a different county), employment changes emerged as the major reason for migrating (Hoover, 1975, p. 176). This general need for better employment opportunities in areas of destination forms part of an often broader spectrum of better economic opportunities existing in these areas.

A fair assumption to make, it seems, is that people move from one area to another mainly in response to economic incentives. These economic incentives can include attractive real (or expected) job opportunities, better income prospects, and better education opportunities. In a study in Greater Khartoum it was found that nearly half of those who were already attending school moved in search of more or better education (Oberai, 1977). Various studies show that the probability of migration increases with education (Yap, 1977, p. 248), with the result

that the more education people attain in the area of origin, the higher the rate of out-migration to other areas. Unless action is taken to keep well-educated people from leaving the rural area, these people will depart for an area where they can obtain better education opportunities. In Ghana, for example, three-fifths of those with a complete primary education left their homes (Caldwell, 1969, p. 61). This indicates that people are either looking for "expected" job opportunities which they can enter with their gained education, or that there are no job opportunities available in their home areas where they can successfully implement their skills or knowledge.

There are, however, areas or countries where the educational or skill levels do not play such a significant role, especially where the literacy level is low. In Ghana's rural areas it was found that two-thirds of the illiterates stayed in their villages and never moved to other areas (Caldwell, 1969, p. 61). In South Africa one finds that in 1970, 65 per cent of all economically active Black males in rural areas had no education, while 29 per cent had an education level of less than Std 6 (Lombard, et al., 1980). It will, however, be wrong to assume that this large illiterate group will *not* leave their homes. They may not leave their homes in search of better education opportunities, but very well for other reasons, like better living conditions, better shopping facilities, social attractions in the area of destination, and climatic conditions. Climatic conditions often influence the seasonal demand for labour, where people work for a season in a specific area.

The reason why people leave their villages or homes to go to an area away from their own area, can either be found in the area of origin or in the area of destination, as had been discussed in the previous paragraphs. Economic incentives, present at both ends of the scale, carry a heavier weight than other factors in the decision-making process. The fact that people move to an area of destination, like an urban area, in search of economic gain, is confirmed by econometric work (Yap, 1977, p. 244). The individual's decision-making process is also influenced by intervening obstacles and personal factors. Attention will briefly be given to these aspects.

### 3.2.2.3 *Intervening obstacles*

Intervening obstacles can either take the form of difficulties in the journey between two areas or measures or controls preventing or prohibiting people from moving freely into an area of destination. Different people are of course differently affected by the same obstacle or set of obstacles. What may be prohibitive to some people, may be trivial to others, like the cost of migration (Lee, 1965, p. 51).

Regarding the *difficulties* in the *journey* between two areas, geographical distance is perhaps the most significant factor, especially in the case of the journey of the migrant (Hoover, 1975, p. 178). With few exceptions, geographic distance has a strong deterrent effect. The longer the distance, the less the chances of frequent visits to the area of origin, as long distances may increase the cost of transport. According to Yap, however, these costs are usually small, typically a fraction of the added income required to induce a migrant to move long distances (Yap, 1977, p. 249).

The second type of intervening obstacle usually prohibiting people from moving to a specific area, is the existence of *control measures*. Such control measures can either be in the form of a physical barrier (like the Berlin Wall which divides East Germany from West Germany) or in the form of legislative measures hampering the free movement of people. Intervening obstacles can also take the form of the deliberate resettlement of people in the area of origin.

One of the major measures in China, particularly since the mid-1950's, has been to develop a system of labour control in order to help alleviate, among other things, the problem of urban unemployment (Wilson, 1972, p. 124). One of the methods used in this regard by the Chinese was the *hsia fang* movements. These movements of people were actually campaigns to reduce the size of the urban population by encouraging unemployed workers and non-productive persons, usually on a voluntary basis, but sometimes using compulsory measures to return to the rural areas. This programme, however, achieved mixed results. Many of the people who were successfully convinced (or forced) to return to their rural areas, returned to the urban areas during the next "boom" period.

Sometimes it is not easy to enforce such control measures. In Latin America the peripheral squatter settlements are often founded by "invasion" (created by the careful planning of migrants already established in the city), about which the local authorities can do very little (Lloyd, 1979, p. 26). In South Africa it has been suggested that influx control of Blacks should be linked only to the availability of work and approved housing (Riekert Report, 1978, para. 4.281(b)). These measures are mainly aimed at trying to maintain social and economic stability in the community. It is a different question whether such measures are enforced or whether the people affected by such measures or controls abide by them.

#### *3.2.2.4 Personal factors*

There is no doubt that personal factors do play a role in deciding whether to move or migrate to an urban area. This input is, however, not easily determined, because of the fact that personalities differ. Some people make a decision to leave an area only after careful consideration of all relevant facts at their disposal, while others may move in response to personal visions or hopes of a better way of life.

Personal factors in the decision-making process cannot be seen in isolation, because personal tastes or preferences are either linked to the known situation in the area of origin or the known (or envisaged) situation in the area of destination. Lee (1965, p. 51) states in this regard: "Personal sensitivities, intelligence and awareness of conditions elsewhere enter into the evaluation of the situation at origin, and knowledge of the situation at destination depends upon personal contacts or upon sources of information which are not universally available."

Other personal factors entering into the decision-making process are marital status, parenthood, family relationships and cultural ties. Married males should consider whether they want, or are allowed to, take their spouses and/or children with them to an urban area. Social and psychological factors combined with different personalities can also influence people to move away from an area. Schapera (1947,

p. 115) has meticulously described these factors, among them a desire for adventure and change, and the escape from communal and domestic problems.

Sex and age can also play a role in an individual's decision to leave an area. In South Asia and Africa there is a tendency for *males* to leave for an area away from their homes in the rural areas. As far as age is concerned, people tend to leave their area in the "young adult" age group ranging from under 20 years of age, to the 20-30 years age group in some countries. Personalities as well as cultural background and tradition enter into decision-making processes of individuals as far as sex and age are concerned.

Following a discussion of the factors playing a role in a person's decision to migrate in this section, the possible advantages and costs to a migrant in the decision-making process are summarised in Table 3.1.


A person in an *area of origin* considering the possibility of migration will probably find that the costs of migration include moving costs (like transport costs, selling some belongings), the risk of leaving the area of origin and being unsuccessful, and the investment in time in arranging the departure. Bad climatic conditions and disasters like droughts in the area of origin may also induce the potential migrant to decide finally to leave. Many of these costs can, however, be minimised or even eliminated.

The advantages, on the other hand, include the fact that members of his family stay behind and that remittances will be sent to them if he/she finds employment in the area of destination. People who consider migration often do it in order to find money to buy food, i.e. to survive.

As already indicated, many people migrate to other *areas*, for economic reasons, which are largely based on expectations for better economic opportunities like employment, higher remunerations (in cash or kind) and better educational opportunities. The second advantage of migration in the area of destination is the belief (true or false) of better living conditions and a better environment to live in, compared to the area of origin. Improvements are envisaged regarding housing, schools, shops, services and health facilities.

Table 3.1 - The decision to migrate

	Advantages of migration	Less costs of migration	Net advantages
Area of origin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• family stays behind</li> <li>• remittances sent to families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• moving costs (including transport costs)</li> <li>• risk</li> <li>• investment of time</li> <li>• climate</li> <li>• disasters (droughts, floods, epidemics)</li> </ul>	Net advantage is to leave area of origin because the cost to migrate is relatively low while the advantages remain whether the migratory move is permanent or temporary
Area of destination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• better expected economical opportunities;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- educational</li> <li>- employment</li> <li>- remuneration</li> </ul> </li> <li>• preferable environment and living conditions (housing, schools, shops, services)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• social distance</li> <li>• geographical distance;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- visits to families</li> <li>- transport costs</li> <li>- remittances</li> </ul> </li> <li>• control measures;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- physical restrictions</li> <li>- legislative restrictions</li> <li>- resettlement</li> </ul> </li> <li>• living costs</li> </ul>	The expected net advantages are greater than the cost, because the social cost may be decreased, the geographical distance may be short, and control measures may be steered clear of
Social factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• more security</li> <li>• dependence (move to relatives/friends)</li> <li>• greater freedom (new/different activities, environment, people)</li> <li>• initiation process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• alienation from community (break ties with area of origin if permanently migrated)</li> <li>• enter uncertainty (new life)</li> </ul>	Advantages may exceed or equal the costs, or <i>vice versa</i> , depending on personal factors and prevailing conditions



The costs of migration in the area of destination basically relate to the social distance, i.e. the difficulty in making adequate social adjustment after the migrant arrives (Hoover, 1975, p. 179), as well as the geographic distance (which may be a long physical distance), where visits to the area of origin, transport costs and the dispatch of remittances to the family mean expenditure for the migrant. Other costs include control measures, usually imposed by the State. Such measures include physical barriers (like the Berlin Wall), legislative and regulative restrictions (like influx control) and resettlement of people. Living expenses may also enter as a cost for the migrant, especially if these costs are higher than in the area of origin. The advantages expected will most certainly exceed the costs of migration in this case, as control measures may be evaded, geographic distance cost be minimised and social distance decreased, depending on the characteristics of the migrant.

Experience has shown that *social factors* may also play an important role in the decision-making process of migrants. Advantages include (expected) security, greater freedom, dependence (stay with relatives/friends) and prestige (through the initiation process). The social cost factors include alienation from the community, and the element of uncertainty of a "new life", which can be offset by the dependence of relatives and friends. Circumstances and prevailing conditions determine whether the advantages of migration exceed the costs, or vice versa, so that it is difficult to determine the net advantages arising from social factors influencing the decision-making process.

The decision to migrate (or not), as well as the weighing of the advantages and costs of migration, is finally influenced by his/her personality and *personal factors*, listed in Table 3.1. These factors include marital status, cultural beliefs, sensitiveness and desire for adventure and change.

The decision to migrate becomes a reality once the potential rational migrant evaluates the net advantages, as determined in Table 3.1, within the framework of his personal characteristics.

From what has been discussed, it should be clear that there are numerous factors contributing to the process of urbanisation of individuals. Many of these factors have a strong economic base, while others have a non-economic base. Jones (1975, p. 27) is also of the opinion that the different factors promoting urbanisation in the world today "... are multifarious, as well as being simultaneous in their operation and effects". People from various countries react differently to these factors, whether it is in the area of origin or in the area of destination, mainly because of various intervening obstacles and different personalities. For this reason it will be unwise to try to identify a single reason why people move to an urban area, especially as situations and circumstances differ from country to country.

### 3.2.3 Types of migrants

Several types of rural-urban migrants can be identified. One of the most distinctive classifications has been made by Nelson (1976, p. 722), identifying the following types of migrants:

- (i) *seasonal migrants* seeking temporary employment to augment their meagre agricultural incomes;
- (ii) *target migrants* seeking employment for a limited period of time in order to accomplish a specific purpose and then return home;
- (iii) *migrants* spending most of their lives *moving* between countryside and town, each successive stay being longer and linked to changing pressures and opportunities of the individual migrant's life cycle;
- (iv) *migrants* spending their productive lives in *town* but planning eventually to *retire* to their *rural homes*;
- (v) *permanent migrants* who are committed to stay for the rest of their lives in *town*; and
- (vi) *migrants* who are *undecided* as to how long they will stay in town and whether they will eventually return to their area of origin.

The most important input distinguishing the type of migrant is surely the *intention* of the individual migrant; that is, whether such a migrant regards his or her stay in the area of destination as temporary or more or less permanent. Very often the intentions of migrants are closely linked to their *behaviour*. In a study in Bombay City, Mazumdar (1979) distinguishes between *individual migrants*, who live in urban areas without their families, and *family migrants*, who bring a family up in the urban area. In Bombay City the family migrants, because of their intention to stay permanently, in most cases are inclined to be more stable, with the result that they are more productive than their counterparts, coupled with a higher demand price. Their intention to stay permanently has, in other words, an effect on their behaviour.

Nelson (1976, p. 724) explains this correlation between intention and behaviour in the following manner:

"... if cityward migration is gradually becoming more permanent in a particular city or country, current intentions may be both a more accurate guide to current behaviour in the city and a better predictor of eventual settlement patterns than retention and return-flow data based on past migration patterns". This means that *intentions* of migrants, which also help to classify the type of migrant, can shed more light on the *behaviour* of migrants as well as on possible settlement patterns. In the case of Bombay City the trend is towards more permanent migration.

Permanent migration occurs in countries such as Thailand, Taiwan, Korea and Latin America. In six different cities in Brazil, only 6 per cent of the *migrants* from rural areas or small interior townships intended to return to their place of origin (Hutchinson, 1976, p. 122). Various experts are of the opinion that there is a general, long-term trend towards more permanent migration and that temporary migration is becoming less significant (see Nelson, 1976, p. 733; and Hanna and Hanna, 1971, p. 30). This trend can be attributed to factors such as higher wages, job opportunities and "better" living conditions in the area of destination.

Such permanent migration to other areas can, on the other hand, bring forward a more stable and productive migrant, especially if he is

allowed to take his family along or if he has the opportunity to visit his family on a regular basis in the area of origin (geographically not far removed). On the other hand, problems such as slums can be created if families are allowed to move freely to an area of destination. These slums are usually created by migrants moving illegally from a rural area to an urban area (adjacent to a city or town).

There are, on the other hand, countries where migration is still mainly temporary. From various studies it can be seen that the level of education (or lack of education) plays a significant role in this regard (see paragraph 3.2.2). The difference may lie in the motivation of such migrants. Educated people may know that if they move to an urban area, they will probably spend the rest of their working lives in such an urban area, whereas illiterate people may "take a chance" in the hope that they will find some luck. If unsuccessful, they can always return home.

Caldwell (1969, p. 186) found that 92 per cent of the people who have become urbanised in some of Ghana's towns either intended to return eventually to their rural areas or were uncertain about their future plans. This shows a strong tendency towards temporary migration or circular migration (where people circulate between two areas). As indicated in section 3.1 of this chapter, seasonal workers can also be classified as temporary migrants, where they work for a few months in an area away from their area of origin. There are various forms of temporary migration, extending over various short-term periods, always with the intention to return home at some time.

### 3.3 MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### 3.3.1 General background

Various studies on rural-urban migration as a determinant of urbanisation in South Africa have been undertaken, e.g. by Leistner (1963), Wilson (1972) and Houghton (1973). As pointed out, the reasons for migration differ greatly. It is, however, possible that the *most important* reasons for migration in a specific country can be identified, given the prevailing circumstances. In this process, realities (and expectations) in both the area of origin and the area of destination must be considered as well as intervening obstacles and

personal preferences, as stated in the previous section.

In South Africa, all six different types of migrants identified in this Chapter are present - some types to a larger extent than others. The most "typical" type of migrant in South Africa is probably the migrant moving between his or her rural home and work-place (see (iii) above). In the South African literature, reference is usually made to "*oscillating*" migrants, which refers to a person whose home is so far away from his work-place that he cannot commute on a daily basis and can only visit his family periodically (Wilson, 1972, p. 1). Current influx control legislation in South Africa impedes to some extent the mobility especially of Blacks and their families. It has been suggested that the movement of Blacks to urban areas should be linked only to the availability of housing and job opportunities in the area of destination. These and other impediments on migrants may very well influence people to move to areas closer to their home areas, where they can still strive to meet their desired needs and expectations. An example of such a situation may be that of people migrating from rural areas in Lebowa to townships such as Seshego, Mahwelereng, Namakgale and Lebowakgomo.

As stated, in the South African literature migration is often described as oscillating migration (Wilson, 1972) or circular or shuttle migration (Lipton in Optima, 1980). Such migrants are mostly forced by circumstances to migrate, spending most of their active working lives commuting between their work-places and homes, very often without their families. The mining industry serves as the single largest employer of migrants in South Africa today. In 1978, the mining industry offered employment opportunities to 664 571 workers, most of whom have had very little or no formal education. (Blacks comprised 588 201 or more than 88 per cent of this total.) It is estimated that the mining industry accounts for 35 - 40 per cent of all migrants (Lipton, 1980), the majority of which can be classified as oscillating migrants, which means they have contracts with their employers to work in the mines for a specific period before returning to their homes for some time.

In a sense the migration patterns in South Africa are structurally determined, with the result that it is highly unlikely that the present system of oscillating migration will change drastically in the near future, despite the fact that there is a tendency towards more permanent urbanisation of Blacks in South Africa. It was established as early as 1950 that nearly half of the Blacks employed in the manufacturing industry were permanently urbanised (Union of South Africa, 1951). Despite the lack of recent statistical data, it can be accepted that a still larger number of urban Blacks are at present *permanently urbanised*, especially in the four large metropolitan areas.

The next section will concentrate on a specific question as far as migration in South Africa is concerned, namely why Blacks move or migrate in South Africa, while the chapter will conclude with the crucial question of what factors promote urbanisation in the national states.

### 3.3.2 Reasons for migration of Blacks in South Africa

Black migrants in South Africa have been referred to as "men of two worlds", indicating the tribal world in which they are brought up and usually also retire; and the modern industrial world, in which they spend most of their working lives for longer or shorter periods (Houghton, 1960, p. 179). Mayer prefers to see these people as "men of three worlds", indicating the country home, the White town where they find employment and the adjoining Black town where they live (Mayer, 1962, p. 1). This description of people from different worlds touches the *roots* of this phenomenon in South Africa (and a few other parts of the world), namely the non-permanence of migration, which is already in existence for more than a hundred years. The bridge which has been built to "replace" people from the area of origin to the area of destination has indeed become two-way-traffic lanes, with people moving in *both* directions, at short and long intervals.

Some very important and valuable studies have already been undertaken in South Africa, taking a closer look at why people (especially Blacks) move for shorter or longer periods *to an area of destination*. This section will give attention to a few of the most important studies in this regard.

In section 3.2.2 it has been pointed out that *economic factors* play a predominantly important role in the decision-making process of migrants, with non-economic factors in a supportive role in this process. On the migration process in South Africa, Mitchell (1958, p. 23) writes "... that the key factor is the economic one: all other causes of migration can be removed, save the economic one, and there would still be migration". Further north in Africa, in the former Tanganyika, Gulliver came to a *similar conclusion* when he studied the migration process there: "The incentives for labor migrants are primarily and pre-eminently a desire for cash and material wealth which are not available away at work" (Gulliver, 1960, p. 161). It is these economic necessities, or lack thereof in the rural areas, that cause Blacks to seek that which they desire in other areas. All other factors are secondary. In this regard Gulliver (*loc.cit.*) concludes: "The reasons why so many thousands of Africans ... go away to work are *not* explicable in terms of man seeking travel and adventure, new experience, the wonders of the White man's world, wanderlust, the evasion of filial duties or political obligations, or others of the employers' and White man's stereotyped myth. Some of these sorts of factors may be involved marginally for particular individuals..."

In a study by Leistner on the economic aspects of Black migrant labour, he confirms that economic factors do in fact play a dominant role in the decision-making process of migrants. In almost 72 per cent of all the responses in this study, it was found that economic motives played a crucial role in the motivation for going to work (Leistner, 1963, p. 116). All other motives figured rather insignificantly in this study.

The roots of the decision to leave an area, mainly because of economic factors involved, are to be found in most cases in the *rural area*, where lack of opportunities, poverty and population pressure are important determinants. In this regard Leistner concludes that "... growing population pressure on rural resources is the principal cause for labour leaving the land - non-economic factors generally play only a subsidiary role" (Leistner, 1963, p. 199). Population pressures in rural areas often give rise to conditions of unemployment or underemployment, in which people simply *have to leave* the areas in search of better opportunities.

In many cases the land tenure system is responsible for pushing people away from an area, for example where divisions of land among sons imply that each has "too little" to survive, with the result that they leave their rural area.

The economic pressure on people in rural areas in the form of poverty and overpopulation (Union of South Africa, 1946, para 59-1, and Lourens, 1979, p. 53), often switches to a wish or for that matter a desire to earn money, in order to satisfy their many desires. Many experts point out that "to earn money" summarises the reasons why people move to urban areas (Dubb, 1937, p. 444, and Williams, 1971, p. 149).

Traditionally, African economies have been subsistence economies with little, if any, specialisation and production for the less prosperous days to come. For this historical reason, many Blacks in Africa have come to towns "... to supplement a failing subsistence economy in the rural areas", which is normally used for one or more of the following purposes (Dubb, 1937, p. 445):

- (i) to supplement the shortage of *food* in the tribal or subsistence economy;
- (ii) to purchase cattle for lobola (*bride's price*);
- (iii) to buy tools and implements for *agricultural purposes* and to buy consumer products;
- (iv) to pay for *taxes* imposed by administrations on the indigenous population;
- (v) to give *financial support* to members of the *family* in the rural areas;
- (vi) to enable children in the rural areas to attend *school* and
- (vii) to satisfy the demand for *European artefacts* and foodstuffs.

If it is to be accepted that the motivation "to earn money" does in fact play a significant role in the decision to migrate, one is tempted to ask in what way it will influence Blacks to migrate to urban areas inside the national states instead of migrating to the large metropoli-

tan areas. On the question whether Blacks would be prepared to work in or near Black areas for the same (or higher) pay as at present, or for a better pay only, it was found that 183 out of 299 respondents (or 61,2 per cent) were prepared to work in or near Black areas if they could obtain economic advantages (Leistner, 1963, p. 183). Of this total, 103 respondents (or 56,3 per cent) said they would have been prepared to work for the same (or higher) pay as at present. Other criteria, such as the preference for rural life, being nearer to home and/or family featured rather insignificantly. From this situation it must be clear that Blacks are willing to work in or near a Black area, given there are *economic advantages*. Assuming that these attitudes of being employed inside the national states at either the same wage or a higher wage have not changed, it must, however, be borne in mind that the position as far as economic advantages inside the national states are concerned, has not improved or developed drastically since the sixties. It seems that the national states are not capable of providing the necessary opportunities for their inhabitants: "... those that enter the labour force in the Black states cannot be completely provided with job opportunities...", with the result that they become "... candidates for migration out of these areas - legally or illegally" (Van Eeden, 1980, p. 419). From this situation it can be concluded that the national states have apparently been incapable of creating the necessary job opportunities to, among other things, initiate a healthy process of urbanisation. Expenditure on the different programmes that have been identified for the development in the national states, confirms this state of affairs. In 1980/81, for instance, various authorities voted only 18,3 per cent to be spent on the creation of job opportunities and the generation of income in the various national states (Benso, 1980, p. 111).

The fact that non-economic factors do not feature significantly among the main reasons for migration does not imply that these factors can be ignored. Many migrants move for personal reasons (like curiosity) or to experience the glitter of city life, or because of social prestige (Dubb, 1937; Williams, 1971; Möller and Schlemmer, 1979; Smedley, 1979; and Schapera, 1941). It has been said that in different ways migration has become a tradition or a custom among many Black people in South Africa (Union of South Africa, 1946, para 5-1). Probably

the best account of the forces operating in the different worlds of these people is found in books like Allan Paton's "Cry, the beloved Country", and Elsa Joubert's "Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena", where a glimpse is taken into the lives of Black people moving from one world to the other and the day-to-day problems they experience. Only a consciousness of such deep-rooted experiences can really shed light on this whole phenomenon as experienced by the people actually involved.

It should be clear that migration in South Africa, as only one part of the urbanisation process, is a deeply rooted and complicated phenomenon, originating *en masse* from individual decisions. These decisions are primarily based on *economic motives*, of which the most important is to exchange (in some cases) their only production factor, *labour*, for a compensation, hopefully in *cash*.

Some other important investigations have also been carried out in South Africa on the question "why do Blacks migrate?" The next few paragraphs refer briefly to the most relevant findings of these studies, which support empirically what has been discussed so far.

In a study by Maasdorp and Pillay in the Durban Metropolitan Area some evidence is found of what has already been highlighted in this section, namely the importance of economic incentives: "... migrants move mainly for economic gain, i.e. to areas with higher income levels and better work opportunities" (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1978, p. 29). This, as well as other similar empirical findings, corresponds to the theoretical model of Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 126-142), which has been discussed in chapter two. As will be recalled, this theoretical model argues that migration proceeds in response to an individual's *expectation* to earn a higher wage in the area of destination, where the expected urban wage is defined as the fixed minimum wage (or actual income earned), multiplied by the proportion of the urban labour force actually employed (the probability of finding a job).

In this same study ("Unauthorised Housing in Clermont") in the Durban metropolitan area, Maasdorp and Pillay summarised the reasons for migration according to the distribution of migrants by area of origin.

Table 3.2 gives the reasons advanced by respondents which are divided into economic and non-economic reasons, in both cases by area of origin.

From Table 3.2 it can be seen that three-quarters of the respondents in the survey migrated because of one or more of the economic reasons stated, whether it was rural poverty and/or rural unemployment, and/or to earn money, and/or to take up a specific job. The remainder of the respondents, only 24,7 per cent, stated that they migrated for non-economic reasons, like family and community reasons, an unsatisfactory lifestyle, family or relatives present in the area of destination, or political reasons.

A closer look at the economic reasons for migration in Table 3.2 reveals that "to earn money" is the predominant factor in this decision-making process, namely 27,3 per cent of the total. In all areas of origin this was the major economic reason for migration, except in the case of Lesotho where the majority of the people migrated because of extreme poverty in the rural areas. It should be noted that 43 per cent of the respondents in this survey migrated because of either rural poverty or rural unemployment, the two major economic "push" factors operating in the areas of origin.

Looking at the reasons for migration by sex, it was determined that males were more concerned about the economic factors (80,5 per cent of the males) than the females (65,7 per cent), mainly because of the unemployment situation in the rural areas (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1978, p. 33). Females tended to place more emphasis on marriage and family affairs, in other words on non-economic reasons.

Among the non-economic reasons for migration the presence of relatives and friends in the area of destination seems to be the most relevant factor (12,3 per cent), mainly because such contacts are potential suppliers of food and accommodation to people from rural areas. Family and community problems are the next most important non-economic reason for migration. It registers, however, only 6,0 per cent of the average total.

Table 3.2 - Percentage distribution of migrants by area of origin and reasons for migrating, 1978

Reason	Natal	Trans= kei	Rest of SA	Swazi= land	Leso= tho	Other foreign	Total
<u>Economic:</u>							
Rural poverty	21,1	25,3	17,6	6,7	41,9	-	22,8
Rural unemployment	21,5	21,6	14,7	-	16,1	20,8	20,2
Earn money	28,1	27,4	35,3	40,0	12,9	20,8	27,3
Specific work	6,3	2,5	5,9	6,7	3,2	12,5	4,9
Sub-total	77,0	76,8	73,5	53,4	74,1	54,1	75,2
<u>Non-economic:</u>							
Family/community problems	4,4	8,3	5,9	6,7	6,5	-	6,0
Lifestyle	3,3	4,1	2,9	13,3	16,1	4,2	4,5
Marriage/family	14,4	10,4	17,6	26,7	3,2	4,2	12,3
Political	0,7	0,4	-	-	-	37,5	1,9
Sub-total	22,8	23,2	26,4	46,7	25,8	45,9	24,7
Total (n = 100%)	270	241	34	15	31	24	618

Source: Maasdorp G and Pillay N, Unauthorised Housing in Clermont, a Socio-Economic Study, Interim Report No. 3, University of Natal, Durban, 1978, p. 31.

It should be clear that the reasons for migration (whether economic or non-economic) will differ from area to area as well as from time to time. As Table 3.2 shows, the major reason for migration out of Lesotho is rural poverty, while the major reason for migration out of Swaziland is to earn money, the difference being that Lesotho has the worst of the two economies and that the pressure of the *de facto* population on the land in Lesotho (especially in the rural areas) is greater than in Swaziland. The major economic reason for migration out of Swaziland (to earn money) corresponds with the major non-economic reason, namely for marriage or family. Reasons for migration will also change over time. During severe droughts, for example, it can be expected that the factors operating in the rural areas will feature more significantly in "pushing" people away from these areas, mainly because migrants tend to review their situations constantly.

A study undertaken by Möller and Schlemmer in the Greater Durban Area in Natal came to virtually the same conclusion as far as the reasons for migration are concerned. It was found that economic factors played a very important role among the 626 single male migrants who were interviewed (Möller and Schlemmer, 1979, p. 8). Job-related reasons formed the centre of the decision-making process among the migrants. This is understandable because the respondents in this case were single male workers. It was further determined that age trends were becoming more of a "coerced economic choice for the individual migrants", mostly to help support their families.

In a study of migration in the Eastern Cape, initiated by the South African Human Sciences Research Council, Blacks were asked what were the most important reasons that convinced them to move to the Western Cape. In this case, as in the other studies, the answers of the respondents point to economic influences. The majority of the migrants from the Ciskei and Transkei moved for economic gain. The reasons for migrating to the Western Cape and the percentage distribution were as follows (Smedley, 1979, p. 32):

- (i) Occupational advantages of residence in the Western Cape - 35 per cent.
- (ii) Financial advantages of residence in the Western Cape - 31 per cent.

- (iii) Ties (through birth) in the Western Cape - 26,7 per cent.
- (iv) Personal reasons - 4,3 per cent.

Two-thirds of the respondents (66 per cent) migrated to the Western Cape because of the occupational or financial advantages present in the area of destination. Here again this study points to the importance of economic determinants in the decision-to-migrate process. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of other empirical studies, namely that migration in Southern Africa, as well as in other countries in the world, takes place mainly for economic gain, whether it is in a negative form where people are pushed from their area of origin or forced to leave the rural areas because of poverty, overpopulation and lack of job opportunities, or whether people are attracted to areas of destination because of economic advantages present in those areas.

The general conclusion is that Blacks migrate mainly for economic reasons. More specifically, the vast majority of Blacks migrate or leave their area of origin in order *to survive*. The real per capita income of Blacks in Lebowa (at 1980 prices) is for instance only R683 per year or only R57 per month. Under such conditions they are forced to go away (or send some family members away) to seek alternative ways to stay alive. Their primary reason for going to an area away from their homes is, in other words, to earn money, and to earn money they need to be employed. This can be regarded as the single most important reason why Blacks migrate in South Africa. It also explains why at present the migration process in this country is still heavily temporary.

This does not deny the fact that there are many other possible reasons for migration, as various studies have indicated. These reasons may, however, to a large extent be linked to the motivation to earn money and to the desperate need to find employment. Migration for non-economic reasons is mostly in support of the abovementioned reasons.

At this stage it should be clear what the major determinants of rural-urban migration are. While the influence of migration on the urban-

sation process may be of a decreasing nature in some countries, this process is still an extremely important phenomenon in other countries of the Third World.

Migration as such has not contributed on a large scale to the urbanisation process in the national states, mainly because urbanisation in the national states has seldom taken place because of economic forces. There are other factors which have contributed to the urbanisation process in the national states. A closer look will now be taken at these factors.

### 3.3.3 Factors promoting urbanisation in the national states

The crucial importance and implications of population growth in the world at large and in Africa in particular have already been spelled out in Chapter two. South Africa, as well as the various surrounding national states, is no exception to this phenomenon.

Table 3.3 - The Black population of South Africa, urban and rural, 1970 and 1980 (millions)<sup>1)</sup>

Census year	South Africa		White areas		National states	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1970	5,1 (33,3%)	10,2 (66,7%)	4,5 (54,6%)	3,7 (45,4%)	0,6 (8,5%)	6,5 (91,5%)
	Total: 15,3 (100,0%)		Total: 8,2 (53,6%)		Total: 7,1 (52,5%)	
1980 <sup>2)</sup>	6,4 (32,5%)	13,6 (67,5%)	5,0 (52,2%)	4,5 (47,8%)	1,4 (13,3%)	9,1 (86,7%)
	Total: 20,0 (100,0)		Total: 9,5 (47,5%)		Total: 10,5 (52,5%)	

1) Including the Black populations of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

2) Provisional figures.

Source: Department of Statistics, 1976, Population Census 1970, Geographical distribution of the population, report No. 02-05-10, unpublished data, and information obtained from the Governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

Table 3.3 shows the Black urban and rural populations of South Africa for 1970 and 1980, the White areas and the national states (provisional 1980 census figures). The figures in Table 3.3 should be interpreted with care, because there are indications that the 1980 census, like previous censuses, under-enumerate the Black population, as will be pointed out in the next chapter.

In a study done by Lombard, Stadler and Steyn on the socio-economic priorities in South Africa (Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria, 1981), the total urban Black population was estimated at more than 9 million people in 1980 (compared to the official 6,4 million shown in Table 3.3), representing 44,3 per cent of the total Black population in that year, which is more realistic than the 32,5 per cent estimated by the Department of Statistics. The latter figure excludes the inhabitants of squatter areas in South Africa (like Winterveld near Pretoria) which have no formal urban status.

From Table 3.3 it can be seen that the Black population in urban areas in the national states have increased from six hundred thousand in 1970 to 1,4 million in 1980. Whereas the urban Blacks in South Africa have increased by 1,4 million during this period (from 5,1 million in 1970 to 6,5 million in 1980), they have percentually decreased from 33,3 per cent to 32,5 per cent. This percentual decrease can mainly be attributed to the fact that the Black population has increased rapidly in absolute numbers in the rural areas in the national states between 1970 and 1980, despite the percentual decrease, which can be attributed to a higher level of urbanisation in the national states.

A second reason for the "higher" level of Black urbanisation in South Africa in 1970 is the continued consolidation of national states, where some formerly "White" areas have been consolidated into Black areas, or where large numbers of Blacks have been resettled in Black urban areas, as will be pointed out in Chapter IV. Examples in this regard include Port St Johns in the Cape Province and Glen Gray and Herschel in Ciskei.

A third reason for the higher percentage of urban Blacks in South Africa in 1970 as opposed to 1980 is the fact that the Department of Statistics changed the official definition of an urban area. For purposes of the 1980 census, only cities and towns with some form or other of local

management have been defined as urban areas. Areas of an urban nature, i.e. areas with urban amenities, have been eliminated in the "new" definition of an urban area. Many mining towns (such as Kriel in the Eastern Transvaal), and various power station towns have been excluded from the new definition of an urban area for purposes of the 1980 census and have been reclassified as "rural" areas.

What factors are responsible for urbanisation in the national states which has increased from 8,5 per cent in 1970 to an estimated 13,3 per cent in 1980 (as may be seen in Table 3.3)?

The first factor contributing to the increase in the urban population in the national states is induced by the South African Government. This is done by the purchase of land and "added" to the national states. The result is that the boundaries of these states are changed and that Blacks who have resided in White areas are now included in a national state (Smit, 1977, p. 19). The greater part of such added land is geographically adjacent to national states. Sometimes these added areas are proclaimed as townships and then regarded as urban areas. Such a step, when it happens, helps to increase the urban population of such a state (for example Mdantsane in Ciskei).

A second factor contributing to the rapid increase of the urban population of the national states is the Government programme to resettle Blacks from time to time, either from "Black spots" or badly located Black areas, or from White urban areas and White rural areas. In the ten year period from 1960 to 1970, some 68 144 Blacks were resettled in the different national states from badly located Black areas (Smit, 1977, p. 20). According to unpublished information from the Department of Co-operation and Development, a further 304 885 Blacks were removed from "Black spots" to the national states during the period 1970 to 1980. Of this total, some 250 594 Blacks or 82 per cent, were resettled between 1975 to 1980, as shown in Table 3.4. These figures include Blacks that have been resettled from one national state to another.

Unfortunately, no statistics are available on the resettlement of Blacks from so-called "White" areas to the national states. It is, however, believed that this type of resettlement is substantial.

Table 3.4 - Number of Blacks resettled from "Black spots" and badly located areas to national states, April 1st 1975 to March 31st 1980

Black states	1/4/75- 31/3/76	1/4/76- 31/3/77	1/4/77- 31/3/78	1/4/78- 31/3/79	1/4/79- 31/3/80	Total
Kwazulu	9 826	26 636	21 857	4 485	3 321	66 125
Kangwane	-	-	357	378	-	735
Bophuthatswana	8 694	17 960 <sup>1)</sup>	10 568	10 809	315	48 346
Ciskei	572	37 900 <sup>2)</sup>	8 927 <sup>3)</sup>	16	19 619	67 034
Lebowa	-	3 981	-	-	8 074	12 055
Qwa-Qwa	-	-	-	-	42 947	42 947
Swazi	2 682	126	-	-	-	2 808
South Ndebele	10 404	140	-	-	-	10 544
Total	32 178	86 743	41 709	15 688	74 276	250 594

1) 595 Blacks were resettled within Bophuthatswana.

2) Blacks resettled from the Republic of Transkei to Ciskei.

3) Including 3 108 Blacks resettled from the Republic of Transkei to Ciskei.

Source: Department of Co-operation and Development, various Annual Reports, 1975-1979, as well as unpublished information.

A third factor promoting urbanisation in the national states is the provision or availability of housing in the urban areas. The number of housing units in proclaimed townships have increased, for instance, from 79 537 in 1970 to an estimated 185 160 in 1980, while a total amount of R105,7 million was spent in 1980/81 on the establishment of towns in the national states (Benso, 1980, pp. 34 and 35). Various Administration Boards are also involved in housing programmes in the national states (e.g. the East Rand Administration Board with a housing programme in Lebowakgomo).

A fourth factor contributing to urbanisation is the depressed conditions in the rural areas. In many instances people have no option but to leave the area in order to survive. They either go to a nearby township or migrate to a metropolitan area where they usually have some contact. It has been suggested that the rural areas (especially the small agricultural settlements), should be planned and developed in such a way as to be viable units for the inhabitants, while the excess inhabitants should be encouraged to move to other areas. More than a quarter of a century ago, the Tomlinson Report (1955), p. 114) arrived at the following conclusion: "To open the way to efficient agricultural development of the Bantu areas, approximately half of the present population will have to be removed eventually from the agricultural land, and will have to find a living outside of agriculture in primary, secondary and tertiary spheres of economic activity." Such a suggestion is in line with Friedman's strategy of "deliberate urbanisation", referred to in Chapter 1, and would have contributed to a higher level of urbanisation in the Black areas.

A fifth factor promoting urbanisation is the drive to create job opportunities via the decentralisation of industries. The Central Government encouraged industrial development just outside the national states since 1960 (Smit, 1977, p. 25). These industries, which were established with the aid of concessions, needed a capital investment of R299,9 million and employed 21 693 Blacks (Benso, 1980, p. 80). In retrospect, this approach was not very successful. By March 1978 only 127 industries have been established at declared growth points and in certain industrial areas in the national states. The new dispensation to promote industrial development, which came into effect on 1 April 1982, offers incentives at a higher level, while the nature of the incentives has been changed. The emphasis has shifted from various forms of *tax* advantages and rebates to concessions offering more *cash* advantages and incentives, such as for wages, training, housing and relocation allowances.

The last factor promoting urbanisation in the national states is the so-called process of "stepwise migration", where migrants use such a township as a "stopover" before migrating to urban areas further away.

Two factors stimulate this process. In the first place there is a tremendous overcrowding of people in the already poverty-stricken rural areas which leaves a section of these people with no option than to leave their area in order for them and their families to survive. Secondly, because of Government laws and regulations, and a shortage of houses and definite employment opportunities in and around metropolitan areas, many of these people and their families are prevented from settling in these urban areas. Assuming that these two factors do not change, and that the rural areas will not escape the population explosion (as will be indicated in Chapter 4), one can expect that these people will have no legal alternative but to go to towns inside or near the national states. Whether such a process is of a temporary or permanent nature, is difficult to determine.

In conclusion it can be said that economic factors, notably the urge to find a job which will have a compensation in cash or kind in order to survive, are primarily responsible for urbanisation in the national states, supported by sociological factors and individual preferences. Government-induced actions may either promote this process or prevent it. An example of such actions may be found in a few recommendations made in 1935, some provisions of which were included in an act at a later stage, namely the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 (it was only after a further 25 years that recommendations were made to scrap these provisions again). The 1935 recommendations were framed in the Report of the Native Laws Commission, reading as follows:

- "(i) To enforce the principle of limiting the number of Natives in urban areas to the labour requirements of such urban areas;
- (ii) to provide for controlling the entry of Natives into urban areas, and;
- (iii) to provide for the withdrawal of superfluous Natives from urban areas."

Despite these measures, Blacks streamed towards "White" urban areas. One of the results was a serious shortfall in housing facilities. Shanty towns, housing thousands of squatters, sprang up around the great industrial centres - Alexandra in Johannesburg, Cato Manor in

Durban and Wintermere in Cape Town. This is no unique phenomenon, as shanty towns and squatter settlements mushroomed in cities such as Manila, Caracas, Kinshasa, Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, Seoul and Calcutta. One quarter of Seoul's population of 5,5 million people live in squatter settlements and slums, compared to almost two-thirds of Calcutta's 8,0 million people (Ward, 1976, p. 193).

These are, in short, the most important factors promoting urbanisation in the national states. The next chapter will focus more specifically on the extent of urbanisation in one of these national states, namely Lebowa.

## CHAPTER 3

 RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AS A MAJOR REASON FOR URBANISATION,  
 INTERNATIONALLY AND IN SOUTH AFRICA

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 the extent of *population growth* as a decisive factor in the urbanisation process in the world and in Africa has been highlighted. There can be no doubt about the importance and powerful forces being created by this phenomenon today. There is, however, a second major factor which contributes to the expansion of urban societies, namely *migration*, which will receive thorough attention in this chapter. Many forms of migration exist, but in this chapter only *rural-urban* migration will be discussed.

Using the time-period approach to classify migrants, we can identify four kinds of rural-urban migration. Such an identification can be presented in the following manner:

	With family	Without family
Temporary migration	1	2
Permanent migration	3	4

Temporary migration is usually of a short-term nature and includes seasonal migrants and migrants who have not yet finally decided. Sometimes persons move to a different locality for several years without intending to stay in the destination area on a permanent basis (or in fact doing so). This would still be regarded as temporary migration. Permanent migrants, on the other hand, never return to their area of origin. Such persons find new roots in new areas of destination. Temporary migration often paves the way for permanent migration in succeeding years (White and Woods, 1980, p. 18). Consequently, the distinction between temporary and permanent migration is not always obvious.

Four different kinds of migration can now be identified, referring to the presentation above. In the first place a temporary migrant can migrate with his family to a destination area, which probably happens very seldom. Secondly, temporary migration can occur without families joining the migrant. Thirdly, permanent migration can take place with families, which in most cases has a stabilizing effect in the area of destination, or fourthly, it can occur without families, which probably happens mostly with single migrants, such as males employed in mines.

The various types of migrants, based on this description of various kinds of rural-urban migration, will be discussed in section 3.2.3 of this chapter. The existence of temporary and permanent migration in various countries will be indicated.

Despite the fact that, generally speaking, rural-urban migration is regarded as a declining contributor to urban population growth in less developed countries (see Table 2.5), this phenomenon is still highly significant in many less developed countries and should under no circumstances be treated lightly.

In the international literature on urbanisation, experts from various countries have already written many books on the question of why people move to urban areas. This is a phenomenon occurring, with no exception, in every country in the world. The only difference is the extent to, and pattern in which, this process takes place.

This section will, therefore, look at the reasons or causes of this type of migration, firstly in an *international context* and then within a *Southern African* framework.

## 3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

### 3.2.1 General background

It is desirable to begin this section with one of the best known and most referred to models of migration, namely the *Harris-Todaro model* of migration. This model has been discussed in great length in the literature on migration.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration states basically that the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas is functionally related to two principal variables, namely (Todaro, 1969, p. 139):

- (i) the urban-rural income differential; and
- (ii) the probability of obtaining an urban job.

According to the Harris-Todaro model of migration, the decision of the individual migrant to migrate is largely determined by the individual's "expectation" of earning a higher income in the area of destination (the urban area). This "expected" urban real income varies directly with the probability of obtaining a job in the urban area. The probability of obtaining a job in the urban area depends furthermore on the number of unemployed and underemployed workers in the urban area. According to Berg (1970), the differential between average unskilled earnings in urban areas and average income in rural areas is sometimes between 300 and 400 per cent in favour of urban areas.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration distinguishes between "expected" urban income and actual rural income, being the basic factors that will influence the decision-making of an individual migrant. The expected income is described as actual income earned multiplied by the probability of obtaining an urban job.

It is clear that as long as the expected urban income exceeds the actual rural income that the individual receives, such a worker is likely to leave the rural area and to migrate to the urban area, even if he is not sure whether he will obtain a job in the urban area. Such a situation will have serious consequences both for the rural and the urban areas. The greater these *imbalances* between expected and actual incomes, the greater the pressures will become on *urban areas*, especially when the influx of new workseekers exceeds the rate at which new jobs can be created (Todaro, 1973, p. 38). If this income differential gives rise to an excessive stream of migrants from rural to urban areas (this is one of the basic assumptions of the Harris-Todaro model of migration), it will also have severe consequences for the *rural areas*, in the sense that labour will leave the area, thereby impeding economic development. According to Todaro, this can be overcome by "holding the

line on the growth in the urban sector while focusing on rapidly raising the incomes in the rural sector" (Todaro, 1976, p. 222).

In a study for the World Bank in 1979 Mazumdar developed a revised hypothesis of the Harris-Todaro model. This revised hypothesis provides an explanation of wage differentials, based on the fact that labour moving to urban areas is not of a homogeneous quality. Family migrants, Mazumdar argues, will have for instance, a different supply price than individual migrants. Mazumdar states that the elevated wage is more likely to be determined by the higher supply price of more permanent migrants (like family migrants). This *higher supply price* is usually linked to *higher productivity* and greater stability. The result is that the high-wage formal sector is often filled by family migrants, while individual migrants are usually found in the low-wage informal sector.

The Harris-Todaro model of migration, therefore, provides an explanation of the *basic reason* for *individual migration*, namely the existence of a wage differential between urban and rural areas. This wage differential, together with the probability of finding a job, will determine whether a person will migrate or not.

It is necessary, however, to look in greater detail at the factors playing a role in the decision-making process of individual migrants, to serve as a background for the reasons for migration in South Africa.

### 3.2.2 The decision to migrate

What factors play a role in a migrant's decision to migrate? According to Lee (1965) and Hoover (1971), migrants are influenced by the following factors:

- (i) Factors associated with the area of origin.
- (ii) Factors associated with the area of destination.
- (iii) Intervening obstacles.
- (iv) Personal factors.

It should be clear that the decision to migrate, including the reasons for this decision, is very seldom homogeneous or consistent; "... (it) is never completely rational, and for some persons the rational component is much less than the irrational" (Lee, 1965). It is, therefore,

necessary to take a closer look at the different factors in each of the four categories mentioned above, to determine in what way they influence the decision to migrate.

### 3.2.2.1 *Factors present in the area of origin*

In his famous work on the Negro in the United States of America, titled "An American Dilemma", Gunnar Myrdal states rightly that the *Great Migration*, which started in 1915, had a tremendous impact on especially the *Negro population*, particularly in the sense that it affected the geographical distribution of Negroes. In a short period of only three decades, from 1910 to 1940, more than 1,7 million Negroes migrated from the rural South to the urban North, to such an extent that in 1940 almost 90 per cent of all Negroes in the Northern and Western states lived in urban areas (Myrdal, 1944, p. 183).

There are *several reasons* why the Negroes in the south of America moved away from these Southern areas. It seems rather strange that the Negro migrated to areas with a generally cold climate, close to the Great Lakes and bordering Canada. The Southern states of America, on the other hand, where the Negroes have settled traditionally, is characterised by a generally warm climate. Why then did the Negroes move to such a cold climate, after being naturally inclined to live in warm areas, like the Southern states and in earlier times Africa?

Myrdal identifies several factors associated with the *area of origin* which influenced many Negroes to move away from the south or out of the area of origin (Myrdal, 1944, p. 191):

- (i) *schools* for Negroes were not so rapidly improved as for Whites and not as swift as in the north;
- (ii) the slow trend towards *Negro landownership* was broken just after the turn of the century;
- (iii) the *natural increase* of the population in the south impeded the expansion of employment opportunities;
- (iv) Negroes were not allowed to share much in the *opportunities* that developed in order to improve their economic position;

- (v) Whites began to monopolise the new *cotton growing* in the south west;
- (vi) during the depression the Whites began to *compete* with Negroes in traditional Negro jobs; and
- (vii) *Southern agriculture* became worse, mainly due to droughts, world agricultural trends, the Federal agricultural policy, and the depression during the thirties. *Unemployment* in the agricultural sector was unavoidable.

These factors served as "*push*" factors that influenced and even forced many Negroes in the Southern areas to move to the Northern areas.

Only one of the abovementioned factors listed by Myrdal, namely natural increase, was within the control of the Negroes in the south. They had very little say in any of the other listed factors that pushed them away from the south. In a sense they became *victims of circumstances* in their own area.

Some of the *basic factors* listed by Myrdal in this regard that have influenced people to leave their area of origin have also been identified by other experts in the world. Jones (1975, p. 21) states, for instance, that "... it is the weaknesses and stresses in the economic and social environment of rural areas..." which play a significant part in the decision-making process of migrants to move *away* from the area of origin. In these views the *economic (and social) characteristics* of the rural area play a determining role in the decision-making process of migrants, building up pressures on the inhabitants.

One of the major economic factors influencing people to migrate, as indicated by the Harris-Todaro model, is the existence of *income differentials*. In a study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1960, it was concluded that "... the main push factor causing workers to leave agriculture is the lower level of incomes" (ILO, 1960, p. 209). According to this report, lower levels of income is a universal reason for migration. Studies undertaken in Sudan, Khartoum and Brazil have all found that wage differentials is a strong impetus to geographic movement of people (Sinclair, 1978, p. 38).

Economic factors influencing people to migrate also include *lack of job opportunities* in rural areas and *severe conditions of poverty*. These situations occur mostly in the absence of comprehensive development programmes. Sometimes the lack of economic opportunities is so severe that people are *forced* to migrate in order to survive.

Other writers, like Hoover, place a different emphasis on the reasons for migration from rural areas. He is of the opinion that migration from an area of origin is primarily determined by the *demographic characteristics* of the population in the area, rather than by economic characteristics of the area (Hoover, 1971, p. 178). There are, for instance, areas that lose their well-educated young people regardless of local economic opportunities. In such cases local economic opportunities may not be significant enough to keep people from leaving the area of origin, e.g. in Ghana, where the level of education seems to be an important factor in inter-regional migration (Beals, 1967, p. 480/6). The availability (or non-availability) of information on better opportunities in other areas will definitely play a role in the decision-making process of well-educated young adults in rural areas, as well as the "better-off" families.

The decision to leave the area of origin, for whatever reason, is seldom taken instantly. People in rural areas have, in most cases, a *long acquaintance* with their area, with the result that normally such a person has sufficient time to decide whether to leave the area (Lee, 1965, p. 50). In cases where people do decide to migrate, steady *contacts* are usually maintained with the kin and tribal group or home community. Because of this often long acquaintance, this home community is often held together by a network of reciprocal obligations (Gutkind, 1965 and Heisler, 1974).

It seems most likely, in conclusion, that the decision to leave the area of origin can generally be linked to *economic reasons*, that is prevailing economic circumstances in the rural area. This serves as a very strong "push" factor. The social environment and demographic features are in support of the influencing process. Not less than five of the seven factors listed by Myrdal that "pushed" Negroes from the south, have an economic base.

### 3.2.2.2 *Factors present in the area of destination*

What attracts people to an area different from their own area? Why are they willing to risk what they have for something they do not know they will get in return? Knowledge of the area of destination is seldom exact, with the result that there is always an element of ignorance or even mystery about such an area (Lee, 1965, p. 50).

In his study on the Negro problem in the United States of America, Myrdal (1944, p. 191) lists the following reasons why Negroes moved *towards* the North during the "Great Migration", which started in 1915:

- (i) more *economic opportunities* (in relief if not in employment);
- (ii) more *security* as a citizen;
- (iii) greater *freedom* as a human being;
- (iv) it became fashionable for many middle-class Whites to employ Negroes as servants, who did not object to *hard work* and *low wages*;
- (v) *Whites* went on *strike* in big Northern industries, creating a demand factor;
- (vi) there was a *desire* among the better-off Negroes to improve themselves (economically and otherwise); and
- (vii) Negroes got a chance to enter *Northern industries* because of the stopping of immigration during World War I.

The most important factor that encouraged Southern Negroes to move northwards was perhaps a *desire* for *economic* (and social) *improvement*, despite the fact that a high unemployment rate developed among especially the Non-White male population in the Northern states (it amounted to 39 per cent in 1937). Mostly due to the presence of "favourable economic factors" in the area of destination (in this case the Northern states) many Negroes left their area of origin. This move was encouraged by the establishment of contacts in the Northern states. The fact is that Negroes in the South became aware of the differentials that existed between their area and the area of destination. Owing to the "seemingly" better economic opportunities in the North, and the corresponding lack of similar (or better) economic

opportunities in the South, they were encouraged to move to the North.

There is no doubt that towns in the area of destination serve as a strong "pull" factor, these towns being "centres of opportunity", acting as positive attractions with a magnetism. In many less developed countries, the attraction of towns and cities lies in the industrialised component, where industrial growth is "believed" to supply a "better way of life" and better living conditions.

In various international studies on migration and urbanisation it is obvious that *economic incentives*, whether in a negative sense in the area of origin or in a positive sense in the area of destination, play a vital role in the decision-making process of individuals. Econometric work confirms that people move for *economic gain* from poorer areas to wealthier areas (Yap, 1977, p. 244). The positive economic incentives include *higher average annual earnings* as well as *employment opportunities* in the areas of destination. Migration between South American countries is, for example, motivated chiefly by the desire for better employment (Breton, 1976, p. 345). In a study done in the Sudan, it was found that 89 per cent of those who had been employed before they moved to Greater Khartoum went in search of employment, which indicates that they either did not have adequate work in their previous place of residence or that their incomes were lower than those they "expected" to earn in Greater Khartoum (Oberai, 1977). In the United States of America it was found that in *intercounty* moves (people moving to a different county), employment changes emerged as the major reason for migrating (Hoover, 1975, p. 176). This general need for better employment opportunities in areas of destination forms part of an often broader spectrum of better economic opportunities existing in these areas.

A fair assumption to make, it seems, is that people move from one area to another mainly in response to economic incentives. These economic incentives can include attractive real (or expected) job opportunities, better income prospects, and better education opportunities. In a study in Greater Khartoum it was found that nearly half of those who were already attending school moved in search of more or better education (Oberai, 1977). Various studies show that the probability of migration increases with education (Yap, 1977, p. 248), with the result

that the more education people attain in the area of origin, the higher the rate of out-migration to other areas. Unless action is taken to keep well-educated people from leaving the rural area, these people will depart for an area where they can obtain better education opportunities. In Ghana, for example, three-fifths of those with a complete primary education left their homes (Caldwell, 1969, p. 61). This indicates that people are either looking for "expected" job opportunities which they can enter with their gained education, or that there are no job opportunities available in their home areas where they can successfully implement their skills or knowledge.

There are, however, areas or countries where the educational or skill levels do not play such a significant role, especially where the literacy level is low. In Ghana's rural areas it was found that two-thirds of the illiterates stayed in their villages and never moved to other areas (Caldwell, 1969, p. 61). In South Africa one finds that in 1970, 65 per cent of all economically active Black males in rural areas had no education, while 29 per cent had an education level of less than Std 6 (Lombard, et al., 1980). It will, however, be wrong to assume that this large illiterate group will *not* leave their homes. They may not leave their homes in search of better education opportunities, but very well for other reasons, like better living conditions, better shopping facilities, social attractions in the area of destination, and climatic conditions. Climatic conditions often influence the seasonal demand for labour, where people work for a season in a specific area.

The reason why people leave their villages or homes to go to an area away from their own area, can either be found in the area of origin or in the area of destination, as had been discussed in the previous paragraphs. Economic incentives, present at both ends of the scale, carry a heavier weight than other factors in the decision-making process. The fact that people move to an area of destination, like an urban area, in search of economic gain, is confirmed by econometric work (Yap, 1977, p. 244). The individual's decision-making process is also influenced by intervening obstacles and personal factors. Attention will briefly be given to these aspects.

### 3.2.2.3 *Intervening obstacles*

Intervening obstacles can either take the form of difficulties in the journey between two areas or measures or controls preventing or prohibiting people from moving freely into an area of destination. Different people are of course differently affected by the same obstacle or set of obstacles. What may be prohibitive to some people, may be trivial to others, like the cost of migration (Lee, 1965, p. 51).

Regarding the *difficulties* in the *journey* between two areas, geographical distance is perhaps the most significant factor, especially in the case of the journey of the migrant (Hoover, 1975, p. 178). With few exceptions, geographic distance has a strong deterrent effect. The longer the distance, the less the chances of frequent visits to the area of origin, as long distances may increase the cost of transport. According to Yap, however, these costs are usually small, typically a fracture of the added income required to induce a migrant to move long distances (Yap, 1977, p. 249).

The second type of intervening obstacle usually prohibiting people from moving to a specific area, is the existence of *control measures*. Such control measures can either be in the form of a physical barrier (like the Berlin Wall which divides East Germany from West Germany) or in the form of legislative measures hampering the free movement of people. Intervening obstacles can also take the form of the deliberate resettlement of people in the area of origin.

One of the major measures in China, particularly since the mid-1950's, has been to develop a system of labour control in order to help alleviate, among other things, the problem of urban unemployment (Wilson, 1972, p. 124). One of the methods used in this regard by the Chinese was the *hsia fang* movements. These movements of people were actually campaigns to reduce the size of the urban population by encouraging unemployed workers and non-productive persons, usually on a voluntary basis, but sometimes using compulsory measures to return to the rural areas. This programme, however, achieved mixed results. Many of the people who were successfully convinced (or forced) to return to their rural areas, returned to the urban areas during the next "boom" period.

Sometimes it is not easy to enforce such control measures. In Latin America the peripheral squatter settlements are often founded by "invasion" (created by the careful planning of migrants already established in the city), about which the local authorities can do very little (Lloyd, 1979, p. 26). In South Africa it has been suggested that influx control of Blacks should be linked only to the availability of work and approved housing (Riekert Report, 1978, para. 4.281(b)). These measures are mainly aimed at trying to maintain social and economic stability in the community. It is a different question whether such measures are enforced or whether the people affected by such measures or controls abide by them.

#### *3.2.2.4 Personal factors*

There is no doubt that personal factors do play a role in deciding whether to move or migrate to an urban area. This input is, however, not easily determined, because of the fact that personalities differ. Some people make a decision to leave an area only after careful consideration of all relevant facts at their disposal, while others may move in response to personal visions or hopes of a better way of life.

Personal factors in the decision-making process cannot be seen in isolation, because personal tastes or preferences are either linked to the known situation in the area of origin or the known (or envisaged) situation in the area of destination. Lee (1965, p. 51) states in this regard: "Personal sensitivities, intelligence and awareness of conditions elsewhere enter into the evaluation of the situation at origin, and knowledge of the situation at destination depends upon personal contacts or upon sources of information which are not universally available."

Other personal factors entering into the decision-making process are marital status, parenthood, family relationships and cultural ties. Married males should consider whether they want, or are allowed to, take their spouses and/or children with them to an urban area. Social and psychological factors combined with different personalities can also influence people to move away from an area. Schapera (1947,

p. 115) has meticulously described these factors, among them a desire for adventure and change, and the escape from communal and domestic problems.

Sex and age can also play a role in an individual's decision to leave an area. In South Asia and Africa there is a tendency for *males* to leave for an area away from their homes in the rural areas. As far as age is concerned, people tend to leave their area in the "young adult" age group ranging from under 20 years of age, to the 20-30 years age group in some countries. Personalities as well as cultural background and tradition enter into decision-making processes of individuals as far as sex and age are concerned.

Following a discussion of the factors playing a role in a person's decision to migrate in this section, the possible advantages and costs to a migrant in the decision-making process are summarised in Table 3.1.


A person in an *area of origin* considering the possibility of migration will probably find that the costs of migration include moving costs (like transport costs, selling some belongings), the risk of leaving the area of origin and being unsuccessful, and the investment in time in arranging the departure. Bad climatic conditions and disasters like droughts in the area of origin may also induce the potential migrant to decide finally to leave. Many of these costs can, however, be minimised or even eliminated.

The advantages, on the other hand, include the fact that members of his family stay behind and that remittances will be sent to them if he/she finds employment in the area of destination. People who consider migration often do it in order to find money to buy food, i.e. to survive.

As already indicated, many people migrate to other *areas*, for economic reasons, which are largely based on expectations for better economic opportunities like employment, higher remunerations (in cash or kind) and better educational opportunities. The second advantage of migration in the area of destination is the belief (true or false) of better living conditions and a better environment to live in, compared to the area of origin. Improvements are envisaged regarding housing, schools, shops, services and health facilities.

Table 3.1 - The decision to migrate

	Advantages of migration	Less costs of migration	Net advantages
Area of origin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• family stays behind</li> <li>• remittances sent to families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• moving costs (including transport costs)</li> <li>• risk</li> <li>• investment of time</li> <li>• climate</li> <li>• disasters (droughts, floods, epidemics)</li> </ul>	Net advantage is to leave area of origin because the cost to migrate is relatively low while the advantages remain whether the migratory move is permanent or temporary
Area of destination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• better expected economical opportunities;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- educational</li> <li>- employment</li> <li>- remuneration</li> </ul> </li> <li>• preferable environment and living conditions (housing, schools, shops, services)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• social distance</li> <li>• geographical distance;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- visits to families</li> <li>- transport costs</li> <li>- remittances</li> </ul> </li> <li>• control measures;               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- physical restrictions</li> <li>- legislative restrictions</li> <li>- resettlement</li> </ul> </li> <li>• living costs</li> </ul>	The expected net advantages are greater than the cost, because the social cost may be decreased, the geographical distance may be short, and control measures may be steered clear of
Social factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• more security</li> <li>• dependence (move to relatives/friends)</li> <li>• greater freedom (new/different activities, environment, people)</li> <li>• initiation process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• alienation from community (break ties with area of origin if permanently migrated)</li> <li>• enter uncertainty (new life)</li> </ul>	Advantages may exceed or equal the costs, or <i>vice versa</i> , depending on personal factors and prevailing conditions



The costs of migration in the area of destination basically relate to the social distance, i.e. the difficulty in making adequate social adjustment after the migrant arrives (Hoover, 1975, p. 179), as well as the geographic distance (which may be a long physical distance), where visits to the area of origin, transport costs and the dispatch of remittances to the family mean expenditure for the migrant. Other costs include control measures, usually imposed by the State. Such measures include physical barriers (like the Berlin Wall), legislative and regulative restrictions (like influx control) and resettlement of people. Living expenses may also enter as a cost for the migrant, especially if these costs are higher than in the area of origin. The advantages expected will most certainly exceed the costs of migration in this case, as control measures may be evaded, geographic distance cost be minimised and social distance decreased, depending on the characteristics of the migrant.

Experience has shown that *social factors* may also play an important role in the decision-making process of migrants. Advantages include (expected) security, greater freedom, dependence (stay with relatives/friends) and prestige (through the initiation process). The social cost factors include alienation from the community, and the element of uncertainty of a "new life", which can be offset by the dependence of relatives and friends. Circumstances and prevailing conditions determine whether the advantages of migration exceed the costs, or vice versa, so that it is difficult to determine the net advantages arising from social factors influencing the decision-making process.

The decision to migrate (or not), as well as the weighing of the advantages and costs of migration, is finally influenced by his/her personality and *personal factors*, listed in Table 3.1. These factors include marital status, cultural beliefs, sensitiveness and desire for adventure and change.

The decision to migrate becomes a reality once the potential rational migrant evaluates the net advantages, as determined in Table 3.1, within the framework of his personal characteristics.

From what has been discussed, it should be clear that there are numerous factors contributing to the process of urbanisation of individuals. Many of these factors have a strong economic base, while others have a non-economic base. Jones (1975, p. 27) is also of the opinion that the different factors promoting urbanisation in the world today "... are multifarious, as well as being simultaneous in their operation and effects". People from various countries react differently to these factors, whether it is in the area of origin or in the area of destination, mainly because of various intervening obstacles and different personalities. For this reason it will be unwise to try to identify a single reason why people move to an urban area, especially as situations and circumstances differ from country to country.

### 3.2.3 Types of migrants

Several types of rural-urban migrants can be identified. One of the most distinctive classifications has been made by Nelson (1976, p. 722), identifying the following types of migrants:

- (i) *seasonal migrants* seeking temporary employment to augment their meagre agricultural incomes;
- (ii) *target migrants* seeking employment for a limited period of time in order to accomplish a specific purpose and then return home;
- (iii) *migrants* spending most of their lives *moving* between countryside and town, each successive stay being longer and linked to changing pressures and opportunities of the individual migrant's life cycle;
- (iv) *migrants* spending their productive lives in *town* but planning eventually to *retire* to their *rural homes*;
- (v) *permanent migrants* who are committed to stay for the rest of their lives in *town*; and
- (vi) *migrants* who are *undecided* as to how long they will stay in town and whether they will eventually return to their area of origin.

The most important input distinguishing the type of migrant is surely the *intention* of the individual migrant; that is, whether such a migrant regards his or her stay in the area of destination as temporary or more or less permanent. Very often the intentions of migrants are closely linked to their *behaviour*. In a study in Bombay City, Mazumdar (1979) distinguishes between *individual migrants*, who live in urban areas without their families, and *family migrants*, who bring a family up in the urban area. In Bombay City the family migrants, because of their intention to stay permanently, in most cases are inclined to be more stable, with the result that they are more productive than their counterparts, coupled with a higher demand price. Their intention to stay permanently has, in other words, an effect on their behaviour.

Nelson (1976, p. 724) explains this correlation between intention and behaviour in the following manner:

"... if cityward migration is gradually becoming more permanent in a particular city or country, current intentions may be both a more accurate guide to current behaviour in the city and a better predictor of eventual settlement patterns than retention and return-flow data based on past migration patterns". This means that *intentions* of migrants, which also help to classify the type of migrant, can shed more light on the *behaviour* of migrants as well as on possible settlement patterns. In the case of Bombay City the trend is towards more permanent migration.

Permanent migration occurs in countries such as Thailand, Taiwan, Korea and Latin America. In six different cities in Brazil, only 6 per cent of the *migrants* from rural areas or small interior townships intended to return to their place of origin (Hutchinson, 1976, p. 122). Various experts are of the opinion that there is a general, long-term trend towards more permanent migration and that temporary migration is becoming less significant (see Nelson, 1976, p. 733; and Hanna and Hanna, 1971, p. 30). This trend can be attributed to factors such as higher wages, job opportunities and "better" living conditions in the area of destination.

Such permanent migration to other areas can, on the other hand, bring forward a more stable and productive migrant, especially if he is

allowed to take his family along or if he has the opportunity to visit his family on a regular basis in the area of origin (geographically not far removed). On the other hand, problems such as slums can be created if families are allowed to move freely to an area of destination. These slums are usually created by migrants moving illegally from a rural area to an urban area (adjacent to a city or town).

There are, on the other hand, countries where migration is still mainly temporary. From various studies it can be seen that the level of education (or lack of education) plays a significant role in this regard (see paragraph 3.2.2). The difference may lie in the motivation of such migrants. Educated people may know that if they move to an urban area, they will probably spend the rest of their working lives in such an urban area, whereas illiterate people may "take a chance" in the hope that they will find some luck. If unsuccessful, they can always return home.

Caldwell (1969, p. 186) found that 92 per cent of the people who have become urbanised in some of Ghana's towns either intended to return eventually to their rural areas or were uncertain about their future plans. This shows a strong tendency towards temporary migration or circular migration (where people circulate between two areas). As indicated in section 3.1 of this chapter, seasonal workers can also be classified as temporary migrants, where they work for a few months in an area away from their area of origin. There are various forms of temporary migration, extending over various short-term periods, always with the intention to return home at some time.

### 3.3 MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### 3.3.1 General background

Various studies on rural-urban migration as a determinant of urbanisation in South Africa have been undertaken, e.g. by Leistner (1963), Wilson (1972) and Houghton (1973). As pointed out, the reasons for migration differ greatly. It is, however, possible that the *most important* reasons for migration in a specific country can be identified, given the prevailing circumstances. In this process, realities (and expectations) in both the area of origin and the area of destination must be considered as well as intervening obstacles and

personal preferences, as stated in the previous section.

In South Africa, all six different types of migrants identified in this Chapter are present - some types to a larger extent than others. The most "typical" type of migrant in South Africa is probably the migrant moving between his or her rural home and work-place (see (iii) above). In the South African literature, reference is usually made to "*oscillating*" migrants, which refers to a person whose home is so far away from his work-place that he cannot commute on a daily basis and can only visit his family periodically (Wilson, 1972, p. 1). Current influx control legislation in South Africa impedes to some extent the mobility especially of Blacks and their families. It has been suggested that the movement of Blacks to urban areas should be linked only to the availability of housing and job opportunities in the area of destination. These and other impediments on migrants may very well influence people to move to areas closer to their home areas, where they can still strive to meet their desired needs and expectations. An example of such a situation may be that of people migrating from rural areas in Lebowa to townships such as Seshego, Mahwelereng, Namakgale and Lebowakgomo.

As stated, in the South African literature migration is often described as oscillating migration (Wilson, 1972) or circular or shuttle migration (Lipton in Optima, 1980). Such migrants are mostly forced by circumstances to migrate, spending most of their active working lives commuting between their work-places and homes, very often without their families. The mining industry serves as the single largest employer of migrants in South Africa today. In 1978, the mining industry offered employment opportunities to 664 571 workers, most of whom have had very little or no formal education. (Blacks comprised 588 201 or more than 88 per cent of this total.) It is estimated that the mining industry accounts for 35 - 40 per cent of all migrants (Lipton, 1980), the majority of which can be classified as oscillating migrants, which means they have contracts with their employers to work in the mines for a specific period before returning to their homes for some time.

In a sense the migration patterns in South Africa are structurally determined, with the result that it is highly unlikely that the present system of oscillating migration will change drastically in the near future, despite the fact that there is a tendency towards more permanent urbanisation of Blacks in South Africa. It was established as early as 1950 that nearly half of the Blacks employed in the manufacturing industry were permanently urbanised (Union of South Africa, 1951). Despite the lack of recent statistical data, it can be accepted that a still larger number of urban Blacks are at present *permanently urbanised*, especially in the four large metropolitan areas.

The next section will concentrate on a specific question as far as migration in South Africa is concerned, namely why Blacks move or migrate in South Africa, while the chapter will conclude with the crucial question of what factors promote urbanisation in the national states.

### 3.3.2 Reasons for migration of Blacks in South Africa

Black migrants in South Africa have been referred to as "men of two worlds", indicating the tribal world in which they are brought up and usually also retire; and the modern industrial world, in which they spend most of their working lives for longer or shorter periods (Houghton, 1960, p. 179). Mayer prefers to see these people as "men of three worlds", indicating the country home, the White town where they find employment and the adjoining Black town where they live (Mayer, 1962, p. 1). This description of people from different worlds touches the *roots* of this phenomenon in South Africa (and a few other parts of the world), namely the non-permanence of migration, which is already in existence for more than a hundred years. The bridge which has been built to "replace" people from the area of origin to the area of destination has indeed become two-way-traffic lanes, with people moving in *both* directions, at short and long intervals.

Some very important and valuable studies have already been undertaken in South Africa, taking a closer look at why people (especially Blacks) move for shorter or longer periods *to an area of destination*. This section will give attention to a few of the most important studies in this regard.

In section 3.2.2 it has been pointed out that *economic factors* play a predominantly important role in the decision-making process of migrants, with non-economic factors in a supportive role in this process. On the migration process in South Africa, Mitchell (1958, p. 23) writes "... that the key factor is the economic one: all other causes of migration can be removed, save the economic one, and there would still be migration". Further north in Africa, in the former Tanganyika, Gulliver came to a *similar conclusion* when he studied the migration process there: "The incentives for labor migrants are primarily and pre-eminently a desire for cash and material wealth which are not available away at work" (Gulliver, 1960, p. 161). It is these economic necessities, or lack thereof in the rural areas, that cause Blacks to seek that which they desire in other areas. All other factors are secondary. In this regard Gulliver (*loc.cit.*) concludes: "The reasons why so many thousands of Africans ... go away to work are *not* explicable in terms of man seeking travel and adventure, new experience, the wonders of the White man's world, wanderlust, the evasion of filial duties or political obligations, or others of the employers' and White man's stereotyped myth. Some of these sorts of factors may be involved marginally for particular individuals..."

In a study by Leistner on the economic aspects of Black migrant labour, he confirms that economic factors do in fact play a dominant role in the decision-making process of migrants. In almost 72 per cent of all the responses in this study, it was found that economic motives played a crucial role in the motivation for going to work (Leistner, 1963, p. 116). All other motives figured rather insignificantly in this study.

The roots of the decision to leave an area, mainly because of economic factors involved, are to be found in most cases in the *rural area*, where lack of opportunities, poverty and population pressure are important determinants. In this regard Leistner concludes that "... growing population pressure on rural resources is the principal cause for labour leaving the land - non-economic factors generally play only a subsidiary role" (Leistner, 1963, p. 199). Population pressures in rural areas often give rise to conditions of unemployment or underemployment, in which people simply *have to leave* the areas in search of better opportunities.

In many cases the land tenure system is responsible for pushing people away from an area, for example where divisions of land among sons imply that each has "too little" to survive, with the result that they leave their rural area.

The economic pressure on people in rural areas in the form of poverty and overpopulation (Union of South Africa, 1946, para 59-1, and Lourens, 1979, p. 53), often switches to a wish or for that matter a desire to earn money, in order to satisfy their many desires. Many experts point out that "to earn money" summarises the reasons why people move to urban areas (Dubb, 1937, p. 444, and Williams, 1971, p. 149).

Traditionally, African economies have been subsistence economies with little, if any, specialisation and production for the less prosperous days to come. For this historical reason, many Blacks in Africa have come to towns "... to supplement a failing subsistence economy in the rural areas", which is normally used for one or more of the following purposes (Dubb, 1937, p. 445):

- (i) to supplement the shortage of *food* in the tribal or subsistence economy;
- (ii) to purchase cattle for lobola (*bride's price*);
- (iii) to buy tools and implements for *agricultural purposes* and to buy consumer products;
- (iv) to pay for *taxes* imposed by administrations on the indigenous population;
- (v) to give *financial support* to members of the *family* in the rural areas;
- (vi) to enable children in the rural areas to attend *school* and
- (vii) to satisfy the demand for *European artefacts* and foodstuffs.

If it is to be accepted that the motivation "to earn money" does in fact play a significant role in the decision to migrate, one is tempted to ask in what way it will influence Blacks to migrate to urban areas inside the national states instead of migrating to the large metropoli-

tan areas. On the question whether Blacks would be prepared to work in or near Black areas for the same (or higher) pay as at present, or for a better pay only, it was found that 183 out of 299 respondents (or 61,2 per cent) were prepared to work in or near Black areas if they could obtain economic advantages (Leistner, 1963, p. 183). Of this total, 103 respondents (or 56,3 per cent) said they would have been prepared to work for the same (or higher) pay as at present. Other criteria, such as the preference for rural life, being nearer to home and/or family featured rather insignificantly. From this situation it must be clear that Blacks are willing to work in or near a Black area, given there are *economic advantages*. Assuming that these attitudes of being employed inside the national states at either the same wage or a higher wage have not changed, it must, however, be borne in mind that the position as far as economic advantages inside the national states are concerned, has not improved or developed drastically since the sixties. It seems that the national states are not capable of providing the necessary opportunities for their inhabitants: "... those that enter the labour force in the Black states cannot be completely provided with job opportunities...", with the result that they become "... candidates for migration out of these areas - legally or illegally" (Van Eeden, 1980, p. 419). From this situation it can be concluded that the national states have apparently been incapable of creating the necessary job opportunities to, among other things, initiate a healthy process of urbanisation. Expenditure on the different programmes that have been identified for the development in the national states, confirms this state of affairs. In 1980/81, for instance, various authorities voted only 18,3 per cent to be spent on the creation of job opportunities and the generation of income in the various national states (Benso, 1980, p. 111).

The fact that non-economic factors do not feature significantly among the main reasons for migration does not imply that these factors can be ignored. Many migrants move for personal reasons (like curiosity) or to experience the glitter of city life, or because of social prestige (Dubb, 1937; Williams, 1971; Möller and Schlemmer, 1979; Smedley, 1979; and Schapera, 1941). It has been said that in different ways migration has become a tradition or a custom among many Black people in South Africa (Union of South Africa, 1946, para 5-1). Probably

the best account of the forces operating in the different worlds of these people is found in books like Allan Paton's "Cry, the beloved Country", and Elsa Joubert's "Die Swerfjare van Poppie Nongena", where a glimpse is taken into the lives of Black people moving from one world to the other and the day-to-day problems they experience. Only a consciousness of such deep-rooted experiences can really shed light on this whole phenomenon as experienced by the people actually involved.

It should be clear that migration in South Africa, as only one part of the urbanisation process, is a deeply rooted and complicated phenomenon, originating *en masse* from individual decisions. These decisions are primarily based on *economic motives*, of which the most important is to exchange (in some cases) their only production factor, *labour*, for a compensation, hopefully in *cash*.

Some other important investigations have also been carried out in South Africa on the question "why do Blacks migrate?" The next few paragraphs refer briefly to the most relevant findings of these studies, which support empirically what has been discussed so far.

In a study by Maasdorp and Pillay in the Durban Metropolitan Area some evidence is found of what has already been highlighted in this section, namely the importance of economic incentives: "... migrants move mainly for economic gain, i.e. to areas with higher income levels and better work opportunities" (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1978, p. 29). This, as well as other similar empirical findings, corresponds to the theoretical model of Harris and Todaro (1970, p. 126-142), which has been discussed in chapter two. As will be recalled, this theoretical model argues that migration proceeds in response to an individual's *expectation* to earn a higher wage in the area of destination, where the expected urban wage is defined as the fixed minimum wage (or actual income earned), multiplied by the proportion of the urban labour force actually employed (the probability of finding a job).

In this same study ("Unauthorised Housing in Clermont") in the Durban metropolitan area, Maasdorp and Pillay summarised the reasons for migration according to the distribution of migrants by area of origin.

Table 3.2 gives the reasons advanced by respondents which are divided into economic and non-economic reasons, in both cases by area of origin.

From Table 3.2 it can be seen that three-quarters of the respondents in the survey migrated because of one or more of the economic reasons stated, whether it was rural poverty and/or rural unemployment, and/or to earn money, and/or to take up a specific job. The remainder of the respondents, only 24,7 per cent, stated that they migrated for non-economic reasons, like family and community reasons, an unsatisfactory lifestyle, family or relatives present in the area of destination, or political reasons.

A closer look at the economic reasons for migration in Table 3.2 reveals that "to earn money" is the predominant factor in this decision-making process, namely 27,3 per cent of the total. In all areas of origin this was the major economic reason for migration, except in the case of Lesotho where the majority of the people migrated because of extreme poverty in the rural areas. It should be noted that 43 per cent of the respondents in this survey migrated because of either rural poverty or rural unemployment, the two major economic "push" factors operating in the areas of origin.

Looking at the reasons for migration by sex, it was determined that males were more concerned about the economic factors (80,5 per cent of the males) than the females (65,7 per cent), mainly because of the unemployment situation in the rural areas (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1978, p. 33). Females tended to place more emphasis on marriage and family affairs, in other words on non-economic reasons.

Among the non-economic reasons for migration the presence of relatives and friends in the area of destination seems to be the most relevant factor (12,3 per cent), mainly because such contacts are potential suppliers of food and accommodation to people from rural areas. Family and community problems are the next most important non-economic reason for migration. It registers, however, only 6,0 per cent of the average total.

Table 3.2 - Percentage distribution of migrants by area of origin and reasons for migrating, 1978

Reason	Natal	Trans= kei	Rest of SA	Swazi= land	Leso= tho	Other foreign	Total
<u>Economic:</u>							
Rural poverty	21,1	25,3	17,6	6,7	41,9	-	22,8
Rural unemployment	21,5	21,6	14,7	-	16,1	20,8	20,2
Earn money	28,1	27,4	35,3	40,0	12,9	20,8	27,3
Specific work	6,3	2,5	5,9	6,7	3,2	12,5	4,9
Sub-total	77,0	76,8	73,5	53,4	74,1	54,1	75,2
<u>Non-economic:</u>							
Family/community problems	4,4	8,3	5,9	6,7	6,5	-	6,0
Lifestyle	3,3	4,1	2,9	13,3	16,1	4,2	4,5
Marriage/family	14,4	10,4	17,6	26,7	3,2	4,2	12,3
Political	0,7	0,4	-	-	-	37,5	1,9
Sub-total	22,8	23,2	26,4	46,7	25,8	45,9	24,7
Total (n = 100%)	270	241	34	15	31	24	618

Source: Maasdorp G and Pillay N, Unauthorised Housing in Clermont, a Socio-Economic Study, Interim Report No. 3, University of Natal, Durban, 1978, p. 31.

It should be clear that the reasons for migration (whether economic or non-economic) will differ from area to area as well as from time to time. As Table 3.2 shows, the major reason for migration out of Lesotho is rural poverty, while the major reason for migration out of Swaziland is to earn money, the difference being that Lesotho has the worst of the two economies and that the pressure of the *de facto* population on the land in Lesotho (especially in the rural areas) is greater than in Swaziland. The major economic reason for migration out of Swaziland (to earn money) corresponds with the major non-economic reason, namely for marriage or family. Reasons for migration will also change over time. During severe droughts, for example, it can be expected that the factors operating in the rural areas will feature more significantly in "pushing" people away from these areas, mainly because migrants tend to review their situations constantly.

A study undertaken by Möller and Schlemmer in the Greater Durban Area in Natal came to virtually the same conclusion as far as the reasons for migration are concerned. It was found that economic factors played a very important role among the 626 single male migrants who were interviewed (Möller and Schlemmer, 1979, p. 8). Job-related reasons formed the centre of the decision-making process among the migrants. This is understandable because the respondents in this case were single male workers. It was further determined that age trends were becoming more of a "coerced economic choice for the individual migrants", mostly to help support their families.

In a study of migration in the Eastern Cape, initiated by the South African Human Sciences Research Council, Blacks were asked what were the most important reasons that convinced them to move to the Western Cape. In this case, as in the other studies, the answers of the respondents point to economic influences. The majority of the migrants from the Ciskei and Transkei moved for economic gain. The reasons for migrating to the Western Cape and the percentage distribution were as follows (Smedley, 1979, p. 32):

- (i) Occupational advantages of residence in the Western Cape - 35 per cent.
- (ii) Financial advantages of residence in the Western Cape - 31 per cent.

- (iii) Ties (through birth) in the Western Cape - 26,7 per cent.
- (iv) Personal reasons - 4,3 per cent.

Two-thirds of the respondents (66 per cent) migrated to the Western Cape because of the occupational or financial advantages present in the area of destination. Here again this study points to the importance of economic determinants in the decision-to-migrate process. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of other empirical studies, namely that migration in Southern Africa, as well as in other countries in the world, takes place mainly for economic gain, whether it is in a negative form where people are pushed from their area of origin or forced to leave the rural areas because of poverty, overpopulation and lack of job opportunities, or whether people are attracted to areas of destination because of economic advantages present in those areas.

The general conclusion is that Blacks migrate mainly for economic reasons. More specifically, the vast majority of Blacks migrate or leave their area of origin in order *to survive*. The real per capita income of Blacks in Lebowa (at 1980 prices) is for instance only R683 per year or only R57 per month. Under such conditions they are forced to go away (or send some family members away) to seek alternative ways to stay alive. Their primary reason for going to an area away from their homes is, in other words, to earn money, and to earn money they need to be employed. This can be regarded as the single most important reason why Blacks migrate in South Africa. It also explains why at present the migration process in this country is still heavily temporary.

This does not deny the fact that there are many other possible reasons for migration, as various studies have indicated. These reasons may, however, to a large extent be linked to the motivation to earn money and to the desperate need to find employment. Migration for non-economic reasons is mostly in support of the abovementioned reasons.

At this stage it should be clear what the major determinants of rural-urban migration are. While the influence of migration on the urban-

sation process may be of a decreasing nature in some countries, this process is still an extremely important phenomenon in other countries of the Third World.

Migration as such has not contributed on a large scale to the urbanisation process in the national states, mainly because urbanisation in the national states has seldom taken place because of economic forces. There are other factors which have contributed to the urbanisation process in the national states. A closer look will now be taken at these factors.

### 3.3.3 Factors promoting urbanisation in the national states

The crucial importance and implications of population growth in the world at large and in Africa in particular have already been spelled out in Chapter two. South Africa, as well as the various surrounding national states, is no exception to this phenomenon.

Table 3.3 - The Black population of South Africa, urban and rural, 1970 and 1980 (millions)<sup>1)</sup>

Census year	South Africa		White areas		National states	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1970	5,1 (33,3%)	10,2 (66,7%)	4,5 (54,6%)	3,7 (45,4%)	0,6 (8,5%)	6,5 (91,5%)
	Total: 15,3 (100,0%)		Total: 8,2 (53,6%)		Total: 7,1 (52,5%)	
1980 <sup>2)</sup>	6,4 (32,5%)	13,6 (67,5%)	5,0 (52,2%)	4,5 (47,8%)	1,4 (13,3%)	9,1 (86,7%)
	Total: 20,0 (100,0)		Total: 9,5 (47,5%)		Total: 10,5 (52,5%)	

1) Including the Black populations of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

2) Provisional figures.

Source: Department of Statistics, 1976, Population Census 1970, Geographical distribution of the population, report No. 02-05-10, unpublished data, and information obtained from the Governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

Table 3.3 shows the Black urban and rural populations of South Africa for 1970 and 1980, the White areas and the national states (provisional 1980 census figures). The figures in Table 3.3 should be interpreted with care, because there are indications that the 1980 census, like previous censuses, under-enumerate the Black population, as will be pointed out in the next chapter.

In a study done by Lombard, Stadler and Steyn on the socio-economic priorities in South Africa (Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria, 1981), the total urban Black population was estimated at more than 9 million people in 1980 (compared to the official 6,4 million shown in Table 3.3), representing 44,3 per cent of the total Black population in that year, which is more realistic than the 32,5 per cent estimated by the Department of Statistics. The latter figure excludes the inhabitants of squatter areas in South Africa (like Winterveld near Pretoria) which have no formal urban status.

From Table 3.3 it can be seen that the Black population in urban areas in the national states have increased from six hundred thousand in 1970 to 1,4 million in 1980. Whereas the urban Blacks in South Africa have increased by 1,4 million during this period (from 5,1 million in 1970 to 6,5 million in 1980), they have percentually decreased from 33,3 per cent to 32,5 per cent. This percentual decrease can mainly be attributed to the fact that the Black population has increased rapidly in absolute numbers in the rural areas in the national states between 1970 and 1980, despite the percentual decrease, which can be attributed to a higher level of urbanisation in the national states.

A second reason for the "higher" level of Black urbanisation in South Africa in 1970 is the continued consolidation of national states, where some formerly "White" areas have been consolidated into Black areas, or where large numbers of Blacks have been resettled in Black urban areas, as will be pointed out in Chapter IV. Examples in this regard include Port St Johns in the Cape Province and Glen Gray and Herschel in Ciskei.

A third reason for the higher percentage of urban Blacks in South Africa in 1970 as opposed to 1980 is the fact that the Department of Statistics changed the official definition of an urban area. For purposes of the 1980 census, only cities and towns with some form or other of local

management have been defined as urban areas. Areas of an urban nature, i.e. areas with urban amenities, have been eliminated in the "new" definition of an urban area. Many mining towns (such as Kriel in the Eastern Transvaal), and various power station towns have been excluded from the new definition of an urban area for purposes of the 1980 census and have been reclassified as "rural" areas.

What factors are responsible for urbanisation in the national states which has increased from 8,5 per cent in 1970 to an estimated 13,3 per cent in 1980 (as may be seen in Table 3.3)?

The first factor contributing to the increase in the urban population in the national states is induced by the South African Government. This is done by the purchase of land and "added" to the national states. The result is that the boundaries of these states are changed and that Blacks who have resided in White areas are now included in a national state (Smit, 1977, p. 19). The greater part of such added land is geographically adjacent to national states. Sometimes these added areas are proclaimed as townships and then regarded as urban areas. Such a step, when it happens, helps to increase the urban population of such a state (for example Mdantsane in Ciskei).

A second factor contributing to the rapid increase of the urban population of the national states is the Government programme to resettle Blacks from time to time, either from "Black spots" or badly located Black areas, or from White urban areas and White rural areas. In the ten year period from 1960 to 1970, some 68 144 Blacks were resettled in the different national states from badly located Black areas (Smit, 1977, p. 20). According to unpublished information from the Department of Co-operation and Development, a further 304 885 Blacks were removed from "Black spots" to the national states during the period 1970 to 1980. Of this total, some 250 594 Blacks or 82 per cent, were resettled between 1975 to 1980, as shown in Table 3.4. These figures include Blacks that have been resettled from one national state to another.

Unfortunately, no statistics are available on the resettlement of Blacks from so-called "White" areas to the national states. It is, however, believed that this type of resettlement is substantial.

Table 3.4 - Number of Blacks resettled from "Black spots" and badly located areas to national states, April 1st 1975 to March 31st 1980

Black states	1/4/75- 31/3/76	1/4/76- 31/3/77	1/4/77- 31/3/78	1/4/78- 31/3/79	1/4/79- 31/3/80	Total
Kwazulu	9 826	26 636	21 857	4 485	3 321	66 125
Kangwane	-	-	357	378	-	735
Bophuthatswana	8 694	17 960 <sup>1)</sup>	10 568	10 809	315	48 346
Ciskei	572	37 900 <sup>2)</sup>	8 927 <sup>3)</sup>	16	19 619	67 034
Lebowa	-	3 981	-	-	8 074	12 055
Qwa-Qwa	-	-	-	-	42 947	42 947
Swazi	2 682	126	-	-	-	2 808
South Ndebele	10 404	140	-	-	-	10 544
Total	32 178	86 743	41 709	15 688	74 276	250 594

1) 595 Blacks were resettled within Bophuthatswana.

2) Blacks resettled from the Republic of Transkei to Ciskei.

3) Including 3 108 Blacks resettled from the Republic of Transkei to Ciskei.

Source: Department of Co-operation and Development, various Annual Reports, 1975-1979, as well as unpublished information.

A third factor promoting urbanisation in the national states is the provision or availability of housing in the urban areas. The number of housing units in proclaimed townships have increased, for instance, from 79 537 in 1970 to an estimated 185 160 in 1980, while a total amount of R105,7 million was spent in 1980/81 on the establishment of towns in the national states (Benso, 1980, pp. 34 and 35). Various Administration Boards are also involved in housing programmes in the national states (e.g. the East Rand Administration Board with a housing programme in Lebowakgomo).

A fourth factor contributing to urbanisation is the depressed conditions in the rural areas. In many instances people have no option but to leave the area in order to survive. They either go to a nearby township or migrate to a metropolitan area where they usually have some contact. It has been suggested that the rural areas (especially the small agricultural settlements), should be planned and developed in such a way as to be viable units for the inhabitants, while the excess inhabitants should be encouraged to move to other areas. More than a quarter of a century ago, the Tomlinson Report (1955), p. 114) arrived at the following conclusion: "To open the way to efficient agricultural development of the Bantu areas, approximately half of the present population will have to be removed eventually from the agricultural land, and will have to find a living outside of agriculture in primary, secondary and tertiary spheres of economic activity." Such a suggestion is in line with Friedman's strategy of "deliberate urbanisation", referred to in Chapter 1, and would have contributed to a higher level of urbanisation in the Black areas.

A fifth factor promoting urbanisation is the drive to create job opportunities via the decentralisation of industries. The Central Government encouraged industrial development just outside the national states since 1960 (Smit, 1977, p. 25). These industries, which were established with the aid of concessions, needed a capital investment of R299,9 million and employed 21 693 Blacks (Benso, 1980, p. 80). In retrospect, this approach was not very successful. By March 1978 only 127 industries have been established at declared growth points and in certain industrial areas in the national states. The new dispensation to promote industrial development, which came into effect on 1 April 1982, offers incentives at a higher level, while the nature of the incentives has been changed. The emphasis has shifted from various forms of *tax* advantages and rebates to concessions offering more *cash* advantages and incentives, such as for wages, training, housing and relocation allowances.

The last factor promoting urbanisation in the national states is the so-called process of "stepwise migration", where migrants use such a township as a "stopover" before migrating to urban areas further away.

Two factors stimulate this process. In the first place there is a tremendous overcrowding of people in the already poverty-stricken rural areas which leaves a section of these people with no option than to leave their area in order for them and their families to survive. Secondly, because of Government laws and regulations, and a shortage of houses and definite employment opportunities in and around metropolitan areas, many of these people and their families are prevented from settling in these urban areas. Assuming that these two factors do not change, and that the rural areas will not escape the population explosion (as will be indicated in Chapter 4), one can expect that these people will have no legal alternative but to go to towns inside or near the national states. Whether such a process is of a temporary or permanent nature, is difficult to determine.

In conclusion it can be said that economic factors, notably the urge to find a job which will have a compensation in cash or kind in order to survive, are primarily responsible for urbanisation in the national states, supported by sociological factors and individual preferences. Government-induced actions may either promote this process or prevent it. An example of such actions may be found in a few recommendations made in 1935, some provisions of which were included in an act at a later stage, namely the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 (it was only after a further 25 years that recommendations were made to scrap these provisions again). The 1935 recommendations were framed in the Report of the Native Laws Commission, reading as follows:

- "(i) To enforce the principle of limiting the number of Natives in urban areas to the labour requirements of such urban areas;
- (ii) to provide for controlling the entry of Natives into urban areas, and;
- (iii) to provide for the withdrawal of superfluous Natives from urban areas."

Despite these measures, Blacks streamed towards "White" urban areas. One of the results was a serious shortfall in housing facilities. Shanty towns, housing thousands of squatters, sprang up around the great industrial centres - Alexandra in Johannesburg, Cato Manor in

Durban and Wintermere in Cape Town. This is no unique phenomenon, as shanty towns and squatter settlements mushroomed in cities such as Manila, Caracas, Kinshasa, Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, Seoul and Calcutta. One quarter of Seoul's population of 5,5 million people live in squatter settlements and slums, compared to almost two-thirds of Calcutta's 8,0 million people (Ward, 1976, p. 193).

These are, in short, the most important factors promoting urbanisation in the national states. The next chapter will focus more specifically on the extent of urbanisation in one of these national states, namely Lebowa.

## CHAPTER 4

## POPULATION AND URBANISATION IN LEBOWA


## 4.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND ON LEBOWA

Lebowa is one of ten national states in South Africa (four of which are independent) and is situated in the Northern Transvaal. At present (1981) Lebowa consists of eleven separate geographical areas, as shown in Map 4.1. Eight of these areas are part of the two larger continuous geographical blocks, generally known as North Lebowa (Mokerong 2, Bochum and Seshego) and South Lebowa (Naphuno, Thabamoope, Mokerong 3, Nebo and Sekhukhuneland). The total surface area of Lebowa is approximately 2,2 million hectares, with an estimated total *de facto* Black population of 1 745 300 people. At present there is not consensus on the *actual* geographical area of Lebowa, the reason being that the magisterial districts, the areas under the jurisdiction of the Lebowa Government and the census districts do not refer to the same area and differ substantially in some cases. This state of affairs seriously affects any definition of the geographical area of Lebowa. Apart from this there is a continuous debate on Black areas that may be excised and White areas that may be added to Lebowa.

Lebowa is traditionally and primarily the home of the North Sotho (Sepedi) and North Ndebele language groups. During 1980, these two groups represented 89 per cent of the total *de facto* population of Lebowa, with Non-Blacks contributing only 0,2 per cent.

Lebowa can be classified as a developing country or region, where a large part of the population is still engaged in the primary sector, notably subsistence farming, which can potentially make a major contribution to the Gross Domestic Product. Because of the weak economy, many citizens of Lebowa are temporarily absent from the area (mostly males), seeking better opportunities in areas outside Lebowa, which has a further hampering effect on the economy. Adjoining towns such as Pietersburg, Potgietersrus, Phalaborwa and Tzaneen serve as attractions for citizens of Lebowa from the viewpoint of providing employment opportunities.

MAP 4.1  
Geographical area of Lebowa, 1980



The small size of the economy of Lebowa can be seen from the fact that the total expected Government expenditure for 1981/82 amounted to only R154 million, of which just more than one fourth (25,9 per cent) is anticipated to be generated from own sources (the balance being an anticipated grant from the Central Government). Of this total expected expenditure, it is estimated that R100 million (nearly two-thirds) will be spent on the development of human potential and the provision of social services, which leaves little money for the creation of physical infrastructure and the creation of employment opportunities.

The economic development of Lebowa is a "worm's eye" glimpse of development in Africa. At present Lebowa depends to a large extent on agricultural production, but already the influences of westernisation are gradually beginning to show, notably industrialisation, the development of commerce, and urbanisation. This touches on the crux of the problems facing Lebowa today. Firstly, the problem of moving towards a market-orientated economy, where goods and services are predominantly produced for the market. In order to do this, ample workers must be available to produce the goods and services in agriculture, mining, industry and commerce. Secondly, the tendency of people to move to urban areas, in search of better opportunities. As in the rest of Africa, Lebowa is also faced with this new problem of urbanisation. As will be shown at a later stage, it is of crucial importance that this increasingly predominant feature of African life, namely urbanisation, be given serious attention in order to stimulate economic development in the area and limit the outflow of people to cities and towns outside Lebowa.

## 4.2 THE POPULATION OF LEBOWA - YESTERDAY AND TODAY

### 4.2.1 Introduction

The most important aspect of this section is the description of the population of Lebowa in various census years, with special reference to 1970 and 1980. Attention will be devoted to the ethnic composition and the geographical distribution of the *de facto* and *de jure* population.

Secondly, the age and sex composition of the *de facto* population will be discussed. Because of the lack of available statistics, census statistics of 1970 will be presented. The percentual composition is, however, still valid in 1980 and, therefore, has important consequences for the urbanisation process in Lebowa.

Thirdly, various dependence ratios prevailing in Lebowa will be determined. These ratios give an indication of the burden on the adult population of Lebowa, a fact that has some significance for the urbanisation process because it is usually the adults in their productive years that become urbanised.

Lastly, the size of the economically active population in Lebowa will be determined. This has important consequences for the urbanisation process, as the size of the labour force determines the need for job creation in the economy and, therefore, also indirectly the places of employment.

#### 4.2.2 The *de facto* and *de jure* population of Lebowa

Before one can embark on a discussion of the population in Lebowa, the distinction between the *de facto* and the *de jure* population should be explained. The *de facto* population is that part of the population which is actually present within the borders of Lebowa on the census date, whereas the *de jure* population includes the *de facto* population as well as those national citizens of Lebowa absent from the area on the census date. It follows that the *de jure* population is normally larger than the *de facto* population of a country. This study will mainly look at the *de facto* population of Lebowa.

Table 4.1 shows the *de facto* and the *de jure* Black population of Lebowa for 1970 and 1980, according to language spoken and geographical distribution, respectively. The data for 1980 is preliminary census figures, and the North Sotho and North Ndebele in Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda are excluded from the *de jure* population in both census years. At this stage it should be pointed out that Table 4.1 shows the official statistics of the population composition in Lebowa, as presented by the Department of Statistics in its official censuses. As will be shown, these statistics are not necessarily reliable.

Table 4.1 - The *de facto* and the *de jure* Black population of Lebowa, 1970 and 1980<sup>1)</sup>

Population	1970			1980 <sup>2)</sup>		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
<u><i>De facto</i> population:</u>	<u>62 140</u>	<u>974 851</u>	<u>1 036 991</u>	<u>118 073</u>	<u>1 470 910</u>	<u>1 588 983</u>
North Sotho	44 723	837 766	882 489	86 685	1 242 413	1 329 098
North Ndebele	2 925	39 753	42 678	10 675	81 207	91 882
Shangaan	8 582	65 107	73 689	11 089	97 494	108 583
South Ndebele	255	12 664	12 919	2 211	20 664	22 875
Swazi	690	6 501	7 191	1 833	14 362	16 195
Tswana	680	4 181	4 861	999	2 037	3 036
Zulu	848	2 599	3 447	1 848	5 370	7 218
Xhosa	1 400	1 648	3 048	286	1 205	1 491
Venda	1 179	1 448	2 627	1 509	2 298	3 807
South Sotho	259	1 104	1 363	743	1 672	2 415
Other	599	2 080	2 679	195	2 188	2 383
<u><i>De jure</i> population:</u>						
North Sotho	<u>413 395</u>	<u>1 304 609</u>	<u>1 718 004</u>	<u>542 738</u>	<u>1 721 806</u>	<u>2 264 544</u>
- <i>de facto</i>	44 723	837 766	882 489	86 685	1 242 413	1 329 098
- White areas	325 260	287 507	612 767	452 906	386 194	839 100
- Other national states <sup>3)</sup>	1 583	61 587	63 170	3 147	93 199	96 346
North Ndebele	<u>41 829</u>	<u>117 749</u>	<u>159 578</u>	<u>83 838</u>	<u>153 045</u>	<u>236 883</u>
- <i>de facto</i>	2 925	39 753	42 678	10 675	81 207	91 882
- White areas	38 817	71 060	109 877	72 984	65 291	138 275
- Other national states <sup>3)</sup>	87	6 936	7 023	179	6 547	6 726

1) According to the 1970 district boundaries.

2) Preliminary figures of the Department of Statistics.

3) Excluding Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

Source: Department of Statistics, Reports No. 02-05-08 and 02-05-10, Statistical News Release P. 11, September 16, 1980, and unpublished information.

From Table 4.1 it can be seen that the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa increased from just more than one million in 1970 to nearly 1,59 million in 1980, which represents an annual growth rate of 4,4 per cent. According to these official statistics, the level of urbanisation has increased from 6,0 per cent in 1970 to 7,4 per cent in 1980, with the balance of 94,0 per cent and 92,6 per cent, respectively, being classified as "rural".

The largest Black population group within Lebowa is the Sepedi (North Sotho), representing nearly 84 per cent of the total Black population (1980), namely more than 1,3 million people. The North Ndebele are represented by nearly 92 000 people or 5,8 per cent of the total *de facto* population.

In 1980 the *de jure* Black population exceeded 2,5 million people of whom 43 per cent lived outside the borders of Lebowa, either in White areas or other Black states (excluding Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda).

Whereas the *de facto* population of Lebowa was 7,4 per cent urbanised in 1980, the *de jure* population reached a level of urbanisation of 25,0 per cent in the same year, which is an indication that urban areas definitely tend to attract the North Sotho and North Ndebele, especially to White urban areas.

It should be mentioned that the statistics in Table 4.1 should be viewed with care and not be accepted *ipso facto* as correct. Two aspects of the figures in Table 4.1 should be carefully interpreted, one of which will be discussed in the section on urbanisation (section 4.3.2).

As far as the other aspect is concerned, it is fairly certain that the *de facto* population of Lebowa (as given in the official statistics) represents an under-enumeration of the people in the area. This statement is based on the fact that an under-enumeration of Blacks was recorded as early as the 1951 census (Lombard and Van der Merwe, 1972, p. 7). It is also believed that the 1960 census recorded an under-enumeration of Blacks, especially in the rural areas. It was estimated, for example, that an under-enumeration of 50 per cent existed in the Sibasa district in 1960 (see Smit, 1965, p. 94).

In this study by Smit (1965) in certain Black areas in the Northern Transvaal, it was established that the total real Black population in certain smaller areas differed largely from the official statistics supplied by the former Bureau of Statistics. By using aerial photographs, it was found that differences of up to 90 per cent occurred when comparing the results with official statistics. There appeared to be some substantial under-enumeration of people in certain census wards of rural areas in 1960, which means that if this under-enumeration of Blacks has not been accounted for in the following censuses (and there is no sign that provision has been made for this fact), this same phenomenon would be present in the subsequent censuses of 1970 and 1980.

The single most obvious tendency one observes when visiting Lebowa is the aspect of *over-population*, i.e. a surplus of people on the existing land. Tens of thousands of people group together along rivers and foothills in Lebowa. These areas have become so over-populated that people scattered all over, even plains in Lebowa have become a general scene.

To describe the *de facto* population in any given year, it is also necessary to compare it with the recorded *de facto* populations in previous available census years, mainly to identify significant trends.

Table 4.2 shows the official *de facto* population of Lebowa for various census years since 1951, according to the 1980 district boundaries. In the 29 year period 1951-1980, the *de facto* population grew at an annual rate of 5,0 per cent. Between 1960 and 1970 an official average growth rate of 7,7 per cent was recorded. This high growth rate can, however, among other factors, be attributed to an under-enumeration of Black people in rural areas in 1951 and 1960. Between 1970 and 1980 an above biological maximum growth rate of 4,4 per cent was recorded. According to official statistics, some districts experienced fivefold and even sixfold increases in their populations during the nearly 30-year period since 1951. In the official 1980 census, four districts recorded populations of more than 200 000 people, namely Sekhukhuneland, Thabamopo, Seshego and Mokerong (Table 4.12).

At present *one* of the transportation organisations, Lebowa Transport, transports some 42 million people annually (1981) in their 320 buses in and around Lebowa (Lebowa Transport, 1982, p. 13). This places a heavy burden on the absorption ability of roads in Lebowa. In the Seshego region alone it is estimated that a fleet of 56 buses of Lebowa Transport is carrying passengers over one million kilometres a month. Some 167 buses (52 per cent of the total fleet) of its organisation carry passengers at present over a total distance of *1,39 million kilometres of road* per month.

Map 6.1 shows the road network in Lebowa, including the tarred primary roads and the untarred secondary and tertiary roads. Firstly, there is the *national road* from south to north, going through the towns of Pietersburg and Potgietersrus, separating North Lebowa from South Lebowa. This road does not pass through any area under the jurisdiction of the Lebowa Government but serves as an important link with the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area. Secondly, there are a few *primary* and *secondary roads* linking this national road with important towns in Lebowa, notably Lebowakgomo, the capital of Lebowa, and other proclaimed towns, mostly on the borders of the area. Thirdly, there are numerous *tertiary roads* linking the hinterland with secondary roads as well as internal linkages. Finally, there are roads outside Lebowa linking the various separate geographic areas of Lebowa, notably in Eastern Lebowa.

Despite the fact that Lebowa has a high road density of 23 km/100 km<sup>2</sup> (compared to South Africa's 6 km/100 km<sup>2</sup>), the quality of these roads leaves much to be desired, as described. This serious absence of quality roads in Lebowa retards urbanisation and makes it difficult to develop an urbanisation strategy, where urban places can be developed with an adequate infrastructure, especially roads.

At present the existing seventeen proclaimed townships, as well as the identified closer settlements and selected agricultural settlements, are not served adequately by a standardised road network to promote rapid urban growth. The existing roads will, therefore, not have the ability to cope with an increased traffic volume in the foreseeable future.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to account for the under-enumeration of Blacks in Lebowa. It is essential that a serious attempt be made to find better means to establish a more reliable population count, especially of the Black people in South Africa as well as the different national states, as this factor holds serious planning consequences for planners and political and other leaders. This study is specifically interested in the *de facto* Black population in Lebowa. Seen against the convincing evidence that official institutions have historically under-estimated Blacks, especially in rural areas, a modest attempt will be made to rectify this disparity in population calculations. The aim is not to criticise the population statistics by an official institution as presented in Table 4.1, but rather to make a modest contribution towards giving a more realistic (and hopefully factual) view of the practical or existing situation.

#### 4.2.3 The age and sex composition of the *de facto* Black population

The age and sex composition of the *de facto* Black population in Lebowa in 1970 is summarised in Table 4.3. No updated statistics, as presented in the format in Table 4.3, are available. Despite the fact that the absolute numbers have increased since 1970, the percentage composition of the different categories has not changed substantially during the last decade. The main purpose of this section is, therefore, not to focus on the absolute numbers, but on the underlying percentage composition of the *de facto* Black population in Lebowa.

One of the important facts to note in Table 4.3 is the youthfulness of the *de facto* population in Lebowa, namely that 51,4 per cent of the population are under fourteen years of age. This compares with an estimated 51,1 per cent of the *de facto* population that was younger than fourteen years in 1980 (Lebowa Development Corporation, 1981, p. 1). This young population will without doubt make severe demands on human and natural resources in Lebowa in the next twenty years, but will, on the other hand, serve as a potential benefit to the country in the supply of manpower.

Also shown in Table 4.3 is the high rate of males absent in their most productive years (15-64 years). It can be seen that males in

Table 4.3 - Age and sex composition of the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa by area, 1970

Area and age group	Male		Female		Total		Male: female ratio
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	
<b>Urban:</b>							
-1-14	12 143	36,4	13 001	45,1	25 144	40,5	0,9340
15-64	20 697	62,1	15 102	52,4	35 799	57,6	1,3705
65+	495	1,5	702	2,5	1 197	1,9	0,7051
Total	33 335	100,0	28 805	100,0	62 140	100,0	1,1573
<b>Non-urban:</b>							
-1-14	254 726	62,6	253 237	44,6	507 963	52,1	1,0058
15-64	134 866	33,1	285 959	50,3	420 825	43,2	0,4716
65+	17 372	4,3	28 691	5,1	46 063	4,7	0,6055
Total	406 964	100,0	567 887	100,0	974 851	100,0	0,7166
<b>All areas:</b>							
-1-14	266 869	60,6	266 238	44,6	533 107	51,4	1 0024
15-64	155 563	35,3	301 061	50,5	456 624	44,0	0,5167
65+	17 867	4,1	29 393	4,9	47 260	4,6	0,6079
Total	440 299	100,0	596 692	100,0	1 036 991	100,0	0,7379


Source: Department of Statistics, report No. 02-05-08.

this age group comprised only 35,3 per cent of the total male population in 1970, in comparison with 50,5 per cent of the females. This is counter-productive for any economic development and retards development, especially in the rural areas, where only 33,1 per cent of the males in the productive age group were present in Lebowa. The productive males in Lebowa either seek jobs in urban places inside the area or in places outside the area. In 1970, some 62,1 per cent of all urban males in their productive years lived in urban places.


Figure 4.1 shows the age and sex composition of the urban and rural *de facto* population of Lebowa, in comparison with the sex and age composition of the urban and rural population of the United States of America.

FIGURE 4.1

AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION OF THE *de facto* BLACK POPULATION OF LEBOWA, 1970



AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1970



The population pyramids for Lebowa are *expansive* with a high proportion of children (broad base) and a rapid rate of population growth. It clearly indicates the large percentual absence of males in the rural areas, especially from the age of 20 years, which can be described as an outflow of productivity. The population pyramid for the urban population shows a more "pyramid-like" form.

For purposes of comparison the population pyramids for the United States of America, for their urban and rural population, are also shown in Figure 4.1. These pyramids are *constrictive*, indicating that the proportion of children is not sufficient to maintain the population (Petersen, 1975, p. 93). The pyramids are representative of a developed and highly industrialised country.

The age and sex composition of the urban populations of the two countries is distinguished by the fact that, in the case of Lebowa, there is a slight increase in males older than 15 years, to urban areas, most probably part of the "overflow" in rural areas. In the United States of America, the narrow base and narrow waist in its population pyramids are a reflection of the prevailing low rate of natural increase and the extremely low birth rates during the 1930's, respectively. There is also a trend in some urban areas in the United States of people leaving the central city or surrounding closely settled territory, to settle further away from the core of an urbanised area. In some cases, people have settled in incorporated places but outside urbanised areas (see Chapter 2 for a description of these terms).

As far as the rural age and sex composition of the populations in the two countries is concerned, it can be seen that there is a dramatic decrease of males of 15 years and older in Lebowa, despite the broad base, especially in the 5-9 years age group. In the United States of America, people also tend to leave the rural areas as from the age of 15 years, but to a much lesser extent than in Lebowa.

#### 4.2.4 Dependency ratios

Various dependency ratios can be determined from Table 4.3. In the first place it can be determined how many people each adult has to support and, secondly, how many children each male has to support.

The first ratio, called the *total dependency ratio*, measures the pressure put on the producers of income by the population (Lombard and Van der Merwe, 1972, p. 8). This ratio, i.e. the number of persons under 15 years of age, together with those persons 65 years and older, in relation to the "productive" population or people in the 15-64 age group, shows that 100 adults in Lebowa have to support 127 persons. This is a high dependence ratio when compared to other areas, countries or continents. The number of persons every 100 adults have to support in Western Europe, the USA and Africa are 56, 61 and 89, respectively.

The second ratio referred to is the *male dependency ratio*. This ratio, i.e. the number of children under the age of 14 years in relation to the males in the "productive" age group of 15-64 years, shows that every male in Lebowa has to support 3,4 children. In the case of White population in South Africa, every male has to support 0,9 children. In the urban areas in Lebowa, the male dependency burden drops to 1,2 children, while it is a high 3,7 in the rural areas. The conclusion is that a very high dependence burden is placed on the traditional heads of households in Lebowa, especially in the rural areas. It also serves as an indication of the population explosion that has already started.

The *male:female ratio* is also shown in Table 4.3. There are about 74 males for every 100 females in Lebowa, which is an indication of the high rate of absence of males or the high concentration of females in the area. In the *urban* areas in Lebowa there are 115 males for every 100 females (or 137 males in the labour productive years of 15-64 years), compared to the *rural* areas where there are 71 males for every 100 females. This compares with the sex ratios of the urban and rural population of Africa, shown in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 which, for the *urban* areas, shows 117 males per 100 females, and in the *rural* areas, 95 males per 100 females.

Apart from the significance of the high dependency burden on adults in Lebowa, the most important point arising from this section is the fact that the ratio of males to females in the urban areas in Lebowa is approximately equal to the average ratio in the urban areas in Africa. In Chapter 2 it has been shown that Africa has one of the highest rates

of urbanisation in the world. Having the same male:female ratio in its urban areas as the average in Africa, it can, therefore, be expected that these areas in Lebowa will have the potential to grow at rapid rates over the next two decades.

#### 4.2.5 The economically active population

Despite the high rate of absence of Blacks in Lebowa, especially among males, the question arises how many Blacks are economically active in Lebowa? The answer to this question is shown in Table 4.4. The statistics are based on two assumptions. Firstly, in Table 4.1 it has been indicated that the North Sotho and North Ndebele represent 89 per cent of the total *de facto* population in Lebowa. Therefore, the statistics in Table 4.4 are primarily based on these two population groups, as being representative of the *de facto* population. Secondly, despite the obsolescence of the statistics in Table 4.4 (1970), it is assumed that the percentual composition of the economically active population in Lebowa has not changed.

From Table 4.4 it can be seen that only 20,2 per cent of all Blacks (1970) are economically active, with nearly 80 per cent classified as not economically active. The last category includes people who do not work and are not looking for work, including workers in subsistence agriculture. There are more economically active males (27,4 per cent) than females (14,9 per cent).

The high rate of absence of Black males referred to earlier in this section can partly be ascribed to the presence of these people in White areas. From Table 4.4 it can be seen that 62,5 per cent of the North Sotho and North Ndebele males are economically active in White areas, compared to only 26,3 per cent in Lebowa.

It should be borne in mind that the last group includes people living in Lebowa, but working in an adjoining White area (commuters).

Table 4.4 - Economically active and not economically active  
Blacks in Lebowa, 1970

Population group	Sex	Total population	Economically active		Not economically active	
			Number	%	Number	%
<u>Population in Lebowa:</u>						
North Sotho and North Ndebele	M	388 672	102 315	26,3	286 253	73,7
	F	536 495	79 128	14,7	457 367	85,3
	T	925 167	181 447	19,6	743 720	80,4
All Blacks	M	440 299	120 645	27,4	319 654	72,6
	F	596 692	88 962	14,9	507 730	85,1
	T	1 036 991	209 607	20,2	827 384	79,8
<u>Population outside Lebowa:</u>						
North Sotho and North Ndebele						
- in other national states	M	75 070	23 365	31,1	51 705	68,9
	F	93 790	17 538	18,7	76 252	81,3
	T	168 860	40 903	24,2	127 957	75,8
- in White areas	M	396 043	247 410	62,5	148 633	37,5
	F	326 601	119 329	36,5	207 272	63,5
	T	722 644	366 739	50,7	355 905	49,3

Source: Department of Statistics, reports No. 02-05-06, 02-02-10, 02-02-12 and unpublished information.

### 4.3 URBANISATION IN LEBOWA - YESTERDAY AND TODAY

#### 4.3.1 Introduction

Following the description of the extent and level of urbanisation in the world and in Africa in particular, presented in Chapter 2, this section will focus on the size of the urban population in Lebowa, both in the past and the present.

Different views on the extent of urbanisation will be presented, including the views of the Department of Statistics, the Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development (BENSOC), and an independent study. Attention will be focused on the extent of urbanisation in 1980, but reference will also be made to the size of the urban population in 1970.

Apart from the urban population, this section will also present the different views on the rural population, with special reference to the view of the Department of Agriculture in Lebowa on the rural *de facto* population.

#### 4.3.2 The extent of urbanisation

Table 4.5 shows the urban and rural *de facto* population of Lebowa, by district, for 1970 and 1980. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, these statistics should be viewed with care.

The Department of Statistics classifies a town or settlement as urban, based on the question whether the inhabitants pay some form of tax or not. The result is that not all proclaimed townships are included as urban population (the proclaimed townships of Lerero, Moetladimo and Morathong have been omitted), while some settlements have been included which have not been proclaimed as townships (Arthurseat, Dientjie and Leeuwfontein in 1970, and Gamapodile in 1980). For purposes of this section, the officially proclaimed townships in Lebowa, announced in the Government Gazette dated July 30th, 1976 (No. 5236), are taken as urban areas in Lebowa, whose inhabitants are, therefore, urbanised. These townships, with the exception of Elandsdoorn in the Moutse district, which is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Lebowa Government, are as follows:

Gakgapane	Morathong
Hlogotlou	Motetema
Lebowakgomo	Motlamotgatshane
Lenenyee	Namakgale
Lerero	Sebayeng
Mahwelareng	Senwamokgope
Mankweng	Seshego
Moetladimo	Shatale
Moganyaka	Tubatse

It is not the intention of this study to criticise the views on urbanisation held by the Department of Statistics. It will, however, be wrong to accept it as absolutely correct and irreplaceable. The question which comes to mind when one examines this definition of urbanisation is whether it keeps track with the practical situation, that is, to what extent is it applicable to the situation in Africa? It is without a shadow of doubt a definition which applies to well-established cities and towns in a Western sense. But cities and towns in the Republic of South Africa obviously differ from towns in the different national states, not only as far as the way of life is concerned but also regarding the form or extent of local government, type of administrative function, population density, layout, and existing infrastructure.

According to this official presentation of urbanisation in Lebowa, as shown in Table 4.5, approximately 6,0 per cent of the *de facto* population lived in urban areas in 1970, compared to 7,4 per cent in 1980. There are various other countries in Africa where less than 8 per cent of the populations are urbanised, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Niger, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland (Hance, 1977, p. 130). There are, however, also countries in Africa where the percentage urban populations are higher, for example Algeria with 54 per cent (see Table 2.10), Egypt with 41 per cent and Tunisia with 20 per cent.

As stated, it is difficult to compare this level of urbanisation in Lebowa with other countries, because of various criteria that are used to define an urban area. Despite low levels of urbanisation in some countries in Africa, however, this continent still has the highest *rate* of urbanisation in the world.

Attempts have been made, in the case of various national states, including Lebowa, to view their populations in a more realistic and practical way. The Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development (BENSOC) estimates, for instance, that by only taking into account the inhabitants of proclaimed townships, which form a part of the real urban population in the national states, the populations of these townships have increased from 9,8 per cent in 1970 to an average of 16,0 per cent in 1980. Table 4.6 shows that nearly 1,72 million

Table 4.5 - The urban and rural *de facto* Black population of Lebowa, 1970 and 1980 ('000)

District <sup>1)</sup>	1970			1980		
	Urban	Rural	Total population	Urban	Rural	Total population
Bochom	-	47,0	47,0	-	101,3	101,3
Mokerong	10,1	159,1	169,2	13,3	218,8	232,1
Seshego	18,4	116,1	134,5	29,7	176,4	206,1
Sekgosese	-	46,6	46,6	1,0	25,0	26,0
Bolobedu	2,4	80,6	83,0	4,5	112,1	116,6
Thabamoopo	3,3	124,2	127,5	13,1	200,5	213,6
Naphuno <sup>2)</sup>	15,9	54,2	70,1	26,9	97,0	123,9
Mapulaneng	3,9	58,9	62,8	14,6	91,5	106,1
Nebo	3,0	130,3	133,3	12,1	184,0	196,1
Sekhukhuleni	5,2	157,7	162,9	2,9	264,3	267,2
Total	62,1	974,8	1036,9	118,1	1470,9	1589,0

1) Excluding the Moutse district.

2) Including the Phalaborwa district.

Source: Department of Statistics, Geographical distribution of the population, report No. 02-05-10, and preliminary census figures, 1980 census, Pretoria.

people lived in proclaimed townships in the national and independent states in 1980.

From Table 4.6 it can be seen that 8,3 per cent of Lebowa's population was regarded as living in proclaimed townships in 1980, which is slightly higher than the "official" figure of 7,4 per cent of the Department of Statistics, shown in Table 4.5.

The three national states with the highest percentage of inhabitants in proclaimed townships are Ciskei (35,5 per cent), Kangwane (28,5 per cent) and Kwazulu (24,3 per cent). This study, which focuses on Lebowa, will indicate that even this view only tells half the truth

Table 4.6 - Populations of proclaimed townships in national and independent states, 1980

State	Total population <sup>1)</sup> ( '000)	Proclaimed townships <sup>2)</sup> ( '000)	Percentage
Kwazulu	3408,2	830,2	24,3
Qwaqwa	156,5	15,9	10,2
Lebowa	1739,5	145,2 <sup>3)</sup>	8,3
Gazankulu	512,0	15,2	3,0
Kangwane	160,6	45,8	28,5
Kwandebele	156,3	25,4	16,3
Subtotal	6133,1	1091,3	17,7
Transkei	2255,3	180,4 <sup>4)</sup>	8,0
Bophuthatswana	1323,3	211,8	16,0
Venda	315,5	6,7	2,1
Ciskei	669,3	237,7	35,5
Total	10696,5	1714,3	16,0

1) Revised estimates of the Department of Statistics (May, 1982).

2) Estimates of Benso (1982).

3) Excluding the inhabitants of Ragae, but including the inhabitants of Moetladimo.

4) Based on the assumption that 8,0 per cent of the total Black *de facto* population of Transkei is urbanised.

Source: Department of Statistics (1982), unpublished census figures; and Benso (1982), unpublished statistics.

about the real urban population of Lebowa. This probably also goes for most other national states.

Although Table 4.6 is a *closer* account of the urban populations of the national states (including Lebowa), it is still not a true reflection of urbanisation in these areas. Butler, Rotberg and Adams (1977, p. 19) are, for instance, of the opinion that, as far as urbanisation in Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu is concerned, the existing statistics seem to under-estimate the extent of real agglomeration in both national states. Even in rural areas, they claim "... concentrated villages

rather than dispersed settlements are the rule". When one visits rural areas in the national states or when aerial photographs are studied, one is impressed by the density of the population of these areas. Large villages (huge agglomerations of people) are numerous. Many of these concentrated villages are not even on record - neither on maps nor on statistical forms!!

In an independent study by a consulting engineering firm, an attempt was made to determine the urban population in one section of Lebowa, namely South Lebowa (Nebo, Thabamoopo, Sekhukhune land, Naphuno and Mokerong 3) for purposes of creating a master water development plan. This was done by identifying the villages on aerial photographs, plotting them on 1:50 000 scale maps, counting the number of dwellings per hectare in some villages (on a sample basis), and multiplying the average number of dwellings per hectare (referring to village sizes) by the total area of each village, to give the estimated number of dwellings in each village, which, when multiplied by the average number of people per dwelling (estimated to be six people), gives the estimated urban population of Southern Lebowa (Lund and Partner; 1980).

By making use of this method, it has been calculated that 70 per cent of the total population of Southern Lebowa can be regarded as "urban", as shown in Table 4.7.

This method, however, has some deficiencies. Firstly, it does not take into consideration the type of activities of the "urban" population, i.e. whether they depend on agriculture for their survival or not.

Secondly, when aerial photographs are used to determine the size of a population through the counting of dwellings, in denser settlements where people are primarily involved in agricultural activities many structures may be counted as dwellings which in fact are non-residential huts in which agricultural products are stored. Thirdly, it should be realised that the main objective of this independent study is to make proposals for a water supply plan for the Olifants River catchment area (i.e. South Lebowa), and is not primarily a classification of the urban and rural population. It is, however, necessary to take note of the approach used in this regard.

Table 4.7 - Estimated urban population of Southern Lebowa, 1980

	Estimated number of dwellings	Total population	Estimated urban population
Mokerong 3	9 750	58 200	58 260
Thabamoopo	25 955	213 744	155 730
Nebo	21 570	196 354	129 420
Sekhukhuneland	29 455	268 547	176 730
Naphuno	10 260	88 290	61 560
Total	96 955	825 135	581 700

Source: BGA Lund and Partner, Consulting Engineers, Johannesburg, in a feasibility study for the Department of Co-operation and Development, 1980.

To conclude this section, a closer look will be taken at the other component of the *de facto* population, namely the rural population. The reason why this distinction is made here, is that this particular composition of the rural population will be used to compile a new classification of urbanisation in Lebowa. This composition can, in this section, be compared to the official rural composition made by the Department of Statistics.

In Table 4.8 the Department of Agriculture in Lebowa estimates a total rural *de facto* population of nearly 1,59 million. This total differs from the official figure in Table 4.5 (1,47 million) but is believed to represent a more realistic composition.

The rural population in Table 4.8 consists of people living in "closer settlements" (i.e. planned rural but *non-agricultural* residential areas located on either government or tribal land), "agricultural settlements" (i.e. settlements where inhabitants have farming rights), and "squatter areas" (i.e. areas where people settle spontaneously and are involved in either non-agricultural or agricultural activities, depending on the location of the settlements).

The population of closer settlements counted 33 900 or 2,1 per cent of the total rural population, while squatters counted 40 500 or 2,6 per cent of the total rural population, with more than 1,5 million or 95,3 per cent of the rural population living in agricultural settlements.

Table 4.8 - The composition of the rural population of Lebowa, 1980 ('000)

District	Closer settle=ments	Other settlements			Total rural popula=tion
		Agricul=ture set=tlements	Squat=ter areas	Total	
Bochum	-	94,6	-	94,6	94,6
Mokerong	-	217,7	5,6	223,3	223,3
Seshego	0,4	180,9	0,1	181,0	181,4
Sekgosese	0,4	73,3	1,6	74,9	75,3
Bolobedu	16,7	102,0	6,0	108,0	124,7
Thabamopo	-	257,2	0,5	257,7	257,7
Naphuno <sup>1)</sup>	3,0	99,4	5,0	104,4	107,4
Mapulaneng	4,2	61,9	21,5	83,4	87,6
Nebo	5,6	175,1	-	175,1	180,7
Sekhukhuland					
- Praktiseer	3,6	121,7	0,2	121,9	125,5
- Schoonoord	-	130,5	-	130,5	130,5
Total	33,9	1514,3	40,5	1554,8	1588,7

1) Including the Phalaborwa district.

Source: Department of Agriculture, Lebowa, unpublished information, March 1980.

#### 4.4 POPULATION AND URBANISATION - TOMORROW

##### 4.4.1 Introduction

After a description of the population of Lebowa in the historical cen=suses, including the most recent census in 1980, in Section 4.2 of this Chapter, where various relevant aspects affecting especially the *de facto* population have been outlined, together with a description of the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa in Section 4.3, mainly as seen by offi=cial institutions, this section can now look at the future.

This part will, in the first place, put forward a new classification as far as urbanisation in Lebowa (and other national states) is concerned.

This will be a more practical approach, as well as more applicable to the context in Africa as experienced at present.

Secondly, this section will produce projections, based on this new classification, of the size of the *de facto* population and the urbanised population in Lebowa for the years 2000 and 2020. The projections have serious implications for all people concerned with the Black urbanisation process in labour surplus areas.

#### 4.4.2 A new classification

In order to get a clear understanding of the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa, a new and realistic view is required. This will benefit our knowledge and understanding of this phenomenon in the context of Africa. Hopefully, this new and more realistic approach to the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa will assist in the planning and development of the area.

In developing this approach, certain assumptions are necessary, e.g. on what is regarded as urban, semi-urban and rural areas, and on the classification of towns, settlements and other areas in such categories. In Chapter 2, one of the criteria of urbanisation described to define an urban area was that of urban activities, i.e. agricultural and non-agricultural activities. At this stage it is important to identify those sections of the *rural* population in Lebowa that are involved in agricultural activities, as distinguished from those people who are involved in non-agricultural activities and who are not dependent on agricultural activities for a living. People falling in the last category are the inhabitants of closer settlements and the majority of squatters, depending on where these squatter areas are located.

There are, in other words, 33 900 people from closer settlements who are not involved in agricultural activities and, as will be pointed out later in this section, an estimated 29 500 squatters who are involved in non-agricultural activities. Most of these squatters are resident in the Mapulaneng district near large towns outside Lebowa, such as Tzaneen, Hoedspruit, Graskop and Pietersburg.

As far as the *urban* population of Lebowa is concerned, a more realistic view than the official one presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.5 is needed

for reasons already mentioned. In Table 4.9 the urban population, as estimated by the Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development (Benso) is given. The populations of all the officially proclaimed townships in Lebowa are included in this urban population, with the exception of Morathong, which may be de-proclaimed in the near future. These 17 proclaimed townships had an estimated population of 145 244 inhabitants (8,3 per cent of the total *de facto* Black population) in 1980.

The *rural* population in Table 4.9 consists of inhabitants of closer settlements, agricultural settlements and squatters. In 1980, some 33 900 people lived in closer settlements (as shown also in Table 4.8). The inhabitants of agricultural settlements, as shown in Table 4.9, are the *highest* total population in each district, as accounted for by the Department of Statistics in Table 4.5 or by the Department of Agriculture in Lebowa in Table 4.8. Basically, the populations shown in Table 4.8 have been taken as correct, with adjustments only in the districts of Bochum, Mapulaneng, Nebo and Sekhukhuneland. The total figure of nearly 1,54 million people in agricultural settlements is higher than the population given by each of the two sources mentioned.

In Lebowa there are an estimated 40 500 squatters (see Table 4.8). Some of these people are involved in agricultural activities, while the majority are *not* dependent on agricultural activities for their survival. The criterion to be used to distinguish people in this regard is the geographic location of the squatter areas. In squatter settlements near larger towns or areas of possible job opportunities, it is most likely that squatters will be involved in non-agricultural activities for their survival. It is estimated in Table 4.9 that 29 500 squatters fall in this category, with the balance involved in agricultural activities (legally or illegally).

The *total rural population* of Lebowa, consisting of the inhabitants of the various settlements as discussed above, amounted to nearly 1.6 million people in 1980, which together with the urban population, amounted to a total *de facto* Black population of 1 745 300 people.

The percentage composition of the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa presented in Table 4.9 reveals that 8,3 per cent live in proclaimed

Table 4.9 - The revised urban and rural *de facto* Black population of Lebowa, 1980 ('000)

District	Urban population		Rural population				Total
	Proclaimed township	Population	Closer settlements	Agricultural settlements	Squatters	Total	
Bochum		-	-	101,3	-	101,3	101,3
Mokerong		15,2	-	217,7	5,6	223,3	238,6
	Mahwelereng	15,2					
Seshego		40,4	0,4	180,9	-	181,3	221,8
	Seshego	40,4					
Sekgosese		0,9	0,4	73,3	-	73,7	74,6
	Senwamokgope	0,9					
Bolobedu		34,2	16,7	102,0	3,3	122,0	156,2
	Namakgale	23,8					
	Ga-Kgapane	10,4					
Thabamopo		17,8	-	257,2	0,5	257,7	275,5
	Lebowakgomo	4,9					
	Mankweng	4,9					
	Sebayeng	8,0					
Naphuno <sup>1)</sup>		9,8	3,0	99,4	5,0	107,4	117,2
	Lenyenyee	8,4					
	Moetladimo <sup>2)</sup>	1,4					
Mapulaneng		10,7	4,2	65,8	15,0	107,4	117,2
	Leroro	2,4					
	Motlamotgatshane	1,6					
	Shatale	6,7					
Nebo		13,5	5,6	178,4	-	184,0	197,5
	Hlogotlou	6,0					
	Moganyaka	4,0					
	Motetema	3,5					
Sekhukhuland		2,7	3,6	260,5	-	264,1	266,8
	Tubatse	2,7					
<b>Total</b>		<b>145,2</b>	<b>33,9</b>	<b>1 536,5</b>	<b>29,4</b>	<b>1 599,8</b>	<b>1 745,3</b>

1) Including the Phalaborwa district in the case of the rural population.

2) Based on an assumed growth rate of 11,8 per cent per annum for the Naphuno district (Lebowa Government, Report No. W1/78, p. 8).

Source: Tables 4.5, 4.8 and Benso (1982), unpublished information.

townships, 2,0 per cent in closer settlements, and 1,7 in squatter settlements. The population of agricultural settlements represents 88,0 per cent.

It is clear that the inhabitants of proclaimed townships, closer settlements and most squatter settlements are primarily involved in non-agricultural activities. There are instances where closer settlements border on agricultural settlements but where the inhabitants work outside the agricultural sector. Many closer settlements may be regarded as forerunners of proclaimed townships.

It is, therefore, desirable at this stage to make a distinction between (1) inhabitants of proclaimed townships, as part of the urban population, (2) inhabitants of closer settlements and squatter settlements, as part of a "semi-urban" population, and (3) inhabitants of agricultural settlements as part of the rural population.

The reasons for the identification of a "semi-urban" population are threefold. Firstly, although the definition of urban population (i.e. inhabitants of proclaimed townships) is accepted, it is not a complete definition as far as areas such as Lebowa are concerned. Secondly, the urban population in Lebowa has grown to some extent out of semi-urban settlements, mostly in step-wise movements. Thirdly, there are many people in Lebowa and other national states who do not live in proclaimed towns, but who are also not involved in agricultural activities and who can, therefore, not be regarded as part of the rural population.

Such a classification is, therefore, still not complete, the reason being that there are many so-called agricultural settlements whose inhabitants are so numerous that it is highly unlikely that all of them will be involved in agricultural activities. It is, therefore, reasoned that agricultural settlements with large populations should be classified as part of Lebowa's "semi-urban" population, because of the fact that the inhabitants are involved in non-agricultural activities. The problem is to identify agricultural settlements that are "large" enough to be included in the "semi-urban" population.

In many international studies, using the minimum population size criterion, "urban" places are regarded as localities with between 2 000 and 5 000 inhabitants (United Nations, 1976, p. 17). Various countries and writers use different cut-off points to define urban areas. Dwyer (1975) and Weber (1899) regards 5 000 inhabitants, for example, as a realistic cut-off point to define an urban area, while Price-Williams (1880) regards 2 000 inhabitants as a realistic cut-off point. Countries using a threshold of 5 000 inhabitants include India, Japan, Sudan and Turkey, while France and various Latin American countries use a threshold of 2 000 inhabitants (see Jones, 1975).

In the case of the 922 agricultural settlements in Lebowa, three options are available to determine a cut-off point for a "semi-urban" population based on some international studies regarding minimum size populations and the involvement of inhabitants in non-agricultural activities.

One of the reasons why a "semi-urban" classification is used here instead of an "urban" classification mentioned in the international literature is that this study wants to keep the already existing definition of an "urban" population separate from this extended classification. At a later stage in this chapter these two concepts will be united to form an overall picture.

The three criteria to be considered are agricultural settlements with:

- (a) 2 000 or more inhabitants;
- (b) 3 500 or more inhabitants; and
- (c) 5 000 or more inhabitants.

These cut-off points are within internationally acceptable limits. The cut-off point of 3 500 inhabitants represents the average of 2 000 and 5 000 inhabitants. Furthermore, looking at the poor performance of agricultural activities in Lebowa, it is unlikely that large agricultural settlements can support and feed very large populations. The moment this happens, people get involved in non-agricultural activities for their survival and *ipso facto* become, at least, part of a "semi-urban" population.

The results of grouping these agricultural settlements are shown in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. Settlements with 2 000 or more inhabitants account for 63,5 per cent of the total population of agricultural settlements (975 600 people). The comparable figures for settlements with 3 500 or

Table 4.10 - Agriculture settlements in Lebowa with more than 2 000, 3 500 and 5 000 inhabitants respectively, 1980 ('000)

District	Agricultural settlements				
	Number	Total population	Population exceeding:		
			2 000	3 500	5 000
Bochum	93	101,3	3,2	-	-
Mokerong	152	217,7	127,0	66,6	21,7
Seshego	128	180,9	77,6	9,3	5,2
Sekgosese	24	73,3	66,6	56,2	40,9
Bolobedu	62	102,0	50,5	16,6	-
Thabamopo	105	257,2	214,9	153,3	120,9
Naphuno	40	99,4	88,6	62,7	53,7
Mapulaneng	43	65,8	46,1	28,6	-
Nebo	127	178,4	103,5	57,5	57,6
Sekhukhuneland	148	260,5	197,6	98,0	67,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>1 536,5</b>	<b>975,6</b>	<b>548,8</b>	<b>367,7</b>

Source: Department of Agriculture, Lebowa, unpublished information, March 1980.

more inhabitants are 35,7 per cent or 548 800 people, and for settlements with 5 000 or more inhabitants, 23,9 per cent or 367 700 people.

From Table 4.11 it can be seen that the district of Sekgosese has the largest percentages of people in each of the three different categories. In the 5 000 or more inhabitants category it can be seen that five districts, namely Sekgosese (55,8 per cent), Naphuno (54,0 per cent), Thabamopo (47,0 per cent), Nebo (32,9 per cent), and Sekhukhuneland (26,0 per cent), have more than one quarter or 25 per cent of their total agricultural settlement population in this category. The highest absolute concentrations in this category are found in Thabamopo (120 900 people), and Nebo (58 000 people). These two districts contain more than 47 per cent of the people in this category.

Using a total urban population of 145 200 people, and a "semi-urban" population consisting of the inhabitants of closer settlements, selected squatter settlements and one of the three categories involving the agricultural settlements, one can determine the total real rural population. This is shown in Table 4. ©2 University of Pretoria

Table 4.11 - Agriculture settlements in Lebowa with more than 2 000, 3 500 and 5 000 inhabitants respectively, 1980  
(Percentages)

District	Percentage population in settlements with populations exceeding:		
	2 000	3 500	5 000
Bochum	3,2	-	-
Mokerong	58,3	30,6	10,0
Seshego	42,9	5,1	2,9
Sekgosese	90,9	76,7	55,8
Bolobedu	49,5	16,3	-
Thabamoopo	83,6	59,6	47,0
Naphuno	89,1	63,1	54,0
Mapulaneng	70,1	43,5	-
Nebo	58,0	32,2	32,9
Sekhukhuneland	75,9	37,6	26,0
Total	63,5	35,7	23,9

Source: See Table 4.10.

The total *de facto* Black population of Lebowa amounts to 1,745 million in 1980, with four districts each having a total population of more than 200 000 people, namely Thabamoopo (275 500), Sekhukhuneland (266 800), Mokerong (238 600) and Seshego (221 800).

Also shown in Table 4.12 are the semi-urban and rural populations of Lebowa, using the three different population cut-off points in the case of agricultural settlements. Each of the three semi-urban categories in Table 4.16 includes the inhabitants of agricultural settlements in that district in that specific category, together with the inhabitants of the closer settlements in that district, and the inhabitants of identified squatter settlements in that district. With an agricultural settlement population cut-off point of 5 000 inhabitants,

Table 4.12 - The urban population and various categories of the semi-urban and rural population of Lebowa, 1980 ('000)

	Urban population	Semi-urban population <sup>1)</sup>			Rural population <sup>2)</sup>			Total population
		2000	3500	5000	2000	3500	5000	
Bochum	-	3,2	-	-	98,1	101,3	101,3	101,3
Mokerong	15,2	132,5	72,3	27,3	90,9	151,1	196,1	238,6
Seshego	40,4	78,0	9,7	5,6	103,4	171,7	175,8	221,8
Sekgosese	0,9	67,0	56,6	41,3	6,7	17,1	32,4	74,6
Bolobedu	34,2	70,5	36,6	20,0	51,5	85,4	102,0	156,2
Thabamopo	17,8	215,4	153,8	121,4	42,3	103,9	136,3	275,5
Naphuno	9,8	96,8	70,7	61,7	10,6	36,7	45,7	117,2
Mapulaneng	10,7	65,3	47,8	19,2	19,8	37,3	65,9	95,8
Nebo	13,5	109,1	63,2	63,2	74,9	120,8	120,8	197,5
Sekhukhuneland	2,7	201,2	101,5	71,3	62,9	162,6	192,8	266,8
Total	145,2	1 039,0	612,2	431,0	561,1	987,9	1 169,1	1 745,3

1) Each of the three categories includes:

- (a) the relevant population of agricultural settlements in that category.
- (b) the population of closer settlements; and
- (c) squatters.

2) Each category depends on the size of the semi-urban population.

Source: Tables 4.10 and 4.11.

for instance, the total semi-urban population of Lebowa amounts to 431 000 people, or 24,7 per cent of the total *de facto* Black population.


The rural population shown in Table 4.12 is based on the size of the semi-urban population and represents the population in each district which is not included in either the urban or the semi-urban population.

Figure 4.2 is a visual presentation of Table 4.12 which shows in the three columns A, B and C, the urban population, the relevant semi-urban population and the relevant rural population, respectively. Each of the three columns represents different semi-urban and rural populations, because of the different population cut-off points as far as agricultural settlements are concerned. Column A indicates a semi-urban population that is larger than the rural population, while column C presents the most "normal" pyramid of urban, semi-urban and rural populations.

From Table 4.12 and Figure 4.2 it can be seen that when a semi-urban population is selected which includes agricultural settlements of 2 000 or more inhabitants, the total semi-urban population amounts to 1 039 000 people or 59,5 per cent of the total *de facto* population. The rural population amounts to 561 100 people or 32,1 per cent. Using this measurement, namely a semi-urban population which includes agricultural settlements with 2 000 or more inhabitants, one obtains the results for individual districts in Lebowa shown in Figure 4.3. In this instance, only two districts (Seshego and Bochum) have larger rural than semi-urban populations.

With a semi-urban population which includes agricultural settlements of 3 500 or more inhabitants, this semi-urban population amounts to 612 200 people or 35,1 per cent, with a corresponding rural population of 987 900 people or 56,6 per cent of the total *de facto* population. From Figure 4.4 it can be seen that three districts (Thabamopo, Naphuno and Sekgosese) have semi-urban populations exceeding their rural populations. Thabamopo and Sekhukhune land remain the two districts with the largest semi-urban populations.

With a semi-urban population which includes agricultural settlements of 5 000 or more inhabitants, 431 000 people or 24,7 per cent of the people can be classified as semi-urban, with a rural population of







Figure 4.4 - The urban, semi-urban and rural population of Lebowa, by district, 1980<sup>1)</sup>



1 169 100 people or 67,0 per cent. Figure 4.5 shows that only Naphuno and Sekgosese have semi-urban populations larger than their rural populations, while Sekhukhuneland, Mokerong and Seshego have the largest rural populations.

On the basis of international studies on the size of urban areas referred to earlier and the phenomenon of urbanisation in Africa today, the most conservative step in this regard is to accept the inhabitants of proclaimed townships in Lebowa as being urbanised, and to regard all inhabitants of closer settlements, selected squatter settlements and agricultural settlements with more than 5 000 inhabitants as "semi-urban" population, with the balance being classified as rural population who depends on agricultural activities for their survival.

This final classification appears in Table 4.13. It shows the urban population (inhabitants of the 17 proclaimed townships indicated), semi-urban population (comprising the inhabitants of 17 closer settlements, 46 agricultural settlements with more than 5 000 inhabitants and 31 selected squatter settlements) and the rural population primarily involved in agricultural activities.

The geographical distribution of the *de facto* population of Lebowa (1980) is shown in Map 4.2. All proclaimed townships are indicated as well as settlements with total populations exceeding 1 000, 2 000, 3 500 and 5 000 inhabitants respectively. These include closer settlements, agricultural settlements and squatter settlements.

*The conclusion reached as far as this classification of the de facto Black population of Lebowa is concerned, is that 33 per cent of the population live in urban and semi-urban areas, with 67 per cent of the population in rural areas. This is an indication that the process of urbanisation in Lebowa has already reached an advanced stage and, in the light of the high urbanisation rate in Africa, that it can be expected that this process will accelerate towards the year 2000. Planning is of crucial importance and no time should be lost devoting urgent attention to this phenomenon.*

Figure 4.5 - The urban, semi-urban and rural population of Lebowa, by district, 1980<sup>1)</sup>




Table 4.13 - The urban, semi-urban and rural population of Lebowa, 1980

District	Proclaimed township <sup>1)</sup>	Popu= lation	Closer settlement	Popu= lation	Agricultural settlement <sup>2)</sup>	Popu= lation	Squatters <sup>3)</sup>	Popu= lation	Rural popu= lation	Total popu= lation
Bolobedu	Namakgale	23 765	Modjadji	1 018			Modjadji	2 698		
	Ga-Kgapane	10 395	Senobela Bellevue (Lebaka) Mamaila	3 984 1 607 10 073			Senobela	638		
		<u>34 160</u>		<u>16 682</u>		<u>-</u>		<u>3 336</u>	<u>102 000</u>	<u>156 178</u>
Nebo	Hlogotlou	5 999	Rietvallei	1 674	Malagies A & B	7 312				
	Moganyaka	4 010	Brakfontein	1 805	Mooifontein	11 773				
	Motetema	3 520	Gembokspruit Uitkyk	896 1 237	Hooggelegen Tafelkop Rietfontein	7 387 21 890 9 190				
		<u>13 529</u>		<u>5 612</u>		<u>57 552</u>		<u>-</u>	<u>120 800</u>	<u>197 493</u>
Mapulaneng	Leroro	2 462	Rooiboklaagte	168			C.R. Didimala	445		
	Motlamotgatshane	1 560	Casteel	2 752			Ar Apara	168		
	Shatale	6 724	Oakley	1 248			BR	340		
							Brooklyn (R <sub>1</sub> ,R <sub>2</sub> ,R <sub>3</sub> )	604		
							Greenvalley	23		
							Mapaleng	133		
							Tsakane	194		
							Arthurseat	848		
							Ga-Josefa	70		
							Graigieburn	757		
							Argashabangu	153		
							Gr Gangobeni	75		
							R11	1 075		
						Alexandria	1 212			
						Oakley	2 591			
						Marite	6 345			
		<u>10 746</u>		<u>4 168</u>		<u>-</u>		<u>15 033</u>	<u>65 900</u>	<u>95 847</u>
Naphuno	Lenyenyee	8 433	Hlohlokwe	3 034	Mosorong	6 285	R1	893		
	Moetladimo <sup>4)</sup>	1 409			Lephepane	5 113	Lephepane	576		
					Moime	6 030	The Willows	1 978		
							Finale	738		
						Nkoko Sunnyside	12 823	Nkoko Sunnyside	275	
						Mogapeng	10 312	Mogapeng	562	
						Mosahate R <sub>1</sub> ,R <sub>2</sub> ,R <sub>3</sub>	6 965 6 135			
		<u>9 842</u>		<u>3 034</u>		<u>53 663</u>		<u>5 022</u>	<u>45 639</u>	<u>117 200</u>

Table 4.13 (continued)

District	Proclaimed township <sup>1)</sup>	Popu=lation	Closer settlements	Popu=lation	Agricultural settlements <sup>2)</sup>	Popu=lation	Squatters <sup>3)</sup>	Popu=lation	Rural popu=lation	Total popu=lation
Mokerong	Mahwelereng	15 177			Gezond Zebediela Phasiane	5 043 11 141 5 542	Magoto Mankweng Magatle	1 599 2 750 1 265		
		<u>15 177</u>		-		21 726		<u>5 614</u>	<u>196 100</u>	<u>238 617</u>
Sekgosesese	Senwamokgope	869	Lomondokop Senwamokgope	74 271	Mpakane Sekonye Sekakane Hartebeesfontein Middelwater Sekgopo	8 338 5 989 5 465 6 137 5 944 9 050				
		<u>869</u>		<u>345</u>		<u>40 923</u>		-	<u>32 400</u>	<u>74 537</u>
Seshego	Seshego	40 474	Vlakfontein Vlaklaagte	10 420	Vaalwater	5 180	Phoffy Uitlucht	10 18		
		<u>40 474</u>		<u>430</u>		<u>5 180</u>		<u>28</u>	<u>175 800</u>	<u>221 912</u>
Sekhukhuneland	Tubatse	2 667	Bothashoek	3 617	Ba Kgwete BA Kgaut=swane (Ward 11) Kwena Mafolo (Ward 1,2) Mooihoek Bakone-Phuti (Ward 1) Strydkraal Soupiana Baroka Ba Nkwana (Ward 24A) Paradys Boschkloof	10 650 5 210 9 094 11 348 5 464 5 836 6 197 7 398 6 516				
		<u>2 667</u>		<u>3 617</u>		<u>67 713</u>		-	<u>192 800</u>	<u>266 797</u>

Table 4.13 (continued)

District	Proclaimed township <sup>1)</sup>	Popu- lation	Closer settlements	Popu- lation	Agricultural settlements <sup>2)</sup>	Popu- lation	Squatters <sup>3)</sup>	Popu- lation	Rural popu- lation	Total popu- lation
Thabamopo	Lebowakgomo	4 904			Soetfontein	6 395	Laastehoop (Ward 7)	198		
	Mankweng	4 916			Kraalfontein	6 794	Schoonheid (Ward 1)	332		
	Sebayeng	7 960			Sebjeng	6 597				
					Ditlhophaneng	6 367				
					Maniwaile	6 697				
					Mamatsha	7 684				
					Kopermyn	7 146				
					Schoonheid (Ward 2)	9 177				
					Schuitsrand	13 250				
					Hartebeeslaagte	6 329				
					Boschplaas	6 511				
					Scheiding/Goudhoek	6 136				
					Byldrift	6 688				
					Grootklip	5 573				
					Mafefe	9 737				
					Mafefe	9 861				
		<u>17 780</u>		<u>-</u>		<u>120 942</u>		<u>530</u>	<u>136 300</u>	<u>275 552</u>
Bochum		<u>-</u>		<u>-</u>		<u>-</u>		<u>-</u>	<u>101 300</u>	<u>101 300</u>
Grand total	Proclaimed Town- ship <sup>1)</sup>	<u>145 244</u>		<u>33 888</u>		<u>367 699</u>		<u>29 563</u>	<u>1 169 039</u>	<u>1 745 433</u>

1) Proclaimed townships as published in the Government Gazette, No. 5236, dated July 30th, 1976, excluding Elandsdoorn (Moutse district) which no longer falls under the jurisdiction of the Lebowa Government, and Morathong (Naphuno district) for which no statistics are available.

2) Includes only agricultural settlements with 5 000 or more inhabitants.

3) Squatters in agricultural settlements comprising more than 50 per cent of the total population of such a settlement, and squatters in agricultural settlements near places of job opportunities who are most likely involved in non-agricultural activities.

4) Based on an assumed growth rate of 11,8 per cent per annum for the Naphuno district (Lebowa Government, Report No. W1/78, p. 8).

Source: Table 4.12.



#### 4.4.3 The year 2000 and beyond

With a more realistic classification of the *de facto* Black population in Lebowa completed in section 4.2, and the extent of urbanisation in section 4.3, the crucial question is what about the future? What is the total *de facto* Black population of Lebowa going to be in 2000? How many people will be urbanised by the end of this century? To answer these questions, certain projections and planning is needed.

##### 4.4.3.1 The *de facto* population

Many of the problems associated with urbanisation in Lebowa are rooted in the rapid growth of the *de facto* population. This population growth is a function of natural increase and of net migration, while it can also be stimulated by voluntary or forced resettlement, under-enumeration in population censuses and political factors, such as border changes.

Table 4.14 shows the adjusted *de facto* population of Lebowa (from Table 4.13) projected for the years 2000 and 2020. Three different growth rates have been used in the projections. The first projected growth rate of 2,6 per cent is based on the growth rate used in the National Development plan for Lebowa, prepared by the University of Pretoria, which estimates an average growth rate of 2,64 per cent of the *de facto* population of Lebowa for the period 1980 to 2000 (University of Pretoria, 1982, paragraph 3.1.2.6). At this growth rate the *de facto* population will increase to more than 2,9 million by the year 2000 and to nearly 4,9 million by the year 2020.

A growth rate of 3 per cent is not unrealistic, taking into consideration the historical population growth trend in Lebowa, as was shown in Table 4.2. It is within biological limits (Sadie estimates a maximum growth rate for South African born Blacks of 3,06 per cent in 1990). At a growth rate of 3 per cent, the *de facto* population will increase to more than 3,1 million by 2000 and to nearly 5,7 million by 2020.

A third growth rate of 4 per cent has also been considered in the population projection of Lebowa. This "high" growth rate, which is lower than some historical population growth rates in Lebowa in the last 30 years, can be ascribed to natural increase, which has already been dis=

Table 4.14 - Adjusted and projected *de facto* population of Lebowa, 1980, 2000 and 2020  
 ('000)

District	1980	2000			2020		
		2,6%	3%	4%	2,6%	3%	4%
Bochum	101,3	169,3	183,0	222,0	282,8	330,4	486,3
Mokerong	238,6	398,7	430,9	552,8	666,1	778,3	1 145,5
Seshego	221,8	370,6	400,6	486,0	619,2	723,5	1 064,9
Sekgosesa	74,6	124,6	134,7	163,5	208,3	243,3	358,2
Bolobedu	156,2	261,0	282,1	342,2	436,1	509,6	750,0
Thabamoopo	275,5	460,3	497,6	603,6	769,2	898,7	1 322,7
Naphuno	117,2	195,8	211,7	256,8	327,2	382,3	562,7
Mapulaneng	95,8	160,1	173,0	210,0	267,5	312,5	460,0
Nebo	197,5	330,0	356,7	432,7	551,4	644,2	948,2
Sekhukhune land	266,8	445,8	481,9	584,6	744,9	870,3	1 280,9
<b>Total</b>	<b>1745,3</b>	<b>2916,2</b>	<b>3152,2</b>	<b>3824,1</b>	<b>4872,7</b>	<b>5693,2</b>	<b>8379,2</b>

Source: Table 4.13.

cussed, net migration, under-enumeration of the population and the "abnormal" male:female ratio.

*Net migration* is the excess of people returning to the area over the people leaving the area. As far as immigration is concerned, it can either be voluntary (for example people returning to their area of origin after a period of absence from the area) or it can be compulsory (for example people being resettled from prescribed and non-prescribed areas, which has already been referred to). The resettlement of people can in some cases be substantial, thus contributing to a larger *de facto* population.


The second factor that can contribute to a population growth rate of 4 per cent for Lebowa is *under-enumerations* especially of Blacks in previous population censuses. It is accepted that a general under-enumeration of Blacks in the rural areas of South Africa took place in 1960.

A third factor playing a role in a high growth rate in Lebowa is the abnormally large number of females. In Table 4.3 it has been indicated that there are two females for every male in Lebowa in the age group 15-64 years of age. More than 57 per cent of the total *de facto* Black population of Lebowa are female, with the result that more new births can be expected (recorded and/or not recorded) than in an area with a more normal male:female ratio.

Taking all factors into consideration, the most realistic projection would seem to be between a minimum population growth rate of 3 per cent and a maximum growth rate of 4 per cent. This means that the total *de facto* population of Lebowa would increase to between 3,2 million and 3,8 million people within the next two decades. Within another twenty years the envisaged population would be between 5,7 million and 8,4 million people. *This* study assumes that the *de facto* population of Lebowa will increase at a rate of 3 per cent to the year 2020, which implies a total *de facto* population of 3,15 million in 2000 and 5,69 million in 2020.

The actual and projected *de facto* population shown in Table 4.14 is presented graphically in Figure 4.6, from which it can be seen that

FIGURE 4.6 : THE *de facto* POPULATION OF LEBOWA FOR 1951, 1960, 1970 AND 1980, WITH ADJUSTED 1980 FIGURE PROJECTED FOR 2000 AND 2020



the 1980 *de facto* population has been adjusted and then projected at different growth rates. The conclusion is that the projected population will fall within the shaded area shown in Figure 4.6. It is assumed that the minimum limit in this shaded area, i.e. a growth rate of 3 per cent, will be achieved.

#### 4.4.3.2 *The urbanised population*

The important question arising from these projections is what part or percentage of the projected *de facto* population will live in urban and semi-urban areas, as already described, towards the end of this century. International studies indicate that countries in Africa have recorded urbanisation rates varying between 2,9 per cent and 18,4 per cent (Table 2.10). The *average* urbanisation rate of the nineteen countries in Africa listed in Table 2.10 (excluding Malawi) during 1970 - 75 amounted to 6,4 per cent, which corresponds with the 6,1 per cent given by Renaud (1981) for 22 selected countries in Africa during the same period. This study being conservative as far as urbanisation in the national states is concerned, in its assumption of projected urbanisation growth rates for Lebowa towards 2000 and 2020, regards 5,0 per cent as a maximum rate and 4,25 per cent as a minimum rate (see the annual urban growth rates for various *regions* in Africa, presented in Table 2.3).

Tables 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show the population projections of 2,6 per cent, 3,0 per cent and 4,0 per cent, respectively, based on Table 4.13. These tables also show the actual level of urbanisation in 1980 as well as the expected levels of urbanisation for the years 2000 and 2020.

As already discussed in the previous section, 33 per cent of the total *de facto* population are urbanised (including urban and semi-urban areas). At an assumed urbanisation rate of 4,25 per cent and a population growth rate of 2,6 per cent, people living in these areas will reach the 45 per cent mark in the year 2000, which will increase to 62,5 per cent by 2020, as can be seen in Table 4.15. This means that nearly double the present *de facto* population of Lebowa will live in urban and semi-urban areas within the next 40 years.

Table 4.15 - The adjusted urban and semi-urban *de facto* population of Lebowa for 1980, and projections for 2000 and 2020<sup>1)</sup>  
 ('000)

Area	1980	%	2000	%	2020	%
Urban and semi-urban	576,2	33,0	1324,6	45,4	3045,2	62,5
Rural	1169,1	67,0	1591,6	54,6	1827,5	37,5
Total	1745,3	100,0	2916,2	100,0	4872,7	100,0

1) Based on a rate of urbanisation of 4,25 per cent per annum, and a population growth rate of 2,6 per cent per annum.

Source: Tables 4.12 and 4.14.

Table 4.16 - The adjusted urban and semi-urban *de facto* population of Lebowa for 1980, and projections for 2000 and 2020<sup>1)</sup>  
 ('000)

Area	1980	%	2000	%	2020	%
Urban and semi-urban	576,2	33,0	1389,6	44,1	3351,4	58,9
Rural	1169,1	67,0	1762,6	55,9	2341,8	41,1
Total	1745,3	100,0	3152,2	100,0	5693,2	100,0

1) Based on an assumed rate of urbanisation of 4,5 per cent per annum, and a population growth rate of 3,0 per cent.

Source: Tables 4.12 and 4.14.

With a population growth rate of 3,0 per cent and an assumed urbanisation rate of 4,5 per cent, nearly 1 390 000 people (or 44,1 per cent) will be urbanised in the year 2000, which will increase to more than 3 350 000 (or 58,9 per cent) by 2020. This is shown in Table 4.16.

Table 4.17 - The adjusted urban and semi-urban *de facto* population of Lebowa for 1980, and projections for 2000 and 2020<sup>1)</sup> ('000)

Area	1980	%	2000	%	2020	%
Urban and semi-urban	576,2	33,0	1528,8	40,0	4056,4	48,4
Rural	1169,1	67,0	2295,3	60,0	4322,8	51,6
Total	1745,3	100,0	3824,1	100,0	8379,2	100,0

1) Based on a rate of urbanisation of 5,0 per cent per annum and a population growth rate of 4,0 per cent.

Source: Tables 4.12 and 4.14.

If the population growth rate is 4,0 per cent and the urbanisation rate 5,0 per cent, Lebowa's urban population will increase to 1 529 000 people (or 40,0 per cent) by 2000, and to over 4 million (or 48,4 per cent) by 2020 (Table 4.17).

Assuming that the same percentage of the *de facto* Black population (20,2 per cent) will be economically active in 2000 as shown in Table 4.4, it follows that at least between 589 100 and 772 500 people will be economically active in the year 2000, compared to less than 210 000 in 1970. This implies an increase of between nearly 20 000 people per annum (53 persons per day) and 26 000 people per annum (70 persons per day). Provision will have to be made for these new entrants to the labour market, especially in the urban areas.

The *conclusion* is that by the turn of the century, Lebowa will most probably have a total *de facto* population of 3,15 million people, of whom 44,1 per cent (or nearly 1,39 million) will be urbanised (see Table 4.16). This is not only a "medium" projection but also a realistic one. The question arises - is the present development strategy geared to provide for such a future urbanisation process, where more than 813 000 people will have to be accommodated in urban and semi-urban areas in the next twenty years, i.e. an average of more than 40 000 people per year?

## CHAPTER 5

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN LEBOWA

## 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, attention will be given to three aspects of the economic structure in Lebowa, namely the gross domestic product (gdp) and its composition by sector; secondly, the gross national income (gni) of Lebowa; and thirdly, the extent of the outflow of purchasing power from Lebowa.

All three these aspects have important consequences for the urbanisation process in Lebowa and need to be discussed and evaluated. Economic activities determine constraints within which urbanisation is possible. From an urbanisation point of view it is important to know what contribution each individual sector makes to the gdp, as well as how many people each sector employs. It is also necessary to determine the relationship between population growth and the ability of individual sectors to provide employment opportunities. Also important is the amount of income generated by the inhabitants of Lebowa, as well as the quantity of the purchasing power retained in the state.

## 5.2 THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)

The gross domestic product of a country can be defined as the total value of all final goods and services produced within the borders of a country during a specific period, usually one year. Table 5.1 shows the gdp of Lebowa by type of economic activity from 1970 tot 1977, divided between market production and non-market production. From Table 5.1 it can be seen that the gdp of Lebowa (at current prices) increased from R39,2 million in 1970 to R118,6 million in 1977 (i.e. 17,9 per cent per annum), which can be mainly attributed to price increases.

Table 5.2 shows the corresponding *percentage* contribution to the gdp by type of economic activity during the same period.

Table 5.1 - The gross domestic product of Lebowa by type of economic activity, 1970 - 1977 (R'000)

Economic activity	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
<b>Market production:</b>								
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	1 163	1 015	1 305	1 260	3 640	3 385	3 216	3 755
Mining and quarrying	7 576	8 516	9 974	11 762	15 019	28 927	24 956	23 329
Manufacturing	585	734	954	1 326	2 275	2 767	3 396	3 345
Electricity, gas and water	12	29	41	38	317	46	52	58
Construction	948	964	862	1 292	1 690	3 451	4 203	5 369
Wholesale and retail trade and catering and accommodation services	2 296	2 523	2 870	3 243	2 661	4 032	4 374	4 913
Transport, storage and communication	573	515	594	850	1 166	1 958	1 991	2 395
Financing, insurance, real estate and business services	2 262	2 362	2 587	2 774	2 956	3 754	3 744	4 169
<b>Community, social and personal services:</b>								
Public administration	3 113	3 837	4 496	5 987	7 902	9 809	13 181	14 577
Educational services	4 687	6 200	7 596	9 222	11 837	16 512	16 071	19 826
Health services	1 998	2 584	2 788	3 232	4 044	6 062	5 538	6 446
Other marketed services	595	695	759	828	910	1 057	1 257	1 384
<b>Total: market production</b>	<b>25 808</b>	<b>29 974</b>	<b>34 826</b>	<b>41 814</b>	<b>55 417</b>	<b>81 760</b>	<b>81 979</b>	<b>89 566</b>
<b>Non-market production:</b>								
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	7 153	6 239	12 466	10 080	19 192	13 686	28 801	15 705
Manufacturing	4 175	4 600	5 087	5 783	6 462	7 212	8 941	10 145
Construction	804	1 113	1 216	1 232	1 320	1 487	1 078	1 000
Home-ownership	1 294	1 420	1 533	1 644	1 760	1 887	1 998	2 166
<b>Total: non-market production</b>	<b>13 426</b>	<b>13 372</b>	<b>20 302</b>	<b>18 739</b>	<b>28 734</b>	<b>24 272</b>	<b>40 818</b>	<b>29 016</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>39 234</b>	<b>43 346</b>	<b>55 128</b>	<b>60 553</b>	<b>84 151</b>	<b>106 032</b>	<b>122 797</b>	<b>118 582</b>

Source: Department of Statistics, *The national accounts of the Bantu Homelands, 1970-1974* (Report No. 09-17-03), *National accounts of the Black states, 1972-1976* (Report No. 09-17-04), and Statistical News Release, P. 1, August 31st, 1981.

Table 5.2 - The percentage composition of the gdp of Lebowa<sup>1)</sup> by type of economic activity, 1970 - 1977

Economic activity	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing	21,2	16,7	25,0	18,7	27,1	16,1	26,1	16,5
Mining and quarrying	19,3	19,6	18,1	19,4	17,8	27,3	20,3	19,7
Manufacture	12,1	12,3	11,0	11,7	10,4	9,4	10,1	11,4
Construction, electricity and water	4,5	4,9	3,8	4,3	3,9	4,7	4,3	5,4
Wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation	5,9	5,8	5,2	5,4	4,4	3,8	3,6	4,1
Transport, storage and communication	1,5	1,2	1,1	1,4	1,4	1,8	1,6	2,0
Financing, insurance, real estate and business services	9,1	8,7	7,5	7,3	5,6	5,3	4,7	5,3
Community, social and personal services	26,5	30,7	28,4	31,8	29,3	31,5	29,3	35,6
TOTAL	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

1) Including Moutse district.

Source: Table 5.1.

From these two tables it can be seen that, as far as the contribution of the different sectors to the gdp in Lebowa is concerned, *agriculture* (only the non-market production) makes the largest single contribution. During 1977 this sector contributed a total of 16,5 per cent, after having reached a high of 26,1 per cent in 1976. This variation in the percentage share of agriculture can mainly be ascribed to the fact that agricultural conditions in Lebowa vary from year to year, influencing especially the non-market agricultural production.

The large contribution of non-market agricultural production, which reached R28,8 million in 1976, is an indication of the relative importance of subsistence farming in Lebowa, where food and livestock are primarily produced for private consumption as well as other purposes.

In general, however, the agricultural activities in Lebowa are still underdeveloped and faced with severe problems. The commission that looked into the socio-economic development of the Black areas in the former Union of South Africa in 1955 (the so-called Tomlinson Commission) stated in its report that Black agricultural development is characterised by certain factors, many of which are still present in Lebowa (Union of South Africa, 1955, p. 112). Ten of these factors are:

- (i) wrong use of land;
- (ii) inefficient methods of cultivation;
- (iii) inefficient animal husbandry practices;
- (iv) increasing soil erosion;
- (v) diminishing soil fertility;
- (vi) low yields from crops and livestock;
- (vii) extremely low incomes from farming;
- (viii) a qualitatively deficient diet;
- (ix) a low standard of health; and
- (x) a generally low standard of living.

Today Lebowa *still* battles with these "agricultural illnesses", with the result that the agricultural potential of Lebowa is not fully utilised, in spite of the fact that a large percentage of the population is involved in agriculture.

To cure these "illnesses" will require vision, dedication, sacrifices and a large-scale physical effort from all concerned.. Special attention will have to be given to the optimal and correct use of agricultural land, correct methods of cultivation, efficient use of the limited water resources of Lebowa, a more efficient use of livestock for market production, and last but not least, the most efficient carrying capacity, population-wise, for agricultural land. Rural development must make rural areas economically more attractive, as well as the rural way of life.

If these measures fail (not much progress has been made in this regard during the last 27 years in Lebowa), it should be expected that the population pressure on rural land, coupled with the limited production capacity of agriculture, will encourage the urbanisation process, most likely outside Lebowa. It is not necessary to lose the "excess" people from the rural areas simply because most of them can be accommodated within the borders of Lebowa if an urbanisation strategy can be successfully implemented.

One of the major problems affecting rural development in Lebowa is the existence of the traditional land tenure system. It will be appreciated that this system, which has been in practice for a few centuries, cannot be abolished overnight. Surely the most important element in the system is the human element or factor, and to force people to change in a too rapid manner will not only cause resentment among the people concerned, but will also cause them to reject the alternatives for the system. Because of the presence of this human element, the approach should rather be to prove to the inhabitants that they cannot go along the old traditional lines of production and still survive. They, as well as their chiefs, who still play a very central and important role in the traditional land tenure system, should be persuaded that there are other means of producing and living a better life (see for instance the article of Ngcobo, 1980, p. 35).

From Table 5.3, which shows the industrial composition of the *de facto* population of Lebowa, it can be seen that 67,7 per cent of the economically active Black population was involved in the agricultural sector in 1970, while this sector contributed only 21,2 per cent of the gdp in the same year (see Table 5.4). This can be contributed to a large

Table 5.3 - The industrial composition of the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa, by district, 1970

District	Total	Agricul= ture	Mining	Manu= facturing	Electri= city	Con= struction	Commerce	Trans= port	Finan= cing	Services	Unspeci= fied, un= employed	Total econo= mically ac= tive	Not econo= mically active
Bochum	47 034	7 315	13	87	9	181	123	38	2	670	164	8 602	38 432
Seshego	134 552	17 178	36	1 481	60	1 211	1 591	703	85	4 413	1 923	28 681	105 871
Thabamopo	127 483	14 557	611	466	25	775	580	158	30	2 330	515	20 047	107 436
Mokerong	169 209	22 504	392	1 304	38	1 354	2 493	525	91	5 009	739	34 449	134 760
Sekgosese	46 610	6 346	4	148	7	135	137	69	4	533	147	7 530	39 080
Mapulaneng	62 847	8 578	64	548	56	858	401	282	10	1 271	484	12 552	50 295
Nebo	133 284	22 429	128	386	64	1 164	800	220	42	2 337	567	28 137	105 147
Sekhukhuland	162 889	21 677	8 980	331	27	752	484	128	14	2 954	1 439	36 786	126 103
Bolobedu	82 989	13 281	16	368	28	552	354	137	6	702	926	16 370	66 619
Naphuno <sup>1)</sup>	70 094	8 051	2 020	574	53	1 042	966	351	42	2 081	1 374	16 554	53 540
Total	1 036 991	141 916	12 264	5 693	367	8 024	7 929	2 611	326	22 300	8 278	209 708	827 283

1) Including the Phalaborwa district.

Source: Department of Statistics (1976), "Occupation and Industry by district and economic region" (report no. 02-05-06).

Table 5.4 - Sectoral composition of the gdp and economically active population of Lebowa, 1970  
(percentages)

Sector	gdp	<i>De facto</i> population
Agriculture	21,2	67,7
Mining	19,3	5,9
Manufacturing	12,1	2,7
Electricity and water	0,0	0,2
Construction	4,5	3,8
Commerce	5,9	3,8
Transport	1,5	1,2
Financing	9,1	0,2
Services	26,5	10,6
Unspecified and unem= ployed	-	3,9
Total	100,0	100,0

Source: Tables 5.2 and 5.3.

percentage of subsistence farming and also to very low levels of productivity, mainly because more than 48 per cent of all the economically active Black population in this sector consisted of females, who had to work in the absence of economically active males.

It will be clear that the estimated population growth rates indicated in Chapter 4 are causing the population of Lebowa to grow at a faster rate than that which the traditional agricultural sector in Lebowa can absorb. To an increasing extent, this fact will put pressure on the urbanisation process in Lebowa. Because of the weakening conditions in the agricultural sector of Lebowa, more people will (be forced to) move to the urban and semi-urban areas in Lebowa. The question remains whether this opportunity will be utilised to build a stable urbanised population in selected geographic areas in Lebowa.

Apart from preparing for this envisaged increase in urbanisation in Lebowa, it will also be necessary to focus attention on the control of population growth (especially in the rural areas) and/or to improve the capability of the agricultural sector, via the increase in productivity, thus eliminating the "agricultural illnesses" mentioned earlier.

As far as *mining* activities in Lebowa are concerned, it is a well-known fact that Lebowa is rich in mineral deposits and that it possesses a wide range of mineral commodities. The well-known Bushveld Complex, which is rich in chrome, platinum and vanadium, stretches over a large part of Southern Lebowa. Several chrome mines are in operation in this area. Southern Lebowa also contains deposits of asbestos, low iron ore, tin, fluorite and high cement-grade limestone. Most of the working mines in Lebowa are situated in the north-eastern part of Southern Lebowa, where especially asbestos mines and chrome mines are found. In 1978 a total of 21 mines were in operation in Lebowa, employing more than 11 000 people, mostly Blacks (Benso, 1979, p. 49).

The contribution of the *mining industry* to the gdp of Lebowa is shown in Table 5.1, which amounts to nearly one-fifth (19,7 per cent) in 1977. When the contribution of agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing is excluded, the share of mining increases to 23,5 per cent. This is an indication of the important role this sector plays in the economy of Lebowa.

The mining industry is also of importance for another reason, namely the provision of jobs. In 1970 this sector employed 12 264 Blacks (see Table 5.3), which makes it, apart from the agricultural and services sectors, the sector with the highest number of Black employees, representing 5,9 per cent of the total economically active Black population in Lebowa (Table 5.4). According to unpublished figures of the Mining Corporation, 11 169 Blacks were employed on the 21 operating mines in Lebowa in 1978.

Most of the mining activities in Lebowa occur in the Sekhukhuneland district in Southern Lebowa, where more than 73 per cent of all Black mining workers in Lebowa are employed, followed by Naphuno with 16 per cent.

At present there are no "large" mining towns in Lebowa. Towns such as Mecklenburg, Penge and Hendriksplaats, situated in the mineral rich Sekhukhuneland, accommodate most of the mineworkers. It is doubtful whether the expansion of the existing mining industry will stimulate an urbanisation process substantially in the next two decades, if the number of employees in the mining industry is to be kept constant during the next two decades.

Potentially, the *industrial* sector can make a substantial contribution to the general economic growth in Lebowa, but at present the contribution of this sector to the gdp is modest, employing only a small percentage of the economically active people in Lebowa. In 1977, for instance, the industrial sector contributed only 11,4 per cent of the gdp (i.e. R13,5 million), compared to 12,1 per cent in 1970 (R4,7 million).

The bulk of industrial activities are found in the non-market production, which accounted for 75 per cent of the total industrial output during 1977 (it amounted to R10,1 million in 1977 compared to R4,1 million in 1970). There are, however, many small-scale manufacturers (mostly one-man businesses) widely distributed in a geographic area who are not included in the official statistics and who make, in a small individual way, a contribution to the economic development of the area. Often these small-scale manufacturers lack the management and technical know-how needed to improve the efficiency of their enterprises. It is envisaged that the newly established Small Business Development Corporation, in co-operation with the private sector, will assist the small enterprises in Lebowa.

Apart from the manufacturers in the informal sector in Lebowa, larger scale industrial development is also taking place. The central government (through encouraging the decentralisation of industries), the Industrial Development Corporation, the Economic Development Corporation, and the Lebowa Development Corporation all play a part in the development of such industries.

Until mid-1978 the Industrial Development Corporation, which is responsible for the establishment of industries in border towns like Pieters-

burg and Phalaborwa was responsible for an investment of R20,8 million out of a total capital investment of R105,9 million in industries on the borders of Lebowa. These industries employed an estimated 6 545 Blacks, many of whom live inside the borders of Lebowa. Goods and services produced in this way, however, do not form part of the gdp of Lebowa.

One of the tasks of the Economic Development Corporation is to promote industrial development inside the national states. This is done in close co-operation with the Board for the Decentralisation of Industry and the Lebowa Development Corporation.

The industrial sector of Lebowa does not provide substantial employment opportunities. During 1970 only 2,7 per cent of the economically active Black population was employed in the manufacturing sector. This figure does not include substantial numbers of Blacks employed in the informal industrial sector.

One of the reasons why the industrial sector in Lebowa employ relatively few people is that industrial developments are also taking place in growth points on or near the borders of Lebowa, notably in towns such as Pietersburg, Potgietersrus and Tzaneen. By 1981 some 12 600 employment opportunities had already been created for Blacks in these areas. Many of the Blacks live in Lebowa and work in these areas. By the end of 1981 only 2 165 direct employment opportunities existed in Seshego and Lebowakgomo. This figure is far too low to absorb the annual expansion of people entering the labour market in Lebowa, as shown in Chapter 4.

The industrial sector is probably the most important one in an urbanisation process because it can stimulate the process by creating job opportunities, supplying people with an income which they can spend on the goods and services that are being produced in their own town, thus contributing to the economic development of the town and area. A deliberate effort to stimulate industrial activities can promote urbanisation. A workable Third World approach is to encourage small industries which have the potential to create substantial employment opportunities because of their large numbers. What they basically need is an infra=

structure (for instance premises in the form of factory flats), assistance on technical and management know-how, and the removal of unnecessary restrictions, especially in the form of regulations.

New incentives to encourage industrial development in and around Lebowa which came into effect on 1 April 1982, are largely based on cash rebates, notably on transport, wages, rent and housing. Six industrial development points have been identified in and around Lebowa which will qualify for these incentives, namely Seshego, Lebowakgomo and a point near the Steelpoort valley, as well as Pietersburg, Potgietersrus and Tzaneen. The identification of the three points in Lebowa has important consequences for an urbanisation strategy, seen against the background of what has been mentioned in this section.

The *construction* industry is an important sector from an urbanisation point of view, because some of the activities measured include the establishment of towns, and specifically the provision of housing, which will be discussed in the next chapter (section 6.2.1). The present discussion will be confined to some general remarks on the activities in this sector. Its contribution to the gdp of Lebowa increased from R1,8 million (4,5 per cent) in 1970 to R6,4 million (5,4 per cent) in 1977. The greatest increase over this period occurred in market production, which can probably be ascribed to the involvement of government in construction activities.

During 1970, 8 000 economically active Blacks in Lebowa were employed in the construction industry, which represents only 3,8 per cent. Unpublished figures for later years show that far fewer people were employed in this sector inside Lebowa, which may be an indication that many construction workers are employed outside the geographic borders of Lebowa. This fact points to another drain of people from Lebowa, which cannot be afforded. The physical aspect of urbanisation requires people, especially construction workers.

Other economic activities measured in the gdp of Lebowa are also shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. It is clear that *services* such as education have received priority attention during the period 1970 - 1977, with large absolute increases. Most services provided in Lebowa are part of the market production which employed 10,8 per cent of the *de facto* population of Lebowa, a contribution second only to that of agriculture (see Table 5.4).

### 5.3 THE GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (GNI)

The gross domestic product (gdp) which have been discussed in the previous section, is a measure of the market value of all final goods and services produced in Lebowa. It does not, however, measure the extent of production by the *citizens* of Lebowa, as many of them live outside the geographic borders of their country. In order to obtain this measure of economic activity, the earnings of foreigners in Lebowa should be subtracted from the gdp, while the earnings of citizens of Lebowa resident outside the geographic borders should be added to the gdp of Lebowa. The result will be the gross national product (gnp), which measures the extent of production of *all* the citizens of Lebowa.

The gnp at factor cost is obtained when indirect taxes are subtracted and subsidies are added to the gnp, which also equals *gross national income* (gni) and which is a measure of economic activity. Net national income is obtained when provision for depreciation is excluded. National income can be defined as "..... the total payments made to owners of productive resources, like labourers and owners of land and capital, for the use of those resources" (Mckenzie and Tullock, 1978, p. 442).

It is important to bear in mind the nature of the national income of Lebowa when discussing the urbanisation process, especially in distinguishing between the gni of the Black inhabitants of Lebowa and the portion of the gni earned by continually absent citizens.

In order to determine the national income of Lebowa, it is necessary to add the income of *commuters* (i.e. people who live inside but work outside the borders of Lebowa), the income of *migrants* (i.e. people who live and work outside the borders of Lebowa on a temporary basis), and the income of *continuously absent citizens*, to the income generated by the *de facto* Black population (excluding the portion of gdp earned by permanent Non-Black inhabitants). The resulting gross national income (gni) of the Black population of Lebowa for the period 1970 to 1977 is shown in Table 5.5.

From Table 5.5 it can be seen that the portion of gdp earned by Blacks in Lebowa, as a percentage of gross national income, came to only 19,8 per cent in 1977, which is an indication of the large share of gni generated outside the borders of Lebowa. In 1977, for instance, 80,2 per cent of the gni was created by commuters and migrant workers. If the income of continuously absent citizens is included, more than 89 per cent of the total income generated by the *de jure* population of Lebowa was generated by commuters, migrant workers and continuously absent citizens. Migrant workers contribute a major share of the gni of Lebowa, despite the fact that they spend the bulk of their income in the areas where they are employed, i.e. outside the borders of Lebowa (some sources estimate migrant remittances to be in the order of 30 per cent).

The *total income* generated by the *de jure* population of Lebowa increased from R203 million in 1970 to more than R734 million in 1977, i.e. by more than 260 per cent. This increase can, however, largely be attributed to the increase in income earned by Blacks other than those who contributed to the gdp. Table 5.5 also shows that the income of continuously absent citizens decreased from 42 per cent in 1970 to 35 per cent in 1977, which means that the gni of Black inhabitants increased from 58 per cent to 65 per cent during the same period.

Table 5.5 - The gross national income and the total income of Lebowa, 1970 - 1977 (R million)

Income	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Share of Blacks in gross domestic product	30,8	33,6	43,2	47,2	68,8	79,9	99,1	94,6
Income of commuters	12,2	15,2	19,5	26,5	38,3	55,9	73,7	89,5
Income of migrant workers	75,2	85,7	99,3	120,7	158,1	207,4	248,1	292,3
Gross national income	118,2	134,5	162,0	194,4	265,2	342,2	420,9	476,3
Income of continuously absent citizens	84,8	93,9	103,5	123,9	152,6	190,1	223,1	258,3
Total income of the <i>de jure</i> population	203,0	228,4	265,5	318,3	417,8	533,3	644,0	734,6

Source: Benso (1980), Statistical survey of Black development, Pretoria, p. 53, and unpublished information.

#### 5.4 THE OUTFLOW OF PURCHASING POWER

One of the concepts closely related to the national income of Lebowa is the *purchasing power* of the *de facto* population. Not all the income generated by the inhabitants of Lebowa is spent within the geographic borders. It is estimated that a large percentage of the total purchasing power is spent outside the area. This has serious implications for an urbanisation strategy, because urban areas require not only people to produce foods and services, but also the money to buy such foods and services.

The purchasing power of the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa is shown in Table 5.6, at current prices as well as constant prices. Table 5.6 shows that the purchasing power of Blacks in Lebowa has increased from R46 million in 1970 to an estimated R301,9 million in 1979 (current prices). At constant 1970 prices, the total purchasing power of Lebowa was only R126,1 million in 1979.

Of great importance in this regard is the great *outflow* of purchasing power from Lebowa. According to unpublished information from the Department of Internal Revenue, the general sales tax collected in Lebowa during 1979 amounted to R1,77 million (see Table 5.7). This implies that goods and services were purchased to the amount of R44,3 million. From Table 5.6 it can be seen that the *de facto* Black population had a purchasing power (at current prices) to an amount of R301,9 million in 1979, of which R257,6 million, or 85,3 per cent, could not be retained in Lebowa (based on estimates made by Professor A.P. Zevenbergen, Bureau of Financial Analysis, University of Pretoria).

The extent of the total purchasing power of the *de facto* Black population of Lebowa as well as the extent of the outflow of a substantial part of this purchasing power has a serious depressing effect on the economic growth of Lebowa. From an urban development point of view, this outflow of purchasing power means that very little money is left to spend on the consumption of goods and services from local entrepreneurs in the towns inside Lebowa. This tendency serves as a "drag" on the development of urban areas and is also an impediment for an urbanisation strategy. Without purchasing power and without commerce and industry, it is extremely difficult to develop a town or city where economic activities can be sufficiently concentrated.

Table 5.6 - Estimated purchasing power of the *de facto* Black population in Lebowa, 1970 - 1979  
 (R'000)

Purchasing power	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 <sup>1)</sup>	1979 <sup>1)</sup>
- at current prices	46,0	55,1	65,2	82,8	115,6	160,8	193,5	228,2	257,2	301,9
- at real 1970 prices	46,0	51,9	57,7	66,9	83,7	102,6	111,1	117,8	121,1	126,1

1) For estimating the purchasing power at current prices, the percentage changes in the average monthly salaries and wages of Blacks in South Africa and a provision of an annual 2 per cent increase in population were used. For estimating the purchasing power at constant 1970 prices, a deflator for private consumption expenditure in South Africa was used.

Source: Benso, (1978 and 1980), Statistical Survey of Black Development.

Table 5.7 - Total general sales tax collected in Lebowa, 1979  
(R)

	Registered vendors	Occasional sales	Total
January, 1979	193 902	2 569	196 471
February, 1979	136 689	2 519	139 208
March, 1979	127 636	1 617	129 253
April, 1979	152 521	2 701	155 222
May, 1979	160 500	1 673	162 173
June, 1979	113 151	2 255	115 406
July, 1979	144 049	2 839	146 888
August, 1979	141 975	1 961	143 936
September, 1979	145 002	4 230	149 232
October, 1979	151 449	2 049	153 498
November, 1979	147 532	2 663	150 195
December, 1979	125 790	2 787	128 577
Total	1 740 196	29 863	1 770 059

Source: Department of Internal Revenue, unpublished information.

To decrease this outflow of purchasing power will not be an easy task, as it is the result of various economic circumstances and will take a long time to change, for instance the income structure of Blacks (which is coupled with their skills), the substantial number of Blacks who are away from the territory on a semi-permanent basis, and the existing, well-established infrastructure on the borders of Lebowa, which is attracting a major part of the purchasing power of the *de facto* Blacks in Lebowa.

There is, however, no doubt that the state does have a large *potential* purchasing power that can be utilised inside its own borders. In 1976, for instance, the purchasing power of Lebowa was only second to

that of Kwazulu (excluding Transkei and Bophuthatswana), making it one of the national states with the highest purchasing power. This economic strength can be redirected to serve the interests of the area concerned, but it will require a substantial amount of vision and adjustment.

## 5.5 CONCLUSION

It can be *concluded* that the population of Lebowa is increasing at a faster rate than can be absorbed by the individual sectors other than the traditional agriculture. Despite the fact that the Lebowa Government has adopted a population policy in a White Paper, such a policy is not being implemented. Most of the individual sectors described in section 5.2 have not developed as rapidly as may be expected, and have even stagnated over the last three decades. Sufficient people have not been trained in the process to stimulate economic activities in Lebowa. These factors also have an effect on the *urbanisation process* where no urban area in Lebowa has developed and grown independently, based on sound economic principles. Nearly all the towns in Lebowa have been stimulated and influenced by factors other than a self-generating one. The main reasons have already been indicated, namely slowly developing individual sectors, which have a hampering effect on economic activity in Lebowa (as measured by the gdp and the gni), as well as a substantial outflow of purchasing power from the area.

Any urbanisation strategy in Lebowa will be seriously hampered unless the existing high population growth rate, indicated in Chapter 4, is curbed, with a simultaneous effort to increase productivity which will also stimulate the production capacity in Lebowa. An increase in economic activities in Lebowa will lead to an increase in gdp and gni, and will also indirectly result in a retention of the maximum purchasing power inside the territory. With an effectively utilised labour force, with a sufficient buying power, certain urban areas can be developed and stimulated, based on economic growth forces.

Chapter 6 will focus on the economics of the present urbanisation process in Lebowa, against the general economic background described in this chapter.

## CHAPTER 6

THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRESENT URBANISATION PROCESS  
IN LEBOWA

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Against the background of the clear picture drawn in the previous two chapters on the extent of urbanisation in Lebowa, as well as the measurement of certain key economic activities, an attempt can now be made to evaluate the current *modus operandi* in Lebowa on urbanisation. Attention will be given to the way urbanisation is encouraged within the existing development strategy, against the background of what exists physically in Lebowa in the form of a supportive infrastructure, and the services being rendered to the urban population in the various geographic areas in Lebowa.

The existing physical infrastructure outside and on the borders of Lebowa will not be taken into account, nor the multiple services being rendered to the *de facto* population of Lebowa outside the jurisdictional area of the Lebowa Government. The reason is that this study focuses *only* on the geographic area known as Lebowa, as defined in Chapter 4. It is believed, however, that in the long run this area will, with or without its present boundaries, play an important role in a greater geographic area, together with the national state of Gazankulu, the independent Venda and the rest of the Northern Transvaal. This larger geographic area will have many mutual interests, especially in the economic sphere, like the development of the various production sectors, the creation of the required infrastructure, the rendering of social services and the development of a population strategy, all in favour of the region or state at large. In such a dispensation each *presently defined area*, especially the two national states and the one independent state, will still need effective measures to control their populations and to house and feed their populations in such a way that they will pursue a deliberate urbanisation strategy in order to achieve a maximum intra-state development, creating sufficient job opportunities.

Already at this "early" stage it should be clear that Lebowa will have to work out its *own* urbanisation policy and strategy. If the total projected *de facto* population, as well as the total envisaged urban population (discussed in Chapter 4), is to become a reality, Lebowa will have to provide more shelter and employment for its inhabitants. It is highly unlikely that any other adjoining authority or government will provide these inputs on behalf of Lebowa, simply because they will be involved in solving similar problems in their own areas of jurisdiction.

For an outline of the present urbanisation process in Lebowa, this chapter will describe, firstly, the economic consequences of providing social infrastructure services, notably housing facilities and health and education services. Anticipated needs in these fields will also be identified.

Secondly, the current physical infrastructure will be described, as well as the economics of the provision of this infrastructure for the present urbanisation process in Lebowa.

## 6.2 SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Lebowa can be classified as a typical Third World region and as such is heavily dependent on certain social services, including the provision of housing facilities, health services and educational facilities. An urbanisation explosion, as predicted for Lebowa in Chapter 4, will make a particular demand on the social infrastructure of the region. With more people concentrated in various urban areas in Lebowa, the demand for housing, health services and education opportunities for the young generation is increasing, with the result that a heavier burden is being placed not only on the Lebowa Government but also on the resources of the country. During 1981/82, not less than 48 per cent of the total amount voted by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly was earmarked for the management and control of health services, the provision of educational services and the settlement of the population (which to a large extent includes the provision of accommodation). Apart from the Lebowa Government, there are also other institutions involved in the provision of social infrastructure in Lebowa, like the South African Development Trust (SADT) and ad=

ministration boards. The SADT is, among other projects, involved in the settlement of the population as well as the provision of social services in Lebowa, while the East Rand Administration Board is involved in the provision of housing in Lebowakgomo.

This section will focus, therefore, on the social infrastructure being provided, especially in the proclaimed townships in Lebowa, because only these townships are regarded as representative of the urban population in Lebowa, with the result that any possible urbanisation process will be concentrated on at least some of these towns.

## 6.2.1 Housing

### 6.2.1.1 Introduction

Apart from food and clothes, shelter is one of the most basic of human needs. The acquisition of a roof over one's head is primarily the responsibility of the individual member of the household. Only one of the four production factors, namely land, will hardly increase. The population, on the other hand, who occupies land, is at present increasing at a rapid rate almost everywhere in the world, with the result that greater pressure is being placed on available land. Unless steps are taken to balance this process, the current shortage of shelter for the increasing numbers of mankind on the fixed amount of existing land will not only continue but will also lead to severe problems for mankind, because of the unavailability of a basic requirement.

This basic problem of non-increasing land and increasing people is causing serious difficulties, especially in urban areas and thus in the process of urbanisation. It is estimated that the world's *urban* population, using a lowest constant-rate projection, will comprise 51,3 per cent of the total population in the year 2000 (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2). Lebowa's *urban* population will comprise 44,1 per cent of the total *de facto* population of the state in 2000 (see Chapter 4, Table 4.16). In absolute figures, this represents, in both cases, huge migrations of people who will float to cities and urban areas in the next two decades. These "additional inhabitants" will have to be accommodated and provided with shelter, a basic human need.

A clear distinction should, however, be made between housing in the First World and housing in the Third World. *First World housing* is usually of a modern lay-out, orderly congested and with efficient and sufficient services. *Third World housing* on the other hand, is often characterised by an environment in which the structures are exactly the opposite of those in the First World. Of special significance, however, is "... the very size of existing urban housing deficits and the probable extent of future needs..." (Dwyer, 1975, p. 103). It is two different worlds, where different approaches are followed as far as the housing problem is concerned. The First World approach cannot be enforced, unqualified, onto the Third World, mainly because of different circumstances, attitudes, environments and criteria.

The mere provision of houses is only one element of the housing process. The housing process involves many other elements and factors. According to the Committee which investigated private sector involvement in resolving the housing backlog in Soweto (the so-called Viljoen Committee), the housing process involves *more* than the provision of accommodation;

"The housing process essentially involves, on a continuing basis, the individual Black household, the Black community, the private sector at large and the public sector. The resources of each, be they capital, labour, expertise, entrepreneurial initiative, land and material resources or 'sweat equity' are co-ordinated and devoted to the creation and development of a stable urban environment, providing for all the material, social, employment and recreative needs of the inhabitants. Shelter is one of the most important but by no means only criterion for such an environment" (Republic of South Africa, 1982, p. 27).

It must be made clear, however, that the provision of housing serves in no way as a guarantee for employment. In many Third World urban areas people have "temporary" accommodation and are without jobs, with the result that shantytowns mushroom at the margin of cities and larger towns. People (squatters) even invade some areas in or close to urban areas, where they put up some basic shacks, and *only then* try to find employment. In many cases people are so unskilled and

untrained that it is extremely difficult for them to find *any* employment.

In such a housing process, especially in a Third World environment, special recognition should be given to the people involved. Most of the people are poor, lacking basic necessities, and with a constant shortage of money. Some are victims of their own circumstances, with a lack of motivation for any kind of improvement. Such people should be *uplifted* and *motivated*, not by way of oral discussions, promises and conferences, but by actual demonstration, where the fact that the only lasting *economic development* originates from *self-development*, should be demonstrated by way of examples in their own communities. The process of providing housing can be a starting point. For this action, maximum understanding about the people involved and their culture is a pre-condition.

#### 6.2.1.2 *Housing in national states*

For purposes of this study it is necessary to take a general view at the housing situation existing in the national states before a closer look is taken at housing in Lebowa in the next section.

Apart from the wide and deep-rooted powers vested in the Minister of Co-operation and Development, there are various institutions or agencies involved in the process of town development in the national states, the most important of which are the South African Development Trust, the individual governments of the national states, development corporations, employers, self-building by home owners, and other private-sector institutions.

The main responsibility of the *South African Development Trust* is the establishment and development of towns in the national states, which includes the responsibility of financing and administering such development programmes. This is done through agents appointed to undertake the physical development of towns. The South African Development Trust is in control of such actions and is also responsible for the financial aspects in such programmes.

The agents of the South African Development Trust, which include town councils, administration boards and large employer companies, operate in various Black townships in the national states. Some of these agents are involved in the provision of accommodation in Black towns, for which the South African Development Trust accepts a financial responsibility. Table 6.1 shows the financial responsibility of the South African Development Trust in the provision of housing in each of the relevant towns in the national states during 1980/81 (including the independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei).

In 1980/81 the South African Development Trust spent R14,23 million on *housing programmes* in various towns in the independent and national states, which is more than one quarter (25,5 per cent) of the total town development programme during this period. Housing appeared as the largest programme, followed by water supply (14,0 per cent), and roads and drainage (12,9 per cent). The largest housing projects were in Kwazulu, where R4,29 million was spent on housing in seven towns; Ciskei, where R3,0 million was spent on housing in Mdantsane; and Lebowa, where R2,0 million was shared by four towns, of which R1,0 million or 50,0 per cent was spent in the capital, Lebowakgomo. Some R8,6 million (or 60,4 per cent) was voted for housing programmes in three national states (Lebowa, Qwaqwa, and Kwazulu) and in Mabopane East.

Since 1970, *the governments* of the various national states became increasingly involved in the establishment of towns. In 1980/81, more than R40 million was spent by national state governments on the establishment of towns. When the governments of the independent states are included, nearly R60 million was spent on this programme. As far as housing programmes are concerned, the governments of the six self-governing national states were to spend R35,3 million on housing and services in their areas during 1981/82 (Benso, 1982, unpublished information).

Apart from the South African Development Trust (using administration boards as agents) and the governments of the national states, the various development corporations, employers, other private sector institutions, and owner-builders all are to some extent involved in

Table 6.1 - Involvement of the South African Development Trust in the provision of housing in towns in the national and independent states, 1980/81 (R)

Independent state/ national state	Town	Expenditure on housing	Total expenditure
Bophuthatswana <sup>1)</sup>			1 814 500
	Atamelang	612 500	
	Itsoseng	580 000	
	Pampierstat	272 000	
	Pudimoe	350 000	
Transkei <sup>1)</sup>			517 000
	Msombomvu	240 000	
	Ezebeleni	277 000	
Venda <sup>1)</sup>			300 000
	Vleyfontein	300 000	
Ciskei <sup>1)</sup>			3 000 000
	Mdantsane	3 000 000	
Lebowa			2 010 000
	Lebowakgomo	1 000 000	
	Namakgale	500 000	
	Steilloop	10 000	
	Seshego	500 000	
Kangwane	-	-	-
KwaNdebele	-	-	-
Qwaqwa			400 000
	Phuthaditjaba	400 000	

Table 6.1 (continued)

Independent state/ national state	Town	Expenditure on housing	Total expenditure
Gazankulu	-	-	-
Kwazulu			4 290 000
	Ntunzuma	740 000	
	Wembezi	50 000	
	Edendale	700 000	
	Mpopomeni	400 000	
	Kwadabeka	600 000	
	Dwadengezi	1 400 000	
	Sundimbili	400 000	
Ethnically unallo- catable			1 900 000
	Mabopane East	1 900 000	
Total:			14 231 500

1) Independent states.

Source: Republic of South Africa, South African Development Trust, Budget of expenditures, 1980/81.

building or supplying houses in these areas, especially in the urban areas. The two government departments usually involved in the various housing programmes in the national states are the Departments of the Internal Affairs (responsible to survey and plan land for the establishment of towns, as well as the management of towns) and Community Development (responsible for the provision of the physical infrastructure, including the provision of accommodation).

The South African Development Trust and the governments of the national states can be regarded as two of the major groups of suppliers of houses in the national states. According to Smit (1979, p. 10)

"..... government bodies supply virtually all housing in urban home-land areas." This includes the South African government, which operates mostly through the South African Development Trust. It also includes various administration boards, which act as agents on behalf of the South African government in the provision of housing in the national states. Since 1976/77 these two institutions spent R427,3 million on the *establishment of towns* in the national and independent states in which the provision of housing stands out as one of the most important programmes. This huge sum was spent during a four-year period, compared to the R384 million that was spent for the same purpose during a fourteen year period from 1961/62 to 1975/76 (Smit, 1979, p. 9). Despite this large capital investment, there is still a serious shortage of houses in the national states.

The "official" urban Black population in the national states increased in slightly more than twenty years from 33 486 in 1960 to nearly 1,6 million in 1981, excluding Transkei (Benso, 1980, p. 34). This rapid increase in the urban population makes severe demands on adequate housing facilities in Black towns. In total, 192 817 houses existed in proclaimed towns in 1981 in the national and independent states (excluding Transkei), most of which were provided by the SADT and the governments of the states.

Assuming that there were an average of 6,0 persons per house in the *proclaimed towns* in the national states, there was still a shortfall of more than 73 800 houses in 1981 in proclaimed towns only (Benso, unpublished information, 1982). This huge backlog of houses arose despite the large amount of capital made available by the SADT, the governments referred to above, and efforts from employers and self-build schemes.

The serious housing shortage in the national (and independent) states is typical of conditions in Third World countries. Special reasons for concern are expressed about the housing shortage in the urban areas. Dwyer (1974, p. 213) goes so far as to say that "... urban housing problems in the Third World have now reached such formidable dimensions, and are likely to become so much more serious, that they are not capable of solution within the foreseeable future solely by Western-

style methods, even given greatly improved capital inputs into housing and the possibility of developing conventional construction capacities markedly larger than those at present in existence in most Third World countries." This daunting housing problem of the Third World is also present in the national states.

The first factor contributing to housing shortages is *high population growth rates*, referred to in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. The second factor, closely related to the first, is high *urban population growth rates*. It is estimated, for instance, that low-income countries (in which category Lebowa falls) recorded an average annual urban growth rate of 5,0 per cent during the period 1970 to 1980, compared to 1,3 per cent in industrial market economies, i.e. weighted averages (World Bank, 1981, p. 172). This corresponds with the estimated urban population growth rates for Lebowa, discussed in Chapter 4.

A third basic factor aggravating the housing problem is the geographical *movement of people*, especially in the form of rural-urban migration in Third World countries, including Lebowa. This factor, which can be cited as a major reason for urbanisation and which puts an additional pressure on the provision of housing facilities in urban areas, has been described in Chapter 3.

These factors give rise to an increase in the demand for housing. It is usually under these circumstances, where the demand totally exceeds the supply of reasonable accommodation, that people begin to gather in spontaneous settlements. Such settlements are today a universal problem, especially in Third World countries. In Manila, 320 000 or 23 per cent of the city's population were living in *barongs-barongs* or spontaneous settlements in 1961; Djakarta had 750 000 people (or 25 per cent) of its population in such settlements in the same year; in Hong Kong there were 580 000 spontaneous settlers (or 17 per cent) in 1964; and in Delhi 200 000 squatters (or 13 per cent of the population) lived in spontaneous settlements in 1964 (Dwyer, 1964, p. 145). The problem of spontaneous settlements appears in various countries, notably in countries such as Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Pakistan, the Philippines, India, Venezuela, Japan and various countries in Africa. In each country or city, squatters constitute a large percentage of the total population (see Abrams, 1977, p. 293). Many of the squatters are illegally

housed, causing many social and economic problems in their environment.

*South Africa* is also hampered by the phenomenon of spontaneous settlements. There are some large spontaneous settlements in South Africa which are characterised by a shortage of housing and basic services. Examples are Winterveld and surroundings (between 300 000 and 400 000 people), Edendale (250 000), Hoekhenteni, Oskraal and Nooitgedacht (100 000), Evaton (20 000), Kromdraai (between 20 000 and 30 000), and Monsiville with 3 000 squatters (Smit and Booysen, 1981, p. 91).

In conclusion, it can be stated that the national states, like other Third World countries, are experiencing an acute shortage of houses. In general, Third World urban populations are overwhelmingly poor (Dwyer, 1975, p. 248), which have important implications for the type of shelter that is provided in these areas. Western-style type of housing or shelters will surely not alleviate this problem *en masse* in Africa. Low-cost housing and the upgrading of existing economically viable settlements should maximise the use of local building contractors and locally manufactured building materials, to foster overall economic development. Unfortunately, self-help housing schemes have not yet reached success levels in the national states, as only 4,9 per cent of all houses in Black towns in the national states were built by their owners (Venter, 1976, p. 59).

#### 6.2.1.3 *Housing in Lebowa*

In this section a short description will be given of what exists in Lebowa, what are the major problems in this regard and what is needed as far as housing is concerned. The provision of housing and shelter is of crucial importance to the general economic development of Lebowa and its population. The general background of this problem has been discussed in the previous section, and direct attention can therefore now be devoted to determine the economic consequences of the housing "strategy" applied at present.

At the outset it is necessary to describe briefly the factual situation on both *ownership* and *allocation* of sites and houses in townships in

Lebowa (also applicable to other national states). These two issues are important in the present urbanisation process, especially as it influences the availability of housing.

All towns in Black areas are administered and controlled according to regulations promulgated by Proclamation R-293 of 1962, published in the Government Gazette of 16 November 1962 (Regulation Gazette No. 140), as amended. As already stated, the South African Development Trust owns the land on which towns are being established, which implies that *ownership* of all *sites* resides with the Development Trust.

In accordance with Regulation 6 of Chapter 2 in the Proclamation, *sites* in townships may be *sold* or *leased* to:

- (a) Black persons for residential purposes;
- (b) Black persons, companies or other corporate bodies in which one or more Blacks have a controlling interest, association, syndicates or partnerships of Black persons, for trading purposes;
- (c) Such persons as the Director-General may approve for professional, mission, church, school or other purposes.

It is furthermore determined in Regulation 7 of the same Chapter that applications for the *allotment of sites* for residential or trading purposes in towns must be made to the manager of a township, for consideration by an appointed committee (which may recommend to the manager the granting or refusal of such application) in the case of a letting unit, or by the Director-General in the case of an ownership unit.

As far as the *allotment of houses* is concerned, a distinction is made between letting units and ownership units. In the first place, any person who is desirous to *lease and occupy a house* erected by or belonging to the Development Trust, must apply for a certificate of occupation in respect of such a house (Regulation 8). Upon receiving such an application, the manager of the township will decide whether such a house and site will be allocated to the applicant. Secondly, if a person desires to *purchase a house* which has been erected by or owned by the Development Trust (or a *site*), he has to apply for a deed

of grant. Such an application will be considered in accordance with Regulation 9 of Chapter 2 in the Proclamation. The deed of grant will be issued only if the applicant satisfies the condition identified in the regulation concerned.

It is *furthermore* prescribed that a site or house may only be *let, sub-let* or *sold* with the prior *written permission* of the manager of the township (see Regulations 11 and 12). In the case of an ownership unit, permission can only be granted by the Director-General. The conditions of assignment are described in Regulation 13.

*Improvements* to houses may be undertaken *if* a building permit is issued for this purpose by the superintendent and only under the conditions determined in Regulation 20. Letting units may be improved under the clear understanding that the Development Trust will not reimburse the tenant for the cost of the improvements when the latter vacates the house. Ownership units may be sold and deeds of grant may be assigned, subject to the regulations already referred to in this section.

It is thus clear that Blacks may, in fact, acquire ownership units in these townships, subject to the conditions of various regulations. Allotment of sites and houses occur, according to bureaucratic methods and in the absence of market forces. It brings the question of "righteousness" and biasness and even possible corruption to the fore: Blacks are allowed to let or sell sites and houses subject to prescribed conditions. Compensation for improvements to houses are not undertaken by the Development Trust.

During the ten-year period from 1970 to 1980 the number of houses erected in the officially *proclaimed townships in Lebowa* increased from less than 10 000 houses in 1970 to more than 19 000 in 1980. This is shown in Table 6.2. The South African Development Trust and the Lebowa Government were responsible for the erection of most of these houses. With the establishment of Lebowakgomo as the capital of Lebowa, a major attempt was made to develop this town, and by 1982 some 1 439 houses had already been built with funds supplied by the Development Trust to the East Rand Administration Board, the body responsible for the provision of housing in this capital. Seshego

Table 6.2 - Housing in proclaimed townships in Lebowa, 1970 and 1980

Town	Number of houses	
	1970	1980
Seshego	2 616	4 924
Namakgale	2 232	4 108
Mahwelereng	1 648	1 900
Ga-Kgapane	601	782
Lenyenyee	850	925
Sebayeng	436	809
Shatale	526	622
Hlogotlou	164	620
Mankweng	117	678
Moganyaka	-	396
Lebowakgomo	-	1 250
Motetema	337	557
Leroro <sup>1)</sup>	297	393
Tubatse	-	267
Senwamokgope	88	166
Motlamotgatshane <sup>1)</sup>	-	416
Moetladimo <sup>2)</sup>	-	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 912</b>	<b>19 013</b>

1) BENS0'S estimate of number of houses in 1980.

2) Assumption that there were no additions to the number of houses in Moetladimo since 1979.

Sources: a) Steyn, G. (1982), Results of development research done into the contribution of the Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd to the provision of houses in Lebowa, unpublished document.

b) Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development (1980) Statistical survey of Black development, Pretoria, p. 27.

(4 925 houses) and Namakgale (4 108 houses) are the largest residential towns in Lebowa, followed by two other towns with more than 1 000 houses, namely Mahwelereng (1 900 houses) and Lebowakgomo. Three of these towns have large adjoining White towns where people find employment.

For the provision of housing, the South African Development Trust uses agents in certain towns who assume responsibility for the erection of a certain number of houses, mostly for their own employees. The East Rand Administration Board serves as an agent in Lebowakgomo, and similar responsibilities are borne by the Northern Transvaal Administration Board in Seshego and Steilloop, the Phalaborwa Mining Company in Namakgale, and the Tubatse Ferrochrome Company in Eerstegeluk (Gamapodile). Negotiations are in progress with the Atok Platinum Mine for the provision of fifty houses in Lebowakgomo, while discussions are being held with the Winterveld Chrome Mine for the erection of houses for their employees (Lebowa Development Corporation, unpublished information). Not many other instances of employers assisting in the provision of houses for their employees can be recorded.

During the period 1979/80 the Lebowa Development Corporation erected a total of 79 houses for the high-income Lebowa citizens in Lebowakgomo (unpublished information). This was an exception rather than the rule, and it remains to be seen whether this Development Corporation will involve itself further in this field.

No statistics are available for existing accommodation outside the proclaimed townships. The inhabitants of closer settlements, agricultural settlements and squatter settlements are mainly responsible for the erection of their own houses which, in many cases, are nothing more than "shelters". These houses and shelters are in most cases basically simple structures providing a roof over the heads of their inhabitants, like squatter dwellings, huts and traditional lapas. It is observed, however, that many of these accommodations are being replaced by firmer structures, mostly of cement bricks and blocks.

The South African Development Trust has a subprogram aimed at the development of settlements in order to resettle people in such settlements. This development includes the provision of water and other essential services. During the 1981/82 period, R762 000 was voted for the development of settlements in Lebowa, divided as follows (South African Development Trust, 1982, p. 31):

Maintenance of roads	:	R297 000
Maintenance of water supply	:	R 83 000
Boreholes	:	R 60 000
Wurthsdorp - services	:	R174 000
Monnadies and Taaiboschgroet - services	:	<u>R148 000</u>
Total	:	<u>R762 000</u>

As far as any *housing programme* is concerned, two important factors which should be borne in mind, as inputs into the provision of housing, are the availability of *manpower* and *materials*. Sufficient financial resources without available local manpower and locally produced building materials do not contribute to the long-term economic development of a country. The provision of these inputs from outside a country hampers the self-dependence of that country. Lebowa is in the fortunate position that it has a *potential* of both these inputs. As far as manpower in the building industry is concerned, there are five full-time building contractors, three plumbing contractors, two electrical contractors, and numerous part-time carpenters, bricklayers and labourers (Lebowa Development Corporation, unpublished information). There are also numerous small industrialists, manufacturing essential building materials like bricks and blocks, window frames, wooden doors and other building materials. They have the potential ability to meet this need.

At present most of the building materials are, however, obtained from outside the borders of Lebowa, mostly from adjoining towns such as Pieters-

burg, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen, Phalaborwa and Groblersdal. This gives way to the outflow of purchasing power from Lebowa, and also to stagnation of the suppliers of locally produced building materials inside Lebowa.

The *cost* of erecting houses in Lebowa is considerable. Table 6.3 shows the total amount spent on houses in Lebowa by the South African Development Trust and the Lebowa Government. During the period 1970/71 to 1980/81 a total of R7,9 million was spent on the provision of housing in Lebowa, R5,4 million of which was spent by the South African Development Trust and R2,5 million by the Lebowa Government. It also shows the total amount spent by these organisations on town development. Only since 1973/74 did the South African Development Trust become involved in the provision of housing and town development. Before 1973/74, housing formed a major part of town development in Lebowa. In 1972/73, for example, R349 000 was spent on the provision of housing by the Lebowa Government, which represents nearly 40 per cent of the total amount spent on town development in that year. In 1976/77 only 5,5 per cent of the total expenditure on town development was spent on housing. It increased, however, to 22,5 per cent in 1980/81, the highest total since 1972/73.

Figure 6.1 represents graphically the information of Table 6.3. Expenditure on housing fluctuates mostly in sympathy with expenditure on town development. Between 1977/78 and 1979/80 total expenditure decreased drastically. Especially noticeable was the sharp decrease in spending by the Lebowa Government, which was most probably influenced by the financial strategy of the Central Government to cut expenses between those years.

It will be clear that the South African Development Trust and the Lebowa Government have made a substantial financial contribution to the provision of houses in Lebowa during the last decade. They are joined by the Lebowa Development Corporation which contributed R3,38 million to a total of 346 loans during the period 1976 to 1981 (unpublished information).

Table 6.3 - Expenditure on housing and town development in Lebowa, 1970/71 - 1980/81 (R'000)

Year	Housing			Town development			Housing as % of total expenditure
	SADT <sup>1)</sup>	Lebowa Government	Total	SADT <sup>1)</sup>	Lebowa Government	Total	
1970/71	-	317,4	317,4	-	821,7	821,7	38,6
1971/72	-	314,6	314,6	-	851,8	851,8	36,9
1972/73	-	349,0	349,0	-	877,5	877,5	39,8
1973/74	200,0	3,8	203,8	1759,0	553,9	2312,9	8,8
1974/75	400,0	90,0	490,0	1953,5	941,6	2895,1	16,9
1975/76	400,0	107,7	507,7	2140,0	1967,8	4107,8	12,4
1976/77	400,0	-	400,0	2134,6	5123,1	7259,7	5,5
1977/78	382,0	1033,5	1415,5	1981,0	8004,9	9985,9	14,2
1978/79	1138,3	119,0	1257,3	5178,8	3452,2	8631,0	14,6
1979/80 <sup>2)</sup>	500,0	52,2	552,2	2780,0	3856,4	6636,4	8,3
1980/81 <sup>2)</sup>	2010,0	59,0	2069,0	4900,0	4317,7	9217,7	22,5

1) South African Development Trust.


2) Approved amounts.

Sources: (a) Benso, unpublished information.

(b) Department of Co-operation and Development, unpublished information.

(c) The South African Development Trust, "Budget of expenditures", various annual reports between 1973/74 and 1980/81.

FIGURE 6.1 : TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON TOWN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING  
IN LEBOWA, 1970/71 - 1980/81



The East Rand Administration Board is committed to build 72 000 houses in Lebowakgomo by the year 2000, i.e. at a rate of 3 600 houses per annum. From 1973 until 28 May 1982 a total of 1 603 houses were completed in Lebowakgomo, comprising 1 439 South African Development Trust homes, 57 government houses for civil servants, and 107 houses by the Lebowa Development Corporation and home-builders. The total investment in this project to date required nearly R7,1 million. The East Rand Administration Board supply four types of houses, varying in size from 75 m<sup>2</sup> to 89 m<sup>2</sup>. The erection costs of these houses vary between R5 576 and R6 186 per house (East Rand Administration Board, unpublished information). A further 190 houses are in the process of erection, while a total of 713 serviced stands are also available for further development by the Administration Board, the Lebowa Development Corporation and other institutions, including individual owners. The total cost to erect a house (excluding services) varies between R9 800 and R11 500 (1982), and houses are now being erected at the rate of one house per working day.

Before houses can be erected, stands need to be acquired, and these stands have to be "serviced", i.e. supplied with essential services such as streets, water, sewerage and electricity (if required). At present, stands in Lebowa are sold for between R66 and R120, while many tribal heads or chiefs "allocate" stands to their followers on request for a minimal payment in cash or kind.

It is estimated that the average cost of servicing a stand varies between R1 500 and R2 000. There is a shortage of serviced stands in Lebowa, and the problem is that it is not clear who should be responsible for supplying them and who can be appointed as "agents" to perform this duty.

The conventional, standard type houses being supplied by government bodies are the 51/6 four-roomed and 51/9 five-roomed type of houses. The purchase price of the 51/6 house is R1 475, compared to the R1 620 for the 51/9 house (these prices exclude the cost of the stands). The standard monthly tariff applicable to the 51/6 house (i.e. rent and maintenance) is R3-99, with cost of service amounting to R5-05 (R2-05 for general services like waste disposal and R3-00 for water

supply). Electricity costs amount to R12-00 per month. The standard monthly tariff of the 51/9 house amounts to R4-22.

The total rent-service fee for a 51/6 house is therefore R9-04, compared to R9-27 of the 51/9 house (excluding the provision of electricity).

It is clear that the provision of houses, as well as the financing thereof in Lebowa (as well as the other national states), is mainly the responsibility of government bodies. These government bodies provide virtually all housing and related services in proclaimed townships in Lebowa. Smit (1979, p. 10) estimates that government bodies are responsible for more than 95 per cent of houses and related services in national states. This range covers the low-cost housing, but also includes the provision of houses for the middle-income group as well as public servants. At present, building societies are reluctant to become involved in the provision of low-cost housing in the national states, and it seems highly unlikely that they will be willing under present circumstances to assist in this urgent need.

From the foregoing it will be clear that houses are being provided to a greater or lesser extent in *all* the proclaimed townships in Lebowa. Most towns had a doubling of the number of houses during the last decade. In 1980, no fewer than 17 towns had houses erected by the South African Development Trust and/or the Lebowa Government. It can, therefore, be *concluded* that the present policy implies that the *housing provision programme in Lebowa is diversified*, and that all towns receive "a smaller or bigger slice of the cake". Lebowakgomo receive priority in this regard, where 1 250 houses have already been erected since the establishment of this town as the capital of Lebowa. Most of the public servants of Lebowa are housed in this town.

What are the *major problems* in Lebowa as far as housing is concerned? The first problem is the *low income* of the *de facto* population. In many developing countries, national per capita income is still less than \$200 a year (Wilscher and Richter, 1977, p. 117). In many developing countries the people are simply too poor to obtain even houses of a better (Western) standard. In many countries the low incomes of the people should be borne in mind. In Lebowa the per-

sonal disposable cash income per capita increased from R82 in 1970 to R148 in 1976 (University of Pretoria, 1982, Chapter 4).

The second problem is the *high demand* for *housing*, which is aggravated by the high population growth rate. More people will need more houses. In some cases a house can be a "home" i.e. a basic and most successful socio-economic unit, and a place of known and recognisable position (Kemp, 1980, p. 23), or it can be a "space", where people "prefer to live in large unfurnished houses - or even large shacks - rather than in small furnished ones" (Turner, 1967, p. 167). In some cases a house can be only an "urban shelter" (especially in squatter settlements) which is basically a "roof over one's head". How is this need to be satisfied?

The third problem facing planners in Lebowa is the *shortage of serviced stands*. In the present economic climate, it is costly to service a stand, i.e. to provide water, sewerage, electricity and roads. On average, a completely serviced stand would cost at least R2 000, depending on the geographic location. This problem is aggravated in Lebowa by the fact that stands are sold at prices of as little as R100 each. Some institution in Lebowa has to bear this loss, which has serious financial implications, especially in the long run.

#### 6.2.1.4 Conclusion

As pointed out at the beginning of this section, housing is probably the most important element in an urbanisation process. Without housing, whether it be shacks or fairly modern houses, urbanisation can hardly be directed and promoted.

In Chapter 4 (Table 4.13) it has been indicated that the proclaimed towns in Lebowa accommodated 145 244 inhabitants in 1980. Based on the assumption that there is an *average* of *6,0 persons* per house in these proclaimed townships, at least some 24 207 houses are required to accommodate the existing inhabitants of these towns. In 1980 there were 19 013 houses in these townships (see Table 6.2), resulting in a *shortfall* of *5 194 houses*. At a cost of R8 000 per house, which is the average cost of administration boards to erect houses (with services), *it will cost R41,55 million to wipe out the housing backlog*

*in proclaimed townships in Lebowa.* This is based on houses erected by the East Rand Administration Board in Lebowa, as agents for the South African Development Trust (SADT).

In Chapter 4 (Table 4.13) it has been indicated that the *semi-urban* population of Lebowa amounted to 431 150 people in 1980. At an assumed average of 6,0 persons per house, it means that *71 858 houses are needed* to accommodate the *present* population in closer settlements, selected squatter settlements and agricultural settlements with 5 000 or more inhabitants. No statistics are available on how many houses exist in these areas at present, with the result that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the present extent of the *shortfall* of houses among the semi-urban population in Lebowa. It can, however, be assumed that there does exist a shortfall of houses for the semi-urban population. The elimination of this backlog will cost millions of rand.

The *urban and semi-urban population* of Lebowa amounted to 576 200 in 1980, as already indicated in Table 4.16 (33 per cent of the *de facto* population). At an average of 6,0 persons per house, more than *96 000 houses were needed in 1980* to accommodate these people (disregarding people in the rural areas). If the urban and semi-urban populations were in fact to increase to 1,39 million in the year 2000 (see Table 4.16), some *231 600 houses will be needed* to accommodate them (still at an assumed average of 6,0 persons per house). This will mean an *annual average addition of 11 580 houses*, which is twice as much as the present backlog in proclaimed townships!

From these estimates it will be clear that a tremendous effort will have to be made to accommodate the future population of Lebowa, because it will *directly* affect the urbanisation process in Lebowa. The economic consequences of the present strategy of the two governments, their agents and other institutions involved seems not to focus on this problem at large, but rather to focus on the housing problems in the officially proclaimed towns only, where much capital, energy and work will be required to accommodate the inhabitants of the seventeen proclaimed townships. At present, more than 78 per cent of the required houses in these townships have already been con=

structed and are occupied. As already indicated, millions of rand is being voted annually for township development in these 17 towns. Every town gets a piece of the cake. Only recently a special effort has been launched to concentrate on Lebowakgomo, the capital of Lebowa, in the provision of houses.

The *result* is that, within the present development strategy, the R41,6 million that is needed to eliminate the present housing backlog in proclaimed townships will be *divided* on a fair and close-to-even basis among the seventeen townships, in order to stimulate urbanisation.

But finance is not the only factor that is "divided" in the present housing strategy. With housing being provided in the seventeen existing townships, these towns also need basic services like roads, water supply, sewerage and, in some instances, electricity. The establishment of this *basic* infrastructure is very costly, and has to be borne by the Lebowa Government - in *all* the townships.

Housing standards and house prices, in an African context, are still high in Lebowa. Many Blacks are excluded from official housing programmes simply because they cannot afford it. Such Blacks rely heavily on their own ability to build houses, often with readily available material. At present very little help (officially) is being given to assist owner-builders in Lebowa on an extensive scale.

The *economic characteristics* of the present policy for the provision of houses in Lebowa can now be summarised. Firstly, it concentrates on the provision and financing of houses in *proclaimed townships*. Despite the fact that more than three-quarters of the anticipated needs are satisfied, there still exists a waiting list for houses in proclaimed townships. Secondly, housing in Lebowa is heavily *subsidised* by the Government. The Lebowa Government supplies, for instance, standard houses and residential plots at prices far below the erection costs and the market value, respectively. On the one hand subsidised housing may serve as an incentive for urbanisation in Lebowwa, but on the other hand it may also serve as a discouragement for potential Black homebuilders, when the adoption of an attitude like "you only have to wait long enough and then the Government will supply

you with a house much below the construction cost" becomes general. This will rather retard an urbanisation process.

In the third place, *government bodies* supply virtually all housing in Lebowa. Smit (1979, p. 10) even states that, in South Africa, government bodies still provide more than 95 per cent of the housing and related services in towns in the national states. The involvement of the private sector, financial institutions and self-build programmes has not yet evolved in its own right to make a substantial contribution to the housing need in Lebowa.

Fourthly, the provision of an *infrastructure* in the proclaimed towns in Lebowa demands vast amounts of capital. Roads, power, sanitation and communication networks are very costly and are supplied to some extent in all towns. The provision of a physical infrastructure and related services is necessary but means that less money is available for housing programmes. The existing physical infrastructure is discussed in paragraph 6.3 of this chapter.

## 6.2.2 Public health

### 6.2.2.1 Introduction

The World Health Organisation (1946) defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". Good health is a godgiven gift, often not appreciated enough by mankind. Bryant (1969) observes correctly that "... the cost of poor health to a nation is intellectual and physical disability". In the developing world where urbanisation rates increase rapidly, where more and more people come to live in large numbers in urban areas, sometimes under poor conditions, health hazards are created. In rural areas in developing countries the presence of diseases creates health hazards. Infectious diseases like tuberculosis, cholera and bubonic plague are spread in unhygienic conditions. Africa, including Lebowa, is no exception in trying to prevent these diseases.

Health services is an important responsibility of governments in developing countries. Despite the high priorities of such programmes it seems, however, that these governments still concentrate more on curative than preventive health services, one reason being the still strong poverty-population link. Two basic reasons for poor health conditions in the developing world today are poor sanitation systems and impure water for consumption. In Africa, it is estimated that only 8 per cent of urban families have access to a sanitary sewerage system (Dwyer, 1975, p. 233). Impure water, often polluted with human waste, is one of the main reasons for the widespread incidence of enteric diseases, like cholera, in many African towns and rural areas.

#### 6.2.2.2 *Public health in Lebowa*

In its White Paper on economic development, approved in 1979, the Lebowa Government accepted and approved the following policy and principles on *health* (Lebowa Government, 1979, p. 9):

- (a) the responsibility of contributing towards the health of the population;
- (b) investment for direct economic development will receive priority over government spending on social services;
- (c) the provision of health services will receive priority over the payment of government pensions;
- (d) the priorities for health services will be curative, then preventive, and then promotive;
- (e) health services will be decentralised through clinics and community health centres;
- (f) the community must be involved in supporting roles in the provision of health services; and
- (g) accurate health and population statistics must be kept to measure progress in the general health improvement of the population.

These policy guidelines form the basis of a well-planned structure where health services can be provided on a decentralised basis, potentially serving the developing community of Lebowa.

In order to put these policy guidelines into practice, Lebowa is divided into four *regions*, viz. North, South, West and East Lebowa. Each of these regions is further divided into four *health wards*. These sixteen health wards are served by 18 hospitals (two of which are situated outside the geographic borders of Lebowa) and 128 clinics.

The four regional hospitals (with the nearest proclaimed town being served in brackets) are the Kgapane Hospital in the northern region (Lenyenye), the Grootboek Hospital in the western region (Lebowakgomo), the Jane Furst Memorial Hospital in the southern region (Motetema), and the Masana Hospital in the eastern region (Shatale). Two hospitals are situated outside the geographic area of Lebowa, namely the St Joseph's and the Douglas Smit Hospitals. St Joseph's Hospital serves the *de facto* population of Lebowa, while it is assumed that the Douglas Smit Hospital has only about 50 per cent of its beds occupied and services used by the *de facto* population of Lebowa.

As can be seen from Table 6.4, the eighteen hospitals in Lebowa have a total of 5 700 beds, of which 4 500 are general beds and 1 200 psychiatric beds. The largest single hospital as far as number of beds is concerned, is the Grootboek Hospital with 910 beds, followed by the Jane Furst Memorial Hospital, the Masana Hospital near Shatale, and the H C Boshoff Hospital in Sekhukhuneland, each with 408 beds. In total, these four hospitals provide more than 47 per cent of the available general beds in Lebowa.

The estimated number of people being served by each of the eighteen hospitals in (and around) Lebowa is also shown in Table 6.4. It is estimated that two hospitals serve more than 200 000 people each, namely Grootboek Hospital (298 365 people) and the Kgapane Hospital (230 715 people). The W F Knobel and the St Joseph's Hospitals serve a combined population of 221 912 people.

From Table 6.4 it can be seen that there is a total of 128 clinics in the four health regions in Lebowa, namely 43 clinics in the western region, 35 in the southern region, 32 in the northern region, and 18 in the eastern region, each of which is attached to a hospital. There are approximately 29 clinics falling under the Grootboek Hospital, of which four are not functioning (Lebowa Government, 1982, p. 33).

Table 6.4 - Provision of health services in Lebowa, 1980

Region	Health ward	Hospital	Population served	Out-patient attendances <sup>1)</sup>	Total admissions	Number of beds	Number of beds per 1 000 population	Surgical <sup>1)</sup> operations	Clinics
North	Kgapane	Kgapane	230 715	80 988	6 864	262	1,1	2 151	9
	Sekgosese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6 <sup>6)</sup>
	Knobel	W F Knobel	221 912	59 689	3 932	213	1,4	916	12
		St Joseph's <sup>2)</sup>		12 046	5 968	103		146	-
	Bochum	Helene Franz	101 300	16 175	2 486	144	1,7	330	5
Blouberg		26 866		2 632	33	297		-	
Sub total	4	5	553 927	195 764	21 882	755	1,4	3 840	32
South	Sekhukhune	Jane Furst	138 734	68 254	8 615	408	2,9	3 167	11
	Nebo	St Rita's	106 646	47 901	6 218	334	3,1	746	6
	Matlala	Matlala	90 846	77 692	6 725	228	2,5	1 075	10
	Maandagshoek	H C Boshoff	128 063	91 820	8 687	408	3,2	1 640	8
Sub total	4	4	464 289	285 667	30 245	1 378	3,0	6 628	35
West	Groothoek	Groothoek	298 365	106 738	10 350	910	3,0	2 351	16
		Thabamoo <sup>3)</sup>	-	-	NA	1 200	-	NA	-
	Mankweng	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13 <sup>7)</sup>
	Refilwe	Mokopane	68 722	72 456	8 831	252	3,7	1 905	4
	Mogalakwana	George Masebe	103 083	71 145	5 176	252	2,4	849	10
Sub total	4	4	470 170	250 339	24 357	2 614	3,0 <sup>5)</sup>	5 105	43 <sup>8)</sup>
East	Masana	Masana	95 847	149 662	25 533	408	4,3	2 492	9
	Shiluvane	Douglas Smit <sup>4)</sup>	44 000	7 309	2 539	114	2,6	308	4
	Malatji	M L Malatji	70 320	38 362	6 961	210	3,0	1 287	2
	Meetse-A-Bophela	Sekororo	46 880	45 985	7 313	213	4,7	1 654	3 <sup>9)</sup>
Lorraine		-		-	8	-		-	
Sub total	4	5	257 047	241 318	42 346	953	3,7	5 741	18
TOTAL	16	18	1 745 433	973 088	118 830	5 700	3,3	21 314	128

1) At hospitals as well as clinics.

2) St Joseph's hospital is situated outside the geographical borders of Lebowa, but serves the *de facto* population of Lebowa.

3) Thabamoo Mental Hospital. No statistics available except for the number of beds.

4) Douglas Smit hospital situated outside the geographic borders of Lebowa, but it is assumed that 50 per cent of the beds of this hospital is occupied by patients from Lebowa. The same assumption applies to out-patient attendances, total admissions and surgical operations.

5) Not taking into account the 1 200 psychiatric beds of the Thabamoo Hospital.

6) Falling under the Kgapane Hospital.

7) Falling under the Groothoek Hospital.

8) Four clinics near the Groothoek Hospital are not functioning.

9) Including the private London Clinic, run by a Catholic Mission.

Sources: (a) Engelhardt, H. (1981), *Hospital and Nursing Yearbook of Southern Africa*, Thomson Publication South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Johannesburg.

(b) University of Pretoria (1982), "National Development Plan for Lebowa", Chapter III.

Despite the fact that the appropriation of funds by the Lebowa Government for health represents a fairly large percentage, actual expenditure on health services is substantially lower. The Department of Health and Welfare is responsible for, among other expenditures, the financing of health services in Lebowa. During 1980/81, approximately R46,7 million or 32,9 per cent of the total amount appropriated by the Lebowa Government was allocated to the Department of Health and Welfare (Lebowa Government, 1982, p. 20). A total of R28,7 million (61 per cent) was, however, allocated to the payment of pensions. A total of R16,3 million (or 35 per cent) was available for health services (which actually amounts to 11,5 per cent of the approved budgeted expenditure figure of the Lebowa Government in 1980/81). The "actual" health budget of R16,3 million in 1980/81 consisted of the following amounts:

- (a) R13,8 million for state hospitals;
- (b) R1,6 million for government-aided hospitals;
- (c) R0,4 million for the administration of health services; and
- (d) R0,5 million for a malaria programme.

#### 6.2.2.3 Conclusion

It can be concluded that the provision of health services can serve as a supportive motive in an urbanisation process in Lebowa. The present urbanisation strategy is to develop seventeen proclaimed townships simultaneously. Eighteen hospitals and 128 clinics are rendering medical services in Lebowa today. There are four regional hospitals in the four health regions, providing health services to the population in the area. No single hospital in Lebowa can be identified as the main hospital of the state regarding facilities and services provided.

The two most serious problems experienced in Lebowa as far as health services are concerned, is a shortage of staff (especially medical officers and nurses), and a lack of capital funds to improve the health infrastructure in the country (building clinics and extending hospitals). During 1980/81, salaries and pensions absorbed 73,9 per cent of the total health budget, after exceeding 81 per cent in each of the three previous years (Lebowa Government, 1982, p. 19). It is, furthermore, estimated that each patient in Lebowa is subsidised to the extent of 88 per cent (*ibid.*, p. 17).

Health services in Lebowa are provided on a decentralised basis and are being organised in various health wards, differing from the magisterial districts and the census wards used to determine population sizes. This lack of co-ordination hampers an urbanisation strategy.

### 6.2.3 Education

#### 6.2.3.1 Introduction

Like the provision of housing and health facilities discussed in the previous two sections, education in Lebowa can be regarded as providing for a *basic need*. Basic education teaches people about their environment and community, about development and technology, about themselves and other human beings, and about chances and opportunities. It contributes to the forming and shaping of better quality persons and improves the lifestyle of the people.

Through education people acquire skills that can be applied in their professions, producing modern goods and services. It is through education that technology and science prosper, with new initiatives, ideas and inventions being brought to the fore. Education also contributes to the skills and abilities of entrepreneurs and business people, through the implementation of technical, management and investment know-how.

Education as a basic need stems from the fact that there is a strong link between education and economic growth. It is probable that the outstanding growth records of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are largely due to the introduction of mass literacy and numeracy at early stages of their development (World Bank, 1980, p. 39). In general it is observed that countries with poor economic performances like Morocco and the Ivory Coast not only grow more slowly but also show low literacy rates and a high occurrence of illiteracy.

Furthermore, a strong link exists between education and labour productivity. As people become more educated, their productivity increases as well as their investment abilities. This is especially true as far as basic education or primary schooling is concerned. Basic farmer education and basic education on manufacturing skills contribute to this end.

Unfortunately it is also true that people with primary education in developing countries tend to leave their areas of origin in search of better job opportunities and higher wages. In some countries this results in a "brain drain". In other countries the number of repeaters and drop-outs among schoolgoing children also has a negative effect, both the loss of resources being invested to educate such children, and the loss of potential human capital.

Education is regarded as investment rather than consumption. It can become a powerful instrument to fight poverty (which is a function of high population growth rates) and to supply a nation or country of people with technical, scientific and professional skills. Many countries, including Lebowa, therefore invest more funds in education, mainly "... to develop and promote the intellectual, mental and physical potential of the individual to the benefit of the community" (Lebowa Government, Department of Education). In developing countries, education typically accounts for 4 per cent of the gross domestic product (gdp) and for 18 to 25 per cent of the government budget (Streeton, 1981, p. 151). Today it has become a basic need to expand the basic educational opportunities for the inhabitants of developing countries, because of an increasing awareness that this is an investment in the future.

#### *6.2.3.2 Education in Lebowa*

The provision of education services and opportunities appears to receive high priority in Lebowa. Expenditure on education amounted to 16,7 per cent of the gross domestic product (gdp) in 1977, and to 30,1 per cent of the total budget in 1981/82, which is higher than the typical percentages earmarked for education in developing countries referred to above. Table 6.5 indicates the amount voted for education by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in each year since 1976, as well as the percentage of each particular year's total budget.

From Table 6.5 it can be seen that the expenditure on education, as a percentage of the total appropriation of funds of the Lebowa Government, has been more than 30 per cent since 1979, after having reached a high of nearly one third of the total budget in 1980/81. Absolute amounts spent on education in Lebowa increased by more than R31 million or 208 per cent during the five-year period between 1976 and 1981, i.e. from R15,1 million to R46,6 million.

It should be realised, however, that until 1980 more than 90 per cent of the amount voted for education each year was earmarked for personnel expenditure or salaries. During 1980/81 this percentage decreased slightly to 89,4 per cent, and then to 84,5 per cent or R39,4 million in 1981/82. During 1981/82 only 11,3 per cent or R5,2 million was voted for expenditure on stores and equipment in schools.

As far as the expenditure on the various educational phases is concerned, the R46,6 million educational budget's main components during 1981/82 were as follows:

Primary education	:	R30,1 million (64,6 per cent)
Secondary education	:	R11,7 million (25,1 per cent)
Teacher training	:	R1,3 million ( 2,8 per cent)
Trade and industrial training	:	R1 million ( 2,2 per cent)

Expenditure on education in Lebowa is important for the urbanisation process, basically because it competes for the same funds that may stimulate urbanisation more directly, such as the provision of physical infrastructure. It is, however, an ongoing debate whether human resources development or physical infrastructure development should receive priority.

The expenditure on education per pupil in Lebowa amounted to R81,42 in 1981/82 (at current prices), which is substantially more than the R34,11 spent per pupil in 1976. Of more importance, however, is the increase in expenditure per pupil at constant 1976 prices, which has been obtained by deflating the expenditure at current prices by the consumer price index. From Table 6.5 it can be seen that, despite high inflation rates, expenditure on education per capita at constant prices increased from R34,11 in 1976 to R44,84 in 1981/82.

Table 6.6 shows the types of schools that existed in Lebowa in 1981. In total there were 1 263 schools, the majority of which, namely 97 per cent, were community schools. There were 18 schools under the control of the Government and 13 private schools. This large number of schools have to accommodate the rapidly increasing population in Lebowa.

Table 6.5 - Expenditure on education in Lebowa, 1976 - 1981

Financial year	Total amount voted R'000	% of total budget	Enrolment	Expenditure per pupil	
				at current prices	at constant 1976 prices
1976/77	15 111	24,0	442 916	R34,11	R34,11
1977/78	16 889	22,5	476 930	R35,40	R31,85
1978/79	21 423	23,0	507 683	R42,20	R34,45
1979/80	28 748	32,4	540 097	R53,20	R38,39
1980/81	37 369	32,9	571 828	R65,35	R41,45
1981/82	46 600	30,1	571 955	R81,42	R44,84

Sources: (a) Lebowa Government (1982), Department of Education, unpublished information.

(b) Benso (1980), *Statistical survey of Black development*, Pretoria, Tables 86 and 112.

(c) South African Reserve Bank (1982), *Quarterly Bulletin*, March 1982, p. S-112.

(d) Republic of South Africa (1982), Department of Education and Training, Annual Report 1981, RP72/1981, Table 3.3.1.

Table 6.6 - Number of schools in Lebowa, 1981

Control	Number of schools
State or government	18
Community	1 226
Subsidised institutions	4
Special schools	2
Private	13
Total	<u>1 263</u>

Source: Republic of South Africa (1982), Department of Education and Training, "Annual Report 1981", RP 72/1981, Table 3.1.1.

No detailed statistics are available as far as the location of *schools in towns and semi-urban places* in Lebowa is concerned. According to the South African Department of Education (1981, p. 247), 89 schools were located in towns in Lebowa in 1981, i.e. 7 per cent. Approximately 58 schools were located in the fourteen largest proclaimed towns in 1981, indicated in Table 6.7. From this table it can be seen that 32 schools or 55 per cent of the schools listed were located in three towns, namely Seshego (18), Mahwelereng (8) and Gakgapane (6). Lebowakgomo, the capital of Lebowa, had only two schools in 1981.

It has been shown that, as far as the expenditure on education in Lebowa is concerned, priority is being given to *primary education*. The main reason is that 78 per cent of all schools in Lebowa are primary institutions, as shown in Table 6.8. These primary schools, with an average of 53 pupils per teacher and an average of more than 75 pupils per classroom, are an indication of the relatively young population of Lebowa.

For a developing country like Lebowa, a total enrolment of only about 700 students in the 11 technical trades listed in Table 6.9 is insufficient. In 1979 only 35,6 per cent of the total enrolments at the four Technical Institutes wrote their final year examinations which, when applied to the 1980 enrolment, would result in 252 candidates writing their final examination (Lebowa Government, 1979, Table 18).

Table 6.7 - Schools in selected proclaimed towns in Lebowa, 1981

Proclaimed town	Number of schools
Seshego	18
Mahwelereng	8
Gakgapane	6
Namakgale	5
Lenyenyee	4
Hlogotlou	3
Motetema	3
Shatale	3
Lebowakgomo	2
Senwamokgope	2
Sebayeng	1
Tubatse	1
Mankweng	1
Leroro	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>58</u>

Source: See Table 6.6.

Table 6.8 - Schools according to educational phases, total enrolment, teachers and classrooms in Lebowa, 1981

Institutions	Number of schools	Total enrolment	Teachers	Pupils per teacher	Classrooms	Pupils per classroom
Primary schools	988	464 395	8 758	53,0	6 161	75,4
Secondary schools	257	102 419	2 596	39,5	1 824	56,2
Teacher training	5	4 164	169	24,6	113	36,8
Technical training	4	707	103	9,5	69 <sup>1)</sup>	14,2
Other	9	270				
Total	1 263	571 955	11 626	49,2	8 167	70,0

1) Includes 44 private classrooms.

Source: Republic of South Africa (1982), Department of Education and Training, "Annual Report, 1981", PP-72/1981, various Tables.

Table 6.9 - Technical training; enrolments per course, 1981

Course	First	Second	Third	Total
Concreting, bricklaying, plastering	58	48	-	106
Tailoring	10	12	14	36
Leatherwork	16	10	NA	26
Carpentry, joinery, cabinetmaking	57	52	NA	109
Plumbing, drainlaying, sheetmetal work	44	45	NA	89
Motor body repair	34	12	NA	46
Upholstery and motor trimming	16	7	NA	23
Painting and glazing	11	NA	NA	11
Welding and metalwork	66	52	NA	118
Motor mechanics	39	24	28	91
Electricians	15	13	24	52
<b>Total</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>707</b>

Source: See Table 6.6.

In 1979 approximately 90 per cent of final year candidates passed their exams, resulting in the availability of 246 tradesmen in 1980 and an estimated 227 tradesmen in 1981. Urban development needs technically trained people, especially in the building and construction industry, where they can make a contribution to the development of physical infrastructure.

In Table 6.10 the enrolment of pupils in primary and secondary schools in Lebowa during 1981 is shown, as well as a projected enrolment of pupils in these educational phases in 1986. Enrolment in primary and secondary school phases in Lebowa (1981) provides significant features. No less than 81,9 per cent of total enrolment in the two school phases were in primary schools, with 18,1 per cent in secondary schools. The total number of pupils per school phase (in percentages) in Lebowa during 1981 were 54,5 per cent in lower primary; 27,4 per cent in higher primary; 14,7 per cent in junior secondary; and 3,4 per cent in senior secondary. Declines in enrolments in 1981 were recorded between sub A and standard 5 (from 89 864 pupils to 41 840 pupils), as well as between standards 8 and 9 (from 23 716 pupils to 10 999 pupils). The sharpest decline in absolute numbers appeared between sub A and sub B, and between standard 8 and standard 9 (1981).

Table 6.10 - Enrolment and estimated enrolment in primary and secondary schools in Lebowa, 1981 and 1986

Educational phase and standard	Enrolment	
	1981	1986
Sub A	89 864	111 000
Sub B	76 004	100 700
Std 1	75 561	98 400
Std 2	67 485	86 700
Lower primary	308 914	396 800
Std 3	62 472	76 900
Std 4	51 169	63 600
Std 5	41 840	61 300
Higher primary	<u>155 481</u>	<u>201 800</u>
Primary	<u>464 395</u>	<u>598 600</u>
Std 6	34 642	43 500
Std 7	24 844	36 300
Std 8	23 716	35 800
Junior secondary	83 202	115 600
Std 9	10 999	22 700
Std 10	8 218	11 200
Senior secondary	<u>19 217</u>	<u>33 900</u>
Secondary	<u>102 419</u>	<u>149 500</u>
TOTAL	<u><u>566 814</u></u>	<u><u>748 100</u></u>

Sources: (a) Republic of South Africa (1982), Department of Education and Training, Annual Report 1981, RP 72/1981, Table 3.3.2.

(b) University of Pretoria (1982), "National Development Plan for Lebowa", Table 9.2.3A (prepared by Prof R D Coertze).

It is expected that enrolments in primary schools will increase from 464 395 pupils to 598 600 pupils during the five year period 1981 - 1986. The contribution of each school phase as a percentage of total enrolments shows, however, that enrolments in the primary schools will decline from 81,9 per cent in 1981 to 80,0 per cent in 1986, while enrolments in the secondary schools will increase from 18,1 per cent in 1981 to 20,0 per cent in 1986.

It is obvious that the estimated larger number of enrolments will put an increasing strain on sources to be canalised towards education in Lebowa. At the same time can it be utilised to stimulate deliberate urbanisation.

#### 6.2.3.3 Conclusion

The most significant feature of the provision of education in Lebowa, from an *urbanisation* point of view, is the distribution of schools in urban areas - 58 schools were spread over 14 of the largest proclaimed towns in 1981, which represents only 4,6 per cent of the total number of schools in Lebowa. Assuming that 89 schools in Lebowa are located in all towns, it still represents only 7 per cent. This implies that the vast majority of schools are outside towns which do not serve as a stimulating factor in an urbanisation strategy in Lebowa at present. As a matter of fact, this very situation discourages urbanisation in Lebowa.

Lebowa has to plan for the future, especially for urbanisation. One aspect in this process will be careful planning to provide educational services and facilities. It is estimated that more than 1 million children will enrol for primary and secondary education in Lebowa in 1992, a mere decade away. More schools will have to be built (at the right places), more teachers will be needed, and more capital will be required.

As far as financing is concerned, approximately 84,5 per cent of the current educational budget in 1981/82 was voted for salaries, while R360 000 (or 4,4 per cent of the total capital budget of the Department of Works) was earmarked for three new schools and additional classrooms.

Special attention is needed in the extension of technical training and secondary education, as trained manpower will become a greater advantage for Lebowa and the expected economical development of the area.

Presently, the impression is created that the provision of educational services and facilities in Lebowa is not in accordance with an urbanisation strategy, but rather aimed at accommodating the rapidly increasing population. Services and facilities are provided where they are needed, with very little co-ordination with other governmental de-

partments, mainly because of the absence of a purposive urbanisation strategy. Even if a clear-cut strategy is followed at present, it will be hampered by the lack of capital for the expansion of the educational infrastructure in Lebowa.

### 6.3 PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The creation of physical infrastructure, especially in a developing country like Lebowa, is a necessary prerequisite for economic development. Because of the nature of physical infrastructure, the public sector has a particular responsibility for its creation and maintenance. It has to provide in the basic need for a transportation network consisting of roads, railway lines, pipelines and airports, storage and distribution of water, generation and distribution of power and provision of communication links.

Without a sound physical infrastructural framework, economic progress and development are seriously hampered. In the case of Lebowa, only 7,7 per cent of the expenditure of various public institutions was spent on the creation of a physical infrastructure in 1980/81, excluding schools, hospitals and clinics. During the past five years this portion has never exceeded 12 per cent. This is one of the major reasons why Lebowa, which received legislative assembly status in 1971, has not obtained a sound physical infrastructure during the last decade.

The purpose of this section is to describe the existing geographic physical infrastructure in Lebowa and also to determine what the needs are at present. From an urbanisation point of view, it is necessary to have this information. In the present absence of an *efficient* framework of a physical infrastructure in Lebowa, it will be desirable to plan for the provision of such a framework within a strategy of deliberate urbanisation. This can, however, only be done with a thorough knowledge of the existing infrastructure in Lebowa.

The task is, unfortunately, seriously hampered by the lack of relevant data and information in this respect. Very few studies have been undertaken on different aspects of the infrastructure in Lebowa, notably roads, railways lines, postal and communication services, water, sanitation and sewerage works and power supply. A modest attempt will be made to describe the present structure.

### 6.3.1 Roads

Today the transport industry is one of the most important sectors in the economy of any country. Without this industry (i.e. road, railway, shipping and air transport and pipelines), economic development will be retarded, trade will not develop at a rapid rate and living standards will be affected. Transport, of which roads are one mode, can serve as a trigger in the development process, in that it can stimulate development. It is not a sufficient pre-condition for economic development, but its economic and social influence, together with the simultaneous development of other sectors of the economy, is of the utmost importance. This influence is active at all times and affects a wide range of activities. Welgemoed (1981, p. 5) in a study on transportation in Lebowa, states that transport influences "... business structures, the establishment of economic activities and results in greater and alternative choices by the consumer, like the alternative choice of a home, work, availability of health services, shopping facilities, etc." In other words, transport or a transport system is not a goal in itself, but a means to obtain a certain objective in the development process. No development is possible without transport, simply because the welfare produced in the form of goods (and services) need to be transferred from producer to consumer.

The transportation industry is also a most important factor in the fostering of *urban development*. The existence of roads, railway lines and air traffic can encourage urbanisation in certain geographic areas where transportation modes or junctions occur. The lack of these services can, however, also retard urbanisation. Businessmen tend to congregate where at least private road transport is readily available, thereby stimulating economic activity through the creation of job opportunities. With sufficient transport communication facilities, especially roads and railway lines, suppliers have easy access to businessmen, while businessmen gain easy access for their products to other geographic markets. But most important, transportation has the ability to *generate employment and income*, especially if canalised and directed in such a manner as to promote deliberate urbanisation. One of the bus fleets in Lebowa, Lebowa Transport, with only a known 52 per cent of its total fleet, at present

carries more than 2,7 million passengers per month, mainly between their homes and place of employment (Lebowa Transport, 1982).

Established transport facilities and businesses also attract more people from abroad and from local rural areas. With an increase in economic activities, more businesses are established. This gives rise to the establishment of councils and committees to watch over the interests of the inhabitants. In the process more employment opportunities are created.

In Lebowa, road transport is the most important mode of transportation, in the absence of air transport, shipping transport and, to a certain extent, railway transport. For purposes of this study, the following classification of roads will be applicable (Lebowa Government, 1977, p. 2):

#### Primary roads

These are the major roads in a country. They are normally tarred and fenced off and can accommodate a high traffic volume. Primary roads link up with secondary roads to give access to other areas in the country.

#### Secondary roads

These untarred roads form offshoots from primary roads. They give access to business areas and centres of activity which are not near primary roads, and also to areas in the rest of the country.

#### Tertiary roads

These minor roads, normally not tarred, lead from primary or secondary roads to smaller centres in the country like settlements, hospitals, clinics and schools.

It is estimated that there are 8 700 km of roads in Lebowa, 1 100 km of which is still under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Provincial Administration. The remaining 7 600 km can be classified as follows (using the classification described above):

Primary roads	:	1 650 km
Secondary roads	:	3 550 km
Tertiary roads	:	<u>2 400 km</u>
Total		7 600 km

From this classification it can be seen that 40,8 per cent of all roads in Lebowa are secondary roads, assuming that the roads under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Provincial Administration are primary roads. In general the roads in Lebowa are not in a very good condition, mainly due to lack of capital to maintain the roads. It is estimated that, based on the traffic density, where it is assumed that 250 equivalent vehicles per day (EVPD) justify the tarring of a road, 12 per cent of all roads in Lebowa needed to be tarred in 1977, of which only 49 km or 0,64 per cent was tarred in 1977 (*ibid.*). With increased economic development in Lebowa, traffic density will undoubtedly increase, with the result that the backlog of tarred roads will also increase unless a deliberate effort is made to tar roads in Lebowa.

Lack of capital seriously hampers the establishment of an efficient road network in Lebowa. In 1977, transport, storage and communication contributed less than R2,4 million (or only 2 per cent) of the total gdp in Lebowa, compared to 11,3 per cent in the Republic of South Africa in the same year. For the 1981/82 financial year, only 12,8 per cent of the total amount voted for the Department of Works, or less than 1,7 per cent of the total amount voted in the budget, was earmarked for roads and bridges (Lebowa budget, 1981/82). In view of the high cost of tarring a road, it is unlikely that Lebowa will have sufficient funds available to even tar the existing backlog of roads.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the existing roads in Lebowa are inadequately maintained and that 35 per cent of the roads are below standard (Lebowa Government, 1977). Certain areas in Lebowa have high average rainfalls, a factor which has its effects on the roads that are not tarred, especially during the months November to March. Increased traffic densities help in the process of creating substandard roads, especially in the absence of road maintenance.


At present *one* of the transportation organisations, Lebowa Transport, transports some 42 million people annually (1981) in their 320 buses in and around Lebowa (Lebowa Transport, 1982, p. 13). This places a heavy burden on the absorption ability of roads in Lebowa. In the Seshego region alone it is estimated that a fleet of 56 buses of Lebowa Transport is carrying passengers over one million kilometres a month. Some 167 buses (52 per cent of the total fleet) of its organisation carry passengers at present over a total distance of *1,39 million kilometres of road* per month.

Map 6.1 shows the road network in Lebowa, including the tarred primary roads and the untarred secondary and tertiary roads. Firstly, there is the *national road* from south to north, going through the towns of Pietersburg and Potgietersrus, separating North Lebowa from South Lebowa. This road does not pass through any area under the jurisdiction of the Lebowa Government but serves as an important link with the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area. Secondly, there are a few *primary* and *secondary roads* linking this national road with important towns in Lebowa, notably Lebowakgomo, the capital of Lebowa, and other proclaimed towns, mostly on the borders of the area. Thirdly, there are numerous *tertiary roads* linking the hinterland with secondary roads as well as internal linkages. Finally, there are roads outside Lebowa linking the various separate geographic areas of Lebowa, notably in Eastern Lebowa.

Despite the fact that Lebowa has a high road density of 23 km/100 km<sup>2</sup> (compared to South Africa's 6 km/100 km<sup>2</sup>), the quality of these roads leaves much to be desired, as described. This serious absence of quality roads in Lebowa retards urbanisation and makes it difficult to develop an urbanisation strategy, where urban places can be developed with an adequate infrastructure, especially roads.

At present the existing seventeen proclaimed townships, as well as the identified closer settlements and selected agricultural settlements, are not served adequately by a standardised road network to promote rapid urban growth. The existing roads will, therefore, not have the ability to cope with an increased traffic volume in the foreseeable future.

MAP 6.1  
The Road and Railway network  
in Lebowa



From this it may be concluded that Lebowa has an inadequate, sub-standard road network, spread over a wide area which cannot foster urbanisation, at least not at present in selected places. These roads serve, on the one hand, too many towns and settlements (i.e. urban and semi-urban places) and have too high a maintenance cost, on the other hand, to upgrade them to the required standard. The present policy of developing various proclaimed townships simultaneously leads to a distribution of capital and manpower in developing the road network. The result is that very few kilometres of road in Lebowa are of an acceptable standard.

It has been noted, however, that transportation has the ability to generate employment opportunities and income. These are urgently needed in Lebowa and can possibly be accommodated within a deliberate urbanisation strategy.

### 6.3.2 Railways

Lebowa does not have any significant railway lines. The short existing lines inside the territory contribute very little to the infrastructure. The railway lines outside the territory, and very often on the borders of Lebowa are, however, of great importance to the economic development of the area. The important railway lines in this respect are the north-south line which runs more or less parallel with the national road, the line from Komatipoort in the east to Tzaneen, which links with Pietersburg, the line on the most southern border of Lebowa (along the Steelpoort river), and the line from Na-boomspruit (on the main north-south line) to Zebediela. These railway lines are shown on Map 6.1.

There is a continuous debate on whether the railway line at Zebediela may be linked with Lebowakgomo, the capital, which will benefit the transportation of people (especially commuters), goods and raw materials to and from Lebowa's capital. Lebowakgomo needs to be linked by rail with markets outside Lebowa, especially regarding its industrial development. Industrialists can then import raw materials and export their finished products from and to the PWV metropolitan area. Because of the fact that there are 23 operating mines in Lebowa (1980),

most of which are situated in South Lebowa, there are most definitely a need for a railway line linking Steelpoort with strategic operating mines in South Lebowa, especially near Doornbosch, Tubatse and Mecklenburg.

It may be concluded that Lebowa lacks the necessary railway lines that will promote economic development in general and urbanisation in particular. Large industry and mining activities are especially in need of railway transport. In the future, provision of railway lines in Lebowa will have a definite influence on urbanisation and will have to be planned accordingly. Railway lines not only bring forward economic development, but also employment opportunities in certain areas. It can, therefore, have a promotive effect on the urbanisation process in Lebowa.

### 6.3.3 Postal and communication services

In any developing country the development of postal and communication services is of the utmost importance. Without communication, businesses develop slower and precious time is wasted. Moreover, the lack of communication is costly to the community and hampers economic development.

Lebowa, like most of the other national states, does not yet have a modern post and telecommunication network. It is expected, however, that the present network will be drastically extended in the next decade or two. If it is assumed, for instance, that the number of telephone subscribers will increase at an annual rate of 12 per cent during the period 1981 to 1990 (estimates by the Post Office in South Africa), the present number of 5 378 (1981) subscribers will increase to 14 914 in 1990.

At present Lebowa has three *automatic telephone exchanges*, situated in Seshego, Chuniespoort (near Lebowakgomo) and Sovenga (see Map 6.2). These three automatic exchanges serve 1 355 existing telephone points, 1 182 (87 per cent) of which are in residential homes and 153 (11 per cent) in businesses. There are also 20 public telephone booths.

There are 69 *manual telephone exchanges* in Lebowa, widely spread over the territory (Map 6.2). These exchanges serve 1 368 telephone points, 834 (61 per cent) of which are in residential homes, 434 (31 per cent) in businesses, and 100 or 7 per cent in telephone offices.

Apart from the telecommunication services, the 69 manual exchanges in Lebowa render *postal services* normally found at post office agencies. In addition, there are 19 offices rendering *only* postal services (no telecommunication services). These postal agencies are shown in Map 6.2. Ten of them are situated in South Lebowa. In *total*, there are 88 agencies rendering postal services to the *de facto* population in Lebowa. On average this implies that every postal agency in Lebowa serves 20 000 people, which leaves much room for the extension of postal services in Lebowa.

Apart from the telecommunication network in Lebowa (automatic and manual exchanges) referred to, there are an additional 2 775 locally situated *party lines* in Lebowa, serving various households and businesses.

Despite the present geographically well-distributed telecommunication network in Lebowa, it should be clear that only certain people can afford to have a telephone. If it is assumed that there are an average of 6 persons per household, less than 2 per cent of all households in Lebowa have the luxury of a telephone.

If the telecommunication network is to be extended and improved as envisaged, the persons per telephone point will decrease from the present 325 persons to 68 persons in the year 2000. Urgent attention should be given to the future *urban population* in particular, which will reach an expected 1,4 million in 2000 (see Table 4.16 in Chapter 4). Following the economic development of the area, the demand for a modern telecommunication network will increase dramatically in the urban areas. The provision of such services in selected urban areas will also serve as a stimulus for a guided urbanisation process.

It may be *concluded* that the existing postal and communication services in Lebowa are inadequate and insufficient to meet the current



demand. Lebowa will benefit if the envisaged growth rate in the communication network can be realised within the next 15 years. From an urbanisation point of view it will be important *where* these extensions will take place, especially the location of new automatic telephone exchanges, which will undoubtedly affect the process of urbanisation in Lebowa.

At present the three automatic telephone exchanges are located in or around the proclaimed townships of Lebowakgomo, Seshego and Sebayeng, all relatively close to each other. This fact has important consequences for the future development of these towns.

#### 6.3.4 Power network

No independent power network exists in Lebowa. The existing power supply in Lebowa is provided by the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), which is responsible for the distribution of power in South Africa. ESCOM does supply power up to the borders of Lebowa, from where the Department of Works in Lebowa can link up with the ESCOM supply and distribute electricity to various settlements and institutions inside the territory. At present the distribution of power inside Lebowa is based on a demand-side approach, where the Department considers various *requests* for power inside the territory.

As far as the supply of power to the urban areas in Lebowa is concerned, at least four towns receive their power from adjoining White towns (University of Pretoria, 1982), namely:

Seshego from Pietersburg;  
Mahwelereng from Potgietersrus;  
Lenyenyee from Tzaneen; and  
Ga-Kgapane from Duiwelskloof.

All but two proclaimed townships have power links. Most of the semi-urban settlements, however, still rely on more traditional modes of supplying energy, like power generators, candles and paraffin-lamps.

From an urbanisation point of view, *this* strategy of supplying power to various points on an *ad hoc* basis inside the territory leads to a wide and unplanned distribution of a power network and does not foster

urbanisation in selected places, thus losing the impact of stimulating the growth of one or more urban areas.

The availability of electricity without any doubt stimulates urbanisation. In a developing country like Lebowa, where the vast majority of inhabitants become increasingly exposed to modern technology and standards, the availability of electricity becomes an obtainable object. The most obvious place to find electricity at present in Lebowa is in one of the proclaimed towns, as nearly 90 per cent of all such towns have electricity. The complete electrification of a town or towns in Lebowa will, therefore, definitely promote urbanisation and will (initially) serve as a "drawing card" to people from the rural areas. It will also act as an input for business and industry.

#### 6.3.5 Water

Water is an indispensable commodity for man, beast and plant. Without this commodity, life will not be possible. Man realises the importance of water for his survival and, therefore, does all in his power in the search for alternative sources. He drills into the earth in search of this "liquid gold", tries to drain clouds and investigates the possible utilisation of seawater for consumption. Dams are being built at high costs to store available water.

The availability (or non-availability) of water also has an important influence on *urbanisation*. Generally, people are attracted to places or areas where they can find employment and where services and amenities are available. Jobs in turn are often drawn to amenities and services. One of the most basic amenities is the availability of quality-sufficient water, and in this sense water can serve as a very important activator of urbanisation. In an urban area especially, people need water. This section will, therefore, concentrate on the rainfall, dams and boreholes in Lebowa, before the present need for water in Lebowa is determined.

##### 6.3.5.1 Rainfall

Most of Lebowa forms part of a high rainfall area, where some areas record annual rainfall figures of 800 mm. These areas are included in a high rainfall category of South Africa. Only certain parts of Natal, Transkei, Eastern Transvaal and the Cape Peninsula as a rule record

average annual rainfall figures of more than 1 000 mm. On the other hand, there are also areas in Lebowa which records very little rain. Northern Lebowa, for instance, averages 450 mm per annum, which is low if it is borne in mind that between May and September a total rainfall of less than 10 mm may be recorded in some districts.

Table 6.11 shows the average monthly rainfall for four regions in Lebowa (recorded in 1979). The four regions are situated in four rainfall districts of the Weather Bureau in Pretoria, namely district 64 (North Lebowa), district 63 (South Lebowa), district 48 (East Lebowa), and district 49 (North East Lebowa).

Table 6.11 - Average rainfall in Lebowa

Region	Rainfall (mm per month)												
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Total
North Lebowa	78	69	57	33	10	6	4	2	9	31	69	82	450
South Lebowa	121	101	83	48	18	9	7	7	25	64	120	125	728
East Lebowa	153	144	108	58	17	12	12	7	20	46	94	137	808
North-East Lebowa	162	142	115	50	19	12	13	9	18	45	92	133	810

Source: University of Pretoria (1982), *National Development Plan for Lebowa*, Pretoria.

From Table 6.11 it can be seen that East Lebowa and North East Lebowa have annual rainfalls of more than 800 mm, followed by South Lebowa with 728 mm and North Lebowa with 450 mm. Lebowa receives its rain mainly during the months of November to March, with "dry" months from June to September, where less than 10 mm per month is recorded in some areas.

North Lebowa is the region which does not have high rainfall figures. From May to September single rainfall figures are recorded. This region seldom, if ever, has a monthly rainfall of more than 90 mm. The largest geographic area in Lebowa, South Lebowa, normally has rainfall figures of 100 mm or more during at least four months per year, but also experiences "dry" months during mid-year periods.

### 6.3.5.2 Dams in Lebowa

High rainfall does not necessarily imply sufficient water. In Lebowa the evaporation of surface water is often higher than the actual rainfall. In some regions the evaporation exceeds the actual rainfall by three to five times. It is estimated that only 8,6 per cent of the water in Lebowa is available as run-off water, while the rest either infiltrates the earth or evaporates (University of Pretoria, 1982, p. 144). It is thus of crucial importance to utilise surface water to the optimum. As shown in Table 6.11, there is only a limited rainy season in Lebowa. Maximum temperatures during this season sometimes exceed 35 °C, with the result that evaporation increases.

Table 6.12 shows the major dams in Lebowa. Only dams with a volume exceeding 200 000 m<sup>3</sup> are included. The largest dam serving Lebowa is the Glen Alpine Dam, with a volume of less than 24 million m<sup>3</sup>. This is extremely small when compared to major dams in South Africa, specifically the H F Verwoerd Dam and the P K le Roux Dam, with storage capacities of 5 943 million m<sup>3</sup> and 3 185 million m<sup>3</sup>, respectively.

Three dams in Lebowa have a volume of more than 7 million m<sup>3</sup>, namely the Glen Alpine Dam (North Lebowa), the Piet Gouws Dam and the Lepelane Dam (South Lebowa). Water from these dams is used for irrigation and livestock.

The geographic location of twelve of the larger dams in Lebowa is shown on Map 6.3. Nine of these dams are located in South Lebowa. Some of the dams are close to proclaimed towns, while some proclaimed towns have no major dam nearby and are dependent on water from neighbouring White towns or other sources such as streams, boreholes, etc.

Eight of the dams listed in Table 6.12 are used for drinking water, while the others are used for irrigation. The Chuniespoort Dam supplies mainly Lebowakgomo with water, while other proclaimed towns are supplied by the following dams:

Seshego	-	Molietsie Dam
Jane Furst	-	Lehlare Matlala
Motetema	-	Varswater Dam
Mankweng	-	Turfloop Dam
Hlogotlou	-	Mahlangu Dam



From Table 6.12 it will be clear that Lebowa does not have large dams providing water for consumption. All the dams are relatively small and have a limited ability to supply water to communities. As a matter of fact, many communities rely on smaller rivers, streams, fountains and boreholes for their daily water supplies.

Table 6.12 - Major dams in Lebowa

Dam	River	Volume m <sup>3</sup> x 10 <sup>6</sup>	Purpose of use
Glen Alpine	Magolakwaena	23,6	Irrigation
Piet Gouws	Ngwaritsi	7,4	Irrigation
Lepellane	Dronkkaffer	7,3	Irrigation
Chuniespoort	Chunies	3,6	Drinking water
Buffelsdoorn	Buffelsdoorn	3,5	Irrigation
Molietsie	Bloed	3,1	Drinking water
Gutswa	Gutswa	2,5	Drinking water
Lolamontes	Matebe	1,9	-
Lehlare Matlala	Ngwaritsi	1,4	Drinking water
Kasteel	Klein Sand	1,3	Irrigation
Varswater	-	1,1	Drinking water
Mahlangu	Gemsbokspruit	1,0	Drinking water
Turfloop	Lokaleleegte	0,8	Drinking water
Strassburg	Rietspruit	0,3	Irrigation
Krokodilheuwel	Lokaleleegte	0,2	Irrigation
Meidingen	-	0,2	Drinking water

Source: Lebowa Government (1982), Department of Works, unpublished information.

It should be clear that few settlements and areas in Lebowa have access to water from the major dams. One of the alternative supplies of water is *boreholes*. Table 6.13 shows the existing boreholes in Lebowa in each district. From the statistics it can be seen that there is an estimated total of 1 769 producing boreholes in Lebowa, suggesting an average of one borehole for every 1 270 hectares, which is a very sparse distribution.

Table 6.13 - Boreholes in Lebowa, by district

District	Number of boreholes	Average supply ℓ/h
<u>North Lebowa</u>		
Bochum	70	2 580
Seshego	220	6 840
Mokerong	154	6 390
BoĀobedu and Sekgosese	175	4 610
Total	619	5 105
<u>South Lebowa</u>		
Nebo	213	2 750
Sekhukhuneland	234	3 200
Thabamooop	151	3 720
Mokerong	147	2 780
Naphuno	288	3 220
Mapulaneng	117	3 710
Total	1 150	3 230

Source: Garlipp (1980) *Lebowa Water Potential*, University of Pretoria.

Strong boreholes exist in Seshego, Mokerong, BoĀobedu and Sekgosese districts, where the average supply exceeds 4 500 ℓ/h. These districts are situated in North Lebowa, which has the lowest rainfall, as indicated in Table 6.11. In South Lebowa there are two districts with boreholes supplying more than 4 500 ℓ/h on average, namely Naphuno (156) and Sekhukhuneland (114).

Taking into consideration that these boreholes to a large extent have to meet the needs of a large part of the *de facto* population, as well as vast numbers of livestock, it becomes clear that this source of water is totally unable to serve all the people and livestock.

Having looked at the supply of water in Lebowa, i.e. from rainfall, dams and boreholes, one will realise that this region does not have

sufficient water resources. The total *de facto* population of more than 1,7 million at present cannot possibly have sufficient water as described in the previous sections. It can be concluded that the present supply or provision of water via rainwater (less evaporation), dams and boreholes is totally inadequate to meet the needs of the current population, especially outside proclaimed towns. Serious considerations will have to be given to the protection and extension of the water resources in Lebowa. Unless the present water consumption is controlled, new water schemes are launched, and a master plan developed, Lebowa will, like the rest of South Africa, face serious water shortages before the end of this century. A deliberate effort is imperative to protect and store the water resources in Lebowa. The availability of this commodity can also be utilised to promote the growth of selected urban and semi-urban places.

#### 6.3.5.3 *The need for water*

As far as the need for water in Lebowa can be estimated (including the needs of schools, district offices, hospitals, clinics, magistrate offices and police stations), it appears that there is an *increasing need* for this important commodity. Table 6.14 shows the estimated need for water in proclaimed townships for 1980 and 1985. These estimates are based on the medium projection of the urban population in Lebowa (see Chapter 4, Table 4.16).

The responsibility to supply water to the towns rests with the Department of Works in Lebowa, which also supplies some closer settlements and agricultural settlements. There is no critical shortage of water in the townships, as shown by the fact that there are no water restrictions. In 1978, 80 per cent of the total water needs of the proclaimed townships were actually available (Lebowa Government, 1978, p. 25). Assuming that part of this shortfall was eliminated by 1980, especially in the towns of Lenyenye, Shatale, Hlogotlou, Tubatse, Ga-Kgapane and Motetema, and that all townships in Lebowa had 90 per cent of their total water needs available in 1980, *the total water needs* of the inhabitants of *proclaimed towns* identified in Chapter 4 can be estimated, as shown in Table 6.14. A total water need of 31 586 kℓ per day or 217 litres per capita per day is estimated, which corresponds with the 225 litres per capita per day used by the Department of Co-operation and Development as representative of the average water consumption of Blacks.

Table 6.14 - The estimated water need in proclaimed townships in Lebowa, 1980 and 1985

District	Town	Popu= lation	Water need, 1980 <sup>1)</sup>		Water need 1985 <sup>1)</sup> kℓ per day
			kℓ per day	ℓ per capita per day	
Bo1obedu	Namakgale	23 765	4 934	207	6 258
	Ga-Kgapane	10 395	2 661	256	3 445
Nebo	Hlogotlou	5 999	558	93	2 036
	Moganyaka	4 010	868	217	1 134
	Motetema	3 520	800	227	1 106
Mapulaneng	Leroro <sup>2)</sup>	2 462	554	225	792
	Motlamotgatshane <sup>2)</sup>	1 560	351	225	502
	Shatale	6 724	730	108	2 472
Naphuno	Lenyenyee	8 433	1 000	118	3 179
	Moetladimo	1 409	182	130	297
Mokerong	Mahwelereng	15 177	3 556	234	6 295
Sekgosese	Senwamokgope	869	30	35	47
Seshego	Seshego	40 474	10 662	263	18 790
Sekhukhuneland	Tabatse	2 667	324	122	974
Thabamoopo	Lebowakgomo	4 904	1 019	208	1 604
	Mankweng	4 916	1 319	268	2 076
	Sebayeng	7 960	2 038	256	3 208
		145 244	31 586	217	55 197

1) Based on the estimated growth rates over a five year period used in the Water Report of the Lebowa Government (see source).

2) Based on an average water need of 225 litres per capita per day, as accepted by the Department of Co-operation and Development.

Source: Lebowa Government (1978), Department of Works, "Waterbehoefte van dorpe, digtere nedersettings en grotere landbounedersettings in Lebowa", Report No. W1/78, November 1978.

It remains a matter of speculation whether the ever-increasing demand for water in the proclaimed townships will be satisfied in the next two decades, basically because of the expected increase in the urban population shown in Table 4.16. If sufficient funds are made available to provide the required services in this regard, problems will be minimised. If, however, there are no funds available to finance the supply of additional water, Lebowa is facing a serious water shortage.

In a study on the availability of water in Lebowa by the Department of Works in Lebowa it was estimated that the *average* growth in water needs in a five-year period (1978-1983) was 9,6 per cent. If this growth rate were to remain constant during the period 1980-1985, the water needs of inhabitants of proclaimed townships will increase to more than 55 000 kℓ per day in 1985. The growth rates of individual towns varied between 5,5 per cent and 12,7 per cent.

Assuming that the estimated 225 litres per capita per day is a realistic average consumption of water by Blacks, it is estimated that the *semi-urban population* identified in Chapter 4, comprising basically inhabitants of certain closer settlements and selected agricultural settlements, experienced a water need of 7 625 kℓ per day and 82 732 kℓ per day respectively (1980). These estimates include only households and industries. With 29 563 squatters in Lebowa who can be included in the semi-urban population (Chapter 4), and an assumed water consumption of 225 litres per capita per day, these people consume an estimated 6 652 kℓ per day.

It can, therefore, be *concluded* that the inhabitants of *urban and semi-urban settlements* needed at least 132 000 kℓ of water per day in 1980.

It will not be unrealistic to assume that the demand for water will increase at a constant rate of 9,6 per cent for the period 1985-2000. With limited water resources, the demand or need for water will probably remain constant. In Table 4.16 it has been established that the urban and semi-urban population of Lebowa will most probably increase to 1,39 million people by the year 2000. If the present estimated need for water of 217 liters per capita per day by the urban population is to

increase to a level of 240 litres per capita per day, while the need of the semi-urban population also increases from the present estimate of 225 litres per capita per day to 240 litres per capita per day, *the urban and semi-urban population of Lebowa will need 333 million litres of water per day in the year 2000, compared to the present need of 132 million litres. This means that the current need for water will increase by 4,7 per cent per year during the next two decades!*

The most acute *water shortages* in Lebowa today are found *outside* the urban areas, where water is not supplied through mass schemes. In closer settlements and larger agricultural settlements people depend on water sources like rainfall, fountains, smaller water schemes, rivers and boreholes. In dry seasons, one often finds inhabitants digging holes and wells in dongas in desperate search for water. Women often have to walk vast distances fetching water from rivers, which they carry in large cans to their homes.

It is a fact that closer settlements and larger agricultural settlements experienced a continuous serious water shortage. In a study done on the water needs of Lebowa in 1978, it was established that *85,5 per cent of the water needs of the settlements mentioned could not be satisfied* (Lebowa Government, 1978, p. 27). With more boreholes that have been drilled and the increased attention given to the supply of water through smaller water schemes, the assumption can be made that the actual water supply in these settlements has probably increased from 14,5 per cent in 1978 to 20,0 per cent in 1980. With an estimated combined water need of 97 009 kℓ per day for the semi-urban population of Lebowa (i.e. inhabitants of closer settlements, larger agricultural settlements and certain squatter areas), only 19 402 kℓ per day (or 20,0 per cent) of the total need has been *satisfied*. This implies a water consumption of 45 litres per capita per day, which is well short of an estimated need of 225 litres per capita per day.

The *conclusion* on the water position in Lebowa is that, despite the fact that the territory is situated in a high-rainfall area, *water shortages are experienced by the semi-urban population and to a lesser extent by*

*the urban population.* The immediate effect of this insufficient supply of water to the large urban areas in Lebowa is that it will keep people from moving to towns inside Lebowa. The lack of this commodity will discourage people to become urbanised and will therefore hamper any deliberate urbanisation strategy in Lebowa. The result is that people will either stay in the rural areas, which will give no relief to the struggling agricultural sector and which will have a negative effect on the overall economic development in Lebowa, or leave the territory semi-permanently, mostly in search of job opportunities and adequate services in adjoining White towns or in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area, which in itself will also be to the detriment of Lebowa.

Apart from the water shortage that has been described in this section, there are also water shortages in *other institutions* like schools, hospitals and clinics. It will require an extensive study to determine the total need for water of all these institutions, as well as the availability of water for consumption. At least four hospitals were experiencing water shortages during 1981 (Department of Health and Social Welfare, unpublished information). From the viewpoint of urbanisation it is, therefore, of crucial importance that *all water resources* in Lebowa should be *protected* and that the available water should be *utilised efficiently*. Urgent attention should also be given to the distribution of the available water, only after priorities have been established for an urbanisation strategy. This means that certain *selected urban areas* in Lebowa should receive priority attention as far as the supply of water is concerned.

#### 6.4 SUMMARY

It will be clear that, as a result of the predicted urban population explosion in Lebowa during the next two decades outlined in Chapter 4 of this study, an extraordinary need will arise for the provision of an infrastructure, both socially and physically. The burden of providing such an infrastructure will rest on the Lebowa Government.

Efforts in this regard are not co-ordinated at present and are mainly based on *ad hoc* decisions. This can be attributed to the absence of

an urbanisation strategy in Lebowa. *Social services* are being provided where the most urgent needs occur. *Housing*, for example, is heavily subsidised and is mainly supplied by Government institutions. Despite these efforts, a shortfall of 5 194 houses existed in 1980 in the proclaimed townships, which will cost an estimated R41 million to eliminate, not taking into account the increasing waiting list for houses. It is also estimated that an even more acute shortage of houses exists among the semi-urban population. Towards the end of this century an average annual addition of 11 580 houses will be required for the urban and semi-urban population in Lebowa. Houses are presently being provided in all the proclaimed townships simultaneously.

*Health services* are provided on a decentralised basis and the 18 hospitals and 128 clinics are serving the population in a wide geographic area. These efforts are, however, hampered by staff shortages and a lack of capital funds to improve the health infrastructure and community health programmes.

Despite the fact that *education* is receiving high priority in Lebowa (an average of nearly R45 per annum is spent per pupil), these efforts do not stimulate urbanisation. This is evident from the fact that only 4,6 per cent of all schools in Lebowa are situated in the fourteen largest proclaimed townships. Such a state of affairs does not encourage an urbanisation process. Potentially, the availability of schools can serve as a great stimulus for urbanisation.

Lebowa does not have an adequate *physical infrastructure*. On average only 7,7 per cent is spent on the creation of the physical infrastructure by the public sector in Lebowa. The result is a sub-standard road network, insufficient railway lines and an inadequate supply of water in Lebowa. Dams in Lebowa have little storage capacity, while boreholes are mainly found in rural areas. As much as 20 per cent of the water needs is not available in Lebowa. The inadequacy of electric power is curbing an urbanisation strategy, because this commodity is being provided on an *ad hoc* basis.

The economics of the present urbanisation process may be summarised in two main points. Firstly, it is very costly, as indicated in the various sections of this chapter. Secondly, it does not serve the long-

term interests of the state, and especially not the development of sound economically based cities and towns. Both the social and physical infrastructures are based on departmental interests, with virtually no co-ordination as far as an urbanisation strategy is concerned.

## CHAPTER 7

## AN ALTERNATIVE URBANISATION STRATEGY FOR LEBOWA

## 7.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the focus points in this study is the expanding phenomenon of Black urbanisation in South Africa in general, and in Lebowa in particular. Smit (*et al.*, 1981, p. 1) describes the urbanisation of the Black population as "... perhaps the single most important social, economic and political feature of the final quarter of the present century." The rapid increase in this process will not be without its growth pains and economical, political, social and cultural adjustments. These symptoms will also be perceived and experienced in Lebowa (as well as the other national states) when this unavoidable urbanisation process gains momentum.

Urbanisation in the national states is a relatively recent process, which started a mere three decades ago with the establishment of Umlazi in Kwazulu in 1949/50. During the early fifties the first township was established in Lebowa. Today, in 1982, there are a total of 121 towns in the various national states, of which 18 are located in Lebowa. This is much more than was suggested by the Tomlinson Commission in 1955, which envisaged 100 towns in today's national states by the year 2000, with only 8 towns in Lebowa (Union of South Africa, 1955, chapter 37). Many of these towns have been established with ideological motives but no inherent self-generating economic basis, administrative function or spatial system. Because of this, urbanisation in the national states, and particularly in Lebowa, faces serious problems in the next two decades. There is an urgent need for an urbanisation strategy in these areas, not only to arrange the urbanisation of people in a desired economic and social manner, but also to take advantage of the multiplier effects it will have on economic development. This study agrees with Lombard and Van der Merwe (1972, p. 27) that the economic degeneration of many national states must be sought largely in the planning of their urbanisation. Urbanisation, directed by an effective strategy must,

therefore, play a key role in the development process of these areas (Smit and Booysen, 1981, p. 1).

In suggesting such a strategy in this chapter it is important, as a first step, to indicate the importance of urban growth especially as far as economic development is concerned. An urban strategy should be part and parcel of the general development policy. This is *partially* recognised by the Lebowa Government, which states in its White Paper on Development Policy that "a national development plan must ... provide for a hierarchy of the different types of settlements..." (paragraph 5.8.2.3). No reference is made to an urbanisation strategy as an implicit goal of government.

In describing the most important aspects of urban growth, the next section of this chapter will give an evaluation of the economic consequences of the present urbanisation process (described in Chapter 6), which has basically emerged in the development of "many small places", where available capital, infrastructure and services are "shared" by the 18 proclaimed townships in Lebowa.

Based on this background description, paragraph 7.4 will present an alternative strategy for urbanisation for Lebowa. This section will link up with the suggestions made by the Tomlinson Commission in 1955 regarding urban development in the homelands or national states. Selected places will be indicated which are suitable for and receptive to urban growth. Functions to be performed in these places will also be indicated.

The last section of this chapter, before the conclusion, will deal with the population strategy of Lebowa. It should be realised that no urbanisation strategy will succeed with uncontrollable and unchecked population growth.

## 7.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN GROWTH

Many well-known studies have already been published on the subject of *economic development* (e.g. Lockwood, 1954; Hance, 1958; Rostow, 1961;

Walinsky, 1962; Kindleberger, 1965; and Sabot, 1979). Because of the existence of such in-depth studies in literature, it is not the object of this section to discuss this phenomenon in great length, as it is only wished to obtain a compact answer to the question: what is economic development and how does urban growth relate to it?

Probably one of the best answers to the question of what is economic development is supplied by Kindleberger (1965, p. 3) who states that economic development involves both more output (economic growth) and changes in the technical and institutional arrangements. It refers in other words to both functional and structural changes. Albert Waterston (1969, p. 17) is in agreement with this description when he writes that "... development requires social and cultural change as well as economic growth ... hence, development means change plus growth." Economic development in this sense includes various forms of growth, including *urban* growth, because urban growth also involves functional and structural changes within a community. Development and growth are thus interrelated, at least up to the point where the (urban) economy is still *dynamic* (Conroy, 1975, p. 10).

While economic development represents, on the one hand, changes in the allocation of inputs and in the structure of outputs by sectors, and changes in functional capacities on the other hand, i.e. in physical co-ordination or learning capacity, the best *measurement* of economic development is the gross national income (gni) over a time period. The growth of the gni in Lebowa has been discussed in Chapter 5 of this study, where it has been indicated that that portion of the gdp (gross domestic product) earned by Blacks in Lebowa, as a percentage of gross national income, came to less than 20 per cent in 1977, which is an indication of the large share of the gni generated outside the borders of Lebowa. A more efficient measure of the level of economic development is income per capita, which serves as an indicator of the efficiency of individual production.

As already indicated, there is a relationship between economic development and growth to the extent that "... growth is not an end in itself,

but a performance test of development" (Streeton, 1981, p. 9). This study is primarily interested in *urban growth* within the framework of economic development inside the national states, particularly Lebowa. Urban growth can be described as the increase of population in an area or place earmarked for urban development. As early as 1955, shortly after the first towns were established in the "homelands", the Tomlinson Commission remarked that city or town formation is an inherent part of development and that no country can achieve a high level of development with a large part of its inhabitants living in the rural areas (Union of South Africa, 1955, Chapter 37, p. 4). In the absence of economic development, there can be no urban growth, which implies that urban growth can be stimulated in the presence of economic development.

There are basically two schools regarding the *rate* of urban growth or urbanisation. Freedman (1968, p. 365) believes that a strategy of deliberate urbanisation is the fastest road to full national development, despite the disruptive effects on the traditional social system. On the other hand, writers like Bairoch (1973) state that an acceleration of the process of urbanisation carries more unfavourable than favourable implications. Much will, of course, depend on the situation in a particular country. In a country like Lebowa, the acceleration of the urbanisation process has already started, which leads one to believe that the best available policy is to direct this process deliberately, at least for benefits in the long term.

It has been indicated in Chapter 2 that the *rate of urban growth* in Africa is among the highest in the world (the urban growth rates of various countries in Africa have been shown in Table 2.10). The result was that many of the largest African cities are sometimes referred to as "parasitic" opposed to "generative" (Abate, 1980, p. 105). These cities tend to absorb the most productive young workers (especially males) from the rural areas which in turn leads to unbalanced regional growth. It is clear, therefore, why some cities in Africa have achieved their present size in one-fifth to one-tenth the time required in Western Europe (Hance, 1970, p. 293).

In Chapters 2 and 3 of this study the two basic *components* of urban growth, namely natural increase and rural-urban migration, have been identified, together with a more detailed discussion of each of these two factors. It has been determined that people move primarily for economic reasons, i.e. to find jobs and to earn money. In Nigeria, one of the major reasons for migration is the wide income differential between urban and rural areas favouring urban workers (Fapohunda, 1980, p. 33). Social amenities (such as clean water), the availability of transport and housing, the concentration of industrial developments in urban areas and political factors have also supported urban growth. In many countries, this rapid urban growth has not been associated with the development of the rural sector, with the result that there has been unbalanced regional growth.

It is highly unlikely that high urban growth rates can be recorded without the stimulation of the *informal sector* in urban areas. It cannot be denied that the informal sector causes the growth of slums, but neither can it be denied that it can play a "generative" role in urban development, notably in the creation of jobs and entrepreneurship. A team of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) noted in this regard in Kenya that "... it is in (its) workshops that practical skills and entrepreneurial talents are being developed at low cost" (*ibid.*, p. 44). It is also capable of making a contribution to the non-market production of the gnp of a country.

Much has been written about the *consequences* of urban growth. Touré (1979, p. 65) stresses the imbalance of urban growth on an economic level, while Fapohunda (1980, p. 34) points out the economic and social problems of urbanisation, for example high unemployment rates, overcrowding, the growth of slums and urban decadence. The whole of Chapter 6 of this study is devoted to the economic consequences of urban growth (urbanisation) in Lebowa, the effects of which will be evaluated in the next section.

There are, however, also positive economic consequences of urban growth. These include the creation of jobs and income through the concentration

of people (which serves as an inducement to investment), the stimulation of many non-agricultural sectors (especially the secondary and tertiary sectors), and the stimulation of trade, especially in the export of locally produced goods and services. Urban growth can also foster balanced regional growth in that it can concentrate economic activities in certain centres, while also serving a large hinterland. It is these positive factors of urban growth that should be pursued in an urbanisation strategy.

From what has been said in this section, one can conclude that urban growth and economic development are related in a positive way. In the second place it is possible to direct urban growth to such an extent in a deliberate manner that it will be able to produce positive economic results, especially as far as balanced regional development in the wake of high population growth rates is concerned. Unfortunately, in South Africa the implementation of a political ideology (the policy of separate development) has led to an unbalanced urban growth structure, especially as regards the urban growth in the national states. Because of the historical restrictions on Blacks to become urbanised in certain "White areas", an accumulation of Blacks in the rural areas has occurred. Urban areas in the national states have never been developed efficiently enough to absorb these "surplus masses" into an urban system. It is of crucial importance that this situation be rectified in a co-ordinated, national urbanisation strategy.

### 7.3 AN EVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRESENT URBANISATION STRATEGY IN LEBOWA

#### 7.3.1 Weaknesses in the urbanisation process

Looking at the Rostow model describing the stages of economic growth, one can classify Lebowa as being in the second phase of economic growth, namely a partial departure from the traditional phase (in which little or no development takes place), a positive attitude towards needed change, and the provision of certain essential infrastructure, like schools, hospitals, and a transport network. It is important for a developing country like Lebowa not to stay in this phase for a long

period of time, but to move as fast as possible to Rostow's next phase of economic growth where economic development is stimulated through accelerated economic growth.

In this crucial phase of economic growth, the decisionmakers in (or for) Lebowa are confronted with an important question, namely whether to opt for *place prosperity* or *people prosperity*. Place prosperity implies taking jobs to the people, i.e. "... to induce more employers to move to regions where unemployment is high" (Hoover, 1975, p. 272). In order to succeed in this option, *many small places* have to be developed. The present strategy towards the urbanisation process in Lebowa seems to select this route, as proved by the simultaneous development of 18 proclaimed towns, as well as a large number of semi-urban places, identified in Chapter 4. The development of the social and physical infrastructure described in Chapter 6 is also aimed at place prosperity.

The second option, people prosperity, takes people to the jobs and tries to stimulate development on the basis of growth potential (*ibid.*, p. 273). The emphasis is on the development of human resources where people will be induced to move to a smaller number of growth centres. This implies the development of a few large places with growth potential. In the case of Lebowa, some investment in human resources is being made, as will be shown in the next section, but unfortunately the development of a few large places has been neglected, despite the fact that it is a specific goal of the settlement policy of the Lebowa Government (see paragraph 5.8.2.4 of the White Paper on Development Policy).

The present strategy in Lebowa towards the urbanisation process suffers from many *weaknesses*. They are universal weaknesses experienced in general by developing countries. An excellent description of them is given by Berry (1976, p. 69):

"What characterizes most of the planning efforts in the Third World is the absence of a will to plan effectively, and more often than not, political smoke-screening. Most urbanisation policy is unconscious, partial, unco-ordinated and negative. It is unconscious in the sense that those who effect it are largely unaware of its proportions and

features. It is partial in that few of the points at which governments might act to manage urbanisation and affect its course and direction are in fact utilized. It is unco-ordinated in that national planning tends to be economic and urban planning tends to be physical, and the disjunction often produces competing policies. It is negative in that the ideological perspective of the planners leads them to try to divert, retard or stop urban growth, and in particular to inhibit the expansion of metropolitan and primate cities."

This passage from Berry could just as well have been written for Lebowa. In the first place, there is no deliberate urbanisation strategy, mainly because planners and officials are not aware of the importance and effects of such a policy. There is also no reference to an urbanisation strategy or policy in the White Paper of the Lebowa Government on economic development.

Secondly, the urbanisation effort in Lebowa is partial, in that few of the 18 proclaimed townships are fully utilised to their potential capacity, despite the high population growth rate and the warnings of increased urbanisation. Many of the ideologically founded proclaimed townships do not have any growth potential, with the result that the downgrading of some has already been suggested.

The third weakness of the present urbanisation process in Lebowa stems from the abovementioned weaknesses, namely the unco-ordinated nature of policy. The settlement policy of the Lebowa Government provides for a hierarchy of the different types of settlements, with preference for the establishment of a few large towns, while physical development of these towns tends to ignore these guidelines.

The fourth weakness, i.e. a negative policy towards urbanisation, does not apply fully to Lebowa because (it is hoped) planners in Lebowa do take economic factors into consideration when trying to divert or retard urban growth in towns. Town planning is ineffective in isolation and can only be successful if it is part of a national development strategy where the comparative advantage of various regions is taken

into account. It is also important to decide whether to spread resources over all regions and towns or to concentrate resources. The latter is more likely to be effective.

The spatial implications of urbanisation in the national states have been described by Smit (1977, p. 27-34), where he points to the artificial reasons for urban development in the national states, reflected in the fact that most of these towns are located on the borders of such states, adjoining large neighbouring towns outside such borders. This also applies to Lebowa and is clearly indicated on Map 4.2 (Chapter 4) where the geographic location of the 17 proclaimed townships in Lebowa is shown. These locations are, among other factors, directly related to the availability of employment opportunities in and near such townships.

There is reason for concern about the urbanisation process in Lebowa. Lombard and Van der Merwe (1972, p. 26) are of the opinion that "... the urbanisation of the rapidly increasing populations in most homelands is unavoidable...." while Smit (1977, p. 34) agrees that "... a rapid process of urbanisation may be expected in the homelands during the next few decades...". In Chapter 4 of this study the level to which urbanisation will grow in Lebowa in the years 2000 and 2020 has been indicated. The important question is: will the present strategy towards the urbanisation process be successful in accommodating this rapidly increasing urban population in the next few decades?

It should be remembered that indigenous urbanisation for Blacks in Africa has never succeeded, except in the case of the Tswanas in Botswana. Add to this the fact that urbanisation of Blacks has largely taken place in the White areas of South Africa (notably the metropolitan areas), which in turn serves as an impeding factor for urbanisation in the national states. At the same time high population growth rates have led to an accumulation of people in these areas, with agriculture increasingly unable to support these masses. There is clearly an urgent need for an urbanisation strategy in the national states, if only to counter the phenomenon of "... unbalanced regional growth and primate city for="

mation ... which has become the order of the day in Africa" (Smit, *et al.*, 1981, p. 24).

The next section will evaluate the economic consequences of the present urbanisation process in Lebowa, with the three fundamental requirements for a town, namely the ability to create functions, the presence of an economical base, and the existence of space (Moolman, 1977, p. 1).

### 7.3.2 The present strategy

The present strategy towards the urbanisation process in Lebowa is directed towards the development of *many smaller places*, as opposed to the strategy to develop a few big places or growth centres. This strategy seems to rest on the concept of *place prosperity* described in the previous section. The economic consequences of this strategy has been described in Chapter 6. These consequences, applicable to each of the 17 proclaimed towns in Lebowa, are summarised in Table 7.1. It should be borne in mind that only proclaimed townships have been taken into account in Table 7.1. All semi-urban towns and settlements (identified in Chapter 4), some of which have a larger growth potential than some of the proclaimed townships, have not been included, mainly because of a lack of available information.

As far as *housing* is concerned, it can be seen from Table 7.1 that four towns have more than 1 000 houses, namely Seshego (4 924), Namakgale (4 108), Mahwelereng (1 900) and Lebowakgomo (1 250). These four towns together have 64 per cent of all houses in proclaimed townships in Lebowa. It should be noted, however, that three of the towns are near to or adjoining White towns, with only Lebowakgomo closer to the hinterland of Lebowa. Housing programmes in some towns are supported by a single organisation or company, like the East Rand Administration Board (Lebowakgomo) and the Ferrochrome Company (Tubatse).

It will be clear from Table 7.1 that Lebowa has a diversified housing programme in its proclaimed townships, with every town "getting a slice of the cake". The public sector and its agents are primarily responsible for the construction of the houses listed in Table 7.1. As a

matter of fact, they have spent R7,9 million since 1970/71. Despite this effort, there was a backlog of 5 194 houses in proclaimed townships in 1980, which can only be cleared at an estimated cost of R41,6 million at current prices (see Chapter 6). At the present rate, the urban and semi-urban population of Lebowa will need an additional 11 580 houses per annum by the year 2000. There is an urgent need for revision and co-ordination of the present supply of houses within a broad national urbanisation strategy.

*Health services* (particularly hospitals and clinics) are fairly well distributed throughout Lebowa. Every proclaimed town is served by at least one hospital, as indicated in Table 7.1. The distribution of the 128 clinics has not been indicated. Three towns in the southern part of South Lebowa (Hlogotlou, Moganyaka and Motetema) are served by three hospitals situated in that area, while four towns, namely Motetema, Lebowakgomo, Shatale and Lenyeneye, each has the facilities of a regional hospital in their areas.

The provision of health services can serve only as a supportive motive for urbanisation. On the other hand, however, it is an important instrument to promote people prosperity. In the 1981/82 budget vote, 14,2 per cent was actually spent on health-related matters and institutions in Lebowa, which showed a near 37 per cent increase on the previous budget vote (1980/81), which is a substantial increase. Despite the fact that this increase plays a key role in terms of the improvement in the quality of life, it does not promote urbanisation *per se*.

*Education* is another key factor playing a part in improving the quality of life in Lebowa and, important, can serve as an active motive for urbanisation. Because of these two factors, careful planning should be applied in the provision of educational services.

At present there are 1 263 schools in Lebowa, 89 (or 7 per cent) of which are located in proclaimed towns. Table 7.1 indicates 58 of these schools spread among the 17 towns, representing 4,8 per cent of all schools in Lebowa. Seshego tops the list with 18 schools, followed by Mahwelereng (8) and Ga-Kgapane (6).

During 1981/82, no less than 30 per cent of the total budget was voted for the development of human potential in Lebowa, which represents an increase of 46 per cent over the previous budget.

On 31 March 1981, only an estimated 6,5 per cent of the 1980/81 budget had been spent on *physical infrastructure* in Lebowa, including water and electrical reticulation in some proclaimed towns, roads, bulk water supply and bulk electricity supply (Lebowa Legislative Assembly budget vote, unpublished information). This represents 45 per cent of the estimated total cost on physical infrastructure and is an indication that the provision of a physical infrastructure in Lebowa does not have a very high priority at present, despite the fact that the creation of a physical infrastructure plays a very important part in the economy of a developing country such as Lebowa.

This low priority given to the provision of physical infrastructure in Lebowa is indicated in Table 7.1. *Roads* are generally not up to standard. As a matter of fact, 35 per cent of the roads are below standard, with less than 1 per cent tarred (see Chapter 6). Only 1,7 per cent of the 1981/82 budget was voted for roads and bridges. Proclaimed towns with the best access to roads are those situated on the borders of Lebowa, like Seshego, Mahwelereng, Mankweng and Motetema, which are linked to major roads outside the borders.

Only two towns have access to adjoining *railway lines*, namely Seshego and Mahwelereng, which are linked to the north-south railway line between Johannesburg and Beit bridge. Two towns may benefit when extensions of railway lines are approved. One is Lebowakgomo which will then be linked to the north-south line, while the other town is Tubatse, which will benefit from the export of mining products.

Both these modes of transport are extremely important in the urbanisation process in Lebowa. They can serve as positive stimulants for urbanisation, because they provide people with the means to move about (daily commuters) and serve as an attraction for foreign investments. Neither of these transportation modes is, however, at present being used to direct the urbanisation process.

Lebowa has a well distributed *post and tele-communication* system, as already indicated in Chapter 6. Three towns have automatic telephone exchanges, namely Seshego, Sebayeng and Lebowakgomo, all relatively closely situated to each other. The importance of this communication facility in a business environment cannot be overemphasised.

Virtually all proclaimed towns have *electricity*, which surely serves as a drawcard in the urbanisation process. Four towns, Seshego, Mahwele= reng, Ga-Kgapane and Lenyeneye, receive their electric power from ac= joining White towns. This physical attraction of urbanisation alone diversifies the urbanisation process in Lebowa among the 17 proclaimed towns.

The non-availability of *water* is probably the greatest handicap in the urbanisation process in Lebowa, despite the fact that 80 per cent of the water needs in proclaimed towns were satisfied in 1978. Many areas rely mainly on boreholes. This basic need will increase in future as a result of the projected population explosion in Lebowa. Clean water remains one of the basic reasons why people move to towns. In an urbanisation strategy, selected urban areas should get clean water!

In *conclusion*, it can be said that the present strategy towards urbanisa= tion tends to favour the development of *many smaller places*. Secondly, there is no urbanisation strategy *per se* which can indicate the direction and flow of this fast-growing process. Thirdly, there seems to be very little co-ordination between various government departments regarding the provision of services and the infrastructure that is needed in an urbanisation process. One gains the impression that towns are being developed according to their needs, whether these are ideological, social or economic, i.e. on an *ad hoc* basis in disregard of an overall plan.

The next section will suggest an alternative urbanisation strategy for Lebowa which will serve as a basis for the urbanisation explosion in Lebowa during the next two decades.

Table 7.1 - The economic consequences of the present strategy towards urbanisation in Lebowa

Town	Facility	Housing (number)	Health (hospitals)	Education (schools)	Roads	Railway	Posts and tele-communication	Power	Water
Seshego		4 924	1	18	good	yes	aut. exchange	yes	dam
Namakgale		4 108	1	5				yes	
Mahwelereng		1 900	2	8	good	yes		yes	
Lebowakgomo		1 250	Regional hospital + 1	2	good	(if extended)	aut. exchange	yes	dam
Lenyenyee		925	Regional hospital	4	reason=able			yes	
Sebayeng		809	1	1			aut. exchange	yes	
Ga-Kgapane		752	1	6				yes	
Mankweng		678	1	1	good			yes	dam
Shatale		622	Regional hospital	3				yes	
Hlogotlou		630	3	3				yes	dam
Motetema		557	Regional hospital + 2	3	good			yes	dam
Motlamotgatshane		416	1	-				yes	
Moganyaka		396	3	-				yes	
Leroro		393	1	1				yes	
Tubatse		267	1	1		(if extended)		yes	
Moetladimo		200	1	-				yes	
Senwamokgope		166	1	2				yes	

## 7.4 AN ALTERNATIVE URBANISATION STRATEGY

### 7.4.1 A framework for the strategy

Before one can start a discussion on an urbanisation strategy for a country, it is necessary to describe a framework within which such a strategy can possibly function, which can be viewed as "potentially the ideal situation". Whether this ideal situation can be reached is not important, but rather the goal to strive for in such ideal situation.

Only two important aspects of such a framework in which an urbanisation strategy can develop will be discussed in this section, namely the stimulation of regional development and the growth and development of towns. There are many other aspects playing a role in this regard, such as government policy, community values and growth potential, that are not taken into account in this study, because of the limits of the field covered.

It is important to know what the underlying factors are initiating and stimulating *regional development*. This study, which is solely concerned with one aspect of the development process in Lebowa, namely the phenomenon of urbanisation, recognises the fact that Lebowa is part of a larger region, Northern Transvaal. Any development, or lack of development, in this region will affect Lebowa. For this reason, the latter cannot be seen as an isolated geographical area, but rather as part of the Northern Transvaal region, which for definition purposes can be defined as Northern Transvaal, Venda, Lebowa and Gazankulu. The Good Hope plan of the South African Government excludes smaller parts of eastern Lebowa and southern Gazankulu from this region, rated only second in relative development needs, to the region defined as the Eastern Cape, Ciskei and the southern part of the Transkei.

Du Pisanie (1980, p. 164) is in favour of such sub-national planning regions in South Africa, where fragments of (various) national states, even if they are geographically interlaced, should be included together with neighbouring and intermediate White areas in a single planning region. In this way it will satisfy the principle of contiguity ("*aangrensing*"). The Northern Transvaal region, defined above, satisfies this criterion.

The generation of regional development is explained by various theories which either emphasise the role of demand or the role of supply. An explanation of these theories is supplied by Hoover (1975, p. 217-245), who states that only interactions of both demand and supply are responsible for growth in regional activities.

There are two models emphasising the role of demand. The economic basis approach identifies "exports" as the generator of growth in a region, where "exports" include goods and services that are either sent out of the region or consumed within the region by outsiders (*ibid.*, p. 219). The input-output model identifies final demand as the initiator of growth in a region, where transactions are conducted among and between households, the government, investors and the outside world. The latter is always treated as part of final demand.

The demand approach of explaining regional growth concentrates not only on final demand but also on outputs and backward linkages. It is only through backward linkages that demand for a region's output, like woodcraft (furniture, ornaments) from the Northern Transvaal, leads to other regional activities, such as the supply and processing of logs and the employment of labour. This approach traces the origins of demand, i.e. final demand, is output-orientated and emphasises backward linkages (*loc.cit.*).

The supply-orientated model is seeking an explanation for regional development, assigns major roles to primary supply, forward linkages and inputs. It tries to establish where inputs come from, i.e. the origins of natural resources, labour, capital, entrepreneurship, imported inputs and infrastructure lead to regional activities generating a regional supply of manufactured items, such as the assembly of electronic equipment.

Regions cannot survive in isolation. A broader view of the regional development process, therefore, focuses on interregional trade and the movement of other production factors. According to Hoover (*ibid.*, p. 232), a region's growth involves at least three kinds of external relationships of the region: (1) trade, i.e. including both the imports

and exports of goods and services; (2) migration of people, either as consumers or workers; and (3) interregional movement of other production factors, notably investment capital. In the Northern Transvaal region these are extremely important relationships, which directly influence the development of Lebowa.

As important as the growth of regions is the *growth and development of towns*. To a great extent, innovations and specialisations originate in cities or towns which allocate a very unique role in the development process to them. What leads to the development and growth of towns and what factors attract foreign investors? One factor at the centre of the development of towns is a *transportation network*. Not only is the quality of such links important but also the cost involved in transporting raw materials, finished products and even workers. The cost will be affected by distances between related production processes (Conroy, 1975, p. 12) and the commuting range (Hoover, 1975, p. 283).

Other important factors underlying the growth and development of towns are the location of *resource sites* and the availability of *low-cost labour*. Both these factors are important to potential investors. The presence of these factors of production can serve as a drawcard for certain types of industries to a town.

Another factor stimulating the development of an urban area is *agglomeration economies*, which can be defined as "... external economies of scale to firms in the same or different industries" (Bish and Nourse, 1975, p. 47). This refers basically to the concentration tendency, where external advantages are being enjoyed by all new firms in a town, like an existing infrastructure.

An attraction of townlife is the *economies of scale* present in the production of many products, i.e. the reduction in average cost per unit of production that occurs when the scale of production is increased. With a large *market* area and a high population density, many businesses, especially in manufacturing, are attracted from rural areas to the towns where these economies of scale can be realised.

A town also develops with the *migration of capital* and the *migration of labour* to such a town. This happens when capital and labour earn greater-than-average returns in for example a town than earned by them in the area of origin (*ibid.*, p. 58).

The provision in *basic needs*, like nutrition, health, education, water, sanitation, and shelter (see Streeton, 1981) contributes to the development of towns. Satisfying these basic needs improves the productivity of people, as well as the welfare of an area. Much depends on the timing of investment and estimated cost of providing basic public services and an infrastructure. The financial aspects of town development can easily hamper the growth of such a town and, therefore, require careful planning and consideration. This largely depends on the attitude of the government involved.

Apart from the economic factors which initiate and stimulate the growth of towns, there are also social factors (like the motives of investors) and political factors (government policy) that can affect the development of towns. Many firms establish themselves in a town on the basis of the economic, social and political expectations they have of such an area.

There are, in conclusion, three fundamental requirements for a town or city to function effectively, namely (Moolman, 1977, p. 1):

- (a) the continuous creation of *functions*;
- (b) the presence of an *economic basis*; and
- (c) the existence of a *spatial system*.

In the first place, a town can only be dynamic if it is capable of performing functions. With a decrease in functional activities, any town will stagnate. A specific function is usually prominent in the origin of a town (Van der Merwe and Nel, 1976, p. 78). Examples include mining towns (Kimberley) and industrial towns (Sasolburg).

It follows that certain functions provide better opportunities for growth and development than other functions, for example an industrial town is in a more favourable position to create employment opportunities and to develop other basic functions than a recreational town, like Stilbaai on the Cape Coast (*ibid.*, p. 81). Because of the

existence and continuous creation of functions, a functional differentiation is developed within a town among its inhabitants and also in the physical structure (Moolman, 1977, p. 1). Some people are economically active, some of whom are wealthy and others poorer, while there are also non-economical people. This functional differentiation among the inhabitants is carried forward towards the physical composition of such a town, like the central business district, different suburbs, smaller business centres, industrial areas and recreational areas, all of which are served by an infrastructural network.

Secondly, the presence of an economic basis is an important requirement for the growth and development of a town. It gives an economic character to the town. An economic basis implies that a town not only supports itself, but also carries its character beyond its own borders. It exports goods and services produced in the town and imports goods and services that are needed. Exports include manufactured products, labour, knowledge, skills, culture, recreation and administration (*loc. cit.*).

In the third place a town can only develop in a spatial system where the previous two requirements, functional differentiation and an economic basis, can be implemented in a spatial system. This requirement also refers to space that will be needed during the growth and development of such a town. Basic needs such as health, education, shelter and places of work require space.

Against this theoretical background of a possible framework for an urbanisation strategy, the next section will suggest an alternative urbanisation strategy for Lebowa.

#### 7.4.2 An alternative urbanisation strategy for Lebowa

The weaknesses of the present policy for the urbanisation process in Lebowa (unconscious, partial, unco-ordinated, partly negative) mentioned in section 7.3.1, and the general absence of one or more of the three fundamental requirements for a town mentioned in section 7.4.1, complicate the suggestion of an alternative urbanisation strategy in Lebowa. The forces that played an important role in the creation of White towns in South Africa (education, religion, trade, administration)

which developed into rural area/town integrations, are different from those in Lebowa. The reasons are basically that education and religion have not been such a "power" among the Blacks as to serve as a primary basis for the creation of towns: the trade function is performed by nearby White towns in competition with their Black counterparts; the administrative function is still performed on a small scale; and a rural area/town integration in these areas, compared to the White areas, is very weak.

For too long have we looked in a "White Western" or more particularly in an "Afrikaner Western" way at urbanisation in Lebowa. Furthermore, the strategy has been directed at the *development of many small places* (eighteen proclaimed towns in a relatively small area such as Lebowa, some of which are ideologically founded towns). It should also be realised that some proclaimed towns have developed *in response to* the existence of the three fundamental requirements for towns. The growth and development of Pietersburg, for example, have given rise to an adjoining Black location, which first became New Pietersburg, then Seshego, some distance now from Pietersburg. The existence of job opportunities in White towns is hampering competition in proclaimed towns in Lebowa.

Despite negative developments, the Tomlinson Commission (Union of South Africa, 1955, Chapter 37) made a number of positive suggestions on urban development in Lebowa. The Commission argued that, notwithstanding the difficulties, each town should have an *existence base*, whether it be White developments served by migrant labour, forestry, agriculture, mining, factories, recreation, or administration, education or culture. The Commission identified eight towns to be developed in Lebowa. These towns, with their suggested primary basis, are:

- (a) Turfloop - nearby White development (Pietersburg), forestry activities, mining activities, agricultural activities
- (b) Gompies - the citrus plantation of Zebediela
- (c) Nebo - agricultural activities
- (d) Zoeknag - forestry activities
- (e) Rolle - migrant labour

- (f) Thabina - agricultural activities
- (g) Bischoffskreuz - migrant labour
- (h) Vaaltyn - White development (Potgietersrus) and migrant labour.

Twenty-seven years later only two of these towns have been proclaimed as townships, namely Turfloop (Mankweng) and Vaaltyn (Mahwelereng). Other proclaimed townships have been established near *some* of the other six suggested towns. The impression is therefore created that some towns in Lebowa were established during the last two-and-a-half decades primarily because of political ideologies, which conflicted with economic criteria. Smit and Booyen (1981, p. 106) conclude that the ideology phase of homeland urbanisation can be viewed as having terminated, and that attention should now be devoted to purely economic considerations.

In suggesting a new alternative to the present strategy on urbanisation, the first and most important factor is to again accept the principle of the Tomlinson Commission to concentrate the urban development in Lebowa only on a few towns which have the potential to become growth centres, where such towns can originate from an existence basis, where a functional differentiation can develop and where space will not hamper development. By at the same time concentrating on the development of people prosperity, i.e. human resources development, the emigration of people from rural areas can be directed towards towns closer to the population's areas of origin, and with the attraction of at least basic needs, i.e. nutrition, health, education and shelter.

At the relatively low level of urbanisation (urban and semi-urban population), and the low level of economic development in Lebowa at present, the concentration of population and economic activities in "... a *few* urban centres ... is inevitable" (Renaud, 1981, p. 9). This means that *the present policy to develop 18 proclaimed townships and numerous semi-urban places should be replaced by a policy to develop and stimulate a few larger places based primarily on economic criteria.*

Some basic inputs will be required to bring about such a strategy. In the first place, *housing* should not be the sole responsibility of the public sector. Local enterprise should get increasingly involved in the provision of houses in these fewer but larger growth centres. Self-help programmes should receive high priority, either in the form of site-and-service projects or in allowing people to build their own shelters (whether of mud or clay) within minimum standards applicable in Africa. Building materials should be made available to such owner/builders with the capital that would have been used to build minimum standard Western-style houses. Even spontaneous settlements, when controlled, can alleviate the housing shortage in Lebowa. Wilsher and Righter (1977, p. 130) state that owner/builders of all income levels and in places where they are free to build "... employ diverse resources, including small quantities of exceptionally cheap materials, equipment and help that can be borrowed from friends and relatives. They can make full use of small, individual sites, as well as their own management and manual skills and spare time." In this way people can become a "self-help society". In suburbs where "modern" houses are built, owners should be free to apply for home loans from financial institutions on the same basis and conditions as their White counterparts. No discrimination should exist in this regard.

Secondly, the *provision of schools* in Lebowa should be much more selective. The need for schools in the rural Orange Free State, for example, served, among other factors, as motivation to establish towns. Schools can thus be a very strong stimulator of urbanisation. Selected urban places earmarked for urban development should receive priority in upgrading and improving the educational system of Lebowa. This includes the distribution of new schools and the expansion of existing schools. At present 93 per cent of all schools in Lebowa are situated outside the proclaimed townships. It follows that people prosperity or the development of human resources should receive high priority, but only in a highly co-ordinated manner.

Thirdly it was pointed out in section 7.4.1 that a *transportation network* is central to the development of a town. *Roads* in the Republic of South Africa surrounding Lebowa are benefiting some of the towns on the borders of Lebowa, while roads inside Lebowa are generally below

standard. Roads to and from selected urban places will have to be improved in order to attract capital and entrepreneurship.

Lebowa does not have its own *railway lines* and depends mainly on the railway lines outside but near its territory. There are two cases in Lebowa where extensions of railway lines can benefit the transportation network in Lebowa. The extension of the railway line from Zebediela to Lebowakgomo (the capital of Lebowa) will give the latter access to the north-south railway line linking up with the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging metropolitan complex. The extension of the railway line in Southern Lebowa, along the Steelpoort valley, to either Tubatse or Eerstegeluk will benefit the export of mining products from the mineral-rich South Lebowa.

In the fourth place *clean water* as a basic need can attract people to the selected areas and also help in the creation of various functions. Many economic activities depend on the use of water, e.g. factories, agriculture, mining and various other activities. The recent outbreak of cholera in Lebowa is an example of the consequences of the general lack of clean water and hygienic conditions.

The last and probably most important input in an urbanisation strategy centres on the *creation of job opportunities* in such a way as not to create a leakage of purchasing power from Lebowa. This is an extremely difficult task for a developing country such as Lebowa. The *informal sector* can make a major contribution in this regard. The informal sector in Kenya is described not as a problem but as a source of Kenya's future growth (Fapohunda, 1980, p. 44). The same principle that underlies the advantages of controlled squatting can underlie the successful development of the informal sector. The most valuable contribution of this sector is in the field of job creation.

The *role of government* is of crucial importance in this urbanisation strategy. Its policies in a wide range of subjects affect especially rural-urban migration of Blacks (i.e. policies on regional development, industrial decentralisation, agricultural development, community development, housing and population control), where some of these policies are also used to channel the direction of the movement of Black people towards specific areas of settlements (Cilliers and Groenewald,

1982, p. 27). A spatial distribution pattern for Blacks has emerged in South Africa (also in Lebowa) since the institution of these measures.

There are various instruments available to government to stimulate urbanisation. The difficulty lies in the choice of the appropriate instruments to stimulate urban growth (Richardson, 1973, p. 191). These instruments are usually directed towards the development of identified regions and can include (Hoover, 1975, p. 270):

- (a) capital available at low interest rates to encourage growth in the area;
- (b) a wide variety of tax exemptions and incentives;
- (c) direct investment by public authorities (industrial parks);
- (d) rebates on transport costs and services;
- (e) regional allocation of procurement contracts;
- (f) subsidising technological progress;
- (g) improvement of local public services; and
- (h) the upgrading of human resources through education.

The Lebowa Government, the South African Government and governmental agencies like the Lebowa Development Corporation use most of the listed instruments to stimulate growth. The former industrial decentralisation proposals failed largely and were, therefore, replaced by a new set of industrial incentives for industrial development in the different development regions (RSA, 1982b), where specific application to the region in which Lebowa is situated will be indicated later in this section.

It is mainly the Lebowa Development Corporation which is responsible for providing low-interest rate capital loans to businesses in Lebowa, while they also invest in industrial parks and other business ventures. Since 1976 the Department of Education is responsible for the general development of human resources in Lebowa (see section 6.2.3 in Chapter 6).

The functions of *local governments* should not be underestimated. Typical local government functions include:

- (a) the provision of water;
- (b) the provision of a sewerage system;
- (c) the provision of posts and telecommunication services;
- (d) the provision of electricity;
- (e) the provision of protection services (police);
- (f) the provision of a storm water system; and
- (g) the removal of refuse.

Not all these services are rendered by local governments in Lebowa, while many of the services are rendered in an inefficient manner. Urban control remains a problem in Lebowa, one of the reasons being the existence of two administrative systems, namely a traditional African system and a more modern Western system of administration. Smit and Booyesen (1981, p. 107) state, not surprisingly, that the administration of urban areas will be one of the biggest problems for the leaders of national states. One of the problems relates to the small revenue received from own resources, which was estimated to be only 25 per cent of the total revenue of the Lebowa Government in 1981/82. Less than 17 per cent and 5,2 per cent of the R39,5 million generated from own sources originated from taxes and towns, respectively, during this period. No local government can provide efficient services to its community without sufficient revenue. Local government in Lebowa will inevitably have to create new and/or larger sources of income, like sales of liquor and rentals.

The implementation of an urbanisation strategy in Lebowa will be difficult and will have its effects only in the medium to long term. The most crucial *prerequisites* will be political commitment at the highest level, and appropriate adjustment of the governmental structure and modes of operation (Renaud, 1981, p. 129). This requires, in other words, a successful marketing of such a strategy to political leaders, planners and government officials.

The main *objective* of such a strategy for Lebowa is to encourage the growth of the agricultural sector on the one hand and to provide a

national infrastructure in such a way on the other hand that it supports the hinterland and also favours the development of a balanced system of towns in the future (see Renaud, 1981, p. 136). The strategy should therefore not be one-sided, but should aim at *balanced economic development*, where the agricultural sector must grow to its maximum together with the simultaneous growth of the urban sector having its own character.

In conclusion, it can be said that few of the proclaimed townships in Lebowa have an economic basis. Many towns situated on the borders of Lebowa have as primary basis the development of nearby White towns and especially the existence of job opportunities in the latter. Most of these towns only have a small economic basis. Migrant labour is the only basis of other townships further away from White towns, and of course this is not a steadfast, lasting basis. *Most of these townships, which have grown rapidly in terms of their population size, have only developed an extended economic basis, while the economic vitality has remained in the adjoining White town.* Such townships have become totally dependent on their White counterparts. This is not a healthy situation as far as the rapidly expanding urbanisation process is concerned.

It is, therefore, suggested that *fewer but larger towns be actively developed* in Lebowa and that these towns receive priority regarding the provision of a social infrastructure, physical infrastructure and other services.

It is also suggested that the *criteria* for the selection of these towns should be the *three fundamental requirements* described in section 7.4.1. Economic factors should receive priority attention. The present geographic distribution of proclaimed towns and semi-urban places should not be ignored but should rather be used as a point of departure.

There should be no hesitation to establish new facilities in the selected towns, when needed. Consideration should especially be given to the establishment of *trade facilities* (where large supermarket groups and other business firms are allowed to establish themselves in such a town) and of *administrative facilities* (i.e. magistrate's office, court,

local government offices, etc.). It is realised that there are numerous problems in Lebowa in regard to these facilities, but it is of vital importance to establish such facilities in selected townships basically to place them in a position to develop on an independent economic basis! The transfer of existing facilities should not be prohibited.

If and where applicable, a system of *double towns* can be developed within the urbanisation strategy. The Black component should, for example, not be totally dependent on its White counterpart and *vice versa*. Each should have its own functional differentiation, all within a greater totality. Each component's character can be exported, which will influence its immediate surroundings. Situations will develop which will call for co-ordination and co-operation in the interest of the area, which may eventually develop into co-operation areas within the regions.

#### 7.4.3 A possible selection of towns in Lebowa

Using the criteria for an alternative urbanisation strategy in Lebowa indicated in section 7.4.2, this section will indicate, as a starting point, certain towns that need to be developed. Therefore, as an illustration, only three towns will be selected, which means that they should get *priority* in terms of stimulating urban growth and development. A later step in this strategy would be to determine which other proclaimed townships and semi-urban places identified in Chapter 4 have an economic growth potential, i.e. can supply job opportunities and can serve their surrounding areas.

The recently announced industrial incentives for *industrial development* in the eight different development regions (RSA, 1982b) identified six industrial development points in the Northern Transvaal region which will directly have an influence on Lebowa *per se*. Three of these industrial development points are situated inside Lebowa (Seshego, Lebowakgomo, a point near Steelpoort Valley), while three White towns are closely situated to the Lebowa borders (Pietersburg, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen). The four additional industrial development points suggested for the region are Louis Trichardt, Giyani, Nkowakowa and Thohoyandou.

Some of the instruments available to government to stimulate industrial development (and thus also urbanisation) which have been described in the previous section, are being used by the South African Government. These industrial development points and the incentives offered are indicated in Table 7.2 and need not be explained.

Table 7.2 - Industrial incentives for selected industrial development points in the Northern Transvaal

Incentives	Rail rebate (%)	Employment incentives (7 years)		Training grant	Rental and interest subsidy (%) for 10 years	Housing subsidy (% of interest rate)	Re-location allowance	Price preference on tenders (%)
		% of total wage bill	Maximum amount per worker (R per month)					
Industrial development points								
Pietersburg, Potgietersrus Tzaneen	50	80	90	Yes	50	50	Yes	5
Seshego	50	95	100	Yes	60	50	Yes	10
Lebowakgomo	50	95	110	Yes	70	50	Yes	10
A point near Steelpoort Valley	50	95	110	Yes	70	50	Yes	10

Source: Republic of South Africa (1982b), The promotion of industrial development: An element of a co-ordinated regional development strategy for Southern Africa, information newsletter. Pretoria.

In Table 7.1 it was shown that Seshego is probably the best developed town in Lebowa, with a population of more than 40 000 inhabitants, nearly 5 000 houses, 18 schools, an automatic telephone exchange and access to a good transport network. It is, therefore, suggested that *Seshego* should receive priority in an urbanisation strategy. It is, however of the utmost importance to establish certain facilities in this town, notably trade (allow large supermarket chain-stores to operate in Seshego) and education as well as the stimulation of industrial development. Seshego should receive priority over Pietersburg as far as the stimulation of development is concerned. Seshego is identified as the focus point of border area development in Lebowa. In this role

it should not be totally dependent on Pietersburg and should develop its own economic basis and develop a functional differentiation regarding its inhabitants and physical structure. Given the limited resources available to Lebowa, it is of utmost importance that *large-scale* industrial development should be concentrated in Seshego which will, at least, require the minimum additional expenditure in the form of extra-ordinary infrastructure like heavy duty roads, railway lines and high-tension power.

The second town to receive priority in the urbanisation strategy is *Lebowakgomo*. At present it is also the capital of Lebowa and is, therefore, a national symbol. The value of this national symbol should, therefore, be developed which can best be achieved by stimulating its growth potential. Du Pisanie (1980, p. 260) suggests that Lebowakgomo, and all other capitals of national states must be acknowledged as growth poles. In this case, Pietersburg should become a main town instead of a growth pole. The requirements for the successful development of the capitals in the national states have been described by Du Pisanie (*ibid.*, p. 202) and also apply to Lebowakgomo. This capital, like Seshego, is well equipped with a social infrastructure and physical infrastructure. It is expanding rapidly as regards the supply of housing. It has two hospitals in its region, two schools, good roads (including a road link with the suggested border area at Seshego), an automatic telephone exchange and the nearby Chuniespoort dam.

A primary facility that can be expanded in Lebowakgomo in a stronger manner than at present is the administrative one. Once this facility is fairly well established, this town can create other functions on which it can grow. Industrial development should be encouraged if it is to the advantage of the inhabitants of the town or to the population of the surrounding area, especially regarding the placement of new facilities. For Lebowakgomo to succeed in this role, it should have a strong link with major markets. The extension of the railway line between Zebediela and Lebowakgomo can provide this link and will, without doubt, contribute to the development of this capital.

The third and last town to receive priority attention in Lebowa's initial urbanisation strategy is *Tubatse* in southern Lebowa, near the Steelpoort Valley. The economic basis of this town should be the *mining activities* of the mineral-rich southern Lebowa. At present, the mining activities of this region are not developed to their full potential. It is, however, envisaged that the development of the mining sector in Lebowa will play an increasingly important role in the future development of the country, at least in the next two decades. In a draft study on the development of the Steelpoort Valley by the Lebowa Government, it was estimated that the urban population of the area will grow at a rate of 6 per cent per annum, which is higher than the maximum rate of urbanisation of 5 per cent estimated in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.17).

Tubatse is at present a proclaimed township and has a social and physical infrastructure, such as roads, power, telephone lines and water from the Steelpoort River. There are also job opportunities in surrounding towns like Burgersfort, Steelpoort and Ohrigstad. Mining operations are, however, the major stimulus in Lebowa. To encourage these activities, it is therefore suggested that the railway line in the Steelpoort Valley should be extended to Tubatse, mainly for the export of Lebowa's mining products.

#### 7.4.4 Population policy

The urbanisation strategy suggested in the previous section will be doomed to failure if the population growth in Lebowa continues to stay at the high levels indicated in Figure 4.9 (Chapter 4). Of greater importance are the expected population growth rates, which are estimated to be between 3 and 4 per cent per annum during the next two decades. This can prove to be the greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of the people in Lebowa. It will lead to unbalanced regional growth, which will render any urbanisation policy ineffective.

Many policies to control population growth have been implemented in various countries in the world. Some programmes achieved great successes, such as those implemented in China, Indonesia and Singapore. Lebowa can learn from these experiences without necessarily trying to implement similar programmes. What is important in this regard is that

Lebowa should create and establish its own *population programme* where goals and methods can be formulated to control the high population growth rate in a manner acceptable to its inhabitants. The schooling of the population in birth control should be an important element of this programme.

## CHAPTER 8

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have described the extent and consequences of urbanisation in the world in general and the economic consequences of urbanisation in Lebowa in particular. This is used as a basis for the formulation of an urbanisation strategy for Lebowa. The strategy is specifically developed to apply to the Africa-context.

This chapter will, in the first place, summarise the most essential features and conclusions of the previous chapters. Secondly, this summary will be extended to include broad conclusions relevant to this study.

## 8.1 URBANISATION AS A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON

Urbanisation has become one of the most important processes observed in the world today. Its effects and consequences are experienced in virtually every country. This phenomenon is bringing about changes affecting the lives of millions of people. It also has an influence on technology and numerous disciplines. Important inventions and innovations have been made in urban areas, for example the development of the first car by Henry Ford in Detroit in the United States of America.

The world is becoming increasingly urbanised. This is proved by the fact that the percentage of the world's population living in urban areas increased from 15 per cent in 1900 to 40 per cent in 1975. It is also estimated that more than 51 per cent of the world's total population will be living in urban areas by the year 2000 which means a total of more than 3,2 billion people (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). The world's urban population will, therefore, exceed the rural population in 1997, a mere 15 years away!

This urban population explosion must be seen against the background of a rapid increase in population in the world, especially since 1950. Whereas 1 868 million people were added to the world population in the three decades between 1950 and 1980, a *larger* number of people (1 966

million) will be added in a shorter period of time (only two decades). It is expected that the world's population will amount to 6 200 million people in the year 2000.

Of particular importance for purposes of this study is the rapid increase in the total population of Third World countries. While the annual growth rate for less developed countries amounted to 2,3 per cent during the period 1970 - 1975, representing an increase of 309,7 million people, the more developed regions in the world recorded an annual growth rate of only 0,8 per cent, representing an increase of less than 48 million people (Chapter 2, Table 2.3). The area demarcated for research in this study, Lebowa, shows typical Third World features, including high population growth rates (indicated in Chapter 4), which also have an influence on the process of urbanisation.

It is especially *Africa* that is displaying the signs of a population explosion. Where previously it took 200 years to add 116 million people to its total population (1750 to 1950), lately it took only 25 years to add another 179 million people (1950 to 1975). It is estimated that in 1975 this continent has started adding another 410 million people, which will bring its total population to an estimated 811 million by the turn of the century, nearly double its population of 1975 (Chapter 2, Table 2.7):

In a discussion of urbanisation in the international world, it is important to distinguish between urbanisation in the more developed countries and in less developed countries. The reason is that the *level* of urbanisation in these two sets of countries differs remarkably. In 1975, for instance, the level of urbanisation in less developed countries was 27 per cent, compared to the 69 per cent in more developed countries. The continent of Africa is the least urbanised of all continents (less than 25 per cent).

Even more important than this large difference in the level of urbanisation in more developed countries (more than two-thirds of their total populations) and less developed countries (slightly more than one quarter), is the *rate* of urbanisation in the latter. The urban populations of less developed countries are increasing at present at *twice* the rate of those in developed countries.

As stated earlier in this section, a continuous process of urbanisation is affecting various important aspects of life. It affects especially human lives. Two important areas where this influence can be detected are the *sex* composition in areas and the *age* structure of different settlements. In Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) it has been indicated that males form the dominant sex group in urban areas in two important regions in the world, namely Africa and South Asia. The causes for this trend may largely be seen in the influence of urban developments.

Urbanisation also influences the age structure in countries and regions. One finds, for instance, a lower percentage of children in the 0-14 years age group in urban areas than in rural areas, while a reverse trend is found for the 15-64 years age group, where a higher percentage of this group is found in urban areas than in rural areas (Chapter 2, Table 2.6). This can, among other things, be attributed to lower birth rates in the urban areas and a trend for people in the economically active age group to agglomerate in urban areas. Again, urban influences are clearly visible. In Africa, for example, 44 per cent of the population is younger than 15 years (Chapter 2, Table 2.9). One of the consequences is a high dependency ratio, in this instance no less than 89 dependants for every 100 economically active adults (compared to a ratio of only 56 dependants in Western Europe). One very often finds that individual countries have a much higher dependency ratio.

One of the most interesting features in the urbanisation process in Africa is the fact that although it is the *least* urbanised continent, it displays a *rate* of urbanisation that is among the highest in the world (see Chapter 2, section 2.4). As a matter of fact, its urban population is likely to treble in the last quarter of this century. The urbanisation process in Africa, supported by the population explosion, can very well become the "time bomb" of the continent.

In conclusion, the definition of the concepts *urban* and *urbanisation* is playing a significant part in describing the phenomenon of urbanisation. Section 2.2 in Chapter 2 contains a short description of these concepts, which not only serve as a background for discussing urbanisation in an international context, but are also used as a basis for suggesting a new classification of urbanisation in Lebowa and which can apply to the Africa-context.

## 8.2 REASONS FOR URBANISATION

Chapter 2 of this study, and also the references in the previous section of this Chapter, refer to one of the major reasons of urbanisation, namely the natural increase of the population. This natural increase refers to the actual difference between fertility and mortality or put more simply, the excess of births over deaths. The rate of natural increase is, therefore, obtained by deducting the death rate (number of deaths per 1 000 of the population per annum) from the birth rate (number of births per 1 000 of the population per annum). It should be remembered that the replacement level amounts to a total fertility of 2.1. It seems that Africa is still in the second phase of the demographic cycle, with high fertility rates and declining mortality rates. The resulting high rates of natural increase are stimulating urbanisation as soon as the agricultural sector reaches its maximum capacity to absorb and feed people.

The second major reason for urbanisation is migration, and more specifically rural-urban migration as discussed in Chapter 3. In many countries of the world this phenomenon of migration is still extremely significant and serves in many places as the major determinant of urbanisation.

In order to obtain an understanding of the urbanisation process, it is necessary to know why people migrate. Writers all over the world agree that there are basic factors inducing people to migrate. Factors associated with the area of origin and with the area of destination affect people strongly in their decision-making. There are a wide range of factors playing a role in this regard which do not only differ from individual to individual but also from country to country. It is, however, *economic factors* that play a decisive role in the decision-making process of migrants. Major "push" factors in this regard are lower levels of income, lack of money due to lack of job opportunities and conditions of poverty. The major economic "pull" factors include higher average annual earnings, employment opportunities and better education opportunities, through which better jobs can be obtained. It is these economic incentives, present at both ends of the scale, that play a decisive part in the decision-making process.

The two types of intervening obstacles for migrants are basically difficulties in the journey (referring to geographic and social distance), and the existence of various control measures, such as legislative measures restricting the free movement of people (Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3). The individual migrant will, however, only make a final decision after having taken certain social factors into consideration (see Table 3.1). In the end it is also personal factors that influence the decision to migrate.

The various types of migrants are described in section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3. One key factor in classifying migrants is their intention. In *South Africa*, reference is usually made to oscillating migrants where such persons, usually males, work in places far from their homes and spend most of their working lives moving at fairly long intervals between workplace and home. This type of migration usually occurs in the mining industry and is in contrast to persons commuting on a daily basis to their places of work.

Migratory labour in South Africa is a deeply rooted and very complicated phenomenon. It stems primarily from economic considerations and gives rise to many social and political problems on the one hand (often evoking strong emotions) while supplying people with jobs and contributing to the growth of the economy on the other hand.

Migration *per se* has not contributed on a large scale to the urbanisation process in the national states. As a matter of fact, it has retarded urbanisation in these areas. There are various other factors that led to the increase of the urban population in the national states from 600 000 people in 1970 to 1,4 million in 1980, or from 8,5 per cent to 13,3 per cent (Chapter 3, Table 3.3). Factors promoting urbanisation in the national states include the consolidation of these areas, the resettlement of Blacks in the national states, the increased provision of housing, depressed conditions in the rural areas, the creation of job opportunities via the decentralisation of industries in particular, and the use of towns as "stopovers" before moving to metropolitan areas. These are important factors to be borne in mind when suggesting an urbanisation strategy, but they are by no means a "complete list".

### 8.3 URBANISATION IN LEBOWA

Having conceptualised the phenomenon of urbanisation and having described the reasons for urbanisation, the process of urbanisation in Lebowa was discussed in Chapter 4, and the key economic variables in the process were reviewed in Chapter 5.

Lebowa is hampered by problems regarding natural increase and migration of people similar to those occurring in the world and in Africa. During the ten years 1970 to 1980, Lebowa has recorded an average population growth of 4,4 per cent per annum, but over a longer period, from 1951 to 1980, it has recorded an average annual growth of 5,0 per cent in its population.

The state also experiences a high rate of absenteeism. During 1980 more than 43 per cent of the North-Sotho and North-Ndebele people, comprising 89 per cent of the *de jure* population of Lebowa, were outside its borders, either in White areas or in other national states.

Further proof of this high rate of absenteeism of the *de jure* population is that only 35,3 per cent of all males in the economically active age group of 15 to 64 years were present in Lebowa (1970), compared to the corresponding 50,5 per cent of the economically active females. This indicates that mainly males are absent from the state. The population pyramids, shown in Figure 4.1 (Chapter 4), shows that there is a dramatic decrease of males above 15 years from the rural areas, while there is a slight increase of males above 15 years in urban areas inside Lebowa.

As a result of these facts an increasing pressure is being exerted on the producers of income in Lebowa. At present, every 100 males have to support 127 children, compared to the total dependency ratio in the United States of America of every 100 males supporting only 61 children.

The high population growth rate in Lebowa is reflected in the male dependency ratio, where every male has to support 3,4 children (compared to the 0,9 children among the White population of South Africa). There is, however, a dramatic difference in this ratio between urban and rural areas, which has to be taken into account in any population

programme. The male dependency ratio of 1:1,2 in urban areas of Lebowa differs substantially from that of 1:3,7 in the rural areas. To complicate the situation still further, Table 4.3 (Chapter 4) shows that no less than 51,4 per cent of the population of Lebowa is under the age of 15 years, which makes it a very "young" population. Only 20,2 per cent of all the Blacks are economically active.

The major contribution of Chapter 4 lies in the suggestion of a *new classification* regarding urbanisation. At present, there are 18 officially proclaimed townships representing the urban population of Lebowa. Estimates of the percentual urban population range from 7,4 per cent (Department of Statistics) to 8,3 per cent (BENS0).

This study showed that these estimates are erroneous reflections of the practical position in Lebowa. Therefore, a new classification of population into urban, semi-urban and rural categories was presented in section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4.

The *urban population* is regarded as the 145 200 inhabitants of the proclaimed townships in Lebowa. This figure is higher than the official count of the 1980 census, because certain corrections based on demographic data were made. The *semi-urban* population was identified basically for three reasons:

- (a) The definition of the urban population (i.e. places with some form of local government) is not directly applicable to an area such as Lebowa and is, therefore, not a complete or comprehensive definition.
- (b) The newly defined semi-urban population has to some extent to serve as a source for the urban population.
- (c) Many people not living in proclaimed townships are not involved in agricultural activities and can, therefore, not be classified as part of the rural population.

The semi-urban population of Lebowa includes the 33 900 inhabitants of "closer settlements", 29 500 "squatters" near large towns involved in non-agricultural activities and the 367 700 residents of "agricultural settlements" with more than 5 000 inhabitants each. There are 922

agricultural settlements in Lebowa. The inhabitants of large settlements are most probably primarily involved in non-agricultural activities, which means that they are in actual fact *not* part of the rural population.

While seven of the proclaimed towns in Lebowa had less than 5 000 inhabitants in 1980 (see Table 4.9), it would not be correct at this stage to define agricultural settlements with more than 5 000 inhabitants as part of the urban population, despite the fact that many urban areas are defined as such when they have 5 000 or more inhabitants (Dwyer, 1975, p. 15), but rather to include them as part of the semi-urban population, for the reasons mentioned above.

The semi-urban population, including the inhabitants of 17 closer settlements, 31 squatter settlements and 46 agricultural settlements, amounts to 431 000 people, or 24,7 per cent of the total *de facto* population of Lebowa. Including the 145 200 people living in the proclaimed townships, the total urban and semi-urban population of Lebowa amounts to 431 150 people, or 33 per cent of the total *de facto* population. This is substantially higher than the official urban population of 8,3 per cent shown in Table 4.6.

This new classification, which can also apply to the Africa-context, is an indication that the process of urbanisation in Lebowa has already reached a more advanced stage than many people are inclined to believe. In the light of what has been indicated in Chapters 2 and 3 of this study, it must be realised that the urbanisation process in Lebowa is sure to accelerate towards the end of this century and beyond.

The high rates of *natural increase* recorded in Lebowa during the last three decades (see Table 4.2) will flatten considerably. Table 4.14 suggests three different population growth rates of 2,6 per cent, 3 per cent and 4 per cent per annum. This study estimates that the *de facto* population of Lebowa will increase at a rate between 3 and 4 per cent per annum (Figure 4,9). At a population growth rate of 3 per cent per annum during the next four decades, Lebowa's *de facto* population will increase to more than 3,1 million people in the year 2000 and to nearly 5,7 million in 2020.

It is also estimated that *urbanisation* in Lebowa will accelerate during the next four decades, but at a more conservative rate than presently estimated in various African countries. Whereas annual urbanisation rates of between 6,1 per cent (Renaud, 1981) and 6,4 per cent (Chapter 4, Table 2.10) were recorded in selected African countries, this study estimates annual urbanisation rates for Lebowa to vary between 4,25 per cent and 5,0 per cent.

With increasing population growth rates, the rates of urbanisation will also increase. For purposes of this study it is assumed that with annual growth rates of 2,6 per cent, 3 per cent and 4 per cent, corresponding annual rates of urbanisation of 4,25 per cent, 4,5 per cent, and 5,0 per cent will prevail. The most probable combination is shown in Table 4.16 (Chapter 4) where it is indicated that with a total *de facto* population of more than 3,1 million in the year 2000 and nearly 5,7 million in 2020, nearly 1,4 million people (44 per cent) and more than 3,3 million people (58,9 per cent) will be urbanised in 2000 and 2020, respectively. This implies that an additional 813 000 people will have to be accommodated in Lebowa for the next 20 years, i.e. an average of more than 40 000 people more per annum. This situation urgently calls for an urbanisation strategy to direct this process.

There are three economic indicators that have an important influence on the process of urbanisation. Firstly, the contribution of various production sectors to urbanisation, especially the number of employment opportunities created through each sector. Secondly, the determination of the national income, especially that part of national income created by the *de facto* population. Thirdly, the extent of the outflow of purchasing power, especially as this process influences the development of towns.

These economic indicators influencing the urbanisation process in Lebowa were described in Chapter 5 of this study. The contribution to the gross domestic product (gdp) by type of economic activity was described in paragraph 5.2. The non-market agricultural production makes the largest single contribution to the non-market production of the gdp, while the market production contribution is exceeded by all sectors except manufacturing, electricity and transport (Table 5.1).

Despite the "illnesses" of the agricultural sector identified by Tomlinson (Union of South Africa, 1955, p. 112), nearly 142 000 people, or 67,7 per cent of the economically active Black population, were involved in this sector during 1970. Part of the problem in this sector is due to a low level of productivity and a large occurrence of subsistence farming. This is combined with a rapid population growth, described in Chapter 4, which is faster than the rate at which the agricultural sector can grow. Its ability to "absorb" people reaches a maximum after which people are forced to move to urban areas.

Whereas communal, social and personal services contribute 35,6 per cent of the gdp and employ 10,6 per cent of the economically active population, the mining sector's contributions amount to 19,7 per cent and 5,8 per cent, respectively. Other sectors with a potential to stimulate urbanisation, like manufacturing, construction, transport and wholesale and retail trade make a relatively small contribution to the urbanisation process, both in contributing to Lebowa's gdp and in employing people. It must, however, be realised that the contribution of the informal sector, which can play an important role in the urbanisation process, is not measured in the gdp or taken into account in the economically active population. The potential stimulation of the urbanisation process in Lebowa by the "neglected" sectors referred to above should not be underestimated, especially the role of the industrial sector.

It is important, in discussing the national income of Lebowa, to make a distinction between the gross national income of inhabitants of Lebowa and that portion of the gross national income earned by continuously absent citizens. The percentual portion of gross national income earned by Blacks in Lebowa came to only 19,8 per cent in 1977, with 80,2 per cent earned by commuters and migrant workers. A further R258,3 million was created by continuously absent citizens during the same period.

The third factor influencing urbanisation in Lebowa is the substantial outflow of purchasing power from the territory. It is estimated that 85,3 per cent of the R301,9 million spent on the purchase of goods and services in 1979 could not be retained in Lebowa (Chapter 5, paragraph 5.4). This tendency directly hampers the development of urban areas.

Towns develop only where people are employed, earn income (in cash and kind), and spend their cash income on goods and services in the town, stimulating local commerce and industry. Purchasing power can only be retained in Lebowa within a broad urbanisation strategy where selected urban areas are stimulated and developed.

#### 8.4 THE ECONOMICS OF URBANISATION IN LEBOWA

The economics of the present urbanisation process, as discussed in Chapter 6, is limited to the existence of social and physical infrastructures. This present strategy is evaluated in Chapter 7 (paragraph 7.3.2), together with a proposed new strategy of urbanisation. The urban explosion envisaged for Lebowa will, without any doubt, increase the demand for these infrastructures. It will, therefore, place additional pressure on the public sector which will also have political consequences.

*Housing* in Lebowa is at present heavily subsidised by government bodies. In the urban areas, a total of 19 000 houses existed in 1980 (Tables 6.2 and 7.1). A total of R7,9 million has been spent on housing in Lebowa by the South African Development Trust (R5,4 million) and the Lebowa Government (R2,5 million) during the past decade, i.e. from 1970 to 1980. In addition, the Lebowa Development Corporation has spent nearly R3,4 million on housing during the period 1976 to 1981, mainly in providing loans. The East Rand Administration Board has already supplied 1 603 houses in Lebowakgomo at a total estimated cost of R7,1 million.

Despite these substantial amounts spent on housing in Lebowa, the urban population experienced a shortfall of 5 194 houses in 1980 (see paragraph 6.2.1.4). At current prices it will cost an estimated R41,5 million to wipe out this backlog. It is, furthermore, estimated that an annual average addition of 11 580 houses will be required to accommodate the urban and semi-urban population of Lebowa in the year 2000. Unfortunately, self-help housing schemes have not yet been successful in Lebowa.

The housing programme in Lebowa is diversified and concentrates on providing housing in virtually all the proclaimed towns. The Government has taken it upon itself to supply this basic human need and, therefore, provides the money.

*Health* is a strong supportive factor in the urbanisation process. The 18 hospitals and 128 clinics serving the *de facto* population of Lebowa provide health and medical facilities on a wide front. The provision of health services in Lebowa is, however, hampered by a shortage of staff and a lack of capital funds to improve the health infrastructure. Only 14,2 per cent of the 1981/82 budget vote was earmarked for health-related matters in Lebowa.

The development of human resources, especially through *education*, should play an important role in an urbanisation process, especially because of the link between education and labour productivity. The Lebowa Government places a high priority on the development of human resources, which is proved by the fact that in the 1981/82 budget not less than 30 per cent was voted for this item. These expenditures should, however, be viewed with care, as not less than 84,5 per cent was spent on personnel expenditure, while only 11,3 per cent was spent on stores and equipment in schools. In the latest available gross domestic product figures (1977), nearly 17 per cent was contributed by educational services (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.3.2).

The present infrastructure of schools in Lebowa does not serve an urbanisation strategy, as only 89 schools out of a total of 1 263 schools are located in proclaimed towns (only 7 per cent). Less than 5 per cent of all schools are located in the 14 largest towns in Lebowa. Seshego has a total of 18 schools (Table 7.1). This situation favours the semi-urban and rural populations comprising 67 per cent of the total *de facto* population.

The provision of *physical infrastructure*, which can foster and stimulate urbanisation, does not receive high priority in Lebowa. Only 6,5 per cent of the 1980/81 budget was spent on physical infrastructure. This includes the provision of roads, railway lines, post and communication services, power and water.

Roads and railway lines are important factors in the development of towns, especially in the promotion of urban development. Only 0,64 per cent of Lebowa's *roads* are tarred (of the required 12 per cent), while 35 per cent of all roads are below standard. At the same time these roads are carrying a heavy load. In Chapter 6 it has been shown that one of Lebowa's bus companies carried 42 million passengers in and around Lebowa during 1981. To worsen matters, practically no capital is available to establish an effective road network - only 1,7 per cent of the 1981/82 budget was voted for roads and bridges. Towns with the best access to good roads are situated on the borders of Lebowa, like Seshego, Mahwelereng, Mankweng and Motetema. In developing 18 towns simultaneously, the available capital and manpower will inevitably be divided among all the development points.

*Railway lines* exist around Lebowa and only come to its borders. At present, Lebowa lacks the necessary railway lines to promote and stimulate economic development in general and urbanisation in particular. Only two towns have direct access to railway transport, namely Seshego and Mahwelereng.

*Post and communication services* are an indispensable input in the urbanisation process. Growing towns need to communicate effectively, not only with the local business community but also on a national level and even on an international level. Whereas only a small percentage of business concerns and households in Lebowa have access to a telephone system, attention should be paid to supplying the estimated urban population of 1,4 million in the year 2000 with these basic services. Map 6.2 shows the current post and communication network in Lebowa, including the existing three automatic exchanges.

Like railway transport, *power* is also only provided (by ESCOM) up to the borders of Lebowa. Beyond this point, the Department of Works in Lebowa is responsible for supplying electricity to places and areas where it is needed.

One of the basic needs in an urbanisation process is that for *water*. Lebowa does not have large dams and can only utilise 8,6 per cent of run-off water (Table 6.11). Towns are fairly well supplied with water for

human consumption (80 per cent of all water needs in towns were met in 1978), excluding water for industry. The majority of places in Lebowa are supplied with water through smaller streams, fountains and boreholes. It is estimated that the water needs for Lebowa's urban and semi-urban population will increase from the present 132 million litres per day to 333 million litres per day in the year 2000.

In *conclusion*, it can be said in the first place that the present urbanisation policy is focused on the development of *many small places*, which seems to emphasize *place* prosperity rather than *people* prosperity. Secondly, there is no urbanisation strategy *per se*. No plan exists on what areas to develop in the next two decades in Lebowa and how this should be done. Thirdly, there is little co-ordination between Government departments regarding the provision of services and an infrastructure to promote urbanisation in Lebowa. In the fourth place, the present urbanisation process is suffering from the four weaknesses identified in section 7.3.1 (Chapter 7), namely the absence of a deliberate urbanisation strategy, a partial urbanisation effort, the unco-ordinated nature of policy, and a negative approach towards urbanisation. The last feature of the present urbanisation process is the unequal spatial distribution of proclaimed towns, for reasons mentioned in Chapter 4. Virtually all towns in Lebowa are situated on the borders, close to adjoining White towns, where job opportunities can be found.

## 8.5 AN ALTERNATIVE URBANISATION STRATEGY FOR LEBOWA

Before an urbanisation strategy can be discussed, it is essential that the relationship between urban growth and economic development be identified. An urban strategy will only be successful if it forms an integral part of a general development policy. The most important features of urban growth are, therefore, discussed in Chapter 7 (section 7.2).

In this section it is stated that (urban) growth is a performance test of development, and that it can be stimulated in the presence of economic development. It remains an important factor in the development process, especially in Africa, where many countries are experiencing high rates of urban growth in association with a developing economy. Attention should, therefore, also be focused on the informal sector, which can create job opportunities. This will contribute to the

positive consequences of urban growth (i.e. creation of job opportunities and the stimulation of trade). Negative consequences of urban growth include overcrowding and urban decadence.

The two major components of urban growth, namely natural population increase and various forms of migration, may give rise to spatially balanced urban development in a country. Unfortunately, political interference has contributed to spatially unbalanced urban development in Lebowa where some towns have either been established for ideological reasons or have never been developed sufficiently to play their role as urban centres.

In implementing an urbanisation strategy, this interrelationship between urban growth and economic development should be recognised. Urbanisation can only be encouraged or directed within the limits of the economic capability of the country. It will, moreover, only be successful *if* the population growth rate is in accordance with the economic capacity of the country, as mentioned in section 7.4.4 (Chapter 7).

In suggesting a framework for an urbanisation strategy in Lebowa in section 7.4.1, two aspects are emphasised, namely the stimulation of regional development and the growth of towns. Regarding the former, Lebowa is part of the Northern Transvaal Region and is also viewed as such in the recently announced industrial incentives by the Central Government for development regions. There are various theories explaining regional development, either concentrating on the role of demand or on the role of supply. The demand-orientated models concentrate on final demand (of which exports form a part), outputs and backward linkages, while the supply-orientated model concentrates on primary supply, inputs and forward linkages. Regional growth in these models is stimulated by trade, migration and the mobility of other production factors such as capital.

Innovations and ideas usually originate in towns and cities and then stimulate growth. There are various factors underlying the growth and development of towns, namely a transportation network, location of resource sites, availability of low-cost labour, agglomeration economies, economics of scale, the intermovement of labour and capital,

the provision in basic needs (such as nutrition, health, education, water and shelter), and various social and political factors. The three fundamental requirements for a town to develop are mentioned in section 7.4.1 and remain important.

At present, many small places are being developed, most of which have an extended basis in an adjoining White town and with the economic vitality remaining in the latter. We should rather start with the suggestions made by the Tomlinson Commission, which proposed a number of urban centres in Lebowa (eight in total) based on economic criteria. The prerequisite for an urbanisation strategy in Lebowa should be political commitment at the highest level. The objective of an urbanisation strategy should be accepted by the Lebowa Government. The strategy should encourage agricultural development simultaneously with the development of a balanced system of towns where definite priorities are determined.

In developing a few larger urban areas in Lebowa, attention should be paid to the important factors referred to in Chapter 6 of this study. More attention should be given to self-help programmes in housing, so that Lebowa will eventually become a self-help society. The selection and building of schools should be more selective so as to serve as a draw-card to urban areas, where the best schools should be located. As far as the transportation network is concerned, attention should be given to the upgrading of identified roads, while the two sections of railway lines should be extended into Lebowa, as suggested in Chapter 7. Any urban area wishing to grow should have sufficient clean water, which is one of the basic needs. It will also counteract unhygienic conditions that may result in outbreaks of cholera and other epidemics. Of particular importance is the creation of job opportunities within these few large towns, not only through large industries, but also through the development of the informal sector. If possible, job opportunities should be created in areas that can retain the purchasing power in Lebowa.

The role of government in an urbanisation strategy is decisive. Through its policies (for example its migration policy) it can influence urbanisation positively, especially by using the instruments available to it, identified by Hoover (1975, p. 270) and mentioned in section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7.

The role of the Lebowa Development Corporation and local governments should not be underestimated. The former usually makes low-interest rate capital loans available to the community, assists in the erection of industrial parks and supports other business ventures. Basic functions to be performed by local governments have been discussed in section 7.4.2. It should, however, at the same time be realised that the two biggest problems in this regard centre on the administration of urban areas and the sources of income of local governments. To some extent Lebowa is caught up between two administrative systems, namely the traditional African system and the modern Western system. As far as revenue is concerned, Lebowa only managed to generate one fourth of its total revenue during 1981/82. Income from taxes and town councils is relatively small.

In the smaller number of towns to be developed with the assistance of the factors spelled out above, it will be necessary to establish certain *new* facilities in them in order that they might become fully fledged towns. An essential basis for towns is trade facilities from where they can both import from and export to areas beyond their own borders. A second facility that will be required in the selected towns is an effective administrative one, where an efficient local government should safeguard the interests of the inhabitants.

In certain cases, a system of double towns may be developed, where each component should have its own character, "exportables" and basis, not totally dependent on the other. Seshego and Pietersburg may, for instance, develop into a double-town system where each component can develop its own basis. Together they should serve the interests of the area by complementing each other rather than competing directly.

By using the factors identified in the previous Chapter to implement an urbanisation strategy, a possible selection of towns in Lebowa that

can serve as a starting point was identified in section 7.4.3. The three selected (proclaimed) towns are Seshego, Lebowakgomo and Tubatse. It is believed that such a dramatic step of selecting only three towns is necessary to emphasise the principle of developing a small number of larger places.

## 8.6 BROAD CONCLUSIONS

Urbanisation is a world-wide problem and Africa, including Lebowa, will experience its effect during the next two decades. It is believed that the present policy to develop many smaller places in Lebowa and in other national states is wrong. A new look at urbanisation in the national states is needed. The aim of this study was to develop such a new perspective to serve as a starting point for a discussion of this subject.

Despite the fact that this study has concentrated on Lebowa, this state should not be viewed in isolation, but rather as part of a larger planning region where other towns or development points will have to be identified in a fashion similar to that used for Lebowa. An alternative urbanisation policy for Lebowa will henceforth also have to focus on the semi-urban population identified in this study. Some of these areas will definitely develop to such an extent that they will justify priority attention.

Various production sectors of Lebowa have been discussed in this study, the development of which will be of crucial importance to the economy of Lebowa. The agricultural sector, for instance, is important for the utilisation of the agricultural resources of Lebowa and for supplying food to its population by increasing its productivity and improving farming methods. Its contribution to urbanisation should be the excess population on agricultural land. The industrial sector's major contribution to urbanisation must be the creation of job opportunities, not only on a large scale in selected urban areas, but also on a smaller scale in various places all over Lebowa. Most important at

this stage is the stimulation and development of the mining sector in Lebowa. This state has a high mineral potential, and it should be exploited to the maximum. The development of this sector will directly affect the larger part of Southern Lebowa, especially Sekhukhuneland where most of the mineral potential occurs. The development of this sector will stimulate growth in Lebowa and create job opportunities. During the *last decade*, however, employment in the mining sector has *not increased* substantially, which can mainly be attributed to the supply of and demand for certain mineral deposits mined in Lebowa. When an excess supply of or a lack of demand for mineral deposits is experienced, it affects not only the production of such minerals but also the employment in the relevant mine or mines. The employment of people in the mining sector in Lebowa depends in other words on the supply of and demand for its minerals. Lebowa may well experience an increase in demand for its mineral deposits in the eighties. This can be an important contribution to a successful process in Lebowa in particular and in the surrounding area in general. Preferably only one town should be stimulated on the basis of the development of this sector (in Chapter 7 Tubatse was suggested).

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Title of thesis: The economic consequences of urbanisation in  
Lebowa

by

Gerhardus Willem Koornhof

Promoter : Prof. Dr. J.A. du Pisanie

Department : Economics

Degree : Doctor Commercii (Economics)

SUMMARY:

The problem identified in this study is that of a rapidly growing urbanisation process in the world in general and in Africa in particular. The national states in South Africa will not escape this process. The purpose of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of this phenomenon as it is developing in one of the national states, namely Lebowa.

To achieve this, a thorough description of the extent of urbanisation, internationally and within the study area, as well as of the underlying causes of urbanisation, was necessary. Urbanisation can only be understood in its historical context. During the past century, Africa has experienced a low level but an increasing rate of urbanisation. A high urban population growth rate is projected for Lebowa in the next four decades. This will place a tremendous pressure on the resources of the country and on the planning capability of the Government.

The development of urban places in Lebowa focuses on the simultaneous stimulation of many smaller places, distributing capital, manpower and services among the eighteen proclaimed townships. Some of these towns lack an economic basis and were, instead, created incidental to ideological motives. The provision of the social and physical infrastructure in Lebowa is at present largely founded on the guidelines for urban development, which has particular economic consequences for urbanisation.

This research makes two main contributions to the study of urbanisation in the national states in general and in Lebowa in particular. Firstly, a new classification regarding the definition of urbanisation in Lebowa is proposed which is a more realistic approach in an Africa-context. It mainly distinguishes between the urban and semi-urban population on the one hand and the rural population on the other hand, paying particular attention to the identification of the semi-urban population. This classification indicates that the process of urbanisation in Lebowa has already reached an advanced stage and that it can be expected that this process will accelerate towards the end of the century.

Secondly, it is argued that the present policy of developing many smaller urban places should be replaced by a co-ordinated urbanisation strategy, concentrating on the development of a few selected larger towns. Such a policy would provide Lebowa with a framework for the development of an urban structure which will be capable of absorbing the projected urban explosion.

The implementation of a policy directed at the promotion of healthy urban development in Lebowa will need political commitment and adoption of a population programme to bring the existing high population growth rate into line with the economic capacity of the country.

Urbanisation should not only be promoted in Lebowa but also in the whole Northern Transvaal region, because of the interdependence of different areas in the region. This will require the development of an urbanisation strategy which will have to be linked to a national urbanisation strategy for South Africa.

Titel van tesis: The economic consequences of urbanisation in  
Lebowa

deur

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Promotor : Prof. Dr. J.A. du Pisanie

Departement : Ekonomie

Graad : Doctor Commercii (Ekonomie)

### SAMEVATTING:

Die probleem wat in hierdie studie geïdentifiseer word, is dié van 'n vinnig ontwikkelende verstedelingsproses in die wêreld in die algemeen en in Afrika in die besonder. Die nasionale state in Suid-Afrika sal hierdie proses nie vryspring nie. Die doel van hierdie studie is dus om 'n bydrae te lewer tot 'n beter begrip van hierdie verskynsel soos dit in een van die nasionale state, te wete Lebowa, ontwikkel.

Om dit te verweselik, was 'n omvattende beskrywing van die omvang van verstedeliking, internasionaal en binne die terrein van hierdie studie, asook van die grondoorsake van verstedeliking gebiedend. Verstedeliking kan slegs in sy historiese verband begryp word. Gedurende die afgelope eeu het Afrika 'n lae vlak maar 'n toenemende koers van verstedeliking belewe. 'n Hoë stedelike bevolkingstoename word vir Lebowa in die volgende vier dekades geprojekteer, wat 'n geweldige druk op die hulpbronne van die land en op die beplanningsvermoë van die Regering sal uitoefen.

Die ontwikkeling van stedelike gebiede in Lebowa is gerig op die gelyktydige stimulering van talle kleiner plekke wat die distribusie van kapitaal, mannekrag en dienste onder die agttien geproklameerde dorpsgebiede tot gevolg het. Sommige van hierdie dorpe het 'n gebrek aan 'n ekonomiese basis en is in plaas daarvan op ideologiese motiewe gegrond. Die verskaffing van die sosiale en fisiese infrastruktuur in Lebowa is op die oomblik in 'n groot mate gegrond op die riglyne vir stedelike ontwikkeling en het besondere ekonomiese konsekwensies vir verstedeliking.

Hierdie navorsing lewer twee belangrike bydraes sover dit die studie van verstedeliking in die nasionale state in die algemeen en in Lebowa in die besonder betref. Eerstens word 'n nuwe klassifikasie betreffende die omskrywing van verstedeliking in Lebowa voorgestel wat 'n meer realistiese benadering in 'n Afrika-verband is. Dit onderskei hoofsaaklik tussen die stedelike en semi-stedelike bevolking enersyds en die landelike bevolking andersyds, en bestee veral aandag aan die identifikasie van die semi-stedelike bevolking. Hierdie klassifikasie dui aan dat die proses van verstedeliking in Lebowa reeds 'n gevorderde stadium bereik het en dat daar verwag kan word dat hierdie proses tot die einde van die eeu sal versnel.

Tweedens word aangevoer dat die huidige beleid om talle kleiner stedelike plekke te ontwikkel, vervang behoort te word deur 'n gekoördineerde verstedelikingsbeleid wat op die ontwikkeling van 'n paar uitgesoekte groter dorpe konsentreer. So 'n beleid sal Lebowa voorsien van 'n raamwerk vir die ontwikkeling van 'n stedelike struktuur wat in staat sal wees om die geprojekteerde stedelike ontploffing te absorbeer.

Die uitvoering van 'n beleid in Lebowa wat op die bevordering van gesonde stedelike ontwikkeling gemik is, vereis politieke verbintenis asook die aanvaarding van 'n bevolkingsprogram om die bestaande hoë bevolkingstoename in ooreenstemming met die ekonomiese vermoë van die land te bring.

Verstedeliking behoort nie net in Lebowa nie, maar ook in die hele Noord-Transvaalse streek bevorder te word, weens die interafhanklikheid van die verskillende gebiede in die streek. Dit vereis die ontwikkeling van 'n verstedelikingstrategie wat aan 'n nasionale verstedelikingstrategie vir Suid-Afrika gekoppel sal moet wees.