

**THE DYNAMICS OF STUDENT UNRESTS IN KENYA'S HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE CASE OF MOI UNIVERSITY**

By

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ABSTRACT

Higher education in post-independence Kenya from 1963 to 2009 has been characterized by rapid expansion - both in terms of student enrolment and in a sharp increase in the number of both private and public universities. While national and institutional mechanisms, such as the establishment of a revolving fund, the Higher Education Loans Board and the introduction of the Privately Sponsored Students Programme, have been initiated to address the sharp demand for higher education against a backdrop of diminishing financial support, violent student unrest - which seriously undermined these efforts - has persisted. A sustained period of student unrest has characterized Kenya's higher education. This has manifested itself in the form of violent protests, riots, boycotts and strikes.

Statistics indicate that the intensity/frequency and violence of the strikes has steadily increased over the years. For example, between 1969 and 2000 sixty-nine cases of student strikes were recorded at all the public universities. Of these cases, twenty-two(31.88%) occurred within a time span of 20 years (1969-1989) while forty-seven cases (68.12%) occurred in a short period of just one decade (1990-2000).At Moi University twenty-four cases of strikes, which affected its colleges and campuses, were recorded between 1985 and 2009. In terms of radical policy adaptation at both national and institutional levels, one would expect a downward trend in unrest. Instead, however, the frequency and intensity of violence associated with strikes has increased at an alarming rate with several deaths being reported.

As such, this study has investigated the factors that have contributed to, and informed, a sustained period of student unrest with a specific focus on Moi University in order to identify policy lessons. Global, national and institutional aspects were examined. A case study strategy was applied - with Moi University as its focus. Data was collected through an in-depth review of the relevant literature, document analysis and interviews. Past and present senior management staff members at Moi University, including Deans of Faculties, Deans of Students, Heads of Departments, and Heads of Sections as well as

former student leaders were interviewed. The study concludes in its findings that the university is operating within a highly dynamic and unstable social-political environment, leading to the emergence of inadequate policy adaptations. The resultant shortcomings in the operations of the university attract the wrath of an informed student population in the form of unrest. The students action is not however simply reactionary, as they too, as change agents have their own agenda that evolves over time as they seize opportunities created by the policy shortcomings to pursue it. The study summarized the salient factors responsible for the violent unrest in five broad thematic areas. These include: (i) Unrest associated with flawed international and national policies and social pressure; (ii) Unrest associated with critical national issues and identification with progressive change agents; (iii) Unrest associated with student politics; (iv) Unrest associated with social identity and threats of their welfare from organized groups; and (v) Unrest associated with the prevalence of institutional catalyzing factors.

A typical strike develops through four main phases: (i) The development/ brewing phase; (ii) The heightened tension phase; (iii) The full blown strike phase; and (iv) The dissipation/uneasy calm phase. Organizational disequilibrium describes the general state of instability characterizing the university, while organizational paranoia is associated with instances of devastating strikes during a heightened tension phase. A strike matrix of Spontaneous vs Orchestrated and Flash vs Protracted typify the strikes. Unrest has led to the disruption of academic programmes; the destruction of property and deaths; a loss of critical study time; and damage to students' careers caused by suspensions and expulsions. The need for a well-considered policy that involves exhaustive consultation with all the stake-holders emerges as critical for the future stability of universities.

KEY WORDS

Collective Dynamics

Higher Education

Joint Admission Board

Organizational Disequilibrium

Organizational Paranoia

Privately Sponsored Students' Programme

Structural Adjustment Programmes

Student Leadership

Student Unrest

Students' Welfare

DECLARATION

I, KIPTOO LELEI KIBOIY, declare that this thesis is my original work. It is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has not been submitted for the award of any degree in any other university.

Researcher's Signature

Date

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	African Development Bank
AIC	African Inland Church
CACO	Chief Academic Officer
CADO	Chief Administrative Officer
CHE	Commission for Higher Education
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CKRC	Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
COMESA	Common Market for East and Central Africa
COTU	Central Organization of Trade Unions
CPK	Church of the Province of Kenya
DC	District Commissioner
DO	District Officer
DP	Democratic Party
DVC (PA&F)	Deputy Vice-Chancellor; Planning, Administration and Finance
DVC (R&E)	Deputy Vice-Chancellor; Research and Extension
FO	Finance Officer
FORD	Forum for Restoration of Democracy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GSU	General Service Unit
GTI	Government Training Institute
HELB	Higher Education Loans Board
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRD	Institute of Research Development
JAB	Joint Admissions Board
K£	Kenyan Pounds (Twenty shillings)

KACE	Kenya Advanced Certificate of Education
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCPE	Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
KCSE	Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education
KNUT	Kenya National Union of Teachers
KShs	Kenyan shillings
MMUST	Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology
MOHEST	Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MU	Moi University
MUCSO	Maseno University College Students' Organization
MUSO	Moi University Students' Organization
NARC	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCST	National Council for Science and Technology
NYS	National Youth Service
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OECD	Organization of Economic Development
PADASA	Planning and Development, Administration and Students' Affairs
PAYE	Pay-As-You-Eat
PSSP	Privately Sponsored Students' Programme
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDC	Students' Disciplinary Committee
SGC	Students' Governing Council
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TSC	Teachers' Service Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VC	Vice-Chancellor
WB	World Bank
WEUCST	Western University College of Science and Technology

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CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Higher education in post-independence Kenya has been characterized by rapid expansion in terms of student enrolment and the number of institutions offering higher education (Jowi *et al.*, 2008). By 2007 seven public universities had been established (up from one in 1963) while by 2011 there were twenty-seven private higher education institutions at different stages of being fully accredited to offer degree programmes. Student enrolments rose from 571 at independence in 1963 to a total of 112,229 in the 2008–2009 academic year (Commission for Higher Education, 2012; Republic of Kenya, 2009). The sharp increase in the number of private universities is attributed to the increasing demand for higher education which had its root cause in the rapid growth of the population. Student enrolment at both private and public universities has been phenomenal. Public universities are creations of various acts of parliament and both their capital and recurrent expenses are sourced from the government. This support and control, however, has been reducing gradually over the years - especially in terms of capital expenditure. Private universities, on the other hand, are owned and managed by private individuals and organizations as well as mainstream churches and they do so either for purposes of profit or for philanthropic reasons.

EAR	NO. OF STUDENTS
1963	571
1983	7,418
2001	59,193
2005	92,316
2008	112,229

Table 0.1: Student enrolment at Kenyan universities

Source: CHE (2008) ; Jowi *et al.* (2008)

Coupled with the exponential expansion of higher education in Kenya has been the perennial problem of student unrest that has characterized Kenya's higher education in the past three decades. The prevalence of strikes in virtually all public universities has persisted amidst radical policy adaptation as well as the embracing and implementation of justifiably acceptable policy frameworks at institutional level. These policy frameworks and adaptations have been aimed at addressing the increasing demand for higher education in the country. For example, in 1995 the government established the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) to address the critical issue of financing higher education - especially for bright students from poor backgrounds (Nafukho, 2004; Chacha, 2004; Republic of Kenya, 1995). At institutional level universities introduced the Privately Sponsored Students' Programme (PSSP) to accommodate qualified students who failed to acquire government financial support for higher education. Despite these radical decisions, amongst others at both government and institutional level, the issue of student unrest in Kenya's higher education continues to puzzle policy-makers and decision-makers in government and at universities. These are the realities that informed this study where the focus is on the pertinent issues and factors that have sustained this perennially adverse phenomenon in Kenya's higher education for over three decades.

In a period spanning 30 years (1969–2000) sixty-nine cases of serious strikes were reported at Kenya's public universities with forty-seven of the incidents, i.e. 68% occurring within one decade between 1990 and 2000 (Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 2000). Over the years, protests that initially started as peaceful demonstrations were rapidly transformed into violent confrontations with the police and the destruction of property, reaching unprecedented levels with serious injuries and deaths being reported. The Report of the Vice-Chancellor's Committee on the causes of strikes at public universities in Kenya (*Ibid*, 2000) describes the violent nature of the strikes:

...demonstrations, boycott of classes, closure of campus ... fierce fights, stoning motorists, statehouse road closed ..., commandeered vehicles, paralyzed the central business district..., looted kitchen ..., broke dining hall, plates, cups, chairs, windows..., extensive damage to property, boycotted classes, etc.(pp. 25–27).

The violent nature of the strikes is also aptly reflected in the Kenyatta University strike of 2009 where a computer laboratory and property worth hundreds of millions of shillings was destroyed and one student was killed (The Standard, 31 March 2009; Daily Nation, 31 March 2009). The violence witnessed during these strikes by students, as well as the disruption of the academic programme, is unprecedented. As such, this study sought to investigate the underlying factors behind the violent unrest in Kenya's higher education - both within and outside the institutions. The study was informed by the fact that the socio-political and economic dynamics, both within and outside the university, have an impact on the operations of any organization. The study, therefore, sought to answer the following research questions:

1. What factors contributed to, and informed, student unrest in Kenya's higher education, in general, and at Moi University, in particular?
2. Why has the unrest in Kenya's higher education persisted in spite of radical government and institutional policy adaptations?
3. How did the unrest manifest itself and with what consequences to both Moi University and its students?
4. How has the government and Moi University responded to the unrest?
5. What policy lessons can be learnt from these experiences?

In investigating student unrest in Kenya's higher education, the study took cognizance of the fact that as an organization the university operates within a dynamic environment and, being an open system, receives input from it and gives output to the same environment. There is an active, dynamic and steady exchange or interaction between the university as an open system and its immediate and wider environment. Being a public institution, the university exists to serve the nation by training students in the various skills required for the overall development of the nation. Its graduates serve in various capacities in the

public and private sectors - and even internationally. The findings of research conducted by various sections of the university are meant to inform critical policy decisions, both nationally and internationally. Public resources are used to support the university's programmes and to finance its operations. Being a system, the university has within it sub-systems components or elements with specific/specialized functions whose combined end-result is to give a unique functional meaning to the whole. There is, therefore, an interaction of components or sectors of the university's system which gives the university its distinctive characteristic features. In taking cognizance of this the study, therefore, had to examine the social, economic and political realities within the immediate and wider environment of the university with a view to establishing whether the dynamics of these had a bearing on, or were linked to, the unstable state characterized by unrest at the university. In other words, the study explored how the developments and practices in the immediate and wider socio-political and economic realms had a bearing on, or were related to, the occurrence of strikes at the university.

Socially, the line of enquiry was to investigate significant social trends during the period under study that could provide an explanation for the phenomenon. The study also critically analyzed political trends in the immediate and wider environment. During the study it emerged that it was necessary to pay attention to some significant political trends, such as the struggle for multiparty democracy and the consequence of an expanded democratic space that was hitherto unheard of. Other significant political occurrences that the study observed include the change of power from the long serving party of Kenya's independence, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), to the National Rainbow Coalition of Kenya party (NARC) under president Kibaki. Later the Party of National Unity (PNU) defeated the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and assumed power after an election whose results were disputed and that resulted in unprecedented violence in the country. Meanwhile, the government conducted two national referendums in 2005 and 2010 to determine whether to adopt a new constitution - exercises that created factions and divisions within the country.

Economically, the study examined the general state of the country's economy during the determined period. It went further by looking at economic policies and, especially, the trend in financing higher education or university education, particularly at Moi University, in order to assess its impact on the higher education system and the resultant unrest.

The study examined the management structures and styles within the university that have been put in place to address issues affecting students and how such issues are handled whenever they arise. The study also interrogated aspects of communication and efficiency by analyzing how grievances were handled whenever there was unrest. It also made enquiries about quality control mechanisms. Student behaviour was also a subject of inquiry, especially at the group level by applying theories of collectives.

1.2 Rationale

While there have been some studies on strikes in Kenya's education system, the emphasis has been mainly on unrest in secondary schools and not a comprehensive coverage of higher education. A comprehensive study of this magnitude, therefore, became necessary in order to fill the gaps that may have occurred by the emphasis of previous studies being restricted to secondary school level. The study is comprehensive in the sense that it goes beyond an analysis of institutional operations and examines the national as well as international dynamics that inform unrest in higher education. A greater and more comprehensive insight is, therefore, the result of this study and it makes a significant contribution to the development of an authoritative higher education policy framework, both in Kenya and internationally.

While there is a wealth of knowledge regarding the behaviour of groups in organizations, including collective dynamics, research and findings in the identified area are not forthcoming in local studies. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to contextualize such behaviour by means of a further study for the purposes of corroboration and/or comparison and to add to the already existing body of knowledge. Indeed, the newly coined concepts, "Organizational Disequilibrium" and "Organizational Paranoia", are the

gratifying and significant contributions to the existing body of knowledge from this study. With regard to the deindividuation theory for explaining extreme behaviour by collectives, the study introduces frustration and disillusion as additional factors that compound the state of deindividuation.

1.3 Argument

The main argument that emerges from the findings is that the establishment of, and early growth at, Moi University has been within the context of a highly dynamic socio-political environment. Support from government and demands exerted on it to deliver in terms of the education and research needs of the country have been at variance, creating serious challenges for the institution. Within this scenario, the study argues that the university's position is that which can best be described as undergoing a state of "organizational disequilibrium" as it confronts the harsh realities that come with these demands in order to make it relevant. The unrest that is witnessed is a manifestation of this state and a clear indication of the shortcomings of the socio-political and economic context within which the university operates.

"Organizational Disequilibrium" is a concept coined in the study to describe the emerging scenario of unrest and instability that captures this reality at the university. This state is characterized by uncertainty in the organization's programmes; frequent strikes and closures; and a general state of turmoil. The organization is experiencing a rapid, sporadic and uncoordinated growth in its programmes as well as its facilities which lack clearly defined objectives and policies. There is little coherence in its policies and the organization does not adhere to its original plans. Very often new and pressing issues emerge without warning to overtake the original plans and, often within a short period of time, the organization emerges as a radically different one from that which was initially conceptualized. Such an organization is the product of a highly unstable and rapidly changing socio-political environment. In this kind of environment policies regarding higher education hardly capture the realities and needs within and outside the university. This makes them incoherent and unrealistic - leading to shortcomings in the provision of services and an inability to sustain its programmes and, consequently, attracting the wrath

of an informed and anxious student population that is critically aware of what is going on and how it can impact on their immediate welfare and future prospects. Such is the situation in the young Kenyan university that this study argues that it is in a state of “Organizational Disequilibrium”.

This study also coins the concept, “Organizational Paranoia”, to describe a volatile situation during a strike or a riot that often leads to extreme action and behaviour on the part of the university administration or the students or, occasionally, both which always leads to disastrous and grave consequences, such as massive destruction of property, death and closure of the institution for long periods of time. Organizations undergoing a state of disequilibrium are prone to experiencing organizational paranoia. Organizational paranoia may set in during a protracted series of orchestrated strikes that continually build up over time to reach a climax. This is often the case when there is a confluence of national and institutional issues. While institutional issues maybe routine ones, national issues have a political dimension with typical characteristics of polarization. At the peak of these protests the institution may suddenly be gripped by an occurrence where there is a deep, irreversible suspicion among all the protagonists. A complete collapse of communication ushers in a moment of generalized falsehoods, rumours and alarming misinformation. The consequence is a complete paralysis of organizational operations, chaos, lawlessness and extreme action and behaviour. It is at such moments that property is razed and destroyed in unprecedented proportions; people are killed; and the university is closed for unrealistic and disproportionate lengths of time - a situation that this study posits to be aptly described as a state of “Organizational Paranoia”.

These arguments are supported by several findings in the study, amongst them that unrest manifests the shortcomings of national and international policies on higher education, especially with regard to funding and other operations. Informed by the human capital theory, there is a general lack of appreciation of the critical role of higher education that lays more emphasis on basic education at the expense of university education. This has led to an acute reduction of funding for higher education, the consequence of which has been a series of unrest witnessed at Moi University during the period under study. This

was compounded by international pressure on the Kenyan government to liberalize the economy. International pressure was in the form of a withdrawal of financial support for capital expenditure which resulted in adverse effects on the operations of the university. Pressure was also exerted both locally and internationally for an expanded democratic space.

Furthermore, a rapid increase in the population that took place in the immediate post-independence period led to a sharp demand for higher education which brought with it an urgent need for *ad-hoc* measures to meet this social demand. The turbulence witnessed at the university is further evidence of the inadequacy of these *ad-hoc* measures. The sharp demand on diminishing financial support not only adversely affects the operations of the university, but its development of necessary infrastructure and teaching facilities as well. Indeed, the ensuing slow economic growth makes it difficult for the average university student - the majority of who come from humble economic backgrounds - to sustain their stay on campus. Also, slow economic growth retards the rate of job creation in the market, thereby creating a student population at the university that is increasingly disillusioned with their university education. The consequence is a student body that has little to lose and is easily convinced to participate in disruptive behaviour.

An unstable situation at a university is not only as the consequence of a flawed policy. The university student is conscious and critically aware of his/her immediate social and political environment and raises concerns about pertinent issues, the most critical being the demand for a democratic space and accountability in the management of public matters. Student unrest is evidence that the university's student body maintains its role as the "conscience of the society". University students are critically aware of themselves and their immediate environment and they play a leading role in questioning the actions of the political leaders of the country. By demonstrating to protest high profile and unresolved killings; by demanding the delivery of political pacts, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); and by supporting lecturer and teacher strikes, students assert their position as the conscience of their immediate environment and they are bold enough to question authority about any malpractice.

With the students' critical conscience leading to the joining of forces in the struggle for a democratic space, the university becomes a focal point or a "war front" in this fight. This further compounds the already unstable state of the university. A series of strikes at a university is a demonstration that university students are part of progressive forces that, over time, have maintained a spirited struggle to bring about positive change in society. The study is replete with cases of students joining these progressive forces in the broader society in demonstrations to condemn government's intolerance of divergent views. It does not, however, escape the findings of the study that on many occasions students also become entangled in factional political fights that often degenerate into negative ethnic rivalry. This is a clear manifestation of the negative ethnicity that is rife in Kenya's social and political arenas. Political power struggles at a national level also play out at the university in ways that, in many instances, destabilize the operations of the university through violent strikes.

Although Moi University - by virtue of being a public institution - inherited an administrative structure with strong state control which was characterized by stifled academic freedom as well as a lack of autonomy, there is evidence of a gradual and steady gravitation away from this grip of the state. For example, in the last decade the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of the university, just as in all other public universities, has been by means of a competitive process conducted by an independent committee. Nevertheless, findings from the study indicate that a perception of intolerance of divergent views and suspicions-concerning academic freedom on the part of the administration still exists.

While significant strides have been made towards academic freedom and in the management of student affairs, generally, the study argues that there are both formal and informal existing situations within the university set-up that precipitate or aggravate unrest at the university. For example, a perception of the alienation of the student body as an interest group in major decision-making processes-compounded by a weak communication system - has been critical in causing unrest.

At the student level instability that compounds the state of disequilibrium has emerged in the form of student politics that revolves around the control of collectively owned student resources. Students are automatic members of their union upon payment of a registration and annual subscription fee. Apart from this, students manage the Students' Centre which is a large facility with several business outlets whose rental goes into the students' account. The elected student leaders or the Students Governing Council (SGC), which is an executive arm of the organization, is charged with the responsibility of managing these resources on behalf of the rest of the students. During the study it emerged that issues of accountability and transparency in the manner in which these resources have been managed has constantly been a thorn in the sides of students and has contributed to fuelling unrest. During several demonstrations students have complained about corruption in terms of the manner in which these resources have been managed.

1.4 Breakdown of Chapters

The argument of the study is developed through a presentation of the entire thesis in nine chapters.

Chapter 1 introduces the study. It contains a brief definition of the problem with a clear statement of the objectives and the research questions that guided the study. This part also presents the rationale and argument of the study as well as how these arguments are developed.

Chapter 2 contains a detailed review of the literature relevant to the study. The literature is subsequently used to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study at the end of the chapter. Preceding this, however, the literature is presented thematically in five broad areas which include the following:

- The study examines the literature of higher education in terms of a global perspective. Here the study looks at the characterization of higher education in a global context and how technological advances shape education both at a national

and international level. The study examines some of the global policies on education, especially with regard to funding and how they impact on national policies and the operation of institutions.

- The study considers the focus of literature on the African region. Here the study considers how globalization, liberalization and a knowledge economy have had an impact on the evolution of higher education in Africa.
- The study explores the literature which focuses attention on higher education in Kenya. It examines the management structures and mandates of the various bodies and commissions in Kenya related to higher education. Some of the salient features of Kenya's higher education, such as its expansion policies and characteristics; the importance of such expansion on operations; and the nature of the university programmes, are examined.
- The study investigates literature which reflects trends in staff and student unrest in higher education. This examination is not restricted to Kenya or Africa, but rather looks at the phenomenon within a global perspective. The approach is to review the global forces that have informed the unrest.
- The study surveys the literature analyses of the features of groups in organizations. This examination of groups is broken into formal and informal groups; collective dynamics; interest groups; and interest articulation.

The literature review is concluded by using it to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study.

Chapter 3 is a presentation of the methodology adopted in the study. It examines and discusses the case study approach, giving its justification as a means of carrying out research of this magnitude. Furthermore, there is an explanation of the data collection techniques that were employed in the study. These include interviews; how the interviewees were identified; the kinds of questions asked; how these were recorded and later analyzed; what documents were sought and how these were identified in the various documentation centres and archives; what the researcher needed to identify for observation in the study area and how what was observed was recorded; and how the

analysis of all this was undertaken. This chapter also examines the issue of trustworthiness as a critical aspect of a study of this magnitude.

Chapter 4 of the study is a description of the historical development of higher education in Kenya and at Moi University which constitutes the case study for this project. The description is given in terms of the university's establishment; growth and development of infrastructural facilities; faculty growth and expansion; student enrolment; and the emergence of constituent colleges, campuses and satellite teaching centres. The chapter continues by examining critical historical developments that have had far reaching implications on the development and the operations of higher education in developing countries and in Kenya, in particular. Historical developments that have had far reaching implications on higher education include: (i) A shift in focus of the World Bank's attention from financing the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War to a focus on the former European colonies, and (ii) The collapse of the Soviet Union; the removal of the Berlin wall; and the end of apartheid.

For the entire study, a total of 25 incidents of unrest, with varying degrees of violence, were analyzed. These incidents were recorded as having taken place on Moi University's Main Campus and at its constituent colleges and campuses. Some of the constituent colleges were transformed into full universities during the period under study and the study has been confined to the period when such campuses or colleges were still under Moi University.

Chapter 5 is an analysis and examination of the first thematic area related to student unrest which is associated with inadequate or inappropriate national and international policies as well as the pressure on academic and welfare facilities within the university that has been brought about by the rapid growth of population - as witnessed in post-independence Kenya. For greater clarity and better analysis this thematic area is divided into three sub-themes: (i) The adaptation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in terms of the cost sharing policy; (ii) The pressure on teaching and learning

facilities; and (iii) Inadequacy in the provision of services. The study uses six cases of student riots and protests to demonstrate that the adaptation of hurriedly thought through policy that did not benefit from the input of a wide section of stake-holders and without evidence of any feasibility studies has been largely responsible for the unrest that has been witnessed at Kenya's higher education institutions.

Chapter 6 discusses three themes and how these have been critical in contributing to sustaining student unrest. Firstly, it examines how critical national issues have been at the centre of the unrest. This is seen in the demonstrations against efforts to silence a criticism of government, support for progressive political struggles and identifying with critical non-political issues. Secondly, the chapter examines the role of student politics and the fight for control of student resources during the unrest. This theme is broken down into a further three areas and each of these is also examined. Here the study examines the role of student elections; the role of different student factions; and the contribution of negative ethnicity. The third major theme considers how perceived threats to student welfare by groups outside the university have rallied students in defending it and fighting - often violently - to ward off the threats. All these themes are discussed with illustrations of the most appropriate actual incidents. The study uses a total of fourteen cases to illustrate these themes.

Chapter 7 looks at the role of institutional dynamics as a catalyst of unrest. The study establishes that within an institution, situations exist which do not, in themselves, cause or instigate unrest but contribute to exacerbating situations that could otherwise be salvaged. These are both formal and informal or non-formal. Formal factors include communication, alienation, law enforcement procedures and student leadership, while non-formal ones include the role of collective dynamics, such as anonymity and diffusion of responsibility associated with large groups, group identity, drugs and alcohol. The study also illustrates these with examples from the incidents that were analyzed.

Chapter 8 explores the nature and form that student unrest has taken. It discusses the four stages/phases that the study has identified that an actual strike goes through. This chapter

also presents a typical classification of strikes on the basis of their general causes and the speed at which they take place. It discusses spontaneous vs orchestrated strikes as well as flash vs protracted strikes. The chapter considers the impact of unrest on university operations as well as on students' academic progress. Lastly, the chapter postulates on what the researcher considers as the main contribution of the study to the existing body of knowledge regarding unrest in educational institutions of higher learning. In the course of the data analysis, it is observed that there are two unique situations that arise within the university as an organization and that may not have been described concisely or in a manner that aptly captures these unique occurrences by earlier studies. This study coins the following phrases to describe or capture the character of the university: the concept of "Organizational Disequilibrium" and the concept of "Organizational Paranoia". In this chapter a definition of these two concepts - as observed during the study – is given. Their salient characteristic features are described as well as what emerges as the prevailing conditions that seem to give rise to their occurrence, the impact of their occurrence and policy implications.

Chapter 9 contains a summary of the entire study with recommendations, both for future policy and for further research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an in-depth examination of the literature related to student unrest. It examines higher education in light of global, national and institutional dynamics that could shed light on, or explain, the phenomenon of student unrest. It is divided into two broad sections. The first section examines global trends in higher education; the impact of globalization on Africa's higher education; staff and student unrest; and higher education in Kenya. The second part looks at the literature dealing with institutional dynamics that may explain unrest where the focus is on policy and decision-making processes at a university; interest groups and interest articulation within organizations; and collective dynamics. The chapter concludes with the use of this literature in developing a conceptual framework which provides a lens through which the data was analyzed, interpreted, presented and given meaning.

The literature suggests that institutions of higher learning operate within a complex set of forces that constitute their social, political and economic environment which is very often beyond the control of the players within the system. These institutions are themselves the product of an increased demand for higher education against a background of diminishing government support. Students within the institution are adversely affected by unfavourable policies adopted by governments and that are imposed on universities. As an interest group that is adversely affected, students use all possible means, including strikes, to resist these policies.

2.2 Higher Education in the Global Context

With the world becoming increasingly "smaller" as a result of advances in technology, there is an increasing interdependence due to the flow of ideas, knowledge and information (Knight, 2008; World Bank, 2007). Globalization is progressively shaping

the nature of higher education. Knight (2008) identifies elements - also referred to as catalysts for globalization - that have far reaching implications and include a knowledge society, information and communication technologies, market economies, liberalization and governance. A knowledge society is also referred to as the knowledge revolution and the World Bank (2007) identifies indicators of this revolution which include: (i) the doubling in the past two decades of published scientific papers; (ii) a steady increase in the number of patent applications; (iii) the absence of developing countries in the rankings of the *per capita* publications worldwide; and (iv) an increased use of personal computers and the internet.

The knowledge revolution implies a need for students not only to learn what is readily known but also to acquire the skills of learning. Overall, the implications of the effects of globalization on higher education are far-reaching and include the commercialization of universities and the emergence of private providers, like private companies and multinationals, alongside public providers of higher education. There is also an increase in the movement of students and scholars across borders and disciplines. ICT has ushered in a new era of international delivery methods, such as e-learning, while the market economy has accelerated the commercialization of educational services and the emergence of the phenomenon of “importing” and “exporting” education. With liberalization and improved government structures, the role of governments in the management of education is changing with the emergence of new actors and frameworks, such as regional and international dimension settings (Knight, 2008).

The World Bank and UNESCO commissioned a task force on higher education and society (World Bank, 2000) and its report provides a comprehensive analysis of the state of higher education, globally. The report notes that policies regarding funding and support for higher education since the 1980s have largely been informed by the economic view that “public investments in universities and colleges bring meagre returns compared to investment in primary and secondary schools, and that higher education magnifies income inequality” (p. 10).

Due to this perception, higher education has since been receiving little attention in terms of donor support and funding which has led to a deterioration of standards in higher education. The report aptly captures this scenario:

During the past two or three decades, however, attention has focused on Primary education, especially for girls. This has led to a neglect of secondary and tertiary education, with higher education in perilous state in many, if not most developing countries. With a few notable exceptions it is underfunded by donors and governments. As a result, quality is low and often deteriorating, while access remains limited. Higher education institutions (and whole systems) are politicized, poorly regulated and sometimes corrupt (p. 16).

As a consequence, new developments characterize higher education. Firstly, higher education - especially in developing countries - is under great strain because it has been severely underfunded while demand has escalated. Under-qualified staff and poorly trained students are common features. Due to the knowledge revolution there is an increasing demand and statistics indicate that this is especially true in developing countries which account for half of the student population of higher education worldwide.

Secondly, the World Bank's report (2007) notes that this has given rise to a sharp or rapid expansion of higher education that is characterized by the replication of traditional institutions. Private organizations have come in to meet the demand by establishing private universities while the existing ones have expanded in size - giving rise to "mega universities", such as the National University of Mexico with a student enrolment of more than 200,000.

Thirdly, this rapid expansion has ushered in a situation of degradation of standards. For example, the report notes that at faculty level there is little graduate training; teaching methods are outmoded; and lecturers are poorly paid. Employment practices discourage the recruitment of talented individuals while bureaucracy and corruption hinder the development of academic freedom. There has also been much political activity that often disrupts academic programmes.

Fourthly, the report notes that conditions make it difficult for students to study due to overcrowded classes, inadequate facilities and substandard living conditions. Cultural and infrastructural factors largely determine the courses undertaken by students, such as the humanities, which lead to the phenomenon of “educated unemployment”. Furthermore, due to early specialization, there is a rigidity that makes it difficult for students to easily make choices of courses in order to increase their chances of employment.

Fifthly, the report notes that there is an acute shortage of resources. Most universities in developing countries depend on central government for their funding. These countries, despite the allocation of a large percentage of their fiscal budgets to education, actually spend lower amounts *per* student compared to developed countries. These budgets are controlled by bureaucrats in central government who have little understanding of the operations of universities. It is often difficult to increase budgetary allocations beyond what was provided in the previous year. Also, due to the poor co-ordination of capital and operational budgets, physical facilities are constructed without any provision for maintenance or equipment and, therefore, a common feature is the existence of structures that are not used. Rigid budgetary practices have led to the rapid disappearance of a research agenda at higher education institutions.

Lastly, the report indicates that there is a widespread imbalance in higher education in developing countries between rural and urban settings; between the rich and the poor, and between the genders.

These realities point to the fact that global policy forces have had far reaching consequences on the operations of institutions of higher learning in developing countries. As a result of the perceived lack of benefits accruing from higher education an acute under-funding policy was adopted by global funding agencies which, combined with an increased demand for higher education, seriously erode standards and undermine the core business of research and knowledge dissemination at the universities of developing countries.

2.3 Higher Education in Africa

In the recent past higher education in Africa, as in other developing countries, has been undergoing far reaching transformation and meeting challenges that are associated with globalization and liberalization as well as the impact of a knowledge economy and the adverse implications of worsening social, economic and political realities (Zezeza and Olukoshi, 2004). Against the backdrop of weakened economies due to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) advances in technology have forced the transformation of universities from traditional “development” ones to “market” universities that are struggling to remain relevant. Universities struggle to provide a relevant service in an environment of dwindling resources, increased demand for higher education, declining standards and a brain-drain as well as a slow pace of economic growth. Recent changes include the crumbling of traditional disciplinary boundaries which has given rise to interdisciplinary configurations that imply new organizational forms of knowledge production, dissemination and consumption (*Ibid*). Zezeza and Olukoshi (2004) observe that:

The Universities’ internal and external constituencies and competitors are more plural than ever as expectations of social access and accountability expand at the same time as the universities lose their monopoly of knowledge production and access to public resource, all of which recast their capacities to articulate a public voice and deliver public service (p. 2).

As a result, Zezeza and Olukoshi (2004) maintain that several issues confront or characterize challenges for African universities today. Firstly, African universities are being forced to develop new strategies to fund their operations. This gives rise to issues that confound these universities concerning their vision, priorities, governance and curriculum development.

Secondly, the emergence and existence of private universities is now a stable feature of higher education in Africa. Many of these universities are run by religious organizations for either profit or philanthropic reasons. This gives rise to questions about quality as

well as “... access, equity, diversity and the secular foundation of the higher education system as a whole” (p. 4).

Thirdly new networks and strategic alliances are emerging at national, regional and global level. This has largely been the result of the World Trade Organizations’ General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) -a move that was largely aimed at facilitating the trade in educational services between the North and the South.

Fourthly, universities in Africa are under pressure to provide education to a large number of students under conditions of resource constrains which lead to issues of delivery of academic programmes as well as sporadic growth and development (Atteh,1996; Knight, 2008; Jowi, *et al.*, 2008).

Fifthly, also associated with the effects of globalization are strategies employed by universities in order to deal with the shortfall in budgetary allocations. Universities are being forced to engage in activities that are not, generally, confined to their missions of research and knowledge creation in order to supplement dwindling budgetary allocations.

These challenges that characterize African universities come into sharp focus when seen against the backdrop of declining social and economic conditions in the 1980s in the form of worsening terms of trade, an increase in oil prices, recurrent drought, rising debt burdens, a decline in development assistance, widespread corruption, questionable national policies and poor management of development programmes (Atteh,1996; Nkinyangi, 1991). Moja (2004) observes that globalization and the knowledge economy have had far reaching consequences as far as higher education is concerned. The commercialization of education is one of the emerging and significant realities of the knowledge revolution. Higher education, through the General Agreement on Trade in Service(GATs), commands a multi-billion dollar market with countries, such as the US, earning up to \$ 8.5 billion from these services in 1999 (Moja, 2004).

As indicated earlier, another feature of higher education in Africa is the emergence of private universities (Thaver, 2004). These universities have been established and developed for several reasons. Firstly, there has been excessive social demand for higher education that the public university sector could not accommodate. Secondly, the development has been because of a need to enhance access to higher education within limited fiscal allocations. Thirdly, the needs of specific population groups have given rise to this demand, such as the religion-based private universities, and lastly is the profit reasons. (*Ibid*; Knight, 2008; AAU). Most of the private universities offer programmes at certificate, diploma and degree levels with a curriculum that emphasizes religious training and business-related courses, including marketing, accountancy, management, banking and finance which reflects an orientation towards a global market economy (*Ibid*). Student fees, subsidies from sponsoring organizations, loan schemes and government support constitute some of the sources of funding for these universities. The fees charged by private universities are very high, often beyond the reach of most households. The issue of access, therefore, needs to be addressed by African governments (Chacha, 2004).

Various strategies have been developed to address issues related to the financing of private institutions and supporting students at these institutions, but with varying success. For example, governments have initiated revolving funds, such as the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) in Kenya, with considerable success (*Ibid*; Nafukho, 2004; AAU, 2004). Others include the establishment of income generating units/companies (IGUs) engaged in commercial activities and the creation of consultancy services. Issues of quality, among other challenges, have been recognized.

2.4 The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on African Higher Education

The Structural Adjustment Programmes, imposed on most Sub-Saharan governments, resulted in immediate budgetary cuts for higher education which led to widespread unrest. This unrest, however, did not begin with these policies but had begun earlier. Student unrest in Africa can be traced to a first generation of African Nationalists whose

activities are linked to the earliest struggle against the activities of colonial governments (Nkinyangi, 1991). Student revolts became widespread in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, between 1970 and 1979 major student protests occurred in 29 African countries while protests were reported in 25 countries between 1980 and 1989. These protests revolved less around internal educational matters and more around wider global concerns, such as foreign policy, politics of the cold war and the South African question (*Ibid*). Colonial power configurations emerged as another factor that sparked student protests. In Kenya, for example, the new government of President Jomo Kenyatta that came into power in 1963 was deeply suspicious of any autonomous activity outside state power. Kenyatta appointed trusted friends to manage the university and, in consolidating power to central government, made himself Chancellor of the university. Any form of dissent was dealt with severely as in the case of students protested for this first time in 1969 (Amutabi, 2002; Nkinyangi, 1991; Klopp and Orina, 2002).

In the 1980s there was a steady decline in social and economic conditions in the form of a reduction of trade; increased oil prices; a rising burden of debt; a decline in development assistance; widespread corruption; questionable national policies; and human rights abuses. This was aggravated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that withdrew financial support to African governments, generally, and higher education, in particular. (Amutabi, 2002; Atteh, 1996; Nkinyangi, 1991). During this period African countries were experiencing a rapid population growth rate - the highest in the world – resulting in a sharp demand for higher education. The provision of adequate basic needs, such as shelter, water and sanitation, has been a mighty challenge for most African countries.

Meanwhile, the IMF and World Bank imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in many African countries, such as Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Kenya - amongst several others. In the Kenyan case, this meant the introduction of cost sharing policies, cutting back on subsidies, a reduced unit cost of education, increased prices of consumer goods and the privatization of public sector activities. These measures sparked riots by students who joined forces with other groups to demonstrate against the structural

reforms. For example, there were food related riots in Khartoum and in Omdurman in 1982, as well as in Zambia in 1986 and 1988.

The foregoing deterioration in economic conditions led to declining standards of education because of the declining pupil expenditure in the context of a rising student enrolment. In this regard, Amutabi (2002) notes:

The budgetary crunch has meant that facilities like classrooms, equipment and teaching materials are simply not available for the ever-expanding number of students (p. 162).

This acute shortage of facilities is best captured by Ankomas (cited in Amutabi, 2002) and Atteh (1996) who describe the nature of this shortage at the University of Kinshasa:

Each school day students arrive for the first classes at 4.00 a.m. in order to reserve a seat. At 6.00 o'clock the 250 seat amphitheatre (60 seats are already out of use) are crammed with most of the 750 students registered for the class which begins at 8.00 a.m. Sometimes the teacher does not even turn up. The classroom is an oven, air conditioners have broken down and the ventilation is poor. In the dormitories, the students are five *per* room and there is not enough space. The university clinic is dirty, the building is surrounded by litter heaps (pp. 163 and 38).

Students often protested against deteriorating standards. The university authorities' response has been that of closing the universities. This has been a frequent occurrence where closures have lasted for as long as up to a year and more (*Ibid*; Nkinyangi, 1991).

While the deterioration of standards was mainly brought about by the impact of the structural adjustment programmes which was compounded by declining economies, this has also been exacerbated by the small budgetary allocations to education, generally, and to higher education, in particular, by African governments. Countries, like Nigeria, have been allocating more funds to their military instead. While enrolment in higher education in 49 sub-Saharan countries rose by 50% between 1980 and 1983, expenditure on education for the same period in these countries fell from US\$ 10 billion to US\$ 8.9 billion (Atteh, 1996). In 1983 Malawi, Nigeria and Somalia each spent less than 10% of their budgetary allocations on education. Consequently, the financing of education

gradually became the responsibility of parents, private organizations and foreign donors (*Ibid*). Between 1975 and 1980 private expenditure on education accounted for 14% of the total of national spending in Sudan; 23% in Tanzania; 48% in Sierra Leone; and 53% in Ghana (*Ibid*).

Amutabi (2002) further observes that the students' protests have been in defense of individual and class interests. He notes that, in the recent past, students' status and privileges have been seriously diminished.

Apart from student strikes, faculty strikes have also featured prominently in Africa's higher education - mainly to oppose oppressive systems and advocate improved terms of service (Zezeza, 2004). In 1994 lecturers at public universities in Kenya went on strike to demand the registration of their trade union. Zezeza (*Ibid*) observes that members of faculty often strike to defend academic freedom. In terms of the recent transformation in higher education, threats to academic freedom are more economic than political. Academics face multiple problems and often find themselves fighting to protect their interests and to promote the mission of higher education of teaching, research and service.

Violence associated with student protests has been an issue of concern. Nigeria recorded a total of 21 major strikes between 1948 and 1979 and over 3 dozen between 1980 and 1996. These include the Ahmadu Bello University crisis of 1986, the national students' crisis of 1988 and the anti-Structural Adjustment Programme riots between 1990 and 1993. Between 1985 and 1993 one hundred Nigerian university students were killed by riot police, while one thousand were imprisoned. Between 1993 and 1994 twelve university professors in Nigeria were arrested and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) as well as the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) was banned by the military government.

This literature related to Africa's higher education points to the fact that unfavourable socio-political and economic realities have had an adverse effect on the provision of

higher education in sub-Saharan Africa. Higher education in the region has been characterized by a decline in financial support from governments; a deterioration of teaching, learning and welfare conditions; a neglect of infrastructural facilities; and a shortage of qualified teaching staff. High-handed pro-government administrations have been used to stifle academic freedom, which has resulted in fierce confrontations between staff and students on the one hand and government law enforcement agents on the other.

2.5 Higher Education in Kenya

Higher education in Kenya has its origins in the establishment of Makerere College in Uganda in 1922. It was established in order to serve the three East African countries, i.e. Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) as well as Zambia and Malawi (Chacha, 2008). In 1963 the Royal Technical College that had been established by the Asian community in 1956 became the University College of Nairobi following the establishment of the University of Eastern Africa, Makerere. The university offered the degree and certificates programmes of the University of London until 1966. Upon the dissolution of the University of Eastern Africa in 1970, the University of Nairobi was established and became the first public university in Kenya (*Ibid*; Jowi *et al.*, 2008). As demand for higher education grew, six other universities were established within a time span of slightly over twenty years. These include Moi University in 1984; Kenyatta University in 1985; Egerton University in 1987; Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in 1994; Maseno University in 2001; and Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology in 2007 (Commission for Higher Education, 2012).

The physical expansion of universities has been spectacular. In most cases this has taken the form of a conversion of middle level colleges into constituent colleges and campuses. For example, between May and July of 2007 the following middle level colleges were converted into university colleges: Pwani, Chuka, Kisii, Kimathi Institute of Technology, the Kenya Polytechnic and Mombasa Polytechnic. Meanwhile, Kenya Science, Taita Taveta, Kabianga and Kitui - which were already campuses - were upgraded to constituent colleges of the existing universities, i.e. the Universities of Nairobi, Moi, Egerton and Kenyatta and Jomo Kenyatta University of Science and Technology (Otieno, 2009). In addition, between January and February 2008 another two middle level

colleges, Narok Teachers' College and South Eastern College, were upgraded to constituent colleges of Moi and Nairobi Universities (Jowi *et al.*, 2008;*Ibid*). By early 2012, there were fifteen constituent colleges affiliated to the seven public universities. The number of private universities also grew dramatically from one in 1991 to fourteen with four constituent colleges by the end of 2011. At this time universities with interim letters of authority totalled eleven while two had been registered prior to the setting up of the Commission for Higher Education and were awaiting the award of their charter, bringing the number of private universities to twenty-seven (Commission for University Education, 2012). In total the country had 34 universities and 19 constituent colleges by the end of 2011.

The growth in student enrolment has also been phenomenal - from the small number of 571 at independence in 1963 to a total of 112,229 in public universities for the 2008/2009 academic year. The annual enrolment has been increasing steadily over the years with an average growth rate of 21.39% between 1985 and 2009. Surges in enrolment were recorded in the 1987/88 and 1990/91 academic years when enrolment rates increased at 89.81% and 63.75%, respectively (Republic of Kenya, 1985-2009). This is explained by two occurrences: the dual intake of 1987 and the double intake of 1990. Two cohorts of 'A' level graduates were admitted in the dual intake of 1986/87 academic year after a backlog was created when the University of Nairobi was closed for over a year as a result of the attempted *coup* of August 1982. When the country changed its system of education from the 7-4-2-3 to the 8-4-4 in 1985 the first cohorts qualified for admission to university at the same time as the last cohort of the old system in 1990. These two cohorts were admitted to the universities during the 1990/91 academic year in a double intake in order to avoid another backlog. This resulted in the admission of 21,000 new students in the 1990/91 academic year (Hornsby, 2012).

The impact of this sporadic expansion of university education has resulted in the prevalence of poor teaching and learning conditions; inadequate learning facilities; and the further dilapidation of an already inadequate infrastructure (Ntarangwi, 2003). The situation has been compounded by the gradual withdrawal of government financial support that began in earnest with the adoption of the World Bank supported Structural

Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in a cost sharing policy (Republic of Kenya, 1988). In grappling with diminishing resources, public universities resorted to a flurry of survival techniques, such as the introduction of Privately Sponsored Students' Programmes (PSSP) otherwise known as Module II programmes and non-teaching income generating ventures (IGUs) (Chacha, 2004; Nafukho, 2004). Moi University, for example, established the following income generating ventures: (i) Consultancy, Research and Development; (ii) Business Unit; and (iii) Production Units and Service Units, while the University of Nairobi incorporated a limited liability company to supplement its income (Weidman, 1995; Chacha, 2004).

Nevertheless, issues of quality continued to be a critical area of concern in public universities in Kenya, resulting in a disruption of programmes because of boycotts by students (Ntarangwi, 2003; Otieno and Lesy, 2007). Most universities were pushed beyond their capacities and, as a result, there have been extremely large classes which made it difficult to manage tutorials. Similarly, library facilities have been stretched beyond limits while congestion in the halls of residence has been a common feature (Ojwang, 2009).

Sifuna (1998) notes that apart from the pressure on teaching facilities, the quality of teaching staff has also emerged as an issue of concern. While a PhD is the required qualification for securing a teaching position at universities, this requirement is no longer strictly enforced in all the public universities. Similarly, publication - another requirement for university teaching - is not emphasized. As such, a university's teaching staff is comprised of many academics who would otherwise not have qualified for such positions.

Poor conditions of service and low salaries for teaching staff have forced these academics into engaging in a flurry of income generating activities in order to supplement their meagre incomes. For example, Abagi (1999) notes that 50% of the teaching staff at Kenya's public universities teach at their own institutions and at other outside institutions and that only 5% of teaching staff engage in research while the rest are involved mainly in consultancies outside their universities. A majority of these staff members also engage

in non-academic businesses, such as road transportation. Zeleza (2003) describes his own experience to illustrate how the politicized reward structures had pushed academics into other engagements to supplement their income when he recalls:

I vividly recall when teaching in Kenya in the 1980s, the juggling I had to do to cling to a rapidly evaporating middle class lifestyle. In addition to my formal job at Kenyatta University, I also taught courses thirty miles away at the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, and learned to hustle my talents to foundations on projects that meant little to me as a historian. Needless to say, my research suffered (p. 78).

Apart from making staff resort to engaging in business, the poor terms of service was considered to have been largely responsible for the strike in 1994 during which the demand for the registration of an academic staff union featured prominently (Zeleza, 2004; Klopp & Orina, 2002; Abagi, 1999). Lecturers also protested against what they perceived as oppression by the state-appointed senior university administrators which, amongst other issues, had led to a low staff-student ratio (Nkinyangi, 1991; Klopp & Orina, 2002; Abagi, 1999).

2.6 Structure of Higher Education in Kenya

The main role-players in the overall running and management of education, generally, and of higher education, in particular, include the Ministry of Education, the Commission for Higher Education (CHE), other government ministries, the Joint Admission Board and several regional institutions and international organizations. (Jowi *et al.*, 2008).

The Ministry of Education is responsible for overall policy development and implementation. The ministry was split into two following the establishment of the coalition government after the disputed election of 2007. Consequently, Kenya has the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology under whose docket the universities fall and the Ministry of Education which is mainly in charge of primary and secondary education.

2.6.1 Commission for Higher Education

The Commission for Higher Education (CHE) was established by an Act of Parliament and is mandated to play a central role in the planning, development, budget development

and maintenance of quality in higher education (Commission for Higher Education, 2012). It is also responsible for the coordination of post-secondary education and training as well as equating and recognizing academic qualifications from other countries. Its regulation of the establishment of universities is based on benchmarks regarding admission requirements, programme lengths, qualification levels, teaching staff qualifications and infrastructure facilities. The commission, however, has only been effective in the accreditation of both private and public universities since public universities are created by acts of parliament which specify their own quality control mechanisms. Furthermore, its role in the maintenance of standards by determining the courses offered, as well as monitoring examinations, seems to have been diminished by the creation of the Joint Admissions Board (JAB) by the Vice-Chancellors of the public universities (Matemba, 2011).

2.6.2 The Joint Admissions Board

The Joint Admissions Board was created by the committee of the Vice-Chancellors of the public universities in Kenya. Its main mandate is to regulate the admission of government sponsored students to the public universities and its membership is drawn from Deans of all the faculties of the public universities.

2.6.3 Regional Institutions and International Organizations

Several regional and international organizations collaborate with Kenyan universities in various aspects of higher education, but mainly in research. These organizations include the International Centre for Research in Agro Forestry (ICRAF); the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI); and the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), amongst others. Regional institutions include the Inter University Council for East Africa (IUCEA); the Association of African Universities (AAU); and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). International development organizations include the World Bank, UNESCO, the Ford foundation and USAID.

In summary, in the last three decades Kenya's higher education has witnessed unplanned and uncoordinated expansion, both in terms of student enrolment as well as in the number

of new institutions. There has been a pressure on the few available teaching facilities which has, essentially, been the result of diminishing government capital support. Meanwhile, Kenya's rapid population expansion has implied an increased demand for higher education. As such, the quality of higher education requires critical evaluation while financing has also emerged as a pertinent issue. These realities inform the present research.

2.7 Organizational Dynamics

The unrest witnessed at Moi University is essentially and inevitably related to decisions or policy in terms of their being favourable or unfavourable to those affected - in this case the university students. It may also be because of a failure to make a decision or develop a policy to address an issue or issues. It follows, therefore, that an investigation into unrest will inevitably involve a study of the decision and policy-making processes at the university. The existence of groups, where there are implications on how individual behaviour may be affected in such contexts, is critical in shedding light on the development of discontent that may eventually lead to unrest. As such, this section examines these processes and, in particular, pays attention to collective dynamics that attempt to provide explanations for extreme group behaviour, such as lynch mobs that have elicited acts of hooliganism in frightening proportions.

2.7.1 The Bureaucratic, Collegial and Political Models

Baldrige (1971) argues that the bureaucratic model is inadequate in providing an effective framework for analyzing the policy processes of the university. Nevertheless, decision-making in many institutions can be explained by the bureaucratic model which presents the organization as having a clearly defined structure with offices that are occupied by individuals who have the authority to make decisions and enforce them. He further notes that the existence of committees that are made up of faculty members who make enforceable decisions implies a collegial model which, unlike the bureaucratic one, involves the use of committees or colleagues in critical decision-making. However, he uses the conflict theory, community power structure theory and studies of informal

groups to build the political model which he maintains offers the best framework in the analysis of organizational decision-making.

The conflict theory perceives social systems to be fragmented into groups, each with its own particular goals. Conflict studies, therefore, focus on the interaction of these groups, especially the conflict process in which one group tries to gain an advantage over another group. Interest groups cluster around divergent values and studying the conflicting interests is central to analysis. There is also a focus on change as change is expected in a system fragmented by values. In emphasizing this as a basis of examining the university policy processes, Baldrige (1971) says:

Instead of looking at stability, we shall examine change; Instead of looking at common values, we shall examine divergent values held by various groups; Instead of emphasizing consensus, we shall examine the dynamics of conflict; Instead of focusing on the integration of the whole system, we shall stress the role of interest groups as they disturb the system (p.16).

On the other hand, community power studies are primarily interested in the study of the nature of power in the political system; what kind of power is available; and how it is articulated. There is also an emphasis on interest groups as well as on goal-setting as opposed to efficiency. Studies on interest groups focus on how interest in organizations fights for privileges and favours.

Policy is the result of intense political activity and the application of power. Not all individuals, groups or sections are equally favoured by the laws of an organization. Consequently, sections that feel left out engage in activities aimed at establishing a favourable policy. Interest groups are appropriate avenues that emerge to create forums through which sections of the organization bargain for policy that embraces their values, attitudes, interests and aspirations. Similarly, Bacharach and Lawler (1982) assert:

Adopting this view, we can observe organizational actors in their daily transactions perpetually bargaining, repeatedly forming and reforming coalitions, and constantly availing themselves of influence tactics. Few organizational actors are the totally passive, apolitical entities that are presented by industrial psychologists and organizational sociologists. Survival in the organization is a political act.

Corporations, universities and voluntary associations are arenas of daily political action (p.1).

In the university set-up the numerous interest groups which include faculty staff, non-teaching staff and students, use various bargaining strategies to positively influence policy in their favour. Alienated partisans are groups that perceive authorities with suspicion and do not trust these authorities to adopt policies that are favourable to their interests and, therefore, they apply radical bargaining tactics, like threats, boycotts and strikes in making their demands (Baldrige, 1971).

2.7.2 Groups in Organizations

Because unrest and strikes are essentially a phenomenon of individuals in groups, this study undertakes a critical analysis of groups in organizations. In looking at the literature concerning groups, one is confronted by several dimensions that have been addressed by scholars. In this study group dimensions include formal and informal group formations and dynamics, collective dynamics, the phenomenon of interest groups in organizations and strategies of influence that are available to interest groups.

2.7.3 Formal and Informal Groups in Organizations

The existence of groups in organizations is a phenomenon that has attracted the attention of scholars - a result of the findings of the Hawthorn studies in the 1920s (Cole, 1995). The literature suggests that groups are two or more people who interact with each other; are aware of each other; and perceive themselves as a group (*Ibid*; Rertz, 1995; Robbins; 1995; Arnold, 1986). Hence, the salient and defining features of a group are: (i) They are made up of two or more people; (ii) They interact with each other; (iii) They share a common ideology; and (v) They view themselves as a group. Broadly, two types of groups are identified: formal and informal groups.

Cole (1995) makes a comprehensive distinction between formal groups and informal ones. Formal groups are made up of units established by management as part of the organizational structure. They are defined in terms of their roles and they are official with appropriate authority. These groups are provided with physical and financial

resources and exist to facilitate the promotion of organizational objectives. The informal groups, on the other hand, are those whose members draw their norms of behaviour from among themselves. Their loyalty is to the group members as opposed to formal ones whose loyalty is to the organization. The group goals are decided more by what the group feels is right for them rather than what is laid down by management. The behaviour of the group members is derived from interpersonal relationships, not from the dictates of management. As such, their behaviour may not be in line with the expectations of management. Group leadership is exercised on a charismatic basis and not in terms of legislative authority. Generally, informal groups exist to satisfy the social and security needs of members and they are likely to be less permanent than formal groups.

Robbins (1995) sub-divides the broad categories further into command and task groups in the formal category and interest and friendship groups in the informal one. A subordinate and his manager belong to a command group while officers of different departments in an organization who work together to achieve a goal or task are a task group. Workers who may share common interests, such as support for a sport outside the job, may form friendship groups while an interest group is made up of people working together to attain a specific objective in which each one is interested. For example, an interest group may emerge to agitate for improved terms of service.

The literature also suggests that people form groups for security, safety, self-esteem, affiliation, power and the achievement of goals and that group development goes through five stages: forming, storming, norming, performing and adjourning. Group members' behaviour is largely attributed to external forces imposed on the group in the form of organizational strategy, authority structures, formal regulations, organizational resources, personnel selection process, evaluation and reward systems, organizational culture and physical work safety (Robbins, 1995; Gibson, 1980; Schein, 1988; Greenberg & Baron, 2008).

“Group think” is a phenomenon that is characteristic of cohesive groups. Jannis (1972, cited in Schein, 1988), identifies the following as symptoms of “group think”: (1) The group shares an illusion of invulnerability; (2) It engages in collective rationalization to discount dissonant information; (3) It believes in the inherent morality of what it wants to do; (4) It develops stereotypes of other groups in order to insulate it against accurate analysis; (5) It silences dissent through direct pressure; (6) Group members begin to censor their own thoughts, particularly those doubting proposed action; (7) The group believes in its unanimity due to lack of dissent and the belief of silence to mean consent; and (8) Some members begin to function as “mind guards”, i.e. they “protect” the leaders from dissenting views by discouraging dissents from expressing their views (See also Robbins, 1995).

2.7.4 Collective Dynamics

Forsyth (1999) addresses the issue of groups that undertake extreme actions, such as mobs that engage in riots or lynch others. He attempts to understand the unseen forces that control people when they are part of an extra-ordinary group. He also attempts to give answers to the critical issue of why crowds sometimes turn into violent mobs and he seeks to know whether human beings lose their rationality when they are immersed in mobs.

In analysing the literature that attempts to address the issues regarding extreme action groups, Forsyth cites four theories: (i) Le Bond’s Crowd Psychology; (ii) Convergence Theories; (iii) Emergent Norm Theory; and (iv) Deindividuation Theory.

In his Crowd Psychology Theory, Le Bond (cited in Forsyth, 1999& 2010) believes that a crowd of people has the potential of becoming a unified entity that acts as if they are guided by a single collective mind. Le Bond contends that in such an instance, despite individual qualities and differences in behavioural characteristics, individuals in crowds transform from being rational and thoughtful individuals into being “...impulsive, unreasonable, and extreme followers.” Such behaviour is perceived by Le Bond to be infectious and, therefore, spreads or is transmitted from one person to another just like an infectious disease.

On the other hand, the convergence theories posit that people joining a group, such as rioters, do so because they possess similar personal characteristics and that it is actually these similar personal characteristics – latent or unrecognizable – that normally cause the formation of both small and large collectives. In forming groups, therefore, a situation presents itself for the individual members to satisfy their needs as the crowd situation triggers a spontaneous release of otherwise controlled behaviour. Forsyth cites the literature that supports the view that individuals joining groups have similar characteristics. For example, studies in the 1980s indicate that people joining social movements were higher in efficacy; were self-confident; were achievement oriented; needed autonomy; were dominant; and demonstrated self-acceptance.

The Emergent Norm Theory espoused by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (cited in Forsyth, 2010) rejects the notion of the homogeneity of, and neutral unity in, crowds. In their view

Crowds, mobs and other collectives only seem to be unanimous in emotions and actions because the members all adhere to norms that are relevant in the given situation. Granted, these emergent norms may be unique and sharply contrary to more general societal standards, but as they emerge in the group situation, they exert a powerful influence on behaviour (p.456).

As such, this theory contends that collectives are not really out of control or without norms. Rather, their behaviour is socially constructed by an unusual temporary norm, not by traditional social standards. Examples of such collectives include soccer hooligans engaging in violence, peer cliques abusing drugs and religious cult members who commit mass suicide.

Deindividuation Theory is derived from the concept of ‘deindividuation’ coined by Leon Festinger, Albert Pepitone and Theodore Newcombs and it is used to describe a situation where individuals become so submerged in a group that they feel as though they no longer stand out as individuals. This theory/model assumes that

...anonymity, reduced responsibility and other situational features can create a deindividuated state; a subjective experience in which the individual group members experience a lowered threshold of normally restrained behaviour (Forsyth, 1999:457).

When individuals become deindividuated, they escape normative regulations and this explains the extreme behaviour of collectives. Several factors contribute to the deindividuation process in any particular setting which includes anonymity, diffused or diminished responsibility, group membership, group size and arousal.

People behave more aggressively when they are anonymous. Being part of a group diminishes a sense of responsibility and when the effect of a particular action is remote, there is a diminished feeling of responsibility and, hence, aggressive behaviour. Large lynch mobs are more violent than small ones. Arousal increases agitated behaviour and this may result from altered temporal perspectives, sensory overload, heightened involvement and the use of drugs.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

This study proceeds from the following theoretical background upon which its findings will be built:

- That universities as organizations operate within a wider socio-political and economic environment that has a direct bearing on their daily operations.
- That within the wider socio-political and economic environment in which these universities operate there are an increasingly large number of players that - for varying reasons -are becoming more and more actively involved in higher education. For example, there are the traditional Government Departments (relevant ministries), International agencies (JICA, USAID, SIDA, CIDA, etc.), International organizations(European Commission, ADB. NEPAD, SADC, etc.), Intergovernmental organizations (UNESCO, UNDP, WTO, WB, etc.),Non-Governmental Organizations, regional and inter-regional university associations, international co-operation organizations, treaties and many other providers of higher education.

- That the increased number of participants in higher education - despite their common interest in higher education - each have varying ideas and interests and see higher education as an avenue of realizing their objectives. For example, churches establish universities with a religious agenda as their objective.
- That these global “interest groups” can, and often do, employ powerful strategies to influence policy at regional, national and institutional levels. For example, the World Bank and IMF funding policies on higher education.
- That students in Kenya’s universities are individual members of groups by virtue of sharing common facilities, such as classes, laboratories, halls of residence, dining facilities and games and sporting facilities.
- That policy issues regarding their academic and social welfare affect them immediately and as members of the same “groups” they feel the effects of adverse policy decisions, more or less, in a similar manner.
- That being affected equally by universities’ policy decisions they are likely to elicit “extreme group behaviour” as they collectively agitate for their demands to be met.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the relevant literature related to higher education on two broad levels. First, it examined the literature on higher education in a global and national context and, secondly, it examined the literature on higher education at an institutional level. In so doing the focus was on reaching an understanding of the dynamics at these two broad levels that might explain the phenomenon of unrest at the university.

At the global level, the literature related to higher education reveals the impact of recent developments, such as globalization and a knowledge economy in shaping the operations

of universities, generally. The literature indicates that the recent past has witnessed the commercialization of higher education as a consequence of global developments and this has given rise to the emergence of private alongside public providers of higher education. Global policies, especially with regard to funding, have also laid an emphasis on basic education at the expense of higher education, leading to the deterioration of standards - especially in the third world countries.

In Africa, the impact of these developments has been worse, especially with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme policies which led to a drastic reduction of expenditure on higher education coupled with a sharp demand for higher education - as evidenced by the sharp increase in enrolment. Universities have, therefore, been forced to devise new strategies in financing their operations and also in providing a relevant curriculum in a dynamic market environment. The literature further reveals that higher education in Africa has been riddled with a myriad of challenges in the form of deteriorating standards, an acute shortage of teaching facilities, a brain-drain as well as staff and student unrest.

Like other African countries, Kenya's higher education has witnessed a sporadic and spectacular expansion, both in terms of student enrolment and physical expansion. In view of dwindling government financial support, there has been a deterioration of standards and both staff and student unrest has featured prominently. Several bodies have been established to manage different aspects of Kenya's higher education.

In the second part of the review - which is at the institutional level - the literature has focused on policy structures at the university, groups in organizations and the phenomenon of collectives, or collective dynamics. With regard to a policy framework the literature reveals the existence of models that attempt to give an insight into the operations of organizations and these include the university as a bureaucracy, the university as a collegium and the political model. The political model seeks to explain the various approaches used by interest groups within an organization to influence policy in their favour. Formal and informal groups exist in organizations in order to achieve certain objectives. With regard to formal groups their objectives are in tandem with those of the organization in which they exist, while for the latter the objectives are in the group

members' interests. Literature on extreme behaviour, such as that of collectives, suggests that several theories attempt to explain the existence of this phenomenon. These include the following: (i) Le Bond's crowd psychology; (ii) Convergence theory; (iii) Emergent norm theory; and (iv) Deindividuation theory, which is contemporary and is deemed to offer the best explanation for extreme behaviour by collectives.

This literature was used by the study to develop a conceptual framework for the study which is basically that the university - as a public institution - is an open system that operates within an environment where a myriad of stake-holders and interest groups exert varying pressures and demands which are often at variance and inconsistent with its mission. The study focuses on the interest groups within and outside the university as a system and the various strategies used by all these players to attain their objectives that facilitate an understanding of the occurrences, including unrest that is witnessed at the university.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research design which was applied to the study; the methods used in the collection of data; the type of data collected; and how the data was analyzed and presented. The last part of the chapter is dedicated to discussing some of the challenges encountered in the collection of data as well as in the writing of the thesis.

3.2 The Case Study Approach

The researcher adopted a case study strategy as a way of gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of student unrest in Kenya's higher education. The nature and complexity of student unrest that has been witnessed in Kenya's higher education is, therefore, the main reason for the choice of this research strategy. The application of the case study approach is often applied when a researcher seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of any particular phenomenon which may be an event, an individual or activities (Creswel, 2012; Burton and Bartlet, 2009). Creswel (2012) proposes that in adopting this strategy

The researcher seeks to develop an in-depth understanding of the case by collecting multiple forms of data (e.g. pictures, scrap books, video tapes and e-mails). Providing the in-depth understanding requires that only a few cases be studied, because for each case examined, the researcher has less time to devote to exploring the depths of any one case (p. 265).

In applying this research strategy, therefore, the study was informed by the researcher's keen interest and the objective of attaining an insight into the phenomenon of student unrest in Kenya's higher education by focusing on one of the affected institutions and by using a multiplicity of data collection techniques.

The choice of Moi University out of seven public and twenty-four private universities in Kenya was informed by several factors whose ultimate objective was to identify a typical

case that would yield findings that would also represent the other universities and stand the test of a study of this magnitude.

Student unrest at Kenya's universities has, largely, been confined to public universities. Serious cases of unrest or strikes have rarely been reported at the private universities (Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 2000). As such, the researcher was left with the option of choosing from the public universities which have been severely affected by a litany of serious cases of student unrest. Hardly a year has passed without such cases being reported at these institutions.

All seven public universities in Kenya have been affected, almost equally, by student unrest (*Ibid*). The difference in the magnitude of the unrest from one university to another could be because of the length of time that a university has been in existence. For example, between 1969 and 2000 the University of Nairobi's Main Campus, alone, recorded a total of twenty-seven serious student strikes - almost an average of one case *per* year. In a period of 26 years, between 1974 and 2000, Kenyatta University - formerly a constituent college of Nairobi University - recorded seventeen serious strikes, while Egerton University recorded a total of eight strikes within a time span of 14 years between 1986 and 2000. Between 1991 and 2000, when Maseno was still constituent colleges of Moi University, a total of seven strikes were recorded. (*Ibid*). This is an average of close to one serious strike incident *per* year in all the Kenyan public universities.

Moi University, established through an act of parliament in 1984 (Republic of Kenya, 1984), is the second oldest University in Kenya after the University of Nairobi. The period demarcated for this study is from the inception of Moi University in 1984 to 2009 during which a total of twenty-four serious student strikes, involving students on its Main Campus, at its constituent colleges and on other campuses, was recorded - almost an average of one incident *per* year. This is more or less the same scenario for all the other public universities. As such, it was felt that the study of any of the public universities would be ideal in producing relevant findings. Some of the public universities, such as

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, however, have a very short history and would not constitute an ideal case to capture the typical scenario that would be found in another relatively older institution.

Unlike the other universities, Moi University was the brainchild of the Kenyan government twenty years after independence and had no ties with colonial administration and/or external collaboration. Moi University was established by the Kenyan government in response to a demand for higher education and it was meant to address Kenyans' needs in as far as its programmes were concerned (Jowi *et al.*, 2008; Chacha, 2004; Republic of Kenya, 1981). The University of Nairobi - formerly the Royal Technical College - was an off-shoot of the University of Eastern Africa, Makerere, which was associated with the University of London (*Ibid*, 2008; Zeleza, 2008). The university had several constituent colleges which were eventually elevated to fully fledged universities. These include Kenyatta University College, Egerton University College and the Jomo Kenyatta University College of Agriculture and Technology.

Moi University has the distinction of being an “indigenously” established institution which espouses the values and aspirations of the Kenyan people and represents a typical Kenyan university that the researcher perceived to be ideal in achieving the desired results from the study.

Over and above these reasons, the researcher had the opportunity to undertake his undergraduate and postgraduate studies at Moi University where he served as a student leader and also worked for close to seven years. The researcher, therefore, has an advantage of understanding the operations of the university and is familiar with the staff. Compared with the other public universities it was much easier for the researcher to access the relevant information and interview the right people than it would have been at those other universities.

In investigating unrest the study applied a case study strategy in the analysis of the individual strikes that were recorded in the period under study. In total the study critically

examined fifteen cases of student riots out of the twenty-four cases recorded during this period. The study, however, does not completely ignore the other cases, rather these were also considered - especially when mapping and analyzing the themes that emerged during the study. It was only in the detailed descriptions that some of the incidents were omitted because of time constraints. The period under study is from the 1984/1985 academic year when Moi University had its first intake of students to the 2008/2009 academic year or, simply stated, between 1984 and 2009.

In the course of developing the main themes of the study, it will be shown that the researcher later coined some new terminology for describing unrest - one of which is “organizational paranoia”. As this phenomenon was examined in depth, it became necessary for the researcher to draw a parallel of the occurrence of organizational paranoia at Moi University with the occurrence of a similar incident at Kenyatta University, another of the public universities in Kenya. Although this is a case study of Moi University, this process became necessary for the following reasons:

- Organizational paranoia, as a phrase or construct used to describe a unique occurrence, is best captured or illustrated by the violent riots that affected Kenyatta University in March 2009. This incident crystallizes the description or concept more clearly than all the incidents at Moi University and it provides a better insight into, or understanding of, this phenomenon. For example, one of the characteristics of organizational paranoia is that it often leads to the destruction of property of unprecedented proportions. In the Kenyatta University case property valued at over KShs 127 million was destroyed by the rioting students - the most devastating in the history of unrest in Kenya’s higher education.
- Kenyatta University falls within the realm of the sample of the study in the sense that it is a public university with similar operation structures and experiences to those at Moi University and, as such, the findings would not distort the conclusions that emerged from the study.

- The necessary data in the form of a detailed report from an investigation of the incident was available for analysis.

3.3 Literature Review

The literature review comprised an important data collection strategy for the study. It was important in acquiring the tools or the lens through which the study would examine the findings in order to address the research questions. The literature review is divided into two broad parts. The first part examines higher education on global, continental and national levels. It also examines the phenomenon of staff and student unrest, especially in Africa. This analysis aimed at equipping the study with the appropriate tools of analysis in as far as global and national socio-political and economic forces informed the unrest. The second part of the literature review focuses on institutional dynamics that can explain the intricacies that may inform unrest at an institutional level. As such, the study focused on policy and decision-making at the university (the bureaucracy, the collegium and the politically negotiated order); groups in organizations (formal and informal groups); interest groups; interest articulation; and collective dynamics.

At a global level, the relevant literature revealed that the onset of globalization and the knowledge economy has brought about far-reaching changes that have been witnessed in higher education. For example, there has been a rapid commercialization of higher education as well as an emergence of private universities alongside public ones in the provision of higher education. The literature also revealed that as a consequence of this an increased movement of students and scholars across borders and disciplines has been witnessed. With the advent of computer technology, international delivery methods have been developed.

The human capital theory of the 1960s and 1970s informed decisions regarding the funding of education. The rate of return analysis was the tool used to determine the benefits accruing from investment in public engagements. The rate of return analysis indicated that it was more beneficial for governments to invest more in basic education as

the returns were perceived to be better compared to higher education where returns were seen to be less and aggravated inequality. The result was the neglect of higher education and a focus on basic and girl-child education which had far reaching consequences. The deterioration in quality and standards and limited access to higher education was the immediate consequence. There was a great strain on facilities and the rise of mega universities. Difficult study conditions were witnessed with overcrowded classes, inadequate facilities and sub-standard living conditions. Cultural and infrastructural factors influenced the choice of courses which led to the phenomenon of educated unemployment while the research agenda disappeared as a result of inadequate funding.

The literature revealed that in the rest of Africa the situation was even worse. Weakened economies, occasioned by the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes, a knowledge economy, globalization and liberalization, have led to the transformation of universities from traditional development institutions to market oriented ones. Universities are operating in an environment of dwindling resources, declining standards, a brain drain and an increased demand for higher education. Higher education in Africa is experiencing the crumbling of traditional disciplinary boundaries which has given rise to inter-disciplinary configurations. Universities are being forced to develop new strategies to fund their operations and there is an emergence of private universities alongside public ones. New networks and strategic alliances are emerging at national, regional and global levels.

The relevant literature revealed that in Kenya higher education had gone through sporadic and unplanned growth. As a result of this growth in terms of student enrolment and the sprouting of constituent colleges and dwindling financial support from government, universities have started engaging in income generating activities in order to subsidize income. With universities being pushed beyond their capacities by an unwavering demand for higher education, there is a growing concern about issues of quality. Universities have been forced to engage the services of personnel who may not be qualified to handle teaching at a university level. Meanwhile, poor conditions of service

have pushed university lecturers into engaging in all sorts of businesses in order to supplement their meager incomes.

At an institutional level the study focused on literature concerning the dynamics that may give rise to unrest. Firstly, the study examined the policy and decision-making process at the university. It showed that policy at an institutional level is the function of the administrative section of the institution or organization. Three areas emerged: the bureaucracy, the collegium and the politically negotiated order. The literature affirmed that the best way of understanding organizational policy process is to conceptualize it as a politically negotiated order. Secondly, the study focused on the literature concerned with groups in organizations where it emerged that there are both formal and informal groups in organizations that exist to serve various purposes. While formal groups are more useful in achieving organizational objectives and goals, informal groups exist to serve the interest of group members who are driven by their own interests and values and which may be at variance with those of the organization. Interest groups also form in organizations to articulate the group interests. Depending on the members' positions within the organization, these groups use various techniques to bargain and articulate their interests, such as persuasion, bargaining, compromise and threats. Alienated partisans employ extreme techniques, such as boycotts, strikes and violent protests, with the aim of taking control of the decision-making organs and getting rid of the authorities.

Lastly, literature that attempts to explain extreme behaviour by groups or collective dynamics was examined. Four theories attempt to explain extreme behaviour in collectives: (i) Le Bond's Crowd Psychology; (ii) Convergence Theories; (iii) Emergent Norm Theory; and (iv) Deindividuation Theory. The last is the contemporary one and is thought to offer the best explanation for extreme behaviour in groups.

After a critical examination of the literature, the researcher proceeded to build a theoretical framework for the study - derived from the comprehensive literature review.

3.4 Document Analysis

Having adopted a case study research strategy, the researcher collected relevant data by using several methods. One of the methods was by means of document analysis. This was preceded by a requisition to the relevant authority to gain access to the appropriate data. The researcher applied for, and received, a research permit from the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST), which is an arm of the Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology, responsible for issuing research permits. This formed part of the requirements for ethical clearance by the University of Pretoria's Ethical Clearance Committee whose other requirements had already been fulfilled by the researcher. Upon clearance by the committee and armed with the requisite documents, the researcher proceeded to access the relevant documents from the university. However, before this could be done the researcher had to obtain permission from the university authorities and this was granted on the strength of the research permit and the letter of authority from the Ministry of Higher Education. Documents were obtained from the various departments of the university, including the admissions office, the senate secretariat, the office of the Dean of Students and the university archives where the bulk of the documents are kept. This process applied to all the campuses and even universities that were formerly constituent colleges of Moi University, such as Maseno University and Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. In such cases the researcher confined his search to the period during which the university in question was still a constituent college. For example, in the case of Maseno this was the period between 1991 and 2001.

To identify the relevant documents the researcher was guided by citing the recorded strike incidents that had been collected earlier during the review of the literature and from information collected during the problem identification phase of the research. The objective in seeking these documents was to obtain reports and firsthand accounts by the people who were present or who had witnessed the actual strikes – as contained in the immediate records, such as those of Senate *ad-hoc* committees that had investigated the causes of the strikes. These reports would also be contained in intelligence reports compiled by university security services. In the documents containing student

disciplinary proceedings the records contained the voices of those affected, including the students accused of various crimes. Their recorded statements also constituted an important part of the documents used for analysis.

The primary sources that the researcher obtained and copied for analysis include minutes of the relevant Senate meetings, minutes and reports of Senate standing and *ad-hoc* committees, such as Senate *ad-hoc* committees investigating particular incidents of students unrest; detailed security intelligence reports; minutes of the Student Disciplinary Committee of Senate; minutes of Students Governing Council (SGC) meetings; various correspondence and communication between student leaders and university administration which was often in the form of internal memorandums; student and university newsletters and cuttings; literature posted on student notice boards and occasionally sent to media houses and collected by a security detail; and documents from the office of the Dean of Students.

The document analysis turned out to be extremely valuable in furnishing the study with a deep insight of the intricacies at play in the day-to-day running of the university. The minutes of the various committees and the correspondence between student leaders that was classified as inciting literature was often posted by students on notice boards while others that were sent anonymously to the local media houses contained information that helped the researcher map out a clear picture and assisted in deriving patterns and themes, especially when this was considered along with other data. These documents did not only aptly capture the critical issues affecting the students and the university, generally, at the time they were written, but they also revealed the frame of mind of the authors which was later confirmed in interviews and by examining the prevailing socio-political conditions in the country. This is best illustrated by a document obtained by the researcher from the security files. The document had been sent anonymously to a popular local daily paper, the Nation Newspaper, on 29 January 2003 and was entitled: “Students of Moi University- Chepkoilel Campus Speak.” The document lashes out at the university’s administration with so much detail about its operations that it suggests the author was privy to the activities within the university’s management. Under normal

circumstances an average student would not have had access to such detail which suggests that the students' complaints went beyond the issues that are often raised during student riots, such as inadequate accommodation, lack of facilities and power failure being among the many "routine issues" which one former student leader referred to during an interview. This document and the several others collected were invaluable in furnishing the study with more information than what was contained in them.

In this particular case, for example, the researcher noted that at the time of the writing of this document, issues affecting the operation of the university were those listed in the document. These included a lack of transport for students by means of university buses, inadequate hostel facilities (in the document the students ask why proceeds from the university's PSSP could not be utilized in building more hostels) and a lack of sporting equipment – among several other issues. The researcher noted that apart from these issues the detailed information contained in the document pointed to the involvement of not just students but also individuals well placed in the system who had access to details, such as those related to the academic qualifications of some of the university's senior staff amongst others. The document enabled the researcher to decipher the frame of mind of the author/authors of the document which is aptly reflected in its opening paragraph:

The year 2003 is a special year of transition towards a positive direction. Gone is the era of political correctness and high handedness. This wave of change has swept like a bushfire virtually (through) every part of Kenya. Moi University-Chepkoilel Campus is not an exception (Security/Intelligence Report, 29 January 2003, p.1).

When looked at in isolation this statement may not be fully appreciated in as far as the message that is conveyed is concerned. However, looked at in the context of the prevailing political development in the country at the time of writing the document a clearer picture emerges. Kenya had just concluded a historic national election in December 2002 during which the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party that had ruled the country since independence and had been associated with all forms of misrule and intolerance to divergent thought lost the election to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). As a result, there was a sense of relief, triumph and optimism in the entire

country and anything associated with the old KANU regime, including appointments made during the old system, was looked upon with a great deal of disdain and disapproval. This political development also emboldened students to demand change in the management of public institutions as was the case captured by the report.

This emboldened attitude of the students, which largely informed their actions during this time, was later confirmed in the interviews conducted with former student leaders who were in office during the period under investigation. Asked about strike incidents during her tenure one former student leader asserted:

Yeah. I think it would be good to understand the background under which we came in especially us, the 14th (*sic*) Students Governing Council. We were coming from a Moi regime where virtually everything was down. If you were in Moi University at that time, you would remember that most of the students were not having mattresses to sleep on, a good number were sleeping on the floor, there were no beds, there were no chairs in the lecture halls and you know, the explanation we got was that it was Uhuru campaign, you know it was just post-Uhuru campaign... (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, May 2012).

While the assertions by this former student leader were found by the study to be largely exaggerated, it demonstrates the frame of mind in which the students were acting, i.e. the notion that anything associated with the former regime, KANU, was bad, corrupt and negative associated with everything at national and institutional levels. The document analysis, therefore, was instrumental in not only providing valuable data for the study, but it also constituted an important grounding for the next phase of the data collection – the interviews.

3.5 Interviews

As already noted, the literature review and the document analysis provided the researcher with a reliable and sufficient basis for an effective interview phase. This basis allowed the researcher to map out patterns that were beginning to emerge and which informed or guided him in terms of the general focus of the line of inquiry. Although certain respondents had been identified at the beginning of the study, the information obtained from the literature and the document analysis provided further insight and was used by

the researcher as a guideline in narrowing the scope in order to prioritize respondents whose contribution would be most valuable to the study. This was particularly necessary in view of the time and financial constraints.

In conducting the interviews, the researcher's objective was three-pronged:

- Firstly, the researcher wanted to obtain the respondents' narratives or stories of their personal experiences of the strike incidents under investigated.
- Secondly, the researcher wanted to confirm or corroborate data that had already been obtained from documents.
- Thirdly, the researcher wanted to fill in gaps where information was omitted in the documents.

In seeking out the respondents' narratives about their experiences, the researcher wanted to establish how the individuals interpreted or made meaning of what they had perceived or the experiences that they had lived through. In so doing, it was possible to explore the explanations given for the actions taken by the different role-players in particular situations. With this kind of information, the researcher was able to map out patterns and themes which were eventually critical in addressing the research questions and in developing a more comprehensive understanding of the events that contributed to the unrest. Through these narratives the researcher was also able to obtain new information that had not been obtained from the analysis of documents. While the analysis of documents – as seen earlier – was very valuable in revealing the day-to-day intricacies in strike situations, much of the information was left out – especially in official records. For example, while it was found that national politics played a major role in the many strikes at the university, this fact was hardly mentioned in almost all official and unofficial records. This could only be inferred from a critical analysis of the documents which was later confirmed during the interviews.

The confirmation of information collected from the analysis of documents was a strategy of achieving the requisite trustworthiness that is vital and critical in this kind of research.

In order to achieve the maximum and best results from the interviews, the researcher avoided the strict application of a structured interview schedule, opting instead to be flexible and less structured while maintaining a pre-arranged line of inquiry in accordance with the position of the respondents who were being interviewed. Generally, the questions were open-ended which allowed the respondents to provide as much information as possible while guarding against digression to irrelevant issues – a task which was not always easy, particularly when respondents were carried away in recalling certain details that had been traumatic for them. It was only in instances where the researcher wanted to confirm a specific issue that a closed-ended question could be posed. It is through this approach that it was possible to collect a rich reservoir of information that turned out to be valuable for the study.

Because the study was interested in analyzing strike cases or incidents that had occurred in the past, it adopted an historical approach. This meant that in identifying the respondents, the study targeted individuals who were present in various capacities when cases of unrest were witnessed. Basically, there were two categories of respondents: university administrative staff and students. With regard to the administrative staff, the researcher targeted senior officers at a policy-making level. These included a former Vice-Chancellor, a Chief Academic Officer as well as a Chief Administrative Officer, Deans and former Deans of Faculties and a Dean of Students. Several Heads of Department and Sections as well as Security Officers were also interviewed. With regard to students, the researcher targeted former student leaders. This was done in such a way that for the periods during which serious unrest was recorded at least one or two former student leaders were interviewed. As such, the study was able to interview former student leaders from the early 1990s, mid 1990s, late 1990s, early 2000 and mid and late 2000. The same applied to the period 2001 to 2009. In order to identify and trace these former student leaders, the researcher first obtained their details (names and registration numbers) from the office of the Dean of Students at all the campuses and previous campuses that had transformed into full universities. These were details of student leaders who had served as far back as the inception of the university. In some instances the

researcher was able to obtain details that included addresses and contact telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. This was particularly true for those who served from around 2004 to 2009 because by then cellular phones and e-mail services were available – even to students. However, for the majority of former student leaders, these details were not available and the researcher had to devise a means of tracing them. One of the options available was to obtain information from the university’s alumni office but this did not yield much because the office had very scanty information. A second option, which yielded better results, was to approach the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB), which has details of all former students of public universities who have benefited from its loans, before and after its inception. By working with HELB, the researcher was able to obtain current details of almost all the former student leaders who were, then, contacted by telephone to request their participation and to make appointments for the interviews. Those students who were contacted assisted in providing details of other former student leaders who were also, then, located.

All the interviews were recorded by means of an Integrated Circuit (IC) recorder. However, there were instances when some respondents did not want to be recorded. In such cases the interviewer made notes during and after the interviews. There were also instances when a respondent would give vital information before the recording began or after the formal interview had been concluded and the recording had been stopped. In these instances the researcher made notes after the interview. All the interviews were transcribed and are available for purposes of reference.

3.6 Data Analysis

The process of analyzing the data began immediately and continued concurrently with the data collection. In the field the researcher identified the relevant documents from the various offices and the university archives – making copies of them once they were identified as relevant. While these documents were being accumulated the researcher created time to study the documents, to code information and to map out patterns. As this continued, over a period of time the researcher was gradually able to reach a greater

understanding of the contents of the documents and to identify themes that were gradually emerging.

This exercise continued as the researcher proceeded to the interview phase which was guided by the preliminary findings. When all the interviews had been completed, the researcher transcribed them and once again began the process of studying them in order to understand and make sense of them. Gradually, the researcher was able to identify themes that emerged from a synthesis of all the data obtained from the literature review, the document analysis and the interviews. Ultimately, the researcher was able to address the salient research questions and develop a comprehensive thematic classification of student unrest and strikes. The researcher was able to identify a general trend and the nature of the strikes with an analytic description of its several stages of development along with its consequences. The researcher was also able to identify unique situations that emerged from the analysis which lead to the coining of terms that were considered best to describe these unique situations.

3.7 Challenges Encountered During the Study

Several challenges were encountered by the researcher during the course of the study. The first and immediate challenge that confronted the researcher was the fact that due to technicalities in his work he was not able to secure study leave during the first two years of study. This was not the deliberate fault of any individual in the institution as the researcher understood the circumstances to be beyond anybody's control and he had to accept the prevailing circumstances. As a result the researcher spent the first two years of his studies balancing a heavy office schedule and his studies - a situation that proved to be quite taxing. In spite of this the researcher was able to attend all the requisite PhD research support sessions that took place at the University of Pretoria's Faculty of Education Campus at Groenkloof in Pretoria.

The second challenge came when the researcher embarked on the collection of data in the form of documents. Accessing and retrieving relevant documents was found to be a time-consuming exercise that forced the researcher to spend a great deal of money on the

many trips that he made to the several campuses, former constituent colleges and the various offices. The documents were scattered over several offices and departments of the university and its campuses as well as former constituent colleges that were now fully fledged and independent institutions. Although the necessary authority had been granted, it was difficult to obtain the relevant documents because most of them had been stored on unused departmental shelves without a system that would allow for easy retrieval. Apart from the fact that staff members assigned to assist in the retrieval were often unwilling to help because of the tedious nature of the exercise, they also had other pressing official duties to attend to. Consequently, the researcher spent several weeks which stretched into months in tracing, retrieving and making copies of the relevant documents. In order to transport documents from one former constituent college which was quite a distance away in terms of kilometers, the researcher had to make close on ten trips as every time he was forced to go back without the documents either because they had not been found; they were missing; or the officer concerned was not in.

The retrieval of documents from the university's archives also proved to be a challenge. The documents had, apparently, been hastily archived without any system which made it extremely difficult to trace the relevant documents. The researcher, therefore, literally went through almost all the documents searching for the right material which was a very tedious exercise that consumed many hours and days. During the course of one of these days the researcher was almost locked in the facility on a Friday evening when he was so engrossed in his the search that he did not notice that it was closing time. This would have meant spending the entire weekend in the archives since the facility was not open over the weekend.

Another challenge which came in several forms was encountered while conducting interviews. Due to the historical nature of the study, it targeted former student leaders who had served in their various capacities as far back as the late 1980s and early 1990s. The immediate problem that the researcher encountered was in identifying these respondents as it meant going into past records in order to retrieve the names of those students who had served as leaders during those years. It was not difficult to obtain

details of student leaders who had served in recent years, such as those from the last decade. However, getting the details of those who had served earlier was quite a tedious process as the details had been transferred to the archives where, again, there was no system in the archiving of the old files. At one of the campuses only details dating back to the mid-1990s were found.

The information did not, of course, contain the latest contact details for these former student leaders as they were records of a specific time. Except for those who served from around 2005 to 2009, the rest had no cellular phone numbers or e-mail addresses. This, therefore, posed a further problem in tracing them. The university's alumni office was not of much assistance since it had hardly any details for contacting the respondents. The only option that the researcher was left with - and which was helpful - was to visit the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) offices in Nairobi. Because of its mandate to recover loans advanced to all its beneficiaries, including all persons who had studied in all the public universities, the board maintains an updated record of all former students and their current contact addresses.

While this enabled the researcher to obtain some contacts, it took time because it involved making several trips to and from Nairobi as the officers who were requested to retrieve the information needed time to do so. Several return trips to Nairobi - a distance of over three hundred kilometers - were made. The researcher, however, benefited immensely from the network maintained by the former student leaders. Once one of them had been traced, it was easier to reach the others because they maintained close contact after college and they volunteered information about the whereabouts of their colleagues and even their cellular phone numbers and their e-mail addresses. In certain instances respondents would suggest names of former student leaders along with their contact addresses and this was very helpful to the researcher.

Another challenge encountered was that in view of the historical nature of the study, interviews revolved around events that had taken place many years ago. The researcher, for example, was requesting some of the respondents to recall incidents that took place in

the late 1980s and early 1990s. Memory lapses became an issue as many of the respondents could not recall all the details of the incidents. In order to address this issue the researcher made use of the available records and documents. Where there was uncertainty as to the sequence of events or decisions made, the researcher would look for the relevant documents and these were relied upon as a true record since they were compiled during, or immediately after, the events.

Having overcome all the above challenges which had financial and time-consuming consequences, the researcher also had to contend with the issue of making appointments for the actual interviews. The former student leaders were scattered in different parts of the country, with distances of hundreds of kilometers between them. Thus, it became a huge challenge to compile and organize a workable schedule of meetings for the interviews. However, the researcher worked out a programme that would enable him to block interviews on successive days for those who were in one town. For example, one week would be dedicated to those in Nairobi and appointments would be made several days or even weeks beforehand, especially for those with busy schedules. Another week would be dedicated to those in the western part of the country, and so on. Again, this had implications in terms of money and time.

With regard to the university staff and former staff members, the biggest challenge was in fixing appointments due to their busy schedules. Nevertheless, because most of them were in one workplace, it was not as strenuous as it was the case of former student leaders. Some of the officers did not want to be recorded while others - either deliberately or otherwise - wanted to paint a good image of the university instead of giving the facts as they were. Whenever a respondent opted not to be recorded the researcher took and compiled detailed notes instead.

Lastly, the researcher faced a substantial challenge with regard to finances. The researcher financed his studies and had to rely on his savings and earnings to pay all the necessary costs incurred as well as fund the entire research. This was particularly strenuous during the data collection phase which involved a lot of movement and the

acquisition of the necessary gadgets to be used during the interviews as well as the document collection phase where much of the material had to be photocopied. Through the efforts of his supervisor, however, the researcher was able to obtain some funding from the university which alleviated the strain in writing up the thesis - a gesture for which the researcher is very grateful. The National Council for Science and Technology provided some highly appreciated support at the beginning of the fourth year and half way into the data collection process.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN KENYA AND AT MOI UNIVERSITY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines: (i) The historical development of higher education in Kenya, generally, and at Moi University, in particular; (ii) The management provision and structure of higher education and the roles of the various bodies that have been created by the laws governing the management of higher education; (iii) Government expenditure on higher education *vis-a-vis* student enrolment; (iv) International and national historical developments (social, political and economic) whose occurrence shaped higher education in Kenya, especially with regard to student unrest.

The purpose of this is to provide an adequate background that forms the basis of the thematic analysis which leads to an understanding of the dynamics that have informed student unrest - the subject of this study. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main themes that result in the main findings of the study which are discussed in the subsequent chapters. This chapter gives a detailed background that facilitates the thematic analysis that the study adopted in order to classify- for clarity and understanding- the factors that have informed students' unrest. This thematic classification which is tabulated at the end of the chapter is the result of the data analysis conducted by the study. However the main argument of the study in this chapter is that there are significant political and economic occurrences at the global and national level that had far reaching consequences on higher education in Kenya generally and on Moi University in particular. Further the study in this chapter demonstrates that Kenya's higher education has witnessed a rapid growth and expansion, both in terms of students' enrollment and physical expansion during the study period. This growth is also witnessed in Moi University. While this rapid expansion characterizes higher education in Kenya, there is no evidence of commensurate government financial support, both recurrent but more critically development or capital. Furthermore the study in this chapter demonstrates that

government expenditure per student has stagnated throughout the study period yet the economic development has not been favourable. Meanwhile there has not been a definite formula, or policy for financing higher education, and government applies a uniform amount of allocation per student irrespective of the degree programme undertaken.

4.2 Higher Education in Kenya: A Brief History

The history of higher education in Kenya has its origins in the establishment of Makerere, a small technical college in Uganda in 1922. From a small technical college it gradually expanded and admitted students from other east African countries, including Kenya, Uganda and, the then, Tanganyika (Chacha, 2004). It began offering the University of London's degree programmes and certificates in 1949 and was, for many years, the only higher level institution in east Africa. It was then referred to as the University College East Africa (*Ibid*). In 1963 the college became the first university in east Africa when it was upgraded and named the University of East Africa, with three constituent colleges in the three east African countries. In Kenya the former Royal Technical College that had been established by the Asian community in 1956 became the constituent college. The University of Eastern Africa offered the University of London's degree programmes and certificates until 1966. In 1970, the University of East Africa was split to create an autonomous university in each of the three countries, marking the establishment of the first public university in Kenya, the University of Nairobi, when the constituent college was upgraded to a full university (*Ibid*; Jowi *et al.*, 2008). Due to pressure and public demand for higher education in Kenya, Moi University was established as the second university in 1984, followed by Kenyatta University in 1985, Egerton University in 1987, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in 1994, Maseno University in 2001 and Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology in 2007. Currently there are fifteen constituent colleges affiliated to these public universities (*Ibid*; Commission for Higher Education, 2012).

Private universities have been established by various churches and private developers and currently there is a total of twenty-seven of these; fourteen of them have full

accreditation, eleven have interim letters of authority while two have been issued with certificates of registration because they were established prior to the creation of the Commission for Higher Education.

Several laws or acts of parliament guide the overall running and management of higher education, while the operation of public universities is guided by specific laws which created the individual universities as well as by their statutes. Being creatures of these specific laws, public universities are body corporates with qualities of other artificial creations. Moi University, for example, was established by the Moi University Act of 1984 (Republic of Kenya, 1984). However, the Education Act, Chapter 211, of the Laws of Kenya gives the Minister of Education the sole authority of supervising and overseeing the overall management and direction of all education matters and the promotion of education as well as the development of all institutions devoted to the promotion of education.

4.3 The Commission for Higher Education

The Commission for Higher Education was created in 1985 by the government through an act of parliament, the Universities Act Cap 210B, in order to regulate higher education in Kenya with regard to matters affecting its growth, development and access. It is concerned with the coordination of sustainable development of quality higher education. Among several other mandates, the commission is authorized to be responsible for: (i) The accreditation of universities; (ii) The standardization, equation and recognition of degrees and other qualifications and awards obtained from abroad; and (iii) The coordination of education and training offered in post-secondary training institutions for purpose of higher education and university education (Republic of Kenya, 1985).

4.4 Joint Admission Board

The Joint Admission Board (JAB) was established by the Vice-Chancellors of all public universities in order to regulate the admission of qualified students to public universities. Its membership is drawn from the Deans of Faculties of all public universities and their Vice-Chancellors. Because of the limited financial support for JAB admitted students, it

only admits a small fraction (30%) of students who qualify for university education (Institutional University Co-operation, 2006). Most public universities have, therefore, introduced the Privately Sponsored Students Programme (PSSP) to absorb those who qualify - but are not placed - as a way of creating an opportunity for these students and also of raising revenue in view of diminishing government support.

4.5 Student Enrolment Growth Rates

The figure below shows the annual growth rate of student enrolment at Kenya's public universities during the period under study, i.e. between 1985 and 2009.




Figure 0.1: Annual Growth Rate of Student Enrolment at Public Universities.

(Source: Republic of Kenya [1985-2010] - Economic Surveys. Nairobi Government Printer, 1985-2010)

The percentage rate of enrolment is an average of 22.29% during the entire period. A sharp rise in enrolment was recorded in the 1987/88 academic year as well as in the 1990/91 academic year. The rate was 89.81% and 63.75%, respectively. These were the years of dual and double intakes - as explained in Chapter 3. After the double intake of the 1990/91 academic year, the growth rate slowed to 4.89% in the subsequent year. This was followed by negative growth rates for the next three academic years - a dismal growth of 1.84% in the 1995/96 academic year and a negative growth of -5.22% in the 1996/97 academic year. The negative growth rates can be explained by the fact that by that time the government had implemented another of the conditions for aid from the World Bank which was to cap university admissions to a maximum of 10,000 students *per year* (Sammoff and Carroll, 2004). By the 2008/2009 academic year the total student enrolment in Kenya's public universities had risen to 112,229, which represents a 507.49% increase in enrolment between 1987 and 2009.

4.6 Student Enrolment

The figure below reflects the enrolment of students in Kenya's public universities during the period of this study.




Figure 0.2: Annual Students Enrolment in Public Universities

(Source: Republic of Kenya [1985-2010] - Economic Surveys. Nairobi Government Printer, 1985-2010)

The data shows that although the annual growth rate in percentage slowed down - as demonstrated in the previous figure - actual enrolment increased steadily. By the 2008/09 academic year enrolment had reached 112,229, with students enrolled at seven public universities and several constituent colleges. This constitutes a very high percentage increase which exerted so much pressure on the scarce facilities.

4.7 Recurrent and Capital Expenditure

The following figure shows the recurrent and capital allocation by government to public universities for the period under study.




Figure 0.3: Recurrent and Capital Allocations by Government to Public Universities.

(Source: Republic of Kenya [1985-2010] - Economic Surveys. Nairobi Government Printer, 1985-2010)

The data in the above figure reveals that there has been a gradual increase in government allocations for recurrent expenses at public universities. This can be explained by the fact that there has been a steady expansion of university education in terms of both enrolment

and the number of universities. The allocation for capital expenses has, however, generally stagnated and in a number of cases the amount has been reduced.

On many occasions the amount of capital allocation remained the same as for previous years. This trend was even worse with regard to capital expenses. There was a gradual increase in this support from the 1985/86 academic year to the 1998/99 academic year with about K£ 75.45 million (US\$ 19,346,153.85). Suddenly, in the subsequent academic year this critical support fell sharply to a paltry K£3.75 million (US\$961,538.46). It is worth noting that it is during this time that the university rolled out its parallel degree programmes and several other income generating activities as a way of creating income for running its operations as well as completing some of the stalled projects that were abandoned by government in the previous years.

4.8 Annual Expenditure *per* Student

While there was a marked increase in the recurrent expenses in university education during the period of study, the amount of expenditure *per* student remained more or less the same with the occasional increase but a reversion to the previous years (see Figure 4.4). In some instances, such as the 1991/92 academic year, which was associated with riots that rocked all public universities, the expenditure *per* student reached an all-time low of K£2,349 (US\$ 602.3) *per annum*. Indeed, interviews with senior university officers confirmed that there was no policy or formula for financing university education and the amount disbursed by government annually depended on the negotiation skills of the officers (Interviews No. 17, Eldoret, July 2012; No. 18, Eldoret, July 2012; No. 23, Eldoret, April 2012).




Figure 0.4: Annual Expenditure *per* Student at Public Universities

(Source: Republic of Kenya [1985-2010] - Economic Surveys. Nairobi Government Printer, 1985-2010)

4.9 Moi University: A Brief History

Moi University was established in 1984 and became the second public university after the University of Nairobi. Its establishment was in response to a rising demand for higher education and was the outcome of one of the recommendations of the MacKay Report (Republic of Kenya, 1981). Through an act of parliament it became operational in 1984 (Republic of Kenya, 1984) as a corporate body. It received its first batch of 83 students from Nairobi University's Department of Forestry.

From an initial population of 83 students, enrolment has risen gradually over the years to reach an enrolment of 28,766 students in the 2010/2011 academic year. The table below shows the enrolment statistics of the university from its inception in 1984 to 2010.




Figure 0.5: Student Enrolment Statistics - Moi University

(Source: Moi University Admissions Office)

The above data reveals that the annual enrolment rate was particularly high during the first seven years after establishment of the university. For example, enrolment rates rose by 238% in 1987; 118% in 1988; 50.2% in 1989; and 99.4% in 1990. As seen earlier, the high percentage increases in 1987 and 1990 were occasioned by the dual and double intakes, respectively. The increase in enrolment stabilizes generally between early 1990s but increases sharply between 2006 and 2009.

4.10 Constituent Colleges and Campuses

As a means of coping with the exponential growth, especially in its initial years of establishment, Moi University established Maseno University College and Chepkoilel Campus in 1990. In 2003 it also established the Western University College of Science and Technology. Maseno was later upgraded to a full university - the sixth public one for the country in 2001. The Western University College of Science and Technology was also upgraded to a full university and renamed Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology in 2007, while Chepkoilel Campus became a constituent college in the same year. By 2012 Moi University had expanded significantly and had four constituent colleges affiliated to it: Kabianga, Narok, Chepkoilel and Karatina. It had five campuses:

Nairobi, Kitale, Kericho Town, Southern Nyanza and Odera Akango as well as several study centres.

4.11 Governance of Moi University

The governance of Moi University is in accordance with the provisions of the Moi University Act of 1984 (Republic of Kenya, 1984) and its statutes. Through periodic strategic plans the statutes may, from time to time, be modified to meet the prevailing demands of higher education.

The main offices in the governance of the university are the Chancellor, the Chairman of Council, the Vice-Chairman of Council, the Honorary Treasurer, the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellors, the Chief Academic and Administrative Officers, the university Librarian and the Dean of Students.

The Chancellor is the honorary head of the university who confers degrees and awards certificates during graduation ceremonies. The Council is the overall administrative body of the university and it has a mandate to manage all resources of the university. The Senate, on the other hand, is the overall academic authority of the university which is responsible for “the control and general direction of research, instruction and examinations and the award of degrees, diplomas, certificates and other distinctions” (Republic of Kenya 1984).

Apart from the Council and Senate, other important policy bodies of the university include Academic Boards (for constituent colleges), Faculty Boards and Departmental Meetings. Both Council and Senate have standing committees that deal with specific matters on their behalf and provide feedback. *Ad-hoc* committees may also be established from time to time to deal with specific issues and disband upon completion of the work and after giving the necessary report to the appointing authority.

4.12 Student Representation and Student Leadership

Apart from the provisions discussed regarding the administrative management of the university, its statutes have also made provision for the establishment of a students’ union or organization which - in this case - is referred to as the Moi University Students’

Organization (MUSO). This is the overall umbrella body representing the interests of the students in their participation in the critical policy bodies of the university, such as the University Council, Senate, Faculty and Departmental Boards as well as the standing and *ad-hoc* committees of these bodies. Membership is drawn from all undergraduate students and has branches on all the campuses of the university. The Moi University Students Organization is, therefore, an important instrument and avenue through which all matters pertaining to students' stay on campus, academic, accommodation, entertainment, games and sports, security, health, catering and general welfare are addressed and channeled for consideration and adoption by the policy-making bodies of the university. The MUSO constitution outlines its mandate and objectives which, broadly, revolve around representation in key decision-making bodies of the university, including Senate and Council, related to academic and welfare matters as well as establishing linkages with other similar organizations outside the university (MUSO, 2000).

To facilitate the effective representation of its members and to operate efficiently, MUSO has the following: (i) The Students' Governing Council (SGC); (ii) The Annual General Meeting; (iii) The Special General Meeting; and (iv) The Students' Newsletter (*Ibid*).

The Students' Governing Council is the executive arm of the organization and it consists of eleven directorates where positions are filled annually by legitimate MUSO members by means of annual elections conducted by secret ballot. Positions on the SGC include: (1) Chairperson; (2) Vice-Chairperson; (3) Secretary General; (4) Deputy-Secretary General; (5) Director of Finance; (6) Director of Academics; (7) Director of Accommodation and Security; (8) Director of Entertainment; (9) Director of Games and Sports; (10) Director of Catering; (11) Director of Health; and (12) Editor General (*Ibid*).

4.13 Schools

Moi University's academic programmes are run by the various academic departments which are established within the following Schools: (i) Business and Economics; (ii) Arts and Social Sciences; (iii) Engineering; (iv) Education; (v) Environmental Studies; (vi)

Human Resource Management; (vii) Law; (viii) Public Health; (ix) Medicine; (x) Information Sciences; (xi) Natural Resource Management; (xii) Science; and (xiii) Agriculture and Biotechnology. These schools are established on the various campuses of the university and in the 2009/2010 academic year were offering over 150 undergraduate and post-graduate degree programmes (Admissions Office Data, 2010).

4.14 Quality Control

While the Commission for Higher Education is mandated to maintain standards in all higher education institutions, including universities, there is no evidence in this study that it monitors quality at the university. However, the university makes use of external examiners to audit all examinations that are sat and marked internally before being released for approval by Senate. In 2005/2006 the government introduced the performance contracting requirement for all public institutions -including Moi University. The university also became ISO 9001-2008 certified in 2009. However, some heads of sections who were interviewed felt that they were already doing well, even before the certification, while others felt that it had not made much difference in as far as service delivery was concerned. (Interviews, No. 13, No. 21, Eldoret, 11 and 13 July 2012).

4.15 Significant Historical Developments

In the analysis of literature on higher education the study established that there are both global and national historical developments that have had a significant bearing on higher education in developing countries, generally, and on higher education in Kenya, in particular, and by extension at Moi University. Indeed, some of the political developments witnessed at the national level were a consequence of an unfolding global history. This section of the chapter is, therefore, dedicated to examining these critical global and national developments for the purposes of casting Kenya's higher education in the global context and establishing a sound background for a thematic analysis in the subsequent chapters.

4.15.1 Global level

As seen in Chapter 3, there have been adverse effects of globalization on the economies of the third world countries and, particularly, sub-Saharan Africa. Zeleza (2008) argues that while there have been advances, gained through modern computing techniques, the imperfections created by the capitalist system are being perpetuated in the globalization process. Key indicators of globalization, whose impact has been more rapid in the last few decades, include increased trade, investment, financial exchanges, production and consumption.

However, his argument that the process has maintained the inequalities characterizing the old capitalist order - which has, in effect, benefited only the western nations at the expense of the developing ones - is captured when he asserts that globalization is best perceived as

...the expansion of global capitalism that is subject to age old processes and patterns of capitalist accumulation with all the social and spatial inequalities and division of labour (p. 14).

While the adverse effects of globalization have been on the economies of developing countries, generally, the emergence of the World Bank as a significant player in the world economy and in education, in particular, during the 1960s is the one single development that has occasioned far-reaching implications on higher education in developing countries, including Kenya.

The World Bank (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) was initially established to fund the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, but during the 1960s its attention shifted to the former European colonies (Sammoff and Carrol, 2004). While doing this, the bank was not initially interested in funding education. Its impact was, therefore, felt as a consequence of “the decision to lend for education activities, a substantially increased role in education research and the adoption of policy based lending” (*Ibid*, p. 8).

With arguments advanced regarding the human capital theory, investment in education became viable because knowledge was seen as important in the eradication of poverty

(*Ibid*). As its attention shifted to funding education, the Bank also invested heavily in research as a means of analyzing the viability of the funded projects which depended heavily on the rate of return analysis (*Ibid*).

The bank's lending also adopted "a policy-based lending, that is loans intended to support particular policy objectives, commonly associated with macro-economic goals" (*Ibid*, p. 9). It is the adoption of this approach whereby the World Bank has replaced the former colonial powers in co-opting the former colonies into the emerging global economy - but not on an equal footing with developed countries. Carrol and Sammoff assert:

Since both sorts of loans carried strong conditions- a set of economic measures commonly termed liberalization-in practice they exchanged cash for control.

More generally, by the final decade of the century, the World Bank and the IMF had taken over much of the responsibility previously exercised by the colonial powers of managing the integration of the former colonial periphery into the World economic system (p.9).

This significant economic development at the global level was to have far reaching consequences on Kenya's higher education, generally, and on Moi University, in particular, in the following years.

Politically - at the global level - two significant developments were to shape Kenya's political landscape and impact on the operations of key institutions including, and especially, higher education. The first was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking down of the Berlin wall which effectively ended the cold war and removed the US government's perceived threat of communism in Africa. The second was the end of apartheid which was the other concern of the US in Africa after communism collapsed and paved the way for democratic governance (Hornsby, 2012:466-468). The implication of these developments for Africa was the immediate demand for a democratic space. Protests took place in several countries in Africa, leading to reform and the restoration of a multiparty democracy. In Mali and Niger former military governments gave way to civilian rule, while multiparty democracies were introduced in Zambia, Rwanda, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana Benin and Cote d'Ivoire (*Ibid*). It then dawned on the Western countries that the perception that Africa's problems were primarily economic ones was wrong and,

rather, that they were political. They began to appreciate the fact that democratization would lead to economic independence (*Ibid*).

For Kenya, the impact of these two global developments was twofold. The first was the immediate demand for a democratic space and, in order to appreciate this demand, it is necessary to glance at Kenya's political scene - especially in the 1980s prior to these historical developments. After the failed coup of 1982, the government's position hardened and any views diverging from the government's position were harshly repressed. Hornsby (2012) describes it as follows:

The mid to late 1980s had seen the entrenchment of an increasingly corrupt, paranoid and autocratic government. The regime now relied on apathy and fear, with active support only of the Kalenjin and Abaluyhia regions, pastoralists and Muslims, and a few military and political leaders, many of them unpopular at home. The dominance of Moi and KANU was unchallenged, but there was growing resistance-inside both the elite and the *wananchi*-to a repressive and ethnically partial administration that had squandered its legitimacy. Anger at the destruction of Kenya's participatory heritage-their right to vote and to choose their MPs, if not what they did in office-was an important drive for their protests of 1990-91 (pp.464-465).

The two historical developments, therefore, emboldened politicians, the clergy and civic society to pressurize the KANU government into opening up a democratic space by allowing competitive multiparty politics. The pent-up tension in the country was compounded by the deaths of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ouko, and the fiery Anglican Archbishop, Alexander Muge, in 1990 and 1991, respectively, in circumstances that raised a suspicion of government involvement (*Ibid*:472-475;479).

The second implication of these developments for Kenya, which was heavily dependent on Western foreign aid in its fiscal programmes, was the decision by the donors to attach conditions for any support - especially from the US. America's moral, military and economic superiority was boosted by the collapse of both communism and apartheid. Consequently, any financial aid from the US came with a demand for upholding "American values", which included change in terms of open democracy or pluralism and economic liberalization (*Ibid*).

The demands for change as a precondition for aid as well as the shift in the World Bank funding policy created a confluence of forces that was to impact on Kenya's higher education in a significantly radical manner in the years that followed.

4.15.2 National Level

As seen in the previous section, there had been simmering dissatisfaction among a cross-section of Kenyans and global developments triggered a series of demonstrations, protests and riots in 1990-91 which culminated in the repeal of Section 2(a) of Kenya's constitution, ushering in multiparty democracy and the holding of the first general elections under this arrangement in 1992.¹

During the first multiparty election of 1992, KANU managed to retain power. Preceding the election and after the election the reform agenda degenerated into a struggle by the multitude of parties to ascend to power. Their strategy, which has dominated Kenyan politics since, was to appeal for tribal support. In decrying this development, Wanjala (1996) laments:

...it is our contention that the ethnic equation in the contemporary African political spectrum has blunted the appeal for democracy to the masses. The peasants belonging to different ethnic groups are not only victims of manipulation; they are also a danger to themselves to the extent to which they periodically embrace tribal considerations and sentiments in national issues(p. 89).

Not only was the ethnic equation - referred to by Wanjala - to influence Kenyan politics and voting patterns at a national level, its effects have been felt in every facet of Kenyans' lives, including at the university where the voting patterns in student elections is a deep reflection of it.

In the run-up to the 1997 second multiparty election, another push for reform emerged from civic organizations, churches and politicians. This created a crisis that was only managed when minimum reforms were introduced by means of legislation. The push

¹ In 1982 the government amended the constitution to make Kenya a one party state by law (de Jure) by inserting a clause, Section2 (a), in the constitution. This made the, then, ruling party, KANU, the only constitutionally recognized party.

began with a meeting of 600 activists in what was referred to as the National Convention Assembly (NCA) which proceeded to elect an executive committee, the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC). However, as in the 1991 agitation for multiparty democracy, there were a series of violent protests that led to deaths and injuries (Hornsby, 2012).

While these efforts were for reform, their immediate objective was to weaken KANU. Hornsby (2012) notes:

NCA's goals were familiar- to curb the power of the presidency, repeal oppressive laws, resettle clash victims and change the electoral system-all of which would weaken KANU. Its long term goal was a new constitution, but there could be no compromise on the need for minimal changes before the 1997 polls (p. 597).

In total there were four protests, one of which degenerated into nationwide violence during which fourteen people were killed. The crisis was eventually controlled by means of the legislation of minimum changes in the electoral laws as well as amendments to the Public Order Act (*Ibid*).

Other significant political developments in Kenya include the 2002 election during which KANU, the party that had been in power since independence in 1963, lost to the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition - a coalition of several parties that united and made pre-election pacts (MoU) in order to win the election. Allegations of betrayal and failure to honour the MoU by the president caused a rift in the coalition which also influenced the voting patterns during the national referendum for a new constitution in 2005 as well as the general election of 2007(*Ibid*).

Economically, Kenya was doing well in the 1980s. However, the country was heavily dependent on Western aid which, at the same time, was pressurizing the government to liberalize the economy. Hornsby (2012) suggests:

The real problem was that Kenya was responding too slowly to the changing world and was structurally dependent on foreign aid. At its peak between 1989 and 1991, total aid inflows to Kenya exceeded US\$1 billion a year... (p.471).

The reliance on Western aid was not specific to the problems that the country was experiencing during that time. Later, Mutunga (1996) was to assert:

There is a wealth of data and writing that conclusively shows Kenya's dependence on the West. Nobody denies the concrete results of whatever developments have taken place: devaluation of the national currency, poverty, unemployment...

...An accusing finger for this state of affairs has to be pointed at the ruling group in Kenya and foreign interests. It is supremely crucial to see this interaction which is always mystified. While the British no longer rule Kenya in the sense of direct administration, Britain and the West still rule Kenya by proxy. The World Bank and the IMF have become the direct colonizers (pp.210-211).

The reliance on donors who were stipulating conditions for aid was critical in the management of public affairs in Kenya, a situation that was to impact on its higher education. In 1990, for example, Denmark froze aid to Kenya, while the Paris Club meeting for Kenya on 25 and 26 November 1991 suspended the balance of payments for non-humanitarian support for Kenya, issuing a statement following the decision that

Kenya must redress macro-economic imbalances, improve the performance of parastatals and speed their divestment, cut the civil service and provide an environment that is supportive of private investment and initiative (Hornsby, 2012: 486).

Socially, the most significant development that had a bearing on the operations of higher education was the rapid increase in Kenya's population. Kenya's population growth since independence had been at a rate of 4.1% and by 1989 Kenya's population was 21.4 million (Hornsby, 2012). This exerted a heavy pressure on social amenities and during the 1980s the demand for higher education rose sharply.

Within the education sector Kenya adopted a new system of education in 1984-5, i.e. the 8-4-4 with eight years of primary education, and four years each for secondary and university education. The older system of seven years of primary education, four of secondary education, two years of high school and three years for university was

abandoned. The effect of this change was that two cohorts of students qualified to join university in 1990 - the first group being the last cohort of the old system while the second was the first cohort of the new system. Early on students of Nairobi University supported an attempt to overthrow the government by the Kenya Air force in August of 1982 which forced the closure of the university for more than a year and created a backlog of students who qualified annually for admission (*Ibid*; Mutua, 2004). The result was a double intake in 1987 to clear the backlog and, therefore, public universities in Kenya had to deal with a dual intake in 1987 and a double intake in 1990, occasioning sharp unprecedented increases in student enrolment.

4.16 Thematic Classification

An examination of the literature and the thematic analysis of the data enabled the study to develop a thematic classification of the dynamics that have, largely, been responsible for student unrest in Kenya's higher education, generally, and Moi University, in particular. Five broad thematic areas are presented in the table below and they form the basis of the discussion and analysis in the following chapters.

Theme	Sub-Theme	Examples/Strike Incidents
1. International Policies, National Policies and Social Pressure	Structural Adjustment Programmes Implemented through Cost Sharing.	June/July 1991 strikes at all universities and campuses
	Pressure on Facilities (Teaching, Learning & Accommodation).	Maseno, April 1991, July 1991, July 1993. Chepkoilel June 1993, Oct. 1999, March 2000. Main Campus March 1998, March 1999, Oct. 1999.
	Inadequacy in the Provision of Services (Academic & Welfare)	Maseno April 1991, July 1991, April 1993, July 1993. Main Campus March 1998, March 1999, Oct. 1999.
2. Critical National Issues.	Struggle for Democracy	Ouko Protests 1990 Muge Protests 1991 Otieno Mbai Protests 2003
	Political Power Struggles	Main Campus 1998, 1999 Kabarak Protests 2004
	Critical Non-Political	Lecturers strike Support 1994/5 Teachers Strike Support 1997
3. Student Politics, Competition for Control of Resources.	Student Elections	MMUST Feb 2006
	JAB Vs PSSP Students	Main Campus, Eldoret West Campuses Nov 2003. MMUST Feb 2006
	Negative Ethnicity	MMUST Feb 2006. Chepkoilel 2007
4. Differences with Organized Groups	Organized Groups.	NYS-Gilgil Oct 1988 Bus fare Protests, Main Campus 2009.
	Local Community	Cheboiywo 1991 MMUST 2006
5. Prevalence of Catalyzing Factors/Situations	<p>Organizational/Formal Communication Rigid Programmes Support Services Alienation SGC Leadership Styles.</p> <p>Non Formal Groups and extreme behaviour; Drugs, Anonymity, Dissillusion.</p>	

Table 0.1: Thematic Classification of Factors informing Student Unrest

4.17 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the context of higher education in Kenya, giving a brief history of its development and its management structure. It has focused on Moi University as a means of creating a sound background for the subsequent analysis in

order to also create a familiarity with the study setting. This was followed by an examination of the key social, political and economic developments that had a profound effect on the operation of higher education in developing countries, generally, and in Kenya, in particular. These include the collapse of communism, marking the end of the cold war and the emergence of democratic government in the place of apartheid in South Africa. In Kenya there was a spirited struggle for the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990-91. This was followed by a degeneration of the struggle into a struggle for power by a myriad of parties that came into existence before and immediately after the election. More agitation for a democratic space was witnessed in 1997. In 2002 KANU lost power to NARC which attempted to re-track the constitutional review process and lost in the 2005 national referendum because factions that emerged soon after assumed power. Kenya's political landscape after the restoration of a multiparty democracy has been shaped by tribal alignment.

Economically, the shift of focus of the World Bank from financing the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War to former European colonies and the interest in funding education activities on the premises of the human capital theory were significant developments that impacted on Kenya's higher education.

This examination formed the basis of a thematic classification of the factors that have informed student unrest. These factors are tabulated at the conclusion of the chapter and they form the basis of the discussion in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

CHAPTER 5

EXPONENTIAL GROWTH: A CRITICAL AND RESENTFUL STUDENT POPULATION AMIDST BITING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME ADAPTATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter contains an analysis of unrest at Moi University, the occurrence of which is associated with the first thematic area in the classification of the findings of this study. As seen in the conclusion of the previous chapter, five themes emerged from the analysis, including the occurrence of unrest as a consequence of flawed international and national policy as well as the pressure brought about by a sharp increase in a demand for university education. As such, this chapter contains an analysis, presentation and discussion of these findings.

In this chapter the study argues that being heavily dependent on donor funding, Kenya became committed to the World Bank's policy of reducing fiscal expenditure which targeted health and education. As such it introduced the cost sharing policy in higher education, which was meant to achieve this. At the same time the government was yielding to pressure created by the demand for higher education; the consequence of a rapid population growth in post-independence Kenya. The consequences of the two incompatible policies; reducing cost while expanding enrollment was the acute shortage of teaching, learning and welfare facilities that was central in the student unrest witnessed in Kenya's higher education generally and at Moi University in particular.

Secondly, the chapter argues from its findings that the implementation of some of the policies, in compliance with the World Bank conditions were associated with teething problems that often triggered off violent protests from the students who were affected by some of the inefficiencies associated with these new developments. A case in point is the establishment of a revolving fund to finance higher education through the establishment of the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB). Its initial challenges of establishing an

effective system of identifying needy students and disbursing the allocated funds were the subject of student protests.

At the institutional level, the acute shortage of funds forced the universities to come up with some income generating activities in order to cushion against the government withdrawal. One of these strategies was the establishment of the Privately Sponsored Students Programme (PSSP). Two issues associated with this programme became the subject of concern that often put the students and the university authorities on a collision path often translating to riots. One was the question of equity of access to university education while the other was the apparent lack of physical growth and expansion of facilities which was often the reason cited for mounting the programme. Also at the personal level, students developed some cost saving practices such as running petty businesses at the campus and in the halls of residence, pitting them against the administration since these were for various reasons outlawed.

Lastly, the study in this chapter demonstrates that while the issues cited above were at the centre of student unrest, national power struggles played out at the university and was compounded by vibrant student activism to take unrest to an unprecedented level. A case in point is the twin riots of Main Campus in 1999 which spilled over to Chepkoilel Campus in the following year.

Statistics obtained in the study show that 40% of student unrest at Moi University manifested itself in the form of demonstrations, strikes and riots. They are associated with, or have been occasioned by, factors related to this thematic area. In total there were 14 such cases of unrest that were found to have occurred during the period under study. This chapter contains an analysis of six of the cases that best demonstrate the effects of these policies on the operations of the university and the subsequent riots. For further clarity the thematic area has been broken down into three sub-themes, namely: (i) Unrest associated with, or sparked off by, the government announcement concerning the adoption of the World Bank' Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) -a cost sharing policy in public universities; (ii) Unrest associated with pressure on teaching, learning

and accommodation facilities; and (iii) Unrest associated with inadequate service delivery.

5.2 Structural Adjustment Programmes: The Introduction of Cost Sharing

The first case of student unrest related to this sub-theme recorded at Moi University during the period under study (1985-2009) occurred in 1991 as a reaction by students to the government's announcement of its decision to adopt the recommendations of the World Bank under the Structural Adjustment Programme. The wave of student protest was not confined to Moi University alone, but it affected all the public universities which led to the widespread destruction of property and closure for over seven months (Interviews, No. 3, No. 13 and No. 17, Moi Eldoret, June 2012).

Kenya was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to receive Structural Adjustment loans. These loans came with conditions aimed at imposing a free market policy on developing countries in order to create a conducive climate for foreign investment (Chacha, 2004, Sammoff and Carrol 2004). The conditions included "eliminating trade and investment regulations, boosting foreign exchange earnings by promoting exports and reducing government deficits through cuts in spending" (Chacha, 2004:97). Public spending on health, education and food subsidies were targeted in the cuts.

University education in Kenya during the first ten years of its independence (1963-74) was free in the sense that it was fully financed by the government from public funds. Funding covered all aspects of university education, including tuition, books and stationery, accommodation and out of pocket allowances for the students. Due to budgetary constraints, the government introduced a revolving loan scheme in 1974 which benefited all students at the university. This fund was, however, inefficiently managed and the rate of recovery was so poor that it was more or less a grant (Chacha, 2004; Nafukho, 2004; Mwinzi, 2004).

In 1990 the Kenyan government approached the World Bank for a loan to finance its universities that were facing acute shortages in teaching, learning and welfare facilities

which had been caused by sharp increases in enrolment. This was rejected, but in its place the Bank suggested the option of the Universities Investment Project (UIP). The project was part of a larger education sector credit that came with stringent conditions affecting the management of higher education in terms of finance and expansion (Sammoff and Carrol, 2004). Specifically, the World Bank offered financial support on condition of “introducing charges for tuition, capping enrolment and reforming the student loan scheme” (*Ibid*, p. 20).

The government was, therefore, left with no option but to accept the conditions which were announced officially at the end of June 1991. The changes that were to affect university students were referred to as the cost sharing programme which encompassed the issues resulting in the student riots: (i) That not all university students would automatically benefit from the government loans, but rather that each student would have to demonstrate their level of need in order to be considered for the loan award; (ii) That students would have to pay directly for tuition; (iii) That students would have to pay for all other services, such as accommodation, and also that they would have to purchase their meals and all required books and stationery from university outlets; and (iv) That the out-of-pocket allowances for students which amounted to Kshs 5040/= *per* semester would be discontinued (Interviews, No. 3, No. 13 and No. 17).

At Moi University events leading to the unrest were triggered by a meeting held by the Vice-Chancellor with student leaders on 28 June 1991 (Chief Security Officer’s Report, July 1991). During the meeting the Vice-Chancellor informed the students of the government’s decision to put the new policy into effect. During the meeting the student leaders objected to the idea and, through the Vice-Chancellor, requested the government to rethink the idea. Students held a rally the following day during which the Vice-Chancellor addressed them. Students who wanted to hold a demonstration immediately objected to the idea, but they were restrained by their leaders who suggested, instead, that another rally (*kamukunji*) be held the following day (*Ibid*, Senate Report, December 1991; Interview No. 13, Eldoret, June 2012).

On Sunday, 30 June 1991, at around 8.00 a.m., most students comprising mainly 1st and 2nd years gathered at the Students' Centre and made demands for the Vice-Chancellor to address them to provide feedback on what decisions had been taken regarding the government policy resolution on fee payment. Several students, who addressed the gathering, dwelled exclusively on the issue of the government's decision to impose a policy concerning the payment of fees and a withdrawal of personal allowances. At 11.00 a.m. the students began a demonstration, proceeding towards Cheptiret, a small market centre on the way to Eldoret town. The Senate Report (December 1991) records the following, in part, about the procession:

On Sunday, 30 June 1991, the students called an illegal *Kamukunji* where they decided to hold a "peaceful" demonstration to Eldoret. In fact, the demonstration was unruly, disorderly and the majority of the students armed themselves with sticks, iron bars and logs (Senate Report, 1991).

A small section of the students, who referred to themselves as the "Action Group", were armed with stones and sticks and they went around the hostels forcing students who were not interested in the demonstrations to join them (*Ibid, Op. cit.*). They also flushed out students who were attending a Sunday church service. The university administration - through a security officer - alerted the police who moved to within a short distance of the campus gate. In a clear indication of the lack of preparedness for a riot of that magnitude, it emerged that the security agents sent a platoon of twelve police officers from the nearest police post to quell the riot involving over three thousand students (Interview No. 13). In the ensuing clash between the students and the police officers which was about 500 meters away from the university's main gate, the latter were literally overwhelmed and some students managed to seize three truncheons, three helmets and were in the process of wrestling a gun from one of the officers when another policeman in the police vehicle shot at the crowd, injuring one of the students. The student was rushed to the university clinic and later to the Eldoret hospital by his colleagues, but was pronounced dead on arrival (*Ibid; Security Report, July 1991; Senate Report, December 1991*).

After that the students marched to the Vice-Chancellor's residence within the university's precinct, but found that he had fled to safety, upon which the students started destroying

property at the Vice-Chancellor's residence. The destroyed property included the Vice-Chancellor's vehicle and two others parked at his house, a canteen, several lecturers' houses and hostels. The vehicles were burnt to ashes. In total ten houses suffered varying levels of destruction, nine hostels had several window panes broken, eight business premises in the Students' Centre had doors and windows shattered and one kitchen was extensively damaged. Property valued at KShs 795,043.45 was looted in the staff canteen. As a result of this destruction, the Vice-Chancellor ordered the immediate closure of the university whereupon all students were required to leave the campus immediately (Security Report, July 1991). The campus remained closed for over seven months. Similar demonstrations took place at Maseno University, a constituent college of Moi University, on 03 July 1991.

The issues that triggered the students' actions in this incident were the policy changes announced by the government which were to take effect in the subsequent academic year, including: (i) The withdrawal of automatic loans to all students; (ii) The introduction of tuition fees and payment for all services and goods at the university; and (iii) The withdrawal of out-of-pocket allowances. The cost of tuition and direct charges which has been applicable since then is KShs 16,000/= (US\$ 205.13) (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, Nafukho, 2004). However, while these were the critical issues, findings also indicate that the riots were also a demonstration against a government that was, generally, dictatorial, oppressive and no longer enjoyed the support of the people. During this time there were spirited efforts for an increased democratic space and pressure had been building up to demand the reintroduction of a multiparty democracy. This is best illustrated by a response from one of the respondents on being asked about the issues at play in the student riots when he said:

I will start by looking at the nation at large; what was happening in the country. It was the time when multiparty politics was being introduced in Kenya and, therefore, there was a lot of agitation in the country for political...and freedom of expression. People were feeling they were subdued by the era of KANU and single party. And then, also, people were feeling that there was no more democracy because of the voting system which was called *Mlolongo*. So people were saying that what is this democracy being talked about when the short line sometimes had to win over the long one? And then before long there is a political assassination which was claimed as suicide and that was the late Dr Robert Ouko and, therefore, the entire country

was polarized. That now created a lot of hostility against the government. Although they tried to deny it was involved in the claim, there were all indicators that there was murder, not suicide.

So there are two issues now which are creating a lot of political hostility in the university. One, on the governance side nationally, the students are unhappy as the rest of the public is. Then we have now the same students being told their allowances are going to be withdrawn (Interview No. 13, Eldoret, June 2012).

It is, therefore, clear that while the policy changes regarding the financing of university education were largely responsible for the students' actions, the prevailing political situation in the country had created a deep sense of anger and discontent which was directed at the government. The government was widely perceived as being very oppressive and applying extreme tactics to silence any form of opposing or divergent view. At that time the entire country was in the midst of a struggle for a democratic space (Hornsby, 2012). The students were expressing their dissatisfaction and anger at a government which was exacerbating the situation by imposing adverse policies at the university.

The riots were spontaneous and happened rapidly. When information reached students that there were radical policy changes by government, this news spread quickly within the student community, building up a tension and anger at equal speed. As such, it took less than two days - between Friday evening and Sunday morning - for the strike to reach its peak. By Sunday afternoon the university was closed.

Within this short period there was a devastation of property and the loss of one life. The university was closed for one year; a Students' disciplinary Committee sat to deliberate on what course of action to take against students who had actively participated in unrest while the university was closed. Before the commencement of the following academic year, 47 students had appeared before the committee; six of them were discharged, five were conditionally discharged, six received written warnings, twenty were suspended for varying lengths of time and ten were expelled (Senate Report, 30 June 1991).

5.2.1 Challenges Associated with the Higher Education Loans Board: Maseno University, 1997

One of the conditions set by the World Bank for financial support was the streamlining of the management of the university and the student loan system or revolving fund in order to facilitate greater efficiency in loan recoveries. The government complied with this requirement in 1995 by establishing the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) through an act of parliament. The Board's mandate was to create a revolving fund by advancing loans to needy students at the university and recovering them with a small interest once the students had graduated and were engaged in gainful employment (Nafukho,2004; Chacha, 2004; Carrol and Sammoff, 2004).

The early years of the Board's operations were, however, characterized by serious challenges that often lead to agitation by students - as illustrated by the Maseno University College case of 1997. In August of 1997 education students from Maseno University College engaged in a three-day series of riots that resulted in the widespread destruction of both university and private property. This strike's main cause was discontent over a failure to reimburse or pay Education students the sum of KShs 4,000/= each which was their teaching practice allowance. An analysis of the records points to a communication breakdown that resulted in agitation by the students as the university had no direct role in this matter which fell within the ambit of the recently created Higher Education Loans Board. In an *ad-hoc* committee's report inadequate student representation, the role of the student organization and the status of security are identified as factors that compounded/aggravated the issue.

Fourth year students converged on the campus playground on 19 August 1997 to make demands for a payment of KShs 4,000 and they were addressed by one of the senior administrative staff. The following day the students gathered at the same venue, but this time they proceeded to venues where other students were studying and caused a disruption. Once again they were addressed - this time by three senior staff members of the college –after which they dispersed, only to regroup again in the early afternoon. Attempts by the principal to address and calm them were unsuccessful. They held a

procession, leaving a trail of destruction as they proceeded to the library. The group gradually became violent, destroying further facilities on campus and creating several roadblocks on the main Kisumu–Busia road where they extorted money from motorists. This continued until late into the night and into the third day (21 August 1997), forcing the college authorities to close it down.

An *ad-hoc* committee was established by the college to investigate the incident and in its report it was suggested that the main cause of the stalemate had been the failure to pay the allowances to the students - a situation which was compounded by a lack of communication between the relevant offices of the college. The report reads, in part:

The committee observes that there are communication gaps between Teaching Practice Centre, Dean, Faculty of Education, Comm-Tech Department, Academic Division and the Deputy Principal: Academic (Academic Board Report, September 1997).

The committee concluded that the main cause of the student disturbances was the failure to advance the KShs 4000/= which was an allowance for their teaching practice. This was the mandate of the Higher Education Loans Board, but the failure was the result of a lack of communication between the Board and the relevant departments of the university college. Nevertheless, the committee also established that besides this main cause, student representation on key decision-making bodies was very weak in that apart from representation on the Academic Board, students were not represented on Teaching Practice Management, Faculty Boards and at Departmental Meetings. It was noted that such a problem would not have arisen had the representation been effective. The committee also recommended that the university examine its role in weakening the mainstream student leadership after it had established that the student union leadership was weak and had been sidelined during the entire process.

Other causes of discontent concerning the Board have been cited elsewhere and they include the insufficient loan amounts advanced and the Board's inability to effectively screen and identify genuinely needy cases. This often led to loan awards to students from wealthy backgrounds who falsified their personal details, while some genuinely needy

cases were left out or received small amounts. This situation was attributed to the manner in which the board collected the information that was used to determine the need for a loan award (Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 2000). With regard to the amounts disbursed to the individual students, the Board's decisions were dictated by the government's annual allocations. For example, by the year 2000 when the Board required a sum of KShs 1.5 billion to adequately satisfy its demands, it only received KShs 600 million (*Ibid*).

5.3 Unrest Associated with Pressure on Facilities and Inadequacy in the Provision of Services

This section examines the unrest associated with two sub-themes: (i) The pressure on teaching, learning and accommodation facilities and (ii) An inadequacy in the provision of services. The classification of these sub-themes is for purposes of clarity. Nevertheless, whenever students protested about these it is hard to distinguish and attribute the students' actions to any one of the factors. As such, the study chooses to present both these sub-themes together. While there are over ten incidents of unrest attributed to these factors, the study uses the following ones as the basis for its analysis because they best crystallize and demonstrate the extent to which these factors have been largely responsible for the unrest. They include: Chepkoilel Campus in 1993; Maseno University College in 1994; and the Main Campus protests of 1999. The Main Campus protests of 1999 spilled over to Chepkoilel in the same year and continued the following year, but by then the riots had evolved from being complaints about poor services and facilities to agitation against disciplinary action against students who had spearheaded the previous year's riots.

5.3.1 Mayhem on Chepkoilel Campus: 1993

Chepkoilel is one of the campuses established by Moi University in response to a sharp increase in student enrolment. In 1990 the university, like other public universities, had to deal with the admission of two cohorts of students who had graduated in 1989. The first cohort comprised the last group of the Kenya Advanced Certificate of Education's (

KACE) form 6 graduates of the old system of education, i.e. the 7:4:2:3 system while the second cohort consisted of the first Form 4 graduates of the new 8:4:4 system (Hornsby, 2012; Moi University, 2001). As a result of the shift from the former to the latter education system, these two groups had qualified for admission to university during the same academic year in the public universities' calendar. In order to address the ensuing acute lack of space, teaching and learning facilities, Moi University acquired the former Moi Science Teachers' College situated 10 kilometers north of Eldoret town and transformed it into the Chepkoilel campus to accommodate Science-based courses. It was thought appropriate to convert this former teachers' college that had been offering a two-year diploma course in Science education into a campus of Moi University because it had facilities that could accommodate Science-based courses and included six lecture halls and thirty laboratories.

In 1993 the campus was rocked by a series of protests that involved all its undergraduate students and which lasted for close on two months - beginning in early May and subsiding towards the end of June. The main issues raised by the students include congestion in the dining hall; a lack of books and stationery in the campus book shop; an impassable access road from the old to the new site; a lack of road bumps on the Eldoret-Kitale highway adjacent to the campus; overcrowding in hostels; unfairness in the awarding of bursaries; and the expulsion of students for non-payment of fees.

The protests began on 05 May 1993 when a student leader, who was the Director of Catering on the Students Governing Council, wrote a strongly worded internal memorandum to the college principal complaining about exorbitant food prices that were beyond the reach of most students. The main complaint, however, was congestion in the dining hall. In in the memorandum the student writes:

Opening of the new mess: As the head of this campus, statistics show you the exact population of Chepkoilel and the time limit to be in the mess. The director of catering (*sic*) ... had promised in your presence that the mess in the old site was to start operating by last semester... Students wish to give seven days to open that mess with their cooperation where necessary, this time failure of which you shall have yourself to blame (Internal Memorandum, 05 May 1993).

This marked the beginning of a series of exchanges between the students and the administration where student leaders adopted a hardline stance which was characterized by threats, the mobilization of students to support their cause and the holding of meetings to exert pressure on the university administration. The statement in the memorandum that the Director of Catering (catering manager) “had promised in your (the Principal’s) presence” implies that the issue had been discussed earlier in another forum. This means that the problem had persisted for some time and the students’ patience was running out. Time for dialogue by then seems to have been squandered and confrontation seemed imminent. For example, by means of a memorandum dated 20 May 1993, the Secretary-General of the students’ organization convened a Special General Meeting (SGM), popularly referred by the student body as *Kamukunji*, that was scheduled to take place on the 24th of the same month to discuss the following: (i) Mess; (ii) Bookshop; (iii) Accommodation; (iv) Tuition fees; (v) Highway; (vi) Students’ Centre; and (vii) Bumps (Internal Memorandum, 20 May 1993).

Shortly after, the Director of Catering on the SGC wrote another memorandum - this time to the Vice-Chancellor - complaining about congestion in the dining hall and alleging that there had been cases of “... fainting, minor injuries, starving...” and demanded the opening of another facility (Internal Memorandum, 26 May 1993). On 07 June 1993, barely two weeks after this memorandum, the same student leader issued another memorandum declaring a “hunger strike” to be staged by the entire student population which would commence on 14 June as a way of protesting against the congestion and the apparent unwillingness of the administration to address the problem. The memorandum was highly emotive and reflected a deep distrust of the administration’s willingness to address the issue. This deep distrust was evident in the entire document, excerpts from which include the following:

...We tire of hearing our director of catering (*sic*) addressing slogans but not issues...

...Sir, they sit on the students’ dignity, reputation and identity. As if the above is not enough, they accompany it with threats, intimidation and fear...With keen evaluation and observation, the catering department will never take our problems seriously and therefore the students have decided to stage a hunger strike on 14th June at 9.00 am... (Internal Memorandum, 07 June 1993).

Upon the declaration of a hunger strike, tension on the campus heightened and took a new turn for the worse as a flurry of activities are reported on campus between 07 and 18 June 1993. During this period the administration took several steps that demonstrated its seriousness in addressing the pertinent issues raised by the students and its desire to diffuse the tension that was threatening to degenerate into a fully-fledged strike. Between these dates there was a series of over nine meetings and consultations within management, between management and students and between management and service departments. These meetings took place almost every day during the period when the students were boycotting classes. The relevant service departments were also meeting regularly to monitor the situation and to update management on the situation on campus. It emerged during this series of meetings that the thorny issues affecting the students included: (i) Congestion in the cafeteria; (ii) Empty bookshop; (iii) Impassable access road from old to new site; (iv) Lack of road bumps on the Eldoret-Kitale highway adjacent to the campus; (v) Overcrowding in hostels; (vi) Unfairness in the awarding of bursaries; and (vii) Expulsion of students for nonpayment of fees(Principal's Report, 23 June 1993).

The students seem to have heeded the call for a hunger strike which began on 14 June 1993. They also maintained a pressure on the administration by boycotting classes and holding a series of meetings and by demanding action from the administration. For example, on the morning of 14 June, they interrupted a joint meeting between management and student leaders, demanding that the Principal - who was chairing the meeting - address them. The Principal spoke to the students, reiterating the commitment by the administration to solving the problems affecting the students. On the same day at 4.00 p.m., the Vice-Chancellor also addressed them, emphasizing the same commitment by the administration to address the issues. That evening students broke into the kitchen and damaged property (*Ibid*).

In analyzing the actions of the administration, it can be seen that the administration countered the students' actions by employing tactics, such as engaging the students in negotiation, bargaining for more time, appealing for calm, immediately conceding to some of the demands and giving assurances of the necessary action and issuing threats.

For example, after hasty arrangements the administration managed to have a new dining facility operational by the morning of 17 June when, for the first time, breakfast was served in the facility. The Vice-Chancellor had, meanwhile, released a circular that instructed students to resume classes immediately and to sign both the nominal roll and a compliance statement by 12.00 noon on Friday, 18 June 1993, as evidence of complying with Senate's decision. Failure to do this would be construed to mean "voluntary deregistration" by the affected students. A similar circular was released by the Principal on 15 June. The circular was posted on the notice boards by 7.30 a.m. on 17 June, but only a few students complied (Vice-Chancellor's Circular, 16 June 1993). At 4.00 p.m. on the same day, an urgent meeting of the Academic Board was convened and student leaders were invited to attend. During the meeting the board

... explained to the SGC the powers of senate and advised it to ask the students to sign both the nominal rolls and compliance statements so as to facilitate the situation back to normal with the resumption of classes (Principal's Report, 23 June 1993).

Personnel from the Ministry of Public Works also began work on the link track/road from the old site to the new site on that the same day. It is also evident that even when tension was high on campus, the administration maintained effective communication with the students through various channels, such as memorandums, meetings and even by appearing before the students to address them whenever they demanded it. Examined in light of similar incidents that degenerated into full scale riots, this strategy - especially when the Principal took the personal initiative of assuring action - was largely responsible for diffusing tension.

The unrest subsided and, thereafter, no further reports of student violence were recorded and there was a return to normalcy. Apparently, students began attending classes on Friday, 18 June 1993, and they signed the nominal rolls as well as the compliance statements. However, it was not until Monday, 21 June, that the SGC released a memorandum, dated 17 June 1993, calling off the hunger strike and accepting to attend classes unconditionally:

...not because of the memorandum signed by the Vice-Chancellor and dated 16th June 1993... but because the demands as put forward in our memorandum dated 11th June 1993...have been met (Internal Memorandum, 17 June 1993).

In the same memorandum the student leaders also expressed their understanding that the following pending issues would be addressed and solutions would be found within ten days of the calling off of the hunger strike:

- (i) The completion of the “Highway”
- (ii) The availability of text books, calculators and other equipment in the bookshop
- (iii) Congestion problems in Blocks I and II
- (iv) The replacement of the thinner mattresses (2 inch) with ‘normal’ mattresses in Block II
- (v) Water problems, which included the rationing of water and the repair of spoilt taps and showers. (*Ibid*).

The release of the memorandum by the student leaders was a confirmation of the decision by the students to resume classes and it marked the end of the standoff. Because of this, drastic action, in terms of the closure of the university, was avoided. The only adverse consequence of the boycott was the loss of one week’s study time and the destruction of property when the students broke into the kitchen - the value of which was not quantified in the records collected for the study. None of the students were punished. In a relatively unrelated circumstance, however, the student leader who had been very vocal throughout the standoff was later suspended by the Vice-Chancellor in a letter dated 31 August 1993. According to the letter of suspension, the student was found to have written an article in the local Kenyan dailies entitled: “*The beating of Nairobi University Students as Molo violence dominates*”, copies of which were posted on notice boards on Chepkoilel campus, and that he had also written previous ‘incitory’ letters “...likely to disrupt the smooth running of the University...”. He was later to appear before the Students’ Disciplinary Committee of Senate to answer these charges.

5.3.2 The Maseno University College Protests: 1994

The following year the newly established constituent college of Moi University, Maseno University College, also experienced a series of protracted student unrest that had a striking similarity with that witnessed on the Chepkoilel campus in 1993. Typically, the

grievances reflect an institution that was struggling to make do with an acute shortage of facilities and services which resulted from a sharp increase in student enrolment against a backdrop of diminishing financial support from central government. The protests continued for a period of close on two months.

The standoff began with an apparently peaceful meeting of the students (*Kamukunji*) which had been authorized by the Dean of Students and which took place on Saturday, 19 November 1994. However, there was a rapid build-up of tension in the following week and on the 23rd the Secretary-General of the students' organization unsuccessfully petitioned the authorities to hold another meeting of the students on 25 November. Regardless of this, the students went ahead and held the meeting. Later, they marched to the office of the Assistant Registrar and to the Senior Staff Club where they destroyed furniture and harassed subordinate staff who were carrying out maintenance work. They then proceeded to one of the college dining halls where they caused further damage to kitchen hardware (Academic Board Reports 1 and 2, December 1994).

On Sunday, 27 November, the entire university college senior management, consisting of the Principal, his two deputies, Deans of Faculties and other senior administrative staff, held a lengthy meeting with the student leaders in an attempt to convince them to call off the class boycott that was then underway. However, the students did not heed the call and not only did they continue with the boycott, but they went ahead with a meeting of all the students on the same day. The students also held several other protest meetings on the 04, 05, 06 and 08 December. They ignored circulars released by the two Deputy-Principals which instructed them to return to class by 07 December 1994 (*Ibid; Op. cit.*).

On 08 December the Bachelor of Science students held a demonstration which gradually became violent. They proceeded to the main road where they barricaded the Kisumu-Busia highway, obstructing and harassing motorists. Police were called and in the ensuing confrontation four students were injured. In the early afternoon the students regrouped, this time joined by the Bachelor of Education students who were not involved in the earlier confrontation. They proceeded on a revenge mission towards the police station, burning a vehicle outside the main gate on their way. For a second time there was

a clash with the law enforcement officers who repulsed them, sending them back to the campus. On the campus the students stormed the kitchen, destroying property and looted all the food. Following the day-long fracas, the Deputy-Principal in charge of administration and finance suspended the Bachelor of Science students, issuing a memorandum requiring them to vacate the campus by 8.45 a.m. on the following morning. The students complied, ushering in a short period of relative calm at the college (*Ibid; Op. cit.*).

On 15 December the students held another meeting for which permission was denied by the authorities, despite the students' request to hold it. During the meeting the Chairman of the Students' Union alleged in his address that he had been suspended. This prompted the students to march to the administration block to seek clarification on the matter. After being addressed by the Principal, the students dispersed, leaving the Chairman to stage a lone "sit in" in front of the administration block for two days. Earlier on, during the meeting the Chairman accused two other student leaders of betraying their cause in his speech - an indicator of a split in the student leadership (*Ibid, Op. cit.*).

At the time the University College was in a deep financial crisis which had led to an acute shortage of teaching, learning and welfare facilities. The crisis was occasioned by a freeze in financial aid due to stringent conditions imposed by the World Bank. Reports in the local press, for example, indicate:

The college is also facing financial woes as a result of stringent conditions imposed by the World Bank.

Sources say the World Bank is prepared to aid the college on condition that it reduces its work force of 900 employees to 500. The College seems to be dragging its feet over the matter hence the current crisis (Kenya Times, 1994).

On the academic front students were agitating against an acute shortage of lecture space which was leading to serious overcrowding that often made it difficult for all students to attend classes and so forced some to miss them. There was also an acute shortage of laboratory equipment and a case cited was that of the chemistry laboratory where

students alleged that there were only two microscopes available for a class of 120 students. Students also complained that no books were available in the bookshop. Students alleged that semester dates were inconsistent, making it difficult for them to plan meaningfully in terms of their academic progress. Transcripts were also not being issued on time and, when issued, contained numerous errors. In the halls of residence students complained about the deplorable state of sanitation and perennial blackouts. Poor diet and improper meals were reported in the catering section while in the university medical centre students complained of being forced to purchase syringes despite the fact that each of them paid a sum of Kshs 800/=, annually, to cover medical services (Kenya Times, 1994).

5.3.3 The Twin Riots on the Main Campus: 1999

Following a protracted series of unrest, the university's Main Campus was closed on 19 October 1999. The campus remained closed for five weeks and experienced a more destructive riot immediately upon reopening. In terms of the destruction of property, this second riot was the worst in the history of Moi University. The critical issues of the unrest concerned the deplorable standards of hygiene, regular power blackouts and congestion in the hostels as well as a plethora of complaints about academic matters. The academic issues mainly concerned problems involved in the issuing of transcripts; allegations of "mass failure" in some courses; and a failure to assess the teaching practice of the Bachelor of Education students. While the university, generally, controlled the situation, the alleged abduction of a student leader sparked more riots, leading to the closure of the campus. The second riot was associated with the imposition of stringent regulations in the hostels, the signing of bond forms and the banning of the Students' Governing Council. There is also evidence of national politics playing a part in the riots.

The student leaders clearly took a confrontational approach in addressing the issues by issuing terse internal memorandums to the University administration and by giving very stringent deadlines. It started on 05 October when the Secretary-General of the Students Union wrote an internal memorandum to the Chief Administrative Officer complaining about "continuous power blackouts in Hostels A, B, C, D, E, F and J and the barracks,

which has crippled students' operations ..." The memorandum further noted that the Chief Administrative Officer had failed to solve the problem. It issued an ultimatum of four hours to put an end to the problem or "appropriate action" would be taken (Internal Memorandum, 05 October 1999). On the night of the same day there was a blackout and the student leaders led a demonstration to the residence of the hostels' officer where they caused damage to property. They also proceeded to a privately run canteen where they broke in, stole food and destroyed property valued at KShs 47,123 (\$574.70) (Undated Senate Report).

On 12 October 1999, the student leader in charge of accommodation and security (Director of Accommodation and Security) wrote an internal memorandum in which an ultimatum of 72 hours was given to address the following issues regarding the management of hostels:

- Pathetic sanitation in all 'Soweto' hostels
- Equipping all partitioned rooms and 'barracks'
- Warm water in 'Soweto' hostels
- Accommodation refunds.

On the same day the student leader in charge of academic affairs (Director of Academics) released two strongly worded memorandums to the Chief Academic Officer and Deans of Faculties demanding that "malpractices in (our) exam results" be addressed. The Director demanded (Internal Memorandum, 12 October 1999) a permanent solution to the problem by 5.00 p.m. on Thursday of the same week or students would camp out on the 'frustration square' on Friday until a solution was reached. The issues specified included:

- Course titles not matching course codes in transcripts
- Transcripts reflecting courses that students had not taken with other transcripts failing to reflect courses that students had taken
- Courses appearing twice in transcripts, but with different marks
- Missing continuous assessment test marks
- Poor performance of students blamed on poor marking

- Lecturers failing to mark scripts
- Mass failure in certain courses
- Uncalled for behaviour of exam administrators
- Demand for the assessment of the Bachelor of Education students' teaching practice.

On Friday, 15 October, the Chairman of the Students' Governing Council (SGC) issued a memorandum to the Vice-Chancellor notifying him of a resolution by the SGC to hold a *kamukunji* (students' gathering) on the same day at 2 p.m. At the appointed time the student leaders prepared the venue for the meeting and called upon the rest of the students to attend. Meanwhile, a section of the student leaders proceeded to the administration block where they managed to coerce four university officers – two senior staff officers, one administrative assistant from the Faculty of Education, and the University Transport Officer – to accompany them to the *kamukunji*. These officers were constantly harassed during the meeting (Undated Senate Report; Senate Report, 11 November 1999).

In addressing the students during this meeting, the student leaders dwelt on matters concerned with examination results, accommodation and an upcoming Festival of the Arts (the university used to hold an annual week-long cultural festival at which students and staff participated in cultural activities, such as traditional dances, a beauty pageant and drama presentations). The student leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the administration had handled their grievances, suggesting that it was necessary to apply “students' power” because dialogue “had failed”. In concluding the *kamukunji*, a resolution was reached by students that no lectures would be attended on the following Monday and Tuesday after which a further decision would be reached, depending the administration's redress of the issues raised (*Ibid; Op. cit.*).

On Monday, 18 October 1999, at 6:15 a.m. some students lit a bonfire outside the Students' Centre. All but one of the student leaders assembled there and, later, at around 9 a.m. they led the students who had gathered at the centre in disrupting lectures that were taking place on several premises: in the School of Social Cultural and Development Centre; in the Margaret Thatcher Library; in the Technology Building; and in the Faculty

of Information Sciences. The students harassed several lecturers and university officers. Attempts by the Vice-Chancellor to intervene were futile. The students proceeded to the administration block, flushing staff out of their offices. They also looted food from the cafeteria/eatery which was situated in the administration building. Students who were reluctant to join in the demonstration and who were attending lectures or reading in the library were pelted with stones (*Ibid; Op. cit.*).

Students regrouped at the Students' Centre where they were addressed by their leaders. They dwelt mainly on matters concerning accommodation, examination results, transport to the Chepkoilel Campus, the equipment of partitioned rooms in the hostels and the barracks (construction site office structures that had been converted into hostels) and the installation of streetlights. One of the student leaders declared that students found engaging in illegal activities in the hostels, such as smoking *bhang* (*cannabis sativa*) and drinking illicit brews (traditional liquor), should not be arrested and that these should be made legal. Later, the Vice-Chancellor addressed the students, promising that his office would ensure that the issues raised by students would be addressed within a few weeks (*Ibid, Op. cit.*).

On Tuesday, 19 October, all seemed to be well and the students returned to lectures. However, the Chairman of the SGC informed the Security Officer that one of the student leaders (Director of Academics) had disappeared and his whereabouts were unknown. This information was relayed to the Vice-Chancellor and investigations were immediately initiated. Meanwhile, the same information about the missing student leader spread rapidly among the students who, then, began to gather around the Students' Centre. Some of the student leaders assured them that the university was not in any way involved in the disappearance of the said student.

However, other student leaders went back to the Students' Centre and some of them disrupted students who were reading in the library by setting off the alarm. This was meant to make them attend the gathering at the Students' Centre. Afterwards, the student leaders addressed the gathering, informing them about the disappearance of one of the

students. Thereafter, the entire group marched to the administration block demanding to be addressed by the Vice-Chancellor, who complied. He assured them that the university administration had nothing to do with the disappearance of the student. The students were not satisfied with his explanation and became rowdy and pelted the staff with stones. They also proceeded to the kitchen and looted it for food (*Ibid, Op. cit.*).

The students dispersed, but soon converged again in the Students' Centre at 3:00 p.m. whereupon the leaders read out a memorandum from the Vice-Chancellor. In the memorandum, the Vice-Chancellor exonerated the university from any involvement in the disappearance of the student and assured the students that efforts were being made to trace him. The gathering turned rowdy and violent; students chanted and marched to the administration block where they threw stones at buildings and staff, lit bonfires and damaged property. This prompted the senate to close the university and eject students from the campus at around 5:00 p.m. (*Ibid;Op. cit.*).

The university remained closed for one month and reopened on Tuesday, 16 November 1999. Shortly thereafter, another riot occurred. A Senate report and interviews trace the genesis of this riot to the imposition of a fine of KShs. 200 (\$2.5); the suspension or banning of the operations of the Students' Governing Council (SGC); and the introduction of rules prohibiting cooking and the running of businesses in the hostels. These rules were unpopular with the students. Upon reporting to campus after the October riots, the students were made to sign an acceptance form in compliance with these new regulations.

Events leading to the riot began with a memorandum pinned on notice boards on the evening of Friday, 19 November 1999, asking students to attend a *kamukunji* scheduled for Monday, 22 November, at 8:00 a.m. The subject of the meeting - as stated in the memorandum - was the banning of the Students' Governing Council. The memorandum, whose author was not indicated, further stated that students would not attend lectures until the university reinstated the SGC (Senate Report, 9 December 1999).

On the following day (Saturday, 20 November 1999) two other memorandums were released in the morning. One of these had, allegedly, been written by the student leader who had been abducted, informing students that he had indeed been abducted from his room on 18 October and expressing his regrets to students who had lost their property; women who had been raped; and anyone else who had suffered during the earlier riot which demanded the establishing of his whereabouts. A second memorandum, whose author was not revealed, also addressed the issue of the student leader's abduction and demanded the immediate reinstatement of the SGC. It further stated that the university administration had failed to arrest the abductors and, instead, had imposed tough regulations and a fine of KShs. 200 (\$ 2.5) on the students. It also stated that cooking in the hostels would go on or students would do something to demonstrate their power to the university administration.

In the evening of the same day at around 9:30 p.m. spontaneous shouting seems to have occurred when a janitor found some students cooking in one of the "Soweto" hostels. Although the shouting and screams initially appeared to be spontaneous, the situation quickly degenerated into a full-blown demonstration and a riot. The students quickly gathered at the Students' Centre and started chanting slogans demanding that the Vice-Chancellor "go". Subsequently, a fully-fledged riot took place during which several university buildings were broken into and property was vandalized and destroyed. The building that bore the brunt of extensive damage was the Students' Centre that houses several service outlets, such as Kitchen III, a bookshop, post office, bank, lecture halls, and the office of the Dean of Students - among others.

The following day, most students who expected a closure of the university, packed their belongings and started leaving the hostels, while a few preferred to wait for such communication from the staff residential quarters. However, after a lengthy meeting, the Senate reached the decision that there would be no closure. This was communicated to the students who had gathered at the Students' Centre to await some communication from the administration.

The study concludes that, primarily, the issues responsible for the students' actions were the deplorable standards in the hostels where capacity had been stretched beyond limits. Complaints about transcripts were the main academic issue. The study also established that the complaint regarding congestion in the hostels was compounded by the feeling among students that the situation was being exacerbated by the university's admission of students into the Privately Sponsored Students Programme (PSSP). As such, these students were seen to be causing congestion or to be competing for the scarce facilities with their government-sponsored counterparts. Animosity between the two groups of students was beginning to build up, although by then the anger of the students was mainly at the university for adopting the policy. A student leader who served during this period, for example, observed:

And then there was the issue of population. This period seriously characterized a lot in growth of students' population, it outstretched facilities, like accommodation services, and so there was a lot of agitation - particularly on this matter of lack of accommodation. Also, and very important, this was also the time when the Privately Sponsored Students Programmes were just beginning in the universities in Kenya and Moi university was the pioneer of this PSSP or Module 2 as it's sometimes called, so there was a lot of bad blood between the regular students and the PSSP students because of the feeling that these PSSP students were coming, of course, with lower grades to struggle or take up these facilities for the government sponsored students and so there was a lot of acrimony at that time. Those were the formative stages of PSSP as a program; so much of it had to do with misunderstanding - a very bitter misunderstanding between these two groups of students (Interview No.4, Eldoret, May 2012).

The study further established that factions within the student body occasionally emerged to create or worsen tensions that developed during such agitation. These factions were made-up of individual students interested in endearing themselves to the rest of the students for personal gain, such as being elected to leadership positions or for recognition. For example, amidst the tension that already prevailed in the university, a Senate report also indicates:

The Committee also established that SGC members and a small group of their supporters were actively involved in forcing students to attend the illegal *kamukunjis*. A rival group which had lost in the elections on its attempt to discredit the SGC, increased tension among the students' community (p. 5).

This conclusion by the committee indicates that politics within the student community was acting as a catalyst in an already badly tense situation.

The analysis of these twin riots in the study indicates that the World Bank's imposed policy of cutting expenditure in higher education affected university operations and this led to student unrest on three different levels. The first, which was discussed in the initial part of this chapter, was the reaction of students to the introduction of a cost-sharing policy which came in the form of the payment for tuition fees and other services as well as the withdrawal of out-of-pocket allowances.

Secondly, the deterioration of both academic and welfare standards which were manifested in the acute shortages of teaching and learning facilities as well as the deplorable state of accommodation facilities has been the subject of many of the strikes that affected the institution, its colleges and its campuses for most of the 1990s. In a way the twin riots represent the climax of these protests.

The third aspect, which is a new dimension demonstrated in these riots, is that the government, the university and the students developed strategies to adapt to the harsh economic conditions that were associated with these policies - both at the personal and institutional level. These adaptations put the university administration and the students on a collision course that often degenerated into full-blown riots. For example, in order to address the issue of financing education and to comply with one other World Bank condition, in 1995 the government established the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) as a means of enabling qualified students, who could not finance their studies, to access loans. The implementation of this programme had its teething problems, especially in putting in place an effective mechanism of identifying genuinely needy cases; in its administration; and in its disbursement of funds. On many occasions this met with resistance from the students which is aptly illustrated by the protests that affected Maseno University College in 1997.

At an institutional level the university introduced the Privately Sponsored Students Programme (PSSP) - primarily as a means of raising funds to supplement dwindling financial support from the government. This was also a way of creating an opportunity for qualified students who could not access university education on account of the limited opportunities available for government support.

While this was an effective means of raising funds needed to supplement government support and a justifiable means of providing alternative access to higher education, it became a bone of contention between the university administration and the government sponsored students. Students raised issues of equity and protested against the congestion that was partly blamed on these admissions. For government sponsored students, their counterparts who were admitted through the PSSP were coming to compete for the limited facilities that were available at the university and this worsened the tension.

On the personal level students began engaging in several income generating activities within and outside the campus to supplement the meagre support they received from their parents. While such engagements outside campus posed no problem, those on campus and particularly in the hostels set the students and the administration on another collision course as, for various reasons, most of these activities were outlawed by the university. For example, activities that were outlawed included cooking in the hostels and petty retail businesses, such as tuck shops, the sale of stationery, the sale of electronic gadgets and dealing in alcoholic drinks - amongst others. These riots are a clear illustration of this.

5.3.4 Chepkoilel: November 1999 – March 2000

The protracted mayhem of October–November 1999 on the Main Campus spilled over onto the Chepkoilel Campus. On that campus the unrest was long and drawn out, stretching into 2000 and resulting in the closure of the campus for one academic year. In reality the issues that informed the students' actions during this riot were not directly related to inadequate facilities as is the case in the previous discussion in this chapter. Rather, the students were rebelling against the university authorities who they did not trust to be fair in their disciplinary proceedings against students who had been implicated

in the 1999 riots on both campuses. The actions of the students imply that they perceived the situation to be an “us” versus “them” situation. The clash was taken to another level where the students were questioning or challenging the integrity and impartiality of their “adversaries”, the administration. The riots were also a demonstration of how student politics (SGC campaigns were ongoing during the riots), are able to catalyze bad situations.

An undated Senate report indicates that eighteen students from the Main Campus went to other campuses, amongst them Chepkoilel Campus, “to incite students into striking”, the consequence of which was a strike on Chepkoilel Campus on 20 October 1999. While the value of property destroyed on the Main Campus was put at KShs 14,400, 144.75, the value of destruction at Chepkoilel - which was caused by the disappearance of a Main Campus student - was estimated to be KShs 288,668.50 (Senate Minutes, 26 May 2000).

Six student leaders from the Main Campus were found to have been involved in the riots that occurred on 19 October 1999 and 20 November 1999 while two student leaders from Chepkoilel Campus were found to have participated in similar riots on that campus on 20 October 1999. These students, among others identified by the investigating committee, were instructed to appear before the Students’ Disciplinary Committee of Senate which was scheduled to take place on the Chepkoilel Campus on 17 March 2000. This scenario set the scene for one of the most daring and fierce confrontations with the administration by the students. At the height of the confrontation senior administrative staff, who were conducting the disciplinary meeting, were besieged and held hostage for seven hours amidst a barrage of stones.

Tension built up rapidly as the date for the disciplinary hearing approached with the formation of a committee to disrupt the hearings on 15 March. A notice was issued to the effect that there would be no classes on 16 March. The notice also made allegations that former student leaders from the Main Campus, who had been expelled, would be addressing students. Several other notices with alarming messages were also posted. A Senate documents reports:

Other notices raised were that Muslims should go for a “jihad” against the Christian Union, the MUSO elections would be a battle between Bantu and Nilotes and would also pit the 1st and 2nd years against 3rd and fourth years (Senate Report, undated, p. 2).

There were other unconfirmed reports that some former student leaders, who had been expelled from the university, would be addressing the students. The minutes of the Special Senate Meeting held on 17 March, for example, included the following:

That on Wednesday morning, posters appeared on notice boards with threats of violence pitting Bantus versus Nilotes. The notice also announced a planned meeting on the next day, Thursday 16th March 2000, ostensibly to be addressed by the former student leader Mr....(Name withheld) who had been expelled by the university and was currently involved in active student national politics. The meeting was also to be addressed by a Mr....(withheld), another student activist (p. 3).

On 16 March students, who were later identified as members of the “Disciplinary Disruption Committee”, stormed the office of the Principal and demanded that the Principal address students on the following:

1. Students facing disciplinary should be given a fair and favourable hearing.
2. The accuser should be present during the hearing to substantiate claims.
3. Transport should be provided for both the accused and their witnesses to attend the disciplinary hearing at Main Campus on 17 March 2000.
4. Students should be refunded money equivalent to the 8 days that the semester had been shortened.
5. Campus security should not handle cases since they were not trained to investigate.
6. Victimization of students should cease.
7. Students should be supplied with insecticide since flies had invaded their hostels
(*Op. cit.*, p. 3).

The report further indicates that following consultations it was agreed that the Principal need not address the students as “a majority of the issues were Senate matters and a memorandum was released instead to address the concerns.” The students left the Principal’s office disappointed. Two hours later the students assembled and marched to

the Campus gate shouting and carrying branches. They were repulsed by law enforcement officers who were at the gate.

On Friday, 17 March 2000, the disciplinary committee commenced its proceedings at 9.00 a.m. However, the students, led by a group referring to itself as the “Students Disciplinary Disruption Committee”, began pelting the venue of the proceedings with stones for over an hour - forcing the committee to adjourn its proceedings. The committee was held hostage on the premises for about seven hours (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, June 2012).

While the genesis of the unrest of the previous year’s riots was poor living conditions and problems with transcripts, this had changed radically in the riots that took place at Chepkoilel. The main issues that emerged had to do with the students’ resistance to the disciplinary process. Their actions indicate that they did not want to be subjected to this process and that they would accept it only on certain conditions which they outlined to the Principal. These included: (i) Fair and favourable hearing; (ii) Presence of the accuser during the hearing; (iii) Provision of transport for both the accused and their witnesses; (iv) Barring of university security officers from handling the cases because “they were not trained to investigate”; and (v) Victimization should cease.

In this interesting scenario, therefore, issues informing students’ actions in a time span of five months evolved from complaints about deplorable conditions of accommodation to the “kidnap of a student leader”; the banning of the SGC; and the introduction of stringent rules in the hostels; as well as a rejection of the disciplinary process. In each stage of this evolution the strike became more and more complicated with new factors and dimensions arising. The second riot on the Main Campus as well as the last one on Chepkoilel Campus reflect a situation of paranoia where most sections of the university were deeply suspicious of the actions of the other players. As will be seen in chapter six, there was orchestration and a playing out of national political issues, creating a confluence with critical institutional matters hence the manner in which the riots manifested.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the theme of unrest associated with flawed international and local policy and pressure resulting from a sharp demand for higher education. This theme is broken down further into the following sub-themes for clarity: (i) Issues associated with the immediate impact of introducing the policy; (ii) Issues associated with the pressure of the teaching and learning facilities; and (iii) Issues associated with the inadequacy of both teaching welfare services. The study analyzed two cases of unrest to demonstrate the impact of the first sub-theme which were the June/July 1991 wave of unrest that affected all the campuses and constituent college of Moi University and the 1997 Maseno University College protest that was caused by the operations of the Higher Education Loans Board. For the second and third sub-themes, the study analyzed the following four incidents: Chepkoilel Campus - 1993, Maseno University College - 1994 and Main Campus twin riots - 1999 and their spill over to Chepkoilel Campus - 1999 and 2000.

The chapter has demonstrated that the Kenyan government was compelled to adopt a policy on higher education of drastically reducing expenditure which was part of the conditions set by the World Bank for its Structural Adjustment loans. The World Bank's policy of budgetary cuts in higher education was based on the Human Capital Theory that relied on the rate of return analysis in determining its support for projects in countries seeking its support. This World Bank's position - that concluded that returns on investment in higher education are less compared to investment in basic education - has since been exposed as narrow in scope and as ignoring some important benefits that are associated with a highly educated population. This, for example, is aptly demonstrated by Sammoff and Carrol (2004) who argue:

But educated people clearly have many other effects on society: educated people are well positioned to be economic and social entrepreneurs, having a far reaching impact on the economic and social wellbeing of their communities. They are also vital to creating an environment in which development is possible. Good governance, strong institutions, and a developed infrastructure are all needed if business is to thrive-and none of these is possible without highly educated people (p. 39).

While the government of Kenya adopted the cost sharing policy, in compliance with the World Bank conditions, there was during this time a sharp demand for higher education that had also led to a double and dual intake of university admissions within a short period. This led to exponential increase in student enrollments. These two developments: the drastic reduction of funding; and the sharp rise in enrollment, at the same time, constitutes a tragic flaw in Kenya's higher education policy which was largely responsible for the unrest witnessed in Kenya's higher education generally and in Moi University in particular. Moi University witnessed violent student riots for most part of the 1990s concerning academic and welfare problems that affected its campuses and constituent colleges.

On the academic front burning issues included a shortage of lecture space; a shortage of teaching and laboratory equipment; a lack of books and essential items, such as calculators and stationary in the bookshop; and ill-equipped libraries. Examination matters included inadequate service delivery which was manifested in the delay in the issuing of transcripts; numerous errors in transcripts; missing examination marks; and doubts that were raised concerning the marking of examination scripts. The poorly developed infrastructure, especially in the hastily created constituent colleges and campuses, resulted in an inadequate supply of electricity in the form of frequent blackouts; poorly developed water supply services and connections which led to frequent shortages; and the poor road or track links on, and between, campuses that made movement from one site to another difficult. With regard to accommodation, overcrowding has by far been the most common problem which brought with it issues associated with congestion. Facilities, such as sanitation, were used by a population of twice or even three times greater than that they were originally intended to serve. Consequently, there were perennial problems with hygiene caused by poor maintenance, broken taps, leaking sewers, etc. The catering services had to cut down on staff and they had to operate on a shoe string budget, resulting in inadequate food of poor dietary quality.

While fee-related issues have not been pronounced, there have always been complaints from the students about being denied registration because they had outstanding unpaid fees. Meanwhile, there were also complaints about the Higher Education Loans Board regarding the manner in which it allocated its funds and the speed at which this was done. The “survival” techniques employed by the students, such as cooking to cut down on expenditure and engaging in small businesses, also created a battle front between the students and the university authorities who had outlawed these activities.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL CONSCIENCE, NATIONAL ISSUES AND EMERGING BATTLE FRONTS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines student unrest associated with three thematic areas or classifications as captured in Chapter 4. These areas are (i) Unrest associated with critical national issues (National consciousness); (ii) Unrest associated with student politics, factional differences and competition for control of student resources; and (iii) Unrest associated with a clash of interest with organized groups/local community.

The study develops these themes by highlighting their salient features by means of analytic narrative and discourse; describing these features; and by drawing illustrations from appropriate examples of actual incidents that best capture, or clarify, the detail in order to provide insights. Examples used are the various actual strike incidents that the study examined and which cover the entire study period. These themes are not confined to the incidents that are used to illustrate them. Rather, the incidents are those that best illustrate these themes by creating a deeper insight into them. Indeed, these themes are at the core and constitute important factors that have informed student unrest, generally, and the occurrence of the specific riots and strikes that have been witnessed and recorded in the history of Moi University, in particular.

A case in point is the sub-theme concerning the struggle for democracy. While, in the wake of political assassinations, protests best illustrate the students' political concerns and involvement in the struggle for democracy, this sub-theme is not just confined to the one or two incidents that are used to illustrate it. This concern is alive in the period characterized by unrest as well as in the numerous cases where it is not necessarily revealed and captured. Examples are numerous: support for the lecturers' and teachers' strikes of 1993-4 and 1997, respectively; Main Campus twin riots of 1999; the clash

between the JAB and PSSP students in the Main Campus and Eldoret West Campus in 2003; as well as the protests and shouts demanding the implementation of the MoU in Kabarak in 2004 - among numerous others. They all confirm the political conscience that is alive in the student protests.

As such, through the discussion in this chapter the study demonstrates that political consciousness is critical and manifests itself in the student protests witnessed at the university during the study period. By engaging in the protests, students were demanding better performance from those in authority in the management of public affairs - be it economic, political or social. The students showed a bitter resentment towards the government's deliberate actions of silencing divergent views and students' advocating progressive change in the management of public affairs.

In this chapter the study also demonstrates that national political power struggles and intrigues played out at the university. The students often took sides in support of certain factions without a clear ideology - often demonstrating unfounded animosity and negative tribalism which threatened the smooth running of the university's operations by means of violent clashes. When Kenya's struggle for the so-called "second liberation" degenerated into a visionless contest to acquire raw political power by the numerous political parties which was bereft of ideology but complete with the manipulation of tribal emotions, students who were advocating progressive change became mixed up in messy tribal alliances that often emerged strongly during student leadership elections. This is best illustrated by the stalemate involving the position of Chairman during the Main Campus election of 2000, the 2006 WUCST and 2007 Chepkoilel elections.

In this chapter the study argues and demonstrates that with an evolving scenario characterizing the university, especially with regard to adverse financial and economic realities, new battles and battle-fronts are emerging. Faced with the harsh economic realities and conditions at the university, the students who had, hitherto, not been bothered by the amount of resources collectively owned by the student body begin to keenly focus and develop a very passionate interest in accessing and controlling these

resources - either directly as an individual entity or by forming alliances as a better means of bargaining for control. Because of the power that comes with a student leadership position to control these resources, either directly or indirectly, these positions have an added premium that, consequently, makes them hot beds of fierce contestation among students. Over a period of time the annual elections to fill these positions have, therefore, become highly emotive - characterized by factional alignments, negotiations, bargaining, coercion, blackmail and the whipping up of tribal emotions that characterize competitive politics at the national level. During such times, the atmosphere at the university is highly charged and tense and on several occasions has degenerated into physical confrontation, leading to a closure of the university or sections of it. Again, the Main Campus election of 2000, the WUCST election of 2006 and Chepkoilel election of 2007 are illustrations of these.

In this chapter the study also demonstrates that in a few recorded incidents, university students have rallied in solidarity in order to violently fight against perceived threats to their common interests from organized groups within the campus environs or within the immediate community. The 1988 clash with the National Youth Service officers in Gilgil, the 1991 clash with petty traders at the trading center adjacent to the Main Campus and the protests against increased fare prizes at Main Campus in 2009 are examples of this.

6.2 Strikes Associated with Critical National Issues

Critical national issues often spark off strike action by the university students in protest against what is seen as retrogressive government actions. In this study these are further sub-divided into three sub-themes which are: (i) The struggle for democracy and Accountability; (ii) Political power struggles; and (iii) Critical non-political concerns.

6.2.1 Struggle for Democracy and Accountability in Public Matters

Student involvement in the struggle for democracy is best illustrated by the demonstrations that rocked all the public universities in 1990 in protest against the disappearance and subsequent murder of the, then, minister of foreign affairs, the Hon. Dr Robert Ouko. Students perceived government participation in the murder that was

seen as an effort to silence calls for pluralism and they demonstrated their anger through violent strikes that crippled the university for several days. Three theories have been advanced to try to explain the murder of the minister and they all allude to government involvement (Hornsby, 2012; Mutunga, 1996). Although Dr Ouko was a minister in the same government which was accused of being dictatorial and opposed to democratic change, he was seen as an articulate person who was capable of effectively confronting the criticism of the government and explaining some of its policies. He was admired by the university students who saw him as sympathetic to their quest for an improved democratic space (Interview No. 13, Hornsby, 2012). Referring to this, a former student leader at the time of the protests who was interviewed commented:

Yeah, remember this was the time when agitation for political pluralism was very high and the government was reacting as well. Quite a number of student leaders had been jailed, some of them had disappeared and so it was easy to identify, it was easy for students to identify with these causes of struggle for political pluralism, disappearance of students leaders all over sudden... whereas the loss of the late Dr Ouko was considered as pro establishment, but many students actually identified with him as an intellectual and as a person who even if you don't agree with him he had the diplomacy to face the students squarely in a debate, unlike his colleagues. Of course, what triggered now the unrest was that first disappeared and after two days his body was found and there were riots all over and the government didn't handle it well (Interview No. 3, Eldoret, May 2012).

Students marched from the university's Main Campus to Cheptiret, a small trading centre fifteen kilometers from the university. At a junction connected to the main Eldoret-Nakuru highway they barricaded the road for some hours before going back to the university and staging class boycotts for close on a week. Later they demanded, and were provided with, university transport in the form of buses to attend the funeral of the late minister. Similar protests were witnessed after the death of the Rev. Alexander Kipsang Muge, the Anglican Bishop of Eldoret. The bishop was a fiery critic of the KANU government under President Moi and was perceived by the university students to represent a progressive and reformist person. Again his death - which was caused by a road accident, after he had been warned by a powerful minister not to travel to the home turf of that minister - was perceived with much suspicion.

Another illustration of student protest against perceived government involvement in high level assassinations was after the death of Dr Odhiambo Mbai. During the drafting of a new constitution for the country Dr Mbai chaired the important devolution committee of the National Delegates' Conference that was carrying out its duties in Nairobi's Bomas of Kenya. This committee had proposed radical changes to government structures to allow for more devolution of power to levels away from central government. The new NARC government was uncomfortable with the proposals and was perceived to be reneging on its promise for a new constitutional dispensation and appeared to be following in the footsteps of the ousted KANU (Hornsby 2012; east African Standard, June 2011). Students from all the campuses of Moi University protested in Eldoret in peaceful demonstrations until the police barred them from boarding the university's buses in order to travel back to campus. Later students from nearly all public universities attended the funeral of the deceased, protesting all the way from their campuses and chanting anti-government slogans (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, May 2012).

While these three examples best illustrate the students' open demonstration of condemning negative government actions and the suppression of reform and dissent, the study also established that the issue of students fighting against government suppression and identifying with progressive forces by means of protests and demonstrations is evident throughout the study period. Whenever actions were successfully realized, especially on the political front, the emboldened students would rally to demand more freedom and better services and increased rights. For example, the protests witnessed in the early to mid-1990s also had much to do with the gains achieved in opening up democratic space through the introduction of multi-party democracy in the repeal of Section 2(a) of Kenya's constitution.

This is also seen when, in the 2002 election, the KANU government that had ruled for 24 years was defeated by the NARC government, ushering in a feeling of a new democratic space. In a document sent to some media houses and that may be traced back to a section of Chepkoilel Campus students, this sense of a new beginning and a confidence to

demand improved operations of public institutions is aptly captured in its opening paragraph which states:

The year 2003 is a very special year of transition towards a positive direction. Gone is the era of political correctness, intimidation and high handedness. This wave of change has swept like a bush fire virtually every part of Kenya. Moi University-Chepkoilel campus is not an exception (Security/Intelligence Documents, 29 January 2003).

6.2.1.1 The NARC MOU Protests: July 2004.

Another incident that aptly demonstrates students demand for improved management of public matters occurred on 31 July 2004 during which “...university students disrupted funeral proceedings, shouted down and booed the president, misbehaved, destroyed property belonging to Kabarak University, roughed up some dignitaries and stole property” (Senate Report, 2004). Records (*Ibid*) indicate that students at several public universities, including Maseno, Kenyatta and Egerton as well as PSSP (Privately Sponsored Students’ Programme) students from the West Campus of Moi University, were instrumental in disrupting proceedings during the funeral and burial ceremony of Lena Moi at Kabarak University on 31 July 2004. The deceased was the wife of President Daniel Arap Moi - the retired second President of Kenya.

While students from the main campus had made an arrangement with the university to be provided with a university bus to attend the funeral, those of Eldoret West Campus did not seem to have made such an arrangement since they were probably preoccupied with the election of their Students’ Governing Council that took place on Friday, 30 July 2004. Last minute arrangements, however, appear to have been made by a few student leaders in haste and in an uncoordinated manner which did not follow accepted procedures. The Senate Report (*Ibid*) regarding the arrangements reports that

Students from PSSP-KPA-Moi University did not make any formal requisition to attend the funeral. It appears they reacted only after learning that Main Campus students would attend using ‘their’ bus.

During this time the tension that had erupted into a fierce fight between the two groups of students, the PSSP and government sponsored ones, had not completely dissipated. The report further notes that

On not having transport in time, some rowdy students roughed up a university officer. Eventually, however, the PSSP students left a little late in the morning. It is imperative to note that the students were not accompanied by a responsible officer and were not well behaved from the beginning of the journey....

The students arrived at the funeral carrying sticks; shouting in an expression of mourning; and demanding to view the body. However, they appear to have demonstrated some restraint when the request to view the body was declined by security personnel. Trouble began when the head of State, President Kibaki, took to the podium to address the mourners. The students shouted the President down and booed him while shouting: “*MOU* (Memorandum of Understanding), *MOU*, *Anglo-Leasing*, *Kibaki aende*, *Lucy akufe*, *Moi Arudi* (Kibaki should go, Lucy should die, Moi should return) (Senate Report, 2004).²

The main issue that the students were protesting against was the manner in which the ruling elite were handling critical national issues. Firstly, students expressed outrage at the manner in which the Kibaki government was reneging on a pre-election agreement which had enabled the NARC coalition to defeat the KANU party to assume power. Secondly, the students agitated against allegations of massive corruption that had marred the NARC government which had come to power on an election platform of zero tolerance of corruption (Hornsby, 2012:681, 698, 719 and 725-727).

²During this time, at the national level, the NARC government was dogged by several controversies and corruption scandals, which had created much discontent and disillusion across the country. A critical issue, for example, was the manner in which the Kibaki regime had handled the MOU upon which several opposition parties had sealed agreement to share power prior to the 2002 election. It was, generally, felt that a large section of the partnership that sealed the agreement had been short-changed.

The students, therefore, shouted down and booed the president as a way of demonstrating solidarity and real discontent that was prevalent in the country. Indeed, the report concludes that

The indiscipline of the students was partly as a result of the present political situation prevalent in the country at the time. However, if stringent measures as to the rules of visits by a campus were followed, the situation might have been saved.

The riots were mainly an expression of discontent with the manner in which the NARC government was handling critical national issues. The students were protesting against massive corruption, in form of the Anglo-Leasing scandal associated with the NARC government, which had been reported in the local media. During the time massive corruption deals involving billions of shillings had been exposed in the local media. They involved violation of procurement procedures in the paying out of large sums of money to legally non-existent firms in the supply of passports, payment for the construction of a CID forensic laboratory, payment for the building of a navy ship for the Kenya Navy and provision of computer and video equipment to the police, all worth over Kshs 15 billion (Ibid: 725-727). Hornsby asserts

During 2004-5, evidence grew, that despite its rhetoric, Kibaki's government had adopted the same kleptocratic attitude to state funds as its predecessors (p. 725).

Students were therefore expressing anger at the manner in which the Kibaki government had handled pre-election agreements with sections of the coalition government that had enabled it to assume power and also the massive corruption that had emerged in the recently elected government that had stood on a platform of zero tolerance to corruption (Ibid).

6.2.2 Political Power Struggles

The study has also established that political power struggles at a national level find expression in student riots and strikes. For example, having lost a national election, opposition parties continue with their agenda of trying to paint the winning party in a bad light in order to diminish its chances of winning subsequent elections. One of the ways

that this was done was to destabilize the smooth running of key public institutions, amongst them the public universities, as a way of demonstrating that government under the, then, ruling party, KANU, had failed in the running of these key public institutions. The President of the Republic is by law the Chancellor of all public universities in Kenya unless he opts to appoint someone else. Before the reform introduced after the 2002 election he also appointed the Vice-Chancellors. With reference to this, one of the respondents - a former senior administrator at the university - pointed out:

When I eventually chaired the Disciplinary Committee, you see different dynamics, particularly events outside the university that precipitate riots, it is so difficult to control. When there is student election going on, Orange Democratic Party (ODM) will sponsor students, KANU will sponsor students, this party will sponsor students. So you have a mirror image of a nation within the university and like all the national elections, there were riots, there were fights those things were not different in the universities and sometimes those made us close the universities (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, July 2012).

The initial struggle and for positive change and democratization had by this time degenerated into competition for raw political power that did not go with commensurate vision and ideology for reconstruction. Hornsby (2012)notes:

During 1992, a trans-ethnic movement for national renewal, human rights and economic liberalization had rapidly disintegrated into hostile, ethnically focused teams, incapable of compromise in their quest to seize state. As in the 1960s, the competition for power had been reduced to a contest between ethnic coalitions built around powerful individuals. For the majority of Kenyans, particularly those from ethnic groups with powerful, popular and wealthy presidential candidates, ethnicity proved the single most effective predictor of political preference (p. 537).

Several incidents of unrest demonstrate the impact of political power struggles playing out at university level one of which is the twin riots on the Main Campus in 1999 and the spill-over to Chepkoilel in 2000.

6.2.2.1 The Main Campus Twin Riots and Chepkoilel: 2000

The 1999 twin riots on the Main Campus that spilled over to Chepkoilel Campus best illustrate how political power struggles play out at an institutional level by taking

advantage of its prevalent short comings. While the student and welfare issues at the university at the time were of critical concern and could not in any way be ignored, findings relating to these two particular riots point to an orchestrated confluence of national political struggles being played out at the university. Several facts support this conclusion.

Firstly, the student leaders' approach was extremely confrontational as their internal memorandums were characterized by terse and uncompromising language; deadlines were unrealistic (between a few hours and a few days); students mobilized at short notice; and staff, including the Vice-Chancellor, were harassed. Secondly, several students went to other campuses to instigate rioting, such as that which actually took place on Chepkoilel Campus. Thirdly, allegations of the abduction of a student at another public university had also been made a week earlier (Interview No. 13). Fourthly, during the same year (1999), a total of 15 cases of student riots, which affected all other public universities, were reported between February and November - the highest in the history of student unrest in Kenya's higher education in such a short period. Fifthly, during the time of these incidents of unrest there was an active national students' body which included membership of former student leaders who had been expelled from the public universities. And lastly, this is confirmed by the responses made during the interviews where respondents kept referring to this issue. For example, on being asked about the alleged abduction of one of the student leaders, a respondent said:

They had planned with the director of academics to make it look like he had been abducted in order to create a crisis because a leader had been abducted in the University of Nairobi, Kikuyu Campus about the same week. So all these things were all choreographed to all depict how the Moi government was failing even to protect students. Because the coincidence did look strange, how can a student be kidnapped in the University of Nairobi and then a repeat in Moi University? (Interview No. 13, Eldoret, June 2012).

During one of the interviews with a former student leader who served at the time of these riots, this issue also kept emerging spontaneously as is best illustrated below.

- I: But these issues have always been there and as you said, while you were a leader issues kept coming but you were able to address, what really made this one to really go that bad?
- R: Political landscape at that time was the opposition versus the government, the ruling party and the chancellor of all the public universities was the President so the only way for the opposition was to make it look like the system was failing was through the students' leadership that they could close the institutions of higher learning and say that is a failed leadership, so that is what led it to be that because politicians were now getting in through the institutions of higher learning.
- I: So they directly influenced students through ...
- R: Through the students' leadership and, of course, out of this there were those who were being sponsored by these opposition parties and it used to be successive. You could hear that Nairobi University has been closed and maybe after 1 week Moi has been closed, after another 1 week these other colleges have been closed and it used to spread like wildfire.
- I: Okay. How would they influence the students to go on strike?
- R: If you find that the SGC Chairman and the Secretary General are the ones who call for these *Kamukunjis*, they just call for a *kamukunji* for things that are not even there, then after that they have their own followers who are hooligans and those are the ones who would cause the destructions when that *kamukunji* is still going on and then they declare that there is no learning until these issues are addressed and when they say that of course you will not go to class because you fear for your life and so people boycott classes even if the students again say the issues have been addressed, they become adamant. (Interview No.9, Nairobi, 5 May 20120)

In order to rally support for the protests, the students raised institutional issues that affected them. This, of course, was not hard to achieve due to the plethora of welfare and academic shortcomings occasioned by international and national policy change demands that have been discussed in the first thematic area. During the Main Campus riots of 1999, for example, student leaders issued internal memorandums to senior officers of the university demanding immediate action on a large number of grievances within three or four days - some within a few hours - which were hardly, by any means, realistic demands.

In the ensuing events the university became an arena or a "war front" in a high stakes political power game in which a discernible pattern in the unrest was apparent. Firstly, "routine issues" - as referred to by respondents - suddenly become critical and urgent. And as if it had just dawned on them, student leaders, factions of the student body and student activists began addressing the issues with exceptional zeal, demanding immediate

action and giving stringent deadlines of expected action in their communication which took the form of internal memorandums to senior management and copies posted on all notice boards. A flurry of activity to address the issues was often met with little success because of the unrealistic time lines. Tension built up rapidly due to the rigour of the student leaders who came up with a barrage of issues, raising a sharp sense of suspicion within management which may already have been divided. Paranoia set in and a deep sense of distrust prevailed at all levels, triggering off a set of extreme counter actions. In this particular case, although the “disappearance” of a student leader aggravated a situation that had been contained, subsequent actions by the university administration - even after students had reported back after being sent home for five weeks - reflects a deep sense of suspicion that was still in existence at the university. These actions included the banning of the SGC; the requirement imposed on all students to sign “bond forms”; and the immediate enforcement of the rule prohibiting cooking in hostels - a rule that seems to have been ignored before the protests.

With the complete breakdown in communication and a disbanded student leadership, it only took a trigger in the form of two university janitors enforcing the “no cooking” rule by apprehending two students, who were found contravening it, to ignite the kind of unprecedented mayhem that was witnessed in the second wave of the twin riots

6.2.3 Critical Non-Political Issues

Critical national issues that were not, necessarily, political in nature often find expression in student unrest. The best illustration of this is in the lecturers’ strike of 1994 and the national teachers’ strike of 1997.

In 1994 lecturers at all the public universities went on strike to demand the registration of their union when the government declined to do so. While a democratic space had earlier on been realized through the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992 (Hornsby, 2012), lecturers did not understand why the government was unwilling to register their union (Atteh, 1996). Students came out to show solidarity with their lecturers although there was nothing much they could do since, without any teaching taking place, the

university had no option but to send the students home until a resolution could be reached between the government and the lecturers. Students however had come out strongly in support of the strike and even when the university was re-opened in June 1994, the stalemate continued with strong support from the students. This forced another closure of the university. Eleven students were later to appear before the Students Disciplinary Committee of Senate on various charges of attending illegal meetings and incitement. Five of them were found guilty and suspended for varying lengths of time (Klopp and Orina, 2002).

In 1997 the powerful Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) declared a nationwide strike to demand better pay. Students at the university demonstrated in support of the teachers. Student and staff protests to fight for increased academic freedom and better working conditions have been recorded by several studies. For example, Nigeria recorded some of the boldest and most daring of these struggles that took place in the 1980s and 1990s during the rule of Abacha and Babangida. During the late 1980s a wave of student protests against the structural adjustment programmes was witnessed in the same country (Zezeza, 2003).

6.3 Strikes Associated with Student Politics/Competition for Control of Student Resources

Some incidents of violence among the students have been a consequence of differences amongst the students, themselves, and competition for the control of student resources by holding elective positions in the student leadership.

6.3.1 Student Elections

Annual elections for leadership positions have - to some extent - created situations that have, occasionally, degenerated into ugly and violent protests that have led to a widespread destruction of property, especially if the elections were not run well. In some instances protests have been so violent that entire elections were nullified while in other cases results of particular positions on the Students Governing Council were declared null and void. Election time, therefore, is generally a tense and volatile period during the

calendar year of the university. Two incidents that illustrate how student elections can degenerate into student violence are the 2006 election in the Western University College of Science and Technology and the failed election on the Chepkoilel Campus in 2007.

6.3.1.1 WUCST Election Clashes: 2006

Elections for the Students' Governing Council's elective positions at the newly established Western University College of Science and Technology is an illustration of how student politics and competition for the control of student resources can degenerate into physical confrontation and clashes, resulting in the disruption of academic programmes through the closure of the university. The incident was further complicated by the bitter animosity between students in the government sponsored programmes and those in the privately sponsored programmes and the local community's entry into the fray when members of the community came to take sides with the self-sponsored students - the majority of whom were residents at the university or in the surrounding areas. This brought with it an element of negative ethnicity as a factor in the clashes. Nevertheless, leadership intrigues and cut-throat competition for the control of student resources was, largely, responsible for the riots where the whipping up of tribal and PSSP *versus* JAB emotions were strategies employed by the aspirant candidates to win the election.

The Western University College was established in 2003 as a constituent of Moi University and the management of the students' welfare, including that of student leadership, was heavily borrowed from the mother institution. Student leadership comprised eleven elected members and one co-opted member, making up the Students' Governing Council (SGC) which was elected into office once a year. Reports of the university and that of an *ad-hoc* committee established to investigate the strike indicate that tension had begun building up when the college adopted the regulations of the mother institution for student elections. The regulations imposed high academic and discipline requirements on clearance to contest elections. Students resisted those requirements, forcing the election that was meant to have been conducted in November of 2005 to be postponed until February 2006 (Academic Board Report, March 2006; Security Report, March 2006).

Campaigns for the election began on 18 February 2006 and triggered a tension between PSSP and JAB students during which an ethnic angle emerged. A report by security office, for example records that

Campaigns started immediately on the weekend on 18th February 2006. However, there was polarization of the student's community based on PSSP: JAB and ethnicity, especially on the Chairman seat. District-based organization also stepped up their activities possibly to influence the voting pattern and results(Academic Board Report, 2006; Principal's Report, 2006).

During one of the campaign's meetings on 24 February, a fight broke out between students supporting the different candidates. However, although tension was building up, there were no further incidents and the election went smoothly. It was not until the results for the position of Chairman were announced late at night that supporters of the candidate who lost started holding protest meetings, urging their colleagues to join in to reject the results of the election. They agitated for a boycott of classes on the following Monday.

The protests persisted throughout the night during which security officers in the compound were roughed up and a university vehicle was commandeered. The protests continued throughout the weekend and degenerated into a fierce clash between PSSP and JAB students on Monday when the former - most of whom resided outside the Campus - arrived for classes. Initially, the PSSP students were driven off campus but, as their members swelled, they regrouped and managed to overpower the JAB students with the help of members of the immediate community. The college was closed for a period of close to one month before students could resume their studies to complete the semester.

An analysis of the reports indicates that the fracas concerned negative ethnicity, the hostility between PSSP and JAB Students and the competition to manage student run businesses in the Students' Centre. Positioning oneself as a student leader was often perceived to be a means of ensuring control of the businesses.

Negative ethnicity manifested itself in the manner in which students mobilized support in the election. Students from western Kenya and most other parts were pitted against those from central Kenya. Coincidentally, most students enrolled in the self-sponsored programme came from the western part of Kenya where the college is situated. This phenomenon was a result of the fact that as a means of saving costs most students in the self-sponsored programme preferred to enroll in public universities close to their homes.

6.3.1.2 Chepkoilel Failed Elections: 2007

Another incident that illustrates how student elections can degenerate into riots is the case of Chepkoilel Campus in 2007. In April 2007, during the election of the Students' Governing Council (SGC) students stormed the counting hall when counting was in process. They seized all the ballots and burnt them, rendering the whole exercise futile. This particular incident demonstrates the seriousness with which students took election to office and, more significantly, that the careless and reckless manner in which university officers handled matters of student leadership could occasion serious agitation and strikes by the student body with far reaching consequences.

The Principal and Dean of Students Reports (23 April and 9 May 2007) indicate that during the day voting went smoothly and that there was no serious build up of tension which is normally associated with students elections. The election was held on Saturday, 21 April 2007. It began at 7:30 a.m. and started smoothly. During the day, however, as voting continued one student was caught with excess ballot papers. This appeared to “confirm” what the students had suspected: that there were several irregularities in the entire exercise. Nevertheless, the election went smoothly until it came time to count the ballots. When the counting of votes for the position of Chairman commenced students became rowdy. Within a short period students had mobilized; they stormed the counting hall and disrupted the exercise, demanding that it be called off. In the ensuing melee students seized all the ballots and burnt them (*Ibid*).

A meeting was held between senior university management and aspirant student candidates to deliberate on the factors that had occasioned the reaction of the students.

The issues that emerged pointed to some laxity in the management of the election process. For example, emergent issues included that names were missing from the voters register; that the use of national ID cards in the voting process was contrary to standard practice; that the names of some candidates were not on the ballot paper; that there was a failure to adhere to simple procedures during voting; and that ballot papers had been carelessly handled as some ballot papers were found outside the voting hall.

Besides numerous other simple procedural issues, these ones did not seem to be adequately addressed by the election officials which led to a buildup of tension. The matter was also aggravated by an ethnic tension between two groups of students and the appointment of former immediate student leaders as officials of the exercise who were perceived by the students to harbour factional interests.

Several reasons explain this situation. Firstly, during this time national politics in terms of voting patterns are played out, complete with the tribal voting blocks that are always witnessed during national elections. This scenario is made worse when these elections coincide with the national ones because the tensions and emotions associated with the national politics are more pronounced.

Secondly, the tension witnessed during these elections is explained by the fact that students are gripped by a cut-throat competition for the elective positions in order to control the resources collectively owned by the students. Students pay a subscription fee in order to be members of the Students' Union and student leaders have an important say in the utilization of these proceeds, not to mention the allowances that come with holding these positions. Apart from this, some business premises in the Students' Centre are owned by the Students' Union and they are always rented out to some students to run their own businesses. Some candidates have been known to promise their cronies these premises in return for their support during the campaigns.

In the 2000 election on the Main Campus the position of Chairman was left vacant after the loser - who was only narrowly defeated in the hotly contested election that had

polarized the entire campus - and students protested against the results, alleging vote-rigging. Two major blocks had formed along tribal lines, based on the part of the country the students came from. The country was divided into two blocks: the western and eastern zones. Such a scenario could be exacerbated by the inadvertent inclination of a section of the administration towards a particular side. In this election tensions were compounded by unconfirmed rumours of sections of management being sympathetic to certain candidates (Interview No. 5, Nairobi, June 2012; Interview No. 22, Eldoret, July 2012).

Similar incidents were recorded at the, then, Western University College of Science and Technology in February 2006 which led to the closure of the college for five weeks after a section of the student population went on the rampage to protest the election results. During this election it emerged that one of the factors that caused the tension was the competition to control some business premises on the campus. In the 2007 Chepkoilel Campus election protests turned violent when students stormed the counting hall, seizing all the election material and destroying it.

6.3.2 Factional Differences: PSSP Vs JAB

Some serious strikes have been triggered by grave differences and tragic animosity amongst students. As such, student politics have resulted in violent clashes between students registered in different university programmes, with the protagonists being students in the government sponsored programmes (JAB), on the one hand, and those in the privately sponsored programmes (PSSP), on the other. These strikes occurred simultaneously on the main campus and the Eldoret West campus on 29–30 October 2003, and on the Western University College Campus in February 2006.

6.3.2.1 JAB vs PSSP Students: September 2003

The underlying animosity between the Joint Admissions Board (JAB) government sponsored students and those in the privately sponsored students programmes (PSSP) emerged during a fierce clash that took place simultaneously on the Main Campus and on the Eldoret West (KPA) campus on 29 and 30 September 2003. The clashes resulted in the widespread destruction of property and a closure of the Main Campus. An analysis of the detailed report prepared by an *Ad-Hoc* Committee of Senate indicates that there had been a build-up of tension within the student community for close on a year.

The Moi University Festival of the Arts (MUFA), an annual event which took place during the first semester, offered a perfect opportunity for a confrontation between the two warring groups. The festival involved cultural activities, such as cultural dance, drama and beauty pageants - among several other items. In that particular year the event which normally took place in the Main Campus was scheduled to take place, simultaneously, on the various campuses including the Eldoret West campus which was utilized mainly for PSSP students.

The opening ceremony at the Eldoret town hall went ahead as planned, followed by a procession to the Eldoret West, Kenya Pipeline Authority (KPA) Campus for the activities scheduled for the day. On arrival at the campus, a few students were involved in the looting of food from the university's cafeteria. However, this did not continue for long. It was when the next batch of students from the Main Campus, ferried in the same bus, arrived that a fierce clash ensued between the JAB and PSSP students. Since the PSSP students who were based at the West campus outnumbered the JAB students, the latter were overpowered. During this clash several students were severely injured and property, including the bus, was extensively damaged. The festival activities were cut short and the injured students were rushed to hospital.

The news of what had transpired on the Eldoret West Campus incited Main Campus students—a majority of whom were JAB programme students. They broke into some facilities, looted property, held a meeting (*kamukunji*) and vowed to walk all the way to the Eldoret West Campus (40kms away) on a revenge mission. They also destroyed some

houses at the staff quarters that accommodated PSSP students who, sensing danger, had already fled. The fracas spilled over to the following day (30 October) and was particularly fierce on the Main Campus where students held demonstrations and harassed senior university staff. Students held a meeting at the Students' Centre and demanded to be addressed by Vice-Chancellor. However, on heeding this demand, the students changed their mind and forced him to walk back to his office amidst heckling, harassment and some stone-throwing. While a section of the students demonstrated in the vicinity of the gate, some camped outside the administration block and a few others went to the Vice-Chancellor's office and presented him with the following demands and a three minute deadline to comply:

1. That the KPA campus be closed
2. That the students injured during the fracas at the KPA be compensated
3. That the director of PSSP be sacked
4. That the integration of the PSSP students with regular students at the Main Campus be stopped (Senate Report, January 2004).

They, then, left the office to allow him to comply with their demands. Within the three minutes the students were back in the Vice-Chancellor's office to "follow up" on their action. After a brief consultation with the Chancellor and the Ministry in order to attempt to diffuse the tension, the Vice-Chancellor who was in an acting capacity at the time yielded to the students' demands and made an announcement to the rest of the students who were outside that the KPA Campus would be closed and that the injured students would be compensated. The Vice-Chancellor was also forced to accompany students to the gate and, later, to a police station at the nearby Kesses Centre to negotiate the release of some students who had been arrested.

While this was going on, a large section of students had held a demonstration, flushing out Engineering students who were reluctant to join the strike. They commandeered two vehicles and started proceeding to town. However, at the Kesses Centre they were repulsed by members of the community and a contingent of police that had arrived there.

They were driven back to campus. At a hurriedly convened Senate meeting held at 3:00 p.m. on the Faculty of Health Sciences' town campus, it was decided that the Main Campus be closed indefinitely.

In conclusion, the Senate *Ad-Hoc* Committee summarized the causes of the student disturbances in five broad areas. These were:

- (i) A build-up of tension and discontent among the student community over a period of time, occasioned by several factors;
- (ii) The development of "bad blood" between regular government sponsored students and the PSSP students;
- (iii) Issues related to acquisition of buses;
- (iv) The Moi University Festival of Arts (MUFA); and
- (iv) Other causes (*Ibid*).

With regard to the first issue, the committee noted that a series of events indicated that there was a deep-seated tension and discontent among the students, especially regarding student leadership. Earlier in the year a section of student activities had pointed to a lack of trust in the 16th Students' Governing Council (SGC) which had led to the emergence of a clique calling itself "the summit".³ This clique demanded and, consequently, succeeded in getting the office of the Dean of Students to concede to the dissolution of the 16th SGC election and agree that the 17th SGC election be conducted earlier than would normally have been the case. Elections for the Students' Governing Council are usually held around April, but on that occasion it was held in February. During that election most members of the summit won various positions on the SGC. Shortly after, however, the newly elected Chairman of the Students' Governing Council was banned from the university on academic grounds.

The situation was further aggravated by the resignation of the Secretary- General of the Students' Governing Council who cited the following as reasons:

³ This group derived this name from a top consultative organ of the NARC campaign team which went by the same name during the run-up to the 2002 national election during which all members of the summit were elected as members of parliament and, subsequently, were appointed to powerful cabinet positions in the NARC government.

- The Moi University Festival of the Arts;
- Postponement of the semester opening dates;
- Integration of the PSSP students in regular programmes;
- The introduction of staggered system; and
- Threats and the intimidation of students(*Ibid*, p.31).

In the subsequent by-election to fill the vacant positions which was characterized by a low turnout, the elected Chairman did not seem to inspire confidence in the majority of students.

While such tension could be explained by the emergence of a strong-willed group of student leaders, it is interesting to note that these students were emboldened by significant political and historical events that were witnessed in the country at about the same time as these events were taking place on the campus. In the historic election that had taken place in Kenya in December 2002, KANU - the party that had been in power since independence - was defeated by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). A group of seasoned politicians who met as the top decision-making body of the NARC party and who referred to themselves as “the summit” were instrumental in the strategy to wrestle power from KANU. In emulating this strategy, therefore, this bold and strong-willed group of students formed a similar “organ”, complete with the name, “the summit”, and endeared themselves to the majority of students by establishing a formidable force that managed to push its agenda; dismantled the previous 16th SGC in its wake; and pushed for a set of demands to the administration without compromise.

The second issue that precipitated the riots was the hostility between the JAB students and those in the PSSP programme which revolved around the belief that the PSSP students had not qualified for admission to undertake degree programmes, but were receiving preferential treatment from the administration and the lecturers in terms of more attention during teaching; favours in the awarding of marks; and in other services, such as admission and the processing of examination results. The hostility was also related to the assumption that since the students in this programme did not have

government support and were paying the full fees, it was their money that was used to procure teaching and learning materials as well as other facilities. Indeed, the demand to use the buses, especially by the PSSP students, was because they believed that the university had used “their” money to purchase the buses. In addition, it was widely believed by students that the university was reverting back to the staggering of semester dates as a means of accommodating the large number of PSSP students.

The third issue of the riots was related to the acquisition of university buses -where the report noted several factors. Firstly, there had been a sustained period of demand for buses by students arising out of difficulties that were experienced regarding both academic and welfare trips. Quite a number of the trips had failed as a consequence of inadequate transport and promises of new buses by the administration that, on many occasions, had not been honoured. Students no longer took the administration seriously whenever they informed them that the university was purchasing new buses. During this period students had been informed that new buses would be on the various campuses by June of that year. To demonstrate the level of anxiety and mistrust amongst the students, for example, student leaders travelled all the way to Nairobi on 22 September just to confirm that buses had, indeed, been acquired and that they were being built to specification at the industrial area in the city. The following day the same students leaders ensured that they brought back one of the buses that was ready. After this student leaders from the KPA Eldoret West Campus also travelled to Nairobi on a similar mission and returned with another bus. Even when the buses arrived, the issue of which bus would be based on which campus remained unclear.

The fourth major issue that the committee established to be responsible for the riots was the way in which the Moi University Festival of the Arts was organized. Issues concerning how the festival was managed in terms of initial preparations, student participation, security, transport and launching arrangements became pertinent issues that provoked the students’ violent actions.

The *ad-hoc* committee noted that students perceived the festival to be a waste of money. Indeed, students cited a case where the festival organizers allocated a sum of KShs 57,000/= to erect a “cultural village” which required the use of locally available materials which should not have exceeded KShs. 10,000/=. Students were also dissatisfied with the manner in which the Students’ Governing Council (SGC) had hand-picked fellow students as officials during the festival. It did not sit well with students when mostly outside performers were invited to perform as they felt that it should have been their prerogative to perform and officiate at the festivals tasks which attracted some payment. Another issue that the students resented was the Senate’s insistence that classes, apart from examinations, proceed as normal during the festival. These issues had all emerged prior to the festival. At the commencement of the festival they were compounded by poor transport and security arrangements. The convergence of students on the Eldoret West Campus and the use of the newly acquired “PSSP” buses triggered the fierce clash that was witnessed. Furthermore, the report noted that the availability of drugs and alcohol also seemed to aggravate the situation.

This study concludes, therefore, that the clash between the two groups of students and the ensuing riots on the Main Campus - leading to its closure - was a culmination of the deep animosity that had engulfed the student population as a result of the introduction of the PSSP. This animosity was attributed to the perceived favouritism of PSSP students with the administration as well as the lecturers who were paid over and above their salaries for teaching these students. The regular students also attributed congestion and the strain on resources to the intake of these PSSP students. The sentiments of the students are best illustrated in the response of one of the former student leaders who served during the formative years of the establishment of the programme and who said:

You see the government at that time was kind of liberalized the admission, and the students who came through JAB had met some of the minimum requirements of the cut-off point. But because of the government liberalizing that would result in to any student with C+ would come and do any degree programme, but you find that sometimes someone in the government sponsored cannot do law with a B+ because of the cut-off of that particular course. So you have B+ you wanted to do law and you can’t do it and you have been admitted for political science which you probably didn’t want or geography or whatever and somebody comes with a C+ because they

have the money they are taken for the law thing. So to my opinion that feeling was one of the reasons that created that animosity, the JAB students looking at these other students as failures who have the money to buy their way out and so on. Again on physical facilities, like I have mentioned: accommodation, chairs, space and all of that, that addition caused a strain on physical facilities. The lecture halls remains the same, the living quarters, hostels, classrooms, library and the books remain the same, so you've got more people but you are not matching that increase in number with facilities. So these people had to struggle for very limited facilities that also create animosity in my view (Interview No. 4, Eldoret, June 2012).

The riots were, therefore, primarily a protest against the establishment of the Privately Sponsored Students' Programme. The government sponsored students confronted their counterparts who were beneficiaries of the programme and who defended themselves because they believed they were financing critical university programmes and projects by paying for their tuition. Nevertheless, this animosity and the ensuing clashes and riots were compounded by the following: (i) Intrigue within the student leadership on the main campus and tensions associated with it that had been brewing for several months and were worsened by the expulsion of the Chairman and resignation of the Secretary-General; (ii) An acute lack of transport services at the university that seriously undermined the operations of the university; (iii) The poor organization of the Moi University Festival of the Arts (MUFA); and (iv) The high prevalence and ready availability of drugs and alcohol on campus.

The brewing of the riot took place over a very long period of time. The tension between the two groups of students had begun with the establishment of the PSSP in 1997; the leadership intrigues had begun in February of the same year; and the issue of the lack of transport had been ongoing for a very long period of time. Within two days, however, the riots reached their peak, resulting in injuries to several students and the widespread destruction of property. In total property valued at KShs 1,254, 507/= was destroyed (Senate Report, January 2004).

A similar clash between PSSP students and government sponsored ones also occurred at the Western University College of Science and Technology during the election of its Students' Governing Council in 2006. However, this was not as devastating as that in the case just described

6.3.3 *Negative Ethnicity*

As seen earlier, some incidents of student riots had an element of ethnicity. In the WUCST election of 2006 that led to riots and the closure of the university, for example, an intelligence report to the Principal's office concluded:

Campaign for chairmanship, especially, was dominated by the tribal factor. Students from Mt. Kenya region met variously to solicit votes for John while those from Western, for Lucas: Students from other regions joined either side based on factors, such as PSSP/JAB, friendship, year of study and other alliances (Security Officer's Report, March 2006).

The findings indicate that ethnicity is most profound during campaigns and elections where candidates whip up ethnic emotions and form voting blocs based on tribe as a way of obtaining votes and beating their opponents. Responses in several interviews, as well as reports accessed in the study, confirm that tribalism is rife in most public institutions in Kenya, including Moi University, and this is a reflection of the situation in the public affairs of the country (Interviews Nos 3, 5,7,8,12,13,14,15,16,17,20).

In emphasizing how this is manifested during student elections, for example, one respondent said:

Elections are a reflection of Kenyan politics, political leaders are ethnic leaders and that ethnicity is also in our universities, students organize themselves in tribal or ethnic blocks and alliances. So student politics are just a reflection of our national politics; in their campaigns, their strategies, they form ethnic blocks, they form ethnic alliances (Interview No. 20, Eldoret, July 2012).

During the SGC election in April 2000 students blocked themselves in two ethnic voting blocs: the "Western.com" and the "Eastern bloc" - both based on tribe. When one of the candidates alleged that there had been a rigging of votes and refused to concede defeat, tension was so high that the results for the position of Chairman were nullified and the position remained unfilled for the entire academic year, leaving it to the Vice-Chairman to act as Chairman.

6.4 Unrest Associated with a Clash of Interests with Organized Groups or Members of the Public

6.4.1 Clash with National Youth Service Regular Officers

The first incident involving students of Moi University was reported as taking place on 14 October 1988 at the National Youth Service (NYS) Training College, but not on any of the campuses. This incident involved students of other public universities who had completed the NYS pre-university training, which - at the time - was part of a government policy that required students who had been admitted by public universities to attend a three-month pre-university training course on national development. This training exposed them to paramilitary training and students were also taken through the National Youth Service Act, foot drill and first aid.

During the incident in question the students had already graduated but were recalled to the college for the purpose of rehearsing their participation in celebrations to mark ten years of rule of the, then, President of the Republic of Kenya, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi. During the rehearsals the administration of the college subjected students - some of whom had already reported to the university - to stringent paramilitary regulations. One regulation, for instance, barred students from associating freely with members of the opposite sex in their hostels. Infuriated by this, the students openly defied the orders which led to a fierce confrontation between them and the regular NYS officers. There were long drawn-out battles that resulted in the extensive destruction of property. Police had to be called to restore order. Later, the Vice-Chancellors of the existing public universities, Nairobi, Moi, Egerton and Kenyatta, came to the college and suspended the students for an indefinite period. After their suspension the students were each charged a fine of KShs 200 (\$2.44).

6.4.1.1 The Matatu Fare Protests

On 22 September 2009 students engaged in a demonstration on the main road leading to Eldoret. When the students attempted to proceed with the demonstration beyond the point that had been authorized by the police, there was a clash between the students and the

police who used teargas to disperse the rowdy students. The students were forced to disperse and retreat to campus. A group of students hijacked and commandeered a pick-up vehicle which one of them drove and which, later, rolled causing injuries to several students on board. One of the students later succumbed to injuries while undergoing treatment. The main issue in the demonstration was the complaint that *matatus* – Public Service Vehicles (PSVs) – plying the university-Eldoret route were charging high fares (KShs 100) to Eldoret town. The students wanted the private businesspeople who were running these services to charge half the amount.

The study has established that there was a build-up of tension prior to the demonstrations and the eventual closure of the university. On 08 September 2009 a meeting was convened between the student leaders, who were elected SGC officials, and the *matatu* owners to deliberate on the fares to be levied by the vehicles plying the route between the Main Campus and Eldoret town. It appears that the student leaders -in the event of a failure to reach an agreement -had already agreed to certain conditions that included the following:

- No private or public vehicle would be allowed on campus from Wednesday,09 September 2009.
- The *matatus* would be suspended from operating until the fare issue was resolved.
- Students would abstain from taking trips to town from Tuesday,08 September,until the issue was resolved.
- The SGC would negotiate the use of university buses to town during the crisis.
- *Akamukunji* , a meeting of students, would be convened during the day(Security Officer's Report, October 2009).

Since there was no agreement on the amount to be charged, the student leaders convened a *Kamukunji* on 14 September with an agenda to discuss fares. Two other issues, however, were introduced as the second and third items on the agenda: accommodation and the results for the 2008/2009 academic year. During this meeting a resolution was quickly reached to chase the *matatu* operators off the university bus stage. This was

quickly done by the students who reached the venue and carried out their decision. Interestingly, the other two agenda items were not discussed, but another meeting was convened on the following day, 15 September, to discuss accommodation.

That meeting did not turn out to be a meeting, as such. Instead, the student leaders proceeded to seek an audience with the Vice-Chancellor to assist in resolving the stalemate. They also requested the Vice-Chancellor to address the students who had gathered at the Students' Centre. Although the Vice-Chancellor, who was accompanied by senior administrative staff, assured them of the university's commitment to address issues pertaining to their governance, the students were not satisfied and started chanting "No buses, No classes, No lectures."

Only a few classes took place on 16 and on 17 September 2009. In an internal memorandum to the students, the student leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Vice-Chancellor had handled the matter. They further informed the students about their resolve to

- request a meeting with the District Officer (DO) and the District Commissioner (DC) on that same day.
- chase all *bodabodas* (cyclists offering transport services) off campus.
- release a press statement later in the week and to apply for a permit to hold a peaceful demonstration.
- request a meeting with the relevant government ministries (*Ibid*, p.3).

The student leaders also released another letter to the *matatu* and *bodaboda* operators, ordering them to move 200 meters away from the main gate. They later requested a meeting with the District Officer (DO) to ask for a permit to hold a demonstration. This permit was eventually obtained on 21 September which contained specifications of the distance from campus beyond which the demonstrators could not go. During the demonstrations the following day, however, the students attempted to proceed beyond the point that had been agreed upon. A clash between the students and the police ensued

because of this, whereupon the latter used teargas to disperse the students who retreated to the campus. On their way back, some students hijacked a pick-up vehicle that was driving in the opposite direction and they drove it back. In unexplained circumstances the vehicle rolled off the road, injuring several students on board - one of whom later succumbed to injuries while undergoing treatment.

The following day the students gathered to protest against the death of one of their own. There was a threat of worse destruction of property as students are said to have stated that they were going to burn down the Students' Centre and the university's Margaret Thatcher Library. On the same day, in an internal memorandum to all students on the Main Campus the Vice-Chancellor informed them of the decision to close the campus immediately, noting with concern that the unrest had led to the tragic death of a student and that students were not attending classes and were participating in illegal gatherings. The students vacated the campus. Through the local dailies, the Vice-Chancellor gave a chronological account to the public of the events that led to the closure of the university on 29 September 2009.

6.5 Clash with the Local Community

6.5.1 *Cheboiywo Market Incident: 1990*

The Cheboiywo Market incident took place on 25 May 1990. During this incident there was a fierce clash between students and members of the public in the adjacent Cheboiywo Market. Members of the public who were affected were small-scale business people running butcheries, groceries, retail shops and bars. Documents obtained by the study point to the fact that tension had been building up for some time between the students and the business people. A report made to the Dean of Students by Security on 15 February 1990 alluded to this tension. In the report, the Security Officer stated:

We have been receiving various reports from both members of the public and the students to the effect that there has been constant confrontation between the students and members of the staff at the above-mentioned centre. The students go to one of the local bars to drink and later they differ with local residents, thereby causing some fights, we have had two cases on such incidents... (Security Officer's Report, February 1990).

When this observation was made in February, there appears to have been nothing else that alluded to this animosity until the tension exploded on 25 May of the same year when students numbering about one hundred responded to a ‘distress’ call by about six students who had been involved in a confrontation at the market. The confrontation had begun the previous day when two students failed to agree with a butcher about the amount of change given after they had purchased some meat. On the following day, the 25th, six students went to the same butcher’s premises to demand the money they claimed was owed them. A fight broke out that led to the injury of some of the students who were outnumbered and overpowered by members of the public who came to the butcher’s rescue. The students were forced to flee back to the campus where they mobilized their ‘comrades’ to go to the market on a mission of vengeance. The report, in part, indicates that

Students started to group themselves in preparation to proceed to Cheboiywo at around 8 p.m. Most of the students, numbering about one hundred, started shouting to themselves and singing war songs as if they were going for a battle (Senate Report, June 1990).

Upon reaching the trading centre, the students broke into several premises, looting and razing them to the ground without any resistance as the members of the public had fled in panic when they heard the students mobilizing themselves for a confrontation. Although this confrontation exacerbated the animosity between students and the immediate community, it did not lead to the disruption of the university’s operations. Nevertheless, the students who participated directly in the actual confrontation were later arraigned in a court of law.

6.5.2 WUCST: 2006

The elections of student leaders at the Western University of Science and Technology also serve to illustrate the rallying of students to fight and defend perceived threats to their interests. Unlike the Main Campus case, however, in the WUCST case the students were divided and fought each other. A section of the students who were in the PSSP programme and who had initially been overpowered by JAB students sought reinforcement from the local community.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined how student unrest at Moi University has been informed by factors from three of the five themes that the study adopted. These broad themes were broken down further into eight sub-themes. The first category concerned critical national issues which were sub-divided into: (i) Struggle for democracy; (ii) Political power struggles; and (iii) Critical non-political issues. Secondly the study examined unrest associated with student politics and the competition for the control of resources which was divided into: (i) Students campaigns and elections; (ii) PSSP vs JAB; and (iii) Negative ethnicity. Finally, the chapter examined unrest associated with the clash of interests within organized groups which has two categories: (i) Organized groups; and (ii) Local community.

The chapter used several incidents from the research material to illustrate how factors, summarized in these themes, have been substantially responsible in sustaining student unrest at Moi University. In total eighteen incidents of student violence at the university and its constituent colleges and on its campuses have been elaborately analyzed to gain an insight into these themes. Eight strike incidents have been used to examine the issues related to critical national issues - three each for the first two sub-themes and two for the last sub-theme. The implication of this is that out of the twenty-five violent strike incidents reported within the parameters of the study period, eight are related to, or have been informed by, critical national issues (national/political consciousness). This constitutes 32% of all the strikes which is quite substantial and constitutes the contribution of political factors in sustaining student unrest in Moi University during the relevant study period.

In terms of student politics - which comprises factional differences, negative ethnicity and students campaigns and elections - the study identified three cases of serious strikes, constituting 12% of all strikes that illustrate this thematic area. The study concludes that the contribution of student politics, competition for control of resources and negative ethnicity in sustaining student unrest at Moi University during the study period is 12%.

The last theme that the chapter examined is related to a clash of interests with organized groups and the local community. Four incidents demonstrate this theme, implying that their contribution to the sustenance of the strikes at Moi University during the study period is 16%.

While in most instances different incidents are appropriate and best illustrate one of the themes or sub-themes, some incidents, such as the 2006 election at WUCST, were found to exemplify more than one theme or sub-theme. This suggests that student unrest is increasingly becoming more complex and it may soon be difficult to pin-point what factor or factors occasioned a particular incident since there will be an interplay of several factors.

CHAPTER 7

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 contains an analysis of institutional factors that make the university vulnerable to, and fertile ground for, likely student unrest. Situations - which are described in detail in this chapter - are not in themselves the direct cause of unrest, but rather only aggravate an already bad situation or provide a catalyzing effect on the prevailing situation. For example, where students are complaining about welfare or academic issues that may, in part, be a consequence of inadequate information resulting from the existence of weak communication structures in the university set-up which serves to compound an already volatile situation. If, however, strong communication structures were in place it could possibly mitigate an impending strike or at least reduce its magnitude.

In this chapter, therefore, the study argues, and demonstrates, that the prevalence of certain organizational conditions in the day-to-day operation of Moi University gives rise to the catalyzing effect on student unrest. These conditions are both formal and informal/non-formal. Formal conditions refer to official structures and arrangements, such as the bureaucratic arrangements in the offices which dictate the operations of the university in the performance of its core and peripheral business. Informal or non-formal conditions, on the other hand, refer to situations that arise out of the context of the official structured settings of the university. It refers to issues that emerge as individual members of the organization interact informally. For example, out of the class context students interact in the hostels; on the playing fields; and in clubs over weekends. Friends are made and relationships emerge as students undergo similar experiences, both pleasant and unpleasant. They share experiences in discussions and develop shared values and principles and survival strategies which govern and influence their behaviour as members of the numerous groups that emerge naturally in such social settings.

Formal catalyzing conditions include weak communication structures, alienation, rigid academic and admission procedures and issues concerning student leadership. Non-

formal conditions include the prevalence of factors that give rise to extreme behaviour, such as anonymity associated with groups and the prevalence of drugs and alcohol. Frustration and disillusionment with university education has also contributed significantly to making the university student vulnerable to being manipulated into participating in disruptive behaviour.

7.2 Communication

Inadequate communication mechanisms compound an already bad situation and spark off violent strikes. In the absence of effective communication, issues and problems affecting students which would, otherwise, be understood and appreciated by the students create some intolerance and seem to result in grave consequences. In such a scenario, there is the onset of rumour, high suspicion, a lack of trust and tension, which easily deteriorate into violent confrontation.

An effective communication facilitates the free flow of information, both vertically and horizontally, within the university. As such, issues that emerge within the student body can reach the decision-making bodies of the institution for the requisite action. The subsequent decisions will reach the affected parties in a timely manner and in an appropriate version. Clarification will be given, where necessary, thereby avoiding the occurrence of incorrect information in the form of rumours. Communication should not only be accurate, but it should also be timely.

A critical analysis of the role of communication in sparking off protests suggests that inadequate communication contributes to unrest in several ways. Firstly, inadequate communication frustrates the flow of information from the aggrieved party, often comprised of students, to the appropriate decision-making offices and bodies. As a result, the university management, or decision-making organs, remain largely unaware of critical issues that are of concern to the students who, contrarily, believe that the university is already aware of the situation. Secondly, ineffective/inadequate communication implies that whatever decisions are made by the appropriate authorities fail to reach the students at the appropriate time. In this scenario, the two sides are in the dark about each other's actions and intentions in a situation that breeds suspicion. The

third and worst case is when the deliberate or accidental distortion of information on either side of the divide works to create heightened suspicion and tension. In such instances the worst incidents of student protests have been reported.

In the 1991 violent demonstrations that led to the death of one of the students, there was clearly a breakdown in communication that led to the wanton destruction that was experienced. Students had -to no avail -requested to be addressed by the Vice-Chancellor. The communication concerning the governments' decision regarding student finances reached the students by way of the media while the Dean of Students was still consulting with the student leaders on the best way to communicate the information to the rest of the student body. Meanwhile tension rapidly built up because of the communication vacuum. As far as the students were concerned the Vice-Chancellor failed to communicate the information at the right time and did not appear anywhere in the vicinity close to where the students were. Students are reported to have been looking for the Vice-Chancellor at his residence when they set upon his and university vehicles that were parked there because of his failure to personally communicate the message (Interview No.13, Eldoret, June 2012). While it would have been difficult to stop the rioting, the extent of the destruction would, perhaps, have been on a lesser scale had communication been made by the university authorities if they had been in a position to clarify information and stem any exaggeration that came with the announcement.

In 1997 when students at Maseno University College went on a violent rampage over Teaching Practice allowances, the issue of communication emerges as having made-a major contribution-to the unrest. The report by an *ad-hoc* committee that investigated the violence and made recommendations to management singled out communication in asserting:

The committee has noted that there is lack of complete communication net-work in the University. This no doubt contributed to the recent problems and may be the cause of others in the future, if not remedied. As the following points under this heading indicate:

- (a) The committee observes that there are communication gaps between Teaching Practice Centre, Dean-Faculty of Education, Comm-Tech Department, Academic Division and the Deputy Principal- Academic.

- (b) There seems to be some confusion of roles between Deputy Principal-Academic and Deputy Principal – PADASA.
- (c) The Committee expresses dissatisfaction with the extempore nature of interventionist address to a restive student body. During the three day stand-off on the part of students some of the communication to students inadvertently elicited skepticism. Address by Head, Teaching Practice Centre and Deputy Principal, Academic are singled out as examples (Academic Board Report, September 1997).

In the twin riots on the Main Campus in October 1999 the rumour of a student leader being kidnapped by university management led to a rekindling of student riots that had, otherwise, been quelled. On the Chepkoilel Campus rumours of the arrest of student leaders who were appearing before the Students’ Disciplinary Committee resulted in a fierce riot during which members of the disciplinary committee were marooned inside the boardroom for seven hours.

While varying issues emerged as critical, aspects of a breakdown in communication compounded and aggravated the following cases of riots: Main Campus- 25 May 1990, 30 June 1990, March 1998, October 1999 and 29–30 October 2003; Maseno University College - 6–7 April 1991, 03 July 1991, 06–09 July 1993 and 20 June 1999; Chepkoilel Campus - 10 October 1999, 17 March 2000, 24 April 2007; and Eldoret West Campus - 29–30 October 2003. In all these cases there were aspects of a communication breakdown on varying levels.

7.3 Alienation

While the university structure is quite elaborate in facilitating an apparently effective representation of students on critical decision-making bodies of the university, a sense of alienation emerges as most critical in informing several protests by students. This is attributed to poor leadership and management styles (Golola, 2004). Student leaders, for example, represent the student body on the university’s Council, Senate, Faculty Boards; at Department Meetings; and on the Students’ Welfare Committee and even on Senate and Council standing committees, such as the Students’ Disciplinary Committee, among many others. While these provisions have been made, quite a number of protests have

cited the lack of representation as a perennial issue of concern amongst students. Otieno and Levy (2007), cited in Matemba, 2010 and Amutabi, 2002) contend that violent and disruptive behaviour constitute an effort to point out frustration, pessimism and apathy that is associated with a feeling of being left out of, or alienated from, critical decisions. In referring to this issue, Matemba (2010) observes:

In the decision-making process relating to university governance, programming of academic affairs and social welfare has for a long time been at the core of student unrest(p. 18).

The Maseno University incident of 1997 is also an illustration of how alienation can be at the centre of student unrest. The *ad-hoc* committee, for example, asserted:

The committee's investigation would seem to show that apart from representation on Academic Board, students' representation on other university committees e.g. Teaching Practice Management, Faculty Boards, Departmental Meetings, etc., is extremely poor (*Ibid*).

The committee also noted that the mainstream Students' Union had been sidelined and recommended that "The University should examine its role in weakening the students' organization" (*Ibid*, p. 4).

The study found that in cases where student leaders perceived alienation, their approach in addressing issues with management was confrontational and would, most likely, lead to strikes. In cases where the student leaders saw an open and accommodating system the approach would be negotiation and the likelihood of violent protests was minimized.

Alienation in mainstream decision-making is caused in two ways. Firstly, while provision has been made for student representation on various critical committees of Senate and Council, students are hardly aware of these and therefore, they do not participate or attend meetings when such meetings are convened. A former student leader, for example, asserted that while these provisions were in place they were hardly aware of them:

Yes, it is only that for the 4 years I was in Moi I never heard of a faculty meeting, I never heard of that, maybe they never used to be there or probably it was happening but they were reserves of maybe the lecturers because the students never used to participate. From 1st year I was also a class representative BBM class and I never

got to attend any of those, so probably I was never invited or I didn't know they were happening. Yeah, so maybe there is this issue of disclosure of information because you know students are also busy people, so there should be a calendar maybe at the beginning of a semester that we are going to be having this kind of meeting so that people can even prepare the agenda and looking at the meeting prior to such kind of a meetings to just brainstorm to what their representative could go and represent. Even if they existed then the representatives just receives a call that tomorrow we are having this sort of a meeting. You know that is just a rubber stamp because it is not even prepared, maybe you are not even served with a gender of the meeting so it is a very weak representation if it is there (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, June 2012).

This is compounded by the fact that occasionally, on account of the university's busy calendar, these meetings may not be close to one another. For example, the Students' Welfare Committee - which is an important decision-making body in terms of the welfare of students - may meet once a semester or even once a year. Bearing in mind the short period of student leadership tenure, student leaders may attend such meetings once during their tenure or they may not even have an opportunity as in cases where semesters are staggered or when such meetings take place during vacations.

Whenever students do attend these meetings they feel alienated because, although decisions are often arrived at through consensus, they feel that due to their small contingent their views do not count. (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, June 2012). Nevertheless, some former student leaders feel that the university has an open door policy and that most of the issues they raised during their tenure were handled effectively. It emerged during the study that whenever former student leaders perceived alienation the approach in handling many issues was confrontational and the result was unrest. This is unlike in cases where student leaders perceived the system to be open and accommodated the students' views.

In formal organizations alienation is critical in determining the strategies used by existing interest groups in demanding that policy should comply with their interests. Various interest groups emerge in organizations in line with, or according to, common values, attitudes and a perception of certain common issues (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Baldrige, 1980; Song & Miskel, 2002). The more an interest group perceives itself as alienated insofar as critical policy and decisions that are made is concerned, the more

aggressive the agitation for the incorporation of favourable policies within the organization.

The violent nature of the demonstrations described in the analyzed documents and the terse language in the written communication with the university authorities - complete with hardly workable deadlines - attests to the lack of trust on the part of students that issues affecting them will be adequately addressed by the relevant authorities. In one instance students at one of the constituent colleges demanded the removal of the Principal, while at another, students questioned the role of the Dean of Students. In many recorded instances, students demanded the removal of Heads of Departments and Heads of Sections. In quite a number of instances *ad-hoc* transfers have had to be made due to violent pressure from the students.

It emerges, therefore, that a certain level of authoritarianism is prevalent in the management styles at the university and that the violent strikes are a student response to try to create a better democratic space. The relevant literature also suggests this to be the case. Amutabi (2002), for example, asserts:

Reports invariably suggest ...that Kenyan universities are occasionally disrupted by a small group of aggressive and anti-establishment students...yet the democratic nature of the students' grievances, and structures under which they operate, are often ignored. It is rarely reported that university students in Kenya are responding to authoritarian leadership, institutional decay, and management crises at the university (p. 159).

Available records and documents affirm the perception that a level approach is evident. As such, recommendations for “regular open forums between all stakeholders of the university are necessary to allow for the free flow of information and exchange of ideas relating to matters of decision-making at the institution” and that “there should be non-interference in the elections of KUSA body” have been made (Republic of Kenya, 2009). This also emerges strongly from the analysis of responses from the respondents.

Strong suggestions in various reports to decentralize decision-making are an indication of the bottleneck of decisions in such a system as a factor informing the interests. The Vice-Chancellor's Committee Report (2000), for instance, asserts that

While there were many causes of disturbances and riots in the universities, the ways in which these were handled when they occurred varied with the university management style. A management style which is flexible, transparent and easily accessible appears to have fewer disturbances than a highly structured, bureaucratic management style (p. 61).

7.4 Law Enforcement Procedures

The findings also indicate that in the event of the violation of the law there is hardly an effective system of ensuring that individual students, who perpetrate the crimes, are made to face the law and receive adequate punishment. Such criminal acts, often committed within and outside the university, involve the destruction of private and public property and are often incurred when students are in groups. A sense of invincibility develops amongst the students who, due to successive escapes from law enforcement, develop a habit of repeating this behaviour. A feeling of being above the law seems to inform repeated actions of the wanton destruction of property. This is also, variously, perceived as a gross disrespect of the law. Several incidents have been cited to support this apparent characterization of the typical Kenyan university student.

In some instances students have forcefully ‘hijacked’ university vehicles, such as buses, to take them on unofficial trips outside the university. In this process and during such trips students have harassed university officers and members of the public and they have looted property. There are also incidents where university students have forced their way into police stations and secured the release of colleagues who had been arrested and were due to appear in a court of law to face charges. In other instances, students have ‘hijacked’ public transport vehicles and forced the university to pay for the ‘services’.

Several factors contribute to this scenario of the apparent immunity of the university student. One such factor is that in perpetrating such actions the students operate in groups where the phenomenon of group-think as well as collective dynamics informs their actions. The characteristics of group-think include the sharing of an illusion of invulnerability; the belief in the inherent morality of what it does; and the silence of dissent through direct pressure, among several others (Schein, 1988). These features of groups make it difficult for law-enforcement officers to penetrate or infiltrate the groups for purposes of identifying the perpetrators in order to prosecute them as there is a fear

among the members of being labeled traitors in the event that they volunteer information. Whenever these groups, therefore, engage in extreme actions which often constitute the wanton destruction of private and public property, authorities would hardly obtain any information that would facilitate appropriate law-enforcement.

Serious cases of degeneration into violent strikes seem to be attributed to the existence of a fluid or weak security system at the university. At public universities the security system is often a patchwork of both uniformed forces on secondment, private security firms and, occasionally, of locally recruited personnel. As such, there is often a lack of proper coordination and internal rivalry as well as a poor flow of intelligence that could facilitate appropriate proactive action. This state of affairs is compounded by a lack of adequate training as well as the lack of clarity regarding the authority of the various security forces. A report by a parliamentary committee after an inquiry into the student disturbances at the Kenyatta University in March 2009 (Republic of Kenya, 2009), for instance, concluded:

...all three units work under the command of a Chief Security Officer who is an Administration Police Officer on secondment at a rank of Superintendent of Police ...the security system lacked proper coordination and ...there was poor flow of intelligence information between the three security groups due to internal rivalry(p. 30).

There is, therefore, an apparent reinforcement of violent student activities, which results in a sustained lack of manifested deterrent action by the authorities and probably interpreted by university students as ‘invincibility’.

7.5 Rigid University Programmes

The rigidity in university programmes manifests itself in two ways and it serves to further frustrate the students by creating a disillusion with their university education and making them vulnerable to manipulation and disruptive behaviour. This, particularly, is the case in the 1990s when a confluence of factors created a sense of eroded value in university studies. While the rigidity of the programmes did not in itself lead to unrest or riots, its contribution was the accumulation of several issues, such as the introduction of the PSSP; the degradation of living standards; as well as the diminishing of the employment

prospects for the university graduates - the end result of which was the sharply perceived degraded value of a university education. This created an acute sense of disillusion and frustration in the average students who lost hope and could easily be involved in a riot to vent their anger on the system.

The rigidity of the academic programmes affected the students in two ways. Firstly, the admission criteria was such that many students often found themselves admitted to degree programmes that they did not choose or in which they were not interested. This was a result of the limited number of government sponsored places at the university, forcing the Joint Admission Board to develop stringent admission criteria that would see only highly qualified students being admitted - especially to the very competitive degree programmes where there were better prospects of employment after graduation. This left a substantial number of students out who ended up in degree programmes that they neither choose nor were they interested in pursuing them.

Secondly, for a long time many degree programmes in most public universities - Moi University included - had not been revised to take into account market dynamics and required skills. The outdated courses did not match market needs. As such, even students enrolled in the relatively competitive courses or programmes were not much better off than those who were enrolled in the less competitive ones. The large student enrolment which translated into thousands of graduates each year, who joined a labour market that was shrinking as a consequence of the poorly performing economy, only served to further reduce the value of a university education and created a frustrated and disillusioned student population.

7.6 Student Leadership

Moi University Students' Organization (MUSO) conducts elections annually to fill eleven positions on the Students' Governing Council (SGC), which is the executive arm of the students' Union. The SGC has several mandates but, mainly, to mediate between the student body and the university's administration in addressing academic and welfare issues affecting the students.

The SGC is very influential amongst students and can be crucial in as far as student engagement in unrest is concerned. This reality is evident in three different ways. First is the style adopted by the SGC, generally, in its approach to addressing issues with the administration which, ultimately, is the Chairperson's style. Second is the active link between the SGC or sections of it with external, often political, forces. Third is the existence of the politics of competition for the influence of the students - either within the SGC or between the SGC and the numerous factions that form amongst the students - predominantly preoccupied with undermining or discrediting the university and painting a non-performing picture of it as a way of gaining political mileage.

Former student leaders who participated in, or were interviewed during the course of, the study revealed the presence of strong-willed individuals who were often very clear in their minds about what they were getting into as student leaders and also what motivated them to assume leadership. For example, many indicated that they had been in leadership positions since primary school and they believed that they were up to the task. Some indicated that they were motivated by colleagues who urged them on. Generally, while they exhibited similar characteristics, the study established two distinct styles and approaches to leadership issues and how they addressed or confronted them.

The first type of student leader was the humble and compassionate one who combined a friendly approach with powerful communication skills to negotiate with the authorities, avoiding confrontation at all times but being able to advance their courses tactfully and successfully. Some leaders perceived themselves as belong to the first type. For example, when asked about what kind of leader they thought they were one of them responded:

It's a hard one. I am compassionate. That's a weakness I have. I get derailed because of a lot of cries from the people I lead. They say I am soft, actually I would not say it here because I am one of the operations supervisors without having any training because I express myself to be somebody who uses a lot of compassion to push things. I put things on the table, facts on the table and the way I push for them is from the soft stand. So, I don't know how such a leader can describe himself in one word; that through this kind of leadership I have been able to achieve so many things (Interview No. 11, Nairobi, May 2012).

The other extreme is the strong-willed, non-compromising leader, highly idealistic who demands the operation of ideal situations with the understanding that if everyone does their part perfectly, then the system work and everything runs smoothly. The failure of a system is, therefore, most definitely the failure of an individual or individuals who should either be made to work or be replaced by competent people. One of the responses of a former student leader aptly captures this when, on being asked what type of leader he perceived himself to be, responded:

I am the kind of leader who likes talking what is in my mind and I will not always like somebody to downtrode (*sic*) another. Led everybody have his time, space, let everybody work. I would accept duties and take responsibilities. Otherwise we would be in a good country, world if everybody does his part without looking at what (the) other does; students, lecturers, catering, do their part. That is it (Interview No. 4, Nairobi, May 2012).

Yet another responded:

Okay I didn't realize my full potential even then, yet I would go with what people described me, they described me as a very radical student leader...

I think I was quite radical, sometimes I could go to sleep and evaluate myself then I would try to pursue things and said you were not supposed to pursue it the way you pursued it. You know your own conscience now starts telling you that you are risking. Yeah, you were not supposed to pursue it like you did and it was too much (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, May 2012).

In the second case the former student leader went ahead to illustrate how s/he was instrumental in exerting pressure on the university management to allow students to demonstrate following the murder of Dr Odhiambo Mbai.

By examining the general trend of strikes at Moi University and the profiles of student leaders who served at the various times, the study has concluded that while there were pertinent and perennial institutional and national issues that caused students to engage in violent demonstrations, there was a general trend in these demonstrations during the tenure of zealous, idealistic and non-compromising leaders. For example, when student leaders adopted a confrontational approach - as in 1999 and 2003 on the Main Campus - the result was often violent rioting. Some former student leaders whose tenure was associated with such violence also mentioned that they were new and inexperienced in

leadership and had not been given the requisite training (Interview No 7, Nairobi, May 2012).

The second SGC aspect concerning student unrest is the maintenance of close coordination with a national students' union which occasionally has ties with, and receives support from, political leaders. The Kenya Universities Students' Association (KUSA) is a loose confederation of student unions at Kenyan universities and it is intermittently influential in orchestrating and coordinating protests whenever a common issue of student concern at the universities or a matter of national concern emerges. In 2003, for example, Dr Odhiambo Mbai - the Chairman of the Devolution Committee of the Delegates Conference that was deliberating on a new constitution for the country - was murdered in what was perceived to be a government effort to frustrate the adoption of a new constitution that the same government had promised to deliver within a hundred days of assuming power. There were widespread protests all over the country. At the universities the protests were coordinated by the Kenya Universities Students' Association.

The third aspect of student leadership that the study found to fuel unrest was the political struggle for control and influence that was alive within the leadership as well as the student body. Within the student fraternity there is always a small group, or several small groups, of students who are active in student politics. Here student politics refers to the active competition for influence and power amongst students. These students are referred to as "activists" who are not, necessarily, members of the Students' Governing Council but their presence is particularly felt whenever there is a crisis affecting students that requires a very vocal intervention by the student leadership and the university administration. These students, who are often popular and influential among a majority of the students, may have been campaign agents for SGC candidates or may, themselves, have contested and failed elections -in which case they formed a group of losers calling themselves members of the official opposition. They may, previously, have been members of the SGC and some may have been preparing to contest SGC positions in the future.

These students engage in a plethora of activities in a bid to endear themselves to the rest of the student body. The most common engagement is to exert pressure on the SGC to deliver on its promises or effectively address the ever emerging academic and welfare issues affecting students. This is done through the publication of literature, often posted on notice boards as well as in the unofficial students' newsletter, "*The Third Eye*". The articles occasionally make allegations of being compromised by the administration, while others allege corruption in the management of student resources. This pressure keeps the SGC on their toes which, in turn, goes into overdrive in trying to deliver by confronting the administration. Occasionally, the scenario is worsened by factions and personal differences that emerge within the SGC. In such instances a disgruntled faction of the SGC may leak sensitive information, often laced with some exaggeration in order to malign their adversaries. Such information always has damaging consequences within the student fraternity that occasionally threatens to pass a vote of no confidence on the affected SGC members. The instigation of discontent amongst the students may reach levels at which the SGC loses control and, in some cases, the activists may convene student meetings to condemn their actions and demand their resignations. Such meetings occasionally degenerate into violence. In order to confront such realities, however, in such a case the SGC is left with little option than to be more confrontational with the administration in order to convince the students that they were, indeed, performing. Such confrontation could escalate into riots, especially if there were pertinent issues that required urgent attention.

Two incidents serve to illustrate the magnitude and impact of these political scenarios amongst students. The first case occurred during the second semester of the 2003/2003 academic year. Before the official end of the 15th SGC's term of office, a small group of students calling itself "the summit" managed to instigate discontent among the students by alleging that there had been massive corruption and misappropriation of funds by the SGC. The tension was only diffused when the Dean of Students - sensing the danger - persuaded the SGC to dissolve and to pave the way for an election to be held earlier than the scheduled time. The second incident is captured in the following by a former student

leader while being interviewed about the occurrences that led to riots and the closure of the university in November 2003. Earlier, JAB and PSSP students had fought on the Eldoret West Campus and the students - through their leaders - were agitating to have the university administration make a statement on the issue, boycotting classes while awaiting the Vice-Chancellor's response.

- I: And that was when the students resorted not to attend classes?
- R: Yeah, until the Vice-Chancellor addresses that issue and yet he was not within the country.
- I: Was that the decision of the SGC or the entire students' population of the university?
- R: You know that time as you go to negotiate you know you have a lot of forces behind you so even these students were just waiting around the administration block hence once you come out they want you to give them response and you know that people are being guided by the id where you need an immediate gratification so that was what also challenged us more, we were wondering what information do we give them as students because they were actually waiting for response. They have not attended a class for that day and they need a response so we had no any other alternative but to tell them what Dr Sang has said.
- I: What was the reaction of the students?
- R: The reaction was bad! It was terrible. In fact it was the one which impacted a lot of immediate animosity. We had students who were activists and they immediately capitalized on that and within no minute a *kamukunji* was already in place and we were told to go there and tell them what we had negotiated.
- I: Who convened the *kamukunji*?
- R: We had some student activists.
- I: Activists who were not student leaders?
- R: Yes, but they capitalized on what we said, they convened and they now wanted to pin us, they would pin us based on that (Interview No.6, Nairobi, May 2012).

The incident that the former student leader relates demonstrates how student activists exert pressure on the student leaders, demanding immediate and tangible results - even in complex situations, while all the time taking advantage of the situation that, in such circumstances, leads to explosive riots, such as the one illustrated above.

7.7 Collective Dynamics

When the study analyzed and examined Moi University in light of the theories that attempt to explain the phenomenon of extreme actions or collectives, it concluded that the university - in its current set-up and composition, especially that of students - is alive and exposed to the possibility of mob and crowd action. As seen earlier these situations are not in themselves the causes of riots, rather they act as catalysts that exacerbate an already bad situation. While the theories that have been advanced to explain extreme action or behaviour by groups do not agree on certain aspects, several features or constructs used to explain these actions are evident from the data collected by the study. Five theories address the issue of extreme actions by collectives and these include: (i) Le Bon's Crowd Psychology, (ii) Convergence Theory; (iii) Deindividuation; (iv) Emergent Norm Theory; and (v) Social Identity Theory (Forsyth, 2010). The data obtained from the study supports the arguments of the last three theories in explaining extreme collective actions - that the students' actions in riots can best be explained by the postulates of these last three theories.

Zimbardo's loss of identity or Deindividuation Theory suggests that "a collective can be so powerful that it can, under the right set of circumstances, transform nearly anyone, no matter what their personal characteristics" (Forsyth, 2010:517). The power of the group can influence and submerge the individual to the extent that they are not their individual self and, as such, the personal restraints that guide individual behaviour are reduced (*Ibid*). As a process deindividuation has input, process and output - as expounded in Forsyth:

The input include situational factors, such as degree of anonymity and the size of group as well as more psychological factors: sense of responsibility, degree of arousal, and altered state of consciousness due to the use of drugs and alcohol. These factors, if present to a sufficient degree and intensity may cause the members of the collective to become deindividuated, which is a state of altered awareness characterized by minimal self- awareness and regulation. Once in this state, individuals become more irrational, emotional and impulsive, and so are more likely to perform aggressive, violent actions (Zimbardo, 1969, 1975, 1977a in Forsyth, 2010:517).

Violent strikes that have been witnessed at Moi University have often been described as being characterized by the wanton and senseless destruction of property that could hardly have been executed by individuals when they are in their conscious state and in control of their actions.

7.7.1 Anonymity

Anonymous members of crowds or mobs are more likely to engage in activities that they would otherwise not engage in, such as violence and aggression. Data obtained by the study indicates that several of the riots that took place at Moi University were compounded by circumstances that increased the anonymity of the students. For example, in the second of the 1999 twin riots on the Main Campus the students were under cover of darkness as the riot occurred at night. This riot was the most destructive in the history of the university in terms of the value of property destroyed. Similarly, the incidents at Maseno University College of 1997, the Western University College riots of 2006 and the failed Chepkoilel election of 2007 were all aggravated by the anonymity created by the cover of darkness.

7.7.2 Responsibility

Whenever members of a group experience a diminishing responsibility of their actions, their engagement in aggressive action is increased. This situation can only arise in a group as a result of the anonymity offered in the group context. Because it is difficult for the university to isolate individuals who are responsible for particular actions during riots, the sense of responsibility has diffused over the entire student population and, consequently, has encouraged similar repetitive actions by the students. On the many occasions that the university has been closed after students engaged in riots, the university has reopened and has charged a uniform amount of money to all the students to compensate for the property destroyed or lost. The twin riots of 1999 are a good illustration of this. While property valued at over Kshs 13,000,000/= was reportedly stolen, the university was only able to charge seven students for the theft of various items, the value of which only amounted to a few thousand shillings. The university was

unable to isolate individuals who were responsible for the theft and destruction and, consequently, levied a uniform charge on all the students.

7.7.3 Group Membership and Size

In their daily activities students are members of groups - both formal and informal - whether in class, in their hostels, at club meetings or informally when they participate in forms of entertainment over weekends. As such, they undergo similar experiences which make them feel that they are members of a group. The protests of students are a means of complaining about issues that affect them as members of groups and they demand action to rectify anomalies. However, it is only in groups that “the sense of anonymity and diffusion of responsibility that generates deindividuation” (Forsyth, 2010) is possible.

Riots, involving students from the entire campus, have been more destructive than those involving only sections of it. The demonstrations in support of the national teachers’ strike in 1997 involved mainly students in the B Ed programme of the Main Campus and had less of an impact in terms of the disruption of academic programmes or the destruction of property than the strikes of 1991 on all the campuses; the 1999 strike on the Main Campus and Chepkoilel Campus; and the 2003 strike which affected the Main Campus and the Eldoret West Campus.

7.7.4 Social Identity

Often students engage in riots or demonstrations as a way of defending their social interests and social identity. It is often an “us” against “them” scenario - be it against the administration, the police or another group. The fact that they see themselves as belonging to a social group motivates them to come out in its defense and, if need be, fight for it. Students, for example, refer to themselves as “comrades” which is a clear indication that they see themselves as belonging to a social group. During the often highly charged meetings convened to discuss issues affecting them, their popular rallying call is the slogan “comrade power”. Although almost all the strikes are a demonstration of this unity and a defense of their identity, a few relevant cases strongly illustrate this.

The June 1991 fight between Main Campus students and local businessmen at the neighbouring Cheboiywo Market and the protest against increased transport charges on the Main Campus in 2009 are good examples. The Main Campus riots of 1999 also demonstrates a fight in defense of social identity while the JAB vs PSSP clash in 2003 was a fight in defense of the two groups' social identities and status.

In the 1999 Main Campus incident the riot was triggered by an attempt to apprehend a student who was found cooking in the hostels by one of the security officers. Cooking had been outlawed by the university. In retaliation, the students not only attacked the Security Officer but went ahead to attack all the university officers in sight. They also destroyed a make-shift office of the university's security on the campus. Clearly the students were targeting the security officers as well as the janitors who - to them - were part of a group that threatened their welfare.

During the demonstration in protest against the murder of Dr Odhiambo Mbai, which was generally peaceful, riots erupted when police officers barricaded the road that the students were using to reach the university's buses that they needed to board in order to travel back to campus. To the students the police were an outside group that was being aggressive by blocking their way –they did not see them as a law-enforcement body. For them, as a social group, the police officers were another group that was provoking them while they were demonstrating peacefully. It was an “us” vs “them” scenario best illustrated by the statement of a former student leader who was interviewed about the incident:

So you can see the mistrust, but you know students are very mature people, they can do their thing. But they called the police anticipating that the students would have rioted, but do you know we sustained the demonstration without anything until we came to Sosiani River and the students find the police have barricaded the road, that we were not going past this. Professor Some and the Dean of Students, Mr Mureithi, and the students' leaders were there but the police have just decided that we were not going past that place and what could the students do? They decided to engage the police in stone throwing. At that time we were there, the student leaders and the VC, but the students who were behind were already irritated by the police and they were wondering what were they doing? Are we stealing anything? (Interview No. 7, Nairobi, May 2012).

7.7.5 *Drugs and Alcohol*

One of the agents, or a cause of deindividuation, is the ingestion of alcohol and drugs which induces a feeling of excitement and reduces the sense of self-control. Various studies and reports confirm the high prevalence of drugs, especially *bhanga* (*cannabis sativa*) and illicit alcoholic drinks, such as the locally brewed “*chang’aa*” at all the public universities in Kenya, including Moi University (Mwinzi, 2003; Standa, 2000). As in all other campaigns and in the election of student leaders to fill the SGC positions, those that took place in 2006 at the Western University College of Science and Technology were characterized by a heavy consumption of alcohol by the student voters who are often bribed by the candidates with the alcohol in order to win their votes. The Senate reports which were released following the twin riots on the Main Campus in 1999 and the JAB vs PSSP clash on the Main Campus and Eldoret West Campus also confirm a high prevalence of drugs and alcohol. In the former case the devastating destruction of property was the consequence of both the anonymity occasioned by the cover of darkness and the effects brought about by the heavy consumption of drugs and alcohol. During the build-up of tension, one of the student leaders is recorded to have urged the university authorities to allow the consumption alcohol and the smoking of *bhanga*.

7.7.6 *Frustration and Disillusion with University Education*

As seen elsewhere in this study, during the 1990s university students became frustrated and highly disillusioned with higher education as a consequence of several factors. These factors include the introduction of PSSP; the degradation of welfare standards; rigid university programmes and admission criteria; and the diminished chances of employment after graduation (Vice-Chancellor’s Committee, 2002; Interviews No. 9 and 13, May and July 2012). All these factors combined to create a university student who was so disillusioned with higher education that the numerous protests that rocked the university gave these students the perfect opportunity to release their pent-up anger and frustration against the system by their destructive behaviour. It is the argument of this study that the frustration and disillusion of the university students compounds the effects of deindividuation and, therefore, it is maintained that this is one of the factors that

occasions the deindividuated state. In other words, apart from the factors, such as anonymity; diffused responsibility; group membership and size; and aroused frustration among the group members, there is also a significant factor that brings about deindividuation that is associated with extreme collective behaviour.

By the late 1990s the average university student was grossly disillusioned with university education because of several factors. First and foremost, students felt that the introduction of the PSSP programme advantaged students with poorer grades in high school as they could access admission into competitive courses, such as Medicine, Engineering, Law and Architecture, among others, because their parents could afford to pay, while better students in the government programme were denied these courses on account of the limited places. This dealt a massive blow to the entire meaning of academic excellence - the core value of university education. For the students it amounted to a betrayal and the devaluation of university education and its cardinal foundation and values. It was no longer anything to be proud of or feel good about.

Secondly, the poorly performing economy whose job creation rate had diminished substantially did not offer any consolation to the graduates and the university students saw their colleagues who were joining the labour being forced to spend many years in the job market without employment. Instead, graduates - who may not have graduated from the competitive courses or excelled academically - landed good jobs and progressed well because of their parents influence and connections. In 1997, for example, the government froze the further employment of teachers. Prior to this, graduates of the Education programmes at public universities usually received letters of employment while still at the university as they finalized their studies. With the freeze this privilege was withdrawn, leaving the B Ed students and graduates uncertain about their employment prospects which, prior to this, had always been guaranteed.

The deplorable living conditions and the general deterioration of standards served only to aggravate a sense of despair, frustration and disillusionment with university education. Meanwhile, the proliferation of petty businesses in the hostels opened up a conduit for

alcohol and drugs which found a ready market with the disillusioned students. The end result was a population of students that was always available for disruptive activities, such as those brought about by protests of every kind for whatever cause. These students who often were not bothered by issues raised during strikes were very destructive and violent. Some students who may have gone without money and food for a long time used the disruptive activities that they always wished for to steal food and valuables that they would later sell. In the twin riots on the Main Campus, for example, of the twenty-four students who appeared before the SDC to answer various charges, nine faced charges of stealing various food items and an assortment of items, such as desktop computers, printers, books and stationery, which most of them confessed they were going to sell. Indeed, during these riots of the KShs 14,400,144.75 of property lost or destroyed, only property worth KShs 1,356,161.80 were broken doors and windowpanes; the rest was the value of electrical appliances, food, cleaning materials, books, stationery and other items stolen from the bookshop, catering units, consumer stores, shops and offices - amounting in value to KShs 13,043,982.95=.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the institutional factors that act as catalysts to grave situations that lead to unrest. These formal or informal factors do not, in themselves, cause unrest - rather they act as catalysts of the situation. Formal factors are organizational structures and arrangements and they include communication, alienation, law-enforcement procedures and students and leadership. Non-formal factors are those that develop as students relate to non-official settings. In so doing and the fact that students are often in groups there is the likelihood of the onset of collective dynamics in form of anonymity, diffused responsibility, influence of the group size, group identity, effects of drugs and alcohol and disillusion and frustration with university education.

CHAPTER 8

NATURE, IMPACT, TYPES AND FURTHER FINDINGS: ORGANIZATIONAL DISEQUILLIBRIUM AND ORGANIZATIONAL PARANOIA

8.1 Introduction

This chapter, Chapter 8, is an analysis and discussion of the general trends in student unrest during the first period of the study. Further, this section analyses the nature or form of the unrest or strikes whenever they occurred. That is, what form the unrest took; how they developed; and whether or not clear distinctions or classifications can be made regarding the manner in which various strikes occur.

8.2 Nature and Form of Unrest

The general trend of student unrest at Moi University during the period under study reflects an institution that can best be described as being 'unstable' or - as will be seen later - undergoing a state of disequilibrium. This is because during this twenty five year period, the university witnessed and recorded twenty four cases of serious unrest, translating to almost one strike recorded every year or, put in another way; the university recorded a high occurrence of unrest during this period. This can, generally, be described as a high prevalence rate of student unrest. These incidents were recorded in the following years: 1988, 1990 (two cases), 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2009. The following years did not experience unrest: 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006. Nevertheless, these interludes were not completely devoid of incidents, Indeed, some 'skirmishes' were reported on the Main Campus in 1989 when, in one incident, students clashed with kitchen staff which resulted in staff injuries and in another case the students protested against increased bus fares to town. As such, there were relatively few periods or interludes of peace during the period and, hence, the justification of the university as being unstable or undergoing a period instability/state of disequilibrium or a general state of unrest.

The intensity of violence elicited during this period varied from time to time, depending on factors which will be discussed later in this section. Nevertheless, in almost all the major incidents, violence was reportedly characterized by the destruction of property within or outside the university. The most violent occurrence was in October and November 1999 that spilled over to Chepkoilel Campus in 1999 and 2000, when property valued at over Kshs 14 million was destroyed. In most instances what began as peaceful demonstrations gradually degenerated into violent confrontations with either law-enforcement officers or members of the outside community who often armed themselves with crude weapons to protect their property which was being targeted by the students.

In examining how a strike occurred, the study identified -from the foregoing narratives – that, generally, strikes developed through the following four main stages:

- 1) The development stage or brewing context
- 2) The tension or heightened tension stage
- 3) The explosion stage
- 4) The dissipation stage.

8.2.1 Development Stage/Brewing Context

The development stage/brewing context is the first stage in the development of a strike. Although it is referred to here as the 1st stage, essentially it may not aptly describe the situation because it is difficult to establish when it begins. The brewing context describes the existence of a state of affairs at the university which is potentially explosive. In essence, a situation or set of situations exist that do not auger well with the students. In other words, there are certain existing grievances within the student body which may constitute a policy or a decision that may have been deliberately or inadvertently adopted by the university. In several other instances it may be an omission or laxity in a section or several sections of the university. Such issue/s may be academic, welfare and/or procedural. For example, issues may concern registration for examinations, the issuing of transcripts or inadequate teaching facilities. In the 1993 Maseno University College incident the issues were the delay in the issuing of transcripts, gross mistakes detected in the issued transcripts and an acute shortage of teaching/learning facilities as well as an

inadequate supply of books in the bookshop. With regard to welfare, issues may involve inadequate catering and accommodation facilities, poor service delivery and a shortage of critical necessities, such as water and electricity (perennial blackouts).

The existence of such a state of affairs creates a potentially explosive situation because, while there is an apparent quiet, students are disgruntled and it will only take a triggering event for the situation to explode. During this time students or student leaders may use existing forums and available channels to present their grievances. These forms may include relevant committees, such as the Students' Welfare Committee; Academic Board meetings, Faculty Board meetings, the Senate and service departments, such as the Dean of Students, the catering and hostel officers or the officers in charge of admissions and the processing of examinations. Whenever an adequate solution is arrived at and communicated, the situation may not develop to the second stage. In most instances, however, issues are hardly eliminated completely and they retain a potential to develop further. Indeed, this stage may take anything from few weeks to even years.

8.2.2 Heightened Tension Stage

As suggested by the name, this heightened tension stage is when tension grips the university and a flurry of activities takes place within the student community, the university administration and between the two. The potent state translates into a situation that may lead to an actual strike in the absence of a quick, realistic and convincing intervention. This is often prompted by desperation on the part of the student population that begins to doubt the university's commitment to addressing the issues in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, suspicion that already exists deepens and time seems to be running out for a quick solution. Signals that all is not well come in the form of strong messages to the senior university authorities, such as the Vice-Chancellor or the college Principal, in form of internal memorandums which are often copied to all other authorities and posted on notice boards, containing stringent timelines or deadlines. In most instances the timelines can be anything from a few hours, but hardly go beyond a week. For example, in one of the memorandums issued by a student leader to the Principal on the Chepkolel Campus, the student leader stated:

Students wish to give seven days to open that mess with their co-operation where necessary, 'this time' failure of which you shall have yourself to blame(Principal's Report, 23 June1993).

During this stage, students also convene meetings, whether or not authorized to do so. By means of notices, announcements in classes or other gatherings, student leaders mobilize the entire student body to attend these meetings during which they are rallied to support the common cause by boycotting classes or engaging in demonstrations. It is also at this stage that pressure groups of varying degrees of activism concerning the grievances emerge. These groups come from within and/or outside the student leadership. Depending on the nature of the strike several categories of these active groups may emerge. In the 1991 SAP protests, for example, a discernible group which referred to itself as the "Action Group" was very active in mobilizing the rest of the students to join in the protests. This group was made up of very few members - often not more than twenty and spread over critical areas of the university – but they were very active individuals who used whistles, shouts, the yelling of verbal threats and other forms of intimidating actions to disrupt normal university operations and to get the rest of the students to join them. In certain instances where a strike is co-ordinated, such a group or groups bear allegiance to one or often not more than five individuals who direct their activities.(Interview No.5, Nairobi, May 2012). A third group constitutes a larger number (over hundred) of students who are quite active and who identify with the grievances.

During this phase of the strike students also demand to be addressed by senior officers of the university on the issues in question. The sequence in these hastily convened meetings usually begins with the student leaders and/or activists presenting the issues to the administrators who are present and may have been coerced into the *kamukunji*. While doing so and often filled with emotive speeches that invoke the students' wrath, the students demand action and ask that these demands be met within a given time-frame. At such a time classes may already be boycotted with their resumption being conditional on convincing action on the part of the administration. This stage of the strike is also characterized by a diminishing effectiveness of official communication regarding the

issues at hand. The grapevine seems to be driven at full throttle and there emerges a situation of alarming information which, in most cases, is far from the truth. If it is not checked such information may lead to fully fledged riots. Examples of such false or inaccurate information include drastic disciplinary measures, like arrests, detention and/or the expulsion of student leaders by the administration or the presence of law-enforcement officers on the university precincts.

During this stage the students also seek to strengthen their case or make it look very serious by bringing on board several other issues which would, otherwise, not elicit serious protest from the students. In this way the students will, in due course, have a long list of demands in the hands of the administration which, in the eyes of a third party or observer, would create an impression that the situation at the university is completely out of control and that the university administration is inept and not performing. In the 1993 Chepkoilel Campus incident, for example, the critical issue bothering the students was the inadequacy of one dining hall that led to congestion and delays during meal times. However, during the second phase of the strike a plethora of issues found their way into the negotiation with the administration in such a way that a very grave picture was painted of the university as a non-performing institution which was aptly captured in the press. The issues included a lack of books and other items in the bookshop; an impassable track from the old site of the university to the new site; a lack of road humps on the Eldoret-Kitale highway; overcrowding in hostels and “thin” mattresses; unfairness in awarding bursaries; and the expulsion of students for the non-payment of fees. These additional issues - which were, perhaps, peripheral - made the situation appear very grave. Student leaders convening such meetings embolden themselves by consuming drugs and alcohol (Senate Report, 1999).

It is also during this stage in the development of a strike that the university heightens its response in an attempt to avoid a fully-fledged strike. Apparently, at this stage the authorities seem to appreciate the seriousness of the situation and acknowledge the looming reality of a strike and, then, they swing into action. Evidence indicates that the authorities’ actions are simultaneously multi-pronged. First, the relevant bodies, such as

the Senate, a section of it or the university's top management, clarify the situation and put it in the right perspective by engaging the contact departments which include hostels, catering, Deans of Faculties and the Dean of Students as well as the student leaders or their representatives who very often may already be aware of the situation. Secondly, the authorities make urgent and hasty arrangements to address the issues. For example, with regard to the inadequacy of teaching material or items in the bookshop, these can be addressed by authorizing a faster requisition of the items and, often, by ignoring normal procedures, such as the number of days stipulated before paying a supplier. Repair services, where necessary, begin immediately. For repair work, it involves mobilizing all personnel engaged in repair work in various departments to deal with the pressing issue. Thirdly, in view of the appreciated seriousness the authorities establish and maintain a powerful communication link with the student body through its leadership in this phase. This powerful communication link is also created amongst the various university bodies and departments -often in form of regular meetings which may also take place simultaneously. For example, Faculty Board meetings may take place to address academic matters while a students' welfare meeting also takes place to address a welfare issue. Important decisions are made and promptly communicated to the rest of the student body *via* official memorandums posted on notice boards.

The authorities utilize these meetings to engage the students in negotiation and bargaining. It is during these meetings that as the students present issues, emphasizing them as grave and coercing the university authorities to take quick action, an opportunity is presented for the university authorities to explain the legal procedures and the difficult positions occasioned by factors outside the university, such as government funding policies, to the students. In so doing, they attempt to win the confidence and sympathy of the students who they hope will tone down their demands. The authorities take quick decisions, making concessions and compromising other fronts. For example, in the Chepkoilel Campus case a quick decision was taken to open up a new serving point on the old site; books were purchased; and the Ministry of Public works was called in to urgently begin repairs on the link track joining the old site and new site. Authorities also

negotiate for more time while making appeals to students to abandon extreme action and to resume classes.

The university authorities also use threats at this stage to counter the threats made by students. Typically, this is done once concessions have been made and evidence of such is available to the student body. These threats are issued in the form of notices and although not necessarily presented as threats, they are thinly veiled. For example, students are “requested to resume classes in order for normalcy to return.” Again, in the Chepkoilel incident, the Vice-Chancellor issued a circular to all students of the campus making them aware of the Senate’s decision that they resume classes and sign the nominal roll and compliance statement which, in part, stated that “students who will not have complied with the above requirements will be deemed to have de-registered themselves and are required to vacate the campus by 4.00. p.m. on Friday, 18 June 1993”(Principal’s Report, 16 June 1993).

Threats and sanctions may be made simultaneously -as in the example at Maseno University College the Bachelor of Science where students were suspended from the university while the Bachelor of Education students were not. This action constituted a punishment to the suspended students and a threat to the section of students who were spared the suspension.

The combined set of activities may lead to convincing the students that sufficient actions by the university are credible enough to warrant a favourable solution to the issues at hand and that the assurances and promises of action by the university outweigh the risks of punitive action likely to ensue from persisting with pressure on the university. The tension, then, quickly dissipates and normality slowly begins to return. In many instances, however, the period is characterized by tense suspicion on the part of the students who begin to realize that disciplinary action may still be taken against those who were vocal during the meetings, especially if there was no agreement of non-victimization.

On the other hand, if in the perception of the students that the university authorities are not committed to addressing the issue/s raised to their satisfaction or if the efforts of the authorities are not successful, then the situation explodes into a fully-fledged strike which is often violent. This may also be preceded or coupled with a state described by this study as “organizational paranoia”. While most strikes may occur without the state of organizational paranoia, the onset of organizational paranoia will always result in very violent strikes with severe consequences for both sides.

8.2.3 The Explosion Phase

During the explosion phase of a strike, the climax is characterized by several occurrences whereby students engage in some or all of the following actions which often involve the greater majority of the students – 60-90% of them as not all students participate in a strike. First, there is a near or complete paralysis of the university’s operations, especially where no classes take place for a long period of time. An extended boycott occurs, especially when the strike is non-violent – otherwise an immediate closure of the university would cut short violent strikes and boycotts. Secondly, students engage in demonstrations, picketing and protest marches and they agitate for remedial action to be taken. Occasionally, they chant slogans demanding the sacking of certain officers or the closure of departments whose performance may be the subject of the protests. Also during this phase and in the cases described, law-enforcement officers would be called in to restore order and this could result in a violent confrontation with the students with grave consequences. Apart from the death of a student reported in the 1991 and 2009 Main Campus incidents, the Maseno University College fracas of 1994 resulted in the injury of four students and the burning of one vehicle. A fully fledged strike would also always lead to the closing of the university or a section of it – again, as in the case of Maseno University.

Strikes that mature to this phase are also characterized by varying degrees of violence in the form of the destruction of property, looting and injury to non-students within the vicinity. The findings suggest that the intensity of the violence is associated with certain factors. First, in instances where a policy decision has severe repercussions for, or an

impact on, the academic or social welfare of the students, the strikes appears to be more violent. A case in point is the introduction of tuition fees and the withdrawal of students allowances in 1991. Secondly, the severity of the violence seems to be associated with a situation where the subject matter of the protests affects a majority of the student population as opposed to when it affects only a small section. Again, the 1991 introduction of tuition fees is a case in point. Thirdly, severe violence is associated with the prevalence of “organizational paranoia” during a strike. Several factors, which are discussed in detail in another part, are responsible for the occurrence of organizational paranoia.

The nature of the student leadership also seems to have a bearing on the severity of violence during a strike. Several facets of student leadership emerge in terms of the critical quality of student leadership. Where the leadership is composed of individuals with powerful communication and negotiation skills, the violence does not seem to be very severe as opposed to a situation where the student leadership lacks communication and persuasion skills.

8.2.4 Dissipation Phase/ Uneasy Calm

If the institution is not closed students, out of exhaustion may retire after engaging in the strike. What follows is a tense moment which may last for several days weeks or even a month in what the study refers to as uneasy calm or dissipation phase. When they look at the extent of the damage, students always expect to be suspended but when this does not happen they remain within the university but under suspicious environment, always waiting of some action by the university to apprehend and charge the leaders or suspected leaders of the strike. Rumours circulate about who is to be charged for what actions creating calm but tense and charged situation. In such a situation, a false alarm or a wrong signal from the administration may trigger off worse riots. With time, the tension gives way to a complete dissipation and a return to the normal operations.

8.3 Effects of Student Unrest

The effects of students unrest are evident both at an institutional and student level. At the student level the effects may be on the group, a section of the group or at an individual level.

The widespread destruction of property is, by and large, the most felt impact of student unrest. Even in instances where strikes do not develop into fully blown ones, the destruction of property has always been reported.

During the 1988 clash between the students and the national youth service officers property was extensively damaged. This study was unable to access records concerning the value of the property which was destroyed. Nevertheless, all the first year students who were meant to be at the college - close to five thousand –were, then, each given a fine of KShs 200, which would translate into KShs 1,000,000 (\$12,195) today. Also the amount of destruction occasioned by students to private businesses during the protest march on the disappearance and subsequent murder of the Hon. Robert Ouko when students clashed with small scale business men at the neighbouring Cheboiywo Market in 1990 was not quantified.

The first riot which recorded extensive damage to in Moi University is that of June/July 1991. During this incident, six vehicles belonging to the university and staff members were completely destroyed or partially destroyed. Three of the vehicles were completely burnt out; residential staff houses, including that of the Vice-chancellor, were partially destroyed; the staff canteen and the Students' Centre were extensively damaged; and nine student hostels were also damaged to varying degrees. Similarly, property worth a varying amount of money was also destroyed on the Chepkoilel Campus in 1993 and at Maseno University in 1994. During the twin riots of 1999 at the Main Campus, property valued at over KShs 14 million was destroyed.

Another immediate impact of student unrest was the disruption of academic programmes and the operation of the university. The 1991 strikes led to the closure of the university's Main Campus, Maseno University College and the Chepkoilel Campus for over seven months. The constant disruption of the university programmes by strikes has been largely responsible for making the university highly unstable and, hence, making it difficult to plan with any measure of certainty. Even when strikes did not lead to closure, disruptions of varying lengths, such as one or two weeks, made it cumbersome to have definite semester programmes, creating a perennial state of uncertainty for all the stakeholders. In the Chepkoilel riots of 2000, during which students held hostage the Disciplinary Committee the college was subsequently closed for one year, the longest period in the history of the university.

Open animosity between the students, the university and the immediate community also resulted as a result of the strikes. In two incidents students destroyed and looted property in markets near the university. After that the relationship between the students and the community was hostile and whenever protests took place the neighbouring community - being suspicious of the students - always sided with the law-enforcement officers to repulse the students back onto their campus. In the Western University College of Science and Technology, tension remained high between the students and the local community who had taken sides when the JAB and PSSP students fought over election results in 2006.

During these strikes scores of injuries and several deaths have been reported. The death of one student and several injuries were reported in 1991 and 2009 at the Main Campus while several injuries were reported in the 1994 Maseno University incident. Indeed, the brunt of the strikes has been borne by the students. Whenever fines are imposed, it is the students - through parental support - who pay for the damages. The lengthy or indefinite closure of the university leads to a loss of precious time for the students whose careers depend on the successful completion of their degree programmes.

Some students who were interviewed, for example, indicated that they missed opportunities that would have put them on different - probably more lucrative - career paths because they failed to meet their deadlines due to delays in completing their degree programmes. For some of the students a consequence of the strikes was that their education and career prospects were cut short when they faced disciplinary action - some of which included suspension for varying lengths of time from the university while others were expelled. For example, following the 1991 strike 47 students appeared before the Students' Disciplinary Committee (SDC) of Senate which reached the following disciplinary decisions:(i) Discharged – 6 students; (ii) Conditionally discharged-5 students; (iii) Written warnings - 6 students; (iv) Suspension of 1 year-20 students; (v) Expulsion-10 students (Senate Document, 1991). On the Chepkoilel Campus the student leader who had been very vocal during the “Hunger Strike” demonstrations was later charged before the Students' Disciplinary Committee of Senate. Similarly, student leaders who had been active in organizing class boycotts in support of the lecturers strike in 1993-94 appeared before, and were charged by, the Students' Disciplinary Committee. In total eleven students appeared before the Committee, six of whom were acquitted while five were suspended for varying lengths of time. Later, in 1996, one of the student leaders was expelled from the university whereupon he joined the Kenya Human Rights Commission and, subsequently, through Amnesty International lived in exile and managed to complete his studies at an American university after ten years (Klopp and Orina, 2002).

In the Maseno University case of 1994 fourteen students were charged with various offences when they appeared before the Students' Disciplinary Committee. Two students were suspended, one for two years and another for one and a half years. The rest were given warning letters and had their bursaries withdrawn while one was discharged (Maseno University Senate document).

8.4 Types of Strikes

From the findings, the study was able to develop a typical classification of the strikes on the basis of: (i) Their nature in as far as the causes are concerned; and (ii) The length of time that a strike takes.

8.4.1 *Classification by Nature*

The study was able to draw a distinction between two extreme scenarios in a strike occurrence which are at two ends of a continuum. At the one end there is the spontaneous strike while the orchestrated strike is at the other end. It should, however, be noted that in most instances strikes may possess elements of both extremes at varying levels or they may be a mix of the two. As such, one may say that in any given incident the strike is either more spontaneous or less spontaneous. For example, in order to succeed orchestrated strikes take advantage of the potency of the existing situation in form of routine grievances to whip up the emotions of students and to get them to participate in a strike. This is done by bringing to the fore the issues and creating a sense of urgency by means of propaganda. This classification into type, therefore, serves the purpose of creating a clearer insight into the intricacies of student strikes.

8.4.1.1 *Spontaneous Strike*

As the name suggests, a spontaneous strike is triggered by the concern of a pertinent issue/issues that genuinely affect the students' academic welfare or conscience, provoking a natural and, often, unplanned reaction to demand that those in authority address them; or expressing anger, dissatisfaction or disapproval of an action - be it within the university or outside of it, such as a government action. It is devoid of manipulation of any kind from any quarters. The issue could stem from the first four of the five thematic areas discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. For example, it could be a policy issue emanating from international or government pressure which has an adverse effect on the academic welfare of the students. A case in point is the adoption of the cost sharing policy that was implemented as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in 1991. It may be a government action, such as denying registration to an association - as

in the case of UASU in 1995, or high level suspect murders, such as the cases of the late Dr Ouko, Bishop Muge and Dr Mbai. At an institutional level, it may be the delay in the issuing of transcripts which affects a section or an entire campus or college. The bottom line is that pertinent issues emerge as the consequence of internal or external policy or a failure that directly concerns the students who are, then, provoked to act in an unplanned and spontaneous manner to express their disapproval and with the aim of having the issues addressed. In many such cases, however, a full blown strike of this nature is often preceded by attempts by both student leaders and the administration to address and rectify the situation, where possible.

A second feature of a spontaneous strike is the existence of a clear objective whose achievement results in the dissipation of the strike and a return to normalcy. The effective solution of the grievance or complaint for which the demonstrations or protests are held is the objective and, once attained, the strike fizzles out and normal operations resume. In other words, the concern is genuine and it is without an ulterior motive or it is a means of making a point that is unrelated to the university operations - as will be seen in the case of orchestrated strikes. In many such instances, therefore, with serious deliberation spontaneous strikes can, and often are, brought under control. However, when the issues go beyond the powers and authority of the university administration, such strikes cannot be controlled. For example, in the June/July 1991 case it was not possible to meet the students' demands since both the university's and government's hands were tied and, in a way, they were helpless. The World Bank had made the payment of tuition fees for university students a precondition of future financial assistance (Samoff and Carrol, 2004). The consequence was a full blown strike that led to the closure of the university for seven months. The protests that followed the death of Dr Ouko in 1990, Archbishop Muge in 1991 and Dr Mbai in 2003 were a show of anger and disapproval of governments which were highly suspected of being involved. During the protracted protests on the Chepkoilel Campus in 1993 the main issue was inadequate catering services, among other things. Once the university had opened up another dining facility and demonstrated their commitment to solving the other pending problems, the students called off the strike.

Except in cases where the issue is a national one or cuts across all public universities - as is occasionally the case - spontaneous strikes are often specific to the affected university, its constituent college or campus. For example, the clash between students and local businessmen in 1991 and the protests against the increase in public transport charges in 2009 were specific to the Main Campus. The protests and clashes that led to the disruption of elections in 2007 were specific to the Chepkoilel Campus just like those which affected Western University College of Science and Technology in 2006 that were specific to the college. Such incidents have also been reported at universities - other than Moi University which was the focus in this study.

Spontaneous strikes, unlike orchestrated ones, do not have the element of inter-university coordination by student leaders or agents working closely with the students. In the past the umbrella students' union, the Kenya National Union of Students' Association, has played a role in coordinating strikes that cut across all universities.

Because these strikes are essentially spontaneous, and because there are mechanisms to address such issues within the university set up, these strikes are often slow in building up and will only explode when there is extreme neglect in tackling the issues on the part of the university administration. An exception is when the strike is caused by a drastic incident, such as the death of a student as a result of being hit, for example, by a speeding vehicle close to the university precinct. In such instances students mobilize and indiscriminately attack motorists and even innocent passersby.

The representation of students on several crucial committees, such as on the Students' Welfare Committee; at departmental meetings; on Faculty Boards, Senate and Council, among several others, as well as the existence in the university structure of relevant offices, such as those of Dean of Students, Deans of Faculties, Heads of Departments and Sections and other senior officers, including the Chief Academic Officer and the Chief Administrative Officer, provides ample opportunities for students to have many of these issues addressed as they arise. Therefore, when they are addressed by the relevant offices

and bodies, spontaneous strikes can be - and often are -controlled. If not, they drag on for up to two months as in the case of Chepkoilel in 1993. This particular incident began on 15 May 1993 and dragged on until 21 June 1993. Another illustration of this kind of strike is that witnessed at Maseno when students engaged the college administration in a protracted series of class boycotts, processions and protests for a period of close to two months from 19 November 1994 until they appear to have only fizzled out when the college broke for the Christmas recess on 15 December 1994. The potential for a full explosion is real in a spontaneous strike until the issues raised are adequately addressed.

The potential for the control of spontaneous strikes is also a consequence of the fact that there is no external manipulation or influence. In their agitation students demonstrate an independence of thought, patience and restraint and hardly demand unrealistic deadlines which results in an opportunity for broad consultations, deliberations and considerations of available and realistic options.

8.4.1.2 Orchestrated Strike

An orchestrated strike is a manipulated strike. While in a spontaneous strike students are genuinely affected by issues that they are protesting against, in an orchestrated strike the manipulators take advantage of the existence of grievances in order to cause a strike by whipping up the emotions of the students. The purpose is, normally, beyond the context of the university and is often political in nature. For example, political factions at a national level may orchestrate strikes in all or most of the public universities as a way of demonstrating the failure of government in the management of public affairs.

Individuals or groups manipulating strikes often target several institutions which results in the occurrence of a series of strikes in a wave - one after another. For example, while the demonstrations in support of the National Teachers' Strike were genuinely a support for the teachers' causes, an element of orchestration was seen when one of the student leaders kept receiving calls from a coordinating office in Nairobi reminding him that it was only Moi University of all the public universities that had not demonstrated in support of the teachers (Interview No. 4, Eldoret; Interview No. 13, Eldoret, 2012).

Due to deliberate orchestration, these strikes are complex and difficult to control or to contain. This is because the manipulators always find reasons in the university context that constitute a serious grievance and of which they take full advantage by bringing it to the attention of students - always in an emotive manner. This is done by means of stringent, often unrealistic, deadlines and demands coming in quick succession.

The first of the twin riots of 1999 on Main Campus had all the elements of an orchestrated riot, especially when examined in light of what was happening at all the public universities. First, a discernible pattern is evident from 1998 when several public universities went on strike: Kenyatta University on 06 and 18 February and 22 March 1998; University of Nairobi on 06 and 22 March 1998; and Moi University on 26 and 27 March. The following year, this pattern reached a crescendo when on 01 February 1999 the University of Nairobi's Main Campus, Kikuyu Campus and Kabete Campus went on the rampage to protest the grabbing of Karura forest by government operatives. These riots continued on Nairobi's Main Campus and the Kabete campuses on 02 February and spread to Kenyatta University. On 03 March students from Moi University's Main Campus and the Faculty of Health Sciences' Town Campus were involved in protests against such issues as "collective punishment, power black-outs, inadequate security, lack of transparency in tendering business premises in the Students' Centre, delay of MUSO elections, delay of academic transcripts and in support of the Dean School of Health Sciences who had been removed from the position of Hospital Director" (Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 2000). On 04 May 1999 students at the University of Nairobi went on the rampage stoning motorists on the Uhuru Highway, University Way, Nyerere Road and State House Road, while on 20 June Maseno University College students demonstrated and boycotted classes. On 20 October 1999 students from the Main Campus and the Chepkoilel Campus of Moi University also went on strike, while Maseno University College again rioted in November of the same year. Upon reporting back after spending five weeks away on suspension, Main Campus students engaged in the second riot of the semester. In total there were fifteen cases of serious student strikes and riots that affected all the public universities in Kenya between February and November of 1999. Except for the protests against the grabbing of Karura Forest and the one incident

at Kenyatta University where students retaliated when a student was hit by a public transport vehicle, all the cases were triggered by issues concerning the inadequacy of facilities and services.

Prior to this series of riots an umbrella body, the Kenya University Students' Association (KUSA), had been formed by the student leaders they were not able to register it, just as the Universities' Academic staff Union had been denied registration earlier on until they went on a national strike and, eventually, registered the union (Klopp and Orina, 2002). Some student leaders had also been expelled from various public universities shortly before these incidents and were actively involved with the national students body (Interview No. 4, Eldoret, May 2012).

The strongest evidence of orchestration in the 1999 riots is the manner in which student leaders communicated their demands and in giving stringent and unrealistic deadlines. The Secretary-General of the SGC, for example, wrote an internal memorandum on 05 October to the Chief Administrative Officer regarding black-outs - that read in part:

May we bring to your attention the dissatisfaction of the entire student community at the continuous power black-outs in Hostels A,B,C,D,E,F, J and Barracks which has crippled students operations, and your failure to save the situation even after trusting that the problem would be brought to an end as had earlier been agreed.

We, therefore, give you a 4 hour notice from 3.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. today 5th October 1999, failure to which we shall take appropriate action. (Internal Memorandum, 05 October 1999).

Similar demands with unrealistic deadlines were made by two student leaders in the following week: one by the Director of Accommodation and Security with a 72 hours ultimatum and another by the Director of Academics in which 12 demands were made in two memorandums with a 48 hour ultimatum. These were followed by two further internal memorandums from the Secretary-General. In an interview with a former student leader who had -at that time - served on the SGC it was confirmed that one of the student leaders maintained close contact with a coordinating office in Nairobi by means of regular phone calls (Interview No. 4, Eldoret; Interview No. 13, Eldoret, 2012).

The university made frantic efforts to stem the rapidly building tension, using several channels of communications including an address by the Vice-Chancellor, and the situation seemed to be under control by Monday, 19 October, when suddenly information was circulated around the university and among the students that one of the student leaders had been kidnapped and that the university authorities had had a hand in it. This was the trigger for the violent protests that led to the closure of the university.

Another characteristic feature of an orchestrated strike is the mutation of issues raised during the protests. Once authorities have effectively addressed the initial issues raised by students, the individuals spearheading the strike come up with fresh demands which are also accompanied by unrealistic deadlines. In the 1999/2000 Main Campus and Chepkoilel Campus riots, for example, the initial issues were deplorable accommodation conditions and problems associated with transcripts. These were supplemented by the alleged abduction of a student leader by the university authorities. By the second riot the issues concerned the introduction of stringent rules in the halls of residence and by the time of the riots on the Chepkoilel Campus the students were complaining about a perceived bias of the administration in handling disciplinary cases.

Orchestrated strikes are, therefore, often difficult to control as they take advantage of pertinent issues that apparently keep cropping up in a series of events reminiscent of mutation once the ones at hand have been effectively addressed. The following comparison shows the differences between the two types of strikes.

Spontaneous strike

- Often specific to the institution.
- Issues raised are genuine.
- Issues raised remain constant throughout the strike.
- May be controlled with adequate effort.
- No connection with external forces or influences.
- Student leaders engage in meaningful deliberations with management, allowing time for realistic deadlines and making suggestions concerning alternative options.

Orchestrated strike

- Affects several institutions at the same time or in succession.
- Issues are manipulated to whip up emotions.
- Issues raised evolve/mutate at different stages of the strike.
- Difficult to control, new issues keep emerging as original ones are addressed.
- Close coordination with external forces.
- No meaningful engagement, unrealistic deadlines, inadequate communication.

8.4.2 Classification According to the Speed of Occurrence

One of the most fascinating features of student strikes is the speed at which they can erupt; develop into a full all-out destructive riot within as short a time as one or two hours; and fizzle out at the same speed. This speed is such that one would hardly know that shortly before there had been a serious situation which could have led to death - the only evidence being the trail of destruction that may have been created. As such, the study has found sufficient evidence from the collected data to warrant a classification based on the speed at which riots develop and fizzle out. As in the previous, classification is on two extreme ends of a continuum. On the one end is the flash or spark of a wild-cat sort of strike that develops to a devastating maturity in as short a time as two hours or less, while on the other end is the protracted strike that drags on for up to two months before exploding and fizzling out. Both of these strikes could result in the serious widespread destruction of property.

8.4.2.1 *The Flash or Spark Strike*

This is the type of strike that takes an extremely short time between its heightened tension phase and a fully blown one. While the brewing context may be relatively long and even difficult to determine, the tension phase is normally very short which culminates in a climax within a very short time and dissipates with equal speed. It may be caused by criminal acts, such as robbery or the rape of a student by a member of the public. These incidents provoke students who quickly rally themselves and proceed to avenge any actions against one of their own. In some instances this may be occasioned by a high profile assassination - as was witnessed in the case of Dr Mbai. Student elections are volatile grounds that may lead to such actions by students as was witnessed on the Chepkoilel Campus during the 2007 SGC election. During this incident an otherwise peaceful process quickly turned chaotic when irate students - who suspected foul play - invaded the counting hall, overrunning it and destroying all the election material and gravely endangering the lives of the university officers supervising the event and those of the candidates and their agents as well as the officiating students. Another illustration of a flash strike is the clash between students and local businessmen of the adjacent centre in 1991. Once students have vented their anger in such riots, they quickly resume their daily routine.

8.4.2.2 *Protracted Strike*

A protracted strike is one that takes as long as two months before either fizzling out or being contained from the time it develops into the heightened tension phase. During this period there is a series of intermittent riots, boycotts, protests, charged student meetings and threats of more serious action by the students.

A protracted strike is more often than not spontaneous in nature and the length of time it takes is as a result of intense negotiations characterized by bargaining, compromise, coercion and threats employed by both sides, i.e. the students on the one hand and the university administration on the other. The best illustration of a protracted strike is that

on the Chepkoilel Campus in May-June 1993. Although the brewing context had evidently started much earlier, it developed into the heightened tension phase with the issuing of a terse memorandum to the office of the Principal by the Director of Accommodation and Security on 05 May complaining about several issues, the most critical of which was the inadequacy of the catering services that was causing congestion and delays during meal times. This was followed by a series of terse exchanges in communication, meetings, boycotts and threats of full-blown strike that culminated in the issuing of a hunger strike notice that took a day or two. The strike was called off on 21 June when a new dining facility was made operational and it was evident that the rest of the issues were being meaningfully addressed. The protracted battle between the students and the administration of Maseno University College in 1994 is another illustration of this kind of strike. It entered the heightened tension phase on 19 November 1994 and only fizzled out when students broke for the Christmas recess on 15 December 1994. The following comparison shows the differences between the two types of strikes.

Spark/Flash Strike

- Takes a very short time: between 2 hours and 2 days.
- Little or no time for intervention by authorities.
- Caused by sudden occurrences, such as the death of a student.

Protracted Strike

- Takes long time: 2 weeks to 2 months.
- Intense negotiations and bargaining occurs throughout.
- Involves several issues affecting students.

The study found that the strikes classified by speed and their causes relate to one another in a matrix which is demonstrated in the figure below.




Figure 8.1: Strike Matrix

This typical presentation and classification is just an ideal situation, however, the study postulates that any one strike, or riot, may fit into any one of the following descriptions, which depends on the general causes and speed of occurrence: (i) Protracted orchestration; (ii) Spontaneous protraction; (iii) Spontaneous spark/flash; or (iv) Orchestrated spark/flash. A protracted orchestration is associated with the confluence of national and institutional issues and may precipitate organizational paranoia. A typical example is the twin riots of Main Campus, 1999. Spontaneous protraction is associated with continued welfare or academic grievances that the university may not be able to address quickly due to factors beyond its control such as inadequate funding. Typical examples are the 1993 and 1994 prolonged protests which affected Chepkoilel Campus and Maseno University College respectively. A spontaneous spark on the other hand occurs when students react to an unforeseen drastic occurrence such as when a student is hit by a speeding motorist while an orchestrated flash occurs when students of a particular campus riot in support of their colleagues in another campus, or university. For example, during the first of the twin riots of Main campus in 1999, students of Chepkoilel Campus rioted in solidarity when

information reached them that a student leader in the Main Campus had allegedly been kidnapped.

8.5 Organizational Disequilibrium and Organizational Paranoia

The study has coined the terms “Organizational Disequilibrium” and “Organizational Paranoia” to describe certain characteristics discernible in the university. Organizational Disequilibrium can be observed as the university evolves to adapt to dynamic policy realities and pressure while Organizational Paranoia is seen in a situation that grips the university in the thick of the crisis of a strike.

8.5.1 Organizational Disequilibrium

This is used to describe the general state of instability, uncertainty and near chaos that characterizes a university in its formative stages from its establishment and through its early historical growth and expansion. The university evolves in some state of turmoil as it grapples and struggles to satisfy the sharp demand for university education from the immediate surrounding society for which it was established, while crucial financial support from government dwindles rapidly. The policy of withdrawing financial support and the pressure to provide education for larger numbers are at variance and incoherent and this is reflected in the university’s growth and development. Capital projects are started only to stall at different levels of completion - some halfway, others three quarters of the way and in even worse case scenarios the projects hardly proceed after the foundation or a quarter of the way. New campuses and constituent colleges are established, mostly through the conversion or the taking over of middle level colleges which are hardly adequate in terms of space and facilities to accommodate the degree programmes. New academic programmes are mounted and are constantly revised to adapt to dynamic market demands. The following features characterize organizational disequilibrium.

8.5.1.1 Rapid and Uncontrolled growth

Rapid and uncontrolled growth comes in the form of both student enrolment and physical expansion. The impact of a knowledge economy is globalization and a rapid population increase, causing the university to become almost helpless in as far as enrolment is concerned and to yield to social pressure -resulting in drastic enrolment rates which can reach as high as 100% or over in a year. During its early years of growth for example the enrolment rates at Moi University were extremely high. For example, enrolment rates rose by 238% in 1987; 118% in 1988; 50.2% in 1989; and 99.4% in 1990.

Establishment of academic programmes also did not strictly adhere to original plans. For example at its inception, Moi University was envisioned as an institution that would emphasize the teaching of science courses. The following faculties were to be established: Faculties of Technology; Agriculture; Veterinary Medicine; Forest Resources and Wildlife Management; Science; Social Cultural and Development Studies; and Information Sciences. However several faculties that were not in this original plan were soon established at a rate that it overtook the enrolments in the originally envisaged programmes. By 2010 the university had established the following schools where close to 30000 students are enrolled in: (i) Business and Economics; (ii) Arts and Social Sciences; (iii) Engineering; (iv) Education; (v) Environmental Studies; (vi) Human Resource Management; (vii) Law; (viii) Public Health; (ix) Medicine; (x) Information Sciences; (xi) Natural Resource Management; (xii) Science; and (xiii) Agriculture and Biotechnology (Republic of Kenya, 1981; Moi University Admissions Office).

8.5.1.2 Physical Expansion

The university embarks on unplanned expansion, establishing campuses and constituent colleges and hurriedly creating new faculties. The academic programmes change rapidly in response to dynamic market force demand. With dwindling government financial support the university introduces a raft of income

generating activities, such as consultancy services, that deviate from its mission. The physical expansion has also been characterized by the initiation of projects that soon stall midway. For example one of the biggest projects, a hostel complex stalled for over ten years and was only completed when the university administration made efforts to complete by sourcing for funds from sources other than government support (Interview No. 12, Eldoret).

8.5.1.3 Student Unrest

Student unrest becomes a common feature with hardly a year passing without reports of unrest on any of the campuses. This is worsened by the university's state of unpreparedness for the strikes. In total Moi University recorded a total of 24 major cases of student unrest in a time span of 25 years.

8.5.1.4 Frequent Closures

As a result of the unrest which is characterized by frequent violent strikes, the university or its constituent colleges and campuses are forced to close on many occasions - interrupting its programmes and causing a sense of uncertainty. In a number of instances it would be hard to tell how long a four year programme can take to complete. This is further exacerbated if the university has adopted a staggering of its programmes as a means of addressing the problem of inadequate space.

8.5.2 Organizational Paranoia

Organizational paranoia refers to a sense of deep suspicion that grips the institution in the middle of a strike, normally between the heightened tension phase and the actual strike. Organizational paranoia can be associated with an institution undergoing a state of disequilibrium. A convergence of national issues playing out at the university level when it is dealing with critical institutional issues is a recipe for organizational paranoia. For example, factional politics at a national level may subtly penetrate the university's management and cascade down to its student leadership, causing deep polarization within the student body.

Coupled with deep-seated academic and welfare issues, a heightened tension phase in a strike may cause suspicion amongst all levels of management, lecturers and students. In such a case there is a total collapse of communication which is immediately superseded by the grapevine that works in overdrive with all sorts of rumours, including those of arrests and sabotage, from different quarters. The result is often extreme action by various groups including the administration which often makes the mistake of suspending the student leadership because of suspicion and a lack of trust. A series of such extreme actions - with corresponding counter actions - puts the university in state of utter lawlessness or near atrophy. Strikes in such situations are often of devastating proportions in terms of the destruction of property and usually the best way to avoid total destruction is to close the institution. The following, therefore, characterize organizational paranoia.

8.5.2.1 Confluence of National and Institutional Critical Issues

Issues at a national level may cascade down to, and play out at, the institutional level - often with devastating effects, especially when this coincides with the existence of serious welfare or academic issues affecting students at the institutional level. National issues are often political and involve intrigues and power struggles between different political factions, such as political parties, which - in the Kenyan context - are often along tribal lines and are not ideological (Hornsby, 2012). The deep polarization that is frequently reflected nationally, especially during elections, cascades to the institutional level and affects both the students and staff by threatening the normal operations of the university. Voting patterns during student elections also reflect the broader national patterns and the animosity that emerges between students belonging to the different political factions is often on the basis of tribe (Interview No 5, Nairobi; Interviews Nos 15 and 16, Eldoret, 2012). The stage is set for hostile relations if, for example, student leaders who are perceived to belong to a particular political faction which is different from that of the administration are voted into office. Meaningful

communication can certainly be hampered by the hostility brought about by the bitter rivalry at the national level which also plays out in such a scenario at the university. This is best illustrated by the violent riots that rocked Kenyatta University twice in March 2009 during which property valued at over Kshs 127,000,000/= was destroyed. The first strike occurred on 18 March 2009 and led to the destruction of property valued at Kshs 15 million while the second one occurred on 29th March 2009 and property valued at Kshs 112 million was destroyed (Daily Nation 4 December 2009). It was the most devastating destruction of property involving university strikes in the history of the country and it is directly associated with the playing out of national political struggles, competition and bitter rivalry in the post PNU/ODM 2008 election that translated into the worst election violence in Kenya's history. The senior university administration was composed of people perceived to be in PNU while the student representatives in the Kenyatta University Students' Association (KUSA) were perceived to be in ODM (Republic of Kenya, 2009; Daily Nation 4, December 2009).

8.5.2.2 Deep Suspicion

Because of the hostility originating in the national political arena, there is an entrenched suspicion among university staff, lecturers, senior administration and the students which worsens whenever issues of concern are raised by the students and particularly if - as in the example of the Kenyatta University case - student leaders and the administration perceive themselves to be from different political/tribal camps. Deep suspicion blurs the objective in dealing with genuine concerns because there is constantly the imagination that such actions are meant to undermine the administration. The report of the Parliamentary Committee on Education that investigated the 2009 Kenyatta University incident, for example, concludes:

The committee is also of the view that the widely held suspicions by the administration of internal and external forces working to destabilize the institution and remove the Vice Chancellor overshadowed any meaningful

effort to dialogue and resolve the students' grievances objectively (Republic of Kenya, 2009:35).

8.5.2.3 Collapse of Communication

Due to the deep suspicion the animosity cascading from the national level as well as extensive polarization, there is a complete collapse of communication between the different sections of the university and its place is taken by the grapevine in all sections of the university with its myriad rumours which affects critical decisions, especially those of management. In the Kenyatta University case rumours circulated in all the sections of the university, including the administration high offices that acted on rumours of the existence of internal and external forces bent on undermining the administration. Several rumours circulated among the students, such as the intention by the university to introduce a dress code (interpreted as uniform), the banning of cooking in the hostels and fee increases - among several others.

8.5.2.4 Panic and Uneven Decisions

Serious animosity, a breakdown in communication and the high prevalence of rumours cause widespread panic both within the student body and the administration which often leads to highly questionable decisions with dire consequences. Due to the perception that the recently elected student leadership was fronting an ODM agenda, the Kenyatta University administration sidelined it, opting to work with the previous leadership instead, which in effect was a kind of “banning” of the newly elected office bearers. This was counterproductive and exacerbated the situation even more. The university also imposed an equal fine on all students for the destruction of property during an earlier strike, including students who were away on official trips and the students of two campuses of the university which had not been affected by the strike in question. According to the students, the fine imposed was not commensurate with the level of destruction (*Ibid*).

8.5.2.5 *Widespread Destruction of Property*

The combined effect of gross animosity and suspicion, communication breakdown, panic and often irrational decisions, generally, is a highly emotive student body that is deeply distrustful of the administration and is frustrated and angered by all their actions. The anger is expressed through the wanton destruction of property of unprecedented proportions.

The Kenyatta University case that has been used in the study to illustrate organizational paranoia has a striking similarity to the 1999/2000 Main Campus and Chepkolel Campus incidents during which students barricaded the administration block, holding members of the Students' Disciplinary Committee hostage for more than seven hours. At the national level there was a struggle to dislodge KANU from power (Interview No. 13, Eldoret, July 2012; Interview No. 9, Nairobi, May 2012). Students were also skeptical of the administration in handling the disciplinary cases. They complained that the campus administration had imposed heavy fines on them when compared to those of the Main Campus students, yet the destruction on the latter was more severe. Rumours were also rife that there would be a clash between Muslims and Christian students during the impending student elections; that student leaders who had been expelled in the past were coming to address the rest of the students; and that current student leaders who were appearing before the disciplinary committee had been arrested by police officers. Parallels are also discernible in the Main Campus twin riots of 1999, especially during the second strike that was more devastating. For example, the SGC had been barred from conducting its activities and several decisions affecting students - especially in the hostels - had been implemented. The banning of the SGC curtailed communication between the students and the administration in a major way.

In the Kenyatta University case there was a struggle and competition between the two leading political parties; PNU and ODM. Students also complained that the fine imposed on them as a result of the first strike was not commensurate with the damage caused on the property. Furthermore all students, even those who were away on official trips and those in campuses that were not affected by the first strike were fined. Rumours were also rife in the university about an increase in fees and the introduction of a dress code among others. Like in the Moi University, Main Campus incident also, there were two strikes that occurred in quick succession and the second strike in each case, was the consequence of actions taken by an administration deeply suspicious of the students actions and leadership. For example, in both cases the student leadership was effectively banned from conducting its duties. The second strike in each of these cases was more devastating in terms of property destroyed.

8.6 Mechanisms for Addressing Unrest

The study sought to discover what policies or strategies have been put in place both nationally and at institutional levels to address the issue of student unrest. Both at the national and institutional level there is no evidence of deliberate efforts to develop a comprehensive policy on the matter. At both levels the study found that the approach has largely been on an *ad-hoc* basis where committees are constituted to investigate and make recommendations that are often seldom adhered to.

8.6.1 National

8.6.1.1 The Vice-Chancellor's Committee

At a national level, the most serious attempt to address the issue of student unrest was the establishment of a Vice-Chancellor's Committee to investigate and make recommendations on how best to deal with the issue. The establishment of this

committee followed a presidential directive on 03 December 1999 where the terms of reference included the following:

- To investigate, make recommendations and report on the causes of the frequent disturbances/riots in public universities with specific reference to:
 - (a) Root causes of the disturbances/riots and their effects. The investigation should focus on identifying any internal, external, sociological, psychological or environmental factors which have contributed to this phenomenon.
 - (b) How future disturbances can be prevented/pre-empted. The proposal should focus on preventive actions to be taken for immediate response and long term solutions.
- To deal with other matters which may directly touch on the causes and effects of pupil/student unrest in Kenya (Vice-Chancellor's Committee,2000:v).

The committee conducted a comprehensive and detailed investigation which entailed collecting views and information from universities and other institutions, including secondary schools. It also interviewed stake-holders, such as parents, teachers and administrators serving in different capacities, before formulating its conclusions. The committee summarized its findings regarding the causes of unrest into seven main issues which include: (i) Inadequate facilities; (ii) Internal provocation; (iii) University management styles;(iv) Poverty; (v) External influences; (vi) Poor upbringing; and (vii) Unemployment of university graduates.

The committee made a total of ninety-eight recommendations to be implemented at national and institutional levels. These recommendations revolved mainly around the restructuring and improvement of welfare services by establishing a Committee of Joint Universities to deal with student welfare; the strengthening of guidance and counseling programmes; improving disciplinary and law enforcement procedures; and revitalizing scholarship and scholarly activities at the universities. This study, however, established that many of the recommendations were not implemented by the universities. For example, at Moi

University it was found that an *ad-hoc* committee was established by the university in 2004 to investigate and make recommendations on the disciplining of students. In all aspects this committee was similar to the Vice-Chancellor's Committee. More instructive is the fact that the recommendations of this internal committee were strikingly similar to the national one which implies that the recommendations of the national committee had not been implemented.

8.6.1.2 Performance Contracting

Upon assuming power, one of the policies adopted by the NARC government with regard to the management and operation of publicly funded institutions was performance contracting. Although this did not target public universities exclusively, it has had a significant impact on their operation and is seen as an effective mechanism of addressing the problem of unrest (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, June, 2012).

In performance contracting two parameters are employed: the service charter and customer satisfaction. The service charter requires public institutions to develop a charter; a list of all the services provided, their cost and its duration. Customer satisfaction requires that public institutions make arrangements for a survey of customer satisfaction which should be conducted by an independent body. On the basis of such an annual survey these institutions are ranked, the best are identified and a public announcement is made. Similarly, a quarterly employee satisfaction survey is conducted.

The effect of performance contracting has been a deliberate effort by institutions, including universities, to improve their service delivery and, hence, minimizing the unrest associated with the poor delivery of service. In this context the students are the clients and their satisfaction regarding the provision of services is increasingly becoming the main concern of the university (*Ibid*).

8.6.2 *Institutional Level*

The study has established that Moi University has developed several strategies aimed at addressing the issue of unrest. These include: (i) The maintenance of a training programme for student leaders; (ii) The maintenance of an effective communication system; (iii) The participation of students in key policy bodies of the university; (iv) The maintenance of an intelligence system; and (vi) The appointment of committees from time to time to investigate and make recommendations about incidents of student unrest.

8.6.2.1 *Training Programme*

A training programme is conducted once a year. Upon election to office, the newly elected student leaders go for a one week training session that focuses on leadership; the university management structure and decision-making; and communication - among several other topics (Interviews, Nos 12, 13 and 17). This training programme also targets elected leaders of clubs and societies that have been registered at the university, such as the Christian Union, Business Students' Association and Students in Free Enterprise, etc.

8.6.2.2 *Communication*

The study has also established that the university - through its various departments - strives to maintain an effective flow of information from the student body to the administration and *vice-versa*. For example, the office of the Vice-Chancellor often ensures that there is a meeting with the newly elected student leaders as a way of establishing a rapport and, thereafter, maintaining constant communication. Most of the other offices, such as those of the Dean of Students, the Chief Academic Officer, Chief Administrative Officer and the Deans of Faculties, have an open door policy (Interviews, Nos 12, 13, 17 and 18). Comments by one former student leader demonstrate how the university maintains communication:

So in that SGC we would agree that we want 1, 2, and 3 and we appoint. We had 11 members so we had 3 on this and 3 on this. So the 3 people, for example, handling health issues would go do a write-up and see the Chief Medical Officer. If they get a way forward there, fine, if they don't get the next day we would go to the Chief Administrative Officer and that's how it would always go same to the issues of welfare. If we had welfare issues we would go to the Dean of Students. Sometimes the Dean of Students would actually refer and say this is actually beyond me, but you can go to so-and-so. Therefore, we would move like that and then report back to ourselves until we finally agree (Interview No. 2, Eldoret, May 2012).

Communication was found to be quite effective not only during the normal operation of the university but also during crises - as in the case on Chepkoilel Campus in 1993 when an impending riot was averted by the principal engaging the students in negotiations and bargaining throughout the crisis.

8.6.2.3 Student Participation in Key Policy Bodies

The Moi University statutes make provision for student representation on key policy bodies of the university, including the University Council and the Senate. Provision is also made for student representation on Faculty and Departmental Boards as well as Senate and Council sub-committees (Republic of Kenya, 1984; Interview No. 17).

8.6.2.3 Ad-hoc Committees

The study has found that from time to time the university has established *ad-hoc* committees to investigate cases of student unrest and to make recommendations. Several such reports were made to Senate during the period under study. In 2004, for example, a detailed report was made by an eighteen man *ad-hoc* committee that was chaired by Professor Akong'a. The report made a total of 72 recommendations to Senate. Most of its recommendations were similar to those of the Vice-Chancellor's Committee and there is no evidence of their implementation.

8.6.2.4 *Intelligence*

The study has established that the university has an intelligence system whose main function is to obtain information about impending riots and what transpires on a daily basis within the student body. This is made up of the university security system, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and some students (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, June 2012; Interview No. 13, Eldoret, July 2012).

8.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the nature of student unrest as a way of addressing two of the research questions: (i) How did the unrest occur/manifest with what and with what consequences? (ii) How did the government and Moi University respond to the unrest? First, in order to address these questions, in this chapter the study examined the various forms taken by the unrest, i.e. how the students at Moi University engaged in what is defined as unrest. Secondly, the chapter looked at the frequency or how often these incidents of unrest occurred within the university, its constituent colleges and campuses. Thirdly, the chapter considered how any one particular incident of unrest occurred. The focus was specifically on the stages that a strike or riot went through from its onset to its end. Fourthly, the types of strikes that emerged from the analysis of the various incidents that the study had carried out were discussed. Fifthly, the impact or the effects that the unrest had at both the institutional and personal levels was examined.

In this chapter the study also coined two phrases - “Organizational Disequilibrium” and “Organizational Paranoia” - to describe situations that were found to prevail at the university and which are associated with unrest. Lastly it examined national and institutional policy efforts to address the issue of student unrest

With regard to how unrest occurred the study found that it took various forms, such as peaceful demonstrations, boycotts of classes, picketing and - on several occasions - there were violent riots and clashes with law-enforcement officers. In

one incident students at one of the campuses declared a “hunger strike”. There have also been incidences where students have clashed fiercely with groups outside or in close proximity to the various campuses, mainly local traders from the community around the locality of the affected institution.

As far as the frequency of occurrence is concerned, the study found that generally there were a total of 24 cases of serious strikes that affected Moi University, its campuses and constituent colleges during the period under study, i.e. 1984-2009, which is a period of 25 years. This implies that on average almost one incident was recorded each year. In reality, however, this was not the case since this is just an average figure. The study found that certain periods experienced the occurrence of strikes in waves that came in succession, followed by periods of calm which lasted for varying lengths of time. For example, on the introduction of cost sharing policies a wave of strikes hit the university in 1991 and affected all its campuses. In 1990 students had demonstrated following the death of Dr Ouko and also in 1991 upon the death of Archbishop Muge. A calm period was witnessed in the following one year but the effects of the sharp increase in enrolment and dwindling finances triggered another wave of unrest which affected Chepkoilel Campus and Maseno University in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Another wave began in 1997 at Maseno, continued to spread to the Main Campus in 1998 and reached its peak with the twin riots of 1999 that spilled over to Chepkoilel in 1999 and 2000.

The study found that a typical strike develops through four main phases: (i) The development phase or brewing context; (ii) The tension/heightened tension phase; (iii) The explosion phase; and (iv) The dissipation or uneasy calm phase. Unrest has had the effect of disrupting university programmes and widespread destruction of property at the institutional level. For students, this has meant the interruption of the development of their careers or the outright loss of university studies through suspension and expulsion. Loss of life has also been reported. The classification of strikes can be in the form of its general causes and the speed at which it builds to maturity. The two classifications lead to four types of strikes -

two each on a continuum and, hence, the spontaneous versus the orchestrated strike and the spark/flash strike versus the protracted strike.

Organizational disequilibrium is the state of instability witnessed as the university struggles to adjust to pressures and demands to provide quality and relevant education for an increasingly high number of students amidst a sharp drop of financial support from government. It is characterized by a sharp, sporadic and unplanned expansion in terms of enrolments and physical development, student unrest and frequent closure. Organizational paranoia describes a situation that grips a university in the midst of a strike or riot. It often features at a university that is in disequilibrium and is characterized by: (i) The confluence of national and institutional issues; (ii) Deep suspicion; (iii) The collapse of communication; (iv) Panic and uneven decisions; and (v) The widespread destruction of property.

The chapter also discussed the findings regarding government and institutional efforts to address student unrest. Following a presidential directive a Vice-Chancellor's Committee was constituted at government level in 1999 to investigate causes of unrest in public universities and to make the necessary recommendations. Public universities have also benefited from the performance contracting policy for all public institutions which was introduced by the NARC government when it assumed power in 2002. Although this was not meant to specifically address the issue of student unrest, its implementation has contributed to improving service delivery at universities and, thereby, reducing strikes related to poor service delivery. At the institutional level, Moi University has adopted the following strategies to address the issue of unrest: (i) Training programmes for student leaders; (ii) Improved communication; (iii) Participation of students in policy-making bodies of the university; (iv) The use of *ad-hoc* committees; and (v) The use of an efficient intelligence network.

CHAPTER 9

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE

9.1 Summary of Findings

This study sought to investigate and analyze the factors that have informed student unrest in Kenya's higher education sector. The quest was informed by the fact that higher education in Kenya has been characterized by a state of turmoil in the form of student unrest which took shape as boycotts, demonstrations, protests and violent riots and strikes. These have led to the widespread destruction of property and the loss of life. The study also investigated the nature and form of the unrest; the impact of the unrest; and the implications for research, policy and practice.

The finding -from which the study was able to build its argument - was that factors informing the unrest could be summarized in five broad thematic areas. These are: (i) Unrest associated with inadequate/inappropriate or flawed international and national policies as well as social pressure; (ii) Unrest associated with critical national issues and its identification with progressive change agents; (iii) Unrest associated with student politics and competition for control of resources; (iv) Unrest associated with student conflict with organized groups; and (v) Unrest associated with the existence of catalyzing factors within the university.

International funding policies on education which are informed by the Human Capital Theory that viewed university education as having fewer returns when compared to basic education and in promoting inequality have had the most devastating effect on higher education in Kenya, generally, and at Moi University, in particular. Informed by this argument, policy adaptations that gained popularity within the main funding agencies in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s came in the form of reduced expenditure *per* student, an attempt to reduce enrolment as well as the

introduction of tuition fee payment at university have been responsible for 40% of the strikes recorded at Moi University during the period under study. Periodically and persistently students have engaged the university authorities in boycotts and protests to complain about the effects of these policy adaptations.

In 1991 the Government of Kenya adopted policies that were imposed by the World Bank as part of the conditions for future loan awards. These included the introduction of tuition fees and the withdrawal of students' out-of-pocket allowances in what was referred to as "cost sharing". The result was one of the most devastating waves of strikes that affected all public universities and saw the death of one student at Moi University and its closure for seven months. The continued implementation of these policies resulted in a decline of both the academic and welfare standards of the university students - most of whom could not afford the tuition fees and their upkeep. Acute shortages of teaching and learning facilities, deplorable living conditions and the stalling of development projects are issues that have dogged the University administration since the drastic policy changes and have been at the centre of almost every serious strike that has affected the university.

The adverse impact of these policy adaptations was compounded by the government's decision to impose a dual and double intake admission for public universities in 1987 and 1990 which resulted in an astronomical increase in student enrolment of 89.81% and 63.75%, respectively. This was as a result of the high demand for university education brought about by a population growth rate of 4.1% that had been registered by 1989 (Hornsby, 2012). The Chepkoilel Campus protests of 1993, 1994 and 1995 concerned the inadequate facilities occasioned by the sharp increase in enrolment amidst dwindling government financial support. They include protests in April and July 1991, April and July 1993 and 1997. Similar protests were witnessed on Main Campus in 1998 and 1999 while the clash between students in the Privately Sponsored Students'

Programmes and government sponsored ones in 2003 also included an element of inadequate resources.

This theme was divided into three sub-themes with examples of strike incidents that best illustrate and clarify each sub-theme. They are: (i) The implementation of the cost sharing policy; (ii) The pressure on teaching, learning and accommodation facilities; and (iii) An inadequacy in the provision of services. In most instances, however, these issues informed the students' actions almost simultaneously and it is hard to exclusively attribute one incident to any single factor.

The study established that student support and identification with the national struggle for a better democratic space and positive change found expression in student unrest. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, 1997 and 2003-2005 Kenya was embroiled in spirited efforts for political reform and a struggle to put a progressive constitution in place by politicians, the clergy and civil society. These efforts were strongly supported by university students in their strikes and demonstrations. The government's response has always been to use force in silencing these efforts. There have also been high level assassinations where the circumstances have pointed to government as a suspect. This is true of the disappearance and subsequent murder of the Right Hon. Robert Ouko in 1990, Bishop Alexander Kipsang Muge in 1991 and Dr Odhiambo Mbai in 2003.

Although Dr Ouko was a minister in the KANU government of the day, he was perceived to have had a liberal mind and was receptive to change. Bishop Muge was critical of the government which he had accused of corruption and land grabbing and he advocated the introduction of multi-party politics. Dr Odhiambo Mbai was the Chairman of the Devolution Sub-committee in the Constitutional Review Delegates Conference that took place in Nairobi and which introduced far-reaching proposals for the new constitution which was being discussed.

As a means of scoring political points, student protests were not confined to these incidents only. Indeed, many other incidents were associated with student support for a democratic space and change. The Main Campus protests of 1999 had strong links to political intrigues and struggles at the national level, pitting different political parties against one another. This is also true of the protests that took place at Kabarak University where students booed the President for renegeing on a pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between different political parties and which facilitated a NARC victory. During the nationwide university lecturers' and teachers' strikes of 1993/4 and 1997, respectively, students at Moi University boycotted classes in solidarity.

The election of student leaders to the executive of the Students' Union and the Students' Governing Council (SGC) has, largely, been a reflection of national politics. This study has established that in the recent past competition for leadership positions as a means of controlling student jointly owned resources has been so critical that it has occasionally degenerated into physical confrontation, at times leading to the closure of the university or sections of it. This worsened particularly when it was compounded by other factors, such as ethnicity or when students registered under different programmes take opposing sides.

Confrontation between students enrolled in different programmes that disrupt university operations is a recent phenomenon. The worst of this was witnessed in 2003 when government sponsored students clashed fiercely with the privately sponsored ones. At the core of the conflict was the use of university buses that had been purchased from "proceeds" of the self-sponsored students. While this was the reason that sparked off the riots, there had been a build-up of tension over a long period of time concerned with what was perceived as special treatment of the self-sponsored students by the university administration and lecturers as they were paid additional allowances for providing service for these students. Concern had also been raised regarding equity in education when universities established this programme as a means of raising funds. Tension had also been brought about

by the expulsion of the MUSO Chairman on academic grounds and the resignation of its Secretary-General earlier in the year.

In a few cases negative ethnicity has occasioned fierce clashes, resulting in the closure of the university. This, however, does not occur in isolation. In such cases there is an interplay of several issues and ethnicity only exacerbates the situation. Such a situation may arise during elections for positions of student leadership. In one such incident which occurred in the, then, Western University College of Science and Technology, there was an interplay of the following: (i) A tension between self-sponsored students and government sponsored students (because of the location of the university college and that most students on the self-sponsored programme belonged to one ethnic community); (ii) Competition for control of student managed business premises; and (iii) Campaigns for elective posts on the Students' Governing Council (SGC). At the conclusion of the process the results of the election triggered the clashes which led to the closure of the university college.

This study uncovered incidents where students united to fight or protest against perceived threats to their welfare or interests by organized groups operating outside or close to the university. Such incidents are, however, very rare. One such case occurred at the National Youth Service (NYS) Training College in Gilgil in 1988 when first year students who had just graduated from the college were recalled to practice in preparation for the celebration of ten years of President Moi's rule. Once at the college the students were subjected to the stringent paramilitary training regulations that had previously been applied during their three months of training. They resisted and, consequently, clashed with the NYS officers in a fierce battle caused extensive destruction of property which earned them a suspension.

In 1991, students from the Main Campus clashed with small-scale businessmen in a small trading centre adjacent to the university. Tension had been building up

between the students and the businessmen who complained about students who were destructive and disrespectful of their businesses. There was widespread destruction of property but this did not disrupt the operations of the university. In 2009, however, students from the Main Campus clashed with operators of the Public Service Vehicles providing transport between the University's Main Campus and Eldoret over high transport charges levied by the operators which mainly affected the students. There was a widespread destruction of property and the death of one student who was onboard a vehicle that had been hijacked by the students and which was involved in an accident. In this incident the Main Campus was closed to avoid imminent riots resulting from the reported death.

In almost all incidents of unrest or specific strikes and riots the situation has always been aggravated by situations pertaining to, or prevailing within, the university that - in effect - have a catalyzing impact on the strikes. In other words, such existing situations may not necessarily be the actual cause of the strikes, rather they only contribute to making the situation worse and reducing the chance or possibility of averting an impending strike. These situations may be formal or informal.

Formal situations include: (i) Inadequate or ineffective communication arrangement which hinders the flow of communication between the administration and the students; (ii) Alienation of students in the decision-making process; (iii) Law enforcement procedures; (iv) Rigid admission criteria and rigid academic programmes; and (v) Student leadership.

Informal situations include: (i) Student disillusion with university education; and (ii) The high chances for the onset of collective dynamics due to anonymity, reduced responsibility, large groups of students and the prevalence of drugs and alcohol.

9.2 Nature of Student Unrest

Student unrest at Moi University has taken the form of protests, a boycott of classes, peaceful demonstrations and often violent riots. In many instances there has been a widespread destruction of property and death - the first such case being in 1991. Other notably violent incidents include the 1999 twin riots on the Main Campus where property worth KShs 16,000,000 was destroyed. The PSSP/ JAB clash of 2003 was equally devastating. While campuses may experience a relatively long period without any incident, the overall picture is of a university in turmoil when statistics of all colleges and campuses are taken into account.

9.2.1 *Stages of a Strike*

The study was able to identify four distinct stages in the development of a strike or riot. They are: (i) The development phase or brewing phase; (ii) The tension or increased tension phase; (iii) The full-scale or actual strike or riot phase; and (iv) The dissipation or uneasy calm phase.

The first phase of a strike is the development or brewing one. This is a latent stage in that there is an existence of potentially explosive issues affecting the students and, consequently, the operation of the university which need to be addressed. These may be academic or welfare issues and are, essentially, routine in nature. The situation causes concern and disquiet among the students and is often addressed by university bodies, such as the relevant departments and committees, department meetings, faculty meetings, Senate and Council. This phase may last from a few weeks to several months. If the issues are effectively addressed a potential strike may not develop into the second phase. However, if they are not attended to, then it develops into the second phase.

The second phase is the heightened or increased tension phase. A strike develops into this phase if the normal processes and procedures fail to address issues prevailing in Phase 1 or if - in the case of an orchestrated strike - these issues are

brought to the fore by active sensitization and propaganda. During this period there is a sense of anxiety prevailing amongst the student population and their confidence in the university administration to address the issues begins to wane. There is increased action among student leaders who communicate by means of internal memorandums with the various officers, giving deadlines within which action is expected. Student meetings (*kamukunjis*) are convened to address and sensitize students about the issues at hand. Meanwhile, at this stage, noting the impending nature of a strike the university administration engages in a flurry of activities, including meetings with student leaders, relevant departments and engaging students in serious dialogue, in an attempt to avert the strike. Persuasion and coercion are strategies and tactics employed by the university at this stage. If all these efforts fail, the strike develops into the third phase.

The full scale riot or strike is characterized by demonstrations, a boycott of classes, processions and - in most cases - violent actions and absolute lawlessness. This results in the interruption of normal university operations as the actions of the students become a function of collective dynamics. The degree of lawlessness and destruction depends on the cause and type of strike, the length of the first and second phases and the gravity of the students' grievances. This often leads to the closure of the institution, but not always.

Dissipation or uneasy calm is the fourth and final phase. If the institution is not closed, students may retire in a state of exhaustion after engaging in the strike. What follows is a tense moment which may last for several days, weeks or even a month in what the study refers to as "an uneasy calm". When they look at the extent of the damage, students always expect to be suspended but when this does not happen they remain at the university in a suspicious environment, waiting for some action by the university to apprehend and charge the leaders or suspected leaders of the strike. Rumours circulate about who is to be charged for what actions and this creates a calm but tense and charged situation. In such a situation

a false alarm or a wrong signal from the administration may trigger worse riots. With time the tension gives way to complete dissipation and a return to normality.

9.2.3 Types of Strikes

The study summarizes its findings by developing a typical classification of strikes on the basis of their causes and their general nature. Two broad types of strikes are presented - each on a continuum of two extremes: (i) Spontaneous *vis-a-vis* Orchestrated; and (ii) Flash/Spark *vis-a-vis* Protracted.

9.3 Impact of Student Unrest

The most glaring impact of student unrest has been the widespread destruction of property. Whenever students engage in violent protests university facilities, such as the lecture halls, students' centre offices and university vehicles - amongst many others, are vandalized in varying degrees. Private property is not spared either as rampaging students destroy what comes within their reach. Injury - incurred as students engage law enforcement officers - is another effect and in two instances there has been a loss of life. Thirdly, the university suffers the effect of having its academic programmes disrupted. In 1991 all public universities were closed for at least seven months, while in 2000 Chepkoilel Campus was closed for one year. There have also been closures at different times for different lengths of time. Fourthly, students lose vital time in their career progression because of the disruption of their academic programmes. Others face disciplinary action that has earned them suspensions for varying lengths of time, ranging from one to five years. In yet other cases students are expelled from the university and, hence, are deprived of a chance of higher education.

In some instances relentless demands and protests by students has forced the university to seek practical solutions that - to a great extent - alleviate bad situations. For example, fifteen years after the government abandoned the construction of a hostel complex the university sought alternative sources of

income and managed to complete the project—thereby reducing the pressure on accommodation facilities.

9.4 Organizational Disequilibrium and Paranoia

In the study the analysis further reveals conditions prevailing at the university whose characteristics are best described by the terms, “organizational disequilibrium” and “organizational paranoia”. These relate to the general trend of unrest pertaining at the university. While these constitute the arguments of the study, they are also significant findings.

9.4.1 Organizational Disequilibrium

Organizational disequilibrium refers to the general state of instability and the brink of disorder that is manifested in the institution as it struggles to remain relevant amidst several internal and external forces that exert pressure and demands - many of which are irreconcilable given the prevailing situation. As such, in this state of disequilibrium the university is characterized by the following:

(i) **Rapid and Uncontrolled Growth**

This comes in the form of both student enrolment and physical expansion. Due to the impact of a knowledge economy, globalization and a rapid population increase, the university becomes almost helpless in as far as enrolment is concerned, yielding to social pressures and drastic enrolment rates which reach as high as over 80% in a year.

(ii) **Physical Expansion**

The university embarks on unplanned expansion, hurriedly establishing campuses, constituent colleges and new faculties.

The academic programmes keep changing rapidly as a response to dynamic market forces demand. With dwindling government financial support the university introduces a raft of income generating activities, such as consultancy services that deviate from its mission.

(iii) Student Unrest

Student unrest becomes a common feature with hardly a year passing without such reports on any of the campuses. This is exacerbated by the state of unpreparedness for the strikes.

(iv) Frequent Closures

As a result of the unrest characterized by frequent violent strikes the university or its constituent colleges and campuses are forced to close on many occasions, interrupting programmes and causing a sense of uncertainty. In a number of instances it would be hard to tell how long a four year programme might take to complete. Worse still is if the university has adopted a staggering of its programmes as a means of addressing the problem of inadequate space.

9.4.2 Organizational Paranoia

Organizational paranoia, on the other hand, refers to a sense of deep suspicion that grips the institution in the thick of a strike - normally between the heightened tension phase and the actual strike. Organizational paranoia can be associated with an institution undergoing a state of disequilibrium. A convergence of national issues playing out at the university level when there are critical institutional issues is a recipe for organizational paranoia. For example, factional politics at the national level may subtly penetrate the university management and

cascade down to the student leadership, causing a deep polarization within the student body. Coupled with the deep-seated academic and welfare issues, a heightened tension phase in a strike may cause suspicion amongst all levels of management, lecturers and students. In such a case there is a total collapse of communication which is immediately overtaken by the grapevine that works overdrive with all sorts of rumours, including those of arrests and sabotage, from different quarters. The result is often extreme action by various groups, including the administration that often makes the mistake of suspending the student leadership because of the suspicion and lack of trust. A series of such extreme action with corresponding counter-reaction puts the university on state of utter lawlessness or near atrophy. Strikes in such situations are often of devastating proportions in as far as the destruction of property is concerned and often the best way to avoid total destruction is to close the institution.

9.5 Recommendations for Policy and Practice

Derived from the findings the study makes the following recommendations for higher education in Kenya, generally, and for Moi University in particular. These concern policy as well as practice.

Firstly, the study recommends that national policy on higher education or in any other sector for that matter should be approached with extreme caution and should not be hurriedly thought out and implemented. It is critical that whenever government is considering adopting and implementing new policy there should be exhaustive deliberations involving professionals and all the stakeholders at all levels. Irrespective of the source and rationale for such policy, it is necessary to ensure that there is a careful consideration of immediate and long term implications as well as weighing all available options. It is also necessary to consider the context of application in order to determine its applicability.

Secondly, in its consultations government should interrogate or at least facilitate the interrogation of the premises on which policy recommendations are made by funding agencies and development partners. This study has established that the Human Capital Theory which relied on the rate of return analysis that informed the World Bank funding policies was tragically flawed. The human capital approach looks at education from a narrow perspective and ignores the critical role of higher education in fueling economic, social and political development in ways beyond the rate of return configurations. Yet this argument has been at the centre of World Bank funding policies from the 1970s through to the 1990s. Sammof and Carrol (2004) observe:

Thus, from the early 1970s through to the 1990s, including the two major international conferences- Education for all in Jomtien, Thailand, March 1990, and World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, in April 2000- World Bank education policy increasingly drew on human capital theory and rate of return analysis to emphasize the importance of basic education. Higher education had a role to play, but in general, the World Bank found higher education in Africa to be incompetent, inefficient and inequitable. Government funding should be redirected to basic education. Privatization could and should fill the gap between supply and demand (p.13).

This led to the neglect of higher education in developing countries which relied heavily on the World Bank in financing their operations and programmes. The important role of higher education in the creation of knowledge that is critical in a knowledge economy is seriously ignored. Sammoff and Carrol (*Ibid*) illustrate this critical role of the university by presenting three important reasons for government support for higher education:

First, allocations to tertiary education contribute to the broad development objectives, for example, through basic research and development of new technology. In this way, notwithstanding rate of return calculations, the social value of higher education may substantially exceed the private benefits to individual higher education student. Second, government intervention is necessary to promote equity, since defective capital markets, which govern private borrowing to pay higher education fees, disadvantage capable but less affluent students. Third, the commitment to basic education requires a strong and effective tertiary education system (p. 16).

It would, therefore, be perilous for government to embrace policy recommendations by funding agencies and development partners without a critical interrogation of the rationale behind such recommendations as well as a careful examination of their implications.

Thirdly, this study further recommends that such interrogation should be accompanied by a thorough and objective analysis of the relevance of such policies in the Kenyan context. While some policies are attractive, seem worthwhile and are based on sound reason, the context of executing such policies varies from place to place and such variations need to be taken into consideration. In certain instances, owing to the peculiarities in a given context, it may be necessary to alter or modify such policy in order to make it applicable and relevant to the situation. For example, encouraging university students to take up part-time employment within or outside the university as a means of generating income that may go towards offsetting tuition fees or raising pocket money is, indeed, worthwhile. Apart from generating income students learn to be responsible; manage their income; and prepare them for future responsibilities. However, given the economic situation in the Kenyan context, generally, and the rural settings of Moi University, in particular, such a recommendation is hardly practical. With its rural setting there are practically no job opportunities. On the other hand, the proceeds from the work/study programme at the same university that is trying to cut down on its fiscal expenditure is too meagre for any meaningful engagement by students.

Fourthly, the study recommends that in negotiating for financial assistance with development partners and funding agencies, government should not do this to the detriment of its responsibilities to its citizens. While some conditions for funding may be well-meaning and are meant to genuinely assist the country achieve economic growth, government should guard against compromising certain crucial services that may have far reaching consequences. As such, government should

solicit the services of experts who will help build its case around the negotiation table in order to avoid the adoption of radical policy.

Fifthly, while a partnership with donor agencies and development partners is important in fiscal planning, this study recommends that the government of Kenya and, indeed, governments of other developing countries should put in place strategies as well as medium and long term plans for reducing dependence or over-reliance on foreign aid. At the time when the World Bank and IMF rolled out its policy lending programmes that included Structural Adjustment Loans, Sectoral Adjustment loans and Sectoral Support, Kenya was almost helplessly dependent on foreign aid (*Ibid*, Hornsby, 2012; Mutunga, 1996). The government was hardly in a position to engage the funding bodies in any meaningful bargaining that would ensure that the harsh conditions were not adopted, or at least adopted with variations that would have taken the local context into consideration.

A sixth recommendation is that public universities in Kenya - in collaboration with government and the Ministry of Higher Education - should address the equity concerns and the dearth of a research agenda that is associated with the emergence of the Privately Sponsored Students' Programmes. While the PSSP has brought positive outcomes, it has been partially responsible for the equity issues as well as the disappearance of the research agenda. On the positive side the PSSP has opened up university education opportunities to thousands of Kenyans who would otherwise have been locked out by the few government sponsored places offered through the JAB admissions. Through this programme the government has also managed to save much needed foreign exchange. For example, prior to the introduction of these programmes, the country was spending approximately US\$ 19 million in the form of tuition fees and related expenses on Kenyan students abroad (Chacha, 2004).

However, in transferring the burden of tuition fees to the parents and individual students this programme has enabled affluent students with lesser grades in secondary school to access competitive degree programmes while at the same time denying this to less affluent but capable students. As the sole criterion for admission to degree programmes good performance in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary School (KCSE) is no longer the case. The issues of equity, quality control and assurance have been raised - even in government reports. Chacha (2004) notes that

... students with grades as low as C+ are now gaining admission into competitive professional courses like Medicine and Law on parallel degree programmes. Previously, these demanding subjects were reserved for students with A- or above (p.104).

In making a similar observation in the Ugandan context, Sammoff and Carrol (2004) observe:

At the same time, increased reliance on student fees may have increased inequality, as students from more affluent families are better able to secure admission and remain in school (p.32).

The study, therefore, recommends that government and universities embark on a comprehensive policy that will address the equity issues that have partially been a consequence of the establishment of the Privately Sponsored Students Programmes.

The relegation of the research agenda at the university has been occasioned by three factors. Firstly, the withdrawal of government funding has meant that there is little or no allocation for research. At Moi University, for example, an entire faculty with over ten departments is allocated a sum of KShs 500,000/= (US \$ 6410.26) annually for research. This is highly inadequate (Interview No. 20, Eldoret, June 2012). Secondly, due to high student enrolments without the commensurate employment of teaching staff, the skeleton staff left to handle these

students is so overburdened with their teaching responsibilities that they hardly have time for research (*Ibid*). Thirdly, universities have gone overboard with the establishment of the PSSP in virtually all academic programmes. Even research-based academic programmes, such as Masters and PhDs, are all under the PSSP. The consequence of this is the literal abdication of the core business of research through the academic programmes by the university, leaving this responsibility to the enrolled individual students (Interview No. 12, Eldoret, June 2012).

The study, therefore, recommends that public universities in Kenya and relevant government ministries and agencies develop a comprehensive research policy that will bring on board the critical role of universities and revive this critical core business of the university.

In view of the all-important role of knowledge and information in a contemporary knowledge economy, this study further recommends that the government should embark on a comprehensive short and long term strategy and policy of revitalizing higher education in Kenya. Sammoff and Carrol (*Ibid*) highlight this crucial role when they assert that

Where knowledge is understood to be the key factor of production, even more consequential than land, labour and capital, then the provider of knowledge is the indispensable fuel depot for the development engine (p. 15).

It is, therefore, important that government appreciates this central role of its universities and devises a comprehensive programme of bringing them back to their lost glory.

At an institutional level the study makes the following recommendations which involve issues of communication, alienation, security operations, wardenship and service delivery.

With regard to communication, the study recommends that while there is a good established communication network, there is room for improvement. Moi University can enhance its communication network with its student body with the publication of periodic newsletters at faculty level in order to constantly clarify issues that often affect students' academic lives and which may create an unnecessary buildup of tension. Similarly, a newsletter could be published periodically by the office of the Dean of Students to cover welfare, games and sport issues as well as clubs and societies. These newsletters should contain an input from students and interactive columns where students are able to raise concerns affecting them which should then be addressed by the relevant offices.

Where possible the office of the Dean of Students should also organize forums where face-to-face discussions between students and various officers of the university can take place. Such sessions may be preceded by a presentation by an officer on a topical issue which will then be followed by a question and answer session. Alternatively, such forums could be presented by the existing university radio station. In such a case the sessions may be more frequent; take a shorter time; and involve as many officers as possible who will each appear at their own scheduled time. The university website should also be interactive to enable students to seek the clarification of issues without having to wait for meetings to be convened - which often take long due to the university's busy schedules.

With regard to alienation the study recommends that the university should make a deliberate effort to ensure that students are aware of, and actively participate in, the existing decision-making bodies of the university. The study has found that while there is provision for student representation on many such bodies, such as the faculty and departmental boards, a large number of students are oblivious of this fact. Furthermore, the student representation on these boards is not formalized in the MUSO constitution, thereby leaving this important aspect of representation to personal student initiative and that of individual departments and faculties. The study, therefore, recommends that this representation should be formalized by

enshrining it in the MUSO constitution so that during SGC elections the offices of the various faculty and departmental representatives are also contested. The benefits and privileges derived from being on the SGC should apply equally to these representatives.

The study further recommends that security operations within the university be improved so that students who engage in acts of indiscipline and hooliganism can always be apprehended and be made to face the law and be held responsible for their actions. The study has found that on many occasions when students engage in such acts it is sometimes impossible to pinpoint students who are responsible and the university ends up meting out a blanket punishment to all students. In effect there is a diffusion of responsibility and a feeling of invincibility among the students which motivates them to frequently engage in such activities in the future. It is, therefore, recommended that security services be improved by being furnished with the necessary facilities and equipment, such as CCTV cameras in strategic points, so that it is possible to identify perpetrators of such crimes and make them take responsibility for their actions. If this is done students are unlikely to repeat such acts. The university should also train its security personnel and/or hire the services of highly skilled personnel in order to handle the complex security matters involving students. In particular, such training should focus on group and collective dynamics as well as intelligence gathering in a tactful and less coercive manner. First-line officers who are in constant touch with students in their daily routine of duties should also benefit from such training and public relation courses.

The study recommends that in its strategic planning, Moi University should revive and strengthen the warden system in the halls of residence. This would create an effective interaction and guidance that is currently lacking as a result of the weak system which is currently in place. This closeness is likely to significantly reduce cases of student indiscipline.

With regard to service delivery, the study recommends that the performance contracting which has been in operation should be maintained and improved where necessary. A training policy should be in place for continued capacity building and the issue of inadequate staff in several departments should be addressed in order to improve performance.

The university also needs to put in place a modern student academic and welfare information and management system in order to facilitate quick online service delivery in cases like registration for courses, payment of fees, allocation of rooms and other critical services. Such arrangements would significantly reduce or eliminate delays and bottlenecks that often lead to frustration amongst students which only fuels tension and erodes the confidence of students in the university.

Finally, the study recommends that the university should develop a comprehensive drug and alcohol policy. Such a policy should also be revised from time to time in order to make it effective and relevant.

9.6 Recommendations for Further Research

The study recommends that similar studies be carried out in other developing countries in order to compare findings. Those studies could take an alternative comparative approach.

Studies using quantitative techniques may be conducted to focus on the five thematic areas with a view to establishing their levels of contribution to unrest and to establishing generalizability.

In view of the World Bank's influence on education policy, especially in developing countries, the study recommends that policy studies in education, generally, and in higher education, specifically, should focus on policy processes within and involving the World Bank. Sammof and Carrol (*Ibid*), for example, observe that

Although there is wide agreement on importance of World Bank policies, empirical studies of World Bank policy making remain very few. Seemingly ubiquitous in Africa, the World Bank also remains significantly invisible. Formally an international organization with transparent decision rules and commitment to expanded access to its documents, the World Bank has been very self protective about its deliberations, priorities and decision rules. Like their counterparts elsewhere, policy makers within the World Bank periodically seek to disguise their intentions, obscure their motives and re-write history (p. 8).

Such a study should try to unravel international policy, especially the dynamics within the World Bank and/or other similar influential bodies.

While this study has found that frustration and disillusionment with university education, amongst other factors, makes students violent in their actions during riots, it recommends that studies be conducted to confirm the role of these factors in extreme actions by collectives. This can be done within the framework of the deindividuation or a related theory.

The study also recommends that in view of the impact of the introduction of the PSSP and other developments in higher education, such as the emergence of private universities, it has become necessary to conduct studies about the equity concerns that have been raised.

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Senior Administrative and Faculty Staff

Dr J. M. Boit, Senior Principal Administrative Officer, Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 12 July 2012.

Major (Rtd) Benjamin Kiplagat, Chief Security Officer, Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 16 May 2012.

Mr Charles Chesang, Manager: Catering and Accommodation, Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 17 July 2012.

Mr Chepkong'a, Senior Assistant to Dean of Students, Chepkoilel University College Campus, Eldoret, 15 May 2012.

Mr David Mureithi, Dean of Students, Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 11 July 2012 and 13 July 2012.

Mr Francis Komen, Senior Administrative Officer, Moi University, Eldoret, 26 November 2011.

Mr Hosea Kipkemboi, Finance Officer, Chepkoilel University College and Former Finance Officer at Moi University, Chepkoilel University College, Eldoret, 24 April 2012.

Mrs Winnie Kottut, Senior Students' Counsellor, Chepkoilel University College Campus, Eldoret, 15 May 2012.

Professor Cephas Odini, Former Dean School of Information Sciences, Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 16 July 2012.

Professor David Kimutai Some, Former Vice-Chancellor: Moi University, Eldoret, 23 June 2012.

Professor Ole Karei, Chief Academic Officer: Moi University, Eldoret, 05 July 2012.

Professor Peter O. Ndege, Professor of History and Former Dean of School of Socio-Cultural and Development Studies, Moi University, Eldoret, 17 July 2012.

Former Student Leaders

Mr Dulo Nyaoro, Former Class Representative and Former Chairman, Moi University Students' Organization (1989-1991), Moi University Main Campus, Eldoret, 10 May 2012.

Mr James Wanyama, Former Director of Academics, Moi University Students' Organization (2003-2004), Nairobi, 23 May 2012.

Mr John Kerich, Former Director of Finance, Moi University Students' Organization (2001-2002), Nairobi, 22 May 2012.

Mr John Oluoch, Former Member of the Students' Governing Council, Editor-in-Chief: Moi University Students' Organization (1999-2000), Eldoret, 12 May 2012.

Mr Katya Kiprop, Former Students' Class Representative (1988-1990), Eldoret, 12 November 2011.

Mr Kipchumba Songok, Former Chairman: Maseno University College Students' Organization (1990-1994), Mosoriot Teachers' College, Mosoriot, 4 March 2012.

Mr Mathew Obonyo, Former Student Leader in various capacity and former Vice-Chairman: Moi University Students' Organization (2003-2006), Nairobi, 25 May 2012.

Mr Opole Ombogo, Former Class Representative, Geography Department; Former Project Coordinator: Geography Student Association and Former Vice-Chairman: Wildlife Students' Association (2004-2006), Nairobi, 25 May 2012.

Mr Richard Kambi, Former Chairman: Gusii University Students' Association; Student Activist and Contestant for position of Chairman: Moi University Students' Organization (1997-2001), Nairobi, 26 May 2012.

Mrs Janet Muthoni Ouko, Former Class Representative; Former Secretary-General: Moi University Students' Organization (2001-2003), Nairobi, 25 May 2012.

Ruth Gathoni, Former Director of Finance: Moi University Students Organization (1993-1994), Nairobi, 25 May 2012.

Ruth Kendagor, Former Vice-Chairperson: Moi University Students' Organization (2007-2008), Eldoret, 15 May 2012.

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(COODSRIA), Dakar, Senegal.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Initial Authorization by the Ethics Committee



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA
Faculty of Education

Faculty of Education

Ethics Committee

27 January 2011

Dear Mr Kiboiy

REFERENCE: EM 10/11/03

Your application was carefully considered and the final decision of the Ethics Committee is:

Your application is approved on the following conditions:

1. Kindly include in your letters of consent detailed information and expectations specific to the participants with regards to their role in your study for a more thorough informed consent.
 - a. Please distinguish between various participants.
 - b. Please state in the letters the sensitivity of your research.

This letter serves as notification that you may continue with your research. You do not have to re-submit an application. The above-mentioned issues can be addressed in consultation with your supervisor who will take final responsibility. Please note that this is **not a clearance certificate**. Upon completion of your research you need to submit the following documentation to the Ethics Committee:

1. Integrated Declarations form that you adhered to conditions stipulated in this letter – Form D08

On receipt of the above-mentioned documents you will be issued a clearance certificate. Please quote the reference number EM 10/11/03 in any communication with the Ethics Committee.

Best wishes,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Liesel Ebersohn'.

Prof Liesel Ebersohn
Chair: Ethics Committee
Faculty of Education

APPENDIX 2

Research Authorization by the National Council for Science and Technology.

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Telegrams: "SCIENCETECH", Nairobi
Telephone: 254-020-241349, 221 3102
254-020-310571, 2213123,
Fax: 254-020-2213215, 318245, 318249
When replying please quote

P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA
Website: www.ncst.go.ke

Our Ref: _____ Date: _____

NCST/RR1/12/1/SS/195/5 30th March, 2010

Mr. Kiboi Kiptoo Lelei
University of Pretoria
SOUTH AFRICA


Dear Sir,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION


Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*The dynamics of students' unrest in Kenya's public Universities: 1989 - 2009*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Uasin Gishu District and Nairobi Province** for a period ending **31st March, 2011**.

You are advised to report to the **Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, the Vice Chancellor, Nairobi University and the Vice Chancellor, Moi University** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit two copies of the research report/thesis to our office.



P. N. NYAKUNDI
FOR: SECRETARY/CEO

Copy to: _____



APPENDIX 3

Authorization by Moi University to Conduct Research in the University.



MOI UNIVERSITY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY VICE CHANCELLOR
RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Tel: (053) 43355
(053) 43620
Fax: (053) 43355
Email: dvcre@mu.ac.ke

P.O. Box 3900
Eldoret - 30100
Kenya

Ref No. MU/DVC/REP/27B 19th July 2010

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

**RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH - MR. KIBOIY KIPTOO
LELEI, UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA – SOUTH AFRICA**

The above subject matter refers.

Mr. Lelei is a Ph. D student at University of Pretoria, South Africa. He has applied for authority to conduct research in Moi University, Uasin Gishu District.


The purpose of this is to request you to permit him to conduct his research on the topic "*The dynamics of students' unrest in Kenya's public Universities: 1989 - 2009*". It is by a copy of this letter that authority is granted to him to conduct the research.

After the completion of the research, a complete report both on hard and soft copy be handed over to the office of Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research & Extension.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

Thanking you in advance.

Yours faithfully,




PROF. B. E. L. WISHITEMI
DEPUTY VICE-CHANCELLOR
RESEARCH & EXTENSION

WEL

APPENDIX 4

**Research Authorization from the National Council for Science and Technology
containing the approval by the Deputy Vice Chancellor; Maseno University**

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Telegram: "SCIENCETECH", Nairobi
Telephone: 254-020-241349, 2213102
254-020-310571, 2213125
Fax: 254-020-2213215, 318245, 318249
When replying please quote

P.O. Box 36623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA
Website: www.ncst.go.ke

Our Ref: _____ Date: _____

NCST/RR1/12/1/SS/195/5 30th March, 2010

Mr. Kiboi Kiptoo Lefei
University of Pretoria
SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Sir,

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION


Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*The dynamics of students' unrest in Kenya's public Universities: 1989 - 2009*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in Uasin Gishu District and Nairobi Province for a period ending 31st March, 2011.

You are advised to report to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, the Vice Chancellor, Nairobi University and the Vice Chancellor, Moi University before embarking on the research project.


On completion of the research, you are expected to submit two copies of the research report/thesis to our office.

Please Assist the bearer with data for his research,

1. Registrar AA
2. Dean of Students
3. Public Relations Director


P. N. NYAKUNDI
FOR: SECRETARY/CEO




Copy to:



DVC (PRES)

**DEPUTY VICE CHANCELLOR PES
MASENO UNIVERSITY
PRIVATE BAG MASENO - 40105**

APPENDIX 5

Research Permit Issued by the National Council for Science and Technology

<p>PAGE 2</p> <p>THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:</p> <p>Prof./Dr./Mr./Mrs./Miss..... KIBOBY KIPTOO, LELSI</p> <p>of (Address)..... UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA SOUTH AFRICA</p> <p>has been permitted to conduct research in.....</p> <p>.....Location, UASIN GISHU AND NAIROBI.....Districts KIPT VALLEY AND NAIROBI.....Provinces</p> <p>on the topic..... STUDENTS' UNREST IN KENYA'S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: 1989-2009.</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....31ST MARCH 11 for a period ending.....20.....</p>	<p>PAGE 3</p> <p>Research Permit No..... NCST/RRJ/12/1/SS/195</p> <p>Date of issue..... 30/03/2010</p> <p>Fee received..... SHS 2,000</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;">  </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  Applicant's Signature </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  Secretary National Council for Science and Technology </div> </div>
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<p style="text-align: center;">CONDITIONS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. You must report to the District Commissioner and the District Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit 2. Government Officers will not be interviewed with-out prior appointment. 3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved. 4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries. 5. You are required to submit at least two(2)/four(4) bound copies of your final report for Kenyans and non-Kenyans respectively. 6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice 	 REPUBLIC OF KENYA <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/> RESEARCH CLEARANCE PERMIT
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GPK6055(3mt10/2009) (CONDITIONS— see back page)


APPENDIX 6

Certificate of Ethical Clearance



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA
Faculty of Education

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE	CLEARANCE NUMBER : EM 10/11/03
<u>DEGREE AND PROJECT</u>	PhD The dynamics of student unrests in Kenya's higher education: the case of Moi University
<u>INVESTIGATOR(S)</u>	Kiptoo Lelei Kiboiy
<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	Education Management and Policy Studies
<u>DATE CONSIDERED</u>	29 November 2012
<u>DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE</u>	APPROVED
Please note: <i>For Masters applications, ethical clearance is valid for 2 years</i> <i>For PhD applications, ethical clearance is valid for 3 years.</i>	
ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF ETHICS COMMITTEE	Dr. Suzanne Bester 
DATE	<u>29 November 2012</u>
CC	Jeannie Beukes M.T. Sehoole

This ethical clearance certificate is issued subject to the following conditions:

1. A signed personal declaration of responsibility
2. If the research question changes significantly so as to alter the nature of the study, a new application for ethical clearance must be submitted
3. It remains the students' responsibility to ensure that all the necessary forms for informed consent are kept for future queries.

Please quote the clearance number in all enquiries.

APPENDIX 7:
Request Letter and Consent Form for Management and faculty Staff



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA
Faculty of Education

1st September 2010
.....

Dear Sir/Madam,

SUBJECT: REQUEST/INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT

My name is Lelei K Kiboiy, a student enrolled in the Department of Education Management, Law and Policy, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for which I am registered, I am required to conduct a comprehensive research and thereafter write a thesis based on the findings of the research. My research is titled; *The Dynamics of Student Unrests in Kenya's Higher Education; the Case of Moi University.*

The purpose of this letter is to request you to participate in this study as a respondent in an oral interview that will take between 30 and 45 minutes. The study seeks to establish factors that have informed and sustained a prolonged period of student unrest in the form of strikes and related incidences in Kenya's higher education, which may emanate from institutional issues or external factors.

The study identified you as a respondent because of your past and current experiences in handling student matters as a Head of Department/Dean/Senior Administrator in the

University. As such the study is therefore requesting that you share the experiences you have gone through in the course of your duties especially on the many cases of student riots and strikes; how it has manifested, who were the different players, what were the issues, how were they resolved and what the university and government have done to redress the problems. The information that you will give is relatively sensitive. However this will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your participation is purely voluntary and you may opt to withdraw at any stage if you so wish. With your consent too, the interview will be recorded but if at any point you would not like some of the information to be recorded, then this will be complied with.

Kindly sign the attached letter as a declaration of consent to participate.

Yours Sincerely

.....

.....

Kiboiy, K.L (Researcher)

Prof Schoole (Supervisor)

CONSENT FORM

I agree to participate in the research entitled, *“The Dynamics of Students unrest in Kenya’s Higher education: the Case of Moi University”* as described in the letter of request which I have read and understood.

Name:

Designation/Student Leadership Post Held:

Current Institution:

Signature:.....

Tel/Mobile Phone No:

Date:

APPENDIX 8:
Request Letter and consent Form for Former Student Leaders

1st September 2010



UNIVERSITEIT VAN PRETORIA
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
YUNIBESITHI YA PRETORIA
Faculty of Education

.....
Dear Sir/Madam,

SUBJECT: REQUEST/INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT

My name is Lelei K Kiboiy, a student enrolled in the Department of Education Management, Law and Policy, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for which I am registered, I am required to conduct a comprehensive research and thereafter write a thesis based on the findings of the research. My research is titled; *The Dynamics of Student Unrests in Kenya's Higher Education; the Case of Moi University*.

The purpose of this letter is to request you to participate in this study as a respondent in an oral interview that will take between 30 and 45 minutes. The study seeks to establish factors that have informed and sustained a prolonged period of student unrest in the form of strikes and related incidences in Kenya's higher education, which may emanate from institutional issues or external factors.

As a former student leader, this study will specifically request you to share your experiences and information that you may have had regarding the various incidences of unrest. For example in such incidences that you may have witnessed; what issues were at play, who were actively involved, how did it occur with what consequences. The

information that you will give is relatively sensitive. However this will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your participation is purely voluntary and you may opt to withdraw at any stage if you so wish. With your consent too, the interview will be recorded but if at any point you would not like some of the information to be recorded, then this will be complied with.

Kindly sign the attached letter as a declaration of consent to participate.

Yours Sincerely

Kiboiy, K.L (Researcher)

Prof Schoole (Supervisor)

CONSENT FORM

I agree to participate in the research entitled, *“The Dynamics of Students unrest in Kenya’s Higher education: the Case of Moi University”* as described in the letter of request which I have read and understood.

Name:

Designation/Student Leadership Post Held:

Current Institution:

Signature:

Tel/Mobile Phone No:

Date:.....

APPENDIX 9:

Interview Schedule for Senior Administrative and Faculty Staff

THE DYNAMICS OF STUDENTS' UNREST IN KENYA'S' HIGHER EDUCATION;THE CASE OF MOI UNIVERSITY

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACULTY OF EDUCATION AND SCHOOL OF SOCIAL CULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT STUDIES.

In the year 1987, a decision was made to establish the Faculty of Education and School of Social Cultural and Development Studies? This was against the initial plan to have the university as a purely science based institution.

1. What factors led to such a decision being made?
2. Was the University management involved? How?
3. Was the university prepared to implement this decision
4. What were the immediate and long term impact of this decision.

B. THE DOUBLE INTAKE; 1987 AND `1990

In 1987, a Government directive was issued for local Public universities to admit the 1965 and 1986 cohorts, of the 'A' level candidates who qualified for admission.

5. Was the university involved in the making of this decision?
6. Was the University prepared to implement this decision?
7. What arrangement did the university make to implement this decision?
8. What challenges did the university face in the implementation of this decision?
9. What was the impact of this decision on the operations of the university?

C. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

During its early years of establishment, the University witnessed a period of increased development of its facilities such as lecture theatres, laboratories, office buildings e.t.c. However, a number of these projects seem to have stalled at different times.

10. How were these projects funded?

11. What circumstances led to the apparent withdrawal of funding the projects.
12. What has been the impact of the support withdrawal of (i) the development of the university, (ii) the operations of the university operations?

D. INTRODUCTION OF THE PAY AS YOU EAT SYSTEM

13. Was the university management involved in the arrival; at this decision?
14. What factors led to the decision?
15. What institutional mechanisms were put in place to make this new system operational?
16. What was the immediate and long term impact of this decision on the operations of the University?

E. INTRODUCTION OF THE PSSP

In the late 1990'S The University introduced the Privately Sponsored Students Programme (PSSP).

17. What circumstances/factors led to the introduction of this programme by the university.
18. What immediate and long term challenges has the university experienced with regard to the introduction of this programme?
19. What institutional mechanisms has the University put in place to counter these challenges?

F. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

20. How much support does the university get from the exchequer for its recurrent expenditure and capital development?
21. Is this support steady over the years? What of its operations does the government support?
22. Is the support sufficient for the operations of the University?
23. If government support is not sufficient. From what other sources does the university finance its operations?
24. What amount of money does the government spend per student per year? Is this amount the same for all degree programmes?

G. STRIKES

Moi University has experienced incidences of strikes and protests by students with varying degrees of violence. These include the strikes that occurred in 1991, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2009.

25. Apart from the above strikes, are there other incidences of protest, boycotts and other forms of unrest?
26. For each of these incidences what form did the unrest take?
27. What issues precipitated these unrests?
28. What was the result?
29. What measures did the University take to stem the protests?
30. Apart from the immediate action, what other institutional mechanisms have been put in place to address the unrests?

APPENDIX 10

Interview Schedule for Former Student Leaders

THE DYNAMICS OF STUDENTS' UNREST IN KENYAS' HIGHER EDUCATION; THE CASE OF MOI UNIVERSITY

Interview Schedule for Former Student Leaders

1. In which year did you serve as a student leader in the Students Governing Council (SGC)?
2. In what capacity did you serve the S.G.C?
3. Your position in the SGC was elective and it means you had to campaign in order to get elected. What were the main issues that you focused your campaign?
4. During your tenure in the SGC, what academic and welfare issues were of main concern to the students? Please rank in order of most serious to least serious.
5. As a member of the SGC did students raise the issues of concern to you? How did they do so?
6. What means did you use as an SGC member to have the issues addressed by the university organs?
7. How did the university administration respond to the issues raised?
8. Did you find the response by the university to be satisfactory?
9. If the response was not satisfactory, did you explore other avenues to address the issues?
10. As a student leader. Did you maintain close contacts with students and students' leaders in other Public and Private universities?
11. Did the maintenance of close contacts with other leaders influence the decisions you made and the approach you adopted in addressing academic and welfare issues? How?
12. A part from contacts with other student leaders, did you also maintain contacts with other leaders such and politicians and businessmen?
13. Did the maintenance of close contacts with leaders in 12 above influence the decision you made a SGC and approach to addressing issues? How?

14. During your tenure as a Student leader and in your entire studentship, was/were there an incident or incidents of students' boycotts, protests or serious strikes?
15. For each of the incidences, please describe how it occurred.
16. What were the factors that led to the protest?
17. Was the protest spontaneous or was it planned?
18. Please describe how the planning was carried out and how it was executed (e.g if meetings were held where, how others were marshalled for support e.t.c.)
19. What was the impact of the protest to the university generally and to the students in particular?
20. How would you describe yourself as a leader? / What type of leader would you describe yourself as?

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This document must be signed and submitted with every
essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation and/or thesis.

Full names of student: MR. KIPERO LELEI KIBAYI

Student number: 20204395

Declaration

I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University's policy in this regard.

1. I declare that this assignment (essay, report, project, assignment, dissertation, thesis, etc.) is my own original work. Where other people's work has been used (taken from a printed source, internet or any other source) it has been properly acknowledged and referenced in accordance with departmental/college/University.
2. I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in as my own.
3. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with ill intention or passing it off as their own work.

SIGNATURE OF STUDENT: Kipero

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: M. I. Schoole

Handwritten text, possibly a date or reference number.

54722/09

