CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of the study is to describe how the experience of loneliness unfolds in the context of the psychotherapeutic dialogue. And how this is related to moving, from an inauthentic/False way of being to a more authentic/True way of being, as a person's loneliness becomes more accessible to him. Although the context of the study is psychotherapy, the aim is not to describe or evaluate the therapeutic process from any specific theoretical orientation. The aim is rather to explicate the meaning of loneliness as experienced by a patient in the light of, firstly, the phenomenological perspective as represented by Heidegger and, secondly, object relations theory as represented by Winnicott.

It is not the aim of the study to integrate the above two perspectives in a meta-theoretical model, but to compare them, to determine whether there are points of convergence and divergence between them, and how they relate to loneliness. Such a comparison could deepen one's theoretical understanding of the ground and nature of these two approaches. The extent to which they both can be applied to the factuality of experiences, such as loneliness (see below), will enhance one's understanding of being human.

Furthermore, it is not intended to compare the views of Heidegger and Winnicott in their entirety. Rather, attention will be given to specific concepts represented in their work, including man's situatedness in the world, his relationships with other people, authentic/true and inauthentic/false ways of being, facticity and temporality. The meaning of these concepts, and the rationale for choosing them, as well as the motivation for focussing on Heidegger and Winnicott, will be discussed later in this chapter and in Chapters Three and Four. In the present chapter, brief reference will be made to the legitimacy of comparing Heidegger's fundamental ontology with Winnicott's object relations theory, and this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
In addition to Heidegger, Buber's philosophy will be discussed, to facilitate the move from Heidegger's fundamental ontology to a discussion on an ontic-psychological level. In this regard, where appropriate, concepts from the work of Binswanger and other persons associated with the existentialist and phenomenological movements will be used.$^1$

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Loneliness is an existential given. It is a fundamental human trait and characteristic. It is part of being human, yet often ignored. One of the reasons why researchers avoid it, is that it has, as a characteristic, the ability to evoke anxiety, and a fear of being tainted with the experience of loneliness (Fromm-Reichmann, 1959). Therefore, it is a condition often euphemistically referred to as depression. Loneliness, however, must be differentiated from depression. When one is lonely, one seeks to rid yourself of this unpleasant experience by re-establishing relationships, while depression leads to apathy and withdrawal from others (Weiss, 1973). Seligson (1983) claims that the scientific community is all too willing to label loneliness a social or philosophical problem rather than a psychological issue.

The experience of loneliness and its importance for psychology and the psychotherapeutic process need to be recognised and confronted. This is confirmed by Rogers (1990: 215) when he quotes Ellen West's words: "I scream but they do not hear me". He stresses the importance of communicating with the 'real self' of the patient in the therapeutic alliance when he states:  

"In the therapeutic relationship, where all of herself was accepted, she could discover that it was safe to communicate her self more completely. She could discover that she did not need to be lonely and isolated - that another could understand and share the meaning of her experience. She could discover too that in this process she had made friends with herself - that her body, her feelings and her desires, were not enemy aliens, but necessary and constructive

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$^1$ This creates a terminological dilemma. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Heidegger was an ontologist, he dissociated himself from being referred to as an existentialist, and used a hermeneutic phenomenological method. Other authors who will be used in this study, and who are associated with existentialism and phenomenology, such as Buber and Binswanger, were not primarily concerned with ontology. For the sake of simplicity, the term existential-phenomenological will be used with full recognition of Heidegger's position in this regard.
parts of herself. It would be unnecessary for her to utter those desperate words, 'I am perishing in the struggle against my nature.' (Rogers, 1990: 217).

This statement encompasses the core of this study.

Modern, technocratic Western society is a fertile breeding ground for the experience of loneliness and alienation from the self. The emphasis is on intellectualisation and rational thought which alienates one from one's affective experience. Achievement, possessions and status rule the day. Humanness is lost. People today are in a crisis, they are strangers in the world. Man has become problematic to himself as never before (Fromm, 1993; Kruger, 1988). According to Irma Kurtz (1983), loneliness serves contemporary unhappiness and neuroses just as cancer serves contemporary death.

Concomitant with loneliness is alienation from the self, and since existence is co-existence, it implies at the same time disconnectedness from others. According to Leiderman (1969) disconnectedness and longing are two necessary conditions for loneliness.

Many people entering the consulting room of the psychotherapist experience disconnectedness from others and from the self. This inability to enter into, or to maintain meaningful relationships, where genuine mutuality exists, is a source of severe distress. It may manifest, as Quinodos (1993) postulated, in depression and other pathologies.

This study will illustrate how the patient's experience of her loneliness unfolded in the course of psychotherapy, to where it could be verbalised. Although it was a painful experience, it also offered relief and tempered her feelings of disconnectedness. A careful analysis of how the phenomenon is experienced can be of value in bringing about a deeper understanding of what modern man is experiencing, when he feels utterly alone. As Erlich (1998: 138) states:

"A better understanding of loneliness should help us to both deepen our theoretical grasp of relatedness and to expand our technical facility in working with these patients."
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.3.1 Overview

As theoretical background an overview of the various perspectives and views on loneliness will be given. To explicate the case study, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the existential-phenomenological perspective as well as an object relations perspective will be used. A comparison of the divergence and convergence of these two approaches with regard to the understanding of loneliness will be done.

The existential-phenomenological paradigm is included because it provides a unique and specific portrayal of the psychological predicament of contemporary Western man and the underlying reality of human beings in crisis (Gunzberg, 1997; Schneider & May, 1995). Martin Heidegger's views, Martin Buber's philosophy and Binswanger's existential analytic approach will represent the existential-phenomenological paradigm. The reasons why this study focuses on the work of Heidegger, Buber and Binswanger are given in paragraphs 1.3.3 and 1.3.5.

The object relations paradigm is included to understand man's relatedness to others and to himself. It explains how the undifferentiated infant emerges as a unique person, through its interaction with primary caregivers. It gives credence to both normal and abnormal development (Ivey, 1990). Donald Winnicott's theory within the object relations paradigm will be used to enhance the understanding of the development of the self. The reasons why this study focuses on the work of Winnicott are given in paragraphs 1.3.4 and 1.3.5.

Although the above mentioned paradigms view a person's life-world from different perspectives, they are in agreement that man develops and lives in his world with other's. The convergence and divergence of Heidegger, Buber, Binswanger and Winnicott's views will be discussed in Chapter Five.
1.3.2 Loneliness: An Overview

The literature reviewed to which both philosophy and psychology contributed, was vast. This will be reported in detail in Chapter Two. The main controversies seem to be whether man is lonelier in modern Western technocratic society, and whether loneliness is experienced on various dimensions.

The first school of thought holds that man has become problematic to himself as never before. People are in emotional turmoil if one considers the increase in the rate of depression and anxiety disorders in Western society. Although it is agreed that loneliness is an existential truth, many authors (for example, Buber, 1958; Fromm, 1993; Kruger, 1988; Moustakas, 1961; Rogers, 1990; Van Den Berg, 1972; Wright, 1995) hold the view that loneliness is exacerbated by man's modem way of living. They claim that loneliness and self-estrangement are common in modern life due to the emphasis on intellectualisation and rational thought, conformity, power and status. Man has lost touch with his affective experience and in doing so creates a distance between himself and others, himself and his world and his own true self. The way to alleviate this terror of isolation seems to be in becoming what man really wants to be: a feeling, loving, caring human being, in relationships which confirm him.

Mijoskovic (1979) and Erlich (1998), amongst others, argue the point that man's loneliness in modern society is due to alienation. They hold the view that human beings are intrinsically alone and in a continuous struggle in an attempt to alleviate their loneliness. Loneliness and disconnectedness, are according to them, part of human relatedness.

Another controversy is whether man experiences, as Sadler (1978) and Rokach (1987) postulate, loneliness on different dimensions, for example on an interpersonal dimension, cosmic dimension and others. This is a difficult question to answer because these dimensions are enmeshed and the one often presupposes the other. However, in this study an overview of these dimensions will be given for the sake of clarity. These dimensions will be discussed in Chapter Two.
1.3.3 Existential-Phenomenological Paradigm: Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber and Ludwig Binswanger

Heidegger's philosophy emphasises holism and he is unrelenting in his attack on traditional dichotomies. He gave philosophy and psychology an important view of man and his world. He was discerning in his analysis of the ills of our age, and brought Western science and modern technology under scrutiny (Dreyfus & Hall, 1995; Inwood, 1997).

Heidegger did not develop a philosophical anthropology, he was not a psychologist, he resisted being labelled an existentialist and was also hesitant, especially in his later works, to use the term phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 1971). His philosophy nevertheless laid important ground for existentialism and has had an important influence on psychology (Chessick, 1986; Mills, 1997; Solomon, 1988). The legitimacy of using his fundamental ontological concepts in the context of psychology, will be discussed in Chapter Five.

His philosophy is voluminous, and it is not within the scope of this study to discuss it in its entirety. Therefore only those aspects salient to the phenomenon under investigation, namely loneliness, will be examined. These will include his views on Being-in-the-world, authentic/inauthentic way of being, facticity and temporality. Binswanger was influenced by Heidegger and applied several of the latter's views in his existential analyses. His work provides a useful bridge between Heidegger's fundamental ontology and psychology, and will be discussed as such.

Buber as a philosopher, educator and humanitarian was poignantly aware of the breakdown in relationships in the modern, technocratic world. For him individualism and the de-emphasis of the interrelatedness of being human, result in distancing between person and person, which leads to isolation. He does not only accentuate the split between persons, and the split within their own psyches, but also the split between people and nature. (Hyckner, 1991). His philosophy is one of hope, the emphasis being that every individual has the capacity for meaningful relationships and true mutuality.

This study focuses on the disconnectedness of people to their world and to themselves. Buber's views assist in the understanding of how loneliness can be alleviated.
1.3.4 Winnicott and the Development of the Self

Within the object relations theory, Winnicott's (1960/1984a) compelling interpretation of the development of the self, out of its relational matrix, is relevant to this study.

According to Winnicott the processes leading to the development or inhibition of the self are seen and understood solely in the context of the child and the environmental provisions supplied by significant others. Winnicott was convinced of the fundamental importance of external reality and its violating impingements on the infant's perception of the world (Greenberg & Mitchel, 1983; Khan, 1975/1992).

Several of his ideas are focal points in this study. The following concepts, postulated by him, will be addressed: the interrelatedness of the individual and his environment; the holding environment; the cohesion of the psyche and the soma; the True and False Self; transitional space; and object usage.

1.3.5 Rationale for comparing Heidegger and Winnicott

Is it legitimate to compare concepts from such diverse orientations, as Heidegger's philosophy and Winnicott's theory of object relations? Not only does the aim of their work differ, but also the methods they used. Heidegger was in search of the fundamental ontological structure of Dasein, with the view to understand the essence and meaning of Being, and he used a hermeneutic phenomenological method (Spiegelberg, 1971). Winnicott (1960/1984a) aimed to understand the development of a person in terms of its relational matrix, and developed his theory on the basis of his observations of the interactions between people as well as his patients' experiences in the consulting room. Although an ontological discourse must be distinguished from an ontic discourse (for example, psychology), they are both concerned with the understanding of human beings. One is an account of the basic structure of the other (Gendlin, 1988). In this regard, it may be meaningful to compare how Heidegger and Winnicott viewed man, and how their views converge and diverge, but with full understanding and acknowledgement of the differences between them. (Whether a transition from Heidegger's fundamental ontology to an ontic
A discourse about the lives and experiences of individuals is possible, will be addressed in Chapter Five).

This is not the first time Heidegger's work is interpreted within a psychological framework. In the psychological literature, various attempts have been made to use Heidegger's fundamental ontology, in a psychological-ontical discourse. Examples of this include the work of Chessick (1986), Gendlin (1988), Kruger (1988) and Mills (1997).

There could be potential points of convergence between the views of Heidegger and Winnicott. A possible convergence concerns solipsism and dualism. Depth or psychodynamic psychology, in all its varied manifestations, is situated in a solipsistic view of man. "Die mens is hiervolgens 'n afgekapselfe wese. Hy is tot homself ingekeer. Daar is versperrings tussen hom en enigiets buite hom" (Preller, 1977: 138). Preller discusses the development of solipsism in Western thought and specifically in psychology. He illustrates how there was a progressive movement in psychology from the early dualism and solipsism inherent in classical psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on the subjective inner world, to greater recognition of man's relationships with his environment in the later proponents of depth or psychodynamic psychology.

It was only through the influence of phenomenology, that psychology obtained an opportunity to free itself fully from solipsism. The most fundamental contribution in this regard came from the work of Heidegger (1927/1980). For him, the essence of man is in his relationship with his world. However, this must not be interpreted that man first exists and then relates to people and things in his environment. The word "relationship" is in fact not really appropriate. Man is, in the most original and essential sense, already in the world. Man is not 'vorhanden', a thing between things, but ex-ists. This being-in-the-world is reflected in Heidegger's description of Dasein as 'In-der-Welt-sein'. Man cannot be, without being in a meaningful world (Heidegger, 1927/1980; Preller, 1977).

Where does Winnicott stand with regard to dualism and solipsism? As one of the representatives of the later psychodynamic movement, his theory is essentially a relational theory, in that he emphasises the relationships between people. Despite Winnicott's claims of continuity and alliance to the work of Klein and Freud, his work resides solidly within a
relational/structural model (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Mills (1997) argues that there is convergence between certain concepts of Winnicott and Heidegger, including that Winnicott, like Heidegger, negated a subject-object dichotomy. "Like Heidegger's hermeneutical treatment of Dasein's existential ontology, Winnicott has obviated the subject-object dichotomy in regards to the ontical structures of the self. The maternal holding environment is part of the very ontic structure of Dasein – it is constitutive of Dasein's Being" (Mills, 1997: 52).

Another potential convergence between Heidegger and Winnicott is related to Heidegger's concept "Mitsein" – that it belongs to the ontological structure of Dasein as Being that it is always with other people. Winnicott, and object relations theory in a broader sense, also emphasise man's relationships with other people. Whether there is, in this regard, convergence between these approaches, is related to the broader question already referred to above, namely whether it is possible to interpret a factual situation in terms of the ground structures of Being.

There might also be a relationship between Heidegger's views on authenticity and inauthenticity, on the one hand, and Winnicott's views on the True and False Self. According to Heidegger (1927/1980; Mills, 1997), authenticity is the process of becoming one's possibilities, whereas inauthenticity involves losing oneself in an anonymous mass, 'das Man'. For Winnicott (1967/1986) the True Self is the vital core of the personality, whereas the False Self is an illusion of a personal existence based on compliant adaptation to external demands and expectations, rather than an expression of the real self. Accordingly, Mills (1997) endeavours to link inauthenticity (Heidegger) and the False self (Winnicott).

Heidegger (1927/1980) states that Dasein is thrust into the world at a certain time and place, in an environment over which he has no choice. This, being situated, delineates man's choices and creates his possibilities. In a related context, Winnicott (1960/1984a) emphasises that the infant is born into a holding environment and says that "Human infants cannot start to be except under certain conditions" (Winnicott, 1960/1984a: 43). The infant's development is inextricably linked to this environment, especially maternal care, which facilitates or hinders the development of its potential.
Winnicott (1963/1984a) views the development of a sense of time, and an integrated self, with a past, present, and future as important developmental tasks. According to Heidegger (1927/1980), Being depends on all three dimensions of temporality, past, future and present. Dasein's past happens out of its future, the past is in the present, which is the way it is appearing now. In the views of both Heidegger and Winnicott, there is a convergence of past, present and future.

The above potential points of convergence will be discussed in greater detail in the rest of this thesis.

1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHOD

For the purpose of this study, the lived experience of loneliness and alienation of the self, as evidenced during psychotherapy, will be researched qualitatively. The phenomena under investigation cannot be quantified or constructed in a controlled setting. Therefore the qualitative research method is appropriate, as it remains faithful to the human phenomenon as it is lived.

A descriptive-dialogic case study research method was applied. A detailed description of the method is presented in Chapter Six. One long-term psychotherapy patient was used as subject. Extensive case notes were made during the course of four years of psychotherapy, and these provide a rich data source. According to Kruger (1988), one of the criteria for selecting participants in qualitative research deals with the extent to which the particular person elucidates the phenomenon under investigation. As will become evident in the study, a central theme in the dialogue with the patient was her loneliness and her disconnectedness from others, herself and her world.

The study contains four basic components according to Edwards' (1993) guidelines for conducting case studies. These components are: existing theoretical frameworks within which the case material is to be understood; identification of the case study against the background of these theoretical frameworks; careful and systematic description of the
person's experience; and finally an analysis and discussion of the case material in view of
the above theoretical frameworks and the aim of the study.

1.5 CONCLUSION

The importance of the experience of loneliness and the implications thereof for the
psychotherapeutic process cannot be denied. This study will concentrate on how it was
experienced by the patient in the consulting room through the psychotherapeutic dialogue.

An overview of the literature on loneliness reviewed will be given in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW ON LONELINESS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide a literature overview of the phenomenon of loneliness and will include a discussion of its various dimensions. Different thoughts and perspectives will be dealt with. Special reference will be made as to how loneliness is seen in the context of modern Western technocratic society.

2.2 THE EXPERIENCE OF LONELINESS

Whether it is acknowledged or not, every human being experiences loneliness. Loneliness does not discriminate between the rich and the poor, the prostitute and the priest, the child and the adult. It is inside one and outside. It is not a disease, nor pathology in itself, but a human reality. All people contain their own loneliness as they experience it and they contribute to the loneliness of others. Moustakas (1972) views loneliness as a positive experience as it affirms a person's identity, and enables him to take steps towards a new life. Klein (1963) also holds that loneliness, when experienced, becomes a stimulus towards object relations. However, when the denial of loneliness is used as a defence, it interferes with good object relations.

Loneliness, it would seem, becomes pathological when one attempts to avoid it through one's own frenzied daily activities. The modern Western technocratic society is well equipped in assisting one in one's alienation from self, others and the world. According to Kruger (1988) man has become problematic to himself as never before. The fact that man is in despair, due to the loneliness and emptiness he is experiencing, is not a novel idea. "Man's dislodgement from a meaningful relation to the world was accurately prognosticated in the nineteenth century and has grown considerably deeper in the twentieth" (Kruger, 1988: 1).
Man's crisis is further stressed by Wright (1995). He reports that the rate of depression has been doubling in certain industrial countries every ten years. Suicide is the third most common form of death among young adults in North America. Fifteen percent of Americans have a clinical anxiety disorder. Irma Kurtz (1983) states that just as cancer serves contemporary death, so loneliness serves contemporary unhappiness and neuroses.

This is a clear indication that people today are in emotional trouble. They are strangers in the world. They do not understand their world or others in the world with them. They are torn between being alienated individuals in a technocratic society, and what they crave to be, namely, feeling, loving, caring human beings in relationships which confirm them as such. Rogers (1990) in his discussion of the case of Ellen West, claims that people experience more loneliness and isolation today than in earlier times. According to him, the loneliness seen today is as a result of two elements, namely: an estrangement of man from himself, "and the lack of any relationship in which we communicate our real experiencing - and hence our real self - to another" (Rogers, 1990: 210).

Mijoskovic (1979) disagrees with this view that man's loneliness in modern society is due to the alienation caused thereby. He postulates that man is intrinsically alone and is in a continuous state of attempting to escape the solipsistic prison of his frightening solitude. According to him man has always been acutely alone and can never fully share his consciousness with others. May and Yalom (1984: 369) explain:

"Existential isolation is a fundamental isolation from other individuals, and from the world as well... No matter how closely we relate to another individual there remains a final unbridgeable gap. Each of us enters existence alone and must depart from it alone."

Erlich (1998: 138) agrees with them and claims that "Loneliness is the other side of the Janusian face of relatedness... man's loneliness, no less than his relatedness, is an inherent part of his humanness". Klein (1963) refers to an inner sense of loneliness, that one can be alone, even in the presence of friends. She claims that this is due to "an ubiquitous yearning for an unattainable perfect internal state" (Klein, 1963: 300).
Agreement exists that loneliness is not a modern phenomenon. However, it can be said that modern Western society frustrates man's ability to alleviate his loneliness and alienation. The emphasis on intellectualisation and rational thought estranges one from one's own emotional experience, and therefore from oneself and from others. As Kurtz (1983: 107) states: "We are born into a threatening crowded jungle, where we must instruct our children never to talk to strangers..., then to whom can we talk? Who will be our fellows?"

Moustakas (1961) poses many questions that need to be answered. He asks why it is that modern man yearns for relatedness to others, but is unable to experience it? Why is it not possible for people to be honest and direct in their meeting with others? Why is self-estrangement and loneliness so common in modern life? Why is loneliness anxiety such a widespread condition in contemporary society?

Perhaps his considerations on loneliness can assist in this predicament. He sees loneliness in modern Western society in two ways: the existential loneliness experienced as an inevitable part of being human and the loneliness of self-alienation and self-rejection, which is, according to him, not loneliness per se, but a loneliness anxiety. This loneliness, according to him, stems from "a fundamental breach between what one is, and what one pretends to be, a basic alienation between man and man and between man and his nature" (Moustakas, 1961: 24).

Fromm (1993) concurs with Moustakas when he says that man is a "mass man", highly socialised but very lonely. Modern man is alienated from others and confronted with a dilemma. He is afraid of contact with others and equally afraid to have no contact. He adds that the danger of intellectualisation is all the greater today. Fromm (1993) ascribes this to the prevailing alienation from one's own affective experience which leads to an almost totally intellectual approach to oneself and to the rest of the world.

Moustakas (1961: 24) explains it as follows:

"Insidious fears of loneliness exist everywhere, nourished and fed by a sense of values and standards, by a way of life, which centers on acquisition control. The emphasis on conformity, directions, imitation, being like others, striving power and status, increasingly alienates man from himself. The search for safety, order
and lack of anxiety, through prediction and mastery arouses inward feelings of despair and fears of loneliness. Unable to experience life in a genuine way, unable to relate authentically to his own nature and other selves, the individual in Western culture suffers from a dread of nothingness."

It seems as if man is lost to himself and to others. He has lost his sense of neighbourliness and community life. He is an individual, but not a unique individual separate from others. He is tied to others through conformity, competitiveness and a solipsistic view of man.

Gaev (1976) affirms loneliness as both an existential truth, a part of being human, and a loneliness that becomes chronic and pathological when we are unable to form close relationships with others. The question that needs to be asked is: what does relating to others in a meaningful way entail?

Buber (1958: 11) holds that "all real living is meeting." There are two fundamental ways of meeting. The other person can be met as a Thou, as the unique person he or she is, or as an It, as something to be used. Buber's sole purpose was an attempt to ground the meaning of human existence in the sphere of concrete human relations (Brice, 1984). May (in Schneider & May 1995) concurs that the possibility of acceptance by, and trust for another, is essential for an "I am" experience; and human nature contains the potential to establish loving, sharing connection with others.

In Buber's I-Thou meeting there is genuine mutuality. The other person is separate and unique. The person is confirmed as a person with whom "I" share a world. Although they are separate people they are joined in a partnership in the world (Brice, 1984). Quinodos (1993) agrees with Buber's view when he claims that one becomes aware that one is unique, that the other is unique and that one's relationship with oneself and with others assumes infinite worth. This is aptly illustrated in the Little Prince when he says that his fox was just like a hundred other foxes "but I made him my friend and now he is unique in the world" (Saint-Exupery, 1944/1995: 83).

According to Sadler (1978) loneliness in the modern Western world is becoming a problem not only because there are so many new occasions for its occurrence, but also because people will probably experience it on many dimensions. This is a controversial perspective,
as many authors see loneliness as an existential truth. However, for the sake of clarity, an outline of the dimensions of loneliness, as postulated by various authors, with different theoretical approaches, will be given next. It must be emphasised that these dimensions are often difficult to distinguish from one another, and one may presuppose the other. There is thus no definitive experience of loneliness on one dimension only.

2.3 DIMENSIONS OF LONELINESS

2.3.1 The Interpersonal Dimension of Loneliness

This is the most recognised form of loneliness and often the only one given acknowledgement. It is the feeling of being separated from those one cares for, of being abandoned or isolated from significant others. People seen in the psychologist's consulting room often testify that they fear being alone and of having inadequate interpersonal relationships. Their "cry" speaks of feelings of rejection, abandonment and being cut off from fellow human beings. All these could constitute despair for the experiencing person, as interpersonal relations are of the utmost importance to all human beings. It is within a relationship of mutuality that one is confirmed as the unique person one is (Boss, 1994; Buber, 1958; Sadler, 1969, 1978; Sullivan, 1953). Even Mijoskovic (1979), with his almost negative view on loneliness, states that true interpersonal dialogue is the only way to temporarily alleviate loneliness.

For Weiss (1973) loneliness is related to the need for human intimacy. He differs from the existential view, in that for him, loneliness is not an integral and fundamental part of being human, but rather a response to a relational deficit. The person experiences a restlessness, which forces him to look for closeness and intimacy, which he experiences as absent. He postulates two kinds of loneliness: the loneliness of emotional isolation due to the loss of a close emotional attachment; and the loneliness precipitated by the absence of an engaging social network. This will be discussed under the social dimension of loneliness.

Gaev (1976: 10) concurs with Weiss when she speaks of emotional loneliness as "a general feeling of sadness and longing that we feel when our need for closeness with significant
others is frustrated." She uses as an example marital relations that do not include intimacy, as a common cause of emotional loneliness in modern society.

Parkes (1973) sees separation anxiety as one of the main components of loneliness. This loss is constituted by the abandonment felt by the orphan, the despair due to divorce, and the agony experienced by the death of a loved one.

Weiss (1973) disagrees with Parkes when he differentiates loneliness from depression and grief. He claims that when one is lonely, one is driven to rid oneself of this unpleasant experience by integrating into new relationships or regaining lost ones, while depression leads to apathy and withdrawal from others. Seligson (1983: 33) on the other hand, states that: "Unlike the depressive, the lonely individual reaches out but can never communicate and, consequently, never quell the longing." Weiss (1973) adds that in grief other emotions seem to form part of it, such as sadness, anger, and shock. He claims that this is not the case with loneliness.

The views of Parkes and Gaev on the one hand, and Seligson and Weiss on the other hand, as described above, differ in terms of whether loneliness is a separate, definable experience, or whether it is related to, or even expressed through, other emotions. It might be possible that loneliness may manifest itself in many different emotions that may be more accessible to the individual than the experience of loneliness. For example, depression can be a result of loneliness if it is not understood and confronted. People generally do almost anything rather than to admit that they are lonely, and their frantic daily activities attest to this. To be alone is shameful. It attacks one's self esteem. One feels that people see one as not "good enough" when one is alone: that others do not want to be with one and therefore something within one is lacking.

The interpersonal dimension and the social dimension of loneliness are closely linked to each other, and are difficult to distinguish. The social dimension, however, elucidates additional facets of loneliness, and this is discussed next.
2.3.2 The Social Dimension of Loneliness

In societies where the social bond is of great value, one of the worst forms of punishment and cause for loneliness is ostracism or exile or being excluded (Schneider & May, 1995).

This type of isolation and abandonment is aptly described in the myth of Prometheus. He was cast out by Zeus as punishment for stealing fire. He was chained to a cliff where he spent many years in total abandonment. He needed a fellow human to rescue him, a half god, from despair (Schwab, 1974). This symbolises how important it must be for "mere mortals" to belong. Even in individualistic societies a sense of not belonging to a group significant to one, can be very painful. One of the worst forms of punishment that can be inflicted is that of solitary confinement. Children are punished by sending them to their rooms, to be alone. In doing so, they are taught that being alone is not solitude, which can be creative, but only an unpleasant experience to be avoided at all costs.

Gaev (1976) views a lack of belongingness as the cause of social loneliness. This is the loneliness referred to as alienation, and may be as a result of pathological barriers within the person, or a social pathology within society. Modern technology is associated with this. Although it has brought people "closer" to one another, it has also alienated them. One need only to consider ways of communicating: the telephone, the internet, e-mail and other forms of communication. There is no need for direct human contact, and in this sense technology hampers "real meeting".

Becker (1974) refers to a social/environmental dimension which refers to the loneliness caused by ways of life which separate people from one another. Social psychologists speak of the 'cut-offness' and solitariness of civilised man. In a related context Kierkegaard used the term "shut-upness" (Matthews, 1996). This solitude is not the same as the state of being through which creativity arises. It lies more at the heart of Western technocratic culture.

2.3.3 The Cultural Dimension of Loneliness

The cultural and social dimensions of loneliness are closely linked. Cultural dislocation or alienation is a significant factor in modern life and in the experience of loneliness. In the
South African context, it is associated with westernisation and urbanisation, which implies that people have to forfeit aspects of their culture in order to survive, without the new culture having a clear or enduring shape. Bühmann (1984: 100), in her study into Xhosa indigenous healers, explains the African continent's dilemma as follows:

".. because of the extreme pressure on its Black inhabitants to develop a Western-orientated society, a Western type of ego-consciousness with Western goals and measures of achievement, they also now have difficulty in listening to the ancestors, and even more important, understanding their messages. This leads to anxiety, confusion and a search for identity."

Rolheiser (1979) calls it a rootlessness-loneliness characterised by having no roots or meaningful grounding in a tradition. A detailed consideration of this aspect is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the collapse of traditions brings a sense of desolation and a person will often use self-destructive means to alleviate this (Schneider & May, 1995).

Becker (1974) talks of maturational loneliness. Whereas previously, for example, ethnic groups had rituals to launch the adolescent on his road to maturity, performing these rituals has declined. In Western culture there is no clearly defined way for the adolescent to find his own identity and he can thus be plunged into an abyss of feelings of worthlessness and futility.

2.3.4 The Cosmic Dimension of Loneliness

The cosmic dimension of loneliness refers to a person's awareness of himself in relation to the universe and/or to some ultimate source of meaning, or God. When one feels out of touch with the universal order and/or God the feeling of loneliness increases. Parry (1993) claims that in the Western world God has become increasingly marginalised; there is less need of God to explain the unexplainable. Mijoskovic (1979), on the other hand, states that people invented God in order to alleviate loneliness.

Another facet of the cosmic dimension of loneliness is death. Death, the great inescapable of human life, has been made commonplace, instead of inescapable, through killings featured in the news and in entertainment (Parry, 1993). According to Heidegger
(1927/1980) one's attitude towards death pervades and shapes one's whole life. It can be assumed that in making death commonplace man distances himself from his own death and therefore from the realisation that he is finite.

Becker (1974) adds a further aspect to this dimension of loneliness with, what he refers to as, the loneliness of individuation. According to him this kind of loneliness emerges when one has achieved everything in life one has set out to do, and one suddenly realises that one's achievements "ring hollow". The rewards are not what one thought they would be. The sense of achievement is no longer satisfactory. This is experienced in the consulting room when "successful" people question the meaning of life and express feelings of emptiness. Eigen (1996) claims that many people seek help because they feel dead. They have a sense of inner deadness which may persist even in an otherwise full and meaningful life.

2.3.5 Physical Loneliness

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) gives a forceful account of man's relatedness to his world through his body. His ideas centre on the body-subject as the means of man's access to the world of perception, which in turn allows for access to his life-world. Perception is thus a bodily event, man perceives through his body and the body is the subject of perception. According to him perception of another person involves co-existence and an assessment of a certain intention in the other person. This does not only involve external stimuli but relies heavily on a pre-established relation to others prior to a particular perspective. It has its root in man's whole psychological past. Merleau-Ponty calls this integration of the psychological and the physical, the ambiguity of existence. He further claims that others must be experienced in order to exist for the experiencing person. This implies that one cannot experience the other if one is alienated from one's own body. The body must grasp that which is offered by the world. Man's alienation from his body will cast him into a solipsistic realm of existence, and hence he cannot be essentially open, to live with others, in a common world. It can be postulated that the dreaded experience of loneliness will ensue.

The above is related to the need for physical contact with others. When human closeness and touch is lost, physical loneliness is the outcome. According to Gaev (1976), the divorced or bereaved often experience this kind of loneliness. When a person has been part of a
union where this need was met, it can result in acute pain of physical loneliness when this relationship is altered or severed. It can, however, be postulated that even within an ongoing relationship this need for intimacy may be unfulfilled and be part of the cause of loneliness and despair.

2.3.6 Loneliness and Psychopathology

Erlich (1998) claims that in the scope of difficult-to-bear feelings of those who seek psychological treatment, loneliness has its own stellar position. He states that it differs from other central human emotions, in both quality and implication, and is pervasive in those who seek psychological help. Seligson (1983) holds the same view when she claims that loneliness should be seen as a separate diagnostic category. According to her it is often perceived as depression, but whereas the primary affect of depression is anger, in loneliness it is longing.

Becker (1974) speaks of developmental loneliness which results from a deprivation of fulfilling relationships with important others during development. He views this as a neurotic loneliness. The individual's object becomes his all and he has little capacity to tolerate himself, unless he is continually immersed in others. He fears losing others, as he fears losing his whole world, since he is so dependent on others to validate him or to fulfil his needs. These individuals have problems in their capacity to love others or even to really love themselves. Social critic Christopher Lasch has said that "ours is an age of narcissism" (Wolfe, 1978: 55).

Gaev (1976) speaks of the loneliness of the inner self. This is defined as a feeling of inner void, a detachment from one's self. Sadler (1978) refers to the inability of a person to have a relationship with the self or to endure solitude. This self-estrangement is the ground for anxiety and despair according to Kiekegaard, Freud and others (Schneider & May, 1995; Weston 1994). Here loneliness is constituted by a perceived separation from that which one regards to be a total integrated self. This aspect is dealt with in more detail under the object relations view of loneliness.
The loneliness of psychosis or mental illness must be the most extreme way to experience loneliness. The pioneering investigators into the phenomenon of loneliness see interpersonal isolation or loneliness as central to psychopathology. Van den Berg (1972: 105) claims that loneliness is the "nucleus of psychopathology". He says that the mental patient is alone and lives in isolation with few relationships. Loneliness is the core of his illness. If there were no loneliness, there would be no psychopathology. He views the hallucinations of the mentally ill as a creation of their own objects, in their isolation. Laing (1974) describes the schizophrenic as an individual who finds the situation so unbearable that he needs to retreat from reality backwards into his inner world, and he is filled with loneliness and despair. The person is centred in the self and as Quinodoz (1993) stated, it becomes an abyss of depression and anxiety which starts with a person's failure or inability to relate to others. Only through a meaningful relation to the world and others can this loneliness, isolation and alienation be alleviated.

The fact that each person must individuate and establish himself as an individual who can move towards intimacy is anxiety provoking. Failure to make this move brings loneliness and the threat of unrelatedness to the experiencing person. Many of the phenomena observable, during the onset of a disorder, reflect efforts to escape anxiety and loneliness, and although loneliness is an integral part of life, unrelatedness means destruction.

As anxiety is closely linked to loneliness it is appropriate to discuss it briefly.

2.3.7 Loneliness and Anxiety

Fromm-Reichman (1959) states that loneliness and the fear of loneliness on the one hand, and anxiety on the other, are often used interchangeably in clinical terminology. Sullivan's (1953) concept of anxiety is central to his theory on interpersonal relations, namely, that anxiety is always interpersonal in nature. It is a disruptive force in relationships, it sets limits to them, and disallows a person to be truly available. In anxiety man is flung back on himself and this closes man off from his world and turns him away from others (Sullivan, 1953). Quinodos (1993) and Fromm-Reichman (1959) concur when they state that separation anxiety can also be seen as the fear of finding oneself alone and abandoned. Moustakas
(1961) speaks of loneliness-anxiety and he says that a person would rather experience anxiety than acknowledge his own loneliness.

Anxiety, however, need not only be a destructive force. Heidegger viewed anxiety as positive and necessary as it is the fundamental mood of authentic being. It pulls man back from inauthentic living, and forces him to heed the call of his conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1980).

2.4 CONCLUSION

Loneliness is an existential truth in the sense that all people experience loneliness in the course of their lives. It is an age-old phenomenon. However, the modern Western technocratic society exaggerates this experience as its expectations of individuals drive them apart to live, not in separateness and togetherness, but rather as lonely individuals.

Different theoretical approaches are used in an attempt to understand this all too familiar but terrifying human experience. Whichever way one views loneliness, as alienation and isolation from the self, or as a social isolation or as a combination of the two, the conclusion must be that man cannot be alone, he cannot bear loneliness. In contrast to solitude, which allows for creativity, a space in which to think, to confront oneself and one's emotional experiences, loneliness alienates. Solitude, however, can become unbearable, and be experienced as loneliness.

As Gotz (1974: 229) explains:

"loneliness can be conquered only by those who can bear solitude. How does one learn to bear solitude without succumbing to loneliness? How can one learn to use solitude creatively? ... this can be accomplished through slow, grinding realisation of the nearness of man to man, through the establishment of a habit of recollecting togetherness, through the development of patterns of effectively creative sharing and through the rooting in ourselves."

The following chapter will attend to the existential-phenomenological view of man and his world. Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber's philosophies will represent this paradigm.
CHAPTER 3

THE EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will give a brief overview of the existential-phenomenological approach. Its view on loneliness will be discussed. Heidegger's philosophy, Martin Buber's work on meeting through dialogue, and Binswanger's views on existence as being-in-the-world will receive special attention. Heidegger's philosophy includes many concepts relevant to this study. However, his philosophy has a rigidity about it, that leaves a feeling that man has little chance in the face of his modern world to live authentically. Buber, on the other hand, tempers Heidegger's thoughts with a hopefulness which articulates a belief in man's ability to be connected to others and to his world. Whereas Heidegger was a fundamental ontologist, Binswanger applies several of his views on an ontic-anthropological level.

3.2 AN EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW OF MAN AND HIS WORLD

Kruger (1988) states that to speak of modern man as being alienated, an anomic being living in a godless, meaningless universe, of being in despair, is not new. The existential view of a person attempts to "understand the reality underlying all ... human beings in crisis" (Schneider & May, 1995: 2).

Existentialism is an expression of profound dimensions of the modern emotional and spiritual temper shown in almost all aspects of modern culture. It is a unique and specific portrayal of the psychological predicament of contemporary Western man. It focuses on the uniqueness and isolation of individual experience and claims that humans are responsible for their own acts towards themselves and towards others (Gunzberg, 1997). Existentialism is the endeavour to understand man by cutting below the cleavage between subject and object which has bedevilled Western thought and science since shortly after the
renaissance. May (in Schneider & May, 1995) calls this division, between subject and object, the cancer of psychology.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: vii) claims phenomenology to be:

"the study of essences ... but phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence ... It is a transcendental philosophy ... but it is also a philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins - as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status."

It is the study of all human experience as free as possible from presuppositions or bias. It sees humans as free agents not controlled by their environment, with the ability to choose and thus having control over their own destiny. Phenomenology is the basic method of existentialism. In studying the phenomena inherent to human existence, for example perception, it endeavours to give us a direct description of our experience as it is (Gunzberg, 1997; Hoeller, 1993).

It is a matter of describing, not explaining or analysing man's everyday 'life world'. It emphasises that one is not the outcome or meeting point of numerous causal agencies which determine one's bodily or psychological make-up. All knowledge is gained from one's experience of the world, and all human experience is in and lived through one's body. The focus is on meaning and how one lives the meaning, for example, one's loneliness. Furthermore, phenomenological psychology attempts to articulate and reveal explicitly, that which is lived implicitly (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

Loneliness, the focal point in this study, is one such phenomenon. It is therefore pertinent to discuss the existential-phenomenological view of loneliness briefly.

3.3 LONELINESS

Loneliness is an existential truth. It is inevitable. It is part of what it means to be human and something that needs to be accepted (May & Yalom, 1984; Mijoskovic, 1979; Moustakas, 1972). However, loneliness can be alleviated through encountering the being of another
person. Loneliness becomes problematic and even pathological, when one is unable to share one's world and the experience thereof with others, through disconnectedness and alienation from the self.

May (in May, R. Angel, E. & Ellenberger, H.F. 1958) claims that modern Western man finds himself in a predicament. Man has reduced his world to an abstraction and thus denies himself the reality of his own experience. Man finds himself floundering in loneliness and isolation. He sets himself in servitude of a function, for example his economic function, and sees himself only in the light of this function. He abdicates to the widespread conformist tendencies of modern society. Modern man does not experience himself as being-in-the-world. He has lost his world and his experience of community. The prevailing problem of loneliness and alienation reflects the state of man whose relation with his world is broken. This alienation is not simply a lack of interpersonal communication, but also an estrangement from nature and from one's own body.

Valle and Halling (1989) expands on this with the statement that when man's self sense is merely egoic, loneliness and isolation can dominate his experience and he feels acutely separated from others. If, however, he can discover that the core of his being is united with the whole creation, man will realise that he can never be separated from those he loves.

Some existentialists, amongst others Sartre, believe that personal relations can never be anything but a struggle for power, but Merleau-Ponty disagrees with this view (Matthews, 1996). Although he recognises the fact that one mind is distinct from the other and that this often allows for conflict and competition between human beings, he denies that this possibility represents the essence of one's relationships with others. Merleau-Ponty's (1962) views on perception and communication rest on the principle of intersubjectivity. He says feelings and thoughts can be communicated to others and concludes that it is through the body that man is in the world, and that he is present to the other and to himself. The body is both the perceiver and the perceived, the unifier and the unified. Man lives in the world before he acknowledges it through an intellectual act. Intersubjective relations are not only possible but also actual. Man cannot refuse to be related to others and he has natural ties to society and to others. However, he chooses his relations to others, admits them, and offers himself into the communion. How he communicates is therefore a choice (Barral, 1993).
Martin Heidegger's thoughts on being-in-the-world and how this is accomplished, Martin Buber's meeting through dialogue and Binswanger's views on existence will be the point of reference in an attempt to understand how man meets his world. A brief overview of some of the philosophies which led to Buber and Heidegger's conceptualisations of man and his world will be given to reiterate the struggle for understanding of the self, and of being-in-the-world.

3.4 PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

Philosophers through the ages have grappled with the question of the self and the self's connection with the world it exists in. Jean-Jacques Rousseau found a self while strolling through the woods in solitude. He found a self that is intrinsically good, despite the artifices and superficialities of social life. Furthermore, he concluded that the self does not only belong to the person, but is shared with all humanity. Although Rousseau is today proclaimed by some as a "narcissist", connecting the self to the world seems hopeful in the face of being alone and lonely. He emphasised feelings, rather than thought, as the key to the self. This is an important concept when taking into account the modern Western world which places such great value on intellectualisation and neglects the affective part of being human (Solomon, 1988).

Rousseau's view is opposed to that of Descartes who saw the subjective self as a thinking thing which satisfied the need to logic. This view did not hold with empathy and human fellowship (Solomon, 1988). Furthermore, Descartes' split between mind and body, and self and world, created a view of reality in which man is essentially separate from his world. This entrenched an existence which is essentially lonely.

According to Hegel, human existence is primordially a matter of mutual recognition. It is only through mutual recognition that one is self-aware and through which one strives for the social meanings of one's life. A similar view is held by Husserl (cited in Solomon, 1988) who proclaimed that philosophy must rise out of and return to lived experience. He says "The monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life... In one's own experience one can discover the world, and realise the nature of everyone else's
experience as well" (Solomon, 1988: 130). He focuses on the life-world as the pre-given ground of all practical and theoretical activities. Husserl proposed a descriptive psychology in which one must return to the 'things themselves'. This does not imply a naive observation, but a multidimensional experience calling on insight, reason and above all intuition (Frankl, 1993; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The emphasis is on man and his world, man and his relationship to the self and to others. This was partly the background Heidegger used for the formulation of his thoughts on man as being-in-the-world.

3.5 MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1889-1976)

Heidegger's philosophy has its origin in the wake of World War I, in Germany, where he brought the destructiveness of Western science and modern technology under scrutiny. He is one of the most controversial of all modern philosophers and is seen either as a charlatan, or as a philosopher of stature. He has been called an "... irredeemable German redneck, and, for a time, a gullible and self-important Nazi" (Inwood, 1997: 1). It seems that as a man, he was dogmatic, morally small and narrow in his living (Chessick, 1986). It can be argued that his living was incongruent with his thoughts, as he joined the Nazi Party and lived his life in isolation.

Nevertheless, he brought to philosophy and psychology an important perspective of man and his world. Although Heidegger, a founding father of phenomenology, adamantly denied he was an existentialist, his philosophy laid important ground for it (Chessick, 1986; Solomon, 1988). He was discerning in his analysis of the ills of this age and has been claimed by some to be its best hope, of a cure for these ills. He also described, and this is of particular relevance to the present study, the nature of man's relationship with things and people, and how one is socialised into a shared world (Dreyfus & Hall, 1995; Inwood, 1997; Ott, 1993). For the purpose of this study, only his thoughts relevant to loneliness will be discussed.

Heidegger, a student of Husserl, "saw in Husserl's phenomenology the means to undermine Descartes' dualism, the mechanistic vision of the world and the solipsistic illusion of self that it fostered" (Solomon, 1988: 153). His philosophy's emphasis is on holism and in his Being and Time he is unrelenting in his attack on traditional dichotomies and dualism.
3.5.1 Dasein: Being-in-the-world

The question is raised, what does it mean to be a person? Heidegger (1927/1980) holds that BEING is a primordial condition or "ground" which allows everything else to come into existence. He formulated the concept Dasein in his deliberations on man and his world.

Who is Dasein? Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its being is in each case mine and Dasein's essence lies in his existence. He emphasises the da, the 'there' of Dasein to stress Being's being there: being there in the course of its everyday activities and practices. There is, according to him, Being and Nothingness and between these lie all man's possibilities. "Dasein is mine to be in one way or another" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 68). According to Heidegger, anxiety pulls one back from Nothingness and is therefore an appropriate bridge between these two poles (Being and Nothingness) of the self (Heidegger, 1927/1980; Hoeller, 1990; Solomon, 1988).

Dasein exists through being-in-the-world. No distance exists between man and his world. There is no existence, no 'being there' without a world in which to exist. Humans are there, living in the world with others. Humans are living in and living with. A person without a world makes no sense. In saying this he opposes the solipsistic view of man. Mills (1997: 44) explains:

"Dasein's original disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, one is thrust into the ontological contingency of "Being-in" (around-world), an environment (Umwelt) and "Being-with" (with-world) others (Mitwelt) and with-oneself (own-world) (Eigenwelt), which underlies all participation, engagement and concrete involvement with the world that is given in one's immediate preoccupations and concerns."

The view that man and world form a unity and presuppose one another, is a central idea in the existential-phenomenological approach. Whereas Heidegger (1927/1980) and Binswanger (1944/5, 1947/1963) refer to man as "Dasein," Merleau-Ponty (1962: 430) uses the term "presence" and refers to the subject and object as "two abstract 'moments' of a unique structure which is presence". Van den Berg (1953: 4) describes man as a dialogue
and says "De mens is een dialoog, hij is de voortdurende 'vanzelfsprekende' communicatie met zichzelf, met de anderen en met de dingen." Luijpen (1969) emphasises the concept "recontre" which expresses the view that an encounter is only possible if both terms of the encounter are present and imply one another. An encounter cannot occur if something is not met; at the same time, that which is met cannot be part of the encounter if there is no subject that meets it.

Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's being-in-the-world presupposes Dasein sharing his world with others. Dasein is Being-with-one-another, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. Existence is thus co-existence. Our understanding and knowledge of the Other, is implied in our Being-with, as self-knowledge is grounded in Being-with. He explains:

"Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is. Of course it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends on how far one's own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one's essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself. And that is possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world already is with others" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 162).

He adds that empathy does not constitute Being-with, but only becomes possible on the basis of Being-with. Empathic understanding of Others are often suppressed and substituted by different ways of Being-with. It can be postulated that how man is in Being-with-the-other will be a determinant in realising his potential, in other words, how far we have journeyed on the road to authenticity (Heidegger, 1927/1980). This implies that man can only enter into mutual relationships with others if he realises his own potential and the extent to which this is the case, will play a significant role in how he experiences loneliness.

Furthermore, one is embodied and bound by one's shared embodied, perceptual capacities. One views oneself as a whole human being. It is through one's body that one meets the world and other people. The body is inconspicuous and lies in the background of Dasein's doings and, as such, man is centred in his relationship to the world. The latter is both
constituted by, and constitutive of, the self. The world is constitutive in that the self comes into being in the world and is shaped by the world. It is not a process of cause and effect between the world and the self but rather a nonreflective taking up of that which the person's world offers, in the form of culture and tradition. By taking up the meanings of that which the world offers, a person who can make sense of the world evolves (Inwood, 1997; Leonard, 1989). Heidegger (1927/1980: 153) summarises as follows: "Yet man's substance is not spirit as synthesis of soul and body, its rather existence."

A central idea in Heidegger's thoughts, as described above, is that man exists in relation to others. One can never not be in relationships, and even in loneliness, one is related to others in a certain way. "Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 157).

3.5.2 Temporality

Human lived experience is for Heidegger temporal. Dasein is born in a particular time, and this time is not of Dasein's choosing. One cannot counteract the effect of when one was born. Dasein can also not refute that it is going to die. "... Dasein exists as born; and, as born it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 426). Since life is a 'Sein zum Tode', temporality is an essence of human existence. Dasein's attitude towards its own death pervades and shapes its whole life. As Inwood (1997: 61) puts it, "A life without the prospect of death would be a life of perpetual postponement". Time is thus finite, one's time is finite and ends with one's death. Birth and death are thus connected and Dasein is the 'between' (Heidegger, 1927/1980). Realising this has profound implications for striving towards authentic living since it confronts one with the very nature and meaning of life.

This temporal, human lived experience depends for meaning on memory and anticipation. Being depends on all three dimensions of temporality, past, future and present. Heidegger uses three terms to describe this: Existence refers to the future, facticity to the past and fallenness to the present, "...authentic Dasein is not wholly engrossed by the present and by
the immediate past and future. Authentic Dasein looks ahead to its death and back to its
birth and beyond its birth to the historical past" (Inwood, 1997: 59). Dasein does not endure
through time, but it acts and brings about its future. Behaviour and choices are related to
how the future is seen, and are also related to the past. Dasein's past happens out of its
future, the past is in the present, which is the way it is appearing now. "Thus 'the past' has a
remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to
the events of that time; and in spite of that it can still be present-at-hand 'now'" (Heidegger,
1927/1980: 430). Heidegger claims that the past, present and future are all involved in the
advent of true speech (speech will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 3.5.5)
(Chessick, 1986; Dreyfus & Hall, 1995; Kruger, 1988; Solomon, 1988).

The psychotherapeutic alliance is in search of true speech, and true speech involves past,
present, and future. A patient does not stand in the present alone. How he views his future
will be of cardinal importance, and his view of the future will reflect his view of the past. If his
past seems chaotic, his future will be inaccessible, because, as Van den Berg (1972) claims,
an accessible future means a well ordered past. It will thus be the task of the
psychotherapeutic encounter to make the past comprehensible, in order to open up the
patient's future for him.

Since existence is co-existence, a person is never situated in time, as an isolated individual.
The temporality of one person refers to the temporality of others (Heidegger, 1927/1980).
Contact with others becomes manifest in time and the way in which the time is filled, reflects
the quality of relationships with others.

Being born at a certain time, over which Dasein has no control, can be expounded by what
Heidegger termed as Dasein's 'facticity' or 'thrownness'.

3.5.3 Facticity - 'thrownness'

Dasein discloses itself in the everydayness of Being-in-the-world. People are, according to
Heidegger, born to a situation; in a sense they are 'thrown' into a situation. Heidegger
(1927/1980: 174) states:
"... we call it the "throwness" of this entity into its "there"; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there". The expression "throwness" is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over".

Dasein is thrust into the world at a certain time and place, in an environment over which he has no choice. Therefore Dasein is situated in a world, and this, being situated, delineates man's choices and creates his possibilities. The self can thus only develop insofar as its world will allow. The freedom of the self to constitute its world is a situated freedom and man is constrained in the way he can constitute the world. Although Dasein has possible ways to be, Heidegger does not claim that it can become whatever it wants. Circumstances place restrictions on what "I" can do (Inwood, 1997; Leonard, 1989; Mills, 1997).

Therefore, man is limited by this existential structure, his 'facticity'; the fact that he finds himself in a world in which the tasks are already there for him. Although one is 'thrown' into a situation over which one has no control, the way one chooses to live the situation will determine whether one will reach one's potential. One is thus not helpless in the face of one's environment or determined by it. One has the ability to choose. However, making these choices that are one's own, is far more problematic than it appears to be. Self-knowledge according to Heidegger is not merely a matter of self-recognition. It is inevitable that facing the future will cause Angst, and then one loses oneself in complacency in the midst of one's frenzied everyday life. For Heidegger anxiety is important as it is due to fallenness, and therefore pulls one back from absorption in the public world and forces one to heed the call of one's conscience, and to strive to an authentic existence (Chessick, 1986; Heidegger, 1927/1980).

How does throwness relate to loneliness? One may be born into an environment where there is little meaningful contact with others. The loneliness which can be associated with this may force one to live in a false manner, which closes one off from true communication with others. However, Heidegger claims that one still has a choice how to live the situation, and a choice to live authentically, which will bring about true communication and alleviate one's loneliness. Only when one lives authentically can one form meaningful relationships.

The question that needs asking is why do some people strive for authenticity and others are constrained by an inauthentic existence?
3.5.4 Authentic and Inauthentic Ways of Being

Heidegger's concept of authentic being is of importance to this study. What does it mean to be authentic? According to Mills (1997: 43), authenticity, viewed from Heidegger's perspective "is a uniquely temporal structure, and a process of unfolding possibility. It is a state of being that is active, teleological, contemplative and congruent - an agency burgeoning with quiescent potentiality". Authenticity implies becoming one's possibilities, and is uniquely subjective in nature. Heidegger (1927/1980: 313) states:

"But because Dasein is lost in the "they", it must find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested."

Fallenness, on the other hand, embodies absorption in the world of objects, together with deprivation of freedom and a dominance of They. This being lost in the They constitutes a way of living to fit in with the other, and denying one's own possibilities for authentic living. "Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillising; it is at the same time alienating" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 222). It takes from Dasein the burden of anxiety and dread, that goes with being human. Genuine discourse is replaced by idle chatter and the 'must do', 'must see' which results in self-destruction through meaningless frantic activity in an attempt to escape anxiety. In doing so, Dasein forfeits the forward drive to 'I', for a drive to things and people (Heidegger, 1927/1980).

According to Heidegger, if man were an isolated self, who only tried to know, but did not care about the world, he would not be the being that he is. As said above, this Being-with-others can be of two kinds: inauthentic or authentic. He describes inauthentic as concern (Sorge) for people, as things or objects. This has no moral connotation, but has rather to do with curiosity. Authenticity, on the other hand, implies that there is a connectedness with people through common causes, and he refers to this as solicitude 'Fursorge' (Chessick, 1986). This implies that contact with others is established through participating in a common world. The implication of this, would be that, loneliness would occur if people do not share a common world of meanings.
Heidegger (1927/1980: 159) states:

"Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein's being-one which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with its authentic Being towards itself."

Dasein's primary concern, however, is its own identity and finding one's own identity is the key to authenticity. According to Heidegger, if one wants to live authentically, one must become a truly independent self, who does not lose oneself in the anonymous mass -das Man. There is a lifelong effort to find one's own identity, to define oneself, for oneself and for others. Heidegger claims that this can not be done through the following notions: competitiveness, which sets one apart from others; or publicness, which he claims suppresses the exceptional in the obsession to promote a well rounded personality; nor averageness which is what one is to fit in with others. In averageness the uniqueness of selfhood is diffused and lost and it is an existential characteristic of the They. It reveals the tendency of Dasein to 'level down' all possibilities of Being. Related to this is adaptation, which requires from one to be as if one has no choice but to follow orders (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 164,165). One would wonder how he integrated these concepts with his own averageness as member of, and adaptation to, the Nazi party.

Although it is a lifelong effort of man to find his own identity, to define himself for himself, and for others, he does not start off with his 'own self'. It is rather a question of being wholly defined by others, and their expectations of him. Heidegger's term das Man, refers to, "just this more-or-less anonymous sense of self, anonymous in the sense that we are nothing more than a placeholder, the one who happens to be the oldest son, the biggest or smartest kid in class" (Solomon, 1988: 163). The implications of this is, that to become an authentic Being, this anonymous sense of self must be redefined to allow for the emergence of one's own true, unique self.

In an attempt to elucidate this Mills (1997) states that, Dasein does not only show itself in the everyday, mundane modes of existence, it also does so in a false manner. It presents to the world a false self due to the conformity expected of it. This fallenness is described as a separation of self from authentic selfhood, and authentic community. It is the universal
tendency of humans to lose themselves in the everydayness of present concerns, and preoccupations. In this way they alienate themselves from their personal, unique possibilities. Therefore, the anonymous one, the fallen, *das Man* who identifies with the 'they' of everydayness as averageness, is a constricted Dasein. Dasein is thus a reduced self, a stifled existence, a false being (Heidegger, 1927/1980).

To break with *das Man*, requires action. Both inauthenticity, as well as, authenticity, begin with the recognition of the challenge to take hold of oneself, either by fleeing it, or by accepting the challenge. Heidegger (1927/1980) stresses the importance of anxiety for individual choice in order to really exist, as opposed to a so-called existence. He claims:

"Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being -- that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its being" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 232).

Anxiety, according to Heidegger, individualises and brings Dasein back from falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity, are possibilities of its Being. This means that Dasein must find its truth within itself, in isolation, although authenticity involves others (Heidegger, 1927/1980).

Being authentic, refers to making one's own life choices autonomously and without rationalisation or excuses, so that one's decisions are one's own. Man must create meaning for himself in his orientation to the future. Meaning is created by structuring existence around fulfilling realistic, and uniquely individual future goal possibilities. Denne and Thompson (1991: 110) interpret this as follows:

"....individuals must first acknowledge and experience the suppressed dread of finiteness which previously led them to live automatically and inauthentically according to the forms, routes and opinions of the masses. Then they must accept the limitation of finiteness and any other uniquely personal limitations, but go on to choose to take responsibility for living toward unique personal possibilities which precede death."

Inauthenticity, on the other hand, implies not making one's own choices, and confronting the call of one’s conscience (Solomon, 1988).
Heidegger (Chessick, 1986: 93) believed "that people must recover authentic engagement or attunement with each other and with the world... He concluded in a mystical fashion, that poetry can lead to the illumination of Being: "Stop, listen, hear, remember, respond to the call of being - it opens up the spirit."

Mills (1997: 43) poses the question:

"Is it possible that the very ontological structures of Dasein itself are false? Can the Being of Dasein be thrown into a deficit world, a world tainted by fallenness and inauthenticity, so much so that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is predetermined as a falsehood? To what degree is worldhood itself structurally differentiated into various existential modalities which are inauthentic, thereby affecting Dasein's modes of being and the very way in which selfhood is disclosed?"

This statement leaves one to wonder whether Dasein can transcend its own 'throwness'. Can the child immersed in a culture and family, which expect compliance from him, and make this compliance a necessity for the survival of the self, do anything else but live inauthentically and present to the world a false self? What price will Dasein have to pay to heed the call of its conscience? Maybe this is what Heidegger meant when claiming that Dasein can only find itself in isolation.

Those patients who enter the consulting room, living inauthentically, claim their lives to be meaningless and empty. Through the psychotherapeutic encounter, the patient can be given the courage to listen to the call of his conscience and thus enable him to live more authentically.

3.5.5 Befindlichkeit: Being in a Mood

To describe the way Being is in the world, Heidegger chooses three concepts of existence which can be easily misunderstood: Befindlichkeit, understanding and speech. These three concepts are interrelated.

Befindlichkeit can be translated as the placement of the self in life and in the world. It has also been translated as 'state of mind', as the 'sense of one's situation, or as "moodness". It
includes affect, mood and feeling, "how we sense ourselves in situations" or where one is affect-wise at a given time (Gendlin, 1988: 44). "A state-of-mind is a basic existential way in which Dasein is its 'there' " (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 178). Loneliness, just as anxiety, would thus be one aspect of Befindlichkeit and would reflect the quality of the relationship between man and his world.

Heidegger (1927/1980: 174) explains:

"In a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in a sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in finding itself in the mood that it has."

Befindlichkeit is neither an interactional nor an intrapsychic concept, it is both before the distinction is made, and always has its own unique understanding.

As stated, Befindlichkeit has its own understanding. It does not necessarily imply a specific awareness of the mood or a knowledge of it. Rather, it refers to how man is managing his 'living-in' and 'living-with'. The situations he finds himself in are not a mere fact, independent of him. Man is active in these situations, with its attendant difficulties and possibilities. How he copes with these is his mood. Man's perception of the world varies from mood to mood, and the mood has an implicit understanding of these intricacies of being. It is not a cognitive understanding, but a sensed or felt thought, because understanding is inherent already in how man has lived and is living a certain situation. "Ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 175). Man's encounter with his possibilities is in itself thus modified by his affectivity. A mood can only be replaced by another mood and a mood cannot be replaced by another mood through cognitive understanding, it must be experienced (Chessick, 1986; Dreyfus & Hall, 1995; Gendlin, 1988; Heidegger, 1927/1980).

Heidegger (1927/1980) further states that speech, or rather the capacity for speech, is already involved in any mood or affect. Because mood has an understanding, there is the possibility of interpretation, of appropriating what is understood. This does not imply that man can always articulate what he lives, but that there is always the capacity for speech involved in any situation. To hear the other, to be open to each other's speech, is part of

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what man is. It allows Dasein to articulate in speech that which is affectively understood (Gendlin, 1988). Dialogue, for Heidegger, is more than a conversation. It is a shared openness towards the other, in an attempt to listen to the unsaid, and to allow it slowly to come to speech. "Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation...the way of speaking" (Heidegger, 1927/1980: 205).

To the extent that the ontological structure of Dasein is unveiled at an ontic level, Heidegger's concept of Befindlichkeit can assist in one's understanding of the patient's perception of his world. The patient's mood, whether implicitly known to him or not, will determine how he perceives, and reacts in situations. Through psychotherapy this mood can become articulated. The patient can find words for what he feels. In so doing, the patient is enabled to replace one mood with another. In the movement from the implicit to the 'lifting out' of the feeling, the feeling changes. To be more specific, a movement from a prevailing mood of anxiety, to that of the awareness of loneliness, may occur. By doing this, the patient comes to perceive his world differently and this can then influence his way of being in various situations.

Furthermore, Heidegger (cited in Chessick, 1986) claims that Being can only appear when people retire from active investigation and achieve a state of what he called Gelassenheit - serenity, composure, release, relaxation, a disposition that "lets be". One can assume that this letting-be-ness does not imply that Dasein becomes complacent or self-satisfied, but that it allows things to present themselves as they are. The other person is permitted to express freely what he is. In the therapeutic relationship this will be important.

To conclude, if one wants to live authentically, one must become a truly independent self, who does not lose oneself in an anonymous mass, thereby living inauthentically. Heidegger's Dasein must find its truth within itself, in isolation. Heidegger views everyday life as dull, banal, enslaved and meaningless and his authentic existence portrays a man who stands out. However, one feels him to be almost pessimistic in his emphasis on the difficulties in becoming an authentic Being in the face of everyday life.

Although he does acknowledge the importance of others, it seems that there are many graces in human life that he ignores. Heidegger's description of an inauthentic existence as
shallow, impersonal, anonymous and conformist, gives one the impression that he may be condemning man too quickly. His views are based on his experiences, and his way of being-in-the-world. It could be argued that he was perhaps more rigid in his relationships than people who have more lively relationships with those they are being-with. Other people do not necessarily relate as inauthentically as he claims. People often genuinely do care for friends and family, and show solicitude for the human community.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, his work does invite contemplation and his concepts are valuable to the world of psychology. His concepts of temporality, bodiliness, authentic/inauthentic self and 'being in a mood', are important. It brings understanding of Dasein's perception of its situation, and will lay the ground for how it will be in the situation.

Although Heidegger views anxiety as positive, existentially, anxiety is also seen as isolating. "In anxiety man is flung back on himself, in anxiety man is isolated and the distance between man and man and man and world is increased" (Preller, 1991). Anxiety suspends man's involvement in the world and makes him speechless. Therefore, loneliness is increased. It could be claimed that anxiety in moderation is necessary for Dasein to pull itself back from "fallenness". However, should anxiety become prevalent, it is pathological and closes man off from his world.

3.6 MARTIN BUBER - A PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

Martin Buber's approach constitutes a paradigm shift from the views of the human as a psychologically isolated self, to the realm of the interhuman. Buber described his viewpoint as the "narrow ridge". Friedman (1960: 3) says that this "expresses not only the 'holy insecurity' of his existential philosophy, but also the 'I-thou' or dialogical philosophy which he has formulated as a genuine alternative to the insistent either-or's of our age."

Martin Buber was a philosopher, an educator, and a humanitarian, who was poignantly aware of the breakdown in relationships in the modern technocratic world. He realised that the technocratic emphasis placed on individualism, leads to distancing between person and person. Hyckner (1991: 5) explains as follows:
"This de-emphasis of the interhuman results in isolation, alienation and the inevitability of a modern-day narcissism. It creates an obsession with the self - a hyperconsciousness. The reality of the other person is hidden by this narrow focus. The modern phobia about intimacy is a reflection of this. The relational becomes subjugated to an overemphasis on separateness. Such overemphasis on separateness creates a split not only between persons, not only in our relationship with nature, but also within our own psyches. The dialogical outlook is an attempt to heal those splits."

Although he was not a psychologist, his dialogical perspective is of immense value to the psychotherapeutic relationship.

Buber (cited in Friedman, 1960) claims that man's culture has abdicated before the world of It, and holds that there are four kinds of evil bedevilling modern Western society. He emphasises the loneliness of modern man in the face of an unfriendly universe in which man lives together with man, but they do not meet; man's inability to integrate modern day technology into his life in a meaningful and constructive way; the inner duality of modern man; and the deliberate and large scale degradation of human life within the totalitarian state. It must be mentioned that he does not see I-It, which constitutes the experiencing and use of the other, as being in itself evil. Only when It is allowed to have mastery and shuts out real meeting, does it become evil. Buber (1958: 34) says: "And in all seriousness of truth, hear this: without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man." The concepts I-It and I-Thou will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter.

According to him no true community exists and the only way in which to rectify the evils of contemporary life is to strengthen the forces of good through the will for genuine relationship and true community (Friedman, 1960). What is genuine relationship in Buber's view, and how does it present itself? He explains as follows:

"the principle of human life is not simple but twofold, being built up in a twofold movement which is of such kind that the one movement is the presupposition of the other... the first movement [is called] 'the primal setting at a distance' and the second 'entering into relation'. That the first movement is a presupposition of the other is plain from the fact that one can enter into a relation only with being which has been set at a distance, more precisely, has become an independent
opposite. And it is only for man that an independent opposite exists" (Buber, 1965: 60).

The emphases of his thoughts is then on man's ability to be a truly separate self from others, and in so being one can enter into true dialogue with another. This does not imply merely a 'setting at a distance' and 'making independent' of the other, but rather an acceptance of one's own uniqueness, and an acceptance of the other person's 'otherness' (Buber, 1965).

As Buber (1958: 11) averred, "all real living is meeting" and the primary attitudes of man to his world are twofold, that of I and Thou and I-It. The I-It relationship constitutes experiencing and using. It does not take place between man and his world but rather within man and therefore it is subjective and lacking in mutuality. This is a relationship of subject-object, the other must become an object for I-It. According to Buber (1958: 3) "I-It can never be spoken with the whole being." In other words, in the I-It relationship one is never totally present in one's meeting with the other.

The I-Thou, on the other hand, views the other person as separate and exclusive, but confirmed as 'he with whom I share the world'. There is genuine mutuality in the relationship. There is no subject or object, rather a we, in which each person authentically meets the other and himself. This does not necessarily imply that words are involved, genuine relation can thus be spoken or silent. Buber (1958: 9) explains:

"Even if the man to whom I say Thou is not aware of it in the midst of his experience, yet relation may exist. For Thou is more than It realises. No deception penetrates here; here is the cradle of the Real Life."

Buber says "in the beginning is relation, the inborn Thou which is realised by the child in the lived relations with what meets it" (Friedman, 1960: 60). The world though, is not ready made. The child must find his own world through hearing, touching, seeing, and shaping it. Buber claims that the infant-mother relationship was primarily, a mutual relation between I and Thou. In the effort to establish relations, actual relations unfold and the child says Thou without words. It is through this meeting with Thou that he becomes I, and the relation split into I and the thing. The child eventually loses his relation with Thou and perceives it as a separate object. It is through this that he falls into the I-It. In this way he differentiates from
the mother and paves the way for I-Thou relations (Brice, 1984; Friedman, 1960). It is inescapable to revert to It. Buber (1958: 16) claims: "But this is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every Thou in our world must become an It."

He does not explain how this distance or separateness is achieved, but to be separate is important for a possibility of mutuality and I-Thou relations. If the child does not attain this separation, he may still learn how to be empathic, but this does not necessarily mean true mutuality. In empathy one gives up the ground of one's own consciousness, whereas a prerequisite for true dialogue is a centredness in oneself. In the silent or spoken dialogue between the I and the Thou both personality and knowledge, come into being. Personality does not develop within the individual, or as a result of socialisation, but is a function of relationships. One's personality is called into being by those who enter into relation with one (Friedman, 1960).

In the I-Thou there is mutuality and togetherness in which one remain oneself. The Thou is neither an It nor another I, and if the other is seen as another I, it is only a mirror image of oneself. Although such a relationship where the other is seen as another I can be warm and friendly, it is really an I-It relation (Friedman 1960).

Buber states that, as subject-object evaporates the we emerges. The relationship is in-between and not within a person. Each partner in the relationship meets himself, and the other, authentically. The true self can emerge in a relationship that is real. It is difficult in daily life to be honest and true to oneself in one's relationships. It requires less dependence on, or control and manipulations by, the other. It requires a relationship of true mutuality. Man is so busy conforming, or searching for wealth and power, that his very 'humanness' is lost. The most complete development of the self, is the development of the self in relation to others. The fundamental nature of a person lies in communication with others. A person must make himself available and thereby more transparent, both to himself, and to others. There is no merger or incorporation which would constitute an I-It relationship. The I-Thou relationship constitutes a full mutuality in the acceptance of differences, which fundamentally and inevitably separate two persons (Buber, 1958, 1965; Friedman, 1960 ; Matthews, 1996). This implies that when one enters a relationship constituting I-Thou, one will be able to alleviate one's loneliness.
I-Thou relationships are immensely satisfying, but are not without anxiety. Buber (1958: 15) wrote that "Love is responsibility of an I for a Thou." Because this love is fully mutual and concerned with both sides of the relationship, such responsibility is often lived anxiously.

The I-Thou form of relating cannot be sustained continually, and healthy adult relating vacillates between the I-Thou and the I-It. At times it is necessary to relate in the I-It, as long as it does not exclude the possibility of becoming an I-Thou. In the I-It one steps back into oneself in order to regain energy, but there must be a desire to come back together again. There is both distance and relation, being a-part-of and apart from. In a healthy existence there is a rhythmic balance between the two. I-It relationships are far less satisfying than I-Thou relations, however, within every I-It relation lies the possibility of an I-Thou relation. In pathological I-It relations the ability to bridge this gap, is greatly diminished (Brice, 1984; Buber, 1958; Hyckner, 1991).

Buber (1958) claims that it is through 'grace' that the I-Thou relation presents itself, and that such relationships are 'rare' and 'ideal'. He poetically says: "The It is the eternal chrysalis, the Thou the eternal butterfly" (Buber, 1958; 17). Brice (1984) disagrees and states that these relations happens more often than Buber believed.

What then is genuine dialogue? For Buber it is 'truth'. One imparts oneself to the other as what one is. It constitutes being authentic which does not imply that one discloses all of oneself to the other, only that one genuinely sees the other. This implies inclusion or 'experiencing the other side'. Friedman (1960: 87) explains:

"Genuine dialogue can thus be either spoken or silent. Its essence lies in the fact that each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them."

When one speaks about communication or dialogue it implies a gap between selves and suggests the possibility of bridging the gap. For Buber this is 'experiencing the other side'. It is not empathy. Empathy means to feel oneself in the other, through relinquishing the ground of one's own consciousness. One suspends one's awareness of oneself to
understand the other better. Buber describes it as: "transposing oneself into the dynamic structure of an object, hence the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates" (Friedman, 1985: 197).

Experiencing the other side is the essence of all genuine love. Experiencing the other side, or as Friedman phrases it, inclusion, or imagining the real is the very stuff of betweenness. It is "a bold, imaginative swinging 'with the intensest stirring of one's being' into the life of the other so that one can, to some extent, concretely imagine what the other person is thinking, willing and feeling and so that one adds something of one's own will to what is thus apprehended" (Friedman, 1985: 198). One turns one's entire existence to the other person in a concentrated attempt to experience the other person's experience as well as one's own (Hyckner, 1991). The person does not lose his centre or the core of his own being in the meeting with another. It is the extension of one's own concreteness, the complete presence in the reality in which we participate (Friedman, 1960).

Buber's belief in the person's ability for true mutuality and I-Thou encounters brings hope to the consulting room. The I-It way of being can be given the opportunity to become an I-Thou relationship. Friedman (1985) expands for the psychotherapist Buber's views with his thoughts on empathy, identification, and inclusion (which is the core of 'betweeness'). Friedman postulates that both empathy and identification are very limited means of understanding, as both rely on one side of the relationship. With empathy, one leaves oneself and moves into the other, while with identification one tunes into the other, while focusing on oneself. "Neither can grasp the uniqueness of the other person, the uniqueness of oneself, and the uniqueness of the relationship" (Friedman, 1985: 201). Inclusion or 'imagining the real', on the other hand, presupposes two separate, unique people meeting each other with a common goal. Neither person loses his centre or personal core. Both stay unique and separate but theirs is real meeting.

In conclusion, Buber's view of man and his ability to enter into genuine dialogue seems hopeful. Every person has an inherent ability to genuine mutuality. He does, however, imply that a child is dependent on his caregiver, for his discovery of Thou and his own
separateness. A person's personality, as he puts it, is called into being through relationships with others.

In the following section, concepts relevant to the present study from the work of Binswanger will be discussed.

3.7 LUDWIG BINSWANGER

In contrast to Heidegger, Binswanger's (1944/1958, 1946/1958) aim is not to propose an ontological thesis about Being, but to make ontic statements, that is, to explicate factual findings about forms and conditions of existence.

Binswanger (1946/1958) applies Heidegger's ontological thesis, that the basic structure of existence is Being-in-the-world, on an anthropological level. He states that "Heidegger, in his concept of being-in-the-world as transcendence, has not only returned to a point prior to the subject-object dichotomy of knowledge and eliminated the gap between self and world, but has also elucidated the structure of subjectivity as transcendence" (Binswanger, 1946/1958:193). By investigating the structure of Being-in-the-world as transcendence, various ways of transcending can be discerned. These ways of transcending are modes of being in the world, such as thinking, feeling, or creating. Examining ways of transcending opens new horizons for describing psychopathology, such as psychoses, which Binswanger regards as modifications of the fundamental or essential structure of Being-in-the-world.

Binswanger (1944/1958) distinguishes between three world-regions, or three aspects of the world, which characterise being-in-the world, namely Umwelt, Mitwelt and Eigenwelt. The Umwelt can be translated as the environment – the world of objects in which people orient themselves bodily and in which they act. The Mitwelt is the world of relationships between people. The Eigenwelt entails the relationship of I-Myself; this is not a subjective, inner relationship, but the basis in terms of which people experience reality.

According to Binswanger, man is inextricably situated in these worlds, and to understand a person, one needs to describe and understand his world-design. The latter ought to include an account of the entire structure of the existence of the individual. In this regard, the life-
history of the individual plays an important role. However, whereas in psychoanalysis the examination of the life-history is the goal of investigation, for Binswanger (1946/1958) it merely provides material for understanding the person’s world-design. In his work "The case of Ellen West", Binswanger (1944/1958) describes various forms which the world-design, as ways of transcending, can take. These include, for example, separation or opposition between the Umwelt, Eigenwelt and Mitwelt, here one of these worlds can become dominant over, or there could be a falling apart of ‘the world’ into irreconcilable worlds.

Binswanger used the above distinction of the Umwelt, Eigenwelt and Mitwelt in his earlier work to organise his descriptions. He later organised his analyses around a larger frame of reference, namely the distinction of “existential modes”. The latter relate to dimensions of Dasein in regard to the Mitwelt, and consist of “dual”, “plural”, “singular” and “anonymous” existential modes. The dual existential mode is an extension of Buber’s views on the I-Thou relationship and is roughly equivalent to the concept “intimacy”. The plural mode relates to formal relationships, competition and struggle, where intimacy has made way for individuals “grappling” with one another. The singular mode involves a person’s relationship with himself, such as the experience of one’s body. The anonymous mode, is the mode of the individual living and acting, in an anonymous collectivity as a way of escaping from, or fighting fellow people (Ellenberger, 1958).

Dasein, according to Heidegger (1927/1980), is thrown into the world at a certain time and place, and into an environment where he has no choice. Binswanger (1944/1958) makes reference to throwness, such as being born a woman, having particular parents and not others, being endowed a particular physical appearance, having to grow up in a particular country, and other similar ‘acts of fate’. He describes how people revolt against this throwness, for example, rebelling against being a woman. It is, however, not possible to escape one’s throwness, and efforts to shatter it or break through it, result in its reassertion in a different, perhaps pathological, way. “The more stubbornly (dictatorially) the human being opposes his being-thrown into his existence and therewith into existence in general, the more strongly this throwness gains in influence” (Binswanger, 1944/1958: 340). Binswanger seems to have used Heidegger’s ontological insight regarding throwness, to gain understanding of particular, factual modes of Being-in-the-world.
According the Heidegger (1927/1980), Dasein finds itself in a particular fundamental situation (Befindlichkeit). The meaning of this situation can be determined through interpreting its prevailing mood. Mood is thus a basic existential way in which Dasein is its 'there'. This oneness of mood and world is reflected, on an ontic-anthropological level, in Binswanger's (1946/1958) views about moods and feelings. According to him, a feeling or a mood can only be understood if one understands how the existence that has the mood, or is in it, is in-the-world. To understand a mood thus requires an explication of the world-design of the person.

Binswanger (1944/1958) regards temporality as the fundamental horizon of all existential explication. According to him (Binswanger, 1946/1958), transcendence is rooted in time, in its unfolding into the future, its past ("having been") and the present. He emphasises, that the world-design can become narrowed and constricted to such a degree, that the self can be prevented from maturing. In this instance, the genuine orientation toward the future becomes replaced by a predominance of the past, the experiences the person has already lived. He, for example, describes Ellen West's life as one which no longer ran into the expanse of the future, but which circled in a bare, empty present, ruled by the past. Such an existence is deprived of its authentic life-meaning, of its existential ripening which involves unfolding into the future. If existence is 'cut off from its future', the world in which it exists becomes insignificant and irrelevant; in other words, there is nothing left for existence from which, and by which, it can understand itself.

However, existence is not only 'determined' by its future, the same as it is not 'determined' by its past. Future and past form a unity. "All futurity of the existence is therefore 'has-been' and all having-been is of the future" (Binswanger, 1944/1958: 303). The past (having-been), which includes the throwness of existence, provides the 'capabilities' by virtue of which the existence exists, whilst the future provides possibilities for the actualisation of these 'capabilities' through practical action in the present. Such existential realisation forms the ground for authenticity. ² "Authentically I am myself, or I exist authentically when I decisively resolve the situation in acting, in other words, where present and having-been unite in an authentic present" (Binswanger, 1944/1958: 298).

² This view of authenticity is reminiscent of Heidegger's (1927/1980) view that authenticity is the process of becoming one's possibilities.
The authentic present involves creating the present by practical action. With regard to the latter, Binswanger (1944/1958: 274) says:

"It is practical action which places the existence on the earth, teaches it to stand and walk on it; more correctly expressed - in practical action, in everyday pre- and nonprofessional conduct (family, friendship, games, sports), and in professional activity, the existence establishes itself on the earth, creates its own Lebensraum, its possibilities of orientation and, at one with it, its 'practical self'. 'For it is only through the practical that we first become truly certain of our existence.' He who stands with both feet firmly on the ground knows where he stands, where he is going, and who he himself ('in practical life') is. Such a standing, going, and knowing we call 'striding', that is a 'ranging from one place to another' which knows about itself, its standpoint, and its goal."

A constricted world-design forms the ground for anxiety. Anxiety emerges when the world becomes shaky or threatens to vanish, thus delivering existence to nothingness. "The emptier, more simplified, and more constricted the world-design to which an existence has committed itself, the sooner will anxiety appear, and the more severe it will be" (Binswanger, 1946/1958:205). The world of the healthy is varied and if one region is threatened, other regions offer a foothold. However, if the world is dominated by one or a few categories, the threat to the preservation of that one or few categories intensifies anxiety (Binswanger, 1946/1958:205).

In conclusion, Binswanger applies several of Heidegger's views on the ontological structure of Dasein, including Being-in-the-world, thrownness, mood, temporality and authenticity on an anthropological level. This transition from an ontological to an ontic discourse can facilitate understanding of factually present individuals, such as in the psychologist's consulting room.

3.8 HEIDEGGER, BUBER AND BINSWANGER - A COMPARISON

Buber, Heidegger and Binswanger hold the view that man is in the world with others. However, where Heidegger is concerned with the ontological structure of Dasein as Being-
in-the-world, and with *Mitsein* as an existential, Buber and Binswanger are interested in the relationships between people, at an ontic level.

According to both Buber and Heidegger, the Western technocratic society restricts man from being an authentic self. It compels man to live in the It. However, Buber seems to be more encouraging of man's ability to enter into a meaningful relationship with his world and others. For him there is always the possibility of an I-Thou. His view of man seems to be tempered with an awareness of man's immense struggle for mutuality and intimacy, in a technocratic world that is set for alienation. Binswanger, in his description of Ellen West, also reflects a positive view: "The possibilities of the truly singular or authentically existential and of the true dual and authentically loving mode of existence are still open even to this *Dasein*, if only for swiftly passing moments" (Binswanger, 1944/1958: 290). Heidegger, however, appears to be more pessimistic in his view of man. This should be viewed in the light of his own existence, which in a way opposes the views he puts forward. It almost seems as if he viewed man as being doomed to 'falleness', and the only way in which man can pull back from it is through isolation.

Although Buber, Binswanger and Heidegger's thoughts have similarities and differences, one salient point emerges, man must experience his world with his whole being. This will enable man to enter into relations of true mutuality and genuine dialogue with others. If man is isolated from his world, himself and others he will be living in the solipsistic realm of the self, and will suffer the dreaded experience of loneliness.

The following chapter will focus on object relations theory in which Donald Winnicott's view on the development of the self out of its relational matrix, will be the focal point.
CHAPTER 4

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Although viewpoints differ, the importance of object relations is accepted by all psychoanalytical schools. Object relations theory, as an approach, has evolved over the last fifty years and comprises many theorists of diverse perspectives. The history of object relations theory, including the approach of Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Guntrip, Kernberg, and many others is not within the scope of this study. In debating which theory would be most valuable in the understanding of the phenomenon under investigation in this study, it was decided that Winnicott's interpretation within the object relations theory, to be pertinent.

4.2 AN OBJECT RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE: WINNICOTT'S VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF

Masud Khan (1975/1992: xi) in his foreword to Winnicott's "Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis" claims of Winnicott, that one cannot begin to understand him and his talent, if one is not aware, that for him, psyche and soma are in perpetual dialogue and debate. Each man, according to him, has to find and define his own truth. Despite his protestations of continuity and alliance to the work of Klein and Freud, his work constitutes an approach to human experience which resides solidly within the relational/structural model (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

Winnicott's work is creative and provocative, as his many publications bear witness to. Although Winnicott encountered a vast range of human suffering, despair and hopelessness, he saw the individual's destiny in a positive light. Winnicott saw his own work as limited, and his views only as revisions of earlier theoretical stances (Eigen, 1996).
According to Winnicott, the processes, leading to the development or the inhibition of the self, can only be seen and understood in the context of the interaction between the child, and the environmental provisions supplied by significant others. Winnicott was convinced of the fundamental importance of external reality, and its violating impingement on the infant's perception of the world (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Khan, 1975/1992).

According to Winnicott the earliest object relations are established through the interaction between the developmental needs of the child, and maternal provisions offered by the mother, which are entirely separate from drive gratifications (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). He claims that gratification by itself does not necessarily meet the needs of the infant for a nurturing, holding environment. Maternal provisions are thus independent of the mother's ability to gratify the instinctual needs. A baby can be fed without love, but an autonomous healthy human being will not evolve out of a loveless impersonal environment (Winnicott, 1971/1988).

Winnicott's contribution is important for the understanding of loneliness. His ideas centre on what he depicts as the continuously hazardous struggle of self for an individual existence, which simultaneously allows for intimate contact with others. Various of his ideas are focal points in this study, for example, his view on the interrelatedness of the individual and his environment as well as the psyche and the soma. His understanding of the True and False Self and his concepts of the holding environment, bringing the world to the person, transitional object/transitional space, object relating and object usage. His view on the isolate core of the person which never communicates, which is sacredly private and worthy of preservation is an important consideration when one is in dialogue with another.

The above concepts are salient to the study and will, for the sake of clarity, be presented under various headings with the understanding that these concepts are not separate but inherently linked. Comments made, in the text, on the psychotherapeutic alliance are to explicate how Winnicott's theory can assist the psychotherapist in his dialogue with a patient.
4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF

The focus of this study is the experience of loneliness. Loneliness is inextricably linked to one's ability to enter into relationships with others. Furthermore, one's way of relating to others depend to a large extent on how one experiences oneself as an individuated, integrated being, and how far one has travelled on the road to ego maturity. According to Winnicott, the development of the self and/or distortions thereof will play an important role in one's ability to be alone. In health one has the capacity to tolerate aloneness. If a person is not able to tolerate the lonely state, the dreaded experience of loneliness will prevail, which according to him is illness (Winnicott, 1971/1988).

An understanding of Winnicott's views on the development of the self, presupposes an understanding of the importance of certain environmental provisions and the child's dependence on them.

4.3.1 Environmental Provisions and the Holding Environment

According to Winnicott, the development of a healthy, creative self, is dependent on an environment he has termed good-enough mothering. He claims that it is useless to describe babies in the earliest stages, except in relation to the mother's functioning. The infant does not develop in isolation; there is no such thing as a baby, only a baby and a mother in a relationship. "Human infants cannot start to be except under certain conditions" (Winnicott, 1960/1984a: 43). He recognises that these conditions do not determine the infant's potential. The infant's potential is inherited, but its development is inextricably linked to maternal care. Selfhood, as Winnicott termed it, is a developmental accomplishment rather than a biological given (Ivey, 1990; Winnicott, 1960/1984a). Therefore a good-enough holding environment by the primary caregiver is of cardinal importance. The importance of the holding environment will be reiterated throughout the text.

For Winnicott, the term holding does not only imply the actual physical holding of the infant, but also the total maternal environmental provisions before the ability to "live with others" develops. The term "living with" implies object relations, and the infant's emergence from the
state of merger with the mother. The latter implies that the infant can now recognise objects as external to himself (Winnicott, 1971/1988).

However, what does the holding environment entail? It includes the actual physical holding of the child. By holding her child, the mother can demonstrate her love for the infant. In unison with this, is the total management, handling and care of the infant. Holding protects the infant from physiological insult, takes into account the whole routine of care, and follows the day to day changes regarding the infant's physical/psychological growth and development. Although the baby possesses a spontaneous impulse to grow, it depends entirely on the mother's care (holding environment) for development. In this climate it is possible for the infant to start "existing and not reacting", and to differentiate his ego from that of the mother. This optimal environment makes possible the shift between infantile dependence, to independence and the cognitive shift, from omnipotent conception to realistic perception. Maternal care is thus important for negotiating the difficult stages from primary narcissism to object-relating (Winnicott, 1960/1984a, 1962/1984, 1971/1988).

Winnicott furthermore describes the mother's function as a mirroring function. He states: "In individual emotional development the precursor of the mirror is the mother's face." (Winnicott, 1971/1988: 130). In answering the question 'what does a baby see when looking at his mother's face?', he suggests that the baby sees himself. The mirroring function of the mother provides the infant with a precise reflection of his own experience and gestures, despite their fragmented and formless qualities. "When I look, I am seen so I exist." (Winnicott, 1971/1988: 134). The mother's ability to resonate with the baby's wants and needs allows for the infant to become attuned to his own bodily functions and impulses, which is the basis for the slowly evolving sense of self. The negative implications of this mirroring function of the mother will be discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.3.3.

This responsiveness of the mother is not necessary for long. The infant must learn the reality that the world is outside his control, and that his powers are limited. This is made possible by the mother's failure, little by little, to shape the world according to the infant's demands. This maternal failure is necessary for the development of separation and differentiation. The mother now knows that the infant has a new capacity, that of giving
signals, to guide her to what the infant needs. It must be emphasised that the mother must fail the infant's id but never its ego (Khan, 1986; Winnicott, 1960/1984a).

The holding environment has important implications for therapy. During the various phases of therapy, a patient often enters a state of regressed dependence, which he cannot manage on his own. He requires someone to recognise this need and to be there to meet him in this need. How does Winnicott view this regression? According to him regression is not a return to certain phases of libidinal fixations. He views regression as a return to that time in which the environment has failed the child. Where adequate parental provisions were absent, development stops, and the absent developmental needs dominate subsequent living. In other words, regression is a search for missing relational experiences. Winnicott sees in the analytic/psychotherapeutic setting, a place where these missing parental provisions are provided and the early developmental needs filled. It is in this attentive, reliable and responsive environment, where no premature demands are made on him, that the patient can become 'unstuck' and proceed to grow (Winnicott, cited in Goldman 1993).

In the therapeutic relationship it is important for the therapist to allow for the patient to give signals according to his needs. Being too readily there with an 'understanding' of the patient's needs, will foster an inability in the patient to gain control. It is necessary for the therapist to fail the patient little by little, and in doing so, place the world before the patient. Therefore the patient can be allowed to move from dependence to independence, when intellectual understanding can be tolerated. The holding environment is important to allow for regression and dependence, but it does not imply that the psychotherapist must be unnecessarily gratifying. The important role of interpretation, at the appropriate time, must not be denied. As Winnicott says, interpretation can be a good hold (Winnicott, 1971/1993).

Winnicott expands his view of the mother as a mirror to encompass the mirror role of the whole family. He claims that as the child develops, the child becomes less and less dependent on reclaiming the self from the mother and the father's face, and from siblings. However, if a family is intact, each child derives benefit from being able to see himself in the attitudes of the individual members, or in the attitudes of the family as a whole (Winnicott, 1971/1988). It can assumed that Winnicott had in mind a relative healthy functional family unit in his use of the word intact.
4.3.2 From Unintegration to Integration

Winnicott has provided a powerful account of the development of the self out of this relational matrix which comprises the mother and the family. Almost all his contributions centre on what he depicts as the continually hazardous struggle of the self for an individuated existence, which at the same time allows for intimate contact with others. His key interest is the delicate and intricate dialectic between contact and differentiation.

The infant starts its life in a state of unintegration, "an immature being who is all the time on the brink of unthinkable anxiety" (Winnicott, 1962/1984: 57). The infant strives for the establishment of a 'unit self'. This requires the ego to move from an unintegrated state, to a state of structured integration. Integration covers almost all the developmental tasks (Winnicott, 1967/1986).

How does the child manage this hazardous journey from unintegration to integration? Greenberg and Mitchell (1983: 190) poses the questions:

"how does a child discover himself within the mother's care without losing himself to her? How can a child differentiate himself, yet retain maternal resources? How can one communicate without being depleted, be seen without being appropriated, be touched without being exploited. How can one preserve a personal core without becoming isolated?"

In answer to these questions the mother's ego coverage plays a cardinal role. Ego-coverage refers to the supportive function of the mother in her relationship with the child during his journey to integration. If the ego-coverage given by the mother is good enough it enables the infant to "build up a personality on the pattern of going-on-being." (Winnicott, 1962/1984: 60). Should the infant not have this person to gather its bits together, it starts with a handicap in its own self-integrating task. "All failures bring about a reaction of the infant, and this reaction cuts across the-going-on-being." (Winnicott, 1962/1984: 60). Anxiety (unthinkable anxiety) in this early stage, relates to the threat of annihilation. The alternative to being is reacting and reacting interrupts being and annihilates. If these impingements, or
rather the infants reaction to these, are persistent, a pattern of fragmentation of being is set into motion.

An important aspect of the mother's task here is her ability to tolerate the infant's aggression. Before integration the infant is ruthless and unconcerned. He is not yet able to realise that he destroys in excitement the very thing he loves in restful periods. Here aggression is seen as a part of love. If aggression is lost at this stage through the mother not being able to let herself be used as an object for the infant's rage, there will be some degree of loss in the capacity to love. This aggression drives the infant to a not-me, an object external to himself which assists the infant in the process of integration and object relating. (Winnicott, 1950/1992). One could postulate that, should the capacity to love be lost, it will have devastating consequences for future object relations, which in turn will lead to the experience of loneliness.

The mother's task is to guide the child towards object relating. "Object relating is something the maturational process drives the baby to achieve, but cannot happen unless the world is presented to the baby well enough." (Winnicott, 1967/1986: 30). Therefore, the mother does not only create a holding environment for the child, she also brings the world to the child. The adapting mother presents the world in such a way, that the baby starts with a ration of the experience of omnipotence, which is the basis for the baby coming to terms later with the reality principle (Winnicott, 1967/1986). However, the infant meets with the reality principle now and then, and not all at once. Winnicott (1962/1984: 62) claims the initiation of object relating to be complex and explains the process as follows:

"It cannot take place except by the environmental provision of object-presenting, done in such a way that the baby creates the object. The pattern is thus: the baby develops a vague expectation that has origin in an unformulated need. The adaptive mother presents an object or a manipulation that meets the baby's needs, and so the baby begins to need just that which the mother presents. In this way the baby comes to feel confident in being able to create objects and to create the actual world. The mother gives the baby a brief period in which omnipotence is a matter of experience."
It is a paradox: the baby creates the object but the object is already there, otherwise he would not have created it. This paradox must be accepted according to Winnicott and not resolved. This is crucial for the healthy development of the child (Winnicott, 1962/1984).

The infant changes from having a relationship with a subjectively conceived object, to having a relationship with an object perceived as 'not me'. The infant evolves from being merged with the mother, to being separate from her, and this is related to the phase of 'living with'. The infant now enters a stage of concern and the capacity to feel guilty, because he realises that he is damaging the loved person. This implies ego integration in the sense that the infant is able to see the object as separate from himself. Winnicott (1971/1988: 206) states:

"The individual's ego integration is sufficient for him to appreciate the personality of the mother figure, and this has the tremendously important result that he is concerned as to the results of his instinctual experience, physical and ideational."

The infant now starts the lifelong task of managing its inner world. The infant can distinguish what is inside and what is external, actual as well as its own fantasy (Winnicott, 1950/1992; 1971/1988).

Furthermore, the mother must assist in the child's task to establish a satisfactory working arrangement between the psyche and the soma. Winnicott terms this personalisation as a kind of positive form of depersonalisation. The physical part of infant care, for example, touching, bathing, feeding is designed to help the infant in this task. "The self finds itself naturally placed inside the body, but may in certain circumstances become dissociated from the body or the body from it." (Winnicott, 1972/1996: 525). This dissociation is as a result of maternal failure. He claims that in health, the use of the body and all its function, is enjoyable for the individual (Winnicott, 1950/1992; 1967/1986; 1972/1996)

In conclusion Winnicott terms three trends in early ego development which he matches with three aspects of infant and child care, which are described next. Firstly, integration is the tendency towards the establishment of a unit self, in other words, the building up of a personality on the pattern of a continuity of 'going on being'. This process is linked to the holding environment and all it implies. Secondly, personalisation refers to a firm union
between ego and body, with the skin as the limiting membrane. This aspect of development is linked to the handling of the child by the care-givers. Thirdly, realisation refers to the child's ability to cope with reality, at which stage his ego is integrated enough to initiate object relating. Here he sees the mother's ability to present an object that meets the baby's needs as important (Winnicott, 1945/1992; 1962/1984).

During his journey to integration, the infant thus moves through various modes of dependence. The phase of absolute dependence exists where it cannot gain control, but can only go on being through its mother's ego-supportive function, or it suffers disturbance through lack thereof. This is the time of 'primary maternal preoccupation. Not only is the infant in a dependent state, but so is the mother, which Winnicott termed absolute dependence. If the mother is at this stage unable to perform her task of protecting her infant's going-on-being, it interferes with the infant's natural tendency to become an integrated self with a past, present, and future. This development of a sense of time is a necessary ingredient for mastering the repetitive losses that must be endured in the course of living. Eventually, the mother must gradually fail the child in order to give the infant reason for anger. If this is not allowed, the infant will be unable to fuse aggression with loving. If all is well, the reward is that the child's development is not distorted and moves to a state of relative dependence (Winnicott, 1963/1984a).

During the phase of relative dependence the child becomes aware of what he needs from maternal care and can then, to a growing extent, relate it to personal impulses. Should the mother be away for a moment, beyond the timespan of his capacity to believe in her survival, anxiety appears. The child becomes aware that he is dependent on his mother and can understand this cognitively (Winnicott, 1963/1984a).

The infant now moves towards independence. It can now do without care (maternal preoccupation). The child is able to begin to give things up, to throw them away (weaning age). The infant now has developed a sense of time which is a prerequisite for the appreciation of the difference between fact and fantasy. This is the depressive position, or as Winnicott called it, the stage of concern. During this process there has been the accumulation of memories of care, the projection of personal needs, and the introjection of care details. If these were 'good enough', the child will develop confidence in the
environment and his reaction to loss will be grief and sadness. Intellectual understanding and its implications now emerge (Winnicott, 1963/1984a; 1963/1984b; 1971/1988).

This does not imply that the infant now does not need care from its environment, only that the care becomes both more and less. Maternal preoccupation is no longer necessary and others in the child's environment will play a significant role in the child's care, that is 'living with' others. Winnicott (1972/1996: 525) explains:

"The relationship between the boy or girl with his or her own internal psychic organisation becomes modified according to the expectations that are displayed by the father and the mother and those who have become significant in the external life of the individual."

The child has now grown and continues to grow from dependence and immaturity to independence. The child now has the capacity to identify with mature love objects without the loss of his individual identity. By this nature the person will be able to enter into meaningful relations with others which will in turn alleviate loneliness.

4.3.3 Failure of Environmental Provisions

What happens when the baby does not see itself in the mother's eyes, but sees reflected there the mother's own mood, or worse still, her defences? What if the mother cannot 'put aside' her own needs, to enable her to resonate with the needs of her baby? Winnicott claims the consequence to the infant, to be the atrophying of his creative ability and he must find other ways of getting something for himself from the environment. The baby sees his mother's face which is not a mirror. The mother's mood dominates, and the baby learns that his personal needs must be withdrawn, otherwise his central self will suffer. This failure thus undercuts the child's sense of hallucinatory omnipotence and constricts his belief in his creativity and powers. It drives a wedge between the evolution of the psyche and its somatic underpinnings (Winnicott, 1967/1988; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

It must clarified that Winnicott did not refer to the satisfaction of instincts when he referred to the meeting of the infant's needs. He explains as follows:

"In the area that I am examining the instincts are not yet clearly defined as internal to the infant. The instinct can be as much external as can a clap of
thunder or a hit. The infant's ego is building up strength and in consequence is getting towards a state in which id demands will be felt as part of the self, and not as environmental. When this development occurs, then id satisfaction becomes a very important strengthener of the ego, or of the True Self; but id excitements can be traumatic when the ego is not yet able to integrate them, and not yet able to contain the risks involved and the frustrations experienced up to the point when id-satisfaction becomes a fact" (Winnicott, 1960/1984b: 141).

Therefore, should the infant be forced to integrate id-excitements before it is ready, it will have crippling consequences for the infant's ego development. This leads to distortions of the ego-organisation which lay down the basis for schizoid characteristics, or the development of a self which takes over its own care to compensate for the mother's failure. Precocious development, leading to the organisation of a personality that is false, will be discussed in more detail later.

Mirroring and impingements play an important role in the psychotherapeutic process. The psychotherapist should allow for the patient's intolerable feelings and simply mirror them, not 'act' out on them. Acting out will constitute impingement on the patient which will hamper his going-on-being, and will lead to him reacting to the therapist's failure by reverting to previous dysfunctional behaviour.

4.3.4 Too Good-mothering

Winnicott's recognition of the danger of the too-good mother is not often quoted, but it seems that the implications for the child's development are important and warrant mention. He speaks of the mother who adapts to a baby's desires too well, beyond the first few months. The mother does not wait for the child to signal his needs, and the child has no means of gaining control. This leads, either to a permanent state of regression, or merger with the mother, or a total rejection of her. The infant actually gains from experiencing frustration and this enables it to make objects real. It is the mother's task to disillusion the baby gradually in order for him to distinguish the 'not me' from the 'me'. This is where Winnicott believes the too good mother fails in her task. (Hopkins, 1996; Winnicott 1960/1984a).
Hopkins (1996) assumes that this must lead to emotional alienation from the mother manifesting in the inability to turn to her in times of distress, and an inability to confide in her. If a child is not allowed to be frustrated, how can it disclose distress. Furthermore 'too good-mothering' may lead to permanent regression and merger. The mother-infant couple needs to balance the infant's experience after the first three months between satisfaction and frustration, as well as separation and merger.

The implications of this for therapy could be profound. Should the psychotherapist be a too-good mother he might hamper patient's emergence from a state of dependence and/or regression in the therapeutic alliance. Furthermore, the person entering the consulting room usually finds himself there because of 'difficult to bear feeling states'. The symptoms of these can vary from severe pathologies, to more day to day feelings of depression, boredom, meaninglessness, anxiety, anger, and many others. The psychotherapist must be able to hold these initially, but must eventually bring them to the patient's awareness. In other words, these feelings must be tolerated and not denied. The patient must not be reassured in order to make these feelings more bearable for both therapist and patient.

Winnicott saw in the very vulnerability of man, his true potential for relating to others. This relating is due to need and desire, and not merely for the autonomous gratification of compelling id impulses through the complicity with others. Therefore, to develop a healthy self the infant is dependent on the environmental provisions afforded by the primary care giver, in early infancy comprising a holding environment, a precise reflection of the mirror functioning, and the careful process of disillusion of the infant through maternal failure.

However, what will be the outcome if the environmental provisions fail the child and the ego-supportive function of the mother is inadequate?

4.3.5 Precocious development and the emergence of the False Self.

According to Winnicott the True Self is the vital core of he personality. He holds that the True Self is ultimately unknowable. It is the secret, sacred, inviolable centre of our being. He claims that the lack of contact with others, as well as total accessibility to others, pose grave
dangers for the survival of the Self. The private isolate core must be afforded the privacy it needs for survival. Eigen (1996: 81) puts it as follows: "The sin against self is the communication with the core of cores, the self beyond reach, the self that is essentially private, one's psychic heartbeat". Everything revolves around, grows out of, guards and extends this still, quiet centre. It is immune from the reality principle and forever silent. Here communication is non-verbal and absolutely personal. "It belongs to being alive. And in health, it is out of this that communication naturally arises" (Winnicott, 1963/1993: 38).

Winnicott's view on the inviolate core of Self needs further clarification. He claims that: "Although healthy persons communicate and enjoy communicating, the other fact is equally true, that each individual is an isolate, permanently non-communicating, permanently unknown, in fact unfound. The question is: how to be isolated without being insulated?" (Winnicott, 1963/1993: 33).

It could be postulated that the core is as Eigen (1996) says 'the core of cores'. This could mean that it is only a small part of the Self that must stay private and in so doing communication from the True Self will evolve, when it is ready, in order for it to be creative and spontaneous, and not to be atrophied.

Winnicott (1971/1988) explains the implications for the infant's ego development should it experience its environment as threatening. Any impingement on this isolation of the True Self constitute major anxiety, and defences are now brought into play to ward off the impingements which might disturb this isolation. Impingements at this stage constitute claims from the outside world on the infant before it is ready. Winnicott depicts an image of the child establishing a private self that is not communicating but at the same time wanting to communicate. "It is a sophisticated game of hide and seek in which it is a joy to be hidden but a disaster not to be found." (Winnicott, 1963/1993: 32). According to him defences are strengthened against being found before being there to be found. He claims that, that which is truly personal and feels real must be defended, at all costs, even in the face of compromise.

During the development of the True Self, the holding environment is essential. If the good-enough mother repeatedly meets the infant's omnipotence and to some extent make sense of it the True Self evolves. Winnicott explains that ideally the True Self, nurtured in a non-
impinging environment represents "the inherited potential which is experiencing a continuity of being, and acquiring in its own way at its own speed a personal psychic reality and a personal body scheme." (Winnicott, 1960/1984a: 46).

The alternative to 'being' is reacting. Reacting on the other hand interrupts 'being' and annihilates, so the infant must choose between 'being' and annihilation. Should the holding environment not be good-enough and the mother's own defences interfere with the way of 'being', the child must react to his environment. Persistent maternal failure to provide a holding environment, for the infant, thus leads to fragmentation of the infant's experience and to it precociously taking over its self care. The child now turns away from the mother and into himself, leaving the False Self to comply with the demands of his environment. This results in a split between the True Self which becomes detached and atrophied and the False Self. The False Self becomes an illusion of a personal existence based on compliant adaptation to external demands and expectations, rather than as a spontaneous expression of the infants real self. The False Self covertly protects the True Self. As Winnicott phrases it "The True Self has been traumatised and it must never be found and wounded again" (Winnicott, 1967/1986: 33).

When a child feels his going-on-being to be so threatened by environmental impingements, the only way to survive is to become exactly that which the external environment wants it to be. Although parents in modern Western society are sophisticated in their knowledge of child rearing, they are also competitive. Their children must be as good as, or better than others, regardless of the cost to the child. The only way for the child to behave is to comply, and to become the 'good', 'clever', 'sporty', 'pretty' one.

Once the False Self is firmly in place, it draws on cognitive functions in its anticipation of, and reactions to, environmental impingements, resulting in an overactivity of mind and a separation of the cognitive processes from the affective or somatic grounding. The affective, and linked to that, its somatic underpinnings, goes into hiding. Intellect takes over. A patient once described this way of being as only existing in the top of her head. Winnicott (1967/1986) claims that society is easily taken in by the False Self organisation, and has to pay heavily for it. Functioning in the mode of the False Self often leads to academic and occupational success, but over time the person experiences himself as bored, detached and
lacking in spontaneity. Occupational success is often 'not owned', and the person lives in fear of being caught out. Although the False Self is a successful defence, it is not an aspect of health (Ogden, 1992; Winnicott, 1967/1986).

Winnicott (1960/1984b) classifies the False Self organisations according to its defensive nature as follows: at one extreme there is the False Self presenting as real, in all living relationships, while the True Self is hidden. Less extreme in nature is when the False Self defends the True Self, but the True Self is allowed a hidden life and its potential is acknowledged. Even more towards health is the True Self which evolves at a risk, and the False Self's main concern is to find conditions which will make this possible. More towards health is when the False Self is built on identifications, which is normal in adolescence. In health, the False Self gains and maintains a place in society (that is, it fits in with social expectations) which the True self can never achieve on its own.

Winnicott (1963/1993) claims that the False Self's communication with the world does not feel real, and therefore is not a true communication. It can be postulated that this often leads to a dreaded experience of loneliness as the True Self never communicates. The personality is, as Alice Miller (1987) puts it, an "as if" personality. This, in turn, leads to feelings of disconnectedness with others which results in the isolation and alienation of self. The fear of annihilation of the True Self evokes anxiety, and this anxiety is often one of the symptoms patients present with in the psychotherapist's consulting room. It can manifest itself in frenzied daily activity, which is the only way in which the person knows to make himself feel real. The person may do continual 'good', without questioning his own needs and desires. He has learnt that own needs are not allowed, and the person stays in service of the needs of others.

Premature interpretations in the psychotherapeutic relationship can be experienced by the patient as impingement, forcing him to develop at somebody else's pace and according to somebody else's understanding of him. This can play into the hand of the False Self and affirm to the patient that this is the only way of relating. The True Self must be given a chance to enter into the dialogue without the fear of being traumatised yet again.
However, personhood according to Winnicott, is fragile and there is always tension between subjective experience and objective reality. According to him it does not matter how successfully one negotiates this fear of exploitation of the True Self. It persists as the deepest dread, and therefore remains as a self that is non-communicating, and the personal core of the self is truly isolate (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). This must be respected in the consulting room. The patient must be allowed to preserve his personal core, without demands from the psychotherapist on the patient to make himself totally accessible to the therapist. Should the psychotherapeutic environment seem threatening to the patient, the patient will most likely turn back into himself, which will strengthen the False Self defence.

Although this isolation and alienation from the self leaves the individual in the despair of loneliness, Winnicott provides hope when he says that a person can acquire the ability to be alone and to accept his loneliness under certain conditions.

4.3.6 On the ability to be alone

Erlich (1998: 136) states as follows:

"psychoanalytic treatment of loneliness, more often than not, is negatively defined or is characterised as the absence of a positive, either the lack of presence of the other, or the incapacity to tolerate this absence and be alone".

Winnicott, however, looked at the aloneness of the individual in a novel way. According to him psycho-analytic literature gave credence to the fear of being alone and the wish to be alone. He poses a question about the ability to be alone. He thus addresses the positive aspects of being alone which leads one to an understanding, of why people cannot tolerate the lonely state, and of what has to be done, to open up this experience for the human being (Winnicott, 1958/1984).

Winnicott (1958/1984) claims that this capacity to be alone is one of the most important signs of maturity in emotional development, and is a highly sophisticated phenomenon. He states that when a person can say "I am alone", integration is a fact. In the psychotherapeutic alliance it presupposes the ability to tolerate silence. Furthermore the infant's relationship to the mother, which he terms ego-relatedness, is of immense value for
the development of the capacity to be alone. He puts it as follows: "I attach a great
importance to this relationship, as I consider that it is the stuff out of which friendship is
made. It may turn out to be the matrix of transference." (Winnicott, 1958/1984: 33).

Although this capacity to be alone presupposes a certain sophistication, the infant can be
alone at a very early age, in the presence of another. Here, the ego immaturity is naturally
balanced by ego support from the mother. He suggests that it is extremely important for the
mother, not only to shape the world to the infant's demands, but also to provide a non-
demanding presence when the infant is not making demands or experiencing needs. This is
a holding environment resonating with the child's needs. It enables the infant to experience
needlessness and complete unintegration, a state of "going on being" out of which needs
and spontaneous gestures emerge. The mother's non-demanding presence makes this
experience of formlessness and comfortable solitude, possible. A relative freedom of
persecutory anxiety exists, and good internal objects are in the person's personal inner
world, and available for projection at a suitable moment. This capacity becomes a central
feature in the development of a stable and personal self. It is thus a paradox: it is an
experience of being alone while somebody else is present but undemanding (Greenberg &

The child can only tolerate being alone, or his loneliness, within the safe knowledge that the
mother is present. Winnicott therefore, not only humanises aloneness, but renders it an ego-
related experience positively involving the other person. However, should the mother fail
here in her task, the child will probably develop a dread of being alone, and therefore a
dread of loneliness.

In the consulting room it is often necessary for the psychotherapist to fulfil this ego
supportive function. It also presupposes the ability to tolerate silence, to allow the patient to
be without any demands made on him.

Winnicott makes use of the concept of transitional space to clarify the evolving child's move
from total dependence, to relative independence. Here inner reality, as well as external life,
plays a role.
4.3.7 Transitional objects and transitional space

Winnicott regards the formation of "transitional objects" as another aspect of the larger process entailing the development of the person. Transitional phenomena refer to developmental "in betweenness" of the hallucinatory omnipotence and the recognition of objective reality. Winnicott perceives this transitional area as:

"the third part of life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, it is an intermediate area of experiencing to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting place for the individual engaged in the perpetual task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated" (Winnicott, 1971/1988: 3).

As an infant emerges it moves from a state of illusory omnipotence in which it, through the mother's facilitation, feels it creates and controls the world it lives in. The infant evolves to a state of objective perception in which it becomes aware that its powers are limited, and that others exist independent of him. At this stage the infant can use symbolism and can distinguish between fantasy and fact, as well as between internal and external objects. The infant uses the transitional space to move from the purely subjective, to the objective (Winnicott, 1971/1988)

Winnicott contrasts these two states as solipsistic subjectivity and objective perception, the inner world with the world of outer reality. The relations with transitional objects constitutes a transitional realm. Winnicott refers to it as a period of hesitation, between these two states. Movement between these two states are not linear as both children and adults vacillate between them (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Eigen, 1996; Winnicott, 1971/1988).

The transitional object is not under magical control nor outside control and the origin and nature of it must not be questioned. Transitional objects are important for what they are as well as for what they are not. They are not the mother or the self, but feelings of mother and self are invested in them. It is not the first object of object relationships, but rather the first possession and the intermediate area between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived (Winnicott, 1971/1988).
According to Winnicott there are special qualities to the infants relationship with the object. The infant assumes a right over the object which he can affectionately cuddle, handle, abuse, lose or rediscover. The object must not change, unless the infant changes it, and it must survive instinctual loving, hating and perhaps aggression. It must show a reality of its own but is not from the inside, nor from the outside, and becomes decathected with time. Its thingness is not important, only that it helps the child to sustain the growing inner reality and helps it to differentiate it from the outer world (Eigen, 1996; Winnicott, 1971/1988).

The parent who understands this, allocates the object to neither of the two realms, and does not question the baby's right and privileges he created over the transitional object. Due to the ambiguous and paradoxical status of the transitional object, it helps the baby to negotiate the gradual shift, from the experience of himself as the centre of a totally subjective world, to himself as a person amongst other persons. Transitional experience is not only a developmental interlude but remains a highly valuable realm within the adult experience. It allows the child to play, and the adult to play with his fantasies, without the threat of being lost in the totally subjective solipsistic realm (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Winnicott, 1971/1988).

In the transitional experience, access is maintained to the most private wellspring of thoughts and imagery without one being held accountable for them in the clear harsh light of objective reality (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). A transitional space must be made available in the psychotherapeutic situation, to allow for the patient to move from a solipsistic realm of self, into the realm of fulfilling object relations. It is the transitional space which allows the patient to 'play' in the consulting room.

4.3.8 Object relating and Object-usage

In later writings Winnicott highlights another feature of the emergence of the person. He distinguishes between "object relating" and "object-usage", in his understanding of the function of aggression and destruction in the process of separation.
Object relating is defined as subjective, projective experiencing in which the other is under the infant's illusionary control. Object-usage on the other hand is the perception of and interaction with the other, as independent, real and outside the infant's control. The infant reacts against a sense of unreality. It needs to break out of its fantasy world, with rage and fury. Now everything depends on the object's reaction. If it survives, it brings forth a new sense of realness. The infant can now really use another for its true growth. He does not have to falsify himself. According to Winnicott, for object usage to occur, object relating must already be established (Slochower, 1994; Winnicott, 1971/1988).

Winnicott examines that which makes the transition possible. Again a paradox is involved: the child destroys the object because he has experienced it as separate and outside his subjective control. The child places the object outside his omnipotent control because he is aware of having destroyed it. Thus the child uses and destroys the object because it has become real and the object becomes real, because he has destroyed it. The survival of the object is crucial. The object is there to receive the communication that it has been destroyed. In other words, to use an object, there must be an external object which allows itself to be used. In this way, the child moves to that which is external to himself and is part of the change to the reality principle. Obviously for this maturational process to happen a facilitating environment is crucial. The mother's non-retaliatory durability allows the infant the experience of unconcerned 'usage' which in turn helps him in creating the belief that others outside his omnipotent control are resilient (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Winnicott, 1971/1988).

In the psychotherapeutic alliance the psychotherapist must frequently allow the patient to use him as an object, whether the use is destructive, aggressive, or loving. The therapist's resilience to withstand these attacks, without retaliation, will play a major role in the process which allows the patient to relate to the therapist.

In summary: Winnicott's basic hypothesis, namely, good-enough environmental provisions, and most importantly the mother's holding function, are critical for the infant's optimal development. The mother's failure to provide the infant with a good-enough holding environment, induces pressure on the relatively mature child, as well as the adult, to correct the imbalances and dissociations in ego-integration. If the mother is unable to regulate, both
external and internal stimuli, it will impinge on the infant. These impingements on the developing child are disruptive of true ego-integration and lead to premature defensive organisation and functioning. The development of the False Self is one result of these failures in the caretaking environment.

The central themes of Winnicott's work are usually presented in the form of thought-provoking paradoxes. These are not tightly reasoned, but more in the way of discussions, and reflects his idiosyncratic thought processes. Khan (1975/1992), one of his most faithful followers, describes his style as "cryptic". It can be said that Winnicott's formulations allow themselves to be taken in many directions. However, he placed great importance on 'feeling free', and his formulations always have in mind growth and freedom for the self. Winnicott has been criticised for being vague, but, as Eigen (1996: 70) puts it: "vague but usable". This becomes apparent when one realises that his theory does not lend itself to the concreteness of linear reading. Another of his concepts, which is open for criticism, is that of the incommunicado core of self. Guntrip asks, how a self which is dependent on a relational matrix for its development, can have that which is most precious to it, outside the range of human communication (Eigen, 1996).

Notwithstanding, it is a theory that seeks understanding of the development of the self in a creative way. He himself claimed that he did not want to be tied down to his own terms, that he wished to use them flexibly. There is no dogmatism in his approach. He believed in personal freedom.

4.4 MASSUD KHAN - CUMULATIVE TRAUMA

The question can be asked how Winnicott's theory can be related to the further development of the child. To assist in this Massud Khan's (a follower of Winnicott) views will be briefly examined. Khan (1986) coins the phrase, "cumulative trauma", for these impingements from the mother's failure in her role as a protective shield. According to him, a treacherous aspect of 'cumulative trauma' is that it operates and builds up silently throughout childhood into adolescence. These impingements do not necessarily mean gross failures but rather consistent failures over a period of time. He claims that this failure:
“tends to get organized into an active collusive relationship between mother and child in the late oral, early anal and phallic phases - the phases where the emergent instinctual process and maturational ego-process test the mother with their full need and demand....the chief psychic process of such collusive relationship is identification... the phase at which the child himself acutely becomes aware of the distortive and disruptive effects of this collusive bond with the mother, is in adolescence. Then the reaction is dramatically rejective of the mother and all past cathexes of her, This, of course, makes the adolescent process of integration at once tortuous and impossible.” (Khan, 1986: 133).

Khan (1986: 135) further states that, although the infants ego is weak, vulnerable and extremely dependent on the mother’s role as protective shield, it would be remiss not to recognise the infant’s inherent resilience and strength. Although the ego can survive these impingements, and “mute the cumulative trauma into abeyance”, emerging to fairly healthy and normal functioning, it may break down in later life under acute stress and in crisis. One can assume that it is at this time, that the patient will enter the consulting room, and it is then that awareness of ‘cumulative trauma’ can be important in assisting in the journey towards growth.

4.5 CONCLUSION

Winnicott views can facilitate our understanding of the experienced phenomenon of loneliness. His views on the importance of an environment that is able to allow a child to develop to his full potential, emphasises the importance of one’s interrelatedness with others. In the event of this environment, in the form of parental provisions, not being available, the child cannot develop into an emotionally mature and authentic being who can relate to others. The development of a rigid False Self and the inability to be alone, are some of the consequences of this. The child feels alienated from himself which leads to loneliness, which is not recognised as disconnectedness between self and others, and is a cause of dread. Miller (1987: 15) calls this alienation from the self, “the True Self's 'solitary confinement' within the prison of the False Self”. This contrasts with a healthy narcissism which depicts an ideal case of a person who is genuinely alive, with free access to his True Self and authentic feelings.
The loneliness and desertion experienced in childhood foster a sense of abandonment. It even manifests where children are the pride of their parents. This "pride" however, is conditional and available only as long as the children adhere to the mould the parents have set for them. There is a sense of emptiness and self alienation that comes to the fore as soon as they feel they have failed. This accommodation to parental needs (Winnicott's False Self) is so ingrained in Western society that children often find it difficult to differentiate and/or to develop a True Self. The child's own real needs are not recognised and he only receives recognition and love when the False Self is presented. Alienation within the self and from others follows, and the person is lonely (Brice, 1984; Miller, 1987; Quinodoz, 1993).

It usually requires the therapeutic alliance to enable the person to grow into full personhood, and to live authentically in genuine dialogue with others without losing his separate being.

In the following chapter the convergence and divergence of the thoughts of Winnicott, Heidegger and Buber will be addressed